As court convened, there was not a vacant seat anywhere in the room. People were standing along the walls in back of the chairs. There was an atmosphere of tense, hushed expectancy. Only those jurors who had been too conscientious even to glance at the headlines or at photographs published in the newspapers were in any doubt as to what had occurred. Judge Barnes, taking his position on the bench and listening to the bailiff call court to order, glanced at Perry Mason with eyes which held a glint of puzzled admiration. Larry Sampson, his mouth a thin line of grim determination, sat doggedly at his desk. His case was crashing about his ears. But he still had a few cards with which he hoped to trump Mason’s aces. “I’m going to ask Mr. Hogan to take the stand,” Mason said.
Hogan took the witness stand and testified to what he had found. He produced the bullet that had been found embedded in the chair, as well as photographs. “And, in your opinion,” Mason asked, “this bullet was fired from the weapon which the prosecution introduced as an exhibit in this case and which has been referred to as the Breel gun?”
“There’s not the slightest doubt of it,” Hogan said.
“Now then,” Mason went on, “at the time this gun was found in the bag of the defendant, only one shell had been fired, is that right?”
“I can’t answer that,” Hogan said. “I know that when the weapon was turned over to me for examination, only one shell had been fired.”
“Thank you,” Mason said, “That’s all.”
“No cross-examination,” Sampson announced.
“Call Paul Drake to the stand,” Mason said. Paul Drake came forward, was sworn, and took the witness stand. He seemed somewhat ill at ease. “You’re a private detective,” Mason asked, “and, as such, have been employed by me?”
“Yes.”
“Did you have occasion to shadow a woman who was known as Lone Bedford and who purported to be the owner of certain jewelry which Austin Cullens had left with George Trent?” Mason asked.
“Objected to as incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial,” Sampson sputtered. “It doesn’t connect up with the present case in anyway.”
“I expect to connect it up,” Mason said.
“I don’t see just what you have in mind,” Judge Barnes remarked.
Mason said, “If the Court please, this is rather an unusual case. Ordinarily, it is incumbent upon the Prosecution to prove the defendant guilty beyond all reasonable doubt. It is not incumbent upon the defendant to prove himself or herself innocent. However, in this case, since the Prosecution has really proved how the murder could not have happened, the Defense is going to show how the murder could have been perpetrated.”
“And you expect to connect this evidence up?” Judge Barnes asked dubiously.
Mason said, “I do, Your Honor.”
“I’ll permit it,” Judge Barnes said, “at least for the present. But it will be subject to a motion on the part of the Prosecution to strike out in the event it isn’t connected in a way which the Court deems pertinent and relevant.”
“That is quite satisfactory,” Mason said. “Answer the question, Mr. Drake.”
Drake said, “Yes.”
“You shadowed this woman?”
“Yes.”
“From where?”
“From police headquarters.”
“Where she had been taken and where she had failed to identify the stones in this bag as being her property?”
Sampson, on his feet, shouted, “Your Honor, I object. That question is leading and suggestive, it calls for hearsay testimony, it’s incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial, it doesn’t make any difference what...”
“The objection is sustained as to what she had done or failed to do,” Judge Barnes ruled. “The witness may state where and when he followed her.”
Drake said, “We followed her from police headquarters. I don’t know what she’d been doing there.”
“And where did you follow her to?” Mason asked.
“To the Milpas Apartments on Canyon Drive, to apartment three-fourteen.”
“And did you investigate to see how she was known in that place, or under what name she was going?”
“I did.”
“And what name was it?”
“Objected to as incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial,” Sampson said. “Also, it’s hearsay. It makes no difference what name she was going under.”
“Sustained,” Judge Barnes ruled.
Mason frowned, as though in annoyance. Mason said, “I’ll try and get at it this way, Mr. Drake. Was there a person living in that apartment house known as Pete Chennery?”
“Yes, sir.”
“In what apartment did he live?”
“In apartment three-fourteen,” Drake said, before Sampson could object.
Sampson said, “Your Honor, I object to this. I move to strike out the answer until I have an opportunity to interpose an objection. I object on the ground that it is incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial, that it has nothing whatever to do with the present case.”
“I think the objection is well taken,” Judge Barnes said, “unless you can show some theory on which it would be admissible.”
Mason said irritably, “If the district attorney’s office will keep from throwing legal monkey wrenches into the machinery, I expect to show that Pete Chennery murdered Austin Cullens. I expect to show it by proof which...”
“That will do, Mr. Mason,” Judge Barnes interrupted. “You have no call to refer to Counsel as throwing legal monkey wrenches into the machinery. Counsel has interposed objections which, so far, the Court has deemed to be well taken. The Court has asked you only to explain why you consider this evidence relevant.”
“I will connect it up,” Mason said. “I will connect it up by proving that this defendant couldn’t have killed Austin Cullens because Pete Chennery did.”
Judge Barnes said, “This is a very unusual procedure.”
“It’s a very unusual case,” Mason said.
“For the moment, I will overrule the objection,” Judge Barnes said, “but will strike out so much of the answer as relating to the apartment where Pete Chennery lived. There is no evidence connecting Pete Chennery with Lone Bedford.”
“There is no evidence,” Mason said, “because the Prosecution won’t allow us to introduce that evidence.”
“The Prosecution has nothing to do with it,” Judge Barnes said. “It is the Court which is controlling the order of proof, you will proceed, Mr. Mason, and confine your remarks to the Court.”
“Very well,” Mason said. “I will ask you, Mr. Drake, whether or not you took, or caused to be taken under your supervision, photographs of latent fingerprints in the house in which Austin Cullens lived.”
“I did,”
“I will ask you whether you secured photographs of the finger-prints of Pete Chennery.”
Drake said, “I entered the apartment where he had been living. I developed latent fingerprints. I found there the fingerprints of a man which I assume were those of Pete Chennery because they were the only fingerprints which I found in any number in the apartment occupied by Pete Chennery.”
“Who was with you when you took these prints, Mr. Drake?”
“Sergeant Holcomb.”
“From those fingerprints, did you ascertain whether Pete Chennery had a criminal record?” Mason asked.
“I object to that,” Sampson said, “as incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial on the further ground that no proper foundation has been laid, and as assuming a fact not in evidence. The witness himself has admitted that he doesn’t know that the fingerprints were those of Pete Chennery.”
Mason glanced up inquiringly at Judge Barnes.
Judge Barnes said, “The objection is sustained. After all, the question before the Court in this case is whether this defendant killed Austin Cullens. Within reasonable limitations, any evidence tending to prove that Cullens met his death at the hands of some other person is, of course, proper, but there must be limits to that, and the evidence must be adduced in proper form.”
“Of course, Your Honor,” Mason pointed out urbanely, “I’am but a private practicing attorney. This man is a private detective. We, neither of us, have available the facilities which are at the command of the district attorney’s office for making complete investigations.”
“I fully understand that,” Judge Barnes said, “but that is something which doesn’t concern this Court. This Court is only concerned with having evidence pertinent, proper, and admissible. What this witness may have assumed to be the case isn’t binding on the Prosecution.”
Mason said, “Well, perhaps I can get at it in another way. I’ll withdraw this witness temporarily and ask that Sergeant Holcomb be called as a witness for the Defense.”
Sergeant Holcomb came belligerently forward, his manner all too plainly indicating that he certainly didn’t intend to be of any assistance to the Defense.
“I will ask you,” Mason said, “if you have located the owner of the jewelry which was found in the bag which it is claimed belonged to the defendant in this case.”
“Objected to,” Sampson said, “as incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial. It makes no difference who owned the jewelry.”
“But,” Mason said, “I thought it was the contention of the Prosecution that this jewelry had been taken from a chamois-skin belt found on the body of the decedent.”
“There is no such contention,” Sampson said. “The photograph of the body shows the position of the chamois-skin belt and its condition, but beyond a necessary inference, we have made no claim that...”
“I think the necessary inference is there,” Judge Barnes ruled. “The witness sought to make that inference even more pointed. I’m going to permit this question to be answered. Have you ascertained the owner of that jewelry, Sergeant Holcomb?”
“We have,” Sergeant Holcomb said sullenly.
“That jewelry had been stolen?” Mason asked.
“Yes.”
“From someone in New Orleans?”
“That’s right.”
“And an insurance company had offered a reward for the recovery of it?”
“Yes,” Sergeant Holcomb said shortly.
“And you, as one of the discoverers, have claimed a part of that reward?”
“Yes.”
“How much of the reward?”
“Objection to as incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial,” Sampson said. “It doesn’t go to show the interest or bias of the witness — in this case in the least.”
“Sustained,” Judge Barnes ruled.
Once more, Mason appeared nettled. “When you examined the premises, Sergeant,” he said, “immediately following the discovery of Mr. Cullens’ body, you found that a fuse had been blown out.”
“That’s right.”
“And did you ascertain what had caused the blowing out of that fuse?”
“Yes. An electric light globe had been unscrewed from one of the sockets. A copper penny had been inserted in the socket, and then the globe had been screwed back in. As soon as the electric switch was turned on, the fuse blew out.”
“Now then,” Mason asked, “did you test that copper penny for latent fingerprints?”
“Objected to as incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial,” Sampson said.
Judge Barnes frowned, then looked down at Sampson. “Is it,” he asked, “the position of the Prosecutor’s office that the defendant is not to have the advantage of any evidence uncovered by the police which may have indicated the crime was committed by some other person?”
Sampson said, “If the Court please, it’s the position of the Prosecutor’s office that we don’t want the issues clouded. There is absolutely no evidence in the case as it now stands tending to show that any person other than the defendant entered that house.”
“But, as I understand it,” Judge Barnes said, “it was your position at the time of your opening statement that robbery had been a motive and...”
“Sometimes,” Sampson said, “if the Court will pardon the interruption, a prosecutor deems it necessary to change his trial tactics in order to meet varying conditions which develop during the trial.”
“I understand that,” Judge Barnes said, “but this evidence is clearly proper. It would have even been proper on cross-examination. This witness is now called by the Defense. The objection will be overruled. Did you develop latent fingerprints on that coin, Sergeant Holcomb?”
Sergeant Holcomb said, “Yes.”
“Did you,” Mason asked, “take fingerprints of the defendant in this case?”
“Yes.”
“Did you compare the fingerprints of the defendant with the fingerprints on the copper coin?”
Sergeant Holcomb said, “She was wearing gloves. She wouldn’t have left any fingerprints.”
“I’m not asking that,” Mason said. “I’m asking if you compared the two fingerprints.”
“Yes.”
“Were they the same?”
“No.”
“Now then, if the Court please,” Mason said, “I would like to have Sergeant Holcomb produce photographs of the fingerprints which were developed on that penny, and give the witness, Drake, an opportunity to demonstrate that these were the fingerprints of Pete Chennery, a man with a known criminal record.”
“I object to that. I object to the statement. I object to the procedure, and I object to the manner in which this offer is made before the jury,” Sampson said. “It is an attempt to cloud the issues. The Court has already ruled that the witness, Drake, has no means of knowing whether the fingerprints which he took are those of Pete Chennery.”
“Do I understand that the Prosecution wishes to keep the Defense from showing the identity of the person who placed that copper coin in the light socket?” Judge Barnes asked.
“I fail to see where it has anything to do with the present case,” Sampson said. “It’s simply going to cloud the issues. Let us suppose that some person did enter the dwelling for the purpose of robbery at some time prior to the murder. That has nothing to do with this case.”
“No,” Judge Barnes said ominously, “but suppose that person entered the dwelling at the time of the murder? ”
“In that event,” Sampson said, “it makes no difference who that person was. There is already evidence before this Court showing that the fingerprints on the copper coin were not the fingerprints of the defendant. That’s all that the defendant is entitled to show... That is, Your Honor, I don’t want to appear in a position of blocking any legitimate proof, but from a technical standpoint, the defendant is only entitled to prove that she did not participate in the commission of a robbery or in short-circuiting those lights. Having once established that fact, the identity of the person who did tamper with the lights becomes absolutely incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial, unless it is shown that such person was acting in a conspiracy with the defendant. And the Prosecution makes no claim that such is the case.”
Mason threw up his hands. “All right. If the Prosecution doesn’t want the jury to know who killed Austin Cullens, I’m not going to waste my time trying to do their work. The question is withdrawn. The witness is excused.”
Sampson said, “That’s unfair. You’re just trying to razzle-dazzle the jury.”
Mason shouted, “You’re the one who’s...”
Judge Barnes banged with his gavel. “Gentlemen,” he said, “we will have order in the court. There will be no more such remarks. Mr. Mason, your remark was improper and uncalled for. Mr. Sampson, your accusation as to Mr. Mason’s purpose in asking questions was entirely out of order. The Court would administer a more stem admonition to you, Mr. Sampson, were it not for the fact that Mr. Mason’s remark which called forth your statement, was so obviously improper. The fact remains, gentlemen, that we are going to have no more personalities injected in the case. This is the Court’s last warning.”
Mason sat back and said resignedly, “All right. That’s the defendant’s case.”
“You mean you quit?” Sampson asked.
Mason glanced up at the Court and said, “Since I must address my remarks to Your Honor, may I suggest to the Court that the Court advise Counsel for the Prosecution that when the defendant announces, ‘That’s the defendant’s case,’ it is improper for the prosecution to seek to capitalize on that by addressing remarks to Counsel. As a matter of fact, I believe the jurors will understand that the Defense has made every effort to solve this case, and that the only reason the Defense has not solved it is...”
“Careful, Mr. Mason,” Judge Barnes frowned.
Mason finished with a smile. ” ‘Only too obvious,’ were the words I was going to use, Your Honor.”
Judge Barnes said, “Do you wish to argue the case, gentlemen?”
Sampson did, and his argument sought to go just as far as a district attorney dared to go in commenting on the failure of a defendant to deny the charges which had been made against her. He brought forward the defendant’s shoe, which had been introduced in evidence, pointed to the telltale stain on the sole, and challenged counsel to explain how that stain got on the shoe if it did not indicate the guilt of the defendant. “Standing, as it does,” Sampson thundered, “unchallenged, undenied and uncontradicted.”
He cited the attempt of the defendant to bring in some mythical criminal, who must have entered the house and, by implication, killed Austin Cullens, and, above all, excoriated Mason for his attempt to becloud the issues by confusing Sergeant Holcomb and mixing up the bullets.
When he had finished, Mason approached the rail, to stand in front of the jurors with a smile. “Ladies and gentlemen,” he said, “the Court will instruct you that in order to warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence, the circumstances must not only be consistent with the guilt of the defendant, but inconsistent with every other reasonable hypothesis. In the event there is any reasonable hypothesis, other than that of guilt, on which the circumstantial evidence can be explained, then it becomes your duty to acquit the defendant.”
“This is a case in which the Prosecution relies on circumstantial evidence. As far as the gun is concerned, that evidence has proven a boomerang. The evidence proves conclusively that the gun found in the defendant’s handbag — and I will admit to you, ladies and gentlemen, that it is the defendant’s handbag, not that she has told me so, because her mind is a blank as to what transpired, but because I think it’s a fair inference from the evidence; that it was her handbag — that gun did not kill Austin Cullens. But that gun did kill George Trent. There are only two bullets in the case. If the bullet from the Breel gun didn’t kill Cullens, then it must have killed George Trent. Now then, on the evening Cullens was killed, there was only one shot fired from this gun. That one shot was fired by Austin Cullens at someone who was in the room with him. That shot lodged in the back of a chair. Cullens carried that revolver in his right hip pocket — which was the reason the coroner’s examination disclosed nothing in that pocket.
“Now then, gentlemen, what is more reasonable than to suppose that Mrs. Breel guessed that her brother was dead, and strongly suspected that Austin Cullens had killed him. Austin Cullens had every reason to want George Trent out of the way. There is every reasonable inference to indicate that George Trent had uncovered evidence which, when communicated to the police, would convict Cullens of a series of gem robberies.
“Therefore, Cullens killed Trent, In order to cover up that killing, he did various and sundry things, such as pretending that Trent had pawned gems with a gambling house. And to bolster up that claim. Cullens even went to the gambling house and put on an act, trying to establish a false motive for Trent’s death.
“It is very evident, gentlemen, that, as in the case of Cullens, Trent couldn’t have been killed with the gun that the Prosecution claims was used in that murder. Therefore, it becomes equally evident that he must have been killed with the other gun, since there are only two guns and only two fatal bullets, one fatal bullet fired from each gun. It’s very evident that Sergeant Holcomb naturally assumed that the gun in Mrs. Breel’s handbag had killed Austin Cullens, and that the gun in Trent’s office had killed Trent. He took from his right-hand vest pocket the bullet which the autopsy surgeon had handed him as having killed Cullens, and handed it to the witness, Hogan. Hogan checked it with the guns and advised Sergeant Holcomb that that bullet had been fired by the gun found in Trent’s office.”
“What happened?” There was a moment of tense silence, while Mason waited for the point he had made to soak in. “You have seen the character of Sergeant Holcomb,” he said. “He exhibited that character very plainly on the witness stand. He thought that he had confused the bullets; that he had inadvertently transposed the bullets in his pockets, when he had in reality done nothing of the sort. In order to cover up what he fancied was his mistake, he immediately handed the other bullet to Hogan with the statement that that bullet had been the one which killed Cullens.
“It is a little thing, ladies and gentlemen, but it is one of the important little things which become increasingly vital in a case. It is an index to the character of Sergeant Holcomb. Doubtless, he would never have sought to frame this defendant had he thought that she was innocent. But, having thought he’d made a mistake, he tried to cover that mistake, and carried his subterfuge so far as to go on the witness stand and testify to what is a manifest impossibility. Regardless of what the deputy district attorney may tell you, and in spite of Sergeant Holcomb’s testimony, it’s a physical impossibility for the bullet which killed Austin Cullens to have been fired from the Breel gun. On the other hand, it’s a physical impossibility for George Trent to have been killed by the Trent gun.”
“Now then, ladies and gentlemen, if I had been permitted to pursue my proof, I believe I could have demonstrated to you who did murder Austin Cullens. However, since I wasn’t permitted to follow that proof to its logical conclusion, I will take the facts as they now stand, and give you a reasonable hypothesis which will explain away every fact in this case. And not only is that hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the defendant, but the innocence of this defendant is the only hypothesis under which the facts can now be explained.”
“Something happened on the afternoon of Cullens’ death which convinced Sarah Breel that Cullens was responsible for her brother’s disappearance, possibly his death. She went to his house to get evidence. Someone had been there before her. Who was that someone? That was someone who was a dead shot with a revolver, someone who went there for some undisclosed purpose, someone who had access to the revolver with which it now appears the murder must have been committed.
“Austin Cullens saw that person. He knew what that person wanted. He was overcome by the consciousness of his own guilt. He suddenly whipped his revolver from his right hip pocket and fired. The shot missed. But that person had also prepared against just such a contingency. That person was armed. That person fired, and that person did not miss.
“Some time later, Mrs. Breel went to the house. She found the door open. She found the lights out. Remember, ladies and gentlemen, no flashlight was found in her bag. She had to grope her way through the darkness. She did not know that the body of Austin Cullens was lying on the floor. Stumbling her way along the dark room, she suddenly touched something with her left foot.”
“There was only one way in which she could investigate, and that was by a sense of touch. The room was dark. She had no flashlight in her bag. She had no matches in her bag. She bent down, exploring with the tips of her gloved fingers. She touched something hard. She picked it up. It was a revolver. And then she touched a body. Panic-stricken, she wished to call the police. She mechanically, automatically and unconsciously shoved the revolver into her bag and fled from the house, screaming for police. There was no one to hear her screams. She dashed out into the boulevard, and found herself suddenly confronted by a pair of headlights. In her terror, she had forgotten to look before she jumped out into the street.”
“That, ladies and gentlemen, since I have been precluded from making any other explanation, is the explanation which I think you will be forced to adopt from a consideration of the circumstantial evidence in this case.”
“You have sworn to act fairly and impartially. I made no effort to pack this jury with persons who would be favorable to the defendant’s side of the case, because I knew I didn’t have to. All I wanted was people who would be fair. Why, one of your number even mentioned that he had formed an opinion as to the guilt of the defendant, but said he could set aside such an opinion when he entered upon the trial of the case. I had the right to challenge him with a peremptory charge and remove him from the jury. I did not do it. Why? Because I felt that he would be fair, because I knew that he was intelligent. And because all on earth that the defendant in this case wanted was fairness and intelligence. Is that the attitude of a lawyer defending a guilty client? Is that the attitude of one who seeks to ‘razzle-dazzle’ a jury?”
“Ladies and gentlemen, you have sworn to follow the law in this case. When you hear the instructions of the judge, you will realize that this means that you have taken a solemn oath that if the facts of this case can be explained on any reasonable hypothesis other than that of guilt, you will acquit the defendant. Ladies and gentlemen, I leave you to your solemn duty.”
Mason turned and walked back to his seat. Sampson, his face livid, struggling hard to control his voice, leaped up. “Just one word in rebuttal, ladies and gentlemen. Let me challenge Counsel to carry his own argument to its logical conclusion... Who was that person who was such an expert revolver shot? Who was that person, who, by his own evidence had access to the revolver with which he now claims Austin Cullens was murdered — could it have been Virginia Trent, the niece of the woman who is on trial! It must have been! I challenge him to deny it!”
Mason, on his feet, drawled, “Your Honor, I dislike to interrupt the deputy district attorney, but do I now understand the deputy district attorney is contending that Virginia Trent murdered Austin Cullens?”
“According to your own reasoning, it’s as plain as the nose on your face,” Sampson roared.
“Well,” Mason asked, “can you find any flaw in that reasoning? If so, please point it out to the jury.” The color drained out of Sampson’s face. His jaw sagged open in surprise. Mason turned to Judge Barnes. “I was going to suggest, Your Honor, that if it is the contention of the Prosecution that the evidence now shows Virginia Trent murdered Austin Cullens, that this jury must be advised to acquit the defendant in this case. But if the deputy district attorney really wants to know who killed Austin Cullens, I suggest he talk with Paul Drake...”
“That will do, Mr. Mason,” Judge Barnes said. “That statement is improper. You will be seated. The Court will not entertain any motion for a directed verdict, but will let the jury speak for itself — that is, unless it is now the contention of the Prosecution that Virginia Trent committed the crime.”
Sampson hesitated, gulped, then said abruptly, “No, I was only showing how absurd Mason’s argument was.”
One of the jurors fixed Sampson with a suspicious eye. “What’s absurd about it?” he asked.
“It’s just a smoke-screen,” Sampson asserted, “behind which he’s trying to hide his client.”
“But what’s wrong with that theory?” the juror insisted.
Sampson said, “Everything. However, I–I have completed my argument. You have evidence that — that Cullens was killed with the gun found in Mrs. Breel’s handbag. Other evidence introduced merely confuses the issues. I trust you ladies and gentlemen won’t be misled. I thank you.” He walked back to his seat at the counsel table.
Mrs. Breel tried anxiously to catch Mason’s eyes, but the lawyer kept his own gaze averted. Judge Barnes instructed the jurors as to the law, swore the bailiff to conduct them to a safe place for their deliberations. And then, as the jurors left the Court, announced that Court would take a recess pending a receipt of the verdict.
Sarah Breel beckoned Perry Mason over to her. “You should never have done that,” she said.
“What?” Mason asked.
“Dragged Virginia into it.”
Mason grinned and said, “On the contrary, I dragged her out of it. You heard Sampson say it was absurd to think she could have murdered Cullens.”
“Where is she? I want to see her.”
Mason said, “My secretary took her for a ride in the country. I thought some fresh air would do her some good. I persuaded her that it would be to her advantage not to be present at the conclusion of the case.”
Sarah Breel sighed. “Well, while we’re waiting for the jury to bring in its verdict, since you’ve admitted that was my bag, suppose you see if I can have the knitting out of it. I might just as well keep working on that sweater for Ginny while I’m waiting to see what the jury does.”
Mason patted her hand. “I think you’d better try crossword puzzles. It might be safer.”
“Will we have long to wait?” she asked.
“My guess,” Mason said, “is ten minutes.”
Events proved that Mason missed his guess by exactly twenty minutes. It took the jury half an hour to come filing into court with its verdict. Judge Barnes said, “Have you agreed upon a verdict, ladies and gentlemen?”
“We have,” one of the men answered.
The clerk took the folded document and handed it to Judge Barnes, who scrutinized it for a moment, then passed it back. “Read your verdict,” he said.
The foreman read the verdict. “We, the jury, impaneled to try the above entitled case, find Sarah Breel not guilty of the crime charged in the indictment. The jury suggests to the district attorney’s office that it forthwith arrest Virginia Trent and try to prosecute her more intelligently than it has the defendant in this case.”
The corners of Mason’s mouth were twitching. “I take it it may be stipulated that in entering the verdict, only the portion which finds the defendant not guilty is to be entered in the records.”
“So stipulated,” Sampson said sullenly.
Judge Barnes waited until the verdict had been entered, and then regarded the jury thoughtfully. “Ladies and gentlemen,” he said, “in discharging you, the Court wishes to compliment you upon the manner in which you have performed your duty. This has been one of the most astounding cases this Court has ever witnessed. Right at present, the Court is frank to state that it doesn’t know whether the evidence points, as the jury apparently believes, to the fact that Virginia Trent fired the shot which killed Austin Cullens, or whether this Court has witnessed one of the most astounding pieces of legal legerdemain which has ever been perpetrated in a courtroom. Subsequent events will doubtless prove which is correct. The defendant is discharged from custody and court is adjourned.”