PROTECTION
FROM
FIRE AND THIEVES

LONDON: PRINTED BY
SPOTTISWOODE AND CO., NEW-STREET SQUARE
AND PARLIAMENT STREET

Frontispiece

PROTECTION
FROM
FIRE AND THIEVES

INCLUDING
THE CONSTRUCTION OF LOCKS, SAFES, STRONG-ROOMS, AND
FIREPROOF BUILDINGS; BURGLARY, AND THE MEANS OF PREVENTING IT;
FIRE, ITS DETECTION, PREVENTION, AND EXTINCTION; ETC.
ALSO
A COMPLETE LIST OF PATENTS FOR LOCKS AND SAFES
BY
GEORGE HAYTER CHUBB
ASSOC. INST. C.E.
\ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ /
CAVENDO TUTUS
\ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ /
LONDON
LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO.
1875
All rights reserved.

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE
LORD HENRY GEORGE CHARLES GORDON LENNOX,
M.P.
FIRST COMMISSIONER OF WORKS;
THIS VOLUME IS, BY KIND PERMISSION,
Respectfully Inscribed.

PREFACE.

A SMALL book, embracing such subjects as herein treated of, is necessarily somewhat disconnected in its character. In endeavouring to be strictly practical, I fear I have made some portions of the book uninteresting to the general reader; if so, it must be remembered that my chief aim has been to place certain facts before professional and business men, at the same time introducing matter that may be useful to everyone.

I have to offer my best thanks to Colonel Fraser, Colonel Henderson, Captain Shaw, and other Gentlemen, who have afforded me valuable help.

If the importance of protecting life and property becomes in the least degree better understood and appreciated, I shall feel amply repaid for the time and trouble incurred in the preparation of the book.

57 St. Paul’s Churchyard, London:
January 1875.

CONTENTS.

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.

PROTECTION
FROM
FIRE AND THIEVES.

CHAPTER I.
LOCKS, KEYS, ETC.

WHEN it is known that cash and securities to the value of upwards of six millions are almost constantly kept in the strong-room of one only of the London banks, it will be understood that the safe custody of valuables is a subject of very great importance. Unfortunately it is a matter that has hitherto been greatly neglected by the general public and professional men; and the ignorance on the part of the majority of people as to what is real security, has given rise to this attempt to place a few facts together that will be of general use. The incidents relating to fires, burglaries, &c. are gathered from authentic sources, and from private records that have been compiled during many years.

Although before the last ten years there were but few persons who employed their skill to foil the increasing attempts of safe-breakers, the subject of locks had long been thoroughly considered. The great interest taken in the lock controversy at the time of the Exhibition of 1851 showed that there were many persons not indifferent to the efforts then made to improve the quality of locks; but it was not until the great burglary at Cornhill, in 1865, that safe-making was fairly investigated by the public. Sufficient proof of this is that in the sixty-four years preceding 1865 only twenty-eight patents for safes were registered, while in the nine years following there were no less than 122. Being myself engaged in the manufacture of locks and safes, I have, of course, some knowledge of their construction; and shall endeavour to state facts that apply to the work of every maker, and my opinions formed by practical acquaintance with this manufacture, and guided by others who have previously written on various branches of the subject.

Locks have, it is said, been in use for above four thousand years in Egypt; anciently these were mostly made of wood, and it is a remarkable thing that the locks that have been in use in the Faroe Islands for many centuries so closely resemble those found in Egyptian catacombs as to be scarcely distinguishable from them. More modern, but considered now to be old-fashioned, are the letter lock and warded lock; later still are the patent locks of Barron, Bramah, Chubb, and others. It is not necessary to describe the variations in all these; it may suffice to say that the most trustworthy are those with levers and tumblers, and protected in other ways from false keys and picks. One chief point of security consists in a lock being so unlike any other that no key but its own will open it; and a 3 in. Chubb’s drawer lock can have no less than 2,592,000 changes made in its combinations. Mr. Tildesley, in an article published in ‘Once a Week,’ mentions a lock which had a chime of bells connected with it in such a manner that no sooner was the skeleton-key of an intruder applied to the lock than the latter began to chime a plaintive air, such as—

Home, sweet home;
Be it ever so humble,
There’s no place like home.

A sentiment in which the housebreaker would doubtless concur as he took his precipitate flight.

It is obvious that locks are only secure so long as their keys are properly taken care of. This is of the utmost importance, for some keys can under favourable circumstances be made merely from a wax impression by a clever workman. Numbers of robberies take place through keys being left about, and to the lock is laid the fault which ought rather to be charged to the careless owner of the keys.

Some people expect perfect impossibilities, and imagine that, having obtained a secure lock, they have done all that is necessary. No lock whatever will guard against culpable negligence with regard to its key; or, as in the famous South-Eastern Railway bullion robbery, the treachery of supposed trustworthy servants. It will be remembered that the notorious lock-picker Agar said the robbery on this railway would be impossible unless copies of the keys could be taken. By the connivance of a guard named Tester this was accomplished, and yet the duplicate keys thus made were useless until Agar had travelled seven or eight times to Folkestone with the chests, altering the keys until they fitted.

Since 1851 many improvements have been made and adopted in Chubb’s locks, and more still have been tried and rejected, as interfering with their proper working. Complexity of action in any lock will sooner or later invariably prove fatal to its success. A lock is unlike a

watch or other delicate machine that is treated with a considerable amount of carefulness; it is subject to every day hard wear and usage. Absolute perfection is perhaps as unattainable in locks as in other matters; nevertheless the present is an age of progress, and a more perfect lock may perhaps be invented some day. Lock patents by scores have appeared within the last twenty-one years; some good, others indifferent or bad in principle, and many of them embracing as new ideas certain principles of construction long since exploded or laid aside. Of those practically defunct (and they are many), my opinion of them is that the ingenuity of the inventors has generally been allowed to over-run their perception of the before-mentioned fact, viz., that a lock is a very hardworked machine, and that in its construction simplicity is as necessary an element as security.

A good lock cannot have a key made to it unless another key is available to copy from or the lock itself can be broken open. Of this latter fact London burglars have not been slow to avail themselves, and they have tried it in the following manner. It should first be said, for those not acquainted with the mode of securing warehouse and office doors at night, where the buildings are left unoccupied, that such doors are usually fastened with a large rim or mortise lock of the ordinary kind. When this is locked from the outside a small flat bar, that is secured at one end to the door, is put across the keyhole to a staple thereon, fastened by a padlock. The advantage of this plan is that the inner lock cannot be touched, the keyhole being closed while the outer lock is secure; and this padlock being visible, the police in their rounds can tell by a glance under the light of the bull’s-eye whether or not it has been interfered with. But there is such a thing as forcing a padlock completely open, with proper appliances; and some clever burglar watching the policeman off his round past a warehouse in Watling Street, one night, wrenched the padlock off and supplied its place by a common one, the outside of which in the dark resembled the one previously on. He then took the patent lock away, got one side off, cut out all the works, so that anything like a key would at once open or close the bolt, fastened the side on as neatly as was possible, took it back to Watling Street again, and watching his opportunity took his own lock off and refixed the empty shell of the patent lock. The purpose in all this was that next night he might at once open the padlock, force the inner lock, and enter the place, while a confederate would doubtless

replace the padlock as if all were right. The success of the scheme depended chiefly upon the padlock or its substitute always being on when the police came round; but, fortunately for the owner of the premises, the attempt was frustrated by the mere chance of the patent lock (now without works and found next day to open rather stiffly) being brought to be examined, when the burglar’s attempt was at once discovered. Further revelations of this trick were made to the police by a convict who died while undergoing a long term of imprisonment, and after his disclosures no less than twenty-seven padlocks were found in use in the City the works of which had all been taken out, to await the thieves’ opportunity, and done in such a clever manner that only the closest inspection could detect it. Two of the locks served thus were on a jeweller’s door, which shows the importance of preventing this mode of robbery. Such a well-planned scheme required an improvement to be made in the padlocks, and there is now largely in use what is known as the ‘police padlock,’ a lock which when once forced asunder is so injured that it cannot be repaired without being entirely re-made, so that if one should be taken off its door by a thief it cannot be put back again.

This is but one of the numberless instances that require the attention and thought of the careful lockmaker; and the other instances that will be given show that with respect to safes it requires yet greater skill to foil the cunning of modern burglars.

The whole of Chubb’s locks are made by hand, and differ one from another. The difficulty is not to make them to differ, but when such are needed to make several alike, for a touch of the file will completely alter a lock.

It is so essential for good locks to be totally unlike each other that we continue to make by hand only, although the cost is in consequence high. Machinery would and does produce well-finished and serviceable locks, but the changes and combinations cannot vary as with hand-work. ‘So extensive are the combinations,[1] that it would be quite practicable to make locks for the doors of all the houses in London with a distinct and different key to each lock, and yet there should be one master-key to pass the whole. A most complete series was constructed some years ago for the Westminster Bridewell, consisting of 1,100 locks, forming one series, with master, sub-master, and warders’ keys.

‘At any time the Governor has the power of stopping out the under-keys; and in case of any surreptitious attempt being made to open a lock, and the detector being thrown, none of the under-keys will regulate it, but the Governor must be made acquainted with the circumstance, as he alone has the power, with his key, to replace the lock in its original state.

‘It need scarcely be stated, that Barron’s, Bramah’s, Chubb’s, and most other locks are adapted for all purposes, from the smallest cabinet to the largest prison-doors or strong-room.

‘As has been already stated, various and numerous patents have been taken out. Ingenious, however, as are some of the arrangements, they appear to have complicated, rather than simplified, the general construction.

‘It is submitted that the true principles of perfect security, strength, simplicity, and durability should be combined in every good lock.

‘1st. Perfect security is the principal point to be attended to, as without it no lock can be considered as answering the intended purpose.

‘2nd. The works of a lock should, in all cases, possess strength, and be well adapted, especially in the larger ones, to resist all attempts to force them open; and both in the larger and the smaller kinds the works should not be susceptible of injury, or derangement, from attempts with picklocks or false keys.

‘3rd. Simplicity of action is requisite, so that any person having the key, and being unacquainted with the mechanism of the lock, should not be able to put it out of order.

‘4th. The workmanship, materials, and interior arrangement of a lock should be so combined as to ensure the permanent and perfect action of all its parts, and its durability under all ordinary circumstances.’

Besides the better class of locks made in South Staffordshire there are really trumpery locks made in abundance, and Willenhall enjoys an unenviable celebrity for the cheapness and worthlessness of its wares. There is a familiar saying that if a Willenhall locksmith happens to let fall a lock while in the process of manufacture he does not stop to pick it up, as he can make another quicker. The late Mr. G. B. Thorneycroft, who once lived at Willenhall, is said to have been taunted with the fact that some padlocks made there would only lock once, but when told the price of them was twopence each he replied, ‘It would be a shame if they did lock twice for that money.’ The total weekly production of locks in the whole district was stated in 1866 to be no less than 31,500 dozens. A very large proportion of this enormous supply goes to foreign markets.

CHAPTER II.
THE ART OF BURGLARY.

IN order to show the absolute necessity of secure locks and safe depositories for property, especially in banking establishments, it may not be out of place just to trace the systematic care and great sagacity with which large burglaries are planned. An unsuccessful attempt, where the booty is of any magnitude, is seldom made. The first-rate ‘cracksmen’ always know beforehand where to go, when to go, and what they are going for. When a ‘plant,’ as it is termed, is made upon a house or a bank, precise information is gained if possible as to the depository of the valuables, and if it is found that the safeguards are so strong in themselves and the locks so invulnerable that there is but little chance of success, the affair is quietly dropped; but if otherwise, then no expenditure of time or misapplied ingenuity is spared to gain the desired end; the house is constantly watched, and the habits of its inmates observed, their ordinary times of going out and coming in being noted. Possibly the confidential servants are bribed or cajoled, and induced to leave the premises when their employers are absent, so that impressions may be taken from the locks, and false keys be made.

When all the keys required are ready, generally one or two men who have not been previously initiated are called in, and receive their instructions to be ready at a certain hour on the following day to enter the premises. A plan is put into their hands; they are cautioned to step over a certain creaking stair or board, and the false keys of the different doors are given to them. The inmates of the house being absent, their servant takes advantage of this fact to fulfil a long-standing engagement with his or her new and liberal friends; a signal is given; the two confederates enter; the so-called safe is swept of its contents; all the doors in the building are carefully re-locked, and not until the house is opened for business next morning is the robbery discovered.

Many years ago there was a bank robbery at a town in Kent, effected as follows: Two respectable-looking and well-behaved men went to the principal inn of the town and informed the landlord their object was to look out for and purchase a small estate in the neighbourhood. They stopped there for nearly three months, taking frequent drives in their gig, lived well and paid well; and at length took leave one market-day between twelve and one o’clock, much to the regret of the landlord, who felt sorry to lose such unexceptionable customers.

These men were thieves, and at a few moments past one o’clock that very day robbed the bank of nearly £5,000.

The banking-office was the ground-floor of a house in the Market Square, and the manager never left the cash there at night, but always took it to his own residence near by. He was accustomed, however, with the clerk, to be absent from one till two o’clock in the day at his dinner, during which time the money was put into the safe and the premises locked up.

It appeared that all the arrangements of the business were perfectly ascertained and understood by the two sojourners at the hotel, and that the necessary impressions of the locks had been taken on various nights and the false keys made.

On the day in question the gig was taken just outside the town. One of the men went back, and in mid-day unlocked the street and internal doors, opened the safe, took out the money, and then the two set off to London with their booty and got the notes cashed the same afternoon. After locking the safe the burglars slipped a small ring over the key-pin of the lock, so that when the manager on his return from dinner tried to open it with its proper key, the key would not enter. A smith was sent for, and it was four hours before the safe was opened—too late, of course, for any effective pursuit.

A more recent and notable instance is that of a daring burglary which took place at Mr. Walker’s, the well-known jeweller of Cornhill, in 1865, the whole facts of which came to light in consequence of one of the gang volunteering a confession during an action arising out of the robbery. I am indebted to the ‘Times’ newspaper for the following particulars, which doubtless are still fresh in the memory of some persons: The robbery had been elaborately schemed, and was only accomplished by a regular expedition of well-equipped thieves. The cleverest of the gang had taken Mr. Walker, his family, and his habits under the closest surveillance for seven weeks before, night and day, until at last everything connected with his business and his practice was thoroughly known. This information being complete, a party of five of the robbers repaired to the premises at ten minutes past six on the evening of Saturday, February 4, 1865. The house was let and occupied in floors, Mr. Walker’s shop being on the ground-floor, Sir C. Crossley’s offices immediately above, and other offices above those, while below the shop was a room tenanted by a tailor. The occupants, when the thieves arrived, had not yet all left for the night, but the offices on the second floor were empty, and to these three of the robbers at once ascended by means of the common staircase, and there took up their first position, the other two remaining in the street to watch and give signals. At twenty minutes to eight the signal was given by the confederates outside the house that Mr. Walker’s foreman, who appears to have been the last on the premises, was gone, and their operations commenced.

It was past midnight before the three robbers inside began their most important work. Mr. Walker’s shop was secured by iron doors or partitions, but the thieves directed their attack against the floor, which had not unnaturally been left with less protection. They got into the tailor’s room, on the lowest floor, mounted upon his cutting-board and forced their way through the ceiling and flooring to the shop above. Having thus effected a lodgment against the real point of attack, they distributed the duties of the night. Of the two thieves stationed in the street one was to be on the watch, lest Mr. Walker or any of his people should return to the house, while the other was to keep guard over the police and give warning whenever a constable approached. Inside, one of the gang sat upstairs in Sir C. Crossley’s arm-chair, at the window of the second floor, to notice the sentries in the street, and the signals of these men he communicated by means of a string to his comrades in the shop.

One of these handed up such instruments as were wanted; the other at length opened the safe (by wedging, as described on p. 36); so that at a quarter to four they washed their hands in the office upstairs, and an hour later were miles away on the Guildford road.

The success in this happily unique case was due to the desertion of the premises for six-and-thirty hours together. The men did not get into the shop till one-and-twenty hours after the commencement of their operations. Aided by time, the science of the housebreakers was successful. The police passed the place every nine minutes, but with such deeply-laid plans were not likely to detect the mischief going on, and so the thieves escaped for three weeks, when a part of the stolen property was traced and the rascals themselves ultimately captured. Caseley, the reputed leader of the gang, stated that he had had a great deal of experience in opening safes, and there is no doubt he was a clever man; but I believe a part at least of his subsequent statements were exaggerations, likely to be indulged in by a man placed in his position.

Very few cases of the kind, however, show such determination and skill, and thus almost the first robbery in which wedges were used in safe-breaking must rank as one of the most remarkable of our times.

When a large amount of property of either cash, plate, or jewels is deposited in one place, it really is in fact offering a premium to robbers, unless fit receptacles for such property are provided. Notwithstanding the cunning, ingenuity, or violence of the professional burglars, means are at hand by which they may be effectually baffled, and all who are interested in the matter should see that their patent locks or iron safes are really what they ought to be—impervious to fraud and force.

The axiom that ‘the best is the cheapest’ will hold good with locks and safes, as with most other things. Let it be remembered that first-class work must be done by the best and most skilful workmen, and that to secure them a high rate of wages must be paid.

Most of the house-robberies so common in all large towns are effected through the common street-door latches in ordinary use being opened by false keys. It is a notorious fact that thousands are made year after year, but which do not afford the least security, as they are all so made that any one key will open the whole, and it is not until the owner has his hall cleared, or his plate carried off, that he finds out that his apparently complex key is a mere sham, there not being in the lock a single tumbler or ward to correspond with the cuts in the web of the key. At a very low computation at least three-fourths of the houses in London can be entered by false keys, and it is simply owing to the vigilance of the often-abused police that robberies are not more constantly effected.

The following particulars, kindly furnished me by Colonel Fraser, of the City Police, will show what facilities are placed within the reach of burglars by careless householders.

Return of Premises found open, or otherwise insecure, by the Police
in the City of London.

By using secure locks or latches on all the outer doors of houses an immense amount of work would be saved to the police, and it is really a question for ratepayers to decide if common and insecure locks should be allowed to be used any longer.

While on the subject of house-robberies I may refer to other modes of entering dwellings, with which the public ought to be acquainted in order to be on their guard.

Admission to a house by the connivance of a dishonest servant is, of course, sometimes obtained by thieves, and the only way of preventing this is to be careful whom one employs in the house. But, if possible, the thief will get into the house unaided by a confederate, who after all might foil his plans, and in any event will claim a part of the plunder. So the house must be carefully watched, and, if possible, examined, in order to discover the easiest mode of access.

Frequently some coal-cellar window is found to be left conveniently unbarred, although all other windows and doors are barred and bolted; or perhaps all the windows have safety-fasteners but one, as was the case in a residence near London, a short time ago, when the burglars happened (so it was said) to pitch upon the unprotected window, and entering cleared the room of valuable jewellery.

Beggars or hawkers are often in the pay of thieves, endeavouring to get information—that may not be used perhaps for a long time hence—and such visitors should certainly never be allowed inside one’s house, though their visits are too often encouraged by the weakness of the domestics.

Now, it will be asked, what are the remedies best adapted to prevent robbery in these various ways? Firstly, be careful to have trustworthy servants, or all other precautions are unavailing. Secondly, have plate-glass to all windows in the house, for this cannot be broken, as common sheet-glass can, without noise. Thirdly, as shutters are really no protection at all, and frequently are not fastened at night, let all windows and openings that can be reached easily from the ground have strong bars built into the stone or brickwork, not more than five inches apart, where this can be done without disfigurement; and let the windows on every upper floor have either Hopkinson’s or Dawes’s patent window fasteners, which cannot be opened from the outside, and are simple and strong in construction and cheap in price.

The engraving shows Hopkinson’s fastener, an extremely simple and ingenious invention. The projection on the left side, as the fastener is moved, comes over the opening and wedges fast any instrument introduced from the outside for the purpose of forcing back the catch.

Fourthly, keep a dog, however small, inside the house; this is a wonderful safeguard, and extremely disliked by burglars. Fifthly, have any number of bells on shutters, electric wires, or other gimcracks that you please, and place no reliance on any of them. Lastly, leave as little property as possible, certainly no silver plate or jewellery, lying about, so that if a thief should overcome all obstacles to entrance, he may not find much ready to hand.

The sort of robbery I have alluded to is committed either at night or in the dusk of the evening or at the dinner-hour, when the inmates are all in one part of the house. There is also that very frequent and too often successful plan of stealing coats, &c. from a hall, when some stranger calls with a fictitious message that causes the servant to leave him alone for a moment, during which he hurries off with everything within reach that is worth stealing. To prevent such an occurrence plainly the best thing is never to allow a stranger to wait inside one’s door.

A professional burglar’s tools comprise skeleton-keys, silent matches, a dark lantern, a wax taper, a palette-knife used for opening windows by pushing the fastening back; a small crowbar, generally made in two pieces to screw together, and with one end forked; a centre-bit, and a carpet-bag. If the object of attack is a safe, then to these must be added chisels and steel wedges of different sizes, an ‘alderman,’ or large crowbar, a ‘Jack-in-the-box,’ some aqua fortis, and sometimes gunpowder for blowing open locks. Besides providing himself with tools, the burglar will often wear a ‘reversible,’ or a coat which can be worn inside out, each side being a different colour, so that if he happened to be noticed he will turn his coat in some quiet corner and become another man to all outward appearances.

The writer of an able article in the Cornhill Magazine of January 1863 gives as a list of the various ways in which houses are regularly broken into, the following: ‘Jumping a crib,’ which is entrance by a window; ‘breaking a crib,’ forcing a back door; ‘grating a crib,’ through cellar gratings; ‘garreting a crib,’ through the roof. Entrance in this last way, the writer states, is sometimes cleverly effected (from the leads of an empty house adjacent) by means of an umbrella. First, a few slates are removed, then a small hole is made, and through this aperture a strong springless umbrella is thrust and shaken open. Again the thieves go to work upon the hole in the roof, which they widen rapidly and with perfect confidence, since the débris falls noiselessly into the umbrella hanging beneath. When in the house the thieves’ only care is to move silently and to show little or no light. When the plunder is secured and the confederates signal that the way is clear, the burden is divided, and they at once separate, though perhaps going to the same place. Cabs are occasionally employed by the thieves; and though the drivers are not exactly in league, yet they must know pretty well by whom they are being hired. The plunder is disposed of immediately to ‘receivers,’ who always drive a good bargain, and if there is any plate or gold at once put it into the melting-pot. These receivers are the curse of large towns, where alone they are to be found. It is entirely owing to them that the majority of robberies are committed, for if thieves had to run a second risk in disposing of the goods after stealing them, they would not continue a dishonest life with the chances of success they now have. The police are generally well aware of the men who thus assist the thieves, but the difficulty of getting evidence against them is extreme, although occasionally a rascal is caught and severely punished owing to information being received from some informer. There are no less than eighty-seven houses in London known to be those of receivers of stolen goods.

In February 1858 there were in Manchester alone ninety-four returned transports, and out of the whole of that number there were not more than six in employment or who had any known means of livelihood. In view of this statement can it be wondered at that in the eleven years from 1857 to 1867 there were no less than seventeen successful robberies effected in that city alone, involving a loss of property amounting to £25,788, chiefly in cash and jewellery? This loss would have been largely augmented had it not been for the vigilance of the Manchester police, who could not, however, possibly frustrate every attempt made by dishonest men let loose upon society in large numbers by a system which is open to very serious objections. The Habitual Criminals Act proves that the country has at length recognised the fact that the ticket-of-leave system has been grossly abused by convicted persons, and that to protect life and property effectually it is necessary to give the police more power of supervision over suspected characters. For the benefit of those not acquainted with this Act, I may state that its most important provision is to give a Judge power to include in the sentence of a person, who has been previously convicted, a certain term of police supervision, to take effect after release from prison; and during this term the person may be called upon at any time to prove that he or she is gaining an honest livelihood—the burden of the proof resting with the suspected person, instead of the police being required to prove dishonesty.

A man who commits a great robbery is not one who up to that moment was honest and industrious; it is most probable that he has been an associate of thieves, and has been apprenticed to it, so to speak, as to a trade; hence the advantage of the new system by which he can be watched and if necessary captured on suspicion. The London police have now on their register 117,000 names of habitual criminals, and the list is said to be increasing at the rate of 30,000 a year.

A few somewhat imperfect statistics may be given. In London, during the years 1862 to 1867 inclusive, there were eight successful burglaries, in which £14,845 worth of valuables was stolen; in other large towns of the kingdom, such as Glasgow, Sheffield, &c., there were thirteen burglaries, with a loss of £11,375; and if our Colonies were to be taken into account, at Hong Kong alone there was a robbery (referred to more fully on page 59), in 1865, of £50,000 from a bank.

Omitting this last, however, it will be seen that in eleven years no less than £52,000 of property was stolen by burglars in Great Britain. It is true a great deal of this was recovered—sometimes in remarkable ways, an instance of which was the finding of some gold watches in the Thames, stolen from Mr. Walker’s, Cornhill; one of the watches having attracted the attention of a river policeman. But, on the other hand, there were numbers of successful attempts where no booty was found; a large number of unsuccessful attempts; and many of both kinds which never appeared in the newspapers at all.

The total would indeed make a formidable list, and yet there is hardly a case in which proper care combined with the use of the best safeguards would not have prevented all loss.

In the year 1873 the total amount of property lost by robberies of all kinds within the metropolitan district alone was £84,000, of which nearly £21,000 was subsequently recovered.

So large a proportion of this loss was occasioned by the use of insecure fastenings on doors or windows, that the Metropolitan Police have drawn the special attention of householders to the risks thus incurred. Colonel Henderson not long since issued a notice, of which the following is an extract:—

‘Caution to Householders and others.—The Commissioner considers it to be his duty to caution householders and others that larcenies are in most instances committed by thieves entering through windows left open or so insecurely fastened that they can be readily opened by thrusting back the catch from the outside with a knife, without any violence or force whatever. The plates of window-fastenings should overlap each other, and self-acting side-stops should be used in sashes. Attention is also directed to the following means by which thieves effect their purpose:—

‘In the absence of the family, especially on Saturday and Sunday evenings, entering with false or skeleton keys, passing through an empty house in the neighbourhood, going along the parapet, and entering any window found open—climbing up the portico and entering through upper windows—calling at houses under pretence of having messages or parcels to deliver, and during the absence of the servant stealing articles from the hall or passage and decamping.

‘If ordinary and necessary precautions were taken, as above recommended, the efforts of the police in preventing crime would be materially aided, and property more effectually secured.’

A short time since there was a robbery at the warehouse of a person who immediately wrote to the newspapers blaming the police and making out a plausible case. Now, the real facts were, that this person gave up residing on his City premises without informing the police. The door had on it only a common latch, easily opened by a false key. There was a window up a side-passage through which it was easy to obtain entrance; and though all these circumstances conspired to facilitate the operations of thieves, yet this was thought a proper opportunity to blame the City Police!

Although seventeen years have elapsed since the conviction of the men who stole the bullion on the South-Eastern Railway, the case is still the most remarkable of its kind—remarkable for the deliberation, the professional spirit, and the pecuniary resources of the modern offender.

The following very condensed account I take from the ‘Times’ newspaper of the day, merely premising that the case shows the extreme importance of guarding one’s keys most jealously, for even up to the present time no lock, such as can be brought within the reach of everyone for practical use, has been invented that will permit of its keys being carelessly used.

On the night of May 15, 1855, gold to the value of £12,000 was taken from the van of a train on the South-Eastern Railway, between London and Folkestone. The boxes were weighed in London and again at Boulogne; at the second place the weight, as was subsequently discovered, differed from the weight in London. The weight in Paris corresponded with the weight at Boulogne. Consequently the boxes must have been tampered with between London and Boulogne, or, as it had been impossible to touch them while in the boat, between London and Folkestone. When the boxes were opened, bags of shot were found substituted for gold. Of course the surprise was great, and the search after the offender earnest. But whatever may be the skill of the detectives, we know from sad experience that the criminal world is more than equal to them in craft. For sixteen months the pursuit was in vain, and the robbery was well-nigh forgotten, when an unexpected revelation threw light on the matter. A man named Edward Agar was convicted in October 1855 of uttering a forged cheque, and sentenced to be transported for life. This man, after his conviction, stated to the authorities that he could give information respecting the great gold robbery of 1855. On being questioned he announced himself as one of the perpetrators, and named as his accomplices Pierce, formerly in the service of the South-Eastern Company; Burgess, a guard; and Tester, a clerk in the traffic department.

Agar was forty-one years of age, and had by his own confession lived by crime from fourteen to twenty years. His evidence was that Pierce first suggested the scheme, but that he himself thought it impracticable. Pierce said he believed he could obtain impressions of keys of the Chubb’s locks by which the iron safes were secured; and Agar then answered that if it could be done he thought the thing might be effected. Pierce and Agar went down to Folkestone as casual visitors for the benefit of sea-bathing. They took lodgings and employed themselves in observing the arrival of the tidal service trains to the boats. This was in May 1854, twelve months before the actual commission of the robbery—so long a time can modern depredators afford to spend upon their preparations. They went daily to the pier to enjoy the fresh air; but their constant observation of the trains and the station aroused suspicion, and they left, though not before they had discovered ‘what Chapman, who had the key of the iron safe, did when the trains arrived and the luggage was removed to the boats.’ By these means it was ascertained where the key was kept, the impression of which it was desirable to obtain.

But to know where the key was kept and to obtain possession of it were very different things, and Agar, according to his own story, was much disheartened. Not so Pierce. Pierce knew a man named Tester who was in the office of the Superintendent of Traffic, and Tester could get possession of the keys for them. However, time rolls on, and we are in August, when Pierce discovers that the locks are to be altered, and that the new keys will be in Tester’s hands. Tester was the clerk who corresponded with Mr. Chubb on the subject of the alterations, and by his means the impression of a key which opened one lock of each box was obtained.

But as each box had two locks it was necessary to obtain the impression of another key, and the following device was adopted: Agar was in possession of no less a sum than £3,000. It was arranged that a box of bullion of the value of two hundred pounds should be conveyed in the iron safe in the usual way, and that it should be delivered to him under the name of Archer.

Agar goes for the box, and it is delivered to him by Chapman, who opens the safe with a key which he takes from a cupboard. Thus Agar learns where the second key is kept. Now, how are they to obtain an impression of the key? Two months have elapsed since they got the impression of key No. 1. This is October, and they are still without No. 2. But they are not disheartened. Pierce and Agar go to Dover, and put up at the ‘Dover Castle;’ they walk over to Folkestone, and arrive just when the train is coming in. In the confusion of an arrival the attendants leave the office for a few minutes. Pierce goes boldly in, opens the cupboard which contains the key of the iron safe, hands it to Agar, who takes an impression, and then replaces it. Thus five months after their reconnoissance at Folkestone they have surmounted the first difficulty which suggested itself to the reflective mind of Agar. They have obtained wax impressions of the keys; everything else remains to be done.

The next thing, of course, was to make keys from the impressions. For that purpose lodgings are taken in Lambeth and Kennington. Pierce disguises himself in a black wig, and the next two months are spent in filing keys. When the keys were completed to a probable similarity with the rough wax impressions—no easy task, it would seem, for two inexpert operators with common files—it was necessary to try them. Agar went down several times in the van with Burgess, the guard. They did not fit at first, but they fitted more nearly every time he went. At last they fitted completely, and the deed was resolved on. Of course, after nearly a year’s labour, it was not worth their while to fly at any paltry game—they would wait till a large sum was to be sent. Two chests would hold about £12,000, and they heard that £12,000 was shortly to be sent.

They then buy shot to replace the gold. Agar and Pierce are admitted into the van by Burgess, and on May 15, 1855, twelve months after the deed was planned, the boxes of Messrs. Spielman, Bult, and Abell are securely rifled. Nineteen months after the crime was committed, and more than two years and a half after it was planned, justice overtook the delinquents. No sentence was passed upon the informer Agar, who was remitted back to prison under the sentence he had incurred by an act of forgery; but Burgess and Tester were sentenced to transportation for fourteen years, while Pierce, through a technicality, got off with only two years’ imprisonment: and so ends this romantic case.

One of the convicts, I have heard, has been of some use to the police, for, like many other convicted thieves, he has been communicative, and at least one improvement in lock-making has resulted from this man’s suggestions.

Though a robbery so patiently planned, so quietly carried out, and with such a successful result, is rare; yet we still hear of instances wherein the same forethought and misguided talent are shown.

The dark autumn and winter evenings have latterly been chosen for the commission of what are earning a separate name, so numerous have they become—‘Jewel Robberies.’ At the West End of London and the fashionable suburbs there have been numerous cases in which the thieves wait till the inhabitants are assembled at dinner—having possibly left some of their jewellery lying about on dressing-tables—and by entering through a window the burglars are able to make a successful haul. Either in this manner or by an ordinary night burglary much of the plate and jewellery is stolen with comparatively slight risk of discovery. The residences of Sir F. Peel, the Dowager Marchioness of Cholmondeley, the Countess Waldegrave, the Countess of Donoughmore, and many other noticeable personages have recently suffered from these unwelcome visits.

The following notice, issued some time ago, I have Colonel Fraser’s permission to republish. It very clearly shows the responsibilities resting with both the police and the public of large towns. If householders would but perform their part as well as the police do in this matter, robbery of the kind indicated would be of the rarest occurrence:—

POLICE NOTICE.

Recent occurrences having shown that an impression somewhat extensively prevails in the City that the duty of protecting house property at night is one which belongs exclusively to the police, it is desirable to point out what the true functions of the police are with respect to the guardianship of house property, inasmuch as the proprietors of houses, when distinctly informed as to the nature and extent of the protection which they may reasonably expect to receive from the police force, will be in a better position to determine what those additional safeguards should be which ordinary prudence makes it incumbent on them to provide for themselves.

Under the influence of the impression above referred to a practice has sprung up in the City, and is gradually increasing, of leaving shops and warehouses, stored with goods of great value, entirely untenanted at night, and throughout the whole of Sunday. Numerous buildings are let out in separate rooms to separate tenants, who require them only for purposes of business during the day; the street-door, during business hours, is left open, in order to give ready access to every part of the house; and thus, in the case of houses which are habitually deserted at night, not only have thieves great facilities for entering them, and secreting themselves there by day, but they may do this with the knowledge that they will, almost certainly, be left for many hours at night in the undisturbed possession of the abandoned premises.

These risks are, moreover, greatly aggravated by want of due care in thoroughly searching the house before it is finally closed for the night, by the defective condition, in many instances, of the external fastenings, and by neglect in making even these fastenings secure.

It has, indeed, been supposed by some persons that if, during their absence, they leave lights burning in their shops, and openings in the shutters through which the interior of the shop can be partially inspected, the property within may be safely left to the exclusive guardianship of the police. This practice has never been approved by the head of the force, and is itself open to serious objection, as tending to encourage reliance on a contrivance which is not only untrustworthy, but which may be used by dexterous thieves to further their own plans.

Nor must it be imagined that a policeman who is in charge of a beat can, without manifest neglect of his duty to the householders generally, devote to the shops where the practice in question is followed, the special supervision which seems to be expected from him. If a constable on duty were bound, each time he passed, to make a careful inspection of the interior of shops through the several apertures which individual shopkeepers may please to make in their shutters, he would obviously be unable to complete the circuit of the buildings under his charge within the time appointed for that purpose, and the majority of houses on the beat, as well as passengers in the streets, would be left without that protection which the police should properly afford.

Under these circumstances it is most important to bear in mind that the special watching over particular premises, which it is sought by the adoption of the custom referred to to exact from the police, is a duty which the police cannot undertake to perform.

The chief functions of police in connection with the protection of house property at night are to prevent, as far as possible, a forcible entry being made into any building from without; to afford protection to all houses equally; to be vigilant in detecting the first indications of fire, and to exercise a general supervision throughout the night over the doors, shutters, and other external defences of the houses.

These functions the police can discharge, but they cannot be responsible for what may be occurring out of their sight, within deserted buildings to which they have no access—they cannot keep stationary guard over the doors of unoccupied warehouses unprovided with any locks or outer fastenings but such as are of the most worthless description—they cannot prevent robberies being effected in premises to which thieves are admitted during the day and secured from all interruption when locked in for the night by the owners of the premises themselves—nor can they, in justice to the legitimate claims which the majority of the ratepayers have on the protection of the police, employ the greater portion of their time in watching over the property of a few individuals, who invite attacks from thieves by omitting to take the precautions which common prudence enjoins.

James Fraser, Colonel,
Commissioner of Police.

City Police Office, 1865.

CHAPTER III.
SAFES AGAINST THIEVES.

OF late years there has been an increasing demand for strong safes, and it is in response to this demand that such a multitude of patents have been taken out. Of these very few have been introduced to the public, for most of the inventions are by persons not practically acquainted with the trade, who consequently have not the opportunity of foreseeing the practical difficulties in the working of their patent, nor often the means of introducing it to public notice.

Perhaps one patent in six is ultimately used, but even of these many are but unwitting copies of former ones. As an instance, a special mode of making an angle-iron frame is claimed by three inventors. However, after the great robbery at a jeweller’s in Cornhill, in 1865, among the numerous patents introduced there were some of undoubted advantage, the object in all being to give greater strength to the door and its fastenings, and (in some patents) to close all joints in a safe against the operation of wedging.

The employment of wedges for forcing open safes was then quite novel, and therefore the many improvements suggested or patented were intended chiefly to baffle this new mode of attack. It is necessary to notice very briefly the salient points of the best of those inventions which by being now used have proved to some extent their utility. Perhaps the safes most generally known are Milner’s, Tann’s, Hobbs’s, Chatwood’s and Chubb’s. There are many other makers, most of whose names appear in the list of patentees, but whose productions have hardly obtained the notoriety belonging to the five names here mentioned. Respecting the first-named makers, so many different qualities are made that it is difficult to give any definite opinion of their work, but it may be safely said that the makers rely more upon the general construction of their safes than upon any special invention to overcome the ‘wedge’ or other instrument. They use to a large extent wedge-shaped pieces of iron fastened to the inner face of the door, which fit into, as the door shuts, corresponding holes in the frame or lining face. These cannot, however, be used well at the back of the door, in consequence of the clearance required when it is swinging open; otherwise, if fastened in a solid manner, they give some additional strength. One of the noticeable features of Messrs. Milners’ safe is the use of an outside band or frame round the body, the advisability of which position for it is sometimes questioned, although it adds somewhat to the appearance of strength. They also use hinges in place of the pivot or centre working in a socket, the more general mode of construction.

One of their stronger safes has been described as follows: ‘Its dimensions being 83¼ inches high; 58¼ inches wide, and 36½ inches deep, and secured by one single and two pairs of double doors. The first, which is of massive strength, and well provided with lock, bolts, and wedge-guards, secures a small chest or treasury designed for bullion, which is in fact the principal object for which the safe was intended. Over this door close a pair of equally strong double doors, each shooting eight massive bolts, and coated, like the inner door, with a layer of hardened steel. Over these second doors close a third pair, consisting, like the inner ones, of two ½-inch plates of iron separated by a plate of ½-inch cast steel. The composition is 3½ inches thick. The weight of the safe is thirteen tons (?), and the cost £300.’

The safes made by Messrs. Tann, of Newgate Street, make no pretension to any special novelty beyond having, in the strong qualities, a projecting rim all round the inside of the door, which fits into a corresponding recess, in order to foil the action of wedges. The finish of most of these safes is decidedly good, showing careful workmanship.

The following is a published description of one of Messrs. Tann’s safes: ‘No special provision as against fire was made, strength being the first object. The size of the safe is 5 feet 6 inches high, and 2 feet 4 inches deep, about four tons weight of iron being used in its manufacture. The case consists first of boiler plate of ½-inch, then of ⅜-inch plate of steel and iron welded together, a third outer case being of ⅜-inch iron plate. The frame is six inches by 1¼ inches, with solid corners; and the construction of the doors is novel. They are folding, and fit into each other at their meeting with dovetails seven inches high and one inch wide of solid ½-inch iron, which effectually prevents any attempt to force them apart by wedging. The back edge of each door is provided with what is technically called a hook rebate, with the same view.’

Messrs. Hobbs’s safes are also of various qualities, their strongest having bolts of a hooked or claw shape, and the outer edges of the body plates being protected in a peculiar way by a covering under which molten metal is run to cover or close the joints.

The safe made by Chatwood has a door with a curved edge,[2] and bolts of hooked shape which slide behind projections on the frame; sometimes he uses also projecting pieces on the inner edge of a door, somewhat in Milner’s way, and his stronger safes have hard metal run in while hot between two iron plates to form the sides. Some of his safes are very ponderous, and more work is spent on them than seems necessary for any but the most extraordinary requirement. The finish is good, and the general plan of construction more elaborate than that used by some makers. The number of applications for patents made by Mr. Chatwood will be seen by reference to the list to be large, but only some of them or parts are in use.

Messrs. Chubb and Son’s safes are chiefly in two distinct qualities, the best being made as shown by the annexed engravings. The advantage of the diagonal bolts will be obvious; they fasten into a solid frame, which in its turn overlaps the body-plates, so that if it were possible to get a wedge past the rebate on the door, the moment the wedge was inserted the bolts would grip the sides and bind it tightly. The edges are joined by angle-iron, rivets and screws, and are rebated and dovetailed together.

Messrs. Chubb and Son have lately (1874) patented a new mode of construction, with the object of providing a stronger safe at a less cost than has hitherto been charged. The frame of the safe, on which the door hangs, is a solid T-iron, its outer edge overlapping the body-plates, and the flange receiving behind it the bolts. Though the inner lining has no screw or rivet, yet it is most securely fastened in the process of joining the other parts. In order to increase the fire-resisting properties of this new safe, besides the usual casing of fire-resisting material, a tube is introduced into the open space behind the T-iron, filled with a substance that will on the approach of fire cause steam to be projected into the interior of the safe. The engraving shows a section of one corner of this patent safe, and an elevation of it will be found facing page 36.

Beyond the fact that its simplicity of construction enables it to be produced at a moderate cost, the chief advantages claimed for this particular safe are:—

1. The door being slightly recessed when shut, a wedge cannot be inserted with the same ease as if it were flush; and if it is inserted, the pressure is exerted against the point of greatest strength and away from the door.

2. The frame being a special T-iron section with a thickened corner, its strength is enormous, and the power necessary to bend it can hardly be applied but by machinery.

3. The bolts fasten behind this solid iron, in place of, as is usually the case, into the lining.

4. The edges of the outer plates are recessed into the frame, so that there is not an open joint.

5. The outer plates are fastened to the frame by a new screw rivet, which can neither be driven in nor taken out.

6. Even if one of the plates should be taken off, the lining cannot be got out, in consequence of the mode adopted for securing it at the front.

7. The adoption of the Patent Steam Tube adds greatly to the fireproof qualities of the safe at the part most subject to the entrance of heat.

Among safe manufacturers I may name Messrs. Mordan and Co., Mr. Whitfield, Mr. Elwell, Messrs. Perry and Co., Mr. Price, and others, whose productions I have not space to describe.

There are in Staffordshire certain firms who make safes of the lightest and most trumpery description, chiefly for export. A partner in one of these establishments once told me that as long as the safes were strong enough to stand the rough voyage round the Cape to India they were all that was needed! I need hardly say that a safe need be no stronger than a packing-case to stand that test. There are, however, already signs of a much better article being required in the East; and the export trade in good English safes to India, China, Australia, and other parts is rapidly becoming of much importance.

Wedging has already been mentioned as an ingenious and somewhat new mode adopted by burglars to force open safes. It is accomplished by means of a number of steel wedges, thin and small, and about two inches long by half an inch broad; these are driven in one by one at different parts round the edge of the door; gradually

thicker ones are put in until the side has been sprung away sufficiently to allow a crowbar to be inserted, and then if the bolts are not of the very best the door is likely to be wrenched open. The sound of hammering the wedges is deadened by a leather pad being put under the hammer, so that it becomes almost a silent operation.

A convicted burglar, who had enjoyed the advantage of some experience in wedging safes, stated that on first trying the door of a safe, if the wedge sprang out and would not remain in the joint without being held, it was generally hopeless to proceed with wedges; but if the first wedge took ‘a bite’ in the joint and stayed in, he was almost certain of success.

But besides this method there is that of using drills, a very favourite way formerly with thieves, and one that has lately again become popular, because of the increased facilities for procuring better drilling instruments. The object sought in drilling is to get at the lock or working parts, so that by destroying the works and bolt of the lock the handle of the safe merely has to be turned and the door comes open. It is quite easy to drill any number of holes into an ordinary iron safe, but unless the holes are near the lock the contents of the safe cannot be reached without much labour and time. Therefore to counteract the drilling it is necessary to protect the lock by steel or some other hard substance. A plate of steel well fixed is usually employed, but in addition to this Mr. John Chubb invented a very simple but effective mode of protection. A number of small holes are made in the door-plate from the inside almost through the plate; the holes are tapped, and then filled up with hard steel screws; so that when a drill touches, however slightly, even one of the steel screws, its edge immediately breaks and the drill becomes useless.

The construction and operation of the powerful instrument which made large holes was unknown until one of them, with all its tools, was captured by the police, and a more powerful, well-made, and compact instrument has seldom been seen. By the courtesy of the Metropolitan Police Authorities Mr. Chubb was allowed to experiment with the instrument, and his attention was directed to provide some means to baffle and destroy its operation. This has been effectually done, and the improvement secured by letters patent.

Fig. 1.

It would be obviously improper to publish any description or illustration of the machine itself, but fig. 1

Fig. 2.

Fig. 3.

shows a part of an iron door with a hole two inches in diameter cut through it. Fig 2 is the cutting tool used, and uninjured, as it was when taken from the machine after cutting the hole. Fig. 3 also shows a part of an iron door, having the patent improvement, upon which a trial was next made by the instrument with the same cutter. No impression, farther than taking a mere skin off the surface, could be made, and the cutter was utterly destroyed, as shown in fig. 4.

Another and more powerful machine was taken by the Manchester police, with cutters capable of making much larger holes, but the improvement is equally effective in destroying the tools.

Fig. 4

A third and more desperate mode of opening safes is by introducing gunpowder into the locks, destroying them, and thus opening the door with ease. This, however, has not lately been tried to any extent; the noise made is likely to lead to detection. It is rather a dangerous thing to try, and the locks of good safes have generally received such improvements as enable them to resist the shock of an explosion without injury.

There have been other methods said to be used by burglars to obtain their object, such as softening steel with a blow-pipe, so as to get a drill through it, or using drills made of diamonds, which are said to be very powerful, or employing acids to act upon and destroy hard steel, but I have not known of any burglaries proving successful by these means.

There is no doubt a vast amount of low ingenuity and cunning always at work, quietly scheming or planning the best mode of getting at the treasure so often kept in safes, and the only safeguard against this is to get the best safe possible, and then not to rely upon its being utterly impregnable (for no safe can be that), but to use ordinary watchfulness and care, so that it may not be exposed to unusual risks.

A safe is protected as much by having careful and honest persons in the employ of a firm as by its own strength; and the common-sense view of the matter to take is to advise all who wish to obtain the best security to pay what is necessarily a good price for a good safe, and to take good care of it—and its keys.

The careless way in which the keys, not only of safes, but of warehouse doors, private boxes, and bags are left about, has been the cause of many robberies.

The great gold robbery on the South-Eastern Railway in 1855 was effected through the thieves obtaining, though only for a few moments, possession of the keys and taking an impression from them. A jewel robbery at the West End of London in 1872 was owing to the key of the jewel-case being left in the same room as the case. It is often found that important keys instead of being in personal custody are kept in some drawer or box having only a very common lock.

Even bankers, careful as they are, need a caution about this, for their keys are so numerous in most instances that great care should be exercised to prevent them from ever getting into improper hands; whatever kind of keys are used, they should never be out of the possession of their rightful owners.

A plan, to which I may call attention, because of its complete success and simplicity, has been extensively used for the recovery of lost keys. It consists of a chain with a label attached to it, engraved as shown in the accompanying illustration, the object being to ensure the return of the keys without the finder becoming aware to whom they belong, thus preventing their possible unlawful use. The bunch of keys being brought to the address on the label, by reference to a register kept of each label, the rightful owner is known and communicated with. Several thousands are now in use, and their value is proved by the constant, almost daily, recovery of keys.

Some of the instances in which this plan has been successfully used are somewhat remarkable, and among these may be mentioned the loss of a gentleman’s keys on one of the Swiss mountains. All hope of finding them was given up and a fresh set accordingly made; but the following year a bunch of keys was found where the snow had melted, and these, brought home by an English traveller, were found to be the missing ones.

Perhaps a more curious case, in which an unexpected use was made of the register, occurred at the time of the terrible Abergele accident to the Irish mail train. Mr. Lund, a passenger in the train, was killed, but nothing could at first be found upon him as a likely means of identification. He happened, however, to have a registered chain, and upon telegraphing to my firm the number on the label his name and address were at once discovered.

It may be of use to add a few particulars respecting the amount of coin that can be stowed in a certain space, in order that it may be easily calculated how much any safe will hold. The Bank of England reckoning for the room required to stow away gold coin in bags is 79 cubic inches to 1,000l. One cubic foot will contain no less than 21,875l. In order to allow a slight margin and to be on the right side, it may be considered that 80 cubic inches will contain 1,000l. in bags of sovereigns.

For silver coin the Bank reckoning is that 157 cubic inches will hold 100l., and that one cubic foot will hold 1,235l. in bags. To allow a margin as before, it may be said that 160 cubic inches contain 100l. in silver coin.

CHAPTER IV.
SAFES AGAINST FIRE.

PERHAPS there is a greater demand for fire-resisting than for thief-resisting safes, and certainly it is in the former character that they are most often put to the test. The consideration, therefore, of what is the best form of construction to cope with fire is most important; while it is also a much simpler matter than when strength against thieves is required.

In fire we have an element whose character is known, and which cannot attack us in some new way for which we are not fully prepared. All that it can do to a safe is to exercise upon it a certain heat, the intensity of which may be pretty nearly determined, and which cannot in actual practice last beyond a certain time. Probably heat that will melt iron in a large mass is seldom produced in the burning of an ordinary dwelling-house; but in a warehouse with inflammable contents such fierce heat often exists, so that a safe should be proof against it for two or three hours. Unless a safe were very bulky it could not well preserve its contents without any damage for a much longer time; and indeed it is not necessary, for no safe is very likely to be exposed to an intense all-round fire longer than three hours; by that time it will either have fallen into rubbish, or the débris from above will have covered it in, and protected it from immediate contact with the fire. It will be seen from this that it is advisable not to build a safe partially into a wall or recess; the chances being that it will be kept in its place long enough to have the full force of the fire expended upon its exposed portion, and then fall a greater distance and upon harder material than if it had fallen when the wooden floor first gave way.

The first quality that a fire-resisting safe should possess is strength in its construction sufficient to prevent its being damaged by a heavy fall, or sustaining injury through the plates warping from heat. This cannot be obtained unless the outer plates are at least a quarter of an inch thick (or upwards, in big safes), strongly joined at all the edges by stout angle-irons well rivetted to them. Other and more expensive methods are used to join the edges, and are doubtless better than the foregoing; but this is at once a cheap, effectual, and most generally used method.

Secondly, it is essential to make the safe as nearly airtight as possible, to do which it is only necessary that the door should fit very closely at its edges, and that its inside face touches at every possible point the interior of the safe.

The third thing to be considered is the fire-proofing—the most important feature of the safe. Almost everything that one can think of has been either proposed or used for proofing—water, wood, paper, plaster-of-Paris, chemicals of all sorts, and many other things besides. But of all these what may be termed a combination of water and wood, in the forms of alum and sawdust, has been most extensively used.

There are two walls of wrought iron in the safe, and the intervening space has to be filled with a fire-resisting material, which may be either of a refractory nature, such as fire-clay, sand, or any other practically infusible slow conductor of heat; or it may be an absorbent substance containing chemicals that will evolve moisture when heated. The former of these two methods is now seldom used except by makers of cheap common safes, who sometimes use clay, ashes, or mould. The evaporating system is generally adopted, and as a rule the absorbent material is common sawdust, with which is mixed ordinary alum, the water of crystallisation in the alum being gradually parted with under the continued heat generated by fire. Mahogany sawdust is preferred, as being less combustible than that of white woods.

At one time tubes of glass or fusible metal containing alkaline solutions were imbedded in the sawdust and were supposed to burst or fuse at a given temperature, but it was found that the glass accidentally broke or the fusible metal became corroded, and allowed the liquids to escape, thus damping the contents of the safe. But the mixture of alum with sawdust is open to two objections. Owing to the hygroscopic nature of sawdust the alum is liable to decomposition, thereby producing a certain moisture in the safe; and, secondly, there is of course a limit to the production of moisture from the alum when under the action of fire, after which the sawdust will become gradually dry, and although it may not actually ignite, it will become charred, and even red hot, under sufficiently continued heat. It is but fair, however, to say, as I have previously suggested, that such instances of continued heat are but rarely probable; yet, for the before-mentioned reasons, I prefer and use an incombustible material, very light and absorbent, and which does not possess the bad qualities of sawdust, but which is more expensive. Supposing the alum to become exhausted, there still remains the protection of a substance which is both infusible and a bad conductor of heat.

Of course the actual amount of resistance to fire depends largely on the capacity of the proofing chambers. When advisable the thickness of these may be increased to any extent desired, or the safe may have several chambers, all containing proofing, or intermediate ones left as air-chambers only.

To sum up the qualities which are requisite to make a safe proof against an ordinary fire, it must, first, be made entirely of wrought iron; secondly, the outer plates must be at least a quarter of an inch thick; thirdly, there should be a space of three to four inches all round it of an evaporating non-conducting composition. With such a safe as this, properly put together, the general run of fires may be defied; but there are cases where extra precaution should be taken, and the safe kept in a brick, stone, or iron strong-room. No safe inside a strong-room has, to my knowledge, ever been destroyed; but many—always light ones—in warehouses or offices have had their contents burnt.

And here I would caution those not acquainted with the subject to put little faith in the tests, either public or private, that are sometimes made, unless they are conducted by persons quite disinterested. When it is done in this way of course the result is one that may, if certain conditions are fulfilled, be valuable; but so frequently are these ‘tests’ arranged, either by making a safe specially for a trial, by carefully packing its contents, or by constructing the fire in a particular mode, to turn out such wonderful successes, that it will be well not to rely upon anything but actual experience gained from the result of safes which have been known to be subject to an ordeal in the ordinary course of things. Plenty of such instances can be investigated, but it will obviously be unadvisable to give here the numerous results that have from time to time been chronicled by the daily papers and other publications.

It should be borne in mind that certain things are less liable to injury from heat than others; and therefore it is that books will sometimes sustain no injury, whilst loose papers in the same safe may be more or less damaged. For this reason it is advisable that all parchments and papers be kept in a drawer or cupboard of a safe, as the second enclosure (though with no more fire-proofing round it) gives a slight extra security.

Another caution I would give is that, after being in one fire, a safe should not be relied on to resist fire again until it has been examined and re-proofed by the maker or a thoroughly competent person. The resisting properties are certain to be damaged, if not destroyed altogether; and although I know of safes still in use that have not been renovated since preserving their contents, I would not place any faith at all in their power to prove again successful.

The destruction of the Pantechnicon has presented an opportunity of fairly ascertaining the effect of great heat upon various safes, and, strange as it may seem, scarcely one of the many safes survived the conflagration without injury. One French safe had nothing but its four sides left intact, its front, back, and inside having disappeared as if driven out by a cannon-ball. The cast-iron safes, of which there were several, proved, as might be expected, utterly useless, being found when pulled out of the ruins twisted into all sorts of shapes, or cracked and broken like glass. Other safes, by makers whose reputation can hardly be affected by damage done in such an unprecedented fire, had their contents very seriously injured; and only a few safes came out of the trial in at all a satisfactory state.

Speaking of French safes, I may here say that, as a rule, they and most of the Continental safes cannot be trusted in English fires, nor against the more advanced skill prevailing among our English thieves. Without offence their character may be summed up as being really ‘French’—pretty in outward appearance (which is more than can be said for our safes), with peculiar locks requiring no keys, and certain other un-English things about them; they are quite unsuitable for our market, and vice versâ our British safes find little sale in France.

Safes and other receptacles to contain gunpowder and preserve it from explosion have recently been talked about; and there is no doubt that one result of such a calamity as the late Regent’s Canal explosion will be to expedite legislation on the subject of the transit and storage of gunpowder and other explosives. It may appear curious that gunpowder can be preserved from damage by fire with much greater ease than such a substance as parchment, but the former can only be destroyed by being in contact with actual fire, or becoming subject to a most intense heat (about 560 degrees); while a moderate heat or exposure to steam, such as is necessarily generated by the fire-proofing of a safe, often irretrievably damages parchment. A well-made safe, on the principle of evaporation already described, may be relied on to preserve gunpowder from considerable heat, but to avoid the possibility of flame or sparks entering the space round the door, a second safe of lighter make may be placed inside the ordinary one. Major Majendie, in a recent report to the Government on this subject, suggests that there should be public trials by the various makers, of safes, such as they severally think most suitable for this special purpose. It remains to be seen if this advice will be followed, and if so, upon what principle the trials will be conducted, and whether the safes or chests so tested will be precisely the same as the makers intend to retail, or are made specially for the occasion. It is extremely doubtful if the Government would be acting wisely in affording facilities at the public expense for private firms to experiment with safes the merits of which are pretty well known; but should the trials take place, no doubt the results will, in some instances, be of a nature to astonish those not practically familiar with the action of fire in such cases.

CHAPTER V.
SECOND-HAND SAFES, ETC.

IN the broadest sense of the term there cannot be such a thing as a burglar-proof or fire-proof safe, but in the usually restricted sense of these words it is easy to obtain a safe that combines both qualities, provided what is considered to be a good price is paid.

But it will be well to begin by warning those who hunt after so-called second-hand safes that a real second-hand one, by a good maker, is seldom to be obtained; also that the majority of safes advertised and sold as genuinely second-hand, and with which a warranty is often said to be given, are absolutely worthless, being made by small makers in London and Birmingham, chiefly on purpose to be sold as second-hand, and constructed of the lightest and poorest materials. The parts that are visible of these safes of course look strong; for instance, the edge of the door is sometimes about an inch thick, thus making it appear as if of that thickness throughout; while the fact is that the door is made of two thin sheets of iron with a thick narrow bar all round the edge, thus showing apparent strength where there is none in reality, for nothing is easier than to drill through this door and force back the bolts.

It is well for the reputation—such as it is—of these second-hand safes that they are covered with paint; the more the defects the nicer the safe frequently looks, outwardly; for it is easy enough to cover up cracks, bad joints, &c. with putty, and then paint it all as smooth as a carriage-panel. The angle-iron, by which the plates are fastened together, is very slight, the rivets are small and few and far between; the plates themselves are but sheet-iron, often of less thickness than the mere linings of good safes; and as for the fireproofing material, it is sometimes the ashes from the hearth, and sometimes garden-mould. It is a fact that, at an auction in Scotland, whilst a safe of this description was being ‘put up’ as one of the best ever made, it suddenly fell to the ground, broke open in the fall, and out came the fireproofing in the shape of fresh garden-turf, with live worms in it.

At a dealer’s at the West End of London, within the last few months, there was one of these new second-hand safes, its outer plates being less than an eighth of an inch thick. The safe, about five feet high, was so top-heavy and badly made that upon being touched it rocked like a jelly, and had to be supported by boards at the back. Such is a sample of many a wretched safe bought by unsuspecting and naturally ignorant customers.

As to the fastening of such safes, the bolts are two or three in number, thrown to the front of the door, while at the back of the door are what are called ‘dogs,’ that is, immovable bolts, of little or no use, and put in merely to make the fastenings look stronger. The hinges, too, which ought to be well-made and of the best wrought-iron, are of cast-iron, so that not only does the movement of the door quickly wear them away, but a sharp blow would at once smash them in pieces.

The lock, which is generally used as a bait to catch the purchaser, is frequently of good make, but of a kind never intended for a safe. Locks made for wooden drawers are constantly bought and used for this purpose, although totally unsuitable, and in spite of all proceedings that can be taken to prevent it. Neither my firm nor any of the large safe-manufacturers make safe-locks for any but safes of their own make. A lock for this purpose requires to be, first, very strong, and protected by hard steel, so as to be drill-proof; second, completely gunpowder-proof; third, simple in construction, so that it may never be liable to derangement. Locks on such safes as we are now describing are seldom anything but the last, and not always that. So weak and poor in its construction is this most important part of most of these safes, that workmen with the simplest tools have, with ease and without noise, forced open many of them in from five to fifteen minutes. The lock most suitable for safes is shown in annexed engraving.

It is, in short, a most obvious truth to all who care to enquire into the matter that of all cheap things a cheap safe as a general rule is the most worthless.

Every lock or safe maker of any repute has, at one time or another, had his name used unlawfully in order to deceive purchasers of these common safes. My firm has been compelled to bring nearly a dozen actions in cases of this kind. It had a case lately in which a dealer attempted twice within twelve months (the second time in defiance of the injunction previously granted against him) to sell most worthless goods as being Chubb’s patent make.

I had thought of giving a few instructions to guide a purchaser of a second-hand safe, that he might secure the best; but, as I believe it is a pure waste of money to buy even the best of the class alluded to, I will note what will assist the purchaser who desires a good safe by a good maker.

First, be satisfied that the lock is gunpowder-proof, and covered by some arrangement that will effectually prevent drills reaching it; then that the spindle or handle is made so that it cannot be pulled out or forced in. There ought to be at least three bolts at the front and three at the back of the door, proportionate to the height of the safe. The lock-case, containing lock and bolts, should be most strongly fastened to the door-plate, which ought never to be less than ½ in. throughout. Respecting the body or outer plates of the safe, these should not be, in smaller safes, less than ¼ in. thick, while in safes above 5 feet high they should be at least ⅜ in. The frame on the safe (for the use and description of which see page 35) must be at least 2¼ × ½ in. in small, and 4 × ⅞ in. in large safes. The rivets used ought to be no more than 3 inches apart; this may sometimes be tested by scraping off the paint, when the rivet-heads may be seen. Attention should be paid to the holes in which the bolts go, for unless these are strong, a wedge and crowbar would tear the bolts out of them without difficulty. Be sure also that the fireproofing is of the best material; and lastly, choose a safe of the best finish in every respect.

It may be said that notwithstanding the disparagement of the cheap second-hand safes some of them have at times resisted burglars or preserved their contents from fire. This may be true, but it has been owing rather to the burglars’ want of skill or the little risk they ran in the fire. On the other hand, I could cite dozens of instances where their worthlessness has been shown under real exposure to fire or the attempts of burglars.

A tolerably correct guide in the purchase of a safe is its weight, wherein the light plate and thin proofing cases are sure to betray themselves. Insist upon the weight being stamped on the safe, and see that it does not deviate largely from the following instances:—

No safes of the sizes mentioned should weigh less than these amounts; but safes lined with steel, and made stronger than usual in other ways, will, of course, be very much heavier.

It is so easy for a safe to be made that will deceive any but an experienced eye, and when one is bought it is so requisite that it should be one to be trusted in, that if only for the sake of peace of mind it is advisable to purchase from one of those firms whose reputations depend upon the quality of their work, and whose name is a guarantee that the safe is a safe.

A guarantee is a capital thing to bait a hook with in most trades, but it is a doubtful advantage at the best, for if an article is not good enough to stand upon its own merits a guarantee cannot improve it; and to say broadly, ‘Oh, yes, we guarantee this to be fire and thief proof,’ is to warrant a safe to withstand any amount of fire and any number of burglars.

There obviously must be a limit to the endurance of safes; therefore a guarantee is as obviously an absurdity, and ought not to be blindly believed in.

CHAPTER VI.
STRONG-ROOMS.

IN the planning and construction of a strong-room it must be remembered that the object sought is to obtain a place secure against both the attack of thieves and the ravages of fire.

There are many cases, however, where the latter is the chief object; and as the attainment of this is more difficult than the former, it will necessarily come before us more prominently. In many respects this subject is the most important in this treatise, and it is one concerning which there is a great amount of ignorance. Bearing in mind the rapid spread of banking and other businesses requiring the security a good strong-room affords, it will be my object to show the faults of many constructions now relied upon, and to suggest the simple ways by which they may be avoided.

Building a single strong-room is a very different matter from erecting a fireproof building; the latter is a larger and more difficult question, which will be noticed by itself; but the room that is to be made secure may be and generally is part of a building with no pretensions to special safety against fire or thieves.

Now, the first thing to consider is the position best adapted in any bank, mansion, or warehouse for placing the more valuable part of its contents. There may be certain parts which seem most convenient for access or other reasons, but such considerations ought never to be taken first, especially as the best place happens to be often rather inconvenient. The basement is undoubtedly the right position; any part of the basement will do, but a room on the ground or first floor has at once a source of weakness in itself, for it has to depend for support on what is not a strong-room. Let some spot be chosen in the basement where, if possible, the room will have none of its walls adjoining any other buildings. Should it be next to a street or thoroughfare, it will not matter; but it should not adjoin a court or area, where burglars might have an opportunity of working unobserved. It would undoubtedly be an excellent precaution to build all the walls quite distinct from the main walls of the larger structure, but this is not absolutely necessary, and the extra expense is a drawback to it, though I would give a caution against false economy in such a matter as this.

Any position likely to be damp should be avoided; but if this is not possible every precaution should be taken to remedy the evil, for the trouble caused by damp when once it has got into a closed room of this kind is endless. A few air-bricks connecting the inside by a hollow flue formed in the wall, with its outlet as far as possible from the inlet, should be sufficient to ventilate any strong-vault. But if other ventilation is necessary in the room, have a jet of gas always alight; and over the gas place a bell-shaped covering communicating with the outer air, or with a chimney flue in preference, by a two-inch iron pipe.

In excavating for the foundations, if the subsoil and the situation are not well known, it is important to see that there is no drain or pipe of any sort under the surface, and that the ground is stiff enough for the heavy weight that will be on it. One of the most important parts of a strong-room is the floor, although there is a popular delusion that because it is the floor it is quite secure without any protection. A circumstance showing the necessity of being careful to make the floor strong occurred in the early part of the year 1865, at Hong Kong. The Central Bank of Western India, situated there, had a strong-room for its securities, but unfortunately the defence of the floor seems to have been forgotten. Accordingly some thieves commenced to make a tunnel from a neighbouring house, and after considerable labour obtained entrance through the floor and carried off plunder to the amount of fifty thousand pounds. The affair was managed during Saturday and Sunday by means of this tunnel dug between a drain and the floor of the treasury, a horizontal distance of sixty feet.

A New York bank was also entered in a similar manner, through an excavation which must have taken two or three weeks to make. Although such approaches may occupy some time, they can be carried on unnoticed until the removal of a stone in the floor is at last only the work of a few minutes. For the floor to be secure, it should certainly be formed of half-inch boiler-plates rebated and fastened together, laid upon a good thickness of brick and cement. Stone has been constantly recommended and used for flooring, but it is not advisable; there ought not to be any stone in a strong-room except for the sill and lintel of the doorway, where it is almost necessary.

The walls must be at least fourteen inches thick, brick and cement, and there ought to be the boiler-plate lining inside wall and roof to correspond with the floor.

The roof must be brick-arched, and the arches should be made in the strongest possible way, in order to resist if necessary the weight of a great portion of the building above falling on them. If the span cannot be from one wall to another, then a wrought-iron girder may be introduced, but should be most carefully covered by cement or plaster at every exposed part. On no account use a cast-iron girder.

The entrance to the room has to be well protected, for it is here that attack is to be expected from thieves, and that fire might possibly creep through.

The best plan is to use a fire-resisting door and gate joined together; the door being flush with the outside of entrance and opening out, the gate flush with the inside, and opening inwards; as a general rule the door only is used, but the addition of a gate not only gives extra security, but allows the door to stand open in the daytime to ventilate the room, when other openings for ventilation are impossible or undesirable. There certainly should not be any other direct opening besides the doorway either for light or air. Light is, I know, frequently desirable, but if it is obtained through a window or skylight the strength of the room is lessened, even if these openings have strong iron shutters. If gas is to be introduced the pipes must be laid on with care; it is best to have no pipe inside, but a swing bracket outside the entrance, which, when the door is open, can be swung through the opening and thus light up the interior. Fixed lamps may be used, but there is a certain amount of risk—though it is small—of their being forgotten, and of sparks from them igniting loose papers. It will follow from this that no stove or fireplace should be used inside a strong-room; for if there is a flue a source of weakness is introduced, besides the contents of the room being liable to damage from fire.

But the fixing of the door is an important and hitherto much-neglected point. The annexed drawing shows almost at a glance the proper mode of doing this:—

I have taken it for granted that it is understood iron doors are made with a frame surrounding them of bar-iron, to which the hinges of the door hang, and the corners of which project, to give greater strength. Now, if this door and frame be fixed while a building is in progress, the locks and bolts are exposed to injury from dirt and damp, and the frame is liable to be thrown out of position by settlement of the wall. It is, therefore, better to leave such an opening as shown in the engraving sufficiently large for the intended door-frame, toothed at the sides, and having an arch above it. The door can then be fixed when the building is nearly ready for occupation, the surplus opening being filled with brickwork. The drawing shows a stone sill, and it is usual, though not necessary, to fix a stone lintel over the top of the door, as shown by dotted lines; or the arch may all be filled with brickwork. The bottom of the frame should be grooved about two-thirds of its thickness into the sill, leaving enough room for the door to open clear of the floor-level; or if it be wished to let the bottom frame entirely in, the same end may be obtained by slightly sloping away the floor outside it. The top and sides of the frame should be rebated into the head-stone (or brick) and jambs the whole of their thickness, so that the inside of the wall-opening may be flush with the inside of the frame.

The door must be placed level and upright in the position prepared for it, and temporarily supported there; it should be received from the makers locked, and must have its brass furniture fixed, and be unlocked by the key before attempting to turn the handle of the main bolts. If after unlocking it there is any difficulty in turning the bolts back with the handle, no great force should be used, but the position of the frame must be adjusted until the bolts move easily and the door opens without binding anywhere. In case of any such difficulty, a little wedging up of the top arm against the shutting side of the door (marked A in drawing), will usually remove it. Try the door with a spirit-level applied to three parts, viz.: 1. The face or edge of frame (right and left sides), with door shut. 2. The inside shutting edge of frame, with door partly open. 3. The inside of bottom of frame; and adjust until the bolts work properly. It should then be fixed in this position, taking care not to force the sides of the frame inwards while so doing.

During the fixing, the opening and shutting of the door should be tried frequently. As cement swells in setting, it is possible a door-frame which appears to be properly set may afterwards be found bulged or bound when dry. This should, therefore, be guarded against by wood struts placed across the inside of the frame. On no account must a frame be fixed without its door, but always with the door hung and open, in accordance with the foregoing directions.

As the keys are not required by the workmen after the door is unlocked before fixing, they should be kept by the owner, lest by being left about they may be mislaid or wrongfully used.

A strong-room door of ordinary quality should have the outer plate ½ or ⅝ inch thick, with the lock-case and fireproofing-case in addition; and at least six bolts, three at front and three at back; the frame of a strength proportionate to the size and weight of the door, and with arms and lugs projecting, to build into the wall.

The interior fittings of the room are of course determined by the requirements of the owner. If there is much shelving it may be of perforated metal or mere strips of iron for boxes to rest on, so as to allow of free circulation of air. For particularly valuable articles or documents a safe either small or to take to pieces may be introduced, as is usually done by bankers. I give a plan of a first-class strong-room, which for all practical purposes is secure, and combines strength with economy in construction.

The side and back walls are about 2 ft. thick, in hard brick laid in cement. At 9 inches from the inside of wall is a continuous rough iron grating of vertical bars, built in as a part of the solid wall. Hoop-iron is used in the horizontal courses. The entrance wall is 2½ ft. thick, but in other respects similar to the side walls.

The roof is formed of a brick arch 18 inches thick, with curved bars in the centre; and is covered with a layer of concrete.

The floor is brick and concrete as shown; with a layer of asphalte on the surface.

At the entrance to the room is a steel door of great strength, with two locks throwing 12 bolts, and with a fire-resisting chamber. Next to this is a pair of iron folding-doors, not fireproof; which, when open, lie within the thickness of the wall. There is next a wrought-iron gate opening inwards; the frames of the doors and gate being all connected by wrought-iron plates.

In the room itself, at the further end, is a fire-resisting iron and steel strong-room; and the space in front of it (sides, roof and floor) is lined with ½-inch iron plate, placed a slight distance from the wall to allow of an air-space between. The fittings are of iron; shelves on one side and cupboards on the other.

The cost of such a room complete, of the best materials and highest finish (including brickwork), would be about 1300l.

The following is a condensed description of a strongroom constructed a few years ago for a London bank, and which might serve as a model for others. The walls, two feet thick, are formed of hard bricks laid in cement, with hoop-iron worked in. The room is lined throughout with wrought-iron, ½ inch thick. There are two doors, the outer one a strong iron one, with two locks; and the inner one of combined iron and steel, of extraordinary strength, with two locks throwing ten bolts. A safe placed inside, weighing eight tons, and having twenty bolts, contains the cash and securities. An alarum in the resident clerk’s bedroom is attached to the inside of the strong-room, so that if the outer door be opened a gong is set going. A porter sleeps on a bed in front of the outer door, and by pulling a handle he can set the alarum off if necessary; and there is a watchman always on duty. With such a room as this, situated in a building constantly and carefully watched by trustworthy servants, robbery is made practically impossible.