THE WAR HISTORY OF
THE 1st/4th BATTALION
THE LOYAL NORTH
LANCASHIRE REGIMENT

THE COLOURS

THE
WAR HISTORY
OF THE
1st/4th Battalion The Loyal North
Lancashire Regiment,
now The Loyal Regiment
(North Lancashire).
1914–1918

“The Lancashire foot were as stout men as were in the world and as brave plunderers as ever went to a field....

“It was to admiration to see what a spirit of courage and resolution there was amongst us, and how God hid us from the fears and dangers we were exposed to.”

Captain Hodgson, writing in 1648, on the Battle of Preston.

[COPYRIGHT]

1921

Printed by Geo. Toulmin & Sons, Ltd., Guardian Works, Preston.

Published by the Battalion History Committee.

Photo: A. Winter, Preston.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL RALPH HINDLE, D.S.O.

He commanded the Battalion from February, 1915, till wounded in action at Festubert, and again from August, 1915, till killed in action at Vaucellette Farm, on 30th November, 1917.

“What do these fellows mean by saying, ‘I’ve done my bit’? What is their ‘bit’? I don’t consider I’ve done mine yet.”—Lieutenant-Colonel Hindle in 1917.

Dedication.

To
The Main Body of our Comrades,
who have gone forward in triumph to
the Unknown Land,

We,
The Rear Party,
left behind to clean up and hand over,
Dedicate this book.

PREFACE

The purpose of this book is to supply to the people of Preston and district, for the first time, a complete and authentic record of the adventures of their original local Territorial Infantry Battalion during the Great War, such a record being a chapter of local history which must sooner or later be written; to put into the hands of the relatives and friends of those who have gloriously fallen the story of the unit with which they served faithful unto death, with its accompanying tribute from their surviving comrades; to supply to the latter ... maimed or whole a book which they may hand down to posterity to speak of their service; and last, but not least, to speak to those who shall succeed to our traditions, of Comradeship, Cheerfulness, Endurance, Devotion to Duty, and all the virtues which go to make up “the Spirit of the Regiment.”

The delay in publication has been unavoidable, and even now the book is not as complete as its compilers would wish; in particular, it is not possible to give the names of casualties as they occurred, except in the case of Officers; both Company and Battalion records have had to be destroyed again and again, and there is little material left to work on except the War Diary and individual diaries.

The book is a live product. Every line of it is either written by those who were actually with the Battalion during the period of which they write, or is condensed from the War Diary. It would have been far easier, and, from a literary point of view, more satisfactory, to have handed over the documents to a professional Historian to write up, but it was felt that the vivid descriptions of eyewitnesses, even though lacking in style, were preferable to any such compilation.

CONTENTS

ILLUSTRATIONS

MAPS

A Reduced Facsimile of the Roll of Volunteers for Service Abroad signed in the Public Hall, on 8th August, 1914

A Company  B Company  C Company

D Company  E Company  F Company

G Company  H Company

CHAPTER I.
Early History and Training in England.

The Loyal North Lancashire Regiment has a peculiar history, being descended from the old 47th, the Lanarkshire[A] Regiment, and the 81st, the Loyal Lincoln Volunteers.

In 1881, when these two Regiments were at their Depot at Preston, it was found convenient to amalgamate them, and they became the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the North Lancashire Regiment. The Lincolnshire men were not pleased at having to drop the epithet “Loyal” (conferred on them[B] in memory of an occasion during the Peninsular War when, on volunteers being told to step one pace forward, the entire Battalion moved forward one pace), and they placed their views before the War Office, with the result that the new formation was allowed to retain the epithet, and it became the Loyal North Lancashire Regiment. This little outline of its history explains why the 1st Battalion’s March-past is “My love is like a red, red rose,” generally known as the “Red Rose,” and the 2nd Battalion’s “The Lincolnshire Poacher.”

A Volunteer Rifle Corps was formed in Preston in 1859 as a consequence of the talked-of possibilities of a French invasion. This Corps continued in existence as a Volunteer Corps until the territorialisation of Regiments about the year 1878, when it became a Volunteer Battalion of the Loyal North Lancashire Regiment; later, on the formation of the Territorial Force it became the 4th (T.) Battalion of the same Regiment.

This Territorial Battalion succeeded to the traditions of the amalgamated units, and strove as best it might to emulate its Regular Battalions, but the Territorial scheme did not produce the full complement of officers and men, and it should be realised that those who served in it prior to the war did so in the face of a certain amount of ridicule, gave up nearly the whole of their spare time to camps and drills, and in most cases were seriously out of pocket over the whole business.

With the exception of a Company which was sent to South Africa to reinforce the Regular Battalion, the unit had not seen active service prior to August, 1914, but those who then belonged to it were keen, and had, in the face of discouragements, done their level best to master their job.

The beginning of August, 1914, found the Battalion, under strength in officers and men, in camp at Kirkby Lonsdale. When war was declared on the 4th of August, and the Territorial Force was embodied, the 4th were hurriedly recalled, and took up their quarters in the Public Hall, Preston. Within two or three days they had recruited to strength in all ranks, and had volunteered, practically to a man, for service abroad. Photographs of the original roll signed on that occasion will be found immediately preceding Chapter I.

That first fortnight in the Public Hall will never be forgotten by any of those who went through it. The Companies lived, ate, and slept on the floor, or on the benches in the gallery; the officers slept on the floor of one of the crush-rooms, and the whole business was a bit of a nightmare, but we were firmly under the impression at that time that any day might bring orders to go abroad, and we were kept fully equipped and issued with ammunition according to the mobilisation scale then in force.

On the 8th August, the Battalion paraded in the Market Square, Preston, and the colours were handed over to the Mayor for safe custody, no one at that time foreseeing that they would remain there for just on five years. A photograph of the colours appears as a frontispiece to this book: in the fulness of time, no doubt, the battle honours earned by the Battalion in the Great War will be embroidered upon them.

On the 22nd August, we moved down to Swindon, where the Battalion remained for nearly three months, billeted in schools, training, and generally improving discipline, but it was very difficult to get much real work done, as detachments were sent off to guard the main line of the Great Western Railway. These detachments, on the whole, had a pretty good time, as they were stationed at various places along the Thames Valley and the local people took a great interest in them, and were most hospitable. They learnt a good deal, especially in getting used to night sentry work, but no one was sorry when in November they were recalled and the Battalion moved as a whole to Sevenoaks.

Here we were allotted good training grounds and serious training was possible. Though the nature of the billets, mostly empty houses, threw us much on our own resources, it had the advantage that we began to learn to make ourselves comfortable under any circumstances.

We spent Christmas here, and had a very elaborate Christmas dinner, followed by a really good concert, in a large marquee provided by the generosity of one of the inhabitants. We found many hospitable folk at Sevenoaks, and made many friends.

The two King’s Own Battalions and the 5th Battalion of the Loyal North Lancashire Regiment were also billeted at the same place, and there was a good deal of unavoidable overcrowding. Up to this time we had been the only 4th Battalion, but in November, 1914, an order was issued that 2nd Line Territorial Battalions should be formed, for Home Service only, to find drafts for the 1st Line Battalions, and we took the title 1/4th, to distinguish ourselves from the 2/4th, then in process of formation at Blackpool. The latter was later on—early in 1916—sent overseas, and served in France and Belgium in the 57th Division.

About February, 1915, the 1/4th, which had previously been worked on the eight-company organisation, with a Captain, two Subalterns, and a Colour-Sergeant to each Company, was reorganised in accordance with a War Office Order on the four company system. This system had been in operation in the Regular Army for some time prior to the war; why it had not previously been applied to the Territorial Force we never knew, and only surmised that it had been on its trial until the change was actually made.

February, 1915, will always be regarded as the turning point in our history. Major Hindle, then Junior Major, was promoted Lieutenant-Colonel and given command of the unit. A severe process of weeding out started, coupled with vigorous inoculation and vaccination, and we commenced to train in accordance with the new War Office syllabus of training. We trained very hard, but everybody was becoming restive. It is not too much to say that we had daily been expecting to be sent abroad ever since the previous August, and by this time we were beginning to think that we should never go. In consequence there was much muttering, which was not allayed when we saw the 1/5th Loyal North Lancashires hand in their blankets one morning, and parade for France.

In March, 1915, we were suddenly moved to Oxted, where we were billeted in empty houses. There we began to dig, and completed, to the satisfaction of those who were in charge, a section of the London Defences running over the Downs. This was excellent experience, as there was every kind of soil to be contended with—clay, chalk, sand, and a sort of conglomerate, composed of what seemed to be melted flints, which blunted any pick in about five minutes. Here we first came into contact with elements of Kitchener’s Army, which were engaged on similar work.

In April, 1915, it was suddenly made known that at last we really were going to France, and we were moved to Bedford, where we joined the 51st Highland Division. The ten days at Bedford were spent in completely re-equipping the Battalion and transport, and in bayonet fighting and route marching, our last route march before crossing to France being one of 18 miles in full pack.

The Lancashire men and the Highlanders fought like anything when they first met, and a keen rivalry sprang up between them, which only became friendly when one evening a fight took place between one of our fellows and one of the Highlanders. It was reported amongst us that our man had won. Probably a similar report was current amongst the Highlanders with regard to their champion! Whatever the truth was, from that day we settled down together and became the best of friends.

It has been impossible to devote very much space to these early days in England. Everyone was as keen as mustard, and we had the advantage of having, besides our Regular Adjutant Captain Norman (Royal Welsh Fusiliers), and Sergeant-Major Farnworth (of the 1st Battalion), a number of senior Officers who had made soldiering their hobby for years and passed the examinations necessary to attain their rank. The Warrant Officers and many of the Non-Commissioned Officers were also thoroughly trained. The disadvantages under which we laboured were that, being a Territorial unit, our equipment had not been up to date, and we were not, at first at any rate, taken in hand and pushed on as the newly-formed Kitchener’s Army were; but there is no doubt that at Bedford, when at last we were under orders for overseas, we held our heads high, and in all the glory of a new issue of equipment and clothes were on the whole a pretty smart and likely looking lot. It is most unfortunate that the only photographs taken of Companies at Bedford are not now available, the films having been destroyed by fire. Two Officers and a number of men had been left at Oxted, and one can never forget the pitiful disappointment shown on their faces as we marched away, leaving them behind. Some of them afterwards came to us as reinforcements.

Elliott & Fry.

OFFICERS GROUP.

Bedford, 1915.

CHAPTER II.
Early Days and the Battle of Festubert.

On the 2nd of May, 1915, Major Foley, Second Lieutenant Harris (Transport Officer), the Machine Gun Officer, and 104 other ranks and the whole of the Regimental Transport, entrained at BALLAST PIT SIDING, BEDFORD, at one o’clock in the morning, arriving at SOUTHAMPTON at 6 40 a.m., where they embarked on s.s. “ROSSETTI” and sailed at 4 30 p.m., arriving at HAVRE at 3 a.m. on the 3rd.

On the evening of that day, the rest of the Battalion entrained at BALLAST PIT SIDING in two trains, and travelled down to FOLKESTONE, where they arrived about midnight, and marched straight down on to the boat, s.s. “ONWARD,” which cast off at 1 30 a.m.

At last we were really on our way, after all the delays and waitings we were going overseas like the rest! And it had all been done so quickly that only now, as we stood on the darkened boat and watched the lights of England receding, did we begin to realise what it meant—this stealthy journey of nearly a thousand souls across the Channel, which many of us had never seen before, and which many were never to see again.

The Adjutant’s diary gives our strength (apart from the Advance Party) as follows:—

Lieut.-Colonel R. Hindle.

Captain and Adjutant C. C. Norman (R. Welsh Fusiliers.)

Captains Nickson, Booth, Hibbert, Peak, Whitfield, Crump, H. Parker, Widdows.

Lieutenants Ord (Signalling Officer), Smith, Rennard, Brindle, Moore, Gregson, Duckworth.

Second Lieutenants Houghton, Davies, Lindsay, Rogerson, P. Parker, Bryce-Smith, Craven.

Lieutenant and Quartermaster F. W. Baker.

Captain Derham (R.A.M.C.).

Rev. Powell, C. of E. Chaplain.

And 895 W.O.’s, N.C.O.’s, and Men.

The total strength of the Battalion on this date was (including attached) 31 Officers and 1,003 other Ranks.

No smoking or talking was allowed on deck during the passage, which was calm and without incident, and the boat drew alongside at BOULOGNE about 3 a.m., where we at once disembarked and marched about two miles to a canvas rest camp at OSTROHOVE. How strange everything looked in the early morning light, as we swung along against our instincts on the right-hand side of the pavé road, the French signs with which we grew so familiar later on, the grilles in the front doors, the smells!

On arrival at the camp we were soon told off to our tents, where we slept till eight, when we had breakfast. After breakfast most of us sent off our first Field Postcards to the folks at home, and cleaned up. We stayed in camp all day, resting and sunning ourselves, parading again at 6 30 p.m., when we marched to PONT DE BRIQUES Station, where we formed up in groups of 40 and waited for the train, which soon arrived from HAVRE with the Transport. Cattle trucks! However, we entrained, about 40 to a truck, and presently jolted off; we spent a very uncomfortable night!

On 5th May, about 2 30 a.m., we arrived at BERGUETTE, where we detrained and at 4 a.m. started to march to LILETTE, led by a “guide” who took us about two miles out of our way—a serious matter, on empty stomachs, to us who were still fresh from “the fleshpots of Egypt”; however, we got there, and went into billets of sorts, many preferring to sleep in the open, so villainously dirty were some of the outhouses. Here we found the 1/8th King’s Liverpools, the 1/4th King’s Own and Brigade Headquarters being at neighbouring places. All day and all night an almost continuous stream of motor vehicles went through, mostly laden with French troops in their picturesque blue and red. Battalion Headquarters was “chez M. Rousseau,” and the Officers’ Mess in a small estaminet. As we rested that day, we heard the distant guns for the first time, booming intermittently the whole day through.

On the 6th, about 7 15 p.m., we received orders to move, and marched out at 8 p.m. to LILLERS, where we joined the rear of the Brigade at 2 47 p.m. Here began the worst march that any of us remember, over strange uneven roads, in pitch darkness. To us, marching in rear of the whole Brigade, it seemed interminable; halts were irregular, and by the time “ten minutes’ halt” came along to us it was time to move again, and it was impossible to maintain a steady pace. Added to this someone had seen fit to billet from the front of the column instead of the rear, which held us up at each billeting village and prolonged the march considerably. The last mile nearly finished us, but we stumbled into CALONNE-SUR-LE-LYS at 4 a.m.—dead beat—and slept it off.

We had a pretty easy time for the next few days, as, beyond being required to be ready to move at an hour’s notice, we were left alone. The weather was fine, and many of us bivouacked; we did a little training, and tried to teach the local people a little sanitation, a word which apparently did not exist in their language. We, on the other hand, learnt that faggots and soil had a market value; one Company, taking soil from a heap in a field, were pounced on by the owner for taking “ma bonne terre” to cover someone else’s smelly midden, and he was quite rude about it. The Officers’ Mess was in a private house on the main street; one night when an al fresco concert was in progress to the great delight of the troops, a man passing on the road enquired what was going on, and received the laconic reply, “Officers’ rum issue!”

METEREN, 1915.

On the 8th we were visited by Sir Douglas Haig and the Divisional Commander.

The gunfire about eight or nine miles away increased on the 9th to what must have been a very heavy bombardment—no doubt the second Battle of LA BASSEE.

On the 11th blankets and Officers’ kits were allowed to be removed from the waggons on which they had hitherto been loaded, and the state of readiness was relaxed. Respirators for poisonous gas (the old gauze and wadding affairs) were issued. On the 13th there was a thunderstorm, accompanied by torrential rain, which did not add to the comfort of the campers.

Just after midnight on the 14th, orders to move arrived, and after breakfast we fell in and moved to the starting point by CALONNE CHURCH, whence we marched as a Brigade to METEREN. We arrived there at 2 p.m., and got into billets about 3, mostly on the east and north-east sides of the town, the Mess as usual in an estaminet, whose landlord thought fit to start emptying his midden soon after we arrived, causing one man to say to another, who seemed in low spirits, “What’s up, Tommy? Avez vous mal de midden?”

The country was different from CALONNE, where the ground was flat and intersected by ditches full of frogs which croaked all night; here it was undulating, and windmills and hop fields became features. On the south side of the town were a number of graves of Officers and Men who had fallen in the fighting there on 15th October, mostly Royal Warwicks and King’s Own—it was said that the Huns had mounted machine guns on the tower of the church, which commands the country to the south and west, and had simply mown them down. How difficult we found it then to realise the story, and how peaceful the little town seemed to us. The Adjutant took the opportunity of teaching the Officers a little field sketching—a branch of our training which had hitherto been crowded out. Courses in those days were few and far between, and though we had learnt in the Regiment many things of which some of the systematically trained Officers of later days were conspicuously ignorant, there were gaps in our knowledge.

Sunday was fine and hot, and all denominations had Church Parades. On Monday the Ninth Division marched through—what a fine lot they looked, and how we envied them “their cookers.” Why hadn’t we got cookers? And the old galling comparisons between the treatment of the Territorial Force and Kitchener’s Army were rubbed in once more. It is all dead now, but we had something to grouse at. On Tuesday, the 18th, we paraded at 8 p.m. for a night march, through VIEUX BERQUIN and NEUF BERQUIN to LA GORGUE, a suburb of ESTAIRES, where we arrived about 4 a.m. Not for months afterwards did most of us learn that we, the 51st Division, had been moved up by General French to be in reserve for the Second Battle of LA BASSEE.

The town was full of troops. Our men were billeted in breweries and factories; B and A Companies were in a shell-riddled Girls’ School; the Officers had difficulty in finding even a floor to sleep on, but at last most of them gravitated to one estaminet, where they fed on what they could get, and slept. An unforgettable incident rises to the mind. Lieutenant——, having disposed himself for slumber on three chairs and fallen asleep, tried to turn over and so rolled off—in one piece—on to the floor, where he lay immovable, only remarking, in injured tones: “I’m fed up with this —— War!”

On the 19th, the 2/5th Lancashire Fusiliers left us and went to ST. OMER, and 18 of our men were sent to the Tunnelling Company R.E.; this is mentioned because it was our first separation—we had been together, in the same sections even, with practically no change for months.

On the 20th we marched to billets in farms on the east side of LOCON; when we got there we found them occupied by a Battalion of the Grenadier Guards, who had been in action the night before and lost their Colonel, Sergt.-Major, and 67 other Ranks, so we formed up in a field opposite a large 18th century farm with a moat round it and stayed there all day; in the evening the Guards moved out and marched off with that inimitable swing of theirs, and we took over their billets—untouched farms within three miles of the line. Here we were close to the lair of a 9in. Howitzer—the only one on that front, it was said—which had been shelling the Hun all day.

The next day we set to work with zeal to clean up and put the sanitation right—covering middens to prevent flies breeding, building incinerators, and fixing up a water supply; we rather specialised in sanitation even in those days, when most people seemed rather to scoff at it. Late at night the 5th Gordons arrived and bivouacked in the field opposite.

On the 23rd, a very hot day, sanitary work continued, and surveys of the billeting area were carried out by Officers, and afterwards combined into a composite map; the next day Second Lieutenant Sutherland, of the 2nd Leicesters, two N.C.O.’s, and 11 men reported, to instruct us in trench work—needless to say we were keen for anything they could teach us, as we were eagerly looking forward to our first tour in the line. Yes, Reader, you may think this is a figure of speech, but it is not—we really were, and we sharpened our bayonets with zest on the old lady’s grindstone, and thought she must be a German spy because she tried to stop us!

All the same, we expected to stay where we were for a few weeks, and were a bit surprised to learn, after a lecture on trench work by Captain Burton, 39th Gharwalis (we were in the Indian Corps), that we were to go into the line on the 25th. We assembled on the road by Battalion Headquarters at 7 p.m. and marched to a Cemetery, where we were met by an Officer of the 1/7th Black Watch. He reported that the trenches we were to occupy were being shelled by the enemy, so we halted till 10 p.m., when we moved forward by platoons at 100 yards’ distance.

It is quite impossible to try to convey in print the impression of one’s first march up to the line: one remembers the dark, strange road, broken trees, loose telephone wires, a long halt in a battered village, then on through interminable miles of breastworks manned by Canadians, crawling cautiously along in single file and breathless silence—then a halt, and platoons are sent off down various alleys, to find at the end a trench full of Scotsmen anxiously awaiting relief. The right of the Battalion rested on the QUINQUE RUE, the left on the road from RUE DE L’EPINETTE to FERME COUR D’AVOUE; A and D Companies and Machine Gun Section occupied the front line, No. 2 platoon having an advanced post about 200 yards in front of the main line; C was in support and B in reserve. The fire trench had only recently been built, and the forward bit had 18in. of water in it; no wire had been put up. The support trench was an old German trench about 300 yards to the left rear of the fire trench, while the reserve trench was again 200 yards behind the latter. The parapets were revetted with, and in some cases entirely built of, sandbags; dugouts—very sketchy—were built in the parados! The trenches were nowhere more than two feet deep, the rest of the cover being above ground; there were narrow communication trenches. Every house in the neighbourhood was in utter ruin, and the ground was a mass of shell holes. Equipment, rifles, ammunition, clothing, tins, both our own and enemy, were strewn everywhere, and dozens of bodies—chiefly of Scots Guards and Germans—lay about as they had fallen in the May Battle of Festubert; the stench was awful. Some old German trenches, not occupied by us, were interesting as showing the elaborate way they had dug themselves in. One dugout was a room about 15ft. square, with doors and a window, lined throughout with wood planking covered with cloth, and furnished with leather-covered chairs and a table; in one a quantity of feminine underclothing was found—what it was doing there could only be guessed.

Most of the above description is taken from the Adjutant’s journal, written at the time; all we saw that night was mud and sandbags. The Platoon which took over the forward trench had to wait for the Scots to climb out at the back, and then stepped down about two feet and found themselves in a good foot of muddy water. There was nothing for it but to wait till dawn; when it came we found ourselves in a shallow ditch, with only two rows of sandbags in front. Immediately to our front was a huge pile of black, red, and yellow sandbags, where the Germans had blocked and strengthened an old communication trench leading into our lines; their main line was further off—from 200 to 400 yards; behind us and in front were the dead bodies, also in our own parapet and under the duckboards of the communication trench, which was soon dubbed “Bluebottle Alley,” for as soon as the sun rose clouds of the loathsome insects filled the air and buzzed round our heads. To our front we could see in the distance the spire of VIOLAINES Church, and on our right was a new parapet, very high and thick, surrounding CANADIAN ORCHARD. We were puzzled and annoyed for some days by sniping from that direction, till one early morning we saw a Hun crawling from under that same parapet towards his own lines, but a rifle shot fired from a rifle which had belonged to one of the Scots Guards settled his hash and avenged the late owner of the rifle.

On the 26th we were shelled intermittently all day, and two men were wounded, our first casualties; in the evening two platoons were sent out and extended from the right of No. 2 Platoon at P 11 and started a trench to connect up with the Canadians. On the 27th we were again shelled intermittently, but no appreciable damage was done and we improved our positions greatly. We did not realise then that we had been put in to finish the consolidation of newly-taken ground—a pretty stiff beginning for raw troops. The night was exceptionally quiet—there was less shelling than usual and very little sniping; during the morning our fire trenches were shelled somewhat severely with shrapnel, and again in the afternoon, six men being wounded. As soon as it got dark, working parties went out to get on with the new trench to the right of P 11; the existing forward trench was strengthened and the R.E. put a footbridge across the ditch on our right front; it was very dark and there were no interruptions.

The next day we lost two men wounded by shell fire, which was pretty heavy. A working party of 200, with a covering party under Lieutenant Brindle, started a new trench from the new bridge towards the Canadians, and did good work in spite of bursts of shrapnel at intervals; during the night bearings were taken on gun flashes, and we located the enemy battery which was troubling us.

On the 30th the enemy fire—both shrapnel and H.E. (known in those days as “Jack Johnsons” or “Coalboxes”)—was heavier than usual; two years later such activity would have provoked a perfect hurricane of retaliation from our own guns, but in 1915 our gunners had nothing to throw away and no retaliation could be had. That night the working parties continued their work, and our guns at 12 15 a.m. and 2 15 a.m. fired a few shells. The enemy retorted with vigour, wounding Second Lieutenant Bryce-Smith and five men and killing one. The working parties were brought in at 1 a.m. The enemy fire died down about 3 30 a.m., but burst out afresh at 11 a.m., being directed chiefly on our fire trenches, which were damaged in several places.

On 1st June we carried out the usual programme, and were shelled fairly heavily during the afternoon; in these early days we had three or six men in every bay of the trench, and the wonder is that our casualties were not much greater than they were. On the 2nd we were relieved by 58th Vaughan’s Rifles, and marched back to billets at CORNET MALO, half a mile north-west of LOCON CHURCH. We went out by companies, and the leading men set off at about four miles an hour, with the result that those at the back of the long single file were running and stumbling and out of breath, and it was great good luck that we all reached the rendezvous; but we did, and after a short rest, tramped off by Companies to our billets, which we reached about 4 a.m. As each Company wheeled into its own farmyard a wild cheer went up, for there were our C.Q.M.S. and cooks, a brand new field cooker, like the ones we had seen and envied with the 9th Division, and, best of all, a meal—piping hot and ready. It took about one minute to get the Company formed in close column, arms piled, packs off and neatly dressed, and coffee served out.

We rested all day, but in the evening moved to fresh billets between CALONNE and ROBECQ via the LA BASSEE CANAL. Lieutenant Gregson and 30 other ranks went to the new Grenadier Company, and Lieutenant Smith and four to the Trench Mortar class. Two days later, back we went to our old billets at CORNET MALO! That was a horrid march. Starting at 7 p.m., we marched 12 miles as ordered, but on arrival no one knew anything about us, and on enquiring at Brigade Headquarters it was discovered that a counter-order had been issued but had never reached us, so we had to turn about and retrace our steps to CORNET MALO, arriving at midnight. It was during this counter-march that we passed a Battalion of Highlanders, and one of them shouted: “What Battalion’s that?” Quick as thought came the answer in a tone of pitying contempt: “Battalion! This isn’t a Battalion; it’s a —— walking club!” Another Scots wit asked: “What are you chaps doing? Marching?” and got prompt answer: “Marching! No; we’re resting!”—as indeed we were, technically.

On the 7th Second Lieutenant Lindsay went to hospital with flu’; it was a sultry day and bathing was fashionable, both in the Canal and the clear streams, also the following day, till a thunderstorm with torrents of rain put a stop to it. Captain Parker also went to hospital about this time.

On 9th June we moved up to the trenches along the RUE DE BOIS, RUE DE L’EPINETTE, through FESTUBERT VILLAGE and down LE QUINQUE RUE for about 800 yards, and relieved the 1/7th Black Watch. FESTUBERT was the most badly-smashed village we had yet seen—there were remnants of barricades still standing in the streets—most of the houses were heavily sandbagged, and some had barbed wire round them. There was a house at the entrance to the village with all the front blown in and the furniture of the upper bedrooms hanging shakily—half in, half out. Where the Church had been, now only recognisable by the Crucifix which still stood unharmed, we turned to the left. (This description and the pages which follow were written by the late Captain Lindsay at the time, and have been inserted practically as he wrote them.)

THURSDAY, June 10th, 1915.

The day passed away very quietly; but there were two or three very heavy thunderstorms with torrential rains which rapidly converted the trenches—the communication trenches in particular—into quagmires. These communication trenches became very dirty, in no place being less than boot-deep and in many places thigh-deep in a pestilent liquid mud. The boards placed at the bottom of the trench were quite covered over, and, being extremely slippery, were mainly useful in leading the way to the deeper, wetter part of the trenches! Working parties at night in heavy rain had very great difficulty in making progress. The night was very dark, and the men were loaded with spades and hurdles and sandbags. Only a section of the working party under the command of Captain Crump managed to get through to the fire trench, and took three hours to do it—until midnight—distance not quite a mile! Working parties were under control of Engineers.

Lieutenant Hoit was admitted to hospital suffering from rheumatism. Second Lieutenant Rawsthorn, Reserve Machine Gun Officer, took over the Machine Guns.

FRIDAY, June 11th, 1915.

Second Lieutenant Lindsay rejoined the Battalion.

The morning was finer, but the trenches were still very muddy. Three working parties were sent out in the morning to work in the open between the reserve and the support lines in the making of bridges across the ditches and of tracks through the long grass, of ramps in the trenches to facilitate climbing the parapet, and in clearing up the old German trench which lay in that area. The Germans shelled this old trench of theirs regularly, though it was not occupied.

The Battalion was relieved unexpectedly by the 1/7th Black Watch. Relief was completed by 10 45 p.m., and the Battalion marched back along the Canal to billets near LE CORNET MALO, in the wood to the south of that place. The march was a tiring one, but the men lasted out well, and billets were reached about 5 a.m.

SATURDAY, June 12th, 1915.

The day was passed in resting and cleaning up.

SUNDAY, June 13th, 1915.

Orders were received to return to the trenches we had left on Friday night, and relieve the Battalions which had relieved the 1/8th K.L. Irish and ourselves then. Though no order had been issued, we all knew that the Battalion was going up for an attack, and in anticipation of this the Officers, or as many as cared to do so, drew men’s uniforms from the Quartermaster’s Stores. Lieutenant Moore, hearing in hospital word of this impending attack, rejoined us. The Battalion marched off at 6 p.m., and relief was completed in the trenches about 1 a.m. This time we took over the fire and support trenches from the 1/6th Black Watch. We found the trenches very much drier than when we left them. There was some shelling at the time of relief. The dispositions of the Battalion (646 strong) were: B and C Companies in fire trenches, D Company in support, A Company in reserve.

Second Lieutenant Houghton and one man were wounded going up.

It is a queer sensation going up to one’s first battle. The bracing of the nerves to face the unknown—it is the essence of religion, voluntary self-sacrifice for a cause, made possible only by faith, and calling for the strongest effort of will to control the nerves. Happy the man who is not gifted with a vivid imagination—who, like Kipling’s oxen, can plod steadily along, living in the present—blind to the future. Those who fall do so at the moment of their highest endeavour; had they lived they had probably never risen so high again. Surely to them, if to anyone, is granted the peace which passeth understanding.

MONDAY, June 14th, 1915.

The Battalion had been warned for an attack, and operation orders issued from the Brigade in the morning made this clear. With the object of gaining ground in the direction of RUE D’OUVERT, the Fourth Corps was to attack the German positions in the north. The 51st Division, the 7th Division, and the Canadian Division were to attack simultaneously.

Map No. 1

FESTUBERT

The 51st Division detailed the 154th Infantry Brigade, and the 154th Infantry Brigade the 1/4th Loyal North Lancashire Regiment (with 10 bombers) on the right, and the 1/6th Scottish Rifles (with 10 bombers), on the left, as assaulting troops. Besides these there were:—

(These North Lancashire details were found by D Company.)

The supporting Battalion was the 1/4th Royal Lancaster Regiment, less two platoons, whilst the 1/8th Liverpool Regiment was held in Brigade Reserve.

There was also a Trench Mortar detachment with two guns of the old “Archibald” type, under the command of Lieutenant Smith.

A working party of two platoons from the 1/4th Royal Lancaster Regiment was detailed to accompany one Section of the 2/2nd Highland Field Company R.E.

The attack by the Brigade was towards the houses on the road behind the German salient. At these houses a junction would be effected, if the attack was successful, with the 7th Division. The two attacks converged on this point. We were to obtain flanking fire from the rifles and machine guns of the 152nd Brigade in the trenches to our left. They in turn were to advance on the flank when we had consolidated our position.

The whole attack was timed for 6 p.m. on the 15th June, and was to be preceded by a 48 hours’ bombardment.

These, in brief, were the operation orders. We had been warned to show no signs of activity during this preliminary bombardment, which began about dawn, and was devoted chiefly to cutting the enemy’s barbed wire. Field guns bombarded this, whilst the heavier guns played on the enemy’s trenches, and the heaviest on the houses behind. The bombardment was not confined to our front, but extended all along the ridge to the south towards VIOLAINES. This village lay over the ridge, and only the church spire could be seen.

From the support trench, the view was of the usual kind, a flat Flanders plain, with ditches bordered by rows of pollard willows, and wrecked farmhouses with a few scattered trees. The plain very gradually rose to a sky-line, the Aubers ridge being especially marked on the right. The British bombardment was persistent and, from what we could see, effective, whereas the Germans only replied sporadically with some sharp bursts of shrapnel and some high explosive shell on the communication trenches, from which B and C Companies lost a few men. The bombardment continued all along the front, on both sides of us, all night with only two slight stoppages.

In reply to an enquiry from the artillery as to the amount of damage done to the wire by the artillery fire in our line of advance, Major Nickson replied that most of the wire had been destroyed. This was at 11 a.m. on the 15th June, 1915, and shrapnel was still bursting over it. Captain Norman reported to the same effect, and said that all stakes were gone, and such strips of wire as remained did not appear to be an obstacle to an advance. He added that the wire opposite the enemy’s main trench could not be observed clearly from our fire trench.

TUESDAY, 15th June, 1915.

The British bombardment continued as on the previous day, with the Germans still only occasionally replying. Very heavy artillery (9.2) was brought to bear upon the houses on the road to our immediate left front, some being set on fire. It was particularly interesting to watch this shelling, and to note the regularity and precision with which it was shifted from house to house. The wire and the German sap and the fire trenches were also kept under continual fire. An advanced mountain battery played on the enemy’s parapets.

B Company was withdrawn to the support trench to the right of D Company, whilst C Company moved to the right of the fire trench, making room for the charging company of the 1/6th Cameronians on their left. A Company was still in reserve.

Orders were received in the afternoon that the British bombardment would increase greatly in intensity at 5 30 p.m., and would continue so until 6 p.m. For this first half-hour, the guns would be concentrated on the enemy’s barbed wire. At 6 p.m. they would “lift,” i.e., increase their range on to the enemy’s fire trench and shell this solely for three minutes. At 6 3 the communication trenches would be bombarded for a minute, and the enemy’s main trench from 6 4 to 6 15. At 6 15 the guns would lift into the road, and would shell this intensely for half-an-hour, until 6 45. At 6 45 the artillery would form a barrage beyond the road.

At 5 30 promptly the bombardment became terrific. Shells whistled and shrieked overhead in enormous numbers. All the British artillery which was massed behind the line concentrated on the assaulting positions with rapid fire. There were also some French 75 batteries to help. Under this rain of shells B and D Companies moved up the communication trenches towards the fire trench from the supports, and A Company to the supports from the reserve line.

But while the British bombardment increased greatly in intensity, the German shelling, from being merely desultory, also became intense. High explosive shells, in salvoes of four, dropped upon the communication trenches, filling them, in many places, with earth and mud, and in some cases obliterating them. It became a task of extreme difficulty to move up to the firing line under this heavy fire. There were some dead and wounded in the trenches.

Sketch Map of Trenches

At 6 p.m. precisely C Company charged from the fire trench. The leading platoon was a composite one, made up from Nos. 9 and 12 for strength, and under the command of Second Lieutenant Parker; No. 10 Platoon under Second Lieutenant Craven followed at 100 yards’ distance, and No. 11 under Second Lieutenant Davies followed this. They had to climb the parapet, and, under a withering fire, form to the left flank slightly and then charge. They did this almost perfectly in line, and were in possession of the trench inside three minutes. Their losses were chiefly from rifle and machine gun fire. This must have been principally from the main trench, and not the advanced trench of the salient, since they found most of the Germans there sheltering in dugouts; these were dealt with by bombing parties. The bombers worked in two groups: (a) (right) 1/5th Royal Lancaster Regiment under Lieutenant Taylor, and (b) 1/6th Scottish Rifles under Lieutenant Hay (left group). These bombing parties, supported by the various parties told off to them, did magnificent work, and penetrated right through the road to a much greater distance than ever the assaulting battalions reached.

Roughly it may be said that the centre of the attack was L 8 as marked on the map. The two leading platoons of C Company, with their left directing the whole attack, charged the German T-head sap directly in front, and taking that in the rush, swept to the German fire trench. On their left were the 1/6th Scottish Rifles also charging.

When the trench was won, comparatively easily, the Germans holding up their hands and pleading for mercy, the bombing parties extended outwards, down past Z 1, K 6, and Z 4. Their orders were to push ahead as far as possible, since the 7th Division, as detailed, would be attacking at the same time. Another party was to break off up towards the German main trench at X 7. The other main party of bombers went towards L 10 up the communication trench—which was also a firing trench facing M 4—at L 10 they split off, one towards L 9 and the other down the main German trench. These bombers actually went beyond the road so fast that their bayonet men could not keep up with them. They mostly ran along the top of the trench, with the German and British Artillery both bombarding the lines all this time very heavily indeed.

Red screens were used to show the furthermost points reached by the infantry, to enable the artillery to support. The bombing parties carried red flags, and a red rocket was to be fired when the infantry reached the houses on the road at L 11. (The artillery had set these houses on fire, and they afforded a good landmark.) But the artillery observers could see nothing because of the tremendous smoke and dust cloud, which hid the whole area from their view. All telephone communication was very soon smashed up, and messages had to be sent by relays of orderlies. Lieutenant Ord at L 8 was in charge of this.

The course of the battle becomes a little obscure. The next supporting Company was B, but Captain Peak, for some time reported missing, has lately been reported dead, and there is no connected account of what actually happened to this Company. At this period the German artillery redoubled in intensity on the deploying Companies, and whereas C Company had suffered chiefly from rifle and machine gun fire, B and D and A Companies suffered from shrapnel and high explosive. B Company seems to have reinforced C Company on the right. B Company men say they had to cross a deep ditch with barbed wire entanglements at the bottom. (This must have been the ditch marked in front of the German fire trench at Z 1). Here, they say, Captain Peak was killed on the barbed wire in front of the trench.

D Company, coming up the now very badly damaged communication and fire trench, was sent to reinforce the line in the left of the centre of the attacking line across the sap and the fire trench, and then along the edge of the communication trench towards L 10. Both B and D Companies moved to support in lines of platoons, through a gap in the trench, under extremely heavy artillery fire.

Meanwhile the attack had swept on, past the German trench, up along the German communication trenches. There were a great number of casualties from rifle fire from the German main trench and enfilading machine gun fire from somewhere about X 7 or Z 2. But the attack swept on and must have carried the main trench, already bombed, but for being pulled up suddenly by uncut barbed wire, which lay concealed in the long grass on the German (east) side of the ditch which runs parallel to the German main trench, south-east from L 10. The attacking line was then within 30 yards of the trench. More enfilade fire came from one of the houses at L 11 on the road. This house must have had a good number of machine guns in it.

The position therefore about 7 p.m. was this:—

Barbed wire marked in red wavy line.

Red line marks approximate centre of attack.

The Scottish Rifles were attacking on our left with their right resting on the British sap head at L 8. Their advance was checked by uncut barbed wire which ran along the northern edge of the communication trench, very early on, and they lay in the open under galling and very heavy fire, losing heavily in attempting to cut it, but were compelled to advance along the communication trench. At 7 p.m. when the advance was checked, they were in this communication trench, which they were holding. Once a part of the German salient, it faced obliquely the British trench at M 4; it was also a fire trench, being very narrow, with numerous traverses and some dugouts about Z. The uncut wire here in front of this trench prevented any further advance by them. All their officers except one were casualties. The result of this forced change of front by them was the formation of an angle at L 10 in the line of attack, they themselves facing north, whilst the Loyal North Lancashires faced east or perhaps north-east.

The ditch in which C Company lay, now reinforced by D on the left and B on the right, with A coming up from reserve, was bordered by a row of pollard willows. On the left it was comparatively dry, with a slight protecting bank on the east (German) side; but the further it went to the right the more of a quagmire it became. In some places on the right it was thigh-deep in water. It ran parallel to the German trench along the road, at about 30 yards’ distance from it. It afforded comparative security after the advance because of the slight cover to be obtained in it, and because it was too near the German trench to allow artillery fire to be brought to bear. C Company had brought up one sandbag per man and one shovel to every three men, with 20 wirecutters to the Company, and B and A Companies had brought up three sandbags per man and a pick or a shovel carried slung with spun yarn, per man, but some of these were lost in the advance, and only a few men came up with them all.

The Battalion entrenched itself in this ditch line as best it could. It was rapidly going dark. A Company, as it came up, was sent to the right of the line to strengthen and extend it and to get into touch with the 7th Division, and several parties were sent out to the right to find them, but fruitlessly. Entrenching in a waterlogged ditch with the entrenching tool was slow work. At dusk the 1/4th King’s Own sent up a Company to reinforce, under the command of Captain Barrow; Major Nickson was in command of the front line. The Colonel had been wounded earlier in the evening, and Major Foley took over command and established his headquarters in the German fire trench opposite L 8.

About 11 p.m. there was a slackening of the German fire, both artillery and rifle. The German artillery fire had been directed chiefly against our supports and reserves, and was particularly violent at L 8. Some of our wounded had been collected there, and were looked after there all night by Sergeant-Major Farnworth.

By this time, in the front line, a machine gun had been placed in position about L 10. The trench junction there had been blocked by sandbags. It was at this point (L 10) that the Scottish Rifles were in touch with us. It was found impossible, because of lack of material, to block the further trench (X 7), and accordingly the line we held in the ditch was bent back to the right to protect that flank. The line was a bad one. There was a conference of Officers held by Major Nickson. Both flanks were in the air. We were not in touch with the 7th Division, and enfilade rifle fire was coming from the right flank, though fairly weak. The ditch was waterlogged, and too wide in places and clearly marked by the row of pollard willows. Spades and picks and sandbags were lacking. There were no bombs left, and no bombers. (There were two advanced bomb reserves of 1,000 bombs each near L 8, but no one knew where these were. The bombers sent to reinforce the original party were shelled heavily on the road to the reserve trenches, and out of 33 only five were unwounded.) Impossible to entrench ditch. Therefore proposed line about 20 yards back in the open. This meant beginning afresh without tools. Men too crowded in line. There were no Verey lights. Artillery support had ceased about 8 45 because of uncertainty as to the actual position of the attacking Battalions. Major Nickson sent back word to Major Foley explaining this and asking for instructions. In the meantime the German counter-attack began, and prevented instructions arriving.

It was about midnight when the Germans began to throw up flares in great numbers. They had been shelling L 10 and the (German) captured salient for some time before. Their counter-attack proper began by bombing at L 10 so severely that the machine gun there was damaged and put out of action, and the connection with the Cameronians broken. Almost at the same time, the Germans began to bomb down the right communication trench (X 7), and followed this by throwing bombs across the open. There was no means of replying, and no cover to be had anywhere in the ditch. To stay there would have meant the wiping out of those in the line; enfilade fire came from both flanks—on the right from the German main trench at K 7, and on the left from L 9; the Scottish Rifles in the German communication trench were enfiladed down the whole length by artillery and rifle fire. Orders were given, therefore, to retire from the position.

At the point Z (see map) a mixed body of men lined the shell craters and held up the Germans for about two hours, losing heavily. This point Z, which lay on the German side of their fire trench, was an absolute mass of wrecked dugouts. These men finally retired, in the mist of the morning, towards the sap south-west of L 8. In the retirement all the attacking Battalions were mixed up. The sap at L 8 was held by a composite company: 1/4th Loyal North Lancashires, 1/6th Scottish Rifles, 1/4th Royal Lancaster Regiment, Grenadier Guards, 1/8th Liverpool Irish, but the Germans, probably because of their check at Z, did not push their counter-attack on to the British lines.

The attacking Battalions were withdrawn to the support trenches about 4 a.m. on the 16th, the men in the sap about 6 a.m., and the lines were taken over by the 1/8th K.L. Regiment (Irish).

Motor machine guns under Captain Hammond, D.S.O., to left of L 8, stayed up through the attack and for four days afterwards.

The casualties were heavy.

The Colonel was wounded at the beginning of the attack, when near L 8. Almost at the same time the Adjutant, Captain Norman, was severely wounded. He advanced with the leading platoon and was on the parapet of the German trench when he was wounded by, it is said, an officer hiding in a dugout.

In C Company, Second Lieutenant P. Parker, who was in command of the charging platoon was seriously wounded, Second Lieutenant Craven was wounded in the leg, and Second Lieutenant Davies, who, wounded slightly twice, would go on, was fatally wounded and died on the field.

In B Company, Captain Peak was reported killed, as previously mentioned, but was posted missing, as there was no definite news of what actually happened to him. Lieutenant Moore was wounded in the wrist, and Captain Crump blown up and injured by a shell.

In D Company, Captain Hibbert was last seen directing the platoons through the gap in the fire trench. After that no news can be obtained of what happened to him, and he was posted missing. Captain Whitfield was seriously wounded in the thighs by shrapnel and died in hospital at Boulogne. Second Lieutenant Rawsthorn, in charge of the machine guns, was killed by shell when leading his team across the open to the German trenches. Lieutenant Brindle was hit on the head and in the arm.

In A Company, Lieutenant Smith[C] was in charge of the trench mortar team during the bombardment, firing from the fire trench. When the order to charge was given, Lieutenant Smith rushed forward with his gun, and was seriously wounded when carrying it across the open. He died in hospital at Lillers two days later, and was buried there.

The Officers who came through the fight unhurt were Major Foley, Major Nickson, Captain Booth, Captain Widdows, Lieutenant Rennard, Lieutenant Ord, Lieutenant Duckworth, Second Lieutenant Lindsay.

Second Lieutenant Rogerson was away at General Headquarters attending a Machine Gun Course, and Lieutenant Gregson was attached to the Grenadier Company at the time.

The casualties among the men were heavy, especially among the N.C.O.’s.[D] They were:—

It must be assumed that most of the missing are killed. The list therefore stands with a high ratio of killed to wounded.

The respective strengths of the Companies on June 30th, according to Orderly Room returns, were:—

15 Officers on strength. The effective rifle strength was 358.

The German trenches after the two days’ bombardment were in a bad state. In many places they had been completely destroyed, and when we took them we found them piled deep with German dead. The dugouts, which had been made in the parados, seemed whole, but were full of dead and wounded, probably the work of the bombers. The communication trench was also partially destroyed, and littered with German dead. The whole series of trenches were full of German equipment in great confusion. Like our trenches, they were built of sandbags, but their communication trench was very deep and well traversed, and was probably intended to serve as a fire trench against M 4. There was an abandoned German machine gun in the fire trench in a stretcher carriage, which could not be moved. There was a good amount of German equipment outside the trench about the point Z. This place was the wildest spot, a mass of shell holes and fragments of works. The German barbed wire was very strong, of abnormal thickness in closeness and strength of spikes and in the wire itself. The ditch in front of the sap was heavily wired under the water. The German casualties must have been very heavy. The artillery Officers said they caught the reinforcements coming up on the road first with the 4.5 howitzers, and later with the 9in. guns. Bombers say something of what they saw there, but not all of them agree on the point. The trenches were occupied at the time of the attack by Bavarians, it is said. The counter-attack was made by the reserve Division of the Prussian Guards.

The British trenches suffered severely too. In the morning L 8 was a wreck, most of the trench battered down, and the communication trench, which was revetted with hurdles, also badly damaged. The trench was saved in many cases, though, by the hurdles bending and not collapsing as sandbag revetting would have done. It was at L 8 that the brunt of the firing was. In some places there the trench lines were completely obliterated, and in very many places so badly damaged as to need extensive repair before being of much use again.

The British report of June 16th, as issued by the Press Bureau, read:—

“Yesterday evening, we captured the German front line of trenches east of Festubert, on a mile of front, but failed to hold them during the night against the strong counter-attacks delivered by the enemy.”

The communique issued at the German Main Headquarters says, according to the “Daily Telegraph”:—

“Wednesday.

“Again influenced by Russian defeats, the French and English yesterday attacked with strong forces of men at many points on the Western front.

“On the other hand, two attacks of four English Divisions between the roads of Estaires—La Bassée and La Bassée Canal completely collapsed. Our brave Westphalian regiments and reinforcements, consisting of portions of our Guard, repulsed the attacks after desperate hand-to-hand fighting. The enemy suffered heavy losses. We captured several machine guns and one mine-throwing howitzer.”

JUNE 16th, 1915–JUNE 21st, 1915.

The Battalion regathered at LE TOURET and was given breakfast there from the cookers which had been brought up, with a rum issue. The roll was called, and only 243 men answered it.[E] We moved off about 10 a.m. In spite of their exhausted condition and their heavy losses, the men marched well and in good spirits, singing for the first half-hour of the journey, but a halt was made just before reaching billets for the purposes of a rest. The day was very hot and close. The march was resumed about 4 30 p.m., and billets at LE CORNET MALO were reached about 5 30 p.m. Billets were of the usual type—barns with adjacent orchards.

Lieutenant Ord was admitted to hospital on June 17th. The men were very exhausted, and the days passed in resting and cleaning-up and reorganising. All the Companies needed reorganising. B Company was without an Officer until Lieutenant Gregson came back from the Bomb School on June 19th. There was a great shortage of N.C.O.’s, since most of them were casualties. B, C, and D Companies had an average of five or six each, and A Company was not much better. Platoons were very weak in strength. A few odd men rolled up during the first few days. One, Corporal Smalley, of D Company, came in from the German lines wounded, with German field dressings on his wounds.

The system of Officers messing by Companies had to be abandoned, and a Battalion mess was reinstituted. This system was abandoned on the 9th July, when three messes were constituted: Headquarters, A and B, and C and D, when out of the trenches.

Brigadier-General Hibbert inspected the Battalion, together with the 1/8th Liverpool Regiment, on June 18th, and conveyed to Officers and Men the appreciation of himself and of the Corps Commander for the services they had rendered. He said that though the attack had failed in its immediate object, yet it had been instrumental in attracting to itself reinforcements which might otherwise have been directed against the French, attacking further south. The G.O.C. Division held an inspection on June 19th, and conveyed to us a message from Field-Marshal Sir John French, congratulating the Brigade on the fight it had made.

CHAPTER III.
TRENCH WARFARE.

Major Foley took over the command of the Battalion on June 16th, 1915, vice Lieutenant-Colonel Hindle, wounded; Major Nickson became senior Major, vice Major Foley, from the same date; Lieutenant Duckworth became Adjutant, vice Captain Norman, wounded; Captain Widdows took over command of C Company, vice Major Nickson; Lieutenant Rennard of D Company, vice Captain Hibbert, missing; Lieutenant Gregson B Company, vice Captain Peak, missing; Second Lieutenant Rogerson became Machine Gun Officer, vice Second Lieutenant Rawsthorn, killed.

The weather was good and sunny, and we bathed in the LA BASSEE Canal. Most of us were exhausted by the attack and in need of rest. Indents for clothing and necessaries were rendered.

Orders were received on the 21st for the Battalion to proceed to billets near LE TOURET. A working party of 200, under Captain Booth, was detailed for work under the R.E. building a light railway.

JUNE 22nd–JUNE 24th.

The Battalion arrived in billets about 7 p.m., and took over the billets of the 1/7th Royal Highlanders.

There was no working party to be furnished for the night, the 22nd/23rd June, but one of 100 men under the command of Captain Widdows for the night following. This working party was detailed for work in the firing trench. The trench, which needed extra traverses and wider parapets, was protected from the German view by an old ruined communication trench which was to be demolished as soon as the new low fire trench was ready for use, and in neither working party were there any casualties.

This stay at LA COUTURE was quiet, and was devoted to resting and reorganising. There was a little shelling of the village to our right, but none near to us. Second Lieutenant Rogerson rejoined the Battalion after a fortnight’s machine gun training.

JUNE 25th.

The Battalion moved off about 7 p.m. on the night of the 24th June, and marched to ESTAIRES, where it arrived about 11 p.m., and was billeted, the men being in factories or breweries. These billets were very similar to the ones we occupied on May 18th. ESTAIRES is a fair-sized town, a market town in many ways, with some industries. It was interesting to us, because it was the first town we had been quartered in since landing in France.

In the afternoon of June 25th, orders were received to move to the trenches the same night. The Battalion marched to the trenches via LAVENTIE, which had been heavily shelled by the enemy, but most of the damage centred on the church, as in other villages where we had been. Here the church, and the two roads which crossed near the church, as well as the adjoining streets for a length of about 200 yards, were in ruins; the nearer you got to the church centre the more intensive was the damage. The inhabitants, however, were living in the village and carrying on their business outside this shelled ring.

The trenches were reached at 8 30, and relief was completed by 9 p.m. The Battalion we relieved was the 1/1st London Regiment (T.F.).

JUNE 26th–JULY 4th.

We spent eight days in these new trenches. They are known as “E 2 Lines, FAUQUISSART,” and were of the breastwork type, a shallow trench first being dug to a little above the water level and a high parapet of sandbags placed in front of this. The line we occupied was practically, when allowances are made for the fact that it was a fire trench, the equivalent of the reserve trenches which we held about June 10th. It was the same line. The British here had been able to make no headway. The parapet was very good and very thick as a rule, but much of the parados was shaky and had to be rebuilt. The long grass in front had already been partly cut by the previous trench holders, and there was a fair amount of wire in front, but not too much. The enemy was about 300 yards off, but the lines were not exactly parallel, and at one point the enemy must have been nearly five hundred yards away. There was very much less shell fire than in the previous trenches we had held, and very much more rifle shooting. There was a number of fixed rifle batteries with which the enemy tried to break the sandbags. There were also snipers normally to be found firing from a flank. The telescopic-sighted rifle, which had been issued to the Battalion just before entering the trenches, proved very useful for sniping in return. These rifles were the short rifles, fitted with telescopic sights, with a crossed hair-line on the object lens and a range dial. One ran to 600 yards and the other 1,200 yards in range.

A, B, and D Companies were in the trench line, with C Company in reserve holding an entrenched post. These “forts” took the place of the support line in the trenches we had been in before and were intended as defensive and rallying points in case of an attack. Battalion Headquarters was in the open.

Second Lieutenant Evans, who had been left behind with Second Lieutenant Norwood at Oxted when the Battalion moved to Bedford preparatory to sailing for France, rejoined the Battalion from the 2/4th Loyal North Lancashire Regiment on the night of June 26th.

On June 27th, Second Lieutenant R. A. Ostrehan and Second Lieutenant E. G. Baker, from the 2/4th Battalion, joined the Battalion, and Second Lieutenant D. H. Ostrehan joined on the night of the 28th.

To the left of our positions, the opposing lines narrowed down until in one place, known as Red Lamp Corner, they were no more than fifty yards apart. A mine was sprung here by us one morning at dawn, and shook the earth around. There was a short bombardment by our artillery of the mine crater and of the enemy line, and a slight reply from the German artillery, which bombarded the position much more heavily two days later, but these bombardments did not affect us.

JULY 4th–JULY 9th.

The Battalion was relieved in the night of the 3rd/4th July about 10 p.m. by the 1/7th Gordon Highlanders, and marched off to billets in the ESTAIRES—LA BASSEE road, near LA GORGUE, taking over billets from the 1/5th Seaforth Highlanders. The billets were of the usual type, orchards and farm buildings. The Officers’ Mess was established in the local schoolroom.

The six days’ rest from the trenches was interrupted by a series of working parties, which swallowed the whole available strength of the Battalion, Officers’ servants, signallers, stretcher-bearers, transport, and machine gunners all having to be impanelled in order to provide the number required. The work done was miscellaneous—digging in communication trenches, improving communication trench parapets, laying a level bed for a light trench railway, &c. This resulted in most of the men sleeping all day. New clothing was issued on the 4th July, and a day was set apart for bathing the Battalion in the brewery-bathhouse. This bathhouse had been made by taking vats from the brewery and tubs, and filling these with hot water. Men filed in at one door and gave up their dirty underclothing, and tied their clothes into a bundle, fastened with their identity disc. Each man was issued there with clean shirt and underclothing, whilst his old garments were washed and cleaned. Facilities were provided for bathing a Company at a time. Six baths for Officers were laid down also. This hot bath was greatly appreciated by the men; it was the first one they had had since landing.

The G.O.C. Indian Corps, to which the Division had been attached, inspected the Brigade on Wednesday, July 7th. The Battalion paraded as strong as possible, and put 293 rifles into the field. The General, Sir James Wilcox, expressed himself as well satisfied with the Brigade and welcomed them back to the Indian Corps, which they had temporarily left, expressing a hope that they were back for good.

JULY 10th–JULY 15th.

In these six days the Battalion was on trench duty in F lines, a little to the right of our previous position. The trenches were of the same type as those of E 2 Lines, consisting of a strong breastwork sandbagged trench, only a little sunk below the level of the ground, with several supporting points in rear. The whole Battalion was in the line, with the exception of Battalion Headquarters, which were situated about 1,000 yards back from the firing line in a farmhouse. Captain Booth was sent to hospital from here.

Nothing of much moment happened to us in these lines. There was one very wet night, which left the trenches in a very bad condition for the following day. What shelling there was was directed upon the house behind us; very few shells fell on the trench.

Our casualties amounted to one killed and three wounded in this period, mainly from sniping, which was fairly active. We had a sniping post, heavily sandbagged, in an orchard to the rear of the line, and a sniping party with telescopic-sighted rifles to garrison it.

There was an order that equipment must never be removed for any purpose. One day a man emerging from his billet with equipment on but the shoulder straps of his jacket unbuttoned cannoned into the R.S.M., who accused him of having had his equipment off. This he denied, and muttered that he had just been having breakfast. “Do you need to unbutton your shoulder straps to have breakfast, then?” enquired the R.S.M. in his silkiest tones. The man stood glowering for a moment, and then in desperation burst out, “Well! Ah’ve got to saay summat, ’evn’t I?”

We were relieved on the night of the 16th/17th July by the 1/4th Royal Lancaster Regiment, about 10 p.m., and moved off to reserve billets near Headquarters. Detachments from A Company, under Second Lieutenant Evans, and C Company, under Second Lieutenant R. A. Ostrehan, garrisoned “fort” supporting points behind the line. There was a heavy trench mortar bombardment of the trenches held by the 2/5th Lancashire Fusiliers on the night of the 19th/20th July, which caused a Brigade “stand-to,” but nothing happened. The 2/5th Lancashire Fusiliers had rejoined the Brigade the week before.

The Brigade was relieved on the night of the 23rd/24th July by the 13th Brigade, the Battalion by the 1st Middlesex Regiment.

On the 27th we left for LA GORGUE Station, where we entrained, and arrived at CALAIS at 8 p.m., then on via ABBEVILLE and AMIENS to CORBIE, where we detrained and marched to billets at RIBEMONT. On the 31st we went to MARTINSART, being then in Divisional Reserve. Here we remained for a week training.

This SOMME country was a great change from the plains of Flanders, and the air was better.

We relieved the 25th Lancashire Fusiliers on the 6th August in Sector B. A, B, and C Companies were in the fire trench; D Company in support at POSTE LESDOS; Battalion Headquarters in AVELUY WOOD south of AUTHUILLE. The trenches were cut in the solid chalk—hardly any sandbags—and the French had made the dugouts very comfortable. The barbed wire was thick. On the 4th Second Lieutenant W. R. Haggas had reported from the 2/4th Loyal North Lancashires, bringing five N.C.O.’s and men, who had been wounded, from the base, and a week later Lieutenant-Colonel Hindle returned from England and again took over the command of the Battalion. On the 9th a thunderstorm broke and turned the trenches into mud. On the 11th the first party went on leave. Two men were wounded the same day. The sector was quiet, and so was LA BOISELLE sector, where we went on the 14th, relieving the 1/5th Irish. C and D Companies were in the fire trench; A and B in support at POSTE DONNEZ. The opposing lines were so close that high bomb nets were found necessary.

On the 21st we were relieved by the 1/5th King’s Liverpool Regiment, and went into billets at AVELUY. It is chronicled in the War Diary that at this time the men began to have hot tea and soup served about midnight and that one-third were allowed to sleep at night. On the 22nd a draft was received from the 2/4th Loyal North Lancashire Regiment of 101 Other Ranks, and the following day four Officers, Second Lieutenants A. B. Bratton and H. M. Strong, from the 3rd Loyal North Lancashires, and Second Lieutenants J. S. Walker and M. W. Nolan, from the 11th Loyal North Lancashires, joined.

On the morning of September 4th the enemy shelled the trenches at POSTE LESDOS fairly heavily, and one shell burst in the midst of a working party, killing one and wounding five Other Ranks of D Company, whilst a week later one Other Rank was killed. On the 17th Lieutenant-Colonel Foley left the Battalion and crossed to England to take over command of a third-line unit. The succeeding day, just before being relieved by the 1/8th Liverpool Irish, the trenches were again heavily shelled, and one Company Sergeant-Major, one Sergeant, and one Corporal were killed by a single shell, whilst three Other Ranks were wounded. Captain H. Parker, Captain J. A. Crump, and Lieutenants K. H. Moore, R. Ord, and J. L. Brindle rejoined the Battalion from the 3/4th Loyal North Lancashires, and the first-named three Officers took over the command of A, B, and C Companies respectively.

At this time Companies of one of the Service Battalions of the Highland Light Infantry were attached to us for instruction.

On October 1st Brigadier-General J. L. Hibbert was wounded in the shoulder, and Lieutenant-Colonel Hindle took over the temporary command of the Brigade, while Major Nickson took over the Battalion with Captain Crump as second. Captain Rennard and Second Lieutenant Norwood went into hospital the same day, and Captain Gregson on the 3rd, and on the 4th Captain Green, R.A.M.C., reported for duty, vice Lieutenant Sugars transferred to the 3rd Battalion. Lieutenant-Colonel Hindle returned to the Battalion on the 7th, and Brigadier-General G. T. G. Edwards, C.B., took over command of the Brigade.

On the whole the month was quiet. On the 3rd we went into the line, A, C, and D in front and B in support at POSTE LESDOS—being relieved on the 15th by the 2/5th Lancashire Fusiliers, when B and C Companies relieved the 1/8th Irish on the right of F 1 sector, A and D being in support at POSTE DONNEZ; here we stayed till the 21st, going back to AVELUY, whence nightly working parties went up the line.

On the 27th, “fur” coats were issued, and we went back to POSTE LESDOS sector.

On the 28th, the enemy bombarded the wire and front line from 7 10 a.m. to 9 30 a.m., doing considerable damage and blowing in 100 yards of trench between AINTREE STREET and MERSEY STREET, held by C Company, and 30 yards in A Company’s sector. C.S.M. Edwards earned the D.C.M. for manoeuvring his Company about during the shelling in such a way as to escape with very few casualties.

The whole of the month was quiet and uneventful, but there was some desultory shelling of the working parties; salvos of H.E. and H.V. shells were sent over hourly, and in one of these bursts on the 30th Major Nickson was killed, whilst Second Lieutenant Bratton and six Other Ranks were wounded.

On the 31st Captain J. O. Widdows went sick and Second Lieutenant Nolan and 20 Other Ranks were wounded, the total casualties for the month being:—Officers: killed one, wounded two, sick four; Other Ranks: killed one, wounded 35, missing one.

Early in November Second Lieutenant R. S. De Blaby reported for duty from the base. On the 2nd an enemy shell burst in the trench held by A Company, killing two men and wounding one, whilst five others were admitted to hospital suffering from shock. Two mornings later two shells landed at the junction of Aintree Street and the fire trench, killing three men and wounding three others who were waiting as sentry reliefs. About this time, owing to the number of sick and wounded (the trenches were in a very bad state and knee-deep in water through the torrential rains and the men were very wet), it became extremely difficult to find the requisite number of men for the different duties each day.

On the 5th Lieutenant-Colonel Hindle went on leave for nine days, Captain Crump taking over command, and during that period the weather was so bad, snow falling on several of the days, that the programme of training could not be carried out. On the 18th Second Lieutenants T. A. Burnside, F. R. Best, and M. Wilson joined, and on the 20th one man was killed during an enemy burst of 30 small shells in reply to our artillery’s work on the German trenches.

On the 25th Bomber Gent did very good work. Taking nine bombs with him, he went out alone, and, encountering an enemy patrol coming from a sap-head, bombed them with good effect. The following day Lieutenant K. H. Moore was killed by a sniper. The month’s casualties consisted of one Officer killed, and of Other Ranks eight killed, three wounded, and 95 sick.

On December 2nd, at BOUZINCOURT, C.Q.M.S. E. E. Lester was presented with the Croix de Guerre for conspicuous bravery at Festubert on June 15th. This ceremony took place on Battalion parade. Second Lieutenant A. Hague arrived from the 3/4th Loyal North Lancashires, and later in the month Second Lieutenants A. Parker and Fairclough joined for duty, whilst Second Lieutenant Bryce-Smith rejoined from the base. As Christmas approached the weather was very bad, and the sides of the trenches were continually falling in. There were pumps in plenty, but the water ran in as fast as it could be pumped out. On Christmas Day we were relieved by the 1/4th King’s Own, and managed to get a good dinner, thanks to our excellent Quartermaster, Lieutenant Baker. The casualties during December consisted of 2 Other Ranks wounded and 82 sick, and for the whole year 23 Officers (4 killed, 10 wounded, 2 missing, 2 died of wounds, and 5 sick), and 624 Other Ranks (30 killed, 271 wounded, 146 missing, and 177 sick).

New Year’s Day, 1916, dawned wet and dismal in the trenches at AUTHUILLE, and though the general situation was quiet our trench mortar batteries were in action for a time. It was during the evening’s retaliation that a shell blew in a dugout, killing Second Lieutenant F. R. Best and wounding Second Lieutenants H. Rogerson and R. A. Ostrehan and three Other Ranks. The following day the Battalion was relieved by the 16th Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers, and moved to billets at LAVIEVILLE, six miles away. The following day the Brigade left the 51st Division, and, moving off from HENENCOURT, we marched via BEHENCOURT to ST. GRATIEN and a day later to RAINNEVILLE. The Brigade stayed at RAINNEVILLE a day and a half, the time being spent in a much-needed clean-up, and at this point—on January 5th—we became the 164th Infantry Brigade of the 55th Division.

On the 6th we left the 13th Corps to move to the new Divisional area, the 55th Division being then part of the 14th Corps. The march was via BERTANGLES, VAUX-EN-AMIENS to ARGOEUVES, the Battalion subsequently moving independently to AIRAINES, via ST. SAUVNEUR, PICQUIGNY, and SOUES, reinforcements arriving from the base the day after the Battalion had been billeted. Company training was carried out, and we had the task of finding control posts for all entrances to the village to prevent British Army horses from entering on account of the number of diseased horses there. On the 14th Second Lieutenants Silveira, Agostini, and Matthews arrived from the 3/4th Loyal North Lancashire Regiment. The Brigadier should have inspected the Brigade the following day at COURCHON, but the event was cancelled owing to rain, and Battalion drill took place instead. In the afternoon the A.S.C.’s Picture Palace was booked and the men given a free show. During the week a bombing school, bayonet course, and rifle range were fixed up, and excellent progress was made with the training. On the 20th of January Major Parker took over the Battalion on Lieutenant-Colonel Hindle’s departure on leave. During the remainder of the stay there the training was rounded off by an attack over open country, a gas test in the presence of the G.O.C. of the Division, and instruction in grenade throwing for all the Officers and N.C.O.’s, before, ultimately, General Allenby inspected the Division near HALLENCOURT, on the 29th.

On February 2nd the Earl of Derby inspected the Battalion at VIEULAINE, and the following day we proceeded to billets at LONGPRE, whence the Brigade, less two Battalions, marched to new billets, Brigade Headquarters proceeding to RIBEACOURT, 2/5th Lancashire Fusiliers to BEAUMETZ, and the 1/4th Loyal North Lancashires to PROUVILLE. At AUTHEUX, a few days later, the Battalion and Platoon bombers were inspected in their work by the G.O.C. of the 55th Division, Major-General Jeudwine. “Old Judy,” as he was called, soon found a place in our hearts—he had the gift of inspiring those under him—and we all loved him.

About this time the Brigade experienced the French winter at its worst in so far as rain was concerned, conditions being so bad that no training was possible for two days. The men found welcome relief when the downpour ceased by participating in a five miles cross-country run. On the 15th the Brigade marched from HEM, via DOULLENS, to HALLOY and on to BELLEVUE, where units broke off to their respective villages, the 1/4th continuing the march via BAVINCOURT and GOUY-EN-ARTOIS to MONCHIET. Three nights afterwards hostile aircraft flew over the village and dropped two bombs not far from our lines. There were no casualties. Shortly before noon the following day an enemy ’plane again flew over the village, dropping a bomb about 150 yards from the huts, once more without effecting any damage. On the 23rd orders were received for the Battalion to go into the trenches to take over from the 1/5th King’s Liverpool Regiment. There was a heavy fall of snow that afternoon, followed by a frost at night, and we moved into the line the following night. The enemy was very quiet on this front and apt to show himself a good deal. Lieutenant-Colonel Hindle took over the command the day following the Battalion’s arrival. About this time the trenches became very wet owing to the thaw, and the discomforts familiar at these times recurred. Meanwhile the enemy indulged in rather more sniping than usual, while a visit by a dozen hostile aeroplanes one morning was accompanied by activity on the part of his artillery. There were no casualties or cases of sickness during the month—a record.

March also was quite uneventful. A German deserter surrendered to us, and there was only a single casualty during the month, one man being wounded. But on April 1st, while A, B, and C Companies were billeted at BRETENCOURT, the enemy fired about three salvoes to the west of the village, and one shell burst in a barn occupied by No. 15 Platoon (D Company), killed six men, and wounded eight others. On the 9th Lieutenant-Colonel Hindle went to the 3rd Army School, and Major Crump took command of the Battalion during his week’s absence. On the 23rd, while rifle grenades were being fired, one exploded in our lines and would have caused serious loss of life, but Private Carter threw himself upon it and received the full force of the burst. He was killed, and Second Lieutenant Wilson, trying at the same time to grasp the grenade and throw it away, lost his hand. Lieutenant-Colonel Hindle went on leave on the 27th, Major Crump taking over the command. During the month, in addition to the casualties referred to, there were seven men killed and a like number wounded.

On 1st April, while the Battalion was at GROSVILLE, four cavalry N.C.O.’s were attached, two from the 1st Dragoon Guards and two from the Inniskilling Dragoons. On the 4th the Battalion took over slightly to the right of the former frontage, the left Company frontage being taken over by the 165th Brigade. Owing to shortage of Officers, A and C Companies worked as one in respect of Officers’ duties. Lieutenant-Colonel Hindle resumed his command two days before the Battalion was relieved. As soon as duty again lay in the shape of trench life, it was discovered that though the enemy was very quiet there appeared to be a great amount of work in progress in his lines. One day the enemy shelled the front line with “Five-nines,” but there was no material damage. Obviously the object of the shoot was to discover trench mortar emplacements. During the next two days there was again some shelling, and on the 30th, during a “strafe” of the right Company, Second Lieutenant Eccles was killed, the only other casualties during the whole of the month being two Other Ranks killed and two wounded.

Shortly after mid-day, June 4th, our artillery and trench mortars opened an intense bombardment on the enemy wire, and this was replied to by heavy fire for half-an-hour, mainly on our support lines and communication trenches, but no severe damage was done, and, although the dressing station behind the support line was blown in, there were no casualties. The following day Second Lieutenant Ducksbury reported for duty from the base. The time was mainly occupied in training bombing parties, scouting, wire cutting and crawling, and cutting new pattern fire steps under R.E. supervision.

A special raiding party was practising and was increased to four Officers (Captain Gregson, and Second Lieutenants Martin, Roscoe, and Walker) and 15 N.C.O.’s and men per company, who were billeted separately in the village and trained. Short rifles and long bayonets were issued to the Battalion on the afternoon of the 19th, and long rifles and short bayonets withdrawn. The same day the Battalion moved up to AGNY to relieve the South Lancashires, the raiding party remaining at BRETENCOURT. Although the enemy shelled and sent over rifle grenades within the next few days, little damage was done and there were no casualties. Here we first met a large trench mortar called “Crashing Christopher”—the “Heavy Minnie” of later days.

The Battalion about to Parade for the Trenches, 1916.

CHAPTER IV.
THE SOMME FIGHTING.

On the 27th of June we were bombarded by all calibres, but sustained no casualties.

On the 28th the raiding party of three Officers and 56 Other Ranks mentioned in the last chapter left our lines at the junction of GAMBLER STREET with the fire trench at 5 35 p.m. The raid was preceded by the discharge of cloud gas and artillery fire.

This party was working in conjunction with raiding parties from all Battalions in the Division. They advanced by two rushes to within a few yards of the enemy trenches, where they came under heavy fire and were held up. At 5 50 p.m. they established communication with our lines and reported that they could get no further and were suffering heavy casualties. A Sergeant returning and reporting that the enemy were in strong force and further progress was impossible, Major Crump ordered them to retire, which they did in good order in spite of losses which included the whole of the leaders.

The wind seemed to be uncertain and blew back the smoke curtain diagonally across the front so as to disclose our party, which was on the right flank of the Division, to the enemy.

The enemy wire had been well cut and presented no obstacle, but the enemy were seen in force in the trenches to the north of BLAIRVILLE WOOD, some of them wearing box respirators. The gas, however, apparently did not reach the wood, but near our lines a number of enemy dead were observed who had obviously been killed by the gas. Corporal Thompson did admirable work in maintaining telephonic communication between the advanced portions and the Headquarters of the Brigade raiding parties in our own front line. Private Clarke and Corporal Thompson remained in a shell hole not far from the enemy wire until after nightfall and saw them come out of their trenches and carry some of our men who were either dead or wounded across the bridge into their trenches. The ten killed of the raiding party included Captain E. M. Gregson and Second Lieutenant A. Martin, whilst Second Lieutenant A. S. Walker was amongst the 18 wounded.

The Lancashire Fusiliers’ party (who also came under command of Major Crump) advanced quickly and rushed the last few yards before effecting an entrance into the enemy trenches. They divided into three parties, which bombed along the fire trench before being attacked by enemy bombers coming across the open. They were then ordered to retire, which they did after suffering casualties. A private of the left party did good work with his bayonet, keeping the enemy at bay until the last of his party had left the trench; for this he was awarded the Victoria Cross. All the parties came under machine gun and rifle fire, but they inflicted a large number of casualties before returning. There were no trench boards in the enemy line where our men entered them, and the trenches had obviously suffered considerably from our artillery fire. The enemy threw “stink” bombs into their own wire, but most of the wounded were brought in by our men, who, however, brought back no prisoners and no material, except a cap taken from a German soldier for identification purposes.

Captain G. C. Hutchinson, of the Lancashire Fusiliers, though severely wounded in the German wire, did capital work in this raid, as he continued to direct operations after being hit. Lance-Sergeant Russ and Private Bennett, of the same Battalion, assisted several wounded men back to our lines and later brought in Captain Hutchinson. Sergeant Entwistle, who brought back reports on the progress of the raid, returned to assist in carrying out the retirement, whilst Private Ward and another collected five wounded in a shell hole and brought them in one at a time under heavy machine gun and shell fire.

A Private who was with the party writes:—“Captain Gregson was there; I never saw him look better—he was always one of the smartest Officers in the Battalion, but he seemed to have been got up for the show with greater care than usual. The smoke lifted like a curtain. We were in full view of the Boche trench. We went on till within 50 yards of it and then he opened out with machine guns, rifles, and trench mortars. It was Hell let loose, but someone shouted ‘On the Kellys,’ and on we went, but were cut down like corn. The ‘Jerrys’ were two-deep in their trench, and we realised we were done.” Sixteen men answered the roll-call out of 76. “The worst part of a stunt is always after, when they have a roll-call. To stand there and listen to names being called and try to answer ‘He’s killed’—no one can picture it who hasn’t seen one.”

The total casualties for the month were two Other Ranks killed, six wounded, and 26 sick, including four Officers.

On the afternoon of July 1st, the enemy shelled our reserve and support trenches and also the village of AGNY with 4.2’s, whilst late at night he opened fire on the front line with “whizzbangs” and 4.2’s, trench mortars, rifle grenades, and machine guns. He also sent up a large number of flares, but our artillery replied and activities ceased within an hour.

The following day Lieutenant-Colonel Hindle went to hospital, and Major Crump again assumed command of the Battalion. There was considerable enemy activity with artillery and trench mortars, whilst our aeroplanes were active. The trenches were damaged by enemy gunfire the following day, when Second Lieutenant Jump and three Other Ranks were wounded. The Battalion was relieved by the 2/5th Lancashire Fusiliers on the 4th, and went to billets at DAINEVILLE; Colonel Hindle returned the same day, but on the 7th he again had to go to hospital. On the 10th we practised over trenches similar to those we expected to attack. The attack was practised several times, and on the night of the 11th the Battalion relieved the 1/6th King’s Liverpools. Two nights later the Brigade made a demonstration, Second Lieutenant Saunders being in charge of a party which went over at midnight to bomb an enemy sap. Though they were unable to enter the sap, owing to wire being uncut, a number of bombs were thrown into it, and it was not until the party returned that the enemy replied with light machine gun and rifle fire.

On the 16th, 76 reinforcements joined the unit, which was relieved by the 1/4th King’s Own and marched to BARLY, where we rehearsed trench attacks and signalling in conjunction with aeroplanes. Later the Battalion marched by stages to CANDAS, where it entrained for MERICOURT. Arriving there on the 11th, we marched to billets in MEAULTE and on the following day to HAPPY VALLEY, where we bivouacked.

The weather was fine and the billets good at this time, and training was carried out on an extensive scale, the work including practising digging-in with entrenching tools. One afternoon men marched to BRAY and bathed in the Somme, where, unfortunately, one man was drowned.

On the 30th July, Church Parade was held, at which Brigadier-General G. T. G. Edwards presented Sergeants Entwistle and Lancaster with Military Medal Ribbons won by them in the raids at BLAIRVILLE. Late that afternoon orders were received to be ready to move at very short notice, and the same night the Battalion left for the trenches at GUILLEMONT, occupying some old German communication trenches (Dublin and Casement trenches), which contained no dugouts. Within a few hours of the Battalion’s arrival the enemy opened out on the trenches and battery positions in the vicinity with 5.9’s and heavier shell. Second Lieutenants Orrell and Crone were wounded, as also were 15 Other Ranks. The total casualties for the month were three Officers and 34 Other Ranks.

August was a trying month. The line held extended from MALTZHORN FARM, where we linked up with the French on the right, to a point near ARROW HEAD COPSE. The trenches were incomplete, as they were newly dug, and besides being narrow and shallow, they had not been joined up in several places. The enemy bombardment was more or less severe every day, and on the 3rd Second Lieutenants C. S. Munro and J. Hunt were wounded, along with 16 Other Ranks, whilst three men were killed. About this time enemy snipers were very active along a ridge about 150 yards ahead, where they appeared to have established themselves. This ridge was on the south side of and abutted on the sunken road which ran from our line to GUILLEMONT. Part of this sunken road was held as a trench by the 2/5th Lancashire Fusiliers, who were thus enfiladed by the enemy snipers on the ridge and consequently had a considerable number of casualties daily, the losses among the Officers being especially heavy.

It was decided, therefore, to attack this ridge and establish a strong point there which would deny that ground to the enemy. This minor operation was considered important in view of the casualties mentioned and also because it would afford facilities for reconnoitring GUILLEMONT and the lines of approach, this being most essential in view of the contemplated general attack on the GUILLEMONT—MAUREPAS line.

At a conference held by the Brigadier with Major Crump and Major H. Parker, it was decided that Major Parker should carry out the operation with two strong platoons of D Company on the evening of the 5th of August; that under Brigade arrangements communication trenches (which were exceedingly narrow) should be kept clear to facilitate the movement of the troops taking part in the attack up to the front line; and that a barrage would be put down by the Divisional artillery who would also do counter-battery work.

When the attacking party commenced to move up to the starting-off place, it was found that the communication trenches had not been cleared as arranged, and it would have been impossible to get up in time by using them. The party therefore moved up over the open and managed to arrive in time, but, unfortunately, not till after dark.

Second Lieutenant A. Hague and his platoon attacked. The second platoon with consolidating material was kept in reserve in our front line, but the enemy was found to be in considerable force on the ridge, occupying a strong point, and a switch line running back towards Wedge Wood.

The attacking platoon encountered heavy rifle and machine gun fire, and our barrage brought down enemy artillery fire, which caused considerable loss to working parties in communication trenches. Three attacks in all were made, but finally the attempt had to be abandoned for that night. Second Lieutenant Hague was reported missing, two men were killed, and 25 wounded.

Major Parker subsequently reported to the Brigadier that he thought that he could attain his objective on the evening of the 6th August, provided he was allowed to attack at dusk without barrage but with only five minutes’ preparation with two Stokes’ Mortars, and this plan was assented to. The same troops were employed, having been brought up to strength. The attacking platoon, led by Lieutenant R. S. De Blaby, attacked at 20.30 hours. The attack was successful, the position was consolidated, and our troops were relieved by the 1/5th Liverpool Regiment just before dawn. During consolidation Major Parker went out with a patrol and located the enemy switch line, finding it heavily wired and strongly held.

The troops engaged in this operation rejoined the Battalion (which had been withdrawn to reserve) on the morning of the 7th August.

After a night in bivouacs, preparations were made to go over the ground prior to an attack on GUILLEMONT on the 8th. The Battalion returned to the line that night and assembled in trenches east and west of the road which ran south from the east corner of TRONES WOOD, C Company being detailed to consolidate the right of the enemy line and D Company the left on the west side of GUILLEMONT. A and B Companies acted in conjunction with the 1/4th Royal Lancasters and the 1/8th Liverpool Regiments respectively. The attack was not a success. The right was held up from the start by the switch line which had been reported by our patrol on the 6th, such report having been either overlooked or ignored, and the men had to fall back to the original line, though the 1/8th Liverpools went through the village on the left, and D Company of our Battalion commenced to consolidate, but were driven off by the enemy coming behind them and cutting them off from the Liverpools.

Considerable confusion was caused owing to the mist and the employment by the enemy of smoke bombs, the four platoons in reserve not being called upon for this reason, though all their officers were killed and they suffered many other casualties. The operation was a costly one. Nine Other Ranks were killed, 97 wounded, and 107 reported missing; whilst of the Officers, Captain E. M. Rennard and Captain H. Lindsay were killed, Second Lieutenants O. H. Ducksbury and J. H. Holden missing (afterwards found to be prisoners of war), and Lieutenants De Blaby and A. T. D. Evans and Second Lieutenants E. L. Fairclough and T. A. Bigger wounded. Lieutenant De Blaby died the following day.

On the 9th of August the remnant of the Battalion was relieved by one Company of the 1/5th South Lancashires and marched to bivouacs, where Lieutenant-Colonel Hindle again took over command.

Three days after coming out of the line a large permanent working party of 150 men, under Major Parker, proceeded to the trenches to the 2/5th Lancashire Fusiliers, who were also detailed for the same work, and on the 14th August Major Parker was wounded. The Brigade subsequently left the area. The Battalion which had been strengthened by drafts of 100 men from the Manchesters and one Officer and 110 Other Ranks from the East Lancashire Regiment, entraining at MERICOURT and detraining at ABBEVILLE, marched to billets in SAIGNEVILLE, via CAMBRON and GOUY. Here training proceeded on the usual lines, whilst a lecture was given to the Officers and N.C.O.’s of the Brigade by Major-General H. S. Jeudwine. The General used the tail of a cart as a platform—without warning it tipped up and sent him sprawling in the road. This was too much for the gravity of the troops—and of the General himself. No one laughed more heartily than he did as he picked himself up and resumed the thread of the lecture—this time from the ground level.

Battalion sports were held whilst the unit was at rest, and in the closing days of the month the Battalion returned by train to MERICOURT, marching to a camping ground at MILLENCOURT, whence Captain L. Duckworth went to hospital, whilst the Battalion again moved a short distance to another area, where all ranks were accommodated in tents. The total casualties for the month were 13 Officers and 289 Other Ranks. After a couple of days’ “rest” at MILLENCOURT, the Battalion was sent for instructional purposes to take over the left of an old Corps line trench running between the ALBERT—AMIENS road and the ALBERT—MILLENCOURT road. On relieving the 8th King’s Liverpool Regiment in the Corps line, the Battalion spent the night rehearsing the numerous phases of trench warfare, one Company building a “strong point.” The following day this was repeated, and some of the time was spent in wiring and patrolling. The Battalion was relieved by the 1/8th (Irish) King’s Liverpool Regiment on the night of September 3rd. Three days later the Battalion moved from MILLENCOURT to a camping ground near FRICOURT, where it was joined by Captain S. B. Donald, of the 5th East Kents (Buffs), and Captain C. B. Bolingbroke, of the 1/6th Norfolks. Orders to go into the trenches were received the following day, and the Battalion marched to MONTAUBAN where it was met by guides of the 8th Devons. The sector taken over by the Brigade extended from the eastern edge of DELVILLE WOOD in the direction of GINCHY, the 1/4th Loyal North Lancashires being in the front line alongside the 2/5th Lancashire Fusiliers, and the remainder of the Brigade in support. Captain C. H. Cockrill reported for duty from the 1/6th Norfolks on the 8th, on which day we had four killed and 19 wounded.

The DELVILLE WOOD battle started on the 9th September. The British artillery were in action all day, and at 4 p.m. the barrage started; at 4 45 the Division on our left attacked. Our objective was to capture HOP ALLEY with B and C Companies, whilst the Lancashire Fusiliers were to go over with us and take ALE ALLEY. At 5 25 the Battalion went over and the first objective—HOP ALLEY—was gained, but the second wave did not succeed in reaching ALE ALLEY, and as HOP ALLEY had become untenable under intense machine gun barrage and gunfire, the remnant of B and C Companies withdrew and fell back to their original line. Supporting Companies from the 1/8th King’s Liverpool Regiment and 1/4th Loyal North Lancashire Regiment were sent up to strengthen the lines, whilst working parties consolidated the position. Sergeant H. Farnworth was awarded the D.C.M. for work in this attack.

The casualties were heavy; amongst the 24 killed were Second Lieutenants W. E. Pyke and E. F. Falby, whilst, in addition to 125 men, Captains Donald and Bolingbroke, Lieutenant H. W. Strong, and Second Lieutenants W. V. Gray, P. Pollard, F. R. Vipond, C. H. Forshaw, and W. H. Berry were wounded. Under the heading of missing were the names of 79 of the rank and file. As the result of these heavy losses the Battalion was withdrawn from the front line to the supports and rested for the day. In the afternoon we stood-to in view of a possible attack by the enemy. Though remaining in support, the Battalion was moved 1,000 yards nearer the front line for the remainder of its stay until the 41st Brigade came up as relief on September 12th, when we marched to bivouacs near FRICOURT.

The customary routine was followed during the “rest,” during which a move was made to BUIRE. Brigadier-General Edwards handed over the Brigade to Brigadier-General C. I. Stockwell, who was quickly dubbed “Strafing Jimmy.” He was a good soldier, and his methods, though often resented by individuals, were effective. He continued to command the 164th Brigade till the Armistice.

On the 19th, after being ordered to go into the line at FRICOURT, where were the 1/8th King’s Liverpool Regiment, we were suddenly ordered to vacate the trenches and proceed to bivouacs at MAMETZ, where six days were spent in Company training, during which specially large working parties were employed in digging a communication trench through LONGUEVAL.

On the 24th a Battalion of the 165th Infantry Brigade was relieved by us in front of DELVILLE WOOD close to FLERS. On the 25th and 26th one Other Rank was killed and 22 wounded. On the latter day we relieved the 1/7th King’s Liverpool Regiment in GIRD TRENCH, close to GUEDECOURT. That day we had 17 wounded and 3 missing.

Following great activity by our artillery, the 164th Brigade attacked in the afternoon of the 27th, the Battalion being in support. The 8th Irish captured the part of GIRD SUPPORT still occupied by the enemy, and in the course of the evening we relieved the Irish in the captured trench, one Company occupying a sunken road running into GUEDECOURT. The casualties were very slight, but Second Lieutenant R. Forrest was killed and Second Lieutenant G. Duerden and 4 Other Ranks were wounded.

The following morning mist hung low over the battlefield, and when it cleared a large enemy party was observed to be digging-in along a line rather more than half a mile away. Rifle and machine gun fire was directed at them, and they ceased work abruptly after suffering a number of casualties. During the afternoon the enemy artillery retaliated, killing 6 men and wounding 30.

The 10th Royal West Kents relieved us on the 29th, and we went into billets at DERNANCOURT. Thus ended an eventful month, in which the Battalion had suffered somewhat heavily, the total casualties being 3 Officers and 33 Other Ranks killed, 9 Officers and 211 Other Ranks wounded, 82 Other Ranks missing, and 2 Officers and 54 Other Ranks sick.

CHAPTER V.
TRENCH WARFARE IN THE SALIENT: October 1st, 1916, to July 14th, 1917.

On the 1st October we left MANANCOURT and entrained at EDGE HILL, arriving in billets at L’ETOILE at 11 p.m. The following day we marched to LONGPRE, where we entrained for POPERINGHE, where we were billeted for the night. The next day we marched to BRANDHOEK, where we were in huts for the next few days, furnishing a daily working party to dig a cable trench near RIGERSBERG CHATEAU. During this period Second Lieutenant G. Duerden joined us again, and the following Officers as reinforcements:—Captain A. Walsh, Second Lieutenants G. Tong, F. C. Jenkinson, V. Mather, A. O. Knight, I. Haworth, F. L. Vernon, E. G. Faber, A. Bardsley, A. Ashton, E. E. Tweedale, H. Holden, H. Swaine, R. V. Reed, B. H. Williams, J. E. Ordish, R. Bissett, J. H. Ogden, and H. K. Vipond.