Charles Sumner: his complete works, (Volume 4 of 20)

Eng^d. by A H Richie

HENRY WILSON

Copyright, 1900,
BY
LEE AND SHEPARD.
Statesman Edition.
Limited to One Thousand Copies.
Of which this is

Norwood Press:
Norwood, Mass., U.S.A.

[CONTENTS OF VOLUME IV.]

[ANDREW J. DOWNING, THE LANDSCAPE GARDENER.]

Speech in the Senate, in Favor of an Allowance to the Widow of the Late Andrew J. Downing, August 26, 1852.

The Civil and Diplomatic Appropriation Bill being under consideration, Mr. Pearce, of Maryland, under instructions from the Committee on Finance, moved the following amendment:—

"For the payment of the arrears of salary due to the late Rural Architect, A.J. Downing, deceased, from the 1st of May, 1852, to the date of his death, and a further allowance to his widow, equal to the salary for one year, $2,500: Provided, that the said sum shall be in full of all claim for the services of the said deceased, and for all models, specifications, and drawings, designed for the benefit of the United States, which are not in its possession."

In the course of the debate which ensued, Mr. Sumner spoke as follows.

Mr. President—The laborer is worthy of his hire; and I believe at this moment there is no question of charity to the widow of the late Mr. Downing. The simple proposition is, to make compensation for services rendered to the United States by this eminent artist as superintendent of the public grounds in Washington. And since the plans he has left behind and the impulse he has given to improvements here by his remarkable genius will continue to benefit us, though he has been removed, it is thought reasonable to continue his salary to the close of the unexpired year from which it commenced. These plans alone have been valued at five thousand dollars, and we are to have the advantage of them. In pursuance of these, his successor will be able to proceed in arranging the public grounds, and in embellishing the national capital, without further expenditure for others. Thus, as I said at the outset, it is not a question of charity, but of compensation; and on this ground I doubt not the estate of the departed artist deserves the small pittance it is proposed to pay. For myself, I should be much happier to vote a larger appropriation, believing, that, over and above the services actually rendered in the discharge of his duties, these plans are amply worth it, and that we shall all feel better by such recognition of our debt.

Few men in the public service have vindicated a title to regard above Mr. Downing. At the age of thirty-seven he has passed away, "dead ere his prime,"—like Lycidas, also, "floating upon his watery bier,"[1]—leaving behind a reputation above that of any other citizen in the beautiful department of Art to which he was devoted. His labors and his example cannot be forgotten. I know of no man among us, in any sphere of life, so young as he was at his death, who has been able to perform services of such true, simple, and lasting beneficence. By wide and active superintendence of rural improvements, by labors of the pen, and by the various exercise of his genius, he has contributed essentially to the sum of human happiness. And now, Sir, by practical services here in Washington, rendered at the call of his country, he has earned, it seems to me, this small appropriation, not as a charity to his desolate widow, but as a remuneration for labor done. I hope the amendment will be agreed to.

[THE PARTY OF FREEDOM: ITS NECESSITY AND PRACTICABILITY.]

Speech at the State Convention of the Free-Soil Party of Massachusetts, held at Lowell, September 15, 1852.

The annual State Convention of the Free-Soil Party of Massachusetts met at Lowell September 15, 1852. It was organized with the following officers: Hon. Stephen C. Phillips, of Salem, President,—Rodney French, of New Bedford, George B. Atwood, of Taunton, William Jackson, of Newton, George F. Williams, of Boston, Charles Beck, of Cambridge, John B. Alley, of Lynn, Benjamin F. Thompson, of Winchester, John Nesmith, of Lowell, John Edgell, of Gardner, Francis Bates, of Springfield, Calvin Marden, of Pittsfield, Vice-Presidents,—George M. Brooks, of Concord, Edmund Anthony, of New Bedford, William S. Robinson, of Lowell, Andrew J. Aiken, of Adams, Benjamin F. White, of Weymouth, Secretaries.

Eloquent speeches were made by the President, Hon. S.C. Phillips, Hon. Henry Wilson, Hon. John W. Graves, Hon. E.L. Keyes, Hon. Rodney French, Dr. Caleb Swan, Richard H. Dana, Jr., Esq., Hon. Horace Mann, Hon. Amasa Walker, Hon. Anson Burlingame, and Seth Webb, Jr., Esq. The resolutions adopted by the Convention were reported by Hon. C.F. Adams. Hon. Horace Mann was nominated as candidate for Governor, and Hon. Amasa Walker as candidate for Lieutenant-Governor.

Early in the proceedings Mr. Sumner was introduced to the audience by the President. This incident is copied from the report in the papers, as is also the speech which he made, with the interruptions.

"The President remarked, that there was one gentleman present whom the Convention would all delight to hear: he alluded to our distinguished Senator in Congress, Hon. Charles Sumner.

"The name of Mr. Sumner was received with 'three times three' rousing cheers, and the waving of hats, canes, handkerchiefs, &c.; which demonstrations of regard were renewed as he made his appearance on the platform."

Among those on the platform was Captain Drayton, called "The Hero of the Pearl," recently liberated from prison through the exertions of Mr. Sumner (ante, p. 49), who took his seat "amid the hearty cheers of the whole assembly."

Mr. President, and Fellow-Citizens of Massachusetts:—

I should be dull indeed,—dull as a weed,—were I insensible to this generous, heart-speaking welcome. After an absence of many months, I have now come home to breathe anew this invigorating Northern air [applause], to tread again the free soil of our native Massachusetts [cheers], and to enjoy the sympathy of friends and fellow-citizens. [Renewed applause.] But, while glad in your greetings, thus bounteously lavished, I cannot accept them for myself. I do not deserve them. They belong to the cause [applause] which we all have at heart, and which binds us together. [Cheers.]

Fellow-citizens, I have not come here to make a speech. The occasion requires no such effort. Weary with other labors, and desiring rest, I have little now to say,—and that little will be too much, if about myself. If, at Washington, during a long session of Congress,—my first experience of public life,—I have been able to do anything which meets your acceptance, I am happy. [Cheers.] I have done nothing but my duty. ["Hear! hear!">[ Passing from this, and taking advantage of the kind attention with which you honor me, let me add one word in vindication of our position as a national party.

We are on the eve of two important elections,—one of National officers, and the other of State officers. A President and Vice-President of the United States and members of Congress are to be chosen; also, Governor and Lieutenant-Governor of the Commonwealth, and members of the Legislature. And at these elections we are to cast our votes so as most to advance the cause of Freedom under the National Constitution. [Cheers.] This is our peculiar object,—though associated with it are other aims, kindred in their humane and liberal character.

Against Freedom both the old parties are banded. Opposed to each other in the contest for power, they concur in opposing every effort for the establishment of Freedom under the National Constitution. [Applause.] Divided as parties, they are one as supporters of Slavery. On this question we can have no sympathy with either, but must necessarily be against both. ["Hear! hear!">[ They sustain Slavery in the District of Columbia: we are against it. They sustain the coastwise Slave-Trade under the National Flag: we abhor it. [Cheers.] They sustain the policy of silence on Slavery in the Territories: we urge the voice of positive prohibition. They sustain that paragon of legislative monsters,—unconstitutional, unchristian, and infamous,—the Fugitive Slave Bill [sensation]: we insist on its repeal. [Great applause.] They concede to the Slave Power new life and protection: we cannot be content except with its total destruction. [Enthusiasm.] Such, fellow-citizens, is the difference between us.

And now, if here in Massachusetts there be any who, on grounds of policy or conscience, feel impelled to support Slavery, let them go and sink in the embrace of the old parties. [Applause.] There they belong. On the other hand, all sincerely opposed to Slavery, who desire to act against Slavery, who seek to bear their testimony for Freedom, who long to carry into public affairs those principles of morality and Christian duty which are the rule of private life,—let them come out from both the old parties, and join us. [Cheers.] In our organization, with the declared friends of Freedom, they will find a place in harmony with their aspirations. [Enthusiasm.]

There is one apology, common to the supporters of both the old parties, and often in their mouths, when pressed for inconsistent persistence in adhering to these parties. It is dogmatically asserted that there can be but two parties,—that a new party is impossible, particularly in our country,—and that, therefore, all persons, however opposed to Slavery, must be content in one of the old parties. This assumption, which is without foundation in reason, is so often put forth, that it has acquired a certain currency; and many, who reason hastily, or implicitly follow others, have adopted it as the all-sufficient excuse for their conduct. Confessing their own opposition to Slavery, they yield to the domination of party, and become dumb. All this is wrong morally, and therefore must be wrong practically.

Party, in its true estate, is the natural expression and agency of different forms of opinion on important public questions, and itself assumes different forms precisely according to the prevalence of different opinions. Thus, in the early Italian republics there were for a while the factions of Guelphs and Ghibellines, rival supporters of Pope and Emperor,—also of Whites and Blacks, taking their names from the color of their respective badges,—and in England, the two factions of the White and Red Roses, in which was involved the succession to the crown. In all these cases the party came into being, died out, or changed with the objects originating it. If there be in a community only two chief antagonist opinions, then there will be but two parties embodying these opinions. But as other opinions practically prevail and seek vent, so must parties change or multiply. This is so strongly the conclusion of reason and philosophy, that it could not be doubted, even if there were no examples of such change and multiplicity. But we need only turn to the recent history of France and England, the two countries where opinion has the freest scope, to find such examples.

Thus, for instance, in France,—and I dwell on this point because I have myself observed, in conversation, that it is of practical importance,—under Louis Philippe, anterior to the late Republic, there was the party of Legitimists, supporters of the old branch of Bourbons, and the party of Orleanists, supporters of the existing throne: these two corresponding at the time, in relative rank and power, to our Whigs and Democrats. Besides these was a third party, the small band of Republicans, represented in the Legislature by a few persons only, but strong in principles and purposes, which in February, 1848, prevailed over both the others. [Applause.] On the establishment of the Republic, the multiplication of parties continued, until, with the freedom of opinion and the freedom of the press, all were equally overthrown by Louis Napoleon, and their place supplied by the enforced unity of despotism.

In England, the most important measure of recent reform, the abolition of the laws imposing a protective duty on corn, was carried only by a third party. Neither of the two old parties could be brought to adopt this measure and press it to consummation. A powerful public opinion, thwarted in the regular parties, had recourse to a new one, neither Whig nor Tory, but formed from both the old ones, where Sir Robert Peel, the great Conservative leader, took his place, side by side, in honorable coalition, with Mr. Cobden, the great Liberal leader. ["Hear! hear!">[ In this way the Corn Laws were finally overthrown. The multiplicity of parties engendered by this contest still continues in England. At the general election for the new Parliament which has just taken place, the strict lines of ancient parties seemed to be effaced, and many were returned, not as Whigs and Tories, but as Protectionists and Anti-Protectionists.

Thus by example in our own day we confirm the principle of political philosophy, that parties naturally adapt themselves in character and number to prevailing public opinion.

At the present time, in our country, there exists a deep, controlling, conscientious feeling against Slavery. [Cheers.] You and I, Sir, and all of us, confess it. While recognizing the Constitution, we desire to do everything in our power to relieve ourselves of responsibility for this terrible wrong. ["Yes! yes!">[ We would vindicate the Constitution, and the National Government it has established, from all participation in this outrage. [Cheers.] Both the old political parties, forgetful of the Fathers, and of the spirit of the Constitution, not only refuse to be agents or representatives in any degree of our convictions, but expressly discourage and denounce them. Thus baffled in effort for utterance, these convictions naturally seek expression in a new agency, the party of Freedom. [Cheers.] Such is the party, representing the great doctrines of Human Rights, as enunciated in our Declaration of Independence, and inspired by a truly Democratic sentiment, now assembled here under the name of the Free Democracy. [Cheers.]

The rising public opinion against Slavery cannot flow in the old political channels. It is impeded, choked, and dammed back. But if not through the old parties, then over the old parties [tremendous cheering], this irresistible current shall find its way. [Enthusiasm.] It cannot be permanently stopped. If the old parties will not become its organs, they must become its victims. [Cheers.] The party of Freedom will certainly prevail. [Sensation.] It may be by entering into and possessing one of the old parties, filling it with our own strong life; or it may be by drawing to itself the good and true from both who are unwilling to continue in a political combination when it ceases to represent their convictions; but, in one way or the other, its ultimate triumph is sure. [Great applause.] Of this let no man doubt. [Repeated cheers.]

At this moment we are in a minority. At the last popular election in Massachusetts, there were twenty-eight thousand Free-Soilers, forty-three thousand Democrats, and sixty-four thousand Whigs. But this is no reason for discouragement. According to recent estimates, the population of the whole world amounts to about eight hundred millions. Of these only two hundred and sixty millions are Christians, while the remaining five hundred and forty millions are mainly Mahometans, Brahmins, and Idolaters. Because the Christians are in this minority, that is no reason for renouncing Christianity, and for surrendering to the false religions [cheers]; nor do we doubt that Christianity will yet prevail over the whole earth, as the waters cover the sea. ["Hear! hear!">[ The friends of Freedom in Massachusetts are likewise in a minority; but they will not therefore renounce Freedom [cheers], nor surrender to the political Mahometans, Brahmins, and Idolaters of Baltimore ["Never! never!">[; nor can they doubt that their cause, like Christianity, will yet prevail. [Enthusiastic cheers.]

Our party commends itself. But it is also commended by our candidates. [Cheers.] In all that makes the eminent civilian or the accomplished statesman fit for the responsibilities of government, they will proudly compare with any of their competitors [applause], while they are dear to our hearts as able, well-tried, loyal supporters of those vital principles which we seek to establish under the Constitution of the United States. [Applause.] In the Senate, Mr. Hale [cheers] is admitted to be foremost in aptitude and readiness for debate, whether in the general legislation of the country, or in constant and valiant championship of our cause. [Applause.] His genial and sun-like nature irradiates the antagonism of political controversy [cheers], while his active and practical mind, richly stored with various experience, never fails to render good service. [Great cheering.]

Of Mr. Julian, our candidate for the Vice-Presidency, ["Hear! hear!">[ let me say simply, that, in ability and devotion to our principles, he is a worthy compeer of Mr. Hale. To vote for such men will itself be a pleasure. But it will be doubly so, when we reflect that in this way we do something to accomplish a noble work, with which the happiness, welfare, and fame of our country are indissolubly connected. [Repeated and enthusiastic cheers.]

With such a cause and such candidates, no man can be disheartened. The tempest may blow,—but ours is a life-boat, not to be harmed by wind or wave. The Genius of Liberty sits at the helm. I hear her voice of cheer, saying, "Whoso sails with me comes to shore!"

Mr. Sumner resumed his seat amid heartiest and long-protracted applause.

[CIVIL SUPERINTENDENTS OF ARMORIES.]

Speech in the Senate, on the Proposition to change the Superintendents of Armories, February 23, 1853.

The Army Appropriation Bill being under discussion, Mr. Davis, of Massachusetts, moved the following amendment:—

"That from and after the first day of July next, the Act of Congress approved August 23, 1842, be so modified, that the President may, if in his opinion the public interest demands it, place over any of the armories a superintendent who does not belong to the Army."

In the course of the debate, Mr. Sumner spoke as follows.

Mr. President,—I do not desire to speak upon the general subject of the manufacture of arms under the authority of the United States, which has been opened in debate by honorable Senators. What I have to say will be on the precise question before the Senate, and nothing else. That question, as I understand it, is on the amendment proposed by my colleague [Mr. Davis], according to which the Act of 1842 is to be so far modified, that the President, in his discretion, may place over the armories persons not of the army,—leaving it, therefore, to his judgment whether the superintendent shall be a military man or a civilian. This is all.

The Senate is exhorted not to act precipitately. But the character of this proposition excludes all idea of precipitation. We do not determine absolutely that the system shall be changed, but simply that it may be changed in the discretion of the President. This discretion, which will be exercised only after ample inquiry, stands in the way of all precipitation; and this is my answer to the Senator from Illinois [Mr. Shields].

Again, it is urged, that under a military head the armories are better administered than they would be under a civil head, and that the arms are better and cheaper; and here my friend from South Carolina, who sits before me [Mr. Butler], dwelt with his accustomed glow upon the success with which this manufacture is conducted at the national armories, and the extent to which it is recognized in Europe. But, Sir, in the precise question before you the merits of the armories are not involved. We do not undertake to judge the military superintendents or their works. The determination of this question is referred to the President; and this is my answer to the Senator from South Carolina.

The objections to this amendment of my colleague, then, seem to disappear. But there are two distinct arguments in its favor, which, at the present moment, do not seem to me susceptible of any answer.

In the first place, there are complaints against the existing system, which ought to be heard. A memorial from five hundred legal voters of Springfield, now on your table, bears testimony to them. Letters to myself and others, from persons whose opinions I am bound to regard, set them forth sometimes in very strong language. The administration of the arsenal at Springfield is commended by many; but there are others who judge it differently. As now conducted, it is sometimes represented to be the seat of oppressive conduct, and the occasion of heart-burning and strife, often running into local politics. In the eyes of some this arsenal is little better than a sore on that beautiful town. Now on these complaints and allegations I express no opinion. I do not affirm their truth or untruth. What I know of the superintendent makes it difficult for me to believe that anything unjust, oppressive, or hard can proceed from him. But the whole case justifies inquiry at least, and such will be secured by the proposition before the Senate. This is the smallest thing we can do.

This proposition is enforced by another consideration which seems to me entitled to weight. I have nothing to say now on the general question of reducing the army or modifying the existing military system. But I do affirm, confidently, that the genius of our institutions favors civil life rather than military life,—and that, in harmony with this, it is our duty, whenever the public interests will permit, to limit and restrict the sphere of military influence. This is not a military monarchy, where the soldier is supreme, but a republic, where the soldier yields to the civilian. But the law, as it now stands, gives to the soldier an absolute preference in a service which is not military, and which, from its nature, belongs to civil life. The manufacture of arms is a mechanical pursuit, and, for myself, I can see no reason why it should not be placed in charge of one bred to the business. Among the intelligent mechanics of Massachusetts there are many fully fit to be at the head of the arsenal at Springfield; but by the existing law all these are austerely excluded from any such trust. The idea which has fallen from so many Senators, that the superintendent of an armory ought to be a military man, that a military man only is competent, or even that a military man is more competent than a civilian, seems to me as illogical as the jocular fallacy of Dr. Johnson, that he "who drives fat oxen should himself be fat."

[NECESSITY OF UNION TO UPHOLD FREEDOM.]

Letter to a Rhode Island Committee, March 26, 1853.

Washington, March 26, 1853.

Dear Sir,—I cannot promise myself the pleasure of being in Rhode Island at the time you propose, and am therefore constrained to decline the invitation with which you have honored me.

But let me assure you, that, in all our political contests, I see no question comparable in practical importance, as surely there is none equal in moral grandeur, to that which is presented by the Free Democracy, and which now enlists your sympathies.

Both the old parties unite in upholding Slavery. It becomes all good citizens to unite in upholding Freedom; nor should any one believe that his single vote may not exert an influence on the struggle.

Believe me, dear Sir, faithfully yours,

Charles Sumner.

George L. Clarke, Chairman of the State Central Committee of the Free Democracy of Rhode Island.

[AGAINST SECRECY IN PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE.]

Speech in the Senate, on the Proposition to limit the Secret Sessions of the Senate, April 6, 1853.

The following resolution was submitted by Mr. Chase, of Ohio.

"Resolved, That all sessions and all proceedings of the Senate shall be public and open, except when matters communicated in confidence by the President shall be received and considered, and in such other cases as the Senate by resolution from time to time shall specially order; and so much of the thirty-eighth, thirty-ninth, and fortieth rules as may be inconsistent with this rule is hereby rescinded."

In the debate which ensued, Mr. Sumner spoke as follows.

Mr. President,—Party allusions and party considerations have been brought to bear upon this question. I wish to regard it for a moment in the light of the Constitution, and in the spirit of our institutions. In the Constitution there is no injunction of secrecy on any of the proceedings of the Senate; nor is there any requirement of publicity. To the Senate is left the determination of its rules of proceeding. Thus abstaining from all regulation of this matter, the framers of the Constitution obviously regarded it as in all respects within the discretion of the Senate, to be exercised from time to time as it thinks best.

The Senate possesses three important functions: first, the legislative or parliamentary power, where it acts concurrently with the House of Representatives, as well as the President; secondly, the diplomatic power, or that of "advice and consent" to treaties with foreign countries in concurrence with the President; and, thirdly, the executive power, or that of "advice and consent" to nominations by the President for offices under the Constitution. I say nothing of another, rarely called into activity, the sole power to try impeachments.

At the first organization of the Government, the proceedings of the Senate, whether in legislation or on treaties or nominations, were with closed doors. In this respect legislative business and executive business were alike. This continued down to the second session of the Third Congress, in 1794, when, in pursuance of a formal resolution, the galleries were opened so long as the Senate were engaged in their legislative capacity, unless where, in the opinion of the Senate, secrecy was required; and this rule has continued ever since. Here was an exercise of discretion, in obvious harmony with public sentiment and the spirit of our institutions.

The change now proposed goes still further. It opens the doors on all occasions, whether legislative or executive, except when specially ordered otherwise. The Senator from South Carolina [Mr. Butler] says that the Senate is a confidential body, and should be ready to receive confidential communications from the President. But this will still be the case, if we adopt the resolution now submitted to us. The limitation proposed seems adequate to all exigencies, while the general rule will be publicity. Executive sessions with closed doors, shrouded from the public gaze and public criticism, constitute an exceptional part of our system, too much in harmony with the proceedings of other Governments less liberal in character. The genius of our institutions requires publicity. The ancient Roman, who bade his architect so to construct his house that his guests and all that he did could be seen by the world, is a fit model for the American people.

[THE GERMAN EMIGRANT MUST BE AGAINST SLAVERY.]

Letter to Lewis Tappan, Esq., May 17, 1853.

Boston, May 17, 1853.

Dear Sir,—I know Mr. Schmidt by the good name he has won, and I have also had the pleasure of making his personal acquaintance. I understand him to be a scholar, believing in the demand which Liberty in our country now makes upon every citizen. Thus endowed in mind and character, he will address his compatriots from Germany, in their own language, with persuasive power. I trust he will find the opportunity he covets; and I know of none which promises better than his present plan of a Weekly German Antislavery Newspaper at Washington.

The number of persons to be addressed by such a journal is very large; and they should be easy converts. The German emigrant who is not against Slavery here leads us to doubt the sincerity of his opposition to the Tyranny he has left behind in his native land.

Believe me, dear Sir, faithfully yours,

Charles Sumner.

Lewis Tappan, Esq.

[POWERS OF THE STATE OVER THE MILITIA: EXEMPTIONS FOR CONSCIENTIOUS SCRUPLES.]

Speech in Convention to revise and amend the Constitution of Massachusetts,[2] June 21, 1853.

Propositions of amendment on the general subject of the Militia being under consideration in Committee of the Whole, Mr. Sumner spoke as follows.

I should like to call the attention of the Committee to the precise question on which we are to vote. This does not, as it seems to me, properly open the discussion to which we have been listening. I do not understand that it involves the topics introduced by my friend opposite [Mr. Wilson],—the present condition of Europe, the prospects of the liberal cause in that quarter of the globe, or the extent to which that cause may be affected by a contemporaneous movement for peace. Nor do I understand that the important considerations introduced by the gentleman on my right [Mr. Whitney, of Boylston], regarding the extent to which Government may be intrusted with the power of the sword, can materially influence our decision. I put these things aside at this time.

The question is on the final passage of the fifteen resolutions reported by the Committee on the Militia. And here let me adopt a suggestion dropped by my friend opposite [Mr. Wilson]. He regretted, if I understood him, that this whole subject was not compressed into one or two resolutions. Am I right?

Mr. Wilson. The gentleman is correct.

Mr. Sumner. I agree with him. I regret that it was not compressed into one or two resolutions. I object to these resolutions for several reasons. In the first place, there are too many; in the second place, at least two of them seem to be an assumption of power belonging to Congress, and therefore at least of doubtful constitutionality; and, in the third place, because twelve of them undertake to control matters which it were better to leave with the Legislature.

On the formation of the Constitution of Massachusetts, in 1780, it was natural that our fathers should introduce details with regard to the militia and its organization. The Constitution of the United States had not then been made. But since the establishment of this Constitution the whole condition of the militia is changed. Among the powers expressly given to Congress is the power "to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress." And Congress has proceeded to exercise this power by the organization of a national militia. Whatever might have been the original inducement to multiform provisions on this subject in the Constitution of Massachusetts, none such exists at this day, and it is impolitic at least to introduce them.

I fear that they are more than impolitic. I will not argue here the question of Constitutional Law; but I appeal to the better judgment of my professional brethren—and I am happy to see some of them lingering at this late hour—that any attempt on the part of the State to interfere, in any way, by addition or subtraction, with the organization of the national militia, is an experiment which we should not introduce into the permanent text of our organic law. If the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States on the powers of Congress are to prevail, then, it seems to me, any such assumption, in a case where the original power of Congress is clear, will be unconstitutional and void. In the famous case of Prigg v. Pennsylvania, after an elaborate discussion at the bar, all State legislation on the subject of fugitive slaves was declared unconstitutional and void, while Congress is recognized as the sole depository of power on this subject. According to my recollection, it was expressly held that legislation by Congress excluded all State legislation on the same subject, whether to control, qualify, or superadd to the remedy enacted by Congress. I commend gentlemen, now so swift with these provisions, to the study of this precedent. It is comparatively recent; and the principle of interpretation which it establishes is applicable to State laws on the militia, even though entirely inapplicable to State laws on fugitive slaves,—for the simple reason, that in the former case the original power of Congress is clear, while in the latter it is denied.

But the States are not without power over the militia. In the very grant to Congress is a reservation to them as follows: "reserving to the States respectively the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress." And here is precisely what the States can do. They may appoint the officers and train the militia.

Now, Sir, the first two resolutions before us transcend the powers of the State. They touch the enrolment and organization of the militia, and on this account are an assumption of power forbidden by the principle to which I have referred. The other thirteen resolutions, with the exception of the seventh, are in the nature of a military code, concerning the choice of officers, all of which should be left to the action of the Legislature.

In conformity with these views, Mr. Chairman, and in the hope of presenting a proposition on which the Convention may unite, I propose to strike out all after the preamble and insert two resolutions, as follows.

Art. 1. The Governor shall be the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the State, and the Militia thereof, excepting when these forces shall be actually in the service of the United States,—and shall have power to call out the same to aid in the execution of the laws, to suppress insurrection, and to repel invasion.

Art. 2. The appointment of officers and the training of the Militia shall be regulated in such manner as may hereafter be deemed expedient by the Legislature; and all persons, who from scruples of conscience shall be averse to bearing arms, shall be excused on such conditions as shall hereafter be prescribed by law.

The first of these resolutions is identical with the seventh resolution of the Committee. The second provides for the exercise by the Legislature of powers expressly reserved to the States over the appointment of officers and the training of the militia; and taking advantage of the Act of Congress which allows the States to determine who shall be exempted from military duty, it plants in the text of the Constitution a clause by which this immunity is secured to all persons who from scruples of conscience are averse to bearing arms. I believe we cannot go far beyond these without doing too much, while these seem to me enough.

[POWERS OF THE STATE OVER THE MILITIA: COLORED COMPANIES.]

Speech in Convention to revise and amend the Constitution of Massachusetts, June 22, 1853.

On 22d June the following resolution was brought forward by Mr. Wilson:—

"Resolved, That no distinction shall ever be made, in the organization of the volunteer militia of this Commonwealth, on account of color or race."

On this proposition Mr. Sumner spoke as follows.

I HAVE a suggestion for my friend opposite [Mr. Wilson], in regard to the form of his proposition, which, if he accepts it, will, as it seems to me, absolutely remove his proposition from the criticism of my most eloquent friend before me [Mr. Choate], and from the criticism of other gentlemen who have addressed the Convention. I suggest to strike out the word "militia," and substitute the words "military companies," so that his proposition will read, "that in the organization of the volunteer military companies of the Commonwealth there shall be no distinction of color or race."

Mr. Wilson. I accept the suggestion, and will amend my proposition accordingly.

Mr. Sumner. Now the proposition, as amended, I assert, is absolutely consistent with the Constitution of the United States, and, I believe, in conformity with the public sentiment of Massachusetts.

A brief inquiry will show that it is consistent with the Constitution of the United States, and in no respect interferes with the organization of the National Militia. That Constitution provides for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and gives Congress full power over the subject,—in which particular, be it observed, it is clearly distinguishable from that of fugitive slaves, over whom no such power is given. To be more explicit, I will read the clause. It is found in the long list of enumerated powers of Congress, and is as follows: "The Congress shall have power to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress." And then, at the close of the section, it is further declared, that Congress shall have power "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers."

In pursuance of this power, Congress has proceeded, by various laws, "to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States." The earliest of these laws, still in force, is entitled "An act more effectually to provide for the national defence, by establishing an uniform militia throughout the United States."[3] This was followed by several acts in addition. Congress, then, has undertaken to exercise the power of "organizing" the militia under the Constitution.

Here the question arises, to what extent, if any, this power, when already exercised by Congress, is exclusive in character. Among the powers delegated to Congress there may be some not for the time being exercised. For instance, there is the power "to fix the standard of weights and measures." Practically, this has never been exercised by Congress; but it is left to each State within its own jurisdiction. On the other hand, there is a power, belonging to the same group, "to establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States," which, when exercised by Congress, has been held so far exclusive as to avoid at once all the bankrupt and insolvent laws of the several States.

I might go over all the powers of Congress, and find constant illustration of the subject. For instance, there is the power "to establish an uniform rule of naturalization," on which Chief Justice Marshall once remarked, "That the power of naturalization is exclusively in Congress does not seem to be, and certainly ought not to be, controverted."[4] There is the power "to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States," which was early declared by the Supreme Court to be exclusive, so as to prevent the exercise of any part of it by the States.[5] There is the power over patents and copyrights, which is also regarded as exclusive. So also is the power "to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offences against the Law of Nations." So also is that other power, "to establish post-offices and post-roads." All these powers, as in the case of the power over the National Militia, have been exercised by Congress, and even if not absolutely exclusive in original character, have become so by exercise.

Now, Sir, upon what ground do gentlemen make any discrimination in the case of the power over the National Militia? I know of none which seems at all tenable. It is natural that the States should desire to exercise this power, since it was so important to them before the Union; but I do not see how any discrimination can be maintained at the present time. Whatever may have been the original importance of the militia to each State, yet, when the National Constitution was formed, and Congress exercised the power delegated to it over this subject, the militia of the several States was absorbed into one uniform body, organized, armed, and disciplined as the National Militia. To the States respectively, according to the express language of the Constitution, was left "the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress." To this may be added the implied power of "governing" them when in the service of the State. This is all. The distinct specification of certain powers, as reserved to the States, excludes the States from the exercise of all other powers not specified or clearly implied. In other words, they are excluded from all power over the "organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia," at least after Congress has undertaken to enact laws for this purpose.

The history of the adoption of the several parts of this clause in the National Convention reflects light upon its true meaning. The first part, in regard to organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, was passed by a vote of nine States against two; the next, reserving the appointment of officers to the States, after an ineffectual attempt to amend it by confining the appointment to officers under the rank of general officers, was passed without a division; and the last, reserving to the States the authority to train the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress, was passed by a vote of seven States against four.[6] It seems, then, that there was strong opposition in the Convention, even to the secondary reservation of "the authority of training the militia." But this power is not reserved unqualifiedly. The States are to train the militia "according to the discipline prescribed by Congress": not according to any discipline determined by the States, or by the States concurrently with the National Government, but absolutely according to the discipline prescribed by Congress,—nor more, nor less: thus distinctly recognizing the essentially exclusive character of the legislation of Congress on this subject.

This interpretation derives confirmation from the manner in which the militia of England was constituted or organized at the time of the adoption of the National Constitution. To the crown was given "the sole right to govern and command them," though they were "officered" by the Lord Lieutenant, the Deputy Lieutenants, and other principal landholders of the county.[7] The Commentaries of Sir William Blackstone, from which this description is drawn, were familiar to the members of the Convention; and it is reasonable to suppose, that, in the distribution of powers between the National Government and the States, on this subject, the peculiar arrangement prevailing in the mother country was not disregarded.

If it should be said, that the adoption of this conclusion would affect the character of many laws enacted by States, and thus far recognized as ancillary to the National Militia, it may be replied, that the possibility of these consequences cannot justly influence our conclusions on a question which must be determined by acknowledged principles of Constitutional Law. In obedience to these same principles, the Supreme Court, in the case of Prigg v. Pennsylvania, after asserting a power over fugitive slaves which is controverted, has proceeded to annul a large number of statutes in different States. Mr. Justice Wayne in this case said, "that the legislation by Congress upon the provision, as the supreme law of the land, excludes all State legislation upon the same subject,—and that no State can pass any law or regulation, or interpose such as may have been a law or regulation when the Constitution of the United States was ratified, to superadd to, control, qualify, or impede a remedy enacted by Congress for the delivery of fugitive slaves to the parties to whom their service or labor is due."[8] Without the sanction of any express words in the Constitution, and chiefly, if not solely, impressed by the importance of consulting "unity of purpose or uniformity of operation"[9] in the legislation with regard to fugitive slaves, the Court assumed a power over this subject, and then, as a natural incident to this assumption, excluded the States from all sovereignty in the premises.

If this rule be applicable to the pretended power over fugitive slaves, it is still more applicable to the power over the militia which nobody questions. Besides, I know of no power which so absolutely requires what has been regarded as an important criterion, "unity of purpose or uniformity of operation." No uniform military organization can spring from opposite or inharmonious systems, and all systems proceeding from different sources are liable to be opposite or inharmonious.

Now, Sir, let us apply this reasoning to the matter in hand. In Massachusetts there exists, and has for a long time existed, an anomalous system, familiarly and loosely described as the Volunteer Militia, not composed absolutely of those enrolled under the laws of the United States, but a smaller, more select, and peculiar body. It cannot be doubted that the State, by virtue of its police powers within its own borders, has power to constitute or organize a body of volunteers to aid in enforcing its laws. But it does not follow that it has power to constitute or organize a body of volunteers who shall be regarded as part of the National Militia. And, Sir, I make bold to say that the volunteer militia—I prefer to call it the volunteer military companies—cannot be regarded as part of the National Militia. It is no part of that uniform militia which it was the object of the early Act of Congress to organize. It may appear to be part of this system, it may affect to be, but I pronounce it a mistake to suppose that it is so in any just constitutional sense.

As a local system, disconnected from the National Militia, and not in any way constrained by its organization, it is within our jurisdiction. We are free to declare the principles which shall govern it. We may declare, that, whatever may be the existing law of the United States with regard to its enrolled militia,—and with this I propose no interference, because it would be futile,—I say, Massachusetts may proudly declare that in her own volunteer military companies, marshalled under her own local laws, there shall be no distinction of race or color.

[THE PACIFIC RAILROAD AND THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE.]

Letter to the Mayor of Boston, for the Celebration Of July 4, 1853.

Boston, July 1, 1853.

Dear Sir,—It will not be in my power to unite with the City Council of Boston in the approaching celebration of our national anniversary; but I beg to assure you that I am not insensible to the honor of their invitation.

The day itself comes full of quickening suggestions, which can need no prompting from me. And yet, with your permission, I would gladly endeavor to associate at this time one special aspiration with the general gladness. Allow me to propose the following toast.

The Railroad from the Atlantic to the Pacific.—Traversing a whole continent, and binding together two oceans, this mighty thoroughfare, when completed, will mark an epoch of human progress second only to that of our Declaration of Independence. May the day soon come!

Believe me, dear Sir, faithfully yours,

Charles Sumner.

Hon. Benjamin Seaver, Mayor, &c.

[THE REPRESENTATIVE SYSTEM, AND ITS PROPER BASIS.]

Speech on the Proposition to amend the Basis of the House of Representatives of Massachusetts, in the Convention to revise and amend the Constitution of that State, July 7, 1853.

Mr. President,—If the question under consideration were less important in its bearings, or less embarrassed by conflicting opinions, I should hesitate to break the silence which I have been inclined to preserve in this Convention. In taking the seat to which I was unexpectedly chosen while absent from the Commonwealth, in another sphere of duty, I felt that it would be becoming in me, and that my associates here would recognize the propriety of my course, considering the little opportunity I had enjoyed of late to make myself acquainted with the sentiments of the people on proposed changes, especially in comparison with friends to whom this movement is mainly due,—on these accounts, as also on other accounts, I felt that it would be becoming in me to interfere as little as possible with these debates. To others I willingly left the part which I might have taken.

And now, while I think, that, since our labors began, weeks, even months, have passed, and that the term is already reached, when, according to the just expectations and earnest desires of many, they should be closed, I feel that acts rather than words, that votes rather than speeches,—at least such as I might hope to make,—are needed here, to the end that the Convention, seasonably and effectively completing its beneficent work, may itself be hailed as a Great Act in the history of the Commonwealth.

But the magnitude of this question justifies debate; and allow me to add, that the State, our common mother, may feel proud of the ability, the eloquence, and the good temper with which it has thus far been conducted. Gentlemen have addressed the Convention in a manner which would grace any assembly that it has been my fortune to know, at home or abroad. Sir, the character of these proceedings gives new assurance for the future. The alarmist, who starts at every suggestion of change, and the croaker, who augurs constant evil from the irresistible tendency of events, must confess that there are men here to whose intelligence and patriotism, under God, the interests of our beloved Commonwealth may well be intrusted. Yes, Sir, Massachusetts is safe. Whatever the result even of the present important question, whichsoever scheme of representation may be adopted, Massachusetts will continue to prosper as in times past.

In the course of human history, two States, small in territory, have won enviable renown by genius and devotion to Freedom, so that their very names awaken echoes: I refer to Athens and Scotland. But Athens,—even at Salamis, repelling the Persian host, or afterwards, in the golden days of Pericles,—and Scotland, throughout her long struggle with England, down to the very Act of Union at the beginning of the last century,—were each inferior, in population and wealth, to Massachusetts at this moment. It belongs to us, according to our capacities, to see that this comparison does not end here. Others may believe that our duty is best accomplished by standing still. I like to believe that it can be completely done only by constant, incessant advance in all things,—in knowledge, in science, in art, and lastly in government itself, destined to be the bright consummation, on earth, of all knowledge, all science, and all art.

In framing our Constitution anew, we encounter a difficulty which at its original formation, in 1780, perplexed our fathers,—which perplexed the Convention of 1820,—which with its perplexities has haunted successive Legislatures and the whole people down to this day,—and which now perplexes us. This difficulty occurs in determining the Representative System, and proceeds mainly from the corporate claims of towns. From an early period in the State, towns, both great and small, with slight exceptions, have sent one or more representatives to the Legislature. In primitive days, when towns were few and the whole population was scanty, this arrangement was convenient at least, if not equitable. But now, with the increased number of towns, and the unequal distribution of a large population, it has become inconvenient, if not inequitable. The existing system does not work well, and we are summoned to reform it.

And here, Sir, let me congratulate the Convention, that, on this most important question, transcending every other, all of us, without distinction of party, are in favor of reform. All are Reformers. The existing system finds no advocate on this floor. Nobody here will do it reverence. If the call of the Convention were not already amply vindicated, if there were doubt anywhere of its expediency, the remarkable concurrence of all sides in condemning the existing representative system shows that we have not come together without cause.

The orders of the day have been filled with various plans to meet the exigency. Most of these aimed to preserve the corporate representation of towns; some of them, at least one from the venerable gentleman from Taunton [Mr. Morton], and another from the venerable gentleman from Boston [Mr. Hale], favored an opposite system, hitherto untried among us, and proposed to divide the State into districts. The question has been between these hostile propositions; and that is the question which I propose to consider, in the light of history and abstract principle, as also with reference to present exigencies. I shall speak, first, of the origin and nature of the Representative System, and its proper character under American institutions; and, secondly, I shall endeavor to indicate the principles which may conduct us to a practical conclusion in the present debate. Entering upon this service at so late a stage of the discussion, I feel like a tardy gleaner in a well-traversed field; but I shall proceed.

I.

I begin with the Origin and Nature of the Representative System. This is an invention of modern times. In antiquity there were republics and democracies, but there was no Representative System. Rulers were chosen by the people, as in many Commonwealths; senators were designated by the king or by the censors, as in Rome; ambassadors or legates were sent to a Federal Council, as to the Assembly of the Amphictyons; but in no ancient state was any body of men ever constituted by the people to represent them in the administration of their internal affairs. In Athens, the people met in public assembly, and directly acted for themselves on all questions, foreign or domestic. This was possible there, as the State was small, and the Assembly seldom exceeded five thousand citizens,—a large town-meeting, or mass-meeting, we might call it,—not inaptly termed "that fierce democratie" of Athens.

But where the territory was extensive, and the population scattered and numerous, there could be no assembly of the whole body of citizens. To meet this precise difficulty the Representative System was devised. By a machinery so obvious that we are astonished it was not employed in the ancient Commonwealths, the people, though scattered and numerous, are gathered, by their chosen representatives, into a small and deliberative assembly, where, without tumult or rashness, they consider and determine all questions which concern them. In every representative body, properly constituted, the people are practically present.

Nothing is invented and perfected at the same time; and this system is no exception to the rule. In England, where it reached its earliest vigor, it has been, and still is, anomalous in character. The existing divisions of the country, composed of boroughs, cities, and counties, were summoned by the king's writ to send representatives, with little regard to equality of any kind, whether of population, taxation, or territory. Their existence as corporate units was the prevailing title. The irregular operation of the system, increasing with lapse of time, provoked a cry for Parliamentary Reform, which, after a struggle of more than fifty years, ending in a debate that occupied the House of Commons more than fifty days, was finally carried; but, though many abuses and inequalities were removed, yet the anomalous representation by counties, cities, and boroughs still continued. And this, Sir, is the English system.

Pass now to the American system. I say American system,—for to our country belongs the honor of first giving to the world the idea of a system which, discarding corporate representation, founded itself absolutely on equality. Let us acknowledge with gratitude that from England have come five great and ever memorable institutions, by which Liberty is secured: I mean the Trial by Jury,—the writ of Habeas Corpus,—the Representative System,—the Rules and Orders of Debate,—and, lastly, that benign principle which pronounces that its air is too pure for a slave to breathe: perhaps the five most important political establishments of modern times. This glory cannot be taken from the mother country. But America has added to the Representative System another principle, without which it is incomplete, and which, in the course of events, is destined, I cannot doubt, to find acceptance wherever the Representative System is employed: I mean the principle of equality.

Here in Massachusetts, home of the ideas out of which sprang the Revolution, this principle had its earliest expression. And it is not a little curious that this very expression was suggested by the two evils of which we now complain,—namely, a practical inequality of representation, and a too numerous House.

In the earliest days of the Colony, while the number of freemen was small and gathered in one neighborhood, there was no occasion for any representative body. All could then meet in public assembly, as at ancient Athens; in fact, they did so meet, and in this way discharged the duties of legislation. But as the freemen became scattered and numerous, it was found grievous to compel the personal attendance of the whole body, and, as a substitute, the towns were empowered, in 1634, to assemble in General Court by deputies.[10] Here was the establishment of the Representative System in Massachusetts, which has continued, without interruption, down to our day. The size of the House and the relative representation of towns have varied at different times; but the great principle of representation, by which a substitute is provided for the whole body of the people, has constantly been preserved. Still a feeling has long prevailed that the system had not yet received its final form, while, with more or less precision, has been discerned that principle of equality which is essential to its completeness.

Among the acts of the first General Court of the Revolution was one passed in the summer of 1775, after the Battle of Bunker Hill, "declaratory of the right of the towns and districts to elect and depute a representative or representatives to serve for and represent them in the General Court." By this act all provisions of previous acts denying to certain towns and districts the right of sending a representative were declared null and void, and every town containing thirty qualified voters was authorized to send one.[11] The immediate consequence was the two evils to which I have already referred,—namely, inequality of representation, and a too numerous House: but the whole number of representatives which aroused the complaints of that day was three hundred and five.

These grievances were the occasion of a Convention of delegates from the towns of Essex County, at Ipswich, April 25, 1776, where was adopted a Memorial, afterwards presented and enforced at the bar of the House by John Lowell. In this remarkable document occurs the first development, if not the first proclamation, of the principle of equality in representation. Here, Sir, is the fountain and origin of an idea full of strength, beauty, and truth. Listen to the words of these Revolutionary fathers.

"If this representation is equal, it is perfect; as far as it deviates from this equality, so far it is imperfect, and approaches to that state of slavery; and the want of a just weight in representation is an evil nearly akin to being totally destitute of it. An inequality of representation has been justly esteemed the cause which has in a great degree sapped the foundation of the once admired, but now tottering, fabric of the British Empire; and we fear, that, if a different mode of representation from the present is not adopted in this Colony, our Constitution will not continue to that late period of time which the glowing heart of every true American now anticipates....

"We cannot realize that your Honors, our wise political fathers, have adverted to the present inequality of representation in this Colony, to the growth of the evil, or to the fatal consequences which will probably ensue from the continuance of it.

"Each town and district in the Colony is by some late regulations permitted to send one representative to the General Court, if such town or district consists of thirty freeholders and other inhabitants qualified to elect; if of one hundred and twenty, to send two. No town is permitted to send more than two, except the town of Boston, which may send four. There are some towns and districts in the Colony in which there are between thirty and forty freeholders, and other inhabitants qualified to elect, only; there are others besides Boston in which there are more than five hundred. The first of these may send one representative; the latter can send only two. If these towns as to property are to each other in the same respective proportion, is it not clear to a mathematical demonstration that the same number of inhabitants of equal property in the one town have but an eighth part of the weight in representation with the other?—and with what colorable pretext? we would decently inquire."[12]

Under the pressure of this powerful state paper the obnoxious law was repealed, and one "providing for a more equal representation" substituted; but the evil was only partially remedied. Then followed an unsuccessful effort to make a Constitution in 1777-8, which failed partly through dissatisfaction with its disposal of this very question. The County of Essex was again heard in another document, now known as the "Essex Result," and among the most able and instructive in our history, from which I take the following important words.

"The rights of representation should be so equally and impartially distributed, that the representatives should have the same views and interests with the people at large. They should think, feel, and act like them, and, in fine, should be an exact miniature of their constituents. They should be, if we may use the expression, the whole body politic, with all its property, rights, and privileges reduced to a smaller scale, every part being diminished in just proportion. To pursue the metaphor, if, in adjusting the representation of freemen, any ten are reduced into one, all the other tens should be alike reduced; or, if any hundred should be reduced to one, all the other hundreds should have just the same reduction."[13]

Mark well these words. Here is the Rule of Three, for the first time in history, applied to representation. This, Sir, is not the English system. I call it, with pride, the American system.

In another place the document proceeds as follows.

"The rights of representation should also be held sacred and inviolable, and for this purpose representation should be fixed upon known and easy principles; and the Constitution should make provision that recourse should constantly be had to those principles within a very small period of years, to rectify the errors that will creep in through lapse of time or alteration of situations."[14]

Then, distinctly, it proposes a system of districts, in words which I quote.

"In forming the first body of legislators, let regard be had only to the representation of persons, not of property. This body we call the House of Representatives. Ascertain the number of representatives. It ought not to be so large as will induce an enormous expense to Government, nor too unwieldy to deliberate with coolness and attention, nor so small as to be unacquainted with the situation and circumstances of the State. One hundred will be large enough, and perhaps it may be too large. We are persuaded that any number of men exceeding that cannot do business with such expedition and propriety as a smaller number could. However, let that at present be considered as the number. Let us have the number of freemen in the several counties in the State, and let these representatives be apportioned among the respective counties in proportion to their number of freemen.... As we have the number of freemen in the county, and the number of county representatives, by dividing the greater by the less we have the number of freemen entitled to send one representative. Then add as many adjoining towns together as contain that number of freemen, or as near as may be, and let those towns form one district, and proceed in this manner through the county."[15]

Mr. Hallett, for Wilbraham (interrupting). Will the gentleman state who was the author of that Essex paper?

Mr. Sumner. Theophilus Parsons is the reputed author of the document known as the "Essex Result."

Mr. Hallett. Yes, Sir, it was Theophilus Parsons who was the author of that, and John Lowell of the other; and good old Tory doctrines they are.

Mr. Sumner. If these be Tory doctrines, I must think well of Toryism.

Sir, notwithstanding these appeals, sustained with unsurpassed ability, the American system failed to be adopted in the Constitution of 1780. The anomalous English system was still continued; but, as if to cover the departure from principle, it was twice declared that the representation of the people should be "founded upon the principle of equality." This declaration still continues as our guide, while the irregular operation of the existing system, with its inequalities and large numbers, is a beacon of warning.

Following closely upon these efforts in Massachusetts, this principle found an illustrious advocate in Thomas Jefferson. In his "Notes on Virginia," written in 1781, he sharply exposes the inequalities of representation;[16] and a short time afterwards, when the victory at Yorktown had rescued Virginia from invasion and secured the independence of the United Colonies, he prepared the draught of a Constitution for his native State, which, disowning the English system, and recognizing the very principle that had failed in Massachusetts, expressly provided that "the number of delegates which each county may send shall be in proportion to the number of its qualified electors; and the whole number of delegates for the State shall be so proportioned to the whole number of qualified electors in it, that they shall never exceed three hundred nor be fewer than one hundred.... If any county be reduced in its qualified electors below the number authorized to send one delegate, let it be annexed to some adjoining county."[17] This proposition, which is substantially the Rule of Three, did not find favor in Virginia, which State, like Massachusetts, was not yet prepared for such a charter of electoral equality; but it still stands as a monument at once of its author and of the true system of representation.

The American system, though first showing itself in Massachusetts and Virginia, found its earliest practical exemplification a few years later in the Constitution of the United States. By the Articles of Confederation each State was entitled to send to Congress not less than two nor more than seven representatives, and in the determination of questions each State had one vote only. This plan was rejected by the framers of the new Constitution, and another was adopted, till then untried in the history of the world. It was declared that "representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union according to their respective numbers": not according to property, not according to territory, not according to any corporate rights, but according to their respective numbers. And this system has continued down to our day, and will continue immortal as the Union itself. Here is the Rule of Three actually incorporated into the Representative System of the United States.

An attempt has been made to render this system odious, or at least questionable, by charging upon it something of the excesses of the great French Revolution. Even if this rule had prevailed at that time in France, it would be bold to charge upon it any such consequences. But it is a mistake to suppose that it was then adopted in that country. The republican Constitution of 1791 was not founded upon numbers only, but upon numbers, territory, and taxation combined,—a mixed system, which excluded the true idea of personal equality. At the peaceful, almost bloodless, Revolution of 1848, under the lead of Lamartine, a National Assembly was convened on the simple basis of population, and one representative was allowed for every forty thousand inhabitants. Here, indeed, is the Rule of Three; but the idea originally came from our country.

Mr. Hallett. Will the gentleman for Marshfield allow me to make one more inquiry?

Mr. Sumner. Certainly.

Mr. Hallett. Do I understand the gentleman to say that the Rule of Three was applied to representation in the United States?

Mr. Sumner. I mean to say that the representation in the lower House of Congress was apportioned according to numbers; and this is the Rule of Three.

A practical question arises here, whether this rule should be applied to the whole body of population, including women, children, and unnaturalized foreigners, or to those only who exercise the electoral franchise,—in other words, to voters. It is probable that the rule would produce nearly similar results in both cases, as voters, except in few places, would bear a uniform proportion to the whole population. But it is easy to determine what the principle of the Representative System requires. Since its object is to provide a practical substitute for meetings of the people, it should be founded, in just proportion, on the numbers of those who, according to our Constitution, can take part in those meetings,—that is, upon the qualified voters. The representative body should be a miniature or abridgment of the electoral body,—in other words, of those allowed to participate in public affairs. If this conclusion needs authority, it may be found in the words of Mr. Madison, in the Debates on the National Constitution. "It has been very properly observed," he says, "that representation is an expedient by which the meeting of the people themselves is rendered unnecessary, and that the representatives ought, therefore, to bear a proportion to the votes which their constituents, if convened, would respectively have."[18]

The Rule of Three, then, applied to voters, seems to me sound; but whether applied to voters or population, it is the true rule of representation, and stands on irreversible principles. In my view, it commends itself to the natural reason so obviously, so instinctively, that I do not feel disposed to dwell upon it. But since it is called in question, I shall be excused for saying a few words in its behalf. Its advantages present themselves in several aspects.

First. I put in the front its constant and equal operation throughout the Commonwealth. Under it, every man will have a representative each year, and every man will have the same representative power as every other man. In this respect it recognizes a darling idea of our institutions, which cannot be disowned without weakening their foundations. It gives to the great principle of human equality a new expansion and application. It makes all men, in the enjoyment of the electoral franchise, whatever their diversities of intelligence, education, or wealth, or wheresoever they may be within the borders of the Commonwealth, whether in small town or in populous city, absolutely equal at the ballot-box.

I know that there are persons, Sir, who do not hesitate to assail the whole doctrine of the equality of men, as enunciated in our Declaration of Independence and in our Bill of Rights. In this work two eminent statesmen of our own country and England have led the way.[19] But it seems to me, that, if they had chosen to comprehend the meaning of the principle, much, if not all, of their objection would have been removed. Very plain it is that men are not born equal in physical strength or in mental capacity, in beauty of form or health of body. This is apparent to all, and the difference increases with years. Diversity or inequality in these respects is the law of creation. But as God is no respecter of persons, and as all are equal in his sight, whether rich or poor, whether dwellers in cities or in fields, so are all equal in natural rights; and it is an absurd declamation—of which no gentleman in this Convention is guilty—to adduce, in argument against them, the physical or mental inequalities by which men are characterized. Now I am not prepared to class the electoral franchise among inherent, natural rights, common to the whole human family, without distinction of age, sex, or residence; but I do say, that from the equality of men, which we so proudly proclaim, we derive a just rule for its exercise. For myself, I accept this principle, and, just so far and just so soon as possible, I would be guided by it in the system of Representation. But there are other reasons still.

Secondly. The Rule of Three, as applied to representation, is commended by its simplicity. It supersedes all the painful calculations to which we have been driven, the long agony of mathematics, as it was called by my friend over the way [Mr. Giles], and is as easy in application as it is just.

Thirdly. This rule is founded in Nature, and not in Art,—on natural bodies, and not on artificial bodies,—on men, and not on corporations,—on souls, and not on petty geographical lines. On this account it may be called a natural rule, and, when once established, will become fixed and permanent, beyond all change or desire of change.

And, fourthly, this rule removes, to every possible extent, those opportunities of political partiality and calculation, in the adjustment of representation, which are naturally incident to any departure from precise rule. It was beautifully said of Law by the greatest intellect of Antiquity, that it is mind without passion; and this very definition I would extend to a rule which, with little intervention from human will, is graduated by numbers, passionless as law itself in the conception of Aristotle. The object of free institutions is to withdraw all concerns of State, so far as practicable, from human discretion, and place them under the shield of human principles, to the end, according to the words of our Constitution, that there may be "a government of laws, and not of men." But, just in proportion as we depart from precise rule, it becomes a government of men, and not of laws.

Such considerations as these, thus briefly expressed, seem to vindicate this rule of representation. But I would not forget the arguments adduced against it. These assume two distinct forms: one founded on the character of our towns and the importance of preserving their influence; the other founded on the alleged necessity of counteracting the centralization of power in the cities. Now of these in their order.

And, first, of the importance of preserving our towns. Sir, I yield to no man in appreciation of the good done by these free municipalities. The able member for Erving [Mr. Griswold], who began this debate, the eloquent member for Berlin [Mr. Boutwell], and my excellent friend of many years, the accomplished member for Manchester [Mr. Dana], in the masterly speeches which they have addressed to the Convention, attributed no good influence to the towns which I do not recognize also. With them I agree, cordially, that the towns of Massachusetts, like the municipalities of Switzerland, have been schools and nurseries of freedom,—and that in these small bodies men were early disciplined in those primal duties of citizenship, which, on a grander scale, are made the foundation of our whole political fabric. But I cannot go so far as to attribute this remarkable influence to the assumed fact, that each town by itself was entitled to a representative in the legislative body. At the time of the Revolution this was the prerogative of most towns, though not of all; but it cannot be regarded as the distinctive, essential, life-giving attribute: at most, it was only an incident.

Sir, the true glory of the towns then was, that they were organized on the principle of self-government, at a time when that principle was not generally recognized,—that each town by itself was a little republic, where the whole body of freemen were voters, with powers of local legislation, taxation, and administration, and, especially, with power to choose their own head and all subordinate magistrates. The boroughs of England have possessed the power to send a member—often two members—to Parliament; but this has not saved them from corruption; nor has any person attributed to them, though in the enjoyment of this franchise, the influence which has proceeded from our municipalities. The reason is obvious. They were organized under charters from the crown, by which local government was vested, not in the whole body of freemen, but in small councils, or select classes, originally nominated by the crown, and ever afterwards renewing themselves. No such abuse prevailed in our municipalities; and this political health at home, Sir, and not the incident of exclusive representation in a distant Legislature, has been the secret of their strength. I would cherish it ever.

This brings me, in the next place, to the objection founded on centralization of power in the cities. It is said that wealth, business, population, and talent, in multitudinous forms, all tend to the cities, and that the excessive influence of this concentrated mass, quickened by an active press, by facilities of concert, and by social appliances, ought to be counterbalanced by allotment to the towns of representative weight beyond their proportion of numbers. Now, Sir, while confessing and regretting the present predominance of the cities, I must be permitted to question the propriety of the proposed remedy. And here, differing in some respects from friends on both sides, I make an appeal for candid judgment of what I shall candidly say.

Let us deal fairly by the cities. No student of history can fail to perceive that they have performed different parts at different stages of the world. In Antiquity, they were the acknowledged centres of power, often of tyranny. In the Middle Ages, they became the home of freedom, and the bridle to feudalism. For this service they should be gratefully remembered. And now there is another change. The armed feudalism is overthrown; but it is impossible not to see that it has yielded to a commercial feudalism, whose seat is in the cities, and which, in its way, is hardly less selfish and exacting than the feudalism of the iron hand. My friend, the member for Manchester [Mr. Dana], was clearly right, when he said that the Boston of to-day is not the Boston of our fathers. Let me be understood. I make no impeachment of individuals, but simply indicate those combined influences proceeding from the potent Spirit of Trade, which, though unlike that Spirit of the Lord where is Liberty, is not inconsistent with the most enlarged munificence. I think, while confessing the abounding charities of the rich men whose eulogy we have heard more than once in this debate, it must be admitted that those pure principles which are the breath of the Republic now find their truest atmosphere in calm retreats, away from the strife of gain and the hot pavements of crowded streets. Sir, it is not only when we look upon the fields, hills, and valleys, clad in verdure, and shining with silver lake or rivulet, that we are ready to exclaim,—

"God made the country, and man made the town."

But, Sir, while maintaining these opinions, I cannot admit the argument, that the centralized power of the cities may be counteracted by degrading them in the scale of representation. This cannot be purposely done, without departing from fundamental principles, and overthrowing the presiding doctrine of personal equality. Cities are but congregations of men; and men exert influence in various ways,—by the accident of position, the accident of intelligence, the accident of property, the accident of birth, and, lastly, by the vote. It is the vote only which is not an accident; and it should be the boast of Massachusetts, that all men, whatever their accidents, are equal in their votes.

Here the hammer of the President fell, as the hour expired; but, by unanimous consent, Mr. Sumner proceeded.

The idea of property as a check upon numbers, which on a former occasion found such favor in this hall, is now rejected in the adjustment of our representative System. And, Sir, I venture to predict that the proposition, newly broached in this Commonwealth, to restrain the cities by curtailment of their just representative power, will hereafter be as little regarded.

II.

Mr. President,—Such is what I have to say on the history and principles of the Representative System, particularly in the light of American institutions; and this brings me to the practical question at this moment. I cannot doubt that the District System, as it is generally called, whereby the representative power will be distributed in just proportion, according to the Rule of Three, among the voters of the Commonwealth, is the true system, destined at no distant day to prevail. And gladly would I see this Convention hasten the day by presenting it to the people for adoption in the organic law. To this end I have striven by my votes. But, Sir, I cannot forget what has passed. The votes already taken show that the Convention is not prepared for this radical change; and I am assured by gentlemen more familiar with public sentiment than I can pretend to be, that the people are not yet prepared for it.

Thus we are brought to the position occupied successively by the Conventions of 1780 and 1820, each of which, though containing warm partisans of the District System, shrank from its adoption—as in Virginia, the early recommendation of Jefferson, and his vehement support at a later day, have been powerless to produce this important amendment. John Lowell, who appeared at the bar of the Massachusetts Legislature in 1776 to vindicate the principle of equality in representation, and Theophilus Parsons, author of the powerful tract which proposed to found the Representative System on the Rule of Three, were both members of the first Convention,—and I know not if the District System has since had any abler defenders. To these I might add the great name of John Adams, who early pleaded for equality of representation, and declared, in words adopted by the Essex Convention, that the Representative Assembly should be "an exact portrait in miniature of the people at large."[20] In the Convention of 1820, the District System was cherished and openly extolled by a distinguished jurist, at that time a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States,—Joseph Story,—whose present fame gives additional importance to his opinions. And yet the desire of these men failed. The corporate representation of towns was preserved, and the District System pronounced impracticable. In the Address put forth by the Convention of 1780, and signed by its President, James Bowdoin, these words may be found:—

"You will observe that we have resolved that representation ought to be founded on the principle of Equality; but it cannot be understood thereby that each town in the Commonwealth shall have weight and importance in a just proportion to its numbers and property. An exact representation would be unpracticable, even in a system of government arising from the state of Nature, and much more so in a State already divided into nearly three hundred corporations."[21]

The Convention seem to have recognized the theoretic fitness of an "exact representation," but did not regard it as feasible in a State already divided into nearly three hundred corporations. In the Convention of 1820, Joseph Story, who has been quoted by my eloquent friend [Mr. Choate], used language which, though not so strong as that of the early Address, has the same result.

"In the Select Committee, I was in favor of a plan of representation in the House founded on population, as the most just and equal in its operation. I still retain that opinion. There were serious objections against this system, and it was believed by others that the towns could not be brought to consent to yield up the corporate privileges of representation, which had been enjoyed so long, and were so intimately connected with their pride and their interests. I felt constrained, therefore, with great reluctance, to yield up a favorite plan. I have lived long enough to know, that, in any question of government, something is to be yielded up on all sides. Conciliation and compromise lie at the origin of every free government; and the question never was and never can be, what is absolutely best, but what is relatively wise, just, and expedient. I have not hesitated, therefore, to support the plan of the Select Committee, as one that, on the whole, was the best that, under existing circumstances, could be obtained."[22]

Sir, I am not insensible to these considerations, or to the authority of these examples. A division of the State into districts would be a change, in conformity with abstract principles, which would interfere with existing opinions, habitudes, and prejudices of the towns, all of which must be respected. A change so important in character cannot be advantageously made, unless supported by the permanent feelings and convictions of the people. Institutions are formed from within, not from without. They spring from custom and popular faith, silently operating with internal power, not from the imposed will of a lawgiver. And our present duty here, at least on this question, may be in some measure satisfied, if we aid this growth.

Two great schools of jurisprudence for a while divided the learned mind of Germany,—one known as the Historic, the other as the Didactic. The question between them was similar to that now before the Convention. The first regarded all laws and institutions as the growth of custom, under constant influences of history; the other insisted upon positive legislation, giving to them a form in conformity with abstract reason. It is clear that both were in a measure right. No lawgiver or statesman can disregard either history or abstract reason. He must contemplate both. He will faithfully study the Past, and will recognize its treasures and traditions; but, with equal fidelity, he will set his face towards the Future, where all institutions will at last be in harmony with truth.

I have been encouraged to believe in the practicability of the District System by its conformity with reason, and by seeing how naturally it went into operation under the Constitution of the United States. But there is a difference between that case and the present. A new Government was then founded, with new powers, applicable to a broad expanse of country; but the Constitution of Massachusetts was little more than a continuation of preëxisting usages and institutions, with all dependence upon royalty removed. This distinction may help us now. If the country were absolutely new, without embarrassment from existing corporate rights,—claims I would rather call them,—it might easily be arranged according to the most approved theory, as Philadelphia is said to have been originally laid out on the model of the German city which its great founder had seen in his travels.[23] But to bring our existing system into symmetry, and to lay it out anew, would seem to be a task—at least I am reluctantly led to this conclusion by what I have heard here—not unlike that of rebuilding Boston, and of shaping its compact mass of crooked streets into the regular rectangular forms of the city of Penn. And yet this is not impossible. With each day, by demolishing ancient houses and widening ancient ways, changes are made which tend to this result.

Sir, we must recognize the existing condition of things, remedy all practical grievances so far as possible, and set our faces towards the true system. We must act in the Present, but be mindful also of the Future. There are proper occasions for compromise, as most certainly there are rights beyond compromise. But the Representative System is an expedient or device for ascertaining the popular will, and, though well satisfied that this can be best founded on numbers, I would not venture to say, in the present light of political science, that the right of each man to an equal representation, according to the Rule of Three, and without regard to existing institutions or controlling usages, is of that inherent and lofty character—like the God-given right to life or liberty—which admits of no compromise.

Several grievances exist, which will be removed by the proposed amendments. There is one which I had hoped would disappear, but which is the necessary incident of corporate representation: I mean the unwieldy size of the House.

It is generally said that a small body is more open to bribery and corruption than a large body; but, on the other hand, I have heard it asserted that the larger is more exposed than the smaller. I put this consideration aside. My objection to a large House is, that it is inconvenient for the despatch of public business. There is a famous saying of Cardinal de Retz, that every assembly of more than one hundred is a mob; and Lord Chesterfield applied the same term to the British House of Commons. At the present time that body has nominally six hundred and fifty-four members. It is called by Lord Brougham "preposterously large"; but a quorum for business is forty only; and it is only on rare occasions of political importance that its benches are completely occupied. The House of Lords, nominally, has four hundred and fifty-nine members; but a quorum in this body consists of three only;[24] and much of its business is transacted in a very thin attendance.

The experience of Congress, as also of other States, points to a reduction of our present number. Indeed, for many years this was a general desire through the State. In the earliest Colonial days every town was allowed three deputies; but in five years the number, on reaching thirty-three, was reduced to two for each.[25] At a later day, in 1694, a great contest in the House was decided by a vote of twenty-six against twenty-four.[26] In the agitating period between 1762 and 1773, covering the controversies which heralded the Revolution, the House consisted, on an average, of one hundred and twenty members; and only on one occasion the magnitude of the interest is reported by Hutchinson to have drawn together so many as one hundred and thirteen. At the last session of the Provincial Legislature, in May, 1774, when the Revolutionary conflict was at hand, the complete returns of the Journal show one hundred and forty. In 1776 there was a House of three hundred and five; but this "enormous and very unwieldy size," according to the language of the time, was assigned as a reason for a new Constitution. I regret that we cannot profit by this experience. A House of two hundred and fifty, or, since we are accustomed to large congregations,[27] of three hundred at most, would be an improvement on the present system.

There are two proposed improvements which I hail with satisfaction: one relates to the small towns, and the other to the cities. The small towns will have a more constant representation; and this of itself is an approach to the true principle of representation, which should be constant as well as equal. The cities will be divided into districts, and this I regard of twofold importance: first, as the beginning of a true system; and, secondly, as reducing the power which the cities, by the large number of their representatives, chosen by general ticket, now exercise.

A respected gentleman, now in my eye, has reminded me that in boyhood his attention was arrested in this House by what was called "the Boston seat," reserved exclusively for the Boston members, who sat together on cushions, while other members were left to such accommodation as they could find on bare benches. This discrimination ceased long ago. But it seems to me that this reserved and cushioned seat is typical of another discrimination, which Boston, in common with the cities, still enjoys. Sir, in voting for forty-four representatives, the elector in Boston exercises a representative power far exceeding that of electors in the country; and the majority which rules Boston and determines the whole delegation exercises a representative power transcending far that of any similar number in the Commonwealth. This is apparent on the bare statement, as forty-four sticks are stronger in one compact bundle than when single or in small parcels. Thus, while other counties are divided, the delegation from Boston is united. In all political contests, it is like the well-knit Macedonian phalanx, or the iron front of the Roman legion, in comparison with the disconnected individual warriors against whom they were engaged. This abuse will be removed; and here is the beginning, I had almost said the inauguration, of a true electoral equality in our Commonwealth.

And now, in conclusion, while thanking gentlemen for the kind attention with which they have honored me, let me express briefly the result to which I have come. I have openly declared my convictions with regard to the District System, and in accordance with these have recorded my votes in this Convention. These votes, which reveal my inmost desires on this matter, I would not change. But the question is not now between the District System, which I covet so much for Massachusetts, and the proposed amendments, but between these amendments and the existing system. On this issue I decide without hesitation. I shall vote, Sir, for the propositions of amendment before the Convention, should they come to a question on their final passage, not because they are all that I desire, not because they satisfy the requirement of principles which I cannot deny, not because they constitute a permanent adjustment of this difficult question, but because they are the best which I can now obtain, because they reform grievances of the existing system, and because they begin a change which can end only in the establishment of a Representative System founded in reality, as in name, on Equality. Their adoption will be the triumph of conciliation and harmony, and will furnish new testimony to the well-tempered spirit of our institutions, where

"jarring interests, reconciled, create

The according music of a well-mixed State."

[BILLS OF RIGHTS: THEIR HISTORY AND POLICY.]

Speech on the Report from the Committee on the Bill of Rights, in the Convention to Revise and Amend the Constitution of Massachusetts, July 25, 1853.

As Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights, Mr. Sumner submitted a Report, on which, in Committee of the Whole, he spoke as follows.

Mr. Chairman,—As Chairman of the Committee on the Preamble and Bill of Rights, it is my duty to introduce and explain their Report. It will be perceived that it is brief, and proposes no important changes. But in justice to the distinguished gentlemen with whom I have the honor of being associated on that Committee, I deem it my duty to suggest that the extent of their labors must not be judged by this result. It appears from the proceedings of the Convention of 1820, that the Committee on the Bill of Rights at that time sat longer than any other Committee. I believe that the same Committee in the present Convention might claim the same preëminence. Their records show twenty different sessions.

At these sessions, the Preamble and the Bill of Rights, in its thirty different propositions, were passed in review and considered clause by clause; the various orders of the Convention, amounting to twelve in number, the petitions addressed to the Convention and referred to the Committee, as also informal propositions from members of the Convention and others were considered, some of them repeatedly and at length. On many questions there was a decided difference of opinion, and on a few the Committee was nearly equally divided. But after the best consideration we could bestow in our protracted series of meetings, it was found that the few simple propositions now on your table were all upon which a majority of the Committee could be brought to unite. As such I was directed to present them. Admonished by the lapse of time and the desire to close these proceedings, I might be content with this simple statement.

But, notwithstanding the urgency of our business, I cannot allow the opportunity to pass—indeed, I should not do my duty—without attempting for a brief moment to show the origin and character of this part of our Constitution. In this way we may learn its weight and authority, and appreciate the difficulty and delicacy of any change in its substance or even its form. I will try not to abuse your patience.

The Preamble and Bill of Rights, like the rest of our Constitution, were from the pen of John Adams,—among whose published works the whole document, in its original draught, may be found. At the time when he rendered this important service to his native Commonwealth and to the principles of free institutions everywhere, he was forty-four years of age. He was also quite prepared. The natural maturity of his powers had been enriched by the well-ripened fruit of assiduous study and of active life, both of which concurred in him. The examples of Greece and Rome and the writings of Sidney and Locke were especially familiar to his mind. The Common Law he had made his own, and mastered well its whole arsenal of Freedom. For a long time the vigorous and unfailing partisan of the liberal cause in Boston, throughout its many conflicts,—then in Congress, whither he was transferred, the irresistible champion of Independence,—and then the republican representative of the United, but still struggling, Colonies at the Court of France,—in the brief interval between two foreign missions, only seven days after landing from his long ocean voyage, he was chosen a delegate to the Constitutional Convention, and at once brought all his varied experience, rare political culture, and eminent powers to the task of adjusting the framework of government for Massachusetts. As his work, it all claims our regard; and no part bears the imprint of his mind so much as the Preamble and Bill of Rights; nor is any other part authenticated as coming so exclusively from him.

At the time of its first adoption the Massachusetts Bill of Rights was more ample in provisions and more complete in form than any similar declaration in English or Colonial history. Glancing at its predecessors, we learn something of its sources. First came, long back in the thirteenth century, Magna Charta, with generous safeguards of Freedom, wrung from King John by the Barons at Runnymede. From time to time these liberties were confirmed, and, after an interval of centuries, they were again ratified, near the beginning of the unhappy reign of Charles the First, by a Parliamentary Declaration, to which the monarch assented, known as the Petition of Right, which, in its very title, reveals the humility with which the rights of the people were then maintained. Finally, in a different tone and language, at the Revolution of 1688, when James the Second was driven from his dominions, a "Declaration of the true, ancient, and indubitable rights and liberties of the people of the kingdom," familiarly known as the Bill of Rights, was delivered by the Convention Parliament to the new sovereigns, William and Mary, and embodied in the Act of Settlement, by virtue of which they sat on the throne. These, Sir, are English examples.

Their influence was not confined to England. It crossed the ocean. From the beginning the Colonists were tenacious of the rights and liberties of Englishmen, and at various times and in various forms declared them. Connecticut, as early as 1639, Virginia in 1624 and 1776, Pennsylvania in 1682, New York in 1691,—and I might mention others still,—put forth Declarations, brief and meagre, but kindred to those of the mother country. In the Colony of New Plymouth, the essential principles of Magna Charta were proclaimed in 1636, under the name of "The General Fundamentals"; and in 1641 the inhabitants of Massachusetts Bay announced, in words worthy of careful study, that "the free fruition of such Liberties, Immunities, and Privileges, as Humanity, Civility, and Christianity call for, as due to every man in his place and proportion, without impeachment and infringement, hath ever been and ever will be the tranquillity and stability of Churches and Commonwealths, and the denial or deprival thereof the disturbance, if not the ruin, of both."[28] Such was the Preamble to the "Body of Liberties" of the Massachusetts Colony in 1641. It would be difficult to find any text more comprehensive than these remarkable words,—the object being "Liberties, Immunities, and Privileges," to such extent "as Humanity, Civility, and Christianity call for"; and this Declaration, broader than Magna Charta, became the inspiration of Massachusetts, if not of the Nation. Nor does Massachusetts stand alone in this honor. Connecticut is by her side.[29]

I should not do justice to this "Body of Liberties," if I did not call attention to at least four different declarations. There is, first, the clause: "There shall never be any bond slavery, villenage, or captivity amongst us, unless it be lawful captives taken in just wars, and such strangers as willingly sell themselves or are sold to us"; and although this provision falls short of that universal freedom which is our present aspiration, it is a plain limitation upon Slavery, and marks the hostility of the Colony. Another declaration sets an example of hospitality: "If any people of other nations, professing the true Christian religion, shall flee to us from the tyranny or oppression of their persecutors, or from famine, wars, or the like necessary and compulsory cause, they shall be entertained and succored amongst us according to that power and prudence God shall give us." And it is further declared: "Every person within this jurisdiction, whether inhabitant or foreigner, shall enjoy the same Justice and Law that is general for the Plantation, which we constitute and execute one towards another, without partiality or delay." Here is nothing less than Equality before the Law, without this compendious term. There is another declaration, which has the same exalted character: "Every man, whether inhabitant or foreigner, free or not free, shall have liberty to come to any public Court, Council, or Town Meeting, and either by speech or writing to move any lawful, seasonable, and material question, or to present any necessary motion, complaint, petition, bill, or information, whereof that meeting hath proper cognizance, so it be done in convenient time, due order, and respective manner." Such declarations as these belong to the history of Freedom.

In the animated discussions immediately preceding the Revolution, the rights and liberties of Englishmen were constantly asserted as the birthright of the Colonists. This was often by formal resolution or declaration, couched at first in moderate phrase. At the outrage of the Stamp Act, a Congress of delegates from nine Colonies, held at New York in October, 1765, put forth a series of resolutions embodying "Declarations of our humble opinion respecting the most essential rights and liberties of the Colonists."[30] The humility of this language recalls the English Petition of Right under Charles the First. This was followed in 1774 by the Declaration of the Continental Congress, which, in another tone and with admirable force, in ten different propositions, arrays the rights which belong to "the inhabitants of the English Colonies in North America, by the immutable Laws of Nature, the Principles of the English Constitution, and the several Charters or Compacts."[31]

"Time's noblest offspring is the last";

and the whole Colonial series is aptly closed by the Declaration of Independence, announcing not merely the rights of Englishmen, but the rights of men.

Only a few brief weeks before the Declaration of Independence, Virginia, taking the lead of her sister Colonies, established a Constitution, to which was prefixed an elaborate Declaration of Rights. This remarkable document, which became the immediate precedent for the whole country, marks an epoch in political history. Massachusetts and Connecticut had already led the way in that early and most comprehensive Preamble, which has been too little noticed; but in all English Declarations of Rights, and generally even in those of the Colonies, stress was laid upon the liberties and privileges of Englishmen. The rights claimed even by the Continental Congress of 1774, in their masculine Declaration, were the rights of "free and natural-born subjects within the realm of England." But the Virginia Bill of Rights, standing at the front of its first Constitution, discarded all narrow title from mere English precedent, planted itself on the eternal law of God, above every human ordinance, and openly proclaimed that "all men are by nature equally free and independent,"—a declaration which is repeated, though in other language, by the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.

The policy of Bills of Rights is sometimes called in question. It has been said that they were originally privileges or concessions extorted from the king, and, though expedient in a monarchy, are of little value in a republic. As late as 1821, in the Convention for revising the Constitution of New York, doubts of their utility were openly expressed by Mr. Van Buren. But they are now above question. State after State, ending with California, follows the example of Virginia and Massachusetts, and places its Bill of Rights in the front of its Constitution. Nor can I doubt that much good is done by this frank assertion of fundamental principles. The public mind is instructed, people learn to know their rights, liberal institutions are confirmed, and the Constitution is made stable in the hearts of the community. Bills of Rights are lessons of political wisdom and anchors of liberty. They are the constant index, and also scourge, of injustice and wrong. In Massachusetts, Slavery itself disappeared before the declaration that "all men are born free and equal," interpreted by a liberty-loving Court.[32]

In the Convention of 1780 the Bill of Rights formed a prominent subject of interest. The necessity of such a safeguard had been pressed upon the people, and its absence from the Constitution of 1778 was unquestionably a reason for the rejection of that ill-fated effort. Indeed, the Constitution was openly opposed because it had no Bill of Rights. In the array of objections at the period was the following, which I take from an important contemporaneous publication: "That a Bill of Rights, clearly ascertaining and defining the rights of conscience and that security of person and property which every member in the State hath a right to expect from the supreme power thereof, ought to be settled and established previous to the ratification of any Constitution for the State."[33] Accordingly, at the earliest moment after the organization of the Convention, a motion was made, "that there be a Declaration of Rights prepared previous to the framing a new Constitution of Government," which after adoption gave way to another, "that the Convention will prepare a Declaration of Rights," and this motion prevailed by a nearly unanimous vote,—the whole number present, as returned by the monitors, being two hundred and fifty-one, of whom two hundred and fifty voted in the affirmative.[34] Thus emphatically did the early fathers of Massachusetts manifest their watchfulness for the rights of the people; and there is good reason to believe, also, that among the motives which stimulated it was a determination in this way to abolish Slavery.[35] The Convention then resolved to "proceed to the framing a new Constitution of Government." A grand Committee of thirty was chosen to perform these two important duties; and this Committee, after extended discussion, intrusted to John Adams alone the preparation of a Declaration of Rights, and to a Sub-Committee, consisting of James Bowdoin, Samuel Adams, and John Adams, the duty of preparing the Form of a Constitution, which Sub-Committee again delegated the task to John Adams: so that to the pen of this illustrious citizen we are indebted primarily both for the Declaration of Rights and the Form of the Constitution.[36]

It is not difficult to trace most, if not all, of the ideas and provisions of our Preamble and Declaration of Rights to their primitive sources. The Preamble, where the body politic is founded on the fiction of the Social Compact, was doubtless inspired by the writings of Sidney and Locke, and by the English discussions at the period of the Revolution of 1688, when this questionable theory did good service in response to the assumptions of Filmer, and as a shield against arbitrary power. Of different provisions in the Bill of Rights, some are in the very words of Magna Charta,—others are derived from the ancient Common Law, the Petition of Right, and the Bill of Rights of 1688,—while, of the thirty Articles composing it, no less than nineteen,[37] either wholly or in part, may be found substantially in the Virginia Bill of Rights: but these again are in great part derived from the earlier fountains.

And now, Sir, you have before you for revision and amendment this early work of our fathers. I do not stop to consider its peculiar merits. With satisfaction I might point to special safeguards by which our rights have been protected against usurpation, whether executive, legislative, or judicial. With pride I might dwell on those words which banished Slavery from our soil, and rendered the Declaration of Independence here with us a living letter. But the hour does not require or admit any such service. You have a practical duty, which I seek to promote; and I now take leave of the whole subject, with the simple remark, that a document proceeding from such a pen, drawn from such sources, with such an origin in all respects, speaking so early for Human Rights, and now for more than threescore years and ten a household word to the people of Massachusetts, should be touched by the Convention only with exceeding care.

[FINGER-POINT FROM PLYMOUTH ROCK.]

Speech at the Plymouth Festival in Commemoration of the Embarkation of the Pilgrims, August 1, 1853.

The President, Richard Warren, Esq., said they had already been delighted with the words of a distinguished member of the Senate of the United States [Mr. Everett.] They were favored with the presence of another; and he would give as a sentiment:—

The Senate of the United States,—The concentrated light of the stars of the Union.

In his reply, Mr. Sumner attempted to obtain a hearing for the Antislavery cause and the Party of Freedom. In picturing the English Puritans he had in mind our Antislavery Puritans, who, like their prototypes, were at first "Separatists," and then "Independents." The abuse showered on each was the same. Though nothing is said directly on present affairs, they were clearly discerned behind the Puritan veil. Such was the sensibility in certain quarters, that it was objected to as out of place. Others were pleased with its fidelity. Among the latter was the poet John G. Whittier, who wrote at the time: "Its tone and bearing are unmistakable, and yet unobjectionable.... When I read the toast which called thee up, I confess I could see very little appropriateness in it; in fact, it seemed to me a very unpromising text, and I almost feared to read the sermon. I enjoyed it all the better for my misgivings."

Mr. President,—You bid me speak for the Senate of the United States. But I know well that there is another voice here, of classical eloquence, which might more fitly render this service. As one of the humblest members of that body, and associated with the public councils for a brief period only, I should prefer that my distinguished colleague [Mr. Everett], whose fame is linked with a long political life, should speak for it. And there is yet another here [Mr. Hale], who, though not at this moment a member of the Senate, has, throughout an active and brilliant career, marked by a rare combination of ability, eloquence, and good-humor, so identified himself with the Senate in the public mind that he might well speak for it always, and when he speaks, all are pleased to listen. But, Sir, you have ordered it otherwise.

From the tears and trials at Delft Haven, from the deck of the Mayflower, from the landing on Plymouth Rock, to the Senate of the United States is a mighty contrast, covering whole spaces of history, hardly less than from the wolf that suckled Romulus and Remus to that Roman Senate which on curule chairs swayed Italy and the world. From these obscure beginnings of poverty and weakness, which you now piously commemorate, and on which all our minds naturally rest to-day, you bid us leap to that marble Capitol, where thirty-one powerful republics, bound in common fellowship and welfare, are gathered together in legislative body, constituting One Government, which, stretching from ocean to ocean, and counting millions of people beneath its majestic rule, surpasses far in wealth and might any government of the Old World when the little band of Pilgrims left it, and now promises to be a clasp between Europe and Asia, bringing the most distant places near together, so that there shall be no more Orient or Occident. It were interesting to dwell on the stages of this grand procession; but it is enough, on this occasion, merely to glance at them and pass on.

Sir, it is the Pilgrims that we commemorate to-day, not the Senate. For this moment, at least, let us tread under foot all pride of empire, all exultation in our manifold triumphs of industry, science, literature, with all the crowding anticipations of the vast untold Future, that we may reverently bow before the Forefathers. The day is theirs. In the contemplation of their virtue we derive a lesson which, like truth, may judge us sternly, but, if we can really follow it, like truth, shall make us free. For myself, I accept the admonition of the day. It may teach us all, though few in numbers or alone, never, by word or act, to swerve from those primal principles of duty, which, from the landing on Plymouth Rock, have been the life of Massachusetts. Let me briefly unfold the lesson,—though to the discerning soul it unfolds itself.

Few persons in history have suffered more from contemporary misrepresentation, abuse, and persecution, than the English Puritans. At first a small body, they were regarded with indifference and contempt. But by degrees they grew in numbers, and drew into their company education, intelligence, and even rank. Reformers in all ages have had little of blessing from the world they sought to serve. But the Puritans were not disheartened. Still they persevered. The obnoxious laws of conformity they vowed to withstand, till, in the fervid language of the time, "they be sent back to the darkness from whence they came." Through them the spirit of modern Freedom made itself potently felt, in great warfare with Authority, in Church, in Literature, and in State,—in other words, for religious, intellectual, and political emancipation. The Puritans primarily aimed at religious freedom: for this they contended in Parliament, under Elizabeth and James; for this they suffered: but, so connected are all these great and glorious interests, that the struggles for one have always helped the others. Such service did they do, that Hume, whose cold nature sympathized little with their burning souls, is obliged to confess that "the precious spark of Liberty had been kindled and was preserved by the Puritans alone," and he adds, that "to this sect the English owe the whole freedom of their Constitution."

As among all reformers, so among them were differences of degree. Some continued within the pale of the National Church, and there pressed their ineffectual attempts in behalf of the good cause. Some at length, driven by conscientious convictions, and unwilling to be partakers longer in its enormities, stung also by cruel excesses of magisterial power, openly disclaimed the National Establishment, and became a separate sect, first under the name of Brownists, from the person who led in this new organization, and then under the better name of Separatists. I like this word, Sir. It has a meaning.[38] After long struggles in Parliament and out of it, in Church and State, prolonged through successive reigns, the Puritans finally triumphed, and the despised sect of Separatists, swollen in numbers, and now under the denomination of Independents,[39] with Oliver Cromwell at their head and John Milton as his Secretary, ruled England. Thus is prefigured the final triumph of all, however few in numbers, who sincerely devote themselves to Truth.

The Pilgrims of Plymouth were among the earliest of the Separatists. As such, they knew by bitter experience all the sharpness of persecution. Against them the men in power raged like the heathen. Against them the whole fury of the law was directed. Some were imprisoned, all were impoverished, while their name became a by-word of reproach. For safety and freedom the little band first sought shelter in Holland, where they continued in obscurity and indigence for more than ten years, when they were inspired to seek a home in this unknown Western world. Such, in brief, is their history. I could not say more of it without intruding upon your time; I could not say less without injustice to them.

Rarely have austere principles been expressed with more gentleness than from their lips. By a covenant with the Lord, they had vowed to walk in all his ways, according to their best endeavors, whatsoever it should cost them,—and also to receive whatsoever truth should be made known from the written word of God. Repentance and prayers, patience and tears, were their weapons. "It is not with us," said they, "as with other men, whom small things can discourage or small discontentments cause to wish themselves at home again." And then again, on another occasion, their souls were lifted to utterance like this: "When we are in our graves, it will be all one, whether we have lived in plenty or penury, whether we have died in a bed of down or on locks of straw." Self-sacrifice is never in vain, and with the clearness of prophecy they foresaw that out of their trials should come a transcendent Future. "As one small candle," said an early Pilgrim Governor, "may light a thousand, so the light kindled here may in some sort shine even to the whole nation." And these utterances were crowned by the testimony of the English governor and historian, whose sympathy for them was as little as that of Hume for the Puritans, confessing it doubtful "whether Britain would have had any colonies in America at this day, if religion had not been the grand inducement,"—thus honoring our Pilgrims.

And yet these men, with such sublime endurance, lofty faith, and admirable achievement, are among those sometimes called "Puritan knaves" and "knaves-Puritans," and openly branded by King James as "very pests in the Church and Commonwealth." The small company of our forefathers became jest and gibe of fashion and power. The phrase "men of one idea" was not invented then; but, in equivalent language, they were styled "the pinched fanatics of Leyden." A contemporary poet and favorite of Charles the First, Thomas Carew, lent his genius to their defamation. A masque, from his elegant and careful pen, was performed by the monarch and his courtiers, turning the whole plantation of New England to royal sport. The jeer broke forth in the exclamation, that it had "purged more virulent humors from the politic body than guaiacum and all the West Indian drugs have from the natural bodies of this kingdom."[40]

And these outcasts, despised in their own day by the proud and great, are the men whom we have met in this goodly number to celebrate,—not for any victory of war,—not for any triumph of discovery, science, learning, or eloquence,—not for worldly success of any kind. How poor are all these things by the side of that divine virtue which, amidst the reproach, the obloquy, and the hardness of the world, made them hold fast to Freedom and Truth! Sir, if the honors of this day are not a mockery, if they do not expend themselves in mere self-gratulation, if they are a sincere homage to the character of the Pilgrims,—and I cannot suppose otherwise,—then is it well for us to be here. Standing on Plymouth Rock, at their great anniversary, we cannot fail to be elevated by their example. We see clearly what it has done for the world, and what it has done for their fame. No pusillanimous soul here to-day will declare their self-sacrifice, their deviation from received opinions, their unquenchable thirst for liberty, an error or illusion. From gushing multitudinous hearts we now thank these lowly men that they dared to be true and brave. Conformity or compromise might, perhaps, have purchased for them a profitable peace, but not peace of mind; it might have secured place and power, but not repose; it might have opened present shelter, but not a home in history and in men's hearts till time shall be no more. All must confess the true grandeur of their example, while, in vindication of a cherished principle, they stood alone, against the madness of men, against the law of the land, against their king. Better the despised Pilgrim, a fugitive for freedom, than the halting politician, forgetful of principle, "with a Senate at his heels."

Such, Sir, is the voice from Plymouth Rock, as it salutes my ears. Others may not hear it; but to me it comes in tones which I cannot mistake. I catch its words of noble cheer:—

"New occasions teach new duties; Time makes ancient good uncouth;

They must upward still and onward who would keep abreast of Truth:

Lo, before us gleam her camp-fires! we ourselves must Pilgrims be,

Launch our Mayflower, and steer boldly through the desperate winter sea."

[IRELAND AND IRISHMEN.]

Letter to a Committee of Irish-born Citizens, August 2, 1853.

Boston, August 2, 1853.

Gentlemen,—It is not in my power to be with you on the evening of the celebration at Faneuil Hall, but, I pray you, do not consider me insensible to the honor of your invitation.

Permit me to say that no country excites a generous sympathy more than Ireland; nor is any society more genial and winning than that of Irishmen.

Believe me, Gentlemen, faithfully yours,

Charles Sumner.

[THE LANDMARK OF FREEDOM:]

NO REPEAL OF THE MISSOURI COMPROMISE.

Speech in the Senate, Against the Repeal of the Missouri Prohibition OF Slavery North of 36° 30´ in the Nebraska and Kansas Bill, February 21, 1854.

Cursed be he that removeth his neighbor's landmark. And all the people shall say, Amen.—Deuteronomy, xxvii. 17.

"The Nebraska Debate," as it was called at the time, was one of the most remarkable in our history. It grew out of the proposition to overturn the famous Missouri Compromise, so as to admit Slavery into the vast territory west of the Mississippi, where it had been prohibited by that Compromise. The country was startled by the outrage. Many who had tried to reconcile themselves to the Fugitive Slave Bill, as required by the Constitution, were maddened by this most audacious attempt. Even assuming that the Fugitive Slave Bill was in any sense justifiable, there was nothing to justify this flagrant violation of plighted faith, where Slavery was the inexorable robber. Here began those heats which afterwards showed themselves in blood. Never was the action of Congress watched with more anxiety. Speeches were read as never before, especially those opposed to this new aggression. That of Mr. Sumner was extensively circulated in various editions, and he received numerous letters expressing sympathy and gratitude. The tone of these illustrates the reception of the speech. The late Rufus W. Griswold, so well known in contemporary literature, wrote from New York on the day after its delivery: "The admirable speech which you delivered in the Senate yesterday will bring you a wearying quantity of approving letters; but, though aware of this, I cannot refrain from assuring you of my own admiration of it and gratitude for it, nor from telling you that all through the city it appears to be the subject of applauding conversation.... I congratulate you on having made a speech so worthy of an American Senator, and calculated to be so serviceable to the cause of Liberty." Frederick Douglass, who watched the contest from a distance with the interest of a former slave, wrote: "All the friends of Freedom in every State and of every color may claim you just now as their representative. As one of your sable constituents, I desire to thank you for your noble speech for Freedom and for your country, which I have now read twice over." An original Abolitionist wrote: "Let me thank you from my heart of hearts for your noble speech. It is everything that we could wish,—bold, free, and true. God will surely bless you!" The feeling of the hour appeared also in the following from John G. Whittier: "I am unused to flatter any one, least of all one whom I love and honor; but I must say, in all sincerity, that there is no orator or statesman living in this country or in Europe whose fame is so great as not to derive additional lustre from such a speech. It will live the full life of American history." Professor C.S. Henry, of the New York University, wrote: "I thank you for your noble speech on the Nebraska Bill. In every quality of nobleness transcendently noble. Unsurpassed in tone and temper,—unrivalled in impregnable soundness and judicious statement of positions, in clearness and logical force of historical recital, in conclusiveness of reasoning, in beautiful fitness of style, and in the true eloquence of a justice-loving soul." Among the curiosities of praise, considering the political position of the writer, was a letter from Pierre Soulé, our minister at Madrid, and formerly Senator from Louisiana, containing the following passage: "Que je profite de cette occasion pour vous dire combien j'ai été heureux du succès, et pour mieux dire, du triomphe éclatant que vous avez obtenu à l'occasion de votre discours sur le Nebraska Bill. Courage! Sic itur ad astra. Mais que dis-je? Vous y êtes déjà, et habile qui réussirait vous en déloger." These are examples only; but they help to exhibit the condition of the public mind. The North was aroused, and felt as never before towards those who spoke in its behalf.

The origin of the debate will appear from a statement of facts.

On the 14th of December, 1853, Mr. Dodge, of Iowa, asked and obtained leave to introduce a bill to organize the Territory of Nebraska, which was read a first and second time by unanimous consent and referred to the Committee on Territories. This was a simple Territorial Bill, in the common form, containing no allusion to Slavery, and not in any way undertaking to touch the existing Prohibition of Slavery in this Territory.

On the 4th of January, 1854, Mr. Douglas, of Illinois, as Chairman of the Committee on Territories, reported this bill back to the Senate with various amendments, accompanied by a special report. By this bill only a single Territory was constituted, under the name of Nebraska; the existing Prohibition of Slavery was not directly overthrown, but it was declared that the States formed out of this Territory should be admitted into the Union "with or without Slavery," as they should desire.

On the 16th of January, Mr. Dixon, of Kentucky, in order to accomplish directly what the bill did only indirectly, gave notice of an amendment, to the effect that the existing Prohibition of Slavery "shall not be so construed as to apply to the Territory contemplated by this Act, or to any other Territory of the United States; but that the citizens of the several States or Territories shall be at liberty to take and hold their slaves within any of the Territories of the United States, or of the States to be formed therefrom."

On the next day, January 17, Mr. Sumner, in order to preserve the existing Prohibition, gave notice of the following amendment.

"Provided, That nothing herein contained shall be construed to abrogate or in any way contravene the Act of March 6, 1820, entitled 'An Act to authorize the people of Missouri Territory to form a Constitution and State Government, and for the admission of such State into the Union on an equal footing with the original States, and to prohibit Slavery in certain Territories'; wherein it is expressly enacted, 'that in that territory ceded by France to the United States, under the name of Louisiana, which lies north of thirty-six degrees and thirty minutes north latitude, not included within the limits of the State contemplated by this Act, slavery and involuntary servitude, otherwise than in the punishment of crimes, whereof the parties shall have been duly convicted, shall be, and is hereby, forever prohibited.'"

It is worthy of remark, that at this stage the proposition of Mr. Dixon, and also that of Mr. Sumner, were equally condemned by the Washington Union, the official organ of the Administration. It had not then been determined to sustain the repeal.

On the 23d of January, Mr. Douglas, from the Committee on Territories, submitted a new bill, as a substitute for that already reported. Here was a sudden change, by which the Territory was divided into two, Nebraska and Kansas, and the Prohibition of Slavery was directly overthrown. According to his language at the time, there were "incorporated into it one or two other amendments, which make the provisions of the bill upon other and more delicate questions more clear and specific, so as to avoid all conflict of opinion." It was formally enunciated in the bill, that the Prohibition of Slavery "was superseded by the principles of the legislation of 1850, commonly called the Compromise Measures, and is hereby declared inoperative." This of course superseded the proposed amendment of Mr. Dixon, who subsequently declared his entire assent to the bill in its new form. It also presented the issue directly raised in Mr. Sumner's proposed amendment.

On the next day, January 24th, when the amended bill had just been laid upon the tables of Senators, and without allowing the necessary time even for its perusal, Mr. Douglas pressed its consideration upon the Senate. After some debate it was postponed until the 30th of January, and made the special order from day to day until disposed of.

Meanwhile an appeal to the country was put forth by a few Senators and Representatives in Congress, calling themselves Independent Democrats. The only Senators who signed this appeal were Mr. Chase and Mr. Sumner. It was entitled, "Shall Slavery be permitted in Nebraska?" and proceeded in strong language to expose the violation of plighted faith and the wickedness about to be perpetrated. This document was extensively circulated, and did much to awaken the public.

On the 30th of January the Senate proceeded to the consideration of the bill, when Mr. Douglas took the floor and devoted himself to denunciation of the appeal by the Independent Democrats, characterizing its authors as "Abolition confederates," and particularly arraigning Mr. Chase and Mr. Sumner, the two Senators who had signed it. When he sat down, Mr. Chase replied at once to the personal matters introduced, and was followed by Mr. Sumner, in the few remarks below; and this was the opening of the great debate which occupied for months the attention of the country.

Mr. President,—Before the Senate adjourns I crave a single moment. As a signer of the address referred to by the Senator from Illinois [Mr. Douglas], I openly accept, before the Senate and the country, my full responsibility for it, and deprecate no criticism from any quarter. That document was put forth in the discharge of a high public duty,—on the precipitate introduction into this body of a measure which, as seems to me, is not only subversive of an ancient landmark, but hostile to the peace, the harmony, and the best interests of the country. But, Sir, in doing this, I judged the act, and not its author. I saw only the enormous proposition, and nothing of the Senator.

The language used is strong, but not stronger than the exigency required. Here is a measure which reverses the time-honored policy of our fathers in the restriction of Slavery,—which sets aside the Missouri Compromise, a solemn compact, by which all the territory ceded by France under the name of Louisiana, north of thirty-six degrees and thirty minutes north latitude and not included within the limits of Missouri, was "forever" consecrated to Freedom,—and which violates, also, the alleged compromises of 1850: and all this opening an immense territory to Slavery. Such a measure cannot be regarded without emotions too strong for speech; nor can it be justly described in common language. It is a soulless, eyeless monster,—horrid, unshapely, vast: and this monster is now let loose upon the country.

Allow me one other word of explanation. It is true I desired that the consideration of this measure should not be pressed at once, with indecent haste, as was proposed, even before the Senate could read the bill in which it is embodied. You may remember that the Missouri Bill, as appears from the Journals of Congress, when first introduced, in December, 1819, was allowed to rest upon the table nearly two months before the discussion commenced. The proposition to undo the only part of that work which is now in any degree within the reach of Congress should be approached with even greater caution and reserve. The people have a right to be heard on this monstrous scheme; and there is no apology for that driving, galloping speed which shall anticipate their voice, and, in its consequences, must despoil them of this right.

The debate was continued from day to day. On the 7th of February Mr. Douglas proposed still another change in his bill. There seemed to be a perpetual difficulty in adjusting the language by which the existing Prohibition of Slavery should be overthrown. He now moved to strike out the words referring to this Prohibition, and to insert the following:—

"Which, being inconsistent with the principles of non-intervention by Congress with Slavery in the States and Territories, as recognized by the legislation of 1850, commonly called the Compromise Measures, is hereby declared inoperative and void: it being the true intent and meaning of this Act not to legislate Slavery into any Territory or State, nor to exclude it therefrom, but to leave the people thereof perfectly free to form and regulate their domestic institutions in their own way, subject only to the Constitution of the United States."

On the 15th of February this amendment was adopted by a vote of thirty-five yeas to ten nays. The debate was then continued upon the pending substitute reported by the Committee for the original bill.

On the 21st of February Mr. Sumner took the floor and delivered the following speech.