I have said that the unfounded claim of Texas to the territory between the Nueces and the Rio Norte, was the greatest impediment to peace. Of this there can be no doubt. For if, relinquishing the spirit of military conquest, nothing shall be required but the indemnities due to our citizens, the United States have only to accept the terms which have been offered by the Mexican Government. It consents to yield a territory five degrees of latitude, or near 350 miles in breadth, and extending from New Mexico to the Pacific. Although the greater part of this is quite worthless, yet the portion of California lying between the Sierra Neveda and the Pacific, and including the port of San Francisco, is certainly worth much more than the amount of indemnities justly due to our citizens. It is only in order to satisfy those claims, that an accession of territory may become necessary.

It is not believed that the Executive will favor the wild suggestions of a subjugation, or annexation of the whole of Mexico, or of any of its interior provinces. And, if I understand the terms offered by Mr. Trist, there was no intention to include within the cessions required, the Province of New Mexico. But the demand of both Old and New California, or of a sea-coast of more than thirteen hundred miles in length (lat. 23° to 42°), is extravagant and unnecessary. The Peninsula is altogether worthless, and there is nothing worth contending for South of San Diego, or about lat. 32°.

In saying that, if conquest is not the object of the war, and if the pretended claim of Texas to the Rio del Norte shall be abandoned, there cannot be any insuperable obstacle to the restoration of peace, it is by no means intended to assert that the terms heretofore proposed by either party are at this time proper. And I apprehend that the different views of the subject entertained by those who sincerely desire a speedy and just peace, may create some difficulty. There are some important considerations which may become the subject of subsequent arrangements. For the present, nothing more is strictly required than to adopt the principle of status ante bellum, or, in other words, to evacuate the Mexican territory, and to provide for the payment of the indemnities due to our citizens. The scruples of those who object to any cession whatever of territory, except on terms unacceptable to the Southern States, might be removed by a provision, that would only pledge a territory sufficient for the purpose, and leave it in the possession of the United States until the indemnities had been fully paid.

Was I to listen exclusively to my own feelings and opinions, I would say, that, if the propositions which I have attempted to establish are correct; if I am not mistaken in my sincere conviction, that the war was unprovoked by the Mexicans, and has been one of iniquitous aggression on our part; it necessarily follows that, according to the dictates of justice, the United States are bound to indemnify them, for having invaded their territory, bombarded their towns, and inflicted all the miseries of war on a people, who were fighting in defence of their own homes. If all this be true, the United States would give but an inadequate compensation for the injuries they have inflicted, by assuming the payment of the indemnities justly due to their own citizens.

Even if a fair purchase of territory should be convenient to both parties, it would be far preferable to postpone it for the present, among other reasons, in order that it should not have the appearance of being imposed on Mexico. There are also some important considerations, to which it may not be improper to call at this time the public attention.

Our population may at this time be assumed, as amounting to twenty millions. Although the ratio of natural increase has already been lessened, from thirty three to about thirty per cent in ten years, the deficiency has been, and will probably continue, for a while, to be compensated by the prodigious increase of immigration from foreign countries. An increase of thirty per cent, would add to our population six millions, within ten, and near fourteen millions in twenty years. At the rate of only twenty five per cent, it will add five millions in ten, and more than eleven millions in twenty years. That the fertile uncultivated land, within the limits of the States admitted, or immediately admissible in the Union, could sustain three times that number is indubitable. But the indomitable energy, the locomotive propensities, and all the habits of the settlers of new countries are such, that, not even the united efforts of both Governments can or will prevent their occupying within twenty if not within ten years, every district, as far as the Pacific, and whether within the limits of the United States or of Mexico, which shall not have previously been actually and bona fide occupied and settled by others. It may be said that this is justifiable by Natural Law; that, for the same reason, which sets aside the right of discovery, if not followed by actual occupation within a reasonable time, the rights of Spain and Mexico have been forfeited by their neglect, or inability, during a period of three hundred years, to colonize a country, which, during the whole of that period, they held undisputed by any other foreign nation. And it may perhaps be observed that, had the Government of the United States waited for the operation of natural and irresistible causes, these alone would have given them, without a war, more than they want at this moment.

However plausible all this may appear, it is nevertheless certain, that it will be an acquisition of territory for the benefit of the peo ple of the United States, and in violation of solemn treaties. Not only collisions must be avoided, and the renewal of another illicit annexation be prevented; but the two countries must coolly consider their relative position; and whatever portion of territory, not actually settled by the Mexicans, and of no real utility to them, they may be disposed to cede, must be acquired by a treaty freely assented to, and for a reasonable compensation. But this is not the time for the discussion of a proper final arrangement. We must wait till peace shall have been restored, and angry feelings shall have subsided. At present the only object is Peace, immediate peace, a just peace, and no acquisition of territory, but that which may be absolutely necessary for effecting the great object in view. The most simple terms, those which will only provide for the adjustment of the Texas boundary and for the payment of the indemnities due to our citizens, and, in every other respect, restore things as they stood before the beginning of hostilities, appear to me the most eligible. For that purpose I may be permitted to wish, that the discussion of the terms should not be embarrassed by the introduction of any other matter. There are other considerations, highly important, and not foreign to the great question of an extension of territory, but which may, without any inconvenience or commitment, be postponed, and should not be permitted to impede the immediate termination of this lamentable war.

I have gone farther than I intended. It is said that a rallying point is wanted by the friends of peace. Let them unite, boldly express their opinions, and use their utmost endeavors in promoting an immediate termination of the war. For the people, no other banner is necessary. But their representatives in Congress assembled are alone competent to ascertain, alone vested with the legitimate power of deciding what course should be pursued at this momentous crisis, what are the best means for carrying into effect their own views, whatever these may be. We may wait with hope and confidence the result of their deliberations.

I have tried, in this essay, to confine myself to the questions at issue between the United States and Mexico. Whether the Executive has, in any respect, exceeded his legitimate powers; whether he is, for any of his acts, liable to animadversion, are questions which do not concern Mexico.

There are certainly some doubtful assumptions of power, and some points on which explanations are necessary. The most important is the reason, which may have induced the President, when he considered the war as necessary and almost unavoidable, not to communicate to Congress, which was all that time in session, the important steps he had taken, till after hostilities, and indeed actual war had taken place. The substitution, for war contributions, of an arbitrary and varying tariff, appears to me to be of a doubtful nature; and it is hoped, that the subject will attract the early attention of Congress. I am also clearly of opinion, that the provisions of the law respecting volunteers, which authorizes them to elect their officers, is a direct violation of the constitution of the United States, which recognizes no other land force than the army and the militia, and which vests in the President and Senate the exclusive power of appointing all the officers of the United States, whose appointments are not otherwise provided for in the constitution itself. (With respect to precedents, refer to the act of July 6th, 1812, chap. 461, (cxxxviii.) enacted with due deliberation, and which repeals, in that respect, the act on same subject of February 6th, 1812.)