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The Sidenotes include a few Greek phrases:
ἕπου Θεῷ
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For this e-text, Chaucer’s translation of the Consolatio is given twice: first as printed, with all notes and apparatus, and then as text alone.
[Introduction]
[Index of First Lines]
[Tabula Libri Boicii] (”Table of Contents”)
[Chaucer’s Translation] (with all notes)
[Appendix] (verse)
[Translation] (text only)
[Glossarial Index]
EARLY ENGLISH TEXT SOCIETY
Extra Series, No. 5
1868
(Reprinted 1889, 1894, 1895, etc., 1969)
Price 40s.
EDITED FROM
BRITISH MUSEUM ADDITIONAL MS. 10,340
COLLATED WITH
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY MS. Ii.3.21
BY
RICHARD MORRIS
Published for
THE EARLY ENGLISH TEXT SOCIETY
by the
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
LONDON NEW YORK TORONTO
FIRST PUBLISHED 1868
REPRINTED 1889, 1894, 1895, ETC.,
AND 1969
Extra Series, No. 5
ORIGINALLY PRINTED BY
RICHARD CLAY & SONS LTD., LONDON AND BUNGAY
AND NOW REPRINTED LITHOGRAPHICALLY IN GREAT BRITAIN
AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS, OXFORD
BY VIVIAN RIDLER
PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY
[INTRODUCTION.]
When master hands like those of Gibbon and Hallam have sketched the life of Boethius, it is well that no meaner man should attempt to mar their pictures. They drew, perhaps, the most touching scene in Middle-age literary history,—the just man in prison, awaiting death, consoled by the Philosophy that had been his light in life, and handing down to posterity for their comfort and strength the presence of her whose silver rays had been his guide as well under the stars of Fortune as the mirk of Fate. With Milton in his dark days, Boece in prison could say,—
‘I argue not
Against Heaven’s hand or will, nor bate a jot
Of heart or hope; but still bear up and steer
Right onward. What supports me, dost thou ask?
The conscience, friend, to have lost them overplied
In liberty’s defence, my noble task,
Of which all Europe rings from side to side.’
For, indeed, the echoes of Boethius, Boethius, rang out loud from every corner of European Literature. An Alfred awoke them in England, a Chaucer, a Caxton would not let them die; an Elizabeth revived them among the glorious music of her reign.[1] To us, though far off, they come with a sweet sound. ‘The angelic’ Thomas Aquinas commented on him, and many others followed the saint’s steps. Dante read him, though, strange to say, he speaks of the Consolation as ‘a book not known by many.’[2] Belgium had her translations—both Flemish[3] and French[4]; Germany hers,[5] France hers,[6] Italy hers.[7] The Latin editors are too numerous to be catalogued here, and manuscripts abound in all our great libraries.
No philosopher was so bone of the bone and flesh of the flesh of Middle-age writers as Boethius. Take up what writer you will, and you find not only the sentiments, but the very words of the distinguished old Roman. And surely we who read him in Chaucer’s tongue, will not refuse to say that his full-circling meed of glory was other than deserved. Nor can we marvel that at the end of our great poet’s life, he was glad that he had swelled the chorus of Boethius’ praise; and ‘of the translacioun of Boece de Consolacioun,’ thanked ‘oure Lord Ihesu Crist and his moder, and alle the seintes in heuen.’
The impression made by Boethius on Chaucer was evidently very deep. Not only did he translate him directly, as in the present work, but he read his beloved original over and over again, as witness the following list, incomplete of course, of passages from Chaucer’s poems translated more or less literally from the De Consolatione:
I. LOVE.
Wost thou nat wel the olde clerkes sawe,
That who schal yeve a lover eny lawe,
Love is a grettere lawe, by my pan,
Then may be yeve to (of) eny erthly man?
(Knightes Tale, Aldine Series, vol. ii. p. 36, 37.)
But what is he þat may ȝeue a lawe to loueres. loue is a gretter lawe and a strengere to hym self þan any lawe þat men may ȝeuen.
(Chaucer’s Prose Translation, [p. 108].)
Quis legem det amantibus?
Major lex amor est sibi.
(Boeth., lib. iii. met. 12.)
II. A DRUNKEN MAN.
A dronke man wot wel he hath an hous,
But he not[8] which the righte wey is thider.
(Knightes Tale, vol. ii. p. 39.)
Ryȝt as a dronke man not nat[9] by whiche paþe he may retourne home to hys house.
(Chaucer’s Trans., [p. 67].)
Sed velut ebrius, domum quo tramite revertatur, ignorat.
(Boeth., lib. iii. pr. 2.)
III. THE CHAIN OF LOVE.
The firste moevere of the cause above,
Whan he first made the fayre cheyne of love,
Gret was theffect, and heigh was his entente;
Wel wist he why, and what therof he mente;
For with that faire cheyne of love he bond
The fyr, the watir, the eyr, and eek the lond
In certeyn boundes, that they may not flee.
(Knightes Tale, p. 92.)
That þe world with stable feith / varieth acordable chaungynges // þat the contraryos qualite of elementȝ holden amonge hem self aliaunce perdurable / þat phebus the sonne with his goldene chariet / bryngeth forth the rosene day / þat the mone hath commaundement ouer the nyhtes // whiche nyhtes hesperus the eue sterre hat[h] browt // þat þe se gredy to flowen constreyneth with a certeyn ende hise floodes / so þat it is nat l[e]ueful to strechche hise brode termes or bowndes vp-on the erthes // þat is to seyn to couere alle the erthe // Al this a-cordaunce of thinges is bownden with looue / þat gouerneth erthe and see / and [he] hath also commaundementȝ to the heuenes / and yif this looue slakede the brydelis / alle thinges þat now louen hem to-gederes / wolden maken a batayle contynuely and stryuen to fordoon the fasoun of this worlde / the which they now leden in acordable feith by fayre moeuynges // this looue halt to-gideres poeples / ioygned with an hooly bond / and knytteth sacrement of maryages of chaste looues // And loue enditeth lawes to trewe felawes // O weleful weere mankynde / yif thilke loue þat gouerneth heuene gouerned yowre corages /.
(Chaucer’s Boethius, bk. ii. met. 8.)
Quod mundus stabili fide
Concordes variat vices,
Quod pugnantia semina
Fœdus perpetuum tenent,
Quod Phœbus roseum diem
Curru provehit aureo,
Ut quas duxerit Hesperus
Phœbe noctibus imperet,
Ut fluctus avidum mare
Certo fine coerceat,
Ne terris liceat vagis
Latos tundere terminos;
Hanc rerum seriem ligat,
Terras ac pelagus regens,
Et cœlo imperitans amor.
Hic si fræna remiserit,
Quicquid nunc amat invicem,
Bellum continuo geret:
Et quam nunc socia fide
Pulcris motibus incitant,
Certent solvere machinam.
Hic sancto populos quoque
Junctos fœdere continet,
Hic et conjugii sacrum
Castis nectit amoribus,
Hic fidis etiam sua
Dictat jura sodalibus.
O felix hominum genus,
Si vestros animos amor,
Quo cælum regitur, regat.
(Boeth., lib. ii. met. 8.)
Love, that of erth and se hath governaunce!
Love, that his hestes hath in hevene hye!
Love, that with an holsom alliaunce
Halt peples joyned, as hym liste hem gye!
Love, that knetteth law and compaignye,
And couples doth in vertu for to dwelle!
(Troylus & Cryseyde, st. 243, vol. iv. p. 296.)
That, that the world with faith, which that is stable
Dyverseth so, his stoundes concordynge;—
That elementz, that ben so discordable,
Holden a bond, perpetualy durynge;—
That Phebus mot his rosy carte forth brynge,
And that the mone hath lordschip overe the nyghte;—
Al this doth Love, ay heryed be his myght!
That, that the se, that gredy is to flowen,
Constreyneth to a certeyn ende so
Hise flodes, that so fiersly they ne growen
To drenchen erth and alle for everemo;
And if that Love aught lete his brydel go,
Al that now loveth asonder sholde lepe,
And lost were al that Love halt now to kepe.
(Ibid. st. 244, 245.)
IV. MUTABILITY DIRECTED AND LIMITED
BY AN IMMUTABLE AND DIVINE INTELLIGENCE.
That same prynce and moevere eek, quod he,
Hath stabled, in this wrecched world adoun,
Certeyn dayes and duracioun
To alle that er engendrid in this place,
Over the whiche day they may nat pace,
Al mowe they yit wel here dayes abregge;
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Than may men wel by this ordre discerne
That thilke moevere stabul is and eterne.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
And therfore of his wyse purveaunce
He hath so wel biset his ordenaunce,
That spices of thinges and progressiouns
Schullen endure by successiouns
And nat eterne be, withoute any lye.
(Knightes Tale, vol. ii. p. 92, 93.)
Þe engendrynge of alle þinges quod she and alle þe progressiouns of muuable nature. and alle þat moeueþ in any manere takiþ hys causes. hys ordre. and hys formes. of þe stablenesse of þe deuyne þouȝt [and thilke deuyne thowht] þat is yset and put in þe toure. þat is to seyne in þe heyȝt of þe simplicite of god. stablisiþ many manere gyses to þinges þat ben to don.
(Chaucer’s Boethius, bk. iv. pr. 6, [p. 134].)
V. THE PART IS DERIVED FROM THE WHOLE,
THE IMPERFECT FROM THE PERFECT.
Wel may men knowe, but it be a fool,
That every partye dyryveth from his hool.
For nature hath nat take his bygynnyng
Of no partye ne cantel of a thing,
But of a thing that parfyt is and stable,
Descendyng so, til it be corumpable.
(Knightes Tale, vol. ii. p. 92.)
For al þing þat is cleped inperfit . is proued inperfit by þe amenusynge of perfeccioun . or of þing þat is perfit . and her-of comeþ it . þat in euery þing general . yif þat . þat men seen any þing þat is inperfit . certys in þilke general þer mot ben somme þing þat is perfit. For yif so be þat perfeccioun is don awey . men may nat þinke nor seye fro whennes þilke þing is þat is cleped inperfit . For þe nature of þinges ne token nat her bygynnyng of þinges amenused and inperfit . but it procediþ of þingus þat ben al hool . and absolut . and descendeþ so doune in-to outerest þinges and in-to þingus empty and wiþ-oute fruyt . but as I haue shewed a litel her byforne . þat yif þer be a blisfulnesse þat be frele and vein and inperfit . þer may no man doute . þat þer nys som blisfulnesse þat is sad stedfast and perfit.’
(bk. iii. pr. 10, [p. 89].)
Omne enim quod imperfectum esse dicitur, id deminutione perfecti imperfectum esse perhibetur. Quo fit ut si in quolibet genere imperfectum quid esse videatur, in eo perfectum quoque aliquod esse necesse sit. Etenim perfectione sublata, unde illud, quod imperfectum perhibetur, extiterit, ne fingi quidem potest. Neque enim ab diminutis inconsummatisque natura rerum cepit exordium, sed ab integris absolutisque procedens in hæc extrema atque effœta dilabitur. Quod si, uti paulo ante monstravimus, est quædam boni fragilis imperfecta felicitas, esse aliquam solidam perfectamque non potest dubitari.
(Boeth., lib. iii. pr. 10.)
VI. GENTILITY.
For gentilnesse nys but renomé
Of thin auncestres, for her heigh bounté
Which is a straunge thing to thy persone.
(The Wyf of Bathes Tale, vol. ii. p. 241.)
For if þe name of gentilesse be referred to renoun and clernesse of linage. þan is gentil name but a foreine þing.
(Chaucer’s Boethius, [p. 78].)
Quæ [nobilitas], si ad claritudinem refertur, aliena est.
(Boethius, lib. iii. pr. 6.)
VII. NERO’S CRUELTY.
No teer out of his eyen for that sighte
Ne cam; but sayde, a fair womman was sche.
Gret wonder is how that he couthe or mighte
Be domesman on hir dede beauté.
(The Monkes Tale, vol. iii. p. 217.)
Ne no tere ne wette his face, but he was so hard-herted þat he myȝte ben domesman or iuge of hire dede beauté.
(Chaucer’s Boethius, [p. 55].)
Ora non tinxit lacrymis, sed esse
Censor extincti potuit decoris.
(Boethius, lib. ii. met. 6.)
VIII. PREDESTINATION AND FREE-WILL.
In ‘Troylus and Cryseyde’ we find the following long passage taken from Boethius, book v. prose 2, 3.
Book iv. st. 134, vol. iv. p. 339.
(1)
Syn God seth every thynge, out of doutaunce,
And hem disponeth, thorugh his ordinaunce,
In hire merites sothely for to be,
As they shul comen by predesteyné
136
(2)
For som men seyn if God seth al byforne,
Ne God may not deseyved ben pardé!
Than moot it fallen, theigh men hadde it sworne,
That purveyaunce hath seyn befor to be,
Wherfor I seye, that, from eterne, if he
Hathe wiste byforn our thought ek as oure dede,
We have no fre choys, as thise clerkes rede.
137
(3)
For other thoughte, nor other dede also,
Myghte nevere ben, but swich as purveyaunce,
Which may nat ben deceyved nevere moo,
Hath feled byforne, withouten ignoraunce;
For if ther myghte ben a variaunce,
To wrythen out fro Goddes purveyinge,
Ther nere no prescience of thynge comynge;
138
(4)
But it were rather an opinyon
Uncertein, and no stedfast forseynge;
And certes that were an abusyon
That God shold han no parfit clere wetynge,
More than we men, that han douteous wenynge,
But swich an erroure upon God to gesse
Were fals, and foule, and wikked corsednesse.
139
(5)
They seyn right thus, that thynge is nat to come,
For that the prescience hath seyne byfore
That it shal come; but they seyn that therfore
That it shal come, therfor the purveyaunce
Woot it bifore, withouten ignorance.
140
(6)
And in this manere this necessité
Retourneth in his part contrarye agayn;
For nedfully byhoveth it not to be,
That thilke thynges fallen in certeyn
That ben purveyed; but nedly, as they seyne,
Bihoveth it that thynges, which that falle,
That thei in certein ben purveied alle.
141
(7)
I mene as though I labourede me in this,
To enqueren which thynge cause of whiche thynge be;
(8)
As, whether that the prescience of God is
The certein cause of the necessité
Of thynges that to comen ben, pardé!
Or, if necessité of thynge comynge
Be cause certein of the purveyinge.
142
(9)
But now nenforce I me nat in shewynge
How the ordre of causes stant; but wel woot I
That it bihoveth that the bifallynge
Of thynges, wiste bifor certeinly,
Be necessarie, al seme it nat therby
That prescience put fallynge necessaire
To thynge to come, al falle it foule or faire.
143
(10)
For, if ther sit a man yonde on a see, [seat]
Than by necessité bihoveth it,
That certes thyn opinioun soth be,
That wenest or conjectest that he sit;
And, further over, now ayeinwarde yit,
Lo right so is it on the part contrarie,
As thus,—nowe herkene, for I wol nat tarie:—
144
(11)
I sey, that if the opinion of the
Be soth for that he sit, than seye I this,
That he moot sitten by necessité;
And thus necessité in either is,
For in hym nede of sittynge is, ywis,
And in the, nede of soth; and thus forsoth
Ther mot necessité ben in yow bothe.
145
(12)
But thow maist seyne, the man sit nat therfore,
That thyn opinioun of his sittynge sothe is;
But rather, for the man sat there byfore,
Therfor is thyn opinioun soth, ywys;
And I seye, though the cause of soth of this
Cometh of his sittynge, yet necessité
Is interchaunged both in hym and the.
146
(13)
Thus in the same wyse, out of doutaunce,
I may wel maken, as it semeth me,
My resonynge of Goddes purveiaunce,
And of the thynges that to comen be; . . .
147
(14)
For although that for thynge shal come, ywys,
Therfor it is purveyed certeynly,
Nat that it cometh for it purveied is;
Yet, natheles, bihoveth it nedfully,
That thynge to come be purveied trewly;
Or elles thynges that purveied be.
That they bitiden by necessité.
148
(15)
And this sufficeth right ynough, certeyn,
For to distruye oure fre choys everydele.
(1) Quæ tamen ille ab æterno cuncta prospiciens providentiæ cernit intuitus, et suis quæque meritis prædestinata disponit. . . . . (Boethius, lib. v. pr. 2.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(2) Nam si cuncta prospicit Deus neque falli ullo modo potest, evenire necesse est, quod providentia futurum esse præviderit. Quare si ab æterno non facta hominum modo, sed etiam consilia voluntatesque prænoscit, nulla erit arbitrii libertas;
(3) Neque enim vel factum aliud ullum vel quælibet existere poterit voluntas, nisi quam nescia falli providentia divina præsenserit. Nam si res aliorsum, quam provisæ sunt detorqueri valent, non jam erit futuri firma præscientia;
(4) Sed opinio potius incerta; quod de Deo nefas credere judico.
(5) Aiunt enim non ideo quid esse eventurum quoniam id providentia futurum esse prospexerit; sed e contrario potius, quoniam quid futurum est, id divinam providentiam latere non possit.
(6) Eoque modo necessarium est hoc in contrariam relabi partem; neque enim necesse est contingere quæ providentur, sed necesse est quæ futura sunt provideri.
(7) Quasi vero quæ cujusque rei causa sit,
(8) Præscientiane futurorum necessitatis an futurorum necessitas providentiæ, laboretur.
(9) At nos illud demonstrare nitamur, quoquo modo sese habeat ordo causarum, necessarium esse eventum præscitarum rerum, etiam si præscientia futuris rebus eveniendi necessitatem non videatur inferre.
(10) Etenim si quispiam sedeat, opinionem quæ eum sedere conjectat veram esse necesse est: at e converso rursus,
(11) Si de quopiam vera sit opinio quoniam sedet eum sedere necesse est. In utroque igitur necessitas inest: in hoc quidem sedendi, at vero in altero veritatis.
(12) Sed non idcirco quisque sedet, quoniam vera est opinio: sed hæc potius vera est, quoniam quempiam sedere præcessit. Ita cum causa veritatis ex altera parte procedat, inest tamen communis in utraque necessitas.
(13) Similia de providentia futurisque rebus ratiocinari patet.