WILLIAM LLOYD GARRISON

Charles Sumner; his complete works, volume 12 (of 20)

Copyright, 1874,
BY
CHARLES SUMNER.

Copyright, 1900,
BY
LEE AND SHEPARD.

Statesman Edition.

Limited to One Thousand Copies.

Of which this is

Norwood Press:
Norwood, Mass., U.S.A.

CONTENTS OF VOLUME XII.

CONGRATULATIONS ON THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION.

Speech at a Public Meeting at Faneuil Hall, Boston, November 8, 1864.

At an impromptu meeting for congratulation, on the evening of the Presidential election, as the votes were announced, there were speeches by Mr. Hooper, Mr. Sumner, Dr. Loring, Mr. Rice, and Mr. Everett. Mr. Sumner spoke as follows.

FELLOW-CITIZENS,—The trumpet of victory is now sounding through the land, “Glory, Hallelujah!” [Loud cheers.] It is the silver trumpet of an archangel, echoing in valleys, traversing mountains, and filling the whole country with immortal melodies, destined to awaken other echoes in the most distant places [cheers], as it proclaims “Liberty throughout all the land, unto all the inhabitants thereof.” [Great applause.]

Such is the victory we celebrate, marking an epoch in our history and in the history of the world. But beyond immediate victory are two things not usually occurring together,—a funeral and a birth. [Great laughter and applause.] The funeral we celebrate is of the Democratic party, which we bury to-night with all the dishonors that belong to it. Loathsome with corruption while still above ground, let it be hurried out of sight, where it will no longer be a nuisance. [Tremendous cheering.]

The Democratic party had ceased to be patriotic. It was in sympathy with the Rebellion, so much so as to be its Northern wing. Such a party could not exist in a country that had determined to exist. It was an outrage and a shame, and hereafter it can never be mentioned except with judgment. [Cries of “That’s so!” and cheers.]

The extent of its degradation is seen in the frauds it has perpetrated to influence this election. Nothing so mean as these. Fraud is always odious; but it becomes more so in proportion to the occasion on which it is employed. It is odious in small things,—doubly odious in greater things. To cheat one man is crime; to cheat a whole class of men is greater far. But if these men be citizen soldiers fighting for their country, and it is proposed to cheat them of their votes by barefaced fraud, I know no language to depict the despicable and most intolerable enormity of the offence. And yet this is the fraud attempted,—happily the last and dying fraud of the Democratic party. [Applause.] Do you inquire the origin of this fraud, and its vicious energy? I answer, It is Slavery. Men who make up their minds to sustain Slavery stick at nothing. If willing to forge chains, they will not hesitate to forge votes. If ready to enslave their fellow-men, they will not hesitate to cheat soldiers. Therefore all these recent frauds are derived naturally out of that baseness and insensibility to right bred of Slavery. [Applause.] But these frauds testify against the Democratic party, that undertook to perpetrate them.

There was an English monarch, whose head, as it dropped from the block, was held up to the people, while a voice cried, “This is the head of a traitor!” Thus do I hold up the head of the Democratic party, and say, “This is the head of a traitor!” Let it be buried out of sight, and let the people dance at its funeral. [Tremendous applause.]

I have said that we celebrate a birth, as well as a funeral. The birth is the new life of our country, born to-day into assured freedom, with all its attendant glory. The voice of the people at the ballot-box has echoed back that great letter of the President, “To whom it may concern” [laughter and loud cheers], declaring the integrity of the Union and the abandonment of Slavery the two essential conditions of peace. [Loud applause.] Let the glad tidings go forth, “to whom it may concern,”—to all the people of the United States, at length now made wholly free,—to foreign countries,—to the whole family of man,—to posterity,—to the martyred band who have fallen in battle for their country,—to the angels above,—ay, and to the devils below,—that this Republic shall live, for Slavery is dead. This is the great joy we now announce to the world. [Here there was a perfect torrent of approving cheers.]

From this time forward, the Rebellion is subdued. Patriot Unionists in the Rebel States, take courage! Freedmen, slaves no longer, be of good cheer! The hour of deliverance has arrived. [Renewed cheering.]

JUBILEE OF LIBERTY.

Letter to the Young Men’s Republican Union of New York, November 10, 1864.

A public meeting, called a Jubilee, was held at the Cooper Institute, New York, to celebrate the recent victory at the polls. Among the letters read was the following.

Boston, November 10, 1864.

DEAR SIR,—It will not be in my power to meet with the Union citizens of New York at the “Jubilee” of Friday evening, according to the invitation with which you honor me. But my joy will mingle with theirs.

The occasion you celebrate is worthy of jubilee, which in the Hebrew language is simply “the blast of a trumpet,” and now, in all languages, signifies “rejoicing.”

The occasion is kindred to that famous jubilee in sacred history, when the mandate went forth, “Proclaim Liberty throughout all the land, unto all the inhabitants thereof: it shall be a jubilee unto you; and ye shall return every man unto his possession, and ye shall return every man unto his family.” And now this same mandate has gone forth, assuring the return of patriot Unionists to their possessions, and the return of patriot soldiers to their families, and crowning all with Universal Emancipation, sign and seal of union and peace. Such is the mandate of the American people in the reëlection of Abraham Lincoln. I pray that it may all be executed promptly and triumphantly.

Thank God, the pettifoggers of compromise are answered by the people, who demand peace on the everlasting foundations of Union and Liberty. The political barbers, who undertake to prescribe, when they can only shave, are warned that their quackery is at an end.

Accept my thanks and best wishes, and believe me, dear Sir, very faithfully yours,

Charles Sumner.

Frank W. Ballard, Esq.,
Corresponding Secretary of the Young Men’s Republican Union.

MR. ASHLEY AND RECONSTRUCTION.

Letter to a Public Banquet in Honor of Hon. James M. Ashley, at Toledo, Ohio, November 18, 1864.

Boston, November 18, 1864.

DEAR SIR,—It will not be in my power to unite in the banquet to your most faithful Representative.

I know Mr. Ashley well, and honor him much. He has been firm when others have hesitated, and from an early day saw the secret of this war, and, I may add, the secret of victory also. In all questions of statesmanship, which will soon supersede military questions, he has already given assurance of practical wisdom. His various indefatigable labors and his elaborate speech on “Reconstruction” show that he sees well what is to be done in order to place peace and liberty under impregnable safeguards.

For myself, I have no hesitation in saying, that, next to the Rebellion itself, I most deprecate a premature State Government in a Rebel State. Such a Government will be a source of sorrow and weakness incalculable. But I am sure that your Representative will fail in no effort to prevent such a calamity.

There is also the Amendment of the Constitution prohibiting Slavery throughout the United States. Nobody has done more for it, practically, than Mr. Ashley.

Accept my thanks for the invitation with which you have honored me, and believe me, dear Sir,

Faithfully yours,

Charles Sumner.

To the Committee.

CASE OF THE FLORIDA:
ILLUSTRATED BY PRECEDENTS OF BRITISH SEIZURES IN NEUTRAL WATERS.

Articles in the Boston Daily Advertiser, November 29, 1864, and January 17, 1865.

The case of the Florida attracted attention at the time, and aroused the British press. Especially to meet the criticism of the latter the first of the following articles was written. Though published in a newspaper anonymously, its authorship was recognized and acknowledged, and it was reprinted in a pamphlet by the Young Men’s Republican Union of New York.

The Florida was a Rebel war-steamer, built in England, which had done damage to our commerce. After capturing and burning the bark Mondamon off Pernambuco, it arrived at Bahia Bay, October 5, 1864, where the United States steamer Wachusett, with Captain Napoleon Collins as commander, was then lying. The Florida at first anchored in the offing, but, at the invitation of the Brazilian admiral, came inside in the midst of the Brazilian fleet, and close under the guns of the principal fort. At about three o’clock on the morning of October 7th, the Wachusett slipped her cables, and, with full head of steam, bore down upon the Rebel war-vessel, one half of whose officers and crew, including Captain Morris, were on shore, and the remainder, having just returned, were in no condition to repel an assault. The officer of the deck, supposing the collision which he saw imminent merely accidental, cried out, “You will run into us, if you don’t look out.” The design of Captain Collins was to strike the Florida amidships, crush in her side, and send her at once to the bottom; but this was not accomplished; the Wachusett struck only the stern, carrying away the mizzen-mast and main-yard, so that the Rebel vessel was not seriously injured, but the broken spars fell across the awning over the hatchway, and thus prevented her crew from getting on deck. In the confusion that ensued several pistol-shots were fired from both vessels, at random and without effect. Two of the Wachusett’s guns were discharged,—by accident, according to one report, or, as another had it, by order of a lieutenant. The shots did not strike the Florida. Captain Collins cried out immediately, “Surrender, or I will blow you out of the water!” The lieutenant in charge of the Florida replied, “Under the circumstances I surrender.” In an instant the vessel was boarded by men from the Wachusett, who made her fast by a hawser to their own vessel, which at once turned her course seaward, moving at the top of her speed and towing the Florida in her wake.

The Wachusett was challenged from the Brazilian fleet, but there was no reply. The Florida, when commanded to stop, answered that she was towed by the vessel in front. Shortly afterward the heavy guns of the fort opened fire. Three shots passed harmlessly above the pennant of the Wachusett, striking the water beyond. Two vessels of the Brazilian fleet gave chase, but soon abandoned it, and the Florida was brought to Hampton Roads, where it was anchored.

Meanwhile the case passed into diplomacy. Mr. Seward addressed a note, under date of November 11th, to Mr. Webb, the minister of the United States at Rio Janeiro, directing him to say that the Government of the United States was not indisposed to examine the subject upon its merits carefully, and to consider whatever questions might arise out of it in a becoming and friendly spirit, if that spirit was adopted by his Imperial Majesty’s Government. The Brazilian representative at Washington, in a note dated December 12th, expressed the belief that the Government of the United States would give the explanations and reparation which, in conformity with international laws, are due to a power that maintains friendly and pacific relations with it. Mr. Seward, in his reply, dated December 26th, disallowed the assumption that the Rebels were “a lawful naval belligerent,” and asserted, that, being still “destitute of naval forces, ports, and courts,” the ascription of that character to them by Brazil “is an act of intervention in derogation of the Law of Nations, and unfriendly and wrongful, as it is manifestly injurious, to the United States.” He also disallowed the assumption that the Florida belonged to the Rebels, and maintained, “on the contrary, that that vessel, like the Alabama, was a pirate, belonging to no nation or lawful belligerent.” He added, that it did not belong to captains of ships-of-war of the United States, acting without authority, to assert the rights and redress the wrongs of the country. The captured crew, being unlawfully brought into the national custody, could not be lawfully subjected here to the punishment they deserved, and were therefore set at liberty. Then follows this statement with regard to the vessel: “The Florida was brought into American waters, and was anchored under naval surveillance and protection at Hampton Roads. While awaiting the representation of the Brazilian Government, on the 28th of November, she sunk, owing to a leak which could not be seasonably stopped. The leak was at first represented to have been caused, or at least increased, by a collision with a war transport.” After stating that there were courts of inquiry on the subject, he concluded: “In the mean time it is assumed that the loss of the Florida was a consequence of some unforeseen accident, which cast no responsibility upon the United States.”[1] Nothing further occurred in this case.

The Advertiser, in a leader on this article, after alluding to the author as “a gentleman whose position and pursuits have led him to give great attention to questions of International Law,” says:—

“We ask attention to his view of the precedents, therefore, and to the connection which he establishes between them and the present case, as being both interesting and instructive, and as deserving no small weight in settling our views upon this important subject. He makes it clear, that, whatever Brazil may feel herself called upon to say in the matter, it does not lie in the mouth of England, either by her press or her ministry, to intermeddle by lecturing the United States.… The most embarrassing feature in the Florida case, however, has been removed within a few hours by the fortuitous collision of an army transport with this steamer, in the crowded roadstead at Fortress Monroe.”

Admiral Porter’s despatch reports this incident.

“Fortress Monroe, November 28, 1864.

“Hon. Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy:—

“I have just received a telegram from the commander of the prize steamer Florida, informing me that she had sunk in nine fathoms of water. She had been run into by an army steamer, and badly damaged. I have not heard the particulars. I will inform the Department, when I receive the written report.

“David D. Porter, Rear-Admiral.”

If we may judge from recent English newspapers, there is to be another cry against us, on account of the Florida, not unlike that on account of the Trent. One paper says the seizure was “most flagrantly lawless”; another, that “the precedent will establish a claim to the right to pursue and destroy every such vessel, whatever may be the port in which she may seek shelter or supplies”; another, that “the outrage cannot be permitted to pass unnoticed by other powers”; and still another, that “events such as these will speedily force European nations to interfere in the American difficulty for their own security.” Such are specimens of British criticism, before the facts in the case have been ascertained in any authentic form, and before our Government has had opportunity to declare itself on the subject.

The same swiftness occurred in the matter of the Trent. The parallel will be complete, if Earl Russell sends us a letter of complaint.

As in that remarkable instance, there is the same indifference to historic precedents. I do not refer to cases decided in prize courts, where the question is of strict law, which must prevail,—as where Sir William Scott decreed restitution of a vessel captured by a British privateer stationed among the mud islands at the mouth of the Mississippi, and within the neutral territory of the United States. I refer to another class of precedents, not to be found in judicial decisions, but in the history of Great Britain. And as, in the instance of the Trent, it appeared that this power had for several generations, under a pretended claim, entered on board foreign ships and forcibly dragged away persons from the protection of their flag, thus doing on a large scale what was done by Commodore Wilkes on a very small scale,—so it appears that this same power, whose newspapers are now swift to condemn the act of Captain Collins, has for many generations been in the habit of seizing or destroying vessels in neutral waters.

Judicial decisions exhibit the strict law obligatory on courts. Historic precedents exhibit the practice of nations, where strict law is often modified by considerations of necessity or policy. The first, as a general rule, concern private rights; the second, as a general rule, concern public rights. The first are questions for the court; the second are questions for executive deliberation and for diplomacy. It is needless to add that the case of the Florida is not a case of private rights. It is an historic incident, destined hereafter to be a precedent, which will be determined by the executive, and not by the judiciary. If the Florida were an ordinary private ship, claimed by private individuals, it would naturally fall under the cognizance of a prize court. But it is claimed as a public ship, which, as is well known, is not subject to the jurisdiction of a prize court. Or, assuming its private character by reason of its piratical origin, there are questions involved which must ultimately come under the cognizance of the Executive, and which belong to the history of the country.

Of course, the general principle of International Law applicable to such an incident is beyond question. It is found in the authoritative words of the Dutch publicist, Bynkershoek, when he says, “Certainly it is by no means lawful to attack or take an enemy in the port of a neutral who is in amity with both parties.”[2] Chancellor Kent, a great authority, enforces the same principle, when he says, “It is not lawful to make neutral territory the scene of hostility, or to attack an enemy while within it.”[3] General Halleck, in his excellent work on International Law, says: “Hostilities cannot be lawfully exercised within the territorial jurisdiction of the neutral state which is the common friend of both parties.” And he follows this compendious statement with the remark, that “the Government of the United States has invariably claimed the absolute inviolability of neutral territory.”[4] As early as 1793, our Government gave its adhesion to this principle in a case where Great Britain and France were the hostile parties. The British merchant-ship Grange was captured in Delaware Bay by a French frigate, and brought into Philadelphia, to which port she was bound. Mr. Jefferson, in a gossiping letter to Mr. Monroe, under date of May 5, 1793, says: “Upon her coming into sight, thousands and thousands of the yeomanry of the city crowded and covered the wharves. Never before was such a crowd seen there; and when the British colors were seen reversed, and the French flying above them, they burst into peals of exultation.”[5] The British minister, addressing himself at once to our Government, demanded restitution of the captured vessel, then within our jurisdiction. The French minister insisted that Delaware Bay was an open sea, so that the original capture was lawful. But the ship was restored. Washington was at the time President, and Jefferson Secretary of State. It is not known that there was any appearance in the prize court with reference to the Grange. It was settled by diplomacy, as will be seen by a formal letter of the Secretary of State addressed to the French minister, where he says: “I am charged by the President of the United States to express to you his expectation, and at the same time his confidence, that you will be pleased to take immediate and effectual measures for having the ship Grange and her cargo restored to the British owners, and the persons taken on board her set at liberty.”[6] The general principle illustrated by this striking case has been maintained by our Government ever since. If any reader is curious to see an elaborate vindication of it, I refer him to a very animated article in the “Boston Gazette” for 1814, transferred to “Niles’s Register,”[7] where the inviolability of neutral territory is upheld, especially against the open pretensions of Great Britain.

This general principle may seem at first view conclusive with regard to the Florida. If this vessel, now lying within the jurisdiction of the United States, were an ordinary private ship, cognizable in a prize court, or if it were still within the jurisdiction of Brazil, it might be so. But it remains to be seen whether there are not decisive considerations, distinguishing this case from every other, which will justify our Government, while recognizing the violation of Brazilian territory, and making all proper apologies, at least in declining any restitution of the ship. On this point it is not necessary to express an opinion. I began by allusion to the reckless judgments of British journals, tending to excite a cry against our country; and my present object will be accomplished, if I exhibit those historic precedents which must close the British mouth, whenever it opens to condemn a capture like that of the Florida.

1. It was in the reign of Queen Elizabeth that England began to contest the supremacy of the seas; and it was in this same reign that this domineering power began those pretensions under which neutral rights of all kinds were set at nought. As early as 1567, Hawkins, fresh from a slave-trading voyage in the ship “Jesus,” fired at a Spanish ship in the harbor of Plymouth, and forced her to lower her flag. The Spanish ambassador said indignantly to Elizabeth: “Your mariners rob my master’s subjects on the sea; they plunder our people in the streets of your towns; they attack our vessels in your very harbors. I entreat your Majesty to punish this last outrage at Plymouth, and to preserve the peace between the two nations.”[8] Elizabeth gave a smooth answer, and that was all.

2. Not long afterwards Admiral Drake entered the harbor of Cadiz, where he scattered, sunk, and burned an immense fleet of Spanish transports, and then did the same thing in the harbor of Lisbon. There were apologies on the part of Elizabeth; Burleigh wrote a crafty letter; the Admiral was disavowed; but this was all.[9] Among the ships seized at Lisbon were no less than sixty belonging to the Hanse Towns. These towns vainly demanded their restitution. Philip of Spain, at that time sovereign of Portugal, was equally unsuccessful, although, by way of retaliation, he drove from Lisbon the factors of the Company of English Merchants.[10]

Such are some of the earliest historic precedents.

3. In similar defiance of unquestionable right, the Dutch East India fleet, in 1665, which had put into Bergen in Norway, was attacked by the English in this neutral port. On this outrage Vattel remarks: “But the Governor of Bergen fired on the assailants, and the Court of Denmark complained, perhaps too faintly, of an enterprise so injurious to its dignity and its rights.”[11]

4. Throughout the seventeenth century numerous incidents illustrate the pretensions of Great Britain; and so also in the next century. Émérigon, the famous French authority on the Law of Insurance, mentions one which deserves notice. In 1757, a French bark, La Victoire, chased by a British privateer, sought refuge in the neutral waters of Majorca, where she anchored within pistol-shot of the shore. The British privateer seized the bark, notwithstanding three shots fired from the castle. A few days later the prize was recaptured by a French privateer. The original owners of the bark claimed her, on the ground that her capture was null; but the court of prizes awarded one third to the recaptor.[12] The learned author fails to record any reparation by Great Britain.

Advancing to later times, the historic precedents multiply. I pass over a considerable period, not without examples, and come at once to those occurring in the protracted war against the French Revolution.

5. War had hardly begun, when, in 1793, the port of Genoa was the scene of an incident differing from that in Bahia only in its very aggravating circumstances, and in the bloodshed that ensued. The French frigate La Modeste was quietly at anchor in this neutral harbor when a British ship-of-the-line came alongside. Suddenly the British commander summoned the Frenchman to surrender. On his refusal, the frigate was boarded, and three hundred of the unarmed crew were massacred. The frigate was carried to England. Such is the account given by a French author, who complains bitterly that the British Government did nothing to punish the outrage. The Genoese Government was powerless; and the French Convention, in a decree marked by great moderation, proceeded to release it from all responsibility, although at a later day it appears to have paid two millions of francs as an indemnity.[13] The reader curious in dates will not fail to observe that it was in the very year when the neutrality of Genoa was thus set at defiance that the British minister in the United States claimed the surrender of a ship seized by a French frigate in defiance of our neutrality. Such are famous contradictions of national conduct. A British ship captured by France in neutral waters was surrendered at the demand of Great Britain; a French ship captured by Great Britain in neutral waters was hurried off by the captor as prize of war.

6. The same author who has described the outrage in the harbor of Genoa adds that Admiral Nelson afterwards carried off another French vessel in full view of the Genoese batteries.[14]

7. Another instance appears, where Admiral Nelson, in 1798, entered the neutral port of Leghorn, and seized a fleet of Genoese ships with rich cargoes. The author who records this outrage makes it “yet otherwise culpable on account of the high position of the personage, who, without respect for the independence and dignity of a friendly and neutral nation, assumed the moral responsibility of it.”[15]

8. The same lawlessness governing British commanders in Leghorn and Genoa appeared also this side of the Atlantic. In August, 1795, an audacious attempt was made by the British ship-of-war Africa to seize the French minister, M. Fauchet, when on his way from New York to Newport, on board the sloop Peggy, within the waters of the United States. The sloop was boarded at the entrance of Newport harbor, and within two miles of the light-house, and the trunks of the minister were overhauled; but he had already left at an intermediate port, so that the trespassers were disappointed. M. Fauchet, in a communication to his successor, M. Adet, says: “I shall express to you but one afflicting sentiment, which is, that in a free State, with a government in which England has just acquired a friend, there is no safety for myself or my papers; for, in a word, as it was from a public packet-boat in a neutral port that I was to have been carried off, there is no reason why I should not be taken on the highway or in an inn, if it could be done with impunity.” Our Government vainly endeavored to obtain reparation from Great Britain for this outrage, while France, on her part, mentioned the “impunity” of its authors among her causes of complaint against us. It is only recently that the facts of this remarkable case have appeared in a document printed by order of the Senate.[16] They help swell the present testimony.

9. Taking these instances in the order of time, we come next to outrages on the coast of Norway. The British frigate Squirrel, on entering the Norwegian port of Oster-Risoer, in 1801, then belonging to Denmark, seized a Swedish ship, and put its pilot in irons. Then coming to anchor, it deliberately captured three other Swedish vessels, and, sending on shore, kidnapped several pilots. Two or three days afterwards, a boat from another British man-of-war, the cutter Achilles, entered the Norwegian port of Egvang, and seized a French prize at anchor there, while the cutter’s crew fired upon a bark having on board peaceable inhabitants, wounding one of them. The Danish Government promptly demanded reparation for these accumulated outrages, and especially the restitution of the vessels. The British minister, Lord Hawkesbury, at once declared that the guilty individuals should receive the strongest marks of disapprobation from his Government, but that, with regard to the restitution of the vessels, it was impossible for him, in the existing circumstances of the two countries, to enter into any explanation,—that, if the present misunderstanding should be amicably adjusted, “these cases would naturally be carried, without loss of time, before the regular and impartial tribunals established for the decision of such causes, according to principles of justice and the Law of Nations.” The Danish minister at once replied, that his sovereign would never consent that the open violation of his ports and his territory should become, under any pretext, the subject of deliberation and decision in any tribunals whatever,—that his sovereign and territorial rights were assured, and he would not abandon them. Lord Hawkesbury was moved, in reply, to disapprove the conduct of the British officers, and to order the restitution of the Swedish vessels captured in the port of Oster-Risoer. At the very moment of this “incomplete reparation,” as it has been called, Great Britain was preparing her first expedition against Copenhagen.[17]

10. The same French author, who, in ardor for neutral rights, has exposed the conduct of Great Britain, mentions the instance of an English frigate, in 1803, which, after capturing a Swedish vessel in a Norwegian port, entered the neutral port of Bergen, where her commander attempted to seize a Dutch vessel and two French privateers. These three vessels were saved by crawling, with permission of the Governor, under the guns of the fortress; but the attempt was a violation of the neutral waters of Bergen, which passed without reparation.[18]

11. M. de Cussy also mentions, that, during this same year, a British man-of-war insulted a French vessel in the neutral port of Lisbon.[19]

12. The next instance was again on this side of the Atlantic, and in the neutral waters of our own coast. The French ship-of-the-line L’Impétueux, separated in a storm from the fleet to which she belonged, and much disabled, was discovered, September, 1806, by several British men-of-war off Cape Henry. The French ship turned her head to the land, and was actually aground before the British ships came within cannon-shot. But, though in this disabled condition, and on the very shores of the United States, she received a British broadside. The French commander vainly protested that he was on neutral territory. His crew were taken prisoners, and his ship was burned. This act was a violation of the Law of Nations doubly noticeable, as the immunity of our coast “within cannon-shot” had been expressly recognized in the Treaty of 1794 between Great Britain and the United States. As the ship was burned, there could be no question of its restitution. But it does not appear that there was reparation of any kind,—not even apology.[20]

13. The outrage upon the frigate Chesapeake properly belongs to this list, for it was a barefaced and most insulting violation of territorial jurisdiction. This was in June, 1807, while the United States were at peace with all the world. The Chesapeake, having proceeded to sea, was followed by the British frigate Leopard, lying at Hampton Roads, which, after ranging alongside, commenced a heavy fire, until the commander of the Chesapeake felt it his duty to strike his colors and to inform the British commander that the Chesapeake was his prize. It is needless to mention the details of this unparalleled enormity, or the mingled anger and humiliation which ensued in the country, as they became known. A demand for reparation was made at once; but it was only after four years of negotiation that the terms of adjustment were mutually accepted. There was no ship to restore; but the men forcibly taken from the Chesapeake were, “as far as circumstances would admit,” returned to that frigate, then lying in the harbor of Boston.[21]

14. At the time these outrages were perpetrated on our coast, another, on a larger scale, was planned and executed in the Baltic. Denmark had been “scrupulously neutral”; but the British Government feared that its fleet at Copenhagen might in some way be appropriated by Napoleon, whose Continental supremacy had recently culminated at the Peace of Tilsit. It was determined to seize this fleet, and a naval expedition of corresponding force was directed against Copenhagen. The Danes made a brave resistance; but at last, on the 7th of September, 1807, they were compelled to capitulate. The Danish fleet was surrendered to the British admiral.[22]

15. Then came the American frigate Essex, under Captain Porter, captured by a superior British force in the neutral waters of Valparaiso. The Essex had made a very successful cruise, and become a terror to British navigation. It was important to stop her victories. The newspapers of the time assert that “an Admiralty order was issued, commanding the officers of British ships in the South Seas not to respect any port as neutral where the Essex should be found.” It is certain that the British commander acted in this spirit. With two frigates, the Phœbe and the Cherub, March 28, 1814, he opened fire upon the Essex, then at anchor, according to her log-book, “in nine and an half fathoms water, within half-pistol shot of the shore.” After a desperate battle of two hours and a half, Captain Porter was compelled to surrender. The people glowed with admiration of his gallantry, and indignation at what was called “this glaring defiance of the clearest principle of National Law.” It was said, that, “though the country had lost a ship, it had lost nothing else.”[23] But here the matter ended. The ship was never restored; nor does it appear to have been the subject of reclamation, either by our Government upon Spain, or by Spain upon Great Britain. The President’s message at the opening of the next Congress, while commending the gallantry of Captain Porter, does not even allude to the violation of International Law in his capture. But it will be remarked, that at this time the South American colonies were beginning to be convulsed by that long revolutionary war which closed with their independence, so that there was a practical difficulty in obtaining any remedy for this outrage. We could not apply directly to England, and neither Spain nor Chile was in condition to receive any such application. Silence on our part was the only policy. But the act is not forgotten among the precedents of British history.

16. Then came the General Armstrong, an American privateer, destroyed by a British squadron in the neutral waters of Fayal, in September, 1814. There is a dispute as to certain facts in this case. On the British side it is said that the privateer fired first and killed several men. But it is clear that the privateer was pursued and attacked under the very guns of the Portuguese fortress, and, after being abandoned by her crew, was burned by the British. As war at that time existed between Great Britain and the United States, our Government was compelled to resort for reparation to Portugal, whose neutral territory had been violated. After a protracted negotiation for more than a generation, the question was submitted to the arbitration of Louis Napoleon, while President of the French Republic, who decided that nothing was due from Portugal. This was on the ground of exceptional circumstances, and among other things, that the American commander “had not applied from the beginning for the intervention of the neutral sovereign, and that, by having recourse to arms to repel an unjust aggression of which he pretended to be the object, he had himself failed to respect the neutrality of the territory of the foreign sovereign, and had thereby released that sovereign from the obligation in which he was to afford him protection by any other means than that of a pacific intervention.”[24] In this case the ship was destroyed, so that there was no question of restitution. But Great Britain made no reparation of any kind.

Such are some of the seizures actually made by Great Britain, in defiance of neutral rights, during the wars against the French Revolution and against us.

17. There is another incident, belonging to the latter period, which, though not a consummated seizure, is in the nature of testimony, especially as it concerns the very port of Bahia where the Florida was taken. Commodore Bainbridge, of the Navy of the United States, after capture of the British frigate Java, left Captain Lawrence in the Hornet to cruise off the port of Bahia, instructing him as follows: “You will cruise off here as long as in your judgment you may deem it necessary.… Be on your guard against the arrival of the Montague, seventy-four; and I advise you not to rely too much on the protection of the neutral port of Bahia against the [British] Admiral’s influence to capture you even in port.”[25] Captain Lawrence followed these instructions, and, though driven by the Montague into the port, at once took advantage of the night and escaped to sea, thus eluding British violence in neutral waters. The Hornet was not “gobbled up,” as her capture of the Peacock shortly afterwards amply attests; but it is evident that the will was not wanting.

18. The long interval of peace after the outrages last mentioned caused a lull in British pretensions,—to be awakened by the blast of war. In 1837, Canada was disturbed by a rebellion, soon followed by the invasion of our territorial jurisdiction at Niagara. I refer to the case of the steamboat Caroline, which, while moored to the American shore, was entered in the darkness of night by a British expedition from Canada, set on fire, and pushed into the rapids to be precipitated over the cataract. Some persons on board were killed and others wounded. For this unquestionable violation of our territory there was no offer of reparation,—“no acknowledgment, no explanation, no apology,” as Mr. Webster expressed it,—until, nearly five years afterwards, Lord Ashburton, on his special mission, expressed regret “that some explanation and apology was not immediately made.” The amiable language of the British minister was promptly accepted by Mr. Webster, who was at the time Secretary of State, and the controversy subsided. The steamboat had been destroyed; but there was no offer to restore its value, nor was this question raised by our Government.[26]

19. The latest instance, in point of time, worth while to name in this list, is that of the Brazilian ship Santa Cruz, which, in 1850, was seized and burned, with all her lading and papers, by a British cruiser in the Brazilian waters. The excuse for the seizure was that the ship was engaged in the slave-trade, and for the burning that she was unseaworthy; but both these assertions were denied point-blank by the Brazilian Government, which branded the transaction as “Vandalism,” and gave notice that it would demand indemnity for the loss of the ship. As the ship was destroyed, there was no question of restitution. But there was formal protest against what was called “a violation of every principle of the Law of Nations by acts highly derogatory to the dignity, the sovereignty, and the independence of Brazil,—a nation as sovereign and independent as Great Britain, although it may not have the power to prevent such proceedings.”[27]

20. There is another instance, which, though earlier in time, I have reserved for the last, on account of the authentic declarations of an eminent British minister, bearing on the question now in issue between Brazil and the United States: I refer to the case of the French ships burnt or captured at Lagos, in 1759, within the territorial jurisdiction of Portugal. A British fleet under Admiral Boscawen falling in with an inferior French fleet, the latter took refuge near the coast. What ensued is thus described in the contemporary Memoirs of Horace Walpole. “They made a running fight, but could not escape the vigilance and bravery of Boscawen. Two of their largest ships were taken; two others forced on shore and burnt, in one of which was the commander, who was wounded in both legs, and expired soon after. The action passed on the 18th of August.”[28] This incident took its place among the victories of the year, which, according to the lively remark of Walpole in another place, were so numerous as to force him “to ask every morning what victory there was, for fear of missing one.”[29] But this victory was followed by an unexpected drawback. Pombal, a man of genius and courage, and the greatest administrator Portugal has produced, was at the time Prime-Minister. He complained vehemently that the Portuguese territory had been violated, and demanded satisfaction of Great Britain according to the Law of Nations.[30] In Great Britain, William Pitt, afterwards Lord Chatham, was at the head of affairs, teaching his country success in war as in commerce, and filling the world with English renown. He met this question promptly. In instructions to the British minister at Lisbon, written before the Portuguese complaint had reached him, dated at Whitehall, September 12, 1759, and marked “Most secret,” he says:—

“In case you shall find that any violence has actually been committed by his Majesty’s ships against the immunities of the coasts of Portugal, it is the King’s pleasure that you should express in the strongest terms to the Count de Oeyras [afterwards Marquis of Pombal], and to the other ministers, the extreme pain which such a most unfortunate incident must give to the King as soon as the certain knowledge of it shall reach his Majesty.… At the same time, in case there has actually been a violation of territory on our part, you will take care to avail yourself of all the circumstances of extenuation, of a nature to soften the impressions which the first sense of any insult on that coast may have made. But you will be particularly attentive not to employ any favorable circumstances to justify what the Law of Nations condemns, but you will insensibly throw the same into your conversation with insinuations and address, as considerations of alleviation, which it is to be hoped may prevent all asperity between two courts so mutually well disposed to each other, and whose interests are so inseparable.”

And the letter closes by declaring that

“His Majesty has nothing more really at heart than to give, as far as he can with honor, to the King of Portugal all reasonable satisfaction that one power in amity can desire from another upon an incident so totally unforeseen and without intention of offence.”

Then follows this postscript:—

“P. S. Though it be sufficiently implied by the above words, all reasonable satisfaction, as far as his Majesty can with honor, that there are things which his Majesty could not possibly on any account comply with, I have thought it may not be improper, for your more certain guidance, expressly to signify to you that any personal mark on a great Admiral who has done so essential a service to his country, or on any one under his command, is totally inadmissible, as well as the idea of restoring the ships of war taken. You will therefore, in case, in your conversation with the Portuguese ministers, any suggestion pointing to either of those methods of satisfaction should be thrown out, take especial care to say enough to shut the door entirely against any expectation of that kind,—being at the same time particularly attentive to avoid, in the manner, everything that can carry the air of peremptoriness or harshness which may interest the delicacy of the King of Portugal. I am further to give you to understand, for your private information, that, if the circumstances of the supposed grievance should come out to be of sufficient magnitude, such is the King’s strong desire to give the most public and ostensible satisfaction to the King of Portugal, that his Majesty will not, I believe, even be averse to sending an extraordinary mission on this occasion.”[31]

The extraordinary embassy promised in this postscript was despatched to Lisbon; and here we have another letter of Mr. Pitt, dated at Whitehall, May 30, 1760, and marked “Most secret,” where he declares anew “the King’s immutable and affectionate concern for the dignity and independence of the crown of Portugal,” and enjoins upon his ambassador to “forbear entering into much controversial reasoning,” and to “accompany his answer with all possible gentleness and cordiality of manner, and with the most conciliating and amicable expressions.” It seems that the Portuguese minister had demanded the restitution of the ships, but accompanied by “the friendly and confidential declaration that a compliance therewith was not expected.” Mr. Pitt was anxious to avoid any such demand, as “an invidious use would not fail to be made of it by enemies, and perhaps by neutral powers.”[32] From the Memoirs of Pombal we learn how the British ambassador acquitted himself.

“The King of England sent an ambassador extraordinary to Lisbon to give the satisfaction which was demanded. It was Lord Kinnoul who was charged with it, and who acquitted himself of this commission as the Count de Oeyras [Marquis of Pombal] required. This lord declared openly and in full audience, composed of the foreign ministers, that the English officers who burnt the French vessels on the coast of Lagos were reprehensible, and that on this account the King, his master, sent him to Lisbon, in order to testify that he had no part in it, and that it was contrary to his orders that they had committed that act of hostility for which he made reparation.”[33]

The ships were not restored, nor was there any indemnity. But the case did not end here. In 1762 France declared war against Portugal, and in its declaration made the failure to obtain restoration of these ships one of the causes of war. These are the words:—

“Every one knows the utmost and violent attack made by the English in 1759 on some of the [French] King’s ships under the cannon of the Portuguese forts at Lagos. His Majesty demanded of the Most Faithful King to procure him restitution of those ships; but that Prince’s ministers, in contempt of what was due to the rules of justice, the laws of the sea, the sovereignty and territory of their master (all which were indecently violated by the most scandalous infraction of the rights of sovereigns and of nations), in answer to the repeated requisitions of the King’s ambassador on this head, made only vague speeches, with an air of indifference that bordered on derision.”[34]

Thus, while Great Britain was saved from the restitution of the ships, Portugal was compelled to suffer.

Such are historic precedents furnished by Great Britain to illustrate the case of the Florida. In face of this long array, it is difficult to see how British critics or British ministers can venture to reproach us.

From this review it appears, that, where ships have been captured in neutral waters, their restitution was at least on one occasion positively refused by a British minister of commanding authority, while on other occasions it was avoided from destruction of the ships. If the American commander who undertook this business at Bahia had done it completely, there would be little difficulty now. There were fire and water both at his service. He might have burned the Florida or scuttled her at once, and his offence would have been no greater than now, while, according to the precedents, his Government would have been relieved from embarrassment.

But there are peculiar circumstances which distinguish this instance from every other. They may be mentioned under two heads: I shall only allude to them.

First. The Florida was illegitimate and piratical in origin and conduct, being little more than a lawless gypsy of the sea,—born contrary to the Law of Nations, and living in constant defiance of that law.

Secondly. The Florida pretended to belong to a Rebel combination of slave-masters, now engaged in rebellion for the sake of Slavery. Though certain foreign powers, including Brazil, have conceded to this Rebel combination what are called “belligerent rights,” yet the extent of this concession is undecided. Of course, it is much less than a recognition of national independence. Every presumption must be against such a Rebel combination, having such an object. The indecent haste with which “belligerent rights” were originally conceded cannot be forgotten now; nor can we neglect the well-founded argument, that, in the absence of prize courts belonging to the pretended power, any such concession on the ocean was flagrantly unjust, and, when we consider its wide-spread consequences, to be reprehended always by our Government, as it must be by impartial history. Assuming that the restitution of a ship belonging to an independent power, as to France or England, might be properly required, it does not follow that such restitution should be required in a case like the present, where the pretended owner is not an independent power, and where the ship was lawless in origin and conduct,—or, in other words, that Brazil should expect the United States to restore the Florida, that it might be handed over again to the support of a slaveholding Rebellion and to burn more ships.

I call attention to these considerations without expressing any final opinion. The case of Koszta, forcibly taken by an American frigate from an Austrian ship-of-war in the territorial waters of Turkey, shows how the conduct of governments is sometimes inconsistent with strict law. An explanation and apology were promptly offered to Turkey, whose neutrality had been violated; but this was all. There was no offer on our part to surrender Koszta; nor was there any demand by Turkey for his restitution. But the present case is stronger than that of Koszta.

It is well understood that the seizure of the Florida was wrong only with respect to Brazil, and not with respect to the Rebel enemy. There can be no demand, therefore, unless Brazil steps forward. Whatever is done must be in her name and at her instance. The enlightened Emperor of Brazil is of the royal house of Braganza, which reigned in Portugal when her great minister, Pombal, forbore to press the restitution of ships captured by the British in Portuguese waters. Here is a precedent of his own family, completely applicable. I venture to add that he would do an inconsiderate and unfriendly act, if he should press the restitution of a ship obnoxious not only as a public enemy, but as the piratical agent of a wicked Rebellion. Even admitting that the capture was null by the Law of Nations, yet the nature of the reparation to be demanded rests absolutely in the discretion of Brazil, and in this age no power can be justified in any exercise of discretion adverse to human freedom.

Americanus.

The article was answered by an able writer in the Advertiser of December 13th, who assumed that Mr. Sumner was the apologist of seizures in neutral waters. It was also severely criticized by Professor Goldwin Smith, then travelling among us, in a letter which was given to the newspapers. Mr. Sumner, whose special object was to anticipate British criticism and to smooth the way with Brazil, said nothing until the case was understood to be settled, when he reappeared in the Advertiser of January 17, 1865.

SUPPLEMENT.

The recent correspondence between Mr. Seward and the Brazilian Chargé d’Affaires at Washington seems to bring the case of the Florida to a close. Our Government has distinctly recognized the inviolability of territorial sovereignty, and made reparation for the original act of violence, so much discussed. The vessel itself, out of which the question arose, was no longer in existence; so that the only important point not already settled by principle and precedent was eliminated from the case. There was no vessel to be claimed on the one side or refused on the other, and nothing was said of damages on account of its loss. Of course, had the Florida belonged to Brazil, any reparation would have been incomplete which did not embrace the vessel or its value.

But Mr. Seward has been careful to exclude the assumption that the Rebels have belligerent rights on the ocean, and also the other assumption that the Florida was anything but a pirate. It is clear that the position taken on these two points must have influenced any decision with regard to the vessel itself, or damages on account of its loss.

As the case is now settled, it is unnecessary to consider objections adduced against the view presented by me in the “Advertiser” some weeks ago. What is now certain was then uncertain. The Government has spoken, and the country accepts the result. But it may not be unprofitable to return for one moment to the original discussion.

My object at that time was to furnish materials for final judgment, and especially to repel British objurgations which befogged the whole question. It was important that our national conduct should be determined calmly, according to the best principles, and with perfect knowledge of the past. But it is difficult to deal with this or any kindred question without repairing to British history. There are precedents to be shunned as well as to be followed, and both should be studied. It is strange that such an attempt should have been misunderstood. Perhaps it is stranger still that anybody should have insisted on our humble submission to the most opprobrious epithets, without reminding the objurgators of the history of their own country, bristling with incidents having in them all that was indefensible in the Florida case without any of its exceptional circumstances. A Roman poet exclaims:—

“Quis tulerit Gracchos de seditione querentes?”[35]

And another authority, which will not be questioned, expressly enjoins on the censor to extract the beam from his own eye before he complains of the mote in the eye of another.

In the excess of dissent from what I said, it was even suggested that the vessel should be surrendered to Brazil,—of course as trustee of Rebel Slavery. But this was a very hasty suggestion, forgetting the piratical origin of the vessel, and forgetting the piratical slavemonger character of its pretended owners, having no ocean rights. Admitting the inviolability of neutral waters, it does not follow that such a vessel could be claimed, or, if Brazil were so ill-advised as to make such a claim, that our Government could hearken to it. It was because I saw this clearly that I sought to set up a breakwater against such claim, and to prepare public opinion on the subject. It is noble in a nation to acknowledge wrong; but it is weakness to sacrifice a great cause.

The Statute of Limitations has been set up against some of the historic instances adduced, and the very recent date of the Congress of Paris, at the close of the Crimean War in 1856, is declared to fix the line of demarcation, marking an altered policy in Great Britain. As a lover of peace and a student of International Law, anxious for its advancement,—yielding to nobody in this regard,—I wish that such an alteration could be shown. Joyfully should I welcome it, as one of the signs of a new order of ages. Unhappily, it cannot be shown, and I feel sure that it can be brought about only by a frank exhibition of transactions demonstrating its necessity. Truth is illustrated by error, health is maintained by knowledge of disease, and crime itself is made repulsive by bringing its perpetrators to judgment.

It is an old adage of the law, that no statute of limitations runs against the sovereign,—Nullum tempus occurrit regi. This, of course, is for the protection of his interests. But, assuming that such a statute may be pleaded against British responsibility for historic precedents more than eight years old, there is no question with regard to what has occurred since. Here the responsibility is admitted. Now, confining ourselves to the brief period since the Crimean Peace, there are instances identical in character with those which occurred previously; and these are the more remarkable as Great Britain had not the apology of war to disturb her equanimity.

A well-informed person, writing from Berlin, furnishes the following instance, which occurred as late as 1860. “Two British men-of-war took, or at least threatened to take, the Paraguayan war-steamer Tacuaril, in the port of Buenos Ayres. They laid themselves on each side of the Paraguayan war-steamer, in order to enforce a claim which proved afterwards to be fallacious.” The writer adds, that “this case, if looked into closely, will probably serve as a counter argument, should England have anything to say on the Florida-Bahia affair.” True enough; and such is the recent judgment of a German publicist.

There is also that other historic instance which has among its incidents the suspension of diplomatic relations between Brazil and Great Britain. It began with a demand by the latter power for reparation on account of a vessel pillaged after shipwreck on the coast of Brazil, in June, 1861. This was complicated soon after by a quarrel between certain officers of a British frigate in the harbor of Rio Janeiro and a sentry on shore, which ended in taking the officers into custody. The British minister demanded reparation for these two alleged wrongs; and the British admiral, who was at hand, seized five Brazilian merchant-vessels in the harbor of Rio Janeiro, declaring that he would not release them until £6,500 had been paid on account of the pillaged vessel, and satisfaction afforded for the detention of the officers. Thus, in time of peace, without any declaration of war, the British admiral performed an act of war, like that in the case of the Florida, but without the apology of the captors of the latter vessel. In short, he undertook, within the territorial jurisdiction of Brazil, to seize, not one vessel, but five vessels,—and all these innocent, neither piratical in origin nor belonging to people without ocean rights. Brazil, succumbing to superior force, paid the money demanded, and referred the question of reparation in the case of the officers to the arbitration of King Leopold of Belgium, who has since rendered judgment for the weaker power. The question of responsibility for the five innocent vessels seized within the territorial jurisdiction of Brazil was left unsettled. The mild and accomplished minister of Brazil in London, M. Carvalho Moreira, made a reclamation on this account, in a careful note, dated May 5, 1863, where he submitted, that “the English Government should express its regret at the acts which accompanied the reprisals, and declare that it had no intention to offend the dignity or to violate the territorial sovereignty of the empire,” and that it should consent to refer the question of damages to arbitration. Earl Russell declining to reopen any part of the questions between the two Governments, or to enter into any explanations, the Brazilian minister at once demanded his passports and left London. This case will be found at length in an authentic publication, which has only recently appeared.[36] I leave it, simply quoting from the work these pertinent words: “The question was with regard to the reparation and compensation which Brazil demanded from England for the seizure of her merchant-vessels and for the violation of her territorial waters.… It was, unhappily, easy to foresee the issue of this question,—England being always more disposed to demand reparation and indemnities than to accord them.”[37] Such is the recent judgment of a French publicist.

There is another case, which has not yet found its way into the books, nor did it occur after the Crimean War; but it is so very recent, and so curious, that I venture to adduce it. I am indebted for it to the Hon. John B. Alley, one of our Representatives in Congress, to whom it was communicated by one of his constituents.[38] The bark Home, of Boston, was on her way from Calcutta to Boston, when, on or about August 22, 1849, she fell in with a vessel, first supposed to be a pirate, but at last proved to be the Polka, prize to the British steamer Sharpshooter, with the crew in a starving condition. The prize-master, on coming aboard, said that the prize was taken in Port Macahé, near Cape Frio, in Brazil, for being engaged in the slave-trade; that, to escape the fire of the fort, which opened on the captors, they slipped the cable, and cut adrift the boat which was made fast astern; that at the time of the capture there was no person aboard, except a single negro; and that a midshipman with ten men was put aboard to take her to St. Helena. The famished crew were supplied by the American bark with bread, beef, water, and other small stores, for which the British Government paid, in 1852, the cost price, being all that was asked. On this case the master of the bark, in his communication to Mr. Alley, remarks: “This is another instance where a vessel was taken in a port by the British, and this in a time of profound peace; and as the fort fired on them, I presume the capture was not made by consent of the Brazilian Government.” Such is the mild conclusion of an American shipmaster, who seems to see the conduct of Great Britain in the same light as it is seen by the publicist of Germany and the publicist of France.

Such instances, so recent, show how little the injunction of International Law has been regarded by Great Britain, whether before or after the Crimean War; and yet British censors have not hesitated to arraign the United States in brutal terms. I do not admit their competency to sit in judgment on us; I plead to the jurisdiction. If they would teach correct principles, they must begin by a correct example. Meanwhile the abuses for which Great Britain is responsible cannot be forgotten by those who sincerely desire a new era in International Law. I say this in no spirit of reproach or controversy, but simply to serve the cause of my country and of truth.

Americanus.

RELATIONS WITH GREAT BRITAIN: THE ST. ALBANS RAID.

Speech in the Senate, on a Bill for Fortifications and Batteries on the Lakes, December 19, 1864.

December 19th, Mr. Doolittle, of Wisconsin, introduced a bill to enable the President to expend the sum of ten million dollars, or so much thereof as might be necessary, in his opinion, in building fortifications and floating-batteries to defend our northern frontier and the commerce of the Lakes against the attacks of piratical and hostile expeditions organized in the British provinces by the enemies of the United States; and he moved the reference of the bill to the Committee on Finance, which, at the suggestion of Mr. Sumner, he changed to the Committee on Foreign Relations. A debate ensued, involving what were called the troubles on the border, and especially the “St. Albans Raid,” when a hostile expedition crossed from Canada into Vermont, and committed acts of violence in that town. Mr. Sumner said:—

MR. PRESIDENT,—The question before the Senate is simply on the reference of this bill. It is a question of the order of business.

Looking at its character, it is plain that it concerns primarily and essentially our foreign relations. This circumstance gives it a peculiar interest. If it concerned only an additional levy of troops, or the building of new forts, or a change in our commercial policy, there would be no question with regard to its reference, nor would the Senator from Maryland [Mr. Reverdy Johnson] have followed it by remarks on the outrage at St. Albans. I assume, then, that it concerns our foreign relations, and therefore, according to the usages of the Senate, should be referred to the committee having that subject in charge.

This is all I have to say on the question of reference; but the Senate will pardon me, if I glance for one moment at the outrage to which the Senator referred. Only a few weeks ago, the village of St. Albans, in Vermont, was disturbed by a band of murderers, highwaymen, house-breakers, horse-thieves, and bank-robbers, from Canada. After breaking open the banks and obtaining a certain amount of spoil, attended by the murder of a citizen, they succeeded in making their way back to Canada, where they declared themselves agents of the Rebel Government. Such are the main facts. Now, Mr. President, does any one suppose that these agents of the Rebel Government were moved to this criminal enterprise merely by considerations of plunder?—that they risked life and everything merely to rob a bank? No such thing. Their object was much higher and more comprehensive. It was to embroil the Government of the United States with the Government of Great Britain. I cannot doubt that such was their object. To my mind it is plain as noonday.

These agents, or rather the men behind who set them on, knew the sensitiveness of our people, and how naturally they would be aroused against the foreign country where the enterprise had its origin. They saw that excitement, passion, anger on our part were inevitable, that out of these some complication or collision might ensue, and that any such complication or collision must necessarily help the Rebellion more than a victory on the field of battle. All this they saw, and acted accordingly. The whole proceeding was a trap in which to catch the Government of our country. It was hoped that in this way the Rebellion might gain that powerful British intervention which would restore its failing fortunes.

For myself, Sir, I am determined not to be caught in any such trap. There are many things Great Britain has done, since the outbreak of our Rebellion, which to my mind are most unfriendly; but I am unwilling that there should be anything on our side to furnish seeming apology for that foreign intervention so constantly menaced, and originally foreshadowed in the most hasty and utterly unjustifiable concession of ocean belligerence to Rebel Slavemongers who had not a single port or prize court. Nobody sees the wrongs we have suffered more clearly than I do; but I see other wrongs also. While never ceasing to claim all our just rights, and reminding this power always of duties plainly neglected, I cannot forget that we are engaged in a war for the suppression of a long-continued and most virulent Rebellion, which has thus far tasked our best energies. To this work let us dedicate ourselves, without arousing another enemy, through whose alliance the Rebellion may be encouraged and strengthened. Let us put down the Rebellion. Do this, and we shall do everything.

Meanwhile I trust the Senate will not be moved by passion into hasty action on any of the measures before it, but that each will be considered carefully and calmly on its merits, according to the usage of this body. This surely is the dictate of prudence, and I cannot doubt that it is the dictate of patriotism also.

Washington, in his Farewell Address, warns against “the insidious wiles of foreign influence”; but the “insidious wiles” of our Rebels, seeking to embroil us with foreign powers, are as deadly as any influence brought against us. Forewarned is forearmed. Let us be steadfast against them.

After further debate, in which Mr. Sumner considered the order of General Dix, authorizing our troops to pursue a hostile expedition into Canada, according to writers on International Law, the bill was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, where, with other similar measures, it was allowed to sleep.

TERMINATION OF THE CANADIAN RECIPROCITY TREATY.

Speeches in the Senate, on the Joint Resolution giving Notice for the Termination of the Canadian Reciprocity Treaty, December 21, 1864, January 11 and 12, 1865.

A joint resolution passed the House of Representatives, December 13, 1864, which, after an argumentative preamble, authorized and requested the President of the United States to give the British Government the notice required by the fifth article of the Reciprocity Treaty of the 5th June, 1854, for the termination of the same; and in the Senate the same was duly referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

December 20, 1864, Mr. Sumner reported from the Committee the House resolution, with the following substitute as an amendment.

“Joint Resolution providing for the termination of the Reciprocity Treaty of fifth June, eighteen hundred and fifty-four, between the United States and Great Britain.

“Whereas it is provided in the Reciprocity Treaty concluded at Washington the 5th of June, 1854, between the United States, of the one part, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, of the other part, that this treaty ‘shall remain in force for ten years from the date at which it may come into operation, and further until the expiration of twelve months after either of the high contracting parties shall give notice to the other of its wish to terminate the same’; and whereas it appears, by a proclamation of the President of the United States, bearing date 16th March, 1855, that the treaty came into operation on that day; and whereas, further, it is no longer for the interests of the United States to continue the same in force: Therefore

“Resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled, That notice be given of the termination of the Reciprocity Treaty, according to the provision therein contained for the termination of the same; and the President of the United States is hereby charged with the communication of such notice to the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.”

December 21st, the joint resolution was, on motion of Mr. Sumner, taken up for consideration, when the substitute was adopted as an amendment. The question occurring on the passage of the joint resolution as amended, Mr. Sumner said:—

MR. PRESIDENT,—I had originally intended, when this joint resolution came up, to review the whole subject, and to exhibit at length the history of the Reciprocity Treaty, and existing reasons for its termination. But, after the debate of a few days ago, and considering the apparent unanimity in the Senate, I feel unwilling to occupy time by any protracted remarks. They are not needed.

The people of the United States have been uneasy under the Reciprocity Treaty for several years,—I may almost say from its date. A feeling early showed itself that the treaty was more advantageous to Canada than to the United States,—that, in short, it was unilateral. This feeling has of late ripened into something like conviction. At the same time the exigencies of the present war, requiring so large an expenditure, make it unreasonable for us to continue a treaty by which the revenues of the country suffer. Such considerations have brought the public mind to its present position. The unamiable feelings manifested toward us by the people of Canada have had little influence on the question, unless, perhaps, they may conspire to make us look at it in the light of reason rather than of sentiment.

The subject of the fisheries is included in this treaty. But it is not doubted that before the termination of the treaty some arrangement can be made in regard to it, either by reciprocal legislation or by further negotiation.

The Committee, after careful consideration at a full meeting, was unanimous in its report. And as the Committee represents all parts of the country and all sentiments of the Senate, I have thought that perhaps there might be a similar unanimity among Senators. Therefore I forbear all further remarks, and ask for a vote.

On motion of Mr. Hale, of New Hampshire, the further consideration of the question was postponed.

January 11, 1865, it was resumed, when Mr. Hale spoke against the notice. He was followed by Mr. Sumner.

Mr. President,—The Reciprocity Treaty has a beautiful name. It suggests at once exchange, equality, equity; and it is because it was supposed to advance these ideas practically that this treaty was originally accepted by the people of the United States. If, however, it shall appear, that, while organizing an exchange, it forgets equality and equity in any essential respect, then must a modification be made in conformity with just principles.

I mean to be brief, but I hope, though brief, to make the proper conclusion apparent. It is a question for reason, and not for passion or sentiment, and in this spirit I enter upon the discussion.

The treaty may be seen under four different heads, as it concerns, first, the fisheries,—secondly, the navigation of the St. Lawrence,—thirdly, the commerce between the United States and the British provinces,—and, fourthly, the revenue of the United States.

1. The fisheries have been a source of anxiety throughout our history, even from the beginning, and for several years previous to the Reciprocity Treaty they had been the occasion of mutual irritation, verging at times on positive outbreak. The treaty was followed by entire tranquillity, which has not been for a moment disturbed. This is a plain advantage not to be denied. But, so far as I have been able to examine official returns, I do not find any further evidence showing the value of the treaty in this connection, while opinions, even among those most interested in the fisheries, are divided. There are partisans for it in Gloucester, and partisans against it in Maine.

If the treaty related exclusively to the fisheries, I should not be willing to touch it,—although the circumstance that representatives of these interests differ with regard to its value may leave it open to debate. But the practical question remains, whether any seeming advantage in this respect is sufficient to counterbalance the disadvantage in other respects.

2. Next comes the navigation of the St. Lawrence. This plausible concession has proved to be little more than a name. It appears that during the first six years of the treaty only forty American vessels, containing 12,550 tons, passed seaward through the St. Lawrence, and during the same time only nineteen vessels, containing 5,446 tons, returned by the same open highway.[39] These are very petty amounts, when we consider the commerce on the Lakes, which in 1856 was estimated at $587,197,320,[40] or when we, consider the carrying trade between the United States and the British provinces. Take the years 1857-62, and we find that during this period the shipping of the United States clearing for the British provinces was 10,707,329 tons, and the foreign shipping clearing during this same period was 7,391,399 tons, while the shipping of the United States entering at our custom-houses from the British provinces was 10,056,183 tons, and the foreign shipping entering was 6,453,520 tons.[41] I mention these things by way of contrast. In comparison with these grand movements of value, the business we have been able to do on the St. Lawrence is trivial. It need not be considered an element in the present discussion.

3. The treaty may be seen next in its bearing on the commerce between the two countries. This has increased immensely; but it is difficult to say how much of this increase is due to the treaty, and how much to the natural growth of population, and the facilities of transportation in both countries. If it could be traced exclusively or in any large measure to the treaty, it would be an element not to be disregarded. But it does not follow from the occurrence of this increase after the treaty that it was on account of the treaty. Post hoc, ergo propter hoc, is too loose a rule for our Government on the present occasion.

The census of the United States and of the British provinces shows an increase of population which must not be disregarded in determining the origin of this increase of commerce.

There are also the railroads, with prompt and constant means of intercommunication, which have come into successful operation only since the treaty. It would be difficult to exaggerate the influence they have exercised in quickening and extending commerce. I cannot doubt that the railroad system of the two countries has been in itself a Reciprocity Treaty more comprehensive and equal than any written on parchment.

The extent of trade before and after the treaty is seen in a few figures.

In the three years immediately preceding the treaty the total exports to Canada and the other British provinces were $48,216,518, and the total imports were $22,588,577,—being of exports to imports in the proportion of one hundred to forty-six.

In the ten years of the treaty the total exports to Canada and the other British provinces were $256,350,931, and the total imports were $200,399,786. According to these amounts the exports were to the imports in the proportion of one hundred to seventy-eight. Taking Canada alone, we find the change in this proportion greater still. The total exports to Canada in the three years immediately preceding the treaty were $31,846,865, and the total imports were $16,589,624, being in the proportion of one hundred to fifty-two,—while the total exports to Canada alone during the ten years of the treaty were $170,371,911, and the total imports were $161,474,349, being in the proportion of one hundred to ninety-four.

I present these tables simply to lay before you the extent and nature of the change in the commerce between the two countries. I forbear embarking on the much debated inquiry as to the effect of a difference between the amount of exports and of imports, involving, as it does, the most delicate question of the balance of trade. In the comparison I am making, it is not necessary to consider it. The Reciprocity Treaty cannot be maintained or overturned on any contested principle of political economy.

4. I come, in the last place, to the influence of the treaty on the revenue of our country; and here the custom-house is our principal witness. The means of determining this question are found in the authentic tables published from time to time in Reports of the Treasury, and especially in the report to Congress at this session, which I have in my hand.

Looking at these tables, we find certain unanswerable points. I begin with an estimate founded on the trade before the treaty. From this it appears, that, if no treaty had been made, and the trade had increased in the same ratio as before the treaty, Canada would have paid to the United States in the ten years of the treaty at least $16,373,880, from which she has been relieved. This sum is actually lost to the revenue of the United States. In return, Canada has given up $2,650,890, being the amount it would have collected, if no treaty had been made. This vast disproportion is to the detriment of the national revenue.

Here is another illustration, derived from the tables. During the ten years of the treaty the United States have actually paid in duties to Canada alone $16,802,962, while during this same period Canada has paid in duties to the United States the very moderate sum of $930,447. Here again is vast disproportion, to the detriment of the national revenue.

The same inequality is seen in another way. During the ten years of the treaty dutiable products of the United States have entered Canada and the other provinces to the amount of $84,347,019, while during this same period dutiable products of Canada and the other provinces have entered the United States only to the amount of $7,750,482. During this same period free products of the United States have entered Canada and the other provinces to the amount of $118,853,972, while free products of Canada and the other provinces have entered the United States to the amount of $178,500,184. Here, again, is vast disproportion to the detriment of the national revenue.

Add to these various results the statement of the Secretary of the Treasury, just laid on our tables, in the following words:—

“The treaty [during the eight fiscal years 1855-63] has released from duty a total sum of $42,333,257 in value of goods of Canada more than of goods the produce of the United States.”[42]

This conclusion is in substantial harmony with that reached from an independent examination of the tables.

These various illustrations show that the revenue of the United States has suffered by the treaty, and that in this important particular its advantages are not shared equally by the two countries. Here, at least, it loses title to its name.

But its onerous character has become manifest in other forms since the adoption of our system of internal revenue. I need not remind the Senate of the extent to which we have gone in seeking out objects of excise,—and there are pending propositions in the same direction, seeking new objects; but it is notorious that such taxation is always graduated with reference to the tariff on the same objects, when imported from abroad. But here the Reciprocity Treaty steps forward with imperative veto. Thus, for instance, the lumber of our country is left free from excise, though I am assured it might well bear it, simply because no countervailing tax can be imposed upon lumber from the British provinces. Had a tax of five per cent been imposed upon the lumber of our country, I am assured, by those familiar with the subject, that we should have received at least $5,000,000,—all of which is lost to our annual revenue. This is only a single illustration.

There are other ways in which the treaty and our excise system come into conflict. Practical difficulties, I am assured, have already occurred in the Bureau of Internal Revenue. This conflict is seen in the extent to which the business of the country, and even its agriculture, is taxed now. Everything is taxed. Even the farmer works now with taxed tools. These considerations, with the increased value of labor among us, must give new advantages to the productive interests of Canada as compared with ours, and tend still further to the unequal operation of the treaty. Even admitting its original equality, you cannot deny that the vicissitudes of war, in these latter days, have worked changes requiring new arrangements and adaptations.

Mr. President, such is the result of a candid inquiry into the operation of this treaty, as it concerns the fisheries, the navigation of the St. Lawrence, the commerce of the two countries, and the revenue of the United States. I have kept back nothing favorable to the treaty that could be adequately stated in the brief space I have allowed myself, nor have I exaggerated its unequal operation.

And now the question is, Shall this condition of things be readjusted? The treaty itself, as if anticipating this exigency, furnishes the opportunity, by expressly providing for its termination at the expiration of ten years, on notice of one year from either party. Great Britain is free to give this notice; so are the United States. Considering the present state of the country, it would seem improvident not to give the notice. We must husband our resources; nor can a foreign Government justly expect us to continue a treaty which is a drain upon our revenue. We are turning in all directions for subjects of taxation. Our own people are contributing largely in every way. Commerce, manufactures in every form, come to the assistance of the country. I know no reason why the large amounts enfranchised by this treaty should enjoy the immunity thus far conceded. An inequality which in ordinary times might escape observation becomes too apparent in the blaze of present responsibilities.

Something has been said about accompanying the proposed notice with instructions to negotiate a new treaty. This is unnecessary. A new treaty may not be advisable. It is possible that the whole matter may be settled by Congress under general laws. At all events, there is a full year from the 16th of March next in which to provide a substitute, either by diplomacy or by legislation. And this remark is applicable to the fisheries, as well as to every other interest touched by the treaty. I cannot doubt that the two contracting parties will approach the whole business in the determination to settle it on the permanent foundations of justice and equity; but the first step in this direction is the notice to terminate the existing treaty.

In the debate which ensued, Mr. Sherman, of Ohio, Mr. Collamer, of Vermont, Mr. Morrill, of Maine, Mr. Chandler, of Michigan, Mr. Foot, of Vermont, Mr. Doolittle, of Wisconsin, Mr. Farwell, of Maine, Mr. Conness, of California, Mr. Wilson, of Massachusetts, Mr. Cowan, of Pennsylvania, Mr. Riddle, of Delaware, and Mr. Richardson, of Illinois, spoke in favor of the notice; Mr. Ramsey, of Minnesota, Mr. Howe, of Wisconsin, Mr. Hale, of New Hampshire, and Mr. Hendricks, of Indiana, spoke against it.

January 12th, Mr. Sumner spoke again.

Mr. President,—The proposition to terminate the Reciprocity Treaty has been mystified in various ways. There has been mystification because it came from the Committee on Foreign Relations, as if that committee, to which are referred all treaties and questions with foreign powers, was not the proper committee to consider it, according to the usages and traditions of the Senate. Pray, what other committee could so justly deal with it?

There has also been illusiveness in argument, by accumulation of statistics and figures without end. We have been treated to calculations, showing the increase of commerce since the treaty, and also the relative increase of exports and imports. To these calculations I am no stranger; but, after careful study, I am satisfied that it is impossible to find in them any terra firma on which to stand. They are little better than quicksand, or a deceptive mirage.

In the remarks which I submitted to the Senate yesterday I declined to dwell on these calculations, for I saw, that, while involving large amounts, they were uncertain, inconclusive, and inapplicable. With one theory of political economy they seemed to point one way, and with another to point another way. If, for instance, you accept the early theory that commerce is disadvantageous where imports exceed exports, they tell against the treaty; but if you accept the opposite theory of later writers, they tell the other way. All this assumes that they are applicable. But nobody is able to show that the general increase of commerce since the treaty has been caused by the treaty. Other agencies have had their influence; and it is difficult to say what is due to them, and what to the treaty.

In this uncertainty, I prefer to rest the proposition on the simple ground that the national revenue is impaired by this treaty. Authentic figures place this beyond controversy.

I forbear now all details, and content myself with stating the indubitable conclusion. The national revenue is impaired in two ways: first, at the custom-house on our frontier, which, under the operation of the treaty, yields little or nothing, when it might yield much; and, secondly, it is impaired through the check and embarrassment the treaty causes in our internal taxation. There is failure of duties and of excise. It is not enough to say that there is a countervailing advantage in the increase of our commerce. The conclusion is none the less exact, that the national revenue is impaired. And the question is distinctly presented, whether, at this critical moment, in a period of war, when the whole country in its wealth and labor is contributing to the support of Government, any good reason can be assigned why the commerce of Canada should be exempt from contribution. Commerce elsewhere, manufactures, business, income, tea, coffee, books, all pay tribute. The tax-gatherer is everywhere except on the Canadian frontier. At home there is not an interest, hardly a sentiment, free from taxation. Surely there is nothing in the recent conduct of Canadians to make us treat them better than we treat ourselves.

There is another consideration which is decisive, even if others fail. In view of existing Public Opinion, and considering the criticisms of the treaty, it is important that our relations with Canada should be carefully revised in the light of experience. The treaty, in authorizing its termination at the end of ten years, has anticipated this very exigency. But such revision cannot be made advantageously without the proposed notice. In the case of a lease, with a right to terminate it at the end of ten years on a year’s notice, the landlord, if the character of the lease had been called in question, would not hesitate to give the notice, if for no other reason, that he might revise the terms anew on a footing of equality. For like reason we must give the notice to Great Britain. We must untie ourselves now, even if we would tie ourselves again for the future. The notice will leave us “master of the situation” to this extent at least, that we shall be free to act according to the requirements of the public good. Without this notice there will be no foothold for diplomacy or legislation; but the notice will be a foothold from which we may accomplish whatever is proper and just. The treaty may be reconsidered and then adopted anew, or it may be entirely changed, and we shall have a year for this purpose,—so that, when the Old expires, the New may begin.

The joint resolution directing the notice was adopted in the Senate,—Yeas 33, Nays 8,—and was at once adopted by the House of Representatives, and approved by the President January 18, 1865. It was then communicated by Mr. Seward to Mr. Adams, our minister at London, who, under date of March 17th, addressed a note to Earl Russell, “giving formal notice of the termination of the Reciprocity Treaty, and inclosing at the same time a certified copy of the resolution expressing the sense of both Houses of Congress on that subject.” Mr. Adams adds, in his letter to Mr. Seward: “This note was delivered by the messenger of this Legation at the Foreign Office at 2 P. M., notice of which was entered by him on the envelope, and also reported to me on his return. Not long afterwards I received from his Lordship his own acknowledgment of the reception of it.”[43]

THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION AND EQUAL RIGHTS.

Letter to a Public Meeting in Philadelphia, December 26, 1864.

Senate Chamber, December 26, 1864.

DEAR SIR,—It will not be in my power to be present at the celebration of the Emancipation Proclamation by the Banneker Institute. But, wherever I may be, I shall not forget this great and good deed.

That proclamation has done more than any military success to save the country. It has already saved the national character. The future historian will confess that it saved everything.

It remains for us to uphold it faithfully, so that it may not be impaired a single jot or tittle.

In the spirit of the Proclamation, and taught by its example, we must press forward in the work of justice to the colored race, until abuse and outrage have ceased, and all are equal before the law.

The astronomer, Banneker, whose honored name you bear, would be shut out of the street cars in some of our cities; but such petty meanness cannot last long.

Accept my best wishes, and believe me, dear Sir, faithfully yours,

Charles Sumner.

The Committee, &c.

FREEDOM OF WIVES AND CHILDREN OF COLORED SOLDIERS.

Speech in the Senate, on a Joint Resolution for this Purpose, January 5, 1865.

As early as January 8, 1864, Mr. Wilson, of Massachusetts, embodied in a bill to promote enlistments a clause declaring, that, when any man or boy of African descent, owing service or labor in any State, under its laws, shall be mustered into the military or naval service of the United States, he and his mother, wife, and children shall be forever free. This bill was considered from time to time. March 18th, Mr. Sherman, of Ohio, moved to postpone the bill, “with a view that we may act upon the main proposition, the Amendment to the Constitution to abolish Slavery in the United States.” Mr. Sumner replied: “The Senator speaks about acting on ‘the main proposition.’ The main proposition, Sir, is to strike Slavery wherever you can hit it.” That session closed without final action on the question.

December 13, 1864, Mr. Wilson brought it forward again, in a joint resolution to encourage enlistments and promote the efficiency of the military and naval forces, by making free the wives and children of persons who had been or might be mustered into the service of the United States.

January 5, 1865, in the debate which ensued, Mr. Sumner said:—

MR. PRESIDENT,—Only a few days ago there was a call for three hundred thousand more troops. The country needs them, and it is the duty of Congress to supply them. To this end there must be no difficulty, impediment, or embarrassment in the way. All these must be removed. This is not all. There must be encouragement of every kind; and such is the character of the present proposition.

There can be no delay. The country cannot wait the slow action of Constitutional Amendment, as proposed by the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. Doolittle]. Congress must act to the extent of its power, and any neglect of power on this question would be injurious to the public interests.

All will confess the humanity of the proposition to enfranchise the families of colored persons who have borne arms for their country. All will confess the hardship of continuing them in Slavery.

But the question is asked by many, and even by the Senator from Wisconsin, What power has Congress to set the families free?

Mr. Doolittle. I did not ask that question.

Mr. Sumner. The question has been put again and again, and the purport of the speech of the Senator was in that sense. He argued that we were about to have a Constitutional Amendment which would supersede everything; that therefore this proposition was unnecessary, if not injurious. I so understood the argument of the Senator, and that it pointed directly to the question of power,—because I know the patriotism of the Senator too well to suppose, that, if in his opinion the power of Congress was beyond doubt, he would hesitate. I do not do the Senator injustice. I say, then, the question is asked, What power has Congress to set the families free? This is the single point on which I shall express an opinion.

My answer is, that Congress has precisely the same power to enfranchise the families that it has to enfranchise the colored soldier. The two powers are coincident, and from the same source.

It is assumed that Congress may enfranchise the colored soldier. This has been done by solemn statute, without reference to the conduct of his pretended owner. If we are asked the reason for such enfranchisement, it must be found, first, in its practical necessity, that we may secure the best service of the slaves, and, secondly, in its intrinsic justice and humanity. In brief, Government cannot be so improvident and so foolish as to seek the service of the slave at the hazard of life, without securing to him the boon of freedom. Nor, if Government were so bereft of common sense as to forego this temptation to enlistment and efficient service, can it be guilty of the unutterable meanness of using the slave in the national defence and then returning him to bondage. Therefore the slave who fights is enfranchised.

But every argument, every consideration, which pleads for the enfranchisement of the slave, pleads also for the enfranchisement of the family. There is the same practical necessity for doing it, and the same unspeakable shabbiness in not doing it.

There is no principle of law better established than this, that an acknowledged right carries with it all incidents essential to its exercise. I do not employ technical language; but I give the idea, founded in reason and the nature of things. It would be vain to confer a right or a power, if the means for its enjoyment were denied. From this simple statement the conclusion is irresistible.

In conferring upon Congress the power to create an army, the Constitution conferred therewith all the powers essential to the exercise of the principal power. If Congress can authorize the enlistment of slaves, as it indubitably can, it may at the same time authorize their enfranchisement, and by the same reason it may authorize the enfranchisement of their families,—and all this from the necessity of the case, and to prevent an intolerable baseness.

A Scottish patriot, nearly two centuries ago, exclaimed in memorable words, which I am always glad to quote, that he would give his life to serve his country, but would not do a base thing to save it.[44] If there be any value in this declaration, it may be invoked, when it is deliberately argued that the National Government can create an army, and in this service can enfranchise the slave it enlists, but is impotent to enfranchise his family. I know not how we can use his right arm and ask him to shed his blood in our defence, and then hand over his wife and child to bondage. The thought is too vile. The human heart rejects the insufferable wrong.

But it is said the slave has no family. Such is the argument of Slavery. For all that he has, as well as all that he is, even wife and child, belong to another. Surely this unrighteous pretension will not be made the apology for a denial of rights. If the family of the slave be not designated by law, or by the forms of legal marriage, then it must be ascertained by the next best evidence possible,—that is, by cohabitation and mutual recognition as man and wife. And any uncertainty in this evidence can only be regarded as a natural incident of Slavery. As men cannot take advantage of their own wrong, so slave-masters cannot take advantage of Slavery. Any other rule would practically unite with Slavery in denying to the slave wife and child.

There is a well-known French maxim, that “it is only the first step which costs”; and here permit me to say, it is only the first stage of the argument which merits attention. Concede that the soldier may be enfranchised, and then by the same constitutional power his family may be admitted to an equal liberty. Any other conclusion would be illogical as inhuman, discreditable alike to head and heart. There is no argument, whether of reason or humanity, for the enfranchisement of the soldier, which does not plead equally for that of his family. Nay, more,—I know not how we can expect a blessing on our arms while we fail to perform this duty.

I cannot close without declaring again my opinion, that Congress at this moment is complete master of the whole subject of Slavery everywhere in the United States, even without any Constitutional Amendment. It can sweep all out of existence, precisely as it can remove any other obstruction to the national defence, and all this by virtue of a power as indisputable as the power to raise armies or to suspend the Habeas Corpus. Future generations will read with amazement, that a great people, when national life was assailed, hesitated to exercise a power so simple and beneficent; and this amazement will know no bounds, as they learn that Congress higgled for months on the question whether the wives and children of our colored soldiers should be admitted to freedom.

January 9th, after further debate, the joint resolution passed the Senate,—Yeas 27, Nays 10. February 22d, it passed the House of Representatives,—Yeas 74, Nays 63; and March 3d, it was approved by the President.

MASSACRE OF THE CHEYENNE INDIANS.

Remarks in the Senate, on a Joint Resolution relating thereto, January 13, 1865.

January 13th, the Senate considered a joint resolution reported by Mr. Harlan, from the Committee on Indian Affairs, in relation to the massacre of the Cheyenne Indians. It proposed to direct the Secretary of War to cause the suspension of all pay and allowances to each of the members of the Third Colorado Regiment, officers, privates, and employees, and all others engaged in the recent attack made on the Cheyenne Indians in their village near Fort Lyon, in the Territory of Colorado, under the command of Colonel Chivington, until the conduct of the colonel and the regiment, and all others engaged in that attack, should receive the approval of the Secretary of War; and he was to cause all ponies, blankets, money, jewels, furs, and other property captured from the Indians, to be seized and held for the use of the United States, or for restitution to the Indians, if it should hereafter appear that the attack was unjustifiable.

In the debate which ensued, Mr. Sumner said:—

MR. PRESIDENT,—Exceptional crimes require exceptional remedies. Here is an exceptional crime,—one of the most atrocious in the history of any country. There must be a remedy commensurate with the crime. And, Sir, the remedy, in order to be anything but a name, should be swift. It cannot wait the slow ceremony of ordinary proceedings. It must have promptitude such as can be imparted by the proposition now under consideration. I thank the Senator from Iowa for bringing it forward. Let us vote upon it, put it on its passage, speed it on its way; for only by doing so can we wash our hands of this blood.

The resolution was adopted without a division.

THE LATE HON. EDWARD EVERETT.

Telegraphic Despatch to Joint Committee of the Legislature of Massachusetts, January 16, 1865.

Boston, January 16, 1865.

To Hon. Charles Sumner.

A Joint Committee of the Legislature invoke you to deliver a Eulogy upon Hon. Edward Everett before the State authorities at such time as meets your convenience during the session of the Legislature. Please answer at once by telegraph.

Moses Kimball.

Mr. Sumner answered by telegraph as follows.

Sharing the general grief in the loss of a rare and pure patriot, I regret that public duties here seem to prevent me from uniting with the Legislature in the honors they propose to his memory. I am grateful to the Joint Committee for the opportunity they offer me of commemorating a great example of genius, learning, and eloquence, consecrated to patriotic service; but the probable session of the Senate and the exigencies of public business (which are always my first duty) make me fear that I cannot respond to their summons. I mention with hesitation, but to explain the rule which is with me obligatory, that, during my long term in the Senate, I have never left my seat for a single day, except while an invalid. Be good enough to accept my thanks and sympathies.

Charles Sumner.

TERMINATION OF TREATIES BY NOTICE.

Remarks in the Senate, on a Joint Resolution to Terminate the Treaty of 1817 regulating the Naval Force on the Lakes, January 18, 1865.

January 18th, the Senate considered a joint resolution passed by the House of Representatives, for the termination of the treaty between the United States and Great Britain regulating the naval force on the Lakes.

The resolution, as it was passed by the House of Representatives, recited, that the Treaty of 1817, as to the naval force upon the Lakes, was designed as a temporary arrangement only, and, although equal and just at the time it was made, has become greatly unequal through the construction by Great Britain of sundry ship-canals,—that the vast interests of commerce upon the Northwestern Lakes, and the security of cities and towns situated on their American borders, manifestly require the establishment of one or more navy-yards wherein ships may be fitted and prepared for naval warfare,—and that the United States Government, unlike that of Great Britain, is destitute of ship-canals for the transmission of gunboats from the Atlantic Ocean to the Western Lakes,—and therefore proposed to direct the President of the United States to give notice to the Government of Great Britain that it is the wish and intention of the Government of the United States to terminate the arrangement of 1817, in respect to the naval force upon the Lakes, at the end of six months from and after giving the notice.

Mr. Sumner, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, reported the following substitute.

“Joint Resolution to terminate the Treaty of 1817, regulating the Naval Force on the Lakes.

“Whereas the United States, of the one part, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, of the other part, by a treaty bearing date April, 1817, have regulated the naval force upon the Lakes, and it was further provided, that, ‘if either party should hereafter be desirous of annulling this stipulation, and should give notice to that effect to the other party, it shall cease to be binding after the expiration of six months from the date of such notice’; and whereas the peace of our frontier is now endangered by hostile expeditions against the commerce of the Lakes, and by other acts of lawless persons, which the naval force of the two countries allowed by the existing treaty may be insufficient to prevent; and whereas, further, the President of the United States has proceeded to give the notice required for the termination of the treaty by a communication which took effect on the 23d November, 1864: Therefore,

“Be it resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the notice given by the President of the United States to the Government of Great Britain and Ireland to terminate the Treaty of 1817, regulating the naval force upon the Lakes, is hereby adopted and ratified, as if the same had been authorized by Congress.”

The substitute was adopted, and the question was on the passage of the resolution as amended.

As appears from the amended resolution, the President had already given the notice for the termination of the treaty.

Mr. Davis, of Kentucky, opposed the resolution, on the ground that the notice to terminate a treaty can be given only by Congress,—that the President had no more power to give the notice than the Judiciary,—and that his interference with the legislative power ought to be condemned, instead of approved by adopting it.

Mr. Sumner replied, that the difference between the Senator and the Committee was of form; and he proceeded to read a communication, bearing date November 23, 1864, from Mr. Adams to Earl Russell, setting forth the grievances on our northern frontier, and giving formal notice, that, “in conformity with the treaty reservation of the right, at the expiration of six months from the date of this note the United States will deem themselves at liberty to increase the naval armament upon the Lakes, if in their judgment the condition of affairs in that quarter shall then require it.” On this note was minuted: “Delivered at the Foreign Office at fifteen minutes past six o’clock, P. M.” In considering the validity of the notice by the President, he referred to authorities, showing that a treaty, like a law, could be repealed only by the legislative power,[45] and argued that notice to terminate it must be given by the same power. Mr. Sumner further said:—