A. W. Elson & Co., Boston

ANDREW JOHNSON

Charles Sumner; his complete works, volume 14 (of 20)

Copyright, 1874 and 1875,
BY
FRANCIS V. BALCH, Executor.

Copyright, 1900,
BY
LEE AND SHEPARD.

Statesman Edition.

Limited to One Thousand Copies.

Of which this is

Norwood Press:
Norwood, Mass., U.S.A.

CONTENTS OF VOLUME XIV.

MAJORITY OR PLURALITY IN THE ELECTION OF SENATORS.

Speech in the Senate, on the Contested Election of Hon. John P. Stockton, of New Jersey, March 23, 1866.

The seat of Hon. John P. Stockton, as Senator from New Jersey, was contested at this session of the Senate, on the ground of irregularity in the election. The Judiciary Committee, by their Chairman, Mr. Trumbull, reported that he “was duly elected, and is entitled to his seat,” and in their report stated the case:—

“The only question involved in the decision of Mr. Stockton’s right to a seat is, whether an election by a plurality of votes of the members of the Legislature of New Jersey, in joint meeting assembled, in pursuance of a rule adopted by the joint meeting itself, is valid. The protestants insist that it is not; and they deny Mr. Stockton’s right to a seat, because, as they say, he was not appointed by a majority of the votes of the joint meeting of the Legislature.”

The debate on this question showed earnestness and feeling. Mr. Fessenden, of Maine, used strong language: “I was exceedingly surprised—more so, I will say, than I ever was before, at a judicial decision, in my life—at the opinion to which the Committee on the Judiciary arrived in relation to this matter.” Mr. Trumbull defended the report. Mr. Sumner followed.

MR. PRESIDENT,—When the Senator from Illinois rose to speak, I had made up my mind to say nothing in this debate; but topics have been introduced by him which I am unwilling should pass without notice.

The Senator did not disguise that the case is without a precedent in the history of the Senate. Never before has a Senator appeared in this Chamber with the credentials of a minority. And I venture to say further, that the rule of a majority has the constant consecration of history in the proceedings of parliamentary or electoral bodies. It is the rule of the House of Commons in the choice of Speaker; and this is the most important precedent for us, for our Parliamentary Law is derived from England. But it antedates the English Parliament. The oldest electoral body in the world is the Conclave of Cardinals; but who has heard that a Pope was ever elected by a minority? I ask your attention to this example, that you may see how the rule of the minority is constantly rejected, notwithstanding temptation, inducement, and pressure to adopt it. There have been many contested elections, during which the Cardinals, separated from the world, each in a small apartment or cell of the Vatican or the Palace of the Quirinal, have been imprisoned like a jury, sometimes for months, waiting for the requisite majority. They did not undertake to change the rule, and set up the will of a minority. There was Lambertini, who shone as Pope Benedict the Fourteenth, conspicuous as statesman and patron of letters, who was not chosen until after six months’ ineffectual efforts. Such instances stand like so many pillars, and I refer to them now as proper to guide your conduct.

The question before us is of law, and nothing else. It is not a question of politics or of sentiment, except so far as these enter into the determination of law. It is a question for reason alone.

It lies in a nutshell. A brief text of the National Constitution, and another brief text of a local statute, are all that need be considered.

The National Constitution provides as follows:—

“The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof.”

“The times, places, and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by law make or alter such regulations, except as to the places of choosing Senators.”

In carrying out this provision, the Legislature of New Jersey, by a statute passed April 10, 1846, and copied from a statute passed in 1790, enacted as follows:—

“Senators of the United States on the part of this State shall be appointed by the Senate and General Assembly of this State in joint meeting assembled.”

In pursuance of these two provisions of National Constitution and of local statute, the Legislature of New Jersey has undertaken to elect a Senator. From the statement of the case, it appears, that, on a certain day, the two Houses assembled “in joint meeting”; that they proceeded to act on a resolution declaring that “any candidate receiving a plurality of votes of the members present shall be declared duly elected”; that this resolution was adopted by forty-one votes out of eighty-one,—eleven Senators, being a majority of the Senate, and thirty members of the House, being less than a majority of that body, voting for it; that, in pursuance of this resolution, Mr. Stockton was declared Senator, although he did not receive a majority of the votes of either House or of the joint meeting. In point of fact, he received forty votes, of which ten were from Senators and thirty from members of the Assembly, while against him were forty-one votes; and the question you are to decide is on the legality of this election.

The National Constitution is the original and highest source of light on the question. Here we find, that, in the absence of any regulations from Congress, the manner of choosing a Senator is referred to the State Legislature. The Senator is to be chosen by the Legislature, which is to prescribe, among other things, the manner of holding the election. Whatever the State can do must be derived from this source, nor more nor less. The choice is by the Legislature, according to a manner prescribed by the Legislature.

The National Constitution does not undertake to define a State Legislature or its forms of proceeding. This is left to the State itself. Notoriously, these Legislatures were modelled on the Colonial Legislatures preceding them, which had been modelled on the Parliament of the mother country. As a general rule, there were two Chambers, upper and lower; but this was not universal. In Georgia and Pennsylvania there was for a while only a single Chamber, constituting the Legislature. I mention this to show how completely the State itself was left to determine the conditions of its Legislature. But the State speaks through the State Constitution, which fixes these conditions. Where the Constitution is silent, can the Legislature itself venture to speak?

Repairing to the Constitution of New Jersey, we find it providing that “the legislative power shall be vested in a Senate and General Assembly”; that these bodies shall meet and organize separately”; that “all bills and joint resolutions shall be read three times in each House”; and “no bill or joint resolution shall pass, unless there be a majority of all the members of each body personally present and agreeing thereto.” Such is the definition of a Legislature, and such are the forms of legislative proceedings prescribed by the Constitution of New Jersey.

The statute of New Jersey, to which I have referred as framed in 1790, was entitled “An Act to prescribe the manner of appointing Senators of the United States and Electors of the President and Vice-President of the United States on the part of this State.” This was in pursuance of the National Constitution. It was the execution, on the part of the State, of the power with which it was invested to prescribe the manner of electing Senators.

I have no purpose of raising any question with regard to the validity of this statute prescribing the election of Senators in joint meeting. Constant usage is in its favor; and yet I have no hesitation in saying that it has always seemed to me inconsistent with a just construction of the National Constitution. Senators are to be “chosen by the Legislature”; but the Legislature is composed of two separate bodies, defined by the State Constitution. Senators, therefore, should be chosen by the two bodies separately. So it has always seemed to me, and the practice of my own State is accordingly. In this opinion I am sustained by so eminent an authority as Chancellor Kent, who, after setting forth the usage, proceeds to express his dissent from it as a just construction of the National Constitution. His language is explicit:—

“I should think, if the question was a new one, that, when the Constitution directed that the Senators should be chosen by the Legislature, it meant, not the members of the Legislature per capita, but the Legislature in the true technical sense, being the two Houses acting in their separate and organized capacities, with the ordinary constitutional right of negative on each other’s proceedings.”[1]

It is difficult to resist this conclusion, especially when it is considered that in any other way the smaller body is actually swamped by the larger. In a joint meeting the Senate loses its relative power. I adduce this, not for criticism, but only for illustration. Even admitting that the received usage of choosing Senators in joint meeting is consistent with the National Constitution, it is clear that it should not be extended; and this is the precise question before us. Contrary to all usage or precedent, and without any direct sanction in the Constitution or statutes of New Jersey, the Legislature has undertaken in joint meeting, not only to choose a Senator, but also to prescribe the manner of choosing him. Finding that it could not choose according to existing usage, it adopted the resolution declaring that the election should be determined by a minority of votes instead of a majority.

In this resolution two questions arise: first, can the Legislature itself, by legislative act, substitute a minority for a majority in the election of Senators, and thus set aside a great and traditional principle? and, secondly, can it do this in a “joint meeting,” without any previous legislative act? It is enough for the present occasion, if I show, that, whatever may be the powers of the Legislature by legislative act, it can have no such extraordinary power in the questionable assembly known as “joint meeting.” But we shall better understand the second question, after considering the first.

To what extent can a Legislature substitute a minority for a majority in any of its proceedings? In most cases the question is controlled by the express language of the State Constitution; but I present the question now independently of any State Constitution.

In considering the power of the Legislature, it is important to put aside any influence that may be attributed to the unquestioned usage of choosing Representatives and other officers by plurality of votes. Because the people choose by plurality, it does not follow that a Legislature may. From time immemorial, the rule in the two cases has been different, unless we except the New England States, where, until recently, even popular elections were by a majority. But the origin of the practice in New England testifies to the rule.

It is proper for us to interrogate the country from which our institutions are derived, for the origin of the rule. Indeed, where a word is used in the Constitution having a previous signification or character in the institutions of England, we cannot err, if we consider its import there. I think we do this habitually. Mr. Wirt, in his masterly argument on the impeachment of Judge Peck, develops this idea.

“The Constitution secures the trial by jury. Where do you get the meaning of a trial by jury? Certainly not from the Civil or Canon Law, or the Law of Nations. It is peculiar to the Common Law; and to the Common Law, therefore, the Constitution itself refers you for a description and explanation of this high privilege, the trial by jury, and the mode of proceeding in those trials.… The very name by which it is called into being authorizes it to look at once to the English archetypes for its government.”[2]

Following this statement, so clearly expressed, the words “Legislature” and “holding elections,” in the National Constitution, which belonged to the political system of England, may be explained by that system,—so, at least, that in case of doubt we shall find light in this quarter.

Now, from the beginning, it appears that in England there have been two different rules with regard to elections by the legislature and elections by the people. Elections by the legislature, like legislative acts, have been by majority; elections by the people for Parliament have been by plurality. This distinction is found throughout English history.

The House of Commons chooses its Speaker by majority. It may be said, also, that it chooses the Ministers of the Crown in the same way, because the fate of a cabinet depends upon a majority. In short, whatever it does, unless it be the nomination of committees, is by majority. It is only through majority that it can act. The House of Commons itself is found in the majority of its members,—never in a minority.

On the other hand, members of Parliament are chosen by plurality. No reason is assigned for the difference; but it may be found, perhaps, in two considerations: first, the superior convenience, amounting almost to necessity, of choosing members of Parliament in this way; and, secondly, the fact that popular bodies were not embraced by the Law of Corporations, which establishes the rule of the majority.

Here I adduce the authority of Mr. Cushing, in his Parliamentary Law, in the very passage cited by the Senator from Illinois:—

“At the time of the first settlement and colonization of the United States, the elections of members of Parliament in England were conducted upon the principle of plurality, which also prevailed in all other elections in which the electors were at liberty to select their candidates from an indefinite number of qualified persons. Such has been, and still continues to be, the Common Law of England; and such is the present practice in that country in all elections.”[3]

It will be perceived that this statement is with reference to popular elections, and not elections by corporate or legislative bodies. So far as it goes, it is explicit. But pardon me, if I say that the Senator from Illinois has misunderstood it. Had he examined it carefully, he would have seen that it had no bearing on the present case. Nobody questions the plurality rule in the election of members of Congress, although few, perhaps, have considered how it came into existence. Mr. Cushing, whom the Senator cites, explains it, and in a way to furnish no authority for a minority instead of a majority in a legislative body. The rule prevailed in England. The colonies of Virginia and New York adopted it. From these, as they became States, it gradually extended throughout the country. A different rule was carried to New England by the Puritan Fathers. Even popular elections were by the rule of the majority, as is explained by the same learned authority.

“The charter of the Colony of the Massachusetts Bay being that of a trading company, and not municipal in its character, the officers of the Colony were originally chosen at general meetings of the whole body of freemen, precisely as at the present day the directors of a business corporation, a bank, for example, are chosen by the stockholders at a general meeting. In the choice of Assistants, who were to be eighteen in number, at these meetings of the Company, or, as they were called, Courts of Election, the practice seems to have been for the names of the candidates to be regularly moved and seconded, and put to the question, one by one, in the same manner with all other motions. This was then, as it is now, the mode of proceeding in England, in the election of the Speaker of the House of Commons, and in the appointment of committees of the House, when they are not chosen by ballot. Probably, also, it was the usual mode of proceeding in electing the officers of a private corporation or company. In voting upon the names thus proposed, it was ordered—with a view, doubtless, to secure the independence and impartiality of the electors—that the freemen, instead of giving an affirmative or negative voice in the usual open and visible manner, should give their suffrages by ballot, and for that purpose should ‘use Indian corn and beans: the Indian corn to manifest election, the beans contrary.’ The names of the candidates being thus moved and voted upon, each by itself, it followed, of course, that no person could be elected but by an absolute majority.”[4]

The rule, thus curiously explained, continued in Massachusetts down to a recent day; at last it yielded to the exigency of public convenience, so that at this moment, I believe, popular elections throughout the United States are by the plurality rule. But I repeat, that this is no authority for overturning the rule of the majority in a legislative body, having in its favor so many reasons of law and tradition.

I have only alluded to the Law of Corporations; but this law is of weight in determining the present case. According to this law, the rule of the majority must prevail. Indeed, an eminent jurist says that this rule is according to the Law of Nature, as it is unquestionably according to the Roman Law, and the modern law of civilized states.[5] But what is a legislative body but a political corporation? Therefore, when asked if a Legislature, even by legislative act, may set aside the rule of the majority in the election of Senators, I must candidly express a doubt. The Constitution confides this power to the “Legislature”; but the “Legislature” consists of a majority. Ubi major pars est, ibi totum: “Where the greater part is, there is the whole.” Such is an approved maxim of the law; and this maxim has in its support, first, the Law of Nature, secondly, the Law of Corporations, thirdly, the Parliamentary Law, and, fourthly, the principles of republican government. Who ever thought of saying, Where the minority is, there is the whole?

But we are not asked now to decide the question, whether the Legislature, by legislative act, may substitute the rule of a minority for the majority. That question is not necessarily before us. In the present case there has been no legislative act; and the question is, whether the rule of the minority may be substituted for the majority by the abnormal body known as joint meeting. On this point the conclusion is clear. Even assuming that this substitution may be made by legislative act, it does not follow that it may be made in joint meeting.

Surely, such a change is of immense gravity, and should be made only under all possible solemnities and safeguards. If ever there was occasion for the delays and precautions provided by legislative proceedings, with three different readings in each separate House, it must be when such a change is in question. Such surely is the suggestion of reason. But the Constitution itself, which delegates to the “Legislature” of each State the power to prescribe the manner of electing Senators, uses language not open to evasion. This power is to be exercised by the “Legislature,” which may prescribe the manner. It is not to be exercised by any other body than the Legislature; and the manner is to be prescribed by the Legislature. But, assuming that it may be exercised in joint meeting, it is clear that this must be in pursuance of some legislative act, prescribing in advance the manner.

Supposing the case doubtful, then I submit that all presumptions and interpretations must tend to support the rule of a majority. In other words, so important a rule, having its foundation in the Law of Nature, the Law of Corporations, Parliamentary Law, and the principles of republican institutions, cannot be set aside without the plainest and most positive intendment. It cannot be done by inference or construction. If ever there was occasion where every doubt was to be counted against the assumption of power, it is the present. I know very little of cards, but I remember a rule of Hoyle, “When you are in doubt, take the trick.” Just the reverse must be done in a case like the present, involving so important a principle: when you are in doubt, do not take the trick. This is a republican government, and surely you will not abandon the first principle of a republican government without good reason. According to received maxims of law, you must always incline in favor of Liberty. In the same spirit you must always incline in favor of every principle of republican government, and especially of that vital principle which establishes the rule of the majority. Thus inclining, the way at present is easy; and here I quote another authority, very different from Hoyle. Lord Bacon, in his Maxims of the Law, after mentioning a similar presumption, says:—

“It is a rule drawn out of the depths of reason.… It makes an end of many questions and doubts about construction of words: for, if the labor were only to pick out the intention of the parties, every judge would have a several sense; whereas this rule doth give them a sway to take the law more certainly one way.”[6]

And now, Sir, I have only to add, in conclusion, let us incline in favor of the rule of the majority. So inclining, you will at once show reverence for the republican principle and will stand on the ancient ways.

The question was then taken on an amendment, moved by Mr. Clark, of New Hampshire, to insert the word “not” before the word “duly” in the resolution of the Committee, and also before the word “entitled,” so that it should read that he “was not duly elected, and is not entitled to his seat.” This amendment was lost,—Yeas 19, Nays 21. The question then recurred on the resolution of the Committee. Upon the conclusion of the calling of the roll, the vote stood, Yeas 21, Nays 20, when Mr. Morrill, of Maine, said, “Call my name.” This was done, and he said, “I vote nay.” Mr. Stockton, who had not voted, rose, and, after stating that his colleague, Mr. Wright, was at home, said, “When he was last in this Chamber, he told me, as he left the Hall, that he would not go home, if it were not for the fact that he had paired off with the Senator from Maine. Mr. President, I ask that my name be called.” His name was then called, and he voted in the affirmative, so that the result was, Yeas 22, Nays 21. Meanwhile Mr. Morrill stated the circumstances with regard to his original pair with Mr. Wright and his withdrawal from it. The result was then declared,—Yeas 22, Nays 21,—making a majority in the affirmative, and the resolution was treated as adopted.

The sequel of these proceedings, ending in the passage of a resolution, moved by Mr. Sumner, “that the vote of Mr. Stockton be not received,” and the adoption of a resolution declaring him “not entitled to a seat as Senator,” will appear under the next article.

A SENATOR CANNOT VOTE FOR HIMSELF.

Speech in the Senate, on the Vote of Hon. John P. Stockton affirming his Seat in the Senate, March 26, 1866.

March 26th, immediately after the reading of the Senate journal, Mr. Sumner rose to what he called a question of privilege, and moved “that the journal of Friday, March 23, 1866, be amended by striking out the vote of Mr. Stockton on the question of his right to a seat in the Senate.” The circumstances of this vote appear at the close of the last article. On his motion Mr. Sumner said:—

There are two ways, I believe, if there are not three, but there are certainly two ways of meeting the question presented by the vote of Mr. Stockton. I use his name directly, because it will be plainer and I shall be more easily understood. I say there are two ways in which the case may be met. One is, by motion to disallow the vote; the other, by motion, such as I have made, to amend the journal. Perhaps a third way, though not so satisfactory to my mind, would be by motion to reconsider; but I am not in a condition to make this motion, as I did not vote with the apparent majority. I call your attention, however, at the outset, to two ways,—one by disallowing the vote, and the other by amending the journal. But behind both, or all three, arises the simple question, Had Mr. Stockton a right to vote? To this it is replied, that his name was on the roll of the Senate, and accordingly was called by our Secretary; to which I answer,—and to my mind the answer is complete,—The rule of the Senate must be construed always in subordination to the principles of Natural Law and Parliamentary Law, and therefore you are brought again to the question with which I began, Had Mr. Stockton a right to vote?

Had he a right to vote, first, according to the principles of Natural Law, or, in other words, the principles of Universal Law? I take it there is no lawyer, there is no man even of the most moderate reading, who is not familiar with the principle of jurisprudence, recognized in all countries and in all ages, that no man can be a judge in his own case. That principle has been reduced to form among the maxims of our Common Law,—Nemo debet esse judex in propria sua causa. As such it has been handed down from the earliest days of the mother country. It was brought here by our fathers, and has been cherished sacredly by us as a cardinal rule in every court of justice. No judge, no tribunal, high or low, can undertake to set aside this rule. I have in my hand the most recent work on the Maxims of Law, where, after quoting this rule, the learned writer says:—

“It is a fundamental rule in the administration of justice, that a person cannot be judge in a cause wherein he is interested.”[7]

In another place, the same learned writer says:—

“It is, then, a rule always observed in practice, and of the application of which instances not unfrequently occur that, where a judge is interested in the result of a cause, he cannot, either personally or by deputy, sit in judgment upon it.”[8]

This rule had its earliest and most authoritative judicial statement in an opinion by an eminent judge of England, who has always been quoted for integrity in times when integrity was rare: I mean Chief Justice Hobart, of the Court of Common Pleas. In his own Reports, cited as Hobart’s Reports, I call attention to the case of Day v. Savadge, where this learned magistrate said:—

“It was against right and justice, and against natural equity, to allow them [the Mayor and Aldermen of London] their certificate, wherein they are to try and judge their own cause.”

And then he says, in memorable language, which has made his name famous:—

“Even an Act of Parliament, made against natural equity, as, to make a man judge in his own case, is void in itself; for jura naturæ sunt immutabilia, and they are leges legum.”[9]

Thus strongly and completely did he cover the present case, reaching forward with judgment. According to him, even an Act of Parliament making a man judge in his own case is void. But, Sir, he was not alone. His great contemporary, and our teacher at this hour, Sir Edward Coke, in a very famous case, known as Bonham’s, which I have not before me now, but which is referred to in other cases, lays down the same rule,—that a court of justice will not even recognize an Act of Parliament, if it undertakes to make a man judge in his own case.[10]

But another judge, who, as lawyer and authority in courts down to this day, perhaps excels even the two already cited,—I mean Lord Chief Justice Holt,—has explained and developed this principle in masterly language. I refer to what is known as Modern Reports, in the case of The City of London v. Wood, where he says:—

“I agree, where the city of London claims any freedom or franchise to itself, there none of London shall be judge or jury; for there they claim an interest to themselves against the rest of mankind.”

He then explains the principle:—

“It is against all laws, that the same person should be party and judge in the same cause, for it is manifest contradiction; for the party is he that is to complain to the judge, and the judge is to hear the party; the party endeavors to have his will, the judge determines against the will of the party, and has authority to enforce him to obey his sentence: and can any man act against his own will, or enforce himself to obey? The judge is agent, the party is patient, and the same person cannot be both agent and patient in the same thing; but it is the same thing to say that the same man may be patient and agent in the same thing as to say that he may be judge and party, and it is manifest contradiction. And what my Lord Coke says in Dr. Bonham’s Case, in his 8 Co., is far from any extravagancy; for it is a very reasonable and true saying, that, if an Act of Parliament should ordain that the same person should be party and judge, or, which is the same thing, judge in his own cause, it would be a void Act of Parliament; for it is impossible that one should be judge and party, for the judge is to determine between party and party, or between the Government and the party; and an Act of Parliament can do no wrong, though it may do several things that look pretty odd, for it may discharge one from his allegiance to the Government he lives under and restore him to the state of Nature, but it cannot make one that lives under a government judge and party.”[11]

These are the words of Chief Justice Holt. It will be observed that three eminent judges, Hobart, Coke, and Holt, all found the inevitable conclusion on the immutable principles of Natural Law, that law which is common to all countries. It is the very law of which Cicero spoke in the memorable sentence of his treatise on the Republic, when he said that there was but one law for all countries, now and in all times, the same at Athens as in Rome.[12] It is also that universal law to which the great English writer, Hooker, alluded, when he said that her seat is the bosom of God; all things on earth do her homage,—the least as feeling her care, and the greatest as not exempt from her power. To this Universal Law all your legislation must be brought as to a touchstone; and all your conduct in this Chamber, and all your rules, must be in accordance with it. Therefore I say, as I began, the practice of calling the roll of the Senate must be interpreted in subordination to this commanding rule of Universal Law.

This is not all. I said that it was forbidden, not only by Natural Law, but also by Parliamentary Law. Of course, Parliamentary Law in itself must be in harmony with Natural Law; but Parliamentary Law has undertaken in advance to deal with this very question. There is no express rule of the Senate on the subject, but here is a rule of the other House:—

“No member shall vote on any question in the event of which he is immediately and particularly interested.”[13]

This is but an expression in parliamentary language of what I have announced as the rule of universal jurisprudence. But, Sir, this rule was borrowed from the rules of the British House of Commons, one of which is,—

“If anything shall come in question touching the return or election of any member, he is to withdraw during the time the matter is in debate.”[14]

I quote from May’s Parliamentary Law. From another work of authority, Dwarris on Statutes, I now read:—

“No member of the House may be present in the House when a bill or any other business concerning himself is debating; while the bill is but reading or opening, he may.”[15]

Then, after citing two different cases, the learned writer proceeds:—

“This rule was always attended to in questions relative to the seat of a member on the hearing of controverted elections, and has been strictly observed in cases of very great moment.”[16]

Again the same writer says:—

“Where a member appeared to be ‘somewhat’ concerned in interest,”—

That is the phrase, only “somewhat concerned,”—

“his voice has been disallowed after a division.”[17]

Then, again, our own eminent countryman, Cushing, who was quoted so frequently the other day, in his elaborate book on the Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies, expresses himself as follows:—

“Cases are frequent in which votes received have been disallowed.”[18]

Again he says:—

“Votes have also been disallowed after the numbers have been declared, on the ground that the members voting were interested in the question; and, in reference to this proceeding, there is no time limited within which it must take place.”[19]

Thus, Sir, it is apparent that Parliamentary Law is completely in harmony with Natural Law. Indeed, if it were not, it would be our duty to correct it, that it might be made in harmony.

And now, after this statement of the law, which I believe completely applicable to the present case, I am brought to consider the remedy. I said at the outset that there were two modes: one was by disallowing the vote on motion to that effect, and the other by amending the journal. But first let me call attention to the practice in disallowing a vote on motion. I have already read from Dwarris, where the vote was disallowed, and I will read it again:—

“Where a member appeared to be ‘somewhat’ concerned in interest, his voice has been disallowed after a division.”

Mr. Trumbull. Was that at the same or a subsequent session?

Mr. Sumner. It does not appear whether it was at a subsequent session, but it simply appears that it was after the division. The Senator understands that the division in the British Parliament corresponds with what we call the yeas and nays. They “divide,” as it is called,—the yeas and the nays being counted by tellers as they pass.

The American authority is in harmony with the English already quoted. I read again from Cushing.

“The disallowance of votes usually takes place, when, after the declaration of the numbers by the Speaker, it is discovered that certain members who voted were not present when the question was put, or were so interested in the question”—

Mark those words, if you please, Sir—

“that they ought to have withdrawn from the House.

“It has already been seen, that, when it is ascertained that members have improperly voted, on a division, who were not in the House when the question was put, if this takes place before the numbers are declared by the Speaker, such votes are disallowed by him at once, and not included in the numbers declared. If the fact is not ascertained until after the numbers are declared, it is then necessary that there should be a motion and vote of the House for their disallowance; and this may take place, for anything that appears to the contrary, at any time during the session, and has in fact taken place after the lapse of several days from the time the votes were given.”[20]

Thus much for the remedy by disallowance; and this brings me to the proposition by amending the journal. That remedy, from the nature of the case, is applicable to an error apparent on the face of the journal. I ask Senators to note the distinction. It is applicable to an error apparent on the face of the journal. If the interest of a Senator appeared only by evidence aliunde, by evidence outside, as, for instance, that he had some private interest in the results of a pending measure by which he was disqualified, his vote could be disallowed only on motion; but if the incapacity of the Senator to vote on a particular occasion appears on the journal itself, I submit that the journal must be amended by striking out his vote. The case is patent. We have already seen, by the opinions of eminent judges, great masters of law in different ages, that what is contrary to the principles of Natural Law must be void; and English judges tell us that even an Act of Parliament must be treated as void, if it undertakes to make a man judge in his own case.

Now, Sir, apply that principle to your journal. It has recognized a man as judge in his own case. I insist that the recognition was void. Is not the true remedy by amending the journal so as to strike out his name? The journal discloses the two essential facts,—first, that as Senator he was party to the proceedings, secondly, that as Senator he was judge in the proceedings; and since these two facts appear on the face of the journal, it seems to me that the only substantial remedy is by amending it, so that a precedent of such a character shall not find place hereafter in the records of the Senate.

Sir, this question is not insignificant; it is grave. It belongs to the privileges of the Senate. I might almost say, it is closely associated with the character of the Senate. Can Senators sit here and allow one of their number, on an important occasion, to come forward and play at the same time the two great parts, party and judge? And yet these two great parts have been played, and your journal records the performance. Suppose Jesse D. Bright, some years since expelled from the Senate, after animated debate lasting weeks, and our excellent Judiciary Committee reporting in his favor,—suppose he had undertaken to vote for himself,—is there a Senator who would not have felt it wrong to admit his vote? The defendant showed no want of hardihood, but he did not offer to vote for himself. But, if Mr. Stockton can vote for himself, how can you prevent a Senator from voting to save himself from expulsion? The rule must be the same in the two cases. Therefore I ask that the journal be rectified, in harmony with Parliamentary Law and the principles of Universal Law.

In making this motion, I have no other motive than to protect the rights of the Senate, and to establish those principles of justice which will be a benefit to our country for all time. You cannot lightly see a great principle sacrificed. You abandon your duty, if you allow an elementary principle of justice to be set at nought in this Chamber. Be it, Sir, our pride to uphold those truths and to stand by those principles. I know no way in which we can do it now so completely as in the motion I have made. The vote of Mr. Stockton was null and void. It should be treated as if it had not been given.

I have no doubt that the motion to correct the journal would be in order even at a late day. I believe that at any day any Senator might rise in his place and move to expunge from the journal a record in itself derogatory to the body. I have in my hands a reference to the case of John Wilkes, who, you will remember, just before our Revolution, was excluded from Parliament, while his competitor, Luttrell, was declared duly elected. The decision of Parliament, so the history records, convulsed the whole kingdom for thirteen years, but after that long period it was expunged from the journal,—I now quote the emphatic words,—“as being subversive of the rights of the whole body of electors of this kingdom.” I submit, Sir, the record in your journal is subversive of the great principle of jurisprudence on which the rights of every citizen depend.

Mr. Reverdy Johnson followed, criticizing Mr. Sumner. He concluded by saying: “Even supposing there was the slightest want of delicacy in casting a vote upon such a question by the member whose seat is contested, it was in the particular instance more than justified by the circumstances existing at the time the vote was cast.”

Mr. Trumbull said:—

“I believe, as I said before, that the Senator from New Jersey is entitled to his seat; but I do not believe that he is entitled to hold his seat by his own vote. He would have held his seat without his own vote. The vote upon the resolution was a tie without the vote of the Senator from New Jersey; and that would have left him in his seat, he already having been sworn in as a member. It is not necessary that the resolution should have passed. He is here as a Senator, and it would require an affirmative vote to deprive him of his seat as a Senator.”

He then avowed his willingness to move a reconsideration of the vote by which the resolution was carried, “if that is necessary to accomplish the object.”

Mr. Sumner, after saying, that, when he brought forward his motion, he had no reason to suppose that any Senator would move a reconsideration, proceeded:—

The Senator from Illinois says, Suppose we strike out Mr. Stockton’s name, what will be the effect? I answer, To change all subsequent proceedings, and make them as if he had not voted, so that the whole record must be corrected accordingly. The Senator supposes a bill passed by mistake afterwards discovered, and asks if the bill could be arrested. Clearly, if not too late. A familiar anecdote with regard to the passage of the Act of Habeas Corpus in England will help answer the Senator. According to the story,—it is Bishop Burnet who tells it,[21]—this great act, which gave to the English people what has since been called the palladium of their liberties, passed under a misapprehension created by a jest. It seems that among the affirmative peers walking through the tellers was one especially fat, when it was said, “Count ten,”—and ten was counted for the bill, thus securing its passage. I am not aware that the mistake was divulged until too late for correction. But we have had in the other House two different cases, which answer precisely the inquiry of the Senator.

Here Mr. Sumner read from the House Journal, 29th Congress, 1st Session, July 6, 1846, p. 1032, a motion by Mr. McGaughey with regard to the Journal. He next read from the House Journal, 31st Congress, 1st Session, September 10, 1850, p. 1436, the following entry:—

“The Speaker stated that the result of the vote of the House on yesterday on the passage of the bill of the House (No. 387) to supply a deficiency in the appropriation for pay and mileage of members of Congress for the present session had been erroneously announced, and that the subsequent proceedings upon the said bill would consequently fall.

“The Speaker then announced the vote to be, Yeas 78, Nays 76.

“So the bill was passed; and the journal of yesterday was ordered to be amended accordingly.”

In conformity with this precedent, Mr. Sumner did not doubt that by the correction of the journal the vote affirming Mr. Stockton’s seat would fall, and he thought it better to follow this course; but, anxious to avoid a protracted discussion, and to “seek a practical result,” he was willing to withdraw his proposition.

Mr. Sherman, of Ohio, thought that Mr. Sumner would “err in withdrawing the proposition.” Mr. Davis, of Kentucky, maintained “that Mr. Stockton had an undoubted right to vote.” Mr. Stockton followed in vindication of his vote, referring especially to an alleged understanding between Mr. Morrill and Mr. Wright, which he said was violated by the vote of the former.

“I never looked upon this as my case. It was the case of the Senator from New Jersey. And when one gentleman from New Jersey, my colleague, was deprived of his vote by—what shall I term it? I do not propose to violate parliamentary propriety by terming it anything,—but when one Senator from New Jersey by artifice was prevented from recording his vote, as he would have done, the other was not to vote from delicacy.

“Mr. President, there are eleven States out of the Union, and they wanted to put New Jersey out; and I did not mean that they should do it from motives of delicacy on my part.”

Mr. Trumbull said, “Let us settle at this time that a member has no right to vote upon the question.… I think, upon consideration, that perhaps the best way to arrive at it is by the adoption of the resolution offered by the Senator from Massachusetts.” Mr. Lane, of Kansas, who had voted to sustain Mr. Stockton, said, “I was never more surprised in my life than when the Senator from New Jersey asked to vote and did vote.” Soon afterwards, Mr. Stockton said, “I rise to withdraw my vote, with the permission of the Senate,” and proceeded to explain his position. In reply to an inquiry from Mr. Sumner, the presiding officer [Mr. Clark, of New Hampshire] said, “The Chair is of opinion that he cannot, unless by the unanimous consent of the Senate he wishes to correct the journal.” Mr. Sumner formally withdrew his motion to correct the journal, “with the understanding that the Senator from Vermont [Mr. Poland] makes the motion for a reconsideration.” Mr. Poland accordingly moved the reconsideration, and this was agreed to, so that the original question was again before the Senate. There was still debate and perplexity as to the proper proceeding in order to repair the error in receiving Mr. Stockton’s vote, when Mr. Sumner moved:—

“That the vote of Mr. Stockton be not received, in determining the question of his seat in the Senate.”

Mr. Sumner remarked:—

I have no personal question with the Senator; I have for him nothing but kindness and respect. I deal with this question simply as a question of principle. The Senator tells us that he will not vote, when the case comes up again. I believe him; he will not vote. But, Sir, he has taken the Constitution in his hand, and, holding it up, he tells us that he finds in that instrument authority for it in his case.…

Since the Senator makes the claim, it is important for us to meet it, in some way or other,—by correcting the journal, or by a resolution declaring that the Senator shall not vote,—fixing the precedent forever, so that hereafter we shall not be left to the uncertain will or opinion of a Senator whose seat may be in question. We must rely, not upon his honor, but upon the Constitution, interpreted by this body and fixed beyond recall. Therefore I think still it would be better, if the Senate had corrected its journal. Being a vote that in itself was null and void, it was to be treated as not having been given.

The Senator asks to withdraw his vote. To withdraw what? Something which has never been done,—that is, legally done. There is no legal vote of the Senator. His name is recorded as having voted, but it is a vote that at the time was null and void. There is nothing, therefore, for him to withdraw, but something for the Senate to annul.

Mr. Sherman moved the reference of Mr. Sumner’s resolution to the Committee on the Judiciary. The Senate refused to refer,—Yeas 18, Nays 22. The resolution was then adopted.

March 27th, the consideration of the resolution declaring Mr. Stockton “duly elected” was resumed, when, after the failure of an effort to postpone it, Mr. Clark moved to amend it by declaring that he “is not entitled to a seat as Senator.” On this amendment Mr. Stockton spoke at length. The amendment was adopted,—Yeas 22, Nays 21,—Mr. Stockton not voting. He said, “I desire to state, in order that it may be a part of the record, that I do not vote on this question, on account of the resolution passed by the Senate yesterday.” The resolution as amended was then adopted,—Yeas 23, Nays 20.

REMODELLING OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

Remarks in the Senate, on the Bill to reorganize the Judiciary of the United States, April 2, 1866.

This bill, reported from the Judiciary Committee by Mr. Harris, of New York, was considered for several days in the Senate, and finally passed that body. It failed in the House of Representatives. Another bill, having a similar object, afterwards became a law.[22]

On the present bill Mr. Sumner remarked:—

We all know that the Supreme Court is now some three years behind in its business, and the practical question is, How are we to bring relief? There are two different ways. One is by limiting appeals, so that hereafter it shall have less business. Another, and to my mind the better way, would be to allow appeals substantially as now, but to limit the court to the exclusive hearing of those appeals. Of course that raises the question, whether the judges of the Supreme Court sitting here in Washington should have duties elsewhere. That is a question of practice, and also of theory. Since I have been in the Senate, it has been very often discussed, formally or informally, and there have been differences of opinion upon it. I believe the inclination has always been that judges are better in the discharge of their duties from experience at Nisi Prius. That opinion, I take it, is derived from England; and yet I need not remind the Senator from New York that the two highest courts in England are held by judges who at the time do nothing at Nisi Prius, and do not go the circuit: I refer to the court of the Privy Council, and to the highest court of all, the court of the House of Lords. If you pass over to France, where certainly the judicature is admirably arranged on principles of science, where I believe justice is assured, you have the highest court, known as the Court of Cassation, composed of persons set apart exclusively for appeals,—never leaving Paris, and never hearing any other business except that which comes before them on appeal.

I refer to these instances for illustration. The Senate is also aware, that, in the beginning of our Government, when Washington invited his first Chief Justice and his Associates to communicate their views on the subject of the Judiciary system, the answer, prepared by John Jay, assigned strong reasons why the Supreme Court should be exclusively for the consideration of appeals.[23] The other business was by circuit judges. This recommendation was put aside, and the existing system prevailed. Justice has been administered to the satisfaction of the country, reasonably at least, under this system.

But now we are driven to a pass: justice threatens to fail in the Supreme Court, unless we provide relief. Is the bill of the Senator from New York adequate? Speaking frankly, I fear that it is not; and I fear that the proposition of my friend from Wisconsin [Mr. Howe], if adopted, will still further limit the relief which my friend from New York proposes. I am disposed to believe that the only real relief will be found in setting apart the judges of our highest court exclusively for the consideration of appeals. They would then sit as many months in the year as they could reasonably give to judicial labor. They might, perhaps, hear every case that could reach the tribunal, while they had a vacation to themselves in which to review the science of their profession and add undoubtedly to their attainments. I remember that one of the ablest lawyers in England, in testimony some years ago before a Committee of the House of Commons on the value of what is known as the vacation,—I refer to Sir James Scarlett, afterward Lord Abinger, Lord Chief Baron,—testified that for one, as an old lawyer, he regarded the vacation as important, because it gave him an opportunity to review his studies and to read books that he could not read in the urgency of practice. I have heard our own judges make similar remarks.

Now the question is, whether the present bill meets the case. Does it supply the needed relief? I fear it does not; and I really should be much better satisfied, if my friend from New York had dealt more boldly with the whole question by providing a court of appeal, composed of the eminent judges of the land, devoted exclusively to appeals, and leaving to other judges the hearing of cases at Nisi Prius.

THE LATE SOLOMON FOOT, SENATOR FROM VERMONT.

Speech in the Senate, on his Death, April 12, 1866.

MR. PRESIDENT,—There is a truce in this Chamber. The antagonism of debate is hushed. The sounds of conflict have died away. The white flag is flying. From opposite camps we meet to bury the dead. It is a Senator we bury, not a soldier.

This is the second time during the present session that we have been called to mourn a distinguished Senator from Vermont. It was much to bear the loss once. Its renewal now, after so brief a period, is a calamity without precedent in the history of the Senate. No State before has ever lost two Senators so near together.

Mr. Foot, at his death, was the oldest Senator in continuous service. He entered the Senate in the same Congress with the Senator from Ohio [Mr. Wade] and myself; but he was sworn at the executive session in March, while the two others were not sworn till the opening of Congress at the succeeding December. During this considerable space of time I have been the constant witness to his life and conversation. With a sentiment of gratitude I look back upon our relations, never from the beginning impaired or darkened by difference. For one brief moment he seemed disturbed by something that fell from me in the unconscious intensity of my convictions; but it was for a brief moment only, and he took my hand with a genial grasp. I make haste also to declare my sense of his personal purity and his incorruptible nature. Such elements of character, exhibited and proved throughout a long service, render him an example for all. He is gone; but these virtues “smell sweet and blossom in the dust.”

He was excellent in judgment. He was excellent also in speech; so that, whenever he spoke, the wonder was that he who spoke so well should speak so seldom. He was full, clear, direct, emphatic, and never was diverted from the thread of his argument. Had he been moved to mingle actively in debate, he must have exerted a commanding influence over opinion in the Senate and in the country. How often we have watched him tranquil in his seat, while others without his experience or weight occupied attention! The reticence which was part of his nature formed a contrast to that prevailing effusion where sometimes the facility of speech is less remarkable than the inability to keep silence; and, again, it formed a contrast to that controversial spirit which too often, like an unwelcome wind, puts out the lights while it fans a flame. And yet in his treatment of questions he was never incomplete or perfunctory. If he did not say, with the orator and parliamentarian of France, the famous founder of the “Doctrinaire” school of politics, M. Royer-Collard, that respect for his audience would not permit him to ask attention until he had reduced his thoughts to writing, it was evident that he never spoke in the Senate without careful preparation. You remember well his commemoration of his late colleague, only a few short weeks ago, when he delivered a funeral oration not unworthy of the French school from which this form of eloquence is derived. Alas! as we listened to that most elaborate eulogy, shaped by study and penetrated by feeling, how little did we think that it was so soon to be echoed back from his own tomb!

Not in our debates only did this self-abnegation show itself. He quietly withdrew from places of importance on committees to which he was entitled, and which he would have filled with honor. More than once I have known him insist that another should take the position assigned to himself. He was far from that nature which Lord Bacon exposes in pungent humor, when he speaks of “extreme self-lovers,” that “will set an house on fire and it were but to roast their eggs.”[24] And yet it must not be disguised that he was happy in the office of Senator. It was to him as much as his “dukedom” to Prospero. He felt its honors and confessed its duties. But he was content. He desired nothing more. Perhaps no person appreciated so thoroughly what it was to bear the commission of a State in this Chamber. Surely no person appreciated so thoroughly all the dignities belonging to the Senate. Of its ceremonial he was the admitted arbiter.

There was no jealousy, envy, or uncharitableness in him. He enjoyed what others did, and praised generously. He knew that his own just position could not be disturbed by the success of another. Whatever another may be, whether more or less, a man must always be himself. A true man is a positive, and not a relative quantity. Properly inspired, he will know that in a just sense nobody can stand in the way of another. And here let me add, that, in proportion as this truth enters into practical life, we shall all become associates and coadjutors rather than rivals. How plain, that, in the infinite diversity of character and talent, there is place for every one! This world is wide enough for all its inhabitants; this republic is grand enough for all its people. Let every one serve in his place according to his allotted faculties.

In the long warfare with Slavery, Mr. Foot was from the beginning firmly and constantly on the side of Freedom. He was against the deadly compromises of 1850. He linked his shield in the small, but solid, phalanx of the Senate which opposed the Nebraska Bill. He was faithful in the defence of Kansas, menaced by Slavery; and when at last this barbarous rebel took up arms, he accepted the issue, and did all he could for his country. But even the cause which for years he had so much at heart did not lead him into debate, except rarely. His opinions appeared in votes, rather than in speeches. But his sympathies were easily known. I call to mind, that, on first coming into the Senate, and not yet personally familiar with him, I was assured by Mr. Giddings, who knew him well, that he belonged to the small circle who would stand by Freedom, and the Antislavery patriarch related pleasantly, how Mr. Foot, on his earliest visit to the House of Representatives after he became Senator, drew attention by coming directly to his seat and sitting by his side in friendly conversation. Solomon Foot by the side of Joshua R. Giddings, in those days, when Slavery still tyrannized, is a picture not to be forgotten. If our departed friend is not to be named among those who have borne the burden of this great controversy, he cannot be forgotten among those whose sympathies with Liberty never failed. Would that he had done more! Let us be thankful that he did so much.

There is a part on the stage known as “the walking gentleman,” who has very little to say, but always appears well. Mr. Foot might seem, at times, to have adopted this part, if we were not constantly reminded of his watchfulness in everything concerning the course of business and the administration of Parliamentary Law. Here he excelled, and was master of us all. The division of labor, which is the lesson of political economy, is also the lesson of public life. All cannot do all things. Some do one, others do another,—each according to his gifts. This diversity produces harmony.

The office of President pro tempore among us grows out of the anomalous relations of the Vice-President to the Senate. There is no such officer in the other House, nor was there in the House of Commons until very recently, when we read of a “Deputy Speaker,” which is the term by which he is addressed, when in the chair. No ordinary talent can guide and control a legislative assembly, especially if numerous or excited by party differences. A good presiding officer is like Alexander mounted on Bucephalus. The assembly knows its master, “as the horse its rider.” This was preëminently the case with Mr. Foot, who was often in the chair, and for a considerable period our President pro tempore. Here he showed special adaptation and power. He was in person “every inch” a President; so also was he in every sound of the voice. He carried into the chair the most marked individuality that has been seen there during this generation. He was unlike any other presiding officer. “None but himself could be his parallel.” His presence was felt instantly. It filled this Chamber from floor to gallery. It attached itself to everything done. Vigor and despatch prevailed. Questions were stated so as to challenge attention. Impartial justice was manifest at once. Business in every form was handled with equal ease. Order was enforced with no timorous authority. If disturbance came from the gallery, how promptly he launched the fulmination! If it came from the floor, you have often seen him throw himself back, and then with voice of lordship, as if all the Senate were in him, insist that debate should be suspended until order was restored. “The Senate must come to order!” he exclaimed; and, like the god Thor, beat with hammer in unison with voice, until the reverberations rattled like thunder in the mountains.

The late Duc de Morny, who was the accomplished President of the Legislative Assembly of France, in a sitting shortly before his death, after sounding his crier’s bell, which is the substitute for the hammer among us, exclaimed from the chair: “I shall be obliged to mention by name the members whom I find conversing. I declare to you that I shall do so, and I shall have it put in the ‘Moniteur.’ You are here to discuss and to listen, not to converse. I promise you that I will do what I say to the very first I catch talking.” Our President might have found occasion for a similar speech, but his energy in the enforcement of order stopped short of this menace. Certainly he did everything consistent with the temper of the Senate, and he showed always what Sir William Scott, on one occasion, in the House of Commons, placed among the essential qualities of a Speaker, when he said that “to a jealous affection for the privileges of the House” must be added “an awful sense of its duties.”[25]

Accustomed as we have become to the rules which govern legislative proceedings, we are hardly aware of their importance in the development of liberal institutions. Unknown in antiquity, they were unknown also on the European continent until latterly introduced from England, which was their original home. They are among the precious contributions which England has made to modern civilization; and yet they did not assume at once their present perfect form. Mr. Hallam tells us that even as late as Queen Elizabeth “the members called confusedly for the business they wished to have brought forward.”[26] But now, at last, these rules have become a beautiful machine, by which business is conducted, legislation moulded, and debate in all possible freedom secured. From the presentation of a petition or the introduction of a bill, all proceeds by fixed processes, until, without disorder, the final result is reached and a new law takes its place in the statute-book. Hoe’s printing-press or Alden’s type-setter is not more exact in operation. But the rules are more even than a beautiful machine; they are the very temple of Constitutional Liberty. In this temple our departed friend served to the end with pious care. His associates, as they recall his stately form, silvered by time, but beaming with goodness, will not cease to cherish the memory of such service. His image will rise before them as the faithful presiding officer, by whom the dignity of the Senate was maintained, its business advanced, and Parliamentary Law upheld.

He had always looked with delight upon this Capitol,—one of the most remarkable edifices of the world,—beautiful in itself, but more beautiful still as the emblem of that national unity he loved so well. He enjoyed its enlargement and improvement. He watched with pride its marble columns moving into place, and its dome as it ascended to the skies. Even the trials of the war did not make him forget it. His care secured those appropriations by which the work was forwarded to its close, and the statue of Liberty installed on its sublime pedestal. It was natural that in his last moments, as life was failing fast, he should long to rest his eyes upon an object that was to him so dear. The early light of morning had come, and he was lifted in bed that with mortal sight he might once more behold this Capitol; but another Capitol already began to fill his vision, fairer than your marble columns, sublimer than your dome, where Liberty without any statue is glorified in that service which is perfect Freedom.

COMPLETE EQUALITY IN RIGHTS, AND NOT SEMI-EQUALITY.

Letter to a Committee on the Celebration of Emancipation in the District of Columbia, April 14, 1866.

Senate Chamber, April 14, 1866.

DEAR SIR,—It will not be in my power to celebrate with you Emancipation in the District, but I rejoice that the beautiful anniversary is to be commemorated.

Looking back upon the day when that Act became a law by the signature of Abraham Lincoln, I feel how grandly it has been vindicated by the result. The sinister forebodings of your enemies are all falsified. We were told that you could not bear freedom,—that you would be lawless, idle, and thriftless. I knew the contrary; and is it not as I foretold? Who so mad as to wish back the old system of wrong?

But the work is only half done. The freedman, despoiled of the elective franchise, is only half a man. He must be made a whole man; and this can be only by investing him with all the rights of an American citizen. Here, too, we encounter the same sinister forebodings that stood in the way of Emancipation. We are told that you cannot bear enfranchisement, and that you will not know how to vote. I know the contrary; and I am satisfied, further, that there can be no true repose in this country until all its people are admitted to that full equality before the law which is the essential principle of republican government. It were not enough to assure equality in what are called civil rights. This is only semi-equality. The equality must be complete. This I ask, not only for your sake, but also for the sake of my country, imperilled by such a denial of justice.

Accept my best wishes, and believe me, dear Sir, faithfully yours,

Charles Sumner.

Daniel G. Muse, Esq.

JUSTICE TO MECHANICS IN THE WAR.

Speech in the Senate, on a Bill for the Relief of certain Contractors, April 17, 1866.

The Senate having under consideration a bill for the relief of certain contractors for the construction of vessels of war and steam machinery, Mr. Sumner said:—

MR. PRESIDENT,—I am happy to agree with the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. Guthrie] in the fundamental principle he has laid down and developed so clearly. I agree with him, that by no legislation of ours can we recognize the principle that contractors with the Government may never lose. The Senator cannot state the proposition too strongly. But I part company with him, when he undertakes to apply it to the present case. We agree on the proposition; we disagree on the application.

Had these contracts covered a period of peace, there would have been occasion for the rule of the Senator. But they were not in a period of peace; they were in a period of war. And the Senator himself has characterized the war as perhaps the greatest in history. If not made in a time of war, they were all the harder performed in those early days which were heralds of war. The practical question for us as legislators is, whether we can shut our eyes to that condition of things. The times were exceptional; and so must the remedy be also.

I have said, had it been a season of peace, then the Senator would be right, and we should not be justified in seeking exceptionally to open the Treasury for the relief of these contractors. But, Sir, war is a mighty disturber. What force in human society, what force in business, more disturbing? Wherever it goes, it not only carries death and destruction, but derangement of business, change of pursuits, interference with the currency, and generally dislocation of the common relations of life. You cannot be blind to such a condition of things. You must not shut your eyes to its consequences, if you would do justice now.

I repeat, therefore, did these contracts grow out of a period of peace, I should not now advocate them; but it is because they grow out of a period of war, that I ask for those who have suffered by them the same justice we accord to all who have contributed to our success in that terrible war. Why, Sir, how often do we appeal in this Chamber for justice to all who have helped the great result! It is my duty constantly to plead here for justice to those freedmen who have done so much and placed you under ceaseless obligations. I hope I am not indifferent also to those national creditors who supplied the means which advanced our triumph,—nor yet again to those soldiers, whether on land or sea, who have so powerfully served the national cause. But there is still another class, for whom no one has yet spoken on this floor, who have contributed to our success not less than soldier or creditor,—I was almost ready to say, not less than the freedman: I mean the mechanics of the country. They, Sir, have helped you carry this war to its victorious close. Without the mechanics, where would you have been? what would have been your equipments on the land? where would have been that marvellous navy on the sea? It was the skilled labor of the country, rushing so promptly to the rescue, that gave you the power which carried you on from victory to victory.

Now, Sir, the practical question is, whether these mechanics, who have done so much to turn the tide of battle, shall be losers by the skill, the labor, and the time they devoted to your triumph. Tell me not, Sir, that they acted according to contract. To that I reply, The war disturbed the contract, and it is your duty here, sitting as a high court of equity, to review all the circumstances of the case, and see in what way the remedy may be fitly applied. You cannot turn away from the equities, treating it literally and severely according to the precise terms of the contract. You must go into those vital considerations arising out of the peculiar circumstances.

Several facts are obvious to all: a Senator on the other side of the Chamber has alluded to them. In the first place, there was the general increase in the price of labor and material that ensued after these contracts were made. Nobody doubts this. There was then a change in the currency. There were, also,—what have been alluded to several times,—changes in the models of these vessels at the Navy Department, necessarily imposing upon these contractors additional expense and labor. There was another circumstance, to which my attention has been directed latterly,—I believe, however, the Senator from Iowa [Mr. Grimes] alluded to it yesterday,—that at the moment of the war, when labor was highest, when it was most difficult to obtain it, there came an order from the proper authorities exempting those who labored in the arsenals and public yards of the United States from enrolment. Of course, all then in private yards or with contractors, so far as they could, hurried under the national flag, that they might become workmen there, and thus obtain the coveted exemption from enrolment.

…

This order illustrates very plainly the disturbing influence from the war; and this brings me again to press this point upon your attention. I mention certain particulars in which this appeared; but I would bring home the controlling consideration that we were in a time of war, vast in proportions and most disturbing in its influence. This alone is enough to account for the failure of these contractors. We were not in a period of peace, and you err, if you undertake to hold these contractors to all the austere responsibilities proper in a period of peace.

The Senator from Kentucky said that they took the war into their calculations. Perhaps they did; but who among these contractors could take that war adequately into his calculations? Who among those sitting here or at the other end of the avenue properly appreciated the character of the great contest coming on? Sir, we had passed half a century in peace; we knew nothing of war, or of war preparations, when all at once we were called to efforts on a gigantic scale. Are you astonished that these contractors did not know more about the war than your statesmen? Be to these contractors as gentle in judgment and as considerate as you are to others in public life who have erred in calculations with regard to it.

I have said that the interest now in question was the great mechanical interest of the country. It is an interest that is not local, as the bill is for the benefit of mechanics in all parts of the loyal States, from Maryland, in the South, to Massachusetts and Maine, in the North and East, and then stretching from New York, on the seaboard, to Missouri, beyond the Mississippi. I have a list of the States concerned, through different contractors, in this very bill,—Maine, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Ohio, Illinois, Missouri, and even California. The interest for which I am speaking crosses the mountains and reaches to the Pacific Ocean.

I said that this was the skilled labor of the country. What labor more valuable? what service, while the war was proceeding, more important? If these mechanics did not expose their persons in the peril of battle, they gave their skill to prepare others for victory. In ancient times, the oracle said to the city in danger, “Look to your wooden walls.” The oracle in our country said, “Look to your ironclads and your double-enders”; and these mechanics came forward and by ingenious labor enabled you to put ironclads and double-enders on the ocean, and thus secure the final triumph. The building of that invulnerable navy was one of the great triumphs of the war, to be commemorated on many a special field, and to be seen in the mighty results we now enjoy.

And yet again I ask, Are you ready to see contractors, who have done this service, sacrificed? You do not allow the soldier to be sacrificed, nor the national creditor who has taken your stock. Will you allow the mechanic? There are many who, without your help, must suffer. One of the most enterprising and faithful in the whole country is a constituent of my own, who, during the last year, has been hurried into bankruptcy from inability to meet liabilities growing out of the war, and at this moment he finds no chance of relief except in what a just Government may return to him. My friend on my right [Mr. Nye, of Nevada] asked you to be magnanimous to these contractors. I do not put it in that way. I ask you simply to be upright. Do by them as you would be done by.

The Senator from Nevada also very fitly reminded you of the experience of other countries. He told you that England, at the close of the Crimean War, when her mechanics had suffered precisely as yours, did not allow them to be sacrificed, but every pound, every shilling, of liability under their contracts was promptly met by that Government. Will you be less just to mechanics than England? It is an old saying, that republics are ungrateful. I hope that this republic will vie with any monarchy in gratitude to those who have served it. You have shown energy in meeting your enemies. I ask you to show a commensurate energy in doing justice to those who have contributed to your success.

…

This bill, after much debate, passed the Senate. It did not pass the House.

POWER OF CONGRESS TO COUNTERACT THE CATTLE-PLAGUE.

Remarks in the Senate, on a Resolution to print a Letter of the Commissioner of Agriculture on the Cattle-Plague, April 25, 1866.

Mr. Sherman of Ohio, reported the following resolution from the Committee on Agriculture:—

“Resolved, That there be printed, for the use of the Senate, ten thousand copies of a letter of the Commissioner of Agriculture, communicating information in relation to the rinderpest or cattle-plague.”

In considering the resolution, he remarked that the Committee “would like very much to report some measure of a practical character, to counteract, if possible, the cattle-plague now prevailing in Europe; but we did not see that Congress had authority to pass an effective measure.” Mr. Sumner followed:—

I was sorry to hear two remarks of the Senator from Ohio. The first told that the cattle-plague is coming. I hope that by proper precautions it may be averted. I do trust it may never come. I will not despair that the Atlantic Ocean may be a barrier. I was sorry also for the other remark, that in his opinion Congress could not apply any efficient remedy. I make no issue on this conclusion; but I was sorry that the Senator having the question in charge had arrived at that result. It does seem to me, that, under the National Government, Congress should be able to apply a remedy in such a case. Is not the National Government defective to a certain extent, if Congress has not that power? I open the question interrogatively now, without undertaking to express an opinion upon it.

I agree with the Senator, that it is of great importance that our people should be put on their guard; he, therefore, is right in proposing to circulate all information on the subject. But I do hope that the Senator will consider carefully whether it be not within the power of Congress, in some way or other, directly or indirectly, to apply an efficient remedy.

URGENT DUTY OF THE HOUR.

Letter to the American Antislavery Society, May 1, 1866.

Senate Chamber, May 1, 1866.

DEAR SIR,—It will not be in my power to take part at the approaching anniversary of the Antislavery Society. My duty keeps me here.

I trust that the Society, which has done so much for human rights, will persevere until these rights are established throughout the country on the impregnable foundation of the Declaration of Independence. This is not the time for relaxation of the old energies. Slavery is abolished only in name. The Slave Oligarchy still lives, and insists upon ruling its former victims.

Believing, as I do, that the National Government owes protection to the freedmen, so that they shall not suffer in rights, I insist on its plenary power over this great question, and that it may do anything needful to assure these rights. In this conviction I shall not hesitate at all times to invoke its intervention, whether to establish what are called civil rights, or that pivotal right of all, the right to elect the government which they support by taxes and by arms.

Accept my best wishes, and believe me, dear Sir, faithfully yours,

Charles Sumner.

The President of the American Antislavery Society.

TIME AND RECONSTRUCTION.

Remarks in the Senate, on a Resolution to hasten Reconstruction, May 2, 1866.

Mr. Dixon, of Connecticut, gave notice of his intention to offer, as a substitute for the bills and resolution reported by the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, the following:—

“That the interests of peace and the interests of the Union require the admission of every State to its share in public legislation, whenever it presents itself, not only in an attitude of loyalty and harmony, but in the persons of representatives whose loyalty cannot be questioned under any constitutional or legal test.”

In the debate on printing this resolution, Mr. Sumner said:—

I was about to say that the proposition involved in the resolution of the Senator from Connecticut is so important that it may be considered as always in order to discuss it. I do not know that we ought to pass a day without in some way considering it. I certainly do not deprecate this debate; but while so saying, I am very positive on another point. I should deprecate any effort now to precipitate decision on the question; and I most sincerely hope that the Senator from Maine [Mr. Fessenden], the Chairman of the Committee on Reconstruction, who has this matter in charge, will bear that in mind. I do not believe that Congress at this moment is in a condition to give the country the best measure on this important subject. I am afraid that excellent Committee has listened too much to voices from without, insisting that there must be a political issue presented to the country. I have always thought such call premature. There is no occasion now for an issue. There are no elections in any States. The election in Connecticut is over; the election in New Hampshire is over. There are to be no elections before next autumn. What occasion, then, for an issue? I see none, unless Congress, after most careful and mature consideration of the whole subject, is able to present a plan on which we can all honestly unite and as one phalanx move forward to victory.

I shall not be drawn into premature discussion of the scheme presented by the report of the Committee on Reconstruction. I speak now to the question of time only. I am sure that report could not have been made in the last week of March. I am equally sure, that, if it had been postponed until the last week of May, they would have made a better one than they made in the last week of April. I hope, therefore, that the decision of this question will be postponed as long as possible, in order that all just influences may come to Congress from the country, and that Congress itself may be inspired by the fullest and amplest consideration of the whole question.

There is the evidence before this Committee,—we have not yet seen it together. That evidence ought to be together; it ought to be before the whole country; and we should have returning to us from the country the just influence which its circulation is calculated to produce. I am sure, that, wherever that evidence is read, the people will say, Congress is justified in insisting upon security for the future. For that purpose I presume the evidence was taken; and I hope Congress will not act until the natural and legitimate influences from the evidence are felt in their counsels.

Allow me to say, by way of comment on the proposition of the Senator from Connecticut, that it seems to me my excellent friend, in bringing it forward, forgot two things.

Mr. Dixon. Probably more than that.

Mr. Sumner. But two things he forgot were so great, so essential, that to forget them was to forget everything. In the first place, he forgot that we had been in a war; and, in the second place, he forgot that four million human beings had been changed from a condition of slavery to freedom. Those two ruling facts my excellent friend forgot, evidently, when he drew his proposition. Plainly, he forgot that we had been in a war, because he fails to make any provision for that security which common sense and common prudence, the Law of Nations and every instinct of the human heart, require should be made. He provides no guaranty. Sir, the essential thing, at this moment, is a guaranty. The Senator abandons that. If, like the Senator, I could forget this terrible war, with all the blood and treasure it has cost, I, too, could be indifferent to security for the future; but as that war is always in my mind, the Senator will pardon me, if I insist upon guaranties.

I have said that my excellent friend forgets that four million human beings have been changed in their condition. Four million slaves have been declared freemen. By whom, and by what power? By the National Government. And let me say, that, as the National Government gave that freedom, the National Government must secure it. The National Government cannot leave the men it has made free to the guardianship or custody or tender mercies of any other government. It is bound to take them into its own keeping, to surround them with its own protecting power, and invest them with all the rights and conditions which, in the exercise of its best judgment, seem necessary to that end. All that the Senator has forgotten. It is not in his mind. If I could bring myself to such obliviousness, if I could bathe so completely in the waters of Lethe as my excellent friend from Connecticut seems to have done daily in these recent times, I might, perhaps, join in the support of his proposition.

THE EMPEROR OF RUSSIA AND EMANCIPATION.

Remarks on a Joint Resolution relative to Attempted Assassination of the Emperor, May 8, 1866.

A joint resolution “relative to the attempted assassination of the Emperor of Russia,” introduced in the House of Representatives by Hon. Thaddeus Stevens, passed that body, and in the Senate was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

May 8th, it was reported to the Senate slightly amended, so as to read:—

“Resolved, &c., That the Congress of the United States of America has learned with deep regret of the attempt made upon the life of the Emperor of Russia by an enemy of Emancipation. The Congress sends greeting to his Imperial Majesty and to the Russian nation, and congratulates the twenty million serfs upon the providential escape from danger of the sovereign to whose head and heart they owe the blessings of their freedom.”

Mr. Sumner, on reporting it, said, that, as it was a resolution which would interest the Senate, and as perhaps it ought to be acted upon immediately and unanimously, he would ask that it be proceeded with at once. There being no objection, he explained it briefly.

MR. PRESIDENT,—This resolution seems scarcely adequate to the occasion, but the Committee was content with making the few slight amendments already approved by the Senate, without interfering further with the idea or language adopted by the other House, where the resolution originated.

From the public prints we learn that an attempt has been made on the life of the Emperor of Russia by an assassin,—maddened against him, so it is said, on account of his divine effort to establish Emancipation. Of these things I know nothing beyond the report open to all; but I am not unacquainted with the generous efforts of the Emperor, and the opposition, if not animosity, aroused by his perseverance in completing the good work.

In urging our own duties, I have more than once referred to this shining example.[27] The decree of Emancipation, in February, 1861, has been supplemented by an elaborate system of regulations, where Human Liberty is crowned by the safeguards of a true civilization, including protection to what are styled civil rights, especially rights in court,—then rights of property, with a homestead for every emancipated serf,—then rights of public education; and added to these were political rights, with the right to vote for local officers, corresponding to our officers for town and county: all of which, though just and practical, have encountered obstacles easily appreciated by us, who are in a similar transition period. The very thoroughness with which the Emperor is carrying out Emancipation has aroused the adversaries of reform, and I think it not improbable that it was one of these who aimed the blow so happily arrested. The laggard and dull are not pursued by assassins.

The Emperor of Russia was born in 1818, and is now forty-eight years of age. He succeeded to the imperial throne in 1855. At once, on his accession, he was inspired to accomplish Emancipation in his extended empire, stretching from the Baltic to the Sea of Kamtchatka. One of his earliest declarations signalized his character: he would have this great work begin from above, anxious that it should not proceed from below. Therefore he insisted that the imperial government should undertake it, and not leave the blessed change to the chance of insurrection and blood. He went forward bravely, encountering opposition; and now that the decree of Emancipation has gone forth, he still goes forward to assure all those rights without which Emancipation, I fear, is little more than a name. Our country does well, when it offers sincere homage to the illustrious liberator who has attempted so great a task, and at such hazard, making a landmark of civilization.

Mr. Saulsbury, of Delaware, moved to amend the resolution by striking out the words “by an enemy of Emancipation,” and advocated his amendment in a speech. Mr. Sumner replied, that it was impossible for the Senate to ascertain through a commission the precise facts in the case,—that it was an historic case, to be determined by historic evidence,—that the same testimony or report from which we learned the attempt to take the life of the Emperor disclosed also the character of the assassin,—and that doubtless the House of Representatives, from which the resolution came, acted on this authority. The amendment was rejected, and the resolution was passed without a division.

Hon. Gustavus V. Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, was sent to Russia in the ironclad Miantonomoh, charged with the communication of this resolution to the Emperor. He was received with much distinction and hospitality. The visit was subsequently described in a work entitled “Narrative of the Mission to Russia, in 1866, of the Hon. Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, from the Journal and Notes of J. F. Loubat, edited by John D. Champlin, Jr., 1873.” The mission was entertained brilliantly by Prince Galitzin at Moscow, August 26th (14th), and it is said that “among the invited guests at the dinner was the emancipated serf, Gvozdeff, the mayor of the commune.”[28]

POWER OF CONGRESS TO PROVIDE AGAINST CHOLERA FROM ABROAD.

Speeches in the Senate, on a Joint Resolution to prevent the Introduction of Cholera into the Ports of the United States, May 9, 11, and 15, 1866.

May 9th, the Senate having under consideration a joint resolution, which had passed the House of Representatives, to prevent the introduction of cholera into the ports of the United States, Mr. Sumner said:—

MR. PRESIDENT,—I must say, that, reflecting upon this question, I find that I travelled with my friend from Maine [Mr. Morrill] through his inquiries and his doubts, but it was only to arrive substantially at the conclusion of my friend from Vermont [Mr. Edmunds]. I thought that the criticism of my friend from Maine was in many respects, at least on its face, just. I went along with him, and yet I hesitated in adopting the conclusion he seemed to intimate. I doubt, if we proceed under the House resolution, whether we shall do the work thoroughly. I doubt whether that resolution can be made sufficiently effective. Indeed, I may go further, and say I am satisfied that it will not be efficient for the occasion. We then have the substitute proposed by our own Committee. Against that there is certainly the remark to be made, that it is novel. I am not aware that any such proposition has ever before been brought forward; but certainly it has in its favor the great argument of efficiency. Yet the question remains behind, to which the Senator from Maine has directed attention,—whether this proposition is not something more than even a novelty,—whether it is not a departure from just principles. I am not inclined to say that it is anything more than a novelty. I admit that it is such. It does invest the Government with large and perhaps unprecedented powers, in order to meet a peculiar case, where a stringent remedy must be applied.

But, as the Chairman of the Committee on Commerce suggests, the powers are temporary. I am not ready to say that such powers cannot be intrusted to the Government. I believe they can be. But while I agree in that, and am ready to vote accordingly, yet I should like to know from the Chairman why these powers are to be placed under the direction of the Secretary of War rather than of the Secretary of the Treasury.

Mr. Chandler, of Michigan, the Chairman, said that they were placed jointly in three Secretaries, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Treasury. After briefly considering this organization, Mr. Sumner proceeded further.

May 11th, Mr. Sumner spoke again.

I should not say anything now, but for the remarks of my friend from New York [Mr. Harris], who seemed at a loss where to find the power it is proposed to exercise. He was so much at a loss that he went beyond the bounds he usually prescribes for himself in this Chamber, and indulged in unwonted jocularity. Not content with showing, as he supposed, that the power did not exist where it was said to exist, he asked, with ludicrous face, whether it was not found under the clause to guaranty a republican form of government. I am very glad to find that my excellent friend is looking to that clause of the Constitution. It is a clause very much neglected, but to my mind one of the most potent in the whole Constitution,—full of beneficent power, which it would be well, if the Government, at this crisis of its history, were disposed to exercise. Here are waters of healing for our distressed country. Follow this text in its natural and obvious requirements, and you will have security, peace, and liberty under the safeguard of that great guaranty, the Equal Rights of All.

But I must remind my friend that there is no occasion for any resort to this transcendent source of power at the present moment. The power from which this resolution is derived seems very obvious. My friend interrupts me to say that it is the war power. I say it is very obvious, and I will show him in a moment, that it is not the war power. It is a power that has been exercised constantly, from the beginning of our history, with regard to which there can be no question,—because it is embodied in one of the clearest texts of the National Constitution,—because it has been expounded by a series of decisions from our Supreme Court, which are among the most authoritative in our history. It is the power to regulate commerce. My friend smiles; but would he smile at the Constitution of his country?

“The Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States.”

By the present resolution it is clearly proposed to regulate commerce with foreign nations. Have not all regulations with regard to passengers been under this power? Have they not all been to regulate commerce with foreign nations? Can there be any doubt? Is it not as plain as language can make it? Why, Sir, ever since I have been in Congress we have had annual bills for the regulation of passengers coming into our ports,—bills of different degrees of stringency, laying one penalty here and another penalty there, all in the execution of this unquestionable power.

Mr. Grimes. Will the Senator be kind enough to look at the second clause of the amended proposition, where it says,—

“That he”—

that is, the Secretary of War—

“shall also enforce the establishment of sanitary cordons to prevent the spread of said disease from infected districts adjacent to or within the limits of the United States”:—

not confining it to the lines between the States, but giving him authority to establish cordons within the jurisdiction of a State. I should like to know where the Constitution authorizes such a thing as that.

Mr. Sumner. I am obliged to my friend even for interrupting me to call attention to that section, though he will pardon me, if I do not answer him at this moment, but when I come to that part of the resolution.

Mr. Grimes. Any time will do, so that we get it.

Mr. Sumner. You will have it all.

I am dwelling now on the power derived from the positive text of the Constitution to regulate commerce with foreign nations. I say, that, in the execution of that power, we have undertaken to apply all manner of restrictions and regulations to the transportation of passengers. We have gone so far as to provide for the quantity of water on board each ship in proportion to every passenger. We have subjected every ship to regulations while at sea, and again to other regulations after arriving in port. The exercise of the power is by practice placed absolutely beyond question. Then it is intrenched in the very best judicial decisions of our country. I submit that no person can raise a question with regard to it.

Mr. Morrill. About regulating the importation of passengers from foreign countries nobody raises a question or a doubt. This is a question of quarantine, in its character police. Is there any precedent in the history of the United States where that power has been exercised by the General Government?

Mr. Sumner. I am very glad the Senator presses that question. I meet it. Does the Senator mean to suggest that the same power that can reach the sea, and determine even the quantity of water in the hold for each passenger, cannot apply the minutest possible regulation when that same ship arrives in the harbor?

Mr. Morrill. Will my friend allow me to answer him right there?

Mr. Sumner. Certainly.

Mr. Morrill. I maintain, that, when the passenger is landed, and comes within the limits and jurisdiction of the State, and within its police power, the commercial power of the Government ceases at that point, and the treatment of the passenger thereafter is within the police power of the State exclusively.

Mr. Sumner. I think the Senator goes beyond the decision of the Supreme Court. He overrules that decision.

Mr. Morrill. I am precisely on a line with the License cases, in which the principle was applied to the importation of liquors.

Mr. Sumner. At a certain stage, I admit, the police power of the State may intervene; but I do nevertheless insist, as beyond question, that the power of the United States is complete over every passenger vessel arriving in the harbor, so that it may be subjected to any regulations in the discretion of Congress for the public good with reference to passengers. Of course, this discretion is to be exercised wisely for the public good, that the public health may not suffer. Strange, if the National Government, which is our guardian against foreign foes, may not protect us against this fearful enemy.

Mr. Morrill. I do not deny that; I agree to that.

Mr. Sumner. Very well.

Mr. Morrill. Now my query is, Can the power of commerce, that power which regulates the passengers on their passage to this country, follow the passengers entirely into the States and overrule the internal police of the States? That is the question.

Mr. Sumner. The Senator puts a question running into that already propounded by the Senator from Iowa, and to which I was coming in due course of time. I have already arrived at it. I was illustrating the power that the Government would have in the harbor; and now let me give another illustration, familiar to my friend: it is with reference to goods. I need not remind the Senator, that, when goods arrive, subject to duties, the custom-house exercises its control, according to the prescription of law, not only while the goods are water-borne, but after they have been landed; and if they have been landed in violation of the law, it pursues them even into the interior.

Mr. Chandler. To the Rocky Mountains.

Mr. Sumner. It is enough to say that it pursues them into the interior. The National Constitution was not so absurd, nor have our courts been so absurd in its interpretation, as to recognize a power in the custom-house merely at the door of the granite structure, and to require that it shall stop there. No, Sir: the power must be made effective. We have made it effective with reference to goods. We have also, to a certain extent, made it effective, through decisions of the Supreme Court, with reference to passengers. It remains that we should carry it one stage further, and, for the public weal, and to secure the public health, which is a large part of the public weal, insist that this same power shall be invoked as in the pursuit of goods. I cannot see the difference between the two cases. I cannot doubt that the power over goods imported at our custom-house under Acts of Congress and the power over passengers introduced into this country under Acts of Congress are both derived from the same source, and you can find no limitation for one and no expansion for one which is not equally applicable to the other. I insist, therefore, that on this simple text you find ample power. You must annul the text, or at least limit it by construction and dwarf its fair proportions, or the power of Congress to provide against cholera is perfect.

But as Senators have such scruples about the second clause of the resolution,—