There now follows a description of the layout of a Red Army espionage network in theory. It is the blueprint which all networks abroad attempt to follow. I can of course speak only for the Red Army system, as that is the only one I know. I should imagine that the Red Fleet or N.K.V.D. (now M.V.D.) network would be organised on approximately the same lines. It is, in fact, an eminently practicable, simple, and effective system, giving the maximum degree of efficiency with the minimum danger of compromise.
The head of the network is, of course, the resident director. Except in exceptional circumstances, he does not reside in the country against which his network is operating but lives and directs the organisation from a convenient neighbouring country against whose interests he is forbidden to work. It naturally happens on occasions that a resident director obtains information concerning his country of residence. In such cases, in normal times, he would hand the development of the source over to another resident director whose network was directed against the first director's country of residence. For example if the resident director in Switzerland of the network against Germany discovered a source who was capable of producing information from the Swiss General Staff, he would hand the source over to the resident director of the network working against Switzerland, who would probably be resident in France, and leave the latter to work out ways and means of getting the information to Moscow. The reason for this is obvious. The local police or counterespionage authorities are likely to take a much greater interest in the activities of anyone they suspect of working against them than they are in an individual who, while resident in their country, is working against a foreign power. Also the chances of compromise through treachery or double agents are much greater if the resident director is living, as it were, on top of his sources. It is, in fact, an extension of the old maxim about dirtying one's own doorstep.
The resident director is also, usually, not a native of his country of residence. He is usually not a Russian either, and in fact few Soviet nationals are used in Russian espionage networks. The Centre (i.e., Moscow) finds that the difference between the way of life in Russia and other countries is so great that it is difficult for Soviet citizens to adjust themselves. Also a Soviet citizen is a much more likely target for suspicion than a person of another nationality. It used to be said that "even- Japanese is a spy." This applies equally well to Russians, as it is impossible for a Russian to get abroad until he has been checked and double-checked by the N.K.V.D. and is known to be one hundred per cent politically reliable. This is equally well known to all foreign counterespionage authorities, who as normal routine take a considerable interest in the activities of any Russian national in their midst.
The resident director is also usually forbidden to search for and develop sources of information. It is not for him to recruit agents or to conduct operations. His tasks are to control the communications system, cope with finance, sort out, evaluate, and edit the information that comes in to him, encipher it for onward transmission to the Centre, and generally to supervise and conduct the work of the whole organisation; seeing that the right lines are being developed and exploited at the right time, but keeping in the background and restricting knowledge of his identity to the minimum number of people. He is usually unknown to his agents, couriers, and radiotelegraphists, maintaining contact with them only through his liaison agents or "cut-outs," who are the only people aware of his identity.
Under the resident director come the cut-outs, who bear the heat and burden of the day. They may or may not be natives of the country of residence of the director or of the country against which the network is working, depending on circumstances and their own particular ability. They act as "talent spotters" and if necessary recruiters as well. It is usually preferable for the actual approach to a new source to be made by another cut-out, one removed from the principal liaison agent, as this reduces the risk of compromise.
One of the most important sources of information and one of the main recruiting grounds for agents is of course the local Communist Party, referred to in network jargon as "the Neighbour." (Not to be confused with "the Neighbours," in the plural, which means the Comintern or rather the function which continued in Russia after the Comintern had been officially, and of course only in theory, abolished.) In every Communist Party there is one highly placed official whose main task is to gather information gleaned from Party members and fellow travellers and pass it on to the resident director through the main cut-out, who is in close but secret touch with him. It is this official who keeps an eye open for likely and useful recruits and passes their names on to the cut-out. The majority of agents are recruited through this means, and in any case any name forwarded by the network to Moscow for vetting is always referred back to the local Party for their views.
Another useful function of the Neighbour is the organisation of study and discussion groups among young students and intellectuals. From among the members of these groups it is possible to discover likely potential spy material: people who, though not members of the Party, are likely to be amenable to an espionage approach, and people who are either in, or likely one day to be in, posts where they could obtain information of value to Russia. Such promising candidates would be discouraged from openly joining the Party or openly expressing Communist or left-wing views. This ensures that their backgrounds are innocuous should they ever come under suspicion or be checked up by the counterespionage authorities. Such characters are sometimes paid for information which is valueless to the Centre purely in order to keep them on a string in the hope that one day they may advance in their profession and be in a position to supply really vital information. The network is prepared to wait a long time for its information to mature. It is much better, if the time can be afforded, to let your spy work his way gradually up into a position of trust rather than to be forced to make a pass at someone in a high position with the risk of failure or compromise. "Catch'em young" is a motto which applies as well to espionage as to other walks of life.
Once an agent is recruited from the Neighbour, he passes his information direct to the cut-out and severs all connection with the Party intelligence system. His final recruitment will usually take place only after a long period during which time he will not be in touch with the network at all but will be passing his information through the contact in the Party. His material and his background will be checked and double-checked against other information supplied from similar sources and the Party records. Only then will he meet the cut-out and become part of the network. Even then he will be able to compromise only his own particular contact who, if he is arrested, will also be knocked off- but will not compromise the network as a whole.
Apart from agents, which term I have used in this chapter only to cover individuals who actually supply- information- spies in the strictest sense of the word- the Party also is a recruiting ground for radio-telegraphists and minor cut-outs and couriers. These may be of the nationality of the country against whom the network is operating or in which the resident director is living. The sole task of the couriers and minor contacts is to act as channels for the information from the agent himself to the resident director, and vice versa. In most cases (and this is of course desirable as often as it is feasible) they are unaware of the identity of the agent they contact or the cut-out to which they work, merely meeting them at predetermined times and places and never at their homes. The information or instructions that they carry are either memorised or typewritten. In the latter case the message is typewritten through a well-used bit of carbon paper and the carbon copy is carried and the original is destroyed. This method makes it much harder to identify the typewriter upon which the message was written should it fall into unauthorised hands. The carbon copy is of course destroyed as soon as the resident director has incorporated it into his enciphered message.
As stated, liaison between the resident director and the local Communist Party is usually carried on by the chief cut-out, who is naturally a person in whom both parties have complete confidence. However, on certain occasions when important directives are being transmitted from Moscow, a secret meeting is arranged between the resident director and the Party leaders where the matter can be discussed. This is one of the few occasions when a director comes out into the open, and happens very rarely.
In all agents' messages and in all enciphered texts, only cover names are used for the sources, etc., and the messages are couched in a jargon which would make them difficult of interpretation by anyone not "in the net," so even if the gist of the message could be made out the agent's identity is concealed by the use of the cover name. The resident director has to memorise all the cover names used in his network. English Christian names are most commonly used, and both male and female names are employed indiscriminately without regard to sex: thus a male agent may easily have a female cover name. In cases where a source is only casual and not in frequent use, the director may give him a name which can be easily remembered by association- such as "Red" if he has red hair or "Lanky" if he is very tall. This is used only for unimportant characters whom the director might not easily be able to remember, and is a practice which is discouraged by Moscow, as such a cover name is obviously less secure than a purely arbitrary one.
In addition to persons, countries also have cover names as well and these vary from network to network. In the Swiss network against Germany, Great Britain was "Brazil," France "Florence," Germany "Jersey," and so on. The U.S.S.R. was always "Home." Other institutions and objects also had their own names. In my network a wireless transmitter was a "musical box"; a passport a "shoe"; a forger of false passports thus naturally became a "cobbler"; a prison was a "hospital" and thus the police became the "doctor."
Finance is one of the major responsibilities of a resident director. He is responsible for paying the entire network and submits his accounts to the Centre once a year. He also has to send an estimated budget for the next year's expenditure. This yearly grant is seldom paid in a lump sum, but at least twice a year the director sends a courier to a neighbouring country where he meets a courier from the Centre who hands the money over, always in dollars. This the director is forbidden to put in a bank; he keeps the entire sum in dollars, hidden somewhere, and removes what is necessary from time to time to change it into local currency for immediate expenses. He is, however, sometimes allowed to put the money in a safe-deposit box.
Salaries in a Soviet espionage network bear little if any relation to the work performed. Instead they are based on the amount the individual needs to maintain his position and support his dependents. Thus the anomaly frequently occurs of an old and trusted agent who is doing valuable and dangerous work being paid far less than, say, a cut-out who has been newly recruited but who has a certain position in life to maintain if he is not to come under suspicion.
A resident director receives about two hundred and fifty to five hundred dollars a month, depending on his dependents, his social position, and the cost of living in the country concerned. A wireless operator under the same conditions would receive from a hundred to two hundred dollars a month. If, on the other hand, he or she has a regular job as well, all that would be paid would be the actual expenses of the job. Agents are paid by results, but an agent of long standing who has produced consistently good and voluminous information may also receive a fixed retainer. Bonuses are also paid for exceptionally good pieces of work. The rates of pay are based on the amount of money that the member of the network has to expend from his day-to-day living expenses. The Centre does not encourage overpayment, as this might result in the individual's accumulating a large bank balance. This is regarded as undesirable, for not only is it a waste of Soviet government money but it also increases the risk of the person's "going private" (i.e., leaving the organisation).
Full-time members of a spy ring are told that they are fully and regularly embodied members of the Red Army and as such can receive military decorations for meritorious service. What actually happens is that all the agent gets is the promise of such a decoration if and when his work outside Russia is finished. For example Rado was a full colonel in the Red Army and I was a major, and when I was in Moscow I was told that I would be promoted to lieutenant colonel on my next assignment. At various times I was informed that I had been recommended for three Soviet decorations, the only one specified being the Order of the Red Banner. This I got for inventing a simplified system of sending Morse numbers which cut transmitting time by a third. I am still, not unnaturally, awaiting my investiture!
In theory a member of the network can retire on full pay after five years' service abroad- but his pension will be paid only in roubles in Russia. And in practice, if he did try to live in idleness and ease on his pension in Russia, he would soon get into trouble, as the slogan "He who does not work shall not eat" would be enforced-even for spies on full pay. He would find it more convenient- and certainly healthier- to volunteer for a further tour of duty abroad or hastily to find some other employment within Russia.
In addition to the return to Russia at the end of the five-year tour, agents are also sometimes summoned back to Moscow either for discussions or to take a course in some specialised subject. In such cases the individual travels to some other country- usually one with a common frontier with the U.S.S.R.- and there, at .a prearranged rendezvous, he meets an agent from the Centre who hands him a new passport (sometimes a Russian one) containing the necessary visas- and of course in a false name. In return, the recalled spy hands over to the
Centre's agent a sealed envelope containing his original passport and necessary documentation which he receives back on his return from Russia.
Frequently these sudden recalls to Moscow are not dictated by necessity but from a desire by the Centre to ascertain the reactions of the person to such a summons. If he expresses immediate willingness to return, the instructions are, as often as not, cancelled at the last minute. If, however, he hesitates or suggests that his recall might imperil the working or security of the network, Moscow's suspicions are at once aroused. He then becomes suspected by the Centre of "Trotskyist sympathies" or some lesser crime, and in all probability is enticed to some other country whence he can be easily abducted to Soviet Russia or where he can be conveniently liquidated.
If the spy is of little importance and his knowledge of the network is limited, the Centre may not take such drastic action. If they decide that his "going private" will not imperil the organisation or hamper its main working, he may merely be excluded from the network, and those individuals with whom he has been in contact are withdrawn and posted elsewhere.
The only occasion on which a member of the network is given leave to get out of the country is if he is under suspicion by the authorities or his security is imperilled by some other member of the organisation who is under suspicion for double-dealing. In such cases, if the need is really urgent, he can even leave without the permission of the Centre. In these cases he will go to his "place of conspiracy" where he will be recognised by the other contact that is there for just such an eventuality. The contact will not, however, make contact on sight. He will note the person's appearance and report back to the Centre, which will then check up to see that it is the right man and not an impersonator planted by some counterespionage authority. The Centre will also check up through the local party and the other members of the network as to the circumstances of the person's departure, and if they are satisfied, then, and only then, will contact be made at the "place of conspiracy."
A resident director, or any member of a network who holds a cipher known only to himself and the Centre, has another course open to him apart from going to the "place of conspiracy," in the event of his being forced to fly the country without receiving specific instructions from the Centre as to his future. He can go to any Soviet military attaché in any country other than that in which he is resident- the farther away the better- and there, without revealing his identity, he hands in a message in his own cipher for the M.A. to dispatch. This message the M.A. will forward to Moscow, asking no questions but merely arranging a rendezvous some time ahead. Moscow will send in return a photograph of the agent and his "control questions." This is a form of question and answer known only to the Centre and the resident director concerned. The M.A. will go to the rendezvous and if the person tallies with the photograph and can give satisfactory answers to the control questions, then his bona fides is considered to be satisfactorily established and the fugitive resident director will, receive further instructions.
So far I have described the skeleton of the organisation and the functions of its main component parts. Also the way its members are recruited, its relations with the local Communist parties, and the means by which information flows to the resident director have been outlined. No mention has been made of the most vital and probably the most difficult operation of all- the getting of the information to Moscow. Communications are the most important part of any spy ring and are its Achilles heel, as it is by tapping in on these that the counterespionage authorities gain most of their information and obtain most of their successes. Because of its importance I have left this subject to the last. Without communications with the outside world and thus to its headquarters, the most efficient spy ring in the world is powerless – as Rado found to his cost in 1940. Cut the channels of communication and you have rendered the network useless. In all probability its attempts to open up communications on an extemporised basis will betray its workings, and the individuals can be scooped up at leisure. This is, I have no doubt, the axiom of counterespionage authorities throughout the world.
Every resident director has of course his own separate means of communication. Before the war the normal means of transmitting the information which the resident director had received, sifted, and evaluated was by means of microphotographs. The director enciphered his text and then the messages were divided into portions of about five hundred cipher groups each. These portions were then microphotographed and resulted in a negative about the size of a pinhead. The pinhead negative was then stuck on an ordinary postcard, the position on the postcard being naturally agreed beforehand. The postcard, which bore a perfectly innocent and normal message, was then sent by the resident director to an address in a nearby country where it was collected by a courier and delivered, either direct or through yet another cut-out, to the Soviet military attaché, who sent it on either in the diplomatic bag or over embassy wireless channels.
Similarly, if the Centre wished to communicate with a resident director, a postcard carrying microphotographs would be sent in the bag to the military attaché's office in a country adjacent to that in which the resident director concerned lived. This postcard the military attaché sent to an accommodation address in the resident director's country where it was collected by a courier and delivered to the chief cut-out, who in turn delivered it to the resident director. In all cases the occupiers of the accommodation or "cover addresses" concerned were entirely ignorant of the identity of the resident director, the military attaché, or even of the cut-outs who collected the mail. They usually believed that they were merely acting as accommodation addresses for the local Communist Party by whom they had probably been recruited.
Apart from this system of microphotographic communication, the networks also used a courier system. The resident director would send one of his trusted cut-outs to various fixed rendezvous in neighbouring countries where the cut-out would meet a courier from the Centre. This system, if slightly slower, was obviously better for the tranmission of bulky documents or samples of apparatus.
These two systems worked very well in times of peace, when postal communications were easy and rapid and, generally speaking, there was no systematic censorship of mail. In time of war, when communications were disrupted, at best subjected to long delay, and at worst never arrived at all, the system was clearly impracticable, and, saves over short distances, broke down. Even when it worked, all correspondence was liable to severe scrutiny by wartime censorship with the consequent risk of compromise.
As a result there was a radical reorganisation of communications systems, and now the main system in use is short-wave wireless transmission. This system is obviously infinitely quicker than the accommodation address and the numerous cut-outs and, provided normal precautions are observed, is equally safe.
In wartime it was vital that the Centre receive information as quickly as possible. Most of the information transmitted by networks concerned operational matters, and these would have been useless even if they had been subject only to the normal peacetime postal delays. As a result wireless transmission was instituted as the normal means of communication between the resident director and the Centre; and all resident directors are now required to undergo a course in radiotelegraphy and construction in Moscow before taking up the direction of a network abroad. Directors so qualified can send off urgent information as soon as it is encoded, without having to contact the normal wireless operator. If the director is forced to flee the country he can then build a new transmitter and is thus in a position to contact the Centre without the delays which a "place of conspiracy" or the contacting of a military attaché is bound to entail.
Though resident directors are now required to be so technically efficient, this newly acquired art has not taken away from the importance of the networks' wireless operators. Even if the director can transmit, it is obviously highly undesirable that in normal circumstances he should go to the set and do it himself- or worse still have the set in his house and transmit from there himself and thus imperil the whole network. As a result there is need for reliable wireless operators who will probably know the chief cut-out but will not know the identity of the director himself.
The ideal operator, like a resident director, is not a native of the country in which he is working. Through being a foreigner it is easier for him to hide his nocturnal and clandestine activities than if he were a permanent resident with many friends and relations all idly curious as to how he spends his time. In equally ideal circumstances this ideal operator will install himself and his transmitter in a top-floor flat of a large building situated in a built-up area. This makes it harder for direction-finding apparatus to locate him than if he were in an isolated place.
In peacetime the operator would probably have no more than two days a month when he was bound to establish two-way contact with the Centre. In addition there would also be several days each week when the Centre would be listening, at prearranged fixed times, in case he should call. Also on certain fixed days the operator himself would be required to listen in in case the Centre wished to call him.
In my network the Centre used a fixed call sign, though the call signs used by our sets varied according to a prearranged schedule. In order to establish communication a fixed call wave was used. For example, if
I wished to call the Centre I would tap out my call sign in Morse on my fixed call wave, say 43 metres. The Centre would be listening and reply on its fixed call wave, perhaps 39 metres. On hearing the Centre reply, I would then switch to my working wave length, say 49 metres, and then with a different call sign send over my material. The Centre would similarly switch wave lengths and call signs, and move over to their working wave length. This system, though it may sound complicated on paper, was simple to operate in practice and cut to the minimum the possibility of radio monitoring.
All messages, of course, were always in cipher and the cipher was one that could be read only by the Centre and the resident director. In the case of our net things were slightly different since, as well as Rado, the resident director, I also held my own cipher, and as I had my transmitter in my flat I was able to answer any questions from the Centre often in a matter of hours. Modern ingenuity has also reduced the risk of having a transmitter on the premises. In the old days transmitters were bulky pieces of apparatus which could not easily be hidden. Now they are made so that they do not occupy more space than the average portable typewriter and are capable of disguise in various forms. Any good modern receiving set is perfectly suitable for picking up messages from the control station. So much for communications.
The foregoing account is an attempt to describe how the network is designed to work under ideal conditions, if it follows strictly the lines laid down by Moscow. Obviously circumstances must alter cases and the network must be adapted to fit in with local conditions, but the general plan is constant and, as will be seen, corresponds very closely with the network in Switzerland. Any variations were due to the exigencies of war and occasionally to the human factor- such as the frailties of the resident director himself. A comparison of the two diagrams showing the organisation in theory and in practice shows the similarity.
It may be argued that the above description of the ideal Soviet network bears little or no resemblance to the espionage organisation uncovered in Canada. There the whole case centred round the Soviet Legation in Ottawa itself, and the legation was directly concerned with espionage against Canada. This goes entirely contrary to the canons of classical Soviet espionage. There is, I think, an easy explanation for this, one which accounts for this variation from the normal - and also, I believe, for the comparative ease with which the network was uncovered. If the network had been properly run even the defection of Gouzenko should not have exposed the whole network. But in fact the network was an ad hoc affair set up in rather a hurry.
The reasons for this are not far to seek. At the outbreak of war the main Soviet espionage effort was switched to Germany and her satellites, and the networks working against the British Empire and the United States were allowed to lie fallow. With the German attack on Russia it became even more imperative to mobilise all espionage resources for the current struggle. Also it was obviously politically undesirable for there to be any chance of a worsening of relations between the Allies as might result from the uncovering of a Russian espionage ring working against one of Russia's own allies. As a result the Soviet spy rings working against the Allies were closed down or allowed to lie dormant.
When it was apparent to Russia that victory was only a matter of time and that her Western Allies were so involved in the war that a separate peace was out of the question, the Centre began to think of reviving their networks in the democracies, so that they would be in full working order when peace came and Russia would once more be in a position to obtain information of value to her from her quondam allies but real and ultimate adversaries- Great Britain and the United States. In the meantime, however, the old networks had fallen apart and the old resident directors had been moved to other posts. There was no time to establish new resident directors and as a result the rather haphazard organisation as exposed in the Canadian case came into being. I myself have no doubt that even though this network was paying dividends to the Centre in the shape of good and high-grade information, new resident directors were being established and were building up their networks quietly in the background. The world was sufficiently startled at the amount of information that the Canadian network was able to obtain. I myself have no doubt that the permanent network will do as well - if not a great deal better- if it is not doing so already. Only the network in Canada and portions of it in the United States have been exposed. It is a fair assumption that a similar emergency network existed in England also. Meanwhile the new resident directors should be well established, perhaps in Mexico and France, working and building up their networks against the United States and Great Britain. Time alone will show how successful they are.