The Supernatural in the New Testament

Possible, Credible, and Historical

Or: An Examination of the Validity of Some Recent Objections Against Christianity as a Divine Revelation

By the

Rev. Charles A. Row, M.A.

Prebendary of St. Paul's

Author of “The Jesus of the Evangelists,” “The Nature and Extent of Divine Inspiration,” “The Moral Teaching of the New Testament,” Etc.

London

Frederic Norgate

1875

Contents

[Transcriber's Note: The above cover image was produced by the submitter at Distributed Proofreaders, and is being placed into the public domain.]

Dedication.

To The Committee Of The Christian Evidence Society.

My Lords and Gentlemen,

Having undertaken to compose this work at your request, I beg permission to dedicate it to you. In doing so I feel that it is a duty which I owe both to you and to myself that I should state the position which we respectively occupy with regard to it. Your responsibility is confined to having requested me to compose a work in refutation of certain principles now widely disseminated, which impugn the supernatural elements contained in the New Testament. For the contents of the work and for the mode of treatment I alone am responsible. When I considered the position of the present controversy, I felt that it was impossible to treat the subject satisfactorily except on the principle that the responsibility for the mode of conducting the argument and of answering the objections should rest with the writer alone. In dealing with a subject so complicated, involving as it does questions of philosophy and science as well as the principles of historical criticism, I can scarcely venture to hope that every position which I have taken will prove acceptable to [pg iv] all the various shades of theological thought. I have endeavoured to take such as seemed to me to be logically defensible without any reference to particular schools of theological opinion. As the entire question is essentially historical, I have done my utmost to exclude from it all discussions that are strictly theological. Modern unbelief however puts in two objections which if valid render all historical evidence in proof of the occurrence of miracles nugatory, namely that they are both impossible and incredible. In meeting these I have been compelled to appeal to what appear to me to be the principles of a sound philosophy. In all other respects I have viewed the question before me as exclusively one of historical evidence.

If the Resurrection of our Lord is an actual occurrence, it follows that Christianity must be a divine revelation. If it is not, no amount of other evidence will avail to prove it to be so. As it has been strongly affirmed that for this great fact, which constitutes the central position of Christianity, the historical evidence is worthless, I have devoted the latter portion of this volume to the consideration of this question, with a view of putting before the reader the value of the New Testament when contemplated as simple history. Using the Epistles as the foundation of my argument, I have endeavoured to prove that the greatest of all the miracles recorded in the Gospels rests on an attestation that is unsurpassed by any event recorded in history. For this purpose I have used the Epistles as simple historical documents, and I have claimed for them precisely the same value which is conceded to other writings of a similar description. The feeling [pg v] among Christians that these writings contain the great principles of the Christian faith has occasioned it to be overlooked that they are also contemporary historical documents of the highest order. As such I have used them in proof of the great facts of Christianity, above all in proof of the greatest of them, the Resurrection of our Lord.

With these observations I now present you the following work, with the hope that it may prove the means of removing many of the difficulties with which recent controversial writers have endeavoured to obscure the subject. Trusting that it maybe accepted by the great Head of the Church, the reality of whose life and teaching as they are recorded in the Gospels it is designed to establish,

I remain, my Lords and Gentlemen,
Your's faithfully,
C. A. Row.

London, January, 1875.

Chapter I. Introduction. The Position of the Controversy Between the Opponents and the Defenders of Christianity.

Although every portion of the Bible is vehemently assailed by the various forms of modern Scepticism, it is clear that the real turning point of the controversy between those who affirm that God has made a supernatural revelation of himself to mankind, and those who deny it, centres in those portions of the New Testament which affirm the presence of the supernatural. The question may be still further narrowed into the inquiry whether the person and actions of Jesus Christ, as they are depicted in the Gospels, are historical facts, or fictitious inventions. If the opponents of Revelation can prove that they are the latter, the entire controversy will end in their favour. It would in that case be utterly useless to attempt to defend any other portion of the Bible; and the controversy respecting the Old Testament becomes a mere waste of labour. If, on the other hand, Christians can prove that the narratives of the four Gospels, or even of any one of them, are a true representation of historical facts, then it is certain that God has made a revelation of himself, notwithstanding the objections which may be urged against certain [pg 002] positions which have been taken by Ecclesiastical Christianity, and the difficulties by which certain questions connected with the Old Testament are surrounded.

It follows, therefore, that the historical truth of the facts narrated in the Gospels constitutes the central position of the entire controversy. It is not my purpose on the present occasion to discuss the general question, whether the delineation of Jesus Christ which the Gospels contain is one of an ideal or an historical person. That question I have already considered in “The Jesus of the Evangelists.” But as the various forms of modern unbelief are making the most strenuous efforts to prove that the supernatural elements of the New Testament are hopelessly incredible, and that the attestation on which the supernatural occurrences mentioned in it rests, is simply worthless, it is my intention to devote the present volume to the consideration of this special subject, and to examine the question of miracles, and their historical credibility.

Modern scepticism makes with respect to supernatural occurrences (under which more general term I include the miracles of the New Testament), the three following assertions, and endeavours to substantiate them by every available argument:

1st. That all supernatural occurrences are impossible.

2nd. That, if not impossible, they are incredible; that is, that they are contrary to reason.

3rd. That those which are narrated in the New Testament are devoid of any adequate historical attestation, and owe their origin to the inventive powers of the mythic and legendary spirit.

It is my purpose, in the course of the present work, to traverse each of these three positions, and to show:

1st. That miracles and supernatural occurrences are not impossible; and that the arguments by which this has been attempted to be established are wholly inconclusive.

2nd. That they are neither incredible, nor contrary to reason; but are entirely consistent with its dictates.

3rd, That the greatest of all the miracles which are recorded in the New Testament, and which, if an actual historical occurrence, is sufficient to carry with it all the others, the resurrection of Jesus Christ, rests on the highest form of historical testimony.

Such is my position.

A recent writer, who has ably advocated the principles of modern scepticism, the author of “Supernatural Religion,” has in the opening passage of his work clearly placed before us the real point at issue. He states the case as follows:

“On the very threshold of inquiry into the origin and true character of Christianity we are brought face to face with the supernatural. It is impossible, without totally setting aside its peculiar and indispensable claim to be a direct external revelation from God of truths which otherwise human reason could not have discovered, to treat Ecclesiastical Christianity as a form of religion developed by the wisdom of man. Not only in form does it profess to be the result of divine communication, but in its very essence, in its principal dogmas it is either superhuman or untenable. There is no question here of mere accessories, which are comparatively unimportant, and do not necessarily affect the essential matter, but we have to do with a scheme of religion claiming to be miraculous in all points, in form, in essence, and in evidence. This religion cannot be accepted without an emphatic belief in supernatural interposition, and it is absurd to imagine that its [pg 004] dogmas can be held, whilst the miraculous is rejected. Those who profess to hold the religion, whilst they discredit the supernatural element, and they are many at the present day, have widely receded from Ecclesiastical Christianity. It is most important that the inseparable connection of the miraculous with the origin, doctrines, and the evidence of Christianity should be clearly understood, in order that inquiry may pursue a logical and consistent course.”—Supernatural Religion, page 1.[1]

I fully accept all the chief positions laid down in this passage as an adequate statement of the points at issue between those who affirm and those who deny that Christianity is a divine revelation. A few minor points require a slight modification, as incurring the danger of confusing ideas that ought to be carefully distinguished.

The writer before me also raises no minor issue. Although the work is entitled “Supernatural Religion, or an inquiry into the reality of divine revelation,” its object, which is consistently carried out throughout it, is to impugn the historical character of the Gospels, and to prove that the supernatural occurrences which are recorded in them are fictitious. The title of the work might have justified the writer in assailing other portions of the Bible; but he clearly sees that to adopt this course is only to attack the outworks of Christianity, and to leave the key of the entire position unassailed. In doing so he has pursued a far nobler course than that which has been adopted by many of the opponents of the Christian faith. He has directed his attack against the very centre of the Christian position, the historical [pg 005] credibility of the supernatural actions attributed to Jesus Christ in the Gospels, being well aware that a successful assault on this position will involve the capture of all the outworks by which it is supposed to be protected; while it by no means follows that a successful assault on any of the latter involves the capture of the citadel itself. This writer does not take up a bye question, but he goes direct to the foundation on which Christianity rests. In doing so, it must be acknowledged that he has taken a straightforward course, and one which must bring the question of the truth or falsehood of Christianity to a direct issue.

I fully agree with the chief position taken in the quotation before us, that Christianity involves the presence of the supernatural and the superhuman, what in fact is generally designated as the miraculous, or it is nothing. To remove these elements out of the pages of the New Testament, is not to retain the same religion, but to manufacture another quite different and distinct from it. In the first place, we have the great central figure in the Gospels, the divine person of Jesus Christ our Lord, and the entire body of his actions and his teaching. He, although depicted as human, is at the same time depicted as superhuman and supernatural, not merely in his miraculous works, but in his entire character. To remove the divine lineaments of Jesus Christ out of the Gospels is simply to destroy them. Besides this, we have a large number of miraculous actions attributed to him. These are inextricably interwoven with the entire narrative, which, when they are taken away, loses all cohesion. Lives of Jesus which have been set forth, deprived of their supernatural and superhuman elements, are in fact nothing better than a new Gospel composed out of the subjective consciousness of the [pg 006] writers. Various attempts have been made to pare down the supernatural and superhuman elements in the Gospels to the smallest possible dimensions. Still they obstinately persist in remaining. If everything else is struck out of the Gospels, except their moral teaching, we are left in the presence of teaching which is raised at an immense elevation above the thoughts and conceptions of the age that produced it; and of a teacher, who while distinguished by the marks of pre-eminent holiness and greatness of mind, is also distinguished by a degree of self-assertion in his utterances of moral truth, which is without parallel, even among the most presumptuous of men. Deal with the Gospels as we will, while we allow any portions of them to remain as historical, we are still in the presence of the superhuman.

As the narrative now stands it is at least harmonious. The lofty pretensions of the teacher bear the most intimate correlation to the supernatural and superhuman facts that are reported of him. The one are the complement of the other. If the facts are true, the lofty self-assertion of the teacher is justified; if they are not true, his pretensions conflict with the entire conception of his holiness and elevation of mind. The use which a wide spread school of modern criticism so freely makes of the critical dissecting knife, for the purpose of amputating the supernatural from the Gospels, can only be attended by the fatal termination of destroying the entire Gospels as of the smallest historical value. It is marvellous that persons who retain any respect for Christianity as a system of religious and moral teaching, should have attempted to throw discredit on this element in the Gospels with a view of saving the remainder.

Nor is the case different with the other portions of [pg 007] the New Testament. Christianity, as enunciated by its writers, does not profess merely to teach a new and improved system of morality. If this was its only pretension, it would certainly have but little claim to be viewed as a divine revelation. In morals its teaching is both unsystematic and fragmentary; though it is an unquestionable fact, that a great system of moral teaching may be deduced from the principles it unfolds. But if one thing is plainer than another on the face of the New Testament, it is that the great purpose sought to be effected by Christianity is to impart a new moral and spiritual power to mankind. It professes to be, not a body of moral rules, but a mighty moral force, which is concentrated in the person of its Founder. The acceptance of it had generated a new power or energy, a moral and spiritual life, which raised those who had embraced it above their former selves; and which it professes to be able to impart to all time. This supernatural element, concentrated as I have said that it is in the person of its founder, runs through the entire epistles, and constitutes their most distinguishing feature. If the supernatural elements in the person of Jesus Christ be removed from their teaching nothing remains but a number of moral precepts robbed of all their vitality. In one word, the whole system of teaching simply collapses.

In a similar manner, if we eliminate every thing supernatural out of the New Testament, with a view of arriving at a residuum of truth, we are brought into immediate contact with the most unique fact in the history of man, the creation of the Church of Jesus Christ, the greatest institution which has ever affected the destinies of our race, and which has for eighteen centuries exerted a most commanding influence on human happiness and civilization. [pg 008] This is professedly based on a miraculous fact, the Resurrection of Jesus Christ. If, therefore, we remove the supernatural elements out of Christianity, this institution, mighty for good in its influence on the progress of our race, has been based on an unreality and a delusion. Here again we encounter something which has very much the appearance of the supernatural.

On these accounts, therefore, I cordially accept the position which is laid down by the author of “Supernatural Religion” as a correct statement of the case, that Christianity involves the presence of the Supernatural, or it is nothing. We must either defend the chief supernatural elements of the New Testament or abandon it as worthless.

But there is an expression which occurs in this quotation, and which is frequently made use of in subsequent parts of the work, which requires consideration, “Ecclesiastical Christianity.” What is intended by it? The meaning is nowhere defined, and unless we come to a clear understanding with respect to it, we shall be in danger of complicating the entire question. The expression is ambiguous. If by it is meant any other form of thought, than that which is contained in the pages of the New Testament; if, in fact, by it is intended a systematic arrangement of doctrinal truth, which has been elaborated at a subsequent period, I emphatically assert that those who are called upon to defend the divine character of the Christian Revelation have nothing to do with it. The only thing which those who maintain that the New Testament contains a divine revelation can be called on to defend, is the express statements of the book itself, and not a system of thought which subsequent writers may have attempted to deduce from it.

This point is so important, that I must make the position which I intend taking with respect to it clear. It involves the distinction between revelation and theology. The religious and moral teaching which is contained in the New Testament is in a very unsystematic form. Not one of its writings is a formal treatise on theology, nor does one of them contain a systematised statement of what constitutes Christianity. Its teaching of religious truth is incidental, and is called forth by the special circumstances of the writer. The plain fact is that four of the writings which comprise the New Testament are religions memoirs. One is an historical account of the foundation of the Church. Twenty-one are letters, written to different Churches and individuals, and all called forth by special emergencies. These all partake of the historical character. The only one which does not participate in this character is the Apocalypse, which, being a vision, is utterly unlike a formal or systematic treatise on Christianity. The result of the form in which the New Testament is composed is that its definite teaching is always incidental, called forth to meet special circumstances and occasions in the history of Churches and individuals, and never formal. It is also universally couched in popular, as distinct from scientific or technical language. Not one of its writers makes an attempt to formulate a system of Christian theology.

The person of Jesus Christ constitutes Christianity in its truest and highest sense. Three of the Gospels embody the traditionary teaching of the Church on this subject. The fourth is the work of an independent writer. The epistles may be received as a set of incidental commentaries on the person and work of Jesus Christ, called forth by the special occasions which gave them birth, and embodying the author's general views as to his [pg 010] work and teaching as adapted to a number of special circumstances and occasions.

Between the contents of the New Testament and what is commonly understood by Ecclesiastical Christianity the difference is extremely wide. The New Testament contains a divine revelation. Ecclesiastical Christianity is a body of religious teaching in which Christianity has been attempted to be presented in a systematised form, or, in other words, it is a theology more or less complete.

It is necessary that we should have a clear appreciation of the difference. Theology is an attempt of the human intellect to present to us the truths communicated in Revelation in a systematised form. It is in fact the result of the human reason investigating the facts and statements of Revelation. Theology therefore is a simple creation of human reason erected on the facts of divine revelation. As such it is subject to all the errors and imperfections to which our rational powers are obnoxious. It can claim no infallibility more than any other rational action of the human mind. Theology is a science, and is subject to the imperfections to which all other sciences are liable. It stands to the facts of Christianity in the same relation as philosophy and physical science stand to the works of nature. In the one the human intellect investigates the divine revelation contained in the works of nature, and endeavours to systematise its truths: in the other it does the same with respect to the divine revelation which in accordance with the assertions of the New Testament has been made in the person of Jesus Christ.

What I am desirous of drawing attention to is that theology is not revelation. Systems of theology may be accurate deductions of reason from Revelation; or [pg 011] they may be inaccurate and imperfect ones. It is very possible that a system of theology which has been evolved by human reason, although it may have attained a wide acceptance, may be as inadequate an explanation of the facts of revelation, as the Ptolemaic system of astronomy was of the facts of the material universe. Objections which were raised against the latter were no real objections against the structure of the universe itself. In the same way objections which may be raised against a particular system of theology, may leave the great facts of revelation entirely untouched.

If we look into the history of Christianity, we shall find that as soon as the Church began to consolidate itself into a distinct community, the reason of man began to exert itself on the facts of revelation, and to attempt to reduce its teaching to a systematic form. From this source have sprung all the various systems of theology which have from time to time predominated in the Church. It has been a plant of gradual growth, and as such may bear a fair comparison with the slow growth of philosophy or physical science. Such an action of reason on the facts of revelation was inevitable and entirely legitimate. What I am desirous of guarding against is the idea that when reason is exerted on the facts of revelation, it is more infallible than when exerted on any other subjects which come under its cognisance.

I am not ignorant that there is another theory respecting the nature of theology. A large branch of the Christian Church holds that a body of dogmatic statements has been handed down traditionally from the Apostles and other inspired teachers, which has been embodied in the system of theology which is accepted by this Church, and that this was intended to [pg 012] be an authoritative statement of the facts of the Christian revelation. It is also part of the same theory that the Church as a collective body has in all ages possessed an inspiration, which enables it to affirm authoritatively and dogmatically, what is and what is not Christian doctrine, and that which it thus authoritatively affirms to be so, must be accepted as a portion of the Christian revelation as much as the contents of the New Testament itself.

I fully admit that those who assume a position of this kind are bound to act consistently, and to defend every statement in their dogmatic creeds as an integral portion of Christianity. Nor is it less certain, if this principle is true, that if any portion of such dogmatic creeds can be successfully assailed as contrary to reason, as for instance the formulated doctrine of transubstantiation, it would imperil the position of Christianity itself. Those, however, who have taken such positions, must be left to take the consequences of them. It is not my intention in undertaking to defend the historical truth of the supernatural elements in the New Testament, to burden myself with an armour which seems only fitted to crash beneath its weight the person who attempts to use it.

It has been necessary to be explicit on this point, in order that the argument may be kept free from all adventitious issues. The introduction into it of the expression, “Ecclesiastical Christianity,” brings with it no inconsiderable danger of diverting our attention from what is the real point of controversy. I must therefore repeat it. Ecclesiastical Christianity is a development made by reason from the facts of the New Testament, and is a thing which is entirely distinct from the contents of the New Testament. With its affirmations therefore I have nothing to do in the [pg 013] present discussion. It will not be my duty to examine into its positions, with a view of ascertaining whether they are developments of Christian teaching which can be logically deduced from its pages; still less to accept and to defend them as authoritative statements of its meaning. In defending the New Testament as containing a divine revelation, I have only to do with the contents and assertions of the book itself, and with nothing outside its pages. What others may have propounded respecting its meaning can form no legitimate portion of the present controversy. The real point at issue is one which is simple and distinct. It is, are the supernatural incidents recorded in it historical events or fictitious inventions? As that is the question before us, I must decline to allow any other issue to be substituted in the place of it. Our inquiry is one which is strictly historical.

Another statement made by the author before me requires qualification. He says that “Christianity is a scheme of religion which claims to be miraculous in all points, in form, in essence, and in evidence.” This statement I must controvert. Christianity does not profess to be divine on all points. On the contrary, it contains a divine and a human element so intimately united, that it is impossible to separate the one from the other. It is also far from clear to me how it can be miraculous in form when it is contained in a body of historical writings. I shall have occasion to show hereafter, that although miracles form an important portion of the attestation on which it rests, they are not the only one.

With these qualifications I fully accept the position taken by this writer as a correct statement of the points at issue between those who affirm, and those who deny the claims of Christianity to be a divine revelation, and [pg 014] accept his challenge to defend the supernatural elements in the New Testament, or to abandon it as worthless. To maintain that any of its dogmas can be accepted as true while its miraculous elements are abandoned seems to me to involve a question which is hopelessly illogical.

Modern unbelief rejects every supernatural occurrence as utterly incredible. Before proceeding to examine into the grounds of this, it will be necessary to lay down definitely the bearing of the present argument on the principles of atheism, pantheism, and theism.

As far as the impossibility of supernatural occurrences is concerned, pantheism and atheism occupy precisely the same grounds. If either of them propounds a true theory of the universe, any supernatural occurrence, which necessarily implies a supernatural agent to bring it about, is impossible, and the entire controversy as to whether miracles have ever been actually performed is a foregone conclusion. Modern atheism, while it does not venture in categorical terms to affirm that no God exists, definitely asserts that there is no evidence that there is one. It follows that if there is no evidence that there is a God, there can be no evidence that a miracle ever has been performed, for the very idea of a miracle implies the idea of a God to work one. If therefore atheism is true, all controversy about miracles is useless. They are simply impossible, and to inquire whether an impossible event has happened is absurd. To such a person the historical enquiry, as far as a miracle is concerned, must be a foregone conclusion. It might have a little interest as a matter of curiosity; but even if the most unequivocal evidence could be adduced that an occurrence such as we call supernatural had taken place, the utmost that it could prove would be that some [pg 015] most extraordinary and abnormal fact had taken place in nature of which we did not know the cause. But to prove a miracle to any person who consistently denies that he has any evidence that any being exists which is not a portion of and included in the material universe, or developed out of it, is impossible.

Nor does the case differ in any material sense with pantheism. When we have got rid of its hazy mysticism, and applied to it clear principles of logic, its affirmation is that God and the Universe are one, and that all past and present forms of existence have been the result of the Universe, i.e. God, everlastingly developing himself in conformity with immutable law. All things which either have existed or exist are as many manifestations of God, who is in fact an infinite impersonal Proteus, ever changing in his outward form. From him, or to speak more correctly, from it (for he is no person), all things have issued as mere phenomenal babbles of the passing moment, and by it will be again swallowed up in never-ending succession. Such a God must be devoid of everything which we understand by personality, intelligence, wisdom, volition or a moral nature. It is evident therefore that to a person who logically and consistently holds these views the occurrence of a miracle is no less an impossibility than it is to an atheist, for the conception of a miracle involves the presence of personality, intelligence, and power at the disposal of volition. All that the strongest evidence could prove to those who hold such principles, is that some abnormal event had taken place of which the cause was unknown.

It is evident, therefore, that the only course which can be pursued with a professed atheist or pantheist, is to grapple with him on the evidences of theism, and to endeavour to prove the existence of a God possessed [pg 016] of personality, intelligence, volition, and adequate power, before we attempt to deal with the evidences of miracles. Until we have convinced him of this all our reasonings must be in vain.

There are four modes of reasoning by which the being of a God may be established. I will simply enumerate them. First, the argument which is founded on the principle of causation; second, that which rests on the order of the universe; third, that from its innumerable adaptations; fourth, that which is derived from the moral nature and personality of man. If the argument from causation fails to prove to those with whom we are reasoning that the finite causes in the universe must have a first cause from whence they have originated; if that from the orderly arrangements in the universe fails to prove that there must be an intelligent being who produced them; if its innumerable adaptations fail to establish the presence of a presiding mind; and if the moral nature of man fails to prove that must be a moral being from whom that nature emanated, and of whom it is the image, it follows that the minds must be so differently constituted as to offer no common ground or basis of reasoning on this question. The whole involves an essential difference of principle, which no argumentation can really reach. To attempt to prove to a mind of this description the occurrence of a miracle, is simply a waste of labour.

A work, therefore, on the subject of miracles can only be addressed to theists, because the very conception of a miracle involves the existence of a personal God. To take this for granted in reasoning with a pantheist or atheist is simply to assume the point at issue. It is perfectly true, that a legitimate body of reasoning may be constructed, if the pantheist or the [pg 017] atheist agrees to assume that a God exists for the purpose of supplying a basis for the argument. We may then reason with him precisely in the same way as we would with a theist. But the contest will be with one who has clad himself in armour which no weapon at our disposal can penetrate. After the strongest amount of historical evidence has been adduced, and after all alleged difficulties have been answered, he simply falls back on his atheism or his pantheism, which assumes that all supernatural occurrences must be impossible, and therefore that alleged instances of them are delusions.

This is not unfrequently the case in the present controversy. A considerable number of objections which are urged against the supernatural elements of Christianity, derive whatever cogency they possess from the assumption that there is a God who is the moral Governor of the universe. These are not unfrequently urged by persons who deny the possibility of miracles on atheistic or pantheistic grounds. It is perfectly fair to reason against Christianity on these grounds; it is equally so for a person who holds these opinions, to attempt to prove that the historical evidence adduced in proof of the miracles recorded in the New Testament is worthless as an additional reason why men should cease to believe in them. But it is not conducive to the interests of truth to urge objections which have no reality except on the supposition that a God exists who is the moral Governor of the universe, and then to fall back on reasonings whose whole force is dependent on the data furnished by pantheism or atheism. I shall have occasion to notice a remarkable instance of this involved mode of reasoning hereafter.

I shall now proceed briefly to state the mode in which I propose to treat the present subject. The point which I have to defend is not any conceivable body of miracles or their evidential value, but specially the supernatural occurrences recorded in the New Testament. I must therefore endeavour to ascertain what is the extent of the supernaturalism asserted in the New Testament, and what is the degree of evidential value which its writers claim for it.

It has been asserted by many writers that the sole and only evidence of a revelation must be a miraculous testimony. Whether this be so or not, this is not the place to enquire. But in relation to the present controversy the plain and obvious course is to ask the writers of the New Testament what is the precise evidential value of the supernatural occurrences which they have narrated. This is far preferable to falling back on any assertions of modern writers, however eminent, on this subject. They may have over-estimated, or under-estimated their evidential value. The writers of the New Testament must be held responsible, not for the assertions of others, but only for their own. I must therefore carefully consider what it is that they affirm to be proved by miracles.

One primary objection against the possibility of miracles is founded on that peculiar form of theoretic belief, which affirms that both philosophy, science, and religion alike point to the existence of a Cause of the Universe, which is the source of all the forces which exist, and of which the various phenomena of the universe are manifestations, and designates this cause by the name of God. But while it concedes his existence, it proclaims him to be Unknown and Unknowable. If this position is correct, the inference seems inevitable, that any thing like a real revelation of him is impossible. [pg 019] It will be necessary therefore for me to examine into the validity of this position.

A vast variety of arguments have been adduced both on philosophic grounds and from the principles established by physical science, for the purpose of proving that the occurrence of any supernatural event is contrary to our reason. If this be true, it is a fatal objection against the entire mass of supernatural occurrences that are recorded in the New Testament. The most important points of these reasonings will require a careful consideration.

A very important objection has been urged against the Christian mode of conducting the argument from miracles. It is alleged that it involves reasoning in a vicious circle, and that Christian apologists endeavour to prove the truth of doctrines which utterly transcend reason by miraculous evidence, and then endeavour to prove the truth of the miracles by the doctrines. If this allegation is true, it is no doubt a fatal objection to the argument. I shall endeavour to show that it is founded on a misapprehension of the entire subject.

An attempt has been made to re-affirm the validity of Hume's argument that no amount of evidence can avail to prove the reality of a miracle unless the falsehood of the evidence is more miraculous than the alleged miracle. It will be necessary to consider the validity of the positions which have been lately assumed respecting it.

A very formidable objection has been urged against the truth of the supernatural occurrences recorded in the New Testament on the ground that the followers of Jesus were a prey to a number of the most grotesque beliefs respecting the action of demons, and that their superstition and credulity on this point was of so extreme a character as to deprive their historical testimony, [pg 020] on the subject of the supernatural of all value. As this objection is not only one which is widely extended, but has been urged with great force by the author of “Supernatural Religion,” I shall devote four chapters of this work to the examination of the question of possession and demoniacal action as far as it affects the present controversy.

The entire school of modern unbelief found a very considerable portion of their arguments against the historical character of the Gospels, on the alleged credulity and superstition of the followers of our Lord. This is alleged to have been of a most profound character, and it forms the weapon which is perhaps in most constant use with the assailants of Christianity. All difficulties which beset their arguments are met by attributing the most unbounded credulity, superstition and enthusiasm to the followers of Jesus. It has also been urged that the belief in supernatural occurrences has been so general, that it renders the attestation of miracles to a revelation invalid. I purpose examining into the validity of this objection. As this may be said to be the key of the position occupied by modern unbelief, I must examine into the reality of the affirmation, and also how far the love of the marvellous in mankind affects the credit of the testimony to miracles. This I propose discussing in two distinct chapters.

It is an unquestionable fact that in these days we summarily reject whole masses of alleged supernatural occurrences, as utterly incredible, without inquiry into the testimony on which they rest. It will be necessary to inquire into the grounds on which we do this, and how far it affects the credibility of the miracles recorded in the New Testament.

The historical value of the testimony which has [pg 021] been adduced for the truth of the miracles recorded in the New Testament, has been assailed by every weapon which criticism can supply. It is affirmed in the strongest manner that they are utterly devoid of all reliable historical evidence. The Gospels are pronounced to consist of a bundle of myths and legends, with only a few grains of historic truth hidden beneath them. They are affirmed to be late compositions, and that we are utterly devoid of all contemporaneous attestation for the facts recorded in them, and that the true account of the origin of Christianity is buried beneath a mass of fiction. If this be true, there cannot be a doubt that it is a most serious allegation, which affects the entire Christian position. It is further urged that while the defenders of Christianity publish works in which they attempt to prove that miracles are possible and credible, they carefully avoid grappling with the real point of the whole question by showing that any historical evidence can be produced for a single miracle recorded in the Gospels, which will stand the test of such historical criticism, and it is loudly proclaimed that no real evidence can be made forthcoming. Such a charge as this, it is impossible to pass over in silence.

I propose, therefore, to examine into the general truth of these allegations, and to consider the nature of the historical evidence which unbelief, after it has exhausted all its powers of criticism, still leaves us unquestionably in possession of.

This consists of the epistles of the New Testament viewed as historical documents. Their value as such has been greatly overlooked by both sides to the controversy, especially by the Christian side. Christians have been in the habit of viewing them as inspired compositions, and have studied them almost exclusively [pg 022] on account of the doctrinal and moral teaching which they contain, and each sect has viewed them as a kind of armoury from which to draw weapons for the establishing its own particular opinions. In doing this they have forgotten that they are also historical documents of the highest order, the great majority of which even the opponents of Christianity concede to have been composed prior to the conclusion of the first century of the Christian era, and many of them at a much earlier period.

Of these writings four are universally admitted to be genuine, and to have been composed prior to the year 60 of our era. Four more are genuine beyond all reasonable doubt, and of two more the evidence in favour of their authenticity is very strong. The Apocalypse, which is also admitted to be genuine, although not strictly an historical document, can be rendered valuable for the purposes of history. Of the remaining writings the genuineness is disputed; but whether genuine or not, it is impossible to deny their antiquity, and that they are faithful representations of the ideas of those who wrote them. In fact the names of their authors are of no great importance in the present controversy, when the writings themselves bear so decisively the marks of originality. Thus the epistle of James, by whomsoever written, bears the most unquestionable marks of the most primitive antiquity. It is in fact a document of the earliest form of Christianity,—in one word, the Jewish form, before the Church was finally separated from the synagogue.

Such are our historical materials. Little justice has been done to their value in the writings of Christian apologists. As included in the Canon of the New Testament, it has been for the most part the practice to view [pg 023] them as standing in need of defence, rather than as being the mainstay of the argument for historical Christianity, and constituting its central position.

It will be admitted that it will be impossible for me to do full justice to such a subject in a work like the present. To bring out all the treasures of evidence respecting primitive Christianity, and the foundation of the Christian Church which these writings contain, the whole subject would require to be unfolded in a distinct and separate treatise exclusively devoted to the subject. Still, however, this work would be very incomplete if I did not accept the challenge so boldly thrown down to us, and show that Christianity rests on an historical attestation of the highest order. To this I propose devoting the six concluding chapters of this work.

I intend, therefore, in the first place to examine the value of the historical documents of the New Testament, and show that several of the epistles take rank as the highest form of historical documents, and present us with what is to all intents and purposes a large mass of contemporaneous evidence as to the primitive beliefs, and the original foundation of the Christian Church. In doing so I propose to treat them in the same manner as all other similar historical documents are treated.

I shall then show that these documents afford a substantial testimony to all the great facts of Christianity, and especially to the existence of miraculous powers in the Church, and that the various Churches were from the very earliest period in possession of an oral account of the actions and teachings of Jesus Christ substantially the same as that which is now embodied in the Gospels; and that this oral Gospel was habitually used for the purposes of instruction. Further, that this [pg 024] oral Gospel was a substantial embodiment of the beliefs of the primitive followers of Jesus, and that the Church as a community was a body especially adapted for handing down correctly the account of the primitive beliefs respecting its origin, and that the peculiar position in which it was placed compelled it to do so.

I shall further show on the evidence furnished by those epistles, the genuineness of which unbelievers do not dispute, that from the earliest commencement of Christianity the whole body of believers, without distinction of sect or party, believed in the resurrection of Jesus Christ as a fact, and viewed it not only as the groundwork on which Christianity rested, but as the one sole and only reason for the existence of the Christian Church. I shall be able also to prove on the same evidence that a considerable number of the followers of Jesus were persuaded that they had seen him alive after his crucifixion, and that his appearance was an actual resurrection from the dead. The same writings prove to demonstration that this was the universal belief of the whole Christian community, and that the Church was established on its basis.

These things being established as the basis for my reasonings, I shall proceed to prove that it is impossible that these beliefs of the Church could have owed their origin to any possible form of delusion; but that the resurrection of Jesus Christ was an historical fact, and that no other supposition can give an adequate account of the phenomenon.

Having proved that the greatest of all the miracles which are recorded in the Gospels is an historical fact, I have got rid of the à priori difficulty with which the acceptance of the Gospels as genuine historical accounts is attended; but further, if it is an historical fact that Jesus Christ really rose from the dead, it is in the [pg 025] highest degree probable that other supernatural occurrences would be connected with his person. I shall therefore proceed to restore the Gospels to their place as history, and to show that even on the principles of the opponents of Christianity, they have every claim to be accepted as true accounts of the action and teaching of Jesus Christ as it was transmitted by the different Churches, partly in an oral, and partly in a written form. I shall also show that even if they were composed at the late dates which are assigned to them by opponents, they were yet written within the period which is strictly historical, while tradition was fresh and reminiscences vivid, and long before it was possible that a great mass of facts which must have formed the basis of the existence of the Christian Church could have been superseded by a number of mythic and legendary creations. Having placed these facts on a firm foundation, I shall proceed to consider their accounts of the Resurrection of Jesus Christ, and to estimate its historical nature.

The proof that the greatest miracle recorded in the Gospels, the Resurrection of Jesus Christ, is an event which has really occurred, places the remainder of them in point of credibility in the same position as the facts of ordinary history; and they must be accepted and regarded in conformity with the usual methods of testing evidence.

Chapter II. Definitions of Terms.

Nothing has more contributed to import an almost hopeless confusion of thought into the entire controversy about miracles than the ambiguous senses in which the most important terms connected with it have been employed, both by theologians and men of science, by the defenders of revelation as well as by its opponents. Of these terms the words “nature,” “natural”, “law,” “force,” “supernatural,” “superhuman,” “miracle,” and “miraculous,” are the most conspicuous. It is quite clear that unless we use these terms in a definite and uniform sense, we shall be fighting the air. The neglect to do so has thrown the greatest obscurity over the entire subject. This vague and uncertain use of them is not confined to writers on theological subjects, but is diffused over a large number of scientific works. My object in the present chapter will be, not to lay down strictly accurate definitions of all the terms used in the controversy (for this in the present state of thought on the subject is hardly possible) but to endeavour to assign a definite meaning to those which it will be necessary for me to employ, and to draw attention to some of the fallacies which a vague use of language has introduced.

First: No terms are more frequently used in this controversy than the words “nature” and “natural.” [pg 027] They are constantly used as if their meaning was definite and invariable. Nothing is more common than to use the expression “laws of nature,” and to speak of miracles as involving contradictions, violations, and suspensions of the laws and order of nature, as though there was no danger of our falling into fallacies of reasoning by classing wholly different orders of phenomena under a common name.

What do we mean by the terms “nature” and “natural”? It is evident that no satisfactory result can come from reasonings on this subject, unless the parties to the discussion agree to attach to those words a steady and consistent meaning. Are we in fact under the expression “nature” to include both matter and its phenomena, and mind and its phenomena? Is nature to include all things which exist, including their causes; laws, and forces; or is it to be restricted to matter, its laws and forces? Or is it to include all things that exist, except God? I need hardly observe that the laying down some clear and definite principles on this subject is vital to the present controversy.

Again: What do we mean by the laws of nature? How do we distinguish between the laws and the forces of nature? Do the laws of nature, in the sense in which that expression is used by science, possess any efficient power whatever; or ought not efficiency to be predicated only of the forces of nature, and never of its laws? Or when we speak of the forces of nature, do we recognise any distinction between material and moral forces, or do we confound phenomena so utterly differing in outward character, and on whose difference some of the most important points of the controversy about miracles rest, under a common name? What again do we mean by the order of nature? Is it its material order; or does it include the order of the [pg 028] moral universe? Until we can agree to attach a definite meaning to these expressions, to argue that miracles are contrary to nature, or involve a suspension of its laws, or a violation of its order, or even to affirm the contrary position, is fighting the air. Yet this I may almost say is the present aspect of the controversy.

Again: What do we intend, when we use the different expressions, “miracles,” “supernatural,” “superhuman,” or events occurring out of the order of nature? It is evident that whether they point to any real distinctions or not, it is necessary to employ them with consistency.

The mere enumeration of these questions makes it clear that by a vague and indefinite use of terms, or by attaching to them meanings which they cannot accurately be made to bear, we may unconsciously assume the entire question at issue.

First: With respect to the terms “nature” and “natural.” What do we include under them? Bishop Butler considers that the latter term is satisfied by attaching to it the meaning “usual.” Nature then would mean the ordinary course of things. But such a meaning would by no means satisfy the requirements of modern science, philosophy, or theology.

One obvious sense to attach to the word “nature” is to use it to denote the entire mass of phenomena as contemplated by physical science. In this point of view it would include matter, its forces, and its laws, and embrace the entire range of those phenomena and forces where action is necessary; and into the conception of which neither volition nor freedom enters. If “nature” and “natural” had been used only in this sense, it would have saved us from a great mass of inconclusive reasoning. But this is far from being the case. [pg 029] Not only are they used to include matter, its laws and forces, but also the whole phenomena of mind.

To this use of the terms the Duke of Argyll has given no inconsiderable countenance in his admirable work, “The Reign of Law,” especially in the sixth chapter. He uses the term law as alike applicable to the operations of mind and matter, and this of course implies that the whole of our mental phenomena form a portion of nature and its order. He is led to this, among other considerations, by the use which we make of the word “natural” as applied to the results of all kinds of mental operations. The question may fairly be asked, Are not the works wrought by man in nature, or is not the building of its nest by a bird, or of its comb by the bee, a natural operation? If so, man, bird, and bee, must form a portion of nature, and their various actions, of its order.

In a popular point of view such expressions involve no difficulty, and as a mere verbal distinction the whole question would not be worth the labour of discussion. But in a question like the one now under consideration, which requires the utmost accuracy both of thought and reasoning, the case is far different. The classing together of phenomena which differ so entirely as mind and matter, under a common term, leads to the inference that there is no essential difference between them, which involves at the outset a petitio principii of the entire question under definition. I shall have occasion repeatedly to point out in the course of this work the number of fallacious reasonings which have been introduced into the question about the possibility and the credibility of miracles by thus including under a common term phenomena utterly different in character. It would be far better to get rid of words so vague as “nature” and “natural” in this discussion, and [pg 030] substitute for them terms of which it is impossible to mistake the meaning, than to employ them in senses which are simply ambiguous and misleading. But of this more hereafter.

What then are we to do with man? Is he a part of nature and its order? I reply that man is within material nature as far as regards his bodily organization; but that he is outside, or above it, and belongs to a different order, as far as his rational action, his volition, and his moral powers are concerned. All that I am contending for is that a clear distinction must be preserved between the necessary action of the forces of material nature, and the voluntary action of man; and that terms must be used which accurately denote this distinction. Matter, its forces and laws, involve the conception of necessary action. They act in a particular manner because they cannot help so acting. With action purely intellectual I am not concerned, but all moral action is voluntary. Man as an agent can act or forbear acting; matter cannot. This distinction is of the highest importance, and must not be lost sight of behind a confused use of such terms as natural, law, force, or order of nature, applied indeterminately to the necessary action of material agents, and the voluntary action of moral ones.

It will doubtless be objected by a certain order of philosophy that all mental and moral force is only some special modification of material force, and consequently that there is no distinction between material and moral action, or between material and moral force, and that the words “nature” and “natural” are correctly applied to both alike, as being simple manifestations of the same original force. To this it will be sufficient to reply, first: that this is an assertion only, [pg 031] and never has been nor can be proved. Secondly: that it contradicts the highest of all our certitudes, the direct testimony of consciousness, which affirms that we live under a law of freedom, wholly different from the necessary laws of material nature. Thirdly: that it contradicts the universal experience of mankind, as embodied in the primary laws of human language and human thought. To assume this at the commencement of the argument is to take for granted the point which requires to be proved.

It would be quite out of place in a treatise like the present to attempt to discuss the question of the origin of the free agency and the moral nature of man. It is sufficient for the purpose to observe that, however voluntary agency may have originated, it is a simple fact that it exists in the universe, and that its phenomena belong to an order of its own. It is no mere theory, but a fact, that man not only is capable of modifying the action of the forces of the material universe, but that he has modified them, and has produced results utterly different from those which would have followed from their simple action. To use terms in this controversy which overlook this plain and obvious fact, can lead to no satisfactory result.

Are then the actions of man, the bird, and the bee, properly designated as natural? In a popular use of language the question may be one purely verbal; but when we are dealing with subjects requiring accurate thought, it is in the highest degree necessary to use language which does not confound the distinct phenomena of mind and matter under a common designation. Both together compose the universe; but each belongs to a different order of phenomena. The whole difficulty proceeds from the fact that both material forces which act in conformity with necessary laws, and moral ones [pg 032] which act in conformity with those of freedom, are united in the person of man.

Another order of thought uses the term “nature” as including everything that exists, even God; or in other words, it affirms that every thing which has existed and exists is a manifestation of Him. As this theory involves the denial of the personality of the Divine Being, it stands excluded from the question under consideration, namely, the credibility of miracles, which is utterly irrelevant, except on the assumption of the existence of a personal God. It ought to be observed, however, that while theism affirms that God and the universe, whether material or moral, are distinct, it fully recognises the fact that God is immanent in both the worlds of mind and matter, while at the same time he transcends them both. This is an important consideration, which is too often overlooked by both parties to the discussion.

Secondly: a still greater confusion has been introduced by a vague and indefinite use of the term “law,” and by confusing a number of utterly diverse phenomena under the designation of the “laws of nature.” It is absolutely necessary to trace this fallacy to its source. The Duke of Argyll tells us in his “Reign of Law” that there are five different senses at least in which this word is habitually used even in scientific writings. They are as follows:—

“First, we have law as applied simply to an observed order of facts.”

“Secondly, to that order as involving the action of some force or forces of which nothing more can be known.”

“Thirdly, as applied to individual forces, the measure of whose operation has been more or less defined or ascertained.”

“Fourthly, as applied to those combinations of forces which have reference to the fulfilment of purposes or the discharge of functions.”

“Fifthly, as applied to abstract conceptions of the mind—not corresponding with any actual phenomena, but deduced therefrom as axioms of thought, necessary to an understanding of them. Law, in this sense, is a reduction of the phenomena, not merely to an order of facts, but to an order of thought.”

“These leading significations of the word Law,” says the Duke, “all circle round the three great questions which science asks of nature, the what, the how, and the why.”

“What are the facts in their established order?”

“How, i.e. from what physical causes does that order come to be? What relation do they bear to purpose, to the fulfilment of intention, to the discharge of function?”

Such are the multiform acceptations attached by scientific men to the term “law,” yet the Duke is not quite certain whether they may not be even more numerous. It is evident that if they are all imported into the question of the credibility of miracles, our position must resemble that of persons who are compelled to fight in the dark; and that the question whether an occurrence is natural or supernatural, whether it is contrary to, or a violation of the laws of nature, or above nature, and many others which enter into this controversy must be without definite meaning. It is clear that unless we can restrict the word “law” to one, or at most, two definite meanings, we shall get into hopeless confusion, or to speak more correctly, we shall open the gate wide for the introduction of any number of fallacies.

The primary conception implied by the term “law” [pg 034] is unquestionably one which is strictly applicable to man and his actions, and can only be applied metaphorically, and in some systems of thought after a considerable change of meaning, to the facts and phenomena of the material universe. A law is a rule of action for human conduct and nothing more. Such rules of conduct for the most part pre-suppose that they are imposed by some external authority, which has the right or the power to enforce obedience to them; or else that the person obeying them has an inward feeling that it is right to do so, and knows that his conscience will reproach him for the omission. But law, strictly speaking, is simply the rule of action itself, as for instance, an Act of Parliament; but as in practice all such rules are enforced by a sanction of some kind, our conception of a law is also united with that of a lawgiver, who has both the right and the power to enforce it.

It follows therefore that such a conception is essentially a moral one. It is also intimately united with the knowledge that we possess the power to act or forbear acting in conformity with its dictates, and, if we prefer it, of taking the consequences of disobedience. But when such a conception is transferred to material nature it loses a considerable portion of its original significancy.

In its application therefore to physical science, it may with strict propriety be used to denote an invariable order of events: and if the human analogy could hold in physics it might be used to include the power which originated and enforced them. But as the consideration of will or purpose forms no portion of strictly physical science, and is expressly excluded from it, the term law as used by it ought to denote the invariable order of sequences, and not to include [pg 035] the forces which generate them. Unless this distinction is carefully observed, we shall be in danger of introducing into our reasonings human analogies to which there is nothing corresponding in nature viewed as a mere body of unintelligent forces.

The use of the term “law” in physical science ought to be confined to denote the invariable sequences of the material phenomena. Physicists profess to know nothing of efficient causation; or of a lawgiver standing outside his laws and possessing power to enforce them. The whole question of intelligent agency or purpose lies in a region outside their province. Law, as far as physical science is acquainted with it, can consist only of a set of antecedents, followed by an invariable set of consequents. Of any inherent efficacy in these antecedents to produce their consequents, it can affirm nothing. A very popular philosophy even denies the power of the human mind to penetrate beyond this, and affirms that its entire knowledge is limited to phenomena.

But physical science also deals with forces. These, and not its laws, are its true principles of causation. Mere invariable sequences can effect nothing; but forces, such as gravitation, heat, electricity, and the entire body of chemical forces, or whatever force they may ultimately be resolved into, can effect much. They are in fact the antecedents of which the invariable order of events are the consequents. Respecting the ultimate principle of force, or what is its real nature, or how it is directed, or came to be, physical science is silent. All that it can do is to observe the order of their occurrence, measure their quantities, and tabulate their results. By this means it rises to the conception of what are called the laws of nature.

If in the present controversy the word law had [pg 036] been used in this sense only, it would have been wholly unexceptionable. But it becomes far otherwise when the idea of force or efficiency is introduced into it. Nothing is more common in the reasonings of those who attempt to prove that miracles are impossible, than to import into the term law the idea of force, or efficient causation, even at the very time when the presence of intelligent action is denied. It is this which imparts to this class of reasonings their entire speciousness. The laws of material nature are continually spoken of as though they were forces which are energetic in the universe, and to the energy of which all things owe their present form; or in other words, it is assumed that the laws of nature are causes which have produced by their unintelligent action the present order of the universe.

Nothing however can be clearer than that a law of nature, in the sense in which purely physical science can take cognizance of one, can effectuate nothing. What can an invariable order of sequences effect? Before the idea of efficiency can be attached to law, the conception of force must be introduced into it. Modern controversy, however, is constantly in the habit of speaking of the laws of nature as though they were efficient agents. We hear of creation by law, evolution by law, of results brought about by the action of invariable laws, and a countless number of assertions of a similar description. To such expressions in a popular sense when no accuracy of expression is required, there is no objection; but when they are introduced into the controversy respecting the credibility of miracles, they create nothing but confusion. What is really meant is, that such results are brought about by the action of forces which act in conformity with invariable laws, but the idea of intelligence [pg 037] and volition is carefully excluded from the conception. It is clearly inaccurate to speak of laws reigning. Laws do not reign even in political societies; but only the power which is able to enact and enforce them. In material nature the only things which possess efficiency are its forces.

There can be no objection to the use of the expression, “the laws of mind,” when care is taken to use language which clearly distinguishes between them and unintelligent and necessary sequences of material nature. But when the term “law” is without any qualification applied to both sets of phenomena alike, it is certain either to lead to fallacious reasoning, or to involve the assumption of the point at issue. Whatever may be the origin of the moral and spiritual in man, it is certain that as they at present exist in him, they stand out in the strongest contrast with the forces which act upon material things, and with the laws of their action. Nothing can be more entirely different in character than the force of gravitation and the principles of volition and self-consciousness, or than the unconscious forces of material nature and those principles which constitute our rationality. If we affirm that the forces of mind act in conformity with law, it ought to be clearly understood that they act in conformity with a law of their own, which affords free action to the principle of volition. Otherwise there is the greatest danger that the expression will involve the covert assumption of the truth of the doctrine of philosophical necessity, or in other words, that all mental and material forces are of the same character, that is to say, that they are both equally necessary. This involves the assumption of the very point on which the entire controversy turns, for if moral and material forces and laws are all alike, it destroys the conception of a God, and the significance of a miracle.

This brings us to the conception of force, what is it? Various definitions of it have been given sufficiently accurate for practical purposes. It should be observed however that physical science can know nothing of it except as a phenomenon. The determination of its nature, and its ultimate cause lie entirely beyond its limits. Many facts respecting it, have been ascertained and tabulated. Many of its manifestations, which bear a different phenomenal aspect, it has ascertained to be capable of transmutation into one another. But it must never be forgotten that it is able to affirm nothing respecting the source in which the forces of the universe originate. All that it can affirm is, that they do exist. The original conception of force is one, however, which we derive, not from the material universe, but from the action of our own minds. We are conscious that we are efficient agents, and that definite results follow the action of our wills. This gives us the conception of force. We apply it in a metaphorical sense to certain things which we observe in the material universe and call them forces, having abstracted from our primary idea of force the conception of volition. But all that we really know about force tends to prove that its origin is mental and not material.

It is of the utmost importance to preserve a clear distinction between the unconscious forces of matter and the intelligent ones of mind; otherwise we shall inevitably be misled by such expressions as “the forces of nature.” It is impossible to argue the question unless the distinction is admitted as a fact, whatever theory may be held about their origin. It is absurd to confound principles so distinct as heat, or gravitation, or electricity, with those which produce the most disinterested moral actions, and designate them by the [pg 039] common term “natural forces.” In common language we are in no danger of error when we speak of the force of conscience, or the force of a motive; but in discussions like the present, where such expressions really involve the assumption of the whole controversy, it is absurd to classify such phenomena, and the unintelligent forces of matter under a common designation, unless it can be demonstrated that they are all manifestations of the same power.

We come now to the much vexed question as to the meaning to be attached to the words “miracle” and “miraculous;” and the terms closely allied to them, “supernatural” and “superhuman.” Is there any valid distinction between miracles and supernatural occurrences? Are, in fact, all miracles supernatural occurrences, and all supernatural occurrences miracles? The determination of this question is closely connected with an important point which will be considered hereafter, viz., whether a miracle could have any evidential value if it were brought about by a special adaptation of the known or unknown forces of material nature.

Let it be observed that we are not discussing this question as a purely abstract one, but in reference to the truth of Christianity. What miracles may be in themselves, I shall not inquire; but in relation to the question before us, what we mean when we call an occurrence a miracle ought to be made sufficiently clear and distinct. In this controversy it would greatly tend to precision if we used the term “miracle” as distinguished from an occurrence which is supernatural or superhuman, to denote only those supernatural occurrences which have an evidential value in connection with the evidences of a divine revelation, since there may be supernatural occurrences which would not be in any proper sense evidential.

But the further question arises, Is it necessary in order to constitute an event a miracle that it should be one which transcends the known or the unknown forces of material nature to have produced? It is clear that to constitute an event a miracle it must involve supernatural or superhuman agency of some kind; that is to say, it must be either supernatural in the mode of its production as an objective fact, or superhuman in its productive elements, by which I mean, that it must be preceded by an announcement that it is going to occur, which must be beyond the sphere of human knowledge. In order to render a supernatural event evidential, or in other words to constitute it a miracle, it must not only consist of an external objective fact, but its occurrence must be unknown beforehand, and take place at the bidding of the agent. Such previous announcement, or prediction, is necessary to render even a supernatural occurrence in the strictest sense of the word a miracle. The prediction of some occurrence in physical nature previously unknown may therefore convert such an event into an evidential miracle, although the occurrence itself as a mere objective fact may have been brought about by some known or unknown forces of material nature. To render it such it would be necessary that the knowledge of the occurrence should be clearly beyond the bounds of existing knowledge. Thus, if any person, when the science of astronomy was utterly unknown, had announced beforehand the day and the hour of the occurrence of the next two transits of Venus, and the various places on the earth's surface in which they would be visible, and if the events had taken place accordingly, this would have unquestionably proved the presence of superhuman knowledge. The only question which in such a case would require to be determined would be [pg 041] whether such a knowledge must have been communicated by God, or by some being inferior to God. As however none of the miracles recorded in the New Testament have the smallest appearance of being of this character, I need not further discuss a supposed case. My only reason for referring to it is, that if it is supposable that any of the miracles recorded in the New Testament could, at some future day, be shown to have been due to a combination of physical forces, their occurring instantly at the direct command of the agent would still give them an evidential value.

But it is clear that the miracles recorded in the New Testament, if caused by material forces at all, could not have been due to their ordinary action. They must have been due either to an unknown combination of known forces, or to the calling of unknown forces into activity, or to the immediate agency of the divine mind. It is clear therefore that their occurrence as objective facts proves the presence of mind acting in some way on the material forces of nature. To determine the mode in which this action mast have taken place has nothing to do with the question of miracles, or the reality of their occurrence.

A miracle therefore may, for all practical purposes of this argument, be defined as an occurrence which cannot be effectuated by the ordinary action of the known material forces of the Universe, and could only have been brought about by the agency of intelligent volition; and which is preceded by an announcement on the part of the agent that it is about to happen or takes place directly on his bidding. The latter element, as I have observed, is essential to constitute the occurrence an evidential miracle. Otherwise in our ignorance of what unknown forces may exist in the universe, we could have no certainty [pg 042] that the event was not a mere unusual occurrence effected by some already existing but unknown forces. To the highest form of the miracles in the New Testament, however, such an idea would be inapplicable.

It may perhaps here be objected that in laying down this definition of a miracle, I have not sufficiently identified its performance with the governing power of the universe, i.e. God; but that if supernatural agents exist, inferior to God, it may be due to their operation; and consequently that it may not be evidential of a divine commission. This objection will be fully considered in a subsequent portion of this work.

A supernatural event is one which exceeds and which cannot be effected by any force existing in material nature. But there must always be a difficulty in determining whether an occurrence, viewed as a bare objective fact, belongs to that class of events which is supernatural, or only to that which is unusual. This will always be the case until our knowledge of the forces of the universe is so complete that we can ascertain for certain what are the limits of their possible action, and whether it is possible to bring into action any forces that may exist, but are unknown to us. In strict language therefore, it is impossible to be certain whether an occurrence, as a bare objective fact, is supernatural, until we are acquainted with the possible action of every force that exists in the universe. This difficulty, however, is one that is entirely theoretical, and has not the smallest practical importance with respect to the miracles of the New Testament. Men have had several thousand years' experience of what can be effected by the ordinary forces of material nature. Occurrences which lie beyond their power to effectuate prove the presence of intelligence and volition. The introduction of an unknown [pg 043] force can only be accomplished by a being who, although he may be immanent in nature, is yet capable of controlling its material forces. Occurrences therefore which transcend the power of the known forces existing in the universe to accomplish, whether they are material or human, may for all practical purposes be viewed as supernatural; that is to say, they denote the presence and agency of a being who is possessed of power, intelligence, and volition. Whether that being be human, superhuman, or divine, must be determined by an intelligent exercise of our reason.

It is useless to discuss this question further. We are dealing with a very definite question, the miraculous events recorded in the Gospels. With respect to the great majority of them, there can be no doubt as to their being supernatural occurrences, if they took place precisely as they are recorded. We know enough of the ordinary forces of material nature to be certain that the instantaneous cure of a blind or leprous man by a word does not lie within the sphere of their operation. Such an event must denote the special interposition of an extremely high degree of intelligence and power. Common sense will affirm that it could only be brought about by the intervention of the supreme power of the universe, i.e. God.

In this sense every supernatural occurrence may be said to be likewise evidential, when we have ascertained for certain that it is due to supernatural causes, and that it cannot have been brought about by the action of unintelligent forces, or by those which are capable of being modified by the agency of man. But in that case it would only prove the presence and intervention of a being who is capable of controlling the unintelligent forces of nature. The real difficulty, as I have observed, is to prove the supernatural nature of [pg 044] the occurrence. But although, if it was certainly supernatural, it would prove the intervention of a supernatural agent, it would say nothing as to the purpose for which such an intervention took place. It follows therefore, that to constitute a supernatural occurrence in the strict sense of the term a miracle, it must take place after an announcement that it is going to happen, and take place at the bidding of the agent who performs it.

It is highly important, in considering the miracles of the Gospels, that the distinction between a merely supernatural event and an evidential miracle should be kept steadily in view. All creative acts would be supernatural events, but they would not necessarily be evidential miracles. The incarnation, and other occurrences mentioned in the New Testament, are supernatural ones; but to mix them up with evidential miracles is simply to invite confusion of thought. Another class of supernatural occurrences mentioned in the New Testament seem to have been wrought, not for purposes directly evidential, but to awaken attention; and another class of supernatural endowments were vouchsafed, to render it possible to lay deep in human society the foundations of the Church as a visible and permanent institution. Such occurrences are not directly but indirectly evidential, and it will be necessary carefully to distinguish between them and occurrences brought about for directly evidential purposes. To keep this distinction clear, I shall designate the last by the term “miracle.” A miracle is supernatural in two ways: namely, in the agency which produced the objective fact, and in the announcement of its occurrence.

The common definition of a miracle, as a violation or a suspension of the laws of nature, is open to very grave objections. The question, as I have observed, at [pg 045] once arises, what is included under nature? It also assumes that we are acquainted with the mode in which miraculous agency must be exerted; which we are not. Other definitions which have been proposed take for granted positions which those who undertake to prove the credibility of miracles ought never to concede. The plain fact is, that we are simply ignorant of the mode in which God acts on material nature; and every definition must be faulty which assumes that we have that knowledge. To say that miracles must involve even a suspension of the laws of nature introduces a needless difficulty. No law or force of nature need be suspended in its action to render the occurrence of a supernatural event possible. All that is necessary is that forces should be introduced which are capable of overbalancing the action of opposing forces. It is extremely inaccurate to affirm that the force of gravitation must be suspended in order to render possible either walking on the water, or an ascent into the sky.

It is equally unwise and unphilosophical to affirm that God cannot work a miracle by the use of intermediate agencies, i.e. by the partial employment of the forces of the material universe. It is true that in most of the miracles recorded in the New Testament we cannot affirm the use of such media, although we observe an economy in the use of divine power: i.e. no power is exerted beyond that which is necessary to produce the particular result in question. But in the Old Testament the use of such media is unquestionably affirmed. To lay down in our definition of a miracle a particular theory as to the mode in which it must be accomplished, involves the whole subject in needless difficulties.

This question has been obscured by representing a miracle as performed by the intervention of a higher [pg 046] law, superseding the action of a lower one. This introduces the conception of force into the idea of law, and leads to confusion of thought. Laws, or the invariable sequences between phenomena, are neither forces nor powers. The counteraction of one force by another is an event of daily occurrence. All that is needful for the working of a miracle is the intervention of a force or mental energy which is capable of acting on matter, and of overbalancing those ordinary forces which would produce a contrary result.

It has also been urged that miracles may obey a law of miracles. The best illustration of this idea is that which has been supplied from the supposed operations of Mr. Babbage's calculating machine. He supposes that a machine might be constructed which could go on grinding out a particular set of results for a long, yet definite period of time; then by the operation of the same machine, that a fresh order might be introduced; and afterwards that it might revert to the original one; and that this operation might be continued for ever. If therefore the great Author of nature had so planned the machine of the universe that whenever a miracle was requisite in His scheme of Providence this abnormal event occurred, like the new series introduced into the calculating mill, in that case miracles might be said to follow a definite law, which might be designated the law and order of miraculous intervention.

It is impossible to deny the ingenuity of this theory, but unfortunately it is not only one which takes for granted that the perfection of mechanical contrivance is the only thing that the Creator had in view in the production of the universe, but even if this were an unquestionable fact, it could afford us no help with respect to all the most important miracles recorded in the [pg 047] New Testament. How is it possible, I ask, to account for many of our Lord's miracles on such a supposition? It is expressly affirmed that this supernatural energy was frequently made to depend on the faith of the person who invoked His help. Could any miracle-working mill be even conceived of, which could bring out, as part of the normal law of its operations, the cure of blind, deaf, and leprous men by a word, or effectuate His own resurrection from the dead, or ascension into Heaven? Such occurrences could not be produced by the action of any machine which has the smallest analogy to a calculating mill. But further: such an operation would be impotent to answer the purposes of a miracle, unless the particular result was announced beforehand by one who was completely ignorant that the machine was capable of producing such extraordinary results. This ignorance would likewise have to be extended to those to whom the announcement was made. It would also be necessary that the announcer should proclaim that on a particular day and hour the machine would grind out the particular result of the cure of a blind man, or a resurrection from the dead. The ability to do this would be utterly abnormal, and impossible ever to be ground out by the self-acting agency of any conceivable machine, however cleverly constructed. Mr. Babbage's miracle-working mill, however ingenious a conception, must therefore be dismissed as incapable of affording us the smallest help in the present argument.

The term “superhuman” remains to be considered. It need not detain us long. Superhuman implies a result brought about by the intervention of a being superior to man. Whether such an agent be divine or otherwise can only be determined by the exercise of our reason. It has been objected that the agency which [pg 048] produces an earthquake is a superhuman agency, that is, it exceeds the powers of man to produce it. Granted: but this has no bearing on the subject under discussion. When we use the word “superhuman” we always mean by it, not the action of the unintelligent forces of material nature, but of a being possessed of intelligence and will.

There is a large number of other subjects having an intimate bearing on the correct definition of the terms habitually used in this controversy, and which greatly modify their meaning. These however will best be considered when I enter on the direct discussion of the possibility and the credibility of miracles.

Chapter III. The Supernatural Elements Contained in the New Testament: In What Do They Consist? And What View Do Its Writers Take Respecting Them?

Before entering on the general question of miracles, it is only reasonable to inquire of the writers of the New Testament what they have to say on the subject. Their opinion of the nature and character of the supernatural occurrences which they have reported is certainly of more value than that of all other writers put together. St. John and St. Paul must have been in the habit of coming in contact with unbelievers. It would be most important if we could ascertain the mode adopted by them of commending Christianity to their acceptance, and what use was made by them of the supernatural power with which they professed to be endowed.

First: It is impossible to read the New Testament without arriving at the conclusion that the superhuman character which is ascribed to Jesus Christ is perfectly unique, and differs entirely from that which is ascribed to any other person. Others wrought miracles; but they were men like ourselves. But in the person of Jesus Christ the supernatural is represented as inherent. To say that he possessed the power of working miracles, is an inadequate statement of the fact. Although he embodies the perfection of human nature with all its finite limitations, the supernatural and the divine take up their [pg 050] abode in his personality. Whenever our Lord is represented as working miracles, he is always represented as performing them by a power which was inherent in himself. This is never once attributed to his followers. The supernatural action which is ascribed to Jesus Christ must be viewed, as a case distinct and separate, by itself. The miracles performed by him are not only evidential, but also portions of his supernatural manifestation.

According to the author of the fourth Gospel, our Lord himself rarely designated them by either of the three terms by which miracles are usually designated in the New Testament, viz., signs, wonders, and mighty works (σημεῖα, τέρατα, δυνάμεις). He almost uniformly called them “Works” (ἔργα). An important distinction is here intended. Our Lord did not view his miracles as a separate class of actions by themselves, but as portions of his ordinary superhuman working, and as having a distinct relation to his entire character. Four passages will be sufficient to show this clearly. “The works that I do in my Father's name, they bear witness of me.” “My Father worketh hitherto, and I work.” “If ye believe not me, believe the works.” “Many good works have I showed you from my Father; for which of those works do ye stone me?” When contemplated by others only, they assume the form of signs and wonders: “Except ye see signs and wonders, ye will not believe.” It is highly important that we should keep steadily in view that the divine character attributed to Jesus is by no means restricted to the performance of miracles; but that it extends throughout his entire working, and that the two together constitute an harmonious whole. It pertains no less to its moral and spiritual aspects, than to the displays which he made of a power capable of controlling [pg 051] nature. Even in this portion of his working, he draws special attention to its moral and spiritual aspects. According to his view of his own mighty works, they not only exhibited a power of controlling nature, but were uniformly invested with a moral and spiritual environment. Throughout the Gospels he is represented as exhibiting a greatness and dignity, a purity, holiness, humility and benevolence, so far transcending that of other men, as to constitute him what may be almost designated a moral and spiritual miracle. Perfection in the moral and spiritual world is as essentially superhuman, as power over nature is supernatural. In considering the miracles which have been attributed to Jesus Christ, it is important to bear in mind the manner in which they stand related to his entire superhuman character. Otherwise we shall fail to observe the double aspect which they bear. They were manifestations of the divine, which dwelt within him, and also they possessed an evidential value.

I shall occasionally use the term “superhuman” instead of “divine,” as applied to Jesus Christ, because for the purposes of this argument it will be unnecessary for me to define the precise degree of divine character which the evangelists intended to attribute to him. To ascertain this is the proper function of the theologian, by comparing together the facts and statements of the New Testament. It is sufficient for my present purpose to observe that the perusal of the Gospels leaves the inevitable impression on the mind that it was the purpose of their writers to depict a divine character in union with a human one—a supernatural power acting within the regions of the natural. This covers alike the aspects of character presented of him both in the Synoptic and the Johannine Gospels.

Although our Lord speaks of his actions by the [pg 052] common name of “works” (ἔργα), when the sacred authors speak generally of miracles, they apply to them, as I have observed, three distinct terms, signs, mighty works, and wonders (σημεῖα, δυνάμεις, τέρατα). Each of these denotes different aspects in which they contemplated miracles. The sign included the supernatural fact wrought on external nature with the whole of its moral environment. In this point of view, the “sign” was the direct proof of a divine mission. It is worthy of observation that the author of the fourth Gospel has uniformly described the supernatural actions which he has ascribed to Jesus Christ by this term. The expression “mighty works” is intended to bring under our notice the power which was displayed in the performance of a miracle, thereby directly connecting it with a superhuman agency. The term “wonder” contemplates a supernatural event in its simple aspect as an occurrence pre-eminently fitted to command attention to the person who was capable of performing it. We may therefore conclude that the writers of the New Testament considered that these were the three special functions of miracles. It is quite possible that the same miracle might have fulfilled all three at the same time: but as three such functions of supernatural occurrences are distinctly stated, it is quite conceivable that there were occasions when they were limited to some one of these in particular.

It is evident that our Lord attached the highest importance to a miracle contemplated as a “sign,” i.e. to the moral environment with which it was connected. This, although more definitely brought out in St. John's Gospel, is also distinctly borne witness to by the Synoptics. It forms the ground of the reiterated refusal of our Lord to comply with the demand of the Pharisees that he would show some sign from heaven, [pg 053] as a proof of his divine mission. His miracles combined in one the two conceptions of signs and mighty works. None of them were mere prodigies devoid of a moral aspect.

It is worthy of consideration whether our Lord's primary purpose in performing supernatural actions was always directly evidential. I have already drawn attention to their twofold aspect, as divine manifestations, and as evidential miracles. A considerable number of the miracles recorded in the Gospels are represented as performed by him because he was moved with compassion. These evidently belong to the former class of his supernatural workings. But although this was their primary object it did not deprive them of an evidential value. But there is also another remarkable class of supernatural actions attributed to him, viz., those in which he is recorded to have expressly forbidden the persons whom he healed to publish the fact. As it is evident that these miracles could only have become extensively known by the persons cured disobeying his orders, it is clear that they could not have been directly performed for evidential purposes, but were the manifestations of the divine which resided in his person.

Such are the supernatural actions attributed to Jesus Christ in the New Testament, respecting which as a whole, whether performed for purposes avowedly evidential or not, he himself affirms, that they bore witness of him, that the Father had sent him. Two other classes of miracles, affirmed to have been performed by his followers, require notice.

The whole of these are stated to have been performed by a delegated power and commission. The great majority of them are described as having been performed in the name of Jesus Christ. They are [pg 054] affirmed to have been performed for two purposes; to prove the divine commission of those who wrought them, and to attest the reality of their Master's resurrection, by giving exhibitions of his present power. These therefore are distinctly affirmed to have been evidential miracles. A few others were providential interferences in favour of the infant Church. There is also another class of supernatural actions referred to in the Acts of the Apostles, such as the passing of St. Peter's shadow, and the supposed supernatural effects resulting from it, and the conveyance from St. Paul's person of handkerchiefs and aprons to the sick, and one or two other instances. These involve special manifestations of supernatural power, and belong to supernatural occurrences in their aspect of wonders, or very extraordinary events, and as such were specially adapted for drawing attention to the message of the Apostles. But the New Testament also affirms another and very peculiar form of the manifestation of the supernatural, as then actually existing in the Apostolic Church. I need hardly say that I allude to the various gifts of the Spirit, with which large numbers of its members believed themselves to be endowed. I shall not consider them any further here, as it will be necessary for me to enter largely on the subject in a subsequent portion of this work. Their use and purpose was to lay deep the foundations of the Christian Church. All that will be necessary in this place is to draw attention to them as a distinct order of supernatural manifestations, to the existence of which the writers of the New Testament are pledged.

There is also one further form of supernatural manifestation affirmed by them, namely, a great moral and spiritual transformation effected in those who cordially embraced the Gospel. This is most positively stated [pg 055] by St. Paul to have been a fact constantly taking place under his own observation. It is only necessary for me to notice its existence, as it is a form of supernatural manifestation, the truth or falsehood of which forms no portion of the present controversy.

Such then are the various forms of the supernatural, to the existence of which the writers of the New Testament are pledged as objective facts. To these only, and not to any conceivable or possible ones, is the defender of Christianity committed. If their occurrence can be shown to have been impossible, either on grounds of science or philosophy, or because human testimony is of so fallible a character that it cannot establish the truth of a supernatural occurrence, it follows that the whole of Christianity must have been an invention of a purely human origin, that it can have no claim to the designation of a divine revelation, and that it is hardly possible to free its inventors from the charge of fraud. No mere paring down of its supernatural elements will enable us to escape from this conclusion.

I must now proceed to consider whether the writers of the New Testament rest the truth of Christianity on the evidence of miracles alone, and what position they occupy respecting it.

If we assume for the sake of argument that the fourth Gospel is the work of the Apostle John, it is evident that neither Jesus Christ nor the Apostle accepted the theory which has been propounded by some divines, and readily accepted by unbelievers, that the evidence of his divine mission was exclusively founded on the testimony of miracles. To state the point distinctly:—This Gospel places the evidence afforded by our Lord's own divine person, i.e. the moral [pg 056] evidence of his mission, in the first rank, and his miraculous works in the second.

As this is a point of considerable importance, and one to which its proper weight has been seldom attached, I will enumerate the chief statements made in this Gospel on this subject.

First: The author of the Gospel directly affirms that Jesus is “the light of men;” and he himself distinctly affirms of himself, “He that seeth me seeth Him that sent me.” “I am come a light into the world, that whosoever believeth on me should not abide in darkness.” (John xii. 45, 46.) Again, “I am the light of the world; he that followeth me shall not walk in darkness, but shall have the light of life.” (John viii. 12.) It is impossible to read these and kindred passages without feeling that our Lord appealed to something else besides his miraculous works, viewed as mere objective facts, as a proof of his divine mission. He evidently places the highest proof of it in his great moral and spiritual manifestation. He asserts the possession of an inherent illumination in his own divine Person in union with the great truths which he enunciated, and the entire course of his divine working. To a mind capable of appreciating a manifestation of holiness, his person and divine working would be self-evidential. “He that seeth me, seeth Him that sent me.” It is evident therefore that he considered the moral aspect of even his supernatural works as an important portion of the evidence that he came from God.

The fourth chapter of this Gospel contains an account of our Lord's visit to the Samaritans. He performed no miracle on this occasion. The Evangelist tells us that many of them accepted him as the Messiah; and expressly states that they affirmed that this was not on [pg 057] account of the report of the woman as to his supernatural insight into her character; but because they themselves had heard him, and on this account they had arrived at the persuasion that was the Christ. There was something therefore in his moral manifestation, even apart from his miracles, which produced this persuasion. The Evangelist accepts this position as a correct one. He has even gone further, and has attributed it in the same chapter to our Lord himself. He makes him address the nobleman who came to solicit his interference in behalf of his sick son with these remarkable words: “Except ye see signs and wonders, ye will not believe.” (John iv. 48.) These words can only imply that, in the opinion of the speaker, there was a moral and spiritual attestation of his divine mission, which stood higher than objective miracles; and that those who witnessed it ought to have received it as such.

In John vi. 30, ff., a remarkable dialogue is described as taking place between our Lord and the Jews on this very subject. The Jews demand of him to work some distinct sign in proof of his divine mission. Let it be observed that the demand of a sign, here stated to have been made, is of precisely the same character as similar statements which are made by the Synoptics on the same subject, and shows that a common conception, underlies them all. “What sign,” say they, “showest thou then, that we may see and believe thee? what dost thou work?” They then proceed to define the particular sign which they wish to see exhibited, by making an invidious comparison between his miracles and those of Moses, viewed as mere objective facts. In reply our Lord does not appeal directly to even the miracle of which the Evangelist had just described the performance; but throughout the remainder of the [pg 058] chapter, he proceeds to draw attention to the moral and spiritual aspects of his working. “Moses gave you not that bread from Heaven; but my Father giveth you the true bread from Heaven; for the bread of God is he which cometh down from Heaven, and giveth life unto the world,” &c.

In chapter vii. (17, 18) our Lord affirms: “If any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God, or whether I speak of myself. He that speaketh of himself seeketh his own glory; but he that seeketh his glory that sent him, the same is true, and no unrighteousness is in him.” Here the affirmation is clear and distinct that there is a moral and spiritual element in our Lord's person and teaching, which jointly with his miraculous works bear witness to his divine character. The testimony given by the one is convergent with that of the other. This the following affirmation of our Lord most strongly asserts. “I am one who bear witness of myself, and the Father who sent me hath borne witness of me,” that is to say, His moral and spiritual manifestation is in a certain sense evidential; and the Father who sent him bore a concurrent testimony of his supernatural work.

On similar principles our Lord reasons with the Jews in the eighth chapter of this Gospel. In reply to the charge that he performed miracles by the aid of the evil one he affirms, that his own absolute sinlessness, constitutes a complete answer to it. “Which of you convinceth me of sin? and if I say the truth why do ye not believe me?” (v. 46.) We have here a direct appeal to men's moral and spiritual perception, as an independent witness to the truth of his teaching; and the affirmation that a being who is not simply good and holy, but perfectly sinless, is worthy of absolute credence. In other words, he does not rest the truth of [pg 059] his teaching on miracles wrought to confirm his different utterances, but on the inherent truthfulness of a sinless character. The moral aspect of his works is the predominant one.

In the fourteenth chapter of this Gospel we have the following remarkable declaration, which puts the whole subject in the clearest light. Philip says to him; “Show us the Father, and it sufficeth us.” Jesus said unto him, “Have I been so long time with you, and yet hast thou not known me, Philip? He that hath seen me hath seen the Father: Believest thou not that I am in the Father, and the Father in me? The words that I speak unto you, I speak not of myself; but the Father that dwelleth in me, he doeth the works. Believe me that I am in the Father, and the Father in me, or else believe me for the very works' sake.” (vs. 8-11.)

This passage contains several most important considerations directly bearing on this subject. I will mention them in order. First—

Philip asks for his complete conviction, a visible miracle in the form of an appearance of God, such as was recorded in the Old Testament as having taken place at Sinai.

Secondly. Our Lord affirms that the manifestations of his character made in his person and work during his previous acquaintance with him were the truest manifestations of the person, character and being of the Father.

Thirdly. That the words which he spake and his entire working, possessed an evidential character as proving that he came from the Father: and that his moral and spiritual perfections were such as to entitle his affirmation to be received on his own word.

Fourthly. That if Philip was unable to receive them on this evidence, which occupied the highest place, then [pg 060] he was entitled to be believed on the evidence of his supernatural works, “If ye believe not me, believe the works.”

This entire passage makes it clear that in the mind of our Lord the moral evidence afforded by him constituted a most important portion of the attestation of his divine mission. Nor was its value confined to those who witnessed it during the time of his personal ministry, but he viewed it as extending to all time. This is made clear by his reply to Thomas in reference to his demand to be allowed to handle his risen body. “Thomas, because thou hast seen me, thou hast believed, Blessed are they who have not seen, and yet have believed.” (xx. 29.)

With these statements before us, unless we reject the authority of this Gospel, it is clear that those Christian writers who have asserted that the evidence of the Christian revelation rests exclusively on miracles as objective facts are in error.

But the same Gospel refers us no less distinctly to the miracles of our Lord as very important evidences of his divine mission, although they are subordinated to those we have been considering. One or two further references will be sufficient.

We have several declarations on this subject in the fifth chapter. “My Father worketh hitherto, and I work. The Son can do nothing of himself, but what he seeth the Father do; for whatsoever things he doeth, these also doeth the Son likewise.” (vs. 17, 19.) “The works which the Father hath given me to finish, the same works that I do bear witness of me that the Father hath sent me.” (ver. 36.)

Here a plain parallel is drawn between the whole course of our Lord's working and that of the Father. In this working he evidently intended to include his [pg 061] miracles. Taken in combination with his entire character the speaker affirms that they form a conclusive proof that the Father had sent him. He subsequently draws attention to the evidence afforded by his miracles as such, “and the Father himself which hath sent me hath borne witness of me.” (ver. 37.)

So again in the tenth chapter, “The works that I do in my Father's name, they bear witness of me,” (ver. 25.) A little further on the moral aspect of his miracles, and their close connection with his entire working is distinctly brought forward. “Many good works have I showed you from my Father; for which of those works do ye stone me?” (vs 37, 38.) “If I do not the works of my Father, believe me not, but if I do, though ye believe not me, believe the works, that ye may know and believe, that the Father is in me, and I in him.” (vs. 37, 38.) No words can bring out more strongly the weight which our Lord attached to the moral aspect of his miracles as proofs of his divine mission.

In the fifteenth chapter we have our Lord's own reflections on the evidences which he had afforded of his Messianic character, during his entire ministry. “If I had not done among them the works which none other man did, they had not had sin; but now they have both seen and hated both me and my Father.” (ver. 24.) Here the miracles are classed with the other exhibitions of our Lord's divine character; and attention is especially drawn to the moral aspect of his entire working as in the highest degree evidential. “They have seen and hated both me and my Father.” It is worthy of remark that while our Lord uniformly spoke of his miracles as part of his general working, by which he manifested his divine character, the Evangelist himself almost invariably calls them “signs.” This is brought out when he gives us his [pg 062] own reflections on the results of his public ministry. “Though he had done so many signs[2] before them yet they believed not on him.” (xii. 37.) So again, “many other signs truly did Jesus in the presence of his disciples, which are not written in this book: but these are written that ye might believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God.” (xx. 30, 31.) In both these passages our Lord's miracles are evidently referred to. They are pronounced to be both evidential of his divine mission, and at the same time to be manifestations of his character. The Evangelist while contemplating them as miracles never loses sight of their moral aspect.

In the Synoptic Gospels one allusion is made to the evidential purpose of a particular miracle which is worthy of notice. Generally speaking they are viewed by the authors of these Gospels as simple manifestations of his divine character. On this occasion, when his power to forgive sins was questioned, he directly performed a miracle to prove that he possessed it. “But that ye may know that the Son of Man hath power on earth to forgive sins, he saith to the sick of the palsy, I say unto thee, arise, and take up thy bed and go thy way into thine house.” In this case it is clear that the purpose of performing the miracle was not to prove the truth of any doctrinal statement which he had made; but to establish the reality of his divine authority and commission.

While it is quite true that the authors of the Synoptic Gospels have not enunciated the purpose of our Lord's miracles in the formal manner in which it is done in St. John's Gospel, it is clear that they must have taken the same view of their general character. In fact the [pg 063] evidential purpose of their performance is less clearly stated in them than in the fourth Gospel. All four Gospels view his miracles only as a portion of his superhuman manifestation, and are ignorant of that broad distinction which has been laid down between them and the other portions of his divine working. They are in fact included under it; and it is the concurrence of both together, and the moral aspect thereby impressed on the whole, which proves him to be the Christ.

It has been important to ascertain what are the views of the writers of the New Testament on this subject, because it has been strongly asserted by authors on both sides of the controversy that the doctrines of Christianity are proved by miracles, and that they can rest for their attestation on no other evidence. The precise value of this position I will consider in the following chapter. It must, however, be observed that this is not the view taken by the writers of the New Testament. There is not a single miracle recorded in it which is alleged to have been performed with the direct purpose of proving the truth of a single doctrine properly so called. Those wrought by our Lord are uniformly represented as having been performed in proof of his divine mission, or as an essential portion of the manifestation of the divine which dwelt within him. As such they were signs, precisely in the same manner as the performance of those actions which can only be performed by man are signs; that is, they are proofs of the presence of man. In the same manner the actions performed by our Lord are signs and proofs of the presence of the divine man Jesus Christ. If our Lord was in truth what he asserted himself to be, supernatural manifestations would be the concomitants of his presence.

In exact conformity with these facts as we find them [pg 064] in the Gospels is the direct dogmatic statement made by the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews on this subject. After having asserted in the first chapter that divine revelation is made in the person of Jesus Christ, and that God speaks to man under the Christian dispensation “in him, who is the brightness of his glory, and the express image of his person, and upholding all things by the word of his power,” the author proceeds to compare it with the former dispensation, and to give us his views of the evidence on which it rests. “How,” says he, “shall we escape, if we neglect so great salvation; which at the first began to be spoken by the Lord, and was confirmed unto us by them that heard him. God also bearing them witness both by signs and wonders, and with divers miracles and gifts of the Holy Ghost, according to his own will.” (ii. 3, 4.)

These words distinctly inform us what were the writer's opinions as to the nature of the evidences on which Christianity rests. First, it reposes on the testimony of Christ respecting himself. Secondly, it is confirmed by a number of miracles wrought by God. This view is strictly in accordance with our Lord's own affirmation respecting it as recorded in the fourth Gospel, “I am one that bear witness of myself, and the Father that sent me hath borne witness of me.” (viii. 18.)

With respect to numerous miracles recorded in the Acts of the Apostles, they are affirmed to have been performed for purposes directly evidential, not however to prove the truth of any doctrine, but of our Lord's Messianic character. The affirmations on this point are express. “In the name of Jesus Christ of Nazareth, rise up and walk.” (iii. 6.) “His name, through faith in his name, hath made this man strong.” [pg 065] (iii. 16.) “Therefore let all the house of Israel know assuredly, that God hath made that same Jesus whom ye have crucified, both Lord and Christ.” (ii. 36.) Of the fact of the resurrection, they affirm that they were witnesses; and that the miraculous powers imparted to them were the consequence of that event, and a proof of its truth.

The nature of the other supernatural occurrences affirmed in the New Testament must be fully considered hereafter. There remain however two further statements, made by the sacred writers respecting this subject, which require to be briefly noticed here. First, although the Gospels affirm that John the Baptist had a divine commission to announce the immediate setting up of the kingdom of the Messiah, and even to point him out, they expressly assert that he performed no objective miracle in confirmation of it. His prophetical assertions rested for their verification on their fulfilment only, i.e. on the immediate appearance of a person who united in himself all the attributes of the Messiah. The following was the line of argument adopted by those who believed his testimony: “John did no miracle, but all things that John spoke of this man were true.” Secondly, while in the Apostolic Epistles, miracles are stated to have been performed by our Lord, and supernatural powers no less clearly asserted to have been at that very time actually present in the Church, there is only one miracle which is directly referred to in proof of the divine mission of Christ. I need not say that this is the greatest of all the miracles recorded in the Gospels, viz. his resurrection from the dead. On this their unanimous testimony affirms that Christianity rests. This is the one final and decisive proof of our Lord's divine mission. On its truth they affirm that their claims as [pg 066] divine teachers stand or fall. His resurrection from the dead puts all his other miracles in the back ground in point of evidential value. According to their statements it constitutes the one great assurance that God has given unto all men that Jesus of Nazareth is Lord and Christ.

It follows, therefore, that if this one miracle can be proved to have been an historical fact, it carries with it the entire force of all the remaining miracles of the New Testament. But it leaves entirely untouched the moral aspects of our Lord's divine character. These, I may say, constitute a standing miracle which will continue to speak for itself in all time. This evidence is again and again referred to by the writers of the Apostolic Epistles. The two constitute one harmonious whole. To the latter of these it is impossible to do more than refer in the present work; I have already devoted a distinct volume to the examination of its evidential value, in which I have examined Christ's witness to himself; here I must confine myself to the consideration of the witness borne to him by the Father.

Chapter IV. Miracles, What Do They Prove?

Having considered the direct assertions in the New Testament in reference to the supernatural, it will be necessary to take a brief view of the question in relation to modern difficulties and objections.

The following subjects present themselves for our consideration:—

1st. To what extent, and in what sense are miracles the proofs of a revelation?

2nd. Are supernatural occurrences devoid of all moral environment capable of affording such proof?

3rd. Can doctrinal statements or moral truths be proved by miracles?

4th. Are miracles objects of faith merely, or if not, how are they related to our reason; and if in any sense they are objects of faith, how can they be the media of proof?

It will be evident that these questions will immediately lay open a number of the most important considerations. They can only be adequately dealt with in the subsequent portions of this work. The natural place to discuss them will be when I come to consider the objections that can be urged against the possibility and credibility of miracles. A few preliminary observations, however, will be necessary for the purpose of putting the reader in possession of some of the most [pg 068] important points of debate and of the positions which I intend to assume respecting them. They will also help to clear the way for the solution of the various difficulties by which the subject has been attempted to be obscured.

The manner in which Christianity claims to be a divine revelation, as we have seen in the former chapter, in its most proper and distinctive sense is that the person of Jesus Christ constitutes that revelation. It is the manifestation of the divine character and perfections by means of the various acts and deeds of his earthly life and ministry. It is a revelation of the divine shining forth in the human. I have already adduced some of the affirmations of the sacred writers on this subject. It would be easy to multiply them indefinitely. Perhaps it would be impossible to express the position which they take on this subject in more distinct language than by citing two brief passages in St. Paul's epistle to the Colossians: “Who is,” says the Apostle, “the image of the invisible God;” “in him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily.” Both passages affirm, as the writer's view, that all revelation is made in the person of Jesus Christ.

It follows, therefore, that the Christian revelation in its highest sense is not a body of abstract dogmas, but that it consists of an objective fact, the Incarnation. As God has manifested his eternal power and Godhead in the material creation, so he has manifested himself as a moral and spiritual being, 1st, imperfectly in the moral nature of man, and afterwards perfectly, in the perfect man who unites in himself the divine and human, Jesus Christ. God, when he effected the work of creation, made a manifestation of himself which chiefly revealed his power and wisdom. When he effected the Incarnation he made an additional manifestation [pg 069] of himself which chiefly revealed his moral character and perfections. The four Gospels contain the historical account of this manifestation, as made in the actions and teaching of Jesus Christ. As this revelation consists of a number of historical facts, all that was necessary was that his life and actions should be correctly reported. The remaining books of the New Testament are historical in character, with one exception, and as far as they treat of doctrines, they may be viewed as commentaries on the Divine fact of the Incarnation.

It follows, therefore, that the essence of Christianity consists of a superhuman or divine fact, the Incarnation. In this point of view the supernatural is not only a concomitant of Christianity, but it constitutes its essence. It is the manifestation of a supernatural and superhuman being appearing within the sphere of the natural and the human. It cannot be too carefully observed throughout this entire controversy that the character which is ascribed to Jesus Christ, while it embraces every perfection of man, is no less superhuman than the powers which are attributed to him are supernatural. In this sense the supernatural is not merely an evidence of revelation, but its essence.

The Incarnation has frequently been designated a miracle. To do so seems to me to incur the danger of involving the whole controversy in confusion of thought. In a loose way of speaking, the creative acts of God may be called miracles: that is, they involve a deviation from the previous order of existing things, and the introduction of a new one; all such results are unquestionable manifestations of supernatural agency, but they differ wholly in conception from what we usually designate by the term miracle. The Incarnation, therefore, ought not to be placed on the same [pg 070] footing as miracles, which are supernatural occurrences, having a definite evidential value, but with God's creative acts, being the highest manifestation of himself which he has made to man. It is perfectly true, as I have already observed, that the miracles of Jesus Christ stand in a double aspect, as part of his supernatural manifestation, and as possessing an evidential value.

It is clear, therefore, that a supernatural event such as the Incarnation, if evidential, can only be self-evidential. It was not wrought for the purpose of proving anything. But, as we have seen, the sacred writers and our Lord himself assert that in a certain sense it was self-evidential. “For the life was manifested, and we have seen it and bear witness, and show unto you that eternal life which was with the Father and was manifested unto us.”

A recent writer affirms that Christianity professes to be a revelation of supernatural truths utterly inconceivable to reason, and that such truths can only be proved by miracles. I can understand what is meant by a truth derived from a supernatural source of information, or one respecting a supernatural being or occurrence: but what a supernatural truth can be contradistinguished from other kinds of truth is far from evident. Revelation may disclose truths which reason alone would have been unable to discover; but this does not make the truths themselves, when they are discovered, either supernatural or incomprehensible.

I will now proceed to consider whether there is any real ground for affirming that occurrences which we designate as miracles are the only proofs of a divine revelation.

The same writer, whose object is to prove that Christianity is utterly destitute of all claims to our acceptance [pg 071] as a divine revelation, endeavours to show that miracles, viewed as bare objective facts, are the only evidence which can substantiate such a mass of incredible assertions as those contained in the New Testament, and that their moral environment cannot be taken into account in estimating their evidential value. For this purpose he quotes the following passage from Dr. Mozley's Bampton Lectures: “Dr. Mozley,” says he, “supposes the case, that if a person of evident integrity and loftiness of character had appeared eighteen centuries ago announcing himself as pre-existing from all eternity, the Son of God, the maker of the world, who had come down from heaven, and had assumed the nature of man, in order to be the Lamb of God that taketh away the sins of the world, and so on, enumerating the other doctrines of Christianity; Dr. Mozley then adds, what would be the inevitable conclusion of sober reason respecting that person? The necessary conclusion of sober reason would be that he was disordered in his understanding.... By no rational being would a just and a benevolent life be accepted as a proof of such announcements. Miracles are the necessary complements of the truth of such announcements, which without them are powerless and abortive, the fragments of a design which is nothing unless it is the whole. They are necessary to the justification of such announcements, which unless they are supernatural truth are the wildest delusions.”—Supernatural Religion.

In justice to Dr. Mozley, the passage which is omitted in this citation from his lectures ought to be quoted. It is as follows: “What other decision could be come to when a man, looking like one of our own selves, and only exemplifying in his life and [pg 072] circumstances the ordinary course of nature, said this about himself, but that when reason had lost its balance a dream of supernatural and unearthly, grandeur might be the result.”—Bampton Lectures.

Some expressions in this passage leave it open to the assumption which this writer wishes to fasten on it that Dr. Mozley intended to affirm that the only adequate proof of such affirmations as were made by Jesus Christ respecting himself would have been visible miracles wrought in confirmation of them. This, however, is not necessarily its meaning, for the omitted passage above cited, distinctly affirms that the person who is supposed to make such assertions is only an ordinary good and holy but imperfect man.

But the assertions in question were not made by an ordinary man like ourselves, but by one who is described as possessed of superhuman greatness and holiness and of profound spiritual insight into truth. He is uniformly depicted as speaking with the fulness of knowledge of the subject on which he speaks. I cannot therefore admit, supposing the character of Jesus to have been historical, that if he had made such assertions respecting himself prior to the performance of his first miracle at Cana, they would have been utterly unworthy of serious attention. It must be readily admitted that if they had been affirmed of himself by an ordinary man like ourselves, no affirmation of his would have been a guarantee of their truth, for the simple reason that they would have been self-contradictory. Nor would the performance of a miracle have made them one atom more credible. But the credibility of such an assertion, if it had been made by such a person as Jesus Christ even prior to his performance of a single miracle, is a wholly different question.

It follows, therefore, on the supposition that the delineation given us in the Gospels is that of an historical reality, that his assertions respecting himself would stand in a wholly different position from those of any other man. He could neither deceive nor be deceived. When he made assertions respecting himself he must have known whether they were true. The assertions of such a person therefore would be worthy of all acceptation.

Miracles are not the means of substantiating assertions respecting the truth of unseen realities, nor are they used for such purposes in the New Testament. The whole question is one of adequate knowledge. If we have the means of knowing that a person has a complete acquaintance with truths of which we are ignorant, we can rationally accept them as true on his assurance that they are so, exactly on the same principles as we accept the truths of physical science although we ourselves are ignorant of the processes by which they are arrived at. To state the position generally, it is quite rational to accept the affirmations of those who possess full knowledge of any subject of which we ourselves are profoundly ignorant. The only thing necessary is to attain an assurance that the knowledge of our informant is adequate to justify his assertions. It is on the ground of the fulness of his knowledge that we accept the assertions of Jesus Christ, and not because he wrought a miracle for the purpose of proving that his assertions were true.

Let us now consider in what sense miracles are a proof of the truth of a divine revelation.

I lay down that the proper function of miracles is to establish the truth of a divine commission. From this we argue to the truth of the assertions of the persons who are intrusted with it.

If an ordinary man, such as a prophet or an apostle, were to affirm that he had a communication from God which he was directed to make to others, or in other words that he had a divine commission, it is evident that no one would be bound to believe him on his mere affirmation. The simple and obvious reply would be, Give us some proof of the reality of the fact. Your claim is far too lofty to be admitted as valid on your simple affirmation. The question then is, how is such a claim to be tested? I reply by the person who makes it performing some action which is adequate to prove that the Great Governor of the Universe ratifies this claim. He must do something analogous to what all persons who claim to be acting under commissions from others do, i.e. he must produce some direct and formal credentials from the authority in whose name he claims to be acting. In this case the authority is God. He must therefore perform some action which directly identifies himself with God.

How is this to be accomplished? I answer by the performance of an unequivocal miracle which will directly connect him with the Great Governor of the Universe. I say unequivocal miracle, because if there were any doubt as to its supernatural character it would be useless. Nor would it be of any avail if it were a bare objective fact in external nature, devoid of its moral and spiritual environment. What is required is some direct manifestation of the divine on the sphere of the human and the natural. It must, in fact, exactly fulfil the character so often assigned to miracles in the Gospels. It must be a σημεῖον, or indication of the presence of God, resembling as it were the Great Seal which is affixed to state documents as the final mark of sovereign authority. Of such a character are all the chief miracles recorded in the Gospels.

The question about miracles has been beclouded by debating it in an abstract instead of in a concrete form; thus forgetting that it is not every conceivable form of alleged supernatural occurrence with which we have to deal, but the miracles recorded in the New Testament. By discussing it in this form it has been possible to raise a number of difficulties which may be abstractedly conceivable, but which have no bearing whatever on the miracles in question. Thus it has been frequently urged that to enable us to be certain that an alleged miracle is really due to supernatural agency, a jury of savants ought to be impanelled, before whom the worker of the miracle should exhibit his miraculous operation. They are to subject it to a variety of scientific tests. Even then if they have failed to discover error, they are to demand a second and a third performance, in order that it may be again and again submitted to the same process of scientific scrutiny. Until miracles can be submitted to and verified by tests of this description they have been affirmed to be unworthy of credit, even on the strongest ordinary testimony.

I shall discuss this and kindred questions more fully in the subsequent portions of this volume, when I consider the nature of the evidence which is adequate to prove the performance of a miracle. For the present I shall only observe that the entire plausibility of this position arises from its being stated in an abstract or general form. We cannot help seeing in reference to the chief miracles recorded in the New Testament, such as the care of blind, lame or leprous persons, instantaneously by a word or a touch, that common sense is fully adequate to determine that such occurrences must belong to the regions of the supernatural and to no other.

Two things are necessary to establish the reality of a supposed miracle. First, that the alleged fact should not only have been brought about by supernatural causes but previously announced by him who performs it: secondly, that the fact actually happened as it appeared to happen.

There can be no doubt that the power of juggling and sleight of hand, to perform actions which would be supernatural, if they were only what they appear to be, is considerable, and the difficulty of detection is great. Enthusiasm also when once excited, is capable of generating various unreal appearances which if actual, would be supernatural. It is also mighty in those regions where the union takes place between mind and matter, but the chief miracles recorded in the Gospels belong to a wholly different order of occurrence. If they took place as they are reported, no one possessed of common sense can doubt as to whether they were due to supernatural agency. It is no less clear that such miracles were occurrences in which successful imposture was impossible. What is required to prove them is the evidence of common sense, and not of scientific analysis. Let it be observed that it is not my intention to affirm that the whole of the supernaturalism recorded in the New Testament is of the same unequivocal character.

The evidential value of a miracle viewed as a matter of common sense maybe briefly stated thus. A person comes to me who affirms that he has a divine message to communicate. I ask him to prove it. He lays his hand on one whom I have known to be blind for the last twenty years, tells him in the name of Jesus Christ to receive his sight, and he forthwith receives it. There is probably no person gifted with ordinary understanding [pg 077] who would not consider such an act to be an adequate proof of divine agency, all theoretical or metaphysical difficulties to the contrary notwithstanding.

It will doubtless be objected that such an act would prove only the presence of a superhuman instead of a divine power. This point will be fully considered hereafter. For my present purpose it will be sufficient to fall back on the decision of common sense, that he who can restore sight to the sightless eye-ball, by no other apparent instrumentality than a word or a touch, can be no other than the Maker of the Universe.

I must now consider whether supernatural occurrences devoid of all moral environment, are capable of proving a divine commission.

It has frequently been the habit, both of the opponents and the defenders of Christianity, to discuss the subject of the evidential value of miracles apart from all reference to their moral environment. As, however, the overwhelming majority of the miracles recorded in the New Testament profess such an environment, the question of the value of supposed miracles which are destitute of it, forms no legitimate portion of the subject before us. What might or might not be proved by them, even if it could be determined satisfactorily, is quite foreign to the present discussion, which is limited to the truth or falsehood of those contained in the New Testament. The most important of these are not mere displays of power, but have an unquestionable moral environment impressed upon them, and they profess to have been wrought for a definite end and purpose. This is less distinctly marked in some of the miracles recorded in the Old Testament, but with them I have no present concern. It will be sufficient to observe that while many of them [pg 078] were unquestionably performed in attestation of a divine mission, as a class they bear another distinctive purpose, viz. that of correcting the polytheistic tendencies of the age. Hence their leading impress is that of power. The necessity of counteracting the tendency which I have referred to, rendered it necessary emphatically to assert the Lordship of one God over universal nature, in opposition to that conception of it so widely diffused throughout the ancient world, which saw a distinct power exerted in every combination of material forces.

The very conception of a miracle as a supernatural occurrence, brought about for the purpose of authenticating a revelation, distinguishes such an action from one which involves only a simple exhibition of power. All acts of moral agents must display a purpose of some kind. No conception of God is of the smallest religious value which does not contemplate him as being a moral agent and a being on whose actions a moral character of some kind must be impressed. Consequently an act entirely devoid of all moral aspect cannot prove that it has resulted from direct divine intervention. The difficulty has originated from dividing into three separate parts an action which is essentially one, and contemplating separately the objective fact in the supernatural action, the circumstances attending its performance, and the purpose for which it was performed. It is the union of all these which constitutes the occurrence in question an evidential miracle.

Let me now offer a few observations on a very important point for our consideration. Can abstract doctrinal statements or moral truths be proved by miracles?

I have already observed that as far as the miracles of the New Testament were wrought for directly evidential purposes, they were performed, not to prove particular doctrines, but as the credentials of a divine mission, or that they formed a part of the superhuman manifestation of our Lord. The apparent exceptions are those which were performed to attract attention to the divine message, to assist in the foundation of the Church, or to bear witness to the truth of the Resurrection. These last were in fact attestations to the reality of the Messianic character of Jesus Christ, which is the highest conceivable form of a divine mission, on which miracle the truth of Christianity is directly pledged by the sacred writers. A mere statement of the facts of the New Testament is a practical solution of the difficulty. It nowhere affirms that a miracle was ever performed to bear witness to the truth of an abstract doctrine.

I will now endeavour to lay down some general principles as to the relation in which doctrinal statements stand to supernatural manifestations. As on such a subject it will be impossible to lay down a general rule which will be applicable to every supernatural event, it will be necessary to consider each case by itself.

First, that of our Lord.

We believe his statements about unknown truths, on the ground that he was perfectly veracious, and had the most perfect knowledge of the subject on which he spoke. The actions which he performed (I mean by these, not his miracles merely, but the entire course of his working) are evidences of his divine character. He himself avers that he possessed the most intimate knowledge of God, and of the great realities of the [pg 080] spiritual world. “We speak,” says he, “that we do know, and testify that we have seen.” “I speak that which I have seen with my Father.” Throughout the Synoptics likewise he is represented as having the most entire knowledge of both spiritual and moral truth, and as teaching direct from his own insight. We believe the assertions, not because he confirmed their truth by the performance of a miracle, but because he afforded evidence that he was a veracious witness, and fully acquainted with the subject on which he spoke. His miraculous actions proved that he was God's messenger, and as such were additional attestations to his veracity.

The acceptance of such affirmations as worthy of the highest credit may be correctly designated as acts of faith; but let us never forget that such acts of faith are also high exercises of reason. Writers in opposition to Christianity are never wearied in running a contrast between reason and faith, and in representing the two as standing in opposition to each other, and belonging to wholly different regions of thought. Nor can it be denied that they have received much encouragement to do this by the indistinct or misleading statements of some Christian writers on the subject. Between them no little confusion has been introduced into the controversy, and a general idea has become prevalent that reason and faith are two distinct, if not opposing faculties, each of which acts within a subject matter of its own. The effect of this confusion has been disastrous.

My contention is that faith is only another name for reason when operating on a particular class of phenomena. To enter on an elaborate proof of this would be out of place here; a few illustrations must therefore suffice. [pg 081] To accept information from persons who have knowledge of subjects which we have not studied, or who have mental powers of insight or perception of which we are destitute, or who have seen phenomena which we have not seen, is an act in conformity with our highest reason. A constant effort has been made by unbelievers to confound faith with credulity: Faith is not credulity, but the acceptance of truth on adequate evidence, and the rejection of mere affirmation, when the evidence is inadequate. On the other hand multitudes of Christians have assiduously laboured to decry reason as the instrument for the investigation of truth. I admit that it is not a perfect instrument, but it is the only one which we have. The light of a candle may not be all that we can wish, but if we have no other we shall not improve our condition by extinguishing it.

Let me illustrate this subject by a few examples. We believe the assertions of Dr. Livingstone about the interior of Africa, although we have no means of verifying them by ocular observation, because we know that he has travelled there, and we are persuaded that he is a veracious witness. We accept the higher truths of astronomy, not because we have studied them, or are even able to appreciate the nature of the processes by which they have been arrived at, but because they are affirmed by persons who have afforded evidence that they possess a high order of knowledge on that subject. The same is true throughout the whole of the higher departments of science. We may call this an act of faith if we like, but it is also an act of our reason. The same thing is true throughout every department of human knowledge. It is astonishing how small a part of it is the result of our own personal observation. It follows therefore that the attempts [pg 082] which are so constantly made to separate faith and reason, and to erect an impassable wall between them, are suicidal alike both to faith and reason.

As therefore we accept the affirmations of others on subjects within the limits of their own knowledge, although we ourselves are ignorant of the processes by which it has been arrived at, so we accept the affirmations of such a person as the Jesus of the Evangelists on those subjects on which he affirms that he possesses the fullest knowledge.

But it will be objected that some of these assertions are made respecting high mysteries incomprehensible to the human intellect. Can we accept such truths?

I answer that we are only capable of accepting propositions the two terms of which we are able to comprehend with more or less distinctness. Nothing has been the subject of greater abuse than the word “mystery” in connection with revelation. It is frequently represented as denoting something which from end to end is utterly incomprehensible, like the unknowable God of a certain system of philosophy. In the New Testament the meaning of the word “mystery” is not an incomprehensible proposition, but a truth which once was hidden in the divine counsels, and has been revealed by the Gospel. That which is actually unthinkable is incapable of affirmation or denial. None of the affirmations of Jesus Christ partake of this character. They are mysteries only in the sense that they ran up into spheres of thought which transcend the limits of human knowledge. But this is done by all ultimate philosophical and scientific truths. If it be urged that some of them are difficult or incapable of definition, the same is true of not a few of the conceptions of science. It is also true that they respect truths with which we could not be acquainted apart from [pg 083] such a revelation as that made in the person of Jesus Christ; but this is true of the phenomena of Creation likewise. We do not acquire a knowledge of its phenomena by reasoning, but by observation, or from the statements of others when they lie beyond the limits of our own observation. The Incarnation, including as it does the divine actions and the teaching of Jesus Christ, is not the revelation of a dogma, but the manifestation of a new fact. This fact, like all other phenomena, although undiscoverable by our reasoning powers without the exercise of observation, becomes after observation a fact on which reason may justly exercise its powers. If he be really what he professed to be, then his statements about himself give as an account of his previous history, before he came under human observation.

Let me now consider the relation in which miracles stand to the affirmations of those who claimed a commission from Jesus Christ to publish his religion in the world, and to lay the foundation of the Church.

I must here also adhere to my original position that miraculous powers are never described in the New Testament as being used for the direct proof of dogmas, but for the proof of the Messianic character of Jesus Christ, or of the divine commission of those who wrought them. The truth of the assertions of its writers rests on no other foundation than the fulness of their knowledge of the subjects on which they spake, whether acquired by ordinary or by supernatural means, and on their veracity, when they affirm that particular truths were within the limits of their knowledge. Thus St. Paul claims acceptance for the things which he asserted because he had been taught them by Revelation from Jesus Christ, not because he had proved their truth, by working miracles in confirmation of them. [pg 084] This course is uniformly adopted by him throughout his epistles. The object of the mighty works that were wrought by him was to prove his own apostleship or the fact of the resurrection.

I must not allow myself to enter on the question of inspiration, its nature and limitations, or the degree of supernatural guidance afforded to the apostles and their followers. Such an inquiry would be foreign to the present subject, which is strictly historical. It is of course a direct and necessary inference that when the miracles proved the reality of the commission of those who performed them, they also proved that they were fully instructed in its terms, and entitled to credit within its limits. But the extent of their enlightenment can only be inferred from the nature of the commission itself, and from the facts and phenomena of the New Testament. It has been an idea widely spread that inspiration must confer a general infallibility. The inference that a man is rendered infallible in general matters because he is invested with a limited and definite commission, and with endowments adequate to render him competent to fulfil the purposes of his mission, is one which the premises will not justify. The utmost that the possession of such a commission can prove is that its possessor is enlightened up to its subject matter, but no further.

But in the present discussion I need not go beyond the affirmations of the New Testament. The actions performed by Jesus Christ proved him to be the Messiah. The miracles wrought by the apostles, were performed either to prove the fact of his resurrection, i.e. that he was the Messiah, or their own divine mission, which was dependent on its truth, or to draw attention to their message. The supernatural gifts so frequently referred to in the epistles, are affirmed to [pg 085] have been designed for the building up of the Church into a distinct community, and when that purpose was accomplished they were to cease. Being functional, the enlightenment communicated by them was necessarily limited to the special subject matter on which they were exercised. In this point of view miracles may be viewed as attestations of the veracity of the persons who performed them, and of the sufficiency of their knowledge on the subjects they were specially commissioned to communicate.

But the question still remains for consideration, Can miracles prove moral truths?

I answer emphatically in the negative. If dogmas, which may be viewed as intellectual truths, are incapable of a direct proof by miracles, still more so are moral truths. Such truths can rest only on a moral basis. With respect to the miracles recorded in the New Testament, the question is nugatory, for it nowhere affirms that its miracles were wrought for such a purpose. It is true that Jesus Christ, as the great legislator of the kingdom of heaven, gave an authoritative utterance to many moral precepts as the laws of his kingdom. This royal right of legislation was inherent in his Messiahship. But to give utterance to moral truths in a legislative capacity, has no connection with attempting to prove them by authority. Ordinary human legislation has its authoritative utterances. But when it does this, it does not rest the truths themselves on authority, or base them on adventitious testimony. Our Lord and his apostles uniformly appealed to the internal perceptions of our moral and spiritual nature as the only ground on which moral obligation rests.

Let it be observed, however, that this by no means pre-supposes the truth of the absurd proposition, that every man, however imperfect or degraded, is capable of [pg 086] reasoning out all moral truth for himself. On the contrary, definite moral knowledge requires to be communicated, as all other kinds of knowledge. Its great principles require to be enunciated, and to be worked out to their special applications. But the principles themselves, as far as their binding power is concerned, must ultimately rest on the internal perceptions of our moral and spiritual being. A miracle, therefore, can communicate to them no higher degree of certainty or obligation. The only thing which it can aid in establishing is, that one invested with a divine commission may have a right to claim obedience to special precepts on the authority of God, in whom all moral obligation centres.

But even in this case, the ground on which the obligation rests is a moral one, which no miracle can possibly prove or even confirm. A moral teacher can only appeal to that in man which we variously designate as conscience, moral sense, or the principles which are the foundation of our moral perceptions. The fact that many men through a long course of evil get morally blinded does not alter the case. It only exemplifies a remarkable saying of our Lord, “If the light that is in thee be darkness, how great is that darkness.” When the light within us has become darkness, there is nothing left to which an appeal to the sense of duty or obligation can be made.

The objection urged against Christianity, that because a miracle cannot prove a moral truth it is therefore useless, is quite beyond the question at issue. The special function of the Christian revelation is one far higher than the mere laying down of rules for the regulation of human conduct. Its great purpose is to impart to man a moral and spiritual power, which is able to make obedience to the moral law a possibility; [pg 087] to supply a motive of sufficient potency to make us capable of resisting the vehemence of our passions; and one which is able to lift the morally degraded from their degradation, and to strengthen the holy in their holiness. According to the teaching of the New Testament, this constitutes the great distinctive purpose of Christianity, and the end of all divine revelation. This most important truth has been greatly overlooked in the present controversy. It entirely disposes of the objection that if moral truth cannot be proved by miracles, they must be valueless. To such a revelation the presence of the supernatural is essential.

But it by no means follows because miracles are unable to impart to us a sense of moral obligation, that a duly commissioned moral teacher would be useless. They might prove his superior knowledge, or as attesting a divine commission, enable him to bring obligations already existing to bear on the mind with superior power. Thus it by no means follows that because men possess in their mental constitution the great principles on which scientific truths are based, each man is able to reason them out for himself. The most highly gifted man would make slow progress without a teacher. As I have already observed, moral truth is capable of being taught like all other truth; and although a miracle cannot prove it, it may establish the fact that the worker of one is a man eminently entitled to be heard on the great subjects of moral obligation, or that he is able to communicate knowledge which is capable of acting mightily on our moral being.

I must now proceed to offer a few observations on the question, Are miracles objects of faith? and if they are so in any sense, how can they be the media of proof of a revelation?

The author of “Supernatural Religion” starts the following difficulty in connection with this subject: “Consciousness of the difficulties which beset miracles in the present age has led many able men to deal thus illogically with them, and to represent them alternately as evidence and as objects of faith.” He then proceeds to refer to Dr. Arnold, Professor Baden Powell, and Archbishop Trench, as having been in various degrees guilty of making this confusion.

I am not prepared to deny that many Christian writers have expressed themselves with great indistinctness on this subject, especially in works where miracles have been only referred to incidentally, and which only partially treat of the supernatural elements of Christianity. This question will be discussed more fully when we consider his definite objections; but it will tend to a clearer understanding of the subject if in the present place, I lay down the following propositions:—

I. That it is impossible to believe in any assertion which contradicts the first principles of our reason, even if it were supposable that a miracle could be wrought in confirmation of it.

II. That, although the illumination which reason imparts is imperfect, yet as it is the only instrument that we possess for the investigation of truth, attempts to disparage it are absurd.

III. So far is faith from standing in opposition to reason, that it is a legitimate branch of it when exercised on a special subject matter.

IV. That beliefs which reason refuses to authorise do not originate in faith but in credulity.

V. That even those who entertain irrational convictions are compelled to base them on evidence of some kind which is satisfactory to themselves: [pg 089] that is to say, on the dictates of their own imperfect reason.

VI. That, while we can believe in nothing that is contrary to our reason, yet it is perfectly rational to believe in many things which our reason would have been unable to discover.

VII. That extraordinary facts which lie beyond the limits of human experience are not contrary to our reason: and it is perfectly rational to believe them whenever they are adequately attested.

VIII. That a large portion of our beliefs on subjects scientific, philosophical, historical, moral, and religious, rest on testimony; the belief in them is highly rational, when the knowledge of those from whom we derive our information is adequate: and consequently that faith is a principle co-extensive with the activities of the human mind, and is by no means confined to subjects simply religious, however intimately it may be connected with them.

A few brief observations will suffice in this part of our subject.

It will be observed that I have included under the term “reason” the whole of our mental processes which are necessary for the cognition and the discovery of truth. These include, not only our powers of inductive and deductive reasoning, but our intuitions, our forms of thought, those powers of our mind, which whether intuitional or instinctive, form the foundation of many of our most important convictions and our moral conceptions. These constitute our reason as distinct from our reasoning powers. No little confusion has been introduced into this controversy from the want of attending to this distinction.

It has been asserted that we can accept things as matters of faith which to our reason would be utterly [pg 090] incredible. This assertion has arisen from the confusion of things which differ widely, viz. things which our reason might have been unable to discover, but which when discovered may be perfectly rational, and things directly contradictory to reason. The existence for example of a square circle is a thing absolutely incredible, and while thus contradictory to reason, it is impossible to accept it by faith. So would any doctrine which in a similar manner contradicted the first principles of our rational convictions. No more pernicious principle can be laid down than that things which are contradictory to our reason can be accepted by the principle of faith. Such a principle would divide the human mind into two hostile camps, and if carried to its logical consequences, must land us in universal scepticism.

It by no means follows that things which transcend our rational powers to discover must be contrary to our reason when they have been discovered. We can only arrive at the knowledge of unknown facts by observation, or accept them on the testimony of others. Until they have been brought within our knowledge in this way, no amount of reasoning could lead to their discovery. In a similar manner with respect to several of the facts in the New Testament connected with the Incarnation, our reason might never have discovered them, but when they have been discovered, they may form suitable subjects on which to exert its energies.

The whole of the confusion in which this question has become involved has originated in the assumption that faith is a faculty of the mind distinct and separate from our reason, and in a certain sense opposed to it; and that things which cannot be subjects of rational conviction may yet be the objects of faith. Whatever [pg 091] opinions may have been held by divines upon this subject, I can discover nothing which countenances them in the New Testament.

To what class of truths is the word “faith” properly applied? I answer to those which we accept on testimony. It has been asserted that some of the first principles of our rational convictions, such as our belief in the existence of an external world, or in the truth of experience, is an act of faith. This, however, is to introduce a confusion of thought. Such convictions can be only acts of faith as far as we believe in ourselves.

Viewing faith as the acceptance of truth on adequate testimony, it follows that all our knowledge of things, whether natural or supernatural, that is not the result of the action of our own minds, but which we accept on the testimony of others, is an act of faith. Our acceptance of them depends on the validity of the testimony that can be adduced for them. The important question for determination is, is the subject on which it is given within the knowledge of the informant? If it respects a fact, has he witnessed it, or received it from others who have? Are his powers of observation good and his judgment sound? Is he worthy of credit? The determination of these and similar points is the proper office of our rational powers, yet the acceptance of the fact is an act of faith. When our reason is satisfied on all these points, faith becomes an act of reason. To assert that the acceptance of supernatural facts belongs to a faculty of our minds which we designate faith, and that our acceptance of others is the result of the action of our reason, is to lay down a distinction entirely of our own creation. In both cases the evidences must form the subject of [pg 092] rational investigation, and they must be accepted or rejected as they approve themselves to our reason.

It will perhaps be urged, that the acceptance of propositions, such as the doctrinal statements of the New Testament, is an act of faith which stands out in manifest contra-distinction to an act of reason. It would be so unquestionably, if we accepted them on insufficient evidence; but when we do so with the knowledge that others have a full acquaintance with the subject on which they speak, it is in the highest degree rational to accept and to act on their testimony. A large portion of the business of life is conducted on this principle. A man is ignorant on some subject, or he distrusts his own judgment respecting it: he consults one who knows, or on whose judgment he relies. For example: let us suppose that I have a bottle full of a certain substance; I do not know whether it is a medicine that I am in need of, or a deadly poison. I consult my chemist, and without hesitation I act on his opinion. In all such cases (and they are spread over the entire sphere of life) we act on faith; but it is a faith which is in conformity with the dictates of reason. The function of the latter is to ascertain the adequate knowledge and the veracity of the person whose assurance we accept. If it is a rational act thus to receive truths on the testimony of man, whose knowledge must be imperfect, it must be still more so to accept them on the authority of him who knows all things, i.e. God.

I am aware that certain writers have given such a representation of faith as to produce the impression that it is one of its special functions to accept certain dogmas, the terms of which are extremely obscure, or absolutely incomprehensible. But no rational evidence can be adduced in support of this position. To exert [pg 093] actual belief in a proposition the terms of which are incomprehensible, is an impossibility, and we only deceive ourselves when we imagine that we can. All that we can do in such cases is to repeat words, but if they have no definite meaning we cannot believe them: for the act of faith or conviction is founded on the affirmation that the two terms of a particular proposition agree. It is quite true that the facts and statements of the New Testament run up into principles which transcend our limited power of reason; but this is common to it, and every system of science or philosophy; and forms no peculiarity of religion. I am far from wishing to affirm that theologians have not fallen into this practice; but my concern is not with them, but with the statements of the New Testament. One of the most important acquisitions made to our mental science in the present day is that we have ascertained that there are limits to our mental powers beyond which we cannot penetrate. This was imperfectly realized by many of the reasoners of earlier times, and the result has been that they have fallen into a hazy mysticism, or logomachy.

Equally pernicious is the view that there is something particularly meritorious in accepting truth on little or no evidence, and that to do so is a high act of faith. Not only is this founded on no rational principle, but it is entirely unsupported by any account of faith as given in the New Testament, which again and again assumes the contrary position. Faith is the acceptance of truths which lie beyond the sphere of our personal knowledge on an adequate attestation. If an astronomer should happen to be ignorant of chemistry, and accept its truths on the testimony of one who was an eminent master of it, this would constitute [pg 094] an act of faith. Surely such an act is one which is highly rational.

It follows, therefore, that although our belief in miracles being founded, as it now must be, on testimony, is an act of faith, yet it is also an act of our reason. It is, therefore, by no means absurd to speak of miracles as objects of faith, and at the same time as possessing an evidential value. We accept them as we do all other adequately attested facts, and reason on them in the same manner as we do on other facts. This is the precise course which will be pursued by the overwhelming majority of astronomers who will be unable to witness the coming transit of Venus. They will accept the facts on adequate testimony, and afterwards use them as media of proof.

Chapter V. The Antecedent Improbability of Miracles.—The Unknown and Unknowable God.

The proof on à priori grounds that an event is either possible or probable, cannot establish that it has actually occurred. This must rest on its own particular evidence. To prove that a revelation is both possible and probable, and that it ought to be evidenced by miracles, may form an essential portion of our general argument, because the degree of probability of the occurrence of a particular fact affects the amount of positive evidence necessary to establish its truth. But the proof that a revelation has actually been given, or a miracle wrought, can only be effected through the same media as those through which other facts are established. To prove that a revelation is probable will not be of the smallest avail to prove that one has been actually given, without adequate proof of the fact itself.

Still the examination of the antecedent question is in this case particularly important, because modern unbelief boldly affirms that a revelation and its attestation of miracles are both impossible and incredible. If this can be demonstrated, the discussion of the evidence that can be adduced for them as facts is a useless expenditure of our reasoning powers; for no evidence can prove the occurrence of that which is impossible. It [pg 096] may be assumed, however, that those who make this affirmation are not quite satisfied as to the cogency of their reasonings; because, after having demonstrated, as they allege, that miracles are impossible, they proceed to attack the evidence of those narrated in the Gospels, and pronounce it worthless. As, therefore, the opponents of Christianity boldly affirm that both a supernatural revelation and miracles are impossible, it is necessary that the defender of Christianity should examine the validity of the assertion.

Our opponents constantly charge us with reasoning in a circle, or assuming the fact which ought to be proved. To avoid even the appearance of this, I lay down the following positions:—

If direct atheism is a just conclusion from the phenomena of the Universe, it follows that a divine revelation is impossible. Nor are miracles in any proper sense of the word less so, because they are not merely facts occurring in external nature, but facts in the production of which we recognize intelligence and will. With the principles of atheism the occurrence of an extraordinary event is quite compatible, because as it cannot rise to any higher knowledge than that of phenomena, the knowledge of the invariability of past phenomena is incapable of giving the fact that all future phenomena will resemble the past. Still the occurrence of a fact, however extraordinary, would not constitute a miracle, and would prove only the existence of an unknown force in the universe, or the predominance of chance.

The same remark is equally applicable to that form of modern atheism which does not affirm that no God exists, but contents itself with the denial that there is any evidence that there is one.

Nor is the case altogether different with regard to [pg 097] pantheism. According to this system, God is only another name for nature, which works out every form of fleeting existence for itself in an unceasing round of unconscious self-evolution. The essence of its affirmation is, that God has no conscious personal existence, but that He is only another name for the blind unconscious forces of the universe. Such a being (if it is possible to conceive of it as a being at all, or as a unity) is everlastingly making a revelation of itself by a ceaseless evolution of phenomena, the result of the blind action of its inherent forces. But to whom? Obviously only to beings capable of reason and consciousness, whom it (I dare not say, He) has evolved out of its own bosom, and will again resolve into unconsciousness. Prior to their evolution this mighty τὸ πᾶν must have been everlastingly making manifestations of itself, without a single being in existence capable of recognizing them. Whatever be the result of such theories in a logical point of view, it is evident that if pantheism be a rational account of the order of the universe, a revelation and miracles, in any sense in which such terms can bear meaning, are impossible.

No less applicable is the same remark to that form of pantheism held by Mr. Herbert Spencer, which, while it affirms the existence of a cause of all things, as alike required by the demands of philosophy, science, and religion, yet affirms that He is unknown and unknowable, and that every thing which is knowable, although a manifestation of that great unknown cause, yet conveys no idea of Him that the intellect can apprehend. In one word, the unknown cause of all things is inconceivable, and incapable of becoming the subject of rational thought. The intellect cannot help assuming the existence of this cause of all things; but all that it can affirm of him is, that He is unknown and unknowable; [pg 098] and that everything within the bounds of our knowledge, though it may represent some mode of his existence, cannot be he, or like him. With respect to this theory, while it cleverly evades some of the harsher difficulties of pantheism and atheism, it is not too much to say that it is a civil way of bowing God out of the universe, of which He is alleged to be the cause. He can neither be a person, nor have wisdom, nor be benevolent, nor be capable of conscious self-manifestation; because all these conceptions are limited and finite. All that we can know of Him is, that such a cause exists beyond present phenomena; and that we are condemned respecting Him, to a profound and perpetual ignorance. It is possible to designate such a being by the name of God, but it would be to use the term in a sense peculiar to those who thus employ it. Such a God is a bare abstract conception of the intellect, void of all moral value. It is sufficient for my present purpose to observe that it is impossible for the unknown and the unknowable to make a revelation of himself. Consequently St. Paul's affirmation with respect to the unknown God at Athens, “Whom therefore ye ignorantly worship, Him declare I unto you” (Acts xvii. 23), is untrue. To such a God a revelation of Himself, and miracles to confirm it, are alike impossible.

It is evident, therefore, that if either of these principles can be demonstrated to be a true account of the nature of things, all further discussion as to the truth of a revelation or of miracles is useless. Let us take the most favourable hypothesis, that of Mr. Spencer. It concedes that the necessities of reason compel us to assume the existence of an unknown cause of all things, which may be called God. But He is unknowable; He is inscrutable. No conception of [pg 099] Him can be realized in thought; it follows, therefore, that no revelation of such a being can be made to the finite intellect of man, for if a revelation of Him could be made, He cannot be unknowable. This being so, the person who attempts to reason out the truth of Christianity is placed under a difficulty. Christianity assumes the existence of a personal God, possessed of moral attributes. This is the very truth, the evidence of which these systems assert to be wanting. The Christian advocate, therefore, has only two courses before him: First, To assume, in conformity with the all but universal belief of mankind, that a personal God exists; and then to argue for the truth of Christianity, and to answer the objections urged against it. When we do this, objectors affirm that we beg the question. Or, Secondly, To prove the existence of a personal God; and then to argue for the truth of revelation. If he adopts the latter course, he is compelled to adduce the proof on which the belief in theism rests, and to answer the objections to it—or, in other words, to compose a bulky volume, before he can get at the immediate subject of inquiry.

Now I affirm that the defender of Christianity is no more open to the charge of begging the question when he assumes the existence of a personal God as the foundation of his reasonings, than the author of a treatise on trigonometry is, who takes for granted the truth of Euclid's propositions.

The author of the work to which I have already referred does his utmost to fasten on the modern defenders of Christianity the charge that they begin and end in assumptions. I will not deny that much ambiguous language has been used on this subject, but I trust I shall show that the charge is utterly unfounded. I must briefly notice a few of his reasonings.

At page 68 he writes as follows: “Dr. Mozley is well aware that the assumption of a ‘personal’ God is not susceptible of proof; indeed, this is admitted in the statement that the definition is an assumption.”

An assumption, I ask, in what sense? Is it a simple assumption without evidence, taken for granted for the bare purposes of argument; or is it one which, though taken for granted in the present case, rests on a substantial basis of evidence previously established, and which bears the same relation to the question of miracles which the truths of Euclid do to those of trigonometry? The latter is the fact though the mode in which the writer puts it implies the former. Without referring to the authority of any particular author, is he not fully aware that theists maintain that their belief in a Personal God rests on a basis of proof which commends itself to their reason? Have not numbers of men, endowed with the highest powers of intellect, accepted it as satisfactory? Yet he seeks to imply that, after all, it is an assumption. It is true that in the argument for miracles we take it for granted; but we do so, because the proof has commended itself to our highest reason.

I admit that Dr. Mozley has used, in speaking of this subject, language which I cannot but think is wanting in precision. Still it does not bear the meaning that this author seeks to fasten on it. “It is then to be admitted,” says he, “that historically, and looking to the general actual reception of it, this conception of God was derived from revelation. Not from the first dawn of history to the spread of Christianity in the world do we see in mankind at large any belief in such a Being.” The learned author then states, at considerable length, the philosophic and vulgar views entertained of God, and shows their inadequacy and [pg 101] imperfection, and concludes as follows: “But although this conception of the Deity has been received through the channel of the Bible, what communicates a truth is one thing, what proves it is another.” He then proceeds to summarize the general proof.

I cannot think this statement altogether free from ambiguity. Whatever may have been the precise forms in which the ideas of the vulgar or the philosopher were embodied, there is strong proof that a higher and better conception of God, though indefinite and indistinct, underlay them all. The most degraded polytheist has indistinct conceptions of a Supreme God above all the degraded objects of his worship. It seems to me impossible that such a conception of God can have been attained from revelation. It may, in a certain sense, be said, looking at the precise form in which it is embodied, that it has been derived by us historically from the Jewish race. But it must have had a prior origin. St. Paul considered that the material universe manifested His eternal power and Godhead. The primitive form of all the great oriental religions contained in them the idea of God. It is simply absurd to affirm that they derived it from the Bible. It is true that the existence of a primitive revelation anterior to the Bible has often been assumed to account for this knowledge, but this is a bare assumption of which we have no proof, and whose only basis is conjecture. Judaism and Christianity have been instrumental in widely spreading correct conceptions of the Deity and dissipating false ones. Yet if the conception had not existed in the mind at least implicitly, no formal revelation could have put it there, for every such revelation must be conveyed in language, and all language is meaningless, unless the mind can realize its conceptions. The assertion, [pg 102] therefore, that the conception of God has been first communicated through the channel of the Bible, and is afterwards proved by reason, seems to me to be one not devoid of danger. On the contrary, our belief that God exists is the very pre-condition of our being able to believe that He has revealed Himself. This conception revelation may modify, invest with a higher moral character, and import into it definiteness and precision, but it cannot create it. It is on such grounds that the author in question seeks to involve his reasoning and that of all other defenders of Christianity in a vicious circle. I fully admit that the conception of God has been elevated and purified by the influence of Christianity, and that the teaching of Christianity on this subject is in conformity with our highest reason. But it is absurd to affirm that this is reasoning in a circle, and that the Christian argument involves reasoning from Theism to Christianity and from Christianity back to Theism.

The following passage, cited by Professor Mozley from Baden Powell, is referred to by this author as a proof that all our reasonings on this subject are a simple argument from reason to revelation, and from revelation to reason. The passage itself is a clear statement of the grounds of the charge, and requires our careful consideration. “Everybody may collect from the order and harmony of the physical universe the existence of a God; but in acknowledging a God, we do not thereby acknowledge this peculiar or doctrinal conception of a God. We see in the structure of nature a mind, a universal mind, but still a mind which only operates and expresses itself by law. Nature only does and can inform us of mind in nature; but in no other sense does nature witness to the existence of an omnipotent Supreme Being. Of a [pg 103] universal mind out of nature, nature says nothing; and of an omnipotence which does not possess an inherent limit in nature, she says nothing either. And therefore that conception of a supreme Being which represents Him as a spirit independent of the physical universe, and able from a standing-point external to nature, to interrupt its order, is a conception of God for which we must go elsewhere. That conception is attained from revelation, which is asserted to be proved by miracles. But that being the case, this doctrine of theism rests itself upon miracles, and therefore miracles cannot rest on this doctrine of theism.”

It will be necessary carefully to point out the inaccurate reasoning of this passage.

First: The author speaks of nature as another expression for the forces, laws, and phenomena of the physical universe, and for these alone. To this I have no objection, for it would greatly conduce to clearness if it was always confined to this meaning. But while he uses it thus, he nowhere tells us in what relation man, including his faculties, intellectual and moral, and above all, his will, stands to nature. Are they included in, or excluded from it? Do they, or do they not, form a part of it? If they are included in nature, then there are other facts in nature bearing on the being of a God, beyond those on which the author reasons. If they are excluded, then the reasoning is inadequate to sustain his conclusion. Our reasonings respecting God are founded not only on the forces and laws of physical nature, but on man, his reason, his conscience, and his will. What makes this fallacy the more plausible is that the term nature is very frequently used to include man, as well as the forces and laws of the material universe.

As far as the physical universe is concerned, the mind infers the existence of a God from its order and its harmonies; that is to say, having observed that order and harmony have been produced by intelligence within the sphere of our own observation, and being deeply convinced on other grounds of reasoning that they are incapable of resulting from any other source, we infer that the results we behold in nature are due to a similar principle which we experience in ourselves. Such an inference is not due to simple observation of the order of the universe only, but unites with it an act of reasoning founded on our own self-conscious being. But the intelligence which produces order, as far as we are cognisant of it, is invariably united with will. We therefore infer from the order and harmonies of nature, not simply the conception of a God, such as the God of pantheism; but, if they are valid to prove anything at all, of a God who is possessed of intelligence adequate to arrange the order, and of purpose adequate for its production. If the inference of the existence of a God from the works of nature is valid, it must be of a God possessed of the attributes in question, for all our inferences on such a subject derive their validity from applying to them the analogies of our reason.

It is quite true that in the structure of the material universe we see only the indications of a mind operating and expressing itself by law; that is to say, we observe in the physical universe no instances of its violation. But WE, that is the reasoning, rational beings, whether existing in nature or outside it, have inferred from the structure of the universe the existence of mind, and we know of no mind which is not possessed of conscious intelligence and will. If our reasoning from the order of the material universe is [pg 105] valid to prove the presence of mind, which is a conception entirely derived from our consciousness of ourselves, it must be equally so to prove the existence of purpose and volition, for we know nothing of mind which is devoid of these attributes. The material universe proves that its order and harmony is the result of the action of mind; but it cannot prove that the mind which produced this order and harmony is unable to introduce a different one. But if our minds form part of nature, then they are a proof that the author of nature has produced something else in nature besides the order and harmonies of the physical universe. If they are outside nature, then we have direct evidence of the existence of beings outside and above nature, i.e. above the physical forces of the universe. It follows that if finite beings possessed of intelligence and will, exist within nature or without it, a God who possesses similar powers may exist also.

In a narrow and restricted sense it may be quite true that nature, i.e. matter and its phenomena, only informs us of the presence of mind in nature, the partner and correlative of organized matter. But let us here guard against a latent fallacy in this mode of statement. We learn the presence of mind, not from material nature, but by the application of our own reason to the investigation of what its phenomena denote. This is overlooked in the above argument. It is perfectly true that as a mere matter of phenomenal appearance, we do not actually behold in natural phenomena manifestations of mind acting outside nature. In fact we do not see mind at all, but simply infer its presence from the phenomena before us through the agency of our own reason; and this inference carries along with it all the other attributes of mind.

The writer before me is one of those who affirm that [pg 106] the utmost our minds can infer from the contemplation of nature, in which he includes every species of vital organism, is the presence of order and harmony; and that any inference that its phenomena testify to the presence of adaptation, contrivance and design is invalid. I reply that this affirmation is only valid on the assumption of a principle which altogether denies that from natural phenomena we can infer the existence of mind. But we also observe in natural phenomena, and above all in animal and vegetable structures, that the results effected are produced, not by simple forces, but by the careful adjustment of many, or by one counteracting and qualifying the action of another, and by forces intersecting one another at precisely the right time and place. Had any of these occurred otherwise, the result would have been different. Throughout nature we observe innumerable instances in which various forces have thus combined to produce a definite result. This we usually designate by the word “adaptation.” Adaptation implies intelligence and purpose. We are quite as much justified in ascribing this purpose to the power manifested in nature, as any other quality whatever, even the possession of mind.

I fully concede that natural phenomena and even the phenomena of the mind of man, only testify directly to the existence of a power adequate to their production, and that we cannot directly infer from them the presence of omnipotence. But this is to quarrel about words. For the power manifested in nature and in man is so great that the human mind can make no distinction between it and omnipotence; or in other words, it justly infers from its manifestations that the power which could originate this universe and all things in it must be capable of effecting anything which is possible. [pg 107] To this mind, whether in or out of nature, our reason ascribes the attributes of intelligence and will. Such a power it is incapable of conceiving as inherent in material forces; it therefore assumes that this power exists outside nature, and is capable of controlling it.

It follows therefore that the reasoning is fallacious, which asserts that the conception of a supreme Being which represents Him as a spirit independent of the physical universe, and able from a standing-point external to nature to interrupt its order, is a conception which we must seek from revelation, and cannot be arrived at by any exertion of our rational powers on the facts of nature and of man. Its apparent plausibility has arisen solely from ignoring the presence of man, either in nature or outside it, and neglecting to take the facts of human nature, man's reason, conscience and will, into consideration. To affirm that, independently of man's moral and intellectual being, physical nature, its forces and laws, can prove nothing, is a simple platitude. We have not to go to revelation for the principles on which we reason, but to man, and the phenomena of his rational, self-conscious, and voluntary agency. It follows, therefore, that the affirmation that in conducting the Christian argument we reason from God to miracles and from miracles to God, is utterly disproved. Yet the writer before me has ventured to affirm that, when we commence with the being of a personal God as the groundwork of our reasonings, we begin and end with a bare assumption.

The philosophical writings of Dr. Mansel are also pressed into the service for the purpose of discrediting the evidences of Christianity, and, I own, with considerably greater reason. Mr. Herbert Spencer has also invoked them in confirmation of his theory that God is unknown and unknowable. He refers to them [pg 108] in the following words: “Here I cannot do better than avail myself of the demonstration which Mr. Mansel, carrying out in detail the doctrine of Sir W. Hamilton, has given us in his ‘Limits of Religious Thought.’ And I gladly do this, not only because his mode of presentation cannot be improved, but because writing as he does in defence of current theology, his reasonings will be more acceptable to the majority of readers.”

Before referring to Dr. Mansel as an unquestionable authority on this subject, it would only have been candid in both writers to have informed their readers that not only have his principles been repudiated by a considerable number of Christian writers as unsound, but they have been carefully examined by that eminent atheistic philosopher, Mr. Mill, who gives it as his deliberate opinion that they are founded on fallacious principles. It is absurd to urge principles, though they have been maintained by an eminent Christian writer, which an eminent unbeliever has pronounced unsound, as a clear and conclusive argument against Christianity.

The work of Dr. Mansel may be described as an attempt to prove the truth of Christianity on the principles of the most sceptical philosophy. It may be briefly stated thus: Reason is incapable of forming any idea of God as He is, whether as the Infinite, the Absolute, or the first Cause. All the conceptions which we can frame on the subject are mutually self-destructive. On similar principles our conceptions of His moral attributes are wholly inadequate to inform us of His real perfections. It by no means follows that our human conception of benevolence or justice is a measure of the divine benevolence, or of divine justice; and so of His other attributes. It is affirmed that because they [pg 109] are the attributes of an infinite Being, they lie beyond the possibility of being realized in human thought. Consequently, holiness in God may admit of very different manifestations from holiness in man. Upon these principles, which affirm the inadequacy of the human intellect, even to conceive of anything as it exists in God, it follows that our only possible conceptions of God are relative; or, to use the word chosen by the author in relation to Christianity, regulative; i.e. fitted to regulate our conduct, but not to illuminate our understanding.

Upon the assumption that reason, when it attempts to analyse our ideas of the Infinite, the Absolute, or the first Cause, lands us in hopeless contradictions, Dr. Mansel arrives at the conclusion that it is incapable of forming any conception of God as he actually exists. It follows as a necessary consequence from this, that even by revelation we are only capable of attaining relative ideas of Him, and that these relative ideas do not represent His real nature, but are only regulative of conduct, i.e. we are to act upon them as if they were true. E.g. God is revealed as holy. Our only conception of holiness is our human conception of it. But we cannot know that this is an adequate measure of the divine holiness. God is declared to be benevolent. We have no conception of benevolence but that which is derived from the human mind. So likewise with respect to justice. But benevolence and justice as they exist in God may differ from these qualities as they exist in man. The same thing follows as a necessary conclusion from Dr. Mansel's premises with respect to all the other attributes of God. Nothing will better illustrate the position to which this argument reduces us than to apply it to the truthfulness or veracity of God. All that we know about truthfulness [pg 110] is as it exists in finite beings, that is, in men. But God is an infinite being. It follows therefore that truthfulness in man is no adequate representation of truthfulness as it exists in God, that is to say, that the divine veracity may differ from our human conception of it. This is certainly a very startling position.

If, therefore, these principles are correct, acquiescence on the part of man in the divine character is impossible. It is impossible to love a being who does not present to us the aspect of loveliness; or to reverence one who does not present to us an aspect capable of exciting this emotion; or to feel trust in a being of whose justice we have no certainty that it resembles our conception of justice; or to rely on the promises of one whose veracity may differ from our own. Such feelings cannot be made to order. They can only be generated by the contemplation of a being who is holy, benevolent, just, and true, in the ordinary acceptation of these words. They cannot be excited by any merely regulative ideas. We love, reverence, and trust, not ideas or conceptions, but persons, possessing moral attributes. But on the principle of merely regulative ideas of God, the assertion that “God is love,” loses all its value, if God is not what I mean by love, but, because he is infinite, he may be something else, I know not what; and thus the great precept of the moral law, “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, mind, soul, and strength,” becomes meaningless. Such devotion of our entire nature cannot be created by the mere command to render it. It can only be rendered to a being whose claims over us we both feel and know to be an absolute reality, and to whom on the conviction of their reality we can offer ourselves up a voluntary sacrifice. But if we cannot know Him as He is, how is the fire of devotion to Him [pg 111] to be kindled in our hearts? How shall we trust in Him? How shall we acquiesce in His character? How shall we worship Him, how shall we adore Him, if it is true that the justice, benevolence, or holiness of the divine character may not resemble our conception of them? Nay, more: the theory in question lays the axe to the root of the Christian revelation itself. There is no affirmation of the New Testament more decisive than that Jesus Christ in His divine and human personality is the image of the invisible God, as far as His moral perfections are concerned. Are the perfections of the character of Jesus Christ only regulative, or are they real representations of these attributes as they exist in God? Are the divine attributes of holiness, benevolence, or justice, adequately represented by the manifestations of them, as made by Jesus Christ? If we accept the testimony of St. John's Gospel, our Lord himself has expressly affirmed, “He that hath seen me hath seen the Father” (John xiv. 9). But this is impossible if our conceptions of God's moral attributes are only regulative, and if the human idea of holiness is no adequate representation of the divine.

However erroneous a system may be, yet if it has been elaborated by a powerful mind, it has generally some foundation in reason, and I am far from affirming that, with considerable qualifications, some important elements of truth may not be found in that of Dr. Mansel. It is well that we should be made to feel that there are limits of thought beyond which the human mind cannot penetrate, and that there are profundities of metaphysics which an imperfect measuring-line cannot reach. But placing the matter as he has, the Christian apologist may well feel indebted to Mr. Mill for his crushing demolition of the dangerous portions of Dr. Mansel's system. When unbelievers quote the [pg 112] authority of Dr. Mansel, why do they not also tell their readers that there was at least one unbeliever of very high logical power, who wrote against the validity of his system.

It is one thing to affirm that we cannot penetrate to the depths of the Deity, and that after we have raised our thoughts to the highest, there is something higher still; and quite another to affirm that our highest thoughts of him have no validity; or, to use the terms of a fashionable philosophy, that God is unknown and unknowable, that no true conception of Him can be formed in thought; in one word, that he is absolutely unthinkable. The difficulties of this subject have arisen mainly from discussing it in terms of pure abstractions, instead of embodying them in a concrete form. It is impossible in this place to enter on the profound depths involved in these questions; but a few observations will be necessary for the purpose of clearing away the difficulties in which our opponents seek to involve the subject of miracles. I shall confine myself to our conceptions of the Infinite.

It is affirmed that no conception of the infinite can be framed in thought; that it is therefore unthinkable, and transcends the limits of human knowledge; that it is a negation; and that therefore our reason is unable to affirm anything respecting it; that the idea of personality is incompatible with that of infinity; and that therefore when we speak of God as a person who possesses infinite perfections, we enter on a region where human thought is invalid, and respecting which all affirmation involves a contradiction.