THE GRENADIER GUARDS
IN THE GREAT WAR OF
1914-1918

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Captain H.R.H. The Prince of Wales, K.G., M.C., &c.

THE
GRENADIER GUARDS
IN THE GREAT WAR OF
1914-1918

BY

Lieut.-Colonel

The Right Hon. SIR FREDERICK PONSONBY

(LATE GRENADIER GUARDS)

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY

Lieut.-General THE EARL OF CAVAN

MAPS BY MR. EMERY WALKER

IN THREE VOLUMES
VOL. III

MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED
ST. MARTIN'S STREET, LONDON
1920

COPYRIGHT

CONTENTS

ILLUSTRATIONS

MAPS

CHAPTER XXVIII

FEBRUARY, MARCH 1918 (4TH BATTALION)

4th Batt. Feb. 1918.

On February 12 the 4th Battalion left the Guards Division, and was played out by the drums of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Battalions Grenadier Guards, the pipers of the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards, and the band of the Irish Guards. Brigadier-General Lord Henry Seymour watched the Battalion march by, and congratulated Lieut.-Colonel Pilcher on its smart appearance.

Thus the newly formed 4th Guards Brigade joined the Thirty-First Division. On the 14th Major-General Sir Charles Fergusson, Commanding the Thirteenth Corps, inspected the Battalion, and expressed himself very pleased with its appearance on parade. On the 17th the Battalion relieved the Durham Light Infantry in the line near Arleux Loop, and was subjected to a slight shelling. This was the new Brigade's first tour in the trenches, and the 4th Battalion was the first of the three Battalions to go into the front line. The line taken over was an example of the new system of holding the front in depth. The Brigade frontage, 2000 yards in length, was held by one Battalion, and constituted the outpost line. Held very lightly by posts at long intervals, it was supported some 1000 yards in rear by a trench, known as the Arleux Loop, South and North, where the Battalion Headquarters were situated together with one company in reserve. Lieut.-Colonel Pilcher was aware that the arrival of a fresh Battalion in the line was likely to be observed by the enemy, and that therefore a raid was highly probable. If any confirmation of this theory was required it had already been supplied by a prisoner, who had been captured before the relief, and had stated that the enemy suspected the presence of the Guards Division, and intended shortly to make a raid to confirm the fact. Nothing, however, was observed either to indicate the exact time or the locality; in fact, everything seemed normal, and the officer commanding the 2nd Battalion Irish Guards went round the posts with Lieut.-Colonel Pilcher in the usual way in order to make the necessary arrangements for the relief the next morning.

From the evidence of the single surviving prisoner, who was captured, it was clear that the Germans had planned and rehearsed every detail of the coming raid with great thoroughness. Practice trenches, made from aeroplane photographs, had been dug in Beaumont, and the raiders were minutely trained in their duties. All the men who were to take part in the raid had been withdrawn from the line for three weeks, and had been well fed and cared for. They were the pick of the 469th German Infantry Regiment, and had been selected on account of their physique and proved courage. Their equipment was of high quality, with every detail carefully thought out; it consisted of a short, light rifle of 1917 pattern with a leather sling, a trench dagger, an automatic pistol, wire-cutters, a watch, and a canvas bag for carrying stick-bombs.

The raid, which had been planned by the Regimental Staff of the 469th Regiment, was carried out in two sections, each consisting of 1 officer and 28 other ranks, in all about 60. At 8 P.M. a concentrated bombardment was put down by the enemy from Oak Post on the left to Tommy Post on the right, and the bombardment was so intense that portions of our trenches were completely obliterated. An S.O.S. signal went up some way to the left of Oak Post, and our barrage came down with great promptitude opposite that part of the line; thus valuable time was lost in having it transferred to where the raid was actually taking place.

Shortly after the enemy's barrage was put down, the men in No. 8 Post saw a strong party of Germans advancing down Brandy Trench from Tee Trench, and a fierce fight commenced. Seeing they were greatly outnumbered, our men slowly closed in on No. 7 Post. After the bombardment began, Captain Benson at No. 2 Company Headquarters sent Second Lieutenant Wrixon to ascertain what was happening, and this officer, after passing through the enemy's barrage, came up just as No. 8 Post was joining No. 7. He at once took charge of both posts, and concentrated his men in Beer Trench, which he determined to hold to the last. He now had 2 N.C.O.'s and 12 men to oppose to the raiding party. The Germans on reaching Brandy Trench split up into two parties; one party continued to bomb up the trench while another, which comprised the majority, rushed across the open towards Beer Trench, with the obvious intention of cutting off these posts. Private Fletcher, No. 1 of the Lewis-gun team in No. 7 Post, saw them coming, and at once turned his gun on them. Several dropped, and the remainder fled, carrying their wounded with them. No sooner was this party disposed of than Lieutenant Wrixon saw a fresh group of men, advancing stealthily down the trench in front of him. Instead of waiting for them, he determined to attack them, and advancing down the trench he shot the first man he met dead with his revolver. His next opponent at once flung a bomb at him, which burst within a few feet, only slightly wounding him. Private Coles, who was just behind him, shot the man dead with his rifle at point-blank range. Then a bugle was blown, and the raiders disappeared. During this fight the Germans attempted an old ruse by calling out in perfect English: "Take off your gas respirators and return to your support line." Some of the men repeated these instructions under the impression they came from one of their officers, but Second Lieutenant Wrixon yelled at the men, and countermanded the spurious order.

At the commencement of the fight, when No. 8 Post was falling back on No. 7, Private Taylor, who had been sent back to No. 8 Post to fetch some bombs, which had been left behind, ran straight into the arms of a party of Germans, and was taken prisoner. He was ordered on pain of death to lead the Germans to No. 14 Post, and feigned to be willing to do so, when the raiders suddenly changed their minds, and told him to lead them back to their own lines. He at once acquiesced, but instead of doing so, led them to the strongest post in our line. When he knew he was within a few yards of Nos. 7 and 8 Posts, he shouted a warning to the garrison, and threw himself on the ground. His warning was heard by his comrades, who at once hurled bombs in the direction of his voice, and the Germans fled, abandoning their prisoner. Unfortunately, one of our bombs wounded Private Taylor, but he was finally rescued by Private Cunliffe, a stretcher-bearer who had already behaved with great gallantry, bringing in the wounded under heavy shell-fire.

Meanwhile a totally distinct fight took place at Nos. 13 and 14 Posts, generally known as Alton Post, where there was a machine-gun protected by a bombing-post, under Lieutenant W. B. Ball. It happened that a party of Royal Engineers, under an officer, was working at the machine-gun dug-out that night. The machine-gun itself was knocked out by the first few shells of the barrage, and a small party of Germans immediately afterwards emerged from the darkness, and rushed at the post. Corporal Horan, who was in charge of the bombing-post, disabled three of them with well-directed bombs, but one very tall German, followed by some more, broke through, and proceeded to throw bombs down the dug-out. It was all done in a moment, and the officer of the Royal Engineers, who was in the dug-out, having just escaped the first bomb, ran round to another exit, when he narrowly missed a second one, before he got out into the open. Meanwhile, Private Moore, a Grenadier attached to the Royal Engineers, closed with the leading German, and was stabbed to death. Corporal Horan then came up, and shot the tall German dead. Presumably the leaders of the party had all been accounted for, as the remainder turned and disappeared into the darkness.

It is difficult to estimate with any accuracy the enemy's casualties, since there is no doubt they were able to carry away most of their wounded and even their dead. It is only possible, therefore, to state the actual number of dead and wounded left in our lines. These were: 2 killed and 5 wounded, 4 of whom subsequently died. The casualties in the Grenadiers were: 2 killed, 2 died of wounds, and 5 wounded. It was a distinctly unfortunate raid for the Germans, who had taken infinite pains to make it a success; yet not only had they suffered heavy loss, but they had failed to obtain an identification of any kind either in the nature of a prisoner or a bit of equipment. With 2 officers and nearly 60 men, they imagined they would make short work of 12 men under one officer, but they had the misfortune to meet some tough fighters, who were anxious to come to close quarters with them.

Brigadier-General Lord Ardee two days later received the following message:

The Corps Commander requests that you will convey to the officers and men of the 4th Battalion Grenadier Guards his high appreciation of the gallant and successful resistance put up by the garrison of Arleux Post on the night of February 19-20. He wishes also to congratulate the Thirty-first Division on having completely repulsed for the fourth time in succession during the last two months determined and elaborately prepared attempts to penetrate their lines.

On the 21st the 4th Battalion was relieved by the 2nd Battalion Irish Guards, and retired to Ecurie Camp for four days' rest, after which it returned to the front trenches. On the 23rd the sad news of the death of Lieutenant Ludlow was received. He had been universally popular as Quartermaster of the Battalion, and had only just retired to take up an appointment at Chelsea Hospital, when he was killed by a bomb dropped by a German aeroplane during a raid on London.

4th Batt. March 1918.

On March 21 the 4th Battalion was in billets in the Cheiers-Guestreville-Bethencourt area, and the Brigade as part of the Thirty-first Division was in General Headquarters Reserve, when an order arrived, warning all Battalions to be ready to move the next morning. At 10 a.m. the 4th Battalion started off in buses, and with the rest of the Brigade moved via St. Pol and Doulens to Blairville. It was now to take part in ten strenuous days' fighting, digging, and marching, in open warfare of the kind associated with the retreat from Mons in 1914, and to forgo the comparative comforts of an established trench line. The following officers took part in these operations:

Mar. 23.

Mar. 24.

During the early morning shells were heard passing over at a great height, and as the Battalion went through St. Pol it was clear that the enemy had begun a systematic bombardment of the back areas, and was paying particular attention to that town. Lieut.-Colonel Pilcher, who had gone on ahead with Lord Ardee, sent back word for the buses to proceed through Blairville to the cross-roads west of Boisleux-au-Mont. There he summoned the Company Commanders, and explained the situation to them. From where they were the men could see a large fire burning on the sky-line, and this proved to be the canteen at Boisleux-au-Mont, which was destroyed together with many thousand pounds' worth of food in order to prevent these stores falling into the hands of the Germans. Whether these drastic measures were necessary seems doubtful, since the enemy did not reach this place till four days later. Guided by Lieut.-Colonel Pilcher, the 4th Battalion moved through Hamelincourt to a ravine east of the Ervillers-Boyelles road, where it arrived on the morning of the 23rd. The line occupied by the 4th Guards Brigade ran through Judas Farm, to the east of Ervillers; St. Leger was in the hands of the Germans. The 4th Battalion and the 2nd Battalion Irish Guards held the front line, while the 3rd Battalion Coldstream Guards was in support. During the morning the news reached the Battalion that the enemy had broken through at Mory, and that the right flank of the Brigade was in danger; this was contradicted later. An order issued to the Battalion to feel its right, and take over ground occupied by the Fortieth Division was never carried out, as the troops on the right refused to move, stating that they had received no orders. Then commenced a most harassing shelling of our trenches by our own guns, which every effort on the part of the Commanding Officer failed to stop. Both British and German shells fell on our trenches and caused many casualties, including Second Lieutenant Gilbey, who was wounded. Nor was the shelling the only annoyance: the men in the front trench were constantly employed in repelling attacks, and fired off no less than 80,000 cartridges, inflicting continual losses on the advancing enemy. The fighting went on intermittently all day, and, although the enemy continually attacked the Brigade front, he was unable to make the slightest impression on the line. That night Lord Ardee issued definite orders for the whole Brigade to "side step" 1000 yards to the right, in order to close any gaps that might exist near Mory. When the order was carried out the next morning, the 2nd Battalion Irish Guards found no troops on its right, and was in a precarious position. During the whole day constant rumours of trouble on the right succeeded each other, and in the evening the news arrived that the Fortieth Division had suffered so severely that it had been relieved by the Forty-second Division. Still the line remained intact, and the German attacks only resulted in masses of their men being killed. The constant strain on our men was, however, beginning to tell, and all ranks were glad when darkness came down, and the attacks ceased. A curious order was issued warning the men against spies dressed as British officers, who were spreading false reports, with the object of hastening our retirement.

4th Batt. Mar. 25, 1918

Mar. 26.

During the morning of the 25th the Companies were warned of a possible retirement under cover of darkness, and about noon it became certain that the line had given way on the right, for men from various units began coming back from the direction of Mory, followed by platoons led by officers; and at 1 P.M. Captain Chapman, who went with the Commanding Officers of the Coldstream and Irish Guards to reconnoitre, reported Germans coming over the ridge on the right in large numbers. This information was at once passed on to Lord Ardee, who gave orders to evacuate the line and fall back north-west of Courcelles. The situation when the order for retirement arrived was extremely difficult, for not only had the right given way entirely, but the enemy was advancing in some force directly against the Battalion Headquarters of the Grenadiers and Coldstream, and there seemed nothing to prevent their penetrating to the rear of the two Battalions. Lieut.-Colonel Pilcher immediately withdrew Nos. 2 and 3 Companies under Captain Benson and Lieutenant Lyon, and placed them on the high ground behind Battalion Headquarters, whence they would be instantly available for a counter-attack in case of emergency. All the time the shelling continued, and the retirement had to be carried out with the enemy unpleasantly close. While the order was being executed Captain Benson was wounded, and was in danger of being left behind, but was gallantly rescued and carried back by Sergeant Marsh. Indeed the evacuation of all the wounded of the 4th Guards Brigade was a notably fine piece of work. No wounded man was left to fall into the enemy's hands, although the medical officers of the Coldstream and Irish Guards and the sick-sergeant of the Grenadiers remained behind, after their Battalions had retired, and the enemy was within a few hundred yards of their aid-posts. Whether our artillery was imperfectly informed as to the movements of the infantry in front, or whether they gave the enemy credit for more rapidity than they possessed, is not clear, but an unfortunate incident occurred which completely prevented a counter-attack being made, when there was an opportunity of inflicting a severe blow on the advancing enemy. A Company of Coldstream had been formed up for a counter-attack, when, without any warning, our heavy artillery poured shells on their Battalion Headquarters, where they were assembling, causing a number of casualties. Although there was constant shelling, the enemy seemed unwilling to come to close quarters with the 4th Guards Brigade, and consequently when it became dark the position remained unchanged, save for a strong defensive flank drawn back on the right. That night the Companies were warned to assemble at Battalion Headquarters, but when once more our heavy artillery began to shell that particular spot, runners were despatched to alter the point of assembly. Captain O'Brien, Irish Guards, was wounded by a shell, and shortly afterwards Second Lieutenant Dawson-Greene was hit by another at the assembly point, and died of the wounds he received some days later. The Battalion formed up in the sunken road to the rear of Battalion Headquarters, and marched off to the Crucifix at Moyenneville, which it reached at 1 A.M. the next morning. Immediately it arrived, it dug a new line of trenches east of the village, and the men were supplied with hot food from the cookers which had been sent up. All the time the German artillery continued to shell Moyenneville without inflicting any casualties. At 4.30 A.M. the Battalion received orders to retire to Ayette, and to hand over its positions to the troops in front of it. Two hours later it moved back through Ayette to Douchy-les-Ayette, where the Battalion Headquarters were established. At noon an order arrived from Lord Ardee, assigning to the Battalion the special rôle of occupying and fortifying Quesnoy Farm, and two hours later it took up its new position. No. 3 Company, under Captain G. C. Sloane-Stanley, on the left; No. 4, under Lieutenant Minchin, in the centre; and No. 1, under Captain H. H. Sloane-Stanley, on the right, dug in east of the farm, while No. 2, under Lieutenant T. Pryce, remained in support behind the trench. The men were dead beat, having worked and fought unceasingly for the last three days, and it was a great relief to all ranks when the night passed quietly. An alarming message of undoubted German origin was received, stating that the enemy had broken through at Hebuterne with armoured motors, but this was subsequently refuted.

Mar. 27.

March 28-31.

Early in the morning of the 27th it was reported that the 93rd Brigade was retiring on the left, and this information was at once passed on to the Brigade Headquarters; at first it was thought best to support this Brigade, and an order to that effect was issued. This was, however, cancelled later, and Lieut.-Colonel Pilcher was instructed to send one Company to each of the other two Battalions of the Brigade. Captain G. C. Sloane-Stanley and Lieutenant T. Pryce went off at once with Nos. 1 and 2 Companies, and did not come under the orders of the 4th Battalion again until the night of relief. In the meantime the enemy determined to take advantage of the retirement of the 93rd Brigade, and commenced to mass two battalions near the aerodrome outside Ayette. This tempting target was not lost on our artillery, but, in order that it might catch as large a number of the enemy as possible, it waited until the movement was nearly completed. Then with a deafening noise all available guns concentrated their fire on this spot, with the result that the most of the force was annihilated, and the survivors fled in disorder. It was as fine a bit of shooting as any one could wish to see, and the results astonished even the gunners themselves. Nos. 1 and 2 Companies, which had gone up to the front line, were able, in spite of the cold and wet, to dig and wire a formidable system of trenches. On the 28th Nos. 3 and 4 Companies moved to the left, and occupied a line that had been dug by the 3rd Battalion Coldstream Guards. The following three days passed quietly, and on the night of the 31st the Battalion was relieved by the 16th Battalion of the Lancashire Fusiliers, and marched back to Bienvillers. The total casualties incurred during the ten days' operations were: 4 officers wounded, and among the other ranks 9 killed, 1 died of wounds, 58 wounded, and 7 missing.

CHAPTER XXIX

APRIL, MAY, JUNE 1918

Diary of the War

1918

The Germans, finding that their advance was being brought to a standstill in the direction of Amiens, turned their attention farther north, and determined to threaten the Channel ports. On April 9 they began a concentrated attack with nine divisions on the British and Portuguese front between Armentières and La Bassée, and the fighting spread to Messines. Bailleul and Wulverghem, amongst other places, fell, and the Germans reached the Forest of Nieppe. Here they were checked, and at the end of April the German effort had spent itself, although Marshal Foch had been obliged to expend much of his reserve. The Germans had suffered enormous losses, and, though the German people rejoiced at the gain of territory, those who knew the true state of affairs were alarmed at the extravagant expenditure of men.

At the end of May Ludendorff determined to go straight for Paris, and with twenty-five divisions overwhelmed the French between Soissons and Rheims. This German onslaught continued with varying success until it reached Château-Thierry. The stubborn resistance of the French made any farther advance impossible, and, although the battle still raged on a gigantic front, the Germans had to abandon their intention of striking at Paris.

In April Naval raids on Zeebrugge and Ostend were made, and two ships filled with concrete were successfully sunk at the entrance of the Bruges Canal, while an obsolete submarine and two other ships were blown up off the Mole at Ostend.

In Italy the Austrians began offensive operations on a large scale, and crossed the Piave River, but the Italians, by a series of counterattacks, regained the lost ground, and by the end of June had driven back the Austrians with heavy loss across the river.

1st Batt.

The 1st Battalion

Roll of Officers

April.

After the very strenuous days at the end of March, when the German attacks were successfully repelled, the 1st Battalion remained in the front line for two days, but whether the enemy considered it wiser to try some other parts of the line, or whether they were merely waiting for reinforcements, they showed very little signs of life. A heavy bombardment, directed against the Canadians on the left, which was vigorously responded to, seemed to indicate an attack in that direction, but by the time the 1st Battalion was relieved no move on the part of the enemy had taken place. After two days' rest at Blaireville the 1st Battalion returned to the trenches at Boisleux-au-Mont, where the line was singularly quiet. Early on the 5th a desultory bombardment commenced on our front line, but only with shells of light calibre. Later the railway station came under fire from the heavy guns, but by 9 A.M. all was quiet again, and no more shells were sent over by the enemy that day. Although infinite trouble had been taken to conceal Battalion Headquarters, a big flight of hostile aeroplanes flying low was able to locate it, and the enemy made some very accurate shooting. On the 8th the enemy began a gas bombardment, and obtained several direct hits on the entrance to the Battalion Headquarters dug-out and on two Lewis-gun posts. A new gas containing ether, which gave off little or no smell, was used by the enemy, and accounted for a large number of the Battalion Staff. After two more days' rest at Blaireville, the 1st Battalion returned to the trenches, where, although the shelling was light, the enemy's aircraft was very active, often flying low and firing into the trenches. Patrols were sent out along the whole frontage on the night of the 11th, and one under Second Lieutenant R. Holmes and Sergeant Brown failed to return. Little, however, was seen of the enemy, although a wiring party was encountered once, and another time the Germans could be heard demolishing a hut near the main Arras—Bapaume road. The next day the enemy occasionally fired with the Minenwerfer, but there was no shelling to speak of. In the evening Lieutenant R. Holmes and his patrol returned, having been cut off on the previous night by very strong parties of the enemy. Finding they were unable to regain our lines, they hid in shell-holes throughout the day, and took advantage of the darkness when night came to get back. On the 14th, when the usual patrols went out, Second Lieutenant W. Fleet took out a strong party to visit a German machine-gun post, which had come under the observation of a patrol on the previous night. Approaching it with caution, he found that it was unoccupied, but a German rifle, which he brought back, seemed to show that the enemy had been there lately. Four escaped British prisoners, who had been captured on the 21st, re-entered our lines near the sunken road; they belonged to the Sixth Division. The 1st Battalion went for ten days' rest to Barly until the 24th, when they marched to Bienvillers-au-Bois on their way to the trenches. Lieutenant Tindal-Atkinson and Second Lieutenant Paget-Cooke, who had just arrived to join the Battalion, were wounded by a shell that fell in No. 4 Company Mess. On the night of the 27th the 1st Battalion returned to the front line of trenches, but the Germans were singularly inactive except for occasional bursts of shell-fire. The patrols that were sent out failed to encounter any German parties, but one discovered that Calcutta Trench had been recently occupied by the enemy. Signs of its recent occupation were found in the shape of fresh bombs, rifles, etc., and a corporal's greatcoat proved that the occupants had belonged to the 453rd Regiment. Traces of German occupation could be seen all over the ground, but the most recent was the line of newly dug posts about 80 yards west of the Ablainzeville—Ayette road. The enemy evidently occupied an advanced picket line, as individual heads could be seen on the low ground, and the rapidity with which his light machine-guns and snipers opened fire from various points confirmed this surmise. On the 29th the enemy still remained inactive, and never engaged any targets which offered themselves. In the evening snipers were sent out from our lines to positions, where they could observe and engage any movement on the part of the enemy, who could be seen advancing in groups of two to occupy shell-slits. Parties were dribbled forward by the King's and No. 2 Companies, and told to occupy any empty enemy-slits, to check any advance of the enemy. These moves and countermoves continued up to 9 p.m., when Lord Gort decided to withdraw all the advanced posts, and patrols continued to reconnoitre throughout the night.

May.

The enemy's attitude during May was purely defensive, and except for two half-hearted raids he showed no inclination to come west of the line of the Ablainzeville—Ayette road. The Germans apparently were occupying an outpost line from Ablainzeville to Ayette, with a shell-hole line in rear and a line of resistance again behind that, and the situation depended very much on what was going on in other parts of the line: if the enemy succeeded in driving back the troops to the north and south, a retirement would become necessary, even without any movement of the hostile troops in front.

During the whole month the 1st Battalion remained either in the front trenches or in reserve. When in the trenches one and a half Companies held the front line, and one and a half Companies were in support, with one Company in reserve. On the days they became the Reserve Battalion, they were simply targets for the German artillery; every day there were casualties, and the number of men killed, wounded, and gassed amounted to a good many during the month. On some days the enemy activity was very slight, and on others the shelling would become intense. Patrols under officers were sent out every night, and the information gained varied. Occasionally bodies of Germans would be reported, moving about and talking, but when no attack developed such movements ceased to have any significance. The back areas were shelled with gas-shells daily, and so it happened that the casualties, when the Battalion was in reserve, were often greater than when it was in the front line. On the 17th the area occupied by the 1st Battalion was subjected to a severe bombing by aircraft; Second Lieutenant W. A. Fleet and Second Lieutenant G. E. A. A. Fitz-George Hamilton were killed, and Second Lieutenant S. J. Hargreaves and Second Lieutenant G. D. Neale were seriously wounded. The two latter never recovered from the wounds they received, and died the next day. The loss of these four keen young officers was deeply felt by the whole Battalion. At the same time Sergeant Robshaw and Lance-Sergeant Nicholson, the Lewis-gun instructors, were wounded and buried by the walls of a house, which were blown in by a bomb on the top of them. On the 20th the Cojeul Valley was bombarded with gas-shells, and Captain O. Stein, Second Lieutenant R. Holmes, and Second Lieutenant C. Brutton were gassed. A few days of rain and mist were welcomed by every one, since it made observation impossible, and therefore the enemy's artillery had to content itself with a small amount of inaccurate shelling. On the 24th Second Lieutenant O. W. D. Smith was seriously wounded by a shell. On the 28th a German propaganda balloon was shot down near Quesnoy Farm; it contained copies of the Gazette des Ardennes, a French newspaper, edited by the Germans. Although enemy transport activity could be often distinctly heard, the impending offensive never developed.

June.

Much the same programme was followed at the beginning of June, and without any definite movement the enemy continued to bombard both the front trenches and the back area. On the 5th the Germans were located by a patrol, working on the road, and Stokes mortars were turned on to them, with the result that Véry lights went up in quick succession, no doubt an appeal for assistance. The guns on both sides were continually busy both day and night, and a great many shells of various sorts must have been fired. On the 8th the Battalion retired for a rest to Barly, where it remained until the end of the month.

2nd Batt.

The 2nd Battalion

Roll of Officers

April.

On the night of April 3 the Thirty-second Division captured Ayette, which considerably eased the situation on the right flank of the Guards Division. The 2nd Battalion went up into the line, and found the trenches very wet. On the 4th, during a heavy shelling, which was entirely directed against No. 1 Company on the right, Lieutenant the Hon. H. F. P. Lubbock was killed by a shell which pitched in the trench.

This was a great loss to the Battalion, for he was an officer of sound judgment, who did not know what fear was. Corporal Teague, M.M., was killed at the same time, and 6 men were wounded. The 7th and 8th were spent in a camp behind Blaireville and Heudecourt, when Lieutenant F. H. J. Drummond and Second Lieutenant G. F. Lawrence joined. After two more days in the trenches the 2nd Battalion retired to Saulty, where they remained training till the 24th. On the 14th Second Lieutenant J. A. Paton and Second Lieutenant C. A. Fitch arrived from the Reinforcement Battalion, and on the 20th Second Lieutenant C. Gwyer joined.

On the 24th the 2nd Battalion proceeded in buses to Bienvillers-au-Bois, to relieve the 15th Battalion Highland Light Infantry, in reserve west of Douchy-les-Ayette. Two companies were billeted in the old German line just west of Monchy-au-Bois, and the remainder were in trenches between Douchy-les-Ayette and Monchy. The following day the Battalion moved up into the front line on the eastern outskirts of Ayette, and found everything very quiet. The explanation seemed to be that the Germans were thinning out their troops in this district, in order to increase their forces available for the thrust forward north on the night of the 29th. Second Lieutenant C. A. Fitch, who had gone out with a patrol to reconnoitre the German lines, was wounded in the head and right arm by a bomb thrown from a German post.

May.

The same routine was carried out all during May: five days in the front line with inter-company relief, followed by two days in reserve at Monchy-au-Bois. On the 4th an American Company Commander and three N.C.O.'s were attached to the 2nd Battalion under instruction. In order to ensure that the junior officers were proficient in technical subjects, special lectures were given by Officers from different branches of the service, and were attended by Officers and N.C.O.'s of the Battalion when it was in reserve. On the 11th Lieutenant J. C. Cornforth arrived, and on the 19th Lieutenant C. A. Gordon and Lieutenant H. A. Finch joined the Battalion. On the 22nd, during a heavy bombardment which was directed on the front line, Lieutenant A. W. Acland, M.C., was wounded, and almost every day there were casualties amongst other ranks. The exact spot the enemy would select for their next thrust was naturally not known, and a determined attack was expected daily, but except for intense shelling the enemy showed no signs of life. On the 27th the shelling increased, and the enemy aircraft became very active, with the result that there were 9 men killed and 8 wounded.

June.

The first week in June was spent by the 2nd Battalion in the front line, where the shells continued to fall with monotonous regularity. On the 3rd Lieutenant R. M. Oliver joined the Battalion. On the 6th, after a relief, rendered difficult by the enemy's barrage, which had been put down on the tracks leading to the trenches, the 2nd Battalion proceeded to Saulty, where they were billeted in the village and the Château grounds. There they remained till the end of the month, training, carrying out tactical schemes, and learning the latest developments in bombing. Colonel Rasch organised a platoon competition in the following: bomb-throwing, rifle-bombing, message-carrying by platoon runners, stretcher-bearer competitions, bayonet-fighting, Lewis-gunnery, musketry, tactical scheme and drill. The tactical scheme was judged by the two other Commanding Officers in the Brigade, and the drill by the three Regimental Sergeant-Majors. No. 7 Platoon, under Lieutenant Palmer, was the winner; No. 16 Platoon, under Sergeant Taylor, second; and No. 4 Platoon, under Second Lieutenant Bevan, third. At the Divisional Horse Show, which took place on the 22nd, the 2nd Battalion won Major-General Feilding's Cup, and Lieutenant G. Vereker, the Transport Officer, was congratulated on his horses having proved themselves the best in the Division. On the 23rd Lieutenant N. McK. Jesper, Lieutenant L. St. L. Hermon-Hodge, and Second Lieutenant F. J. Langley rejoined the Battalion, and in the absence of Colonel Rasch, who had gone temporarily to command the Brigade, Captain Harcourt-Vernon took over the command of the Battalion. On the 29th a Guard of Honour for H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught, under the command of Captain Browning, went in buses to the Third Army Headquarters at Hesdin, where their smart appearance created a great impression. Onlookers refused to believe that the men had just come out of the line, and maintained that they had been sent out from England for the purpose. The following day, the Army Commander, General Sir Julian Byng, in a message addressed to the Division, expressed the satisfaction at their smart appearance, and added that their turn-out and bearing, their marching and handling of arms, were beyond all criticism.

3rd Batt.

The 3rd Battalion

Roll of Officers

April.

The 3rd Battalion spent the whole month of April either in the trenches, with three Companies in the front line, or in reserve. On the 7th Lieutenant E. G. A. Fitzgerald was wounded, and on the 8th the following officers joined the Battalion: Lieutenant F. A. Magnay, Second Lieutenant R. K. Henderson, Lieutenant C. Clifton Brown, and Second Lieutenant H. W. Sanderson. The days spent in the front trenches were remarkably quiet, but as the ground on which these trenches were dug was overlooked by the enemy, very little work could be done except wiring, and this at night. On the 14th the Battalion, having "embussed" at Ransart, proceeded via Beaumetz-les-Loges to Lakerlière and Larbret, where it was billeted. On the 17th drafts reached the Battalion with the following officers: Second Lieutenant E. L. F. Clough-Taylor, Second Lieutenant R. Delacombe, Second Lieutenant W. B. L. Manley, Second Lieutenant H. J. Gibbon, and Second Lieutenant R. C. G. de Reuter. The days spent in billets were taken up with training, but as the men had to remain ready to move at one hour's notice in the morning and three hours' notice in the afternoon, it was impossible for Companies to go far. An attack from the enemy was expected on the 21st, and additional precautions were taken, but the Battalion was not called upon to go up into the front line. Major Lord Lascelles was appointed Second in Command vice Major Cavendish, and as Lieut.-Colonel Thorne had to take temporary command of the Brigade, he had at once to command the Battalion. Companies were now organised into three platoons with the headquarters of a fourth or depot platoon, to which all details were attached, when the Battalion went into action. On the 24th Lieut.-Colonel Thorne returned to the Battalion, and took it up into the front line the following day. On the 27th the front posts were subjected to an unusually heavy shelling, during which Second Lieutenant C. L. F. Boughey was wounded, and there were 6 killed and 5 wounded among other ranks. On the following day the Battalion retired into Brigade Reserve, where it remained till the end of the month.

May.

During the first week in May the Battalion remained in the line, with an inter-company relief, Major Lord Lascelles taking turns with Lieut.-Colonel Thorne. On the 3rd Second Lieutenant R. P. Papillon and Lieutenant the Hon. M. H. E. C. Towneley-Bertie joined. Officers' patrols were sent out every night and in the early morning, to lie out and listen for any hostile movement. After three days' rest the Battalion returned to the trenches, and came in for much shelling. Our artillery carried out nightly a harassing fire on the enemy's tracks, roads, and possible assembly areas, and this naturally brought down considerable retaliation. Lieutenant the Hon. M. H. E. C. Towneley-Bertie was wounded, and among other ranks there were 10 killed and 14 wounded. Another tour of duty in the front line from the 20th to the 24th caused 2 killed and 25 wounded among other ranks. On the 26th Captain G. F. R. Hirst, Lieutenant E. R. M. Fryer, M.C., and Second Lieutenant J. Chapman joined the Battalion. On the 28th the Battalion returned to the front trenches, and again came in for a harassing fire. Inter-company reliefs were carried out, and the work was concentrated on shelters and the deepening of lateral communication trenches.

June.

The Battalion remained in the front line until June 3, and was constantly bombarded with Blue Cross gas-shells. On the 2nd Lieutenant G. M. Cornish, M.C., joined. After four days spent in reserve the Battalion retired to La Baseque, where the men were either billeted in the farms, or placed in tents and shelters in the wood. There they remained until the end of the month, training and practising tactical schemes.

CHAPTER XXX

APRIL 1-14, 1918

The 4th Battalion

4th Batt. April 1-14, 1918.

In April 1918 it fell to the lot of the 4th Guards Brigade to take part in some of the fiercest fighting of the war.

Ludendorff had opened a concentrated attack with nine divisions on the line north of La Bassée, and General von Quast, who commanded the German forces, had penetrated the portion of the line held by the Portuguese, and gained a considerable amount of ground. Reinforced by General von Arnim's infantry, he pushed on in the hope of gaining the Channel ports, or, at the least, of cutting the British communications. The German masses were pressing forward, and the general situation became more and more critical.

The attack commenced on April 9, and the Fifteenth Corps, under Lieut.-General Sir J. P. du Cane, which had been driven back, was holding the line between Merville and Vieux Berquin, south-east of Hazebrouck. Although the troops in Merville held fast, the enemy broke through at Robermetz, and, after capturing Neuf Berquin, moved down the road to Vierhoek.

Such was the state of affairs, when the 4th Guards Brigade was sent for to restore the line. After having "debussed" at Strazeele, it marched towards Vieux Berquin on the evening of April 11. Next day Brigadier-General the Hon. L. J. P. Butler received orders to attack Vierhoek, Pont Rondin, and Les Puresbecques, but before he could make much headway, was himself in turn vigorously engaged by the enemy. Reinforcements were being hurried up from several quarters, but everything depended on whether the line would hold. If the Australian Division, which was being sent up from the rear, could have time to detrain and take up good positions, the German rush would be checked. But should the enemy break through far enough to dislocate this arrangement, matters would become serious.

Realising the gravity of the crisis, General de Lisle, commanding the Fifteenth Corps, issued an order that no retirement must be made without an order in writing, signed by a responsible officer, who must be prepared to justify his action before a court-martial. Every inch of ground was to be disputed, and every company was told to stand firm until reinforcements could arrive.

The roll of officers of the 4th Battalion at the beginning of April was as follows:

The Battalion was in billets at Villers Brulin on April 10, when Lieut.-Colonel Pilcher received orders to move up in omnibuses to Strazeele Station via St. Pol. According to instructions it should have started "embussing" at 11.30 that night, but owing to some mistake the buses were twelve hours late, and all ranks spent the night and half the next day waiting by the roadside. It was impossible to cook any proper breakfasts, and too cold to sleep, so that when at last a start was made the men were already tired out. Then for twelve hours they jolted along in the buses, terribly cramped and without any opportunity for real rest. When it arrived at its destination next day, the Battalion marched to a field near Le Paradis, where Brigadier-General Butler held a conference. There were to be two battalions in the front line and one in reserve; on the right was the 3rd Battalion Coldstream which was to take up a position from L'Epinette to Le Cornet Perdu. The 4th Battalion Grenadiers would be on the left, and the 2nd Battalion Irish Guards in reserve.

April 12.

Marching off at once, the whole force reached its position about dawn on the 12th. So promptly was the movement carried out that there was no time to issue rations, and the food had to follow on later in limbers. There was also a considerable shortage of tools, with the result that when daylight came the men were still very inadequately dug-in. In the 4th Battalion, No. 1 Company, under Captain H. Sloane-Stanley, was on the right, No. 4, under Lieutenant Green, in the centre, and No. 2, under Captain Pryce, on the left, with No. 3, under Lieutenant Nash, in support. As soon as it was light the enemy opened a heavy fire along the whole front with field-guns, while they swept with their lighter field-guns and machine-guns all places where they detected any movement. Battalion Headquarters seemed to come in for special attention, and, whenever any one went in or out, it was the signal for a shower of shells to fall round the spot.

An order came to Brigadier-General Butler to secure the line from the College to Vieux Moulin with his brigade, and to prevent any movements along the Merville—Neuf Berquin road. He accordingly went up to Battalion Headquarters, and ordered an advance at 11 A.M. At the same time he sent up two companies of the Irish Guards to advance in échelon behind the right flank, in the hope of getting in touch with the Fiftieth Division. In the 4th Battalion Captain H. Sloane-Stanley was told to push forward two platoons to seize Vierhoek, and Captain Pryce to occupy Pont Rondin with a similar force.

The following were the officers who took part in the operations from April 12 to 14:

The attack started at 11 a.m., but the Coldstream encountered such strenuous opposition that they were unable to advance more than 100 yards. Nor could No. 1 Company of the 4th Battalion Grenadiers make much headway towards Vierhoek, owing to the intense and accurate machine-gun and artillery fire, which swept the only road over the stream; and it suffered severely in its attempts to carry out the orders. Second Lieutenant Osborne, however, had managed to push on about 200 yards with his platoon when he was wounded. But No. 2 Company made a most skilful advance towards Pont Rondin, led by Captain Pryce himself.

In the houses down the road, by which the Grenadiers had to come, the Germans were posted with light machine-guns, and before any progress could be made these houses had to be cleared. Slowly and systematically, No. 2 Company worked from house to house, and silenced the machine-guns. Thirty Germans were killed in this way—Captain Pryce alone accounted for seven—and were found afterwards in the houses or near by. Two machine-guns were taken, as well as a couple of prisoners.

During the whole operation, this company was under heavy fire, not only from machine-guns but also from a battery of field-guns, which was firing with open sights from a position some 300 yards down the road. It was a remarkably fine performance, and was watched with intense interest from Battalion Headquarters, which were some 200 yards in rear of the centre of the line, in a position from which the commanding officer could see most of the trenches occupied by his battalion. Lieutenant Nash, who had brought up one platoon to support No. 2 Company, was on his way back when his hand was carried away by a shell, and the command of No. 3 Company devolved on Lieutenant M. D. Thomas.

About 3 P.M. the situation of the 4th Guards Brigade became very critical. On the right the Coldstream reported that there was no sign of the Fiftieth Division, which should have been on their right flank, and at the same time Captain Pryce sent back word that his left flank was in the air, and that Germans could be seen 1000 yards in rear of his company. He added that he was being engaged by trench mortars and field-guns, which were firing at him with open sights from the exposed flank.

Affairs on the right were improved by the arrival of a company of the Irish Guards, which, without orders, undertook a counter-attack in conjunction with a company of the Coldstream. But, having no troops to send up on the left flank, Brigadier-General Butler decided that that portion of the line must be withdrawn. Accordingly, Lieut.-Colonel Pilcher ordered Captain Pryce to fall back, but even then there was a large gap between his company and the troops on the left flank, of which the Germans took advantage. Having reached the position indicated, Captain Pryce held on to it in spite of several determined attacks by the enemy. Colonel Pilcher, accompanied by the Adjutant, Captain Gerard, visited the left of the line about 4.30 P.M. He found No. 2 Company rather scattered, as it had been compelled to form a defensive flank. Meanwhile, after an intense artillery preparation, the enemy attacked No. 1 and No. 4 Companies, and was driven back with severe losses.

All day the Battalion Headquarters were severely shelled by two German field-guns and also by trench mortars. The farm they occupied was set on fire, and both Captain M. Chapman, who had distinguished himself on many occasions as intelligence officer, and Lieutenant N. R. Abbey, who was attached to Battalion Headquarters, were killed by shells. A good many valuable men, who had served on Battalion Headquarters for a long time, were killed or wounded during the day. The farm was full of cows and horses, which had to be turned loose when the farm caught fire, and several casualties took place on this account. The Headquarters were afterwards moved to the garden of the farm. To some extent the fire was kept down by the skilful and gallant conduct of Lieutenant Lewis of the 152nd Brigade R.F.A., who exposed himself continually to get direct observation, while his guns undoubtedly inflicted heavy casualties on the advancing Germans.

At the close of the day, the front of the 4th Battalion remained intact, but the cost of holding this line against repeated assaults had necessarily been very heavy. No. 2 Company lost 80 men and 1 officer out of 120 who went into action, and No. 4 Company lost 70 per cent of its strength and all the officers. The total casualties in the Battalion were 250, including 8 officers. On the other hand, the enemy lost so heavily that the ground in front of the Battalion was strewn with their dead; in some places there were heaps of bodies piled up in front of the trenches. Some idea of the fierceness of the fighting may be gathered from the fact that during the day the 4th Battalion alone fired off no less than 70,000 rounds of ammunition.

In view of the situation on both flanks, Brigadier-General Butler gave orders on the night of the 12th that the Brigade was to take up a new line. For this the 2nd Battalion Irish Guards was to have its right resting on Pont Tournant, with the 3rd Battalion Coldstream in the centre, and the 4th Battalion Grenadiers on the left, in touch with the 12th Battalion K.O.Y.L.I., which was to join up with the troops of the Twenty-ninth Division. In response to General Butler's request that the line held by his brigade might be contracted, the Fifth Division was ordered to take over the line as far as L'Epinette inclusive.

As soon as this relief was completed, the 2nd Battalion Irish Guards and one company of the Coldstream were withdrawn into Brigade Reserve, and the 210th Field Company R.E. went up, to help the 4th Battalion Grenadiers dig the new line. To replace some of the losses in the Battalion, Captain Minchin, Lieutenant Lyon, and Lieutenant Burt were sent up, and Lieutenant Murray-Lawes went to Battalion Headquarters. Colonel Pilcher's orders were to delay the enemy at all costs, so as to give the Australian Division time to detrain and come up to that part of the line.

The new Battalion frontage was 1800 yards long; the country was absolutely flat, with not a single hedge to mask the trenches, and the line was held by companies in isolated posts. So heavily had the Battalion suffered in the fighting on the 12th that it had only 9 officers and 180 other ranks left—that is to say, one man to every ten yards of front.

As the Battalion Headquarters had been destroyed, Colonel Pilcher assembled the newly-arrived officers at the Irish Guards Headquarters, and explained to them that the new line was to be dug east of the Vieux Berquin—Neuf Berquin road, so that the village of La Couronne and the cross-roads south of it might be protected. When Captain Minchin reached the leading companies, Captain Pryce told him the men were so dead beat that he thought they were quite incapable of digging a new line, and the Adjutant of the K.O.Y.L.I. said his men were in much the same condition. When this was reported to Colonel Pilcher, he went up himself to explain how things stood. He could find no trace of the machine-guns from the Thirty-first Division, which should have been there. The Germans were so close that they could be heard talking quite distinctly. He found Captain Pryce, who was quite worn out from want of sleep, and made it clear that the orders must be carried out, as it was absolutely essential to alter the position of the trenches. The plans had been changed, and the line the Battalion was now to occupy lay between La Couronne and the burnt farm, that had been the Battalion Headquarters.

The men were awakened with difficulty, and led to the new position, where, exhausted as they were, they were set to dig themselves in. Having satisfied himself that the orders were understood, Colonel Pilcher went in search of Captain Minchin, but failed to find him in the dark. The field company of R.E., that was to have been sent up to help, did not appear, and as there were only 14 men left in No. 4 Company, and 30 in No. 2, a continuous line of trenches was out of the question. Captain Minchin, therefore, ordered them to dig rifle-pits, capable of holding three or four men at intervals, and even so there were gaps of considerable length between companies. So utterly weary were the men that it was not at all easy to make them understand what had to be done, and naturally the darkness did not help to simplify matters. No. 1 Company, under Captain H. Sloane-Stanley, had gone too far to the right, and instead of being up to the burnt farm was some 200 yards away. This made it necessary to post a strong sentry group, where it could guard the gap.

It was nearly dawn before the digging was finished; one man in each bay then took turns to watch while the other three slept. One source of constant anxiety to the officers was the ammunition, which had not been sent up. Just before dawn Lieutenant Lyon received a message that it had been dumped near La Couronne, but as it was then getting light he could not send men for it. Captain Pryce, however, succeeded in getting five boxes before daylight.

April 13.

Fog hung thickly round during the early morning of the 13th, and it was found that the Germans had taken advantage of it to work up machine-guns close to our line. Their first attack occurred at 6.30, and was directed against the 3rd Battalion Coldstream. With the aid of a tank, the enemy forced his way between the left and centre companies of the Coldstream, but was soon ejected. A company of the 2nd Battalion Irish Guards went up later to strengthen that part of the line. At 9.15 Colonel Pilcher found that strong German attacks were developing all down the line, and sent orders round to the companies that they must hold on to their line at all costs, and fight to the end. This message was duly acknowledged by all officers commanding companies.

4th Battalion at La Couronne

Position on April 13, 1918.

As soon as the mist cleared away, the Germans opened fire with their machine-guns and swept the parapet with bullets. When the light improved, they brought up more machine-guns, and were able to enfilade the trenches. Under cover of this fire they crawled forward by ones and twos, and established sniping posts in some unfinished trenches not 150 yards off. The Brigade-Major came up to Battalion Headquarters, to confirm the report that the troops on the left had retired, and that the left was entirely in the air. He had also heard that the enemy had penetrated the centre of the Brigade. Colonel Pilcher and the Brigade-Major went down the road to within some 150 yards of La Couronne, where they met Private Bagshaw (afterwards killed), who was runner to No. 4 Company, and who reported that the centre was still intact. After going up close to the front line to verify this statement, the Brigade-Major returned to inform the Brigadier of what he had ascertained.

Captain Minchin meanwhile reported the precarious condition of affairs in front, and was told in reply that a company of Irish Guards and a platoon of Coldstream would be sent to his assistance, but these reinforcements never arrived. At one time the Germans seemed to be contemplating a determined attack; they stood up and advanced in extended order, in the hope of finding a gap and penetrating the line, but the steady fire poured on them by the 4th Battalion soon changed their minds, and sent them back to cover. About 12.30 P.M. the 12th Pioneer Battalion of the K.O.Y.L.I. at La Couronne was completely blown out of its trenches by the enemy's trench mortars. When the men of that battalion found that the troops on their left had been pushed back, and that the Germans were working round in rear of them, they had no choice but to retire. This placed the left flank of the 4th Battalion in the air.

Captain Pryce sent back an urgent message saying that the Germans were in Vieux Berquin and La Couronne, and that another column, estimated at two battalions, was advancing from Bleu. Up to that point, he added, he had managed to beat off the enemy, and there was a large number of their dead in front of his trenches, but he was not strong enough to resist much longer the repeated assaults of so large a force. As soon as this message reached General Butler, he sent up the company of Irish Guards, which had already been promised, but it never got to Captain Pryce, for by now the Germans had wedged themselves in some force between him and his hopes of relief. Advancing north of the road leading to La Couronne, the reinforcing company was met by large numbers of Germans coming from La Becque. It fought on till it was completely cut off, and only one sergeant and six men escaped.

An attempt was made to alter the position of a Lewis-gun belonging to No. 2 Company, but the moment they moved the N.C.O. and the men with it were fired on, and the gun was disabled. Finding that all attempts to retrieve the gun were useless, Second Lieutenant Philipps, who was in charge of the party, decided to rejoin Captain Pryce, but was hit in the hip by a machine-gun bullet just as he reached the trench.

Their turning of the left flank allowed the Germans to creep round in rear of the Battalion, but they had not gone far before they were engaged by the Battalion Headquarters, as well as the 3rd Battalion Coldstream Headquarters, who offered a most determined resistance. This final effort kept them successfully at bay until the arrival of the Australian Division put a final and effective stop to any farther movements on their part.

There remains the epic story of Captain Pryce. One last message was received from him—that his company was surrounded and his men shooting to front and to rear, standing back to back in the trenches to meet the encircling enemy at all points.

Of what happened afterwards, an outline at any rate was gathered from a corporal of the company, who escaped from Vieux Berquin the following night. Reduced now to only thirty men, the gallant little band fought on all that day. Without a pause they fired at their advancing foes, steadily, calmly, with the same rapidity and deadly aim that caused the Germans in the Mons retreat to mistake our "contemptible" riflemen for machine-guns. The enemy was puzzled. They could not for a moment believe that such a stout resistance could be put up by anything but a formidable force, and dared not make the attempt to come to close quarters.

By the evening the defenders were practically at the end of their tether. Only eighteen out of the thirty were left, and they had used up every scrap of ammunition. The Germans were in Verte Rue, and the beleaguered band could see the field-grey uniforms advancing towards Bois d'Aval. It was now 8.15. Suddenly Captain Pryce perceived a new move against him. A party of the enemy had made up their minds to test the strength of their obstinate opponents; they pressed forward, and got to within 80 yards of the stubbornly-held trenches. The position seemed hopeless, but not for a moment did he flinch. Though the last cartridge had been fired, the men still had their bayonets, and he ordered them to charge.

Straight at the advancing enemy he rushed at the head of his handful of men. The Germans were completely taken aback. They dared not fire, for fear of hitting their own men, who were now in rear of the Grenadiers' desperately defended position, and retired. Thereupon Captain Pryce decided to take his men back to the trench again.

But by now the enemy had seen. They had realised the almost incredible weakness of the hitherto unknown force, that had so long successfully kept them at bay. And, restored to confidence, they came on once more. Once more Captain Pryce led the tattered remnant of his company—that now numbered only fourteen—to the charge, and when last seen they were still fighting fearlessly and doggedly against overwhelming odds.

In all the glorious record of the Grenadiers there has been no story more splendid than this. It was a Homeric combat—two battalions held up (and the advance of a whole enemy division thus delayed) by a few determined men. Of the losses they inflicted on their overwhelmingly superior foe, some idea was gathered by Lieutenant Burt, who when taken prisoner afterwards was shown by a German officer the heaps of enemy dead in front of the British trenches. If ever a niche were earned in the Temple of Fame it was by these brave men and their brave leader—who, having already won a bar to his Military Cross, was awarded the Victoria Cross for this crowning act of gallantry.

Meanwhile, No. 1 and No. 4 Companies, who had been enfiladed all day, had lost all their officers. Captain H. Sloane-Stanley had been killed and Captain Minchin wounded in three places, though he just managed to crawl back afterwards, being fired at all the way. In No. 3 Company Lieutenant Lyon was killed, and subsequently the whole company was surrounded and taken prisoners. The survivors of No. 1 and No. 4 Companies held on till night, although by then the Germans were in rear of them, and finally managed to get back to the Australians. The Headquarters of the Battalion took up a position in the evening just south of the Forêt de Nieppe, in prolongation of the Australian line. Although the line had been saved, the whole Brigade had been cut to pieces. The Coldstream and Irish Guards had suffered the same fate as the Grenadiers, and few of them got back to the Australian line.

By April 14 the 4th Battalion had been three days and three nights fighting and digging without any rest, while of the nineteen officers who went into action only two were left. The casualties were:

The total casualties amongst other ranks were 504, or 90 per cent of the strength of the Battalion.

In the Brigade the casualties amounted to 39 officers and 1244 other ranks.

The following message was sent by Lieut.-General Sir H. de B. de Lisle, the Corps Commander, to General Sir H. S. Horne, commanding the First Army:

SECRET.

XV. Corps No. 608/13/70.
Dated 23-4-1918.
31D/211.A.

Second Army

I forward the attached narrative of the action of the 4th Guards Brigade during the operations of the 11th to 14th April 1918, for the information of the Army Commander.

An account of the operations of the Corps as a whole is being prepared, but this record of the glorious stand against overwhelming odds made by the 4th Guards Brigade is of exceptional interest.

The history of the British Army can record nothing finer than the story of the action of the 4th Guards Brigade on the 12th and 13th April 1918.

The troops of the 29th and 31st Divisions by their stout defence covered the detrainment of the First Australian Division and saved Hazebrouck.

(Signed)  Beauvoir de Lisle,
Lieut.-General Commanding XV. Corps.

XV. Corps.
23-4-18.

Copy to 31st Division.

..............................

..............................

Forwarded for your information.

(Signed)  W. H. Annesley, Lieut.-Colonel,
24-4-18. A.A. and Q.M.G., 31st Division.

General Sir H. S. Horne, commanding the First Army, telegraphed as follows to the Commander of the Fifteenth Corps:

I wish to express my appreciation of the great bravery and endurance with which all ranks have fought and held out (during the last five days) against overwhelming numbers.

It has been necessary to call for great exertions and more must still be asked for, but I am quite confident that at this critical period, when the existence of the British Army is at stake, all ranks of the First Army will do their best.

(Signed)  H. S. Horne, General,
Commanding First Army.

Sir Douglas Haig in his Despatch of October 21 describes the fighting as follows:

Next day (April 12) the enemy followed up his attacks with great vigour, and the troops of the Twenty-ninth and Thirty-first Divisions, now greatly reduced in strength by the severe fighting already experienced, and strung out over a front of nearly 10,000 yards east of the Forêt de Nieppe, were once more tried to the utmost. Behind them the First Australian Division, under the command of Major-General Sir H. B. Walker, K.C.B., D.S.O., was in process of detraining, and the troops were told that the line was to be held at all costs until the detrainment could be completed.

During the morning, which was very foggy, several determined attacks, in which a German armoured car came into action against the 4th Guards Brigade on the southern portion of our line, were repulsed with great loss to the enemy. After the failure of these assaults, he brought up field-guns to point-blank range, and in the northern sector, with their aid, gained Vieux Berquin. Everywhere except at Vieux Berquin the enemy's advance was held up all day by desperate fighting, in which our advanced posts displayed the greatest gallantry, maintaining their ground when entirely surrounded, men standing back to back in the trenches and shooting to front and rear.

Emery Walker. ph. sc.

Brigadier-General C. R. Champion de Crespigny D.S.O.

In the afternoon the enemy made a further determined effort, and by sheer weight of numbers forced his way through the gaps in our depleted line, the surviving garrisons of our posts fighting where they stood to the last with bullet and bayonet. The heroic resistance of these troops, however, had given the leading Brigade of the First Australian Division time to reach and organise their appointed line east of the Forêt de Nieppe. These now took up the fight, and the way to Hazebrouck was definitely closed.

The performance of all the troops engaged in this most gallant stand, and especially that of the 4th Guards Brigade, on whose front of some 4000 yards the heaviest attacks fell, is worthy of the highest praise. No more brilliant exploit has taken place since the opening of the enemy's offensive, though gallant actions have been without number.

The action of these troops, and indeed of all the Divisions engaged in the fighting in the Lys Valley, is the more noteworthy because, as already pointed out, practically the whole of them had been brought straight out of the Somme battlefield, where they had suffered severely and had been subjected to a great strain. All these Divisions, without adequate rest and filled with young reinforcements, which they had had no time to assimilate, were again hurriedly thrown into the fight, and in spite of the great disadvantages under which they laboured, succeeded in holding up the advance of greatly superior forces of fresh troops. Such an accomplishment reflects the greatest credit on the youth of Great Britain, as well as upon those responsible for the training of young soldiers sent out from home at this time.

Lieutenant C. Kerr of the 8th Battalion Australian Infantry afterwards reported that, when the Australian Division was establishing a line of defence for the troops in front to fall back upon, isolated parties from the front arrived. Sergeant E. Shaw of the 4th Battalion on reaching that line, collected all the men he could, and inquired where he should take up a position; but Lieutenant Kerr, who knew what hard fighting the Battalion had been through, offered to send these men back to his Battalion Headquarters. Sergeant Shaw, however, asked permission to stay in the line with his men until he received instructions to join his battalion. A position behind the hedge near Seclin Farm was allotted to these men, and there they stayed until the 15th, when they received orders to join their battalion.

Lieutenant Kerr added in his report:

The men of my company and battalion are full of admiration for the manner in which the Guards fought. We watched the fighting in the village and farms whilst consolidating new line. The moral effect on our troops of the stubborn resistance offered by these troops in denying ground to the enemy, the orderly withdrawal to our line, and the refusal of this sergeant to leave the line when offered the choice of comfortable quarters, was excellent.

CHAPTER XXXI

APRIL TO NOVEMBER 1918

The 4th Battalion

4th Batt. April 1918.

Lieut.-Colonel Pilcher brought the remnants of the 4th Battalion out of the line on the 15th, and after halting for a few hours at Grand Sec Bois, arrived at Borre. The billets into which the Battalion went, were between Hazebrouck and Borre, and the men were glad to get a rest after their hard fighting. Captain the Hon. F. E. Needham arrived, and took over command of No. 1 Company, and Second Lieutenant P. G. S. Gregson-Ellis, who joined at the same time, was posted to No. 2 Company. The Battalion was now so weak in numbers that Lieut.-Colonel Pilcher organised it into two companies of three platoons each. Being in reserve it was still in the area of operations, and on the 16th, while the Germans were shelling the back areas, one shell fell in one of the billets, killing three men, and wounding five more, including Company Sergeant-Major Pettit. On the 16th the Battalion marched to La Kreule, moving on the next day into billets at La Halte. Brigadier-General Butler found that these sadly depleted battalions were difficult to work with, since at any time his Brigade might be called upon to take over a portion of the line, and a battalion of six platoons would be expected to hold trenches, occupied by a battalion up to full strength. He therefore determined to make a composite battalion of the 4th Battalion Grenadiers and the 3rd Battalion Coldstream, and to place it under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Pilcher, with Major Gillilan as Second in Command. In all the history of the two regiments this had never been done before; not even at the first battle of Ypres, where battalions of each regiment had been decimated, had any amalgamation been attempted. This composite battalion now took over from the 5th Battalion of the 2nd Australian Regiment the billets in Le-Tir-Anglais, and was placed in support. During a severe shelling on the 20th Second Lieutenant R. D. Richardson was severely wounded, and died four days later. On the 22nd the composite battalion relieved the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry in the front line, and came in for a heavy bombardment of gas and high-explosive shells from the enemy's artillery, during which Lieutenant R. Rolfe was killed. After three days in the trenches the composite battalion moved back into support, and now that drafts of men had been sent up to both battalions, it was split up again into two. The officers of the 4th Battalion were:

On the 27th the Battalion proceeded to Hondeghem, where Lieutenant A. A. Morris and Second Lieutenant the Hon. S. E. Marsham joined.

May.

At the beginning of May the 4th Guards Brigade was transferred from the Second to the Third Army, and was placed directly under the orders of General Headquarters. On the 21st it marched via Wandicourt to Saulty, where it remained until the end of the month.

The following officers arrived during May: Lieutenant M. P. B. Wrixon, M.C., Second Lieutenant H. V. Gillett, Lieutenant J. E. Greenwood, Lieutenant R. P. le Poer Trench.

June.

The Battalion remained at Saulty until the 11th, when it moved to La Cauchie, where Captain J. H. C. Simpson and Lieutenant H. G. Wiggins joined. On the 30th, after church parade, Field-Marshal His Royal Highness the Duke of Connaught visited the Battalion.

July.

Roll of Officers in July

At the beginning of July the Battalion went to Criel Plage. On the 20th the third anniversary of the formation of the Battalion was duly celebrated by a football match between the two half battalions, and a Sergeants' dinner and concert, which Brigadier-General Butler attended.

Aug.

During August the Battalion remained at Criel Plage employed in training and fatigue work. Lieutenant C. C. Cubitt joined.

Sept.

At the beginning of September Captain R. Wolrige-Gordon joined, and on the 25th the Battalion proceeded to Hiermont, where it was placed under the orders of the Cavalry Corps, as mobile infantry to be moved by motor transport. On the 27th it moved to Rorcourt, and two days later to Bray-sur-Somme, where it occupied a camp which had formerly been used for German prisoners. On the 30th Lieutenant B. Layton, Second Lieutenant A. G. Snelling, and Second Lieutenant W. R. Wearne arrived.

Oct.

Roll of Officers at the Beginning of October

On October 3 the Battalion moved to Frise, and on the 8th to Pœuilly. Its movements now depended on the Cavalry Corps, but as there was no scope for the latter, since the country was enclosed and full of barbed wire, its rôle was to march in the wake of the divisions, which were driving the Germans in front of them. In order to be at hand if wanted it was necessary to keep well up, and so the column was constantly under shell-fire. On leaving Pœuilly the Battalion marched to Bellenglise, moving on the following day to Montbrehain, where the British lines advancing and the Germans retiring could be plainly seen. On the 9th Major J. S. Hughes, M.C., arrived and took up his duties as Second in Command. The march was continued through Brancourt to Premont, where the main road was completely blocked, as the retreating Germans had blown down the church, through Montigny to Gouy, where the Battalion remained for three days. The men had an opportunity of seeing Lesbœufs and Morval, which had played so great a part in the battle of the Somme in 1916, and also the Grenadiers' Memorial erected there. On the 21st Second Lieutenant M. C. St. J. Hornby joined. On the 26th the 4th Guards Brigade left the Cavalry Corps and received orders to join the Guards Division. For the time being the Battalion was sent to its old billets in Criel, where Lieutenant R. D. Leigh-Pemberton, M.C., and Second Lieutenant O. Scott Russell joined, and there it remained until the Armistice was signed on November 11.

CHAPTER XXXII

JULY AND AUGUST 1918

Diary of the War

1918.

After some successes on a small scale by the French at St. Pierre Aigle, and by the Americans at Château-Thierry, the Germans launched their third and last offensive on a fifty-mile front in the direction of Rheims, and penetrated the line to a depth of two to three miles. Thirty German divisions took part in this battle, and the fighting was very severe. On July 18 Marshal Foch began his brilliant counter-stroke on a twenty-seven-mile front from Fontenoy to Belleau, and drove the Germans back over the Marne, capturing a large number of prisoners. Although in full retreat, the Germans continued to offer a stubborn resistance, and counter-attacked all along the line.

In August Sir Douglas Haig struck with the Fourth Army under Sir Henry Rawlinson, and succeeded in inflicting a crushing defeat on the Germans and capturing 22,000 prisoners. Hardly had the enemy recovered from this blow, when the Third Army under Sir Julian Byng advanced on a nine-mile front, and recovered a large portion of the ground that had been lost in the spring.

In Italy the Austrians were completely defeated by the Italians, who took a large number of prisoners and guns, and the whole Piave Delta was cleared. These successes were quickly followed up until the Austrians were in full retreat.

In Albania the Allied Forces made considerable progress and compelled the Austrians to retire.

In Palestine the British positions covering the passages of the Jordan and the north of Jericho were attacked by the Turks.

Operations from August 21 to 28

Divisional Account

Aug.

After Rawlinson's success on the Somme Byng was ordered to advance, recover the Arras—Albert railway, and generally to hustle the Germans, who were now falling slowly back. This was to be the prelude to the main operation.

The attack on August 21 was planned and carried out at exceedingly short notice, and was completely successful. The subsequent daily attacks, executed in pursuance of the policy laid down by higher authority, gave the enemy no rest and no opportunity of organising a new line of resistance, but they rendered the task of coordination with the division on the flanks almost impossible. By the time the position of the advanced troops of the Guards Division at the end of the day's fighting had been ascertained (probably not before 4 A.M.), there was usually only just time to plan and issue orders for the next day's operations. It seldom happened that the situation and intention of the flank divisions could be ascertained before orders were issued, with the result that each division had to work independently.

Aug. 21.

The Guards Division was at that time in the Sixth Corps, which had been ordered to capture the Ablainzeville—Moyenneville spur on the morning of the 21st. The attack was carried out by the Second Division on the right, followed by the Third Division and 2nd Guards Brigade from the Guards Division on the left, with the 5th Infantry Brigade from the Second Division in reserve.

In the 2nd Guards Brigade (Sergison-Brooke) the attack was carried out by the 1st Battalion Coldstream Guards and 1st Battalion Scots Guards, with the 3rd Battalion Grenadier Guards in reserve. When the first objectives had been secured the 3rd Battalion Grenadier Guards was pushed through, and captured the line of the railway. The attack was supported by seven brigades of field artillery and heavy guns under Colonel Phipps. One company of the 4th Battalion Guards Machine Gun Regiment was attached, and sixteen tanks (Mark IV.) were to co-operate.

The 1st Guards Brigade (with Gort temporarily in command) was ordered to advance towards the railway, and be prepared to occupy Hamel Switch in the event of the leading brigade finding it unoccupied. There was very thick mist in the early morning, and the contact patrols were unable to work, but the enemy had expected this attack, and had withdrawn all his guns, leaving only a very small garrison in the forward area. Moyenneville was secured without difficulty, while the Second Division captured Courcelles. On reaching the railway the resistance stiffened; and when General Sergison-Brooke reported that all the tanks appeared to have been drawn away south-east, and that there were none operating on the front of the Brigade, Major-General Feilding warned him that no advance beyond the railway must be attempted without them. In the meantime the Third Division on the right had some stiff fighting on the railway, and the Fifty-ninth Division on the left made some progress towards Boisieux St. Marc. Gort's Brigade reached the quarries on the other side of the railway in the afternoon, and found there was heavy hostile shelling from the north of Courcelles. That night the patrols entered Hamelincourt Trench, and early the next morning the Germans counter-attacked, but failed to eject the companies which were occupying Hamel Works.

Aug. 22.

On the 22nd orders were issued for a farther advance the next day. Brigadier-General Sergison-Brooke, in command of the 2nd Guards Brigade, was instructed to advance. On his left the Third and Fifty-sixth Divisions would operate, and on his right the Second Division would capture Gomiecourt. The enemy was to be pressed continuously in order to conform to the attack by British and French troops elsewhere. On the 23rd the enemy shelled Boiry with gas and high-explosive shells, but did not offer any serious resistance. Sergison-Brooke's 2nd Guards Brigade met with little opposition, and gained all their objectives along Hamelincourt Trench, capturing Hamel Mound. Orders were then sent to Brigadier-General Sergison-Brooke to advance on the line Judas Farm—St. Leger Mill, while Brigadier-General Follett was told to move up the 3rd Guards Brigade, and be prepared to relieve the 2nd Guards Brigade in the evening. Meanwhile the Second Division had captured Ervillers.

The great feature of the day's fighting was the advance of the 1st Battalion Grenadier Guards, which had been placed at the disposal of General Sergison-Brooke. After a long approach march, this Battalion, advancing with both flanks exposed, passed through Sergison-Brooke's Brigade, and seized the key-position south-west of St. Leger. The capture of this position enabled the divisions on both flanks to advance the following day with little loss.

Aug. 23.

That night when the 3rd Guards Brigade relieved the 2nd, the Guards Division had reached the line running through Mory Switch as far as Judas Trench, thence to Judas Farm, and on to Boyelles Reserve, where it was in touch with the Fifty-sixth Division.

The next morning—the 24th—the 3rd Guards Brigade continued the pursuit of the Germans, and was ordered to advance on St. Leger, which was not to be entered by the battalions engaged in the attack, as the battalion in reserve would be responsible for the "mopping up" of the town. This advance was successfully accomplished, but after St. Leger had been secured, it was found impossible to make any further progress until Mory Copse was cleared. The Second Division was accordingly ordered to take and hold Mory Copse, while the 3rd Guards Brigade was to push forward at once, and conform to the general advance. As soon as Mory and Mory Copse had been secured, the Second Division advanced on Behagnies and Sapignies.

Aug. 25.

The attack continued on the 25th, and the Guards Division advanced towards Ecouste and Longatte via Bank's Trench and Bank's Reserve, while the Fifty-sixth Division tried to gain the Hindenburg support line. The occupation of Behagnies and part of Sapignies was successfully accomplished by the Second Division on the right. Follett's 3rd Guards Brigade advanced supported by tanks, but these were quickly put out of action by the anti-tank rifles of the Germans. Considerable resistance was met with in Leger Wood, and there was heavy hostile machine-gun fire from Croisilles. The 1st Battalion Grenadier Guards made a wonderfully fine advance on the right of the Brigade, but was strongly counter-attacked and suffered heavy casualties. The Sixty-second Division was unable to capture Mory on account of the division on its right being held up; later in the evening it succeeded in reaching Camouflage Copse. That night De Crespigny's 1st Guards Brigade relieved the 3rd Guards Brigade.

The following day orders for a further attack were issued. The advance was to be continued by the Sixty-second, Fifty-sixth, and Guards Divisions, the latter directed on high ground north and south of Ecouste and Longatte, while the Fifty-sixth Division was to envelop Croisilles, moving down the Hindenburg line. The advance was not to be pressed if strong resistance was encountered. The 1st Guards Brigade was to advance under barrage in a line from Croisilles Copse to the Crucifix, and the heavy artillery was to concentrate on Sensee Valley.

Aug. 27.

Early on the 27th the Sixty-second Division captured Bank's Trench, and De Crespigny's Brigade reached Burnhill Trench. Here the 2nd Battalion Grenadier Guards was held up by heavy machine-gun fire, while the 2nd Battalion Coldstream Guards was counter-attacked from both flanks, and driven back to the line of Leger Reserve—Bank's Trench. The Fifty-sixth Division was also in difficulties, and could make no headway against the machine-gun fire from Croisilles. The situation as regards the Guards Division was as follows: On the right the 2nd Battalion Grenadier Guards was in touch with the Sixty-second Division on the ridge south-west of L'Homme Mort, the line then reaching a sunken road leading to St. Leger. There were some men in Bank's Trench, but there were also isolated parties of the enemy still there, which made reorganisation impossible until dark. Major-General Feilding sent orders to Brigadier-General de Crespigny to reorganise the battalions in front, and to endeavour to secure the line from Bank's Trench to Leger Reserve. If it was found that the Germans had withdrawn, the 76th Brigade was to pass through the 1st Guards Brigade and follow them up. During the night Bank's Trench was cleared of Germans, and 150 prisoners were taken.

On the 28th De Crespigny's Brigade was holding a line along Mory Switch—Bank's Trench and St. Leger Reserve, and the enemy was reported to have withdrawn to Longatte support. At mid-day the Fifty-sixth Division captured Croisilles, and continued its advance towards Bullecourt. The whole of Bank's Trench up to the Mory—Ecoust road had now fallen into the hands of De Crespigny's Brigade, and patrols had been sent out some way in front. During the day the Germans withdrew towards Ecoust and Bullecourt, followed by our patrols. Orders were given for this brigade to be relieved by the 76th Infantry Brigade, and to retire to the area between the Arras—Bapaume road and the Arras—Albert railway.

The total number of prisoners taken by the Division from the 21st to the 29th was 30 officers, and 1479 other ranks.

The casualties were: Killed, 28 officers, 278 other ranks; wounded, 58 officers, 1675 other ranks; missing, 3 officers, 239 other ranks.

1st. Batt.

The 1st Battalion

July and August

Roll of Officers

July.

After six days spent at Barly, the 1st Battalion marched to Bavincourt, where it entrained for Blaireville. On arrival the men were provided with tea and cigarettes by the Thirty-second Division, and the Battalion took over trench shelters from the 2nd Battalion Manchester Regiment, whose Adjutant was Captain Kaye, formerly a sergeant in the King's Company, and whose Second in Command was Major Marshall, late Irish Guards. On the 10th the Battalion relieved the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards, which was the battalion in support, and some high-velocity shells fell in its area, wounding three men. On the 14th the Battalion moved up to the front line, which had become very slippery owing to the heavy rainstorms, and the ground was so deep in mud in some places that the relief was not completed till 2 A.M. The enemy was quiet on the whole, but some movement was observed round Boyelles. The following day the Germans showed an inclination to push machine-guns forward on the south side of the railway in order to get close to our lines. Hostile aircraft was more active, but was kept well in hand, and in the evening two German aeroplanes were brought down near Hamelincourt. On the 19th the Battalion was relieved, and retired to the reserve line trenches. The period spent in reserve was uneventful, but on the 27th, when the Battalion had moved up in support, the Germans carried out a concentrated gas bombardment of the area Boisleux-au-Mont village and station, and eight men in No. 4 Company were gassed. On the 30th Second Lieutenant J. L. Campbell, Company Sergeant-Major Frost, and two men were wounded during some severe shelling. The former recovered, but Sergeant-Major Frost succumbed to the wounds he had received, and died that evening. On the 31st six platoons from the 320th Regiment of the American Army, in addition to the Second in Command and the Lewis-gun officer, were attached to the Battalion. The enemy's artillery that evening showed an increased activity, and put down a destructive barrage which lasted for three hours.

Aug.

From the 1st to the 6th of August the 1st Battalion was in the front line at Boisleux-au-Mont, where, except for intermittent shelling, everything was unusually quiet. During one of the periods of shelling Lieutenant G. Hughes was severely wounded, and died in the evening. There were 2 men killed and 11 wounded, in addition to two of the American troops. On the 6th the Battalion returned to the reserve trenches at Blaireville, where it remained until the 15th. In the absence of Brigadier-General de Crespigny, Lord Gort assumed temporary command of the 1st Guards Brigade, and Major Bailey commanded the Battalion. On the 21st Sergison-Brooke's Brigade attacked in a thick mist on the right of the 3rd Guards Brigade, and the Germans put down a heavy barrage of shells and Minenwerfer on the trenches occupied by the 1st Battalion. The mist rendered smoke-bombs useless, and a patrol was sent out to get touch with the enemy, who was expected to retire. Lieutenant Hawkesworth with nine men entered Marc trench supported by a platoon from No. 3 Company, and captured two Germans; a strong party of the enemy which tried to recapture them, was beaten off with several men killed. On the 22nd the Battalion was relieved, and proceeded to Boiry St. Martin.

Aug. 23.

In accordance with General Follett's order, the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards and 1st Battalion Welsh Guards moved to the low ground east of Ayette, while the 1st Battalion Grenadier Guards was ordered to send an officer to Brigade Headquarters. Lieutenant Hawkesworth, who was selected for this duty, sent back word that the Battalion was to be ready to march at once. At 12.50 P.M. Major Bailey received orders to move up his Battalion to the east of Moyenneville, and to report to Sergison-Brooke's Brigade as soon as he arrived there. Accordingly the Battalion marched off, and reached its destination about 3.15 P.M. There was no time to issue written orders, and General Sergison-Brooke was able to explain only verbally to Major Bailey the objective of the Battalion. Having summoned his Company Commanders, Major Bailey informed them of the general situation. The 3rd Battalion Grenadier Guards and 1st Battalion Scots Guards were holding the general line of Hamerville trench and also Hamel trench, while the 1st Battalion Coldstream Guards was established on the high ground about Judas Farm. The situation on the right, however, was not clear, and no troops of the Second Division had been seen east of Ervillers. The 1st Battalion was therefore to move forward as soon as possible, gain touch with the Second Division about Ervillers, and in conjunction with it, capture Mory Switch.

List of Officers who took part in these Operations

At 4.10 p.m. the Battalion advanced in approach march formation with the King's Company under Captain Cary on the right, and No. 2 Company under Lieutenant H. B. Vernon on the left, with No. 3 Company under Captain Chambers in support and No. 4 Company under Lieutenant Byng in reserve. The frontage occupied by the Battalion was 1000 yards, with strong patrols preceding the two leading companies at a distance of 300 yards. On reaching the line of the Ervillers—Hamelincourt road, the leading companies came under a light field-gun barrage and long-range machine-gun fire, which forced them to deploy, and the support company conformed as soon as it arrived at the same place. Captain Chambers then moved his company to a position écheloned in rear of the King's Company, so as to be in a position to protect the right flank. When the leading companies reached the neighbourhood of Jewel trench, the Germans offered a certain amount of resistance, which caused a momentary check, but the threat of an outflanking movement by No. 3 Company broke down their defence, and they fled, pursued by Lewis-gun and rifle fire, leaving fifty men who were taken prisoners.

No. 4 Company was moved to a position on the high ground on the right to cover that flank, and was given orders to be prepared to move across the front of Ervillers, if a hostile counter-attack developed in that direction. The other three companies swept on to the next objective, which was carried without a further check. The three leading companies then proceeded forward to capture the final objective, and the defence of the enemy broke down, as soon as he saw that the victorious advance of the Battalion could not be stopped. By 5.45 P.M. the position was completely in the hands of the Battalion, many prisoners being taken, numbers of whom rushed forward with their hands up as soon as the leading companies appeared over the ridge. After the final objective had been secured, No. 4 Company returned to its proper position in reserve, its place on the right being taken by a sub-section of machine-guns. At dusk the Battalion was distributed as follows: No. 3 Company in Mory Switch trench as far as Hally Avenue (exclusive), No. 2 Company conformed from Hally Avenue (inclusive) to Judas trench, while the King's Company formed a refused right flank in shell-slits about Iscariot Work, and No. 4 Company was in reserve in Jewel trench.

Considering the extent of ground that had been covered and the rapidity with which the objective had been secured, the casualties were not heavy: Lieutenant Rocke, who had been with the leading platoon of the King's Company, was killed, and Captain Cary in the King's Company and Lieutenant Conant of No. 2 Company were wounded. The casualties amongst other ranks amounted to about forty.

Aug. 24.

At 4 A.M. Major Bailey received orders to continue the attack, and summoned a conference of Company Commanders. He explained to them that the Battalion was to advance at 7 A.M. on a front of 1000 yards and écheloned in depth. No. 4 Company was to lead the attack on a front of 500 yards, with the left flank on Hally Avenue; No. 3 Company écheloned at a distance of 250 yards on their right, No. 2 Company in support, covering the centre at a distance of 250 yards behind the left of No. 3 Company, and the King's Company in reserve.

The three leading companies were formed up by daylight in Mory Switch trench, but the King's Company remained in its position near Iscariot Work. The wire in front of Mory was too thick to cut before daylight, and the men were told to work their way through the gaps as best they could. As soon as the attack started, some thirty prisoners were taken; they were in positions outside the wire, and surrendered without firing a shot. A shrapnel barrage had been put down by our artillery, but it was placed too far in advance to be of any real assistance, and as the attack developed the Germans opened an intense machine-gun fire from Mory Copse and Hally Copse. It soon became evident that, until some advance was made on the right, there was no possibility of the attack succeeding, and even if it did succeed there seemed little prospect of the 1st Battalion retaining the position it had gained, unless the Second Division could keep pace with them. Nothing could be done but to wait until the situation on the right developed, and the difficulty of the position was increased by the fact that all communication with the leading companies was cut off for the remainder of the day. During the morning Germans could be seen dribbling forward small parties to Mory Copse, and the sniping and machine-gun fire from this direction became more intense. At 10.45 the Second Division made an attempt to come up on the right, but was immediately checked and suffered considerably.

The casualties in the 1st Battalion were naturally heavy. Second Lieutenant G. E. Barber was killed, and Lieutenant L. G. Byng, M.C., was so severely wounded that he died that evening. Major Bailey, Captain Chambers, Lieutenant Vernon, Second Lieutenant Warner, and Second Lieutenant Webber were wounded, and amongst the other ranks there were 150 casualties.

Lord Gort, who had been temporarily commanding the 1st Guards Brigade, returned to the Battalion that evening, and Captain Wolrige-Gordon, M.C., came up to take over command of No. 4 Company, while Lieutenant Hawkesworth left Battalion Headquarters to command No. 3 Company. On learning that the Brigade was to continue the attack on the following day with the assistance of eight tanks, Lord Gort went round the line at dusk, and decided that, as the King's and No. 3 Companies had suffered fewest casualties, they should undertake the attack. He therefore gave orders for these two companies to withdraw for the night, and get as much rest as they could in Mory Switch, while No. 2 and 4 Companies should supply the outposts; and he impressed on the officers commanding these companies, that in view of the attack the next day the men should be spared as much as possible, and that defensive measures for the night should be undertaken mainly by patrols.

Aug. 25.

After consultation with the officers commanding the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards, the 1st Battalion Welsh Guards, and the tanks, Lord Gort returned to his Battalion Headquarters, and summoned the Company Commanders—Second Lieutenant Cruttenden, King's Company; Lieutenant A. A. Morris, No. 2 Company; Lieutenant Hawkesworth, No. 3 Company; and Captain Wolrige-Gordon, No. 4 Company. The details of the attack were explained, and orders were issued. The total fighting strength of the Battalion was only 212 with 7 officers, including the Battalion Headquarters Staff.

In order to increase the number of officers, Captain Malcolm was sent up to join the King's Company. He received this order only at 10 P.M. the night before, and the distance he had to go made it most improbable that he could reach the Battalion before the attack started. But his determination to lead the King's Company into action helped him to overcome all difficulties. By dint of riding and walking all night over appalling country, without any guide, he managed to find the Battalion in time.

At 4.30 A.M. the attack started. A very thick mist covered the ground, which made it difficult for the tanks to find their way. Lieutenant Hawkesworth started off with No. 3 Company supported by one tank, but when he reached the neighbourhood of Bank's Trench the tank broke down, and when the fog lifted he found he had only forty men quite unsupported. Unfortunately, at this moment he was badly wounded, and therefore ordered his men, who were without an officer, to fall back on to Mory Switch.

The King's and No. 4 Companies moved up Mory Switch supported by one tank, while another worked on the southern flank. The fog was still thick, and as the first tank advanced it was suddenly engaged at very close range by a stray machine-gun post. Armour-piercing bullets were used, and the engine and water jacket were penetrated. It was therefore necessary to find the other tank, which could be heard working in the fog, and after an unsuccessful attempt to get it going in the right direction, it eventually succeeded in moving forward at 8.30 A.M., supported by the King's Company and a platoon of No. 4 Company. But soon afterwards the fog lifted, and the tank was immediately put out of action. Germans in bodies of fifty and one hundred could be seen standing about in Bank's Trench, but as the King's Company and a platoon of No. 3 Company were close by, Lord Gort did not give the order to engage these hostile parties with machine-gun fire, until he could ascertain if they were prisoners surrendering or not. After a lapse of five minutes fire was opened on them, and they disappeared into their trenches. Meanwhile the enemy opened a very heavy and concentrated machine-gun fire on Mory Switch, and engaged the disabled tank with a field-gun. Lord Gort having been called back to Battalion Headquarters to speak to the Brigadier on the telephone with reference to the attack of the Sixty-second Division, which was timed to begin at 9 A.M., ordered Captain Wolrige-Gordon to hold on to Mory Switch and Camouflage Copse. But the enfilade machine-gun fire made this impossible, more especially as the right flank was quite unsupported, and the three companies had to withdraw from Mory Switch to the north-west of Mory.

At 4 P.M. after a severe bombardment the Germans developed a counter-attack, which was met by the Sixty-second Division, and driven back. Battalions of this division returned to the attack, and regained some ground, while the 1st Battalion reoccupied Mory Switch. Lord Gort told the captain of the leading company of the battalion from the Sixty-second Division that he was prepared to push on to the sunken road, if his company would co-operate, but the Company Commander replied that the right flank of his battalion was entirely unsupported, and that therefore any further advance was out of the question. The Sixty-second Division was subsequently withdrawn to the line from which they started, but the 1st Battalion was able to maintain its position and to clear Hally Copse of the enemy. That night it withdrew to Boiry St. Martin, and was relieved by the 2nd Battalion Grenadier Guards.

Captain Malcolm and Second Lieutenant Cruttenden were reported missing, and Lieutenant Hawkesworth was wounded. The total number of casualties during the three days' fighting was 13 officers and 258 other ranks, out of 18 officers and 489 other ranks who were engaged in the operations. 250 prisoners, 1 field-gun, and 20 machine-guns, in addition to several trench mortars, were captured by the Battalion.

In a letter which Brigadier-General G. B. S. Follett, commanding the 3rd Guards Brigade, wrote to Sir Henry Streatfeild, the Lieutenant-Colonel commanding the Regiment, he said:

As you have probably heard by now, we attacked on the 23rd, 24th, and 25th August—that is, this Brigade. The 1st Battalion Grenadiers gave the finest exhibition that has ever been made in this war. At 3 P.M. on the 23rd they were sent up to protect the right flank of the 2nd Brigade and take the heights south of St. Leger. There was just time to issue verbal orders and to collect the Company Commanders for a conference. Starting about 3.45 P.M. they had taken all objectives before 6 P.M.—that is, advancing 5000 yards from their starting point! Having been very highly trained by Gort during the past month or two, they proceeded to put their training into practice, with the result that it was a wonderful success. Commanded by Bailey (Gort was with the 1st Guards Brigade), they were magnificently manœuvred by their company and platoon commanders, moving in great depth on a very wide extension. They captured 197 prisoners, 15 machine-guns and several trench mortars, and killed a lot. Their casualties were 2 officers and 50 O.R. I say again, the finest attack in open warfare that has ever been made. During the night 23-24 they even did a relief, and we were up against the junction of two fresh divisions in great strength, with the result that no great advance was made and many losses.

Aug. 26-31.

After remaining for twenty-four hours at Boiry St. Martin, the Battalion marched to Berles-au-Bois, where it occupied shelters in a bank. Lieutenant E. B. Shelley and twenty-five men joined, in addition to a large draft from the 4th Battalion under Captain Simpson, and the following days were spent in reorganising the companies.

The 2nd Battalion

Roll of Officers

July.

The 2nd Battalion, which had been training during the first few days in July at Saulty, proceeded by train on the 5th to Ransart, where tea was provided for the men by the Thirty-second Division. Guides from the Royal Scots led the Battalion to the position which it was to take up as reserve battalion of the brigade 500 yards east of Ransart. The Guards Division was occupying a sector of the line with its right joining the Second Division between Ayette and Moyenneville, and its left joining the Canadian Corps on the outskirts of Boisieux St. Marc. While in reserve, companies carried out training round the outskirts of Ransart, and scouting and patrolling by day were practised. In order to accustom the men to night-work they wore darkened glasses, which produced much the same effect as night. On the 11th the Battalion moved up into support, and relieved the 1st Battalion Irish Guards near the outskirts of Hendecourt. A place was found for a cricket-ground in a sheltered valley, and two matches were played with composition balls and bats made by the pioneers. From the 17th to the 23rd the Battalion went up into the front line, which had been formerly held by isolated posts, but which was now a continuous trench. The weather was fine and the casualties were not heavy, although there was usually a certain amount of shelling in the early morning. From the 24th to the 28th the Battalion returned to the reserve trenches at Ransart, when Lieutenant T. A. Combe, Lieutenant M. H. Ponsonby, Second Lieutenant A. P. J. M. P. de Lisle, and Second Lieutenant D. L. King joined the Battalion. During the days in reserve an increasing stream of American officers were attached to the 1st Guards Brigade for instruction, and the following amusing messages show the excellent relations that existed between the officers of the two armies:

From:—Guards Division Q.

To:—Transport Officer, 1st Guards Brigade.

Draw 6 bottles of Whisky from Divisional Soldiers Club and deliver to Brigade H.Q. for American Officers attached.

From G.O.C. 1st Guards Brigade.

To:—Guards Division Q.

On behalf of all officers of the American Army attached to the Brigade under my command, I wish to express my deepest thanks for the courteous present of whisky foreshadowed in your message. I am requested to add that these officers accept this gift as a proof of the solidarity of the union existing between the American and British nations, which will endure until the whisky runs out.

C. R. C. de Crespigny,

Brigadier-General.

Aug.

While the Battalion was in support at Hendecourt, Captain A. H. Penn, M.C., resigned the adjutancy, much to the regret of all ranks, and was succeeded by Captain R. G. Briscoe, M.C. On August 4 the Battalion went up into the front line in front of Boiry St. Martin, and on August 5 six platoons of Americans who were to be initiated in the mysteries of trench warfare were attached for four days. The enemy was, however, not very active, and there was but little shelling. From the 10th to the 16th the Battalion remained in reserve at Ransart, where Lieutenant G. F. Lawrence took on the duties of Intelligence Officer from Second Lieutenant S. C. K. George, who was invalided home with dysentery. On the 18th the Battalion relieved the 320th American Regiment in the front line, where again the enemy was fairly quiet. Two advanced posts were established some 500 yards from the line, and the nights were spent in active patrolling to prevent the enemy occupying the dead ground in front of Moyenneville, which was to become the forming-up area for the attack on the 21st.

After three days spent in the reserve, the Battalion moved up into very inadequate trench accommodation in Boiry St. Martin. These trenches were now the reserve line, and out of range of enemy artillery owing to the advance on the 21st.

Aug. 25.

On the afternoon of the 25th the Battalion marched off to relieve a battalion in the 3rd Guards Brigade. A three hours' uncomfortable halt was made in a field at Hamelincourt, and as the ground had been well covered with gas, the companies had to move about to escape the drifting fumes. Respirators had to be worn, which rendered the eating of the evening meal no easy matter.

The relief in the front line of St. Leger was carried out without a hitch, although complicated by the fact that the Battalion was taking over a wide and sketchy front from the remnants of the 1st Battalion Grenadier Guards and the 1st Battalion Scots Guards. During the night Second Lieutenant H. A. Finch and eight men went out as a patrol to get in touch with the enemy and never returned. Second Lieutenant Finch was found killed 1000 yards in front of the line, when the Battalion advanced, which showed how thoroughly he had carried out his instructions.

August 26 was a very quiet day, with occasional shelling around Mory Trench. Judging by the extent to which he fired his machine-guns after dark, the enemy seemed very apprehensive. The following officers took part in the operations on August 26-28:

Aug. 26.

At midnight on the 26th a conference held at Battalion Headquarters was attended by all Company Commanders, at which Lieut.-Colonel Rasch explained the general situation and the objectives of the advance for the following day as far as they were known.

Definite orders were not received until 1.30 A.M. on the morning of the 27th. The instructions the Battalion received were to push forward at zero hour (7 A.M.), with the 2nd Battalion Coldstream Guards on its left, and the Sixty-second Division on its right, and to secure the enemy's trenches in and south of Ecoust and Longatte. Before dawn the Battalion was to be reorganised and disposed in battle formation. No. 3 Company under Captain J. C. Cornforth, M.C., extended along the whole Battalion frontage of 1500 yards, along the road in No Man's Land, running from Mory Copse to St. Leger. No. 2 Company under Captain O. M. Smith in left support lay concealed until zero in Hally Copse. No. 4 Company under Lieutenant Morgan was in right support in Mory Copse, and No. 1 Company under Lieutenant M. Ponsonby in reserve, with Battalion Headquarters in Mory Trench.

There were three points in these orders which caused a little uneasiness. In the first place, a very short space of time before dawn was allowed to re-dispose the Battalion, although fortunately strong patrols had been sent out earlier in the night to secure the Mory Copse—St. Leger road. In the second place, dawn being at 4.30 A.M. and zero at 7 A.M., No. 3 Company would be in an exposed position during daylight at some points within fifty yards of the enemy. It was a clear night, and even in the darkness this company got into difficulties, for while they were forming up, they were observed by the enemy, who spent the rest of the night sweeping the ground and putting up innumerable lights, probably thinking it was a patrol. Fortunately there were a number of large felled tree-trunks along the road, which enabled this Company to escape detection from ground observation, and from the low-flying aeroplanes, which continually patrolled No Man's Land at dawn. In the third place, although Bank's Trench was known to be held all along the whole front, the barrage table showed that on the left of the Battalion the barrage would open a considerable distance behind the trench, probably owing to the proximity of our front troops to the enemy position.

The reorganisation and forming up of the Battalion were successfully carried out before dawn. Unfortunately, while No. 1 Company was moving across the open to take up its position in reserve, a shell fell in the centre of No. 1 Platoon, mortally wounding Lieutenant M. Ponsonby, and causing casualties to the whole platoon, with the exception of three other ranks. Lieutenant Jesper took command of the remaining three platoons, and brought them to their allotted positions.

Aug. 27.

At zero hour (7 A.M.) the field-gun barrage came down on a line about 300 yards in front of No. 3 Company, creeping forward at the rate of 100 yards every two minutes. As soon as our troops moved off from their forming-up positions to close up to the barrage, the enemy covered his front with a deadly and accurate screen of bullets, fired from numerous carefully-sighted machine-guns, which were so well protected that our field-gun barrage had little or no effect upon them. In consequence we suffered heavy casualties from the very outset. On the left the troops of the leading company were mown down as soon as they got on to their feet, and were unable to advance. The right of the 2nd Battalion Coldstream Guards had also suffered severely, and was unable to push forward.

As No. 2 Company, under Captain O. Martin Smith, debouched from Hally Copse, it was caught by the machine-gun fire, and nearly cut to pieces before it could extend from artillery formation. Captain O. Martin Smith made a determined effort to reinforce the left of No. 3 Company, and push forward the advance, but long before his Company reached the front troops it had suffered over 50 per cent casualties. Captain O. Martin Smith and Lieutenant de Lisle were wounded, and Lieutenant Gwyer, who was pluckily pushing forward in spite of the storm of bullets, was killed. Captain O. Martin Smith ordered his Company to lie down in the open, while the N.C.O.'s collected the men who were nearest to them, and eventually got in close support of No. 3 Company. As, however, the enemy was entrenched on the top of the rise, 200 yards in front, the slightest movement attracted a torrent of lead. This made it impossible to get communication in any direction or to collect the wounded, who had to remain in the open on the fire-swept ground until dark. Lieutenant R. M. Oliver, who had been in charge of the left platoon of No. 3 Company, had been killed earlier, so the left half of the Battalion was now without an officer.

In the centre, during the first 200 yards, the machine-gun fire, although equally intense, was slightly less accurate; but on nearing the St. Leger—Homme Mort road Captain Cornforth found it swept by a practically impassable hail of machine-gun bullets, fired from three directions—the Homme Mort on the south, Bank's Trench on the east, and outskirts of St. Leger on the north. This last enemy position was off the Battalion frontage, and the troops opposite it had been held up. The only method of relieving this pressure on the left was to push on at all costs in our centre and right.

Lieut.-Colonel Rasch sent up No. 1 Company to reinforce the thinned ranks of No. 3, and to help in the capture of Homme Mort and the rushing of Bank's Trench. While going up this Company came under heavy fire, and Lieutenant Jesper and Lieutenant Giles were both wounded. Captain Cornforth therefore took over command of this Company in addition to his own.

With these reinforcements Lieutenant White and Second Lieutenant Langley led their platoons forward against the machine-gun nest at Homme Mort, but in advancing up the slope they were met with an increasing volume of accurate fire, and both the officers were mortally wounded before the position was reached. These platoons, however, with an inspired dash and determination took the position after a hard fight. Twenty prisoners were captured, in spite of the fact that, in the short rush up to the position, these platoons had been practically decimated.

At the same time Captain Cornforth decided to rush Bank's Trench, although the road was still swept by enfilade fire from the left, and by frontal fire from the trench itself. A party of men was sent over the road to cover the advance, but few succeeded in crossing it. Captain Cornforth thereupon collected a small number of men, led them across the road, and by short rushes succeeded with three other men in gaining Bank's Trench. Here fortunately they found a large supply of German hand-grenades, which they quickly detonated, and by this means succeeded in clearing the trench for 500 yards northwards, knocking out six German machine-guns and taking 40 men prisoners. Several other men soon succeeded in joining them, and this party, which eventually numbered one officer and 25 men, found that they were completely isolated. No other troops could be located on their flanks, and the ground was being swept by machine-gun fire from Bank's Copse in the front, from the high ground on the right, and from the outskirts of St. Leger on the left. It was impossible to advance farther, and the rest of the day was spent in resisting the efforts of the Germans to turn them out, and in endeavouring to gain communication on the flanks.

Lieutenant Morgan with No. 4 Company was more successful. At zero he advanced along Mory Switch and the southern end of Bank's Trench, eventually establishing a position in Vraucourt Trench. The lie of the land and the cover afforded by the trenches enabled this Company to keep up with the barrage, and to avoid coming under the intense fire that the remainder of the Battalion had experienced. During the advance this Company captured a German Battalion Commander and 180 men—a remarkably fine performance. Lieutenant Morgan led his Company forward with such dash that they succeeded in penetrating the enemy's position to a depth of 2000 yards. However, it was soon clear that they were completely isolated, as they were being fired at from all directions. When it was dark Lieutenant Morgan decided that it would be unwise to remain in such an advanced position, since neither the Sixty-second Division on his right nor our own troops on his left showed any signs of coming into line with him, and he consequently withdrew his Company until he was in touch with troops on his flanks.

Aug. 28.

During the night the enemy retired from our front, and in the morning the remnants of the Battalion were reorganised, and continued the advance over the original frontage for about 1700 yards to a marked-out trench called Bank's Reserve. Here some machine-guns were encountered, but a good and continuous line was established with connection on both flanks.

This line was handed over to the 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders on the night of the 28th-29th, and the Battalion marched back to the trenches east of Hamelincourt. The only officers left with the Battalion were Lieut.-Colonel Rasch, Captain Cornforth, Captain Briscoe, and Lieutenant Morgan. The total casualties were 12 officers and 278 other ranks. Amongst the officers the casualties were as follows:

In a message, which Major-General Feilding afterwards sent to Brigadier-General de Crespigny, he said: "All Battalions of the 1st Guards Brigade discharged their duty splendidly. The attack delivered by the 2nd Battalion Grenadier Guards and 2nd Battalion Coldstream Guards on August 27 not only inflicted heavy losses on the enemy and brought in large numbers of prisoners, but also compelled him next day to relax his hold on the high ground south of Croisilles."

The 3rd Battalion

Roll of Officers

July.