FULL REPORT, FROM ORIGINAL SOURCES.

THE TRIAL
OF
EMILE ZOLA

A DETAILED REPORT

OF THE

Fifteen Days’ Proceedings in the
Assize Court at Paris

NEW YORK
Benj. R. Tucker, 24 Gold Street
1898

The Trial

OF

EMILE ZOLA

Containing

M. ZOLA’S LETTER TO PRESIDENT FAURE RELATING TO
THE DREYFUS CASE, AND A FULL REPORT OF THE
FIFTEEN DAYS’ PROCEEDINGS IN THE ASSIZE
COURT OF THE SEINE, INCLUDING TESTIMONY
OF WITNESSES AND SPEECHES OF COUNSEL

New York
Benj. R. Tucker, Publisher
1898

Copyright
By Benj. R. Tucker
1898

☞ The advantages of the method of typography employed in the composition of this volume, in which the “justification” of lines is dispensed with, are undeniable. From the standpoint of æsthetics it is an improvement, because by it absolutely perfect spacing is secured. From the standpoint of economy it is almost a revolution, since it saves, in the case of book work, from twenty to forty per cent. of the cost of type-setting, according to the grade of the work. If adopted in all printing-offices, it would effect a daily saving of the labor of about two hundred thousand men.

Contents.

THE OFFENCE.

On January 10, 1898, some three years after the secret trial and conviction, by a council of war, of Captain Alfred Dreyfus, then a staff officer of the French army, of having sold French military secrets to a foreign power, in consequence of which he was stripped of his uniform in a degrading public ceremony and sent for life to Devil’s Island, a French penal settlement situated off the coast of French Guiana, where he is now confined under guard, a second council of war convened in Paris for the trial of Major Marie Charles Ferdinand Walsin-Esterhazy, a French infantry officer temporarily relieved from active service on account of poor health, the charge against him—preferred by Mathieu Dreyfus, brother of Captain Alfred Dreyfus—being that he was the real author of the bordereau, or itemized memorandum, supposed to have been written by Captain Dreyfus, and on the strength of which the latter was convicted.

The trial was conducted publicly until the most important witness, Lieutenant-Colonel Georges Picquart, of the Fourth Algerian Sharpshooters, was reached, when the council went into secret session, remaining behind closed doors until the evening of January 11, when the doors were thrown open and General de Luxer, the president of the council, announced a unanimous vote in acquittal of the defendant.

Two days later—January 13—“L’Aurore,” a daily paper published in Paris under the directorship of Ernest Vaughan and the editorship of Georges Clemenceau, and having as its gérant, or legally responsible editor, J. A. Perrenx, published the following letter from Emile Zola, man of letters, to Félix Faure, president of France:

I ACCUSE...!

LETTER TO M. FELIX FAURE, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC.

Monsieur le Président:

Will you permit me, in my gratitude for the kindly welcome that you once extended to me, to have a care for the glory that belongs to you, and to say to you that your star, so lucky hitherto, is threatened with the most shameful, the most ineffaceable, of stains?

You have emerged from base calumnies safe and sound; you have conquered hearts. You seem radiant in the apotheosis of that patriotic fête which the Russian alliance has been for France, and you are preparing to preside at the solemn triumph of our Universal Exposition, which will crown our great century of labor, truth, and liberty. But what a mud-stain on your name—I was going to say on your reign—is this abominable Dreyfus affair! A council of war has just dared to acquit an Esterhazy in obedience to orders, a final blow at all truth, at all justice. And now it is done! France has this stain upon her cheek; it will be written in history that under your presidency it was possible for this social crime to be committed.

Since they have dared, I too will dare. I will tell the truth, for I have promised to tell it, if the courts, once regularly appealed to, did not bring it out fully and entirely. It is my duty to speak; I will not be an accomplice. My nights would be haunted by the spectre of the innocent man who is atoning, in a far-away country, by the most frightful of tortures, for a crime that he did not commit.

And to you, Monsieur le Président, will I cry this truth, with all the force of an honest man’s revolt. Because of your honor I am convinced that you are ignorant of it. And to whom then shall I denounce the malevolent gang of the really guilty, if not to you, the first magistrate of the country?

First, the truth as to the trial and conviction of Dreyfus.

A calamitous man has managed it all, has done it all—Colonel du Paty de Clam, then a simple major. He is the entire Dreyfus case; it will be fully known only when a sincere investigation shall have clearly established his acts and his responsibilities. He appears as the most heady, the most intricate, of minds, haunted with romantic intrigues, delighting in the methods of the newspaper novel, stolen papers, anonymous letters, meetings in deserted spots, mysterious women who peddle overwhelming proofs by night. It is he who conceived the idea of dictating the bordereau to Dreyfus; it is he who dreamed of studying it in a room completely lined with mirrors; it is he whom Major Forzinetti represents to us armed with a dark lantern, trying to gain access to the accused when asleep, in order to throw upon his face a sudden flood of light, and thus surprise a confession of his crime in the confusion of his awakening. And I have not to tell the whole; let them look, they will find. I declare simply that Major du Paty de Clam, entrusted as a judicial officer with the duty of preparing the Dreyfus case, is, in the order of dates and responsibilities, the first person guilty of the fearful judicial error that has been committed.

The bordereau already had been for some time in the hands of Colonel Sandherr, director of the bureau of information, who since then has died of general paralysis. “Flights” have taken place; papers have disappeared, as they continue to disappear even today; and the authorship of the bordereau was an object of inquiry, when little by little an a priori conclusion was arrived at that the author must be a staff officer and an officer of artillery,—clearly a double error, which shows how superficially this bordereau had been studied, for a systematic examination proves that it could have been written only by an officer of troops. So they searched their own house; they examined writings; it was a sort of family affair,—a traitor to be surprised in the war offices themselves, that he might be expelled therefrom. I need not again go over a story already known in part. It is sufficient to say that Major du Paty de Clam enters upon the scene as soon as the first breath of suspicion falls upon Dreyfus. Starting from that moment, it is he who invented Dreyfus; the case becomes his case; he undertakes to confound the traitor, and induce him to make a complete confession. There is also, to be sure, the minister of war, General Mercier, whose intelligence seems rather inferior; there is also the chief of staff, General de Boisdeffre, who seems to have yielded to his clerical passion, and the sub-chief of staff, General Gonse, whose conscience has succeeded in accommodating itself to many things. But at bottom there was at first only Major du Paty de Clam, who leads them all, who hypnotizes them,—for he concerns himself also with spiritualism, with occultism, holding converse with spirits. Incredible are the experiences to which he submitted the unfortunate Dreyfus, the traps into which he tried to lead him, the mad inquiries, the monstrous fancies, a complete and torturing madness.

Ah! this first affair is a nightmare to one who knows it in its real details. Major du Paty de Clam arrests Dreyfus, puts him in close confinement; he runs to Madame Dreyfus, terrorizes her, tells her that, if she speaks, her husband is lost. Meantime the unfortunate was tearing his flesh, screaming his innocence. And thus the examination went on, as in a fifteenth-century chronicle, amid mystery, with a complication of savage expedients, all based on a single childish charge, this imbecile bordereau, which was not simply a vulgar treason, but also the most shameless of swindles, for the famous secrets delivered proved, almost all of them, valueless. If I insist, it is because here lies the egg from which later was to be hatched the real crime, the frightful denial of justice, of which France lies ill. I should like to show in detail how the judicial error was possible; how it was born of the machinations of Major du Paty de Clam; how General Mercier and Generals de Boisdeffre and Gonse were led into it, gradually assuming responsibility for this error, which afterward they believed it their duty to impose as sacred truth, truth beyond discussion. At the start there was, on their part, only carelessness and lack of understanding. At worst we see them yielding to the religious passions of their surroundings, and to the prejudices of the esprit de corps. They have suffered folly to do its work.

But here is Dreyfus before the council of war. The most absolute secrecy is demanded. Had a traitor opened the frontier to the enemy in order to lead the German emperor to Notre Dame, they would not have taken stricter measures of silence and mystery. The nation is awe-struck; there are whisperings of terrible doings, of those monstrous treasons that excite the indignation of History, and naturally the nation bows. There is no punishment severe enough; it will applaud even public degradation; it will wish the guilty man to remain upon his rock of infamy, eaten by remorse. Are they real then,—these unspeakable things, these dangerous things, capable of setting Europe aflame, which they have had to bury carefully behind closed doors? No, there was nothing behind them save the romantic and mad fancies of Major du Paty de Clam. All this was done only to conceal the most ridiculous of newspaper novels. And, to assure one’s self of it, one need only study attentively the indictment read before the council of war.

Ah! the emptiness of this indictment! That a man could have been condemned on this document is a prodigy of iniquity. I defy honest people to read it without feeling their hearts leap with indignation and crying out their revolt at the thought of the unlimited atonement yonder, on Devil’s Island. Dreyfus knows several languages—a crime; no compromising document was found on his premises—a crime; he sometimes visits the neighborhood of his birth—a crime; he is industrious, he is desirous of knowing everything—a crime; he does not get confused—a crime; he gets confused—a crime. And the simplicities of this document, the formal assertions in the void! We were told of fourteen counts, but we find, after all, only one,—that of the bordereau. And even as to this we learn that the experts were not in agreement; that one of them, M. Gobert, was hustled out in military fashion, because he permitted himself to arrive at another than the desired opinion. We were told also of twenty-three officers who came to overwhelm Dreyfus with their testimony. We are still in ignorance of their examination, but it is certain that all of them did not attack him, and it is to be remarked, furthermore, that all of them belonged to the war officers. It is a family trial; there they are all at home; and it must be remembered that the staff wanted the trial, sat in judgment at it, and has just passed judgment a second time.

So there remained only the bordereau, concerning which the experts were not in agreement. It is said that in the council-chamber the judges naturally were going to acquit. And, after that, how easy to understand the desperate obstinacy with which, in order to justify the conviction, they affirm today the existence of a secret overwhelming document, a document that cannot be shown, that legitimates everything, before which we must bow, an invisible and unknowable god. I deny this document; I deny it with all my might. A ridiculous document, yes, perhaps a document concerning little women, in which there is mention of a certain D—— who becomes too exacting; some husband doubtless, who thinks that they pay him too low a price for his wife. But a document of interest to the national defence the production of which would lead to a declaration of war tomorrow! No, no; it is a lie; and a lie the more odious and cynical because they lie with impunity, in such a way that no one can convict them of it. They stir up France; they hide themselves behind her legitimate emotion; they close mouths by disturbing hearts, by perverting minds. I know no greater civic crime.

These, then, Monsieur le Président, are the facts which explain how it was possible to commit a judicial error; and the moral proofs, the position of Dreyfus as a man of wealth, the absence of motive, this continual cry of innocence, complete the demonstration that he is a victim of the extraordinary fancies of Major du Paty de Clam, of his clerical surroundings, of that hunting down of the “dirty Jews” which disgraces our epoch.

And we come to the Esterhazy case. Three years have passed; many consciences remain profoundly disturbed, are anxiously seeking, and finally become convinced of the innocence of Dreyfus.

I shall not give the history of M. Scheurer-Kestner’s doubts, which later became convictions. But, while he was investigating for himself, serious things were happening to the staff. Colonel Sandherr was dead, and Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart had succeeded him as chief of the bureau of information. And it is in this capacity that the latter, in the exercise of his functions, came one day into possession of a letter-telegram addressed to Major Esterhazy by an agent of a foreign power. His plain duty was to open an investigation. It is certain that he never acted except at the command of his superiors. So he submitted his suspicions to his hierarchical superiors, first to General Gonse, then to General de Boisdeffre, then to General Billot, who had succeeded General Mercier as minister of war. The famous Picquart documents, of which we have heard so much, were never anything but the Billot documents,—I mean, the documents collected by a subordinate for his minister, the documents which must be still in existence in the war department. The inquiries lasted from May to September, 1896, and here it must be squarely affirmed that General Gonse was convinced of Esterhazy’s guilt, and that General de Boisdeffre and General Billot had no doubt that the famous bordereau was in Esterhazy’s handwriting. Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart’s investigation had ended in the certain establishment of this fact. But the emotion thereat was great, for Esterhazy’s conviction inevitably involved a revision of the Dreyfus trial; and this the staff was determined to avoid at any cost.

Then there must have been a psychological moment, full of anguish. Note that General Billot was in no way compromised; he came freshly to the matter; he could bring out the truth. He did not dare, in terror, undoubtedly, of public opinion, and certainly fearful also of betraying the entire staff, General de Boisdeffre, General Gonse, to say nothing of their subordinates. Then there was but a minute of struggle between his conscience and what he believed to be the military interest. When this minute had passed, it was already too late. He was involved himself; he was compromised. And since then his responsibility has only grown; he has taken upon his shoulders the crime of others, he is as guilty as the others, he is more guilty than they, for it was in his power to do justice, and he did nothing. Understand this; for a year General Billot, Generals De Boisdeffre and Gonse have known that Dreyfus is innocent, and they have kept this dreadful thing to themselves. And these people sleep, and they have wives and children whom they love!

Colonel Picquart had done his duty as an honest man. He insisted in the presence of his superiors, in the name of justice; he even begged of them; he told them how impolitic were their delays, in view of the terrible storm which was gathering, and which would surely burst as soon as the truth should be known. Later there was the language that M. Scheurer-Kestner held likewise to General Billot, adjuring him in the name of patriotism to take the matter in hand, and not to allow it to be aggravated till it should become a public disaster. No, the crime had been committed; now the staff could not confess it. And Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart was sent on a mission; he was farther and farther removed, even to Tunis, where one day they even wanted to honor his bravery by charging him with a mission which would surely have led to his massacre in the district where the marquis de Morès met his death. He was not in disgrace; Gen. Gonse was in friendly correspondence with him; but there are secrets which it does one no good to find out.

At Paris the truth went on, irresistibly, and we know in what way the expected storm broke out. M. Mathieu Dreyfus denounced Major Esterhazy as the real author of the bordereau, at the moment when M. Scheurer-Kestner was about to lodge a demand for a revision of the trial with the keeper of the seals. And it is here that Major Esterhazy appears. The evidence shows that at first he was dazed, ready for suicide or flight. Then suddenly he determines to brazen it out; he astonishes Paris by the violence of his attitude. The fact was that aid had come to him; he had received an anonymous letter warning him of the intrigues of his enemies; a mysterious woman had even disturbed herself at night to hand to him a document stolen from the staff, which would save him. And I cannot help seeing here again the hand of Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam, recognizing the expedients of his fertile imagination. His work, the guilt of Dreyfus, was in danger, and he was determined to defend it. A revision of the trial,—why, that meant the downfall of the newspaper novel, so extravagant, so tragic, with its abominable dénouement on Devil’s Island. That would never do. Thenceforth there was to be a duel between Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart and Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam, the one with face uncovered, the other masked. Presently we shall meet them both in the presence of civil justice. At bottom it is always the staff defending itself, unwilling to confess its crime, the abomination of which is growing from hour to hour.

It has been wonderingly asked who were the protectors of Major Esterhazy. First, in the shadow, Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam, who devised everything, managed everything; his hand betrays itself in the ridiculous methods. Then there is General de Boisdeffre, General Gonse, General Billot himself, who are obliged to acquit the major, since they cannot permit the innocence of Dreyfus to be recognized, for, if they should, the war offices would fall under the weight of public contempt. And the beautiful result of this prodigious situation is that the one honest man in the case, Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart, who alone has done his duty, is to be the victim, the man to be derided and punished. O justice, what frightful despair grips the heart! They go so far as to say that he is a forger; that he manufactured the telegram, to ruin Esterhazy. But, in heaven’s name, why? For what purpose? Show a motive. Is he, too, paid by the Jews? The pretty part of the story is that he himself was an anti-Semite. Yes, we are witnesses of this infamous spectacle,—the proclamation of the innocence of men ruined with debts and crimes, while honor itself, a man of stainless life, is stricken down. When a society reaches that point, it is beginning to rot.

There you have, then, Monsieur le Président, the Esterhazy case,—a guilty man to be declared innocent. We can follow the beautiful business, hour by hour, for the last two months. I abridge, for this is but the résumé of a story whose burning pages will some day be written at length. So we have seen General de Pellieux, and then Major Ravary, carrying on a rascally investigation whence knaves come transfigured and honest people sullied. Then they convened the council of war.

How could it have been expected that a council of war would undo what a council of war had done?

I say nothing of the choice, always possible, of the judges. Is not the superior idea of discipline, which is in the very blood of these soldiers, enough to destroy their power to do justice? Who says discipline says obedience. When the minister of war, the great chief, has publicly established, amid the applause of the nation’s representatives, the absolute authority of the thing judged, do you expect a council of war to formally contradict him? Hierarchically that is impossible. General Billot conveyed a suggestion to the judges by his declaration, and they passed judgment as they must face the cannon’s mouth, without reasoning. The preconceived opinion that they took with them to their bench is evidently this: “Dreyfus has been condemned for the crime of treason by a council of war; then he is guilty, and we, a council of war, cannot declare him innocent. Now, we know that to recognize Esterhazy’s guilt would be to proclaim the innocence of Dreyfus.” Nothing could turn them from that course of reasoning.

They have rendered an iniquitous verdict which will weigh forever upon our councils of war, which will henceforth tinge with suspicion all their decrees. The first council of war may have been lacking in comprehension; the second is necessarily criminal. Its excuse, I repeat, is that the supreme chief had spoken, declaring the thing judged unassailable, sacred and superior to men, so that inferiors could say naught to the contrary. They talk to us of the honor of the army; they want us to love it, to respect it. Ah! certainly, yes, the army which would rise at the first threat, which would defend French soil; that army is the whole people, and we have for it nothing but tenderness and respect. But it is not a question of that army, whose dignity is our special desire, in our need of justice. It is the sword that is in question; the master that they may give us tomorrow. And piously kiss the sword-hilt, the god? No!

I have proved it, moreover; the Dreyfus case was the case of the war offices, a staff officer, accused by his staff comrades, convicted under the pressure of the chiefs of staff. Again I say, he cannot come back innocent, unless all the staff is guilty. Consequently the war offices, by all imaginable means, by press campaigns, by communications, by influences, have covered Esterhazy only to ruin Dreyfus a second time. Ah! with what a sweep the republican government should clear away this band of Jesuits, as General Billot himself calls them! Where is the truly strong and wisely patriotic minister who will dare to reshape and renew all? How many of the people I know are trembling with anguish in view of a possible war, knowing in what hands lies the national defence! And what a nest of base intrigues, gossip, and dilapidation has this sacred asylum, entrusted with the fate of the country, become! We are frightened by the terrible light thrown upon it by the Dreyfus case, this human sacrifice of an unfortunate, of a “dirty Jew.” Ah! what a mixture of madness and folly, of crazy fancies, of low police practices, of inquisitorial and tyrannical customs, the good pleasure of a few persons in gold lace, with their boots on the neck of the nation, cramming back into its throat its cry of truth and justice, under the lying and sacrilegious pretext of the raison d’Etat!

And another of their crimes is that they have accepted the support of the unclean press, have suffered themselves to be championed by all the knavery of Paris, so that now we witness knavery’s insolent triumph in the downfall of right and of simple probity. It is a crime to have accused of troubling France those who wish to see her generous, at the head of the free and just nations, when they themselves are hatching the impudent conspiracy to impose error, in the face of the entire world. It is a crime to mislead opinion, to utilize for a task of death this opinion that they have perverted to the point of delirium. It is a crime to poison the minds of the little and the humble, to exasperate the passions of reaction and intolerance, while seeking shelter behind odious anti-Semitism, of which the great liberal France of the rights of man will die, if she is not cured. It is a crime to exploit patriotism for works of hatred, and, finally, it is a crime to make the sword the modern god, when all human science is at work on the coming temple of truth and justice.

This truth, this justice, for which we have so ardently longed,—how distressing it is to see them thus buffeted, more neglected and more obscured. I have a suspicion of the fall that must have occurred in the soul of M. Scheurer-Kestner, and I really believe that he will finally feel remorse that he did not act in a revolutionary fashion, on the day of interpellation in the senate, by thoroughly ventilating the whole matter, to topple everything over. He has been the highly honest man, the man of loyal life, and he thought that the truth was sufficient unto itself, especially when it should appear as dazzling as the open day. Of what use to overturn everything, since soon the sun would shine? And it is for this confident serenity that he is now so cruelly punished. And the same is the case of Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart, who, moved by a feeling of lofty dignity, has been unwilling to publish General Gonse’s letters. These scruples honor him the more because, while he remained respectful of discipline, his superiors heaped mud upon him, working up the case against him themselves, in the most unexpected and most outrageous fashion. Here are two victims, two worthy people, two simple hearts, who have trusted God, while the devil was at work. And in the case of Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart we have seen even this ignoble thing,—a French tribunal, after suffering the reporter in the case to publicly arraign a witness and accuse him of every crime, closing its doors as soon as this witness has been introduced to explain and defend himself. I say that is one crime more, and that this crime will awaken the universal conscience. Decidedly, military tribunals have a singular idea of justice.

Such, then, is the simple truth, Monsieur le Président, and it is frightful. It will remain a stain upon your presidency. I suspect that you are powerless in this matter,—that you are the prisoner of the constitution and of your environment. You have none the less a man’s duty, upon which you will reflect, and which you will fulfill. Not indeed that I despair, the least in the world, of triumph. I repeat with more vehement certainty; truth is on the march, and nothing can stop it. Today sees the real beginning of the affair, since not until today have the positions been clear: on one hand, the guilty, who do not want the light; on the other, the doers of justice, who will give their lives to get it. When truth is buried in the earth, it accumulates there, and assumes so mighty an explosive power that, on the day when it bursts forth, it hurls everything into the air. We shall see if they have not just made preparations for the most resounding of disasters, yet to come.

But this letter is long, Monsieur le Président, and it is time to finish.

I accuse Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam of having been the diabolical workman of judicial error,—unconsciously, I am willing to believe,—and of having then defended his calamitous work, for three years, by the most guilty machinations.

I accuse General Mercier of having made himself an accomplice, at least through weakness of mind, in one of the greatest iniquities of the century.

I accuse General Billot of having had in his hands certain proofs of the innocence of Dreyfus, and of having stifled them; of having rendered himself guilty of this crime of lèse-humanité and lèse-justice for a political purpose, and to save the compromised staff.

I accuse General de Boisdeffre and General Gonse of having made themselves accomplices in the same crime, one undoubtedly through clerical passion, the other perhaps through that esprit de corps which makes of the war offices the Holy Ark, unassailable.

I accuse General de Pellieux and Major Ravary of having conducted a rascally inquiry,—I mean by that a monstrously partial inquiry, of which we have, in the report of the latter, an imperishable monument of naive audacity.

I accuse the three experts in handwriting, Belhomme, Varinard, and Couard, of having made lying and fraudulent reports, unless a medical examination should declare them afflicted with diseases of the eye and of the mind.

I accuse the war offices of having carried on in the press, particularly in “L’Eclair” and in “L’Echo de Paris,” an abominable campaign, to mislead opinion and cover up their faults.

I accuse, finally, the first council of war of having violated the law by condemning an accused person on the strength of a secret document, and I accuse the second council of war of having covered this illegality, in obedience to orders, in committing in its turn the judicial crime of knowingly acquitting a guilty man.

In preferring these charges, I am not unaware that I lay myself liable under Articles 30 and 31 of the press law of July 29, 1881, which punishes defamation. And it is wilfully that I expose myself thereto.

As for the people whom I accuse, I do not know them, I have never seen them, I entertain against them no feeling of revenge or hatred. They are to me simple entities, spirits of social ill-doing. And the act that I perform here is nothing but a revolutionary measure to hasten the explosion of truth and justice.

I have but one passion, the passion for the light, in the name of humanity which has suffered so much, and which is entitled to happiness. My fiery protest is simply the cry of my soul. Let them dare, then, to bring me into the assize court, and let the investigation take place in the open day.

I await it.

Accept, Monsieur le Président, the assurance of my profound respect.

Emile Zola.

At the sitting of the French chamber of deputies on the day of the appearance of the foregoing letter, Comte de Mun, a member of the chamber and representing the monarchical party, questioned the government “as to the measures which the minister of war intends to take, in consequence of the article published this morning by M. Emile Zola.” After a stormy debate and a suspension of the sitting, M. Méline, the prime minister, reluctantly declared the intention of the government to prosecute the author of the article.

Accordingly, on January 20, the assize court of the Seine served notice on M. Zola and M. Perrenx to appear before it at the Palais de Justice on the following February 7, and there answer to a charge of having publicly defamed the first council of war of the military government of Paris, the charge being based on the following passages from the incriminated article:

“A council of war has just dared to acquit an Esterhazy in obedience to orders, a final blow at all truth, at all justice. And now it is done; France has this stain upon her cheek; it will be written in history that under your presidency it was possible for this social crime to be committed.”

“They have rendered an iniquitous verdict which will weigh forever upon our councils of war, which will henceforth tinge all their decrees with suspicion. The first council of war may have been lacking in comprehension; the second is necessarily criminal.”

“I accuse the second council of war of having covered this illegality, in obedience to orders, in committing in its turn the judicial crime of knowingly acquitting a guilty man.”

On January 22 “L’Aurore” published a second letter from M. Zola, addressed to the minister of war, in which he complained that the government had based its charge of defamation exclusively on those passages of his first letter which related to the trial of Major Esterhazy, carefully refraining from specification of those passages relating to the trial of Captain Dreyfus, lest thereby the truth about the latter should come to light and compel a revision of his case. This second letter concluded as follows:

Why were you afraid to take notice of all my charges? I will tell you.

Fearing an open discussion, you have resorted, in order to save yourself, to the methods of a prosecuting attorney. They have called to your attention, in the law of July 21, 1881, an Article 52 which permits me to offer proof concerning only the matters “set forth and complained of in the summons.”

And now you are quite at your ease, are you not?

Well, you are mistaken; I warn you in advance; you have been ill-advised.

The first thought was to bring me before the police court, but they did not dare, for the court of appeals would have upset the whole procedure.

Then they conceived the idea of delaying matters by greatly prolonging the preliminary examination; but they were afraid that this might give a new development to the case, and pile up against you a crushing mass of evidence, methodically recorded.

Finally, in desperation, they decided to impose upon me an unequal struggle, tying my hands in advance, to assure you, by the methods of a lawyer’s clerk, the victory that undoubtedly you did not expect from a free discussion.

You have forgotten that I am to have for judges twelve French citizens, in possession of their independence.

I shall find a way to win by the force of justice; I shall illuminate consciences with the effulgence of truth. At the first words we shall see the methods of the quibblers swept away by the imperious necessity of proof. This proof the law bids me give, and the law would be a liar if, imposing on me this duty, it should refuse me the means of doing it.

How could I prove the charges of which you complain, if I were not allowed to show the concatenation of facts and were prevented from placing the whole matter in the fullest light?

Liberty to prove,—that is the power on which I depend.

On January 24 M. Zola’s counsel served notice on the attorney-general of a long list of witnesses whom he intended to summon, in which notice he called on the attorney-general to produce in court all the papers relating to the trials of Captain Dreyfus and Major Esterhazy, and made formal offer to prove, not only the matters set forth in the summons, but also, as inseparable from them, the charges preferred in the letter to President Faure against Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam, General Mercier, General Billot, General de Boisdeffre, General Gonse, General de Pellieux, Major Ravary, the three experts in handwriting,—Belhomme, Varinard, and Couard,—the war offices, and the Dreyfus council of war.

On February 7 M. Zola and M. Perrenx appeared for trial, and the record of the court proceedings here follows.

THE TRIAL.

First Day—February 7.

The first day’s proceedings began with the entrance of the presiding judge, M. Delegorgue, the other members of the court being Councillors Lault and Bousquet. Attorney-General Van Cassel appeared for the prosecution, M. Fernand Labori for M. Zola, and M. Albert Clemenceau, assisted by his brother, M. Georges Clemenceau, for M. Perrenx, the gérant of “L’Aurore.” The court-room of the assize court of the Seine was crowded to its utmost capacity; wherefore the judge, on taking his seat, addressed those present as follows:

“I notify the public that we shall not begin until all are seated. I likewise warn the public that every sort of manifestation, whether for or against the accused, is formally forbidden, and that at the first sign of disorder I shall order the court-room cleared. Please consider this said once for all, for I shall not repeat it.”

The usual dialogue then ensued between the judge and M. Zola.

“Your name?”

“Emile Zola.”

“Your profession?”

“Man of letters.”

“Your age?”

“Fifty-eight years.”

“Your residence?”

“21 bis, Rue de Bruxelles.”

The drawing of the jury was then proceeded with. Three challenges were used by the prosecution, and seven by the defence, the jurors finally selected being as follows:

Foreman, Auguste Dutrieux, merchant; Auguste Leblond, roof-builder; Pierre Emery, merchant; Bernier, molder in copper; Edouard Gressin, clerk; Bouvier, proprietor; Albert Chevanier, wine merchant; Nigon, leather-dresser; Charles Fouquet, seedsman; Joseph Moureire, wire-drawer; Charles Huet, market-gardener; Brunot, linen-draper. Supplementary jurors: Antoine Jourde, tradesman; Alfred Boucreux, butcher.

Then began the reading of the documents in the case by the clerk, the only one of interest being the complaint of Gen. Billot. Referring to M. Zola’s letter, the complainant declared:

This article contains a series of insults and slanders directed against two ministers of war, general officers, and army officers of all grades under their orders. Chiefs and subordinates are above such outrages, and the opinion of parliament, of the country, and of the army has already placed them beyond reach of attack. Though the minister of war does not consider it his duty to lodge a complaint for the persons above referred to, any more than for the council of war which rendered the verdict of 1894, the authority of which must remain intact, we cannot admit any suspicion of the independence of military justice or any accusation that it rendered on January 11 in obedience to orders an iniquitous sentence and committed a judicial error in knowingly acquitting a guilty man. Consequently I have the honor to lodge a complaint against the gérant of “L’Aurore” and M. Emile Zola on account of the defamation directed against the first council of war of the military government of Paris, which at its sessions of January 10 and 11, 1898, declared the acquittal of Major Esterhazy.

After the reading of the documents, Attorney-General Van Cassel took the floor to make what he described as “a statement of the case,” speaking as follows:

“The minister of war has taken notice, in his complaint, of the imputation cast by M. Emile Zola upon the first council of war of having acquitted Major Esterhazy in obedience to orders. The summons could not go beyond the terms of the complaint. It is natural that every complainant should circumscribe the grievances for which he demands reparation. Otherwise it would be too easy for the accused to turn the discussion from its proper course, and create a diversion for the audience, which is the great art in the assize court. A single question is submitted to you, gentlemen of the jury: Did the first council of war act in obedience to orders in acquitting Major Esterhazy? The other imputation contained in M. Zola’s article the minister of war holds in contempt. Nevertheless the accused assert the right to discuss all the allegations contained in the article. Their avowed plan is to make you judges of the legality of the sentence passed upon Dreyfus. We shall not permit it. I warn them that any attempt on their part to provoke a sort of indirect revision of the Dreyfus case would be illegal and futile. No one has a right to indirectly call in question the thing judged. Our legislation, in its desire to avoid judicial error, has laid down rules for revision. These rules were broadened by the law of 1895. This law was passed prior to the trial of Dreyfus. Why have the accused not availed themselves of it? Why have they not attempted revision by the legal methods? They have not done so. They have tried to secure the conviction of a second officer on account of the crime of which Dreyfus was convicted. They have failed in their undertaking. Since then no new fact has been produced; no unknown document of such a nature as to establish the innocence of the condemned has been revealed to justice. In the absence of material wherewith to secure a legal revision, they wish—I use the words of M. Emile Zola—to provoke a revolutionary revision. The court will not lend itself to this manœuvre. Respect for the thing judged requires that the discussion be circumscribed to the single matter of which the minister of war takes notice in his complaint. Therefore no evidence can be admitted here except such as tends to prove the charges relating to the pretended iniquity committed in obedience to orders in 1898 by the military judges of Major Esterhazy. Accusations foreign to this special matter must remain outside of the discussion. I ask, then, that the accused may not be authorized to attempt proof thereof, either by documents or by testimony. The charges preferred by them against the officers, the witnesses, the experts, the members of the council of war of 1894, which convicted Dreyfus, have no connection with the defamation of the council of war of 1898.”

To this contention M. Labori made the following reply:

“I am not much astonished, gentlemen, at the difficulties which M. Zola meets in this affair, and I expect that this incident, which is the first, will not be the last. We expected that they would offer to you and impose upon us a restricted discussion. Such was the desire of the minister of war, and it was his right. It will be ours, at a certain moment, to ask what could have been the underlying reasons for the exercise of this right under the circumstances in which the minister of war has made use of it. However that may be, it was his right, and I do not deny it. But, gentlemen, I do not believe that the form of the complaint within which he confines himself involves the consequences which he has hoped for.”

Reading then all the charges made at the end of M. Zola’s letter, M. Labori continued:

“You know, gentlemen, what was the reply. It began on the day when, after five days and five nights of deliberation and uncertainty, the minister of war preferred this complaint, the bearing of which you now know, and it continues today in the motions which the attorney-general now makes in the name of the complainant and in his own name. Do you think that that is going to strangle the discussion? Absurd! It is as if one should place himself in the middle of a torrent to prevent it from flowing. The discussion is open. If they wanted to stifle it, they need not have prosecuted either Perrenx or Zola. They had the right to refrain; and, in fact, public opinion, to which, gentlemen, I shall speak,—public opinion, which is not enlightened, and which, admirable in generosity and in faith, but blind, most faithfully supports the ruling powers,—public opinion perhaps would have given its sanction to such a course. But they have chosen to prosecute M. Zola. Being accused, he will defend himself. Are they, then, serious when they say to us today that the three paragraphs cited from this letter of two thousand lines have nothing to do with the intention of M. Zola on the one hand, or, on the other, with the article as a whole and the other charges contained in it? Can the court accept that? Between the three matters taken notice of by the minister of war and the sum total of the matters which I have read to the court there is a connection not only close, but indivisible. In the first place, gentlemen, Major Esterhazy was prosecuted for the same crime of treason for which Captain Dreyfus had been prosecuted. The document of the trial was the bordereau; the bordereau concerning which the first experts testified; the bordereau concerning which, at the second trial, experts testified again. And it is not strange to read that the experts of both trials, not being the same, feel no desire to meet at this bar in contradiction of each other in a discussion where the light is to be complete. But it is certain that the document in question, and which was the object of discussion in the Esterhazy trial and in the Dreyfus trial, is the bordereau. The two crimes were the same. M. Mathieu Dreyfus had denounced Major Esterhazy. If Major Esterhazy had been condemned, the setting aside of the verdict against Captain Dreyfus would have followed as a matter of necessity. Major Esterhazy was acquitted. The question remains open, and we are to deal with it. The question takes the form of a dilemma. Either we are to be prevented from offering any proof, and in that case we shall see; or, on the contrary, we are to be permitted to examine the situation of Captain Dreyfus as well as that of Major Esterhazy, since both are closely connected, and it would not be possible for us to prove here the guilt of Major Esterhazy and his acquittal in obedience to orders, if we had not the right to prove at the same time the innocence of Captain Dreyfus. To say nothing of the fact, gentlemen, that the minister of war, in drawing up his complaint, perhaps not perceiving this dangerous detail, allowed a little paragraph to slip in, in which it was said that the second council of war covered the illegality to which the first had committed itself. Now, gentlemen, how are we to demonstrate that they have covered an illegality, unless we are allowed to demonstrate first that an illegality has been committed? Unless, indeed, they mean—and I confess that that would seem to me a really curious preliminary to this discussion—to acknowledge that the illegality has been committed, and that it is recognized in the face of France and the civilized world. If not, then on this point as on others we must be permitted the opportunity of proof. You know, gentlemen, what the authorities say. It is a matter of doctrine and of law that, outside of the matters set forth in the summons, it is permissible to prove matters connected with them by close and indivisible ties. I have shown you that the matters which it is our right to prove are closely bound up with the other matters of which we likewise offer proof. It remains only to say a single word in answer to a last objection of the attorney-general,—the thing judged. The thing judged! What will be left of it, gentlemen, if we succeed in showing that it has been irregularly and illegally judged, this thing, in which public opinion has such faith that it considers as public malefactors those who dream for a second of doubting it, even though they have declared that they are ready to furnish the proof? Citizens respect this thing judged. It is their right and their duty to respect it. But only, I repeat, because they believe it to have been regularly and legally judged. Where there is no right, there is no legality, no justice, no thing judged, Mr. Attorney-General, and let us say no more of exceptions.”

In reinforcement of the position of M. Labori, M. Albert Clemenceau then addressed the court:

“I wish to speak simply of two points made by the attorney-general. He has told us that his hands are tied by the minister of war, that he is unable to broaden the discussion, and that it must take the form that the minister of war desires. We suspected it, but I believe that it will be interesting to the jury to know that, if he had desired a general discussion, the minister of war perhaps would have done as all French citizens do when they believe themselves injured,—namely, would have lodged a complaint with the attorney-general. The attorney-general is supposed to know something about law. He would have read M. Zola’s article, and it is probable that he would have had us indicted on grounds much more numerous than those which this complaint specifically alleges. So much for the first point. The second is this. The attorney-general, who knows the meaning of words, began his observations by saying: ‘Gentlemen, I am going to make a statement of the case’; but he made an argument, and he finished in a way of which the jury had had no warning, asking the court to limit the discussion which we desire to carry on at this bar.”

M. Labori then submitted a formal motion that the court authorize the introduction of evidence on all the matters referred to in M. Zola’s letter.

Before the court had passed upon this motion, the three experts in handwriting, Couard, Belhomme, and Varinard, intervened through their counsel, M. Cabanes, asking that, in view of the fact that they had prosecuted M. Zola and “L’Aurore” in the police courts, no introduction of their names into the case now on trial should be permitted.

The Judge.—“The purpose of this motion is to enable the experts, in case it is granted, to prosecute M. Zola in the assize court for outrages upon witnesses because of their testimony before the council of war.”

M. Albert Clemenceau.—“We accept any discussion before the assize court.”

M. Labori.—“If that is the motive of the intervention of the experts, I ask the court to suspend judgment on the motion, until that point in the discussion is reached which concerns the experts and their testimony. And, if it is a matter of reserving to these gentlemen a special right, which will end, I imagine, in one facility more for the production of the explanations that we have to furnish, we can only congratulate ourselves in so far as we are concerned. I speak in the name of M. Zola and M. Perrenx.”

M. Zola.—“Complete light!”

M. Clemenceau.—“Whatever motions may be made in this court, and from whatsoever persons they may come, if their object is to bring about a public discussion in the assize court, we second them. In fact, I do not care even to know whether these motions are well founded in law; you warn us that their tendency would be to bring us here again on another charge; we accept every sort of discussion before the assize court.”

Without passing upon the motion of M. Cabanes, the court then rendered an adverse decision on M. Labori’s motion for the introduction of evidence concerning all the charges preferred by M. Zola, claiming that they were not indivisibly connected with the matter on trial.

The time having arrived for the calling of the witnesses, the court announced that it had received letters from several of them, in explanation of their absence.

The Judge.—“I have a letter from the keeper of the seals, saying that the minister of war, General Billot, has not been authorized to respond to the summons. M. Labori and M. Clemenceau, do you forego this witness’s evidence?”

M. Labori.—“In regard to him we make a reservation.”

The Judge.—“Here is a letter from General Gonse. He asks to be heard among the first, because of his service.”

M. Labori.—“We shall be able to hear General Gonse among the first. It was our intention to do so. But, in spite of our great desire to hear him, we cannot take his personal convenience into consideration.”

The Attorney-General.—“Nor his service?”

M. Labori.—“Nor his service.”

The Judge.—“Here is a letter from Major d’Ormescheville, declaring that, having been the reporter for the council of war, he does not believe it his duty to respond to the summons.”

M. Labori.—“I make a reservation, as in the case of General Billot.”

The Judge.—“Here is a letter from M. Gibert, cited as a witness by M. Zola. ‘I have left Havre, and have retired to.... In view of the gravity of my condition, it is impossible for me to come to testify in person, and I have just sent what I have to say to M. Labori.’”

M. Labori.—“I have not yet received it.”

The Judge.—“Then you make a reservation?”

M. Labori.—“Yes.”

The Judge.—“Here is a letter from M. Casimir-Perier, in which he says: ‘I am unable to enlighten justice on any matter that has occurred since my resignation of the presidency of the republic. I add that, if I were questioned concerning matters which occurred when I held the presidency, personal responsibilities would impose silence upon me. Out of deference for the court, I am ready to appear before it, if it deems it necessary that I repeat this declaration verbally.’”

M. Labori.—“I make a reservation in regard to M. Casimir-Perier.”

The Judge.—“Here is a letter from Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam. He says: ‘In the Dreyfus case I performed the functions of an officer of judicial police. My only part in the Esterhazy trial was to testify behind closed doors, and in the matter of this testimony I am bound to professional secrecy. Under these circumstances I have the honor to pray you to excuse me from appearing in court, where I should be unable to furnish any information concerning the matters mentioned in the summons.’”

M. Labori.—“M. Zola and M. Perrenx deem Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam a witness of the highest importance, not only in matters relating to the Dreyfus trial, but in matters relating to the Esterhazy trial. Furthermore, the testimony of Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam is necessary, because it bears upon the good faith of the accused, for, if certain information that has come to M. Zola, and the production of which he will call for before this court, is to be believed, Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam has been mixed up in matters which concerned Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart, certain of which are very curious. Furthermore, a complaint has been lodged against Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam, the consideration of which has been entrusted to Examining Magistrate Bertulus. For all these reasons the testimony of Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam is indispensable. We cannot produce here certain evidence that concerns him, unless he is called to explain himself in person. And under these circumstances I believe it my duty to make formal motion that all legal means be employed to make Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam come here and testify concerning his relations with the de Comminges family, concerning the scene with the mysterious lady in 1892, and concerning the telegrams signed ‘Speranza’ and ‘Blanche,’ addressed to Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart at Tunis.”

The Attorney-General.—“M. du Paty de Clam declares in his letter, like all the members of the council of war, the hearing of whom has been abandoned because it was evident that it could not be exacted, that professional secrecy prevents him from giving any information whatever. Consequently there is no reason for rejecting his excuse. But M. Labori points out that Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam was interested as a witness in an examination not yet finished, but opened on the complaint of Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart. The reply to this is manifest and direct. There can be no confusion here between M. Zola and the gérant of ‘L’Aurore’ on the one hand, and Colonel Picquart on the other. The latter has lodged a complaint which is being regularly examined, and it is for him alone to intervene if he sees fit. But his proceeding is the proceeding of a third party, so far as these defendants are concerned. From no point of view, then, do the arguments that have just been presented seem to me well founded.”

M. Labori.—“Will the court permit me to indicate the matters concerning which M. Zola desires to hear Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam, and the connection between them and the verdict of January 11? In 1892 Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam, who had not then risen to his present office, was in very close relations with the de Comminges family, whose society Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart also frequented. Mlle. Blanche de Comminges and her brother, Captain de Comminges, have been summoned here as witnesses.”

The Judge.—“I regret to inform you that Mlle. de Comminges is sick, and that she has sent a doctor’s certificate.”

M. Labori.—“We hope that she will be well again within forty-eight hours. There are many sick people in this case. We shall have something to say concerning the things that are happening in this matter to prevent witnesses from coming, and we shall expose all intimidations and threats. Mlle. de Comminges knew Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart and Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam. At the beginning of the campaign in relation to Major Esterhazy, Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart received at Tunis two singular dispatches. One of them read: ‘All is discovered. Speranza.’ The court will remember that this is a signature which has been met already in the Esterhazy trial. The other dispatch said in substance: ‘It is known that Georges (that is the name of Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart) is the author of the telegram. All is discovered. Blanche.’ By Blanche was meant Mlle. Blanche de Comminges, and that this was understood by the military authorities is proved by the fact that they demanded of Mlle. Blanche de Comminges certain specimens of her handwriting. She protested, and lodged a complaint, as did Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart. These dispatches, then, were forgeries. It would be interesting to find out who the forgers are. Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart attributes one of them to the police agent, Souffrain, and we have summoned him. We hope that he will come, and then we shall have an explanation. As for the other telegram, we are curious to know how there could have started from certain circles which must be in touch either with the minister of war or with Major Esterhazy a dispatch signed Blanche which Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart was expected to consider as coming from Mlle. Blanche de Comminges. We should like to hear Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam concerning these matters, and others of an earlier date in which he has been mixed up, and which relate exclusively and very closely to Major Esterhazy. They happened in 1892, and we shall have need also of the testimony of Mlle. de Comminges on the same subject.”

The Judge.—“There is no question here of Mlle. de Comminges. The question is of Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam.”

M. Labori.—“But it is Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam whom these matters concern. He was induced at a certain moment, on the intervention of one of his most eminent superiors, General Davout, to restore to the de Comminges family certain correspondence. I cannot be more precise on this point, and the court understands why; but the matter is in the hands of the prefect of police. One day Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam said that a certain letter belonging to this correspondence was not in his hands, and that he could not give it up directly, because it had fallen into the hands of a woman, but that it was not very difficult to see her, and that the only thing necessary was to hand her a 500-franc bill in exchange for the letter. Then, it seems, on the demand of Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam, a meeting was appointed at the cours la Reine, at the very spot to which came the singular veiled lady of Major Esterhazy. There, in the presence of witnesses, Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam entered into conversation with the veiled lady, with whom he remained a long time, and to whom he pretended to have given a 500-franc bill, which, however, no one had sent to him. Then he brought back the letter to transmit it anew to the de Comminges family. These are facts concerning which I can say nothing more, in presence of the interested parties. I can furnish only indications.”

The Judge.—“But I do not see the relation between what you have just said and the matter for which your client is prosecuted.”

M. Labori.—“You shall see. M. Zola does not hesitate to think that the veiled lady, far from being in relations with Colonel Picquart, as they have not feared to state in official reports, and as Major Esterhazy loudly and audaciously charges, belongs to the circle of certain members of the staff, or to the circle of Major Esterhazy himself. Now, concerning this veiled lady we shall have to have explanations. For how can you expect us to prove that a guilty man has been acquitted in obedience to orders, if we do not begin by proving that he is guilty, and by establishing consequently the various circumstances which could culminate in his guilt? Under these circumstances it is for us to examine in detail, in order to get complete light, points that in no way concern the national defence, which has been abused. It is our indisputable right to seek light on Major Esterhazy’s means of defence, which have been welcomed in another place with a facility that they will not meet at the hands of this jury.”

M. Albert Clemenceau.—“At the trial of Major Esterhazy, and in the course of his examination, reference was made to the veiled lady, and this mysterious person was taken so seriously that the president of the council of war asked the accused if he could not give some indications concerning this lady, who had given him the mysterious rendezvous. I conclude therefrom that in the Esterhazy trial, with which we are necessarily concerned, the veiled lady was in question, and that therefore all that concerns her is well within our case. Again, Major du Paty de Clam, in his letter, says that he cannot come here to testify, because he was a judicial officer of police in the first examination. The court perhaps remembers that in this very place, in the case known as the Prado case, they heard Examining Magistrate Guillot, who came to testify concerning facts that took place in his private office. The presiding judge was a Paris magistrate. Now, what was done in the Prado case can be done in this case, and I do not see that the fact that Major du Paty de Clam played a part in another inquiry is a reason why we should not hear him here.”

M. Labori.—“Another thing. This is the first time that I have known witnesses to be judged according to the utility of their evidence. M. du Paty de Clam is not sick, nor is he detained, so far as I know, by the duties of his military office. He does not know upon what points he is to be examined, or what we shall ask him. It is his duty to appear in this case. We have to question him as well on matters of fact as on matters of morals pertaining exclusively to the Esterhazy case, and not at all to the Dreyfus case. Under these circumstances it is indispensable that M. du Paty de Clam should appear at this bar. If we question him upon points in regard to which he can take shelter behind professional secrecy, he will take such shelter, and will not answer. And even then it will be our right to make a motion before the court, asking whether, as a matter of law, M. du Paty de Clam can cut himself off behind professional secrecy. M. du Paty de Clam refers to closed doors. Well, if closed doors are necessary in this assize court, we will have them. With a jury, closed doors have no terrors for us. But we shall ask no questions concerning the national defence. None are involved in this affair.”

M. Zola.—“None.”

M. Labori.—“They have put forward the plea of the nation’s defence. But that is a jest.”

The Attorney-General.—“The defence of the nation a jest?”

M. Labori.—“Ah! really, that is not worthy of you, Mr. Attorney-General. I do not accept that. No, no! I will suffer no one, not even you, to suspect my patriotism. No! I repeat, gentlemen of the jury, if there is any question here that concerns the national defence, we shall not approach it. If closed doors are necessary, let the doors be closed; we are willing. But we will not permit them to say, in placing us at the mercy of all calumnies and all insults, that we are paid men, when, in fact, in a trial like this, we are fighting a battle in which we risk our life and honor. We will allow no one to say that we are triflers, and that contempt is the most that we deserve. It will be seen later whether we deserve it.”

The Judge.—“I have a letter from Mme. de Boulancy in which she says: ‘I am kept in bed by an affection of the heart, which gives me much pain just now. I enclose the certificate of my doctor, M. de Basse, 4, Rue de Berlin. I beg to refer you to my evidence before M. Bertulus.’”

M. Labori.—“We must hear Mme. de Boulancy. She cannot lapse into a state of perpetual silence simply because she testified before M. Bertulus. From the standpoint of authenticity Major Esterhazy’s letters belong to this discussion. Major Esterhazy, realizing how terrible a blow the letter in which he styled himself a Uhlan would be to him, in spite of his numerous protectors, has denied its genuineness; now, it is genuine, it is, I declare it! And, if Mme. de Boulancy were here, we would prove it. In the presence of all these obstacles, I have the right, in the name of my client, who, I am sure, will approve me” ...

M. Zola.—“Certainly.”

M. Labori.—“... and it is my duty, to tell the whole. Mme. de Boulancy has other letters” ...

M. Zola.—“That is absolutely true.”

M. Labori.—“... which are authentic and still more serious. For weeks she has been the object of all sorts of threats. Major Esterhazy visits her house daily, with the support and protection of the police, who do not prevent him. And Major Esterhazy threatens her with death, if she gives up the letters. Mme. de Boulancy has also in her hands telegrams from Major Esterhazy of a later date, in which he begs her to give him the letters, and this is a fact known to more than one witness. For instance, there is M. Tysse. We shall be told directly that he will not come because, it seems, the Crédit Lyonnais threatens him with discharge if he comes, and promises to pay his fine if he does not come. We submit these facts to the jurors, and we ask them whether it is M. Zola, or the minister of war by his complaint and his limitations, who is creating in France a situation which, whatever may be said, is really revolutionary.”

M. Albert Clemenceau.—“It was not until this morning that Mme. de Boulancy became afflicted with heart trouble, but for two days we have known that she would not come, and that, in the fear that the court will send an expert physician to examine her, she will remain in bed all day. I must add that Mme. de Boulancy has informed the court that she lives in the Rue de Berlin. I beg the court to send either a doctor or a sheriff’s officer to that address. He will not find Mme. de Boulancy there.”

The Judge.—“She lives in the Boulevard des Batignolles, No. 22.”

M. Zola.—“She is not there either.”

M. Albert Clemenceau.—“You will not find Mme. de Boulancy at 22, Boulevard des Batignolles. I have the honor to offer a motion drawn up forty-eight hours ago, in which we foresaw that Mme. de Boulancy would be afflicted with heart trouble, and here, according to the terms of her letter, she is suffering with an affection of the heart. We were not mistaken.”

M. Clemenceau then offered a formal motion that, whereas Mme. de Boulancy had declared on several occasions that she possessed letters from Major Esterhazy no less insulting to the French army than those already known, and that she would produce them in the assize court, and whereas it was known to the defence that Mme. de Boulancy had recently received three dispatches from Major Esterhazy demanding a return of these letters, and threatening her with death if she should produce them in court, and whereas, because of these threats, Mme. de Boulancy had moved, concealing her new address, a physician be sent to examine her physical condition, and that a police officer be sent to seize the letters and dispatches referred to, wherever he might find them.

The Judge.—“M. Lebrun-Renault writes: ‘I am summoned only because of the special service that I performed January 5, 1895, at the parade in which Captain Dreyfus was disgraced. I can report what took place in the course of this service only to my hierarchical chiefs, and that is what I did. It is for them to make such use of my report as may seem to them proper. As for me, outside of them, I am bound to silence by my professional duty. Wherefore it is impossible for me to testify before the jurors. Under these circumstances I shall not respond.’”

M. Labori then offered a motion that, whereas there had been for some weeks a question in the press and at the tribune of the chamber of deputies of pretended confessions made by ex-Captain Dreyfus to Captain Lebrun-Renault on the day of the former’s degradation, the court order the hearing, first, of M. Lebrun-Renault, who will be asked to state whether he received the confession from Dreyfus and under what conditions, whether he reported the confession officially and under what circumstances, and whether he has spoken to various persons concerning them, and especially to M. Forzinetti, the baron de Vaux, M. P..., M. Fontbrune, and M. Dumont, and, second, of any other witness who can be usefully questioned concerning these matters.

The judge then read the following letter from Major Ravary:

My presence at the trial would be absolutely useless. I abstain, then, from appearing.

Ravary.

M. Labori.—“Major Ravary was the first to establish officially, in a report that has been read publicly, the existence of what is known as the secret documents in the Dreyfus case. This is a point wholly pertinent to the discussion, since M. Zola and his fellow-defendant are authorized to prove that an illegality was committed in 1894 and covered in 1898. Therefore it is indispensable that M. Ravary be heard, and I shall have the honor to make a motion to that effect.”

The Judge.—“I have received a letter from General Mercier, in which he says that the prosecution of M. Zola deals only with the Esterhazy verdict, with which he had nothing do. He says that he has received from General Billot an authorization not to appear.”

M. Labori.—“I am greatly surprised that General Mercier, like so many others, should constitute himself judge of the question whether it is incumbent upon him to appear before the court. The minister of war may confine his complaint within limits, but he has no right as complainant to pursue the shocking and monstrous course of interposing an obstacle, not juridical, but material to the facts that we wish to establish. General Mercier is a witness of the first importance. Perhaps he will read tomorrow in the newspapers what has occurred at this first hearing, which is given in the presence, not of fifteen hundred persons simply, but of all France. M. Zola declares that in 1894 General Mercier, then minister of war, constituting himself judge in a council of war, did, after the hearing was over, outside of the discussion, without the knowledge of the accused, without examination of the accused upon the matter, and without even submitting it to his counsel, communicate to the council of war a secret document, and a document, for that matter, of no significance. If that is not true, let General Mercier come here tomorrow and say so. If it is true, I have no further use for him.”

The judge then announced that Major Rivals and the court clerk, Vallecalle, had notified him that they would not appear.

M. Labori.—“The complainant is represented here by the attorney-general. We should like him to inform us whether the minister of war has given to all these witnesses, as to General Mercier, an authorization which to them would have been more than an authorization,—that is, an order. If the attorney-general does not know, I would like him to put the question to the minister of war between now and tomorrow, in order to give us an answer.”

M. Zola.—“In short, we should like to know whether these persons have received orders from Billot, or are acting on their own initiative.”

M. Labori.—“Have they been ordered not to come? If so, let it be stated frankly, and the court tomorrow will pass upon our motion, which possibly will ask for a postponement of the case, in order that it may be judged when we are in full possession of the facts.”

M. Albert Clemenceau.—“The president of the republic refused to sign the decree of the minister of justice summoning M. Billot; then M. Billot authorized General Mercier not to appear in the assize court. Knowing the beginning of the story, we are interested in knowing the sequel, and I ask the attorney-general to inform us at the next hearing if the other officers, of a lower grade than that of General Mercier, have likewise been authorized by their superiors not to appear in court. If so, I may be permitted to express my astonishment that there has not been found a person in all this hierarchy to understand that there is one thing which is above the minister of war,—namely, justice. We thought so until today.”

The court then presented the refusals of Colonel Maurel, president of the council of war of 1894, M. Autant, architect, and M. Eichmann, who sat in the first council of war; and the defence, as in the previous cases, insisted upon their appearance.

The Judge.—“A letter from General de Boisdeffre reads as follows: ‘I do not need to tell you that, out of respect to the jury and deference to the court, I would willingly appear, but I have been in no way connected with the Esterhazy case, which was conducted entirely by the military government of Paris. Outside of professional secrecy, therefore, I could furnish no useful information.’”

M. Labori.—“All these witnesses seem to imagine that they constitute a caste apart and independent, and that it is permissible to them to rise above the law, above justice itself, and personally constitute themselves judges of the question whether they are useful or not as witnesses in a trial. Consequently in the case of General de Boisdeffre, as in the other cases, we insist and we protest.”

M. Albert Clemenceau.—“We are a little at sea. In the letters read, some witnesses declare that they will not come because they know certain facts, while others, like M. de Boisdeffre, declare that they will not come because they do not know any facts in this case. We do not know which of these two observations is sound, but it is impossible for both of them to be. It is interesting also to the jurors to know that former cabinet ministers, who are by no means the first comers, MM. Guérin and Trarieux, former keepers of the seals, and M. Raymond Poincaré, former minister of finance, have responded to the summons. It is certain that they would have had nothing to fear, if they had written to the court that they could not come. These former cabinet ministers come; yet among the military officers we cannot get a single witness. I believe it is well for the jurors to remember that.”

The court announcing that ex-President Casimir-Perier would appear, the defence withdrew its motion for his further summons. But M. Labori then offered a formal motion that MM. d’Ormescheville, Ravary, General Mercier, Patron, Vallecalle, Maurel, Autant, Eichmann, de Boisdeffre, and Captain de Comminges be forcibly constrained to appear. And he submitted a further motion that Mlle. Blanche de Comminges be constrained to appear, unless it should be found that her illness was genuine, and that, in the latter case, a commission should be appointed to visit her and ask her the following questions:

(1) Is she aware that her name has been used in writing to Colonel Picquart?

(2) How did she become aware of it?

(3) Did she not give the nickname “demigod” to Captain Lallement?

(4) Does she know whether this name was used in a telegram which is said to have been a forgery?

(5) Had Colonel du Paty de Clam any reason for entertaining a revengeful feeling toward her and her family?

(6) Is it not within her knowledge that he resorted in 1892 to very serious manœuvres, notably the employment of anonymous letters?

(7) Was not this matter put in the hands of M. Lozé, prefect of police, and did not General D—— have to intervene?

(8) Did not Colonel du Paty de Clam arrange, for the restitution of a letter, a scene that took place at cours la Reine, in which a veiled lady appeared?

After hearing these motions, the court adjourned for the day.

Second Day—February 8.

The second day’s hearing began at half past twelve with the announcement of the court that, before proceeding to the hearing of the witnesses, there were new excuses to be read. The first was from Major Esterhazy, who wrote as follows:

I have been accused by M. Mathieu Dreyfus of the crime of high treason, and my judges have acquitted me by a unanimous decree of the council of war. Today I receive, at the instance of a simple individual, M. Emile Zola, a summons to appear as a witness in his trial in the assize court. It is plain, on the other hand, that in this trial the object of M. Zola is at the same time to revise by a revolutionary method the decree of acquittal rendered in my favor, and to sully, by representing them as criminals, the judges whom I respect. Such is the work in which M. Emile Zola invites me to participate. Under such circumstances I consider that I am not obliged to respond to M. Zola’s summons.

M. Labori.—“Major Esterhazy was present yesterday. It does not become me to inquire what suggestions he obeys today. I have not consulted M. Emile Zola, but I can say this for myself: it was a feeling of high discretion that led us to summon Major Esterhazy. He will not be here as an accused person, since he has been acquitted, and we consider his case a thing judged. But we have a right to the testimony of Major Esterhazy for the purpose of proving M. Zola’s good faith. Major Esterhazy refuses. So be it. I do not insist. We will discuss his rôle without him.”

M. Albert Clemenceau.—“Pardon me. For my part, I do not give up his testimony. I have some questions to put to Major Esterhazy in the name of the gérant of ‘L’Aurore.’ I demand that he be summoned again, and, if need be, forced to come.”

The next letter was from a widow Chapelon, who declared herself afflicted with influenza.

M. Albert Clemenceau.—“Mme. Chapelon appeared at the office of ‘L’Aurore’ a week ago; it was after she had been notified. She asked that her name be struck from the list of witnesses. She was asked why. She replied that she was soliciting for her son a scholarship at Chaptal, and that, if she were to testify, they would not give it to her. M. Perrenx informed her that this was not a good reason, and that she was required to come to the assize court and tell the truth. She went away, slamming the doors, and saying: ‘If you force me to come, I will tell the opposite of the truth.’ I insist that this witness shall come, and I demand that, as in the case of Major Esterhazy, she be brought to court after a second summons.”

The Judge.—“There is a doctor’s certificate.”

M. Clemenceau.—“I ask that an expert physician be sent to her. The one who is to see Mme. de Boulancy can see her too.”

The court then rendered its decision on the motions of the day before, ordering that Dr. Socquet be sent to examine Mme. de Boulancy, Mlle. Blanche de Comminges, M. Autant, and the widow Chapelon, and that a second summons be served upon Captain Lebrun-Renault, Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam, Major d’Ormescheville, Major Ravary, General Mercier, MM. Patron, Vallecalle, Maurel, Eichmann, General de Boisdeffre, and Major Esterhazy, directing them to appear on February 9.

Testimony of Mme. Dreyfus.

The calling of the witnesses was then begun, the first to take the stand being Mme. Lucie Dreyfus, wife of ex-Captain Dreyfus.

M. Labori.—“I would like Mme. Dreyfus to have the goodness to tell us what she thinks of M. Zola’s good faith, and in this connection to make known to us under what circumstances in 1894 she learned of her husband’s arrest, and what was the attitude at that time of Colonel du Paty de Clam, who was then only a major.”

The Judge.—“What has that to do with the case?”

M. Labori.—“It concerns M. Zola’s good faith.”

M. Zola.—“I ask to be allowed here the liberty that is accorded thieves and murderers. They can defend themselves, summon witnesses, and ask them questions; but every day I am insulted in the street; they break my carriage windows, they roll me in the mud, and an unclean press treats me as a bandit. I have the right to prove my good faith, my probity, my honor.”

The Judge.—“Do you know Article 52, of the law of 1881?”

M. Zola.—“I do not know the law, and at the present moment I do not want to know it. I appeal to the probity of the jurors. I make them judges of the situation in which I am placed, and I entrust myself to them.”

The Judge.—“I remind you of the terms of the decree rendered yesterday by the court, the provisions of Article 52 of the law of 1881, and the terms of your summons. Let us not depart therefrom. Any question outside of these limits will not be put by me. Let that be well understood. It is useless to recur to the matter.”

M. Zola.—“I ask to be treated here as well as thieves and murderers. All accused persons are entitled to prove their probity, their good faith, and their honor.”

M. Labori.—“Will you permit me to point out the bearing of my questions? M. Zola has made two assertions. He has asserted that the council of war of 1894 convicted, in the person of ex-Captain Dreyfus, an innocent man by illegal methods.”

The Judge.—“He is not prosecuted for that.”

M. Labori.—“Pardon me, he is prosecuted for having said that the second council of war knowingly acquitted a guilty man by covering, in obedience to orders, the illegality committed by the first.”

M. Zola.—“It is in the summons.”

M. Labori.—“M. Zola asks to prove this illegality, and the elements out of which it grew, from the standpoint of his good faith. This illegality is not confined to the moment of the verdict of the council of war, but extends over the very period of inquiry in which occurred facts of the highest gravity which M. Zola asks to produce. If the court considers that Mme. Dreyfus can not be heard on this point, I shall be obliged to offer a motion.”

The Judge.—“Offer your motion. The question will not be put by me.”

M. Clemenceau.—“I ask to make a simple observation, addressed especially to the jurors. I am of the opinion that the law must be complied with, whatever it may be. But I beg you to remember, gentlemen of the jury, that M. Zola has written an article which fills sixteen pages of the pamphlet in my hands. Out of these sixteen pages the public prosecutor, at the order of the minister of war, complains of only fifteen lines, and, when we come to court, it transpires that, in spite of a judicious selection of fifteen lines from sixteen pages, the prosecution is still embarrassed by one of these fifteen lines. They tell us in these fifteen lines there are still six which must be put aside, because, were we to leave them there, embarrassing evidence would be put in.”

The Judge.—“I repeat that no question will be put which would be a means of arriving at the revision of a case sovereignly judged.”

M. Clemenceau.—“Then the court will put no question concerning good faith?”

The Judge.—“Concerning anything that relates to the Dreyfus case. No. Offer your motions. I repeat that I will not put the question.”

M. Labori.—“Will you permit me, Monsieur le Président, in our common interest, to ask you, then, what practical means you see by which we may ascertain the truth?”

The Judge.—“That does not concern me.”

M. Labori then made a formal motion that, whereas the matters upon which the testimony of Mme. Dreyfus was required bore directly upon the matters expressly set out in the complaint, and especially upon the illegality charged, and whereas the defendants maintained, in spite of the court’s decree, the right to prove their good faith, and whereas the refusal to hear the witnesses summoned would constitute the highest violation of the defendants’ rights, the court order the following questions to be put to Mme. Dreyfus:

(1) What do you think of M. Zola’s good faith?

(2) What are the reasons that have led you to believe in his good faith?

(3) Do you consider from what you know that the measures taken against your husband were legal or illegal?

(4) Will you describe the first visit of Major du Paty de Clam at your house? Who were present?

(5) Did not M. du Paty de Clam utter the grossest insults against your husband?

(6) Did he not pretend to demonstrate his guilt geometrically and by drawing concentric circles?

(7) Did he not speak of the Iron Mask?

(8) Did he not expressly forbid you to speak of the arrest to anyone whomsoever, even to his family?

(9) After how long a time were you allowed the right to write to your husband?

(10) After how long a time did you again see your husband?

(11) Did not M. du Paty de Clam say to you: “He denies, but I shall succeed in making him spit out all that he has in his body”?

(12) Did not M. du Paty de Clam nevertheless lead you to hope that perhaps there had been an error, and that up to November?

(13) Did not M. du Paty de Clam try, by the most irregular means, and even by insidious means, to tear confessions from you throughout the trial and after the verdict?

(14) What do you think of your husband’s character and morals? What was the nature of your life with him after your marriage?

(15) Did not your husband steadily declare, during the trial and after, that this whole matter was incomprehensible, and that he was the victim of a conspiracy?

The reading of these questions being received with a hostile manifestation from those present in the court-room, M. Labori turned to the audience, and shouted: “If you think you can prevent me from doing my duty, you are mistaken. I am embarrassed only when I am applauded. Let them howl! It is all one to me.”

The Attorney-General.—“I simply call attention to this,—that these incidents are rehearsed before the audience, but they are always the same, and that the jurors whom you have just addressed will remember that you have for the thing judged yesterday the same respect that you have for the thing judged on a previous occasion. I said at the beginning that a plan had been fixed upon; it is being carried out, and you have just given us the formula: ‘I do not know the law, and I do not want to know it.’ Well, we know it, and we will see that it is respected, with the aid of the jurors, in whom I have absolute confidence.”

M. Labori.—“M. Zola will answer in a moment, and it is to assure him the means of doing so that I take the floor.”

The Judge.—“Take it once for all, and do not renew this scene with each witness.”

M. Labori.—“Pardon me, I am much grieved if the line of conduct which I follow is in any way inconvenient or disagreeable to anyone whomsoever. But I know very well that it is dictated to me by a conviction so profound and a resolution so fixed that nothing, nothing, shall force me to deviate from it by a line. That said, I answer the attorney-general in a word. The attorney-general, who, after a firm and energetic beginning, preserved a profound silence throughout the last part of yesterday’s hearing” ...

The Attorney-General.—“To the point of self-denial.”

M. Labori.—“To the point of self-denial, ... rises today to tell us that we are confronted with a fixed plan, and that the same incidents, starting from the same preconceived idea, are being rehearsed. Very well, but the plan that we have fixed is the plan that leads to the light. There is another plan which is being rehearsed at the other side of the bar,—the plan which leads to obscurity and darkness. Reference has been made to the thing judged. We respect it. We respect the thing judged yesterday, but between that and the other the difference is that the thing judged yesterday was legally judged, and that the other was judged illegally.”

M. Zola.—“Gentlemen of the jury, to you will I address myself. I am not an orator, I am a writer; but unfortunately” ...

The Judge.—“You should address the court.”

M. Zola.—“I ask your pardon. I thought that I had permission to address the jurors. But I will address myself to you. What I have to say will be as well said. I am a writer; I am not accustomed to public speaking; moreover, I am an extremely nervous being, and am liable to use words that ill express my thought. Undoubtedly I have expressed it ill, since I have been misunderstood. I am quoted as saying that I have placed myself above the law. Did I say that?”

M. Labori.—“You said: ‘I have not to know the law at this moment.’”

M. Zola.—“I meant to say, at any rate, that I do not revolt against this grand idea of the law. I submit to it completely, and from it I expect justice. I meant to say that my revolt was against the processes that find expression in all these quibbles raised against me, against the way in which I am prosecuted, against the limitation of the complaint to fifteen lines from my long letter of accusation; and these things I declare unworthy of justice. I say that these few lines are not to be taken and passed upon without regard to all that I have said. A writing is consecutive; phrases lead to phrases, ideas lead to ideas; and to fix upon a single thing therein because it brings me under the law is, I say, unworthy. That is what I say, and that is what I meant. I do not place myself above the law, but I am above hypocritical methods.”

M. Labori.—“Bravo!”

The Attorney-General.—“So, M. Labori, you give the signal for these bravos?”

M. Labori.—“It is true, I said ‘Bravo;’ but frankly, it was the cry of my conscience.”

M. Albert Clemenceau.—“There is one point beyond dispute,—that we are authorized to prove that M. Zola has accused the council of war of having committed an illegality. Well, I ask you how it is possible for us to prove this, if we do not begin by establishing that an illegality has been committed.”

The court denied the motion of M. Labori, and the second witness was called,—M. Leblois, a lawyer of the appellate court.

Testimony of M. Leblois.

The Judge.—“M. Labori, what question do you desire me to put to the witness?”

M. Labori.—“Will you ask M. Leblois at what date and under what circumstances he came into possession of the facts now within his knowledge concerning the Esterhazy case?”

The court interposing no objection, M. Leblois made the following statement:

“I have been for many years the friend of Colonel Picquart. We made all our studies together, and we have remained faithful to this friendship. In 1890 Colonel Picquart was made professor in the School of War, and since then I have seen him more or less frequently. Then he entered the war department, to which he had already been attached for several years, and finally, about the middle of 1895, if I am not mistaken, he was appointed chief of the bureau of information. It would have been natural at that time for him to consult me occasionally upon the legal difficulties that he met, since I was his intimate friend and had belonged to the magistracy for ten years. Nevertheless he spoke to me of only two cases,—a case of criminal procedure that was under way at Nancy, and a batch of documents relating to carrier pigeons, which was nothing but a collection of ministerial decrees upon that question. When, on November 16, 1896, Colonel Picquart was suddenly obliged to quit the war department, he had never said a word to me, either of the Dreyfus case or of the Esterhazy case, and I was absolutely unaware that he was concerning himself with either of them. All who know Colonel Picquart will not be astonished at this reserve.

“In June, 1897, I received a visit from Colonel Picquart, who had come to pass a fortnight’s leave of absence in Paris. On June 3, he had received at Sousse a threatening letter, which had been written to him by one of his former subordinates, and thus he found himself under the necessity of consulting a lawyer. For purposes of his defence he made known to me some of the facts in the cases of Dreyfus and Esterhazy. I say, gentlemen, some of the facts, for Colonel Picquart never revealed to me any military secret, in that sense of the term secret in which it is employed in military language. Colonel Picquart had become convinced of the innocence of Captain Dreyfus, and he explained to me the facts upon which his conviction rested. I had too much confidence in his intelligence and honesty not to admit the materiality of the facts that he made known to me, and from them I came to the same conclusion that he had arrived at. I was profoundly disturbed by what I had just learned, for I not only deplored the possibility of so grave an error, and the submission to undeserved torture of a man who seemed to be innocent, but I was anxious lest such revelations might agitate the country; and so I determined to exercise the greatest prudence.

“First, I collected all the information that I could procure. I consulted certain persons who had been familiar with other facts, making my study more precise by reading documents published in 1896. I gathered information as to the Dreyfus family, and as to Captain Dreyfus, whom I did not know, and finally I studied the various questions of law to which the case might give rise. In the course of these inquiries I learned that M. Scheurer-Kestner had been concerning himself with the Dreyfus case for a year, and had collected facts of some interest. About the same time I met M. Scheurer-Kestner at a dinner, and an interview was arranged between us for a subsequent day. When he found that I was in possession of important information, he urged me strongly to tell him more. He was so insistent, and showed so keen anxiety, that I could not refrain from enlightening him more completely. My original plan, the only one that seemed possible to me, was to promptly put the government in possession of the facts that I had learned through Colonel Picquart. M. Scheurer-Kestner, vice-president of the senate, seemed to me the best person that I could find through whom to approach the government. For these reasons I thought it my duty to yield to M. Scheurer-Kestner’s solicitations, and I gave him the desired enlightenment. Especially I spoke to him of letters that General Gonse had written to Colonel Picquart. M. Scheurer-Kestner begged me to show him these letters immediately, and he accompanied me to my house to get them. From that moment he was convinced of the innocence of Dreyfus, and his conviction has never since been shaken. He will never abandon the cause that he has undertaken.

“Meanwhile, the vacation season was approaching, and it seemed very difficult to institute proceedings at that time. It seemed to me that an affair of this sort should not be entered upon, unless there was a possibility of pursuing it to the end. Furthermore, M. Scheurer-Kestner deemed it necessary to have in his hands certain material proofs which both he and I lacked,—proofs in the shape of examples of Major Esterhazy’s handwriting, which was supposed to be identical with that of the bordereau. Nevertheless, I thought it my duty to submit to M. Scheurer-Kestner at that moment the idea of presenting to the keeper of the seals a petition for the cancellation of the verdict of 1894, because it seemed to me a settled fact that a secret document had been communicated to the judges, and that consequently the judgment was void. M. Scheurer-Kestner thought that it was too early to take such a step in the absence of material proofs. He made arrangements to get examples of Major Esterhazy’s handwriting as soon as possible, and toward the end of July started on his vacation. In the course of the following months he succeeded in procuring examples of Major Esterhazy’s handwriting, and, on returning to Paris, he entered into communication with the government. Concerning that, he will testify himself. For my part, I have nothing more to say upon this point. Nevertheless I add that, when M. Scheurer-Kestner made his interpellation in the senate on November 7, 1897, it seemed to him that this should be the end of his personal participation in the matter. In fact, the declarations of the government pointed to an honest and full investigation, and it did not seem to M. Scheurer-Kestner that there was any occasion for him to interfere in the working-up of a criminal case. So about Christmas time he thought himself entitled to take a few days’ rest, of which he was in great need.

“At that moment I had been informed by Colonel Picquart of the conspiracies against him,—conspiracies of extreme gravity, the most serious and important point of which is found in two telegrams addressed to him from Paris on November 10, 1897, and reaching him at Sousse, the first on November 11, the second on November 12 in the morning. These telegrams were forgeries. It seemed plain that they could not have been drawn up, except upon information emanating from the bureau of information, and this it would be easy to demonstrate; but Colonel Picquart will demonstrate it better than I. As the jury and the court will see, this was a new incident in an extremely serious matter, since these telegrams were dated November 10, 1897. Nevertheless it was a conspiracy which had long been in preparation, for in December, 1896, false letters had been addressed to the minister of war signed with the same name, ‘Speranza,’ that appeared at the foot of the two telegrams of November 10, 1897. It seemed to me it was my first duty to inform the government of this situation. But, having with the government no easy and direct means of communication, I asked M. Trarieux, senator and former keeper of the seals, whom I had met several times at the house of a friend, and who, moreover, had taken part in the senate discussion of M. Scheurer-Kestner’s interpellation, to give me the benefit of his sanction by acting as an intermediary between myself and the government. He will tell you what steps he took. For my part I could do but one thing,—lodge, on behalf of my client, a complaint with the government attorney, which complaint is under examination by M. Bertulus, who has already taken the deposition of Mlle. Blanche de Comminges.

“I said just now that Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart suddenly left the war department on November 16, 1896, on the eve of the Castelin interpellation in the chamber of deputies. His friends were unaware of his departure, and I in particular went several times, and during several weeks, to see him, and failed to find him. One of his friends wrote to the minister of war a letter which should be among the documents in the hands of M. Bertulus, and which, at any rate, constitutes one of the papers in the investigations made by General de Pellieux and Major Ravary. This letter was insignificant, but in it there was a brief allusion to a personage who, in the salon of Mlle. de Comminges, had been nicknamed the ‘demigod.’ The letter contained this sentence: ‘Every day the demigod asks Mme. the Countess [that is Mlle. de Comminges] when he will be able to see the good God.’ In this circle, where Colonel Picquart was very popular, he was known as ‘the good God,’ and the name ‘demigod’ had been given to a certain Captain Lallement, who was the orderly of General des Garet, commanding the sixteenth army corps at Montpellier. This letter was intended for Colonel Picquart, but reached him only after it had been secretly opened and copied at the war department. The following month there came to the bureau of information a letter which was intercepted entirely, and of which no knowledge came to Colonel Picquart. This letter is surely the work of a forger. It is signed ‘Speranza.’ That was the beginning, in December, 1896, of the attempt to compromise Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart. The existence of the second letter was concealed for more than a year, and he learned of it for the first time in the course of General de Pellieux’s investigation. But it was made the basis of all the conspiracies for the ruin of this officer. Be not astonished, then, that last November, when this matter came to public attention and enlisted the interest of parliament, new conspiracies came to light. In the evening of November 10, 1897, two telegrams started from Paris together. The first read thus: ‘Stop, demigod. Affair very serious. Speranza.’ From this telegram it seemed that the demigod must be a very important personage, probably a political personality, perhaps M. Scheurer-Kestner. The second telegram read: ‘We have proofs that the dispatch was manufactured by Georges. Blanche.’ This second telegram, which was evidently a part of the same conspiracy to which the first belonged, tended to destroy the authenticity, and consequently the force as evidence, of a certain dispatch on which rested the investigation opened by Colonel Picquart in the spring of 1896 concerning Major Esterhazy. Thus they endeavored to represent Colonel Picquart as the tool of a politician and the author of a forgery. I should add that it is certain that Colonel Picquart was not acquainted with M. Scheurer-Kestner, and that he had no communication with him, direct or indirect. As for the charge of forgery brought against Colonel Picquart, it has been completely abandoned, for, although there were some insinuations to that effect in Major Ravary’s report, Colonel Picquart recently appeared before a council of inquiry, and among the things with which he was reproached there was not the slightest allusion to the possibility of a forgery in the case of the document in question.”

The Judge.—“What do you know about it?”

M. Leblois.—“Monsieur le Président, I know it in the most certain and natural way, because I was myself a witness before the council of inquiry.”

The Judge.—“Were you there throughout the hearing?”

M. Leblois.—“No, but I have knowledge of the facts with which the colonel was reproached.”

The Judge.—“You say that you have knowledge of them, but you do not know them of your own knowledge, since you were not there.”

M. Labori.—“Permit me to observe, Monsieur le Président, that the witnesses should have the advantage of the right to give their testimony without being interrupted, according to the terms of Article 315 of the code of criminal examination. I claim this right for M. Leblois. As to the fact which he affirms, the question is not how he knows it, but whether it is true.”

The Judge.—“Permit me, Maître Labori; I suppose that the court is entitled to question witnesses.”

M. Labori.—“It is not entitled to interrupt them.”

The Judge.—“I did not interrupt M. Leblois. I asked him for indications on a point which it is necessary to throw light upon. I will continue to do so, rest assured.”

M. Labori.—“I do not pretend to discuss with you the duties of the judge of the assize court. You know them better than I do. I add that I am ready to render homage to the great impartiality with which you endeavor to direct the debate. But, on the other hand, this is a matter in which it is impossible for us to part with the smallest particle of our rights. They deprive us here of all the faculties that they can deprive us of. We are here face to face with testimony which is entitled to be heard; we ask that it shall be heard freely and independently. Now, Article 315 of the code of criminal examination authorizes witnesses to give their testimony without interruption, without prejudice to the right of the court to ask them, after their deposition, whatsoever questions it sees fit.”

The Judge.—“That is what I have just done.”

M. Labori.—“The deposition of M. Leblois is not finished. He was in the course of it when you interrupted him.”

The Judge.—“Pardon, M. Leblois had finished. I asked him a question to throw light upon his deposition.”

M. Leblois.—“I will answer you in the clearest fashion. In the first place, I declare that I know that Colonel Picquart was asked but four questions. As to the source of this knowledge, I do not think that I am bound to give it, and for a good reason; I am Colonel Picquart’s lawyer.”

The Judge.—“You should have said so at the beginning.”

M. Leblois.—“I did say so.”

The Judge.—“I did not hear it.”

M. Leblois.—“I said just now that I was first introduced to this affair in June, 1897, when Colonel Picquart came to ask my aid and protection against written threats that he had received on June 3 from one of his former subordinates. It was for purposes of his defence that Colonel Picquart related to me a portion of the facts, but not those concerning military secrets, and it was for purposes of his defence that he gave me General Gonse’s letters. I consider that you are now reassured as to the source of my information.

“I add that nothing is easier than to establish materially the proof of what I have just said, for information telegraphed by a provincial agency on February 2, and not contradicted since by any newspaper or otherwise, specifies the points raised in the debate before the council of inquiry. Furthermore, Colonel Picquart has received, in conformity with military regulations, a clear notification of the questions concerning which he was examined. In fact, if a single question is to be put in a council of inquiry, the law requires that the person to be questioned shall receive a notice of the points on which the discussion will turn. Then Colonel Picquart, being in possession of such notice, emanating from the reporter in the case, is clearly in a position to prove what I have just said.”

M. Albert Clemenceau.—“Permit me to ask a question. Just now the witness said this second letter, which was a forgery, was so drawn up as to prove that it emanated from a personage familiar with the documents of the war offices. But the witness did not explain this declaration. I should like to ask him what there was in this letter that enables him to make this declaration, and to say that it came from the war offices.”

M. Leblois.—“I prefer not to give any explanations in regard to this letter, for I should run a risk of altering the version that you will soon hear from Colonel Picquart. [Laughter.] I think there is some misunderstanding. I said that the text of the two telegrams was a certain proof that they emanated from a man familiar with all the secrets of the war department, but I can say that only of the telegrams, because I have seen them and am in possession of their text. I cannot speak so certainly of a letter which I have not seen, and concerning which I have only information.”

M. Labori.—“From the standpoint of the conspiracies to which M. Leblois has referred, what was the bearing of the false letter intercepted in the war offices?”

M. Leblois.—“I said just now that I considered this false letter signed ‘Speranza’ another stone on which to erect, little by little, the edifice of the conspiracies against Colonel Picquart. Regarding the two telegrams, must I give details?”

The Judge [hastily].—“No.”

M. Labori.—“Monsieur le Président, we are very desirous that he should.”

The Judge [sadly].—“Since the defence demands it, speak.”

M. Leblois.—“The following telegram: ‘We have proofs that the dispatch was manufactured by Georges. Blanche,’ suggests to me this reflection: Who, outside of the war department, could then know that an inquiry was in progress concerning Major Esterhazy, and especially that the basis of this inquiry was a dispatch? That was an absolute secret. The two telegrams of which I have spoken were not the only elements of this complicated plot against Colonel Picquart. There were many other telegrams sent by third parties. For instance, an individual sent from Paris a telegram signed ‘Baron Keller’ and addressed to a pretended Baroness Keller at Sousse. All these telegrams were intended to compromise Colonel Picquart. The two which I have cited are the only ones that reached him, but they are only the centre of a very complicated network. He referred to all of this in an article in ‘La Libre Parole’ of November 16, 1897.”

M. Labori.—“M. Leblois has told us that Colonel Picquart left the war department November 16, 1896. Could he tell us what was the attitude of his superiors, and especially of General Gonse, toward him at that time? Did Colonel Picquart go in disgrace, and how has he been treated since, up to the time of his recall to Paris, under circumstances with which the jurors must be familiar, at the beginning of the Esterhazy inquiry?”

M. Leblois.—“Colonel Picquart’s superiors behaved toward him in the most kindly manner throughout his inquiry concerning Major Esterhazy,—an inquiry which began toward the end of spring and continued until September. According to Colonel Picquart, it was not until the moment had come for a decision in this matter that a difference of opinion was revealed between his superiors and himself. This difference did not assume an acute form at first. In the beginning it was simply an exchange of opposite views, such as often takes place between inferiors and superiors. The solution of the matter, clearly stated in a letter from Colonel Picquart bearing date of September 5, 1896, remained in suspense until November, 1896. At that moment things were growing worse under influences which I do not exactly know myself. Perhaps the government, upon the question being laid before it, decided that there was no occasion to review the Dreyfus case. I know nothing about it; I can only form hypotheses. Answering M. Labori’s question, I will say this: when Colonel Picquart left the war department, they gave him not the slightest hint that he was sent away in disgrace. On the contrary, they represented to him as a favor the rather vague mission with which he was entrusted. They said to him: ‘You are to go away for a few days. You will go to Nancy, to do certain things.’ When once he was at Nancy, they said to him: ‘Go elsewhere.’ Thus from day to day they gave him new orders, continually prolonging his mission; and the colonel, who had left Paris without extra clothing, was told, when he asked permission to return to get his linen, that his mission was too important to warrant a diversion of even a few hours; and they sent him to Besançon. Thus, without suspecting the fate that was in store for him, he was sent along the frontier, and then to Algeria and Tunis, where, in March, 1897, he was made lieutenant-colonel of the Fourth Sharpshooters. They pretended that he was given this appointment as a favor. General Gonse told him positively, in a letter, that the regiment was a very select one, and that he should consider himself fortunate in belonging to it. The general’s letters are full of expressions of sympathy.”

M. Labori.—“M. Leblois referred just now to a threatening letter which intervened at a certain moment, and which apparently modified the state of mind prevailing in the office of the minister of war. Could he tell us when this letter was addressed to Colonel Picquart, from whom it came, and in what spirit it was conceived?”

M. Leblois.—“I have already said that this letter was dated June 3, 1897. It came from Lieutenant-Colonel Henry, who had been Colonel Picquart’s subordinate, and it was couched in terms almost insulting.”

M. Albert Clemenceau.—“The witness has said that at the same time when Colonel Picquart’s letters were being seized in the war department he was suffered to receive forged telegrams, and that at the same time also General Gonse, sub-chief of the general staff, acted in a very kindly manner toward him. I ask him if these three matters were really contemporaneous.”

M. Leblois.—“The reply is simple enough. You must distinguish between two utterly distinct orders of events,—the events at the end of 1896, which was the time of Colonel Picquart’s departure, and the events at the end of 1897. I know of only one letter intercepted at the bureau of information in 1896,—namely, the letter signed ‘Speranza.’ It was at that time that General Gonse showed the greatest sympathy for Colonel Picquart. Coming to the conspiracy of 1897, it is my opinion that letters were then intercepted, but I prefer that the testimony on this point should come from Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart.”

M. Clemenceau.—“Yet the witness said just now that they sent a letter to Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart after having opened it.”

M. Leblois.—“That was in 1896. It was in December of that year that the Speranza letter was sent.”