THE JOURNALS

OF

MAJOR-GEN. C. G. GORDON, C.B.,

AT KARTOUM.

THE JOURNALS

OF

MAJOR-GEN. C. G. GORDON, C.B.,

AT KARTOUM.

PRINTED FROM THE ORIGINAL MSS.

INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

BY

A. EGMONT HAKE,

AUTHOR OF “THE STORY OF CHINESE GORDON,” ETC.

WITH PORTRAIT, TWO MAPS, AND THIRTY ILLUSTRATIONS AFTER SKETCHES
BY GENERAL GORDON.

LONDON:
KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH, & CO., 1 PATERNOSTER SQUARE.
1885.

LONDON:
PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, Limited.
STAMFORD STREET AND CHARING CROSS.

The rights of translation and of reproduction are reserved.

[PREFACE.]

The work of editing these Journals is at an end; it only remains now for me to thank one of my oldest and most valued friends, whose assistance in every way I wish most thoroughly to acknowledge: this is Mr. Godfrey Thrupp. When it became obvious that the public demand for the work made its completion in so short a time impossible—as the conscientious achievement of one man—he generously came forward. His knowledge of the East and his deep interest in the subject made him an invaluable colleague.

A. Egmont Hake.

June 11, 1885.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

Appendices:—

Book I.

Book IV.

Book V.

Book VI.

[INTRODUCTION.]

“Friends, Romans, countrymen, lend me your ears;
I come to bury Cæsar, not to praise him.
The evil that men do lives after them;
The good is oft interred with their bones.

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Good friends, sweet friends, let me not stir you up
To such a sudden flood of mutiny.
They that have done this deed are honourable;
What private griefs they had, alas! I know not,
That made them do it; they are wise and honourable,
And will no doubt, with reasons answer you.

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But were I Brutus,

And Brutus Antony, there were an Antony
Would ruffle up your spirits, and put a tongue
In every wound of Cæsar, that should move
The stones of Rome to rise and mutiny.”

These grand lines force themselves upon me, though maybe their analogy is incomplete. Mark Antony was a casuist, and pleaded the cause of revenge; I am only earnest in the cause of justice. Yet I trust in my pleading to enable Englishmen to realise how great and how sad is the loss of Charles Gordon, not only to those who loved him, but to the cause of suffering humanity. Gordon is dead. We cannot bring him back to life. Yet from his death we may learn at least how fit he was to teach us while he lived, how fit to hold his country’s honour in his hand, how fit to judge of what was right and what was wrong. His journals are his last words to the world as much as they are instruction and information to his Government, and Englishmen who value England’s honour may well read them with a heavy heart—with eyes dimmed by tears. I say Gordon is dead, and we cannot bring him back to life, but we can do much he would have done for us had he been allowed to live. His journals tell us how we can best repair mischief already done (and I understand his words to apply rather to the English people than to the Government which represents them), and they tell us what is best for the Soudan. In the interest of this unhappy land he devoted much of his life; in its interest he died. Let us then compare the opposite conditions under which the people existed during Gordon’s presence and absence, and in doing this let us mark well what Gordon said during his life, and what his journals say for him now that he is dead.

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Gordon used to tell the story of how, when Said Pasha, Viceroy of Egypt before Ismail, went up to the Soudan, so discouraged and horrified was he at the misery of the people, that at Berber he threw his guns into the river, declaring he would be no party to such oppression. In this spirit Gordon went there as Governor of the Equator in 1874, and in this spirit he expressed his views on the duties of foreigners in the service of Oriental States. His ardent and unstudied words are worthy of the deepest study. They breathe the kindliest wisdom, the most prudent philanthropy; and it would be well if those whose lot is thrown in barbarous lands would take them for a constant guide. To accept government, only if by so doing you benefit the race you rule; to lead, not drive the people to a higher civilisation; to establish only such reforms as represent the spontaneous desire of the mass; to abandon relations with your native land; to resist other governments, and keep intact the sovereignty of the State whose bread you eat; to represent the native when advising Ameer, Sultan or Khedive, on any question which your own or any foreign government may wish solved; and in this to have for prop and guide that which is universally right throughout the world, that which is best for the people of the State you serve.

Such were Gordon’s sentiments when he first entered upon his task; well would it have been for Egypt, England, and the world, had his successors taken them to heart and made them their ideal. In such a case the peace, the happiness he brought to the Soudan might still have been preserved.

Never perhaps in the histories of barbarous rule were the ideals of justice and truth more needed than at this date (1874). Seven-eighths of the population were slaves; the country swarmed with slave-hunters and slave-dealers; and district governors, greedy for pelf, aided and abetted them in their raids. So crushed were the remaining population that they regarded all comers as their foes; so destitute that they were ready and willing to exchange their own kin for cattle or for grain. Their flocks and herds, like their kindred, had been robbed. To sow they were afraid, for governors and slave-hunters never let them reap; and if perchance they cultivated ground, it was a mere patch hidden in some distant nook out of the enemy’s way. The maxims of their rulers, prior to Gordon’s advent, had been that if the natives—poor unenlightened blacks—did not act in the most civilised fashion, then must they be punished; and when these rulers for their own acts were brought to book, they cited the native custom of “plunder no offence” in their own excuse. How the governors, in league with dealers and hunters, had acted up to these precepts, was apparent enough in the desolation which reigned around, for amid the jungle of stunted trees and tall grasses not a soul was to be seen—all driven away by the slavers in past years. With the Egyptian Government such was the estimate of this waste, that it did service as a colony for misdemeanants among Arab troops; and hundreds of these died from the damp and the dulness of the scene. In other parts less than 100 men dared not move from one station to another, in fear of the retaliating tribes, and so far were these stations apart that it took six weeks to communicate one with the other. In addition to this certain chieftains who inhabited the borders of the great lakes were engaged in wars in which the capture of slaves was the main motive.

Such, in brief, was the state of affairs between Kartoum and the Lakes when Gordon made his journey thither; yet it afforded in no way the only instance of oppression, anarchy or misrule in these lands. In Kordofan and Darfour the slave-traffic was even more formidable than here. In the latter province a war between the slave-dealers and the Sultan’s troops was just concluded, and the two vast lands, with Darfertit, had been made into a Homkumdircat, or Governor-General’s district responsible to Cairo, and separated from the Soudan. But Gordon’s work was for the present confined to laying down a chain of posts between Gondokoro and the Lakes, and by this and other means contributing to the welfare of the tribes and the confusion of the slavers. To gain the confidence of the natives was his first care; and to this end he ventured alone and unarmed into those isolated spots, whither not less than a hundred men had dared to go. Then he showed the people how they might sow their grain without fear, supplying them with enough to live on until their wants were met; he also taught them the use of money, and gave them task-work. It was infinitely little, he said, among such a mass, but it was at any rate something, and might perhaps enable him to solve the question whether the negroes would work sufficiently to keep themselves if life and property were secured. To give them this protection, he seized all convoys of slaves, and ivory and cattle coming from the south, punished the slave-dealers, or converted them into troops, for they were hard, active fellows, the remnant of an ancient race; and designing and despotic governors he despatched to Cairo or Kartoum. The slaves themselves, until he could deliver them over to their kinsfolk, he kept, the cattle and the ivory he confiscated, and with the proceeds swelled the Government treasury.

It would seem the fate of those who devote their lives to the cause of humanity to be foiled instead of aided in their aim. In all his efforts for the good of these blacks Gordon met with every form of interference whence he might at least expect support. Ismail Pasha Yacoub, the Governor-General of the Soudan, jealous of the new Governor of the Equator and fearful of exposure from so conscientious a servant of the State, put every obstacle in Gordon’s way; and the Khedive himself was not always mindful of the many difficulties to be encountered. But Gordon said, to blame the Khedive for his actions you must blame his people, and blame their Creator; they act after their kind, and in the fashion they were made. So that he took little heed of all this. He was content to let it be widely known that the motto of his province would henceforth be Hurryat (liberty); and this meant that no man should interfere with another, that there should be an end to kidnapping and all plunder, an end to despotic Pashas; and those who objected were told that the motto included their liberty to quit. Moreover, he was of opinion that those who annexed the province needed as much civilisation as those they attempted to civilise; and, whenever it was necessary, in the interests of his people, he never hesitated to show them that this was his view.

Still, though he succeeded in giving peace and happiness to the people, in reforming the cruelties of Mudirs and Pashas, in settling the disputes of warring chiefs, and in laying down the chain of posts between Gondokoro and the Lakes: in making all these beneficent reforms, his heart was ever burdened with the thought of how this new and unaccustomed good would affect the people and their lands when, as time went on, himself and his influence were removed, and his successors, who understood his high intent as little as they understood the people themselves, ruled in his stead. “I think, what right have I to coax the natives to be quiet for them to fall into the hands of rapacious Pashas? I think sometimes that through my influence I am seducing the natives into a position where they will be a prey to my Arab successor. They would never do for an Arab what they do for me. I make friends with the tribes right and left.”

But, apart from these feelings, he was not satisfied; his success in his own province had been complete, but, instead of meeting with co-operation from the adjoining Soudan, he had encountered nothing but interference from its then Governor-General, Ismail Pasha Yacoub, to whose interests it was to let slavery go on. For this reason, therefore, Gordon, after three years’ labour, resigned his post as Governor of the Equator. But the step was taken in a wavering spirit; and these are among his last words ere he left: “By retiring I do not aid anything; by staying I keep my province safe from injustice and cruelty in some degree. Why should I fear? Is man stronger than God? Things have come to such a pass in these Mussulman countries that a crisis must come about soon.”

These significant words, so terribly confirmed less then ten years later, were uttered in September of 1876.

Gordon’s resignation soon led to his reinstatement on terms more fitted to his views. In the new position he felt strongly that, great as was the trust and the almost superhuman work expected of him, if he did not entirely succeed at least he would not be hampered. He was not only appointed Governor-General of the Soudan in Ismail Pasha Yacoub’s stead; he was given authority such as none had previously enjoyed—complete power, civil and military, with the life or death of his subjects in his hand; and no man dare enter his dominions without special leave. He had stipulated that this supreme command should be independent of Cairo, for he knew the Egyptian authorities to be in favour of the slave-trade. The undefined territory now his had hitherto been subject to several governments—Arab, Egyptian, Turkish. Henceforth Soudan was to mean the vast territory limited on the north by Upper Egypt, on the south by the Lakes, on the east by Abyssinia and the Red Sea, and on the west extending beyond Kordofan and the newly acquired sultanate of Darfour—the whole roughly estimated at more than 1600 miles in length, and 700 miles in width. There were to be three Vakeels or Sub-Governors: one for the original Soudan, another for Darfour, and a third for the Red Sea, or Eastern Soudan.

The suppression of slavery, in which he had been so far successful in his own province, and the improvement of communications, which he had long declared to be the one means by which that traffic could be effectually checked, were the two objects to which Gordon was to specially direct his aim.

Remembering his recent experiences, he was fully prepared for the condition of his new subjects. In his predecessor, Ismail Pasha Yacoub, he had already recognised the quintessence of Egyptian cupidity and Turkish misrule—the main cause of the people’s ruin. The experiences of the first months of his administration only served to confirm his worst fears; whithersoever he looked he saw an enlarged picture of native misery and destitution, of alien cruelty and oppression he had before witnessed. He saw that the Circassian Pashas, the Bashi-Bazouks, the Arab soldiery, the slave-hunters, were by their acts fast goading the people to revolt; that tribes which without their interference would have been at peace were now at war; that towns which under proper rule would have flourished were starving or besieged; and that the land, otherwise fertile, was a waste. On every hand he found caravans of packed slaves hungering and parching in the sun, far from their homes and far from their goal, unless that goal were death; deserts strewn with innumerable bones; armed bands of slave-hunters, dogged by the vulture-like dealers, waiting and watching for further prey; and over all these reigned the miscreant spirit of Zubair, the slave-king, now ostensibly a prisoner at Cairo for past deeds, but actually aiding and abetting this cruel war against man through his son Suleiman, the chief of his deserted band. To remove Zubair’s influence was as impossible of achievement as to cut off the demand for slaves at Cairo, Constantinople, or Stamboul; but to break up Suleiman and his band lay within Gordon’s grasp, and, as one of the main causes of trouble, he made it his foremost aim. How he did this by the simple power of his presence, and how Suleiman and his six thousand, after signal submission, again broke out into open revolt so soon as Gordon’s presence was required elsewhere, affords one of the most striking examples of the personal influence he had acquired. Alone and himself unarmed he had temporarily succeeded in disarming these rebels; but, this failing in permanent use, he effectually quelled them in battle; then, to show his people, his Government, and the world how great a wrong this slavery was, he ordered the summary execution of the ringleaders. “With the death of Zubair’s son,” he said, “there is an end of the slave-trade.” Never had the Government such a chance of preventing its renewal. He had disbanded the Bashi-Bazouks, he had dismissed the peculating Mudirs and Pashas; and when he left the country, after a three years’ reign, the people blessed him, and begged him to return.

Had he been allowed to act according to the letter and the spirit of the Firman he received, it is most probable that he would never this second time have resigned; but the overthrow of Ismail at Cairo and the dissolution of the Dual Control had with other changes brought new law-makers for the Soudan. Ismail, though in many respects an imprudent ruler, had at least the merit of believing in his English Governor-General, and of supporting him whenever it lay in his power. Gordon’s lonely ride into the slavers’ camp at Shaka had fired the ex-Khedive’s imagination, and it was observed that, whenever the Court Pashas attempted to criticise Gordon’s methods of rule, the Khedive referred them to this deed. Moreover, he openly acknowledged him as his superior, and fought his battles as those of one who was above the murmur of men. Gordon has, indeed, himself recorded how the Khedive sent him a congratulatory letter on the suppression of Suleiman, adding that during the time of his rule the ex-Khedive supported him through thick and thin against his own Pashas and his own people; and certain it is that to the files of petitions sent to him against Gordon he would never listen. But when Towfik was set up it was a different affair. Never was he heard to mention Zubair’s name. As for the slave-trade, it was equally ignored. Nay, worse than this, the Cairo Pashas, powerless in Ismail’s time, had now full sway, and it being in their interests that the slave-trade should revive, the choice of Gordon’s successor was settled among themselves. It fell to Réouf Pasha, a man whom Sir Samuel Baker had already exposed as a murderer, and whom Gordon had in 1877 turned out of Harrat for acts of oppression. The appointment, therefore, meant nothing more nor less than a declaration in favour of the slavers; and it was because Gordon feared this result that he had said six months before, viz., in April 1879, that “If the liberation of slaves takes place in 1884, and if the present system of government goes on, there cannot fail to be a revolt of the whole country.” And again he says in 1878, “There is no doubt that if the Government of France and England pay more attention to the Soudan and see that justice is done, the disruption of the Soudan from Cairo is only a matter of time. This disruption, moreover, will not end the troubles for the Soudanese, though their allies in Lower Egypt will carry on their efforts in Cairo itself.”[1]

How prophetic these words have since proved to be it is needless to say. In April 1880, just a year later, Gordon wrote, as he left for India:—

I have learned with equal pain and indignation that the Khedive and his subordinate officers have permitted the resuscitation of the slave-trade in Darfour and the other provinces of central and equatorial Africa, and that fresh parties of slave-hunters are forming at Obeyed in Kordofan, and that every order which I gave concerning the suppression of this abomination has been cancelled.

The two missionaries—Wilson and Felkin—who have lately come down from Uganda, passed through these districts, and they tell me that the slave-hunters are all ready to start once more upon their detestable trade, and that there is a very strong feeling abroad that all the Europeans, including of course Gessi and the other officers who acted under me, are about to be turned out of the country. This report, even if it be untrue, will largely serve to lower the authority of the European officers, and to render their work more difficult.

This news is very disheartening, especially when one realises the immense misery which will ensue to the remains of these poor tribes of helpless negroes.

The events which followed on these first examples of a wholesale perversion of Gordon’s methods have proved over and over again the value of his warning words; it is worthy of special remark that among the causes of the great rebellion which ensued, as interpreted by the English Government in their history and the insurrection of the False Prophet,[2] not the religious fanaticism of the native tribes has a foremost place, but the venality and oppression of by Egyptian officials, the unjust manner of collecting the taxes, and, above all, the suppression of the slave-trade, which Gordon had repeatedly said must lead to future troubles, unless accompanied by a proper system of government.

Thus the condition into which the Soudan drifted during Gordon’s absence was due to deliberate neglect of the precautions he had urged. Had the Egyptian Government watched and warded off the regeneration of the slavers after Gordon dealt his final blow in Suleiman’s death; had they set their face against the oppression and cupidity of their own officials, the Soudan might still have been at peace, as Gordon left it in 1879. But the new rulers were in favour of slavery, in favour of oppression, in favour of backsheesh; and “a revolt of the whole country” was their reward.

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It is needless to do more than briefly recall the events preceding those related by Gordon himself in these Journals. Every one remembers his going, and the triumph of his journey and reception in the Soudan; the wide welcome which his first Proclamation received, and the fortunes of the peace policy he at first endeavoured to pursue. Every one remembers how, before he had been in Kartoum a week, he issued a further Proclamation, warning the rebellious against forcing him to severe measures. The Sheikhs and people were anxious to be loyal; without Government protection they would be forced, in self-defence, to join the Mahdi. This Colonel Stewart had discovered in his journey up the White Nile. For this reason Zubair was asked for, the only man of enough prestige to hold the country together. A Pasha among the Shaggyeh irregulars, a tribe wavering between loyalty and revolt, and blockaded at Halfyeh, outside the city,—to him were open sources of information closed to the English Governor-General. Zubair would prove stronger than the Mahdi, and the Mahdi must be “smashed up;” otherwise, not only would peace and the evacuation of Kartoum be impossible, but Egypt itself would be in danger. This state of affairs and the measures necessary for a new departure being alike unacceptable to Her Majesty’s Government, Gordon thereupon used, as he had every right to do, the resources to his hand. His predictions as to what would result if Zubair were not sent up were soon realised. The rebels gradually gathered round the city, besieged its outlying suburbs, and cut the communications. His suffering subjects, unable to hold out, were either killed or, escaping, went over to the enemy. In some cases he managed to drive the rebels from the trenches of Kartoum, and even to relieve the beleagured villages, and return loaded with ammunition and stores; in others, his army of defence, composed largely of Egyptians and Bashi-Bazouks, encountered miserable defeat. These expeditions were made in small steamers, armoured with boiler plates and carrying mountain guns, with wooden mantlets of his own contriving. On one occasion the rebels so harassed the city that Gordon resolved on a sortie; but no sooner had the rebels retired to a place of safety than five of his own commanders charged back on their men and aided the rebels, who suddenly leaped from their hiding-place, driving the affrighted army back to Kartoum. In this treacherous and cowardly affair the loss on both sides was great; but the disgrace was the besiegers’, and of it they showed their sense by crying out for justice on the traitors. Two of them were tried and found guilty, and were shot by the men they had outraged. Henceforth the city was exposed to the attacks of the Mahdi’s troops; the streets, the Mission House, the Palace were hourly shelled; citizens died as they passed from end to end; but the Governor-General, always exposed as in old days, though daily inspecting the lines or pacing the Palace roof, escaped unhurt.

Meantime the strength of the rebellion grew with every day; the Mahdi, still at El Obeyed, had despatched his emissaries in all directions; around Suakin, Berber, Shendy, Kassala, the rebels rapidly recruited their ranks. The would-be loyal fell from sheer collapse; they were unable to help themselves. All chance of relief was gone, and the rebel leaders re-echoed in jeering tones the Governor-General’s reiterated words, “The English are coming.” Then Berber, the main link between Kartoum and Cairo, cried out for help, but like those at Tokar and those at Sinkat, it cried out in vain. To do as he pleased was the answer sent to its hitherto loyal Governor; and, to save his people and himself, he joined the Mahdi’s hordes. In his triumph, the False Prophet despatched two dervishes to Kartoum, to ask if Gordon would himself become a follower of the Imam, the Expected One; but they were told that no terms could be made while Kartoum held its ground.

All hope of a peace, all hope of aid from his own Government or country, being at an end, Gordon forthwith began to provision the town, and to take such steps as would ensure a safe means of defence and attack. Money was scarce, so a paper currency was established, and three of the wealthier citizens were called upon to advance sums on the Governor-General’s security. Their arrears were paid, the poor were succoured, and rations issued. All possible precautions were taken for the safety of the people. Mines were contrived, torpedoes laid, and broken glass and wire entanglements arranged, and watchers posted everywhere. The blacks quartered in the poorer district of the town were made to serve, and all men ordered to bear arms; the staple food of officers was biscuit, and dhoora was given the men. Having made all his arrangements on land, he now turned his attention to the Nile; and, as in the campaign against the Taipings, so in this desperate struggle with the Arabs, he organized out of the wretched materials at hand a fleet such as the rebels could not withstand. Thus he avenged defeat, drew in stores and guns, and held the enemy at bay. So that for eleven long months, spite of mutiny, cowardice and treachery within, and the constant attacks from the enemy without, he held his own; and to spare, out of the little navy he had built, a steamer for the conveyance of his comrades, Stewart, Power, Herbin, and the Greeks. Moreover, when at last the news of the English Expedition arrived, he was further able to send down three other boats to Metemma for their use. It is at this point, when vainly watching day and night for English help, that the Journals begin. How his time was passed till we should come, how he viewed our chances of success, and how he proposed to act if we at last did arrive—this is a story which the Journals tell themselves.

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I have endeavoured to show the conditions under which the people of the Soudan existed during Gordon’s absence and during his presence. The contrast is sufficient to enable the world to believe that if any man were capable of restoring order to the country, that man was Gordon. But when he left England for the Soudan as the Envoy of Her Majesty’s Government, he had no authority to act, for his mission was only to advise. He was to report to Her Majesty’s Government on the military situation in the Soudan, and on the measures which it might be deemed advisable to take for the security of the Egyptian garrisons still holding positions in that country, and for the safety of the European population in Kartoum; and, further, upon the manner in which the safety and good administration of the Egyptian Government of the ports on the sea coast could best be secured. So far then all action lay in the hands of the Government to which Gordon was to make his report: the administrators were to be Her Majesty’s Ministers and their representative at Cairo, while Gordon was to be their informant, and perhaps subsequently their agent, to carry out such measures as they might think fit to adopt. With this arrangement in view, all who knew Gordon’s character and antecedents felt that the only chance for the Soudan lay in Her Majesty’s Government first accepting such suggestions as he might append to his report, and, second, in their giving him carte blanche to carry out those suggestions in his own way. Little heed was paid to the clause which said, “You will consider yourself authorised and instructed to perform such other duties as the Egyptian Government may desire to entrust to you,” for its possible value seemed upset by the concluding sentence, “and as may be communicated to you by Sir E. Baring.” Yet this clause, strangely enough, enabled Gordon to hold a position over which even Her Majesty’s Government could have no control, unless they openly declared the annexation of Egypt and the Soudan. The Egyptian Government, that is the Khedive and his ministers, elected again to appoint Gordon Governor-General of the Soudan; Gordon elected to accept that appointment; and Her Majesty’s Government elected to sanction the acceptance, in an official communication forwarded to him through their representative, Sir E. Baring. From this moment Gordon’s position was entirely altered. Her Majesty’s Government and the Egyptian Government agreed that his mission was no longer to be one of mere reporting. He was to “evacuate the Soudan, and the Egyptian Government had the fullest confidence in his judgment and knowledge of the country, and of his comprehension of the general line of policy to be pursued; and no effort was to be wanting on the part of the Cairo authorities, whether English or Egyptian, to afford him all the co-operation and support in their power.”

When it became an established fact that General Gordon, Governor-General of the Soudan, had been sent up to evacuate the garrisons of the country, it also became an established fact that the method of conducting that evacuation had passed out of the hands of Her Majesty’s Government; and one may also say it had virtually passed out of the hands of the Egyptian Government while Gordon held the Firman of the Khedive. Therefore, as this Firman was never cancelled from the day of Gordon’s departure from Cairo to the day of his death at Kartoum, and as it said, amongst other things, “We do hereby appoint you Governor-General of the Soudan, and we trust that you will carry out our good intentions for the establishment of justice and order, and that you will assure the peace and prosperity of the people of Soudan by maintaining the security of the roads open, &c.,” it is as unfair as it is illogical to talk about “General Gordon having exceeded the instructions conveyed to him by Her Majesty’s Government.” These instructions were neither more nor less than those conveyed to him by the Khedive of Egypt, who actually delegated his own power to his Governor-General. To exceed his instructions was an impossibility; to fulfil or to disappoint all the hopes expressed in them was a possibility dependent solely on the good or bad faith of the Governments who employed him.

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The fact that Gordon held his commission in Her Majesty’s service and the Governor-Generalship of the Soudan at the same time, in no way compromised him with Her Majesty’s Government in regard to their wishes as to how this or that should be done, or as to how this or that should be left undone: yet he tried earnestly to identify himself with their wishes as far as in doing so he could keep faith with the people he was endeavouring to assist, and with whom he began to compromise himself. That he was justified in so doing there should be no shadow of doubt even in the minds of Mr. Gladstone’s ministry. The wishes of the Khedive were accepted by Gordon as the wishes of Her Majesty’s Government, and he had begun to act, i.e. to compromise himself with the Soudanese and the beleaguered garrisons before he reached Kartoum.

These are the Khedive’s wishes as expressed in a letter to Gordon, dated January 26th, 1884:—

Excellency,

You are aware that the object of your arrival here and of your mission to the Soudan is to carry into execution the evacuation of those territories, and to withdraw our troops, civil officials, and such of the inhabitants, together with their belongings, as may wish to leave for Egypt. We trust that your Excellency will adopt the most effective measures for the accomplishment of your mission in this respect, and that, after completing the evacuation, you will take the necessary steps for establishing an organised Government in the different provinces of the Soudan, for the maintenance of order, and the cessation of all disasters and incitement to revolt.

We have full confidence in your tried abilities and tact, and are convinced that you will accomplish your mission according to our desire.

The Khedive could hardly have written this letter had he imagined Lord Granville would telegraph three months later to Gordon, saying that “undertaking military expeditions was beyond the scope of the commission he held, and at variance with the pacific policy which was the purpose of his mission to the Soudan.”

Effective measures for the accomplishment of General Gordon’s mission included the possibility and great probability of serious fighting in the interest of a pacific policy, and it is strange if Lord Granville were unable to grasp that fact when he endorsed the Khedive’s Firman.

So far I have advanced only a few of the innumerable proofs of Gordon’s authority to act as he thought fit; as to his capabilities and his judgment it is unnecessary to speak. Of those who subsequently would not accept his judgment, one, Mr. Gladstone, said, “It was our duty, whatever we might feel, to beware of interfering with Gordon’s plans, and before we adopted any scheme that should bear that aspect (i.e. the aspect of interference), to ask whether in his judgment there would or would not be such an interference.” The other, Sir Charles Dilke, said, “He is better able to form a judgment than anybody. He will have, I make no doubt, every support he can need in the prosecution of his mission.”

Personally I do not believe that a single Cabinet Minister doubted Gordon’s authority to act as he thought fit, nor do I believe a single Cabinet Minister doubted either his capabilities or his judgment. It was only when the Government realised how strong that authority was; how significantly Gordon proposed to wield it, and how he meant to call upon his country to support him in what was right, irrespective of party feeling and of prejudiced public opinion, that references were made to “General Gordon’s peculiar views” and to “his disobedience of orders.” I would let the latter remark pass as unworthy of further comment, were it not for the fact that it has become a common phrase among the working classes in the North of England, when they are either speaking of or are spoken to about General Gordon. Now I sincerely trust and believe that the Journals will be read eagerly by the working classes; they cannot occupy their leisure time better than in reading them, and, indeed, in learning much of them by heart. I would say then, to these people, Do not believe that General Gordon was disobedient to his Government. His Government permitted him to accept the Khedive’s Firman, appointing him Governor-General of the Soudan, with full powers, civil and military, and the Khedive desired him to “evacuate the garrisons of the country, and to restore order;” and the way in which this was to be done was left to the discretion of the man who had to do it. I would also ask these people to note particularly that the Khedive did not tell him to evacuate the garrisons of Kartoum and leave the other garrisons in the lurch; did not tell him to sacrifice everything rather than engage in military operations against the Mahdi; did not tell him to identify his interests with those of the people and then to get away as best he could, and to leave the people to their fate. Had the Khedive told him to do this, he would never have accepted the Governor-Generalship of the Soudan; and, when his own Government suggested this method as a way out of difficulties, the substance of his numerous replies was, “Our relative positions do not justify you in giving me such orders. I can only accept them as your wishes; and the duty I owe to myself, as a God-fearing and an honourable man, prevents me being able to comply with them.”

When Gordon telegraphed to Sir E. Baring, “You must see that you could not recall me nor could I possibly obey until the Cairo employés get out from all the places. I have named men to different places, thus involving them with the Mahdi; how could I look the world in the face if I abandoned them and fled? As a gentleman could you advise this course?” he really telegraphed a bitter rebuke to the English Government; and when he added, “It may have been a mistake to send me up, but, having been done, I have no option but to see evacuation through,” he merely pointed out, what the Government already knew, namely, that the position they had allowed him to accept was one over which they had no legal control, unless they announced the annexation of Egypt. I, therefore, again most emphatically repeat, that Gordon in no instance disobeyed his Government, though he frequently had to tell them how utterly unable he was to execute their wishes. The Governor-General of the Soudan had definite orders from the Khedive, whose servant he was, and these orders could not be capsized by the English Government, unless the Khedive were deposed or Egypt were annexed.

I cannot conclude this portion of my subject in a better way than by quoting what the Khedive said to Baron Malortie, after he had appointed Gordon Governor-General of the Soudan. Speaking of his mission, he remarked:—

I could not give a better proof of my intention than by accepting Gordon as Governor-General with full powers to take whatever steps he may judge best for obtaining the end my Government and Her Majesty’s Government have in view. I could not do more than delegate to Gordon my own power and make him irresponsible arbiter of the situation. Whatever he does will be well done, whatever arrangements he will make are accepted in advance, whatever combination he may decide upon will be binding for us; and in thus placing unlimited trust in the Pasha’s judgment I have only made one condition: that he should provide for the safely of the Europeans and the Egyptian civilian element. He is now the supreme master, and my best wishes accompany him on a mission of such gravity and importance, for my heart aches at the thought of the thousands of loyal adherents whom a false step may doom to destruction. I have no doubt that Gordon Pasha will do his best to sacrifice as few as possible; and, should he succeed, with God’s help, in accomplishing the evacuation of Kartoum and the chief ports in the Eastern Soudan, he will be entitled to the everlasting gratitude of my people, who at present tremble that help may come too late. To tell you that he will succeed is more than I or any mortal could prognosticate, for there are tremendous odds against him. But let us hope for the best, and, as far as I and my Government are concerned, he shall find the most loyal and energetic support.[3]

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The points I have already dwelt upon are all-important for the correct interpretation of what Gordon says in his Journals. There are now two other questions, with which I must deal. The first of these is “To what extent were H.M. Government morally bound to support Gordon?” The answer is to be found in the conditions laid down in the Khedive’s Firman, which H.M. Government endorsed. Mr. Gladstone admitted as much in the House of Commons on Feb. 14th, when he said: “The direct actions and direct functions in which General Gordon is immediately connected with this Government are, I think, pretty much absorbed in the greater duties of the large mission he has undertaken under the immediate authority of the Egyptian Government, with the full moral and political responsibility of the British Government.” Therefore we owed the same kind of responsibility to Gordon as it owed to Egypt, moral and political. Gordon shows in his Journals what brought about our responsibility to Egypt. First, we were morally to blame for General Hicks’s defeat, for had we prevented the Fellaheen conscripts being dragged in chains from their homes, and sent up to recruit Hicks’s army, Hicks would not have left Kartoum, and his troops would not have been annihilated. Through this disaster we became morally responsible for the extended influence of the Mahdi, who, previous to crushing a huge army, had merely defeated small detachments of troops far inferior to his own. It was the crushing of Hicks’s force which led the Mahdi to put forth his agents in all parts of the Soudan, and thus to convert a trumpery local rising into a wide-spreading rebellion. So much for our responsibility from a moral point of view. Our political responsibility began with the order to abandon the Soudan (which was unnecessary interference on our part, inasmuch as the Soudan was practically lost), and was followed up by our objection to the despatch of Egyptian or Turkish troops, our sending Gordon, and our operations for the relief of Tokar and Sinkat. Right through we forced the hand of the Khedive. Why did we not go one step further and force him to cancel the Firman by which he appointed Gordon Governor-General of the Soudan? Had we done this, Gordon would have reverted to his original position as reporter to Her Majesty’s Government, or he could have endeavoured to leave Kartoum at once, as his responsibilities towards the people of the Soudan would have ceased. Until we did this we were as responsible to him, morally and politically, as we were to the Egyptian Government. A little decision here might have spared to us Gordon, Colonel Stewart, and Mr. Power; might have prevented the loss of thousands of other lives; might have saved us millions of money.

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I am only endeavouring to place Gordon’s situation and action in a fair light, and I cannot do this without pointing out how greatly England has been to blame in not accepting a responsibility for which she made herself liable. This brings me directly to the second question, which deals with the reason why Gordon, with the promised support of Egypt and England, failed not only to restore order to the Soudan, but even to extricate the beleaguered garrisons. Volumes have been already written on this subject, and there are probably volumes yet to come, particularly those representing that Journal by Gordon and Colonel Stewart, which was captured by a treacherous enemy, and is now supposed to be in the hands of Mahomet Achmet, the Mahdi. I will content myself then with an endeavour to supply what I feel is the substance of the answer to be found, in this missing Journal, to the question I have raised. Gordon was constantly thwarted and never supported is the summary of a whole which I will give in detail as briefly as I can.

(1) Gordon wished to visit the Mahdi if he thought fit, but Sir E. Baring gave him a positive order from Her Majesty’s Government that he was on no account to do so. Of course, as I have already shown, Gordon, in his position as Governor-General, need not have accepted this as an order, but he was, as he always has been, most anxious to conform to the wishes or desires expressed by Her Majesty’s Government, when those wishes affected only a point of judgment, and not a point of duty or a point of honour.

(2) Gordon proposed to go direct from Kartoum to the Bahr Gazelle and Equatorial Provinces, but Her Majesty’s Government refused to sanction his proceeding beyond Kartoum.

(3) Gordon desired 3000 Turkish troops, in British pay, to be sent to Suakin, but Her Majesty’s Government, advised by Sir E. Baring, who disapproved of the measure, declined to send these troops.

(4) Gordon, being convinced that some government was essential for the safety of the Soudan, suggested the appointment of Zubair as his successor, and gave the most cogent reasons why it was absolutely necessary for the accomplishment of his mission that the appointment should be made. He reiterated his request over and over again from February to December. Her Majesty’s Government would not permit the Khedive to make this appointment.

(5) Gordon requested that in the interests of England, Egypt, and the Soudan, he should be provided with a Firman which recognised a moral control and suzerainty over the Soudan. This was peremptorily refused.

(6) Gordon asked for Indian Moslem troops to be sent to Wady Halfa. They were refused him.

(7) In March Gordon desired 100 British troops to be sent to Assouan or to Wady Halfa. In making known this desire to Her Majesty’s Government, Sir E. Baring said he would not risk sending so small a body, and the principal medical officer said the climate would exercise an injurious effect on the troops. These troops were not sent.

(8) Gordon, for the sake of everything and everybody concerned, showed that the Mahdi’s power must be smashed. Her Majesty’s Government declined to assist in, or even to countenance, the process.

(9) Gordon, in a series of eleven telegrams, explained his difficulties, and said that if Her Majesty’s Government would not send British troops to Wady Halfa, an adjutant to inspect Dongola, and then open up the Berber-Suakin route by Indian Moslem troops, they would probably have to decide between Zubair or the Mahdi, and he concluded these telegrams by saying he would do his best to carry out his instructions, but felt convinced he would be caught in Kartoum. Sir Evelyn Baring, in his reply to these telegrams, recommended Gordon to reconsider the whole question carefully, and then to state in one telegram what he recommended!

(10) Gordon telegraphed: “The combination of Zubair and myself is an absolute necessity for success. To do any good we must be together, and that without delay;” and he supplemented this by another telegram, saying: “Believe me, I am right; and do not delay.” The combination was not permitted.

(11) Sir Evelyn Baring telegraphed to Lord Granville that General Gordon had on several occasions pressed for 200 British troops to be sent to Wady Halfa, but that he (Baring) did not think it desirable to comply with the request.

(12) Gordon desired a British diversion at Berber, but Sir Evelyn Baring replied that there was no intention to send an English force to Berber.

(13) Gordon, foiled on every point, telegraphed a graceful adieu to Her Majesty’s Government. Then came the fall of Berber, upon which Sir Evelyn Baring at once telegraphed to Lord Granville that it had now become of the utmost importance not only to open the road between Suakin and Berber, but “to come to terms with the tribes between Berber and Kartoum”; and Lord Granville telegraphed to Sir E. Baring that “General Gordon had several times suggested a movement on Wady Halfa, which might support him by threatening an advance on Dongola, and, under the present circumstances at Berber, this might be found advantageous.”!!

After this, may we not well echo Gordon’s sentiments, “What a farce if it did not deal with men’s lives”? If Gordon, instead of being thwarted, had only been not supported, how different might have been the result of his mission to the Soudan! Indeed, one may say how different would have been the result! for Gordon has practically said this, and he was a competent and a reliable judge. If England and Egypt had only said, “We will give you no help at all; do what you can with the material you have about you, and do not refer to us until you have succeeded, or until you have failed,” I confidently believe Gordon would have at least relieved the beleaguered garrisons of the Soudan, and would have sent down all who wished to leave the country. His weakness was that of trustfulness—the besetting weakness of an honourable man: it had stood him in good stead through his campaigns in China, and through his previous operations in the Soudan; through terrible sufferings which had often made him wish for death. Then he trusted enemies, and they always enabled him to save life. Now he trusted friends, and they only enabled him to die.

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“The evil that men do lives after them,
The good is oft interred with their bones.”

Gordon tells us plainly in his Journals how great is the evil done by the policy of Her Majesty’s Government, and for how long that evil will live when the Government is dead. Is it not possible to avert something of what is about to happen? Her Majesty’s Government are, I believe, beginning to realise how thoroughly correct Gordon was in his views, and how mistaken they were in not following his advice at the time he gave it. At all events after he was dead they expressed their intention of doing much he recommended while he lived. They have been always very late: too late to save Gordon’s life, and too late to save the lives of many thousands. May they not be yet in time to prevent some of the evil that must live after them? I think Gordon tells them in his Journals they may, and I think he also tells them how. It is impossible to read carefully what he says without feeling that he did not expect to live long, and that he had a distinct presentiment he would die at Kartoum. At all events there is a strong undercurrent of this presentiment all through, and it even rises to the surface every now and then when he appears to be taking a hopeful and almost a cheerful view of the situation. At times it carries all before it, as for example when he emphasises the possibility of the fall of Kartoum under the nose of the expedition, and again in the words with which he concludes his sixth and last volume; but then, on the other hand, it is often quite out of sight, especially at such times as he is discussing his position as Governor-General, and turning over in his mind the expediency of appointing Lord Wolseley or Sir Evelyn Baring as his successor. But, whether on the surface or deep down, I think it is always there, and I feel sure that some of his numerous efforts at a solution of the Soudan problem were intended as final instructions for Her Majesty’s Government, to be read after his death or after the fall of Kartoum. The days of prophecy are gone, and I do not at all wish to place Gordon in the light of the ancient orthodox and professional seer, but in considering his career one cannot avoid being struck by the remarkable way in which the lost gift of prophecy has been replaced by the power of combining knowledge with judgment. It would be well if Her Majesty’s Government would bear this in mind, and lay down a distinct line of policy and action with regard to the Soudan, which should be based upon what Gordon recommends. The recall of the troops from the Soudan may have been necessary to meet the exigencies of the moment, or it may not; but it is a pity it did not precede Lord Wolseley’s letter to Cassim el Mousse Pasha:—

We mean to destroy the power of Mohammed Achmet at Kartoum, no matter how long it may take us to do so; you know Gordon Pasha’s countrymen are not likely to turn back from any enterprise they have begun until it has been fully accomplished. When that happy event takes place I hope to be able to establish you amongst your own people, and that you and all others will realise that the English nation does not forget those who serve it faithfully.[4]

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General Gordon’s Journals are sufficiently characteristic to enable those who read them with care to know their author perfectly. The first volume is alone a very complete introduction, in which each succeeding page brings you to a closer intimacy. If a friendship is not established before reaching the sixth, then all that is noble and chivalrous in man can have no charm. Examples of his rare genius, his nobility, his honesty and his marvellous energy are to be found throughout, but, in pointing out a few characteristics, I will confine myself to the first volume, as I propose to refer chiefly to special points of military and political interest in the others.

In this first volume then we have an interesting instance of Gordon’s nobility, when he declines to have anything to do with certain doubtful proposals made by the apostate Europeans in the Mahdi’s camp, for he declares “treachery never succeeds; and it is better to fail with clean hands than to be mixed up with dubious acts and dubious men. Maybe it is better to fall with honour than to gain the victory with dishonour, and in this view the Ulemas are agreed, for they will have nought to do with the proposals of treachery.”

The generosity of his feeling towards the enemy is shown when he says: “I do not call our enemy rebels, for it is a vexed question whether we are not rebels, seeing I hold the Firman restoring the Soudan to its chiefs.” His consideration is apparent in his regret at not being more considerate; and his tolerance in the desire to spare even the lives of traitors.

His views on hypocrisy are humorously expressed when he is speaking of the Mahdi’s trick of bringing tears to his eyes by the use of pepper under his finger-nails, and, as tears are considered a proof of sincerity, he recommends the recipe to Cabinet Ministers who wish to justify some job.

His severity is evident in his remarks on diplomatists, whom he considers most unsatisfactory men to have anything to do with in their official capacity; and his irritability peeps out when he says: “Egerton must have considered I was a complete idiot to have needed permission to contract with tribes to escort down the refugees. I hope he will get promoted, and will not be blamed for overstraining his instructions.”

His religious earnestness is everywhere apparent, and he delights in endeavours to interpret Scriptural passages, especially such as are more or less paradoxical.

As example of his humility I select the passage where he says: “If we will be with our Master we must be like Him, who from His birth to His death may be said to have been utterly miserable as far as things in this world are concerned. Yet I kick at the least obstacle to my will.” His desire to help every one is to be seen on almost every page, and his forethought, energy and judgment are also everywhere. His notions of chivalry do not permit him to countenance the distribution of honours to men who only do what he considers to be their duty, and he does not approve of the Victoria Cross being given in cases of noblesse oblige.

His determination often prompts him to speak very plainly: “If you remove me from being Governor-General, then all responsibility is off me; but if you keep me as Governor-General then I will, at the cost of my commission in Her Majesty’s service, see all refugees out of this country.” His satire is generally severe, but there is nearly always a cheerful or a good-natured ring in it. The following is a fair example:—

I am sure I should like that fellow Egerton; there is a big-hearted jocularity about his communications, and I should think the cares of life sat easily on him. He wishes to know exactly, “day, hour, and minute,” that I expect to be in difficulties as to provisions and ammunition.

Now I really think if Egerton was to turn over the “archives” (a delicious word) of his office, he would see we had been in difficulties for provisions for some months. It is as a man on the bank, having seen his friend in river already bobbed down two or three times, hails, “I say, old fellow, let us know when we are to throw you the life-buoy; I know you have bobbed down two or three times, but it is a pity to throw you the life-buoy until you really are in extremis, and I want to know exactly, for I am a man brought up in a school of exactitude, though I did forget (?) to date my June telegram about that Bedouin escort contract.”

He is a strict disciplinarian, and never hesitates to rebuke laxness in others. “If Abdel Kader is at Kassala,”[5] he says, “what on earth are our people about not to tell me! for of course I could help him. We seem to have lost our heads in the Intelligence Department, though it costs enough money.”

His bluntness and honesty are often combined with subtle humour, and an excellent notion of all three may be gathered from the last words in this volume of the Journals:—

As for “evacuation” it is one thing; as for “ratting out” it is another. I am quite of advice as to No. 1 (as we have not the decision to keep the country), but I will be no party to No. 2 (this “rat” business), 1st, because it is dishonourable; 2nd, because it is not possible (which will have more weight); therefore, if it is going to be No. 2, the troops had better not come beyond Berber till the question of what will be done is settled.

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The interest of the second volume is great from a military point of view, but its value is somewhat lessened by the fact that Gordon’s instructions and suggestions were based on the assumption that the relieving force would reach him some two months earlier than it did. During those two months the conditions around Kartoum materially changed, and with these altering conditions Gordon had to reconsider many of the manœuvres he at first suggested. The political interest chiefly consists in the strong recommendation that the country should be given to the Turks, or that Zubair should be established as Governor-General at Kartoum, and that the Equator should be given to himself. “I will (d.v.) keep it,” he says, “from Zubair;” that is to say, he will guard the country against all slave-hunters. In this volume Gordon declines the imputation that the Expeditionary Force has come for him, and shows how, to save our national honour, it has come to extricate the garrisons of the Soudan. Of the troubles these garrisons were causing him we get a fair notion, but his complaints seem to be only a safety-valve for his humour. He knows the men about him are treacherous and liars, but he almost seeks excuse for them when he says: “Man is essentially a treacherous animal; and although the Psalmist said in his haste ‘all men are liars,’ I think he might have said the same at his leisure.” This volume concludes with a new effort to solve the Soudan problem by suggesting the Khedive should replace him at once by appointing Abdel Kader Governor-General.

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This solution is fully discussed in the opening of Vol. III. It is not one in which Gordon will participate, but it may prevent his being antagonistic to the relieving force. Unless he is deposed nothing will induce him to leave the Soudan until he can extricate the garrisons. In removing him from the Governor-Generalship and in replacing him by Abdel Kader, the Government would be utilising a man whom they could mould to their own shape. Of course this solution was, as Gordon says, in some degree “a trap,” but it recommended itself as the only way out of the difficulty, if the Government decided to abandon the garrisons.

The only creditable solution, Gordon still affirms, is to be found in handing the country over to the Turks with a subsidy or a sum down; and he supplements his argument by a programme showing how by this action Her Majesty’s troops could leave the Soudan with honour before January 1885. “I think this would read well in history,” he says. “Her Majesty’s Government, having accepted duties in Egypt, and consequently in the Soudan, sent up a force to restore tranquillity, which having been done, Her Majesty’s Government handed over the government of the Soudan to the Sultan.” The necessity for this solution is the result, in Gordon’s opinion, of the indecisions of Her Majesty’s Government, and he enumerates with great care the causes which have hampered his action and thus required the despatch of a relieving force. This volume is perhaps more cheerful in its tone than any of the others. The presentiment that the expedition will be too late to prevent disaster is rarely evident, and the advance of the Mahdi promises to decide, at all events, the fate of those who are shut up in Kartoum. “A month will see him defeated or victorious, as God may will it,” and with this philosophical consolation Gordon ceases to discuss the future of the Soudan, and begins an interesting detailed account of the offensive and defensive manœuvres which are taking place in and around Kartoum.

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In the fourth volume—the shortest of all—Gordon continues his narrative of events, and shows how numerous and how wearisome are the internal troubles with which he has to contend at Kartoum. Treachery is silently at work, while indolence, selfishness, and dishonesty make those who are not treacherous almost useless. He is the referee of every petty dispute, as much as he is chief justice, administrator, and commander-in-chief. The people demand his decision on every point, political or personal, and wish to leave it to him to do or not to do, irrespective of his knowing anything of the merits of the case they bring before him. His counsellers say: “Do what you think right, you will do better than we;” and his reflection is, “I, poor devil, do not know where to turn.” Then in sorrow he exclaims, “Oh, our Government, our Government! What has it not to answer for? Not to me, but to these poor people. I declare if I thought the town wished the Mahdi I would give it up: so much do I respect free will.” It is doubtless these internal troubles which lead him to say: “It is of course on the cards that Kartoum is taken under the nose of the Expeditionary Force, which will be just too late.”

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In Vol. V., which begins on the first day of the Arab New Year, the arrival of the Mahdi at Omdurman is reported. The treachery referred to in the previous volume had led General Gordon to make numerous arrests—a necessity he deplored; but these arrests in all probability saved the fall of Kartoum on October 21st, for the Mahdi had evidently speculated on either a rising in the town on that day, or on the gates being opened to him by some of those who were then imprisoned. On this day Gordon also received the news of the treaty concluded between King John of Abyssinia and Admiral Sir William Hewitt, and his anger at the injustice of such a treaty is as apparent as is the bitterness of his satire: throughout the whole volume, indeed, he cannot get away from this subject, and, though the frequent effort to dismiss it in disgust from his mind is evident, he continually reverts to it. He considers it discreditable, and does not hesitate to say so. Moreover, he contends that by the Treaty of Paris, and also by that of Berlin, the integrity of the Ottoman Dominion is guaranteed by the Powers, and that it is therefore a farce to say Egypt ceded Kassala.

His views on the whole policy of Her Majesty’s Government are summed up in an imaginary scene in the House of Lords. “The noble Marquis asked what the policy of Her Majesty’s Government was? It was as if he asked the policy of a log floating down stream—it was going to sea, as any one with an ounce of brains could see. Well, that was the policy of it, only it was a decided policy, and a straightforward one to drift along and take advantage of every circumstance. His lordship deprecated the frequent questioning on subjects which his lordship had said he knew nothing about, and, further, did not care to know anything about.”

Fielding, had he been alive, would have envied Gordon the completeness of this humorous satire. The results of the policy, as far as it has gone, he shows to have been the loss of some 80,000 lives and the effectual restoration of the slave-trade and of slave-hunting: “a miserable end to diplomacy when it would have been so easy in 1880 to have settled the Soudan with decency and quiet, giving up Kordofan, Darfur, the Bahr Gazelle, and the Equator.”

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In the latter part of Vol. V., but especially in the early part of Vol. VI., Gordon fully realises the Abbas catastrophe. He knows Stewart and Power are dead. There is no expression of personal regret, though he is “sorry for their friends.” He loved them both, and he pays the highest tribute he can to their merits; but he is sure that in their present they are happier than in their past. Moreover, he had done his best, for every precaution human foresight could conceive he had taken; having done this, the rest was in the hands of God, and the disaster was “ordained.” But these views do not prevent him from courting all inquiry; and he even holds a court-martial on himself. His verdict is, that if the Abbas was attacked and overpowered, he is to blame; but that if she was captured by treachery, or if she struck a rock, he is not to blame. In the one case he should have foreseen the chance, and prevented her going; in the others he could foresee nothing. It was out of his power to avert treachery; and the Abbas drew under two feet of water, and was accompanied by two sailing boats.

He explains with care and clearness why Stewart and Power left him; they went of their free will, not by his order; for he would not “put them in any danger in which he was not himself.” If they went they did him a service, for they could telegraph his views; if they stayed, they could not help him. They could go in honour, for they had promised the people nothing; he could not go in honour, for he had promised them himself. If Gordon were alive, and thought any one could misinterpret what he says, and thus cast a slur on the memory of either Stewart or Power, he would be greatly pained. His love and admiration for them both was evident; and he knew that, had it been their duty to remain, they would have stayed to die with him at Kartoum. “If Zubair had been sent in March, when I asked for him, we would not have lost Berber, and would never have wanted an expedition;” and, if Berber had not fallen, Stewart and Power would have been alive. Zubair had been his almost first request, and he never ceases to regret that one who had devoted his life to the Soudan should not have been allowed to comprehend its requirements better than those who sat in Downing Street.

Within a week of beginning this volume of his Journal, Gordon expected the town of Kartoum to fall; the recovery of an enormous quantity of stolen biscuit enabled him to hold his own for more than another month. During this time a notion of his troubles may be gathered from what he says up to December 14th; his real suffering must for ever remain unknown. That it depended upon the suffering of others we may feel assured; he never knew what it was to feel for himself. He felt for his country; he felt for all he tried to help, and if he was among such as were killed first, his dying thought would have been, “What is to be the future of all I leave behind?”

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In his Journals—his last words—those familiar with his character and life will see Charles Gordon true to himself to the very end. They will see in him the same ardent passion for justice and for truth; the same scorn for wrong-doing and deceit; the same gentle pity for the sufferings of all, and the same mercy and forgiveness for his foes: and with all this is combined the perfection of humility, and the sense of imperfection. There is no impatience, save with those who wronged his honour and the poor people for whom he died; there is no unrest, for he neared that “life of action” for which he had long yearned; there is no sorrow, no dark doubt, for Charles Gordon was with his God.

A. Egmont Hake.

[GENERAL GORDON’S POSITION AT KARTOUM.]

Only a very few words on my part are necessary in laying these Journals before the public.

On New Year’s Day, 1884, General Gordon arrived at Brussels from the Holy Land, and at once commenced his arrangements with His Majesty the King of the Belgians to proceed to the Congo.

After visiting England once or twice, he left this country for Belgium and the Congo on the morning of the 16th January.

On the 17th January he was recalled by telegram. He reached London on the morning of the 18th, and was on his road to Kartoum upon that evening.

At this time, he felt quite confident of success, his instructions being that, by restoring the ancient families, whose territories had been seized by the Egyptian authorities, to their former power, he would be able to extricate the Egyptian garrisons and civil employés with their families, and remove them to Lower Egypt without difficulty.

During the voyage, however, from Brindisi to Port Said he prepared a Report, or Memorandum, dated 22nd January, in which, reviewing these instructions, he drew attention to some of the difficulties and complications which were likely to arise in carrying out the policy of Her Majesty’s Government, and asked for their support and consideration in case of his being unable to fulfil their expectations with exactness; and Colonel Stewart, in his separate observations of the same date, pointed out that, in view of eventualities for which it would be impossible to provide, the wisest course was “to rely on the discretion of General Gordon and his knowledge of the country.”

General Gordon, it will be seen, accepted—and disclaimed the right to express any opinion of his own upon it—the policy of leaving the Soudan. It appeared to him then that to reconquer that country and restore it to the Egyptian Government without securities for a just and honest administration would be iniquitous; that, on the other hand, to secure that object would involve an expenditure of time and money which could not be afforded, and consequently he then came to the conclusion that the Soudan might properly be restored to independence, and left to itself.

It will be seen, however, that he did not, after his return to the Soudan, remain long of that opinion. His heart warmed at once to the people whom he had faithfully governed, and whose affections he found, or at all events believed, were constant to him.

It is necessary here to explain that General Gordon had not intended to go to Cairo, but to proceed viâ Suakin and Berber. On the invitation, however, of Sir Evelyn Baring, he went to Cairo and accepted at the hands of the Khedive a firman appointing him Governor-General of the Soudan, without which he could have exercised no control over the Egyptian authorities employed in that province.

It was no part of General Gordon’s character to form a definite opinion from imperfectly known facts, and to adhere obstinately to that opinion, notwithstanding the evidence of altered circumstances and new elements.

We need not therefore be surprised to find that, on arrival at Abu Hamed, on the 8th February, finding the state of the country to be less disorganised than he had supposed, and adverting to the confusion which must ensue if all traces of the Khedive’s Government were suddenly effaced, he made the suggestion that a sort of suzerainty should be kept up, and that the chief officers of the Soudan should continue to be appointed by the Khedive, a complete and abrupt separation being thus postponed, although the control to be retained would be more nominal than real.

This feeling in General Gordon’s mind grew rapidly stronger as time went on. When he reached Berber he saw still more clearly the position he was in, and became impressed with the impossibility of carrying out his mission with credit, unless he was able to secure to the provinces of the Soudan some sort of government in the place of the one it was intended to withdraw.

Accordingly, upon the day of his arrival at Kartoum (the 18th February), General Gordon, after pointing out to the Government the difficulties that surrounded him, inasmuch as the garrisons and employés were to be removed, when all form of government would disappear, urged in the strongest terms he could employ that power should be placed in the hands of a single man, and that the man to be chosen should be Zubair Pasha.

Now it may be remarked that although Zubair was one of the most noted slave-hunters that had ever existed, yet his ability and influence could not be surpassed, while even the Khedive could not lay claim to any such proud descent—Zubair being a direct descendant of the Abbassides.

This recommendation was rejected by the Government although renewed over and over again in a most persistent manner by General Gordon, backed up by Sir Evelyn Baring, who, on the 9th March, says: “I believe that Zubair Pasha may be made a bulwark against the approach of the Mahdi. Of course there is a certain risk that he will constitute a danger to Egypt, but this risk is, I think, a small one; and it is in any case preferable to incur it rather than to face the certain disadvantages of withdrawing without making any provision for the future government of the country, which would thus be sure to fall under the power of the Mahdi.”

I must admit that, up to the end of July, I was of opinion that if Zubair had been sent up General Gordon’s life would have been in danger. On the other hand, I am aware that a Cabinet Minister of high position was, from the first, in favour of sending Zubair up, and so indeed was Lord Wolseley.

At the beginning of August, General Gordon, having again begged that Zubair might be sent to Kartoum, I used my endeavours to secure the attainment of that object, but without success. It was now apparent that General Gordon could not in honour leave until some form of future government had been determined upon.

Zubair’s appointment having been disallowed, the only alternative seemed to be the Turks, and the suggestion was made that they should occupy the Soudan. Anything, in fact, to secure the country against anarchy and its reversion to barbarism.

In must be borne in mind General Gordon did not ask that an expedition should be sent; on the contrary, he deprecated sending any, unless for the purpose of saving the garrisons and of establishing some form of government.

The proposed movement of two squadrons of cavalry from Suakin to Berber is outside the question. It was to save Berber they were applied for, not for the relief of Kartoum. General Gordon’s message was, “Send troops (200) to Berber, or you will lose it!” It is fair to Sir Evelyn Baring, to add that on the 24th March he said, “Under present circumstances I think an effort should be made to help General Gordon from Suakin, if it is at all a possible operation.”

If General Gordon had known how much in unison Sir Evelyn Baring’s advice had been with his own, and what support he had received at Sir Evelyn’s hands, he would have been eager, had his life been spared, to acknowledge that co-operation.

Before concluding, I must say a few words with respect to the severe comments which occur in places throughout the Diaries, upon the meagre information he received from the Intelligence Department,[6] in connection with which the names of Major Chermside and Major Kitchener are mentioned. Now, with regard to the former of these officers, he was at Suakin, and therefore does not come into the question. With respect, however, to Major Kitchener, I am persuaded that he did all in his power to get messengers into Kartoum, for just in the same way General Gordon fancied he got them out, and yet how few succeeded in reaching their destination. In the same way too as General Gordon fancied his messengers had reached, so did Mr. Egerton fancy his had been successful, for at the end of July he hinted that General Gordon could have sent messengers out, in the same way as others had got in, and yet at that date only one had done so. It is due to Major Kitchener to say that from the time he went to Dongola he certainly kept us acquainted with the position of affairs at Kartoum in a manner most reliable, and deserving of much credit.

With these prefatory remarks I leave my brother’s Journals to speak for themselves. He shows, to my mind, with the utmost clearness the position in which he was placed, and reiterates over and over again that nothing will induce him to leave Kartoum until he has secured the safety of all those who have stood by him. He says, “I will end these egotistical remarks by saying that no persuasion will induce me to change my views; and that, as to force, it is out of the question, for I have the people with me, at any rate, of the towns which hold out; therefore, if Her Majesty’s forces are not prepared to relieve the whole of the garrisons, the General should consider whether it is worth coming up. In his place, if not so prepared, I would not do so. I do not dictate; but I say, what every gentleman in Her Majesty’s army would agree to, that it would be mean to leave men, who (though they may not come up to our ideas as heroes) have stuck to me, though a Christian dog in their eyes, through great difficulties, and thus force them to surrender to those who have not conquered them, and to do that at the bidding of a foreign Power to save one’s own skin. Why, the black sluts would stone me if they thought I meditated such action.”

Up to the 14th December General Gordon could have got away at any time, had he been so inclined; in fact, he says, “As for myself, I could make good my retreat at any moment I wished.” After that date we know nothing. No doubt Omdurman fell at once, and in all probability the Island of Tuti followed soon after. General Gordon must then have seen that no relief could reach him, provisions were rapidly running out, treachery, as he well knew, was at work, and the end came.

He writes to his sister on the 14th December: “God rules all; and as God will rule to His glory and our welfare, His will be done. I am quite happy, and, like Lawrence, have tried to do my duty.”

In conclusion, I will add in General Gordon’s own words, “It is, of course, on the cards that Kartoum is taken under the nose of the Expeditionary Force, which will be just too late. The Expeditionary Force will perhaps think it necessary to retake it; but that will be no use, and will cause loss of life uselessly on both sides. It had far better quietly return with its tail between its legs; for, once Kartoum is taken, the sun will have set and the people will not care much for the satellites. If Kartoum falls, then go quietly back to Cairo, for you will only lose men and spend money uselessly in carrying on the campaign.”

H. W. Gordon.

[THE MISSION OF COLONEL SIR CHARLES WILSON,
R.E., K.C.M.G.]

Very severe criticisms have been made upon the manner in which Sir Charles Wilson carried out the duties that had been entrusted to him, with regard to communicating with General Gordon at Kartoum.

The charges made against him may be with advantage restricted to two:—

First—The delay in not proceeding to Kartoum at the latest on the morning of the 22nd; and

Second—In not having pushed on to Kartoum itself in order to ascertain General Gordon’s fate beyond a doubt.

Sir Charles Wilson left England in order to assume the position of Head of the Intelligence Department, and also with the tacit understanding that he was to be specially employed in order to open direct communication with General Gordon.

Having this special object in view, Sir Charles Wilson accompanied Sir Herbert Stewart’s force towards the Nile; and, when that gallant and highly-distinguished officer was wounded on the 19th January, he found himself in command.

Now this force, which did not equal a British battalion upon its war strength, was hampered with a number of wounded officers and men, some of whom were with it, while others—the bulk—were in a zereba constructed at some distance in its rear.

Sir Charles Wilson, however, advanced to the Nile, where he bivouacked for the night; and on the morning of the 20th he returned to the zereba, and brought back with him to Gubat the wounded who had been left behind.

Early in the morning of the 21st, General Gordon’s steamers appeared, and landed their soldiers, who took part in the operations of that day.

Reports now reached Sir Charles Wilson that, exclusive of the Arabs in Metemma, large numbers were advancing from the North and from the South. It therefore became imperatively necessary for him to secure the safety of those who were under his orders before he could proceed upon his mission.

Accordingly, on the morning of the 22nd, he made a reconnaissance towards the North, and, finding no enemy, he turned his attention to the South.

The whole of the 23rd was occupied in making arrangements for the proper protection of his force, and he could not have left before the morning of the 24th.

It may here be observed, in confirmation of the report of the Arabs advancing from the south, that Sir Charles Wilson, on his road to Kartoum, saw a body of men at a place on the left bank of the Nile, about twelve miles south of Gubat.

It is really beyond the question to consider what General Gordon’s position at this time was at Kartoum. When General Gordon sent down his last journal, on the 14th December, he stated he could not hold out for more than ten days, and he was in daily expectation that the Fort at Omdurman would fall; while even then, with that Fort in his possession, he considered it would be very hazardous for any steamer to attempt to come up to Kartoum. On the 28th November he says: “I hope the officer in command will clear Halfeyeh before he pushes on to this, for he may get a shell from the works at Omdurman (not the Fort) into one of his steamers. I do not like to risk sending the Bordeen steamer down to give the warning. If the steamers do come up, and have not the sense to stop at Halfeyeh, I shall endeavour to warn them. The danger is at the Ras or nose, on the junction of the Blue and White Niles. The proper thing to do would be to clear Halfeyeh camp of the Arabs before coming on here. You could then communicate with Kartoum by land, and avoid running the gauntlet of Arab guns in penny steamboats.”

Now if General Gordon so expressed himself on the 28th November, two months before Sir Charles Wilson got to Kartoum, and when the fort at Omdurman and the island of Tuti were both in the General’s hands, what must have been the state of affairs when both those positions had fallen and were in the possession of the Arabs?

Returning to Sir Charles Wilson’s progress with his detachment of only twenty men, when he got to the point of danger, as pointed out by General Gordon, he found himself under a cross fire of artillery and musketry from all points of the compass, including Kartoum itself. Under such circumstances he had no alternative but to retire, since, had he continued his journey, he could never have secured his retreat.

Consequently I cannot but express my feeling that on neither head of charge does any blame attach to Sir Charles Wilson.

H. W. Gordon.

[DESCRIPTION OF THE JOURNAL.]

[Lieut.-Colonel Stewart kept a complete journal of events that occurred at Kartoum from the 1st March to the 9th September, upon the night of which day he left.]

General Gordon, who had assisted in great measure in the preparation of this Journal, describes it as a perfect gem.

It was in duplicate, and was captured when Colonel Stewart was murdered; and, according to Slatin Bey’s account (who at the time was with the Mahdi), is now in his (the Mahdi’s) possession.

General Gordon’s Diaries are in six parts.

The First is from the 10th of September to the 23rd of September, and contains 78 pages.

The Second is from the 23rd of September to the 30th of September, and contains 41 pages.

The Third is from the 1st to the 12th of October, and contains 85 pages.

The Fourth is from the 12th to the 20th of October, and contains 32 pages.

The Fifth is from the 20th of October to the 5th of November, and contains 93 pages.

The Sixth is from the 5th of November to the 14th of December, and contains 104 pages.

The First, Second, Third, and Fourth Diaries are addressed to Lieut.-Colonel Stewart, C.M.G., or the Chief of the Staff. The Fifth is addressed to the Chief of the Staff of the Expeditionary Force for the relief of the garrison, and the Sixth is addressed in the same way.

The First and Second Diaries were sent on the 30th of September by steamer for Berber viâ Shendy.

The Third was sent by the steamer Towfikia on the 12th of October to Metemma.

The Fourth was sent to Shendy in a steamer on the 21st of October.

The Fifth left in the steamer Bordeen on the 5th of November for Metemma;

And the Sixth also left in the steamer Bordeen on the 15th of December.

Each Diary has the same remarks—sometimes repeated three times, on the outside of the Journal, to the effect that “it should be pruned down prior to publication.”

The Journals or Diaries were handed over to Sir Charles Wilson on the 22nd of January, at Metemma, by the officer commanding General Gordon’s steamers.

The Journals were, in my opinion, properly considered by the Government as official documents (see letter accompanying the last Journal), and were handed over to me with the remark that, “So far as Her Majesty’s Government had a desire in the matter, it was for the publication of the whole Diary; but they did not wish to interfere with my discretion.”

The note at the end of the first Journal evidently implies that when the Government have done with the Journals, then Miss Gordon is to have them.

The publication being, therefore, in my hands, I have arranged with Messrs. Kegan Paul, Trench & Co. for their issue in a very nearly entire state, only some six or seven pages being omitted, which contain, in my opinion, no matter of public interest; while, with regard to names, those who are well acquainted with the affairs of Egypt can fill up the blanks without difficulty.

It is to be hoped that strenuous endeavours may be made in order to obtain Colonel Stewart’s Journal, together with those of General Gordon from the 15th of December to the day upon which Kartoum fell, as well as that of the Doctor promised to the Times.

The Cairo telegrams alluded to in the Diaries have not been handed over to me.

H. W. Gordon.

[POSITION OF THE STEAMERS,]

December 14, 1884.

Resumé—

BOOK I.

On outside wrapper (a glass-cloth):

No secrets as far as I am concerned.

C. G. GORDON.

Lt.-Colonel Stewart, C.M.G.
or

Chief of the Staff, Lord Wolseley, G.C.B.

Soudan Expeditionary Force.

Journal of Events—Kartoum, Vol. I.

From 10th Sept. to 23rd Sept., 1884.

On Cover at back:

General Gordon’s Journal

From the 10th to 23rd September, 1884.

N.B.—This Journal will want pruning out if thought necessary to publish.

C. G. GORDON.

10/9/84.

[JOURNAL.]

Vide note as to pruning down on outside.—C. G. G.

September 10.—Colonel Stewart, MM. Power and Herbin, left during the night for Dongola, viâ Berber.

Spy came in from south front, and one from Halfeyeh reports Arabs will not attack, but will continue the blockade.

Sent off two sets of telegrams by a spy, who will go to Shendy.

Yesterday, when the messenger went out to deliver my answer to the Arabs, in response to Mahdi’s letter, though he had a white flag, they fired on him, and tried to capture him. They use the white flag, and find it respected by us, and that we let their men go back. They chain any men we send to them.

It is wonderful how the people of the town, who have every possible facility to leave the city, cling to it, and how, indeed, there are hundreds who flock in, though it is an open secret we have neither money nor food.[7] Somehow this makes me feel confident in the future, for it is seldom that an impulse such as this acts on each member of a disintegrated mass without there being some reason for it, which those who act have no idea of, but which is a sort of instinct. Truly I do not think one could inflict a greater punishment on an inhabitant of Kartoum than to force him to go to the Arabs.

Halfeyeh reports that Faki Mustapha, who was in command of the Arabs on the west or left bank of the White Nile, wishes to join the Government. He is informed we are glad of it, but wish him to remain quiet, and to take no active part till he sees how the scales of the balance go; if we rise, then he can act, if we fall he is not to compromise himself; but what we ask him is to send up our spies, which he can do without risk.[8] The same advice was given to the people of Shendy, who wished to issue out and attack Berber.

The runaways of Tuti[9] wish to come back, which is allowed.

The “matches” used for the mines are all finished, and we are obliged to go back to powder hose, and unite the mines in families of ten.

Rows on rows of wire entanglement are being placed around the lines. General Gordon’s horse was captured by the Arabs in the defeat of El foun; the other staff horse got a cut on the head, but is now all right.

The Mahdi is still at Rahad.[10] The answer to his letter (vide Colonel Stewart’s journal) was sent open, so that the Arab leaders could read its contents.

With respect to letters written to the Mahdi and to the Arab chiefs, commenting on the apostacy of Europeans, they may, and are, no doubt, hard, but it is not a small thing for a European, for fear of death, to deny our faith; it was not so in old times, and it should not be regarded as if it was taking off one coat, and putting on another. If the Christian faith is a myth, then let men throw it off, but it is mean and dishonourable to do so merely to save one’s life if one believes it is the true faith. What can be more strong than these words, “He who denies Me on earth I will deny in heaven.” The old martyrs regarded men as their enemies, who tried to prevent them avowing their faith. In the time of Queens Mary and Elizabeth, what men we had, and then it was for less than here, for it was mainly the question of the Mass, while here it is the question of the denial of our Lord and of his passion. It is perhaps as well to omit this, if this journal is published, for no man has a right to judge another. Politically and morally, however, it is better for us not to have anything to do with the apostate Europeans in the Arab camp. Treachery never succeeds, and, however matters may end, it is better to fall with clean hands, than to be mixed up with dubious acts and dubious men. Maybe it is better for us to fall with honour, than to gain the victory with dishonour, and in this view the Ulemas of the town are agreed; they will have nought to do with the proposals of treachery.

No doubt the letters to the Arabs will make the Arab chiefs work on the Europeans with them, to take an active part against us, by saying to those Europeans, “You are cast out;” but the Arabs will never trust them really, so they can do little against us.

We had a regular gaol delivery to-day, letting out some fifty, and are sending to the Arabs about nine prisoners whom it is not advisable to keep in the town. A donkey quietly grazing near the north fort, exploded one of the mines there (an iron alembic which belonged to the time of Mahomet Ali, and had been used for the reduction of gold; it held some 10 lbs. of powder); the donkey, angry and surprised, walked off unhurt! These alembics are of this shape, braced by iron straps together. It is extraordinary that after a good deal of rain, and three months’ exposure, the domestic matchbox should have retained its vitality.

The school here is most interesting, as the scholars get a certain ration. It is always full, viz., two hundred. Each boy has a wooden board, on which his lesson is written, and on visiting it the object of each boy is to be called out to read his lesson, which they do with a swaying motion of body, and in a sing-song way, like the Jews do at the wailing place at Jerusalem and in their synagogues, from which we may infer this was the ancient way of worship, for the lessons are always from the Koran. Little black doves with no pretension to any nose, and not more than two feet high, push forward to say the first ten letters of the alphabet, which is all they know.

We have completed the census (vide Colonel Stewart’s Journal),[11] and have 34,000 people in the town.

September 11.—Stewart’s steamers, which had been delayed at Halfeyeh[12] owing to some machinery accident, left last night for Berber.[13] Spy reports that one of captured steamers at Berber is disabled by the Arabs.

When Cuzzi[14] came to the lines yesterday, the officer Hassan Bey made him walk over on his knees in order to pass into lines, pointing out to him that the lines were thickly spread with fearful mines. Cuzzi asked what one would do when the Nile fell, and was told that these new mines would be put down as the river fell. Hassan Bey put Cuzzi into a hut, and questioned him as to the whereabouts of the Mahdi. He said first he was at Duem,[15] and when pressed he agreed the Mahdi was in Kordofan, and had not moved. He said the Mahdi had not more than two regiments; that he had lost heavily in fighting the mountain tribes of Nubia, and had not much ammunition left; that Waled a Goun had some 200 regulars with him, 10 mountain guns, and 2 Krupps, but only 5 boxes of mountain gun ammunition, and 3 boxes of Krupp, and 5 boxes of Remington. (The Arabs captured at our defeat at El foun 75,000 rounds, so that will help them.) Waled a Goun wanted to go to Giraffe, where Abou Gugliz was defeated, but Abou Gugliz said it would never do. Cuzzi looked pretty miserable. Outside the lines were three Arabs and Zarada (a Greek); they waited for Cuzzi. Soon after Cuzzi had left for the Arab camp, two dervishes came in with the Mahdi’s letter (vide Colonel Stewart’s Journal), and a dervish dress from the Mahdi to me. They were given the letters I had received for Slatin for Cairo, and my answer to the Arabs; also the horse head-stall which Abou Gugliz had lost, at which they were amused, and went off to the Arab camp. I sent out my letter in answer to the Mahdi (vide Colonel Stewart’s Journal) with a slave, upon whom they fired. Talataween and Bordeen left for Sennaar this morning to bring down dhoora.[16] Letter written to the Sheikh el Obeyed[17] proposing “we should mutually remain quiet, &c., &c., with relation to one another, as we are rendering the country a desert.”

Jer. xvii. 5. “Cursed (thus saith the Lord) is the man that trusteth in man, and maketh flesh his arm, and whose heart departeth from the Lord;” therefore cursed is he of the Lord, who hopes by any arrangement of forces, or by exterior help, to be relieved from the position we are in. Jer. xvii. 7. “Blessed (thus saith the Lord) is he that trusteth in the Lord, and whose hope the Lord is,” therefore blessed is he “of the Lord” who makes all his arrangements of forces, without any reliance on such arrangements, or on any exterior help, but trusts in the Lord.[18] How impossible for man alone to accept these views, for with what heart can he make his arrangements if he does not trust in their success! Curious verses, Ezekiel xxix. 10-14,[19] as to Egypt being waste for forty years from the Tower of Syene (Assouan) to frontier of Ethiopia; it is certainly the Soudan which is meant, and it is in a fair way of being a desert.

A Dervish came in with a letter from Abdel Kader, the Sheikh on the White Nile, which, with answer, is annexed;[20] he also brought a letter from the messengers who brought in the Mahdi’s letter on 9th September (vide Col. Stewart’s journal). They said they had not received my answer, which it will be remembered was sent out by a slave, whom they fired upon. This man also brought in a letter from a Greek, Calamatino,[21] who begs to come in and tell me important news for all Europe. His letter and my answer are annexed.

It will be noticed that Cuzzi adds “he is going to Berber to-day,” so he may meet with Stewart. They might have gone down together had they mutually have known of one another’s departure.

A soldier captured at Obeyed came in, and reports that his comrades would come in en masse if we would let them come at night. Abou Gugliz denies that the head-stall I sent to him is his.

I put down our defeat on the Dem or headquarters of Sheikh el Obeyed to two things—1. A lot of Kartoum pedlars went out to loot, and they broke the square. 2. Mahomet Ali Pasha captured a lad of twelve or fourteen years of age, and the little chap spoke out boldly, and said he believed Mahomet Achmet was the Mahdi, and that we were dogs. He was shot! Before I heard of our defeat I heard of this, and I thought “that will not pass unavenged.” There was an old belief among old Christians that every event which happens on earth is caused by some action being taken in heaven; the action in heaven being the cause of the event on earth, vide Revelations, when at the opening of seals the trumpet sounds, &c., &c., all events exercised in heaven are followed by events on earth. This being the case, how futile are our efforts to turn things out of their course. Vials are poured out on earth whence events happen. To me, it seems little what those events may be, but that the great object of our lives is how we bear those events in our individuality. If we trust in the flesh, thus saith the Lord, we are cursed; if we trust in Him we are blessed. I cannot think that there are any promises for answers to prayer made for temporal things; the promises are to hear prayer, and to give strength to bear with quiet what may be the Will of God. A vial is poured on earth; events happen; one is furious with the British Government for these events; but if we were logical, we should be furious with the pourer out of the vial, and that we shrink from being, for He is the Almighty who pours out the vial.

This afternoon another mine blew up at Tuti; the victim was another donkey, who, however, did not get off so well as his colleague of the North Fort, for he lost his hind quarters, and was killed.—R.I.P.

We cannot help thinking something has happened in Europe of a startling nature, and which is known to the Arabs in an indistinct way, for they evidently look on the game as theirs, and that without fighting, of which they show no sign. Abou Gugliz (in remonstrating with Waled a Goun, who wished to descend the river) told him “that his forts were better than any at Cairo, but that the soldiers came over them, like afreets;”[22] so says the Dervish who came in to-day.

We decided to-night to send out a letter to Arabs, saying that though we will not admit any European into the place we will permit an interview, with any European they may wish to send to a flag placed in front of lines, with the Greek Consul and Greek Doctor.

September 12.—It is most dispiriting to be in the position I am, if it was not good for me, when I think that, when I left, I could say, “no man could lift his hand or foot in the land of the Soudan”[23] without me (Gen. xli. 44)[24] and now we cannot calculate on our existence over twenty-four hours. The people are all against us, and what a power they have; they need not fight, but have merely to refuse to sell us their grain. The stomach governs the world, and it was the stomach (a despised organ) which caused our misery from the beginning. It is wonderful that the ventral tube of man governs the world, in small and great things.

One of Seyd Mahomet Osman’s family, come in from Shendy, reports Osman Digma, as writing to Berber, reporting the arrival of the English at Suakin, their purchase of camels, and advance. The Arab chief of Berber assembled his subordinates and told them this, also of the advance of the troops from Debbeh commanded by English (Wood’s force) and recommended them to collect their men. The two captured steamers at Berber are on opposite sides of river.

Sent out letter to the Arabs to-day, saying I would let the Greek Consul come out and meet the Greek who had written to me; the Arabs, this time, did not fire on the flag of truce.

Church parade of Arabs on south front, but very far off.

The man from Shendy reports that all the right bank of the Nile is quiet. We have sent out an escort to try and capture Cuzzi, who is on his way to Berber.

It certainly is a curious exemplification of how very lightly religions sit on men, and to note the fearful apostacy of both Mussulmans and Christians, when their lives or property are menaced. There is scarcely one great family of the Soudan, families who can trace their pedigree for five hundred years, who have not accepted Mahomet Achmet as Mahdi, to save their property, though they laugh at the idea afterwards. I am using this argument with them, in saying, “You ask me to become a Mussulman to save my life, and you yourself acknowledge Mahomet Achmet as the Mahdi, to save your lives; why, if we go on this principle, we will be adopting every religion whose adherents threaten our existence, for you know and own, when you are safe, that Mahomet Achmet is not the Mahdi.”[25]