WAR SERVICES OF THE 62nd DIVISIONAL ARTILLERY.

WAR SERVICES
OF THE
62ND WEST RIDING
DIVISIONAL ARTILLERY

BY
Colonel A. T. ANDERSON, C.M.G.
(C.R.H. 62nd Division, 1916-1919),
Author of "The Field Gunner's Catechism," "A Short History
of Lucknow,"
With a Preface by
Lieut.-General Sir W. P. BRAITHWAITE, K.C.B.
W. HEFFER & SONS LTD.
CAMBRIDGE
1920

TO THE MEMORY OF OUR FALLEN COMRADES.

"As fighters with unequal lance we met,
Broken I lie,
And yet,
O Death, art thou the victor or am I?"

Mary Byron.

CONTENTS

PREFACE
By Lieut.-General Sir WALTER BRAITHWAITE, K.C.B.

Colonel Anderson has commenced his interesting record of the war services of the 62nd Divisional Artillery in January, 1917. He has, therefore, no word to say as to how the instrument he commanded so ably and with such distinction during two strenuous years of war came to attain the standard of excellence which the following pages attest.

It was in February, 1916, that Brig.-General Anderson and Capt. Lindsell, then serving at the Front, were selected to take over the Command and Brigade-Majorship respectively of the 62nd Divisional Artillery.

The Division was then at Salisbury Plain, and, without going into details, I would like to tender my tribute to the untiring devoted work accomplished by these two officers in training and fitting for war the Artillery of the Division I had the honour to command.

They had their reward when the time came that the instrument they had created was put to the test of war. It never failed to respond to their touch. The proud record it established is the best testimony to their teaching and training.

In the early part of 1917 I was asked to write a foreword for the Divisional Magazine, and in it I wrote that, given grit and discipline, there was nothing the Division could not accomplish. Grit the Yorkshireman has always possessed, discipline he learnt. I might have added a third desideratum—co-operation.

The event proved, however, that this virtue was not lacking. It is to these three great qualities I attribute the success of the Division. The Divisional Artillery knew that they existed for the purpose of helping the Infantry. The Infantry knew that they could depend on the Artillery in all circumstances and under all conditions.

There are many glorious episodes described in the following pages, many plain unvarnished tales of heroism, and much record of what, to the casual reader unacquainted with the conditions of life "out there," may appear to be commonplace drudgery.

All had their place in building up the reputation of the 62nd Divisional Artillery, and none were more important than others, or less.

The strain on the horses, the toil of the men in the never-ceasing "packing" of the ammunition to Miraumont, up the shell-swept road, past Shrapnel Corner, to the fire-desolated village, had its result and compensation in the advance to Bapaume and the capture of Achiet-le-Petit and Achiet-le-Grand.

The daily digging, the unceasing work on dug-outs and gun-positions in Ecoust, and in the Noreuil Valley, saved many a life and rendered possible the accurate service of the guns in the Battle of Bullecourt, and in the subsequent period of holding that much-strafed line.

The practice in driving and the training in open warfare found their consummation in that glorious advance of the batteries to Graincourt.

And then, after a year's hard work, came the first rest. In December, 1917, the gunners came out of the line for the first time, and hardly knew themselves!

January, 1918, saw the Division back in the line again in a comparatively peaceful sector with, however, as always, one bad spot—Bailleul, through which one never loitered.

But peaceful bits of the line were not the lot of the 62nd Divisional Artillery for long, and in March we were hurried down to Bucquoy. Here was no line, peaceful or otherwise, no prepared positions to take over, but the hurly-burly of battle, and positions to be chosen where they could be found. But what splendid targets!

After the battle came a period of holding the line again, in, I think, the most unpleasant sector we occupied, of which Essarts was the most unhealthy spot.

Then came a change. A quick train journey to the South and a rush into battle without time for proper reconnaissance, but with the willing and ready help of French and Italian comrades.

A quick change also to open warfare, and fighting in dense woods! But these variations affected not at all the Divisional Artillery except in so far as it stimulated the interest of officers and men.

The fighting in the Ardre Valley was indeed an experience we shall all look back upon with pride and with pleasure.

It was in the thick woods bordering the main road from Epernay to Rheims that the D.A.C. lost their show team of roans who fell victims to a bomb in that much bombed area. I can see now the distress on Fraser's face when he told me of the casualty. There were many other gallant four-footed friends who paid the toll of war there. If "the men both good and wise" are right we may yet hope "to give them joyous greeting when we pass the Golden Gate."

And so we come to the return journey, back again to the 4th Army Corps. I am glad to say my own especial pets, a very handsome pair of blacks in "A" Battery 310 Brigade, survived the bombs, and before long another battle and the beginning of the glorious end.

Indeed, had we but realised it at the time, the beginning had come, and we had participated in it, one of the only four British Divisions which had had the luck of that honour.

It was shortly after our return from Rheims that I left the 62nd Division for the 9th Army Corps, so I cannot speak from actual experience of the thrilling excitement and glorious successes which the Division achieved in the 2nd taking of Havrincourt, and in the other great battles which brought this long war to a triumphant conclusion. (I left just after the York and Lancasters made that thrilling bayonet charge in company with the King's Company of the Grenadier Guards on the heights near Mory.)

But the story of these culminating triumphs is told in the pages of this book, and it only remains for me to offer one or two remarks.

Three things, among others, seem to me to be especially worthy of note: the endurance of the personnel, the youth of the officers in command of batteries, the efficiency of the Territorial gunner and driver.

How often do we see the phrase, "The Infantry were withdrawn for a rest, the Artillery remaining, as usual, in the line covering the —th Division."

The periodical reliefs of Divisions hardly affected the gunner at all. It was a marvel to me how the various Divisional Artilleries managed to "stick it out." A day or two in the wagon lines now and then seemed all that was necessary to restore officers and men to full vigour and activity again. It was a triumph of endurance.

As the war progressed battery commanders became younger and younger. I remember once congratulating an officer on gaining command of a six-gun battery—he had just "put up" his crowns—and making some remark on his age, to be met with the retort, "I'm not so very young, Sir, I'm nearly 21."

I wonder what would have been thought of the prophet who, in 1913, had predicted that batteries would be commanded in the greatest of all wars by men of "nearly 21"!

I well remember, some years before the war, when the Territorial Force was first evolved, the utter scepticism expressed of the Territorial ever being able to be made into a gunner. Infantry yes, but gunners—! And a distinguished Colonel Commandant R.A., of the old school, told me, during 1916, that Territorial Force gunners might be all right during trench warfare, but that it was absurd to think that Territorial Force drivers would ever be able to bring the guns into position in a war of movement. The advance of the batteries to Graincourt at the Battle of Cambrai, the changes of position on the Ardre, and 100 other instances prove the fallacy of such gloomy prognostications.

Properly trained and instructed—and the 62nd Divisional Artillery was that—Territorial Force gunners and drivers proved themselves equal to all tasks set them. Higher praise it is impossible to bestow.

In the concluding paragraph of his book, Colonel Anderson writes of "the brotherhood of officers and men" and of "steadfast and loyal comradeship."

It was these virtues fostered and encouraged by men like the writer of this book, David Sherlock, Bedwell, Gadie, Woodcock, Lindsell, FitzGibbon, and many others, which enabled the 62nd Divisional Artillery to triumph over all obstacles, to achieve its deeds of valour, and to gain its brilliant successes for the glory of England and to the eternal honour of Yorkshiremen.

WALTER BRAITHWAITE,
Lieut.-General.
(A former Commander of the
62nd (West Riding) Division, T.F.)

February 7th, 1920.

Chapter I
THE FIRST ADVANCE

"Come, join in the only battle
Wherein no man can fail,
Where whoso fadeth and dieth
Yet his deed shall still prevail."

William Morris.

Jan. 1917.

On the 23rd December, 1916, the 62nd Division received orders to embark for France. The artillery, which was billeted in Northampton, was conveyed from Southampton to Havre on the 6th and 7th January, 1917, and thence railed to the concentration area at and around Wavans, near Auxi-le-Chateau. The weather was of the worst type that January can give, alternate frost and thaw and bitterly cold, and we began to experience at once the distressing conditions of mud and slush, which were to be so normal a feature in this and the two following winters in France and Belgium.

On the 17th January the 310th and 312th Brigades sent off one section per battery by motor lorry to be attached to the 19th Division, then in the firing line, for training preliminary to taking over finally their part of the line. It was a snowy, uncomfortable sort of day, and the lorries were, as so often happened, late in arriving, with the result that the detachments did not get started on their journey till about 3 p.m., and arrived at their destination after dark. Sections from the 311th Brigade followed the next day.

On the 23rd the Divisional Artillery marched to Auteuil and Amplieu, and remained in billets there for the next few days, the headquarters being at Bus-les-Artois. The first gunner casualty took place on the 24th, a gunner of the 312th Brigade being wounded on that day while attached to the 19th Division.

The next few days were spent by the Staffs of Headquarters and Brigades in inspecting the positions to be occupied by batteries in the neighbourhood of Courcelles, Mailly-mailly, Colincamps, and Engelbelmer, and in reconnoitring the observation posts on the high ground north of Beaumont Hamel. This village, like so many that we were now to become acquainted with, had been so thoroughly destroyed by shell fire, our own and that of the enemy, that one might easily have passed through it without realising that there had ever been a village there. All the ground in its neighbourhood was so deeply pitted with shell craters that it was almost impossible for a foot passenger even to find a pathway through them, there being rarely more than an inch or two of the original ground between each. The mud was, moreover, indescribable, and there was not only a risk of being badly bogged, but cases even occurred of men being engulphed and drowned in the viscous mud of a shell crater, and two of our artillery horses lost their lives in this way.

Feb. 1917.

On the night of the 1st February the 310th Brigade, and one battery of the 311th, went into action near Auchonvillers and Engelbelmer, and a few days later helped to support an attack by the 63rd Division, when the enemy was driven out of a part of the Pusieux trench and thereby forced to evacuate Grandcourt.

On the 10th the same batteries supported the 32nd Division in a successful assault on Ten Tree Alley; on this occasion we had the first casualty among our officers, Capt. H. C. Lasbrey being severely wounded.

The remainder of the batteries took over their positions in action from the 7th Division on the 11th and 12th February, as did our infantry during the following two days; and on the 15th I took over the artillery command. After a period of intense cold, during which the temperature fell below zero one night, a thaw set in this day, and the mud difficulty again became acute. Early on the 17th the 63rd Division on our immediate right attacked and captured the Swan trench north of Grandcourt, taking about 100 prisoners. The 311th Brigade did good work in this successful little operation, and I got a special message of thanks for their help from the G.O.C. 2nd Corps.

Arrangements were now in progress for a fresh attack, and, new positions having being selected on the western outskirts of Beaumont Hamel, the first sections of all the batteries moved into them on the 21st. The remainder was preparing to follow when, on the morning of Saturday, the 24th February, our patrols discovered that the enemy had vacated his line. The 5th Corps, to which we belonged, at once began a cautious advance, and on the 25th had occupied Serre and Miraumont, while the Division on our right pressed on into Pys. Strenuous efforts, which none who took part in them are likely to forget, were now made to push forward the guns, although the one road through Beaucourt to Miraumont was all but impassable. Officers and men worked with a will, and by the 28th all batteries were in action at the Bois d'Hollande and Baillescourt, while one section of the Ammunition Column was advanced to the neighbourhood of Hamel. Major R. C. Williams was wounded on this date, and had to leave us, a great loss to the Divisional Artillery.

March 1917.

It was now established that the Boche was holding the line Bucquoy—Achiet-le-Petit—Loupart, and it became necessary to advance the guns to closer range. Positions were accordingly reconnoitred in and around Miraumont, and every endeavour was made to occupy them as quickly as possible. By the 3rd of March most of the batteries were in their new positions, and the front infantry line on that date ran along the dry ditch from the East of Pusieux to the railway line about a mile N.E. of Miraumont. During the next week the forward move was completed in the face of indescribable difficulties. On the 3rd March, Lieut. H. A. Sabelli, and on the 5th Lieut. E. W. Jephson, were wounded, and two more officers were hit on the 6th, Lieuts. R. Holburn and J. MacIlroy. Major Swain had a fortunate escape; when his battery got into Miraumont he took up his quarters in a German dug-out, which boasted the luxury of a fireplace. His servant was about to light a fire, when Swain told him that he needn't bother about it that night. Next morning the man was laying the fire when he noticed a bit of wire; closer investigation showed a length of quick-match fastened to the wire and leading to a hole under the dug-out, in which was packed sufficient explosive to have blown the whole place sky-high. On the 5th, Divisional Headquarters moved to Engelsart, a hutted camp between Engelbelmer and Martinsart.

Miraumont was a particularly dangerous and unpleasant spot; the Bosche kept it continually under shell-fire, and also bespattered freely the one road which formed our communication with it. This road ran for over half-a-mile in full view of the enemy, and was in such a shocking state of disrepair that all ammunition had to be brought up on pack saddles, each horse or mule carrying eight rounds. The country on each side was such a slough of despond that it was generally impossible for pack animals to leave the road, and as all movements had to take place at night, the ammunition supply was a very serious problem. At least 4000 rounds were required for daily consumption, and I find in my diary that 1600 horse loads were sent up on the night of the 4th, in batches of 25 animals at ten minutes interval, and that only one man was hit in the process, although the road was constantly under fire. There was very little rest for any of the drivers, whether of the D.A.C. or of the batteries, and their zeal, endurance, and good temper were beyond all praise.

Just before the road enters Miraumont a sunken road runs to the left, honeycombed with dug-outs and occupied by one of our Infantry Brigade Headquarters; and on the right a steep path leads down into the valley. Here the three Colonels have their precarious shelters; sometimes things may be quiet for a short breathing space—more often they are just the reverse. On the 11th, all through the afternoon, and right on through the night, shells were exploding in this part of the valley on an average of one every two minutes. Not much damage was done, but the strain of it may be imagined on the nerves of those who have to live there without any adequate cover. The village is utterly destroyed, but has not disappeared. Walls and ruins still stand, sometimes as high as ten feet or so, and the streets are distinguishable. But it is not good to linger in them. Almost unceasingly in one part or another of the skeleton village shells scream and crash, raking the streets with bullets and splinters, and hurling bricks and beams in every direction. Here are to be found Swain's, Foot's, Bigg's, Arnold Forster's, Hudson's, and Robinson's batteries, the others being outside in the scarcely less dangerous outskirts of the village.

During the fighting in Miraumont, the losses in the Artillery amounted to 6 officers (Capt. F. H. Seeman gassed, in addition to those already mentioned) and about 70 other ranks, while a great many horses and mules were killed; nine guns were knocked out by Artillery fire. The strain on officers and men was very great; and although the latter were able to get some slight respite from danger, though not from hard work, by taking an occasional spell at the wagon lines, it was difficult to give any relief to the officers. I therefore started an experiment which was a great success for the short time in which it was possible for it to remain in operation. One of the less ruined houses in Mailly-mailly was commandeered and roughly fitted up as a rest house in charge of one of the trench mortar officers, the mortars not yet having been brought into action. It was arranged that three officers at a time should be accommodated here for a clear three days and nights, during which they would have nothing to do but take it easy and recoup themselves, away from the noise and stress of battle. The change was greatly appreciated by the few officers who were able to avail themselves of it before a further advance put an end to the scheme.

Irles was captured by the 18th Division, supported by our artillery, on the 10th March, and on the 14th the enemy was driven out of Grevillers and Loupart Wood. A plan of attack on Achiet-le-Petit was now drawn up, to take place at dawn on the 18th. Our preliminary bombardment, however, which began on the 16th and went on through the night, was too much for the Boche, and on the morning of Saturday the 17th March our infantry patrols entered the village and found it unoccupied. News came through the day of further successes. Bapaume had fallen, and Bucquoy, Biefvillers and Bihucourt were all in our possession. Hopes ran high, and there was general excitement and delight. Once more the batteries were ordered to push on as quickly as possible, and they moved forward into positions close to Achiet-le-Petit. The 7th Division now passed through us, and for a short time the 62nd Division ceased to take an active part in the fighting, though still continuing to advance. Advanced guards occupied Courcelles and Gomiecourt on the 18th, and the Lucknow Cavalry Brigade pressed on further and hung on to the heels of the retreating enemy. On the 21st, D/312 advanced at dawn and joined the 7th Division advanced guard at Ervillers, to help them in an attack on Croisilles, which the Boche was still holding. On this occasion we had our first officer killed, Lieut. C. W. Pullan; a shell burst in the observation post near St. Leger, from which he was gallantly directing the fire of his battery. A/312 and C/312 went into action the same day between Ervillers and St. Leger, also with the 7th Division, while the 310th Brigade remained in positions of readiness near Logeast Wood.

The 311th Brigade was withdrawn from the line on the 22nd March, on being converted into an Army Brigade, and marched from Engelbelmer on the 24th, en route for an area in the North. It was with great regret that I said farewell to this most efficient brigade, which, under the able command of Lieut.-Colonel A. Gadie, had done consistently good service, and had always given evidence of the finest fighting spirit under the most trying conditions.

On the 27th March the 310th Brigade moved up into action in support of the 7th Division before Croisilles, and were followed four days later by B/312, so that all batteries were then again active.

April 1917.

On the 1st April, Divisional Headquarters moved to Achiet-le-Grand, and next day, to the accompaniment of a blizzard of snow, the 7th Division captured the villages of Croisilles and Ecoust, supported by the 62nd Divisional Artillery in addition to their own guns. In this fight Lieut. E. W. F. Jephson was awarded the Military Cross for the following act of gallantry:—

"On the 2nd April, 1917, during an attack on Ecoust, this officer was sent forward with an orderly to reconnoitre for an O.P. On his way forward two runners of the Gordon Highlanders were fired at by a German sniper in a post. One was shot dead. The other runner, Lieut. Jephson, and orderly procured bombs from some wounded men, and crept up to the post from behind some fallen trees, and bombed the sniper, severely wounding him. Lieut. Jephson then went on through Ecoust with the orderly, when he discovered sniping from his right rear. He then returned another way and saw three Germans running into a cellar, which he approached. After he had fired some revolver shots into the cellar, they came out when ordered. One of these prisoners was taken off as a guide to the infantry, the other two being brought back by Lieut. Jephson. He did good work at the O.P. previous to moving forward out of Ecoust."

The enemy was now firmly posted in his much advertised Hindenburg Line, and as he showed every intention of holding on to it after his long retreat, it became necessary to get all batteries forward to within about 2500 yards range, in order to start wire cutting. The Ecoust valley area was apportioned to my artillery, and the batteries began to occupy positions there on the 3rd April. This was a work of great difficulty and danger as the approaches were in view of the enemy, and the positions themselves were barely concealed. As the first section of B/312 were coming into action a shell completely knocked out one of the detachments, killing five men and wounding three.

On the 5th our infantry again went into the line, and I took over command of the artillery, which included, in addition to my own brigades, the 7th D.A., the 16th R.H.A. Brigade, and an Anzac Brigade. That afternoon a mine exploded in Mory, killing one and wounding two of my men, and also wounding some artillery mules. In the evening a similar mine went off in Ervillers with disastrous effect, killing five and wounding seven men of D/312. These mines, which we often met with later, were worked by a corrosive acid, acting on a wire holding a spring hammer; when the acid had eaten through the wire, which might be within a period ranging from a few hours to several weeks, according to the relative strengths of the acid and the wire, the hammer struck a detonator, and the mine exploded; a typically Hunnish method of warfare.

For the next few days guns were actively employed in wire cutting, and the enemy responded by a vigorous shelling of the valley. Capt. J. Willey and 14 men of B/310 were wounded on the 7th, and between the 6th and the 9th three other officers were hit, Major F. A. Arnold Forster, and Lieuts. P. K. B. Reynolds and H. C. Ashby. Five Military Medals were awarded for gallant work on these days.

On the 9th April the Third and First Armies on our left began a big forward movement, to be known as the Battle of Arras, and by the evening of the 13th they were in possession of the Vimy Ridge and the whole of the Wancourt branch of the Hindenburg Line, and had taken about 16,000 prisoners, together with a large number of guns and mortars. Our share in the operations was to make holding attacks and to keep as many of the enemy as possible glued to our front. One of the trench mortar batteries, V/62, was lent to the 51st Division, and took part in the capture of the Vimy Ridge. On the last day of the battle C/312 suffered heavily, losing the Sergeant-Major, three Sergeants, and four other ranks killed, eight men wounded and four guns knocked out.

Capt. G. L. C. Hudson was wounded on the 13th, and Lieut. K. B. Nicholson on the 14th; the latter officer was awarded the Military Cross for the following services:

"On the 13th April, 1917, Lieut. K. B. Nicholson entered a dug-out in which both a gas shell and a high explosive shell had burst, and bravely attempted to save the men inside. Later on in the day, though suffering from the effects of the gas, he went to the O.P. with the Battery Commander, and while under heavy shell fire volunteered to go back over the wire, thereby keeping up communication with the battery. The following day, while still suffering from the gas, he again repaired to the O.P. under heavy gas fire, remaining there until he was finally wounded in the head by a fragment of high explosive shell. By his actions on the days under review this gallant officer showed a fine example of devotion to duty."

Our casualties in the artillery up to this date amounted to 14 officers and about 150 other ranks.

My command was now largely increased, with a view to further operations, by the addition of the 11th and the 58th Divisional Artilleries, which went into action near St. Leger and Ecoust respectively. This brought the artillery with the 62nd Division to a strength of 180 18-pounder guns and 48 howitzers.

Early on the 15th the Huns made a determined counter-attack against the Australian Division on our right. At first it was completely successful; the enemy broke through as far as Noreuil and Lagnicourt, and for a short time was actually in possession of two brigades of the Australian artillery. At about 8 a.m., however, the Anzacs made a magnificent recovery, and hurled the enemy back to his original line, retaking their guns and capturing about 400 prisoners. Over a thousand German corpses were left on the field. While all this was going on my batteries were subjected to heavy shell fire, and suffered many casualties. In one of the batteries of the 58th Division the losses were particularly severe, three officers being killed and one wounded. I sent one of the brigades of the 11th Division to reinforce the Anzacs directly the attack commenced, and this was retained after the battle, and therefore left my command.

On the 16th Lieut.-Colonel F. A. Woodcock arrived to command the D.A.C. vice Lieut.-Colonel F. Mitchell, who had gone to England.

For some time past the weather had been very inclement, and the unvarying cold and damp, added to the strain of heavy work and constant danger night and day, was having its inevitable effect on the physical powers, though not on the fighting spirit, of the officers and men behind the guns; and, it should be added, of the officers and men of the D.A.C., whose work in these operations had been of a most strenuous and perilous nature.

The men fall asleep while working at the guns. For nine or ten weeks now they have worked without a rest, and it is a question whether human endurance can go much further. They fire day and night, and when not firing they are staggering through the mud carrying up ammunition; they have no shelter except what they can dig in the ground, and no sooner have they dug a resting place than the batteries have to move to a fresh position. And the weather is beyond words abominable. If it isn't raining it's snowing, and it's impossible to keep anything dry; nothing but cold, squalor, and hideous discomfort. And yet they stick it out with the utmost courage and cheerfulness, and fight splendidly.

It was impossible to relieve the artillery as a whole, but as it was now decided to make no serious attack for at least a fortnight, I obtained authority to keep 50 per cent. of my command at rest in the wagon lines during this period, and this measure did something to relieve the strain. The horses, too, had suffered severely; about five per cent. had been killed, and ten per cent. had died of over work and debility, twenty per cent. having been sent away for the same reason. As the Veterinary authorities, who naturally knew more of the condition of the animals than of the circumstances which had brought them into so low a state, showed a disposition to attribute the state of affairs to indifferent horsemastership, I was glad when the Army Commander, Sir H. de la P. Gough, inspected my wagon lines on the 21st April. He expressed himself as perfectly satisfied with all he saw, and was most cordial and pleasant. It was a great relief to Brigade and Battery Commanders, who had been much harassed during a time of great anxiety by the criticisms referred to above, to know that the Army Commander had now seen for himself that everything possible was being done.

For the rest of the month little occurred of special interest; preparations were being made for a further attack against the Hindenburg Line, and meanwhile the now familiar form of trench warfare was carried on from trenches about 200 yards apart. The Ecoust Valley was still a far from healthy spot, though batteries improved their cover day by day by incessant building and digging; and at times the Boche turned his attention to the wagon lines as well. On the 18th the 310th lines were badly shelled, when two men were killed and seven wounded, and several horses were lost. Lieut. G. P. Senior was wounded (gassed) on the 24th, and on the 28th four more officers were hit, Lieuts. C. T. Lutyens, S. C. Ball, R. Forrest, and J. W. Proctor. Five Military Medals were awarded during this period, and the Military Cross was gained by Lieut. J. C. F. Nowill.

"On the evening of the 26th April, 1917, near Ecoust, the camouflage covering a large ammunition dump at the battery position was set ablaze by hostile shell fire. Lieut. Nowill, single-handed, removed the burning mass from the dump and extinguished it, at very great personal danger from the burning ammunition which was exploding in large quantities. By his gallantry and prompt action he undoubtedly stopped the explosions from spreading through the whole dump."

On the 25th, Lieut.-Colonel G. R. V. Kinsman, D.S.O., left, much to the regret of us all, to take up the duty of Artillery Instructor at Shoeburyness; he was succeeded by Lieut.-Colonel D. J. C. Sherlock, D.S.O.

Now, and afterwards, efforts were constantly being made by which to vary the monotony of trench warfare, and to make things more lively for the Huns; as an example, I select the following instance. On the 27th April, at a given time, two howitzer batteries put "stops" on selected portions of the enemy's support line about 200 yards apart. Then on the trench thus enclosed three batteries opened a rapid fire of gas and smoke shell, the object being to smoke the occupants out of their dug-outs. After five minutes of this treatment two more batteries opened with shrapnel on the only trench which could be used by the enemy if he tried to escape to the rear—this, of course, in the hope of getting some of them as they retired. The whole thing went off like clockwork, and the fire was most accurate. As to the amount of damage done, that must remain a matter of conjecture, as it was impossible to see into the trenches. In this case, as always in such experiments, one could but hope for the best.

May 1917.

All arrangements having been made for an attack on Bullecourt under an artillery barrage, Divisional Headquarters moved up on the 2nd May to an advanced position north of Ervillers. The attack was launched early on the 3rd as part of a big operation in which altogether fourteen divisions took part. Our infantry advanced under a barrage at 3.45 a.m., and broke through the Hindenburg Line at Bullecourt. The enemy was, however, in great strength, and his position was an extraordinarily formidable one. Although our men managed to get through and beyond the village, they were then checked by numerous machine guns firing from concrete emplacements, and were finally forced back again through Bullecourt by a strong counter-attack. The Division suffered very heavy losses, and the results of the battle did not come up to our high expectations; but, none the less, substantial progress had been made, and at the end of the action we were able to hold on to and consolidate a good slice of the village of Bullecourt, together with about 2000 yards of the Hindenburg front line to the east of it. It was hard that our first battle should have been so costly in life and so apparently unfruitful in results, but our sorely tried infantry had proved their mettle, and had shown that magnificent spirit in the face of appalling odds which, in the Homeric battles which were still to come, was so often to spur them on to victory.

Lieut. C. Punchard was wounded (gas) on the 7th, and Lieuts. G. H. Kitson and C. V. Montgomery were wounded on the 12th and 13th respectively.

On the 14th May there was a readjustment of the line, the 7th Division taking over the Bullecourt front and the Hindenburg trench to the South-East, while the 62nd Division became responsible for the sector from Bullecourt for about 2400 yards to the North-West. This entailed a general shuffle of the artillery, my own brigades coming under the 7th Division, while the guns of the 7th remained under my command. On this same night the 310th Brigade was subjected to a more than usually heavy bombardment; over two thousand gas shells fell among the batteries, and we lost five gunners killed, and about 12 wounded. On the 15th, Lieuts. A. J. Edwards and E. W. Jephson were wounded, the latter for the second time.

On the 16th May, Lieut.-Colonel E. P. Bedwell left the Division, invalided home. His services had been invaluable, and I fully shared the sorrow which all ranks of his brigade felt at his departure. He had trained and commanded this brigade, the 312th, from the earliest days of its formation, and might fairly claim to have made it; it must have been a great satisfaction to him to see how well its performances in France had repaid his care. I am glad to say that he recovered his health and was able to take his place again in the fighting line later on, though not in the 62nd Division. Major F. H. Lister took over the command of the brigade, with the acting rank of Lieut.-Colonel.

Both sides now settled down to deliberate trench warfare, a state of things which entailed constant work of a dangerous and harassing nature, but which furnished few outstanding incidents of sufficient interest to be chronicled. On the 26th May a sad disaster occurred in D/312 Howitzer Battery. The camouflage over one of the howitzers caught fire and blazed up. It was merely a question of a few moments when the flames should reach the ammunition and cause a terrible explosion, but there was a slight chance of the fire being put out in time, and Capt. H. B. Gallimore, who was temporarily commanding the battery, with Lieut. G. Hardy and a party of N.C.O.'s and men, made a gallant attempt to extinguish the flames. Unfortunately their efforts were vain, and there was a tremendous explosion. Poor Gallimore was killed, and also ten others (including all the six "Numbers One" of the battery), while Hardy was dangerously wounded, and also five gunners more or less severely. The loss of two such officers and six of the most valuable N.C.O.'s was a very serious blow to D/312, but the splendid act of devotion, in which they sacrificed their brave young lives, conferred a lustre not only on their own battery, but on the whole of the Divisional Artillery, and will not soon be forgotten. Hardy, unhappily, died of his wounds on the 28th.

The casualties in the artillery up to this date had been:

3 officers and 72 other ranks killed.
23 officers and 256 other ranks wounded.

On the 29th May our infantry was withdrawn from the line for a rest, and I therefore ceased to command the artillery tactically; it remained in the line in support of the 58th Division.

It was a great disappointment to me that the artillery could not be withdrawn for a rest after all its strenuous work since coming into action. The promise of rest in the near future had long been dangled before our eyes, but the plain fact was that guns could not be spared from the firing line, and although the Commander-in-Chief, in a confidential circular issued about this time, showed that he "fully realised the untiring energy of the artillery during the first half of the year," still he was unable to hold out any hopes of relaxation, and could only "rely upon all ranks to continue their good work ungrudgingly." His reliance was well founded, for all ranks accepted the situation loyally, and learned now, and I may add for the rest of the war, to do without rest, and to "stick it" somehow or other even when it might have been truly said that

"there was nothing in them
"Except the will that said to them, Hold on."

I think that all realised the impossibility of reducing the number of guns in front of the enemy, and one scarcely ever heard a word of grumbling, but it is well that the fact should be placed on record that the artillery practically never got a rest. Their work was not perhaps so much in the public eye as that of their gallant comrades in the infantry, nor did they experience as a rule the same extremes of danger, but it should be remembered that, while the latter were periodically withdrawn from the danger zone after about eight days in the trenches to rest billets miles behind the firing line, the men behind the guns endured the dirt and discomfort of the trenches for months at a time, were never safe day or night from hostile shell fire, and were constantly hard at work. Only perhaps those who have actually served in a battery in war-time can realise the amount of hard work and nerve strain involved in keeping up even the normal programme of day and night firing, the map readings and calculations to be worked out by the officers in a damp dug-out by the light of a guttering candle, the long spells of duty to be endured by the weak gun detachments always under strength through sickness and casualties, the heart-breaking and back-breaking labours of keeping up the ammunition supply, and with it all the constant sense of an ever-brooding danger. That all sorts and conditions of men should have endured this kind of existence for several years, cheerfully and without a murmur, seems to me a more wonderful phenomenon than even the most dramatic act of individual gallantry.

The following honours were announced on the 30th May:—

Major G. Fleming, Legion of Honour.
Major G. A. Swain, Croix de Guerre.

Chapter II
JUNE TO OCTOBER, 1917. TRENCH WARFARE

"The thundering line of battle stands,
And in the air Death moans and sings."

Julian Grenfell.

June 1917.

In the next few weeks trench warfare pursued its monotonous course—long periods, as it has been aptly said, of unutterable boredom varied by moments of inexpressible terror—but June was, on the whole, the quietest month the Division had in France. On the 15th the Divisional Headquarters at Achiet-le-Grand was shelled by a 15-inch gun firing from a range of about 20 miles. Two or three shells burst within 50 yards of our mess, but the only casualties were one of my clerks and my Reconnaissance Officer Anderson's servant, both slightly wounded. On the 19th orders came for the Division to go into the line again, relieving the 20th Division on the front opposite Riencourt and Quéant, a side slip of a mile or two to the right of our old position. The artillery were all in their new positions by the 22nd, on which date I reassumed command, moving my headquarters to the Monument Camp on the Sapignies-Bapaume road.

I received the following letter from the G.O.C.R.A. 58th Division:—

"The B.G.R.A. 58th Division wishes to express his gratitude and appreciation to all ranks of the 62nd Divisional Artillery, whom he has had the honour to have under his command during the past month.

"Despite heavy shelling of their positions and continual firing night and day, they have never failed to respond quickly and efficiently to every call which he has made upon them, and it has been largely due to their excellent and energetic shooting that the operations which have just concluded have attained the measure of success which has come their way.

"All ranks of the 58th Divisional Artillery unite in thanking the 62nd Divisional Artillery for all their help, and wish them the best of luck.

"E. J. R. PEEL,
"Brig.-General."

The 310th Brigade were now in positions in the Noreuil Valley, which had been given not inaptly the name of the Valley of Death, and the 312th in the neighbourhood of Lagnicourt. Early in the morning of the 25th they supported a successful little raid made by our infantry on the Boche front line south of Riencourt. No prisoners were taken unfortunately, but the infantry found several dead bodies, killed by our artillery fire.

We now began to get the trench mortars into action. Up till this time they had not had much chance of proving their value, although the personnel had done much useful work in helping the D.A.C. with the ammunition supply. They were now to take up their legitimate rôle in the front trenches.

On the 26th D/312 underwent a severe shelling, but although two howitzers were badly hit, no men were hurt.

About this time I used often to go round the O.P.'s in my spare time, and to test the quickness of the different batteries in getting off a round on a trial call of S.O.S. I considered it distinctly good if a battery opened fire within 40 seconds of getting the call, but as time went on most of them became extraordinarily quick to answer, and I well remember my satisfaction when, during a walk round the O.P.'s in company with General Benson, Commanding the 5th Corps Artillery, we tried a few S.O.S. tests, and one of my batteries got off the answering round in 17 seconds. I think that the record time was nine seconds, the battery that reached it being C/310, then in position in the Noreuil Valley.

July 1917.

On the 2nd July I was returning from one of these tours, and, calling on my way back at the 310th Brigade Headquarters, which were then in a sunken road just N.W. of Noreuil, I found that a few minutes before my arrival a 4.2-inch shell had penetrated and burst inside a small shelter in the trench, killing four men and wounding three—all, of my special little R.A.R.E. company. The place was a shambles when I went into it. It was a particularly distressing affair, as there was a good and equally handy dug-out just beside the one that had suffered, fit to withstand any number of 4.2-inch shells; and these poor fellows had selected a place with no more protection than a corrugated iron roof.

I have not mentioned the R.A.R.E. company before. It was an unauthorised formation, not to be found, that is to say, in any official manual, and was made up of eight sappers from the Divisional R.E., together with about ten men from each brigade and from the D.A.C. The company was thus brought up to an establishment of about 40 men, and was commanded by a Royal Engineer officer. We called it the R.A.R.E. Company, and its duties were to supervise generally the work of building gun emplacements, stables, shelters, dug-outs, etc., and to carry out itself any works demanding skilled labour. I was most fortunate in being given the services of Lieut. E. B. Hammond, M.C., R.E., as its first commander. He took the keenest interest in his work and inspired all his men with his own zeal and energy; and his cheery personality, and unfailing tact and good humour ensured him a warm welcome from every battery he visited, and the cordial co-operation, moreover, of those who, at the inception of the scheme, might have been inclined to resent the taking away of even a few men from their depleted batteries. It did not take long to convince any such doubters of the immense utility of this small body of men. From working with the eight skilled sappers, the gunners and drivers furnished from the brigades gradually became skilled workers themselves, and the company proved such an invaluable addition to my command from this date until the final breaking up of the division in the Army of Occupation, that I do not know how the D.A. could ever have got on without it. It was a great blow when Hammond left us in January, 1918, on appointment as Adjutant R.E., but our luck still held good, and the work was carried on most efficiently by Lieut. C. L. Clarson, M.C., his successor.

On the 5th July Lieut.-Colonel Lister left the Division on appointment to the Staff at G.H.Q., and was succeeded in command of the 312th Brigade by Lieut.-Colonel A. T. Lough, who joined on the 9th.

Major-General W. P. Braithwaite, our Divisional Commander, inspected the D.A.C. on the 7th. The General always took the greatest interest in his artillery, and was a constant visitor to one or other of the units, and I only mention this particular occasion because I noted at the time, and well remember, what a really splendid turn-out we saw that day. I don't believe there was a better ammunition column in France. Lieut.-Colonel Woodcock, though not an old Regular officer himself, shared to the full the conviction held by most Regulars, that the smartest and best turned out troops are almost invariably the hardest workers and the best fighters, that in fact the one virtue leads automatically to the other. He had the happy knack, too, of getting the last ounce of work out of his subordinates without any unpleasantness in the process. In writing a record of artillery work it is inevitable that the performances of the batteries which do the actual fighting should come in for more frequent mention than the less showy, but equally indispensable and arduous, services of the D.A.C. Let me take this opportunity, therefore, of recording that the 62nd D.A.C. never failed me. As the war went on the daily expenditure of ammunition grew greater and greater, and at times the demands made on the column seemed almost impossible of fulfilment. Yet I can recall no instance when the amount of ammunition required was not punctually to hand. Colonel Woodcock was fortunate in his three Section Commanders, Captains Fraser, Kewley, and (for the greater part of the war) Edmondson. They were always cheery and willing, however difficult and depressing the circumstances might be, and they infected the N.C.O.'s and men under their command with the same spirit of cheeriness and good-will.

At about this date the 5th Corps Staff left, and was replaced by that of the 6th, to which corps we consequently now belonged.

Lieut. J. A. Brown was wounded on the 7th, and Lieut. R. L. Pickard on the 11th July.

V/62 (Trench Mortar Battery), which had recently gone into action near Bullecourt, took part in some successful minor operations towards the end of July, at Hargicourt and Epehy, with the 34th and 35th Divisions respectively, and had three men wounded.

During the second half of July the activity of the hostile artillery increased considerably. On the 17th three officers were wounded, Lieuts. H. C. O. Lawrie, E. H. Vanderpump, and T. B. Wills, and three guns of B/310 were put out of action. On the next day the Noreuil Valley again came in for a severe shelling, chiefly directed on the advanced section of A/310, which had one of its guns knocked out, but no casualties in its personnel.

The Army Commander, Sir Julian Byng, visited some of the batteries in the right sector on the 19th, and also one or two of the O.P.'s. He expressed himself as much pleased with all he saw.

On the 22nd A/312 was heavily shelled in its position just west of Lagnicourt, and had two guns put out of action. C/312 was bombarded the same night for several hours in the village of Morchies; not much harm was done, but the guns were shifted next day to a garden in the village which afforded better cover from the view of the Boche observation balloons. Morchies showed signs of having once been as pretty a village as could be seen in France, and must have been a charming spot before the Boche left his obscene trail there. At this time it was a shameful ruin, wantonly and brutally destroyed by the Huns when they retired through it a few months before. The numerous fruit trees had all been barked or uprooted, and most of the destruction in the village, both indoors and out, had obviously been done purposely and malignantly, and not by our, or the enemy's, shell fire. Of course this was only one out of hundreds of such cases, but Morchies must have once been so pretty and simple, and so aloof, that one felt an especial sense of outrage in seeing the hateful treatment to which it had been subjected. I used to wish that some of our pacifists could be brought out to see it.

On the 24th A/310 was again plentifully bespattered with shell, but so well were the guns and detachments protected that the net result of several hours bombardment was only two men wounded, and one gun wheel broken. Fortunately we were able to spot one of the batteries responsible for these recent annoyances, and on the 25th July Major Foot's battery, D/310, engaged this 5.9-inch battery with aeroplane observation. The shoot was a very successful one; several direct hits on the guns were recorded, and two emplacements were blown up with their ammunition. As a rule the batteries that annoyed us were firing from such a long range that they had to be dealt with by our heavy artillery, and it was a great satisfaction to us all when we were able to have a smack at them ourselves.

Aug. 1917.

On the 3rd August the Division made a side slip to the left, our left sector now becoming our right; for the new left sector we took over the rather unpleasant piece of trench (the old Hindenburg line) which ran from due south of Riencourt to about 500 yards west of Bullecourt, and which included the latter village. On this readjustment the 35th Brigade, of the 7th Division, was added to my command, in positions in the Ecoust valley. I moved two batteries of the 312th Brigade across into the same valley, while A and C/312 remained on the Lagnicourt side temporarily.

About this time we heard from a prisoner that part of the artillery acting against our front was the 49th Field Artillery Regiment; "but we call it," he said, "the 48½th, because they never quite reach their target, and are always firing into their own trenches." This was satisfactory hearing; at the same time we were uncomfortably aware that they managed to reach their targets rather more often than their own infantry seemed to suppose.

Good news reached us on the 4th from the Ypres front of 6000 prisoners having been taken and St. Julien occupied. Operations had, however, been brought to a standstill in the north by the vile weather; really it seemed as though the elements were always on the side of the Powers of Darkness.

Lieut. A. G. Bennett was wounded on the 8th August.

On about this date one of my trench mortar batteries went into action in Bullecourt.

They are in a ruin in the middle of the village. You get to them by first entering an old cellar in another ruin, and then scrambling down a sloping tunnel to an underground chamber about 30 feet below the surface of the ground. Here the detachment live. Then you crawl up another tunnel, and emerge into the ruin which holds the mortar emplacements.

I think that the trench mortar batteries had, on the whole, while they were in action, the most uncomfortable and dangerous job of any troops in the line. The infantry, while recognising their great value, objected not unnaturally to have such favourite objects of the enemy's attentions in any position near their dug-outs or much frequented trenches; and, as it was necessary that the mortars should be sited as close as possible to the enemy's front line, and yet, for the above reason, not too near the infantry, it followed that the only available positions were usually in unpopular spots shunned by all who had any choice in the matter, and generally bearing such significant titles as Hell Fire Point, V.C. Corner, Deadman's Gulley, etc. The unfortunate detachments lived underground for practically the whole of their tour of duty, as it was often impossible to get to and from their emplacements during the daylight; and, owing to shortage of men, their tours of duty were generally two or three times as long as those of the infantry. When I went to visit them, I could nearly always promise myself an exciting walk with plenty of thrills in it. I retain lively recollections of crawling with Lindsell or Anderson, guided by Powell, the D.T.M.O., along shallow trenches, or places where trenches had been before they were demolished, and finally diving down into the ground to find ourselves, when the eyes got used to the subterranean darkness, in the midst of a party of smiling jolly looking gunners. They were a cheerful lot, and, after all, they had their compensations. There were times when there was no scope for the use of trench mortars, and then they would sometimes get a rest for several weeks at a time, in some pleasant billet well back from the firing line; and when they did get a rest, it was well deserved.

On the 11th August C/312 was accurately bombarded, and lost two men killed and two wounded. The casualties up to this date amounted to

3 officers and 80 other ranks killed.
28 officers and 292 other ranks wounded.

C/310 came in for a tremendous bombardment on the 15th. For a long time shells were bursting in the position at the rate of about two a minute, chiefly 5.9-inch, varied by an occasional 8-inch. The detachments took refuge in their deep dug-out, and were able to laugh at the Boche's efforts, the effects of which were very slight considering the severity of the bombardment. One gun was buried, but subsequently dug out undamaged; another was blown out of its pit, but though the carriage was knocked to atoms the piece itself was still quite serviceable. At least 400 shells had fallen in and around the battery, and the ground was churned up into huge craters, many dead bodies being exhumed from their graves and scattered about. We felt that the Huns had not got good value on this occasion for the four thousand pounds which, at the very least, the expenditure of ammunition must have cost them.

On the 18th the 6th Corps held an admirably managed horse show at Bihucourt, which gave great enjoyment to a large concourse of officers and men. The artillery competitors came from six divisional artilleries, and we were remarkably successful, gaining the following events:—

Tent-pegging for Officers—1st prize (Major Swain).
Tent-pegging for other ranks—1st prize (B.S.M. Howes of the D.A.C.).
Gun Team—3rd prize.
Pair of Light Draught Horses—1st prize.
G.S. Wagon and Pair—2nd prize.
Team of Mules—3rd prize.

I may mention that all the three prizes for officers' chargers were won by the division, going to Lieut.-Colonel Hore-Ruthven V.C., Major-General Braithwaite, and Lieut. C. Newman respectively; the second of these was a particularly popular win.

By this time the science of protective building and digging had been brought to a wonderful state of perfection in the batteries, as was evidenced by the remarkably small number of casualties caused by the enemy's constant shelling. Rarely a day passed but that the Noreuil and Ecoust valleys were under fire, and the former valley in particular presented an extraordinarily sinister appearance. It was thickly pitted with deep shell craters along its whole length, and a casual visitor would have found it hard to believe that any human beings could go on living in such a shell-swept area. Further investigation would however have shown that beneath all this desolation an active and busy underground existence was being carried on. The gun positions were camouflaged to appear like the surrounding ground, or disguised to represents heaps of debris, and were generally strongly enough protected to resist the impact of a 4.2-inch shell; and from every position at least two stairways led deep down into the ground to a network of passages and sleeping chambers from 30 to 40 feet below the surface. Where all the positions were so good, it would be difficult to discriminate between them, but perhaps the palm should be given to D/310. The Battery Commander, Major R. C. Foot, was a mining engineer by profession, and two of his subalterns, Lieuts. Currie and Casey, had been students with him at the same engineering college; their experience was of great value in a case of this sort, and their scientifically constructed position in a sunken road just north-west of Noreuil was a model of what a position should be, and was visited with great interest by many senior officers of other divisions as well as of our own.

Concealment from view was daily becoming more and more impossible. The enemy's balloons were so numerous, and were poised at so great an altitude, that very few depressions on the ground were deep enough to conceal emplacements from one or another of them. But, in addition to this, as the science of sound ranging was brought to greater and greater perfection, concealment became less and less useful, and overhead protection became the most important consideration. We now adopted a practice which was henceforth followed when possible throughout the war. Each battery had a main position, the guns of which remained silent except in combined "strafes," when every gun in the line was firing; when this happened the gun flashes were so numerous and continuous along the whole front that it was almost impossible for observers in the hostile balloons to take accurate bearings to any one battery, and sound ranging also was impracticable. For the ordinary routine shooting each battery kept an advanced section; this could be moved with comparative ease if the Boche artillery should make the position too hot, and in any case it is more difficult to spot two guns than six, and harder to hit them when found.

On the 21st August B/310 and C/312 were bombarded for several hours by 5.9 and 8-inch howitzers; although a tremendous weight of metal was poured into the positions, no material damage was done, and only two men were wounded.

On the 23rd and 24th the 35th Brigade was withdrawn from my command, and a readjustment of batteries had to be made. The 310th continued to cover the right, or Noreuil, sector, and the left, or Bullecourt, sector fell to the 312th. A/312 consequently moved from Lagnicourt to the Ecoust Valley; to our great delight the Boche threw about 400 rounds into the empty position the day after the battery had cleared out of it.

Sept. 1917.

On the 4th and 6th September the Noreuil valley was again heavily shelled; on the first of these dates A/310 had two guns knocked out, but suffered no loss to personnel; on the 6th the fire was directed on B/310 and C/310; one man was killed and one wounded, but no damage whatever was done to material. Capt. J. G. Robinson was awarded the Military Cross in connection with the above:

"On the 4th September, near Vaulx, the battery position was very heavily shelled. Capt. Robinson, having got his men into safety, endeavoured to locate the hostile battery by compass bearing. Later on, noticing that the camouflage of the two gun pits had caught fire, he, with Sergt. Rider and Gunner Charlesworth, left cover, and proceeded to extinguish the fires and to recover the gun pits with camouflage. As the shelling continued and the dial sights had not been removed from the guns, he again went out and removed four of them. All this was done under very heavy fire and at great personal risk. He showed very great gallantry and coolness, and set a fine example to the rest of the battery."

On the 10th the trench mortars in Bullecourt carried out one of their periodical bombardments of the Boche trenches and knocked them about handsomely. The enemy turned a number of batteries of varying calibres on to the mortar emplacements and put one mortar out of action. Corporal W. Settle, who was in charge of one of the mortars, behaved with great gallantry. He was almost buried by an explosion, and his coat was literally riddled, with at least 30 rents and holes, though in some miraculous way he escaped unwounded. In spite of this he stuck to his work until the shoot was finished. He got the Military Medal, but, to my great sorrow, was killed five days later at Cherisy.

At the beginning of September the G.S.O.I. of the Division, Lieut.-Colonel the Hon. A. Hore-Ruthven V.C., left us on transfer to the Guards Division, much to the regret of us all. He was succeeded by a Gunner, Lieut.-Colonel C. R. Newman, D.S.O.

On the night of the 11th our infantry carried out a successful little raid on the Star Cross Roads, about quarter of a mile S.W. of Riencourt. The guns bombarded the trench from 11.10 to 11.15 p.m., and then formed a box barrage round the cross roads for quarter of an hour, while the infantry walked in; they bombed the dug-outs, did as much destruction as they could, and returned with four prisoners; their own casualties were only three wounded. Early in the morning of the 13th the enemy attempted a raid on our trenches at the Apex. The S.O.S. signal was sent up, and our guns were firing hard for about two hours. The attack was completely repulsed.

The G.O.C. received the following message from Sir Douglas Haig:

"The Commander-in-Chief congratulates you and your troops on the repeated successes shown in your local operations, which show excellent spirit and skill. These successes help appreciably in the general plan."

A few days before this attack I had been ordered to lend two 18-pounder batteries and two trench mortar batteries to the 50th Division to help them in a raid in the neighbourhood of Cherisy, and as they had marched out on the 12th for an absence of four days, our artillery strength was in a dangerously low state when the attack took place, their being only sixteen 18-pounder guns and eleven howitzers to cover a front of 5000 yards.

The two field batteries that were temporarily detached for this duty were A/310 and B/312. The raid was a very successful one, but, unhappily, our losses in the trench mortars were very heavy, and we lost two valuable officers killed, Lieuts. G. A. Craven and W. E. Harris, and one wounded, Lieut. W. Wooliscroft. Seven N.C.O.'s and gunners were also killed, and a large number wounded. Lieut. E. Parkinson was given the Military Cross "for gallantry and devotion to duty during minor operations west of Cherisy. After his battery had suffered many casualties during the first phase, he reorganised his positions, and, after his Commanding Officer had been killed, went round under heavy fire encouraging his men to keep their mortars going. Later, under heavy fire, he searched his gun position and assisted to get wounded clear and his men away."

Lieut. Parkinson has kindly furnished me with the following account of what took place:

"Y/62 and Z/62 trench mortar batteries were lent to the 50th Division for a raid they carried out on September 15th, 1917. The field guns and trench mortars provided a box barrage, the latter putting their contributions at each side, while the field guns shelled the enemy's support trenches.

"Our positions were in a little-used trench about 150 yards behind our own front line, opposite Cherisy. This trench had previously suffered very little from the German barrage, and it was expected that casualties there would be slight. The wire was not cut from any of these positions, and guns not even registered from them.

"The first portion of the raid was carried out from 4 p.m. to 4.40 p.m., and was completely successful. The Battalion which went over the top was commanded by the late Brig.-General Bradford, V.C., then Colonel, who afterwards came to the 62nd Division as a Brigade Commander.

"As ill luck would have it (I cannot think it anything else), the trench the mortars were in received about 75 per cent. of the total German barrage, and casualties were so heavy among Z battery that they were unable to man their guns for the full length of time. Lieut. G. A. Craven was so severely wounded that he died the same evening, while Lieut. W. Wooliscroft was wounded, and most of the men either killed or wounded.

"At 7.40 p.m. half a battalion went over the top again, and in this case also the results were all that could have been desired. Previously Y Battery had only had two men killed, and so were able to man their four guns. The German barrage was again very heavy, and we suffered severely. Round one gun were grouped about a hundred bombs ready for firing, and exactly what happened we shall never know, but the lot were detonated. The detachment was of course blown to atoms, and at the next gun two men were killed by the explosion as well as Lieut. Harris. One man alone was left unharmed, and after carrying some wounded under cover, he returned and manned his gun single-handed until the raid was over.

"We went to the raid 4 officers and about 40 other ranks, and returned to our Division 1 officer and 6 other ranks."

I received the following letter from the G.O.C.R.A., 50th Division:

"Will you please thank your fellows very much for the good work they did for us yesterday. I am most awfully sorry your trench mortars had such a bad time. It was just bad luck; the Boche put down a barrage where he had never put one down before, and caught them. It was most unfortunate. I can't tell you how sorry I am about it."

On the 26th September we carried out a bombardment of the enemy's trenches south of Riencourt, together with a barrage, with the object of making him think we were assaulting, and inducing him to unmask his artillery positions. This object was successfully attained, the enemy "got the wind up" thoroughly, and answered with every available gun. Our planes and balloons were able to fix the positions of nearly 40 batteries.

Major A. F. Bayley arrived on the 27th, and was posted to the 310th Brigade.

For the next few weeks things were comparatively quiet, though life in the batteries was diversified by occasional bombardments. I take from a note written at the time a short account of one of my routine trips. It is a fairly typical one, and will serve to give some idea of the sort of condition under which we were now holding the line:

First we drive in the car for about two miles; then we alight, fix gas helmets in the ready position, put on tin hats, and go on on foot, leaving the car in a sunken road fairly safe and snug. Now the excitement begins. We go across country, generally in full view of the Boche lines, though they are still far off, and often dodging the places where their long-range shells are falling, or lying down till they burst if we hear them coming near us. A walk of one and a half miles brings us into a much-battered village in which my most advanced guns are scattered about, and now begins the second and more dangerous stage. The village (Ecoust) is a deserted ruin, but for occasional individuals moving hastily from cover to cover, and we waste no time in passing through it, and enter the communication trench which leads up to the front infantry line. As the Boche has exact photographs of the course of this trench, he frequently bombards it; and though the chances are greatly against a shell falling on any one bit of the trench just at the moment when one is passing, still at the time the possibility seems far from remote, and the situation is thrilling enough. About a mile of trench as the crow flies (but treble that distance to walk, owing to the zig-zag formation of the trench, so designed to prevent a shell from sweeping right down it) brings one to the support line. Stage three, and the most dangerous one, now begins; one follows the support trench for a good long way; it is generally pretty deep, but in places it has almost been destroyed by recent shelling, and then one has to crawl and duck until a safer depth is reached; then up other zig-zags to the very front line. Here one is in comparative safety, for the enemy is only one or two hundred yards off, and his artillery dare not shoot at you for fear of hitting their own front line; so you are safe except for snipers (if you are foolish enough to show yourself), or for that most terrible of all terrors, the minenwerfer.

These trips were often unpleasant enough even to people who, like myself, could always count on returning to a comfortable and fairly safe billet for the night, and they helped us, I hope, to realise the strain and discomfort which the officers and men at the batteries were forced to endure from day to day and night to night. The bulletins "nothing fresh to report" or "all quiet on such a front" had for them very little signification.

During this period, in addition to the normal duties at the gun positions and in the wagon lines, every spare man was kept constantly hard at work in building stabling for the coming winter. It was a case of "sic vos non vobis," for everyone knew that our chances of remaining in this particular place were very small indeed, and that other men would enter into the fruit of our labours; however, the same considerations applied to the whole army, and one could only work one's hardest and trust that other divisions would do the same—a trust which, it is only fair to say, was rarely disappointed, even though, as must also be admitted, batteries almost always thought that the stables, shelters, and positions, which they had made, were a good deal better than those to which they succeeded. This belief may or may not have been always justified; anyway, it was human nature, and certainly the stabling constructed for this winter by the brigades and D.A.C. was of a very excellent and substantial nature.

During the period covered by this chapter 14 Military Medals were gained in the Divisional Artillery. Lieut. F. C. Pritchard won the Military Cross on the 8th October for the following act:

"When an ammunition pit and the camouflage over a gun were on fire, he went out and pulled the camouflage off the gun, and shovelled wet mud on to the fire. He did not leave until it was isolated from the other ammunition, thereby preventing much destruction."

Chapter III
THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI

"And you, good Yeomen,
Whose limbs were made in England, show us here
The mettle of your pasture; let us swear
That you are worth your breeding."

Shakespeare.—King Henry the Fifth.

Oct. 1917.

Our infantry withdrew from the line for a rest on the 12th October. The artillery, however, merely changed the scene of their labours, and about ten days later marched straight up from their former positions into action in the neighbourhood of Wancourt, to cover the 51st Division; the trench mortar batteries in the meantime were temporarily distributed between the 3rd and the 16th Divisions.

On the 29th we had the misfortune to lose a valuable officer in Lieut. H. Sutherland, signalling officer of the 312th Brigade, who was killed very soon after his brigade had joined the 51st Division.

My own headquarters had meanwhile moved to Haplincourt, and on the 30th October I learned from the G.O.C.R.A. of the 4th Corps that a big attack was to be made in the direction of Cambrai within about three weeks, in which the 62nd Division was to play a leading part. It was, in fact, to attack and capture the village of Havrincourt, a position of enormous strength protected by an elaborate system of trenches and barbed wire entanglements, and forming one of the strongest portions of the formidable Hindenburg line.

Nov. 1917.

The method of attack was to be an entirely new departure. There was to be no artillery preparation; in other words, not one gun beyond the normal was to be fired until the moment of assault, or what is technically known as "Zero." Then the barrage was to begin, and the infantry were to assault preceded by tanks. In addition to my own brigades, I was to have under my command for the operation the 77th, 93rd, and 16th Brigades, i.e. twenty batteries in all.

A period of intense activity now commenced. A tremendous lot of work had to be done, and there were at first very few men to do it. A party of about 100 men, taken from the 3rd and 16th Brigades R.H.A., was placed at my disposal, and I entrusted the superintendence of the work to Major C. A. Eeles, who tackled it with the greatest energy. Positions were selected for the five brigades at ranges of from 2000 to 2500 yards from the enemy's front line, chiefly along the Hubert road on the northern edge of the Havrincourt Wood, and, as it was absolutely essential that the work should be done without the Boche suspecting it, and the whole country was visible from his lines, the task was a very difficult one. The first thing to do was to screen off the proposed positions from view. That part of the wood through which the Hubert road ran had been cut down by the Huns when they retreated through it in April; a lot of scrub had grown up in the clearing during the summer, and with this a screen of twigs and branches was erected in one night, for a distance of two miles along the edge of the road on the enemy's side. When morning broke on the 4th November the road itself was invisible from the German trenches, and yet the screen that hid it mingled so well with the surrounding scrub that the enemy never noticed any change. For the next fortnight the work of preparation went on night and day, and so careful were the precautions taken by the working parties, that the enemy never had the slightest suspicion that anything unusual was going on. On this occasion the weather helped us, as the days were usually misty, and yet not a drop of rain fell all the time.

The preliminaries consisted in making positions for 20 batteries, digging ammunition recesses and telephone pits, construction of shelters for the detachments, the preparation of gun platforms and trail beds, and the collection at the gun pits of tremendous dumps of ammunition (700 rounds per 18-pounder gun and 450 rounds per howitzer). For the conveyance of the latter about three miles of light railway had to be laid down. Then O.P.'s and brigade headquarters were selected and prepared, and camouflage was collected and placed over all work as it was carried out, and also arranged ready for putting on the guns as they were required to move into their positions in action.

Lieut. E. W. Davis was wounded on the 9th November.

Lieut.-Colonel R. M. Foot, D.S.O., A.A. and Q.M.G. of the Division, left us about this time on appointment to a corps. He had always been most helpful to the gunners, and we were very sorry to lose him. His place was taken, after an interval of a few weeks, by Lieut.-Colonel Harold Lea, D.S.O., with whom the Divisional Artillery always preserved the same happy relations.

The artillery concentration began on the night of the 12th/13th November, when the 310th and 312th Brigades arrived in the neighbourhood of Beaulencourt; they concentrated next day at Barastre, where their wagon lines were to be during the battle. In this advance to the battle area the most elaborate precautions were taken to keep the enemy's suspicions from being awakened. All troops marched by night, and remained hidden during the day time in the various big woods, which are dotted about in this part of the country. I well remember walking over to the Corps Headquarters at Villers au Flos on the evening of the 14th; it was a pitch dark night, and I found it almost impossible to make my way along the road, which was covered along its whole length by an unbroken column of heavy guns being drawn by caterpillars—the heavy artillery concentrating for the battle. And yet next morning that same road presented its usual empty and tranquil appearance to such hostile planes as might happen to fly overhead.

On the 18th, Divisional headquarters moved to Neuville. The 312th Brigade moved into their gun positions on the night of the 17th/18th, and all the rest of my command on the night of the 18th/19th, i.e. the 310th, 77th, 93rd, and 153rd Brigades.

Lieut.-Colonel Lough, commanding 312th Brigade, left on the 17th, invalided home, and his successor, Lieut.-Col. A. G. Eden, joined us on the 19th.

The night of the 19th was a very anxious one, and will long be remembered by all who took part in the battle. It was impossible to tell whether the enemy had any suspicions of what was in store for him; he might even know all about it, and this was the more possible, as he had made a raid two nights before the battle and had captured one or two of our men. There was a chance that he might have wormed some information out of them, for an uneducated man may often give away valuable information quite innocently, out of pure ignorance or indiscretion. If he did know, the enemy might have wrecked the attack before it began, by bombarding the long line of guns, which had the most definite orders on no account to fire a round till 6.20 a.m. when the attack was to be launched. As it happened, the Boche showed great uneasiness, and fired very heavily during the night, though fortunately not on any vital places. We listened to the firing in great suspense, and watched the flashes of the shell bursting apparently very near our line of guns; but we could get no information, for no telephones were allowed until the moment of attack, lest indiscreet things might be said, and tapped by the enemy's listening apparatus.

At 5.45 a.m. there was a particularly furious burst of firing, which died down at a few minutes past six, and was succeeded by a dead silence, during which one could fancy one heard the anxious beating of fifty thousand hearts. Did the Boche know; had he some infernal surprise for us? We stood in a little group outside the hut which served for our headquarters, and fixed our eyes on the long grey line of wood along the edge of which the guns lay waiting. The moment arrived. A tremendous thunder clap broke the silence; the whole sky grew red, and the air sighed with shell. The battle had begun according to our plans, and success was certain.

Preceded by the tanks, our infantry swept forward in an irresistible wave, and pressing close up behind the barrage, overcame all obstacles, capturing system after system of strongly fortified posts, and following the tanks through a jungle of barbed wire which the Boche might well have believed to be absolutely impenetrable. By about noon they had taken all their objectives. Havrincourt, Graincourt, Anneux, and the Cambrai road, from the factory north-west of Graincourt to the canal, were in our hands, together with several hundreds of prisoners, a 4.2-inch howitzer battery, and many machine guns and mortars. The Division had made the record advance of the war, 7000 yards in one day. The following message was received in the evening:

"Army Commander sends special congratulations to all ranks of the 62nd Division on their very fine achievements to-day."

As this was the greatest battle in which the Division had yet been engaged, I shall here give in full the official account of the artillery action, as it was made out at the time by Capt. Lindsell, my Brigade Major.

20th November. From zero (6.20 a.m.) until the capture of the brown line the artillery action was in the nature of a set piece, the barrage being fired according to timetable as detailed. No modifications were found necessary.

10.30 a.m. The first artillery advance was ordered, 77th Brigade being directed to send forward one battery to the area north-east of Havrincourt Wood in support of the 185th Infantry Brigade.

10.40 a.m. Eight prisoners were captured by the advanced reconnoitring party of C/310.

10.50 a.m. The 5th Brigade R.H.A., having passed under the orders of the C.R.A. 62nd Division, was ordered to advance battery by battery to the east of Havrincourt, to support the advance of the 186th Infantry Brigade on Graincourt.

11.40 a.m. The 77th Brigade was ordered to advance complete to the south-west of Havrincourt to cover the line Graincourt—Factory on Bapaume-Cambrai road.

12 noon. The 310th Brigade was ordered to advance battery by battery to the east of Havrincourt to support, with 5th Brigade R.H.A., the further advance of the 186th Infantry Brigade.

2 p.m. The Divisional Artillery situation was as follows:

2 p.m. It was ascertained that the 51st Division (on our right) had not captured Flesquières. As this position exposed the right of the attack of the 62nd Division, the 310th Brigade were ordered back to their former positions; this order did not, however, take effect, as on receipt of later information they were allowed to continue their former movement.

2.30 p.m. The 77th Brigade was in action complete S.W. of Havrincourt.

4.10 p.m. The 5th Brigade R.H.A. and 310th Brigade R.F.A., in action east of Havrincourt, were grouped under Colonel West, R.H.A., to cover the line gained by the 186th Infantry Brigade in the vicinity of Graincourt. The 77th Brigade was ordered to cover the part in the direction of Flesquières. The 312th Brigade, still in its original position, was ordered to be prepared to cover the brown line as a defensive measure in case of necessity.

6.50 p.m. Orders were issued for the 62nd Division to continue the advance on Bourlon on the 21st, and for a further advance of all artillery brigades in support of this attack. Owing to the state of the ground it was found impossible to get the guns forward during the night. Brigades therefore advanced as early as possible on the 21st to positions S.W. of Graincourt, with the exception of the 5th Brigade R.H.A., which remained N.E. of Havrincourt. The four brigades, as their batteries were able to get into action, were placed at the disposal of the G.O.C. 186th Infantry Brigade for his attack on Bourlon Wood. Owing to bad going and damaged roads the difficulties of getting guns forward proved very considerable, but all brigades were in position by the afternoon of the 21st, with communication established with the Infantry Brigade headquarters in Graincourt.

21st November. Bourlon Wood and village were attacked, under a barrage fired by the 5th R.H.A. and 310th Brigades. The attack was held up by machine gun fire from the Marquion trench. During the remainder of the day the artillery forward moves were continued, and a fresh attack on the Marquion line was organised for the 22nd.

22nd November. The 62nd Division again attacked under a barrage provided by all four artillery brigades. The attack succeeded in gaining a hold astride the Marquion line, south of Bourlon Wood.

The 40th Division then relieved the 62nd, the artillery, however, remaining in action under the former division.

The following Divisional Order was issued on the 24th November:

"Special Order of the Day.

"The Divisional Commander has the honour to announce that both the Commander-in-Chief and the Army Commander have expressed their high appreciation of the achievements of the 62nd Division in the battle.

"The Divisional Commander had the most implicit confidence that the Division would acquit itself with honour. To have advanced 7000 yards on the first day, taken all objectives, held them against counter attacks, and handed over all gains intact to the relieving division, is a feat of arms of which any division may be justly proud.

"The number of prisoners taken by the division is not far short of 2000. Thirty-seven guns have been captured, which include two 8-inch howitzers, one complete 4.2-inch battery, one complete battery of 5.9-inch, and the remainder guns of various calibres, many of which were brought into action against the enemy.

"The number of machine guns, granatenwerfer, etc., etc., which have fallen into our possession is so considerable that it has not been possible yet to make an accurate tally of them.

"The advance of the artillery to Graincourt, and the accuracy of the barrage, is worthy of the best traditions of the Royal Regiment.

"To G Battalion, the Tanks, all ranks of the Division expresses their admiration of the skill, bravery, and the splendid self-sacrifice which made success possible.

"The discipline, valour, and steadiness of all ranks has been beyond praise.

"It is with great and legitimate pride that I have the honour to sign my name as Commander of the 62nd West Riding Division.

"Walter Braithwaite,
"Major-General."

On the 23rd, 24th and 25th November attacks were continued by the 40th Division against Bourlon Wood, which ended in the gaining of a firm footing in its southern outskirts. I received a letter from the G.O.C. 40th Division expressing his thanks "for the excellent and untiring support which the 62nd Divisional Artillery gave to the infantry under his command" on these days.

On Sunday the 25th the 62nd Division was ordered back into the line, much to our surprise, in relief of the 40th Division, which had suffered heavily in its severe three days' fight. Our orders were to capture Bourlon Wood, and we had the support of the following artillery in addition to our own: 5th Brigade R.H.A., 77th, 178th, and 181st Brigade R.F.A., and the 87th Heavy Artillery group.

Divisional headquarters moved forward into the Park of Havrincourt Chateau.

The attack was made at 6.20 a.m. on the 27th under a rolling barrage, and resulted in the capture of almost the whole of Bourlon Wood, the highest piece of ground for miles round. Our losses were very heavy, but the success was a most important one, and in the battle our tired Division met and shattered a division of Prussian Guards which had to be withdrawn from the line after only 24 hours in action.

Lieut. E. E. C. Lintern was wounded on the 25th, and for gallant services on the 21st and 22nd, Major E. W. F. Jephson won a bar to his Military Cross, and Lieut. N. Hess was awarded the Military Cross. The same honour was gained by Lieut. J. B. Boden and Lieut. P. C. Furlong for the following acts:

"On the 23rd November, Lieut. Boden, finding a disabled enemy field gun in a forward position, fitted the breech mechanism of another gun to it, and brought it into action in the open. He fired about 60 rounds with excellent effect, though under heavy fire, and in full view of the enemy."

"On the 25th November, when one of his guns blew up while his battery was in action, Lieut. Furlong collected the detachment who were suffering from shell shock, got them under cover, and steadied the detachments at the other guns, under heavy shell fire."

On the night of the 28th our infantry was relieved by the 47th Division. On this day and on the 29th there was a great increase of activity on the part of the enemy's artillery, and it became evident that he had been strongly reinforced.

At 8.45 a.m. on the 30th the enemy launched a very formidable counter attack, pouring his infantry forward in great masses and with the most desperate determination, supported by a tremendous artillery fire of high explosive and gas shell. As the hostile infantry appeared over the crest of the hill, to the west of Bourlon Wood, they were engaged with direct fire by our field artillery, which swept through and raked the advancing masses again and again, inflicting the most appalling losses upon them. The most desperate fighting went on all day, and at one time my two most forward batteries, A/312 and D/312, were within a few hundred yards of the Boche infantry. Batteries have seldom been given such excellent targets of massed infantry in the open as offered themselves that day to nearly all my batteries, and full advantage was taken of the opportunity. At 4 p.m., when darkness came on, the enemy had made no progress against our corps front, the most determined attacks of four German divisions, with three others in support, having been utterly crushed by the unconquerable resistance of the three British Divisions in the line. To quote from the official account issued by the General Staff:

"At the end of this day of high courage and glorious achievement, except for a few advanced positions, some of which were afterwards regained, our line had been maintained intact. The men who had come triumphantly through this mighty contest felt, and rightly felt, that they had won a great victory, in which the enemy had come against them in his full strength, and had been defeated with losses at which even the victors stood aghast."

Against the corps on our right the Boche had been more successful, and the position on its extreme right was at one time full of peril. Here the enemy penetrated our lines and captured Gonnelieu and Gouzancourt, though he was driven out of the latter village by the Guards that same night. The back areas were very heavily bombarded all through the day, and the D.A.C. in Metz suffered a good many casualties.

Lieut. C. B. Innes was wounded during this day's fighting; Lieut. E. T. Williams was awarded the Military Cross, while Lieut. J. B. Boden added a bar to the decoration which he had earned only eight days before:

"During a strong enemy attack the battery was in action during the whole of the day. For over seven hours the battery was heavily shelled, and during the whole of this period Lieut. Boden was among the guns, occasionally working a gun himself, and setting a magnificent example to the men of his detachment. Finally he was put hors de combat through a shell dropping close by him and stunning him. His cool determination and devotion to duty were magnificent."

"On the battery being heavily shelled, and fired on by machine guns from the flank, orders were received to withdraw. Lieut. Williams remained behind with two guns, the wheels of which had been damaged, but succeeded in getting both of them clear of the position, thereby setting a splendid example of gallantry and fearlessness to the men."

Thirty-three Military Medals were also awarded (v. Appendix).

I handed over artillery command on the evening of the 30th, and rejoined Divisional Headquarters at Haplincourt, to find that all our three infantry brigades had again been thrown into the line in support of three different divisions. I heard to my great sorrow that Brig.-General Bradford, V.C., who had joined the 62nd only about three weeks before, had been killed. He was a man of extraordinary gallantry and great personal charm, and a born soldier and leader of men.

I copy here an extract from a captured document, signed by the Commander of the German army on our front, which was rather flattering to our pride as gunners:

"It is worthy of remark that our enemy's guns have a much smaller zone of dispersion than our own. They also appear to have better and more accurate data for shooting from the map than we have. This seems to be proved from the fact that in weather that excludes all possibility of observation, and under conditions very different from those prevailing during previous shoots, he obtains hits on small targets with great accuracy."

Dec. 1917.

Divisional Headquarters left the area of the Cambrai battle on the 4th December, together with the infantry of the Division, and after several moves the Artillery Headquarters finally settled down for a time at Bethoncourt, near Tincques, on the 19th. The guns, as usual, remained in action, supporting different divisions in the arduous work of adjusting the new trench line. Bourlon Wood was given up together with some more of the captured ground, but Havrincourt was retained, and the net result to us was considerably on the credit side.

Capt. E. F. Johnson was killed on the 9th December only about a week after joining the Division. On the 13th Lieut. L. Gane was awarded the Military Cross when in action at Doignies:

"When an enemy shell hit one of the gun pits which contained a large number of charges, Lieut. Gane ordered all the men away, and himself went into the pit. Satisfied that immediate action would save the shell dump and prevent the fire from spreading, he had a party to extinguish the flames, which was successfully accomplished. By his prompt action and coolness he saved the shells and guns from being blown up."

I received the following letter dated the 11th December from the G.O.C. R.A. of the 47th Division:

"To-morrow I shall be parting with your brigades and D.A.C., and I take the opportunity of thanking you most heartily for all the work they have done since you handed them over to me.

"Our infantry have been greatly pleased with the support your gallant fellows have given them, not only on November 30th, but ever since, and I am only sorry that they have had to put up with so much discomfort, but the conditions have made it impossible to do much for them. Colonel Sherlock has been a tower of strength.

"E. N. Whitley,
"Brig.-General R.A."

At last, after another fortnight of hard fighting and great discomfort, the artillery was withdrawn, and arrived in the rest area behind Arras on the 29th December. In spite of the severity of the weather, all ranks greatly enjoyed the rest which they had so well earned, although it could only be called a rest in the sense that they were out of danger and in a condition of comparative comfort. Much work of course had to be done in cleaning up and generally refitting, and in preparing to take up the new positions just north of Arras, which were now to be our special charge.

Jan. 1918.

On the 7th January my Brigade-Major, Capt. W. G. Lindsell, D.S.O., M.C., left the Division to take up the appointment of Staff Officer R.A. of the 8th Corps. He was greatly regretted throughout the Division, by none more sincerely than by myself. To an unlimited capacity for work, and a meticulously accurate knowledge of staff duties, he added a tact and charm of manner which made him many friends in the Divisional Artillery, and helped to ensure that all orders, however unpleasant, were carried out cheerfully and without question in full confidence that nothing which bore the Brigade-Major's signature would ever be unreasonable or unnecessary.

Major F. FitzGibbon, D.S.O., was appointed Brigade-Major in Lindsell's place, and I may say at once that he proved a most worthy successor.

In the New Year's gazette Capt. Lindsell, M.C., and Major Arnold Forster both received the D.S.O., and Major R. C. Foot the Military Cross. All these honours had been thoroughly well earned, but it was a great disappointment to me that more officers could not receive decorations. The allotment of honours allowed for regimental officers was always so small that each gazette left this feeling of disappointment behind it, and many an officer remained undecorated at the end of the war who had earned such distinction over and over again. Major Arnold Forster, I may here mention, was the only battery commander to hold that position in the Division throughout the war; one or two others ran him close as far as service in France was concerned, but he commanded a battery—and commanded it with conspicuous success—from May, 1916, till the breaking up of the Division in Germany, and had the satisfaction therefore of fighting the battery which he had himself trained.

Chapter IV
THE GREAT GERMAN OFFENSIVE

"There is but one task for all,
For each one life to give,
Who stands, if freedom fall?
Who dies, if England live?"

Kipling.

Jan. 1918.

On the 9th January Divisional Headquarters moved to Victory Camp, near Roclincourt, and I assumed command of the artillery in the line, the 56th Divisional Artillery.

Our own artillery relieved the 56th on the 15th. The front we now covered ran roughly from Gavrelle to Oppy. The 310th Brigade, which formed the right group, occupied positions on or about the southern end of the Vimy Ridge, with one advanced battery, B/310, close to Arleux, and only about a thousand yards from the Boche front line; this battery was so sited as to enfilade a long portion of the enemy's trenches; and though in what was apparently a dangerously forward position, it was so well concealed in a hollow of the ground that it came in for no greater attention than did the other batteries much further in rear.

The 312th Brigade was the left group; two of its batteries, B/312 and D/312, were in the shattered ruins of Bailleul village; this was a most unpleasant spot, and I don't think I've ever seen a village which bore the signs of such serious and constant shell fire.

We now belonged to the 13th Corps, which consisted of the 31st and 56th Divisions, in addition to our own. A system of reliefs was arranged under which two divisions should hold the line and one division remain at rest, and it was hoped that divisional artilleries would get about three weeks' rest for every six weeks spent in action. No one, however, believed in his heart that this scheme would prove a lasting one. There were many indications that the enemy was preparing for a great offensive, and indeed it was now obvious that his only chance would be to strike, and strike hard, before the full weight of American intervention should be thrown into the balance.

The next few weeks were comparatively quiet ones, and a tremendous lot of work was done in improving the very indifferent positions which we had taken over. These positions, it is only fair to state, had not been occupied for more than ten days or so by the 56th Divisional Artillery, who were in no way to blame for their unsatisfactory condition.

Two Regular Majors were posted to us about this time, Majors M. R. H. Crofton, D.S.O., and J. F. K. Lockhart, who took over command of C/312 and A/310 respectively.

The experiment was now made of employing Indian drivers in ammunition columns, and on the 26th January I inspected those who had been sent to the 62nd D.A.C. There were about 130 of them, all Mussulmans, and they looked a useful lot of men; they proved to be so as it turned out, and did very good work for the rest of the war.

Feb. 1918.

On February 1st our heavy trench mortar battery, which, under command of Capt. S. V. Bowden, had done much good service, was transferred to the Corps, as it was now decided that divisional artillery should only have medium trench mortars. Capt. Bowden himself remained in the Division with the latter.

I have described this period as a comparatively quiet one, but that is not to say that the batteries were left alone by the Boche artillery. Shelling of a desultory sort was always going on, and most of the batteries came in for an occasional bombardment—a daily bombardment it would be more correct to say in the case of the two batteries in Bailleul. Fortunately the shooting was strangely ineffective. D/310, for instance, was heavily shelled on the evening of the 23rd January; but though there were three direct hits on emplacements and the whole position was deeply pitted with shell craters, no damage was done to men or material. A/310 was less fortunate on the 5th February, when, unhappily, two sergeants and a signaller were killed, though no guns were put out of action. B/310 was shelled the same day at Arleux, and on this occasion one officer was wounded, Lieut. C. R. Witcher.

On the 16th February the artillery withdrew from the line into billets in and around Aubigny, Caucourt, and Frevin Capelle, the headquarters being in the chateau at Berles. This was the only rest we were to get under the scheme mentioned above.

March, 1918.

On the 6th and 7th March we went into the line in relief of the 31st Division, against an enemy front of about 4000 yards, stretching from Oppy to Acheville; the 310th was again on the right, and the 312th on the left, batteries being mostly in or about Willerval and Farbus. Headquarters were at Roclincourt.

It now seemed certain that a big German offensive was brewing, and henceforth practically all our firing was done by detached sections, while the main positions remained silent, and every possible artifice was employed to conceal them from detection by the enemy. At the same time several single guns were distributed along the front for defence against tanks, being so sited that every possible approach by a hostile tank would be under fire from one or more of the guns.

Some experimental firing by single guns was carried out on the afternoon of the 10th March near Souchez. A dummy tank, about three-quarters real size, was drawn across an open space at about a thousand yards from the gun. Detachments from various divisions engaged it in turn, and the results were most reassuring, two or three direct hits being very quickly scored in nearly every case; it seemed to prove that an anti-tank gun well handled ought to be able to knock out several tanks in a minute or two.

On the 11th Divisional Headquarters were persistently shelled by a 13 cm. gun firing from a range of about 14,000 yards. Information had been received that the long expected offensive was to begin on the 13th, and as the enemy's attacks were often heralded by long range firing into the back areas, it seemed likely that the report might in this case be correct, and all preparations were made accordingly. The bombardment was repeated on the night of the 12th, and all troops, artillery and infantry, were standing-to from an hour before dawn on the 13th. Nothing unusual, however, happened, although the long range activity against our headquarters became a regular nightly occurrence from now on. As it was important to find out what was brewing, it was decided to carry out a raid with the object of taking prisoners and getting such information out of them as might be possible. The raid was carried out by a battalion of the 186th Infantry Brigade. At 10.50 p.m. on the 17th March, two batteries of the 56th Divisional Artillery opened on the Boche front about a thousand yards south of the part we were raiding. The enemy at once sent up S.O.S. signals, and his artillery put down a barrage on that part of the front—which was exactly what we wanted. At 11 p.m. all our guns opened fire on the real front for five minutes, and then, lifting off the part that was to be raided, formed a box barrage all round it. Our raiding party, consisting of 2 officers and 70 men, then went over the top, passing through gaps in the wire which had previously been cut by the trench mortars and by Bangalore torpedoes. At 11.25 they returned, having killed several Huns and taken five prisoners. The guns kept up the barrage till 11.40, and one of the howitzer batteries fired a screen of smoke shell along the edge of Fresnoy Park from 11.25 to 11.40, to screen our men as they returned. The whole thing went off like clockwork, and our infantry only had three men slightly wounded.

I received the following letter next day from the G.O.C. 186th Infantry Brigade:

"The raiders wish me to say that the barrage was perfect. Would you please accept for yourself and your batteries their thanks for the large part you contributed towards the success of the show. To show the accuracy of the shooting, the Bangalore torpedoes were inserted in the wire while the barrage was still on the front line. This and the absence of casualties from short shooting, and the fact that the garrison was discovered prostrate on the floor of the trench, I think speaks for itself.

"J. G. Burnett,
"Brig.-General."

And also the following from Lieut.-Colonel Thackeray, who commanded the battalion that carried out the raid: