THE NAVY OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION

The University of Chicago
FOUNDED BY JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER

The Navy of the
American Revolution

Its Administration, its Policy and
its Achievements

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to the Faculty of the
Graduate School of Arts and Literature
In Candidacy for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Department of History

By
CHARLES OSCAR PAULLIN
CHICAGO
1906

Copyright, 1906
by
The Burrows Brothers Company
REPUBLICAN PRINTING COMPANY
CEDAR RAPIDS, IOWA

PREFACE

Several narrative accounts of the navy of the American Revolution have been written. These usually form the introductory part of a history of the American Navy since 1789. The earliest of these accounts is that of Thomas Clark, published in 1814, and probably the best that of James Fenimore Cooper, first printed in 1839. Later narratives are rather more popular than Cooper’s. Many sources of information, which were not accessible to the earlier writers, and were not much used by the later, were drawn upon in the writing of this book. Moreover, the information that is here presented is of a somewhat different sort from that of previous writers; and the method of treatment is new.

This book is written from the point of view of the naval administrators; hitherto, historians have written from the point of view of the naval officers. Their narratives treat almost exclusively of the doings at sea, the movements of armed vessels, and the details of sea fights. They have the advantage of dealing primarily with picturesque, and sometimes dramatic, events. Their accounts, however, lack unity, since they consist of a series of detached incidents.

In the first place an attempt has been here made to restore the naval administrative machinery of the Revolution. The center of this narrative is the origin, organization, and work of naval committees, secretaries of marine, navy boards, and naval agents. Next, inasmuch as the men who served as naval executives administered the laws relating to naval affairs, and indeed often prepared these laws before their adoption by the legislative authorities, it was thought best to give a fairly complete resume of the naval legislation of the Revolution. Those laws with which the naval administrators were chiefly concerned have received most attention. The legislation with reference to prize courts and privateering has been treated more briefly. As the privateers do not, properly speaking, form a part of the Revolutionary navy, no attempt to write their history has been made. In order that the subject may be seen in its true relations, some statistics and other interesting facts concerning this industry have, however, been introduced. An account of the State Navies is now given for the first time.

Since naval committees, navy boards, and naval agents issued written orders to the naval commanders prescribing the time, place, and manner of their cruises, it has seemed logical and proper to consider the naval policy of the administrators, and the movements of the armed vessels. So detailed an account of naval movements, as would be given by those writers who proceed from the point of view of the doings of the naval officers, would obviously not be expected in this book. My plan has been to describe the various classes of naval movements, to present the sum total of their results, and to give briefly the details of a few typical cruises and sea fights. The cruises of the American vessels were much alike; they were minor affairs, and many of them scarcely merit individual treatment.

It is evident that one who proposes to write the history of the navy of the American Revolution from the point of view which I have described, will not only avoid excessive detail in respect to individual naval achievements, but will be particularly determined not to allow their brilliancy or their dramatic quality to fix the amount of detail with which each shall be narrated. For instance, several historians have been inclined to dwell at some length upon the brilliant and picturesque achievements of John Paul Jones. Sometimes they have devoted more than one-third of their narratives of the Continental navy to this hero, undoubtedly the greatest naval officer of the Revolution. As a result, the pictures which they have presented are somewhat distorted, and many brave sea officers have had scant justice done their gallant services. An attempt is made in this book to present a better balanced narrative, and to make a juster estimate of the work of the Revolutionary navy. The scope and method of treatment adopted by the author has compelled a certain economy of phrase, precision of statement, and sharpness of outline.

I am very grateful to the many persons who have assisted me. Space does not permit me to thank each of them by name. I am under special obligations to the librarians and officials of the Library of Congress, the Library of the Department of the Navy, the Bureau of Rolls and Library of the Department of State, the State Library of Massachusetts, the Office of the Massachusetts State Archives, the Boston Public Library, the Boston Athenaeum, the library of Harvard University, the State Library of Rhode Island, the Rhode Island Historical Society, the State Library of Connecticut, the Connecticut Historical Society, the Pennsylvania Historical Society, the State Library of Virginia, the Virginia Historical Society, the Office of the Secretary of State of South Carolina, the Charleston (South Carolina) Public Library, and the Library of the University of Chicago. Far more than to any one else, I am indebted to Professor John Franklin Jameson, Director of the Department of Historical Research in the Carnegie Institution of Washington. I have had the advantage of Professor Jameson’s extensive knowledge of bibliography, his fruitful suggestions as to treatment, and his painstaking care in reading and criticising my manuscript. Parts of the narrative, somewhat popularized, have appeared in the Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute and the Sewanee Review.

C. O. P.

Washington, D. C.
March 1, 1906.

CONTENTS

PART I
THE CONTINENTAL NAVY

CHAPTER I
THE NAVAL COMMITTEE

The history of the Continental navy covers a period of ten years, extending from 1775 to 1785. During this time the Continental Congress made many experiments in naval legislation and devised several organs of naval administration. The first of these organs, with whose origin and work this chapter is concerned, was the Naval Committee. It lasted for only a few months. Its lineal successors, each of which will be duly considered, were the Marine Committee, the Board of Admiralty, and the Agent of Marine. These four executive organs, for the most part, administered the Continental navy. Certain odds and ends of the naval business, however, fell to the commander-in-chief of the army and his officers, and to the American representatives in foreign countries. The second chapter will treat of the fleets of the army, and the closing chapters of the narrative of the Continental navy will consider the naval services of our representatives in foreign lands.

In maritime countries the military service is generally ambidextrous. Whether the army or navy is first brought into play at the opening of a war depends upon various circumstances. The presence of a British army at Boston, already on colonial soil, when the American Resolution broke out early in 1775, naturally led to the immediate organization of an army by the colonists. The need of a navy was at this time not quite so insistent. Moreover, the building, or even the purchase, of an armed fleet required more time than did the raising of an army, which was rendered comparatively easy by the previous training of the colonists in the local militia. Nevertheless, since both countries engaged in the war were maritime, the creating of a navy could not long be delayed.

The reader recollects that by the middle of 1775 the battles of Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill had been fought, a Continental army had been organized, and Washington had been made commander-in-chief. Outside of Congress the agitation in behalf of a Continental navy had begun. That the first suggestions and advances for a navy should come from New England, where the concrete problems of the defence of her ports and coasts were being faced, was to be expected. One of the first men to make such suggestions was Josiah Quincy of Massachusetts. On July 11, 1775, he wrote to John Adams in Philadelphia that the best method of securing the coastwise navigation of the colonies was by row-galleys. He then continued: “As the whole Continent is so firmly united, why not a Number of Vessels of War be fitted out and judiciously stationed, so as to intercept and prevent any supplies going to our Enemies; and consequently, unless they can make an Impression inland, they must leave the Country or starve.”[1] The first formal movement in behalf of a Continental navy came from Rhode Island, which state was during the summer of 1775 suffering serious annoyances from the British ships. On August 26 her legislature instructed the Rhode Island delegates to the Continental Congress to use their influence at the ensuing session of Congress to obtain a fleet for the protection of the colonies.[2] On September 2, 1775, Washington, in order to prevent reinforcements from reaching the enemy at Boston, instructed Nicholson Broughton to proceed in the schooner “Hannah” on a cruise against the British transports.[3]

That the question of providing a Continental navy would come up during the fall session of Congress was certain. The arguments in its behalf, which were made almost unanimously later in the session, must have been on the lips of several of the members when they assembled in Philadelphia in September: an army had been organized, why not a navy? The situation of the combatants, separated by the great Atlantic highway; and their character, one a great naval and commercial power, and the other with maritime interests by no means inconsiderable, would necessarily make the impending struggle in no small part a naval one. America had seacoasts and seaports to be defended, a coastwise navigation to be secured, and above all commercial and diplomatic communications with foreign powers to be kept open. These communications were a jugular vein, whose severing would mean death to the United Colonies. The urgent and specific calls for armed vessels, which were being made, must be met at once. Had not America conveniently at hand materials for ships, and abundant men who had the “habit of the sea”?

In the early months of the session there certainly would arise opposition to the new military project. The inertia and conservatism of some of the members would set them against so great an innovation. To others the fitting out of a fleet, at a time when the length, seriousness, and meaning of the war with the motherland were but half unveiled, would seem an unwise and hasty action.

The question of procuring a fleet of armed vessels was first brought to the attention of Congress on October 3, 1775, when the Rhode Island members presented their instructions, an account of which will be given in a succeeding chapter.[4] It is sufficient for present purposes to say that until December the Rhode Island instructions had little other result beyond crystallizing and clarifying opinion on naval affairs by means of the debates which they caused in Congress.

On October 5 sundry letters from London were laid before the Congress and read. They conveyed the intelligence of “the sailing of two north country built brigs, of no force, from England, on the 11th of August last, loaded with arms, powder, and other stores, for Quebec, without convoy.” Congress at once saw the importance of capturing these two vessels, in order both to deprive the British of these stores and to obtain them for the Continental army around Boston, which sorely needed all the munitions of war it could get. A motion was therefore made that a committee of three be appointed to prepare a plan for intercepting the two brigs, and that it “proceed on this business immediately.”[5] John Adams in his autobiography says that the opposition to this motion was “very loud and vehement,” and included some of his own colleagues, and also especially Edward Rutledge of South Carolina. It seems to have been recognized that the carrying of the motion would be the initial step in the establishment of a Continental navy. Such an undertaking its opponents declared, with a greater display of rhetoric than judgment, was the “most wild, visionary, mad project that ever had been imagined. It was an infant taking a mad bull by his horns; and what was more profound and remote, it was said it would ruin the character and corrupt the morals of all our seamen. It would make them selfish, piratical, mercenary, bent wholly upon plunder, etc., etc.” The friends of the motion, in colors equally glowing, set forth “the great advantages of distressing the enemy, supplying ourselves, and beginning a system of maritime and naval operations.” On the taking of the vote the motion passed in the affirmative; and according to John Adams’s recollection, he, John Langdon of New Hampshire, and Silas Deane of Connecticut, “three members who had expressed much zeal in favor of the motion,” composed the committee.[6]

A little later on the same day this committee reported; and thereupon Congress decided to write a letter to Washington directing him to obtain from the Council of Massachusetts two of that state’s cruisers, and to despatch them on the errand of intercepting the two supply ships. It also directed that letters be written to the governors of Connecticut and Rhode Island asking for the loan of some of their armed vessels, which were to be sent on the same mission. “The committee appointed to prepare a plan for intercepting the two vessels bound to Canada” made another report on the 6th, which was ordered to lie on the table “for the perusal of the members.”[7] This report was acted upon on October 13, when Congress decided to fit out two armed vessels, one of ten and the other of fourteen guns, to cruise three months to the eastward for the purpose of intercepting the enemy’s transports laden with warlike stores and other supplies. A committee consisting of Silas Deane, John Langdon, and Christopher Gadsden of South Carolina was appointed to estimate the expense which would be incurred in fitting out the two vessels.[8]

In four days this new committee reported an estimate, which was unsatisfactory and was recommitted.[9] When it again reported on October 30, two more vessels, one to mount not more than twenty and the other not more than thirty-six guns, were ordered to be prepared for sea, and “to be employed in such manner, for the protection and defence of the United Colonies, as the Congress shall direct.” It should be noted that the two vessels for which provision was now made were to engage in the defence of the colonies, and not merely in the interception of transports, an indication of an advance in the naval policy of Congress. Four additional members were now added to the committee, Stephen Hopkins of Rhode Island, Joseph Hewes of North Carolina, R. H. Lee of Virginia, and John Adams of Massachusetts.[10] This reconstituted committee composed of seven members was sometimes called “the committee for fitting out armed vessels,” occasionally the “Marine Committee,” but most frequently the “Naval Committee.” It secured for its use a room in a public house in Philadelphia, and in order that there should be no conflict between its meetings and those of Congress, it fixed its hours from six in the evening until the close of its business. Its sessions were sometimes pleasantly continued, even until midnight, by conversational diversions, marked by a rich flow of soul, history, poetry, wine, and Jamaica rum.

John Adams, who always wrote pungently, has left us a lively picture of the Naval Committee. His description makes it clear that the deliberations of this committee were not always marked by that exalted seriousness and impassive dignity, which we too habitually ascribe to the Revolutionary Fathers. “The pleasantest part of my labors for the four years I spent in Congress from 1774 to 1778,” he said, “was in this Naval Committee. Mr. Lee, Mr. Gadsden, were sensible men, and very cheerful, but Governor Hopkins of Rhode Island, above seventy years of age, kept us all alive. Upon business, his experience and judgment were very useful. But when the business of the evening was over, he kept us in conversation till eleven, and sometimes twelve o’clock. His custom was to drink nothing all day, nor till eight o’clock in the evening, and then his beverage was Jamaica spirit and water. It gave him wit, humor, anecdotes, science, and learning. He had read Greek, Roman, and British history, and was familiar with English poetry, particularly Pope, Thomson, and Milton, and the flow of his soul made all of his reading our own, and seemed to bring to recollection in all of us, all we had ever read. I could neither eat nor drink in these days. The other gentlemen were very temperate. Hopkins never drank to excess, but all he drank was immediately not only converted into wit, sense, knowledge, and good humor, but inspired us with similar qualities.”[11]

The active life of the Naval Committee lasted from October, 1775, until January, 1776, during which time it laid the foundations of the navy. Its chairman in January, 1776, was Stephen Hopkins; whether he was the first to fill this position is not known. His knowledge of the business of shipping made him particularly useful to the Committee.[12] The accounts of the Naval Committee were kept by Joseph Hewes, who was settling them with the Board of Treasury in September, 1776.[13] Early in December, 1775, John Adams returned home, and by January only four members of the Committee were left to transact its business.

In October Congress ordered the fitting out of four vessels, and appointed the Naval Committee, but did nothing more. By the first of November the sentiment of Congress was setting strongly towards organizing a navy. In its debates on the State of Trade during the latter half of October the necessity of having a navy in order both to defend the colonial commerce and to carry on the war was generally recognized.[14] The members from the South were as a rule now lining up with those of the North in behalf of a naval armament. Events had happened and were daily happening in New England which were convincing the doubtful members of Congress. As a military necessity for conducting the siege of Boston, and with no intention whatever to create a navy, as such, Washington had obtained seven small cruisers, and either had sent or was sending them to sea in pursuit of the enemy’s transports. The logic of events had forced him, on his own responsibility, to create a little fleet of his own.[15]

With the passage of each day, the gap between the mother-country and her revolting subjects widened, and the feeling became stronger and more general that an irrepressible war, which must be fought to a just conclusion, had begun. What in October seemed chimerical, might in November appear practicable.

Beginning with November the naval legislation of Congress moved rapidly. The duty of preparing much of it naturally fell to the Naval Committee. Its work in large part may be found in the Journals of the Continental Congress for November and December, 1775, and January, 1776. A brief summary of the most important Congressional resolutions for this period will be here presented.

On November 2, 1775, Congress voted $100,000 for the work of the Naval Committee, and empowered it “to agree with such officers and seamen as are proper to man and command” the four vessels already ordered to be prepared for sea. Congress also fixed the “encouragement” of the officers and seamen at “one-half of all ships of war made prize of by them, and one-third of all transport vessels.”[16]

On November 10 the first legislation relating to the Marine Corps of the United States was passed. Two battalions, which were to be called “the first and second battalions of American Marines,” were to be raised, consisting of one colonel, two lieutenant-colonels, two majors, and “other officers as usual in other regiments.” There is some doubt whether Congress fully understood the duties of marines, for it provided that “no persons be appointed to office, or inlisted into said Battalions, but such as are good seamen, or so acquainted with maritime affairs as to be able to serve to advantage by sea when required.”[17] Such a requirement seems to overlook the fact that the duties of marines are military in character, rather than naval.

The Naval Committee made what probably was its most important report on November 23, when it laid before Congress “a draught of rules for the government of the American navy, and articles to be signed by the officers and men employed in that service.” On the 25th and 28th of November, these were debated by paragraphs and after slight amendment were adopted.[18] The rules, eight or ten pages in length, are brevity itself as compared with the present rules and regulations of the United States navy, which make a book of some six hundred pages. More than one-half of the navy’s first rules are concerned with the feeding, care, rights, duties, and punishments of the ordinary sailor; while the present rules of the American navy in large part apply to officers.

A few of the provisions of these old rules are worthy of notice. The commanders of ships of the thirteen united colonies were “to take care that divine service be performed twice a day on board, and a sermon preached on Sundays, unless bad weather or other extraordinary accidents prevent.” Sailors were to be punished for swearing by the wearing of a wooden collar, “or some other shameful badge of distinction.” Sailors were to be put in irons for drunkenness; while officers guilty of the same offense forfeited two days’ pay. The extreme punishment which an officer might inflict on a seaman was “twelve lashes upon his bare back, with a cat of nine tails.” In case a sailor deserved greater punishment, he must be tried by a court-martial, which should consist of “at least three captains and three first lieutenants, with three captains and three first lieutenants of marines, if there shall be so many of the marines then present, and the eldest captain shall preside.” A penal code was established. A court-martial might inflict death for desertion, mutiny, or murder.

Rations for the sailors were fixed by these old rules for each day of the week. Saturday’s bill of fare, which consisted of “1 lb. bread, 1 lb. pork, half pint peas, and four ounces cheese,” may be taken as a sample one. Each seaman was given a half-pint of rum a day, with a “discretionary allowance on extra duty, and in time of engagement.” The following provision, for keeping the eatables sweet and palatable, is noted: “The captain is frequently to order the proper officers to inspect the condition of the provisions, and if the bread proves damp, to have it aired upon the quarter deck or poop, and also examine the flesh cask, and if any of the pickle be leaked out, to have new made and put in, and the cask made tight and secure.”

The following naval offices were established; the first two only were commissioned: captain, lieutenant, master, master’s mate, boatswain, boatswain’s first mate, boatswain’s second mate, gunner, gunner’s mate, surgeon, surgeon’s mate, carpenter, carpenter’s mate, cooper, captain’s clerk, steward, and chaplain. Five marine offices were established; the highest was that of captain. A pay-table was provided, according to which the monthly wage ranged form $32 for captains, to $6.67 for able seamen and marines. According to the form of a contract of enlistment which accompanied the rules, a bounty of $400 was to be deducted from the proceeds of prizes and to be paid to the commander, in all cases where he lost a limb in the engagement, or was incapacitated from earning a livelihood; if the commander was killed, an equal sum was to be paid to his widow. Minor officers under the same circumstances received proportionately smaller sums. The man who first discovered a vessel that was afterwards captured was rewarded with a double share of prize money; he who first boarded a prize was entitled to a treble share. Ten shares of every prize were set aside “to be given to such inferior officers, seamen and marines, as shall be adjudged best to deserve them by the superior officers.”

These rules, which were in force throughout the Revolution, and which were readopted for the government of the new navy under the Constitution,[19] were drawn up by John Adams, and “examined, discussed, and corrected” by the Naval Committee. They are an abridgment and adaptation of parts of the British naval statutes and regulations in force in 1775. That part of Adams’s rules which constitutes the penal code of the navy, he obtained from the Naval Discipline Act passed by the British Parliament in 1749.[20] In adapting the British code, however, he made it less stringent. The British also found it advisable in 1779 to lessen the severity of their code. The rest of Adams’s rules are, with verbal changes and omissions, chiefly taken from the King’s Regulations and Admiralty Instructions of 1772. An extract from the King’s regulations followed by the corresponding one from Adams’s rules will illustrate the closeness of the parallelism: “No Commander shall inflict any punishment upon a Seaman, beyond Twelve Lashes upon his bare Back with a Cat of Nine Tails, according to the ancient Practice of the Sea.”[21] “No commander shall inflict any punishment upon a seaman beyond twelve lashes upon his bare back, with a cat of nine tails.” An additional example of the influence of the British upon the American navy is found in the fact that the naval offices as given above were already established in the navy of the Stuarts, indeed, many of them in the navy of Elizabeth. The Americans were still British at the time of the Revolution, and they intuitively went home, so to speak, for the naval models with which they were familiar.

On November 25, 1775, Congress enacted some very important naval legislation, which in John Adams’s opinion was “the true origin and foundation of the American navy,” and in producing which he “had at least as great a share ... as any man living.”[22] The occasion of this legislation was certain recommendations of Washington. On October 5 he requested the “determination of Congress, as to the property and disposal of such vessels and cargoes, as are designed for the supply of the enemy, and may fall into our hands.” On November 8 he pointed out the necessity of establishing proper admiralty courts. On November 11 he recommended to Congress the establishment of an admiralty court for the trial of prize cases arising from Continental captures.[23] A report of a committee of seven members, which had been appointed on the 17th to take Washington’s request of November 8 into consideration, was, on the 23rd, laid on the table “for the perusal of the members,” and was debated and agreed to by paragraphs on the 24th and 25th.[24] Congress now took the decisive step of authorizing the capture of all British vessels employed against the United Colonies, either as armed vessels of war, transports, or supply ships. Provision for privateering was made in part. It was recommended to the legislatures of the several colonies to establish courts for the trial of prize cases. In all cases appeals to Congress were to be allowed, when made in accordance with certain prescribed rules. Prosecutions in prize cases must commence in the court of that colony in which the capture was made, but if the capture took place on the open sea the captor had the privilege of selecting the most convenient court. Congress fixed the shares of the proceeds of prizes. In the case of privateers the whole of the proceeds of captures went to the captors. In the case of vessels fitted out by a colony, or by Congress, two-thirds were to go in the first instance to the colony, and in the second, to Congress; and one-third was to go to the captors: provided that, if the prize should be a vessel of war, the captor’s share should be increased to one-half, and the government’s share correspondingly decreased.

On December 2, 1775, Congress authorized the Naval Committee to employ two additional vessels, and also to “prepare a proper commission for the captains or commanders of the ships of war in the service of the United Colonies.”[25] On the report of the committee on recaptures, Congress on December 5 fixed the compensation of recaptors, which varied from one-eighth to the whole of the value of the vessel and cargo, depending on the time which elapsed between the capture and recapture.[26] On December 9 the following new naval offices were established: midshipman, armorer, sailmaker, yeoman, quarter-master, quarter-gunner, cook, and coxswain.[27] On December 13 the wages of able-bodied seamen were raised to $8 a month; and on the 22nd the salary of the commander-in-chief of the navy was fixed at $125 a month.[28]

In accordance with the direction of Congress, the Naval Committee, on January 6, 1776, reported on the division of the captor’s share of prizes, among officers, seamen, and marines; whereupon, Congress divided the captor’s share into twenty parts, and allotted them equitably between the officers and men. The commander-in-chief received one-twentieth, and the captains of the fleet making the capture, two-twentieths. After the officers had been provided for, the remaining eight and one-half parts were allotted to the seamen, “share and share alike.”[29]

Meanwhile, the Naval Committee had been busy purchasing, fitting for sea, and officering a fleet. About the first of November John Adams was writing from Philadelphia to James Warren in Massachusetts, inquiring whether naval vessels might be purchased or built in Massachusetts, and whether suitable officers could be procured there; and also at the same time to Samuel Chase in Baltimore, in regard to the purchase of certain vessels in that city.[30] On November 17 the Committee ordered Silas Deane to go to New York and to purchase a 20-gun ship and a 10-gun Bermudan-built sloop.[31] Under the authorizations of Congress of October 13 and October 30, the Naval Committee purchased four vessels, the “Alfred,” “Columbus,” “Cabot,” and “Andrew Doria;” named, respectively, for the founder of the English navy, the discoverer of America, the first English explorer of America, and the great Genoese Admiral.[32] The first vessel to be bought was the “Alfred,” a ship of two hundred tons burden. The “Alfred” was originally the “Black Prince,” and belonged to John Nixon, the well-known Philadelphia merchant of Revolutionary times.[33]

On November 5 the Naval Committee appointed Esek Hopkins, of Rhode Island, commander-in-chief of the fleet.[34] The Committee may have created this office as analogous to Washington’s position in the army. It is more probable that the office was borrowed from the British navy, in which the commander-in-chief was the chief admiral of a port or station, who held command over all other admirals within his jurisdiction.[35] The first and only commander-in-chief of the American navy was at the time of his appointment fifty-seven years of age. He was a member of an influential Rhode Island family, and a brother of Stephen Hopkins, of the Naval Committee. About 1745 Esek Hopkins was a sea captain and merchant adventurer. In the French and Indian War he had commanded a privateer.[36] At the breaking out of the Revolution he received the appointment of captain and then of brigadier-general in the Rhode Island forces. Deliberate in action and irascible in temper, Hopkins was at the same time industrious, steadfast, and veracious. The following description was written by Henry Knox to his wife, probably in April, 1776: “I have been on board Admiral Hopkins’ ship, and in company with his gallant son, who was wounded in the engagement with the ‘Glasgow.’ The admiral is an antiquated figure. He brought to my mind Van Tromp, the famous Dutch admiral. Though antiquated in figure, he is shrewd and sensible. I, whom you think not a little enthusiastic, should have taken him for an angel, only he swore now and then.”[37] The choice of Hopkins as head of the navy was, at the time, as promising as could have been made.

On December 7, 1775, a commission was given to John Paul Jones, an energetic and capable young man, twenty-eight years old, whose brilliant career was still unforeseen.[38] On December 22 the Naval Committee laid before Congress a “list of the officers by them appointed.”[39] It included, besides Hopkins and Jones, the names of four captains, four first-lieutenants, five second-lieutenants, and three third-lieutenants. The little roll of captains was headed by Dudley Saltonstall, who owed his appointment to his brother-in-law, Silas Deane, a member of the Committee; and was ended by John Burroughs Hopkins, a son of the commander-in-chief. Immediately above J. B. Hopkins in rank was Nicholas Biddle, a young Philadelphian, twenty-five years old, and very promising material for a naval officer. He had entered the British navy in 1770, and had served as midshipman on board the same vessel with Lord Nelson. In the summer of 1775 he was appointed commander of the “Franklin” galley of the Pennsylvania navy. The fourth captain was Abraham Whipple, the commodore of the Rhode Island navy.

In these first appointments of the Committee it takes no eagle eye to discern the workings of nepotism and sectional influences. Of the five largest naval plums, New England plucked four. This may have been, however, right enough, as the South was credited with the commander-in-chief of the army, and New England greatly exceeded the Middle and Southern states in the number of men who were experienced in maritime affairs.

In December, 1775, the Naval Committee was preparing a fleet for sea, which was to make the first naval essay of the new government. The Pennsylvania Committee of Safety was contributing arms, ammunition, and sailors. Commodore Hopkins enlisted for the service of his fleet more than one hundred seamen in Rhode Island, whom Whipple brought to Philadelphia in the “Katy.” On December 3, 1775, John Paul Jones hoisted the Continental flag on board the “Alfred,” Hopkins’s flagship, the first Continental vessel to fly the colors of the new nation.[40] By the end of January, 1776, the Committee had added four other small vessels to the navy, the sloops “Providence,” and “Hornet,” and the schooners, “Wasp,” and “Fly.”[41] The “Providence” had been the “Katy” of the Rhode Island navy. The “Hornet” and the “Wasp” were obtained in Baltimore.

On January 5, 1776, the Naval Committee issued sailing orders to the commander-in-chief. He was ordered, “if Winds and Weather possibly admit of it, to proceed directly for Chesapeake Bay in Virginia.” Here he was to strike the enemy’s fleet under Lord Dunmore, unless it was found to be greatly superior to his own. If he was so fortunate as to execute this business successfully, he was to continue southward and master the British forces off the coast of the Carolinas, and from thence he was to sail northward directly to Rhode Island and “attack, take, and destroy all the enemy’s naval force that you may find there.”[42] This program seems rather ambitious, when one considers the motley assemblage of officers, seamen, and cruisers, that composed this fleet of made-over merchantmen.

The ice in the Delaware greatly delayed the expedition. Early in February, 1776, the fleet was assembling at Cape Henlopen. It then consisted of the flagship “Alfred,” 24, Captain Dudley Saltonstall; the ship “Columbus,” 20, Captain Abraham Whipple; the brigs “Andrew Doria,” 14, Captain Nicholas Biddle, and “Cabot,” 14, Captain J. B. Hopkins; the sloop “Providence,” 12; and the schooner “Fly,” 8. On February 15 the sloop “Hornet,” 10, and the schooner “Wasp,” 8, joined the fleet from Baltimore.[43] On the 17th the fleet sailed outside the Capes into the broad Atlantic. A new nation in whose veins flowed the blood of a long line of seafaring and sea-fighting ancestors was about to put to the initial test its skill in naval warfare, and under conditions far from auspicious. If the doughty Admiral should get all his queer craft once more into a safe harbor he would be doing well.

Hopkins had apparently concluded that his Armada might prove vincible on the stormy coasts of Virginia. Indeed, the enemy must have heard of his intended coming, and awaited it. Not only discretion, but good military judgment advised him to abandon for the present the visitation to the Chesapeake.[44] Before sailing on February 17 he had determined to make a descent on Nassau, New Providence, and accordingly he gave orders to his captains and commanders to keep in company, if possible, but if not, to make for the island of Abaco, one of the Bahamas, where the fleet would next rendezvous.[45]

On the 3rd and 4th of March Nassau was taken after a slight resistance and without bloodshed, by a landing party consisting of two hundred marines under one of their officers, Captain Samuel Nichols, and fifty sailors under Lieutenant Weaver of the “Cabot.” Eighty-eight cannon, fifteen mortars, a large quantity of shot and shell besides other munitions of war were captured. Since the governor of the island succeeded the night before the landing was effected in removing the gunpowder to a safe hiding place, the expedition failed of its chief object.[46]

On March 17, having loaded his vessels and a borrowed sloop with the warlike stores, Hopkins set sail for Rhode Island, taking with him as prisoners of war several important officials, including the Governor and Lieutenant-Governor of New Providence. On April 4 the squadron, having reached the eastward end of Long Island, captured the British schooner “Hawk,” 6, and the bomb brig “Bolton,” 8. At 1 o’clock on the morning of the 6th the “Alfred,” “Cabot,” “Columbus,” “Andrew Doria,” and “Providence” engaged His Majesty’s ship “Glasgow,” 20, Captain Tyringham Howe. After a severe fight of about three hours, the “Glasgow,” was permitted to escape, leaving her tender with the Americans.[47] The loss of the enemy was four; that of the Americans, twenty-four, of which number twenty-three were on board the “Alfred” and “Cabot,” the two vessels which bore the brunt of the encounter.[48] Each of these vessels had a lieutenant killed.

The American commanders in this engagement exhibited little skill in tactics. A fleet permitted a single vessel of the enemy to escape. Something can be said for them by way of extenuating circumstances. It should also be said that they showed no lack of spirit. As was natural, Commodore Hopkins was made the target for much adverse criticism. Nations, it is said, are seldom just under disgrace, imaginary or real.

The expedition to New Providence was the sole naval enterprise made by the Continental vessels, while they were under the direction of the Naval Committee. Early in 1776 this Committee, reduced in membership, yielded its control of marine affairs to a new committee with a fuller complement of members. It scarcely needs to be said that the Naval Committee’s claim to distinction rests not upon its military achievements, but upon its work of a civil character, whereby it laid the foundations of the Revolutionary navy. It acquired the first American fleet, selected its officers, and fitted it for sea. It drafted the first civil and penal code of the navy, and prepared not a little fundamental naval legislation.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Manuscript Letters of John Adams, lodged with the Massachusetts Historical Society by Mr. Charles Francis Adams, who kindly permitted the writer to see them.

[2] See Chapter III, The Organization of the Marine Committee.

[3] See Chapter II, The Fleets of Washington and Arnold. After a thorough investigation and study of the sources of the early history of the Continental navy, I am compelled to reject many of the statements and conclusions found in Chapter II, Volume I, of Augustus C. Buell’s book, Paul Jones, Founder of the American Navy.

[4] See Chapter III, The Organization of the Marine Committee.

[5] Journals of Continental Congress, October 5, 1775. Waite, H. E., Origin of American Navy, 1-5, containing letters of John Adams, Elbridge Gerry, and John Langdon, written in 1813.

[6] Works of John Adams, III, 7, 8. I have accepted the account of this debate as found in John Adams’s autobiography, although it is possible that writing many years after its occurrence Adams may have confused it with the debate of October 7 on the Rhode Island resolutions.—Works of John Adams, I, 187.

[7] Journals of Continental Congress, October 6, 1775.

[8] Journals of Continental Congress, October 13, 1775. The armament of the second vessel was not determined until October 30, 1775.

[9] Ibid., October 17, 1775.

[10] Ibid., October 30, 1775. John Adams, in his Notes on Debates for October 30, 1775, reports George Ross of Pennsylvania as saying: “We can’t get seamen to man four vessels. We could not get seamen to man our boats, our galleys.” Adams also tells us that three of the Virginia members, Wythe, Nelson, and Lee, were “for fitting out four ships.”—Works of John Adams, II, 484.

[11] Works of John Adams, III, 9, 12.

[12] Appleton’s Cyclopedia of American Biography, III, 259.

[13] Journals of Continental Congress, September 19, 1776.

[14] Works of John Adams, II, 469-83. In one of these debates, according to Adams, George Wythe of Virginia said: “Why should not America have a navy? No maritime power near the seacoast can be safe without it. It is no chimera. The Romans suddenly built one in their Carthaginian war. Why may not we lay a foundation for it? We abound with firs, iron ore, tar, pitch, turpentine; we have all the materials for the construction of a navy.”—Works of John Adams, II, 479.

[15] See Chapter II, The Fleets of Washington and Arnold.

[16] Journals of Continental Congress, November 2, 1775.

[17] Ibid., November 10. Congress first ordered the marines to be raised from the Continental army, but on the objecting of Washington to such weakening of his forces, they were directed to be raised independent of the army.—Journals, November 10, 30, 1775; Ford, Writings of Washington, III, 225, 274.

[18] Journals of Continental Congress, November 23, 25, 28, 1775.

[19] Thomas Clark, Naval History of United States, II, 108.

[20] Pickering’s Statutes, 22, George II, chapter 33; title of act, “An act for amending, explaining, and reducing into one Act of Parliament, the laws relating to the government of his Majesty’s ships, vessels, and forces by sea.”

[21] King’s Regulations and Admiralty Instructions of 1772.

[22] Works of John Adams, III, 11. Certain words of John Adams in a letter dated, Philadelphia, April 28, 1776, have an interest in this connection: “I have vanity enough to take to myself a share in the merit of the American navy. It was always a measure that my heart was much engaged in, and I pursued it for a long time against the wind and tide, but at last obtained it.”—Force, American Archives, 4th, V, 1111.

[23] Ford, Writings of Washington, III, 165, 203-04, 213-14; Washington to President of Congress, October 5, November 8, 11, 1775. See Chapter II, page 67.

[24] Journals of Continental Congress, November 17, 23, 24, and 25. The Journals for November 25 contain the resolutions.

[25] Journals of Continental Congress, December 2, 1775.

[26] Ibid., December 5, 1775. This legislation refers to American vessels captured by the British and recaptured by the Americans.

[27] Ibid., December 9, 1775.

[28] Journals of Continental Congress, December 13 and 22, 1775.

[29] Ibid., January 6, 1776.

[30] Manuscript letters of John Adams, Massachusetts Historical Society; Warren to Adams, November 14, 1775; Chase to Adams, November 16 and 25, 1775.

[31] Collections of New York Historical Society, Deane Papers, I, 91-92.

[32] Works of John Adams, III, 12.

[33] M. I. J. Griffin, Commodore John Barry, 19; Pennsylvania Archives, 2nd, II, 668. In December, 1774, the “Black Prince” belonged to Thomas Willing, Robert Morris, Thomas Morris, John Wharton, and John Nixon.—Pa. Magazine of History and Biography, October, 1904, 495.

[34] Edward Field’s Esek Hopkins, 78-9.

[35] British Marine Encyclopedia, in Hogg’s Naval Magazine for 1801.

[36] Edward Field, State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, II, 422.

[37] Edward Field’s Esek Hopkins, 134, quotes from Drake’s Life of Knox.

[38] Sands, Life and Correspondence of John Paul Jones, 32.

[39] Journals of Continental Congress, December 22, 1775.

[40] Force, American Archives, 4th, IV, 360; letter to Earl of Dartmouth, dated Maryland, Dec. 20, 1775.

[41] Journals of Continental Congress, December 2, 1775, January 9 and 16, 1776. The Naval Committee spent $134,333 on the eight vessels which they fitted out.—Journals of Continental Congress, September 19, 1776.

[42] Records and Papers of Continental Congress, 78, III, 239-40, orders of Commodore Hopkins, signed by four members of the Naval Committee.

[43] Force, American Archives, 4th, V, 823.

[44] Ford, Writings of Washington, III, 299-300, 319. Washington wrote on January 4, 1776, to Joseph Reed: “I fear your fleet has been so long in fitting, and the destination of it so well known, that the end will be defeated, if the vessels escape.” In July, 1776, Dunmore’s fleet consisted of more than forty vessels, most of which, however, were probably unarmed, being occupied by refugee Tories.—Maryland Archives, XII, 24-25.

[45] Edward Field’s Esek Hopkins, 101; a copy of Hopkins’s orders is given.

[46] Papers of Esek Hopkins, Rhode Island Historical Society, an invoice of captured articles.

[47] Force, American Archives, 4th, V, 823, Hopkins to President of Congress, April, 1776, giving an account of the expedition.

[48] W. L. Clowes, Royal Navy, IV, 3, 4; Connecticut Gazette, April 12, 1776.

CHAPTER II
THE FLEETS OF WASHINGTON AND ARNOLD[49]

The first armed vessels that sailed under Continental pay and control were those that composed the little fleet fitted out by Washington in the ports of Massachusetts in the fall of 1775. As these vessels were manned by soldiers and were commanded by army officers, and were designed to weaken the army of the enemy by capturing his transports carrying supplies and troops, Washington was able to derive his authority for procuring and fitting out the fleet from his commission as commander-in-chief of the Continental army. The first vessel employed in this service was the schooner “Hannah,” commanded by Nicholson Broughton, a captain in the army. According to his instructions, issued September 2, 1775, and signed by Washington, Broughton was directed to proceed “immediately on a cruise against such vessels as may be found on the high seas, or elsewhere, bound inwards and outwards, to or from Boston, in the service of the Ministerial Army, and to take and seize all such vessels, laden with soldiers, arms, ammunition, or provisions, for or from said Army, or which you shall have good reason to suspect are in such service.” One-third of all captured cargoes were to be given to officers and crews as an encouragement. The proportions according to which the captors’ share was to be divided were fixed. The captain was to receive six times as much as a private. Prizes were to be sent to the “safest and nearest port to this camp.” Prisoners were to be treated with kindness and humanity. Broughton was directed to be exceedingly careful and frugal with his ammunition, and not to waste it in salutes.[50]

Not until a month after the fitting out of the “Hannah” did Washington begin to add to his naval force. On October 4 he appointed Colonel John Glover and Stephen Moylan agents to equip two vessels at Salem, Marblehead, or Newburyport, and they were directed to name suitable men for prize agents in the leading ports of Massachusetts.[51] When Washington received the letter of Congress of October 5 directing him to obtain two vessels from Massachusetts and to send them to the St. Lawrence river to intercept two British transports bound from London for Quebec, he ordered on this service, since Massachusetts at this time had no armed vessels, the schooners “Lynch,” Captain Nicholson Broughton, and “Franklin,” Captain John Selman, which had been or were being fitted out by Glover and Moylan.[52] In October and November four other small vessels, the schooners “Lee,” “Harrison,” and “Warren,” and the brigantine “Washington” were fitted out and sent cruising against the enemy’s transports. About the first of January, 1776, the schooner “Hancock” was added. Washington had the entire management of his fleet. Stephen Moylan, who was attached to his staff, conducted most of the correspondence with the captains and naval agents while Washington was at Cambridge.[53] Agents for fitting out the fleet and receiving its prizes were established in Plymouth, Boston, Lynn, Salem, Marblehead, Beverly, Newburyport, and Portsmouth, N. H. In January, 1776, Washington appointed John Manly commodore of the fleet. The other commanders thereby became subject to Manly’s orders.

With the exception of Manly, Washington had a poor opinion of the abilities of his commanders. On January 28 he wrote to Manly: “I wish you could inspire the captains of the other armed schooners under your command with some of your activity and industry.”[54] In November, 1775, he had written: “Our rascally privateersmen go on at the old rate, mutinying if they can not do as they please. Those at Plymouth, Beverly, and Portsmouth have done nothing worth mentioning in the prize way, and no account as yet received from those farther eastward,” referring to the “Lynch” and “Franklin,” whose commanders he feared “would not effect any good purpose.”[55] Early in December Washington was still more emphatic: “The plague, trouble, and vexation I have had with the crews of all the armed vessels, are inexpressible. I do believe there is not on earth a more disorderly set. Every time they come into port, we hear of nothing but mutinous complaints. Manly’s success has lately, and but lately, quieted his people. The crews of the Washington and Harrison have actually deserted them; so that I have been under the necessity of ordering the agent to lay the latter up, and get hands for the other on the best terms he could.”[56]

Notwithstanding the Commander-in-chief’s unfavorable judgment, it must be said that his fleet, upon the whole, was quite as successful as were other fleets of equal size and force during the Revolution. The vessels which composed it were small and lightly armed. Manly’s first vessel, the “Lee,” with which he rendered effective service, carried fifty men and four 4-pounders. The brigantine “Washington” was somewhat larger, mounting ten guns. Altogether the fleet captured some thirty-five prizes.[57] The first important capture, that of the brigantine “Nancy,” was an exceedingly timely one, and was made by Manly in the “Lee” on one of the last days of November, 1775. Among other stores the “Nancy” had on board 2,000 muskets, 100,000 flints, 30,000 round shot, more than 30 tons of musket shot, 11 mortar beds, and a brass mortar weighing 10,000 pounds. It would have taken the Americans eighteen months to have manufactured a like quantity of ordnance.[58] In June, 1776, the fleet, together with the “Defence” of the Connecticut navy, captured four British transports, which had on board besides a quantity of supplies upwards of three hundred and twenty Scottish troops.[59]

Washington’s fleet cruised chiefly off the Massachusetts coast. Broughton and Selman, whom Washington dispatched to the river St. Lawrence to intercept the two British transports, did not enter the river at all. After making several unauthorized captures, they turned their attention to the island of St. Johns, now Prince Edward island. Here they pillaged the defenceless inhabitants, and robbed the houses of the Governor and Acting-Governor of plate, carpets, curtains, mirrors, table linen, and wearing apparel. They made prisoners of the Acting-Governor and two other leading men of the island, whose families were left in great distress. Washington was highly indignant at these unwarranted acts of his captains, and at once on their arrival in Massachusetts he released their three prisoners.[60]

Moved by the need for a proper judicial tribunal to try the prize cases arising from captures made by his vessels, Washington on November 11, 1775, wrote to Congress on the subject. He enclosed in his letter a copy of the Massachusetts law establishing admiralty courts, and explained that this law did not apply to the captures made by Continental vessels. “Should not a court,” he asked, “be established by authority of Congress, to take cognizance of prizes made by the Continental vessels? Whatever the mode is, which they are pleased to adopt, there is an absolute necessity of its being speedily determined on, for I can not spare time from military affairs to give proper attention to these matters.” As early as October 5 Washington had requested the “determination of Congress, as to the property and disposal of such vessels and cargoes, as are designed for the supply of the enemy, and may fall into our hands.” On November 8 he called the attention of Congress to the same subject. On December 4 and December 14 he again urged Congress to establish a Continental prize court.[61] Finally, on December 20 Congress resolved that the several vessels heretofore carried into Massachusetts by the armed vessels in the service of the United Colonies should be “proceeded against by the rules of the law of nations, and libelled in the courts of admiralty erected in said colony.”[62] The method of procedure which Congress here established was followed throughout the Revolution in all prize cases arising from captures made by Continental vessels. Congress permitted the states to exercise original jurisdiction in all Continental prize cases, and reserved to itself appellate jurisdiction, so far as it had power to do so.

It is recalled that Congress, on November 25, 1775, having under consideration the report of a committee on Washington’s letter of November 8, determined the kinds of British property which should be subject to capture, fixed the shares of prizes, and established certain forms of procedure in the trial of prize cases.[63] The lack of correspondence between these resolutions and the Massachusetts law of November 1, establishing admiralty courts, caused long and serious delays in bringing the Continental prizes to trial. Washington, on April 25, 1776, wrote from New York: “I have not yet heard, that there has been any trial of the prizes carried into Massachusetts Bay. This procrastination is attended with very bad consequences. Some of the vessels I had fitted out are now laid up, the crews being dissatisfied that they cannot get their prize money. I have tired the Congress on this subject, but the importance of it makes me again mention, that, if a summary way of proceeding is not resolved on, it will be impossible to get our vessels manned.”[64]

On the evacuation of Boston by the British in March, 1776, Washington soon removed his headquarters to New York. He left his fleet in charge of General Artemas Ward, who reported its movements to him. In February, 1777, the Marine Committee of Congress ordered the Continental agent at Boston to pay off and discharge the fleet.[65] In March the Marine Committee appointed three commissioners to settle the accounts of Washington’s prize agents.[66] These commissioners had not completed their task in April, 1778.[67]

In April, 1776, immediately upon Washington’s arrival in New York, he began to equip a fleet similar to the one at Boston. He requested from the New York Committee of Safety the loan of their state vessels, which he wished to use in suppressing illicit trade with the enemy. Some disagreement arose as to the terms of the loan. Washington insisted that if he manned the “General Schuyler,” he would expect to appoint her officers. In the end, the “General Schuyler” was turned over to Washington, and the captain of the “General Putnam” was directed to obey his orders.[68] Washington now obtained from other sources the sloop “General Mifflin.” These vessels, which cruised during the summer of 1776 chiefly in the neighborhood of Long Island, and usually with the New York state sloop “Montgomery,” captured several British vessels.[69] In the summer of 1776 Washington was constructing some “gondolas,” row-galleys, and fire-ships, for the defence of the Hudson. The galley “Lady Washington,” which was manned and completed by the summer of 1776, was still in service on the Hudson in June, 1777.[70]

In the significance of their results the operations of no other naval armament of the Americans during the Revolution compare with those of Arnold’s fleet on Lake Champlain in the fall of 1776. On May 31, 1775, the Continental Congress desired the New York Provincial Congress “to take effectual care that a sufficient number of batteaus be immediately provided for the lakes.”[71] Major-General Schuyler commanded the Continental forces in this region, including the naval armaments upon the Lakes. These last, in September, consisted of a sloop, a schooner, two row-galleys, and ten “batteaus.”[72] About the first of August the New York Provincial Congress sent James Smith to Schuyler to take command of the sloop “Enterprise.”[73] Smith either received or gave to himself the title of “Commodore on the Lakes.” He did not long hold this title; for in March, 1776, the Continental Congress appointed Major William Douglass of New York, “Commodore on the Lakes,” a place for which General Schuyler had recommended Captain Jacobus Wynkoop, of the same state.[74] In April Wynkoop was enlisting seamen in New York City.[75] In May, since Douglass did not enter upon his appointment, Schuyler, acting under the orders of Congress, put the armed vessels under the command of Wynkoop.[76]

About the first of July, 1776, the American forces were driven out of Canada. They retreated southward as far as the forts on the Lakes. The holding of Lakes Champlain and George, which were a strategic part of the line of communication between Canada and the Hudson, now became a matter of vital importance. Providing against a possible failure in Canada, Congress, Washington, and Schuyler had, in May and early June, been increasing the effectiveness of the naval armament on the Lakes. On June 17 Congress ordered Schuyler to build “with all expedition, as many galleys and armed vessels as, in the opinion of himself and the general officer to be sent into Canada, shall be sufficient to make us indisputable masters of the lakes Champlain and George.” A master carpenter, acquainted with the construction of the galleys used on the Delaware, other carpenters, and models of galleys, if required, were to be sent on from Philadelphia.[77]

Towards the end of June, Brigadier-General Benedict Arnold, recognizing the supreme importance of maintaining a naval superiority on the Lakes, began to exert an influence in naval affairs. Arnold was not without marine experience; as a resident of New Haven, engaged in the West India trade, he had sometimes commanded his own ships. On June 25, 1776, he wrote to Washington: “It now appears to me of the utmost importance that the Lakes be immediately secured by a large number (at least twenty or thirty) of gondolas, row-galleys, and floating batteries.... I think it absolutely necessary that three hundred carpenters be immediately employed.”[78] Towards the end of July, General Gates appointed Arnold to command the naval forces on the Lakes. Wynkoop, who held a similar command by virtue of an appointment from Congress and Schuyler, refused to yield to Arnold. He was thereupon arrested by Gates and sent as a prisoner to Schuyler.[79]

During July and August, 1776, Skenesborough, at the head of Lake Champlain, was the scene of the greatest naval activity. Requisitions were made upon Pennsylvania, New York, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts for carpenters. Naval stores and munitions of war of all sorts, sail-cloth, cordage, anchors, cannon, and ammunition were sent to the Lakes from the seaboard, especially from New York and Connecticut. Seamen were hurried forward. On August 13 the Governor and Council of Safety of Connecticut voted £180 to Captain Seth Warner of Saybrook to enable him to raise a crew of forty seamen for the naval service on the Lakes. These men were “to receive a bounty of £6 for inlisting; and for finding themselves blankets, 12s; guns, 6s; and cartouch-box and belt and knapsack, 2s; and one month’s wages being 48s advanced, according to proclamation.” On August 16 the Governor and Council of Safety authorized two other companies to be raised.[80] In September Gates understood that two hundred seamen had been enlisted in New York city.[81]

On July 24, 1776, Arnold wrote from Skenesborough to Gates: “I arrived here last evening, and found three gondolas on the stocks; two will be completed in five or six days, the row galley in eight or ten days. Three other gondolas will be set up immediately, and may be completed in ten days. A company of twenty-seven carpenters from Middletown are cutting timber for a row-galley, on the Spanish construction, to mount six heavy pieces of cannon. One hundred carpenters from Pennsylvania and Massachusetts will be here this evening. I shall employ them on another row-galley. In two or three weeks, I think we shall have a formidable fleet. No canvass or cordage is yet arrived, though much wanted.”[82] Through strenuous exertions the American fleet on the Lakes was greatly increased and strengthened. By October it consisted of one sloop, three schooners, eight “gondolas,” and four galleys, mounting a total of 94 cannon, 2-pounders to 18-pounders. With a full complement, the fleet would have carried 856 men. It probably numbered about 700 officers and men, such as they were.[83] Arnold said that he had a “wretched motley crew in the fleet; the marines the refuse of every regiment, and the seamen few of them ever wet with salt water.” Many of his seamen and marines were almost naked.[84]

During the first days of October the naval superiority on the Lakes shifted to the British. General Sir Guy Carleton, the British commander, drawing upon superior naval resources, had outbuilt Arnold. Early in October Carleton’s fleet consisted of one ship, two schooners, one “radeau,” one large “gondola,” twenty gunboats, and four armed tenders. Some of these vessels and the material for others he had brought from the St. Lawrence up the Richelieu. The ship “Enterprise,” eighteen 12-pounders, 180 tons burden, whose construction had been begun at Quebec, he thus transported in pieces. She was set up at St. Johns, on the Richelieu, where the British shipyard was situated. This vessel in size and armament greatly exceeding any one craft of the Americans. A fleet of transports and ships of war in the St. Lawrence furnished Carleton with seven hundred experienced officers and seamen.[85]

The two fleets engaged each other on Lake Champlain on October 11, 12, and 13, 1776. Ten of the American vessels were captured or destroyed. General Waterbury, second in command, and 110 prisoners, were captured. In killed and wounded Arnold lost about eighty men; and the British forty. The British were left in command of the Lake; the Americans retreated to Ticonderoga.[86]

Although most decisively defeated in the battle upon the Lake, Arnold had delayed the advance of the British some two or three months, while they were obtaining a naval superiority. This delay had far-reaching consequences. Carleton now found the season too late to pursue his advantage, and to make, or attempt to make, a juncture with Howe to the southward. He therefore soon returned to winter quarters at Montreal. When Burgoyne, in 1777, repeated the attempt to penetrate to the Hudson, Howe’s removal of his army to the Chesapeake in his movement against Philadelphia, deprived Burgoyne’s army of the support on the Hudson, which it might have had in the fall of 1776. It has been strikingly said, by Captain Mahan, that Arnold’s and Carleton’s naval campaign on Lake Champlain was a “strife of pigmies for the prize of a continent.” Although the American flotilla was wiped out, “never had any force, big or small, lived to better purpose, or died more gloriously; for it had saved the Lake for that year.”[87]

FOOTNOTES:

[49] This chapter, which is presented here for chronological reasons, is not closely related to the main narrative, which will be resumed at the beginning of Chapter III.

[50] Force, American Archives, 4th, III, 633-34, Instructions to Broughton.

[51] Force, American Archives, 4th, III, 946.

[52] See Chapter I, The Naval Committee, page 37; Ford, Writings of Washington, III, 174-5.

[53] Moylan had been for some months a member of Washington’s official household before he was appointed aide-de-camp in March, 1776.

[54] Ford, Writings of Washington, III, 382-83.

[55] Ibid., 231-32, Washington to Joseph Reed, November 20, 1775.

[56] Ford, Writings of Washington, III, 261-62, Washington to President of Congress, December 4, 1775.

[57] This calculation is made chiefly from accounts of the vessels found in Force’s American Archives and Ford’s Writings of Washington.

[58] Ford, Writings of Washington, III, 252 and note; Letters of John Adams, Massachusetts Historical Society, William Tudor to John Adams, December 3, 1775.

[59] Boston Gazette, July 6, 1776.

[60] Force, American Archives, 4th, IV, 451-52, Memorial of Philip Callbeck and Thomas Wright; Ford, Writings of Washington, III, 175 and note, 261-62 and note. H. E. Waite, Origin of American Navy, 26-28. Report on Canadian Archives, 1895, Prince Edward Island, 15-16. The number of vessels captured by Broughton and Selman on this cruise has been given by Elbridge Gerry as ten and by Selman as seven. Both figures are probably too high.

[61] Ford, Writings of Washington, III, 165, 203-04, 213-214, 251-58, 274.

[62] Journals of Continental Congress, December 20, 1775.

[63] See Chapter I, The Naval Committee, page 48. It would seem that Congress, by its resolutions of November 25, intended to give colonial courts original jurisdiction in Continental prize cases. Washington did not so understand these resolutions. See his letter of December 14, 1775, to the President of Congress, and his letter of December 26, 1775, to R. H. Lee.

[64] Ford, Writings of Washington, III, 404; IV, 44, 45.

[65] Marine Committee Letter Book, Robert Morris, Vice-President of the Marine Committee, to John Bradford, Continental agent at Boston, February 7, 1777. The “Lee,” Captain Skimmer, was still in the Continental service in November, 1777, when the Navy Board was ordered to discharge Skimmer, and to take the “Lee” into the regular Continental navy, if she was adapted for it.—Marine Committee Letter Book, Committee to Navy Board at Boston, November 22, 1777.

[66] Marine Committee Letter Book, Committee to the three Commissioners, March 21, 1777.

[67] Journals of Continental Congress, April 9, 1778.

[68] Journals of New York Committee of Safety, April 24, May 10, 1776.

[69] The movements of these vessels may be followed in Force’s American Archives, Ford’s Writings of Washington, and the Journals of the New York Provincial Congress and Committee of Safety.

[70] Journals of Continental Congress, May 30, 1776; Force, American Archives, 5th, I, 1263; Journals of New York Provincial Congress, June 7, 1777.

[71] Journals of Continental Congress, May 31, 1775.

[72] Force, American Archives, 4th, III, 738.

[73] Ibid., 11, 14.

[74] Journals of Continental Congress, March 26, 1776; Journals of New York Committee of Safety, March 18, 1776.

[75] Journals of New York Committee of Safety, April 24, 1776.

[76] Force, American Archives, 5th, I, 1186, 1277; Journals of New York Provincial Congress, March 16, 1776; Journals of Continental Congress, May 2, 1776.

[77] Journals of Continental Congress, May 22, May 25, June 17, 1776; Ford, Writings of Washington, IV, 101.

[78] Force, American Archives, 4th, VI, 1107-08.

[79] Ibid., 5th, I, 1186-87.

[80] Colonial Records of Connecticut, XV, 500, 503. The rolls of these three Connecticut companies, containing eighty-five names, will be found in the Connecticut Historical Society Collections, VIII, 235-37.

[81] Force, American Archives, 5th, II, 186.

[82] Ibid., I, 563.

[83] Force, American Archives, 5th, II, 1039. One galley which was fitting at Ticonderoga is not included in the above list. The exact number of men in Arnold’s fleet is uncertain.

[84] Ibid., 481, 834.

[85] Force, American Archives, 5th, II, 1178-79; Clowes, Royal Navy, III, 353-370, Chapter XXXI, written by Captain A. T. Mahan.

[86] Force, American Archives, 5th, II, 1079-80; Almon’s Remembrancer, 1777, 356.

[87] Clowes, Royal Navy, III, 363, 368. In the campaign of Burgoyne, in July, 1777, the British destroyed or captured a small American flotilla at Skenesborough.—Winsor, Narrative and Critical History, VI, 297.

CHAPTER III
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE MARINE COMMITTEE

In the years immediately preceding the Revolution the four New England colonies were largely engaged in shipbuilding, fishing, whaling, and commerce. The forests of Maine and New Hampshire afforded incomparable oaks and white pines for ships. Indeed, not a few of these trees were sealed for the use of the Royal Navy, and their high quality authenticated, by the mark of the “King’s broad arrow.” New England’s hardy dwellers on the seacoast had long engaged in fishing on the Newfoundland banks, or in whaling in many seas, and had bred a race of sailors. The Atlantic withheld few secrets from the bold Yankee skippers. They were equally at home in the coastwise navigation, reaching from Nova Scotia to Florida, in deep-sea voyages to the motherland or the Continent, in skirting the Guinea coast in quest of its dark-skinned trade, or in slipping down the trade winds with canvas set for the sunny sugar islands of the West Indies or the Spanish Main. In no other section of the revolting colonies was the first formal movement for the building of a Continental navy so likely to be made as in New England. Here were ships, sailors, and a knowledge of the sea.

Certainly not a whit behind the other three New England states in nautical interests was little sea-cleft Rhode Island. In the establishing of state navies she had moved first, and on June 15, 1775, had put two vessels in commission. On the same day her Commodore Whipple captured an armed tender of the British frigate “Rose”—the first authorized capture made by the Americans at sea during the Revolution.[88] Already her coasts and her trade were being annoyed by the enemy. It was then in keeping with her maritime character, with her forwardness in naval enterprise, and with her needs for defence, that her Assembly should have instructed her two delegates to the Continental Congress, on August 26, 1775, “to use their whole influence, at the ensuing Congress, for building at the Continental expense, a Fleet of sufficient force for the protection of these Colonies, and for employing them in such manner and places as will most effectually annoy our enemies, and contribute to the common defence of these Colonies.” The Assembly was persuaded that an American fleet “would greatly and essentially conduce to the preservation of the lives, liberty, and property of the good people of these Colonies.”[89]

The naval situation in Congress during the fall of 1775 and the winter of 1775-76 should be clearly understood. The debates and legislation of Congress concerning naval affairs are attached, as it were, to two threads. One thread, beginning with the appointment of a committee, on October 5, 1775, to prepare a plan for intercepting two British transports, has already been unraveled. The other, which had its origin in the introduction in Congress of the Rhode Island instructions, will now be followed.

The delegates of Rhode Island to the Congress in the fall of 1775 were two sterling patriots, Samuel Ward and Stephen Hopkins. Each had been governor of Rhode Island, and each had grown old in the public service. Once bitter political rivals, they were now yoked together in the common cause of their state and country. On October 3, 1775, one of the Rhode Island delegates, presumably Samuel Ward, laid before Congress the instructions of his state in behalf of a Continental fleet. On this day the consideration of the instructions went over until the 6th, and on the 6th until the 7th.[90]

When the Rhode Island instructions came up on October 7, a debate ensued, a synopsis of which has been left us by John Adams.[91] The discussion was participated in by Robert Treat Paine, Samuel Adams, and John Adams of Massachusetts, John Rutledge and Christopher Gadsden of South Carolina, Samuel Chase of Maryland, Stephen Hopkins of Rhode Island, Dr. John J. Zubly of Georgia, Eliphalet Dyer and Silas Deane of Connecticut, and Peyton Randolph of Virginia. When the debate took place, the consideration of the Rhode Island instructions had been postponed until the 16th, and the motion before the Congress was to appoint a committee “to consider the whole subject.”

The establishing of a navy naturally found least favor among the members coming from the agricultural South, and most support from those of maritime New England. Chase, of Maryland, declared, “It is the maddest idea in the world to think of building an American fleet; its latitude is wonderful; we should mortgage the whole continent.” He added, however: “We should provide, for gaining intelligence, two swift sailing vessels.” Zubly, of Georgia, said: “If the plans of some gentlemen are to take place, an American fleet must be a part of it, extravagant as it is.” Gadsden, of South Carolina, temperately favored the procuring of armed vessels, thinking that it was “absolutely necessary that some plan of defence, by sea, should be adopted.” He was opposed to the “extensiveness of the Rhode Island plan,” although he thought that it should be considered. The friends of the navy acted on the defensive. They probably realized that their cause might well bide its time. Its opponents, to use John Adams’s phrase, were “lightly skirmishing.” In the end the motion was lost, and consideration of the instructions was deferred until the 16th.

On October 16, and again on November 16, the Rhode Island instructions were postponed.[92] Samuel Ward had hopes for a favorable action on the latter day. On November 16 he wrote from Philadelphia to his brother in Rhode Island: “Our instruction for an American fleet has been long upon the table. When it was first presented, it was looked upon as perfectly chimerical; but gentlemen now consider it in a very different light. It is this day to be taken into consideration, and I have great hopes of carrying it. Dr. Franklin, Colonel Lee, the two Adamses, and many others, will support it. If it succeeds, I shall remember your ideas of our building two of the ships.”[93]

The several postponements of the Rhode Island instructions make it clear that Congress was slow to reach the conclusion that the “building of a fleet” was desirable or feasible. It was one thing to fit out a few small vessels for intercepting British transports, and quite another to build a fleet of frigates. It is not surprising that under the circumstances Congress hesitated to embark on the larger undertaking. The difference in the presentation to Congress of the two propositions, both of which involved the procuring of a naval armament, is worthy of note, for it had its influence on legislation. The appointment of a committee to prepare a plan for intercepting transports, put the question in a softened, more veiled, and less direct form. It pointed the wedge of naval legislation by a tactful presentation, and drove it home with an exigency.

In Chapter I the increase of sentiment in favor of a naval armament during the latter part of October and during November has been shown, and the important naval legislation of November has been presented. It was now only a question of time until Congress would heed the recommendations of Rhode Island. On December 9, 1775, the Rhode Island instructions once more came up, and a day for their consideration was fixed, Monday, December 11.[94] On the 11th, “agreeable to the order of the day, the Congress took into consideration the instructions given to the delegates of Rhode Island;” whereupon a committee of twelve was appointed to devise ways and means for furnishing these colonies with a naval armament.[95] This committee performed its work with commendable celerity, and brought in, on December 13, one of the most important reports in the history of the naval affairs under the Revolution, for by its acceptance Congress committed itself to the establishment of a considerable naval force. Congress determined to build thirteen frigates, five of 32, five of 28, and three of 24 guns, to be distributed, as regards the place of their construction, among the states as follows: New Hampshire, one; Massachusetts, two; Rhode Island, two; Connecticut, one; New York, two; Pennsylvania, four; and Maryland, one. It was estimated that these ships would cost on the average $66,666.67 each, and that their whole cost would amount to $866,666.67. All the materials for fitting them for sea would be procured in America except canvas and gunpowder.[96]

On December 14 a committee consisting of one member from each colony was chosen by ballot to take charge of the building and fitting out of these vessels. The members chosen with their states were as follows: Josiah Bartlett, New Hampshire; John Hancock, Massachusetts; Stephen Hopkins, Rhode Island; Silas Deane, Connecticut; Francis Lewis, New York; Stephen Crane, New Jersey; Robert Morris, Pennsylvania; George Read, Delaware; Samuel Chase, Maryland; R. H. Lee, Virginia; Joseph Hewes, North Carolina; Christopher Gadsden, South Carolina; John Houston, Georgia.[97] This committee was substantially the same as that which reported the naval increase on the 13th; the only changes were in the members from Massachusetts and Maryland, and in the addition of a member from Georgia. The committee was a very able one, comprising several of the foremost men of the Revolution. Hancock, Morris, Hopkins, and Hewes were especially interested in naval and maritime affairs. The absence of the name of John Adams is probably accounted for by his return home early in December.

This new committee was soon designated as the Marine Committee, by which name it was referred to throughout the Revolution. Larger, and, with its engrossing work of building and fitting out the thirteen frigates, more active than the Naval Committee, it soon overshadowed and finally absorbed its colleague. This absorption was facilitated no doubt by the fact that the four members of the Naval Committee remaining in January, 1776, also belonged to the new committee. With the exception of the rendering of its accounts, the duties of the Naval Committee came to an end with the sailing of Hopkins’s fleet in February, 1776.[98] The Marine Committee now acquired a firm grasp of the naval business of the colonies, and from this time until December, 1779, it was the recognized and responsible head of the Naval Department, and as such, during the period that saw the rise and partial decline of the Continental navy, its history is of prime importance.

The Marine Committee like the Naval Committee had at Philadelphia an office of its own, and held its sessions in the evening. Its officers consisted of a chairman or president, a vice-president, and a secretary.[99] Its clerical force comprised one or more clerks. On June 6, 1777, Congress resolved that five of its members—which number thereafter constituted a quorum—should form a “board” for the transaction of business.[100] Each of the thirteen states had one member on the Committee. Rarely did more than one-half of the Committee’s members attend its sessions. Its personnel was continually changing. This was necessitated in part by a similar change in the membership of Congress; as the old members retired, the new ones filled their places. The members of the Marine Committee received no pay for their naval services as such. Each state of course paid its member of the Committee for his services as a delegate to the Continental Congress. The wages of the secretary of the Committee and of its clerical force varied. On June 16, 1778, the Committee was permitted to raise the wages of its clerks to $100 a month.[101] The secretary was paid at the rate of $8,000 a year after November 2, 1778.[102] During 1778 and 1779 Congress was raising the salaries of its executive employees because of the depreciation of the currency.

The most responsible duties of the Committee naturally fell to the four or five members oldest in its service. From this class it drew its chairmen. Three out of the five men who are known to have filled this office were on the first list of the Committee’s members. During possibly all of 1776, and for a part of 1777, courtly John Hancock presided over the Marine Committee, while at the same time he dignified the chair of the President of Congress. In December, 1777, Henry Laurens of South Carolina had succeeded to both of Hancock’s positions.[103] In 1778 and 1779 the mantles of the first leaders in naval administration, whether they exactly fitted or not, were worn by Richard Henry Lee, “one of the fine fellows from Virginia”; Samuel Adams of Massachusetts; and William Whipple of New Hampshire. Lee was chairman in the summer of 1778. Probably before December of that year, certainly by that time, Adams had succeeded him.[104] Adams in turn yielded in June, 1779, to Whipple, who continued to fill the office until the Committee was superseded by a Board of Admiralty in December, 1779.

There were other members besides the chairmen upon whose shoulders rested the burden of the naval business. Morris, Hewes, and Hopkins have been previously mentioned as members who were deeply interested in naval affairs. Morris was for a time vice-president of the Committee. During the winter of 1776-77, while Congress was at Baltimore, he remained in Philadelphia, and, for a time, practically without assistance from the Committee, administered the naval affairs of the colonies. William Ellery of Rhode Island, who on October 13, 1776, succeeded Hopkins, showed zeal in the business of the navy. The work of Francis Lewis of New York deserves mention. No doubt there were other members whose naval services were considerable. Unfortunately, time has been careless with many of the records of the Marine Committee.

In carrying out the resolutions of Congress of December 13, 1775, authorizing the building of thirteen frigates, the Marine Committee employed agents to superintend the work. These agents, who were variously designated, were residents of the colonies in which they were employed, and their selection was usually determined by local advice and influence. The New Hampshire frigate, the “Raleigh,” 32, was built at Portsmouth under the direction of John Langdon, formerly a member of the Naval Committee, but now Continental agent at Portsmouth. He employed three master-builders, who completed the frigate within less than sixty days after raising it.[105] The Massachusetts frigates, the “Hancock,” 32, and the “Boston,” 24, were built at Salisbury and Newburyport, under the direction of an agent.[106]

The Rhode Island vessels, the “Warren,” 32, and the “Providence,” 28, were constructed at Providence, under the superintendence of a committee of twelve influential men of that city, who were appointed by Stephen Hopkins, the Rhode Island member of the Marine Committee. Certain complaints were lodged with the Marine Committee against the committee at Providence. One of these was made by Commodore Hopkins, who charged that the “Providence” and the “Warren” had cost twice as much as their contract price, “owing to some of the very committee that built the ships taking the workmen and the stock agreed for off to work and fit their privateers, and even threatening the workmen if they did not work for them.”[107] When in the fall of 1776 the Marine Committee wrote to the committee, blaming its members for some of their proceedings, they relinquished their authority over the two vessels to Stephen Hopkins.[108]

The “Trumbull” was built under the direction of agents at Chatham on the Connecticut river.[109] Two other frigates were begun in Connecticut in 1777, the “Confederacy,” 36, on the Thames river between Norwich and New London, and the “Bourbon,” 28, at Chatham on the Connecticut. Each of these two frigates was constructed under a superintendent responsible to Governor Jonathan Trumbull and the Connecticut Council of Safety.[110] Two Commissioners at Poughkeepsie, New York, had charge of the work on the “Montgomery,” 28, and “Congress,” 24. The Marine Committee kept fairly well in its own hands the direction of the building at Philadelphia of the Pennsylvania frigates, the “Randolph,” 32, the “Washington,” 32, the “Effingham,” 28, and the “Delaware,” 24. The “Virginia,” 28, was built at Baltimore, Maryland, with the assistance of the Baltimore Committee of Observation.[111] When under the resolves of Congress of November 20, 1776, two frigates were begun at the Gosport navy-yard in Virginia, the work was placed in charge of two commissioners and a master-builder. Richard Henry Lee, the Virginia member of the Marine Committee, made the contract with the master-builder.[112]

The need of some one to receive and dispose of prizes soon led to the appointment of “agents for prizes” in the leading seaports of the colonies. On April 23, 1776, Congress, on the recommendation of the Marine Committee, appointed prize agents as follows: One at Boston; one at Providence; one at New London, Connecticut; one at New York; two at Philadelphia; one at Baltimore; one at Williamsburg, Virginia; and one each at Wilmington, Newbern, and Edenton, North Carolina.[113] On June 25, 1776, Congress appointed an agent at Portsmouth, New Hampshire.[114] In November, 1776, the Marine Committee selected two prize agents for South Carolina and one for Georgia.[115] This list was not completed until September 1, 1779, when Congress appointed a prize agent for New Jersey.[116] These agents had charge of all Continental prizes sent into their respective states. By far the most important agency was that of John Bradford at Boston. It may be estimated that one-half of all the prizes captured by the Continental vessels in American waters were ordered to Boston. The naval port second in importance was Philadelphia.

The duties of the prize agents were to libel all of the Continental prizes sent into their jurisdiction, see that the prizes were tried by the proper admiralty court; and after they had been legally condemned, to sell them, and make an equitable distribution of the proceeds, in accordance with the resolutions of Congress governing the sharing of prizes. The prize agents were directed by the Marine Committee to render to it a quarterly statement showing the prizes received, sales effected, and distributions of the proceeds made.[117]

The same men who were prize agents were also as a rule “Continental agents,” in which latter capacity they served the various administrative organs of Congress, including the Marine Committee. They assisted the Committee and commander-in-chief of the fleet in purchasing, refitting, provisioning, and manning the armed vessels. The naval services of some of these men, both as prize agents and as Continental agents, were so considerable as to render their names worthy of mention. Most conspicuous among the several naval agents were John Bradford of Boston, John Nixon and John Maxwell Nesbit of Philadelphia, John Langdon of Portsmouth, New Hampshire, Nathaniel Shaw, jr., of New London, and Daniel Tillinghast of Providence.

The governors and legislatures of the colonies and other local governmental authorities often aided the Committee in its work. The work of Governor Trumbull and the Connecticut Council of Safety in the building of the Continental frigates in that state has already been noted. In the latter part of 1776 the New York Convention attempted in behalf of the Marine Committee to secure the two Continental frigates at Poughkeepsie from the British when they occupied the lower Hudson. Such illustrations could be multiplied. In two services so closely connected as the navy and the army, the officers and agents of one were naturally now and then called upon to serve the other. They borrowed from and lent to each other cannon, ammunition, and military stores. The Commissaries of one and the Navy Boards of the other had mutual dealings. The Commissary-General of Prisoners of the Army had much to do with the care of the marine prisoners.

Towards the close of 1776 the unsatisfactory state of the naval business, together with its increase and its growing complexity, forced home upon the Committee the necessity of providing some permanent force to take charge of the details of naval administration. Accordingly, on November 6, 1776, Congress at the instance of the Marine Committee resolved “that three persons, well skilled in maritime affairs, be immediately appointed to execute the business of the navy, under the direction of the marine committee.”[118] Later in the same month John Nixon, John Wharton, and Francis Hopkinson were selected as suitable persons for this work, all three living within or near Philadelphia.

Nixon with his experience as a shipping merchant was probably best fitted for his task. Fancy may discern a poetic fitness in his choice, since he had been the owner of the “Alfred,” the first vessel of the American navy. Nixon also had the distinction of being the first man to read publicly the Declaration of Independence. Wharton belonged to the distinguished Philadelphia family of that name. Of the three men, Hopkinson probably had the widest culture. At the outbreak of the Revolution he was practicing law at Bordentown, New Jersey. He was one of the Signers of the Declaration of Independence. From 1779 to 1789 he was judge of the Admiralty Court of Pennsylvania. He is best known, however, not for his substantial services, but as the author of the humorous ballad, the “Battle of the Kegs.”

On April 19, 1777, Congress on the motion of John Adams decided to form a similar board for the New England states, the members of which were to “reside at or in the neighborhood of Boston, in the state of Massachusetts Bay, with a power to adjourn to any part of New England; who shall have the superintendence of all naval and marine affairs of these United States within the four eastern states, under the direction of the marine committee.”[119] Adams secured the filling of this board with some difficulty owing to the indifference of Congress to its establishment. Finally, nine men were nominated, and on May 6 three of these were chosen commissioners, James Warren of Plymouth, Massachusetts; William Vernon of Providence, Rhode Island; and John Deshon of New London, Connecticut.[120]

Foremost of the three Commissioners was Warren, an eminent patriot, who had been President of the Massachusetts Provincial Congress and also of the Massachusetts Board of War. He was an intimate friend of John and Samuel Adams, and, it is said, much resembled the latter in character. Vernon, who served as President of the Navy Board, was a most distinguished Newport merchant and one of the most self-sacrificing of patriots. During the Revolution he advanced large sums of money to the government, which were only in part repaid. Before the war his trade extended to all the maritime nations of Europe and to the West Indies and Africa.[121] Deshon was of Huguenot descent. He was conspicuous in the Revolutionary party of New London, and was a captain in his state’s military forces. He rendered much assistance in fitting out the Connecticut navy.

These two boards were variously designated in the official documents of the time. The one was most frequently called the Navy Board of the Middle Department or District, or the Navy Board at Philadelphia, Bordentown, or Baltimore, according to its location; and the other, the Navy Board of the Eastern Department or District, or the Navy Board at Boston. The Navy Board at Philadelphia was at first referred to as the Continental Navy Board, or the Board of Assistants. These two names indicate that when the board at Philadelphia was formed, the establishing of a second board was not in contemplation. The Navy Board at Philadelphia seems to have taken little or no part in the naval affairs in New England. It was hardly settled in its work before the Navy Board at Boston was created. Attention should be called to the fact that the offices of Navy Board and of Commissioner of the Navy had long been established in the British navy. The British offices served in some degree as models to Congress and the Marine Committee.[122]

Each board had a secretary, treasurer, and paymaster; but one person sometimes served in two, or even the three, capacities. Each board had one, and sometimes two clerks. A clerkship was at times joined with one of the other offices. The boards as a rule selected their own employees. Any two members of the Navy Board at Boston were empowered by Congress on October 23, 1777, to form a quorum.[123]

With the exception of the resignation of Deshon in May, 1781, the Navy Board at Boston did not change in personnel. Its headquarters remained continually at Boston. On the other hand, the membership of the Navy Board at Philadelphia made several changes. On May 9, 1778, William Smith of Baltimore was elected in the place of John Nixon, who had resigned.[124] On August 19, Hopkinson and Smith having resigned, Captain Nathaniel Falconer and James Searle, both of Pennsylvania, were appointed.[125] Falconer declined the appointment; Searle accepted, but resigned on September 26.[126] Meanwhile, Wharton had resigned, and the three commissionerships were vacant. On November 4, 1778, the vacancies were filled by the reappointment of Wharton, and the selection of James Read of Delaware, the clerk and paymaster of the Board, and William Winder,[127] a captain in the military forces of Maryland and a judge of the court of appeals of Somerset county in that state. When in December, 1776, Philadelphia seemed to be in danger from the enemy, Congress and the Board retreated to Baltimore, where they spent the winter of 1776-1777. The fortunes of war compelled the Board in the fall of 1777 to retreat to Bordentown, New Jersey; and after the American fleet in the Delaware was destroyed, the Marine Committee early in 1778 ordered it to Baltimore,[128] where it was situated for a few months. In the summer of 1778 it returned permanently to Philadelphia.

The salary of a commissioner of the navy was first fixed at $1,500 a year. On October 31, 1778, “in consideration of the extensive business of their departments,” this salary was raised to $3,000, and on November 12, 1779, on the depreciation of the currency, to $12,000. It was reduced on September 25, 1780, to $1,500, and was now paid quarterly in specie or its equivalent. The salaries of the employees of the Navy Boards underwent like variations. Beginning with $500, they advanced in some instances as high as $2,000 a year. On August 4, 1778, the clerk of the Navy Board at Boston was made a special allowance of $500, “in consideration of the great and constant business,” in which he had been engaged.[129]

To recapitulate, the chief agents of the Marine Committee were these: the Navy-Boards, the prize agents, the Continental agents, and the agents for building vessels. After the creation of the Navy Boards, the latter three classes served in part as their sub-agents; but by no means entirely so, for the Marine Committee gave many orders over the heads of the Boards.

The Marine Committee and its principal agents employed many minor agents. One illustration, taken from the work of the Navy Boards as purveyors of the navy, will suffice to show the subordinate character of the services which these minor agents rendered. It is recorded that the Navy Board at Boston had in its employ in New Hampshire “a contractor of beef for the navy,” who in turn had in his employ a single drover, that by September, 1779, had purchased more than one thousand head of cattle for the use of the Navy Board at Boston.[130]

FOOTNOTES:

[88] See Chapter XVII, The Minor Navies of the Northern States.

[89] Force, American Archives, 4th, III, 231; Sparks, American Biography, 2nd, IX, 314-15.

[90] Journals of Continental Congress, October 3, 1775; Force, American Archives 4th, III, 1888-91; Works of John Adams, II, 462.

[91] Works of John Adams, II, 463-4.

[92] Journals of Continental Congress, October 16, November 16, 1775.

[93] Gammell, Life of Samuel Ward, in Sparks’s American Biography, 2nd, IX, 316.

[94] Journals of Continental Congress, December 9, 1775.

[95] Ibid., December 11, 1775.

[96] Ibid., December 13, 1775.

[97] Journals of Continental Congress, December 14, 1775.

[98] Journals of Continental Congress. January 25, September 19, 1776. See Ford’s new edition of the Journals.

[99] The Secretary of the Marine Committee was John Brown.

[100] Journals of Continental Congress, June 6, 1777.

[101] Ibid., June 16, 1778.

[102] Ibid., January 27, 1780.

[103] Journals of Continental Congress, December 27, 1777.

[104] Lee, however, signed a letter as chairman in March, 1779. Relative to Samuel Adams’s work in the Marine Committee, these words of his biographer possess interest: “Upon his arrival in Congress [May 21, 1778], he was added to the Marine Committee, of which important Board he was made chairman, and continued to direct its duties, for the next two years. In this arduous position, judged from the great number of reports and the multiplicity of business submitted to it, Adams might fairly have claimed exemption from all other employments.”—Wells, Life and Public Services of Samuel Adams, III, 13. Mr. Wells exaggerates the length of the naval services of Adams, who left Philadelphia about June 20, 1779; whereupon William Whipple succeeded him as chairman of the Marine Committee.

[105] New Hampshire Gazette, June 1, 1776.

[106] Probably put upon the stocks at Salisbury and completed at Newburyport.

[107] Edward Field, State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, II, 423.

[108] Staples, Annals of Providence, 267-8; Marine Committee Letter Book, Marine Committee to Stephen Hopkins, and Marine Committee to Committee for Building the Continental Frigates at Providence, October 9, 1776.

[109] Colonial Records of Connecticut, XV, 526.

[110] Records of State of Connecticut, I, 177.

[111] Force, American Archives, 5th, II, 350, 636, 989; III, 827.

[112] Marine Committee Letter Book, Marine Committee to David Stodder, master-builder, April 11, 1778.

[113] Journals of Continental Congress, April 23, 1776.

[114] Ibid., June 25, 1776.

[115] Force, American Archives, 5th, III, 671, 739-40. The first prize agents to be appointed, many of whom held their offices throughout the greater part of the Revolution, were as follows: John Langdon, Portsmouth; John Bradford, Boston; Daniel Tillinghast, Providence; Nathaniel Shaw, jr., New London; Jacobus Vanzant, New York; John Nixon and John Maxwell Nesbit, Philadelphia; William Lux, Baltimore; John Tazewell, Williamsburg; Robert Smith, Edenton; Richard Ellis, Newbern; Cornelius Harnet, Wilmington; Livinus Clarkson and John Dorsius, Charleston; John Wereat, Savannah; and Okey Hoaglandt, New Jersey.

[116] Journals of Continental Congress, September 1, 1779.

[117] Force, American Archives, 5th, II, 1113-14.

[118] Journals of Continental Congress, October 28, November 6, 1776.

[119] Journals of Continental Congress, April 19, 1777.

[120] On May 6, 1777, John Adams wrote to James Warren notifying him of his appointment. He added a few words explaining the character of the position: “You will have the building and fitting of all ships, the appointment of officers, the establishment of arsenals and magazines, which will take up your whole time; but it will be honorable to be so capitally concerned in laying a foundation of a great navy. The profit to you will be nothing; but the honor and the virtue the greater. I almost envy you this employment.”—Works of John Adams, IX, 465. On May 9, the Rhode Island member of the Marine Committee notified William Vernon of his appointment.—Publications of the Rhode Island Historical Society, VIII, 206. See also Massachusetts Historical Society Collections, 7th, II, 45.

[121] New England Historical and Genealogical Register, XXX, 316-18.

[122] When the Navy Board at Philadelphia was being established and its commissioners appointed, William Ellery wrote to William Vernon as follows: “I should be glad to know what is the Office of Commissioners of the Navy, and that you would point it out particularly; unless you can refer me to some Author who particularly describes. The Conduct of the Affairs of a Navy as well as those of an Army, We are yet to learn. We are still unacquainted with the systematical management of them, although We have made considerable Progress in the latter. It is the Duty of every Friend to his Country to throw his Knowledge into the common Stock. I know you are well skilled in Commerce and I believe you are acquainted with the System of the British Navy, and I am sure of your Disposition to do every Service to the Cause of Liberty in your Power.”—Publications of Rhode Island Historical Society, VIII, 201, Papers of William Vernon and the Navy Board.

[123] Journals of Continental Congress, October 23, 1777.

[124] Ibid., May 9, 1778.

[125] Ibid., August 19, 1778.

[126] Ibid., September 28, 1778.

[127] Ibid., November 4, 1778.

[128] Marine Committee Letter Book, Marine Committee to Navy Board of Middle Department, January 22, 1778. The Philadelphia Board was ordered on January 22 to remove to Baltimore, but it appears that it did not go until April.

[129] For salaries of the Commissioners of the Navy and their employees, see Journals of Continental Congress, November 7, 1776; April 19, 1777; October 23, 1777; October 10, 1778; October 31, 1778; November 12, 1779; January 28, 1780; and September 25, 1780.

[130] Miscellaneous Manuscripts, Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress.

CHAPTER IV
THE WORK OF THE NAVY BOARDS AND THE MARINE COMMITTEE

There was a painful lack of system about the business methods of the Naval Department of the Revolution. Then, official routine was not settled as at present. Usage had had no opportunity to establish fixed and orderly forms of procedure; and amid the distractions of war, when some real or supposed emergency was continually inviting one authority or another to disregard regularity and order, usage could obtain but scant permission to begin its work. Wars are famous for breaking through, not for forming a crust of official precedent. The administrative machinery of armies and navies tends to adapt itself to the conditions of peace—now the normal state of nations. During long periods of partial stagnation this machinery becomes complicated; its tension is weakened; and many of its axles grow rusty from disuse. When war breaks out, the conditions of administration are greatly changed. A thousand extra calls for work to be done at once are loud and inexorable. Expedition must be had at all hazards and costs. Rapid action of the administrative machinery must be obtained, its tension screwed down, extra cog wheels discarded, and efficient machinists substituted for the dotards of peace. It is obvious that with this sort of difficulty those who managed the naval affairs during the Revolution did not have to contend, for the organ of naval administration was then created from its foundation. Their difficulties sprang not from the age, but from the newness of this organ. It lacked a nice correlation of parts, the smooth action that comes from long service, and the system that immemorial routine establishes.

The absence of system in the Naval Department was most conspicuous in the appointment of naval officers, from the captain to the coxswain. This work was shared by Congress, the Marine Committee, the Navy Boards, the Continental agents, the Commander-in-chief of the navy, the commanders of vessels, recruiting agents, the Commissioners at Paris, and the commercial agents residing in foreign countries. Appointments were sometimes actually determined by the governors of states, “conspicuous citizens,” and local governmental bodies. A good illustration of the way in which convenience was sometimes consulted is found in the resolution of Congress of June 14, 1777, which designated William Whipple, the New Hampshire member of the Marine Committee, John Langdon, Continental agent at Portsmouth, and John Paul Jones, the commander of the ship “Ranger,” to select the commissioned and warrant officers of the “Ranger,” then at Portsmouth.[131] In a new navy without esprit de corps, to permit a commander to have a voice in choosing his own officers often made for proper subordination.

It was a source of annoyance and confusion to the Navy Boards to find through accidental sources of information, as they sometimes did, that the Marine Committee had given orders to naval agents to transact business, the immediate control of which was vested in the Boards. Naval agents sometimes discovered that they were serving in a single task two or three naval masters. Irregularities were chargeable not alone to the Naval Department. The governor of a state was known on his own authority, to the vexation of the rightful executive, to take part in the direction of the cruises of Continental vessels. Naval commanders were now and then guilty of breaches of their orders. Congress had its share in the confusing of business. On one occasion, making a display of its ignorance, it suspended Captain John Roach from a command to which he had not been appointed; Roach in fact was not an officer in the Continental navy.[132] It sometimes made impracticable details of the armed vessels. It also exercised its privilege of referring to special committees bits of business that logically belonged to the Marine Committee.

These irregularities, notwithstanding their number, were after all exceptions. The very nature of business forces it to follow some system, however imperfectly. Where there is a number of agents there must be a division of labor. Without such arrangements chaos would exist. It is therefore possible to set forth with some detail the respective duties of the Marine Committee, the Navy Boards, and the various naval agents. The work and duties of the naval agents have already been treated with sufficient particularity. The work of the Navy Boards and the Marine Committee will be considered in this chapter.

The duties of the Navy Boards were of a varied character. Each Board superintended the building, manning, fitting, provisioning, and repairing of the armed vessels in its district. It kept a register of the vessels which it built, showing the name, dimensions, burden, number of guns, tackle, apparel, and furniture of each vessel. Each Board had records of all the officers, sailors, and marines in its district, and required the commanders to make returns of these items upon the termination of their cruises. It was the duty of the Boards to notify the Marine Committee of the arrivals and departures of the Continental vessels. They were required to settle the naval accounts and “to keep fair Books of all expenditures of Publick Moneys.” The records of their transactions were to be open to the inspection of Congress and the Marine Committee. They rendered to the Committee annually, or oftener when required, an account of their disbursements. The Boards paid the salaries of officers and seamen, and audited the accounts of the prize agents.[133]

In the appointment of officers the Navy Board at Boston was given a freer rein than was its colleague at Philadelphia. The share of the Navy Boards in selecting officers and in enlisting seamen was about as follows. The Boards superintended the appointing of petty officers and the enlisting of seamen, both of which duties were chiefly performed by the commanders of vessels and by recruiting agents. The Boards generally selected the warrant officers, very frequently on the recommendation of the commanders. If the one appointment to the office of Commander-in-chief be disregarded, there existed but two classes of commissioned officers in the Revolutionary navy, captains and lieutenants. The Boards often chose the lieutenants; and they generally recommended the captains to the Marine Committee. The Committee furnished the Boards with blank warrants and commissions, signed by the President of Congress. When one of these forms was properly filled out by a navy board for an officer, the validity of his title to his position and rank could not be questioned.

The Boards were empowered under certain circumstances, and in accordance with the rules and regulations of the navy and the resolutions of Congress, to order the holding of courts of enquiry and courts-martial. They could administer oaths to the judges and officials of these courts. A Board might suspend an officer of the navy who treated it with “indecency and disrespect.”[134] On October 23, 1777, the Navy Board at Boston was given power to suspend a naval officer, “until the pleasure of Congress shall be known.”[135] Not always did the kindliest relations exist between the Navy Boards and the commanders of the vessels. Officers who but yesterday tramped the decks of their own merchantmen, giving commands but not receiving them, chafed under the subordination that their position in the navy exacted.

The Navy Boards made public the resolutions of Congress on naval affairs, copies of which they lodged with the prize agents, the commanders of vessels, and all interested persons. They distributed among the naval captains the rules and regulations of the navy, the sea-books, and the naval signals. The Boards acted in an advisory capacity to the Marine Committee, which frequently called upon them for information or opinions; when a revision of the rules and regulations of the navy was under consideration their assistance in the work was requested. Sometimes they volunteered important suggestions looking to the betterment of the navy. They communicated frequently with the Committee, giving in detail the state of the naval business in their respective districts.

In the hiring, purchase, and building of vessels the Boards had to do with craft of all sorts, freight-boats, fire-ships, galleys, packets, brigs, schooners, sloops, ships, frigates, and men-of-war. Measured by the standards of the time, the building of one of the larger vessels was a work of some magnitude. A notion of the men and materials requisite for such an undertaking may be gained from an estimate, made early in 1780, of the sundries needed to complete the 74-gun ship “America,” the largest of the Continental vessels constructed during the Revolution. The construction of this ship had been begun at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, in 1777. It was computed that one hundred and fifty workmen for an average period of eight months would be required. Fifty carpenters, twenty ordinary laborers, twenty caulkers, ten riggers, ten sailors, two master-builders, and an uncertain number of blacksmiths, sailmakers, coopers, plumbers, painters, glaziers, carvers, boat-builders, ship-copperers, tinners, cabinet-makers, and tanners were demanded. Materials and provisions were needed as follows: Seven hundred tons of timbers, one hundred casks of naval stores, forty tons of iron, one thousand water-casks, masts and spars of all sorts, sheets of lead, train oil, and oakum; provisions for most of the above workmen, and lastly, an indispensable lubricant for all naval services at this time, “rum, one half pint per day, including extra hands, say for 150 hands, 8 months, 12 hhds, 1310 gallons.”[136] In building the armed vessels, the Boards were greatly hampered by the difficulty of obtaining artisans, owing to their being called out for military service, or to their engaging in privateering. In providing armament and equipment, they were embarrassed by the inexperience of the colonists in casting cannon, and by the obstacles which they encountered in importing canvas, cables, arms, and ammunition.

For the future use of the fleet the Navy Boards collected in due season provisions and naval stores. In their work as purveyors for the navy a knowledge of the baking of bread and the curing of meats might not prove amiss. The kinds and quantities of provisions which they bought may be judged from an estimate of the supplies that were requisite to equip for sea and for a single cruise the 36-gun frigate “Confederacy.” The names and quantities of the articles needed were as follows: bread, 35,700 lbs.; beef, 15,300 lbs.; pork, 15,300 lbs.; flour, 5,100 lbs.; potatoes, 10,000 lbs.; peas, 80 bus.; mutton, 2,500 lbs.; butter, 637 lbs.; rice, 2,550 lbs.; vinegar, 160 gals.; and rum, 2,791 gals.[137] The Boards’ supplies of naval stores consisted chiefly of canvas, sails, cordage, cables, tar, turpentine, and ship chandlery.

The commissioners of each district made some division of their work among themselves. For instance, the special task of Wharton of the Philadelphia Board was the superintending of the accounting and the naval finances of the Middle District. During 1778 Deshon of the Boston Board spent much time in Connecticut attending to the naval business in that state. This had to do chiefly with freeing the “Trumbull” frigate from a sandbar upon which she had grounded. During the same year Vernon was for a time at Providence endeavoring to get to sea the Continental vessels which the British had blockaded in that port. For a part of the year Warren alone attended to the business of the Board at its headquarters at Boston. On August 4, 1778, Congress appropriated $365 to each of the commissioners of the Navy Board at Boston to pay their traveling expenses during the past year, since in the right discharge of their office they were obliged “frequently to visit the different parts of their extensive district.”[138]

In the extent of its powers and in the amount of its business the Boston Board exceeded the one at Philadelphia.[139] This was largely owing to the centering of naval affairs in New England after the occupation of Philadelphia in September, 1777; and to the capture or destruction in that year of a large part of the fleet to the southward of New England. After 1776 all the new vessels added in America to the navy, with the exception of two or three, were either purchased or built in New England. The long distance of the Marine Committee from Boston, with the consequent difficulties and delays in communication, made it necessary for the Committee to grant to the Boston Board larger powers than to the Philadelphia Board.

The most important work of a Naval Office is the directing of the movements of the fleet, or in other words, the determining of the cruises of the armed vessels. This power the Marine Committee jealously guarded, and was loathe to yield any part of it. The Committee was forced at times, however, to give to the Boston Board a considerable discretion. In July, 1777, it ordered the Board to send out the cruisers as fast as they could be got ready, “directing the Commanders to such Latitudes as you shall think there will be the greatest chance of success in intercepting the enemy’s Transports and Merchant Ships”; and in November, 1778, to send the vessels out, “either collectively, or singly, as you shall judge proper, using your discretion as to the time for which their Cruises shall continue, and your best judgment in directing the commanders to such places and on such stations as you shall think will be for the general benefit of the United States, and to annoy and distress the Enemy.”[140] Such general orders were always subject to the particular plans and directions of the Committee, which were by no means few. The Committee itself determined the service of all vessels that refitted at Philadelphia. As a consequence the duties of the Navy Board of the Middle Department had to do chiefly with the minor details of administration.

Turning now from the work of the Navy Boards to that of the Marine Committee, one finds the significant fact to be the two-fold relation that the Committee bore to the Continental Congress. By reason of the union in Congress of both legislative and executive functions, the Committee was at one and the same time an administrative organ of Congress charged with executing the business of its Naval Department, and its legislative committee on naval affairs. Naturally, there were at points no lines of demarkation between these two functions; and it is therefore not always easy, or even possible, to determine in which capacity the Committee is acting. The Committee’s administrative duties, par excellence, were the enforcing and the carrying out by means of its agents of the various resolutions of Congress upon naval affairs. Already much light has been thrown upon this phase of the Committee’s work in the treatment of the Navy Boards and the naval agents.

It was the duty of the Marine Committee to see that the resolutions on naval affairs were brought to the attention of the proper persons, officers, agents, and authorities. As the head of the Naval Department, it issued its commands and orders to the Navy Boards, the naval agents, and the commanders of vessels. This was done both verbally and by letters. The Navy Board of the Middle Department, the naval agents at Philadelphia, and often the naval officers in that port, conferred with the Committee and received orders by word of mouth. In the prosecution of its work outside of Philadelphia the Committee conducted a large correspondence, chiefly with the Navy Board at Boston, the naval agents at Portsmouth, Boston, New London, and Baltimore, and the leading captains of the navy. It addressed letters to the governors of most of the states and to many of the local governmental authorities; to the Commander-in-chief of the navy, Washington, General Heath, General Schuyler, the Commissary-General of Prisoners, Commissary-General of Purchases of the army, the merchants of Baltimore, Count D’Estaing, the Commissioners in Paris, and most of the captains of the navy. This list of correspondents well represents the range of the business of the Committee.

Through its recommendations to Congress the Marine Committee virtually selected almost all the captains of the navy and of the marine corps, many lieutenants of both services, as a rule the commissioners of the navy, the prize agents, and the advocates for the trying of maritime causes. Appointments to these offices were rarely made by Congress contrary to the recommendations of the Committee, or on its own initiative independent of the Committee. A few captains and lieutenants of the navy were appointed by representatives of the United States residing abroad.

As is well known, all executive offices are called upon to establish certain forms, rules, and regulations for the guidance and government of their agents. Of this character was the fixing by the Marine Committee of the naval signals, the forms for sea-books, and the proper uniforms for the naval officers. The Committee’s regulations on uniforms were dated September 5, 1776. For captains they prescribed a blue coat “with red lappels, slash cuff, stand-up collar, flat yellow buttons, blue britches, red waistcoat with narrow lace.” The uniform of the officers of the marines was equally resplendent in colors. It included a green coat, with white cuffs, a silver epaulet on the shoulder, white waistcoat and breeches edged with green, and black gaiters and garters. Green was the distinctive color of the marines. The privates were to display this badge in the form of green shirts, “if they can be procured.”[141] Not enough information is accessible to the writer to determine what influence the regulations prescribing the uniform of British officers had on those adopted by the Marine Committee. Both required in the uniform of captains, blue coats, standing-up collars, and flat buttons; neither required epaulets, the wearing of which, as is well known, originated in France.[142] It is probable that the prescribed uniform was little worn by the Continental naval officers. Grim necessity forced each officer to ransack whatever wardrobe Providence offered, and it is somewhat inaccurate to call their miscellaneous garbs “uniforms.”

As the Naval Office at Philadelphia developed, letters, memorials, and petitions poured in upon it in increasing numbers. Many of these communications were addressed to the President of Congress, were read in Congress, and were formally referred to the Marine Committee to be acted or reported upon. It was only infrequently that Congress offered any suggestions as to their proper disposition. These complaints and requests were of a varied character, and came from many sources; not a few originated with that obsequious crowd, with axes to grind, that always attends upon official bodies. The wide range of these communications may be judged from the following subjects selected at random:

New Hampshire and Massachusetts request that the frigates building in those states be ordered to defend the New England coast.[143] Governor Livingston of New Jersey asks for a naval office for a relative, Musco Livingston.[144] Gerard, the minister of France to the United States, wishes to know “the opinion of Congress respecting his offering a premium to the owners of privateers that shall intercept masts and spars belonging to the enemy, coming from Halifax to New York and Rhode Island.”[145] John Macpherson asserts that the position of commander-in-chief in the navy was promised to him by Messrs. Randolph, Hopkins, and Rutledge, to whom he communicated an important secret.[146] An affront has been offered several French captains in Boston by the commander of the Continental frigate “Warren.”[147] Twelve lieutenants, who had been dismissed from the navy for combining in order to extort an increase of pay, ask to be reinstated.[148] The ambassador of Naples at the Court of France, whose king has opened his ports to the American vessels, wishes “to know the colours of the flag, and form of the sea-papers of the United States.”[149] Captain Biddle writes concerning the cruel treatment inflicted by Lord Howe upon Lieutenant Josiah of the Continental navy.[150] Captain Skimmer has been killed in an action with the “Montague,” and has left eleven children, nine of whom are unable to earn a livelihood. His widow asks for a pension.[151]

The Marine Committee made frequent reports to Congress, both in response to previous orders therefrom, and of its own accord in the course of its business. Occasionally parts of its reports were recommitted by Congress to a limited number of the Committee’s members, doubtless for the purpose of obtaining prompt and expert action. The Committee sometimes assigned special business to sub-committees, or to single members. The subjects which the Committee considered, discussed, and reported upon ran the whole gamut of naval activities and interests. The substance of many of its reports may be found in the Journals of the Continental Congress for the years 1776, 1777, 1778, and 1779. During this period the Marine Committee prepared and reported the larger part of the naval legislation of Congress. It is true that special committees contributed something to this work, but these were composed in part of members of the Marine Committee. Congress, as a body, originated little, although occasionally it was moved to the passage of resolutions on naval affairs by some real or supposed emergency, the importunities of the self-seeking, or the whims of individual members. It of course amended the reports of its committees.

The principal legislation of Congress relating to the navy which was passed during the incumbency of the Marine Committee will now be noted. No attempt will be made to separate those provisions that were the special work of the Marine Committee from the whole legislative output.

During 1776 and 1777 Congress authorized important naval increases. It directed the Marine Committee in March and April, 1776, to purchase “the armed vessel now in the river Delaware” and the ship “Molly,” to fit out two armed cutters, and to build two galleys “capable of carrying two 36 or 42 pounders.”[152] On November 20, 1776, Congress resolved to build immediately, one ship, 74, in New Hampshire; two ships, 74 and 36, in Massachusetts; one ship, 74, a brig, 18, and a packet boat, in Pennsylvania; two frigates, 36 each, in Virginia; and two frigates, 36 each, in Maryland.[153] Later, the size and armament of some of these vessels were reduced by the Marine Committee, and some of them were never completed. Only three of these ten vessels were armed, manned, and sent to sea as a part of the forces of the Continental navy. They were the “Alliance,” 36, the “General Gates,” 18, both built in Massachusetts, and the “Saratoga,” 16, built in Pennsylvania. The 74-gun ship “America,” constructed at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, was not launched until shortly before the Revolution ended. On January 23, 1777, Congress ordered the construction of two frigates, 36 and 28, in Connecticut. These two ships were named respectively the “Confederacy” and “Bourbon.” On March 15, 1777, the Marine Committee was ordered to purchase three ships.[154] Congress gave directions for other naval increases, but they were not fully carried out. In July, 1777, owing to the “extravagant prices now demanded for all kinds of materials used in shipbuilding, and the enormous wages required by tradesmen and labourers,” Congress empowered the Committee to stop the building of such of the Continental vessels as they should judge proper.[155]

During 1776 many important appointments and promotions in the navy and the marine corps were made by the Marine Committee, and confirmed by Congress. Samuel Nichols was placed at the head of the marines, with the rank of major. Twenty captains of the navy were appointed. Four of these had been appointed lieutenants on December 22, 1775, and were promoted, but the remaining sixteen were new appointees. John Manly was taken from Washington’s fleet. Nicholas Biddle, Thomas Read, Charles Alexander, and James Josiah had seen service in the Pennsylvania navy; and James Nicholson in the Maryland navy. During this year there was a great scramble to obtain offices on board the thirteen frigates, and amid the rivalries of politics, it is not surprising that some candidates were successful that, unfortunately for the navy, had tasted little salt water.[156]

In military services questions of promotion and rank are perennial sources of heartburning and jealousy. The advancing of an officer on any other principle than that of seniority in service rarely fails to arouse feelings of injustice and suspicions of partiality, which are only too often warranted. The discontent and insubordination that such a promotion incites must always be weighed against its beneficial results. When, on October 10, 1776, Congress, in determining the rank of twenty-four captains and two lieutenants, disregarded the dates of their commissions and appointments, it was unable to defend its act on the usual, and under some circumstances, tenable ground of the conspicuous services, marked talents, and signal professional skill of those favored. Once more Southern influences prevailed, and James Nicholson, of Maryland, commander of the frigate “Virginia,” was made the senior captain of the navy. This distinguishing of Nicholson, who was appointed captain on June 6, 1776, worked a hardship to the officers, and especially to the four captains, appointed on December 22, 1775. John Paul Jones, who stood fifth in rank in the list of December 22, and now found himself eighteenth, smarted under the injustice which was done him.[157] It is noteworthy that from March, 1777, when Esek Hopkins was suspended from his position of commander-in-chief of the fleet, until the end of the Revolution, the head of the Continental army and the ranking officer of the navy came from adjoining Southern states.[158]

On November 15, 1776, Congress fixed the relative rank of army and naval officers as follows:[159]

Admiral, with General.

Vice-Admiral, with Lieutenant-General.

Rear-Admiral, with Major-General.

Commodore, with Brigadier-General.

Captain of a ship of 40 guns and upwards, with Colonel.

Captain of a ship of 20 to 40 guns, with Lieutenant-Colonel.

Captain of a ship of 10 to 20 guns, with Major.

Lieutenant of the navy, with Captain.

In this legislation on rank once more the influence of British models is apparent. The Committee was evidently building for the future, for the four higher ranks were not established at this time, nor during the Revolution. The present relative rank of army and naval officers is based on the above table.

On March 23, 1776, Congress passed most important resolutions supplementary to those of November 25, 1775, concerning captures and the shares of prizes. The resolutions of November 25 legalized the capture of the enemy’s vessels of war and transports. The new resolutions permitted for the first time the capture of all ships and cargoes, “belonging to any inhabitant, or inhabitants of Great Britain, taken on the high seas, or between high and low water mark,” by American privateers, vessels of the Continental navy, or ships fitted out by any of the colonies. In brief, the new resolutions legalized reprisals on British commerce. In the case of Continental vessels, one-third of the prize went to the officers and crew; in the case of privateers, the whole of the prize fell to the owners and captors. Each colony was permitted to fix the shares of the proceeds of merchantmen captured by its own ships of war.[160] On October 30, 1776, the share of prizes taken by vessels of the Continental navy was increased to one-half of merchantmen, transports, and store ships; and to the whole of ships of war and privateers.[161]

On April 2, 1776, Congress agreed to a form of commission for privateers. On the next day it resolved to send blank commissions, signed by the President of Congress, to the legislatures, provincial congresses, and committees of safety of the United Colonies. These were to be filled out and delivered to privateersmen. Blank bonds, which were to be executed by the owners or masters of privateers, were also sent. These bonds, which prescribed a penalty of five or ten thousand dollars, according to the size of the ship, were intended to discourage or prevent misconduct and unwarrantable acts on the part of officers and crews. Congress also drafted a form of instructions to the commanders of privateers.[162]

Congress on November 15, 1776, established a new pay-table. Officers were now divided into three classes, those serving on board of vessels of 20 guns and upwards, vessels of 10 to 20 guns, and vessels below 10 guns. The vessels of the first two classes were commanded by captains, and of the third class by lieutenants. The pay of the higher officers, which the new table generally raised, varied for each of the three classes, the commanding officers of which received, respectively, $60, $48, and $30 a month. Seamen were now paid a monthly wage of $8. The pay of officers below the captain ranged from $30 to $8.34 a month. A bounty of $20 for every cannon and $8 for every seaman captured on board a British ship of war was now voted.[163] On July 25, 1777, the “subsistence” of officers while in foreign or domestic ports was fixed.[164] On January 19, 1778, Congress resolved that officers not in actual service should be allowed pay, but not rations. While prisoners of war, their allowance for rations was to be diminished by the value of the supplies which they received from the enemy.[165] Pursers for vessels of 16 guns and upwards were authorized on November 14, 1778.[166]

Additional interest attaches to the initial legislation on pensions of the American government because of the unprecedented liberality which now marks its treatment of its veterans. The first legislation on naval pensions dates from the adoption by Congress on November 28, 1775, of a form of naval contract according to which certain bounties were granted officers, seamen, and marines disabled from earning a livelihood.[167] These bounties were derived from the proceeds of prizes captured by the aid of the beneficiaries. A more typical pension law was passed on August 26, 1776.[168] It had, however, a vital defect in that it was left to the enforcement of the individual states. According to its provisions every naval officer, seaman, or marine, “belonging to the United States of America, who shall lose a limb in any engagement in which no prize shall be taken, or be therein otherwise so disabled as to be rendered incapable of getting a livelihood, shall receive during his life, or the continuance of such disability, one half of his monthly pay.” When a prize was captured at the time the disability was contracted, the disabled person’s share of prize money was considered as a part of his half-pay. If the disabled person was rendered incapable of serving in the navy, although not totally disabled from earning a livelihood, he received a monthly sum, judged to be adequate by the legislature of the state in which he resided. Each state was to determine which of its citizens were entitled to a pension under this law, to pay such persons their half-pay or allowance, and to make a quarterly report of its work to the secretary of Congress. The distinguishing characteristic of the law lay in its dependence on the states for its enforcement. As might be expected, it was very imperfectly carried out.

On September 25, 1778, Congress extended the advantages of the law to all persons whose disabilities were acquired previous to August 26, 1776.[169] It is to be carefully noted that this was a pension for disabilities and not for service—a fundamental classification in pension law. An agitation for a service pension for life for the officers of the army was made in and out of Congress for a long time, until in 1780 it was at last successful.[170] Such emoluments were not at this time granted to naval officers; it was probably argued that their sharing in captured prizes offset the pensions of the army officers. Then, too, the army had ways of gaining the attention of Congress that the weak and insignificant navy did not possess.

Few more important duties fall to naval offices than the enforcing of discipline in the navy by means of naval courts. Adams’s rules of November 28, 1775, made provision for holding courts-martial, but not courts of enquiry, which are a sort of grand jury or inquest. They also provided that courts-martial should consist of at least six naval officers, with six officers of marines, if so many of the latter were convenient to the court.[171] The Committee and Navy Boards at times found it impossible to assemble so many officers. No definite procedure in investigating the loss of vessels was prescribed by Adams’s rules. Additional legislation was therefore demanded. On May 6, 1778, Congress adopted new regulations on naval courts, which were to be operative for one year.[172] They provided that, when a vessel of war was lost by capture or otherwise, a court of enquiry should be held, “consisting of that navy board which shall, by the marine committee of Congress, be directed to proceed therein, or any three persons that such navy board may appoint.” If the court of enquiry found that the loss of the vessel was caused by the negligence or malconduct of any commissioned officer, the Navy Board might suspend such officer pending his trial by a court-martial, which, in the event that six naval officers could not be assembled, was to consist of five men appointed by the Navy Board. The permitting of civilians to sit upon naval courts is the salient feature of these new resolutions, and is an anomaly in naval judicature. They also provided that in cases where one or more vessels out of a fleet were lost by capture or otherwise, the commanders of the escaping vessels were to be tried by a similar procedure. If a court-martial found that the loss of a vessel was caused by the cowardice or treachery of the commanding officer, it was directed to inflict the death penalty. On August 19, 1778, the procedure established on May 6 was extended to “all offences and misdemeanors in the marine department.”[173] The proceedings of courts-martial were forwarded to the Marine Committee, which laid them, together with its recommendations thereupon, before Congress for final action.

During the incumbency of the Marine Committee a number of interesting and important naval trials were held. Captain Thomas Thompson in 1778 and Captain Dudley Saltonstall in 1779 were broken by courts-martial. Other captains who lost their vessels were tried, but escaped so severe a punishment. The cases growing out of Commodore Hopkins’s expedition to New Providence, his engagement with the “Glasgow,” and the immediately succeeding events of his fleet in the spring of 1776 deserve more extended notice. During the summer of 1776 the Marine Committee ordered Commodore Hopkins and Captains Dudley Saltonstall and Abraham Whipple to leave the fleet, which was then stationed in Rhode Island, and to come to Philadelphia for trial. After calling before it the inferior officers of the “Alfred” and “Columbus,” and hearing their complaints against the two captains, the Committee reported to Congress on July 11 that the charge against Captain Saltonstall was not well founded, and that the charge against Captain Whipple “amounts to nothing more than a rough, indelicate mode of behaviour to his marine officers.” Congress ordered the two captains to repair to their commands, and recommended Captain Whipple “to cultivate harmony with his officers.”[174]

Commodore Hopkins was not to get off so easily. His whole conduct since he left Philadelphia early in January, 1776, was investigated. The principal charge against him was the disobeying of the instructions of the Naval Committee of January 5, 1776, to attack the forces of the enemy in the region of Virginia and the Carolinas. Hopkins based his defence on the statement that the enemy in that region had become too strong to attack by the time his fleet had sailed on February 17, and also on a certain clause in his instructions granting him discretionary powers.[175] After the Marine Committee had investigated the case, and reported upon it, Congress, on August 12, took into consideration the “instructions given to Commodore Hopkins, his examination and answers to the Marine Committee, and the report of the Marine Committee thereupon; also, the farther defence by him made, and the testimony of the witnesses.” On the 15th, Congress came to the resolution: “That the said commodore Hopkins, during his cruise to the southward, did not pay due regard to the tenor of his instructions ... and, that his reasons for not going from Providence immediately to the Carolinas, are by no means satisfactory.” The next day Congress resolved, “that the said conduct of commodore Hopkins deserves the censure of this house, and this house does accordingly censure him.”[176]

This action seems more severe than the facts justify. John Adams, who defended Hopkins, had with difficulty prevented Congress from cashiering the Commodore. According to Adams’s view, Hopkins was “pursued and persecuted by that anti-New-England spirit which haunted Congress in many other of their proceedings, as well as in this case.”[177] The action of Congress may be interpreted differently. Hopkins had not met the expectations of Congress or the Marine Committee. As the head of the fleet, blame naturally fell upon him, whether he deserved it or not. He had his shortcomings as a naval officer, and failure magnified them. By placing the blame upon him, the skirts of Congress, of the Marine Committee, and of the other naval officers were cleared, and the hopes of a few self-interested men were brightened.

Commodore Hopkins’s failure to carry out the plans of the Marine Committee during the fall of 1776, together with the partial inaction of the fleet under his command, increased his disfavor with Congress and the Marine Committee. His praiseworthy endeavors to man and prepare his fleet for sea won for him the enmity of the owners of privateers at Providence, for his success would mean the taking of men and materials sorely needed by the privateersmen. Hopkins’s intemperate language, lack of tact, and naval misfortunes bred a spirit of discontent, and gave an excuse for insubordination among his inferior officers. Encouraged by the discontented privateersmen of Providence, ten of the inferior officers of the “Warren,” the Commodore’s flagship, signed a petition and certain letters containing complaints and charges against Hopkins, and sent their documents to the Marine Committee. They were taken to Philadelphia by the chief “conspirator,” Captain John Grannis of the marines. These documents asserted that Hopkins had called the members of the Marine Committee and of Congress “ignorant fellows-lawyers, clerks-persons who don’t know how to govern men;” that he was “remarkably addicted to profane swearing;” that he had “treated prisoners in a most inhuman and barbarous manner;” that he was a “hindrance to the proper manning of the fleet;” and that “his conversation is at times so wild and orders so unsteady that I have sometimes thought he was not in his right mind.” Besides these accusations, there were a few others of even less substantial character.[178]

On March 25, 1777, the Marine Committee laid before Congress the complaints and charges against Commodore Hopkins, and on the next day Congress took them into consideration; whereupon it resolved that “Esek Hopkins be immediately, and he is hereby, suspended from his command in the American navy.”[179] Hopkins remained suspended until January 2, 1778. The Journals of Congress for this date contain the following entry: “Congress having no farther occasion for the service of Esek Hopkins, esq. who, on the 22nd of December, 1775, was appointed commander in chief of the fleet fitted out by the naval committee, Resolved, That the said Esek Hopkins, esq. be dismissed from the service of the United States.”[180]

Hopkins’s suspension and removal did not in any way improve the navy. Indeed, it was far less fortunate in 1777, than it had been in 1776. That its chief officer should have been suspended without a hearing, on flimsy charges, offered by a small number of inferior officers whose leader was guilty of insubordination, convicts Congress of acting with undue haste and of doing a possible injustice, and arouses the suspicion that it was not actuated wholly by a calm and unbiased judgment. The wording of Hopkins’s dismissal seems needlessly curt, and harsh. Since Hopkins had lost the confidence of Congress, the Marine Committee, and many of his countrymen, his removal from the office of commander-in-chief to that of a captain might have been justified.

On January 13, 1778, Hopkins brought a suit for libel against the ten officers concerned in the “conspiracy,” fixing his damages at £10,000. On July 30 Congress passed a resolution for defraying the reasonable expenses of the ten officers in defending their suit.[181] The case was tried before a jury in the Inferior Court of Common Pleas of Rhode Island. The decision was unfavorable to Hopkins, as the jury brought in a verdict for “the defendants and their costs.” The victory of the opposition to the Commodore was complete. He had not, however, lost the confidence of his fellow townsmen. He served in the General Assembly of his state, representing North Providence from 1777 until 1786, and he was from 1777 until the end of the Revolution a member of the Rhode Island Council of War.[182] No one who knew Hopkins intimately ever doubted his courage, his patriotism, or his honesty of purpose.

The arrival off the Delaware Capes, on July 8, 1778, of twelve sail of the line and four frigates under the command of Count D’Estaing, Vice-Admiral of France, threw additional work upon the Naval Department. No sooner did the Marine Committee learn of the presence of the French, than it exerted itself to supply the table of its naval guests with eatables and drinkables. Casks of fresh water, several hundred barrels of bread and flour, and a small supply of fresh provisions, were at once sent to the Count, and the Committee ordered a commissary to collect for the use of the French fleet fifty bullocks, seven hundred sheep, a number of poultry, and a quantity of vegetables. After the ill-starred expedition against Rhode Island in August, 1778, when the French fleet put into Boston for repairs, its provisioning again became a care to the Naval Department. The Marine Committee ordered three thousand barrels of flour to be sent on from Albany for the use of the French.[183]

The distinction of having performed the first work of a consular bureau in the United States belongs to the Marine Committee, since it had charge of the publication and record of the first consular appointments to this country. In accordance with the first commercial treaty between the United States and France, Gerard, the French minister, soon after his arrival in America in July, 1778, appointed John Holker, consul for the port of Philadelphia, and in September named a vice-consul for the same place. The latter appointment Congress referred to the Marine Committee “in order that the same may be made public.” A similar disposition was made of the appointments of consuls for Maryland, South Carolina, and Boston, and of the vice-consuls for Alexandria (Virginia), and Virginia. In the case of the vice-consul for Virginia, Congress ordered the Marine Committee to “cause the commission of Mr. d’Annemours to be recorded in the book by them kept for that purpose, and his appointment made known to all concerned.” The Committee was instrumental in obtaining the settling of the powers and duties of consuls as regards the United States and France. On August 2, 1779, the control of consular affairs was removed from the Marine Committee and vested in the Secretary of Congress.[184]

FOOTNOTES:

[131] Journals of Continental Congress, June 14, 1777.

[132] Journals of Continental Congress, June 14, 1777. Marine Committee Letter Book, Committee to Navy Board at Boston, March 6, 1778.

[133] Publications of Rhode Island Historical Society, VIII, 208, Instructions of Marine Committee to the Eastern Navy Board, July 10, 1777.

[134] Journals of Continental Congress, December 30, 1777. The occasion of this grant of power by Congress was a letter complaining of “disrespect and ill treatment” which a member of the Navy Board of the Middle Department had received at the hands of John Barry, commander of the frigate “Effingham.”

[135] Journals of Continental Congress, October 23, 1777.

[136] Records and papers of Continental Congress, 37, p. 217.

[137] Records and papers of Continental Congress, 37, p. 273.

[138] Journals of Continental Congress, August 4, 1778.