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THE WAR HISTORY
OF THE 4TH BATTALION
THE LONDON REGIMENT
(ROYAL FUSILIERS)
1914-1919

Frontispiece

Ypres Cathedral

THE WAR HISTORY
OF THE 4TH BATTALION
THE LONDON REGIMENT
(ROYAL FUSILIERS)
1914-1919

BY
CAPTAIN F. CLIVE GRIMWADE
4TH BATTALION, THE LONDON REGIMENT (ROYAL FUSILIERS)

LONDON
HEADQUARTERS OF THE 4TH LONDON REGIMENT
112 SHAFTESBURY STREET, N.1
1922

Printed in Great Britain
by Turnbull & Spears, Edinburgh

THIS HISTORY IS DEDICATED
TO THE MEMORY OF
Colonel E. T. RODNEY WILDE, V.D.,
WHO COMMANDED THE BATTALION
FROM 23RD NOVEMBER 1890 TO 24TH JANUARY 1903
AND COMPILED ITS HISTORICAL RECORDS
FROM 1643 TO 1908

FOREWORD

It was considered by the past and present members of the 4th Battalion, The London Regiment (Royal Fusiliers), that some permanent record of the part taken by the Regiment in the European War should be compiled, and a War History Committee was formed in February 1920 to consider the preparation of such a record.

At the unanimous request of the Committee Captain F. Clive Grimwade undertook to write the Regiment's War History.

The Committee desire to express their keen appreciation of the manner in which he has overcome the difficulties of compiling such a History and of his devotion in carrying out this long and arduous work.

The Committee wish to express their thanks also to Lieut.-Col. Marchment, to Captains Boutall, Garratt, Croll and Hetley, and to other officers who have given Captain Grimwade valuable assistance; to the author's mother, Mrs Grimwade, for her assistance in arranging information as to officers' personal services and in correcting the drafts of the book; and to the Regiment's Honorary Colonel, Lord Marshall, for facilitating the publication of the book.

THE WAR HISTORY COMMITTEE,
4th Battalion, The London
Regiment (Royal Fusiliers).
LESLIE T. BURNETT, Lieut.-Col. (Chairman).
G. H. M. VINE, Major (retired).
H. J. DUNCAN-TEAPE, Major.
S. J. ELLIOTT, Major.

February 1922

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I
MOBILISATION—DEPARTURE OVERSEAS

Of the London Volunteer Corps the unit now known as the 4th (City of London) Battalion, The London Regiment (Royal Fusiliers) is one of the most ancient. Called out as a Trained Band in 1643 to share in repelling a threatened Royalist invasion of the City during the Civil Wars, it has had a practically unbroken history for nearly three hundred years. After the regular constitution of the Volunteer Forces in the middle of last century it achieved some distinction as the 1st Tower Hamlets Rifle Brigade, and despatched a machine-gun detachment to the fighting in South Africa in 1900. In 1903 it became affiliated to The Royal Fusiliers, as the 4th Volunteer Battalion of that distinguished Regiment. On the reorganisation of the auxiliary forces in 1908 by Lord Haldane, it acquired its present designation, which we will abbreviate to the more convenient title by which it became known in the Great War, namely, The 4th London Regiment.

Prior to the War the training provided for the Territorial Force was only such as to furnish the nucleus of a Second Line Army. Fourteen days in camp each summer, an easy musketry course, and a few drills at headquarters could not develop a soldier fit to meet fully trained troops. That this was recognised by Lord Haldane is evidenced by the fact that his scheme provided for a period of six months' training at home for all Territorial soldiers should war break out, prior to their despatch on active service.

But they were none the less given a definite rôle in the defence of the Motherland. Possibly this was not always realised to the full by all the officers and non-commissioned officers of the Regiment; but it was unmistakably brought home to them one evening in February 1914 when a secret meeting of officers was convened at Headquarters in Hoxton for the explanation of the scheme of mobilisation and of the task which the Regiment would be called upon to execute should war occur.

At that date the scheme of Mobilisation was already complete. Under it the 1st London Infantry Brigade, of which the 4th London formed a part, was entrusted with the supremely important task of guarding the London and South Western Railway between London and Southampton during the mobilisation and embarkation of the Expeditionary Force from the latter port. The section allotted to the 4th Battalion was the main line from Waterloo Station to Farnborough (inclusive); the Alton branch from its junction with the main line near Brookwood to Bentley Station; and the branch from the last-named station to Borden Camp. These dispositions were worked out in the greatest detail, and arrangements were made for the efficient guarding of all railway stations, signal boxes, junctions, tunnels and bridges, and for a system of constant patrolling of the line.

The Infantry of the Territorial Force not being supplied during peace time with war scale of transport, ammunition, etc., provision was made for this necessary equipment to be drawn on mobilisation, and waggons and horses in civilian employ were "earmarked" beforehand for this purpose.

The scheme having been explained, arrangements were made to detail all guards, patrols, and requisitioning parties in readiness.

When the war cloud over South-eastern Europe began to spread in July 1914 and threatened to envelop this country in the storm, the finishing touches were put to the scheme at a memorable secret meeting at Headquarters on the evening of Thursday, 31st July 1914. After that meeting few who attended it had any doubt as to what was about to take place.

The annual camp in 1914 for the 1st London Division (Major-Gen. W. Fry, C.B., C.V.O.) had been arranged for Sunday, 2nd August, and on that date, this country still not having declared its intentions as to the war, the 4th London Regiment entrained for Wareham, in Dorsetshire, where the camp was to be held, with a strength of 23 officers and about 650 other ranks under Lieut.-Col. G. P. Botterill.

Camp was reached shortly after noon, but scarcely had the Battalion marched in when an order was received recalling it to London. By 2.30 p.m. it was once again entrained, quivering with excitement and well-nourished on the journey to town with the most impossible rumours of gigantic battles, most of which apocryphal happenings it swallowed with gusto. At 2 a.m. on the 3rd August the 4th Londons marched into Headquarters, and after a few hours' rest began to put the wheels of the carefully assembled machine of mobilisation into motion. All went without a hitch. Field dressings, identity discs and small books were issued: separation allowance and next-of-kin rolls prepared. The "earmarked" horses and vehicles were collected, and with the aid of these, ammunition drawn from the Hyde Park Magazine.

Blankets, lanterns and other stores sent up the River from Woolwich were unloaded and conveyed direct to the platform at Waterloo Station, ready for issue to the Battalion on its arrival there. The machine was moving steadily. During the day the Regimental Colours were handed over to the Lord Mayor of London for safe keeping.

Shortly after midnight the 4th London Regiment entrained at Waterloo in two trains, from which at each stop the allotted platoons detrained: so that by the time the end of the sector was reached in the early hours of the 4th August 1914, the railway was already guarded. Eighteen hours before the declaration of war the Battalion was on its war station: a good lead from Territorial troops to the rest of the country!

The distribution of the Battalion was as follows:

Battalion Headquarters, Lieut.-Col. G. P. Botterill, Surbiton.

A and B Companies (forming No. 1 Double Company), Headquarters at Clapham Junction, under Capt. H. J. Duncan-Teape.

C and E Companies (forming No. 2 Double Company), Headquarters at Woking, under Capt. G. H. M. Vine.

D and F Companies (forming No. 3 Double Company), Headquarters at North Camp, under Capt. R. J. Jackson.

G and H Companies (forming No. 4 Double Company), Headquarters at Bentley, under Capt. E. H. Stillwell.

The Transport Section returned to Headquarters at Hoxton to complete the formation of the Battalion transport on a war footing.

Brigade Headquarters were at Waterloo Station under command of Brigadier-General the Earl of Lucan. The Brigade Major was Major R. F. Legge (Leinster Regiment); and the Staff Captain, Captain Cornelius-Wheeler (3rd London Regiment, Royal Fusiliers).

On the evening of the same day Lord Grey of Falloden (then Sir Edward Grey), in the House of Commons, made his never-to-be-forgotten indictment of the duplicity of Germany's action in the pre-war negotiations and in her violation of Belgian neutrality, and the formal declaration of war followed.

The order for General Mobilisation, which was applicable to the Territorial Force equally with the Regular Army, immediately ensued, and orders to report forthwith were issued to all members of the Battalion who had not paraded for the summer training two days previously. It is to the credit of the Battalion that within twelve hours no member had failed to reply. The N.C.O.'s and men thus reporting for duty were as quickly as possible despatched from peace headquarters and reported to their respective companies on the line.

As the N.C.O.'s and men of the Battalion reported for duty they were subjected to medical examination, and a certain number were unfortunately unable to pass fit at the high standard required during the early days of the war, so that the strength of the Battalion on the 6th August was 24 officers and 785 N.C.O.'s and men.

The early days of August on the railway line afforded unmistakable proof, if such were needed, of the extraordinary power of the London soldier to adapt himself to circumstances. Men from offices, factories and docks, suddenly taken from their occupations and their homes, settled down to patrols and guards, to cooking their food and taking responsibility, as to the manner born. All were swept forward on the high flood of a great enthusiasm, and buoyed up amid minor discomforts with intense pride that their country needed them and had given them a job of work to carry out. This enthusiasm certainly bid fair at times to show signs of excess of zeal. But the zeal was tempered with an immense sense of the dignity of each and every one as a soldier in the 4th Londons: the days on railway guard thus formed the basis of the esprit de corps which is essential to military success and which in pre-war days it had been difficult, by the nature of things, to develop. Scattered though the Battalion was over some 50 miles of railway, disciplinary trouble of a serious nature was conspicuous by its absence.

By the middle of August the greater part of the Expeditionary Force had been embarked to France, but the Brigade remained at its war station. During the dark days which ensued, when telegram after telegram told always of withdrawal before overwhelming forces of the German Army after the glorious resistance at Mons, the Battalion continued to guard the railway, and was busily occupied in recruiting to full strength and in completing its equipment. The strength of the Battalion rose steadily and rapidly, and by the end of August 941 N.C.O.'s and men were at duty on the railway line.

The duties on the railway were extremely heavy, and no training was possible except the rudimentary instructions of the recruits who were retained at peace headquarters.

On the night of 31st August / 1st September orders were issued to the Brigade to withdraw from the line and return to peace headquarters. The move was satisfactorily completed by 12 noon on the 1st September, the duties of the Brigade on the railway being taken over two days later by the 3rd London Infantry Brigade. On return to headquarters the Commanding Officer informed the Battalion that the whole Brigade would be despatched on overseas garrison duty almost immediately, and called for volunteers, a call which met with a favourable response from all ranks.

The two following days were actively occupied with medical inspections, recruiting to fill the few remaining vacancies, etc.

On the afternoon of the 3rd September the Battalion was paraded for inspection by Major-Gen. W. Fry, C.B., C.V.O., commanding 1st London Division, who, in an address to the troops, announced that the destination of the Brigade was Malta; and conveyed to the Battalion, to the great satisfaction of all ranks, the direct assurance of Earl Kitchener that the Battalion would be retained in Malta only until it should be passed fit to take the field. This announcement was received with enthusiasm as it served to allay the disquieting rumours of the possibility of the Malta station proving to be a "sidetrack" for the period of the war.

Shortly after midnight on the 3/4th September 1914, the Battalion (strength 29 officers and 976 other ranks, fully armed and equipped) paraded and marched to Waterloo amid scenes of enthusiasm and excitement in Hoxton which will probably never be forgotten by those who witnessed them, and entrained at 3.30 a.m. on the 4th September for Southampton, embarking on arrival in H.T. Galician (Union Castle Line).

The following officers proceeded overseas with the Battalion:

At 4 p.m. that afternoon anchor was weighed, and the transport convoy, conveying the first Brigade of Territorial troops to leave this country, dropped down Southampton water.

CHAPTER II
THE 1/4TH BATTALION IN MALTA--FORMATION OF THE 2/4TH BATTALION

Under escort of H.M.S. Amphitrite, and accompanied by four other transports conveying the remainder of the 1st London Infantry Brigade, the Galician, carrying, in addition to the 1/4th Londons, two companies of the 1/3rd Londons and a section of the 1/1st London Field Ambulance, made a fair passage through the Bay and reached Gibraltar without mishap. Here the convoy broke up, and the transports proceeded independently to their destination.

Nine days of the comparative peace of ship's routine formed a pleasant interlude for the 1/4th Battalion after its recent trying duties on the railway line. The passage to Malta was too short to allow the monotony of ship's inspections, watches, and roll calls to pall, and the interest of the troops was constantly quickened by the incidents of a sea voyage—all so strange to Londoners whose horizon hitherto had for the most part hardly extended beyond Hampstead Heath or Chingford. Occasional fleeting glimpses of France and Spain, the gambols of a school of whales, the brilliant hues of the African shore, and the indescribable blue of the Mediterranean all contributed to render the Battalion happy and indifferent to the discomforts of their quarters 'tween decks, where the heat was certainly trying after the Gates of the Mediterranean had been passed.

The first glimpse of Malta on the morning of the 13th September was uninspiring. From the sea no vegetation can be seen owing to the system whereby the scanty soil is walled up along the hillsides to prevent it from being washed away; and the island presents to the passing voyager an aspect of monotonous drab rock. No time was allowed for despondency, however, for, with the pilot on board, the Galician steamed into the Marsamuscetto Harbour at Valetta where the Battalion could feast on the riot of colour which unrolled before its eyes.

Ghain Tuffieha Camp

Melleha Camp

Selmun Palace

The responsibilities of the 1st London Brigade for the defence of the Fortress of Malta began immediately, for the day after its arrival the infantry of the regular garrison left for the front.

In the early hours of the 14th September the 1/4th Londons disembarked, and being allotted quarters under canvas in Ghain Tuffieha Camp, was introduced to the ardours of a sub-tropical summer by undertaking the longest march it is possible to make in the island—a very trying experience indeed.

Ghain Tuffieha is a summer station on the west coast of the island about eleven miles from Valetta, and is an important outpost of the main defences of the Fortress. It lies in a broad, fertile valley known as the Wied Tal Paules, which traverses the island from east to west, its eastern limit being the coast at St Paul's Bay. To the north of this valley lie the Melleha and the Marfa Ridges, two of the northernmost barriers against invasion. The coast round these two ranges of hills possesses a considerable number of sandy landing-places in well-sheltered bays, which, as they face Sicily at about three hours' passage from that island, required special guarding at this period.

The Battalion now settled down seriously to its training, and it was found necessary to deal with some 250 men as recruits. These, however, were passed through the Barrack Square stage of their training as expeditiously as possible in view of the heavy duties which fell to the Battalion in guarding the northern coast.

The guards found from the main body of the Battalion at Ghain Tuffieha were mostly night guards at the landing-places, at St Paul's Bay on the east coast, and at Ghain Tuffieha Bay, Karraba Ridge, and Gneina Bay on the west coast. In addition to these, G and H companies were immediately despatched on detachment, the former to Selmun Palace (which commands the promontory between the shores of Melleha and St Paul's Bays), the latter to Melleha (which dominates the head of Melleha Bay and the Marfa Ridge beyond it). The latter detachment was subsequently moved down the ridge to the coast near the head of Melleha Bay. The guards found by these detached companies were at Cala Mistra Fort (at the foot of Kalkara Ravine), Ir Razzet tal Blata, L'Imgiebah, and Ghain Zeituna by the Selmun force; and at Melleha Bay, Torri L'Ahmar cross roads, and Marfa Palace by the Melleha force.

The duties of the detached companies were found to be particularly onerous, and the proportion of N.C.O.'s and men employed not only on guards, but also on such necessary duties as signals, look-outs, and water-carrying fatigues, continuously totalled rather more than a third of the total strength of the detachments. Arrangements were therefore made for the relief of the detachment companies every seven or eight days, and this procedure was maintained throughout the Battalion's duty on the island.

The training of the Battalion proceeded smoothly but under conditions of some difficulty, partly owing to the number of men constantly engaged in coastal defence duties, and partly owing to the unfavourable conditions of terrain. Every square yard of the rocky hillsides which is covered with soil is devoted to some sort of cultivation by the thrifty inhabitants, and the walling up of the soil on the hillsides, which has already been alluded to, converts every hill into a series of steps, over which manœuvres are both laborious and painful. In spite of these obstacles, however, a good deal of useful work was achieved, and the Battalion rapidly began to take shape as a useful and well-disciplined unit. There can be no doubt that the experience gained by all ranks in taking their share in ordinary garrison duties at so early a stage in their embodied career proved of infinite value later when the 1/4th Londons ultimately took their place in the fighting line; and, moreover, the knowledge that they were subject to the critical—and at that period not always sympathetic—surveillance of the regular staff of the Fortress provided the strongest possible incentive to all ranks to conduct themselves with credit to their Regiment and to the Territorial Force.

Early in October a very thorough course of musketry instruction under Fortress arrangements was begun, firing taking place on the Naval ranges of Ghain Tuffieha. The companies were thus employed as follows:—2 on detachment, 2 on musketry course, 3 on company training, and 1 finding all the duties at Battalion Headquarters, the whole being worked on a roster so that each company was kept for training and detachment purposes at its greatest possible strength.

During the early days of the Battalion in Malta a few changes of distribution took place among officers as follows:

Major R. J. J. Jackson was evacuated to Cottonera Hospital sick. He unfortunately remained in hospital until early in December 1914, when he was invalided to England. Command of F Company was taken by Lieut. F. C. Grimwade, and the Machine-Gun Section was taken over by 2/Lieut. T. I. Walker, Lieut. S. Elliott transferring to E Company. The Battalion was also joined by 2/Lieut. R. C. Kelly who, however, remained with the unit for a few weeks only, at the end of which time he was appointed to the Secret Service, and with this he remained until the end of the War.

The middle of September, when the Battalion landed in Malta, found the hot season waning, and although the temperature remained high for some weeks the full intensity of the sub-tropical summer was not experienced. In the early part of October, however, the scirocco, a warm south-westerly wind which originates in the Sahara, followed, with all its usual enervating effects, which were indeed quite as trying as the intense heat of the sun had been. Towards the end of the same month the wet season set in in earnest, and from that time until the early part of December the camping ground at Ghain Tuffieha was swept by tropical rains and sand storms of considerable violence, which from time to time caused a certain amount of material damage and not a little discomfort to the troops. The memory of suddenly having to turn out and clear blocked drainage trenches and lay on to straining tent ropes in the—sometimes—vain endeavour to prevent one's temporary home from vanishing into thin air, and to rescue one's kit from a mud bath, is now sufficiently remote to be contemplated without acute distress, but the feelings which these encounters which the elements evoked at the time were by no means so calm!

During the worst phase of the Malta climate the Battalion remained under canvas, and it is of some interest—though admittedly of little consolation—to remark that no battalion had previously spent the winter in Malta in other than permanent barracks.

Thanks to the untiring efforts of the Battalion Medical Officer, Major J. F. F. Parr, the bill of health during these marked variations of climate remained extraordinarily clean, and in spite of its exposed situation the Battalion suffered less from sickness than the others of the Brigade which were accommodated in modern barracks.

The month of December, however, saw the beginning of the most delightful season in the island's year. The temperature was mild but the evenings cool; vegetation began to spring up with almost startling rapidity, and the prospect of the island, seen from the tops of the hills, when looking down on to the terraced fields set in a sea of the deepest azure, formed a most welcome and delightful contrast to the sun-baked and drab view which had greeted the Battalion on its arrival three months earlier.

At the end of November the detachments were redistributed, the defence duties on the northern coast being dealt with by one company only, half at Selmun Palace, which formed its headquarters, the other half at Melleha Bay. A fresh detachment was formed by the despatch of another company to Verdala Barracks (in the Cottonera Lines, the Southern Fortress of Valetta), for the duty of guarding prisoners of war, notably the crew of the German raider Emden who had just been landed on the island.

But for these changes the routine of training proceeded with little variation, and it began to be thought by some that the Battalion would be condemned to continue its duties in Malta until the end of the War; but on the 22nd December 1914 a warning order was issued that the Brigade would leave the island at an early date.

On the 23rd the Battalion (less E and F Companies on detachment), marched to Valetta to be reviewed by His Excellency the Governor on the Marsa, a sports ground near the town. The review took place on the following day and the Battalion returned the same evening, arriving in camp at 6.30 p.m.

The following Fortress Order was published on the 24th December:

The Commander-in-Chief, after having inspected the units of Lord Lucan's Brigade this morning, desires to place on record his great satisfaction at the evident progress made by them to become efficient soldiers of the King. His Excellency, who fully appreciates the patriotic sentiments which have caused such a magnificent body of men to respond to the call of the Empire in this hour of national danger, has had much pleasure in telegraphing to Lord Kitchener reporting the high state of efficiency and fitness which the Brigade has reached. Such a result, which must have been apparent to everyone who saw them on parade this morning, could only have been obtained by the whole-hearted devotion to their Country's cause of every officer, N.C.O., and man, and the Commander-in-Chief wishes to congratulate the Earl of Lucan and the whole of his Brigade on achieving such highly satisfactory results.

No further preparations for departure were made until after the Christmas festivities, which were rendered very enjoyable by the arrival of many good things from home and by special gifts from the Corporation of the City of London and the Regimental Association, the latter organisation providing a gift of a pipe and tobacco-box for every officer, N.C.O., and man. Christmastide over, however, the Battalion concentrated on its preparations for leaving the island at short notice.

On the 28th December the detachment at Selmun was withdrawn, its place being taken by a company of the Malta Militia; that at Verdala being relieved by the 1st London Regiment, which for the time being was to remain in the island.

On the departure of the 1/4th Battalion overseas the following officers had been detailed to remain at headquarters to supervise the formation of a Reserve Battalion:

• Captain E. H. Stillwell.
• Captain W. H. Hamilton.
• Lieutenant H. G. Stanham.
• Lieutenant H. Parkhouse.

These officers were assisted by a small number of N.C.O.'s and men of the 1/4th Battalion who had been found medically unfit to proceed overseas. The intention in raising the new battalion originally was to provide a unit to supply reinforcements to the overseas battalion, but, as will be seen, this intention was subsequently modified to a large degree.

Recruiting for the new battalion, which was at first designated the 4th (1st Reserve) Battalion The London Regiment, and later was known as the 2/4th London Regiment, proceeded (as indeed for all the formations then being raised) with unprecedented rapidity, and within a fortnight over 400 men had been enrolled, while the ranks continued to be swelled daily by the advent of fresh recruits.

Colonel Vickers Dunfee, V.D., was appointed with effect from 6th September 1914 to command the new battalion with Hon. Lieut. E. V. Wellby (late Lieut.-Col. 4th V.B. The Royal Fusiliers) as Captain and Adjutant.

The available accommodation proving utterly inadequate for the growing numbers, the 2/4th Battalion moved on 23rd September, after inspection by the Lord Mayor, Sir Vansittart Bowater, to quarters under canvas at Folly Farm, New Barnet. The strength was now 6 officers and 480 other ranks, and steadily increased from this time until the establishment in all ranks was filled. Training now began in earnest—so far as the wills of every officer, N.C.O., and man were concerned—but under the most acute practical difficulties, such as were general among the newly raised formations, owing to the lack of stores of all kinds, including clothing, arms, and equipment. Gradually, however, "wooden equivalents" gave place to rifles, and mufti made its final disappearance from the parade ground. During the following month the Battalion moved into winter quarters, occupying as barracks two vacant houses at Barnet, namely, "Littlegrove" and "Beech Hill," and also some stabling and out-buildings at "Oakhill."

The Battalion owes a considerable debt of gratitude to the owners of these houses and to other local residents, notably to W. H. Vernon, Esq., and Sir Philip Sassoon, for their generosity in providing accommodation and training facilities and for extending hospitality to the Battalion in various ways, generosity which was also extended to the 4/4th (Reserve) Battalion when it was formed in the following year. Facilities for musketry training were also provided by the Enfield Rifle Club, who very generously placed their range and the services as instructors of several of their members at the disposal of the Battalion.

Training at Barnet continued until 14th December 1914, when, after inspection by Lieut.-Gen. G. H. Moncrieff, Honorary Colonel of the Regiment, the Battalion, which had now grown to a strength of 27 officers and 986 other ranks, joined the Brigade in billets at Maidstone. Here the Brigade received on the 17th a warning order to proceed on foreign service at short notice. The necessary preparation of equipment, medical inspection, inoculation, etc., was at once put in hand, and the Battalion was inspected by Major-General W. Fry, C.B., C.V.O., commanding 1st London Division, who addressed the troops.

It was fortunately possible to grant forty-eight hours' leave to all ranks before departure, destined to be the last home leave for some nineteen months, and on 23rd December the Battalion entrained at 10 a.m. for Southampton, where it embarked on H.T. Avon (Royal Mail Steam Packet Company), the strength on embarkation being 27 officers and 889 other ranks.

The following officers proceeded overseas with the Battalion:

Hon. Lieut. and Quartermaster, J. E. W. Lambley (Quartermaster); Lieut. Casey, R.A.M.C., Medical Officer attached.

Just before departure the following telegram was received by Colonel Dunfee from General Sir Ian Hamilton, G.C.B., D.S.O.:

Had arranged to go down and see your Battalion. Unfortunately situation renders imperative my presence at Headquarters. Can only, therefore, wish you best of good luck and hope we may meet again.

At about 5 p.m. on the 23rd December H.T. Avon put to sea, and the following day at daybreak the convoy assembled, consisting of:—

H.T. Avon—2/4th London Regiment and two Companies 2/3rd London Regiment.

H.T. Euralia—2/2nd London Regiment and 2/3rd London Regiment, less two companies, under the escort of H.M.S. Eclipse, which accompanied the transports as far as Gibraltar.

Melleha

Grand Harbour, Valetta

Grand Harbour, Valetta

The following appointments were made on H.T. Avon: Colonel Vickers Dunfee to be O.C. Ship; Captain and Adjutant W. G. Hayward to be Ship's Adjutant.

Christmas was spent at sea with as much good cheer as circumstances permitted, and after an uneventful voyage Malta was reached and H.T. Avon dropped anchor in the Grand Harbour at Valetta on 31st December 1914.

On the 30th December the 1/4th Battalion marched from Ghain Tuffieha to St George's Barracks and handed over its arms and equipment, as it was understood that these would be required for the relieving troops.

The strength of the 1/4th Battalion on leaving the Island was 24 officers and about 850 other ranks. Major J. F. F. Parr remained on the Island and took over the duties of Medical Officer to the 2/4th Battalion, his duties in the 1/4th Battalion being assumed by Lieutenant Casey, who had just arrived with the 2/4th Battalion. In addition Captain R. N. Arthur and Lieut. V. W. Edwards transferred to the 2/4th Battalion together with about 85 N.C.O.'s and men who were found medically unfit for active service. These officers, N.C.O.'s, and men reported on the 3rd January to the 2/4th Battalion which was thus brought to about war strength.

On the 2nd January the 2/4th Battalion disembarked and marched to quarters at St Andrew's barracks, and the same day at 6.35 a.m. the 1/4th Battalion paraded for the last time at Ghain Tuffieha, marched to Valetta and embarked on the Avon. That afternoon the Avon, conveying in addition to the 1/4th Battalion the 1/3rd Londons, put to sea under sealed orders, which were subsequently found to be for Marseilles.

CHAPTER III
THE 1/4TH BATTALION IN FRANCE--OPERATIONS AT NEUVE CHAPELLE

The Gulf of Lyons has an evil reputation and in January 1915 its achievement did not belie its notoriety. The Avon was a fine ship of some 12,000 tons but being in ballast rolled unmercifully for three days; and the smooth waters of Marseilles harbour, which were reached early on the morning of the 5th January, were never more heartily welcome than to the 1/4th Londons.

Disembarkation took place the following afternoon at about 4 p.m. and the Battalion, after forming up on the quay, marched straight to the railway siding, where a train stood in readiness to carry it into the war area. To British soldiers who have served in the French theatre of war there is, we imagine, no recollection more vivid than that conveyed by the words "40 Hommes—Chevaux en long!" The fourth class French railway carriage, which is employed with fine impartiality for the conveyance of men or horses as occasion demands, is now too well known to call for lengthy comment; it is a subject over which we prefer to pass hurriedly! Into these abominations on wheels the Battalion was inserted at the standard rate of 40 men to each truck and rations for two days were issued. After a delay, which seemed to the troops as interminable as it was certainly inexplicable to them, the train at about 9.30 p.m. rumbled sedately out of Marseilles in the leisurely manner of all troop trains.

Dawn next morning found the train at Avignon where a five minutes' halt was made. The enthusiastic reception accorded to the Battalion all along the line by the French civilians and also by the military was most impressive; and the obvious satisfaction with which the arrival of fresh British troops was hailed by one and all in the Rhone Valley could not fail to impress the dullest sense with the strength of the common cause which bound us to our gallant allies.

A "Halte Repas," that is a halt just not long enough to enable the troops to detrain and cook dinners, was made at Macon, after which the journey, which resolved itself practically into a triumphal progress, was resumed. At one wayside station, the name of which has, unfortunately, passed from our recollection, a military guard of honour saluted the arrival of the Battalion, while the ladies of the district appeared with offerings of milk, coffee, and bouquets. So great, in fact, was the enthusiasm that M. le Maire sent for a cask of wine in which to assert his faith in the Entente Cordiale! Unhappily the French railway authorities were not stirred by such intense emotion and the train moved on before the wine arrived.

By the morning of the 8th the train was skirting Paris, and that day the first signs of war were reached. Near Chantilly (the famous French racecourse) reserve lines of trenches forming the outer ring of the Paris Defences were passed, while at Creil some buildings severely damaged by shell fire stood as stern remembrances of the great retreat three months earlier.

This amusing though very tedious railway journey terminated at 9 p.m. on the 7th January, when the Battalion detrained some ten miles south of Boulogne at Etaples, at that date a small, muddy, and evil-smelling fishing village. Etaples, which at a later stage of the war became such an important base camp, with accommodation for some thirty thousand men and many hospitals, was, in January 1915, not used as a British military station, and the 1st London Brigade were the first troops to be quartered there. Accommodation was provided under canvas in an exposed situation, and the severity of the weather, which was intensely cold and windy with occasional falls of snow, formed a contrast to the sub-tropical climate in which the Battalion had been basking ten days previously, which can only evoke surprise at the comparatively small amount of sickness which ensued.

The Battalion had, it will be remembered, left its rifles, equipment, and transport in Malta, and the refitting and equipment of the troops was taken in hand at once. The first step was the reorganisation of the Battalion in four companies, as follows:

New A Company—Old A and C Companies; Captain H. J. Duncan-Teape in command. Captain W. G. Clark second in command. New B Company—Old B and F Companies; Captain W. Moore in command. Captain F. C. Grimwade second in command. New C Company—Old D and E Companies; Captain G. H. M. Vine in command. 2/Lieut. W. H. Weathersbee second in command. New D Company—Old G and H Companies; Captain C. R. Saunders in command. Captain H. P. L. Cart de Lafontaine second in command.

The Company Sergeant-Majors were respectively Edwards, Elsom, Chennels, and Cornwall.

In addition to this reorganisation the Battalion was issued with new rifles of the long charger-loading type, with four Vickers guns, and with new equipment of the 1914 pattern (webbing); and a refit of clothing and necessaries was effected. Steps were also taken to dispose of the surplus baggage and personal belongings acquired by all ranks in Malta, and to reduce all to the scales of weight permissible in the field.

Command of the Regimental Transport was assumed by 2/Lieut. R. L. Herring, who proceeded with his section to Abbeville, and returned by road with the full war scale of 1st and 2nd Line Transport and the Battalion chargers.

These preparations which occupied the Battalion until the 25th January were interspersed with such training as the state of the weather permitted, the training being carried out on the sand dunes north of Etaples. A warning order was received on the 25th to proceed to billets near St Omer to join G.H.Q. Reserve.

The following day the Battalion moved by train from Etaples to St Omer, and thence by march route to the billeting area which had been allotted to it in two small straggling villages called Helfaut and Bilques, where it arrived about midnight. At this point the Battalions of the 1st London Brigade parted company until once more reassembled by the formation of the 56th Division a year later.

Billeting in the early days of the war was not the simple matter which it became at a later stage. For one thing, in most villages neither wire beds, cook-houses, nor ablutions existed for the troops, and the accommodation of barns and stables had not been tabulated by Town-Majors ready for the use of billeting officers. All negotiations for billets had therefore to be conducted by the billeting officer direct with the communal authorities, through whom also straw and fuel were drawn.

After a few days in Helfaut and Bilques the Battalion was driven from its billets by an epidemic of measles which attacked the civilian inhabitants, and it found fresh quarters slightly nearer St Omer in a more important village called Blendecques.

The 1/4th Londons now embarked on a course of very severe training under the immediate supervision of the Inspector of Infantry, Brigadier-General Oxley. This was, indeed, a strenuous three weeks, with breakfasts at 7.30 a.m. and dinners at 5 p.m., the hours between being occupied in tactical exercises. Usually a march of five miles in each direction to and from the training ground was involved and the exercise itself was almost invariably the "Attack in Open Warfare." In every conceivable formation, over every conceivable sort of ground, did the Battalion attack every one of the villages within reach of Blendecques, till at last it was entirely weary of the attack in any shape or form! But the grounding in field work thus obtained was excellent and so completely were the lessons rubbed into the mind of every member of the Battalion that this wearisome training bore excellent fruit as we shall see later.

Once or twice a slight variation of training was obtained in work on a new reserve line of trenches then being constructed east of St Omer. This work was carried out under R.E. supervision. The design of these trenches was strange. Their like was indeed never met with in any sector of the line held by the Battalion in the whole of its war service, and we can only be thankful that this reserve line never came into active use.

Throughout the training period the weather was continuously wet and cold, and these adverse conditions, added to the long hours without food, imposed a serious physical strain on all, and the news that the Battalion had been passed fit to join a brigade was therefore received by all ranks with extreme satisfaction.

At Blendecques the Battalion was joined by Lieut. A. Hurd, R.A.M.C., medical officer, vice Captain Casey to hospital. 2/Lieut. E. W. Bottomley was also evacuated to hospital.

On the 19th February the 1/4th Londons left the many good friends they had made in Blendecques and marched through Wittes, where it halted for the night, to Ham-en-Artois, arriving at 12.30 p.m. on the 20th, and joined the Ferozepore Brigade of the Lahore Division.

The Indian Corps (Lieut.-Gen. Sir James Willcocks, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., K.C.S.I., D.S.O.) had arrived in France in the preceding October and comprised the 3rd (Lahore) and 7th (Meerut) Divisions, the former including the following units:

LAHORE DIVISION Major General H. D'U. Keary, C.B., D.S.O. Divisional Cavalry 15th Lancers. Engineers 20th and 21st Sappers and Miners. 34th Sikh Pioneers. Jullundur Brigade—Brig.-Gen. E. P. Strickland, C.M.G., D.S.O. 1st Manchesters. 1/4th Suffolks. 40th Pathans. 47th Sikhs. 59th Scinde Rifles (F.F.). Sirhind Brigade—Brig.-Gen. W. R. Walker, V.C. 1st Highland Light Infantry. 4th King's Liverpools. 15th Ludhiana Sikhs. 1/1st Gurkha Rifles. 1/4th Gurkha Rifles. Ferozepore Brigade—Brig.-Gen. R. G. Egerton, C.B. 1st Connaught Rangers. 1/4th Londons. 9th Bhopals. 57th Wilde's Rifles (F.F.). 129th Baluchis (Duke of Connaught's Own).

During the months of December and January the Indian Corps had been heavily engaged in a local operation which had raged with terrific intensity between the small village of Givenchy and the extreme right of our line; but our struggles to press forward along the canal to La Bassée had been checked by a particularly vigorous defence on the part of the enemy. The casualties suffered by the Brigades of the Indian Corps in the fighting had been so severe that it was necessary to withdraw some of them for a time from the line for the purpose of rest and reorganisation.

On joining its Brigade the strength of the 1/4th Londons was 25 officers and 828 other ranks. The Battalion was fortunate in being posted to the Division at this juncture as it had an opportunity before going into action of becoming acquainted with its neighbouring battalions with whom it was destined to share the fortunes of war during the ensuing eleven months, and of gaining some insight into the ancient, but at that date recently revived, sciences of bombing and trench mortar work. And here let us remark for the benefit of those members of the Battalion who joined the Service at a later stage and found Mills Bombs and the Stokes Mortar ready for their use, that in February 1915 the only bombs in use were those of the "jam-tin" variety, that is to say, were roughly constructed out of old tins by the troops who were to use them, filled with explosives, plugged with clay, and fused with ordinary time fuse which had to be ignited before the bomb was thrown; while the trench mortar of the day is perhaps best described as a glorified rainwater pipe bound with copper wire, and which threw a "jam-tin" bomb and was quite as dangerous to the team which manned it as to the Germans.

With their unfailing adaptability to circumstances the men of the Battalion rapidly became friends with the Indian troops whom they held in the greatest admiration. The Gurkhas in particular seemed to exercise an irresistible attraction for the men of London, who were especially impressed with the Gurkhas' playful way of throwing their murderous Kukri knives. Indeed, to such lengths did this admiration—which took the form of imitation—lead them that a Battalion order was very quickly necessary to the effect that "the game known as 'Gurkhas' played with unsheathed bayonets must cease forthwith!"

Throughout this period the weather was intensely cold and several falls of snow occurred. The billets were passably good, however, and the Battalion's bill of health remained clean.

The Battalion was unfortunate at this period in losing Sergeant-Major Dudley, who had done excellent work since mobilisation and now left for a commission in the Royal Fusiliers. He was killed a fortnight after joining his regiment. His duties were taken by Col.-Sergt. Instr. M. Harris, who filled this important position with success for nearly three years.

On the 22nd February the undermentioned officers, being the first reinforcement received by the Battalion, joined as follows:

Lieuts. F. A. Coffin, H. M. Lorden, D. J. Leonard, and A. D. Coates.

It is now necessary for a moment to look at the course which events were taking on the wide field of the Western Theatre.

At the period with which we are dealing, the Front held by the British troops extended from the Béthune-La Bassée Road, on the right to just north of the Ypres Salient on the left, and General Headquarters (Field-Marshal Sir John French in command) were at St Omer. The British troops were divided into two Armies, of which the First Army under Sir Douglas Haig, consisting of the I Corps (Gough), IV Corps (Rawlinson), and Indian Corps (Willcocks), held the right or southern end of the line; the left being entrusted to the Second Army (Sir H. Smith-Dorrien), which comprised the II Corps (Fergusson), the III Corps (Pulteney), and the V Corps (Plumer).

The moving warfare of the autumn of 1914, which had ended by the opposing armies gradually extending their flanks until the sea was reached and had culminated in the First Battle of Ypres in October—November 1914, had given way to a siege warfare in which the belligerents were confined in continuous lines of trenches which were gradually being more heavily fortified. After the force of the German drive toward Ypres had exhausted itself, a lull in active operations ensued, hostilities flaring up here and there along the line in the shape of minor operations of terrible intensity, in which the possession of a few yards of ground was contested with ferocity by both sides. In the intervals between these small struggles, however, the battle line had been comparatively quiet during the winter months, and not materially changed, the nett result being perhaps a slight gain of ground to the British at the southern end of the line, which was balanced by a tendency to lose ground in the north.

Since the bitter struggle at Ypres in November 1914, the enemy had, in the opinion of Sir John French, shown certain signs of weakening on the Western Front, and this was attributed by him to the success which was attending the Russian offensive in East Prussia, and to the consequent withdrawal of German troops from the West. In order to assist our Russian Allies as far as possible it was necessary to have resort to active operations with the main object of holding as many of the German reserves as possible in the West, and efforts to this end were already being made by the French at Arras and in Champagne.

The ravages caused during the winter trench warfare by sickness and "trench-foot," which had had especially disastrous effects on those regular divisions composed of troops withdrawn from tropical garrisons, rendered necessary the early cultivation of a vigorous offensive spirit, and these combined considerations led Sir John French to the decision to take the offensive as soon as the condition of the ground in Flanders should afford such an undertaking a reasonable prospect of success. By the beginning of March the conditions were considered sufficiently favourable, and the terrain selected for the proposed offensive was the German positions opposed to the First Army and defending the lower slopes of the Aubers Ridge.

The objective of the First Army's attack was the advancement of our line to the high ground about Illies and Hermies as a prelude to the occupation of La Bassée, and this involved as a first local objective the capture of the village of Neuve Chapelle. The Aubers Ridge is a strongly marked hill feature, which runs in a south-westerly direction from Lille until it loses itself in the marshlands in the neighbourhood of La Bassée. Neuve Chapelle, which had already changed hands several times in the fighting of the previous autumn, is a small village, the immediate surroundings of which are much intersected with orchards and fences, about 1000 yards from the lowest slopes of the Ridge, which, immediately opposite to it, are covered by a considerable wood called the Bois du Biez.

The German defensive position skirted in front (or to the north-west) of Neuve Chapelle and then making a sharp turn southwards, followed the line of the Estaires-La Bassée Road, for some 600 yards, from its junction with Foresters Lane (Rue des Berceaux) to its junction with the Rue du Bois, where once more turning slightly to the west it left the hamlet of Richebourg L'Avoué in the British lines, and finally made a wide sweep once more to the south in the direction of Festubert (see Map No. 1). The front of attack allotted to the Indian Corps was that part which followed the alignment of the La Bassée road between Rue du Bois and Foresters Lane, the actual capture of the greater part of Neuve Chapelle being entrusted to the 8th Division.

The attack was to be preceded by a heavy artillery bombardment, which on the Corps front would be conducted by the divisional artillery of both the Lahore and Meerut Divisions and the Corps heavy artillery, and this was to be directed towards destroying the enemy's front trenches and entanglements and certain strong posts, the searching of the Bois du Biez, in order to disperse the concentration of the enemy's counter-attack troops, and finally the building up of a "curtain of fire" (subsequently though less descriptively termed a "barrage") east of the captured positions, with the object of assisting the work of consolidating them.

The direction of the Indian Corps' attack being almost easterly converged towards that of the IV Corps on their left (this being south-easterly), and it was, therefore, necessary after the first German positions had been carried and touch with the IV Corps secured, to swing the direction of attack round more to the south, and to establish a fire position facing south in order to guard against the danger of a German flanking counter-attack from that quarter. The position selected for this was a German sap, which had been thrown out from the enemy lines towards the British strong point, Port Arthur, at the corner of La Bassée Road and Rue du Bois.

The troops holding the line of the Rue du Bois front, outside the limit of the general attack, would thus be responsible for the defence of the Indian right flank. It was hoped that the first bound would carry our line forward to the old II Corps line first occupied by Smith-Dorrien's troops in October 1914, east of Neuve Chapelle village.

The assaulting troops detailed for this task were the Gharwal and Dehra Dun Brigades of the Meerut Division, the Bareilly Brigade being in close support; while the Lahore Division (less artillery) was placed in Corps reserve, the Ferozepore Brigade being allotted to Army Reserve.

In accordance with these orders the Ferozepore Brigade moved forward from Ham-en-Artois to the Zelobes area on the 7th March, the 4th Londons marching to Calonne-sur-Lys about eight miles north-west of Neuve Chapelle, where it remained in billets in a constant state of readiness to move. On the eve of the outbreak of our offensive the order was relaxed to one of readiness to move at twelve hours' notice.

On the 10th March Lieut.-Col. Botterill was granted seven days' leave of absence on urgent private affairs, and command of the Battalion devolved temporarily on Major L. T. Burnett, who remained in command until after the termination of the Neuve Chapelle operations.

In addition to the Brigades of the Meerut Division already mentioned, on the right of the line, the troops detailed for the assault comprised the 25th Brigade of the 8th Division opposite Neuve Chapelle village, with the 23rd Brigade of the same Division on the extreme left.

An enormous concentration of artillery had been quietly effected on this front, including many of our newly arrived heavy batteries, and at 7.30 a.m. on the 10th March, some 300 guns opened a devastating bombardment on the German trenches along the frontage of attack. The severity of this bombardment was unprecedented. Trenches were obliterated, machine-guns and Germans were literally blown into the air, and so dazed were the enemy by the appalling ordeal that our men were able to stand on their parapets to watch the inferno in front of them. At 8.5 a.m. the range of the guns was lengthened on to the enemy's support trenches and our assaulting columns dashed forward. The Indians and the 25th Brigade met with little resistance, but the 23rd Brigade on the left found itself faced with a practically unbroken wire entanglement, from beyond which a deadly fire was poured into it by the enemy machine-guns. By 8.35 a.m. the right and centre brigades had effected a lodgment in the village, but the 23rd, being still held up and suffering terrible losses, the 25th Brigade swung to its left and turned the flank of the German troops who were opposing the 23rd. By this means our left was able to advance and by 11 a.m. the village of Neuve Chapelle was completely in our hands, and consolidation of the ground won was begun under cover of our artillery barrage, which effectually carried out its task of preventing the enemy bringing forward reinforcements for a counter-attack.

The street fighting, however, had resulted in considerable disorganisation of units, so that valuable hours were lost in the necessary reorganisation, and it was not until 3.30 p.m. that the advance could be resumed. The attack so far had proved—as was intended—a complete surprise, and the enemy's resistance seems to have been paralysed except on the extreme left where our troops were still under heavy fire.

The only local counter-attack which developed during the morning of the 10th was on the extreme right of the attack, where the enemy succeeded along the Rue du Bois in temporarily ejecting the Indian troops from the captured trenches, and in effecting a strong lodgment in the Orchard Trench in front of Richebourg L'Avoué. During the morning the Jullundur and Sirhind Brigades moved forward to Richebourg St Vaast and Vieille Chapelle respectively.

The afternoon advance was made on the right by the Dehra Dun Brigade, supported by the Jullundur Brigade of the Lahore Division, and the objective assigned to it was the Bois du Biez. Between Neuve Chapelle and the wood runs the little Rivière des Layes, and at a point where this stream is spanned by a road bridge the enemy had established a strong machine-gun post. The Indians made a gallant advance over 1000 yards of open country, and succeeded in penetrating the wood, but their line was enfiladed by the machine-guns on the bridge and they were unable to hold the line of their furthest advance. On the left the attack was renewed by the 25th and 24th Brigades, the hard-hit 23rd being held back, their objective being the cluster of houses at Moulin de Pietre, about a mile east of Neuve Chapelle; but their efforts also were frustrated by the machine-guns on the bridge, which our artillery was unable to dislodge. Further left still the front of attack had been extended and the 21st Brigade (Watts) of the 7th Division was also directed on Pietre; but in its advance encountered a line of undamaged German trenches which effectually barred its efforts to progress.

The position, therefore, when darkness intervened was that an average advance of over a thousand yards had been gained and held, while practically no effort had been made by the enemy to regain possession of the lost ground.

Preparations were made for a renewal of the advance on the following day, but the 11th dawned misty and the day proved to be one of equilibrium. A further advance was, attempted but the mist rendered aircraft observation impossible and artillery co-operation with the infantry extremely difficult owing to the constant breaking of our forward lines of communication by the enemy shell fire. Our troops, therefore, clung to their positions opposite the Bois du Biez and Pietre under a murderous shell fire which caused many casualties; while the enemy, by a stroke of ill fortune, was accorded a for him lucky respite, in which he was able to prepare his counter-attack.

On the evening of the 11th the exhaustion of the troops after two days' fighting rendered a relief desirable, as it was hoped that weather conditions would favour a prosecution of the offensive on the next day. The Meerut Division consequently handed over its newly won positions to the Lahore Division, the Dehra Dun Brigade being replaced by the Sirhind Brigade, while arrangements were completed for relieving the Gharwal Brigade on the night of the 12th/13th by the Ferozepore Brigade.

The same evening the 4th London moved at 6 p.m. from Calonne to Lestrem where it arrived at midnight and went into billets. Its stay there, however, was short as within two hours it was turned out in order to move further forward to Lacouture, about four miles west of Neuve Chapelle, reaching there about 7.30 a.m. on the 12th March. Similar forward moves were made by the remainder of the Brigade in view of its impending occupation of the line.

When the 4th Londons reached Lacouture the village was under shell fire from the enemy's heavy guns and the behaviour of all ranks under fire for the first time was highly commendable. But here also the hopes of rest on which the thoughts of all had been centred far more than on the German shells, were dashed, for almost immediately on arrival the Battalion received fresh orders to move forward to Richebourg St Vaast, in which village Brigade headquarters were then operating. The exhaustion of all ranks on arrival was considerable as the Battalion had been almost continuously on the move in full marching order for about eighteen hours. Richebourg was a village of some importance and a considerable number of our heavy batteries supporting the Neuve Chapelle attack were stationed in its vicinity, with the result that it received a generous share of the enemy's counter-battery bombardment and also a good deal of attention due, apparently, to the prominence of its church tower, to the existence of which the Germans objected.

Here at last the Battalion was allotted billets in which it remained until about 7 p.m., being under heavy shell fire the whole time and sustaining its first battle casualties of seven men wounded.

The mist continued during the 12th and our main operation could not be pursued. The hostile shell fire increased in intensity, but the Germans were equally with ourselves embarrassed by the difficulties of accurate observation and their bombardments were not very disastrous to us. Local advances were attempted by our troops in various parts of the line and the houses at Pietre were actually reached by the Guards of the 20th Brigade, but the ground gained was heavily swept by hostile fire and could not be retained. All day counter-attacks in mass formation were attempted by the Germans, and costly as the day was to us, our casualties must have been far exceeded by theirs, their ranks being literally mown down by our rifle, machine-gun and shrapnel fire. By dusk the enemy's attempts had exhausted themselves and for the first time in the war the Germans gave up attempts to recapture ground they had lost.

As it had been hoped that the 12th would witness the continuance of our successes it had been impossible to arrange beforehand the details of the relief of the Gharwal Brigade by the Ferozepore Brigade until the result of the intended operations should be known, and it was not, therefore, until late in the afternoon that the Brigade received orders to move forward at once in order to take part in an attack that evening on the Bois du Biez, which position it was proposed to carry at all costs. For this operation the 41st Dogras of the Bareilly Brigade, then in the trenches, were to be lent to the Brigade and relieved in their position in line by the 4th Londons. This relief, however, could not be effected in time to enable the 41st Dogras to join the Ferozepore Brigade, which consequently advanced short of one battalion.

The Brigade was not assembled in front of Neuve Chapelle until darkness had fallen, and in order to allow time for the necessary dispositions to be made, General Egerton, who for this operation commanded not only the Ferozepore, but also the Jullundur and Sirhind Brigades, arranged for the attack to commence at 10.30 p.m. At 9.30 p.m., however, orders were received cancelling the attack and indicating that the offensive had closed, and the Brigade returned to billets in Vieille Chapelle and Lacouture.

Meanwhile the 4th Londons proceeded with the relief of the 41st Dogras, and although they occupied the line only for a few hours, perhaps we may be pardoned for a rather more detailed record of the night's work than the importance of the operation warrants in view of the fact that this was the first tour of duty done by the Battalion in trenches. The sector to be occupied lay at an interval of about 300 yards from the right limit of the Neuve Chapelle attack as already described, and consisted of a frontage of some 400 yards, in front of the Rue du Bois. The line in this part did not consist of a continuous line of trenches. In the first place, the ground here, as for miles in each direction, was too waterlogged to admit of a trench being dug, and the defences, therefore, consisted of a breastwork built up above ground level, and in most parts of this sector the breastwork did not exceed three feet in height and was entirely without parados. As a result, moreover, of the recent fighting the defensive line consisted rather of a series of short breastworks with gaps between them which could only be crossed under cover of darkness. Communication trenches to the rear were non-existent and the breastwork had to be approached from the Rue du Bois, to which it ran parallel at a distance of about fifty yards, "overland." It may be of interest to those who served in this area with the regiment in the winter of 1916/17 to state that this feeble breastwork was almost in the position of the support line subsequently known as Guards' Trench.

Neuve Chapelle—Richebourg l'Avoué

This position perhaps was not an ideal one for the first introduction of a raw Battalion to trench warfare, and the situation was not improved by the exhaustion of the men or the fact that the Rue du Bois was subject to a great deal of heavy shelling which had not died down since the German counter-attacks of the day, but which continued through the night. The Battalion moved forward by platoons past Windy Corner, where it came under a heavy burst of shrapnel, and Edward Road, skirting behind the ruined factory at the corner of the Rue du Bois, and led by Indian guides, whose vague acquaintance with the language of London did not assist matters to any appreciable extent. Be it remembered also that no maps had been issued and no reconnaissance of the line had been possible to any company officer. However, the Battalion succeeded in occupying its breastwork and remained there during the night, somewhat isolated as touch with the units on its flanks was difficult to maintain owing to the breaks in the line, and all ranks acquitted themselves in an exemplary manner. The shrapnel and machine-gun fire maintained by the Germans during the night cost a few casualties, amounting to 14 N.C.O.'s and men wounded. In addition to these was 2/Lieut. A. R. Moore, who was hit in the leg on the way up to the line. This officer, however, stuck to his duty and remained with his platoon until after relief of the Battalion the next morning. He was awarded the Military Cross for his gallant conduct.

The Ferozepore Brigade attack not having materialised, the 41st Dogras returned to the trenches, and before daybreak the 4th Londons were relieved and withdrew to billets in Vieille Chapelle.

With these incidents ended the battle of Neuve Chapelle in which, although the gain of ground was much less than had been hoped for, yet some solid success had been achieved. Our line had been carried forward for about 1000 yards on a front of about two miles, and the prisoners captured amounted to 1650 all ranks. The British casualties had reached the serious total of 12,811, but the enemy's far exceeded this number. The outstanding result of the action, however, was an immense accession of moral strength to the British troops, for it had been clearly established that where we could meet the Germans on terms of equality in men and material, we were able to beat them, and the confirmation of this, supplied by the battle of Neuve Chapelle, sent a thrill of triumph in the hearts of our men all along the line.

On the night 13/14 March, the Ferozepore Brigade relieved the Bareilly Brigade on the Rue du Bois, the front line being occupied by the 57th Rifles, 129th Baluchis and 1st Connaught Rangers, the 4th Londons moving to Richebourg St Vaast in Brigade reserve.

The sector now taken over extended from Chocolat Menier Corner on the right to Port Arthur on the left, and during the tour proved to be fairly quiet, except in the left subsection held by the Connaughts, where two strong points, Port Arthur and the Orchard Redoubt, and also the Crescent Trench, a circular trench connecting them, were daily subjected to heavy bombardments.

The 4th Londons in reserve provided garrisons for the forward area as follows:

D Company (Cart de Lafontaine) to the Orchard Redoubt, which it held in company with a party of the Connaughts.

One Platoon of each of A, B and C Companies to the left subsection, under instruction in trench warfare by the Connaughts.

Two Platoons each of B and C Companies (Moore and Vine) to Redoubts D5 and D6 respectively. These redoubts were close to Windy Corner on Forresters Lane, and were subsequently known as Dogs and Edward Posts.

Machine-Gun Detachment to Port Arthur Keep, and Trench Mortar Section to the left subsection.

The platoons under instruction were relieved every forty-eight hours in order to ensure that during the tour of duty the companies were all given a certain amount of trench experience. The remaining platoons, not for the moment employed in garrison duty, were billeted with Battalion Headquarters in Richebourg, and provided working and carrying parties each night for the line.

The line was still not fully organised after the battle, and the Crescent Trench was not properly connected either to the Orchard on its right or to Port Arthur on the farther side of the La Bassée Road on its left; and as the construction of communication trenches in this area had not yet been seriously undertaken, the various companies holding those works were isolated during the hours of daylight, as were also the detached listening posts pushed forward in front of them into No Man's Land. There was thus a very considerable amount of trench work required to bring the defences to a proper state of organisation and also in the completion of the wire entanglements in front of the new advanced line, and the 4th Londons were called upon for heavy duties in this direction in conjunction with the Sappers and Miners.

The tower of Richebourg church still proved a great attraction to the enemy's heavy guns, and the village was daily subjected to severe shell fire during daytime. On 21st March it became evident that the Germans were determined to destroy the church tower, and a steady bombardment with heavy shells began, which caused infinite damage to the church itself and the surrounding houses. During this bombardment a direct hit was obtained on a billet occupied by a platoon of Highland Light Infantry, causing casualties of 12 killed and 30 wounded. Later three direct hits were registered on the church tower, which fell about noon, and this achievement was followed by a complete cessation of hostile fire, which indicated sufficiently clearly what the intention of the bombardment had been.

All ranks of the Battalion were now settling down to their duties in the trenches, showing great keenness to increase their value as fighting troops and exhibiting the greatest steadiness under the numerous heavy bombardments to which they had been exposed, and it was, therefore, gratifying to receive a word of appreciation as to their behaviour from the Divisional Commander during a visit which he paid to Battalion Headquarters on the 17th.

The Battalion was now again under command of Lieut.-Col. G. P. Botterill, and Major L. T. Burnett resumed his duties as second in command.

On the 17th also a further reinforcement of officers was received as follows:

Major E. H. Stillwell and 2/Lieuts. E. P. M. Mosely and F. F. Hunt.

The Machine-Gun and Trench Mortar Sections were now carrying out their full duties in the front trenches, and did exceedingly good work during this tour, which, for the latter section, was their first experience of working their mortars in action. During the bombardment of the 19th, 2/Lieut. J. T. Sykes, in charge of the trench mortars, was wounded by shrapnel while "spotting" for a mortar shoot, and evacuated to hospital.

On the night of the 23/24 March the relief of the Ferozepore Brigade by the 2nd Brigade began, and the forward garrisons of the 4th London being withdrawn, the Battalion on the following evening marched back to billets at Paradis, a small village near Merville. The Connaughts were relieved in the line on the following night, and the Brigade being concentrated in the Paradis area came into Army Reserve at two hours' notice to move.

The total casualties sustained by the Battalion during this tour of trench duty were 17, a very small number having regard to the severity of the bombardments to which it had been subjected.

From the 26th March until the 2nd April, Lieut.-Col. Botterill was in temporary command of the Brigade during the absence on leave of the Brigadier; and command of the Battalion for this period was assumed by Major G. H. M. Vine.

The rest billets at Paradis were retained until the 30th March, the six days being occupied in company training and route marches, and viewing of arms by the Brigade Armourer-Sergeant. On the 28th a parade service was held by Captain Cart de Lafontaine, this being the first Church Service which the Battalion had had the opportunity of attending since the middle of February.

The Battalion was now firm friends with its Indian comrades whose soldierly qualities it was learning to appreciate from actual experience. Difficulties of language formed a barrier to close intercourse, but a sort of war-cry was evolved which, being exchanged between Indian and Cockney, formed a guarantee of friendship. A shout of "Anglais-bon! Indian-bon! Allemand-NO BON!!" exchanged in passing became a frequent form of greeting.

On the night of the 31st March the Brigade returned to the trenches, relieving the Sirhind Brigade in a sector north of Neuve Chapelle village, the right boundary of which was Sign Post Lane, a road running through the lines in the direction of the Bois du Biez.

The 4th London was again in Brigade Reserve, and moved from Paradis at 7 a.m. to Les Huit Maisons, where it remained in temporary billets until dusk when it advanced to Croix Barbée, Battalion Headquarters occupying a house at the corner of Loretto and Edward Roads. This house will be in the recollection of those who served in this area in 1917 as the site of St Vaast R.E. dump. Here the Battalion was again under instruction in trench duties with the Connaughts, who were in the right subsection of the new Brigade sector, but on this occasion companies went into the line in turn as a whole, the companies not actually in trenches occupying reserve posts at Loretto, Green Barn, and St Vaast.

The right subsection was defended by breastworks and was immediately facing Pietre, the hamlet which had stood between our troops and success on the afternoon of the 10th March. It included the peculiar feature of the Duck's Bill, in regard to which a word of description may not be out of place. The name Duck's Bill brings to the minds of most 4th London men the picture of a large defended mine crater quite close to the German line, and approached by a defended sap which was generally full of water. Such it was in the winter of 1916/17, but in the spring of 1915 the Duck's Bill was a ruined farmhouse standing on a knoll just in front of the cross-road connecting Sign Post Lane with Sunken Road. This ruin was surrounded by a horseshoe trench, the points of the horseshoe resting on the cross-road, which was barricaded and connected with the front line by a rough breastwork. The defences here were still in an unfinished condition as the farmhouse was the extreme point of our advance in this sector in the battle, and the road barricades were under the continual watch of German snipers in Pietre. On the night of our entry into this sector the farmhouse had just been demolished by German incendiary shells and the ruins were still smouldering.

"A Bosche had been buried," writes Captain Moore, "in the hastily constructed parapet, face downward, and with his booted feet sticking into our trench. They were Bosche boots, so presumably were on Bosche feet, and every time one passed in the dark one knocked them—a truly gruesome spot."

The Duck's Bill farmhouse was finally disposed of when the mine crater was blown in 1916.

The reserve posts to which the companies in reserve were detailed were defended keeps forming with others the Croix Barbée line of defence. The aftermath of the battle, which had taken the form of such vigorous shelling by the enemy, now exhausted itself and this tour proved particularly quiet. The enemy's attention was paid principally to the roads and communications in rear of our trenches, but his shelling was sporadic and harmless.

On the 11th April the Battalion moved out of Croix Barbée, marching at 5 p.m. for Paradis, where it was joined the following day by the remaining units of the Brigade, now in Divisional reserve.

Of the rest in Paradis little need be said. The twelve days were spent in training under company arrangements and in bathing, completing issues of deficiencies in clothing, etc. On the 16th and 17th April, however, practice attacks on trenches were carried out as a brigade exercise, and although no definite information was, at the time, conveyed to the units as regards the purpose of the practice, the exercise was in preparation for the rôle which the Brigade would be called upon to play during its next tour in the line. It was, therefore, with the greater satisfaction that the 4th Londons carried out the exercises in leading the assaulting columns beside the Connaught Rangers.

The novitiate of the Battalion was now over, and it was accepted as being in every way able to do its full duty as a unit of the Ferozepore Brigade, and the knowledge that it had "found itself" was in itself the best possible incentive to all ranks to uphold worthily the honour of their regiment. The weather was of the most perfect spring type, and the ground and dykes were once more in their normal condition for the time of year. Speculation was rife, therefore, as to the task which was destined to be set the Brigade on its return to the line.

A warning order was received that the Brigade would relieve the Dehra Dun Brigade on Saturday, the 26th April, in a sector in front of Neuve Chapelle village, extending from the La Bassée Road on the right to Sign Post Lane on the left. The 4th Londons were to take over the left centre subsection, the other front line battalions being the Connaughts, the 9th Bhopals and the 57th Rifles, with the 129th Baluchis in Brigade reserve. But this relief was destined not to take place.

During the day disquieting rumours went round—started as inexplicably as such rumours always are—that things were not well in the north near Ypres: rumours of heavy fighting, of defeat, and of dastardly crimes on the part of the enemy. That the incredible brutality of the Germans was indeed an accomplished fact all the world now knows, and we must now review the tremendous happenings in the Ypres salient which caused the outbreak of a storm destined to rage with ever-increasing fury for the next three weeks.

CHAPTER IV
THE 1/4TH BATTALION IN THE SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES, 1915

Since the exhaustion of the enemy's drive towards Ypres in November 1914, the Ypres area had not been the scene of any important operations, although from time to time fierce struggles had raged here and there for the possession of points of minor tactical importance. Early in April 1915 the British lines had been extended slightly northward, and a sector had been taken over from the French troops on the left. On the 22nd of that month the line from Steenstraate (near the Yser Canal) as far as the Poelcapelle Road east of Langemarck was held by a Moroccan Division of the French Army. Thence the line took a south-easterly turn towards the Passchendaele-Becelaere Road and was occupied by the Canadian Division. On the right of the Canadians, British divisions held the trenches which ran east of Zonnebeeke in the direction of Hooge.

On the afternoon of the 22nd the French lines were subjected to a heavy bombardment, following which at about 5 p.m. our aeroplanes reported that they had seen thick clouds of yellow smoke issuing from the German trenches between Langemarck and Bixschoote. These arose, as is now well known, from poison gas, of which the effect was so terrible as to render the troops exposed to it practically incapable of action. The smoke and fumes at first hid everything from sight, and hundreds of men were immediately incapacitated. Within an hour the whole position had to be abandoned with the loss of fifty guns. This horrible and unlooked-for attack was so overpowering in its moral effect that our gallant allies were unable to combat it, and being totally unprovided with means of defence against so diabolical a contrivance, were forced—as indeed any troops would probably have been under the like conditions—to abandon their position without offering resistance. The confusion and moral effect were doubtless increased by the fact that the trenches thus attacked were occupied by Africans whose firm belief in the supernatural rendered it so much the more difficult for them to withstand this assault.

The immediate result of this gas attack was that the left flank of the Canadian Division was in the air and was in imminent danger of being entirely cut off. But the Canadians stuck to their positions with magnificent tenacity and during the night repulsed numerous German attacks. In the disorganisation following the gas attack the Germans had succeeded in establishing themselves on the west side of the Yser Canal at Lizerne, thus threatening to drive a wedge between the Canadians on the right and the French and Belgian troops on the left.

By 10 o'clock the next morning the position, though by no means re-established, was slightly easier, touch being definitely ensured between the Canadians' left and the French right, about 800 yards east of the Canal; but in order to effect this junction so great an extension of the British lines had been necessary that no reserves were available for counter-attack. The enemy's artillery fire was severe all day and the situation was rendered exceptionally difficult by the loss of so many allied guns in the gas attack.

It was arranged between Sir John French and General Foch, who was in command of the French Army on our left, that the latter should make immediate arrangements for the recapture of the original French Line, and for this purpose it was necessary for the British to maintain their present position without further retirement; but it was clear that the British troops could not be allowed to remain in the precarious position held by them during the last twenty-four hours unless the French attack were delivered within a reasonable time. In the meantime such reinforcements as were immediately available from neighbouring Corps were being rushed up into Ypres to strengthen the temporary line between ourselves and the French.

On the 24th a heavy German attack breached our lines at St Julien. This might have initiated an extremely critical situation but for a powerful counter-attack organised and launched by Brig.-Gen. Hull (afterwards G.O.C. 56th Division), who, with his own Brigade and parts of battalions belonging to six different divisions all new to the ground, was successful in stemming the tide of the enemy's advance, although attempts to recapture St Julien were repulsed.

Early in the morning of the 25th the left flank of the Canadian division was driven back after two days' magnificent fighting, and by the evening the allied line north of Ypres ran practically east and west from the neighbourhood of Boesinghe on the Canal to the south outskirts of St Julien. The general tendency of this line was to bow inwards towards Ypres. The seriousness of the threat to the whole British position east of Ypres is obvious. It was now possible for the enemy to shell any point in our lines from both sides of the salient, while his positions being about two miles farther to the south than they had been prior to the gas attack of the 22nd, he was able to keep the arterial road from Ypres to Zonnebeeke under continuous and heavy shell fire from guns of all calibres.

During the whole time considerable confusion was created by the alteration of areas caused by the sudden relinquishment of the forward positions; and by the fact that fresh troops on arrival in the Ypres area had at once to be absorbed into the firing line to prevent the enemy from exploiting his initial success. This confusion was heightened by our lack of artillery, which was inadequate to keep down the heavy German fire, and our casualties were in consequence continuously heavy. Ypres was itself kept under very heavy shell fire which vastly increased the difficulty of maintaining supplies of munitions and food.

The Lahore Division was ordered on the 23rd April to move to the Ypres area, and on the morning of the 24th orders were received by the 1/4th Londons that the contemplated relief of the Dehra Dun Brigade on the La Bassée Road would not take place and that the Battalion would be ready to move—possibly by train—at 1.30 p.m. By 2 p.m. the Battalion had joined in the Ferozepore Brigade column followed by the first line transport. In ignorance of its destination, and quite unaware of the bitter struggle then going on at Ypres, the Battalion expected to entrain at Merville, and a great many packs were filled with eatables and comforts for a long train journey.

However, when Merville, Indian Corps railhead, was passed it became evident that whatever journey was before the column would be made on foot. The march was an exceedingly trying one and was made under "forced" conditions. The roads were in a bad state after the winter rains, and a good deal of opening out in the column was inevitable, so that the five-minute halts which took place each hour were mostly spent in "closing up." Hour after hour the column moved on under the burden of full marching order, now over uneven pavé, now in deep ruts and thick mud. Merville, Vieux, Berquin, Strazeele, were passed in succession. Daylight gave place to dusk and dusk to darkness but still the column struggled forward. From all battalions stragglers now began to line the sides of the road, unable after the physically weakening experience of trench life to keep up the pace. At last about 10.30 p.m. a long halt was made just outside Godewaersvelde, a small village at the foot of the Mont des Cats. Here a rest of some forty minutes was obtained on the roadside while double lines of guns, ammunition columns, and transport blocked the road.

Finally at about 10.45 p.m. the Battalion moved forward into Godewaersvelde, but the village was packed with troops, and the companies, therefore, had to content themselves with such shelter as could be found beneath the parked lorries in the streets.

But the end of the march was not yet. After a hasty breakfast the Battalion was again on parade before 6 o'clock on the morning of the 25th, and once more joining the Brigade Column struggled up the steep hill at Boescheppe, at the top of which another delay was caused by a cross-current of vehicular traffic. The distress of the troops was now so evident that orders were received to lighten packs, and garments of all sorts, principally gifts of knitted garments sent out from ladies in England, were left by the roadside. Through Westoutre and Reninghelst the column marched on to Ouderdom, where it arrived at about 2.30 p.m. with orders to billet in huts. Most of the huts were already fully occupied and the greater part of the 1/4th Londons were compelled to bivouac in the fields adjoining. Ouderdom is about seven miles south-west of Ypres, and the object of the forced march was at last clear. Some little idea of the storm raging in the salient could be gathered from the bivouacs, as throughout the afternoon and night the air vibrated with the continuous thunder of artillery in which the rapid and sharp rafales of the French "seventy-fives" away to the north were plainly distinguishable.

Shortly after midnight orders were received that the Division would be pushed into the firing line that day, the 26th April, and at dawn the Battalion was once more formed up. Shovels and picks were issued alternately to all the troops for the purpose of digging themselves into such positions as they might be able to gain, and to each platoon was issued a yellow flag for signalling its location to the artillery. In these early days of the War no arrangements were made for the formation of a "battle surplus," and consequently the whole available strength of officers and men prepared to move forward. Packs were now stacked to relieve the troops of superfluous weight, and at 4.30 a.m. the companies began to move off at five minutes' intervals.

The exhaustion of the men made progress inevitably slow. The roads traversed were fortunately not receiving much attention from the enemy's artillery, though a steady bombardment of Ypres with shells of the heaviest calibre was proceeding. By about 9.30 a.m. the Battalion was concentrated in a field adjoining Outskirt Farm at La Brique, where it proceeded to dig itself into assembly trenches (see map No. 3).

Meanwhile the Jullundur Brigade had concentrated farther to the east, between St Jean and Wieltje, while the Sirhind Brigade in Divisional Reserve had moved round the south of Ypres to a position north-west of Potizje.

The 1/4th Londons' position[1] during the hours of waiting in the morning was behind the crest of the spur which runs westward from St Jean, past La Brique towards the Canal, and though out of view from the German trenches was undoubtedly located by the enemy's Taubes, whose reconnaissances over our lines were entirely unmolested. This, combined with the close proximity of the Battalion's position to several British and French batteries, brought it a fair share of German shrapnel during the morning, the shelling being from both the north and south sides of the salient. Happily but few casualties were sustained.

[1] It has been thought convenient in the account of this action to designate buildings and other topographical features by the names by which they afterwards became generally known, though they were not in every case so named in April 1915.

Below the hillside on which the Battalion lay concealed and distant something more than half a mile the gaunt ruins of Ypres stood out clearly in the morning sunlight, the fast-crumbling tower of its wonderful Cloth Hall still erect, a silent witness of the tragedy which was being enacted. All the morning shells were falling into the town, a steady and merciless bombardment without the least cessation or abatement. From the centre of the town dense columns of black smoke rose continuously, and the crash of explosions and the clatter of falling débris followed each other without respite. The cross-roads at which the St Jean road left the town were in particular a target for the German heavy guns. All the morning the 50th (Northumberland) Division T.F. was moving from Ypres along this road to St Julien, and as each platoon passed the fatal cross-road at the double a heavy shell fell close by thinning the ranks. It seemed to every spectator of this horrible yet fascinating sight that the German artillery fire must surely be directed from some point within the British lines.

At 12.40 p.m. the Brigade received orders to prepare to take part in a divisional attack in conjunction with the French in a due northerly direction, with the object of relieving the pressure on the left of St Julien and of endeavouring to push the enemy back. With this attack the 50th Division would co-operate on the right of the Lahore Division in an attempt to recapture St Julien itself.

The Ferozepore Brigade's frontage was on the right of Boundary Road (the Ypres-Langemarck Road) and extended as far as English Farm, beyond which the Jullundur Brigade was responsible as far as Wieltje Farm on the extreme right, and the general line of assembly was on the forward slope of the spur some 600 yards north of La Brique.

The Brigade's advance was led by the Connaught Rangers on the left, the 57th Rifles in the centre, with the 129th Baluchis on the right. The 1/4th Londons were to follow the Connaughts, while the 9th Bhopals remained in reserve in La Brique.

At 2 o'clock the attack was launched under a heavy bombardment from all available British and French batteries, but such was the shortage of ammunition that this support died down for lack of supplies in about five minutes, after which the German batteries were free to search intensively the whole area of the Brigade advance, causing a good many casualties in the assaulting columns.

From the line of assembly the ground subsided gently to a shallow depression running across the direction of advance, beyond which, at a distance of some 1000 yards from the crest on the La Brique side, the hill swelled to a second skyline which impeded further view. Just below the crest of the further spur an unfenced lane, Buffs Road, followed the contour running eastwards from Boundary Road. None of this land was intersected by trenches, the Allied trenches being several miles ahead and to the rear of the German positions.

The 1/4th Londons moved from their position of waiting at about 2.30 p.m., and shaking out into four lines of platoons in file with B Company (Moore) on the left, and A (Duncan-Teape) on the right of the front line, followed by D (Saunders) and C (Clark). The German shrapnel was now searching both slopes of the spur pretty severely and men began to drop, but the Battalion steadily breasted the rise from which it could overlook the shallow valley towards Buffs Road. The sight which met their eyes defies description. The valley was covered with a ragged crowd of agonised and nerve-racked men, both Moroccans and Indians, who, having thrown down their arms and everything which could impede them, were streaming back from the front trenches suffering the tortures of poison gas. It was a revolting sight. The attack had clearly failed and our leading troops were broken and in retirement. But the men of the 1/4th Londons were splendid. Without wavering for a single instant they trudged steadily forward, though indeed almost completely exhausted, maintaining the intervals and distances between platoons with the precision of the parade ground. Never was there a more striking example of the results of training and discipline. The "attack in open warfare" which had been so roundly cursed by one and all in the days of training at Blendecques had indeed so sunk into the minds of everyone that instinctively the troops remembering only their orders to "follow the Connaughts at all costs" carried out under the most trying ordeal the lessons which had been drilled into them.

The Battalion continued to advance as far as Buffs Road, where a halt, believed at first to be temporary, was called. No trench line existed here but the ditch on the near side of the road had been widened. This was already filled with the remains of the 2nd K.O.S.B. (who had been fighting continuously since the action at Hill 60 on the 17th April, and were now reduced to under 100 all ranks) and by the reserve company of the Connaughts. The majority of the Battalion were, therefore, unable to obtain shelter in the ditch, and the digging of a fresh line some fifteen yards in rear was at once put in hand.

Early in the advance Moore (B Coy.) was hit in the foot and his company was taken over by Grimwade. Considering the severity of the enemy's shrapnel fire the advance was made with surprisingly few casualties, and although owing to the massing of the whole Battalion on one line of narrow frontage some intermingling of platoons on halting was inevitable, this was rapidly set to rights with little difficulty. The enemy's bombardment soon died away considerably, though for a while he maintained a steady machine-gun fire sweeping the crest of the ridge ahead of Buffs Road.

The troops leading the attack had moved forward steadily at zero hour and had pushed over the crest line in front of Buffs Road descending the further slope towards Turco Farm. The front German trench north of the Farm was reached and occupied, but before the position was properly established dense yellow clouds of poison gas issued from the enemy lines and, being gently wafted by the breeze, bore down on our defenceless troops. Under the horror of this ordeal the greater part of the line broke and a general retirement ensued which affected most severely the French and Indian Battalions, as already described. About 100 of the Connaughts and the Manchesters (Sirhind Brigade), however, managed to cling gallantly to their ground under Major Deacon, though they were shortly afterwards ejected by a strong enemy counter-attack which followed the gas cloud. They eventually succeeded in consolidating a line in the immediate vicinity of Turco Farm.

Shortly after the 1/4th Londons were established on Buffs Road Lieut.-Col. Botterill became a casualty, and Major L. T. Burnett assumed command of the Battalion. It was decided by Major Burnett that the overcrowding of the Buffs Road alignment was so great and wasteful of fire power, quite half the Battalion being unable to get into position to use their rifles, that a redisposition of his forces was desirable, and accordingly C and D companies withdrew to a position in support some 300 yards in rear of Buffs Road, where they dug themselves in.

During this time the Regimental Aid Post under Lieut. Hurd, R.A.M.C., was established at Irish Farm and the Battalion stretcher-bearers under Corpl. Fulford worked with great coolness in evacuating the wounded under heavy fire.

The Second Battle of Ypres, 1915

At about 4.30 p.m. orders were received that the reserve company of the Connaughts was to push forward and reinforce their two leading companies, supported by the 1/4th Londons. But, after consultation with Major Burnett, Major Hamilton of the Connaughts decided that the severity of the enemy's fire was so great that there was no reasonable probability of achieving a result commensurate with the inevitable loss of life, and the orders for the projected advance were cancelled. An attempt to reinforce the advanced troops was, however, actually made at about 7.30 p.m. by the 15th Sikhs and the 1/4th Gurkhas of the Sirhind Brigade, supported by the 9th Bhopals. This advance was carried out in good order, the Indians passing through the 1/4th Londons and disappearing over the ridge in front under a veritable hail of fire; but although touch was obtained with the leading companies of the Connaughts, the position of the German trenches could not be ascertained in the gathering darkness, and Lieut.-Col. Hills, who was in charge of the operation, decided to dig in on the position gained.

In conjunction with Bhopals' attempt an attack was also delivered by the Turcos of the French Brigade Moroccaine, who passed over the 1/4th Londons' trench in the gathering dusk. They were met in the crest line by a frightful machine-gun fire under which they advanced steadily, suffering heavy losses. A young French officer in charge of these Africans filled all who saw him with the deepest admiration of his coolness. Smoking a cigarette and lightly swinging a small rattan cane, he stood up on the sky line with his loose blue cloak thrown negligently over his shoulders, directing the advance of his men with all the indifference to danger of which his wonderful nation is capable. None of these gallant fellows were seen again.

During the whole of the 26th very good work was done by 2/Lieut. A. D. Coates, who was employed as liaison officer between Brigade Headquarters and the advanced troops. This gallant young officer succeeded several times in passing through the enemy's barrage and was the means of providing Headquarters with valuable information as to the course of events at Turco Farm.

Meanwhile the 1/4th Londons remained in readiness for action on Buffs Road, which was shelled heavily at intervals, especially at about 6 p.m., when the German shrapnel caused a great many casualties. The enemy's fire, however, died down after the evening advance by the Indians had been checked. The night was particularly quiet, and Sergt.-Major Harris at La Brique was able to get rations up to the Battalion and issue them.

The 27th April broke grey and cold and the morning was misty. During the early hours the enemy's artillery was remarkably inactive and the work of strengthening the Battalion's position was proceeded with without molestation by the Germans. The signs of battle were few indeed and it seemed almost impossible to realise the critical position of the British troops. The sense of detachment from the serious events of the preceding afternoon was enhanced by the unbroken state of the countryside in the immediate neighbourhood and the presence of several cows, which by some marvellous chance had escaped the enemy's shells and continued to graze lazily in the field in rear of the Battalion's position, as they had done during the battle on the previous afternoon.

The lull, however, was only the calm which proverbially precedes the storm, for about noon the enemy's guns opened with intense violence on the British positions and the 1/4th Londons received their full share of these hostile attentions. Fortunately, however, its position behind the crest secured it from heavy loss.

During this bombardment Major Burnett was ordered to report to Brigade Headquarters, where he received orders for an attack to take place in half an hour's time. When he got back to the Battalion under ten minutes were left in which to explain the orders to his company commanders and to make all preparations. The Battalion was to execute a further advance in a north-easterly direction on to Oblong Farm, which was given as the objective. In order to reach the assembly position, it was necessary for the Battalion to move about 200 yards to the right flank in order to come up on the right of the Sirhind Brigade, who, in the early hours of the morning, had relieved the most advanced troops of the Ferozepore Brigade.

The hurried nature of the attack precluded any possibility of reconnaissance of the ground by the officers and allowed no time for the explanation of the work on hand to the rank and file. The position of the German trenches was unknown and the difficulties and obstacles which might be met with during the advance were entirely undisclosed.

The movement of the Battalion toward its position of assembly for this unpromising enterprise was carried out steadily although with considerable loss. The British and Canadian artillery, which were co-operating in giving support to the attack, were again lamentably short of ammunition, so that an intense bombardment of some five minutes left them unable to render further assistance. Thus as the Battalion in moving to its flank came near the crest of the spur behind which it had hitherto been concealed from direct observation by the enemy, it became a very clear target for the hostile artillery, and the German guns being no longer harassed by our artillery, were able to pour a devastating fire upon the companies.

The actual "jumping-off" position was the ditch on the south side of Buffs Road which, at this point, was bordered by a hedge. The Battalion advanced in two lines of two companies in open order, each company formed in three waves, and the leading companies were C (Clark) on the left and D (Saunders) on the right, followed respectively by B (Grimwade) and A (Duncan-Teape). In order to ensure that the waves in each company should move forward together, it was necessary to collect the whole of each wave in the ditch before it moved; and this could only be effected by "feeding" the men along the ditch in single file, from the western end of the Battalion's frontage, the hedge in rear being impenetrable. The result of this slow progress was that the remainder of the Battalion waiting its turn to go into the ditch was compelled to wait on the hill, under a high explosive and shrapnel fire which was both intense and accurate. The result needs no description, but under this very trying ordeal the Battalion was perfectly steady, each platoon grouped together and waiting its order to move with the greatest nonchalance.

Before following the actual advance of the 1/4th Londons it will be convenient to explain the object and scope of the operation of which it formed part.

During the morning arrangements had been made for the Lahore Division to co-operate in an attack which was projected by the French Brigade Moroccaine. The general direction of the French attack was to be along the Ypres-Langemarck Road, as on the previous day, and the Lahore Division was to take all possible advantage of the French advance to gain ground, but without committing itself to the attack before the French troops had secured its left flank. The Lahore Division's attack was to conform to the French movement but on the east side of the Langemarck Road; the Sirhind Brigade occupying the left of the Divisional front next the French with the Ferozepore Brigade on its right.

The objective of the latter was, as already stated, Oblong Farm, a moated farmstead some 1700 yards from starting-point, the attack being led by the 1/4th Londons on the left and the 9th Bhopals on the right. The Connaughts followed in support at a distance of 400 yards, while the 57th Rifles and the 129th Baluchis, both of which regiments had been seriously weakened in the action of the 26th, were in reserve.

At 12.30 p.m. the leading waves of the two assaulting battalions moved forward under a continued heavy shell and machine-gun fire. The ground over which the advance was to be made was for the first 700 yards an unenclosed plateau which afforded the enemy good observation of our movements, and then sloping gently downwards to a somewhat more enclosed depression rose beyond it once more towards the objective. The objective itself was not visible from starting-point, and it appears probable that in consequence of the very hurried preparations for the attack, its position was not fully appreciated by all concerned and thus it was not recognised. However this may be, it is certain that the general direction of the attack after crossing Admirals Road became diverted too much towards the north and thus some encroachment was made on the frontage for which the Sirhind Brigade was responsible. This was probably accentuated by the fact that the position selected as starting-point lay at an acute angle to the direction of advance, so that a change of direction was necessary during the advance itself—always an operation of great difficulty.

As far as Admirals Road cover was non-existent. On topping the crest of the hill the Battalion came under an exceedingly severe rifle and machine-gun fire, and losses were consequently heavy. The succeeding waves, however, pushed on steadily as far as the near edge of the depression described above, in the vicinity of Hampshire Farm, when it became clearly impossible to get down the forward slope of the valley under the raking fire of the enemy, without incurring frightful losses. Half the leading companies were already hit, as were also Saunders, fatally wounded, Grimwade, Stedman, Leonard, and Coates. It was, therefore, decided by Major Burnett to hold the line gained and there to reorganise the Battalion pending the arrival of reinforcements, when it might be possible to carry the line forward.

A small part of C Company under Clark and of B Company under Giles, however, were successful in gaining the bottom of the valley, but finding himself isolated and further advance impossible without support, Clark, who assumed command of the composite party, took up a position to the right of Canadian Farm, where the men dug themselves in with their entrenching tools and hung on gallantly under a murderous fire. Splendid service was rendered by two N.C.O.'s of this party, Sergeant A. C. Ehren and Lance-Corporal C. Badham, both of B Company, who passed through the barrage three times unscathed with messages between Captain Clark and Battalion Headquarters.

Excellent work was also done by the Machine-Gun Section under 2/Lieuts. Walker and Pyper, who skilfully brought their guns into action on the left of Hampshire Farm and assisted in no small measure to keep down the hostile rifle fire from the enemy trenches on the further side of the valley. Their position, however, was shortly afterwards discovered, evidently by a Taube, which continued its reconnaissance over our lines without let or hindrance, and the section came under heavy shell fire and was forced to fall back on the main position, with Walker dangerously wounded, Sergt. Phillips killed, and several other casualties.

At about 2.30 p.m. the enemy's artillery fire abated considerably, but by that time the advance of the whole Division had been definitely checked on an alignment generally corresponding with that occupied by the 1/4th Londons, and reports were received that the French also had failed to gain their objectives.

Later in the evening the French attempted to renew their offensive, but once more were met with clouds of poison gas which definitely broke up their attack, and a report having been received from Col. Savy, the French Commander, that his losses were so heavy as to preclude all further attempts, orders were received that the Brigade would consolidate its position.

During the evening before dusk the Ferozepore Brigade was again subjected to violent shelling, which inflicted considerable loss on all battalions. During this later bombardment Lieut. Coffin was buried by a high explosive shell.

After darkness fell the 1/4th Londons were withdrawn from their advanced line to Brigade Reserve in rear of Cross Roads Farm where they set about digging fresh trenches. The Connaughts and the Bhopals withdrew to the line of Admirals Road near Cross Roads Farm, in which Brigade Headquarters were now established, while the Rifles and Baluchis took up a position to the rear.

The night passed without incident and with very little shelling, and the opportunity was taken to collect the wounded whom it had been impossible to evacuate under the heavy fire of the afternoon. 2/Lieut. E. Giles, who from many volunteers was selected for this work, set a splendid example of devotion to duty and worked hard throughout the night in endeavouring to relieve the sufferings of his men.

The day's losses had been heavy and the gain of ground nil, but the bearing of the Battalion under somewhat disheartening circumstances had been worthy of the highest traditions of regular troops. Something, however, had been achieved as, in spite of his use of poison gas, the enemy was no nearer Ypres and our line, though strained almost to breaking point, was still holding. It appears indeed that the gallant front shown by the Lahore Division was successful in deceiving the Germans as to the extent of our resources, and deterred him from pressing the advantages he had already gained.

The casualties of the afternoon of the 27th April were in officers:

Capt. C. R. Saunders and 2/Lieut. A. D. Coates, killed; Lieut. P. B. K. Stedman, died of wounds; Capt. F. G. Grimwade, Lieuts. F. A. Coffin and D. J. Leonard, and 2/Lieut. T. I. Walker, wounded; and in N.C.O.'s and men, 32 killed (including C. S. M. Chennels), 132 wounded, and 13 missing.

During the 28th the 1/4th Londons remained in position in rear of Cross Roads Farm, and beyond a good deal of shelling in which gas shell was freely used by the enemy the day passed without important incident. Luckily the bombardment this day was not very costly to the Battalion or, indeed, to the Brigade as a whole. The Lahore Division was transferred from V Corps to a special counter-attack force then formed under command of Gen. Plumer, and it was arranged that the Sirhind and Ferozepore Brigades should be prepared to co-operate with an attack contemplated by the French who were still on our left flank, making such advance as might be justified by the results achieved by our Allies. The French attack, however, did not materialise in consequence of the very heavy losses of the preceding two days and our Allies confined themselves to artillery action.

During the evening the enemy turned a large number of guns on to St Jean and in a few hours the work of destruction, already far advanced, was almost completed. In the darkness the church was clearly visible in flames, the windows being lit up by the conflagration within: before morning the tower had fallen, the roof had collapsed, and nothing but smouldering ruins remained.

The 29th April found the Ferozepore Brigade still holding its trenches and orders were again issued to it to be prepared to co-operate with the French. But during the morning definite orders were received that the French attack was postponed, the assault of the enemy positions being a more formidable proposition than could be tackled by the Allied troops in their then exhausted and numerically weak condition.

The German bombardment continued throughout the 29th, and the Battalion remained inactive beyond the further strengthening of its trenches. It did, however, have the satisfaction of seeing a Taube brought down close to its lines by our anti-aircraft guns.

Before daybreak on the 30th, the Ferozepore Brigade was relieved and marched out of the salient, the 1/4th Londons proceeding by way of Buffs Road and La Brique to hutments at Ouderdom. While passing through La Brique the Battalion was met by a reinforcement of about fifty N.C.O.'s and men from the 3/4th Battalion in England, conducted by Major E. H. Stillwell. Accompanying this draft were 2/Lieuts. L. G. Rix and B. Rivers Smith.