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THE GRENADIER GUARDS
IN THE GREAT WAR OF
1914-1918

MACMILLAN AND CO., Limited

LONDON · BOMBAY · CALCUTTA · MADRAS
MELBOURNE

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

NEW YORK · BOSTON · CHICAGO
DALLAS · SAN FRANCISCO

THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, Ltd.

TORONTO

J. S. Sargent portrait Emery Walker ph. sc.

Field Marshal H.R.H. The Duke of Connaught
K.G., G.C.B. &c.
Colonel of the Regiment

THE
GRENADIER GUARDS
IN THE GREAT WAR OF
1914-1918

BY

Lieut.-Colonel

The Right Hon. SIR FREDERICK PONSONBY

(LATE GRENADIER GUARDS)

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY
Lieut.-General THE EARL OF CAVAN

MAPS BY MR. EMERY WALKER

IN THREE VOLUMES
VOL. II

MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED
ST. MARTIN’S STREET, LONDON

1920

COPYRIGHT

CHAPTER XVIII

JANUARY TO SEPTEMBER 1916

The 3rd Battalion

3rd Batt.
Jan. 1916.

At the beginning of 1916 the officers of the 3rd Battalion were:

On the 1st the 3rd Battalion marched from Merville to Laventie, and went into billets vacated

by the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards. On the 3rd it took over the left sector from the 1st Battalion Scots Guards, with the Battalion Headquarters at Wangeric Farm. Forty-eight hours in the trenches followed by forty-eight hours’ rest was the regular routine for the next fortnight. The trenches in this sector were in a very good state, and it was possible, therefore, to go in for refinements and erect splinter-proof shelters; but the enemy’s artillery was very active, and expended a great deal of ammunition on the reserve trenches and communications. During this fortnight a troop of Wiltshire Yeomanry was attached to the Battalion for instruction, and did very well although it was quite new to trench warfare. On the 12th Colonel Corry relinquished command of the Battalion, and on the 14th Lieut.-Colonel Jeffreys took charge of it temporarily, pending the arrival of Major Sergison-Brooke.

On the 14th the Battalion marched back to La Gorgue, where it remained in billets for ten days, after which it returned to Laventie. Great activity was noticeable behind the enemy’s lines, and as this might be the prelude to an attack every precaution was taken. There seemed some possibility of a gas attack, and special warnings were conveyed to each company, but although the enemy’s artillery shelled the strong points in our line, Elgin Post, Fauquissart Cross Roads, and Hougoumont Post, no infantry attack was made by the enemy.

Feb.

On February 1 the 3rd Battalion proceeded to Merville, where it remained until the 7th, when it marched to Riez Bailleul. The usual routine

of two days in and two days out of the trenches was observed until the 16th, when it was relieved by the 9th Battalion Royal Welsh Fusiliers, and marched back to La Gorgue. The only incident worth recording during this tour of duty in the trenches was an unfortunate accident that happened to Lieutenant R. W. Parker. He was returning with a patrol early in the morning, and as he came in over the parapet he slipped, and fell on a bayonet which penetrated his leg below the knee. On the 17th Lieutenant W. Champneys and Second Lieutenant G. D. Jackson arrived, and on the 19th the Battalion marched to Eecke. The following day it proceeded to Wormhoudt, where it remained for two days, and then marched to Poperinghe.

March.

Major-General G. Feilding gave a lecture to the officers on March 1, and impressed on them the importance of making the line north of Hooge strong and defensible, since it was the left flank of the whole British line. This could be done only by ingenious concealment of any new work and by unremitting efforts of all ranks. He added that, if the enemy concentrated opposite the Ypres salient, a withdrawal would be made to the Canal line. Any ground that could not be held against the enemy’s artillery fire would be defended by strong points and machine-guns concealed in natural features, and placed apart from entrenchments and other works.

On the 5th the 3rd Battalion proceeded to Calais, and marched to Camp Beaumarais, where it remained until the 18th. Here a most unfortunate bombing accident occurred. No. 4

Company bombers were practising under Lieutenant L. Hermon-Hodge behind a thick sand-bag wall, when a bomb exploded prematurely on leaving the thrower’s hand. Five men were killed and sixteen wounded in addition to Lieutenant Hermon-Hodge himself, who received fragments of the bomb in his right arm. On the 18th the 3rd Battalion left Calais, and went by train to Cassel, where it detrained and marched to Oudezeele.

On the 26th it reached the Ypres salient, and went into the support trenches. Lieut.-Colonel Sergison-Brooke was on leave, and the Battalion was commanded by Major Maitland. Special precautions with regard to gas were taken, and on the wind becoming favourable it was arranged that the Brigade would send the message “Gas alert,” when all sentries would be doubled, and men would be placed at the entrance of each dug-out to give the alarm. Warnings were also issued with regard to the aeroplanes, which required careful watching, since the enemy in that sector was very active, and if any movement was seen on the Canal bank or in the town shelling immediately began. During the sixteen days the Battalion spent at Ypres there were a certain number of casualties, and the number of sick increased slightly.

On the 30th the 3rd Battalion had to relieve the Scots Guards under very trying conditions, for not only was the front line being shelled, but the communication trenches were also included in the bombardment. The three leading companies succeeded in reaching the front line without casualties, but No. 2, under Captain

Stanhope, came under shrapnel fire as it passed through Potidje, and had seven casualties. Communication between the Battalion Headquarters and the companies was cut, and there was considerable difficulty in transmitting the orders. The leading companies, which were ordered to hold from Duke Street to Roulers railway, found the front trenches devastated and swept by shrapnel fired both frontally and obliquely from Pilkem and Belleward ridge. The 1st Battalion Scots Guards had suffered considerably and was in great difficulties, as communication along the front line was impossible under cover. Men were cut off from the remainder of their company and were covered with mud and debris, some even being buried. Relieving a battalion under such conditions required time, and it was not till 4 A.M. that the relief was complete.

In view of the probability of an attack while the relief was being carried out, three batteries of 18-pounder guns were ordered to put down a barrage on the German front line. This proved to be a great help, and no doubt prevented the 3rd Battalion from suffering as heavy losses as the Scots Guards. There were in all five men killed and sixteen wounded, in addition to Captain R. Wolrige-Gordon, whose leg was grazed by a bullet. The front line was wrecked, but by placing men in the wreckage under what cover there was the trench was made defensible. The enemy, however, showed no signs of life, and the following days were quiet. Meanwhile it was found difficult to drain the trenches, which were in a very dilapidated condition after the

bombardment. The whole ground was cut up, and water stood in the shell-holes, while the wooden revetments had been torn to pieces and buried beneath the parapets and parados. The work of clearing away the debris was necessarily slow, and the water could not be got rid of in spite of the good fall in the ground towards Belleward Beer. At first it was impossible to go down the front line for more than a few yards, but after two days’ hard work the trench was so far improved that men could crawl along it, although not without difficulty. April.On April 3, instead of returning to Ypres, the 3rd Battalion went into camp just west of Vlamertinghe.

The officers of the 3rd Battalion at that time were:

After four days’ rest the 3rd Battalion returned to the same line of trenches it had occupied before, and found them worse than ever. The Scots Guards who had been there had again been subjected to a severe bombardment, and all the work that had been done was now obliterated. On the 4th Lieutenant Worsley left to take up his appointment as Trench Mortar Officer. The four days spent in the trenches proved to be very quiet, as the Germans seemed to have expended all their shells on the Scots Guards, and nothing of any interest occurred. On the 11th the Battalion moved to Poperinghe, where most unfortunately four men were killed and two wounded whilst unloading the officers’ kits. On the 12th Captain Wolrige-Gordon rejoined, his wound not having proved very serious, and Second Lieutenant M. Thrupp arrived. Two days later Captain A. K. Mackenzie, Captain W. A. L. Stewart, and Second Lieutenant F. J. Heasman joined the Battalion.

The system of reliefs was changed at this time in order to avoid the inconvenience of two brigades relieving on the same night. The tour of duty was divided as follows: five days at Ypres, five days in the front line, three days at Camp B, three days in the front line. On the 18th the 3rd Battalion moved up into Ypres, and went into support trenches. The men were provided with steel helmets, and left their service caps with the transport and their unnecessary kit in sand-bags at the prison. On the 24th they relieved the 1st Battalion Scots Guards in the front line, where the trenches proved to be fairly good,

although there was still a lot of water standing everywhere. As the ground was so much cut up, the draining of the trenches was not easy; and since any movement during the day was impossible, all the work had to be done at night. Lieutenant Thrupp was knocked down by a shell during these operations, but was fortunately unhurt, and there were a few casualties every day. On the 29th the 3rd Battalion was relieved by the 1st Battalion Scots Guards, and retired to B Camp near Vlamertinghe.

May.

On May 1 Second Lieutenant M. Duquenoy arrived, and was appointed Transport Officer. The Battalion returned to the trenches on the 2nd, when the relief was carried out in most favourable circumstances. The three days in the front line were uneventful, although the patrols reported great activity in the enemy’s lines, and the time was spent in draining operations and in wiring and repairing the parapet. A good many high-explosive shells were sent over by the enemy’s artillery, which became fairly active during the third day, but the casualties were few. On the 5th the Battalion was relieved, and went by train to Poperinghe where it went into billets, but it was by no means free from shell-fire, as the German artillery periodically bombarded the town.

After a week’s rest it returned to Ypres, and was employed on nightly fatigues, carrying wood for mining parties and wiring the support lines. On the night of the 16th it returned to the trenches from Duke Street to Roulers railway, and came in for a good deal of shelling,

chiefly behind the lines. The usual work was continued, but forty yards of the line had been completely blown in, and accordingly the trench had to be re-dug. On the 21st the Battalion returned to Poperinghe after having been relieved by the 10th Battalion Rifle Brigade, and marched to Camp N, where it remained till the end of the month.

June.

On June 1 the 2nd Guards Brigade proceeded to Volckerinchove, where it marched past Lieut.-General Lord Cavan, the Corps Commander, and Major-General G. Feilding, the Divisional Commander. In order to try a new method of attack, a complete representation to scale of the German trenches revetted with sand-bags was constructed, while the British line was also roughly indicated. The assault on the German trenches was then practised on the following lines: the assault was to take place in five waves, the fifth wave being a carrying company, provided by a battalion other than the actual assaulting battalion. The two leading companies were to assault in two waves, the second following about fifty yards in rear of the first. These two waves were to cross the German front-line trench without getting into it, and push on to the objective, roughly speaking, the German third line. The third wave was to pass over the German front line and take the German second line, which was to be consolidated. The fourth wave was to take and consolidate the German front line. Strong bombing parties were to be placed on both flanks of all companies, with centre bombing parties dispersed roughly opposite

the German communication trenches. Bombing parties of the two leading waves were to establish blocks in the German communication trenches, while the bombing parties of the rear waves were to clear the communication trenches forward and get into touch with the two leading waves. All the men were to carry two Mills grenades and four sand-bags, tucked through the web equipment in front, and every third man was to carry a shovel slung. The R.E. material and trench-mortar ammunition was to be carried by the fifth wave. At night the men were to carry Roman candles to show the position of the waves. All the battalions in the Brigade carried out this form of attack, and when they had mastered the new features it was practised by the Brigade.

On the 14th the 3rd Battalion moved to Vlamertinghe in motor lorries to relieve the 9th Canadian Battalion, which had suffered heavy losses, and remained there for three days, with one company at Ypres and three companies at the west end of Zillebeke Lake. On the night of the 18th it took over from the 1st Battalion Scots Guards the front trenches in Sanctuary Wood, and found the whole ground much cut about by shell-fire. The wire, which the Germans had put up whilst in occupation of the old British front line, combined with the natural obstacles, such as fallen trees and debris, made any approach on the part of the enemy very difficult. Reconnaissance proved that the Germans had withdrawn to their original front line, leaving the old British line full of dead, equipment, and ammunition. Over 350 rifles and a large quantity

of ammunition were thus collected. Both on the 19th and 20th the Battalion was subjected to heavy shelling, and even during the relief suffered casualties, among whom was Lieut, the Hon. H. E. Eaton who was wounded. After a week’s rest in Camp D, the Battalion took over the left reserve sub-sector, at the junction of the British and French armies on the Yser Canal, where it remained for three days, and on the night of the 30th it went up again into the front line.

July.

During the three days the Battalion was in these trenches there was a great deal of activity on the part of the artillery on both sides. Preparation was being made on our side for an attack by the Welsh Guards on Morteloje Estaminet, while the enemy replied by laying down a heavy barrage over our communication trenches; but as the men had been withdrawn from the first trench the casualties of the 3rd Battalion were not heavy. On the 3rd the Battalion withdrew into support by the Canal bank, and returned again to the front line on the 8th. On the 7th Major Maitland left to take command of the 1st Battalion, and on the 9th Second Lieutenant W. W. S. C. Neville arrived. On the 12th the Battalion retired to the Canal bank, and three days later proceeded to Camp E, where it remained for ten days. On the 25th it proceeded to Volckerinchove, and left the Ypres area. On the 31st it moved down to Le Souich, where it was employed for a week in digging for another Division.

Aug.

On August 3 Lieutenant G. F. R. Hirst and Lieutenant W. A. Stainton joined the Battalion,

and on the 6th Second Lieutenant A. H. Penfold and Second Lieutenant H. St. J. Williams arrived. On the 9th His Majesty the King paid an informal visit to the 2nd Brigade, but there was no actual inspection or parade. On the 13th the Battalion went up into the trenches in front of Bertrancourt, and beyond the usual amount of shelling nothing of interest occurred. On the 15th Lieutenant C. G. Gardner and Second Lieutenant G. M. Cornish joined the Battalion. Two days later the Battalion went into camp at Sailly-au-Bois, where it was packed rather closely together; and when the enemy began shelling that locality it had to be taken out of the camp and placed in artillery formation in the fields in rear. The remainder of the month was spent in training, during which the Battalion was encamped at Bus-les-Artois, Amplier Naours, and finally Morlancourt.

The 4th Battalion

4th Batt.
Jan. 1.

The officers of the 4th Battalion on January 1, 1916, were:

The 4th Battalion began the new year in billets at Merville, where it remained till the 13th, doing steady drill, route marching, Lewis gun and bombing practice. On the 1st, Second Lieutenant B. Burman, Second Lieutenant C. G. Keith, and Second Lieutenant D. O. Constable joined the Battalion.

On the 13th it moved up to the trenches in front of Laventie, and relieved the 2nd Battalion Irish Guards. There it remained for a fortnight, spending two days in the trenches, followed by two days in support billets. In the line it occupied were certain strong points, A 1 Redoubt, Flank Post, and Firework Post, and these were subjected daily to a systematic shelling from the German artillery. Beyond a few casualties, nothing of importance occurred until the 25th, when Captain Sir Robert Filmer was mortally wounded. He had just left the trenches when he found he had lost his glasses. Being very short-sighted, he determined to go back and look for them, although he was warned that the road was being heavily shelled at the time. With that supreme contempt for all shells that had characterised his whole conduct since he came out, he rode back when a shell burst close to him,

killing his horse and wounding him so severely that he died the next day.

On the 27th the 4th Battalion returned to billets at Merville for four days, and on the Feb. 1st of February took over the Red House line at Laventie, where it remained until the 15th, retiring into support billets every two days. Numerous patrols lay out each night in the hopes of capturing prisoners, but these ventures were not attended with any success, and no prisoners were secured. Heavy shelling of the front line of trenches continued daily, but although considerable damage was done to the parapet the casualties were few. On the 12th the enemy shelled Dead End Post, and burnt it to the ground. There were fortunately no men killed or wounded, but all the rifles, S.A.A., bombs, and rations were destroyed. The same night Captain Layton sent out one N.C.O. and four men, with two R.E. men carrying a Bangalore torpedo, which was placed under the German wire, with its nose against the enemy’s parapet. After the party had returned in safety the torpedo was successfully exploded by means of an electric cable, and our patrols later reported extensive damage to the enemy’s parapet.

On the 15th the 4th Battalion returned to billets at Merville, and the next day entrained at Lestrem for Calais. On arrival at Calais it marched to a camp at Le Beaumarais, where the Y.M.C.A. had hot drinks and cakes ready. The sea air for which the men had come was somewhat powerful when they arrived, as it was blowing a gale, and most of the tents were

laid flat. In fact, the whole time they were there the weather was bad, with heavy snow and hail storms, which made camp life unpleasant. On the 23rd forty-three officers of the 1st and 4th Battalions dined together, and invited General Heyworth to join them. On the 26th the Battalion went by train to Cassel, where it detrained and marched to Herzeele. A great deal of snow had fallen, and the roads were in a very bad state, which made it difficult for the transport to move with any rapidity. The men were billeted in farms round about, and, although very much scattered, the billets were good.

A new system of parchments, in recognition of good work done by N.C.O.’s and men in the Division, was instituted. These were signed by the Major-General commanding the Division and issued to the men, but as there was every danger of their being lost if carried about, they were re-collected, and sent through the Regimental Orderly Room to the men’s relatives. The infinitesimal number of decorations allotted to each battalion necessitated some other means of recognising conspicuous services, and although it could hardly be said that these parchments in any way compensated for the lack of decoration, they at least gave the man the satisfaction of knowing that his services had been brought to the notice of the Major-General.

After spending a fortnight at Herzeele the 4th Battalion moved to a camp of huts and tents near Poperinghe on March 6. March. A digging party 250 strong, under Captain Blundell, was sent on to work at Ypres, and remained there for

three days. On the 15th the whole battalion went by train to Ypres, where it went into dug-outs, and on the following day took over the line of trenches with its right 200 yards north of the Menin road, and its left on the Roulers railway by Railway Wood. There it remained until the 27th, retiring every four days into dug-outs at Ypres, and although it became a mere target for the German artillery, it had only nineteen casualties in its first four days in the trenches.

On the 23rd the following officers joined the Battalion: Lieutenant C. G. Goschen, Second Lieutenant A. F. Newey, Lieutenant M. F. H. Payne-Gallwey, and Second Lieutenant J. P. Bibby. On the 24th Second Lieutenant B. G. H. Maclear rendered a very good patrol report, and on the information he gained a further reconnaissance under his guidance was sent out the next day, to be followed, if successful, by a bombing raid. The patrol was unfortunately seen by the enemy, and a hot fire was opened on them all down the line. This completely precluded all possibility of surprise, and consequently the enterprise was abandoned. That evening the German artillery heavily shelled the Canadian trenches on the right, and inflicted considerable damage. On the 27th the Battalion returned to Poperinghe, where the men washed in the Corps baths, and received clean underclothing.

April.

The officers of the 4th Battalion at that time were:

On April 3 the 4th Battalion moved to Camp B at Vlamertinghe by companies, and on the 8th returned to the trenches, relieving the 1st Battalion Grenadiers as right battalion of the left sector of the Division. There it remained until the 20th, placing two companies at a time in the front line. There was a great deal of work to be done in strengthening and heightening the parapet, which in some parts was in a lamentable condition. On the 17th Second Lieutenant M. H. Ponsonby and Second Lieutenant R. A. Gault arrived. The enemy was very active in this sector, and frequent raids occurred. On the 19th the German artillery began a systematic bombardment of our first and second lines by way of a barrage, while they launched an attack

somewhat to the left of the line occupied by the 4th Battalion. At first this attack hardly seemed to affect Nos. 2 and 3 Companies, which were at that time in the front trenches, but when a message arrived from the Brigade-Major to the effect that the enemy had occupied Wieltje in front of the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards, which had held it lightly, it was clear that something had to be done. It afterwards turned out that the enemy had made a determined attack on the Sixth Division, and had taken 600 yards of trench, while a raiding party had got down the trench occupied by the Scots Guards. Lieutenant C. G. Goschen, who was an old hand at this type of fighting, at once sent a strong patrol, under Second Lieutenant Maclear, up the trench to the left to clear up the situation, and if necessary support the Scots Guards. This manœuvre proved eminently successful, and, in spite of the bombs which rained on them the party of Grenadiers carried all before them. In the meantime the Scots Guards ejected all the Germans who had succeeded in penetrating into their trench. There was necessarily some very stiff fighting, but although there were 3 men killed and 24 wounded, of whom 3 died later, the party returned with no men missing. Lieut.-Colonel Lord Henry Seymour afterwards attributed the success of the operation to the coolness and resource displayed by Second Lieutenant Maclear, Lieutenant Goschen, and Captain Blundell. He also praised the marked ability shown by Second Lieutenant Keith and Second Lieutenant Constable in the control of their men under very difficult circumstances.

One particularly gallant act was performed that night by Private James Grundy, who was on duty with his telephone under very heavy fire, when he suddenly discovered that the wire had been cut by a shell. He at once went out in the open to mend the wire, although he was only 120 yards from the enemy, and had hardly returned when the wire was cut a second time. Again, without a moment’s hesitation, he went out to find where the wire was broken. This time, however, he was severely wounded as he was engaged in repairing the line, and when rescued was found still working away in spite of his wounds. Even then he refused to be taken out of the trench until he had handed over the secret code to an officer. Shells, bullets, wounds made no difference to him: he had his duty to do, and he meant to do it. For this act of bravery he was awarded the D.C.M.

On the 20th the 4th Battalion returned to Vlamertinghe, where it remained resting for a week, after which it moved up to Ypres, and took over the right of the right sector at Rifle Farm on the 27th for four days.

May.

The Battalion remained at Ypres until the 15th, taking over various portions of the line every four days. Nothing of interest occurred until the night of the 3rd, when it was found that the enemy had undermined our front line. In order to destroy the enemy’s shaft, our miners exploded a mine fifteen yards in front of our trenches. The shock of the explosion was very great, and the crater that was formed was roughly 200 feet in diameter and 80 to 100

feet deep. The far edge of the crater was about seventy yards from the enemy’s trenches. Immediately after the explosion Lieutenant Payne-Gallwey dashed over with a N.C.O. and ten men, and occupied the far edge of the crater to form a covering party, while Lieutenant Nairn, with a similar party, occupied the near edge of the crater, and commenced placing previously-filled sand-bags in position to form some cover while digging. Each of these parties took with them long ropes, which proved of the greatest assistance in keeping the men together and showing the line along which they were to dig. One man shot in the chest fell half-way down the crater, and was pulled up with this rope.

While the consolidation of the crater was in progress, Captain Layton determined to link up the wire entanglements and bring them round in front of the crater. He despatched another party from his company for this purpose, and ordered them to report themselves to Lieutenant Payne-Gallwey, but as the enemy was clearly visible, when the lights went up, the erection of barbed wire entanglements within seventy yards of their line was perilous work. The wiring of the crater, however, was successfully accomplished, although the enemy threw a quantity of bombs. Fortunately most of them pitched short, but seven casualties occurred from splinters. Meanwhile Lieutenant H. H. Sloane-Stanley on the right sent out similar wiring and digging parties from No. 2 Company to join up with No. 3 Company, and the two parties had got within thirty yards of each other when they were discovered by the

Germans, and a storm of bullets from the enemy’s machine-guns put an end to the work. The trench between the two companies had, however, been finished, and as there was no immediate hurry about the wire, the parties were withdrawn.

General Heyworth the next day, in a letter reporting the incident, wrote:

I personally inspected the crater this morning and was enabled to walk through the trench which was dug, and which now connects H.17 to H.19. The work done last night reflects the greatest credit on those officers and men who took part in it, more especially on the wiring party, who for some time had to work under the most trying circumstances, as the Germans turned a machine-gun on them. It was in this party that all the casualties occurred. The Officer Commanding the 4th Battalion Grenadier Guards must also be congratulated on the excellent arrangements made. The defence of this sub-sector has been considerably strengthened by this trench.

This was the last time General Heyworth saw the 4th Battalion, for he was killed on the 9th whilst going round the trenches of the 1st Battalion Grenadiers.[1]

On the 18th the 4th Battalion retired to Poperinghe by train, and on the 19th marched to Wormhoudt, and remained there till the end of the month, going into the trenches in various parts of the line, where it was continually under shell-fire, but nothing of interest appears to have happened.

June.

On June 1 the 4th Battalion moved to Poperinghe

again, and was employed on fatigues and digging. On the 5th Second Lieutenant J. B. M. Burke and Second Lieutenant C. S. Nash arrived, and on the 7th the Battalion marched to Honbeghem. The next day after a march of fifteen miles, it moved to Tatinghem, and on the 17th returned to Poperinghe. These were two long, hot marches, but no man fell out on the line of march either day. On the 18th the Battalion moved up to the Canal Bank at Ypres, and then back into the trenches on the right of R sector, with the Battalion Headquarters at Irish Farm. The line was very much disconnected, and consisted chiefly of a chain of posts, most of which were in bad order, while what trenches there were, were mostly derelict, and required a good deal of work. On the 28th Lieutenant H. H. Sloane-Stanley took out a patrol with the object of capturing an enemy post, but it was surprised by one of the enemy’s patrols, which opened fire on it, wounding every man in the left party of the patrol. One wounded man was left behind when the party retired, and although Lieutenant Sloane-Stanley, Lance-Corporal Holland, and Private Heap returned and searched for him, he was never found.

July.

After four very wet days in the trenches the 4th Battalion retired to Ypres for four days’ rest, and on the 4th returned for two nights to the trenches. The days spent in the trenches proved uneventful, but on the 7th a raid was made on a part of the enemy’s line known as the Canadian Dug-outs. A party under Lieutenant H. H. Sloane-Stanley and Second Lieutenant

D. O. Constable was sent out, and crawled up quite close to the enemy’s position. Unfortunately the ground was very wet and muddy, and this made a noiseless advance a matter of some difficulty. There seems no doubt that the enemy heard it, and took precautions. The barrage was timed to commence at 1.5 A.M., and this was to be the signal for the assault. At 1 A.M. the Battery covering the Twentieth Division on the right opened fire, and the raiding party mistook this for their barrage. Immediately Lieutenant Sloane-Stanley and Second Lieutenant D. O. Constable sprang to their feet, and were about to lead the assault when they found themselves confronted at fifteen paces by a party of the enemy who opened a sharp fire on them. Fortunately the shooting was very wild, and only four men were wounded. The fighting then resolved itself into a bombing and Lewis-gun contest, but the Grenadiers were well hidden and suffered no loss. Lieutenant Sloane-Stanley’s orders were not to assault unless it could be done by surprise, and he therefore decided to withdraw his party four at a time, covered by the Lewis gunners, who behaved with great coolness. So successfully did they cover the retreat that the whole party returned without loss. This raid alarmed the enemy, who opened a heavy bombardment on our line, during which 4 men were killed and 18 wounded, in addition to Captain M. Chapman, who was struck by splinters of a shell in the leg and hand.

On the 8th the Battalion retired to Poperinghe, and on the 10th Second Lieutenant L. R. Abel-Smith

joined the Battalion. The first anniversary of the formation of the Battalion was celebrated on the 15th in a befitting manner, and a programme suitable for the occasion was carried out. At the men’s dinners at 12.30 free beer and extra vegetables were issued. In the afternoon there was a football match between the right half and left half battalions, followed at 5 P.M. by a sergeants’ and corporals’ dinner, At 6.15 there was a Battalion concert, after which the officers had a dinner. Lord Cavan, who attended the football match, gave away the prizes, and afterwards addressed the Battalion. He visited the N.C.O.’s at dinner, and made them a short speech on the work done by the Division, giving especial praise to the Battalion for its initiative in raids and patrols. Major-General G. Feilding and Brigadier-General C. Corkran attended the officers’ dinner.

That night the 4th Battalion moved up again into the line, and became the right reserve Battalion, Nos. 1 and 2 Companies going into dug-outs on the canal bank, and Nos. 3 and 4 remaining at Château Elverdinghe, which was a large and comfortable house with a park and gardens. The shelling was continuous, and even back at the Château the shells fell at times in large numbers. On the 19th “a dummy raid” was carried out with the object of surprising the enemy with artillery fire when he expected an infantry attack. All the usual preparations for an attack were gone through, and at 12.30 A.M. our guns, assisted by the Belgian artillery, opened an intense bombardment for three minutes on a

selected portion of the enemy’s front line, while the infantry indulged in a rapid fire supplemented by Lewis guns. After three minutes the fire was lifted on the enemy’s second and third lines, following the procedure observed when an infantry attack was about to be launched. It was then hoped that the Germans would come out of their dug-outs and man their trenches in order to repel the attack. The artillery at once shortened their range, and gave the front German trenches a sound shelling. The result of this manœuvre was of course unknown, but judging by the very feeble reply made by the enemy, the ruse must have been fairly successful.

Second Lieutenant G. H. T. Paton joined the Battalion on the 23rd, and Second Lieutenant A. C. Flower on the 24th. Nothing of interest occurred during the days the Battalion was in the trenches until the 26th, when a party of the enemy raided No. 2 Company trench. About half-a-dozen Germans suddenly got in over the parapet and bombed a working party, which was completely taken by surprise. Second Lieutenant Maclear, hearing the bombing, rushed to the spot, and was instantly killed by a bomb thrown at close quarters. But the German occupation of the trench was only momentary, for bombing parties soon arrived from the right and left, and ejected the raiders, who did not wait but made their escape as fast as they could in the darkness. Second Lieutenant Maclear was an officer who could be ill spared, as he had proved himself to be absolutely fearless and self-reliant, and his loss was felt by every one

in the Battalion. Captain Layton was hit in the foot during the repulse of the enemy’s raid, and Sergeant Aiers, senior sergeant of the Battalion, was wounded for the third time.

The Guards Division now left the Ypres area and moved down farther south by easy stages. Having been relieved by the 1st Battalion Hampshire Regiment, the 4th Battalion Grenadiers marched to Poperinghe, where they entrained for Bollezeele and then marched to Millain. Aug. During the first fortnight in August they moved via Bollezeele, Millain, Arqueves, Mailly-Mallet to the line of trenches at Beaumont-Hamel. On the 7th Lieutenant J. F. J. Joicey-Cecil and Second Lieutenant R. Y. T. Kendall arrived, and on the 18th Captain C. Mitchell, Lieutenant R. Farquhar, and Second Lieutenant J. W. F. Selby-Lowndes joined the Battalion. The four days spent in the trenches at Beaumont-Hamel proved uneventful, although there was a good deal of shelling in addition to the Minenwerfers. On the 19th the Battalion started off for the Somme area, but this necessitated going a long way round by Vauchelles, Gezaincourt, Vignacourt to Ville. Here it rested for ten days, and on September 8 moved to Carnoy. On August 31 Captain E. G. Spencer-Churchill joined the Battalion.

CHAPTER XIX

THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME

A new stage, and a very distinct and important stage, in the Allied operations in the West was marked by the battle of the Somme.

It was at last understood, in the summer of 1916, that spasmodic attacks on the German trenches did little to gain any real and comprehensive success, and that, in order to prevent the enemy moving his reserves from one front to another, a simultaneous assault by all the Allies was necessary.

In accord with this view the Allies at the beginning of the year accepted the principle of an offensive campaign, and as the objective for the British and French advance Sir Douglas Haig and General Joffre selected the Somme area. All idea of “breaking through” had by now been abandoned. Such a thing was no longer regarded as possible in the West, and the plan adopted was one more suited to modern conditions of war and more economical of human life. The objects of the offensive were to relieve Verdun, to prevent the transfer of German troops elsewhere, and to wear down the resistance of the enemy on the Western front.

Conditions had changed, too, in other ways. The British Army had been slowly gaining strength, and the old Army had given place to the new. There were now fifty divisions in the field. At the same time, the supply of ammunition had been steadily increasing, and, thanks to the patriotism of the trade unions and the splendid performances of the workers, immense quantities of guns and shells were pouring into France. Consequently there was no reason why a general attack should not be made on the Western front, although, as Sir Douglas Haig pointed out in his despatch, he considered it advisable to postpone it as long as possible.

During the gigantic battle, which began on July 1 and lasted till November 18, the fighting was continuous. The German positions were amazingly strong. First came a network of trenches, well provided with bomb-proof shelters and protected in front by wire entanglements, many of which were in two belts forty yards broad and built of iron stakes, interlaced with barbed wire, often as thick as a man’s finger. Behind these lines the enemy’s strongholds had been reinforced with every device of military ingenuity—woods and villages turned into fortresses, cellars filled with machine-guns and trench mortars, dug-outs connected by elaborate passages. The enormous power of modern weapons of defence had been used to the utmost. In fact, the whole line was as nearly impregnable as Nature, art, and the unstinted labour of close on two years could make it. And undoubtedly the Germans believed it impregnable.

The first phase of the battle took place at the beginning of July, and although the attacks in the northern sector were unsuccessful, the armour was pierced; while in the south our troops secured Mametz, Montauban, Fricourt, Contalmaison, and Trônes Wood. On July 14 and the three following days, the capture of the enemy’s second line on a front of three miles gave us possession of the main plateau between Delville Wood and Bazentin-le-Petit.

The long and severe struggle, which was the second phase, began on July 18 and culminated on September 15 with the fall of Ginchy, after Pozières, Delville Wood, Guillemont, Falfemont Farm, and Leuze Wood had been taken in succession. But although the main ridge from Delville Wood to the road above Mouquet Farm was secured, Morval on the right and Thiepval on the left remained in German hands.

In the third phase Flers, High Wood, Martinpuich, Courcelette, and the Quadrilateral came into our hands one after another, and on September 25 Morval, Lesbœufs, and Gueudecourt were secured by the British Army, while the French took Combles. During October Thiepval was taken, and also Eaucourt l’Abbaye and Le Sars, while in November, as the outcome of an advance on both sides of the Ancre, we captured St. Pierre Divion, Beaucourt, and Beaumont-Hamel.

Thus all our principal objects were achieved, in spite of the fact that the Germans were able to mass more than half their army upon this part of their front. The British Army took 38,000 prisoners, including over 800 officers; also

29 heavy guns, 96 field-guns and field-howitzers, 136 trench mortars, and 514 machine-guns.

The battle was marked by the sudden appearance of the Tanks. So well had their secret been kept that until they came upon the battlefield the Germans had no idea of their existence. “The Machine-gun Corps, Heavy Section” was the official title of these heavy armoured cars which could move anywhere, over trenches and through wire entanglements, pushing down walls and even houses; they contained a garrison of six men with machine-guns and 6-pdr. guns. So many legends had grown up of their supernatural powers that their actual début caused a certain disappointment. But although in some parts of the battlefield they failed us, some of them did wonders, and many of the strongholds in the German line could never have been taken without their help.

The net result of the battle was a brilliant victory for the British Army, for not only was a large tract of ground captured from the enemy, but the three objects which we had set out to gain were fully attained. Verdun was relieved of pressure, the main portion of the German Army was detained on the Western front, and a crippling blow was struck at the enemy forces. It was clearly shown that, on anything like equal terms, the British could drive back the German Army, sheltered even by the strongest entrenchments.

As the area and duration of modern battles are immense, a long time naturally elapses before their effects are felt by the losing side.

Formerly battles lasted only a few days, and their results were seen immediately in the retirement of the beaten army. After the battle of the Somme, however, nothing happened at first, and it was not until six months later that the Germans found that their positions had become untenable, and a general retirement was advisable.

The Guards Division at the Somme

Sept.

Nothing has ever been done by battalions of the Guards finer than the part they took in the battle of the Somme. It was not until the beginning of September that the Guards Division arrived in the Somme area, so it was not present at the first two phases of the battle. But in the attacks of September 15 and 25 the men covered themselves with glory; their discipline and coolness under fire were magnificent, and they captured lines which had up to then been considered impregnable. The final assault of Lesbœufs was one of the most successful operations of the war.

Not only were the staff arrangements admirable, but the co-operation between infantry and artillery proved in every way perfect. Against the unflinching attack of the Division nothing could stand; the mass of shells poured over by the German artillery, the hail of bullets from their machine-guns, and the rifle-fire of their infantry in the trenches, were all powerless to check it. The men were splendid: it made not a scrap of difference whether they had officers or not, whether they were with their own units or

mixed up with other regiments. Nothing could stop them. When the 3rd Brigade went up, the battle had already been raging for over two months; and the Germans were then busily but vainly carrying out counter-attacks, in the hope of re-taking some of the ground that had been wrested from them. Consequently the two battalions sent forward came in for some very stiff fighting, especially the Welsh Guards, who went through some anxious moments owing to the advanced position they were occupying. They were fiercely attacked by large bodies of the enemy, but, with the help of one company of the 1st Battalion Grenadiers, managed to hold their own. Meanwhile the 4th Battalion Grenadiers—the other battalion sent up from the 3rd Brigade—held an uncomfortable position near the Quadrilateral, to the right and in rear of the Welsh Guards.

Parts of the line had also to be straightened, and “pockets” of Germans to be cleared away before the general attack of the 15th; and for this task were detailed those battalions from the 1st and 2nd Brigades which would not be in the front line on the 15th. There were some closely-contested bombing fights, supported by artillery, in the parts of the line that needed straightening, and these operations were all successfully carried out.

On the 12th Major-General G. Feilding issued the following orders:

The Guards Division Order, No. 76

1. The Fourth Army will attack the enemy’s defences between Combles Ravine and Martinpuich on Z day

with the object of seizing Morval, Lesbœufs, Gueudecourt, and Flers, and to break through the enemy’s system of defence.

The French are undertaking an offensive simultaneously on the South and the Reserve Army on the North.

2. The attack will be pushed with the utmost vigour all along the line until the most distant objectives are reached. The failure of one unit on the flank is not to prevent other units pushing on to their final objective, as it is by such means that those units who have failed will be assisted to advance.

3. Preliminary Bombardment.—(a) Commencing on the 12th September a bombardment and wire-cutting on the hostile defensive system will take place from 6 A.M. to 6.30 daily.

(b) The preliminary bombardment on the day of the attack will be similar to that of previous days, there being no further increase of fire previous to zero.

(c) At 6.30 each evening from the 12th September inclusive night firing will commence, and continue till 6 A.M., lethal shells being used.

4. (a) The Sixth Division is to attack on the right and the Fourteenth Division on the left.

(b) The 2nd Guards Brigade will attack on the right of the Division, the 1st Guards Brigade on the left. The 3rd Guards Brigade will be in Divisional Reserve.

5. Forming-up Areas.—Forming-up areas are shown on attached maps. The 1st and 2nd Guards Brigades will allot a forming-up area for the 75th and 76th Field Companies R.E. respectively in their forming-up areas.

Instructions as to movements of troops to their forming-up areas will be issued separately.

6. The objectives allotted to the Guards Division and neighbouring divisions are shown on attached map.

7. (a) 50 per cent Field Artillery covering the Division will be used for creeping barrage, and 50 per cent for stationary barrage.

(b) Details of the stationary barrages will be issued later. In all cases the stationary barrage will lift back when the creeping barrage reaches it.

(c) At zero the creeping barrage will open 100 yards in front of our front trenches, and will advance at the rate of 50 yards per minute until it is 200 yards beyond the first objective, when it will become stationary. At zero + 1 hour the creeping barrage will become intense on the line 200 yards in front of first objective, and will creep forward at the rate of 50 yards per minute in front of that portion of the 1st Guards Brigade which is to advance to the second objective.

(d) At zero + 1 hour and 10 minutes the creeping barrage will become intense on a line 200 yards in front of the first objective as far north as T.86.4.6, thence on a line 200 yards in front of the second objective, and will advance at the rate of 30 yards per minute until it has passed 200 yards beyond the third objective, when it will become stationary.

This barrage is to cover the advance of the tanks. There will be no creeping barrage in front of infantry during their advance to third objective, which commences at zero + 2 hours.

(e) At zero + 3 hours and 30 minutes the creeping barrage will become intense on a line 200 yards in front of third objective, and will advance at the rate of 30 yards per minute until it has passed 200 yards beyond fourth objective, when it will become stationary. This barrage is to cover the advance of the tanks. There will be no creeping barrage in front of the infantry during the advance on the fourth objective, which commences at zero + 4 hours and 30 minutes.

(f) In the attack on the first and second objectives gaps of 100 yards wide will be left in the creeping barrage for the routes of the tanks.

8. The flow of troops to the 2nd Guards Brigade and 1st Guards Brigade must be maintained so as to ensure a strong attack being pressed against each successive objective. Sufficient men will be left in each line captured to clear it of the enemy. No troops of the 2nd and 1st Guards Brigades will be detailed to remain behind in objectives after they have been passed for purposes of consolidation.

The task of the two leading Brigades is to press the attack through to their ultimate objectives with every means at their disposal.

9. The 3rd Guards Brigade will advance at zero + 1 hour and 30 minutes until its leading troops reach the south-western outskirts of Ginchy, when the Brigade will halt and await orders.

Special instructions as to action of Reserve Brigade will be issued.

10. Tanks will be employed to operate with the attack; instructions as to their movements are attached.

(Remainder of orders related to R.E., R.A., Aircraft and Transport.)

C. Heywood, Lieut.-Col.,

General Staff, Guards Division.

September 12, 1916.

So great was the danger of battalions being practically annihilated in an attack that orders had been issued for a certain nucleus of officers and N.C.O.’s to be left with the Transport, whenever a battalion went into action, so as to make sure of a sufficient number surviving to carry on the work. Accordingly on this occasion the Second in Command, the junior Captains of companies, the Battalion and Company Sergeant-Majors and Quartermaster-Sergeants in each battalion were left behind.

At 6.20 on the morning of the 15th the artillery

bombardment ceased, and the Guards Division advanced, preceded by a creeping barrage, with Pereira’s Brigade on the left and Ponsonby’s Brigade on the right, while Corkran’s Brigade remained in reserve. In the front line were the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Battalions of the Coldstream and the 3rd Battalion Grenadiers. The advance of the three Coldstream battalions was a wonderful sight, and they carried everything before them, but in their eagerness to reach the enemy lost direction and went too far to the left. Meanwhile the 3rd Battalion Grenadiers on the right kept straight on, so there was a considerable gap between it and the three battalions of Coldstream. Coming up through the German barrage, the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers, which was in support of the 2nd Coldstream, completely lost sight of the Coldstream battalions. In accordance with its orders it advanced with its right on the Ginchy—Lesbœufs road, but on reaching the first objective it found it occupied by the enemy instead of by the Coldstream, as it expected, and suffered heavy loss. Under the impression that it was following in the wake of the 2nd Battalion Coldstream, it was advancing in artillery formation, and had to form line when within a few yards of the enemy’s trench, which was untouched, as the Coldstream battalions had passed farther to the left.

When the first objective was secured, the order from right to left was as follows: the 3rd Battalion Grenadiers, the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers, the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Battalion Coldstream. Between the first two objectives there were

several intermediate lines of trenches, all of which were most confusing for the battalions in front. The Coldstream battalions mistook these intermediate lines for objectives, and thought that they had reached the third objective when they were really between the first and second objectives. Their real position, however, was correctly reported by the air scouts.

Meantime the Quadrilateral—a powerful system of redoubts—on the right had made any advance by the Sixth Division impossible, and on the left also the Fourteenth Division had been held up by some strong points in the enemy’s line. The result was that the Guards Division had both flanks in the air, and was subjected to a withering fire almost from the start. The 3rd Battalion Grenadiers on the right and the 3rd Battalion Coldstream on the left were obliged to throw out protective flanks, and so had some difficulty in keeping pace with the battalions in the centre.

It was some time before the two brigades were firmly established in the first objective, as there were parts of the line in which some Germans had been left, more especially in the space reserved for the tanks, which unfortunately never arrived. However, the 1st and 2nd Battalions Coldstream in the centre pushed on and gained the second objective, while the battalions right and left threw back protective flanks. The second objective was a trench running into the first objective, and only concerned the Coldstream battalions on the left.

On the next day, the 16th, Corkran’s Brigade was ordered to advance through the leading

brigades and continue the attack. But it did not start till the middle of the day, and after having gone some distance was held up by machine-gun fire and the men were told to dig themselves in where they were.

The whole Division was taken out of the line on the night of the 18th and remained resting in bivouacs until the 20th, when each brigade sent battalions into the front line to dig assembly trenches and straighten parts of the line. On the 22nd Major-General G. Feilding issued the following orders:

Guards Division Order, No. 82

1. (a) The Fourth Army will renew the attack on Z day in combination with attacks by the French to the South and the Reserve Army to the North.

(b) The objectives of the Fourteenth Corps include Morval and Lesbœufs, and those of the Fifteenth Corps Gueudecourt.

(c) The attack of the Fourteenth Corps will be carried out by the Fifth Division on the right, the Sixth Division in the centre, and the Guards Division on the left. The Fifty-eighth Division will form a defensive flank to the south of the Fifth Division. The Twenty-first Division will be attacking on our left.

2. The 1st Guards Brigade will attack on the right and the 3rd Guards Brigade on the left.

The 2nd Guards Brigade (less one Battalion) will be in Divisional Reserve.

1st Battalion 2nd Guards Brigade will be in Corps Reserve; 2nd Guards Brigade will notify Divisional Headquarters the name of the Battalion detailed.

3. Preliminary Bombardment.—A steady bombardment of hostile positions will be commenced at 7 A.M. on Z day, and will be continued to 6.30 P.M.; it will recommence at 6.30 A.M. on Z day.

The ground in front and rear of the German trenches which are being bombarded will be searched occasionally with 18-pdr. shrapnel and H.E. shell.

There will be no intensive fire previous to the hour of zero. Night firing will be carried out nightly between the hours of 6.30 P.M. and 6.30 A.M.

4. Forming-up areas are shown on the attached map. The 1st and 3rd Guards Brigades will allot forming-up areas to the 75th and 55th Field Companies R.E. respectively, within their areas.

Instructions for movements to forming-up areas will be issued separately.

5. Objectives allotted to the Guards Brigades and neighbouring Divisions, also the dividing lines, are shown on attached map.

6. The infantry will advance to the attack on the Green line at zero; to the attack on the Brown line at zero + 1 hour, and to the attack on the Blue line at zero + 2 hours.

7. Barrages—

(a) 50 per cent of the Field Artillery covering the Division will be used for the creeping barrage and 50 per cent for stationary barrage.

(b) In all cases the stationary barrage will lift when the creeping barrage meets it.

8. (a) At zero the creeping barrage will commence 100 yards in front of our front trenches. It will advance at the rate of 50 yards per minute until it is 200 yards beyond the Green line, when it will become stationary.

(b) At zero + 1 hour the creeping barrage will commence 200 yards in front of the Green line and will advance at the rate of 50 yards per minute until it has passed 200 yards beyond the Brown line, when it will become stationary.

(c) At zero + 2 hours the creeping barrage will commence 200 yards in front of the Brown line, and will advance at the rate of 50 yards per minute until it has passed 200 yards beyond the Blue line, when it will become stationary.

9. (a) The task of the two leading Guards Brigades is to press the attack through to the Blue line. A sufficient flow of troops must be maintained by the 1st and 2nd Guards Brigades from zero onwards to ensure that the attack made from the Brown line is strong and well supported.

(b) Special arrangements must be made to deal with resistance in Lesbœufs and thus prevent any possibility of the enemy getting round our troops who have gained the Blue line.

(c) The 1st and 3rd Guards Brigades will garrison and consolidate the Brown line with a portion of their reserves when the attack goes forward to the Blue line.

(d) On gaining the Blue line, Battalions will be sent forward to any ground from which observation can be gained; such points will be consolidated and eventually joined up with our line.

On the 24th the Battalions that were to lead the attack took their place in the line ready for the next day. The order of attack was for the Fifty-sixth Division to form the right flank guarding Combles, the Fifth Division to capture Morval, the Sixth Division to occupy the southern end of Lesbœufs, and the Guards Division to take Lesbœufs.

In Pereira’s Brigade, which attacked on the right, the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers and 1st Battalion Irish Guards were in the front line, and were supported by the 2nd and 3rd Battalions Coldstream. In Corkran’s Brigade on the left the 4th Battalion Grenadiers and 2nd Battalion

Scots Guards led, supported by the 1st Battalion Grenadiers and 1st Battalion Welsh Guards. The orders of the two brigades differed. In the 1st Guards Brigade the leading battalions were to take all the objectives, and when they passed on the battalions in support were to consolidate each line. In the 3rd Brigade the two leading battalions were to take the first two objectives and then throw out a defensive flank; the battalions in support were then to advance through them and secure the third objective, one of these again throwing out a defensive flank.

At 12.35 P.M. on the 25th the attack started, and in spite of the wire, in some places intact, the first objective was secured. At 1.30 the advance to the second objective began. The battalions in front suffered heavily, especially in officers, but by 1.45 the second objective was in our hands. All this time the Twenty-first Division on the left had been held up, and the left flank of the Guards Division was consequently in the air. The 4th Grenadiers had therefore to throw out a defensive flank to the left, which eventually became so long that not only that battalion but also the Welsh Guards were employed to guard it. Major-General Feilding regarded this defensive flank as of the utmost importance, since it was from this quarter that a counter-attack was expected. In some parts of the line the wire was uncut, and the advance was retarded, but this did not prevent the objectives being secured by the times specified in the orders.

As soon as we had gained the second objective, the 1st Battalion Grenadiers and 1st Battalion

Welsh Guards passed through the leading battalions of Corkran’s Brigade and attacked Lesbœufs, while the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers and 1st Battalion Irish Guards continued their advance.

Thus with the 4th Battalion Grenadiers on the defensive flank there were three Grenadier battalions engaged in the attack on the third objective. The capture of Lesbœufs itself fell to the lot of the 1st Battalion, and news was at once sent back that all the objectives had been secured. The battalions in front appear to have been so elated by their success that they asked for the cavalry to be allowed to go through. But Lord Cavan, the Corps Commander, realised that it would be madness to employ cavalry on such a limited front, and gave orders that the leading battalions were to consolidate their position.

The 2nd Battalion

2nd Batt.

Detached from the 1st Guards Brigade on August 31 the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers had been sent up to Carnoy to dig in rear of the Twentieth Division. It returned on September 3rd to Méaulte, where it underwent a thorough course of training, something in the nature of a dress rehearsal. Expert bombing officers gave instruction to every company in the Brigade, so that each man had an opportunity of learning the latest developments in bombing. All the battalions practised deploying in artillery formation, attacking an imaginary line of trenches, and then moving on immediately to a second

objective. A great deal was learned in the way of signalling, and trials were made of a system of organising a single main trunk line, as central as possible, so as to avoid having a number of defective lines to each unit. This line was to consist of telephone or visual or relay posts—or, if possible, of all three. Careful consideration was given to the difficult task of getting the men across No Man’s Land, and every detail was rehearsed. Later the whole Brigade was practised in the attack, and in maintaining constant communication during an advance.

Sept. 9.

After a week the 1st Brigade received orders to proceed to Carnoy, and all surplus kit and equipment were left behind in store. The 2nd Battalion Grenadiers marched to Carnoy, and bivouacked not far from the place where it had been at the beginning of the month.

Sept. 11.

On the 11th orders were received for the 1st Brigade to relieve the left half of the 3rd Guards Brigade, while the 2nd Guards Brigade was to take the place of the other half. These orders (given below) were communicated to commanding officers at a conference held at Brigade Headquarters.

Brigadier-General Pereira issued the following orders:

1st Guards Brigade Order, No. 73

1. The Fourth Army will attack the enemy’s defences between Combles Ravine and Martinpuich on Z day with the object of seizing Morval, Lesbœufs, Gueudecourt, and Flers, breaking through the enemy’s system of defence.

The French are undertaking an offensive simultaneously

on the south and the Reserve Army on the north.

2. The attack will be pushed with the utmost vigour, all along the line, until the most distant objectives are reached.

The failure of a unit on a flank is not to prevent other units pushing on to their final objectives, as it is by such means that these units, which have failed, will be assisted to advance.

3. Preliminary Bombardment.—(a) Commencing on the 12th September bombardment and wire-cutting on hostile defensive system will take place from 6 A.M. to 6.30 P.M. daily.

(b) The preliminary bombardment on the day of the attack will be similar to that on previous days, there being no increase of fire previous to zero.

(c) At 6.30 P.M. each evening from the 12th September inclusive, night firing will commence and continue till 6 A.M. Lethal shells will be used.

4. (a) The 2nd Guards Brigade will attack on the right of the Division—the 1st Guards Brigade the left, and the 3rd Guards Brigade will be in divisional reserve.

(b) The 4th Brigade of the Fourteenth Division will attack on the left of the 1st Guards Brigade.

(c) Boundaries are shown on attached map.

5. Forming-up Areas.—Forming-up areas are shown on attached maps.

Instructions as to movement of troops to their forming-up areas will be issued separately.

6. Objectives allotted to Guards Brigades and neighbouring Divisions are shown on attached map.

7. The infantry will advance to the attack of the Green line at zero.

To the attack of the Brown line at zero + 1 hour.

To the attack of the Blue line at zero + 2 hours.

To the attack of the Red line at zero + 4 hours and 30 minutes.

8. Artillery Barrages—

(a) 50 per cent of Field Artillery covering the Division will be used for creeping barrage, and 50 per cent for stationary barrage.

(b) Details of stationary barrages will be issued later. In all cases the stationary barrages will lift back when the creeping barrage reaches it.

(c) At zero the creeping barrage will open 100 yards in front of our trenches, and will advance at rate of 50 yards per minute until it is 200 yards beyond the first objective, when it will become stationary.

At zero + 1 hour the creeping barrage will become intense on a line 200 yards in front of the first objective, and will creep forward at rate of 50 yards per minute in front of that portion of the 1st Guards Brigade which is to advance to the second objective.

(d) At zero + 1 hour and 10 minutes the creeping barrage will become intense on a line 200 yards in front of the first objective as far north as T.8.b.4.6, thence on a line 200 yards in front of second objective, and will advance at rate of 30 yards per minute until it has passed 200 yards beyond the third objective—when it will become stationary.

This barrage is to cover the advance of the tanks.

There will be no creeping barrage in front of the infantry during their advance to third objective, which commences at zero + 2 hours.

(e) At zero + 3 hours 30 minutes, the creeping barrage will become intense on a line 200 yards in front of the third objective—and will advance at rate of 30 yards per minute until it has passed 200 yards beyond fourth objective, when it will become stationary. This barrage is to cover the advance of the tanks.

There will be no creeping barrage in front of the

infantry during the advance to the fourth objective, which commences at zero + 4 hours 30 minutes.

(f) In the attack on first and second objectives gaps of 100 yards wide will be left in the creeping barrage for the routes of the tanks.

9. The attack will be carried out as follows:

(a) The 2nd and 3rd Battalions Coldstream Guards will attack and capture the first, second, and third objectives. The dividing line between these battalions is shown on attached maps.

(b) The 2nd Battalion Grenadier Guards will move in rear of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions Coldstream Guards. When the latter advance to the assault of the second objective the 2nd Battalion Grenadier Guards will occupy the first objective until the 1st Battalion Irish Guards have passed through them; they will then follow and support them in their attack on the fourth objective.

The rôle of the 1st Battalion Grenadier Guards is to form a defensive flank, if necessary, and to support the attack of the 1st Battalion Irish Guards in their attack on the fourth objective, with such troops as are not required for a defensive flank.

(c) 1st Battalion Irish Guards will attack the fourth objective.

(d) Machine-gun Coy. One section will accompany each battalion in the assault, and will be under the orders of the O.C. Battalion.

(e) Stokes T.M. Battery. Four guns will accompany the 2nd Battalion Grenadier Guards in case it is necessary to form a defensive flank. They will not go farther than the second objective. They will act under the orders of the O.C. Battalion.

The remaining four guns will be in the trench in which advanced Brigade Headquarters is situated, S.24.b.6.2.

(f) The 75th Field Coy. and the four work platoons will remain in their forming-up area until further orders are received.

10. Formation of Attack.—The formation for the carrying out of the attack is shown on attached sketch.

The 2nd Battalion Grenadier Guards and 1st Battalion Irish Guards will move into line or small columns according as to whether they are under rifle-fire or not.

11. The flow of troops will be continuous. This is to ensure a strong attack being pressed against each successive objective.

Officers commanding battalions will call for support, if necessary, from the battalions immediately in rear of them. If necessary, men will be left in each line captured to clear it of the enemy, but troops will not be detailed to remain behind in objectives for purposes of consolidation, except that the 2nd and 3rd Battalions Coldstream Guards will remain in the third objective ready to support the troops attacking the fourth objective.

The task of the Brigade is to press the attack through to their ultimate objectives with every means at our disposal.

12. Tanks will be employed to co-operate with the attack. Instructions as to their employment are attached.

Instructions will be issued as to movement of tanks to their departure positions, and as to time of their advance to the various objectives.

13. Royal Flying Corps—

(a) 9th Squadron, Royal Flying Corps will have one Contact aeroplane in the air from zero to dark on Z day, and again from 6.30 A.M. to 9 A.M. on Z + 1 days.

(b) Flares will be lit as follows:

(1) On obtaining each objective.

(2) At 12 noon and 5 P.M. on Z day by leading troops.

(3) At 6.30 A.M. on Z + 1 day by leading troops.

Red flares will be used by infantry, Green flares by Cavalry.

14. An orderly with a watch will visit all Battalion H.Q. about 1 P.M. and 7 P.M. on Y day, so that time may be checked.

15. Special instructions will be issued on the following subjects:

(a) Medical arrangement.

(b) Supply of rations, water, S.A.A., Light T.M. ammunition and hand grenades.

(c) Communications.

16. All transport will be packed up and ready to move forward at one hour’s notice after zero + 4 hours.

The Brigade Transport officer will remain at Divisional Headquarters, Minden Post, from zero + 2 hours onwards.

On Y day after 7.30 P.M. the road running north from cross-roads S.28.d.4.2 will be clear of all wheeled traffic.

17. As soon as the final objectives have been captured by the infantry the cavalry will advance and seize the high ground Rocquigny—Villers-au-Flos—Riencourt-les-Bapaume—Bapaume.

The Fourteenth Corps will be prepared to support the cavalry on the above line at the earliest possible moment.

18. Prisoners will be sent via Brigade Headquarters to Divisional Collecting Station at Crater Post A.8.a.6.3, where they will be taken over and searched under A.P.M. arrangements.

Receipts will be given for prisoners and escorts will return to their units.

All captured documents should be sent with prisoners to Divisional Collecting Station, whence they will be forwarded under Divisional arrangements.

19. Dumps.—R.E. dumps of sand-bags and wire have been established along the Guillemont—Waterlot Farm road in the Brigade area. A water dump is being established at Advanced Brigade Headquarters at S.24.b.6.1½.

Dumps of bombs and S.A.A. are also being established along the Guillemont—Waterlot Farm road in the Brigade area.

20. Brigade Headquarters will be established at S.24.b.6.1½ from 9 P.M. to-night.

M. B. Smith, Captain,

Brigade-Major, 1st Guards Brigade.

September 13, 1916.

S.A. Chandler & Co. Southampton, photographers Emery Walker ph. sc.

Lieutenant-General The Earl of Cavan. K.P., K.C.B.

Sept. 12.

By September 12 the whole Brigade was fully equipped. To every battalion had been issued bombs, sand-bags, distinguishing arm-bands, rockets, flares, wire-cutters, etc., and all that remained to be done was to fix the hour and the day of attack.

The 2nd Battalion Grenadiers took over the left half of the line occupied by the 3rd Guards Brigade on the night of the 12th, while the 1st Battalion Irish Guards moved up in support to Trônes Wood and Bernafay Wood. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions Coldstream, which were to carry out the assault, remained resting at Carnoy till the last moment, and the Brigade Headquarters moved up to a dummy trench between Trônes and Bernafay Woods.

The following message from Lieut.-General Lord Cavan was circulated:

The Corps Commander knows that there are difficulties to be cleared up on the left and in front of the 1st Guards Brigade, and on the right of the 2nd Guards Brigade, but the Commander-in-Chief is of opinion that the general situation is so favourable that every effort must be made to take advantage of it and that tanks should carry out a special programme before zero to deal with these unsatisfactory positions. The Commander-in-chief states that there were only two German divisions in reserve on a large front, and that one of