THE TRUTH ABOUT PORT ARTHUR
First Edition April, 1908.
Second Impression May, 1908.
Third Impression September, 1908.
GENERAL SMIRNOFF.
THE TRUTH ABOUT PORT ARTHUR
BY MONSIEUR E.K. NOJINE
ACCREDITED RUSSIAN WAR CORRESPONDENT DURING THE SIEGE
TRANSLATED AND ABRIDGED BY
CAPTAIN A.B. LINDSAY
2ND KING EDWARD'S OWN GURKHA RIFLES
TRANSLATOR OF 'THE BATTLE OF TSU-SHIMA,' ETC.
EDITED BY
MAJOR E.D. SWINTON, D.S.O.
ROYAL ENGINEERS
AUTHOR OF 'THE DEFENCE OF DUFFER'S DRIFT'
WITH MAP AND ILLUSTRATIONS
LONDON
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W.
1908
The siege of Port Arthur was the event of the late war in the Far East which most attracted the attention and interest of the rest of the world. There were other military operations, it is true, of equal if not of greater importance to the ultimate issue of the struggle; but, owing to their complexity, their slowness, and the absence of definite advance information, their progress and purport were not easily grasped by any save military students. The case of Port Arthur was different. The long drawn-out agony of the siege was continued before the eyes of the world for many months,[1] and, while the imagination was touched by its romantic side, the point at issue was at once apparent.
Even so, there was much mystery about the conduct of the defence and the eventual fall of the Fortress; for, owing to its remote position and almost complete isolation by the enemy, the available information almost entirely consisted of that supplied by correspondents with the Japanese, and was, therefore, information from the outside, and more or less a history of results alone. In 1907, or between two and three years after the culmination of the siege, the inevitable disclosures—the aftermath of defeat—which sometimes help to an appreciation of causes began to be made in Russia.
More than one book has recently been written by Russians who saw the defence from inside the Fortress, and who therefore claim to be in a position to give the inner history of the tragedy.
'The Truth about Port Arthur' was published in Russia last year. M. Nojine, the author, by whose permission this abridged translation has been made, was the accredited Russian war-correspondent in Port Arthur, and as such went through the greater part of the siege. He had exceptional facilities for collecting material for his work, for he was all through in close contact with the 'fighting' leaders of Port Arthur, and had access to official documents and diaries, and, having been an eye-witness of much, and possessing the trained observation of a journalist, his testimony should carry weight. His book is one long indictment of the then régime in Russia, and of some of the officials connected with the defence of Port Arthur.
By the time that the English translation was completed, in the autumn of 1907, it was announced that some of the senior officers who conducted the defence were to be tried by court-martial. In fact, from the copy of the official indictment then published,[2] it seemed as if it might almost have been framed upon material furnished by M. Nojine's book. It was therefore decided to delay publication whilst matters were sub judice. The trial is now over, the result is known to the world, and there seems no reason why the English version of the account by an eye-witness of what went on in the ill-fated Fortress should not be given to the public.
The translator and editor disclaim all responsibility for the statements made and the opinions expressed, which are the author's own.
If he has sometimes been carried beyond the limits of a strictly judicial impartiality, it is, perhaps, in the circumstances, comprehensible. His patriotism must have been again and again outraged by the existing maladministration, while his personal feelings were probably embittered by the treatment which he and those who bore the burden of the defence received.
Though the author, as will be seen by a perusal of his book, is not sparing of censure and is distinctly outspoken in his conclusions, yet he is capable of giving praise when he considers it to be due. Indeed, it is a relief, amongst so much that is depressing, to read his opinion of Generals Smirnoff and Kondratenko amongst others, and his whole-hearted championship of the stolid, dogged Russian soldier who, weighed down by the incompetence of many above him, struggled through those weary months of defeat, privation, and suspense.
Amongst much in this book which gives food for thought there are two or three matters described by the author which are truly extraordinary. For instance, it is difficult to believe that when, after so much threatening, the storm eventually burst and war broke out, Port Arthur—that outpost of the Russian Empire—was so far from being ready that on January 14, 1904, only eight guns of the allotted armament were mounted on the land defences. And yet there is official authority for this statement (see Appendix II.). It is also remarkable that even before the place was finally cut off by complete investment in July, 1904, the troops had to be put on short rations; this seems to have been caused by the subordination, even in war, of the military to other requirements. General Fock's theory also upon fortress warfare (p. 227) is strangely at variance with the practice of his great countryman Todleben, who defended Sevastopol for 349 days, and his reasoning is difficult to follow. Finally, the action of the senior officer of a beleaguered fortress, in disobeying and concealing the official messages which ordered his recall and appointed his successor, seems inconceivable.
Undoubtedly, if a proper organization had existed upon the outbreak of hostilities instead of the inadequate product of a nation's false economy, Port Arthur might have held out for a considerably longer time than it did; but speculation upon the possible results of this is beyond the scope of this preface. Without labouring the morals pointed by this siege, it is clear that policy should wait on military preparedness, that now as of old the internal jealousies within an army are as dangerous to it as the enemy, and that it is still the moral factor that counts most.
In the translation there has of necessity been some abridgement; but an endeavour has been made all through to convey the writer's meaning and, wherever possible, to use his exact words. The chief interest of the work for British readers seems to be in the picture presented of the general conduct of the defence and of the state of affairs in the Fortress rather than in the more technical accounts of the actual fighting, which are very like each other. To those not engaged, the description of an attack on one point bears much resemblance to the descriptions of attacks on other points. It is with this feeling that the necessary curtailment has been made. Some, also, of the author's picturesque writing, which would probably appeal less to the Briton than it would to the Slav, has been eliminated.
All military history must to a certain extent lose in interest for the non-professional reader from the continual occurrence of the names of small places which are only of importance to the military student, and which, even without necessitating a reference to the map, rather break the continuity of the narrative. This is especially so in the case of the recent war, where the majority of the localities referred to are obscure spots, possessing names of Chinese origin which not only are very long and uncouth, but also have a confusing resemblance to each other. Added to this, they have been as a rule spelled differently in every account or on every map. It has, therefore, been decided in this translation to give, wherever possible, the English equivalents of the Russian instead of the Chinese or Japanese names of places, forts, or positions. They are shorter, convey more meaning to the British reader, and therefore so far tend to simplification. This has been thought to outweigh the disadvantages of the fact that they are comparatively unknown, for the Chinese or Japanese names have so far been almost exclusively used in England.
To this rule there are three exceptions. Three localities at Port Arthur possess non-Russian names, which are now almost historic in the English tongue, and for which it would be confusing and almost pedantic to use the Russian equivalents. These are 203 Metre Hill, North Fort Chi-kuan-shan, and Fort Erh-lung-shan, which would not be recognized under their Russian names of High Hill,[3] Fort No. 2, Fort No. 3. For these three places the names already so well known have been used, except in Appendix I. and the table of Appendix III.
As regards the accounts of the fighting and the numbers engaged, it must be borne in mind that the organization of both the Russian and Japanese infantry is different to that existing in the British army, and that where a regiment is mentioned in the text it means three battalions. Thus a division of the East Siberian Rifles (as well as a Japanese active division) consisted of two brigades of two regiments of three battalions each, or twelve battalions.
Finally, a short description of the defences of Port Arthur will, perhaps, elucidate the author's narrative. At the outbreak of war the land defences of the Fortress consisted of the following:
The Chinese Wall, which was a continuous earth rampart extending for some distance round the north of the place.
Five principal permanent works of large size and great strength, arranged in a rough semicircle from sea to sea. Of these, one, No. 5, was not finished at the outbreak of hostilities. Another, No. 6, which was to have completed the girdle on the west, was not commenced. These works are called in the text 'forts.'
Five subsidiary works in the intervals between the principal 'forts.' These were not of such strength as the latter, and were for the most part completed but not armed at the commencement of hostilities. They are called in the text 'fortifications.'
Certain of the batteries on the land side, and a few auxiliary works—such as redoubts, etc.
After the outbreak of war the existing permanent and semi-permanent works were supplemented by a large number of batteries and closed infantry works, in some of which guns were emplaced. These were sited between the other works, or, in some cases, upon special points, and are called 'redoubts' and 'lunettes.' There were also a few open infantry works constructed for the special purpose of 'flanking' others, or for firing over ground in front of them not covered by their own fire. These are here called 'open caponiers,' and should not be confused with the masonry structures called 'caponiers,' placed at the bottom of the deep ditches of the larger works for the defence of those ditches.
Round, between, and behind the forts, fortifications, redoubts, lunettes, etc., a maze of trenches grew up for fire, shelter, and communication, and numerous bomb-proofs, magazines, dressing stations, were also built. In front were wire entanglements, live electric wires, land mines—every obstacle that ingenuity could suggest.
To assist in identification a table has been prepared in which the Russian and the other names (where available) of the localities mentioned are given. A chronological table of the principal events of the siege has been also added.
London, March, 1908.
TABLE OF NAMES
List of Principal Places mentioned, giving their Russian and in some Cases their Other Names.
| Russian Names. | Other Names. | ||
| Principal Works—'Forts.' | |||
| No. 1 Fort (S.E.). | Paiyin-shan Fort; South Fort. | ||
| No. 2 " (N.E.). | North Fort; Chi-kuan-shan; Fort Kitohadai. | ||
| No. 3 " (N.). | Fort Erh-lung-shan; Fort Nirusan. | ||
| No. 4 " (N.W.). | I-tzu-shan Fort. | ||
| No. 5 " (W.). | Tayanko North. | ||
| No. 6 " (S.W.). | |||
| Subsidiary Works—'Fortifications.' | |||
| Fortification No. 1 (S.E.). | South-east Chi-kuan-shan Battery. | ||
| " No. 2 (E.). | Dangerous Mountain. | ||
| " No. 3 (N.). | Sho-zu-shan Fort; Sung-su-shan Fort; Shoju-san. | ||
| " No. 4 (W.). | South An-tzu-shan Fort. | ||
| " No. 5 (S.W.). | Cha-kua-tzu. | ||
| Intermediate, Temporary, and Field Works. | |||
| Takhe Redoubt (S.E.). | South-east Redoubt. | ||
| Rear Redoubt (E.). | |||
| Kuropatkin Lunette (N.E.). | 'Q' Work. | ||
| No. 1 Open Caponier (N.E.). | |||
| Redoubt No. 1 (N.E.). | East Pan-lun-shan Redoubt; East Banrusan. | ||
| No. 2 Open Caponier (N.E.). | 'P' Work. | ||
| Redoubt No. 2 (N.E.). | West Pan-lun-shan Redoubt; West Banrusan. | ||
| No. 3 Open Caponier (N.E.). | 'G' Work; Hachi-maki-yama. | ||
| Water Supply Redoubt (N.). | Fort Kuropatkin. | ||
| Rocky Redoubt (N.). | Railway Redoubt; Lung-yen. | ||
| Temple Redoubt (N.). | |||
| Pan-lun-shan Redoubt (N.W.). | |||
| Flat Hill, No. 1 Redoubt (N.W.). | |||
| " No. 2 " (N.W.). | |||
| " No. 3 " (N.W.). | |||
| " No. 4 " Stone-broken (N.W.). | |||
| Double Angle Lunette (N.W.). | |||
| New Lunette (N.W.). | |||
| Fougasse Lunette (N.W.). | |||
| No. 5 Redoubt (W.). | Quarry Battery. | ||
| No. 4 " (W.). | |||
| Timber Redoubt (S.W.). | |||
| Salt Redoubt (S.W.). | |||
| Quail Hill (centre). | |||
| Land Batteries. | |||
| Cross (S.E.). | |||
| Dragon's Back (E.). | |||
| Dragon's Head (E.). | |||
| 'A' (E.). | |||
| 'B' (N.E.). | |||
| Zaliterny (N.E.). | 'R.' | ||
| Little Eagle's Nest (N.E.). | 'M.' | ||
| Eagle's Nest (N.E.). | Bodai; Wang-tai. | ||
| Zaredoubt (N.). | 'H.' | ||
| Howitzer (N.). | |||
| Wolf's (N.). | 'I.' | ||
| Tumulus (N.). | Sung-su-shan Auxiliary. | ||
| Cemetery (N.W.). | Cemetery. | ||
| 'C' (Sapper) (N.W.). | |||
| Jagged Hill (N.W.). | |||
| Howitzer (N.W.). | |||
| Obelisk Hill (N.W.). | Obelisk Hill. | ||
| Tea (W.). | Stonebroken. | ||
| Pigeon (W.). | |||
| 'D' (W.). | South Tayanko. | ||
| Salt, [? Redoubt] (S.W.). | |||
| Coast Batteries. | |||
| White Wolf. | |||
| No. 1. | } | On Tiger's Peninsula. | |
| " 2. | } | Tiger's Head. | |
| " 3. | } | ||
| " 4. | } | ||
| " 5. | } | ||
| " 6.} | } | }Chi-kuan-shan. | |
| " 7.} | } | ||
| " 8. | } | Man-tzu-ying. | |
| " 9. | } | ||
| " 10. | } | ||
| Lighthouse. | } | ||
| No. 12 (S.). | |||
| " 13, Golden Hill (S.). | |||
| " 14 (S.) | |||
| " 15, Electric Cliff (S.) | |||
| " 16 (S.E.). | Six-inch Gun. | ||
| " 17 (S.E.). | |||
| " 18 (S.E.). | |||
| " 19 (S.E.). | |||
| " 20 (S.E.). | |||
| " 21, Long Battery (S.E.). | |||
| " 22 (S.E.). | |||
| Other Places. | |||
| Kuen-san Hill (N.E.). | Ken-san Hill. | ||
| Sia-gu-shan (E.). | Shokozan; Hsiao-ku-shan. | ||
| Ta-ku-shan (E.). | Ta-ku-shan. | ||
| High Hill (N.W.). | 203 Metre Hill; Royusan. | ||
| Angle Hill (N.W.). | 174 Metre Hill. | ||
| Long Hill (N.W.). | Namakoyama. | ||
| Divisional Hill (N.). | |||
| Flat Hill (N.). | Akasakayama. | ||
| Wolf's Hills (N.E.). | Feng-huang-shen. |
FOOTNOTES:
[1] One hundred and fifty-four days after the close investment.
[2] See Conclusion, p. 336.
[3] There is another hill called High Hill, on the eastern flank, which has been left as such.
CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF PRINCIPAL EVENTS
| 1904 | ||
| Feb. 8. | Japanese torpedo Russian Fleet. | |
| " 25. | Japanese attempt to 'block.' | |
| Mar. 10. | Japanese bombard the harbour. | |
| " 17. | General Smirnoff arrives. | |
| " 22. | Japanese bombard the harbour. | |
| " 25. | Japanese attempt to 'block.' | |
| April 13. | The Petropalovsk blown up by a mine. | |
| " 14. | The Viceroy, Admiral Alexeieff, arrives in PortArthur. | |
| May 2. | Japanese attempt to 'block.' | |
| " 4. | Japanese land at Petsiwo. | |
| " 5. | The Viceroy leaves Port Arthur. | |
| " 15. | The Hatsuse sunk by a Russian mine. The Fujidamaged. | |
| " 16. | Action at Shanshihlipu. | |
| " 20. | Japanese attack by sea. | |
| " 26. | Battle of Kinchou. Dalny evacuated. | |
| June 18. | General Stössel receives a telegram of recall. | |
| " 19. | Sortie of Russian Fleet. Sevastopol damaged bya mine. Japanese attempt to torpedo Russian Fleet. | |
| " 26.} | The fight on Green Hills. Russians lose Kuen-san Hill. | |
| " 27.} | ||
| July 3.} | Russian attempts to recapture Kuen-san fail. | |
| " 4.} | ||
| " 5.} | ||
| " 26.} | Russians driven from Green Hills position. | |
| " 27.} | ||
| " 28.} | ||
| July 29. | Russians driven from Wolf's Hills position. | |
| " 30.} | Investment commences. | |
| " 31.} | ||
| Aug. 8. | Ta-ku-shan and Sia-gu-shan lost by Russians. | |
| " 9. | First attempt to recapture Ta-ku-shan Hill fails. | |
| " 10. | Sortie of the Russian Fleet. | |
| " 11. | Second attempt to recapture Ta-ku-shan Hill fails. | |
| " 16. | Japanese suggest surrender of Port Arthur. | |
| " 21.} | Great Japanese assault. Nos. 1 and 2 Redoubts captured by Japanese. | |
| " 22.} | ||
| " 23.} | ||
| Sept.19. | Japanese capture Water-supply Redoubt. | |
| " 20. | Japanese capture Temple Redoubt. | |
| Oct. 1. | Japanese commence firing from 11-inch howitzers. | |
| " 29.} | General assault by Japanese. No. 2 Open Caponier captured by them. | |
| " 30.} | ||
| Nov. 20-26. | Japanese assaults. | |
| Dec. 5. | 203 Metre Hill captured. | |
| " 6. | Japanese commence to shell Russian ships. | |
| " 15. | General Kondratenko killed. | |
| " 18. | Chi-kuan-shan Fort captured. | |
| " 28. | Erh-lung-shan Fort captured. | |
| " 31. | Fortification No. 3 captured. | |
| 1905. | ||
| Jan. 1. | Eagle's Nest captured. | |
| " 2. | Capitulation signed. | |
CONTENTS
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
[ GENERAL SMIRNOFF]
[ ADMIRAL LOSCHINSKY]
[ COLONEL KHVOSTOFF]
[ ADMIRAL MAKHAROFF]
[ MAJOR-GENERAL TRETIAKOFF]
[ COLONEL LAPEROFF]
[ A WOMAN DRESSED AS A SOLDIER WHO WENT THROUGH SEVERAL FIGHTS]
[ A BOMBPROOF]
[ REAR-ADMIRAL GRIGOROVITCH]
[ INSIDE A TRENCH ON THE EASTERN FRONT]
[ GENERAL GORBATOVSKY]
[ ON THE ATTACKED FRONT]
[ THE ASSAULT REPULSED]
[ BURIAL-PARTIES AT WORK]
[ COLONEL RASCHEVSKY]
[ PANORAMA OF NORTH-EAST FRONT]
[ A CANET GUN MOUNTED ON FORT V., SEPTEMBER 22]
[ A COMPANY IN THE TRENCHES]
[ BOMBARDMENT: JAPANESE SHELLS BURSTING ON HILL]
[ RESULTS OF A BOMBARDMENT]
[ GENERAL SMIRNOFF FIRING THE CAMOUFLET]
[ KUROPATKIN LUNETTE AFTER THE ASSAULT IN OCTOBER]
[ B BATTERY]
[ RESERVES WAITING UNDER 203 METRE HILL]
[ GENERAL BIELY]
[ GENERAL KONDRATENKO]
[ NORTH FORT, CHI-KUAN-SHAN, SHOWING GREEN HILLS IN THE DISTANCE]
[ ADMIRAL WIREN]
THE
TRUTH ABOUT PORT ARTHUR
'Culpam pæna premit comes.'
Port Arthur has fallen....
The bare fact is now a matter of history; but at last the time has come to reckon up in detail all that happened during the blockade by land and sea. As late war correspondent in the theatre of operations in Kwantun, as a close witness of all that took place, and as one who voluntarily went through that terrible time, I look upon it as my sacred duty to narrate what this defence cost the garrison and inhabitants of the unhappy town—to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
All who went through that heartrending siege, and who reflected at all on what was passing before their eyes, became gradually aware of—and finally, I might almost say, resigned to—two great facts. First, that the Fortress Commandant, Lieutenant-General Smirnoff, had two enemies to fight—one inside the Fortress and one out; second, that it was the internal enemy which proved too strong. The immense efforts of General Smirnoff and of his immediate assistants—the late General Kondratenko, Admirals Grigorovitch, Loschinsky, and Wiren, and Generals Biely and Gorbatovsky—were in vain.
Why?
To this question the following pages will, I hope, supply the answer; but, before commencing my narrative, I should explain that I shall only recount facts either confirmed by documentary evidence or witnessed by myself.
THE BOMB-SHELL
When, one hour before midnight on February 8, 1904, our warships began to belch fire from their many steel mouths, and the seaward batteries suddenly thundered forth their angry death-dealing tidings, no one dreamed that the noise was War, for no one had taken the constant rumours of the rupture of diplomatic relations and of approaching hostilities at all seriously. Those who heard the increasing cannonade buoyed themselves up with the vague hope that some surprise combined manœuvres were taking place between the fleet and the coast defences. When three rockets, however, snaked up into the inky night from Golden Hill and burst on high, they told their message, and finally when the gun-fire from Electric Cliff and the adjacent batteries changed to salvos, those who understood the message of the rockets doubted no longer.
Thus was all hope of a peaceful issue to the negotiations with Japan shattered. Our incapable, idle, and utterly short-sighted diplomacy, which had so long and so stupidly exhausted the patience of the Mikado's Government, was now at an end. It was to enjoy a dishonourable repose, whilst others reaped the harvest of its handiwork. The hour had struck for the cold, impartial judgment of history.
Although the sky in the East had for weeks been blood-red with the menace of immediate war, yet when it came the surprise was absolute, its horror intensified by our complete unreadiness.
Regiments hearing the alarm fell in. Officers, surprised in bed, at a ball, at the theatre, or in restaurants, hurried off to march their units to the alarm posts: hurried, but went without speed—for, alas! no one had hitherto taken the trouble to become acquainted with the geography of the Fortress, and the consequence was that most of the troops wandered about unknown roads and hill-tracks, in vain searching for the posts assigned to them. The confusion which ensued was incredible—a fitting prelude to the fall of Port Arthur. Finally, when the troops did arrive at their posts, to their amazement they found in them either no small-arm ammunition at all or else only the ordinary quantity for the guards. To the men it was at first a huge joke; they naturally thought they were only doing a 'sham fight.' But the jest wore off as they sat on through the night, and through the next day, hungry, and chilled to the bone by the pitiless icy wind which was howling down the hill-sides. It was possibly good training for the hardships to follow? It was not until the morning that it struck some bright staff-officer to send up ammunition. This reached the frozen detachments on the following evening, together with the means of cooking. Yes, certainly Luck did favour us sometimes in Port Arthur; she did that night, in that the Japanese did not press a land attack.
While this cheerful state of chaos reigned in the Fortress, on the sea the prologue to the war was already over. One Russian ship alone—the Novik—could be heard, hull down on the horizon, firing at Japanese destroyers. In the town itself a doleful rumour spread apace, that some of our ships had been blown up. It was not believed. We were afraid to believe what we did hear, but did not want to hear the truth, which we dreaded still more.
Next morning Port Arthur woke earlier than usual. Every one wanted to know what had actually happened during the night. Alas! the reports as to Japanese torpedo attacks were only too well founded, and the Cesarevitch, Pallada, and Retvisan were hors de combat. Despite the completeness of the night attack, and the calculating thoroughness with which the enemy had done their work—clearest proof that man could want of the outbreak of war—in the absence of any official communication from the Commandant, the population still hoped against hope. The more impressionable prepared to leave, but otherwise things went on much as usual. At the wharf a crowd collected to look at the Retvisan lying in the entrance to the harbour; from her appearance it was difficult to believe that she had sustained any damage, and the reports were pronounced untrue. The printing office of the Novy Kry was another centre of attraction, every one hustling round to buy a paper with some account of the night's work. But in the paper was no word of war.
Although outwardly the current of life in Port Arthur seemed to flow unruffled, this calm did not extend to those in authority. The staffs, which up to the preceding evening had been peacefully slumbering for six years, were now extraordinarily busy; their activity was proved by the utter confusion which reigned. The disorganization of the Fortress Staff particularly was almost ludicrous: officers hurried hither and thither, contradictory and impossible orders were being issued and countermanded, and above and through all this confusion resounded the ceaseless chattering of the telephone-bells. It was not a sight to inspire confidence. It seemed as if the staff momentarily anticipated some fatal and sudden blow, but did not know what to do in order to ward it off. Colonel Khvostoff, the Chief of the Fortress Staff, and his immediate assistants alone kept their heads. He knew that the time was approaching when every one would see the real state of things, and to what extent the 'stronghold'—Port Arthur—was impregnable. [Several alarmists had already been punished by the Commandant for spreading rumours that many of the batteries were gunless, and many of the guns without ammunition.] He and his predecessor, General Flug, had done all that was in their power, but they might as well have knocked their heads against a wall.
Meanwhile the Viceroy's staff wrote orders, which ended up in the Viceroy's own words: 'You must all keep calm, in order to be able to perform your duty in the most efficient manner possible, trusting to the help of God that every man will do his work, remembering that neither prayers to God nor service for the Tsar are in vain.'
In the outer harbour the Pacific Ocean squadron was lying, steam up and cleared for action, waiting the order to go out and engage the enemy. When, at 10 a.m., the Boyarin, having returned to harbour, signalled that the Japanese fleet was approaching in force, the Viceroy and General Stössel, escorted by a troop of Cossacks, and followed by a numerous suite, went up on to Golden Hill. It certainly was to be hoped that General Stössel, to whom the Emperor had entrusted the Fortress, and who had recently reported to him that it was ready, would 'keep calm' and do his duty 'in the most efficient manner'; but those who were privileged to see him on that historic morning saw no traces of calmness in his demeanour.
After about an hour the presence of the whole Japanese fleet on the horizon was signalled, but the majority of the people knew nothing, and all was quiet in the town. A little later and Port Arthur was paralysed with fear, for the very ground quivered with the shock as the guns of both fleets and of the coast batteries suddenly opened fire. The battle had begun, and the fleet of young Japan, a nation which had only begun to take lessons in Western culture thirty-two years ago, was pitted against that of Russia—founded two hundred years ago by Peter the Great.
In twenty minutes' time 12-inch shells were detonating in the streets of the town, and the population began to flee in panic to the hills. The battle waxed, but there was curious silence on Liao-tieh-shan and Quail Hills—two peaks which commanded the ground all round Port Arthur. The first was armed with a lighthouse and the second with a fire observation-tower! In spite of the fire, but little damage was done on either side—the enemy could not hurt Electric Cliff and Golden Hill, and the bark of our shore batteries was worse than their bite, owing to the short range of their guns. Indeed, owing to lack of guns and ammunition, some of our batteries were actually firing blank, whilst others maintained a haughty silence. Though Russia did not then know of this, the Japanese did, but, with their natural cunning, held their tongues. The British knew of it, and chuckled whilst they kept silence for their allies.
Just before noon the bombardment ceased, and the Japanese fleet steamed off. The first wild panic subsided and the little railway-station was soon crowded with fugitives, all anxious to depart.
What the Viceroy, Alexeieff, said to Stössel that day is hidden by a veil of obscurity, but that he decided to remove him from the post of General admits of not the slightest doubt, for Lieutenant-General Konstantine Nikolaevitch Smirnoff was chosen by the War Minister to supersede Stössel as Commandant, and left Warsaw for Port Arthur on February 25.
SETTLING DOWN TO IT
From that day onwards Port Arthur was, after dusk, plunged in complete darkness, the screened windows and deserted streets giving an ominous impression of desolation. The town became noticeably empty, though numerous families, anxious to share the fate of husbands and fathers, were still allowed to remain. In spite of the Viceroy's order (No. 49) that all families should be sent out of the besieged Fortress, General Stössel made no effort to enforce this. In vain it was pointed out that women—except nurses—and children are a most undesirable element in a fortress: he took no action.
About this time much valuable time and labour was wasted by Stössel on the construction of an inner wall[4] with a ditch round the Old Town. The futility of this as a defence would have struck a first year's cadet, for it ran all along the hollow in which the town was situated, and would therefore be absolutely useless should the Japanese seize the hills in rear of the line of forts. Whilst he thus squandered time, labour, and money on this 'folly,' Stössel delayed the work on the forts, and paid no attention to the fortification of that most important position—Kinchou.
Another curious point about the conduct of affairs was that officers were strictly forbidden to make themselves acquainted with the topography of the Fortress. In fact, the object seemed to be to handicap our forces as much as possible by ignorance of the ground, for practice manœuvres were only held once, and the troops which had taken part in these manœuvres and were the only ones that knew the ground—the 3rd Siberian Rifle Division—were sent away to the Yalu. Their places were taken by corps fresh from Siberia.
Though Russian officers were not allowed to learn their way about the Fortress, numbers of officers of the Japanese General Staff, disguised as washermen, coolies, etc., were permitted to move about the batteries without hindrance. No one watched them. Not only were they able to learn all they desired and to make maps, but they drew up accurate range-tables for the siege-guns which afterwards did such brilliant service. When Smirnoff arrived and organized a fortress gendarmerie this was put a stop to.
The supply question was another branch of the organization that was shockingly mismanaged. Slaughter cattle, etc., were largely requisitioned from the surrounding district, but, owing to the disgraceful system of accounts and to the fact that the civil authorities in charge of the work were much under-staffed, only about one-half of what was available was obtained. In spite of the advice and protests of Colonel Vershinin, the Chief Commissary for the civil population, Stössel went his own way and quite serenely left the Fortress under-supplied. After the departure of the Viceroy to Mukden he assumed complete control of the commissariat, and, in addition to the failure of the system as far as supplies went, earned the resentment of all the civilians by the severity of his regulations. The Chinese naturally tried to drive away their cattle into Manchuria, as the requisitioning price was not a large one, and after a proclamation issued by Stössel on February 21, by which requisitioning was still more restricted, they were largely successful. Thus, with a close blockade looming in the near future, the district round the Fortress was being denuded of live-stock.
Stössel's influence was not confined to the question of slaughter cattle. As the armies in the north gradually concentrated, a horde of officers turned up in Port Arthur trying to purchase supplies of every sort, and whole vans of sugar, flour, salt, tinned milk, green foods, preserved fish and meat, etc., were actually allowed to be taken from this important fortress—a fortress separated by many thousands of miles from Russia, blockaded by sea, and expecting, according to the natural course of events, to be blockaded also by land. General Stössel, who wrote in his order No. 126, of February 27, that there could be no retirement, since the sea was on three sides and the enemy on the fourth, allowed—nay, encouraged—the export of articles of vital importance. There was, consequently, in October, November, and December a shortage, which brought on an epidemic of scurvy. To all protests he replied that Kuropatkin would never allow us to be cut off, and, if we were cut off, it would only be for a very brief period. When the protests were repeated he 'came the senior officer,' and said that, as Commandant of the besieged Fortress, he would stand no interference. The civil authorities, who were under him, watched with silent indifference the melting away of our reserves. Several of the shopkeepers, indeed, hearing that supplies of every kind were badly wanted by the army in the north, themselves began to despatch truckloads. The state of affairs was almost a burlesque. Port Arthur, instead of being a fortress preparing itself for a siege, might have been a sort of general market, a principal supply depôt for the main army, to which every one came to do business, or to gamble, and dissipate, for although Stössel allowed only three restaurants for general use and closed the gambling hells, rowdyism was rampant and money flowed like water. Never in my life have I witnessed such orgies as I saw that February in Arthur before the arrival of General Smirnoff, and this in spite of the most severe efforts at prevention.
Whenever I passed by the fire-brigade station in the morning I heard the swish of whips and the heartrending shrieks of men being flogged for drunkenness, for permission had been given to the Chief of the Police to correct drunkards with some 'homely treatment.' The usual procedure was as follows: The men to be corrected—workmen, cab-drivers, Chinamen—were drawn up in the prison courtyard. The inspector presented the charge-sheet, and the police-officer stopped in front of each prisoner.
'What have you to say?'
'Sir, yesterday——'
'One hundred lashes, two weeks' cells. Next. What have you to say?'
'Yesterday, sir——'
'One hundred lashes, to-day and to-morrow.'
And so on to the end. And then these God's creatures, some of them future heroes who died for the honour and glory of Russia, were removed and flogged. Later, owing to the protests of the Chief of the Fire Brigade, the flogging was carried out in the prison-house, where it was still more cruel. I know that men are flogged in Russia, but there it is only after trial. With us in Arthur things were more simple, more patriarchal.
During that time laws did not exist in Arthur. Once when Colonel Vershinin, the Civil Commissary, remarked with regard to an order that it was illegal, a staff-officer replied: 'How can you have laws on service? General Stössel's orders are law for us.' And this was the state of affairs right up to the capitulation, more especially after Stössel's appointment as aide-de-camp to the Tsar.
After he had left the garrison and the sick and wounded to their fate and departed to Russia, Japanese military law came into force. It was strict, but it did not prevent freedom.
On February 22 we perused the following order by the Commandant with fear and trembling:
'Colonel Petrusha will ride round the Old and New Towns and the New Chinese Town, and will make prisoners of all men who are drunk or disorderly, and anyone else whom he may consider it necessary to arrest.'
This was alarming. Colonel Petrusha authorized to arrest 'anyone'? Several people went to the military Procurator to find out what it meant. It would be dangerous to go out in the streets, for if Colonel Petrusha thought it 'necessary' he would arrest you. The following day you would be up under the cold grey eye of the Chief of the Police. He would ask, 'What have you to say?' and you would be flogged. The only advice that the Procurator could give us was to be careful and retiring.
As February passed guards were placed along the whole of the railway-line from Tashihchiao to Arthur, and guns were mounted near the longer bridges, for bands of Hunhuses were now on the prowl. Train-loads of soldiers from the reserve battalions arrived every day, and the confusion and lack of system shown in their distribution were hopeless. Though all concerned strove to appear busy, it was mainly in the direction of writing orders that their energy was expended.
The general mental attitude towards the enemy was at this time remarkable, for from Stössel down to the last-joined recruit all professed the greatest contempt for the Japanese. The whole nation was judged by the specimens seen in Port Arthur. 'A Japanese? Pooh! he's a mosquito. Why, I'll stick a pin through him and send him home in a letter,' was a favourite remark of the moment. The General commanding the 4th Rifle Division, who led Stössel by the nose, absolutely, assured all and sundry that the Japanese were 'fools.' 'The Japanese are fools, because in their field regulations it is laid down, that in the attack, the firing-line should extend at wide intervals.' Sitting on his horse in front of the regiments under his command, he would explain this, and then say: 'Front rank, tell me why the Japanese are fools.' The soldiers would shout in chorus: 'Because, when attacking, their firing-line extends widely.' Is it to be wondered that our men thought the Japanese fools—till their first engagement, and that after systematically retiring before the 'fools' and suffering heavy losses they lost confidence in their General?
Having spent more than a year in Japan, I knew of the enemy's energetic preparations for war. But our people would neither pay attention to the serious articles in the newspapers nor to the warnings of their own keen officers who had been through the Chinese campaign. The majority, especially those who had recently come from European Russia, preferred to accept Fock's estimate, for, thanks to the inferiority of our professional military literature, the army had no idea of what modern Japan was like, and in particular of her military strength. This stupidity and ignorance was shameful and sad. Whose fault was it?
On the whole, the daily life in the town little resembled that in a besieged fortress, for there was a false sense of security, and people did not seem to realize the position. Because, since bombarding us on February 9, the enemy's fleet had disappeared and made no sign, people almost believed we were not at war, and things went on as before. The population, especially the garrison, believed that everything was 'all right,' and, together with their commanders, carelessly passed the time without worrying about the future.
'Why, if there was a chance of our being cut off, do you suppose for a minute that Stössel would let supplies be sent out? Do you really imagine that the Japanese can wage war on two fronts? They are concentrating against the main army on the Yalu, and Stössel says the more that land in Kwantun the better. He will take them all prisoners,' were remarks made. Nearly all talked similar nonsense, and, what's more, believed it, and beyond mining the shores, carried out by Admiral Loschinsky, no precautions were taken to prevent a landing.
A certain amount of activity was visible within the Fortress. We commenced laying a fortress telegraph, but the system was overhead. Both the telephone and telegraph systems worked very badly when they were installed, and their faults were intensified when falling shells cut the wires. It was usually quicker to send an orderly than to attempt to get a telephone message through the exchange. Not only was the system unreliable, it was also unsafe, for the private and military lines were all together, so that, owing to the induction, anyone could overhear the most secret military message. Such a state of affairs in a besieged fortress was a monstrosity. One might have thought that at a place like Port Arthur a proper telephone system would have been organized in peace-time. But no! A system had been worked out by a certain captain of artillery, and the money had been allotted; but when the time came this officer was sent to the north, and the scheme was not carried out. The question of what happened to this money would form an excellent subject for an inquiry.
In addition to his intense activity in writing profuse orders, Stössel developed a mania about 'signalling.' He was convinced that the enemy were being continually signalled to from the hills, and the strictest orders were issued to watch day and night for the culprits. The hills were always being patrolled, and 'signaller-catching' became a kind of amusement. Even the civilians joined in, although anyone who gave the matter a thought knew that the Japanese would not require to have messages sent them when they already knew every inch of the place; but owing to this practice many an innocent human being was wafted to a better world. An order on the subject—No. 120, of February 26—ran as follows:
'Although twenty men were caught yesterday in the act of making some kind of signals, about 3 a.m. this morning some one was seen signalling with a lantern between my house and the commissariat depôt. It was impossible to catch him, as he ran off to the New Chinese Town. Pickets detailed for this work will in future fire on any men seen signalling, if they run.'
Though in the majority of cases, of course, the military procurator was unable to produce any proof of guilt against the Chinamen arrested, after this order they were shot like partridges.
Though many were lulled into a false security by the absence of any military operations by the enemy since their first attack, yet to every one the complete state of unpreparedness of the Fortress, as well as the chaos reigning in every corner of it, was patent. In vino veritas, and in the restaurants and clubs the strongest opinions were expressed about Stössel and his actions by those who had exceeded. So much of this criticism went on that a special order upon the subject was issued:
'It has come to my knowledge that in the garrison club officers busy themselves over matters which do not concern them, criticize the course of the military operations, and repeat various stupid stories, picked up from God knows where. An officer's duty is to think how best to carry out his orders, and not to judge the actions of his seniors. Those who cavil do much harm, and I, of course, will punish them to the utmost of my power.'
After this tongues ceased to wag, for it was known that the Commandant had wonderful ears. Officers even began to suspect each other of espionage and tale-bearing.
FOOTNOTES:
[4] The Central Wall.
DEVELOPMENTS
At 1 a.m. on February 25 some destroyers, which were covering the advance of a blocker[5] towards the narrows into the harbour, attempted to torpedo the Retvisan. The battleship sank one destroyer, while the blocker was set on fire, and ran on the rocks of Tiger Peninsula. Here she lay blazing close to the Retvisan, a source of extreme danger, as she might at any moment blow up. Later on the enemy's fleet appeared on the horizon. The Bayan, Novik, and Askold, lying in the outer Roads, at once moved out and engaged it. From the hill I was on, I watched that rare picture, a fight at sea; but it did not last long. In face of a force four times their own strength, our ships were finally forced to seek shelter under the guns of the Fortress. Just at the end of this fight one of two of our destroyers, returning from night reconnaissance, was forced by the enemy's cruisers to beach herself. This was entirely due to the unfortified state of Liao-tieh-shan.
On February 28 a remarkable order by Stössel was published in the Novy Kry. It was also telegraphed all over the whole world, and presumably redounded to the credit of its author:
'The troops know well, and I now make known to the civilians, that there will be no retirement; in the first place, the Fortress must fight to the last, and I, as its Commandant, will never give the order to retreat; in the second, there is no place to which to retreat....'
As a matter of fact, Stössel, quâ Commandant of the Fortress, never did give an order to retreat, because the question did not arise; but, as Officer Commanding the Kwantun District, which district he abandoned within two months, he surrendered the Fortress, despite the protests of the then Commandant, General Smirnoff, and the whole of the Council of Defence.
In spite of the extensive range of subjects touched upon in the literature issued in the shape of orders, it was astonishing how little was said about the defences proper of the Fortress, which were still in the most incomplete state, or of the Kinchou position, where practically nothing had been done. It was only in an order of March 7 that the works were mentioned for the first time, and then it was the Central Wall—already mentioned as a monumental folly—which called for attention! The cost of this folly in cash was £20,000; its cost in work left undone elsewhere cannot be estimated.
As we were not disturbed by the enemy from February 25 to March 10, we had time in Port Arthur to attend to home affairs. About March 4 Stössel received a wire from a certain General Bogdanovitch. In this the sender congratulated him on his victories, and expressed the hope that Arthur would give birth to new Nakhimoffs, Korniloffs, and Istomins. The telegram was quite genuine. It was thought that such a siege would certainly produce some heroes. Smirnoff and Kondratenko were not then known, and Bogdanovitch's kind wishes evidently referred to Stössel and his assistants, whose names had been well before the public since the Boxer campaign. Lieutenant Prince Karseladse of the 25th Regiment, who knew very well what was really going on, sent a reply wire to Bogdanovitch, to the effect that:
'There are no Nakhimoffs here; there is nothing but miserable incompetence.'
This wire was not despatched, but was handed over to Stössel. As a result, a District Order upon the subject of official telegrams was issued, and the sender of this message was placed under arrest and tried by court-martial. He was sentenced to some days' arrest. For reporting well on the prisoner, the report being made at the request of the court, Colonel Selinen, who commanded his regiment, was deprived of his command by Stössel, and immediately left for Russia.
One morning towards the end of February, I was informed by an aide-de-camp that Stössel wanted to see me. He received me very affably, but at once gave me to understand, not rudely, but in unmistakable terms, that he was General Stössel and I was only Nojine. On my asking to what extent the defences were ready, and in particular those stretching for miles on the land side, he said:
'I must tell you that I am a fighting infantry General, and don't understand anything about the Fortress or its surroundings. I am here temporarily. As you know, I have been appointed to command the 3rd Siberian Army Corps, which is on its way to the Yalu, and am only waiting for the new Commandant to arrive. He will soon put everything in order.'
'And under whom will Kinchou be?'
'Under him—under him. He is a most competent and clever officer. The papers say he has passed through almost ten academies. Why, he'll be a walking encyclopædia. My duty is to fight, and not to run a fortress. Lord! what a deuce of a lot of money has been spent on it! How can the Japanese, yellow-skinned little devils that they are, get into the place?' He then went on to threaten me with the awful things that would happen to journalists generally, and to me in particular, if we were not careful, and ended by saying that in the Fortress the Commandant was 'both God and the Tsar.' Only one thing comforted me as I left, and that was that Stössel was not long destined to be the Commandant of Port Arthur.
While we in the Fortress exhausted our energies on the useless Central Wall, Rear-Admiral Loschinsky, who had arrived on February 11, organized a mine defence of the Liaotun Peninsula, paying particular attention to Dalny, where the enemy might land. He then drew up a scheme for mining the Port Arthur waters, and every place which seemed suitable for a landing. Unfortunately, after the sad accident to the Yenisee and Boyarin, the officer commanding the fleet was very sceptical about the value of submarine mines, more especially as he believed that three months would see us again in command of the sea. On March 8 Vice-Admiral Makharoff, who had just been appointed to the command of the fleet, arrived, and great naval activity was at once noticeable; the dockyard literally hummed with work. After many attempts, the Retvisan was on the same day successfully floated off the shoal at Tiger's Tail, and taken to the western basin, a coincidence which made a great impression. The officer to command the balloon park also arrived; but there were neither balloons nor materials of which to make them, as when the Manchuria was captured in the beginning of the war they fell into the hands of the enemy, together with a large quantity of ammunition. We used later on to watch with great interest our own balloon float up from behind Wolf's Hills. It spent much time in the air, but not for our amusement; for while it, our own balloon, was watching, our own shells were shrieking on their way towards us.
ADMIRAL LOSCHINSKY.
In the early hours of March 10 our destroyer division went out scouting. At dawn they were engaged by the enemy, and we lost the Steresguschy, which was sunk. At 8.18 the enemy's fleet appeared off Liao-tieh-shan. At 8.30 three battleships and two light cruisers separated from the rest and took up their position about a mile from that hill, whose cliffs ran at right angles to our shore front. None of our batteries could fire on them, and Liao-tieh-shan had on it, as already stated, instead of guns, a lighthouse. They were in 'dead water.' It was impossible for us to use high-angle fire, controlled from the highest point of that hill, against these ships, for the gun-mountings in the seaward batteries did not allow of enough elevation or of all-round fire. Telephone connexions to the observation-posts also were then only in the process of construction. This simple manœuvre of the enemy rendered us absolutely helpless.
At 8.45 a.m. an incessant roar commenced, followed by the detonation of 12-inch shells in the New Town. It was galling to see these shells falling and no action being taken on our part. The Fortress Staff every moment were receiving information of the damage being done to the New Town, but could do nothing to drive off the enemy's ships, which lay in three lines under shelter. The first line fired systematically and deliberately, evidently trying to hit our ships and the harbour, for several of the shells struck the port workshops, and fell into the western and eastern basins. At 11 the firing suddenly ceased, and our observation post reported that the first line was steaming off, their stations being taken by the battleships in the second line. At 11.25 they started again. This time all the shells fell in the inner harbour; some even struck the ships, but did not stop the work. About 1 p.m. the enemy steamed off in a south-easterly direction and disappeared. From 9.30 a.m. to 1 p.m. the Japanese had fired 208 12-inch shells, and none of us will ever forget our humiliation that we should have been shelled by a fleet which could come right up to our shores, but which we could not touch.
From March 10 all work on the armament of the place came to a standstill, save for guns being dragged up and mounted on Liao-tieh-shan. In the fleet and the port alone was work hurriedly pushed on, for the artificers from the Baltic yards began to arrive from St. Petersburg. These, under the immediate supervision and direction of that energetic and clever engineer Kuteynikoff, set to work to repair the ships, and things hustled.
While work was thus being feverishly carried on in the port, the military garrison, bored by the want of occupation, got out of hand, and soldiers took to highway robbery. This became so common that private persons feared to go out alone.
COLONEL KHVOSTOFF.
FOOTNOTES:
[5] A blocker is a ship which is intentionally sunk so as to block up the entrance to a port or a channel.—E.D.S.
SMIRNOFF ARRIVES
At last!
It was on the footboard of a railway-carriage, lighted up by the glimmer of a railway-station lamp, that we first saw Smirnoff, for he arrived in Port Arthur at midnight on March 17. Though quite grey-headed, as he stepped out on to the platform in the uniform of an officer of the General Staff, he seemed the embodiment of energy. Casting on all around a keen glance, which expressed determination and capability, he gave utterance to a few polite sentences—for all the senior commanders were there to meet him—and drove off at once to his quarters with Lieutenant-Colonel Khvostoff, his Chief of the Staff. It is difficult for anyone who was not actually present to appreciate the pleasing impression he gave. No sooner had he arrived than he began to get a grip of affairs in Port Arthur, and accompanied by his trusted and indefatigable assistant, General Kondratenko, set to work to fortify and arm the Fortress. These two men spent days together going over the landward defences.
On March 17 Stössel issued a farewell order preparatory to departing to command the 3rd Siberian Army Corps. In it he said that 'Arthur is now an impregnable stronghold.' The Novy Kry objected to publish this order, as it was obviously inaccurate. It was all very well to tell those not in the know that Arthur was 'impregnable,' but why say so to us, who had gone through three bombardments, and especially that of March 10? Report it to St. Petersburg—yes: St. Petersburg was many miles away; but why stultify himself before the whole garrison?
Having inspected the line of forts, batteries, and earthworks on the landward, and part of those on the seaward side, General Smirnoff was horrified at what he found. The heavy semi-permanent works which it was proposed to construct in order to complete the girdle of fortifications as laid down by Imperial order, were either not begun or in a very embryonic condition; and it was the same with the laying of the armoured concrete for casemated buildings—work which required time. Scarcely anything was being done to the intermediate field-works. There, where menacing works sprang up afterwards within five months, were now naked rocks. Military roads had alone been made—many of them by the Chinese. The sites for Little and Big Eagle's Nests, Zaredoubt, Zaliterny, Tumulus, Cemetery Batteries, Obelisk Hill, and Fort No. 6, were then rock as bare as my hand; they had not been even traced out on the ground. The strengthening of Fort No. 5 had not been commenced. On the greater number of old fortifications to be strengthened, but which were not yet completed, guns had not even been mounted, or had been so badly mounted that the work would have to be done over again. Of a third line of defence no one had even thought. It was the same with 203 Metre Hill, Divisional Hill, Long Hill, Flat Hill, Angle Hill, Ta-ku-shan and Sia-gu-shan Hills, etc. In a word, a picture of absolute unpreparedness was unfolded before the new Commandant. This was alarmingly increased by the fact that the different advanced works were very badly sited, and badly designed for their sites at that. He decided to depart considerably from the proposed plan of the polygon of defences, and found it necessary to move several of the works forward, and to strengthen the above-mentioned hills, well knowing that once the Japanese got possession of Kinchou and a strict blockade commenced on land, the Fortress could not long hold out in the state in which he found it. With his arrival all the best men, headed by the late General Kondratenko, joined hands, and the work proceeded apace. Though the gangs of Chinamen employed on the earthworks day and night were large, they were not large enough, and a dearth of labour was at once felt. The Chinese would not agree to work for the fairly high wage offered to them, and began gradually to slink away to Chifu. The Japanese spread proclamations among them, of which the following—a typical one—was published:
'Port Arthur will soon be cut off, and then captured. No Chinaman who has in any way assisted the Russians to defend the place will be given quarter.'
All the labour of fortifying and arming the Fortress fell upon the 7th East Siberian Rifle Division, under General Kondratenko, and upon the reserve battalions. The work done by these simple, rough Russians was the work of Titans, and only those who watched them delving, shoving, and hauling on the slopes of those rocky hills for months can appreciate what the labour was.
General Stössel, hanging 'twixt heaven and earth, daily expecting orders to leave for the corps he commanded, now 'sat very tight.' All to whom Arthur and the honour and glory of Russia were dear were delighted, for they were convinced that in the hands of Smirnoff and Kondratenko the place would be transformed into a veritable inaccessible stronghold, if not too late. The Commandant held long and constant consultations with the officer in command of the fleet, at which combined operations were worked out, in case the enemy should land. Liao-tieh-shan was rapidly and energetically fortified. Canet guns were got into position, new telephone-lines were constructed, and the finishing touches were put to the mine defences. Arrangements were also made for high-angle fire over this hill, in case the Japanese fleet should attempt to repeat their tactics of March 10, and the guns in the coast batteries were mounted so as to allow of all-round traverse, and greater angle of elevation, and others were borrowed from the navy. The gunboats Otvajny and Giliak were stationed in the narrows as look-outs, and the cruisers issued at night by turns into the outer roads for the same purpose. Work went right merrily, confidence increased, and every one grew calmer.
STÖSSEL STAYS
Early on the morning of March 22 the enemy's fleet, in three divisions, consisting of six battleships, six armoured cruisers, and six second and third class cruisers, slowly approached us from different directions. At 7 a.m. our cruiser squadron, led by the Askold, flying the flag of the officer in command, slipped out into the outer Roads. In rear of them steamed the battleships. The enemy moved towards Liao-tieh-shan, and at 9.30 opened fire with their 12-inchers, which at measured intervals thundered forth one after another. First a bright yellow spurt of flame tinged with red, a little cloud of smoke, then the boom of a gun, followed by the horrid groan of the shell hurtling through the air, and the final crack of the burst.
From the top of Quail Hill the whole scene was clearly visible—the Fortress, the sea, and the ships. That day the Japs again fired 208 shells, the majority of which fell in the narrows, in the western basin, on Liao-tieh-shan, or in its vicinity; but their shooting was bad. We replied by indirect fire, and also enfilade fire from our ships, lying in the outer Roads. By 11 o'clock we got in several hits, and the enemy moved off, and, in spite of their superiority in numbers, did not attempt to prolong the battle. A good instance of the disregard shown by the army to these naval bombardments occurred that day. When the gun-fire ceased the rattle of musketry was heard from the direction of Pigeon Bay, and on the Commandant telephoning to ascertain what it was, it turned out that a company commander was merely putting his men through musketry.
The rest of that day we heard the names of Smirnoff and Makharoff on all sides, but never a word of Stössel.
As soon as General Smirnoff had inspected the position at Kinchou, he saw of what enormous strategical importance it was, and he gave orders for it to be fortified with the utmost rapidity, and in his order No. 228, of March 23, he authorized the Fortress Commanding Engineer to draw £1,000 for this purpose from the Defence Fund. As I have said before, the position was under the actual command of General Fock, commanding the 4th Rifle Division. What Fock accomplished between the beginning of hostilities up to May 26 the reader will see in the following pages.
After midnight on March 25 the sky cleared, and the moon lit up the sleeping town and harbour. In the inner roads the shapes of our ships and the closely-crowded destroyers looked black against the transparent blue of the quiet night. There was no sound in the Roads. The darkness increased, and seemed to be cut into by the rays of the searchlights. Suddenly a single shot rang out from the narrows, then another, then a cannonade commenced from the seaward batteries. The blockers at it again? It was, and despite the hail of shot, they continued at full speed straight for the boom. Three of them got right up close to the entrance, and then, suddenly turning to starboard, dashed at full speed on to the rocks under Golden Hill. The fourth first turned to port, then sank just out of the fairway, riddled with shell.
Every day after riding round the positions Smirnoff consulted with Generals Kondratenko[6] and Biely,[7] and Colonels Grigorenko[8] and Khvostoff.[9] In conjunction with them, he settled the most important questions re future work. His labours cannot be judged from his written orders, for he had no time to write—questions were decided on the spot. He gave his verbal orders there and then, and they were at once carried out.
From day to day we expected to hear of Stössel's departure, but instead, officers of the 3rd Corps began coming in to him. It was rumoured that he would operate with his corps in the peninsula, and might never go to the Yalu. We were afraid to think that he might remain, and all who valued Arthur as the mainstay of Russia in the Far East hoped that such a trial might be spared us. But the blow fell, and dire was the shock when we read his Orders of March 27:
'... I have received the following telegram from the Viceroy:
'"It is the Imperial wish that you should assume temporary command of the land defences in the Kwantun district, the Commandant of the Fortress being under your orders. You will exercise the full powers of an officer in command of an independent corps, directly under the Officer Commanding the Manchurian Army. The Commandant of the Fortress will have the powers of an officer commanding a corps which is not independent...."
'General Roznatovsky, Chief of the Staff of the 3rd Siberian Army Corps, is also appointed to be Chief Staff Officer of the District, and the Commandant of the Fortress and the Officer Commanding the 4th Rifle Brigade will send all orders and information, etc., into the office of 3rd Siberian Army Corps.
'Stössel, Lieutenant-General.'
'"It is the Imperial wish that you should assume temporary command of the land defences in the Kwantun district, the Commandant of the Fortress being under your orders. You will exercise the full powers of an officer in command of an independent corps, directly under the Officer Commanding the Manchurian Army. The Commandant of the Fortress will have the powers of an officer commanding a corps which is not independent...."
This was the worst piece of news we heard during the whole siege.
The 29th of March was the sixth anniversary of our occupation of Port Arthur. For six years we had been spending millions on the fortifications, on building Dalny, and in constructing a railway from distant Russia. What was the result when war commenced? Does Russia realize the gigantic work done by Smirnoff and the garrison under him? No, not yet.
When it was reported to General Smirnoff that quantities of articles of the first importance were being exported from the Fortress, he at once issued an order forbidding it. He received several complaints, but adhered to his decision. The dissatisfied ones then went to the Officer Commanding the District to complain about the Commandant. Among them was a school friend of mine, Captain Radetsky, who was acting as a commissariat officer, and had come from the main army to buy what he could. He took away several waggon-loads.
In spite of the very strict orders about not exporting, Stössel wrote to Smirnoff that he considered exportation should be permitted, and he sanctioned the request made to him to take out supplies, and asked Smirnoff to rescind his orders. Smirnoff at once instructed the Chief of the Gendarmes to see that his orders were carried out to the letter, adding that any neglect would entail a court-martial. To the Officer Commanding the District he politely explained that he could not permit anything to be taken out of the Fortress which was entrusted to him, and which might any day be strictly blockaded. The confusion caused by this interference can be imagined.
Day followed day and Easter came and went, but work during the holiday stopped for one day only.
FOOTNOTES:
[6] O.C. the Fortress Division.
[7] O.C. Fortress Artillery.
[8] O.C. Fortress Engineers.
[9] Chief of the Fortress Staff.
THE WORK OF JAPANESE MINE-LAYERS
At 7 o'clock on the evening of April 12 our destroyer division of eight ships went out, in beautiful weather, to do a long reconnaissance. By 10 the weather had rapidly changed for the worse, and the sky was overcast. A thick sea mist covered the water and it was hailing. In such a night there was nothing to prevent the Japs getting within half a cable of the place without being discovered. Notwithstanding the little practice our men had had at sea in peace-time, they were not at all put out by the weather. Those who assert that Russians do not make good sailors, lie: all they want is good leaders. By midnight our destroyers drew near a group of islands, and here the fog and murk of the pouring rain were so thick that it was impossible for the vessels to distinguish one another. Around were solid darkness and deathly silence, broken only by the beat of the engines. Owing to the fog, the proximity of the islands, and the rocky nature of the coast, the division kept at low speed, being only able to get its bearings by the cries of the gulls roosting on the shore hard by. About midnight among the islands the Strashny lost touch with the rest. At 2 o'clock she made out some lights, and thinking them to belong to her division, steamed slowly towards them, only to be met as dawn broke by a sudden broadside. Instead of being with our ships, she was in the middle of six Japanese destroyers and two two-funnelled cruisers.
Returning the fire, the commander ordered 'full steam ahead' and made for Port Arthur; but it was too late. The enemy had everything in their favour—numbers, strength, and speed. The Strashny was overhauled and riddled. But though Captain Urasovsky, who was commanding, and all the crews of the bow guns were killed almost at once, and she was soon full of dead and dying men, the engines still worked. She had not been deprived of her life, her mobility—and she moved. Life was dear to every man aboard her, and they fought like devils. Lieutenant Malaeff, upon whom the command had now devolved, was everywhere—now forward, now aft—giving orders and encouragement. In him the desire to live beat strong, and a faint hope of assistance or of escape made him disregard the slaughter all around him, the enemy's increasing fire—all else but the main chance. Sub-Lieutenant Akinfieff fell wounded in the side; the crew were falling fast. The swish, crack, and whistle of shells was mingled with the groans, prayers, and shrieks of the wounded.
Choosing a favourable moment, Malaeff fired a torpedo from the stern tube at the nearest cruiser, and hit. She heeled over and stopped, and the other cruiser and two of the destroyers went to her aid. Things now looked better, as only four destroyers were left against the Strashny. Encouraged by what Malaeff had done, torpedo-man Cherepanoff dashed to the other torpedo-tube; but he had not got hold of the firing-lever when a shell struck the torpedo and exploded it, with awful results. Engineer-mechanic Dmitrieff was blown in half, and every man near was killed. The engines stopped. The Japs also stopped, and continued firing at a range of 80 yards. Akinfieff, who up till now had been still able to give orders, was struck by another shell. The last 47-millimetre gun was disabled; the vessel was penetrated below water-line, and must sink. Convinced that there was no chance, Malaeff raised the head of his dead comrade Dmitrieff, kissed him, then returned to the crew. 'Better die than surrender,' he said, and, going to the quick-firer, which had been taken off a blocker, he fired point-blank at the enemy.
The fire of this little gun brought down the bridge of one of the destroyers and the funnel of another. The Japanese, infuriated at such dogged resistance, mercilessly shelled the Strashny. Malaeff fell, wounded in the temple. The little vessel, her deck a-wash with blood and loaded with dead and dying men, began to settle. Suddenly the enemy ceased fire and were seen to be sheering off: the Smiely had put out from Liao-tieh-shan to the rescue. But it was too late, for the Strashny sank, leaving behind but a trail of crimson bubbles and some wounded struggling in the water. Of four officers and forty-eight men only five were saved, picked up under a heavy fire by the Bayan, which had come out.
The danger for the Bayan while rescuing the wounded increased every moment, for the fire of six big ships and a destroyer division, which had come up, was now concentrated upon her. But our fleet dashed upon the scene, the Petropalovsk leading, and the remainder in single column after her. Getting into battle formation, and being joined by the Bayan, the fleet steamed towards the enemy, and, opening fire, drove them off. In the distance, more than hull-down, could be seen the enemy's main fleet, consisting of eighteen ships: both of his divisions were moving towards Liao-tieh-shan to concentrate. Our fleet had turned and begun to change front under the protection of the guns of the Fortress, when suddenly a great column of water shot up by the stem of the Petropalovsk, and there boomed forth the dull sound of a submarine explosion, followed immediately by a second and louder report. The whole of the centre of the huge battleship was enveloped in a sheet of flame and a cloud of yellow-brown smoke. Her stern rose high out of water and her screws glistened in the sun as they whizzed round, racing. In a minute and a half the Petropalovsk had ceased to exist: where she had been was cold, dirty water, flecked with foam.
ADMIRAL MAKHAROFF.
The explosion was witnessed by many, and was signalled to the harbour from Golden Hill, so the town received the awful news almost at once; but no one knew any further details, nor wished to believe that Makharoff had perished with his ship, and I shall never forget the consternation in the harbour as reports were anxiously awaited. At last the Captain of an incoming destroyer shouted through his megaphone: 'The Petropalovsk has gone down, and with her the Admiral: they are searching for his body.'
And what was the cause of this catastrophe? On the preceding night the Admiral had been on the Diana, which was doing duty in the outer Roads. Some small ships were sighted from the cruiser behind Flat Cape. Makharoff thought they were our destroyers, and despite convincing proofs that they were not, he would not open fire. They were Japanese laying mines, one of which destroyed the Petropalovsk and injured the Pobieda.
And so perished the gallant Admiral whose command of the fleet had in an incredibly short time done wonders, and who, had he been spared, might have changed the whole course of after-events.
NEWS FROM THE NORTH
The Viceroy[10] arrived in Arthur and assumed command of the fleet on April 14. Evidently anxious to ascertain what impression had been made by the death of Admiral Makharoff and the destruction of the Petropalovsk, the Japanese showed up again at 9 a.m. on the 15th, the approach of the fleet creating quite a flutter amongst the inhabitants. We all got nervous, and prepared for a fourth bombardment. Steaming towards Liao-tieh-shan, the fleet opened fire on the seaward defences, concentrating on the batteries on Tiger's Tail and the narrows. Our batteries and ships, which were lying in the inner Roads, replied energetically, and very luckily, with indirect fire. The bombardment continued at intervals till lunch-time, and was, from the Japanese point of view, fruitless. After this the Viceroy gave orders for the sea near Liao-tieh-shan to be at once mined. Admiral Loschinsky had, some time before, reported to the late Admiral Makharoff the necessity of mining Arthur and Petsiwo where a landing was possible, but the latter was exceedingly sceptical as to the value of mines, for the same reasons as his predecessor had been. It had only been after the bombardment of March 10 and 24 that Loschinsky was ordered to mine the southern shore of Liao-tieh-shan.
We now got some news from the north, and heard that a disaster had occurred on the Yalu. We became convinced that Arthur would be cut off and that the enemy were preparing to transport troops for a landing. There were continual rumours also that they would make another desperate attempt to block the entrance to the harbour. Though great progress was made on the arming and fortifying of the Fortress itself, on the position at Kinchou, owing to the insufficiency of men, of building materials, and to the incomprehensible apathy of the Officers Commanding the District, little was done. Stössel sat in Port Arthur, writing orders and interfering with Smirnoff, and left the Kinchou position entirely to other hands.
The state of affairs there was incredible. Colonel Tretiakoff, commanding the 5th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, was appointed to command the position, but was given no power. Whenever he asked for guns and ammunition for the weakly armed position, for engineers, labour, and building materials to repair the unserviceable batteries, or pointed out the necessity for constructing bomb-proofs, and urged that new positions on the hills might be fortified, the General would fly into a passion and shout: 'Traitors! all traitors! Who says that Kinchou is badly fortified? The Japanese will never take it. I will destroy their whole army if they only dare to land. We all know they are fools, but they will never send a large force here, and so weaken their main army.' Being convinced of the futility of dealing with the General, Tretiakoff, himself a 'sapper,' together with another engineer officer, Schwartz, set to work with his regiment to try and get the place into order. Although he continued, at every convenient opportunity, to point out the unsatisfactory state of the position against which the first blow of the besieging army must fall, not only was he not given more labour, materials, or engineers, but those that he did have were taken away from him. This sounds impossible, but is literally true.
Amongst the large number of men now employed on the works there was naturally a proportion of undesirables and the Commandant being anxious lest the results of the work and the plans of the newly-created fortifications should be communicated to the Japanese, ordered a service of police gendarmes to be organized, under which were to be all the railway, town and gendarme police, Captain Prince Mickeladsey was in charge. Strict watch was now kept over the Chinese, and the Japanese knew nothing of what was going on in the Fortress. On June 10, however, Prince Mickeladsey, with all his gendarmes, was sent by Stössel to the other side of Liao-tieh-shan, without the right of entering Arthur, and the Fortress being left without a gendarmerie, offered grand scope for spies. But more of this later.
After the sinking of the Petropalovsk the Japanese came almost every night into the outer Roads and laid mines Rarely a night passed without something happening: either destroyers or mine-layers always appeared, and the searchlights used to pick up these gallant craft, which were then shelled by the whole front. Later the enemy became more cunning, sending junks in front of the destroyers to draw fire, thus enabling the destroyers to lay mines with impunity. The navy had hard work from now, fishing for mines, and ships were told off daily for what could not but be a most dangerous duty. The continual night duty also was most harassing, and the gunners—officers and men—were becoming exhausted.
While the isolation of Arthur came closer and closer, little was being done by the Officer Commanding the District as regards providing the Fortress with the necessary reserve of war materials, supplies, and hospital appliances, and poor progress was being made in requisitioning slaughter cattle and horses, for Stössel paid no sort of attention to these points. This was perhaps, after all, logical, as he would not admit of the possibility of the isolation of the town. He informed the Commander-in-Chief that he wanted nothing—neither troops nor ammunition. Although 50,000 field troops at least were essential for a successful defence of the Fortress, and we had less than this number, men were actually sent from us to the north. As an instance of what happened, take this order, No. 328, of May 4:
'The following details, whose departure for Liao-yang has been reported, are struck off the strength of the garrison from this date: One officer and 134 men from the 3rd Reserve Battalion and 250 men of the 7th Reserve Battalion.'
In this case, curiously enough, the men never actually went. After the Battle of the Yalu, in which the 3rd Division suffered heavily, reserves were ordered to be sent from the Fortress to replace casualties. The Commandant obeyed the order, and despatched the required number of men within twenty-four hours. They were wanted for active service, and at once, and were sent off in 'serviceable'—not in 'first-year'—tunics. After their departure a telegram was received:
'Why have the reserve men not been supplied with first-year tunics? They have been sent back.'
And back came more than 300 men a distance of 200 miles! Why? For better coats! The Commandant sent for the Fortress Intendant, who explained that, according to the local military regulations, reserve men were not supplied with first-year tunics, and that none were in store for them. Tunics were, therefore, issued from the Fortress Artillery stores, refitted, and the men again sent off to the front, and this actually on the day before the communications were cut, when the Commandant had implored that every available waggon might be used to bring into the Fortress ammunition, guns, hospital appliances, medicines, etc. But though the men were actually in the train, they never reached their destination, for by then the line had been cut. 'It's an ill wind that blows nobody any good,' and we profited to the extent of a few hundred more defenders.
The supply problem also became more acute. As the reserve of live stock was so small, for reasons already given, preserved rations were issued; but not only was the reserve of the latter not kept up as issued, but tons of preserved stuff were still allowed to be exported by the merchants, who held large stocks. As regards the collection of live stock, the position was more hopeless than ever. The Civil Commissary pointed out that requisitioning for cattle should commence on the furthest point from Port Arthur—in the country bordering on Manchuria, and work inwards—so as to make it impossible for the Chinese to drive away their cattle in that direction. The Officer Commanding the District, however, decided that the requisitions were to be served first in the sections nearest Arthur. As might have been expected, the Chinese, who are no fools, at once began to drive their cattle northwards. The district officers, under-staffed as they were, could only stop this to a very small extent, for, besides driving them, the Chinese resorted to loading cattle on junks and taking them to Chifu.
And so May arrived.
FOOTNOTES:
[10] Alexeieff.
MORE BLOCKERS
The 2nd of May was a trying day, for there was a rumour about that we were again to be attacked. The day wore on until the sun slowly sank in the west on its way to hide behind Quail Hill, and its slanting rays gave a farewell glint of light upon the sea, the hills, and the town. Soon all was veiled by the cloak of night; everything behind the huge hills seemed to sleep. But the Fortress was not sleeping; it was only pretending, for now and then searchlights flashed from the dark mass, like the eyes of a monster, and their rays wheeled dazzlingly across the sea. Yet the monster had not eyes enough; there were only five all told. It was midnight, and the gentle moon above the hills lit up the whole scene. Suddenly, as if by word of command, the shore batteries opened fire. A minute passed—a second, a third, and everything was once more quiet; but though silence again reigned, the town was awake, and life was visible in the streets. The vibrating rattle of a machine-gun could be heard in the channel as it fired at an escaping rowing-boat, for one blocker had been sunk. A cutter put out from the Sevastopol; in it was the Viceroy, Alexeieff, going to the gunboat Otvajny, which flew the flag of Rear-Admiral Loschinsky, and which was lying right in the narrows by Tiger's Tail; further forward near the boom itself lay the Giliak. Again the awful whirlwind of metal thundered, whistled, and roared, seemingly destroying everything that came in its way; the condition of the narrows beggars all description; the water literally boiled with falling shells. On the forebridge of the Otvajny, in the very centre of the narrows, stood the Viceroy, personally directing the defences, inspiring every one by his calmness under the hail of small shell from the quick-firing guns of the blockers and destroyers. Loschinsky, in the conning-tower of the Giliak, was methodically directing the repulse of one of the most gallant attacks ever attempted in this world, made by unarmoured steamers against the whole front of a powerful naval fortress. The cannonade increased till individual shots could not be distinguished, but were blended in the thundering echoes.
Two rockets shot up from the Giliak, and there was silence for twenty minutes, after which fire recommenced and continued almost without ceasing for two hours. Three rockets shot up from Golden Hill, lighting up the narrows and the Roads close by. The batteries again ceased fire. In the blinding glare of the bursting rockets a dreadful picture was revealed: against the dark background of the waters, almost in the narrows, lay the sunken vessels, masts and funnels clustered with men. It was only a lull before a fresh storm—a boding silence—for in the distance more blockers were seen to be tearing in. The whole Fortress slumbered for a moment, then woke up and turned all its force to beyond the narrows, towards which the doomed vessels, brilliantly lit up in the rays of the searchlights, were dashing at full speed. The enemy's fleet stood afar off on the dark horizon, as if frightened.
But the attempt was all in vain; the narrows were quite clear. Out of twelve blockers, ten had ceased to exist—had been absolutely destroyed—and with them two destroyers, and many a Japanese hero had been hurled into his cold grave. With morning the fight ended.
This incredible attempt to block the entrance to the harbour in the face of the whole front of the Fortress—incredible by reason of its magnificent daring—had failed, thanks to the vigilance of the guard-ships and the skilfully organized mine defences. I venture to assert that the whole honour of repulsing the blockers, and, in consequence, of preserving all our ships from dishonourable inactivity when the enemy were preparing to land, is due almost entirely to the ships of the mining defence and to Rear-Admiral Loschinsky. Of nine of the blockers, two were blown up by engineer mines, two by mines laid by steam pinnaces, one by a Whitehead torpedo fired from one of the blockers which had been sunk on March 27; three never reached the narrows, but anchored outside and blew up, all on board being killed, and one ran aground at Electric Cliff.
After dinner on the evening of the 4th I was sitting in the ward-room of the Otvajny, where several of the officers were relating their experiences of the previous night. Conversation had gradually turned to the doings of the army in the north and the connexion between the desperate attempts to block the entrance and the probable landing of troops in the north, when about eight o'clock an orderly came in and told Captain Pekarsky that they had called him up on the telephone from Golden Hill. After a few minutes he returned.
'Gentlemen, I've just got a message to say that the enemy have begun landing at Petsiwo. The Viceroy, in accordance with Imperial orders, leaves for Mukden to-morrow.'
For a minute we sat silent, for, although it could hardly be called unexpected, the news was depressing.
We were cut off!
WHAT WE DID WHILE THE ENEMY WERE ADVANCING
On the 5th the Viceroy left for Mukden, having handed over the command of the fleet to Rear-Admiral Witgeft. A worse choice could not have been made. That Witgeft expiated his shortcomings as a fleet commander by his gallant death in the execution of his duty does not alter the fact that it was wrong to appoint a shore admiral to the command of a fleet before which lay such a tremendous task. The main duty of the fleet in Port Arthur was to co-operate with the army and to prevent a landing on the peninsula. This was entirely appreciated by Smirnoff and Makharoff, who worked together and settled many questions in regard to future combined operations. Fate, however, decided against their execution, for Smirnoff became subordinate to Stössel, and Makharoff was struck off the roll of the living.
The enemy, who had landed at Petsiwo without opposition, attacked on the 6th our weak advanced posts of Frontier Guards and compelled them to retire, after cutting the railway near the station of Pulienten. Telegram after telegram came in urging energetic measures. Even the station-master at Kinchou made a report as to the landing, but was reprimanded, and ordered not to talk nonsense, for Stössel saw no urgency. The only opposition to the enemy's disembarkation was made by about fifty scouts of the Frontier Guard, under the command of Lieutenant Sirotko, who, after making an obstinate resistance, were obliged to withdraw before the enemy's advanced troops, which were nearly twenty times as strong. Although everything was ready at the station of Nangalin for the despatch of a train full of reserves, it was not sent, and the Frontier Guards were not reinforced.
On May 8 the last train, loaded with ammunition, came in from the north. She brought the news that north of Pulienten the telegraph had been destroyed and the railway damaged by the Frontier Guards retiring to Wafangtien. What some had known must happen, but of which others had doubted the possibility, did happen—Port Arthur was actually cut off, and henceforth upon its garrison lay the serious task of attracting and retaining a whole army, and so decreasing the enemy's concentration against our forces in the north.
The evacuation of Dalny is a good example of the ill-informed and over-centralized control of our General Officer Commanding the District. The peaceful inhabitants of this town were first disturbed on the 3rd and 5th of May by the news of the enemy's landing at Petsiwo. They began to flee, but only a few got away. On the 6th the railway was cut, and steps were taken to repair it; but Stössel's order, No. 168, of May 8—
'The inhabitants of Dalny and Talienwan are to remain quietly in their houses, as they are not in the least in danger from the enemy'—
somehow did not produce the expected feeling of security. Afterwards, on the 11th, when the rail had been again cut, a train full of civilians was, by Stössel's permission, sent off. It was met by the enemy, fired on, and sent back to Dalny.
Now that we were isolated, the blockade by sea became stricter, while to the north the disembarkation of the besieging army was permitted to take place without opposition. The second phase of the military operations in the Kwantun Peninsula had commenced, for we were now absolutely dependent on our own resources. This is my excuse for again referring to the vital question of supply. What had been done on the whole? From February 8 till May 8 Port Arthur had been connected by rail with Siberia, and only blockaded by sea in a half-hearted manner, and during that time all necessaries could have been poured into the town. Nevertheless, now that we were cut off, we found ourselves very badly off for provisions. It had evidently been forgotten that, for a successful defence of a fortress one of the chief essentials, in addition to troops, guns, and ammunition, is an ample supply of food and a rational organization of the sanitary department. It is necessary to emphasize these points in order to show up all the factors which led to Port Arthur's fall. By the orders published, which I do not quote, it is clear that even in May some anxiety was felt by the authorities, especially the Commandant, as to the food-supply. From the beginning of that month the troops were put on short rations. When one considers the exceptional conditions of service and the continued arduous work carried on at high pressure in the Fortress and district, it appears that, to last out, the men should rather have had increased rations. But it could not be done, and they had to carry on for eight months on insufficient food. Yet, though the rail had not been used as it might have been to bring in food, that mountain of packing-cases near the station showed that it had not been idle. This mound, which served as a landmark—a sort of a triumphal arch by the entrance to the Old Town—was composed entirely of—vodka! We might lack food in Arthur, but never drink. Can a more hopeless state of things be imagined? For of all places in the world where drink can do harm, a fortress full of half-nourished men is the worst. Stössel's efforts to repress drunkenness were beyond praise, but what could he do? The sale of spirituous liquor was forbidden in all shops, stores, or public-houses; but it could always be got for money, and all drank what they wanted to. It was there.
All we knew of the enemy was that they continued to advance undisturbed along the Mandarin road towards Kinchou. On the Kinchou position everything was quiet. Work was being carried on by Colonel Tretiakoff alone with the regiment under his command. General Fock occasionally paid the place a visit, went round the works, joked with the soldiers, gossiped with the officers, and went off to Dalny. The one point he insisted on was the arming of the right flank and the construction of a battery on Lime Hill. General Stössel sat in Port Arthur, and kept all in a continual state of astonishment by his orders. In the Fortress we had, up to now, placed a good deal of confidence in the Kinchou position, for General Stössel had told every one that the Japanese would never be allowed to come beyond it, and few except the Japanese knew what was going to happen. On May 10 we read the following order:
'On account of the possible arrival (from Kinchou) of the whole of the 4th East Siberian Rifle Division, the Commandant will make arrangements for the building of field-ovens.'
Our Commander, without even having seen the enemy, was already looking behind him! To many it was now evident that the stronghold at Kinchou was not particularly to be relied on, and alarming rumours began to be circulated about it. Every one at once declared that as a position it was beneath contempt, but the Officer Commanding the District paid no regard to such things, and continued to publish weighty orders, such as that of May 12:
'I am always meeting private soldiers, particularly those of the 7th Reserve Battalion, wearing felt boots. This is irregular, and it would be better that skins should be bought at the butchers' and cured.'
As a detail, the men wore felt boots because during the whole siege they had nothing else, because for six years the Fortress had never been supplied with a sufficient quantity of leather boots.
Up to the present no serious steps had been taken at Kinchou; only a few weak battalions had been thrown forward in advance of the position. That was the real state of affairs, though other information was invented for the inhabitants. At this time men who knew the ground and could scout well, like some of the Frontier Guards, were invaluable, and yet they were scarcely ever employed. For some reason they did not find favour in the eyes of the Generals. Every one knew the splendid qualities of these Frontier Guards, but they were ignored till they came under the command of Kondratenko. Even when the enemy advanced and seized the position near Shanshihlipu we did nothing. In Dalny Fock did the 'dictator'; in Arthur we continued to write orders. For instance, No. 187:
'To-day, near the church, I met two officers with a lady; she was wearing an officer's rifle forage-cap. It appears that one of the officers was Lieutenant Erben, and the lady his wife. I do not think that I need dwell upon how out of place it seems for one of the female sex to wear a military cap with a cockade, when even retired officers and reserves are not allowed by regulation to wear them.'
In Dalny there were numerous buildings, docks, and the most splendid breakwaters running out into the sea for a distance of one and a half miles, but nothing had so far been done to destroy them in the event of the town being abandoned. It was only by an order of May 14 that a committee was appointed to settle which of the larger buildings should be destroyed. The result was that the Japanese eventually found the docks and quays untouched, and of the greatest service to them when they used that place as a base. On the 14th also the fact that the enemy had landed in force at Petsiwo was first mentioned in Orders. This news was twice repeated in the paper—once as an official communiqué upon the doings of Fock's troops, and again as a true account of the reconnaissance. As a matter of fact, they had by this time occupied the village of Shanshihlipu, but of this the staffs of both Generals Stössel and Fock were in complete ignorance till the fight of May 16. That they did not know of it is proved by the fact that the 3rd Battery of the 4th East Siberian Rifle Artillery Brigade, on occupying the southern heights at Shanshihlipu, was almost blown out of existence by the enemy's artillery, which had already, somewhat earlier, taken up a position on the northern hills opposite. On my asking the Colonel how this had happened, he said:
'Everything was in such a muddle that it is a wonder any of us are alive to tell the tale. Stössel gave one order and Fock another—every hour brought fresh instructions.'
Fock, who had always declared that Kinchou was quite unassailable, seeing that the enemy had landed and were advancing in earnest to the attack, stated publicly that to give battle at Kinchou would be a crime, that a division there would be merely destroyed. The 15th and 16th East Siberian Rifle Regiments were hurriedly entrained, and moved backwards and forwards, first to Dalny and then back to Port Arthur. The confusion boded ill.
THE NAVY LOSE A CHANCE
When describing the repulse of the blockers on the night of May 2, I essayed to bring forward the importance of the work done by the guard-ships, and now a word as to the destruction of the Japanese battleship Hatsuse. From the beginning of the blockade Admiral Loschinsky and the Captain of the Amur had studied the usual course of the enemy's ships, with a view to laying mines along it. This was impossible for some time, owing to the fog and the number of ships, especially destroyers, cruising about. At last, on May 14, during a council held at Admiral Witgeft's, at which Loschinsky was present, the Captain of the Amur asked permission to set to work. Loschinsky turned to Witgeft, as his senior, and asked permission to start this important but risky work. 'As you like; it is entirely your business and you are responsible,' was the reply. Loschinsky then turned to the Captain of the Amur. 'The enemy is not visible; there is scarcely any fog, and what there is will only help us. Go, and God be with you! Lay not less than fifty mines, and none nearer than ten miles.' The Admiral himself did not go on this trip, as the meeting had only just begun and was a very important one. The Amur left at three and returned after five, no one at all suspecting what an invaluable service to the besieged place she had done that day. At eleven o'clock next morning, in sight of the whole Fortress, the Japanese battleship Hatsuse struck a mine and perished even more quickly than the Petropalovsk; the Fuji also was badly damaged. Thus did the Amur avenge the Petropalovsk.
Loschinsky and several others were at the moment with the naval Commander-in-Chief. As the tide was at the flood, those who were present advised Witgeft to take advantage of the favourable conditions, and at once to send out three battleships, all five cruisers, and the destroyers to capture the damaged battleship and its escort of three. 'Everything will be done in its own good time,' was the answer. Even when Balashoff, the Master of the Hunt,[11] hurried up to point out with great earnestness the necessity for the fleet putting out in order to make an end of the Japanese on the sea, Witgeft repeated: 'Wait; everything will be done in its own good time.' Only at 12.30 were orders given to the cruiser division and the destroyers to get up steam. The former could not put out at all, for, being a holiday, their crews were ashore, and it was two o'clock before the destroyers got under way. The Novik, which happened by chance to be under steam, joined them. Out they went at full speed, and, regardless of danger, tried to approach the wounded battleship in broad daylight—but the psychological moment had passed: the enemy had carried out repairs, and opened such a fire that it was impossible to get near, for every destroyer was valuable, and there was no object in throwing them away. They returned.
The garrison and inhabitants were disgusted. The navy had again made a mess of it. Had Witgeft been a man of decision, had he kept his fleet ready for battle, the picture would have been different. For had the fleet gone out at once, the Fuji and the battleship and two cruisers with her would undoubtedly have been destroyed. This would have so weakened the enemy's fleet that the fight on July 11 would have had another result. All the same, the destruction of the Hatsuse greatly influenced the defence afterwards, in particular during the strict blockade. From the moment she was destroyed not a single big ship except the Nisshin and Kasuga, which stood at long range, and threw some 10-inch shells on to Cross Hill, ventured near Port Arthur. The Fortress was thus ensured from the dreadful prospect of being bombarded from the sea, and therefore all the big guns on the sea-front, from the 6-inch up to the 11-inch howitzers, were turned towards the land, and gave invaluable help in the land defence to the end.
After the blowing up of the Hatsuse, the sweeping, blocking, and defence of the Roads was made over to the officer in command of the cruiser division, and the hunt for mines went on day and night. The cruisers went out by turns at night into the outer Roads. This almost invariably called forth an attack by the enemy's destroyers, which, covered by the confusion of the fight, laid mines. Our destroyers were ordered by Witgeft to lie in pairs in Takhe and White Wolf's Bays. Despite Loschinsky's energetic protests that it was the duty of the fortress artillery and guard-ships to wage war against mine-layers, and not the work of the destroyers, which ran great risk of being blown up, Witgeft was immovable. But the wisdom of Loschinsky's advice was proved later, for on one dark, foggy night the Lieutenant Burakoff and the Boevoy were rendered hors de combat by Japanese torpedo-boats, which crept up to them unawares in Takhe Bay. In the middle of May Witgeft gave orders that mines should be laid by junks near Inchenzy and Melankhe, which was done. When the Amur was laying mines west of Liao-tieh-shan she ran on to the mast of a sunken blocker, and damaged herself badly. It was impossible to dock her, as the only dock was occupied, and we had to make use of the Bogatir and afterwards the Reshitelny for this work.
FOOTNOTES:
[11] A Court title.—A.B.L.
PREPARATIONS ON THE KINCHOU POSITION
After much hesitation, opposition, many quarrels, alterations, and frequent fresh orders, a column consisting of two regiments and three batteries was formed on May 15, on which evening it moved out of Nangalin station to take the field. The advance-guard, under the general command of Lieutenant-Colonel Laperoff, was composed of the battalions of the 13th Regiment and the 3rd Battery of the 4th East Siberian Rifle Artillery Brigade. At daybreak on the 16th the column got near the Shanshihlipu heights, where, as soon as it was light, the advance-guard heard firing in front. This altogether puzzled Laperoff, for he knew that none of our guns were ahead of him. It turned out that, owing to ignorance of the country, the main body had lost its way, got in front of its advance-guard, and had attempted to occupy these heights, without having reconnoitred them or even despatched scouts in advance. Fock, commanding the 4th Division, had trusted to luck, and we paid the price, especially the 3rd Battery, under Romanovsky, for the enemy had occupied the position before us, and opened a heavy fire on this battery as it came up, almost destroying it.
This battery was admirably supported by, and only got away out of action with the assistance of, the 'bullock battery,' under Lieutenant Sadikoff. On the initiative of this young officer, whom our gunners afterwards dubbed the 'Guardian Angel,' some old Chinese guns had been collected and formed into a battery drawn by bullocks. Laperoff did not know what to do with his advance-guard under the peculiar circumstances, for it was no longer in advance, he received no orders, and the fire was getting hotter. Briefly, the result was that our force had, after heavy casualties, to retire to Nangalin without effecting anything. As soon as the withdrawal began General Fock who had hitherto been with the rear guard, suddenly turned up. When Laperoff reported the mistake and its disastrous result, he began to excuse himself, saying that he had never given the orders, and complained of the inactivity and idleness of his Chief of the Staff. 'Traitors! they are all traitors! They never obey my verbal orders; they only obey written ones.'
This fight showed the superiority of the enemy in artillery preparation, in fire control, and in knowledge of how to use the ground. After taking Shanshihlipu they were able to mask their guns perfectly, but we, not understanding the value of ground, exposed ourselves needlessly, and suffered much. While they, after a tedious sea-voyage, victoriously advanced, we, on our own ground, with every chance of selecting and fortifying the best positions beforehand, only tried to occupy them after the enemy had already done it. So, after the first brush, we withdrew rapidly and with much loss to the celebrated but worthless position at Kinchou.
After carefully watching everything that happened throughout the whole campaign, and thus getting to know and appreciate the Russian soldier under service conditions, I have come to the conclusion that he was not only a hero, but a Titan, and I must say I had never dreamed that he would exhibit the moral and physical strength that he always did. Possessing such qualities, had he only received proper training, and been well led by the more senior of his officers, we would never have witnessed that pitiable slaughter—for which General Fock, with the approval of the Officer Commanding the District—at Kinchou was responsible. The first fight at Shanshihlipu, its failure, and the rapid retreat had a disastrous effect on the moral of the men. They lost that confidence which counts for so much in war.
From the moment of the withdrawal from Shanshihlipu up till May 26 the ground lying in front of Kinchou was never properly reconnoitred. I would lay particular stress on this absence of any regular and well-organized intelligence work, because, operating as we did with our eyes shut, we always allowed the enemy, who was energetic, insistent, and cunning, to take us unawares.
And now to the Kinchou position. The fortification of it was still being carried on solely by the labour of the 5th Regiment, which gallant corps did not belong to General Fock's division, and so was not spared. As has been already mentioned, Colonel Tretiakoff, commanding the regiment and nominally in command of the position, knew well that it was anything but ready even for a temporary defence. As before, so now, especially after Shanshihlipu, he recognized the absolute necessity of masking the guns, which were standing exposed on the highest points, without any attempt at concealment. He fully realized that durable splinter-proofs, and not mere 'hen-coops,' were necessary, that the infantry trenches should be made deeper, and that all the communications should be greatly improved; but his representations still met with little success. Though Fock continued to talk much, he no longer said that he would destroy the whole Japanese army here. On the contrary, he turned round and declared, in self-contradiction, that to attempt to hold the place long would be a crime.
The navy had given us two long-range Canet guns, which had been got into position on the left flank, under the idea that the attack would develop there, which, as a matter of fact, it did. A great deal of labour and time had been expended on doing this, and the guns were splendidly masked. But a few days before the battle General Fock insisted on their being dismounted, taken down, and dragged off to a position on the right. He was told that this flank on Lime Hill was not important, and that the enemy would never attempt to advance that side (which was justified by the event); but he would not reconsider his order. The guns were taken down; there was no time to remount them again, and so they fell, unused and uninjured, with two waggon-loads of ammunition, into the enemy's hands.
The batteries on this most important position, called in the highest military circles the 'key to Arthur,' were commanded by Lieutenants and Sub-Lieutenants, and the command of the artillery was given to a very young officer, one Captain Visokikh. He continually reported that he had not enough ammunition, asked for projectors to light up the Kinchou Valley, and begged for sand-bags, sleepers, rails, beams, etc., for thickening the cover and making the buildings splinter-proof, but without result. I know for a fact that his brother, commanding the 7th Sector in Port Arthur, so well appreciated his helpless position that he, quite illegally, upon his own authority, sent ammunition to him. Tretiakoff, finding that even Stössel would do nothing to assist him, at last went direct to Smirnoff, and telling him everything, asked his help. The latter did everything that he was able so as to delay the fall of Kinchou, if only for a few days; but what he could do was little, for his powers did not extend beyond the Fortress glacis. When some of the necessary materials did arrive, the men worked like slaves to improve the defences, the Fortress artillerymen assisting the men of the 5th Regiment, under the supervision of Colonel Tretiakoff and Captain Schwartz. But it was too late.
Now, shortly before the battle the state of affairs in the district was, to put it mildly, slightly mixed. If the staff issued an order, the General, instead of at once carrying it out, wrote long-winded memoranda and proceeded to do the opposite. Trains stood in the stations ready to start day and night, and, as can be seen from the orders, the wretched 15th Regiment spent its time entraining and detraining, being taken out one day and brought back the next. The authorities seemed to have lost their heads, and orders were only issued to be at once cancelled. The day before the battle was a nightmare of confusion: no one knew what was being done or why it was done. Men were worn out by being 'messed about' uselessly from one place to another, and were never long enough in any place to get to know it. The work on the position which had for a short time been proceeding again had to cease for want of materials. For instance, the frontal battery on Lime Hill, under the command of Lieutenant Solomonoff, to a certain degree important as being able to fire on the approaches to the right flank, was armed with four old Chinese guns. It had no traverses, and no bullet-proof shelter for the gunners or ammunition, and was not connected by telephone with the Commandant.
This was the state of the Kinchou position.
In Port Arthur, after the Viceroy's departure and the assumption of command of the fleet by Witgeft, there was a lull in naval operations; but rapid progress was being made with the repairing of the lame ducks. The battleships and cruisers—too precious to use—lay motionless in the inner Roads, the destroyers, gunboats, and the Novik were alone active. The latter were kept with steam up, and were always cruising about, protecting the mine-trawlers, laying mines, or doing short or long reconnaissances, which were called by the men 'adventures'—a very suitable name. Complete ignorance of the coast generally, pointless tasks, lack of speed, bad engines, absence of well-thought-out plans, a numerous, keen, and powerful enemy, who always operated systematically and cleverly, rendered these expeditions abortive of any result except fatigue, waste of coal, and loss of vessels.
Having served all his time ashore, Witgeft naturally could not give an example of useful activity; moreover, the very weak line he took with junior officers undoubtedly greatly undermined his own authority and naval discipline generally. The attitude of the younger officers towards him and other seniors was deplorable, and noticeable even to outsiders; the juniors not only saw the defects, and the incompetence of their seniors, but they publicly criticized them. At the same time, a great gulf grew between army and navy, and scarcely a day passed without a conflict between the officers of the two services; they insulted each other in the streets. And the position of the sailors was a difficult one, because they themselves were not to blame: it was not their fault that they did little cruising and were generally in port in peace-time; that they had not been taught how to shoot and know their ships; that the only thing required of them was spittle and polish. Like the infantry, the naval officers were not trained for war.
General Stössel, instead of endeavouring to get the two services to pull together, made matters worse, and in his effort to gain personal popularity amongst the younger army officers did not even refrain from making fun of the Officer Commanding the Fleet. However, later on, when soldiers and sailors fought together and were struck down side by side in the trenches, all differences vanished—men recognized men.
On May 20 we had another sea attack, carried out by seven ships and two destroyers. It lasted from shortly after midnight to 2 a.m. The result was immaterial.
THE BATTLE OF KINCHOU COMMENCES[12]
The days passed monotonously. Wherever one looked one saw men—our rough peasants in the guise of soldiers—digging and delving, not in their native heath in the hope of a fruitful harvest, but in the stony, sandy soil of the inhospitable peninsula. It was depressing to watch them, sleepless and hungry, and I often wondered how many would ever again see their fields. The monotony, however, was sometimes broken by General Stössel's orders. On May 23 he wrote:
'Before May 28 all cattle must be removed from the country round the town of Kinchou—i.e., north of the position of that name.'
Remove the cattle from country already in the possession of the enemy? Was it a joke?
On May 24 I went to Kinchou. In the same train was the 15th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, which had only arrived in Arthur on the 20th, but was now on its way back to Nangalin. Lieutenant-Colonel Yolshin, commanding the military communications, was in the officials' carriage, and with him were Captain O., the officers of the 15th Regiment, the railway engineers, and myself. Sitting at the common table in the saloon, conversation turned on coming events. Colonel Yolshin, looking out of the window, said: 'I wonder how long all this will be ours? Can we hold out at Kinchou? Do we know how to? The enemy is advancing in considerable force: scouts report that they have brought with them a quantity of artillery.'
'Can you tell us, Colonel,' said an officer of the regiment, 'why we are being continually taken into Arthur and then back again? The men can't have a square meal and never get any sleep, and we are losing a lot of forage. To-day we have again been sent off suddenly, and the men had to snatch dinner at the station. Why is it all done?'
'There you are. There is the man who knows,' replied Yolshin, pointing to Captain O.
'Yes, I can tell you. I have been made Chief of the Staff of the Rear-Guard, of which your regiment is to form part,' said the newly fledged staff-officer in a smug tone. He then relapsed into the mysterious silence beloved of the staff-officer. He evidently wanted to see what impression he had made on those present, and especially on those junior to himself, and looked at me none too kindly, for it behoved him to be careful of what he said in the presence of a mere civilian, even though an official war correspondent.
I detrained at Tafashin, the head-quarters of the 4th Division, near the Kinchou position, where I attached myself to some Frontier Guards, and with them made a night reconnaissance towards Mount Samson, in front of the position. This was to me exciting and novel, but the main feature of general interest was that, though one of our objects was to investigate Mount Samson if possible, we were suddenly recalled before we reached our objective, as the reconnaissance had been countermanded. We thus nearly lost the advance patrols we had sent on ahead of us, and returned without finding out if there were many enemy on Mount Samson or none at all. I got back to our starting-point at dawn and slept soundly, tired out by the varied and unusual impressions of the night. In my dreams I seemed to hear noises, which got louder and louder, till suddenly I woke. Every one was throwing on his clothes and the alarm was sounding.
'What's up?' I asked, half dazed, for the whole building was trembling from the noise of firing.
'It's nothing; the enemy are bombarding us with the Lord knows how many guns!'
Shrapnel were bursting over the position, and the hills seemed to be smoking from the bursting shells.
Our patrols of the Frontier Guards only returned in the middle of the day, and they reported that the enemy had occupied Mount Samson in considerable force. They had seen their bivouac, guns, and horses, and had heard the noise of work and the ringing of telephones.
At 5 a.m. horses were brought us, and Lieutenant Sirotko suggested that we should go on to the position together. The fire increased, the heaviest falling on the guns under the command of Egoroff. All the batteries on the position kept up a hot fire; but the enemy rained shell after shell on Egoroff's unit, literally plastering it with lead. At times as many as ten shells appeared to be bursting above the battery at once, and it seemed as if it must be swept away. The Japanese field-batteries were a long way off, firing at their longest range. At 6 a.m. the enemy opened fire from some concealed howitzers on the left; we judged them to be of large calibre by the noise of the bursts and the powerful effect of the explosions.
It was difficult to range on the enemy's guns, thanks to the use they made of the ground; we were shooting by guess-work at unseen targets. In addition to this, their fire was extraordinarily accurate and concentrated by turns on each battery. At 6.45 a.m. the fire slacked off, and at 7.45 there was a lull all along the position.
I was struck by the calmness and endurance of the gunners during the whole time of this, their first artillery battle; whence did they get it? No exhibition of fear for their lives was at all visible. It was not that they did not realize the danger, and had not yet seen any wounded, because up to the end of the siege they behaved in the same way—like men. If we bow before the heroes of the late war, we must first bow before the gallant defenders of Port Arthur.