TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE

Footnote anchors are denoted by [number], and the footnotes have been placed at the end of each chapter.

Many minor changes to the text are noted at the [end of the book].

THE FIELD OF WATERLOO.

HOTEL DU MUSÉE,

AT THE FOOT OF THE LION MOUNT.

This Hotel, kept by a niece of the late Sergeant-Major Cotton, is situated in the very centre of the field of Waterloo, and is strongly recommended to visitors on account of its proximity to the scenes of interest connected with the great battle, and also for the excellent accomodation and comfort it offers at moderate charges.—See Bradshaw’s continental Guide.

Wines and Spirits of the best quality. Bass’s pale Ale;
London porter, etc.

N.B.—Guide Books,—“The voice from Waterloo” by Sergeant Cotton, the most correct and cheapest account of the battle published—Plans of the field views and Photographs of all noted places always on sale at the Hotel.

A Museum of Relics shewn to visitors.

A VOICE
FROM
WATERLOO.

Déposé selon la loi.

Entered at Stationers’ Hall.

BRUSSELS:
J. H. Briard, Printer, 4, Rue aux Laines.

NAPOLEON. WELLINGTON.

A VOICE FROM

WATERLOO

A HISTORY OF THE BATTLE

FOUGHT ON THE 18TH JUNE 1815

WITH A SELECTION FROM THE WELLINGTON DISPATCHES, GENERAL ORDERS
AND LETTERS RELATING TO THE BATTLE.
ILLUSTRATED WITH ENGRAVINGS, PORTRAITS AND PLANS.

BY

SERGEANT-MAJOR EDWARD COTTON

(LATE 7TH HUSSARS).

“Facts are stubborn things.”

SIXTH EDITION, REVISED AND ENLARGED.

PRINTED FOR THE PROPRIETOR,

MONT-ST.-JEAN,

SOLD ALSO BY THE PRINCIPAL BOOKSELLERS IN BELGIUM.

LONDON

B. GREEN, PATERNOSTER-ROW.

1862

AS A TESTIMONY

of the profound admiration entertained for His Lordship by every British soldier,

THIS WORK IS HUMBLY DEDICATED

TO FIELD-MARSHAL THE MOST NOBLE

THE MARQUIS OF ANGLESEY, K.G., G.C.B., G.C.H.,

by His Lordship’s grateful servant,

E. COTTON, Sergeant-Major,

LATE 7TH HUSSARS.

PREFACE

TO THE SIXTH EDITION.

“A Voice from Waterloo” is the unassuming tale of an old soldier who was an eyewitness of and actor in many of the scenes he attempts to describe.

My having resided more than fourteen years on the field, as Guide, and Describer of the battle, may be considered as the parent of the present memoirs.

No one can be more convinced than I am, of my inability to do justice to the subject: but I have had great advantages in communicating personally on the spot with “Waterloo men” of every nation; all of whom, from the general to the private, have evidently considered it a duty and a pleasure to assist an old companion in arms. The inquiries and comments made by those gallant men, have afforded me opportunities of gleaning much information which no other person has obtained, and has enabled me to give a fuller and truer history of the battle, than a more talented man could have done, unless he had enjoyed the same privilege.

One of my objects in writing, is to correct opinions which have gone forth, and which are greatly at variance with facts: opinions so erroneous as to warrant the remark of general Jomini, that “Never was a battle so confusedly described as that of Waterloo.” It is certain that the hour of many occurrences on the field has been erroneously stated: such as of the arrival, or rather becoming engaged, of the different Prussian corps; the fall of La Haye-Sainte, defeat of the Imperial guard, etc.

After the publication of so many accounts of the battle of the 18th of June, it may be fairly asked on what grounds I expect to awaken fresh interest in a subject so long before the public. Can I reconcile the conflicting statements which have already appeared in print? Can I add to the information which most of my countrymen already possess concerning this memorable epoch? Or can I present that information in a compendious and lucid form, such as the general reader may still need? Something in all these ways, I hope I have accomplished.

Putting aside some of the French and English accounts as not only irreconcilable with facts, but as self-refuted by their inconsistencies and mutual contradictions,—using such of the French narratives as agree with those of their opponents, which, as Wellington observed of Napoleon’s bulletins, may be safely relied upon as far as they tell against themselves,—I have cleared up a great number of the points disputed by our own writers, who agree in the main, but differ in some circumstances involving not merely questions of time and locality of certain events, but even the claims of individuals, regiments and brigades to the honour attached to their deeds on that day. By my long residence at Mont-St.-Jean, constant study of the surface of the battle field, knowledge of the composition and even dress of the different bodies of the French troops which stood before us, and by paying close attention to the remarks made by many a gallant comrade revisiting the spot, I have in a great measure succeeded in reconciling discrepancies which perhaps no other person could explain.

I am also emboldened to think that my “Voice from Waterloo” presents to the general reader all the leading facts of this eventful struggle, in so concise a manner, and at so moderate a cost, as to secure it a preference over every other narration of the battle.

Although not strictly belonging to “A Voice from Waterloo,” I have added, as a connecting link in the narrative, an outline map, and a sketch of the military operations of the campaign of 1815.

Most anxious to avoid the imputation of having employed the materials of others without acknowledgment, I beg to state that, besides various military periodicals, I have made use of captain Siborne’s History of the War in France and Belgium: The Military Life of the Duke of Wellington, by Major Basil Jackson and Captain Rochfort Scott; The Wellington Dispatches and General Orders, by Colonel Gurwood; Fall of Napoleon, by Colonel Mitchell; Political and Military Life of Napoleon, and The Art of War, by General Jomini; History of the King’s German Legion, by Major Beamish; Prussian History of the Campaign of 1815, by General Grollman, etc., etc.

As to the manner in which I have executed my task, I know I am open to criticism. No doubt many of my remarks will be considered too digressive. Some persons will think I am too hard upon Napoleon: my authorities in this are more frequently French than English. Others will judge me too partial to the immortal Wellington.

Waterloo was termed by Napoleon, “a concurrence of unexempled fatalities, a day not to be comprehended. Was there treason? or was there only misfortune?”

Wellington said, that “he had never before fought so hard a battle, nor won so great a victory.” If the reader derive the same impression from his attention to “A Voice from Waterloo,” I shall be satisfied, because I shall have succeeded.

Edward Cotton,
Waterloo Guide, and Describer of the Battle.

Mont-St.-Jean, February, 1849.

CONTENTS.

APPENDIX.

LIST OF PLATES.

[ click here for larger image.]

OUTLINE MAP OF THE WATERLOO CAMPAIGN.

Drawn for Cotton’s Voice from Waterloo.

A VOICE

FROM

WATERLOO.

CHAPTER I.

Napoleon leaves Elba; lands in France.—Louis XVIII quits Paris.—Napoleon, joined by the army, arrives in Paris.—Hostile declaration of the great powers of Europe against Napoleon, which he treats with contempt, and prepares for war.—France soon appears one vast camp.—Allied armies assemble in Belgium.—The duke of Wellington arrives and takes the command; adopts precautionary measures.—In consequence of rumours, his Grace issues a secret memorandum, and draws the army together.—Strength, composition and distribution of the allied, Prussian, and French armies.—Continued rumours; and certain intelligence of the enemy’s advance.—Importance of holding Brussels.—Napoleon’s attempt to surprise us frustrated.—Blücher concentrates his forces.—Napoleon joins his army, and issues his order of the day; attacks the Prussian outposts, and takes Charleroi.—Intelligence reaches the Duke.—Distribution of the enemy.—The Duke orders the army to prepare, and afterwards to march on Quatre-Bras.—The duchess of Richmond’s ball.—The troops in motion at early dawn.—His Grace proceeds by Waterloo to Quatre-Bras, and from thence to Ligny, where he meets Blücher, whom he promises to support, and returns to Quatre-Bras.—Picton’s division and the Brunswickers arrive at Quatre-Bras, and are attacked by the French left column under Ney; more of our troops arrive.—Outline of the battles of Quatre-Bras and Ligny.—Observations.

On the 26th of February 1815, Napoleon, accompanied by about a thousand of his guards, and all his civil and military officers, secretly left the isle of Elba, and landed the 1st of March, near Cannes, on the coast of Provence. The Emperor immediately marched towards the French capital; and arrived in Paris on the evening of the 20th; the same day that Louis XVIII set out for Ghent.

Joined by all the troops which had been sent to oppose him, Napoleon was enabled to re-establish his authority in France. Amongst those who rejoined him, was marshal Ney, “le Brave des Braves;” he who had so warmly expressed himself in favour of the restoration of the Bourbons, and who, when appointed to the command of a body of troops to oppose his former master, declared, whilst kissing the king’s hand, that “he would bring back Napoleon in an iron cage.” Ney and the iron cage was the chief topic of conversation in Paris, when the news of his having joined Napoleon with his corps d’armée reached that capital[1].

The great powers of Europe, then assembled in congress at Vienna, instantly declared, that Napoleon, by breaking the convention which established him as an independent sovereign at Elba, had destroyed the only legal title on which his political existence depended, placed himself without the pale of the law, and proved to the world, that there could neither be truce nor peace with him. The allied powers, in consequence, denounced Napoleon as the enemy and disturber of the tranquillity of Europe, and resolved immediately upon uniting their forces against him and his faction, to preserve, if possible, the general peace.

Notwithstanding the hostile declaration of the allied sovereigns, they were utterly unable to put their armies in motion without that most powerful lever, English gold, the real sinews of war. Britain’s expenditure in 1815, was no less than 110,000,000l. sterling; out of which immense sum 11,000,000l. were distributed as subsidies amongst the contracting powers: Austria received 1,796,220l.; Russia, 3,241,919l.; Prussia, 2,382,823l.; and Hanover, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Italy and the Netherlands, with the smaller German states, shared the remainder amongst them.

Menacing as the position of the allies towards Napoleon appeared to be, and imposing as were their armies assembling to oppose him, he assumed a bold and resolute posture of defence. The general aspect of France at that time was singularly warlike; nearly the whole nation appeared to be electrified, and buckled on its armour to join the messenger of war. The exaltation of Napoleon was soon however sobered down by the arrival in Paris of the declaration of the allied powers, which document was little calculated to produce a favourable impression as to the ultimate success of the Emperor’s enterprise. The war-cry of nearly every state in Europe was, To arms! Draw the sword, throw away the scabbard, until the usurper shall be entirely subjugated and his adherents put down.

Napoleon, however, appeared undismayed, and endeavoured, by every means, to conceal the determined resolution of Europe from the French nation, who, for the most part, cheerfully responded to their leader’s call. Troops were organized, as if by magic, all over the country. The scarred veterans of a hundred battles, they who had followed their “petit caporal” through many a gory fight, heard with joy the voice of their idolized Emperor, summoning them again to glorious war and the battle field. There was a generation of fierce, daring, war-breathing men, ever ready to range themselves under the Imperial banners. Davoust states that France, on Napoleon’s return, was overrun with soldiers just released from the prisons of Europe, most of whom counted as many battles as years, and who quickly flocked round the Imperial eagles. Transports of artillery, arms, ammunition waggons, with all the materials of war, were to be seen moving from every point towards the frontiers. France, in a short time, bore the appearance of one vast camp.

To completely surround Paris with fortifications, as Louis-Philippe has since done, was also the desire of Napoleon, who inquired of Carnot, how much time and money it would require. “Three years and two hundred millions,” replied the minister, “and when finished, I would only ask for sixty thousand men and twenty-four hours to demolish the whole.”

Early in April 1815, the allied troops began to assemble in Belgium. The Anglo-Hanoverian army, commanded by the prince of Orange, (afterwards William II,) had occupied the Low-Countries for the protection of Belgium and Holland, which had been constituted by the congress of Vienna a new monarchy, under the name of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. This army comprised about 28,000 men, 15,000 being British and German troops; a part of these were the remains of lord Lynedoch’s army, and the remainder young Hanoverians. 20,000 Dutch-Belgians were raised to act in concert with these troops. The general appearance of the army is thus described by sir Henry, now lord Hardinge, in a letter to lord Stewart: “This army is not unlike lord Randscliff’s description of a French pack of hounds: pointers, poodles, turnspits, all mixed up together and running in sad confusion.”

The duke of Wellington arrived in Brussels from the congress of Vienna on the night of April 4th, and took the command of the allied army; but the Dutch-Belgian army had not been placed immediately under the Duke’s command. His Grace being strongly convinced that his power of regulating the movements of the Dutch-Belgian troops ought not to be left open to any cavil or dispute, demanded the most unequivocal statement upon this matter from the king of the Netherlands. Nothing less than this measure could have made those troops serviceable to the cause of their country; such was still the fascinating power of Napoleon’s name over countries in which his rule and conscriptions had subdued and enervated the minds of men. On the 4th of May, Wellington received copies of the king’s decrees, making him field-marshal in his service, and placing the Dutch-Belgian army entirely under his command[2]. The Duke immediately put matters in a better condition, and instructed the prince of Orange how to keep up the necessary communications[3]. He transferred prince Frederick’s corps to lord Hill[4], warned the Prussian commandant at Charleroi, the duke of Berry, and all others concerned, to be on the alert; he also gave them exact accounts of the movements and strength of the enemy between Valenciennes and Maubeuge. All this was accomplished by the Duke before the 10th of May. On the 11th, he wrote to sir Henry Hardinge, then attached to the Prussian head-quarters for the purpose of communication, that he reckoned the enemy’s strength on the frontiers at 110,000 men; and was glad that Blücher was drawing his forces nearer to the British. His Grace adopted the most effective measures for placing all the fortified towns and strong places in a condition to embarrass the enemy; and notwithstanding the objections made, by interested parties, to the necessary inundations, he was firm in ordering them, wherever the general security required it. The Duke sent able engineers to limit, as much as possible, the injury arising from letting out the waters, and to inundate with fresh instead of salt water, when practicable. For this timely care of the general interests, and even, as far as it was possible, of private property, the return he met with was unceasing complaints from the authorities of the several towns, where these measures had been applied. But the Duke did his duty firmly, and, after some expostulation with unreasonable grumblers, compelled them to do theirs. On the 7th of June, he issued his orders for the defence of the towns of Antwerp, Ostend, Nieuport, Ypres, Tournay, Ath, Mons and Ghent. The governors of these respective towns were required to declare them in a state of siege, the moment the enemy should put his foot on the Belgian territory: the towns were to be defended to the utmost; and if any governor surrendered before sustaining at least one assault, and without the consent of his council, he should be deemed guilty, not only of military disobedience, but of high treason. Such decisive measures were rendered necessary, in consequence of the equivocal loyalty of many who held municipal and military rank in the Netherlands. The king had prudently invested Wellington with these important powers, and no man could have exercised them more effectively.

The French court (Louis XVIII and his suite) received advice how to save themselves by retiring to Antwerp, in case the enemy should succeed in turning the British right: they were desired to be in no alarm, nor to be startled by mere rumours, but to await positive information. Having thus provided for the military wants, and even for the fears of those behind him, the Duke devoted his whole attention to the army; and in proportion as the storm approached, repeated his warnings to the Prussians, by incessant dispatches to sir Henry Hardinge. He also sent frequent instructions to his own officers who were the nearest to the enemy, to keep on the alert.

The regiment I belonged to disembarked at Ostend on the 21st of April, and we soon found there was work in hand. Swords were to be ground and well pointed, and the frequent inspections of arms, ammunition, camp equipage, etc., plainly announced that we were shortly about to take the field. The army, soon after our arrival, had, in consequence of a secret memorandum[5] issued by the duke of Wellington to the chief officers in command, drawn closer together, in the probable expectation of an attack, and our great antagonist was not the sort of man to send us word of the when and the where. Louis XVIII, with his suite and a train of followers, being with us at Ghent, we were not destitute of information. Napoleon was as well informed of all that transpired in Belgium as if it had taken place at the Tuileries.

Things continued in this state until June, when, from various rumours, we began to be more on the alert.

At the commencement of operations, the duke of Wellington’s army comprised about 105,000 men, including the troops in garrison, and composed of about 35,000 British, 6,000 King’s German legion, 24,000 Hanoverians, 7,000 Brunswickers, and 32,000 Dutch-Belgians and Nassau-men, with a hundred and ninety-six guns. Many in the ranks of the last-named troops had served under Napoleon, and there still prevailed amongst them a most powerful prejudice in his favour; it was natural, therefore, that we should not place too strong a reliance upon them, whenever they might become opposed to their old companions in arms.

The Anglo-allied army was divided into two corps, of five divisions each. The first was commanded by the prince of Orange; its head-quarters being Braine-le-Comte. Those of the second corps, under lord Hill, were at Grammont. The cavalry, divided into eleven brigades, was commanded by the earl of Uxbridge, now marquis of Anglesey; head-quarters Ninove. His Grace’s head-quarters were at Brussels, in and around which place was our reserve of all arms, ready to be thrown into whatever point of our line the enemy might attack, so as to hold the ground until the rest of the army could be united.

The Prussian army, under the veteran prince Blücher, consisted of about 115,000 men, divided into four corps, each composed of four brigades. The head-quarters of the 1st, or Zieten’s corps, were at Charleroi; the 2d, Pirch’s, at Namur, which was also Blücher’s head-quarters; the 3d, Thielmann’s, at Ciney; and the 4th, Bulow’s, at Liège.

Each corps had a reserve cavalry attached, respectively commanded by generals Röder, Jurgass, Hobe, and prince William. Their artillery comprised three hundred and twelve guns.

The Prussian army was posted on the frontier upon our left, from Charleroi to Maestricht. Our left, communicating with Blücher’s right, was at Binche; and our right stretched to the sea.

A large proportion of the British troops was composed of weak second and third battalions, made up of militia and recruits, who had never been under fire[6]; most of our best-tried Spanish infantry, the victors of many a hard-fought field, were on their way from America. The foreign troops, with the exception of the old gallant Peninsular German legion, were chiefly composed of new levies, hastily embodied, and very imperfectly drilled; quite inexperienced in war, raw militia-men in every sense of the word, and wholly strangers to the British troops and to each other. Nor was the Prussian army what it had been; it was no longer the old Silesian one: many soldiers had just been embodied, and thousands had fought under the Imperial eagles.

The French army of the North, commanded by the Emperor in person, and destined to act against Belgium, early in June, was divided into six corps, and cantoned: the 1st, or D’Erlon’s, at Lille; the 2d, or Reille’s, at Valenciennes; the 3d, or Vandamme’s, at Mézières; the 4th, or Gérard’s, at Metz; and the 6th, or Lobau’s, at Laon. The Imperial guard was in Paris. The reserve cavalry, commanded by generals Pajol, Excelmans, Milhaut, and Kellermann, cantoned between the Aisne, the Meuse and the Sambre. There were three hundred and fifty pieces of artillery.

On the 16th of May, we received intelligence of there being 110,000 French troops in our front. On the 1st of June, it was rumoured that we were to be attacked; Napoleon was to be at Laon on the 6th, and extraordinary preparations were being made for the conveyance of troops in carriages from Paris to the frontiers. Intelligence reached the Duke, on the 10th of the same month, that Napoleon had arrived at Maubeuge, and was passing along the frontier. On the 12th, it was ascertained, for certain, that the French army had assembled and was about to cross the frontiers[7]; but the Duke, for reasons we shall hereafter give, did not think proper to move his troops until quite satisfied as to the point where Napoleon would make his attack; that point proved to be Charleroi, on the high-road to Brussels, on the left of the allied and right of the Prussian armies, said to be the most favourable for defeating the two armies, in detail; which I am inclined to doubt. Situated as the allied and Prussian armies were, Napoleon, by attempting to wedge his army in between the two, was pretty certain of having both upon him: he could not aim a blow at one enemy without being assailed in flank or rear by the other.

Brussels, the capital of Belgium, lies in the very centre of that country, which was declared by general Gneisenau, chief of the Prussian staff, to be a formidable bastion, flanking efficaciously any invasion meditated by France against Germany, and serving at the same time as a tête de pont to England.

Napoleon had numerous partisans and friends in Belgium, who secretly espoused his cause, and who, no doubt, would have seconded him in his attempt to again annex that country to the French Empire. The people also were by no means reconciled to the union forced upon them by the congress of Vienna, a union with a country differing from them in religion and customs; and the dense population and troops of Belgium might probably have made a movement in favour of the French, had Napoleon obtained possession of the capital. From the tenor of Napoleon’s letter to Ney, and his proclamations to his army and to the Belgians[8], it is quite evident that the Emperor expected a manifestation of this kind. This would certainly have added to his cause that moral force of which it stood so much in need, and have induced thousands to rally round the Imperial eagles.

Brussels was our main line of operations and the line of communication with Ostend and Antwerp, the dépôts where our reinforcements and supplies were landed. The Duke, in consequence, saw clearly, it was of the utmost importance, both in a military and political point of view, to preserve an uninterrupted communication with those ports, and that the enemy should not, even for a moment, obtain possession of Brussels[9].

By the Emperor’s masterly arrangements his army was assembled on the frontiers with astonishing secrecy; but his intention of taking the two armies by surprise was defeated, on the night of the 13th, by the Prussian outposts, in advance of Charleroi, having observed the horizon illumined by the reflection of numerous bivac fires in the direction of Beaumont and Maubeuge, which announced that a numerous enemy had assembled in their immediate front; this intelligence was forthwith transmitted to both Wellington and Blücher.

Zieten, the Prussian commander at Charleroi, received intelligence, on the afternoon of the 14th, that the enemy’s columns were assembling in his front, the certain prelude to an attack, probably the next day. Blücher, apprized of this about ten o’clock the same evening, immediately sent off orders for the concentration of the Prussian army at Fleurus, a preconcerted plan between the two commanders. When the order was first sent to Bulow at Liège, to move to Hannut, had the most trifling hint been given him of the French being about to attack, he would probably have been up in time to share in the battle of Ligny, which might have changed the aspect of affairs.

After dispatching orders for the concentration of the Grand army, Napoleon left Paris on the 12th, and, as he himself states, under a great depression of spirits, aware he was leaving a host of enemies behind, more formidable than those he was going to confront. He slept at Laon, and arrived at Avesnes on the 13th, near which place he found his army assembled, amounting, according to his own account, to 122,400 men and three hundred and fifty guns. Their bivacs were behind small hills, about a league from the frontier, situated so as to be concealed, in a great measure, from the view of their opponents.

The Emperor’s arrival amongst his devoted soldiers raised their spirits to the highest degree of enthusiasm, and on the 14th he issued the following order:

“Imperial head-quarters, 14th June, 1815.

“Napoleon, by the grace of God and the constitution of the Empire, Emperor of the French, etc.

“Soldiers! this day is the anniversary of Marengo and of Friedland, which twice decided the fate of Europe. Then, as after Austerlitz, as after Wagram, we were too generous: we believed in the protestations and in the oaths of princes, whom we left on their thrones. Now, however, leagued together, they aim at the independence and most sacred rights of France; they have commenced the most unjust of aggressions. Let us then march to meet them: are they, and we, no longer the same men?

“Soldiers! at Jena, against those same Prussians, now so arrogant, you were one to three, and at Montmirail one to six. Let those amongst you, who have been captives to the English, describe the nature of their prison ships, and the frightful miseries you endured.

“The Saxons, the Belgians, the Hanoverians, the soldiers of the Confederation of the Rhine, lament that they are compelled to use their arms in the cause of princes, the enemies of justice, and of the rights of nations. They know that this coalition is insatiable: after having devoured twelve millions of Italians, one million of Saxons, and six millions of Belgians, it now wishes to devour the states of the second rank in Germany. Madmen! one moment of prosperity has bewildered them: the oppression and humiliation of the French people are beyond their power: if they enter France, they will find their grave.

“Soldiers! we have forced marches to make, battles to fight, dangers to encounter; but with firmness, victory will be ours.

“The rights, the honour and the happiness of the country will be recovered.

“To every Frenchman who has a heart, the moment is now arrived to conquer or to die[10].”

About four o’clock in the morning of the 15th of June, Napoleon attacked the Prussian outposts in front of Charleroi, at Thuin and Lobbes[11]. The Prussians fell back, slowly and with great caution, on their supports. By some unaccountable neglect Willington was not informed of the attack until after three o’clock in the afternoon, although the distance from Thuin and Lobbes to Brussels is but forty-five miles[12]. Had a well arranged communication been kept up, the Duke could have been informed of the first advance of the French by ten o’clock A.M., and of the real line of attack by four P.M.

The French were in possession of Charleroi by eleven o’clock. The Prussians retired to a position between Ligny and St.-Amand, nearly twenty miles from the outposts. At three o’clock in the afternoon, the 2d Prussian corps had taken position not far from Ligny; Blücher had established his head-quarters at Sombreffe. The advanced posts of the French left column were at Frasnes, three miles beyond Quatre-Bras, from which the advanced posts of the allies had been driven. Ney’s head-quarters were at Gosselies, with a part of his troops only, whilst D’Erlon’s corps and the cavalry of Kellermann were on the Sambre. The centre column of the French army lay near Fleurus, the right column near Châtelet, and the reserve, composed of the Imperial guard and the 6th corps, between Charleroi and Fleurus.

The duke of Wellington, although apprized of the advance of Napoleon and his attack on the Prussian outposts, would make no movement to leave Brussels uncovered, until certain of the real line of attack, as such attacks are often made to mask the real direction of the main body of the enemy. But orders were immediately transmitted to the different divisions to assemble and hold themselves in readiness to march, some at a moment’s notice, and some at day-light in the morning[13].

Lord Uxbridge was ordered to get the cavalry together at the head-quarters (Ninove) that night, leaving the 2d hussars of the King’s German legion on the look-out between the Scheldt and the Lys.

The troops in Brussels, composed of the 5th, or Picton’s division, the 81st regiment, and the Hanoverian brigade of the 6th division, called the reserve, were to be in readiness to march at a moment’s notice.

After the Duke had completed his arrangements for the concentration of the army, his Grace, with many of our officers, went to the celebrated ball, given, on the eve of the memorable engagement at Quatre-Bras, by the duchess of Richmond, at her residence, now Nº 9, Rue des Cendres, Boulevard Botanique, near the Porte de Cologne. The saloons of the duchess were filled with a brilliant company of distinguished guests. The officers in their magnificent uniforms, threading the mazy dance with the most lovely and beautiful women. The ball was at its height, when the duke of Wellington first received positive intelligence that Napoleon had crossed the Sambre with his whole army and taken possession of Charleroi. The excitement which ensued, on the company being made acquainted with Napoleon’s advance, was most extraordinary. The countenances which, a moment before, were lighted up with pleasure and gaiety, now wore a most solemn aspect. The duke of Brunswick, sitting with a child (the present prince de Ligne) on his knees, was so affected, that in rising he let the prince fall on the floor. The guests little imagined that the music which accompanied the gay and lively dances at her Grace’s ball, would so shortly after play martial airs on the battle field, or that some of the officers present at the fête would be seen fighting in their ball dresses, and, in that costume, found amongst the slain.

At about the same time, his Grace also received information from his outposts in front of Mons, and from other sources, which proved that the enemy’s movement upon Charleroi was the real point of attack, and he immediately issued the following orders:

“Brussels, 15th June, 1815.

“AFTER-ORDERS.—TEN O’CLOCK, P.M.

“The 5th” (Picton’s) “division of infantry, to march on Waterloo at two o’clock to-morrow morning.

“The 3d” (Alten’s) “division of infantry, to continue its movement from Braine-le-Comte upon Nivelles.

“The 1st” (Cooke’s) “division of infantry, to move from Enghien upon Braine-le-Comte.

“The 2d” (Clinton’s) “and 4th” (Colville’s) “division of infantry, to move from Ath and Grammont, also from Audenaerde, and to continue their movements upon Enghien.

“The cavalry, to continue its movement from Ninove upon Enghien.

“The above movements to take place with as little delay as possible.

“Wellington.”

Picton’s division and the Hanoverian brigade marched from Brussels about two o’clock A.M., on the 16th, taking the road to Waterloo by the forest of Soigne; near which they halted to refresh, and to await orders, to march either on Nivelles or Quatre-Bras, (the roads branching off at Mont-St.-Jean,) according as the Duke might direct, upon his becoming acquainted with the real state of affairs in front. Shortly after they were joined by the Brunswickers.

“And Ardennes[14] waves above them her green leaves,

Dewy with nature’s tear-drops, as they pass,

Grieving, if aught, inanimate e’er grieves,

Over the unreturning brave,—alas!

Ere evening to be trodden like the grass

Which now beneath them, but above shall grow

In its next verdure, when this fiery mass

Of living valour, rolling on the foe

And burning with high hope, shall moulder cold and low.”

While halting, the duke of Wellington, who had left Brussels between seven and eight o’clock, passed with his staff, and gave strict orders to keep the road clear of baggage, and everything that might obstruct the movements of the troops. The duke of Brunswick dismounted, and seated himself on a bank on the road side, in company of his adjutant-general, colonel Olfermann. How little did those who observed this incident, think, that in a few hours the illustrious duke would, with many of themselves, be laid low in death! and numbers truly there were amongst the slain ere the sun set.

About twelve o’clock, orders arrived for the troops to proceed on to Quatre-Bras, leaving the baggage behind; this looked rather warlike, but as yet nothing was known for certain. The Duke galloped on, and, after a hasty glance at the Waterloo position, rode to Quatre-Bras, where he conversed with the prince of Orange respecting the disposition of the troops as they arrived. His Grace well reconnoitred the enemy’s position. Seeing the latter were not in great force, he rode on to hold a conference with Blücher, whom he found about half-past one o’clock P.M. at the wind-mill at Bussy, between Ligny and Bry, where towards noon, by great activity and exertion, three corps of the Prussian army, about 85,000 men, had been put in position, but so disposed as to draw from the Duke his disapprobation of the arrangements. His Grace saw that the enemy were strong in Blücher’s front, and promising to support his gallant and venerable colleague, shook hands and returned to Quatre-Bras, where he arrived at about half-past two o’clock, soon after which time Napoleon began his attack upon Blücher.

Marshal Ney, who commanded the French troops at Quatre-Bras, commenced his attack upon Perponcher’s Dutch-Belgian division under the prince of Orange. About two o’clock, Picton’s division came up, composed of Kempt’s brigade, the 28th, 32d, 79th Highlanders, and 1st battalion 95th rifles, and of Pack’s brigade, the 1st Royal, 44th, 42d and 92d Highlanders, with Best’s Hanoverian brigade; soon after, the Brunswickers arrived incomplete, and some Nassau troops. Towards six o’clock, sir Colin Halkett’s brigade, the 30th, 33d, 69th, and 73d regiments, also Kielmansegge’s Hanoverian brigade, most opportunely reached the scene of action. Pack’s noble fellows were by this time so hard pressed, so much exhausted, and their ammunition was so nearly expended, that sir Denis Pack applied for a fresh supply of cartridges, or assistance, to sir Colin Halkett, who immediately ordered the 69th to push on and obey any orders given by Pack; the latter then galloped forward to a commanding point, and soon discovered the formation of a large force of cuirassiers preparing for attack. He spurred off to his brigade to prepare them for the coming storm, and in passing by the 69th, ordered colonel Morice to form square, as the enemy’s cavalry was at hand. The formation was nearly completed, when the prince of Orange rode up, and, by a decided misconception, most indiscreetly directed them to reform line, which they were in the act of doing, when the rushing noise in the high corn announced the arrival of the enemy’s cuirassiers, who charged them in flank, rode right along them, regularly rolling them up. A cuirassier carried off the 69th’s colour, in defence of which cadet Clarke, afterwards lieutenant in the 42d, received twenty-three wounds, one of which deprived him of the use of an arm for life.

The duke of Wellington was nearly taken prisoner, and owed his escape to an order which he promptly gave to a part of the 92d, who were lining a ditch, to lie down whilst he galloped over them.

A little before seven o’clock, sir G. Cooke’s division, composed of the 1st brigade, under major-general Maitland, (the second and third battalions of the 1st foot-guards,) and of the 2d brigade, under sir J. Byng, (now lord Strafford,) composed of the 2d battalions of the Coldstream and the 3d foot-guards, came up, and soon drove the enemy back. Ney’s attacks were maintained with the greatest impetuosity during the first hours, but they became fewer and feebler as our reinforcements joined us, and towards the close of the day conducted with greater caution. Soon after sun-set, Ney fell back upon Frasnes, and the desperate struggle terminated. The duke of Wellington then advanced his victorious troops to the foot of the French position, when piquets for the night were thrown forward by both parties. Thus ended the action of Quatre-Bras, during which our troops were fully employed, and the Duke prevented from rendering his promised aid to the Prussians. It was only through the greatest personal exertions of our gallant chief and the most determined resistance on the part of his troops, that the enemy’s attacks were repulsed, and our communication with Blücher at Ligny by the Namur road kept open. The Emperor’s instructions to Ney to drive back the English, whom he supposed to be at that point in no great numbers, and afterwards to turn round and envelop the Prussian right flank, were completely frustrated. Our force in the field towards the close of the day was about 29,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry, and sixty-eight guns; that of the enemy, about 16,000 infantry, 5,000 cavalry, with fifty guns.

To the fortunate circumstance of the marching and countermarching of D’Erlon’s corps (Ney’s reserve) between Frasnes, Ligny and Quatre-Bras, without pulling a trigger, we may probably attribute our success on the 16th. An additional force of 25,000 men, either at Ligny or Quatre-Bras, might have gained Napoleon a decisive victory.

The action at Quatre-Bras possessed its own peculiar and important merits, which, with our masterly retreat to the Waterloo position, would have been sounded by the trumpet of fame, but for the glorious achievement that immediately followed on the field of Waterloo.

In no battle did the British infantry display more valour or more cool determined courage than at Quatre-Bras. Cavalry we had none that could stand the shock of the French; the Brunswick and Belgian cavalry, it is true, made an attempt, but were scattered like chaff before the wind by the veteran cuirassiers, who, to render them the more effective, had been mounted on horses taken from the gendarmes throughout France. The British cavalry had had a long march, some nearly forty miles, and consequently did not arrive until the battle was over. The gallant Picton, seeing the cavalry driven back, led on our infantry in squares into the centre of the enemy’s masses of cavalry; faced with squares the charging squadrons, and in line, the heavy columns of infantry. What may not be effected by such troops, led by such a general? The duke of Brunswick fell, while rallying one of his regiments that had given way. Colonel sir Robert Mac Ara of the 42d, and colonel Cameron of the 92d, were also killed.

During our struggle at Quatre-Bras, Napoleon had attacked the Prussians at Ligny, and between nine and ten o’clock in the evening, their centre was broken, and they began a retreat upon Wavre[15]. The horse of marshal Blücher, a beautiful grey charger, presented to him by our Prince Regent in 1814, was shot under him, and, while lying on the ground, the field-marshal was twice charged over by the enemy’s cavalry. Sir Henry Hardinge, attached to the Prussian head-quarters, lost his left hand at Ligny; and about eight thousand Prussians deserted, and returned home.

The battle of Ligny may be considered as a series of village fights, and had the impetuous old hussar, the gallant Blücher, then seventy-three years of age, not drawn troops from his centre, to strengthen his right, and to enable him to attack the enemy’s left, he might probably have maintained his position; but immediately Napoleon perceived that Blücher had withdrawn his troops from his centre, he made a dash at it, forced it, and thus gained the victory. Notwithstanding the Prussians were defeated, they highly distinguished themselves by their audacity and valour. The battle of Ligny was a fierce and sanguinary contest, and little or no quarter given by either side. Both parties were excited by deadly animosity, and the helpless wounded became the victims. The Prussian loss was about fifteen thousand men and twenty-five guns, exclusive of the eight thousand men that disbanded themselves. The French loss was rather less.

CHAPTER II.

Colonel Gordon’s patrol discovers the Prussians are retreating upon Wavre.—The allied army ordered to retire upon Waterloo.—The Duke writes to Blücher.—Retreat commenced, followed by the enemy.—Skirmishing.—Pressed by the lancers, who are charged by the 7th hussars; the latter are repulsed.—The life-guards make a successful charge.—Lord Anglesey’s letter, refuting a calumnious report of his regiment.—Allied army arrives on the Waterloo position.—The enemy arrive on the opposite heights, and salute us with round-shot, to which we reply to their cost.—Piquets thrown out on both sides.—Dismal bivac; a regular soaker.—The Duke and Napoleon’s quarters.—His Grace receives an answer from Blücher.—Probability of a quarrel on the morrow.—Orders sent to general Colville.—Description of the field of Waterloo; Hougoumont and La Haye-Sainte.—Disposition of the allied army, and the advantages of our position.—Disposition of the enemy, and admirable order of battle.—The eve of Waterloo.—Morning of the 18th wet and uncomfortable; our occupation.—The Duke arrives; his appearance, dress, staff, etc.—Positions corrected.—French bands play, and their troops appear; are marshalled by Napoleon, a magnificent sight, worth ten years of peaceful life.—Why tarries Napoleon with his grand martial display?—The Emperor passes along his lines; his troops exhibit unbounded enthusiasm; his confidence of victory.

Our bivac was quiet during the night, except that the arrival of cavalry and artillery caused an occasional movement.

About two o’clock in the morning, a cavalry patrol got between the piquets, and a rattling fire of musketry began, which brought some of our generals to the spot; Picton was the first that arrived, when it was found that no attempt to advance had been made, and all was soon quiet again. After which the stillness of the enemy quite surprised his Grace, and drew the remark, “They are possibly retreating.”

The Duke, who had slept at Genappe, was early at Quatre-Bras. Up to this time we had no satisfactory intelligence of the Prussians. His Grace consequently sent a patrol along the Namur road to gain intelligence; captain Grey’s troop of the 10th hussars was sent on this duty, accompanied by lieutenant-colonel the Hon. sir Alexander Gordon, one of the Duke’s aides-de-camp. Shortly afterwards, captain Wood, of the 10th, who had been patrolling, informed the Duke that the Prussians had retreated. Gordon’s patrol discovered, on the right of the road, some of the enemy’s vedettes and a piquet; they fell back hurriedly before the patrol, who turned off the high-road to their left, about five miles from Quatre-Bras, and about an hour afterwards came up with the Prussian rear. After obtaining the required information, the patrol returned to head-quarters at Quatre-Bras, where they arrived about seven o’clock A.M., reporting that the Prussians were retreating upon Wavre[16].

The Duke immediately issued the following orders:

To General Lord Hill, G.C.B.

“QUATRE-BRAS, 17th June, 1815.

“The 2d division of British infantry, to march from Nivelles on Waterloo, at ten o’clock.

“The brigades of the 4th division, now at Nivelles, to march from that place on Waterloo, at ten o’clock. Those brigades of the 4th division at Braine-le-Comte, and on the road from Braine-le-Comte to Nivelles, to collect and halt at Braine-le-Comte this day.

“All the baggage on the road from Braine-le-Comte to Nivelles, to return immediately to Braine-le-Comte, and to proceed immediately from thence to Hal and Brussels.

“The spare musket ammunition to be immediately parked behind Genappe.

“The corps under the command of prince Frederick of Orange will move from Enghien this evening, and take up a position in front of Hal, occupying Braine-le-Château with two battalions.

“Colonel Erstorff will fall back with his brigade on Hal, and place himself under the orders of prince Frederick.”

An officer from the Prussian head-quarters, bearing dispatches, written, no doubt, in secret characters, or the French would have immediately discovered the direction in which the Prussians retreated, had been waylaid and made prisoner in the night. But a second officer afterwards arrived at our head-quarters, and confirmed colonel Gordon’s statement that the Prussians had fallen back upon Wavre. The Duke immediately wrote to Blücher, informing him of his intention to retreat upon the position in front of Waterloo, and proposing to accept battle on the following day, provided the Prince would support him with two corps of his army.

The first hint to Picton of the Duke’s intention to retreat, was an order conveyed to him, to collect his wounded; when he growled out, “Very well, sir,” in a tone that showed his reluctance to quit the ground his troops had so bravely maintained the day before.

The Duke commenced the retrograde movement, masked as much as possible from the enemy, who followed us with a large force of cavalry, shouting, Vive l’Empereur!

The first part of the day (the 17th) was sultry, not a breath of air to be felt, and the sky covered with dark heavy clouds. Shortly after the guns came into play, it began to thunder, lighten, and rain in torrents. The ground very quickly became so soaked, that it was difficult for the cavalry to move, except on the paved road: this, in some measure, checked the advance of the French cavalry, who pressed us very much.

The regiment to which I belonged covered the retreat of the main columns. As we neared Genappe, our right squadron, under major Hodge, was skirmishing. By this time the ploughed fields were so completely saturated with rain, that the horses sunk up to the knees, and at times nearly up to the girths, which made this part of the service very severe. Our other two squadrons cleared the town of Genappe, and formed on the rising ground on the Brussels side. Shortly after, the right squadron retired through the town, and drew up on the high-road in column, when a few straggling French lancers, half tipsy, came up and dashed into the head of the column; some were cut down, and some made prisoners. The head of the French column now appeared debouching from the town, and lord Uxbridge being present, he ordered the 7th hussars to charge.

The charge was gallantly led by the officers, and followed by the men, who cut aside the lances, and did all in their power to break the enemy: but our horses being jaded by skirmishing on heavy ground, and the enemy being chiefly lancers, backed by cuirassiers, they were rather awkward customers to deal with, particularly so, as it was an arm with which we were quite unacquainted. When our charge first commenced, their lances were erect, but upon our coming within two or three horses’ length of them, they lowered the points and waved the flags, which made some of our horses shy. Lord Uxbridge, seeing we could make no impression on them, ordered us about: we retired, pursued by the lancers and the cuirassiers intermixed. We rode away from them, reformed, and again attacked them, but with little more effect than at first. Upon this, lord Uxbridge brought forward the 1st life-guards, who made a splendid charge, and drove the cuirassiers and lancers pell-mell back into Genappe; the life-guards charging down hill, with their weight of men and horses, literally rode the enemy down, cutting and thrusting at them as they were falling. In this affair my old regiment had to experience the loss of major Hodge and lieutenant Myer, killed; captain Elphinstone[17], lieutenant Gordon and Peters, wounded; and forty-two men, with thirty-seven horses, killed and wounded. We were well nigh getting a bad name into the bargain.

Reports, as false as they were invidious, having been propagated by some secret enemy of the 7th hussars, it may not be uninteresting to the military world to be made acquainted with the opinion of their colonel, the marquis of Anglesey[18], as conveyed in the following letter:

“Brussels, 28th June 1815.

“MY DEAR BROTHER OFFICERS,

“It has been stated to me, that a report injurious to the reputation of our regiment has gone abroad, and I do not therefore lose an instant in addressing you on the subject. The report must take its origin from the affair which took place with the advance-guard of the French cavalry, near Genappe, on the 17th inst., when I ordered the 7th to cover the retreat. As I was with you and saw the conduct of every individual, there is no one more capable of speaking to the fact than I am. As the lancers pressed us hard, I ordered you, (upon a principle I ever did, and shall act upon,) not to wait to be attacked, but to fall upon them.

“The attack was most gallantly led by the officers, but it failed. It failed because the lancers stood firm, had their flanks completely secured, and were backed by a large mass of cavalry.

“The regiment was repulsed, but it did not run away: no, it rallied immediately. I renewed the attack; it again failed, from the same cause. It retired in perfect order, although it had sustained so severe a loss; but you had thrown the lancers into disorder, who being in motion, I then made an attack upon them with the 1st life-guards, who certainly made a very handsome charge, and completely succeeded. This is the plain honest truth. However lightly I think of lancers under ordinary circumstances, I think, posted as they were, they had a decided advantage over the hussars. The impetuosity however and weight of the life-guards carried all before them, and whilst I exculpate my own regiment, I am delighted in being able to bear testimony to the gallant conduct of the former. Be not uneasy, my brother officers; you had ample opportunity, of which you gallantly availed yourselves, of avenging yourselves on the 18th for the failure on the 17th; and after all, what regiment, or which of us, is certain of success?

“Be assured that I am proud of being your colonel, and that you possess my utmost confidence.

“Your sincere friend,
“Anglesey, lieutenant-general.”

The 23d light dragoons, supported by the life-guards, covered our retreat, and we arrived at a position on which was exhibited as noble a display of valour and discipline, as is to be found either in our own military annals, or in those of any other nation. This position was in front of and about two miles and a half from Waterloo, where most of our army was then drawn up.

The French advance-guard halted on the heights near La Belle-Alliance, when Napoleon said, he wished he had the power of Joshua to stop the sun, that he might attack us that day.

They opened a cannonade upon our line, but principally upon our centre behind the farm of La Haye-Sainte: our guns soon answered them to their cost, and caused great havock amongst the enemy’s columns, as they arrived on the opposite heights between La Belle-Alliance and the orchard of La Haye-Sainte. It was now getting dusk, and orders were given to throw out piquets along the front and flanks of the army.

Our left squadron, under captain Verner, was thrown into the valley in front of the left wing; the rest of my regiment bivacked near where Picton fell the next day.

The spirit of mutual defiance was such, that in posting the piquets, there were many little cavalry affairs, which, although of no useful result to either side, were conducted with great bravery, and carried to such a pitch, that restraint was absolutely necessary. Captain Heyliger, of the 7th hussars, (part of our piquet,) with his troop, made a spirited charge upon the enemy’s cavalry, and when the Duke sent to check him, his Grace desired to be made acquainted with the name of the officer who had shown so much gallantry. A better or more gallant officer, than captain Heyliger, never drew a sword; but he was truly unfortunate: if there was a ball flying about, he was usually the target. I was three times engaged with the enemy, serving with the captain, and he was wounded on each of those occasions: the first time, foraging at Haspereen; next, at the battle of Orthez; and thirdly, at Waterloo. The ball he received on the last occasion was extracted at Bruges, in 1831.

Our bivac was dismal in the extreme; what with the thunder, lightning and rain, it was as bad a night as I ever witnessed, a regular soaker: torrents burst forth from the well charged clouds upon our comfortless bivacs, and the uproar of the elements, during the night preceding Waterloo, seemed as the harbinger of the bloody contest. We cloaked, throwing a part over the saddle, holding by the stirrup leather, to steady us if sleepy: to lie down with water running in streams under us, was not desirable, and to lie amongst the horses not altogether safe. A comrade of mine, Robert Fisher, a tailor by trade, proposed that one of us should go in search of something to sit on. I moved off for that purpose, and obtained two bundles of bean-stalks from a place that I now know as Mont-St.-Jean farm. This put us, I may say, quite in clover. The poor tailor had his thread of life snapped short on the following day.

The duke of Wellington established his head-quarters opposite the church at Waterloo, (now the post-house and post-office;) while his Imperial antagonist, Napoleon, pitched his tent near the farm of Caillou, about five miles from Waterloo, on the left of the Genappe road, in the parish of Old-Genappe. The Imperial baggage was also at this farm.

Most of the houses in the villages adjacent Waterloo were occupied by our generals, their staff, and the superior officers. Their names and rank were chalked on the doors, and legible long after a soldier’s death had snatched many of them from the field of their prowess and glory.

In the course of the evening the Duke received a dispatch from Blücher, in answer to his letter sent from Quatre-Bras, requesting the support of two corps of the Prussian army. The officer bearing this dispatch was escorted from Smohain, to Waterloo, by a party of the 1st King’s German hussars. Blücher’s reply was:

“I shall not come with two corps only, but with my whole army, upon this condition, that should the French not attack us on the 18th, we shall attack them on the 19th.”

The Duke therefore accepted battle only under these circumstances; Napoleon’s lauded plan of operations enabling his Grace to ultimately place the author of those brilliant conceptions between two fires. Blücher appeared most anxious to fight side by side with the allies and their chief, deeming an Anglo-Prussian army invincible; while Wellington, after having defeated most of Napoleon’s best marshals, was no doubt desirous of measuring swords with their mighty master himself, the hero of a hundred battles.

There is every reason to believe that the Duke was more apprehensive of being turned by Hal on his right, and of Brussels being consequently taken by a coup de main, than about any other part of his position. This fact is confirmed by the following orders, dated

“Waterloo, 17th June, 1815.

“The army retired this day from its position at Quatre-Bras, to its present position in front of Waterloo.

“The brigades of the 4th division at Braine-le-Comte are to retire at day-light to-morrow morning upon Hal.

“Major-general Colville must be guided by the intelligence he receives of the enemy’s movements, in his march to Hal, whether he moves by the direct route, or by Enghien.

“Prince Frederick of Orange is to occupy with his corps the position between Hal and Enghien[19], and is to defend it as long as possible.

“The army will probably continue in its position, in front of Waterloo, to-morrow.

“Lieutenant-colonel Torrens will inform lieutenant-general sir Charles Colville of the position and situation of the armies.”

FIELD OF WATERLOO, LA HAYE-SAINTE AND MONUMENTS.

The field of Waterloo is an open undulating plain; and, on the day of the battle, was covered with splendid crops of rye, wheat, barley, oats, beans, peas, potatoes, tares and clover; some of these were of great height. There were a few patches of ploughed ground. The field is intersected by two high-roads which branch off at Mont-St.-Jean; these are very wide: the one on the right, leading to Nivelles and Binche, since planted with trees, is straight as an arrow for miles; that on the left, lying in the centre of both armies, leading south to Genappe, Charleroi and Namur, is not so straight as the former: about eleven hundred yards in advance of the junction, is a gently elevated ridge which formed a good natural military position.

Nearly a year before these events, the Duke had written to lord Bathurst, enclosing “a Memorandum on the defence of the Netherlands,” in which he says:

“About Nivelles, and between that and Binche, there are many advantageous positions; and the entrance of the forêt de Soigne, by the high-road which leads to Brussels from Binche, Charleroi and Namur, would, if worked upon, afford others[20].”

The great advantage was that the troops could rest in rear of the crest of the ridge, screened in a great measure from the enemy’s artillery and observation, whilst our guns were placed at points, from whence they could sweep (they are wonderful brooms) the slope that descends to the valley in front. Upon the crest is a cross-road running east and west, intersecting the Genappe road at right angles, about two hundred and fifty yards on this side of the farm of La Haye-Sainte. The cross-road marks the front of the allied position. Near where the Lion now stands, the cross-road or line runs curving forward a little for about six hundred yards, when it first gently and then abruptly falls back into the Nivelles road, near the termination of the ridge, where it takes a sweep to the rear.

This point was at first our right centre, but became our right when lord Hill’s troops were brought forward into the front line, between four and five o’clock P.M.

About four hundred and fifty yards south of this point, is the important post of Hougoumont, destined to become so celebrated in the annals of history, and which even now stands a noble monument of the determined valour of both the assailed and assailants.

It was then a gentleman’s seat, with farm, out-buildings, walled garden, orchard and wood. The latter has been since cleared, in consequence of the injury the trees sustained in the battle. The buildings are more than two hundred years old, and were erected for defence. Many of the stone loop-holes made in the garden walls when first built, are still quite perfect, as are also those made by our troops on the spur of the moment. The hedges were all banked up, and with the ditches on the inner side formed excellent breastworks.

A ravine or hollow-way, called by colonel Hepburn “our friendly hollow-way,” runs along the northern boundary of the premises, which during the battle frequently served as a covered communication with the walled enclosures and buildings, as also for a rallying point and cover.

NORTH VIEW OF THE FARM OF HOUGOUMONT.

Hougoumont was formerly the property of Arrazola Deonate, who had been viceroy of Naples. In 1815 it was in the occupation of M. de Luneville, a descendant of the above family; it is now the property of count Robiano. This post is situated about midway between the positions of the two hostile armies. The château, farm, walls, etc., were at the time of the battle of a substantial nature. The garden, or park, was enclosed, on the east and south sides, by a wall, in which our troops made additional loop-holes; they also cut down a portion of the buttresses, on the inside of the south wall, for the purpose of erecting a scaffolding which would enable them to fire over the top of the wall, or to bayonet intruders. At the east wall, an embankment, and the scaffolds erected with some farming utensils, enabled the Coldstream to throw such a fire upon the enemy’s left flank when in the large orchard, that colonel Hepburn, who commanded there from about two o’clock, considered it (the east wall) as the strength of his position. Loop-holes were also made in the stables joining the south gate, and a scaffold was erected against the wall on the west, that ran from the south stables to the barn. The flooring over the south gateway was partly torn up, to enable our men to fire down upon the enemy, should they force the gate which had been blocked up, and was not opened during the action. The little chapel and crucifix still remain; but the numerous autographs of persons visiting the field since 1815, are all destroyed, the walls having been lately fresh plastered. The most interesting objects now at Hougoumont, for visitors to see, are the north gateway facing our position, by which the enemy entered, its burnt beams, the small barn where many of the wounded were burnt, the cannon-ball hole in the east gable of the building attached to the present farm-house[21], the well perforated top part of the south gate, the battered front of the house, stables, and the loop-holed walls with the banked-up hedges, hollow-way, and some perforated trees in front of the walls. In the garden is a tomb, beneath which lie the remains of captain Blackman of the Coldstream, (brother to sir George Harnage,) who fell on that spot[22]. Hougoumont presents even at this moment a scene of shattered ruins, which cannot be viewed without exciting feelings of the deepest interest.

On the troops being thrown into Hougoumont on the 17th, all means were employed to strengthen it as much as possible, and there are still to be seen many of the intended loop-holes in an incomplete state, from which it may be inferred that the troops were called off to defend the post, whilst in the act of making them.

Hougoumont was first occupied on the afternoon of the 17th by the light companies of the 1st division of British guards: the light troops of the 1st regiment, under colonel lord Saltoun, held the orchard and wood; those of the Coldstream and 3d guards, under colonel Macdonell, held the buildings and garden. In the out-grounds and wood there were also a battalion of Nassau troops, a company of Hanoverian field riflemen, and a hundred men from the Luneburg battalion. The supernumerary light companies of the guards were thrown into the valley on our side of the enclosures, as a support, and to keep up a communication with the main line.

On the east side of the Genappe road, the cross-road was lined by two broken banked-up hedges, extending about half a mile; near the termination of which is a knoll, with a bit of copse or brushwood on the rear slope: this mound, or knoll, overlooks the farms of Papelotte, La Haye, Frischermont, and the hamlet of Smohain in the valley.

The undulation in rear of the ridge afforded excellent protection to the second line, cavalry and reserves, which were quite concealed from the enemy’s view. Beyond the right of the main ridge, on the right of the Nivelles road, is a deep valley which runs round Hougoumont in the direction of Merbe-Braine, and from the valley cutting through the ridge to the little white chapel on the Nivelles road, runs a deep ravine, which is the one mentioned by the Duke in his dispatch, and intersects the second ridge or plateau, that was occupied by part of the 2d corps, under lieutenant-general lord Hill, who were to act as a right wing, en potence[23], or as a reserve, as circumstances might require.

The principal part of the troops occupying this plateau and valley, belonged to the 2d British division under lieutenant-general sir Henry Clinton: it was composed of the 3d light brigade, major-general F. Adam; the 52d, colonel sir John Colborne (now lord Seaton); the 71st, colonel T. Reynell; the 2d battalion 59th rifles[24], colonel Norcott, with two companies of the 3d battalion 95th, under lieutenant-colonel Ross, who were posted near Merbe-Braine.

The 1st brigade, King’s German legion, under colonel Duplat, was composed of the 1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th line battalions. The 3d, Hanoverian brigade, under colonel Hugh Halkett, consisted of the militia battalions, Osnabruck, Salzgitter, Bremeverden, and Quakenbruck.

The Brunswick corps, after their duke had fallen, were under colonel Olfermann, also near Merbe-Braine. Along the Hougoumont avenue and the road leading from it to Braine-l’Alleud, were some light troops, who, in conjunction with the hussars posted on their right, had in the morning, before the battle began, a sharp skirmish with the enemy. They were part of the fourth brigade of the 4th division, under colonel Mitchell, and attached to the 2d division, composed of the 51st regiment, lieutenant-colonel Rice, the 15th regiment, lieutenant-colonel Tidy, and of the 32d fuzileers, colonel sir H. Ellis; the latter came into front line during the afternoon.

On the right of the former, was a squadron of the 15th hussars, under captain Wodehouse, who threw out vedettes and kept a look-out upon our extreme right. Upon the Nivelles road, opposite the Hougoumont avenue, was an abattis, or barricade. Near Mitchell’s brigade were posted, about two o’clock, two companies of the Coldstream guards, with their colours, in reserve.

Upon the ridge above and overlooking, Hougoumont was posted the 1st division of British guards, composed of the 2d battalion of the Coldstream guards, colonel Woodford, who was a little in advance; the 2d battalion of the 3d guards, colonel Hepburn, posted a little in rear of the crest of the ridge. The whole were in battalion columns, with deploying intervals, and in chequer.

On their left was the first brigade, composed of the 2d battalion of the 1st guards[25], colonel Askew, and posted in rear; and of the 3d battalion, colonel the Hon. W. Stuart, posted a little in advance of the crest.

On the left of Maitland, was the 3d division, under lieutenant-general count Alten; the 5th British brigade, composed of the 30th, colonel Hamilton, and the 73d, colonel G. Harris, posted in advance; and of the 33d, colonel Elphinstone, with the 69th, colonel Morice, posted upon the right rear of the 30th and 73d. The four regiments formed and acted as two.

On their left was the 1st Hanoverian brigade, under major-general count Kielmansegge. The field battalions of Bremen, Verden, York, Grubenhagen and Luneburg were posted three in front and two in second line.

On Kielmansegge’s left, was the 2d brigade of the King’s German legion, under colonel Ompteda, which formed Alten’s left and rested upon the Genappe high-road: it was composed of the 1st light battalion, major Bussche, and the 2d, colonel Baring; of the 5th line, colonel Linsingen, and the 8th, colonel Schröder: the 1st and 5th were a little in rear of the cross-road upon the ridge; the 8th in reserve.

The 2d light, under colonel Baring, held La Haye-Sainte, a post far from being so commodious as Hougoumont, but considerably nearer our position, consequently easier of access, although more exposed to the enemy’s attacks and cannonade. It was a strong stone and brick building, with a narrow orchard in front, and a small garden in the rear, both of which were hedged round, except the east side of the garden, on which there was a strong wall running along the high-road side, then taking a western direction terminated upon the east end of the barn; a large and small gate opened on the road; a yard and barn door led to the orchard and fields which now face the Lion. At this point was the chief tug of war.

A passage led through the house from the farm-yard into the garden, which lies on the north or allied side of the buildings, the door of which was four feet wide; there were also on the same side four windows and ten loop or air-holes, by which any quantity of ammunition might have been thrown in; consequently, the oft-told tale that a breach should have been made on that side but was forgotten, falls to the ground, like many other false reports. A dozen loop-holes in the west or Lion side of the buildings would have added considerably to the strength of the post. Loop-holes were made in the south and east walls as well as in the roofs, and the post strengthened on being occupied by our troops.

A barricade was thrown across the high-road, near the south-east angle of the wall; but there were several drawbacks to the strengthening of this post. The working tools had been lost, the carpenters had been sent to assist at Hougoumont; half of the large west barn door was wanting, and in addition, the post was exposed to a line of batteries, that had been pushed forward upon the inner ridge of the French right wing, at a range of from six to eight hundred yards.

In rear of the interval between Halkett’s and Kielmansegge’s brigades stood the Nassau brigade, three battalions of the 1st regiment of Nassau, under general Kruse.

Upon the left of the Genappe road, in columns just under the crest of the ridge, was the 5th division: the 8th brigade, composed of the 28th, colonel sir P. Belson; the 32d, colonel Hicks; the 79th Highlanders, colonel Douglas, and of the 1st battalion 95th rifles, colonel Sir A. Barnard. In front of the right of the brigade, and about a hundred and forty yards from the cross-road, stood a knoll, in front of which was a sand-hole, (where the Hanoverian monument now stands;) on our side of the knoll and parallel with our front, was a hedge slightly studded with trees, about a hundred and forty yards long. The whole of this ground was occupied by three companies of riflemen, under major Leach, who made a barricade across the road: more of the rifles lined the straggling hedge along the cross-road; their reserve was at the junction of the roads.

On their left was the 9th brigade, consisting of the 1st or Royal Scots, colonel Campbell; the 42d Royal Highlanders, colonel sir R. Mac Ara; the 44th, colonel Hamerton; and the 92d Highlanders, colonel Cameron; their left near the brushwood, upon the rear face of the knoll on our left. From this to Wavre, which is concealed by woods and high ground, and from whence the Prussians had to march, the distance is about twelve miles: consequently the Duke had good reason for calculating on a much earlier support by Blücher.

In Pack’s left front was the 4th Hanoverian brigade, under colonel Best, composed of the militia battalions, Luneburg, Verden and Osterode; the Munden in reserve.

In Best’s left rear, and posted a little under the crest of the ridge, was the 5th Hanoverian brigade, 5th division, under colonel Vincke, in columns of battalions: namely, those of Hameln and Hildesheim, Peine and Gifhorn.

The hamlet of Smohain, with the farms of Papelotte and La Haye, and the houses and enclosures in the valley, were occupied by the second brigade of the 2d Dutch-Belgian division, under general Perponcher. This brigade, under the duke of Saxe-Weimar, was composed of the two battalions of Orange-Nassau, and the 2d and 3d battalions of the regiment of Nassau, the 1st battalion of which was at Hougoumont.

Upon our extreme left was the 6th cavalry brigade, under major-general sir Hussey Vivian, composed of the 10th hussars, colonel Quentin; the 18th hussars, colonel the Hon. H. Murray, and of the 1st hussars of the German legion, colonel de Wissel. A piquet of the 10th, under captain Taylor[26] was thrown into Smohain in the valley; their vedettes were posted on the rising ground beyond.

Before the battle began, a Prussian patrol arrived at this piquet, and informed captain Taylor, that part of Bulow’s (4th) corps was at St.-Lambert; this intelligence was immediately sent to the duke of Wellington.

On Vivian’s right was the 4th cavalry brigade, under major-general sir J. O. Vandeleur, composed of the 11th light dragoons, colonel Sleigh; the 12th, colonel the Hon. F. Ponsonby, and the 16th, colonel J. Hay. In advance of the hedge, in front of the centre of the left wing, was Byland’s brigade of the Netherlands, deployed in line, composed of the 27th Dutch light infantry, the 5th, 7th, and 8th Dutch militia, and the 7th of the Belgian line; the 5th Dutch was in reserve.

On the left of the Genappe road, in rear of Picton’s division, was the 2d cavalry brigade, under major-general sir William Ponsonby, composed of the 1st Royal dragoons, colonel Clifton; the 2d or Scots Greys, colonel Hamilton, and the 6th, Inniskilling, colonel Muter.

Near the farm of Mont-St.-Jean[27], was the 10th brigade of the 6th division, which was to have been under lieutenant-general the Hon. sir L. Cole, but he had not joined. Sir J. Lambert commanded this brigade, which was composed of the 4th, colonel Brook; the 27th, Inniskilling, major Hare, and the 40th, major Heyland; they had just landed from America, and had made forced marches from Assche. These were what the Duke termed Spanish, or old tried infantry, most of whom being on their way from America did not arrive until the battle was fought. Sir Harry Smith (the hero of Aliwal) was on sir J. Lambert’s staff.

In the hollow, on the right of the high-road in rear of Ompteda, was the 1st or household brigade, under major-general lord Edward Somerset, viz. the 1st life-guards, colonel Ferrior; the 2d ditto, colonel the Hon. E. Lygon; the Royal horse-guards (Blues,) colonel R. Hill; 1st dragoon guards, colonel Fuller.

In rear of Alten’s centre were the 3d hussars of the King’s German legion, under colonel sir F. Arentschild. Behind the centre was the cavalry division of the Netherlands, under lieutenant-general baron Collaert: the 1st brigade, major-general Tripp, the 1st and 3d Dutch, and 2d Belgian carabineers. The second brigade, major-general de Ghigny, consisted of the 4th Dutch light dragoons, and the 8th Belgian hussars. The 3d brigade, major-general Merle, was composed of the 5th Belgian light dragoons and the 6th Dutch hussars.

On the right of the 3d German hussars were the Cumberland Hanoverian hussars, under colonel Hake.

In rear of Halkett’s right was the 3d cavalry brigade, under major-general sir William Dornberg, consisting of the 23d light dragoons, major Cutcliffe, and of the 1st and 2d light dragoons of the King’s German legion.

In rear of Byng was the 5th cavalry brigade, under major-general sir Colquhoun Grant, composed of the 7th hussars, colonel Kerrison, of the 15th hussars, colonel L. Dalrymple, and of the 13th light dragoons, lieutenant-colonel Boyse. The 13th did not properly belong to this brigade.

The 3d division of the Netherlands, lieutenant-general Chassé, (who so gallantly defended the citadel of Antwerp in 1832,) was under lord Hill: its 1st brigade, under colonel Ditmers, was composed of the 33d battalion of Belgian light infantry, and the 2d of the line, with the 4th, 6th, 17th, and 19th battalions of Dutch militia. It occupied the town of Braine-l’Alleud; the 17th was posted a little nearer to the 2d British division, to keep up the communication.

The 2d brigade, under major-general d’Aubremé, composed of the 36th Belgian light infantry, the 3d, the 12th, and the 13th line, and the 10th militia, was at the farm of Vieux-Forêt, beyond Braine-l’Alleud, for the security of our right flank, and to keep open the communication with our detached forces at Hal, etc., for the protection of our extreme right. The 6th British brigade thus detached was composed of the 35th, 55th, 59th, and 91st regiments, under major-general Johnstone, with the 6th Hanoverian brigade, major-general sir James Lyon, and two regiments of Hanoverian cavalry, under colonel Erstorff, and a division of Netherlanders, under prince Frederick of Holland. These troops were thus posted for the protection of Brussels against a coup de main by any detached force of the enemy[28].

The reader will observe that the principal advantages of the allied position were.

1º The junction of the two high-roads immediately in rear of our centre, from which branched off the paved broad road to Brussels, our main line of operation, and the paved road to the capital by Braine-l’Alleud and Alsemberg. This added to the facility of communication, and enabled us to move ammunition, guns, troops, the wounded, etc., to or from any part of our main front line, as circumstances demanded.

2º The advanced posts of Hougoumont, La Haye-Sainte, Papelotte, and La Haye farms, near which no enemy could pass without being assailed in flank by musketry.

3º The continuous ridge from flank to flank towards which no hostile force could advance undiscovered, within range of our artillery upon the crest. Behind this ridge our troops could manœuvre, or lie concealed from the enemy’s view, while they were in great measure protected from the fire of the hostile batteries.

4º Our extreme left was strong by nature. The buildings, hollow-ways, enclosures, trees and brushwood, along the valley from Papelotte to Ohain, thickly peopled with light infantry, would have kept a strong force long at bay. Our batteries on the left on the knoll commanded the valley and the slopes. The ground from those batteries to Ohain, which was occupied till near eight o’clock P.M. by Vandeleur’s and Vivian’s brigades, was admirably adapted for cavalry.

5º Our extreme right was secured by numerous patches of brushwood, trees and ravines, and further protected by hamlets, and by lord Hill’s troops en potence, part of which occupied Braine-l’Alleud and the farm of Vieux-Forêt, on the height above that town.

Between nine and ten o’clock, the French began to take up their position in our front, on an opposite ridge running nearly parallel to ours; their centre being near La Belle-Alliance, about fourteen hundred yards from ours; their right running east along the ridge towards Frischermont. At two hundred yards behind La Belle-Alliance is a cross-road, leading from Plancenoit to the Nivelles road, and intersecting the latter about midway between Hougoumont and Mon-Plaisir, at which point there are now two small houses built, and visible from the allied right wing. It was near this point that the French left terminated.

The French right wing was the 1st corps, under lieutenant-general count d’Erlon, the same, (with the exception of Durutte’s infantry and Jacquinot’s cavalry divisions, which were at Ligny,) that had been marching and countermarching between Gosselies, Ligny and Frasnes on the 16th, and which, up to this time, had not fired a shot during the campaign. It was composed of four divisions of infantry, and one of light cavalry. The 2d or left division, under general Donzelot, had its left upon La Belle-Alliance. It consisted of the 13th light, and 17th, 19th, 51st of the line, and was drawn up, like the whole of their front, in two lines about sixty yards apart. On their right was the 1st division, under general Alix: the 28th, 54th, 55th, and 105th of the line. On their right was the 3d division, under lieutenant-general Marcognet: the 21st, 25th, 45th, and 46th of the line. On their right was the 4th division, under general Darutte: the 8th, 29th, 85th, 95th of the line. The 1st division of cavalry, under general Jacquinot, was on the right of this corps: it consisted of the 3d and 7th light dragoons, and the 3d and 4th lancers, with seven batteries to the corps.

The left wing was the 2d corps, under lieutenant-general count Reille, composed of three divisions of infantry and one of cavalry. The right division, the 5th, under lieutenant-general Bachelu, rested its right upon La Belle-Alliance, and its left in the valley that runs round the south enclosures of Hougoumont: it comprised the 12th, 61st, 72d, and 108th line. Girard’s division was during the 16th and 17th at Ligny, where it was left on the 18th, it is said, by mistake.

Upon their left, and facing the wood of Hougoumont, was the 9th division, under lieutenant-general Foy; viz. the 4th light, the 92d, 93d, and 100th line. On the left of the 9th division, upon the ridge facing the buildings of Hougoumont, was the 6th division, under general prince Jérôme Napoleon, comprising the 1st and 2d light, and 1st, 2d, and 3d line; the last three regiments were composed of three battalions each. On the left of the corps was the 2d cavalry division, under lieutenant-general Piré, being the 1st and 6th light dragoons, and the 5th and 6th lancers; they crossed the Nivelles road in lines, and threw forward piquets towards Braine-l’Alleud and Uphain; thus keeping a look-out upon the extreme left of their army. Their artillery, composed of five batteries, was ranged along the front of the divisions.

Behind their centre, close along their left of the Genappe road, was the 6th corps, under lieutenant-general count de Lobau (George Mouton). The 19th and 20th divisions only were present: they were formed in close columns of battalions, by divisions. The 19th division was about two hundred yards behind the right of the 2d corps; the 20th about two hundred yards in rear of the 19th division. The former was under lieutenant-general Simmer, being the 5th, 11th, 27th, and 84th of the line. The 20th division, under lieutenant-general Jeannin, was formed of the 5th light, and 10th, 47th, and 107th line. There were five batteries to this corps. The 21st, or Teste’s division, was with Grouchy.

Upon the right of the 6th corps, separated only by the road, was the 3d cavalry division, under lieutenant-general Domont, being the 4th, 9th, and 12th light dragoons; and the 5th cavalry division, under lieutenant-general Subervie, being the 1st and 2d lancers, and the 11th light dragoons. They were in close columns. Their two troops of artillery were on their right.

Behind the centre of the right wing was the 4th cavalry corps, under lieutenant-general count Milhaut.

The 13th cavalry division, under lieutenant-general Wattier, comprised the 5th, 6th, 9th, and 10th cuirassiers; and the 14th division, under lieutenant-general Delort, consisted of the 1st, 4th, 7th, and 12th cuirassiers. Their two troops of artillery were in the centre.

In rear of those divisions, in reserve, was the light cavalry of the Imperial guard, composed of light dragoons and lancers, under generals Lefebvre-Desnouettes and Colbert, like the rest, drawn up in two lines; their artillery in the centre.

In rear of the centre of the left wing was the 3d cavalry corps, under lieutenant-general Kellermann. It comprised the 11th cavalry division, the 2d and 7th dragoons, and 8th and 11th cuirassiers, under lieutenant-general L’Héritier; and the 12th division, viz. the 1st and 2d carabineers (brass-clad cuirassiers,) and 2d and 3d cuirassiers, under lieutenant-general Roussel. Their two troops of artillery were upon their flanks.

In rear of those two divisions were the horse-grenadiers and dragoons of the Imperial guard, in reserve, under the generals Guyot and Hoffmeyer; their artillery was in their centre.

In rear of the 6th corps and the 3d and 5th cavalry divisions, near the farm of Rossomme, was the infantry of the Imperial guard, in reserve, under lieutenant-general Drouot: it consisted of four regiments of grenadiers, four regiments of chasseurs, two regiments of tirailleurs and two of voltigeurs, of two battalions each. The 1st and 2d regiments of grenadiers and chasseurs formed the old guard, under lieutenant-general Friant; the 3d and 4th regiments of grenadiers and chasseurs formed the middle guard, under lieutenant-general count Morand; and the four regiments of voltigeurs and tirailleurs formed the young guard, under lieutenant-general Duhesme. They were drawn up in six lines of four battalions each; the Genappe high-road divided them into two equal parts; their artillery (six batteries) was on their flank. The reserve artillery of the guard (twenty-four guns) was in their rear.

Such was Napoleon’s disposition of his eager and gallant followers.

“This admirable order of battle,” observes a distinguished military writer, “at once grand, simple and imposing, and presenting to its skilful designer the most ample means of sustaining, by an immediate and efficient support, any attack from whatever point he might wish to direct it, and of possessing everywhere a respectable force at hand to oppose any attack made upon himself, from whatever quarter it might be made, was no less remarkable for the regularity and precision with which the several masses, constituting thirteen distinct columns, advanced to their destined stations, than for the unusual degree of warlike pomp and high martial bearing with which the lines drew up in this mighty battle array.” (Siborne, vol. I.)

Both positions, whatever some prejudiced French writers may assert, offered everywhere fair fighting ground, on which all arms could act without any disadvantage.

THE EVE OF WATERLOO.

“Kneel, warrior, kneel: to-morrow’s sun

May see thy course of glory run;

And batter’d helm and shiver’d glave

May lie neglected near thy grave.

Kneel; for thy prayer in battle field

May sanctify thy sword and shield,

And help to guard, unstain’d and free,

Our altars, home and liberty.

“Arm, warrior, arm: the hostile bands

Now grasp in haste their whetted brands,

And seek the vantage of the height,

Ere the first blush of morning light;

And hark! the trumpet’s stormy bray!

God speed thee, warrior, on thy way!

The stirring word of onset be,

Our altars, home and liberty!