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[Introduction] (1968)
[Author’s Preface]
[Democritus Platonissans]
[Cupids Conflict]
[Particular Interpretation ...]
[Philosopher’s Devotion]
[Augustan Reprint Society]
The General Interpretation (“Interp. Gen.”) referenced in the Particular Interpretation is not part of this text.
The Augustan Reprint Society
HENRY MORE
Democritus
Platonissans
(1646)
Introduction by
P. G. Stanwood
PUBLICATION NUMBER 130
WILLIAM ANDREWS CLARK MEMORIAL LIBRARY
University of California, Los Angeles
1968
GENERAL EDITORS
George Robert Guffey, University of California, Los Angeles
Maximillian E. Novak, University of California, Los Angeles
Robert Vosper, William Andrews Clark Memorial Library
ADVISORY EDITORS
Richard C. Boys, University of Michigan
James L. Clifford, Columbia University
Ralph Cohen, University of Virginia
Vinton A. Dearing, University of California, Los Angeles
Arthur Friedman, University of Chicago
Louis A. Landa, Princeton University
Earl Miner, University of California, Los Angeles
Samuel H. Monk, University of Minnesota
Everett T. Moore, University of California, Los Angeles
Lawrence Clark Powell, William Andrews Clark Memorial Library
James Sutherland, University College, London
H. T. Swedenberg, Jr., University of California, Los Angeles
CORRESPONDING SECRETARY
Edna C. Davis, William Andrews Clark Memorial Library
[INTRODUCTION]
Henry More (1614-1687), the most interesting member of that group traditionally known as the Cambridge Platonists, lived conscientiously and well. Having early set out on one course, he never thought to change it; he devoted his whole life to the joy of celebrating, again and again, “a firm and unshaken Belief of the Existence of GOD . . . , a God infinitely Good, as well as infinitely Great . . . .”[1] Such faith was for More the starting point of his rational understanding: “with the most fervent Prayers” he beseeched God, in his autobiographical “Praefatio Generalissima,” “to set me free from the dark Chains, and this so sordid Captivity of my own Will.” More offered to faith all which his reason could know, and so it happened that he “was got into a most Joyous and Lucid State of Mind,” something quite ineffable; to preserve these “Sensations and Experiences of my own Soul,” he wrote “a pretty full Poem call’d Psychozoia” (or A Christiano-Platonicall display of Life), an exercise begun about 1640 and designed for no audience but himself. There were times, More continued in his autobiographical remarks, when he thought of destroying Psychozoia because its style is rough and its language filled with archaisms. His principal purpose in that poem was to demonstrate in detail the spiritual foundation of all existence; Psyche, his heroine, is the daughter of the Absolute, the general Soul who holds together the metaphysical universe, against whom he sees reflected his own soul’s mystical progress. More must, nevertheless, have been pleased with his labor, for he next wrote Psychathanasia Platonica: or Platonicall Poem of the Immortality of Souls, especially Mans Soul, in which he attempts to demonstrate the immortality of the soul as a corrective to his age. Then, he joined to that Antipsychopannychia, or A Confutation of the sleep of the Soul
after death, and Antimonopsychia, or That all Souls are not one; at the urging of friends, he published the poems in 1642—his first literary work—as Psychodia Platonica.
In his argument for the soul’s immortality toward the end of Psychathanasia (III.4), More had urged that there was no need to plead for any extension of the infinite (“a contradiction,” and also, it would seem, a fruitless inquiry); but he soon changed his mind. The preface to Democritus Platonissans reproduces those stanzas of the earlier poem which deny infinity (34 to the end of the canto) with a new (formerly concluding) stanza 39 and three further stanzas “for a more easie and naturall leading to the present Canto,” i.e., Democritus Platonissans, which More clearly intended to be an addition, a fifth canto to Psychathanasia (Book III); and although Democritus Platonissans first appeared separately, More appended it to Psychathanasia in the second edition of his collected poems, this time with English titles, the whole being called A Platonick Song of the Soul (1647).
There is little relationship between Democritus Platonissans and the rest of More’s poetry; even the main work to which it supposedly forms a final and conclusive canto provides only the slightest excuse for such a continuation. Certainly, in Psychathanasia, More is excited by the new astronomy; he praises the Copernican system throughout Book III, giving an account of it according to the lessons of his study of Galileo’s Dialogo, which he may have been reading even as he wrote.[2] Indeed, More tries to harmonize the two poems—his habit was always to look for unity. But even though Democritus Platonissans explores an astronomical subject, just as the third part of Psychathanasia also does, its attitude and theme are quite different; for More had meanwhile been reading Descartes.
More’s theory of the infinity of worlds and God’s plenitude evidently owed a great deal to Descartes’ recent example; More responds exuberantly to him, especially to his Principes de la Philosophie (1644); for in him he fancied having found a true ally. Steeped in Platonic and neo-Platonic thought, and determined
to reconcile Spirit with the rational mind of man, More thought he had discovered in Cartesian ‘intuition’ what was not necessarily there. Descartes had enjoyed an ecstatic illumination, and so had Plotinus; but this was not enough, as More may have wanted to imagine, to make Descartes a neo-Platonist.[3] But the Platonic element implicit in Descartes, his theory of innate ideas, and his proof of the existence of God from the idea of God, all helped to make More so receptive to him. Nevertheless, More did not really need Descartes, nor, as he himself was later to discover, had he even understood him properly, for More had looked at him only to find his own reflection.
But there was nothing really new about the idea of infinite worlds which More described in Democritus Platonissans; it surely was not a conception unique to Descartes. The theory was a common one in Greek and Renaissance thought. Democritus and the Epicureans, of course, advocated the theme of infinite worlds in an infinite universe which More accepted; but at the same time, he rejected their view of a mechanistic and fortuitous creation. Although Plato specifically rejects the idea of infinite worlds (in Timaeus), More imagines, as the title of his poem implies, a Platonic universe, by which he really means neo-Platonic, combined with a Democritean plurality of worlds. More filled space, not with the infinite void of the Atomists, but with the Divine, ever active immanence. More, in fact, in an early philosophic work, An Antidote against Atheisme (1652), and again in Divine Dialogues (1668), refutes Lucretius by asserting the usefulness of all created things in God’s Providence and the essential design in Nature. His reference in Democritus Platonissans (st. 20) is typical: “though I detest the sect/ of Epicurus for their manners vile,/ Yet what is true I may not well reject.” In bringing together Democritus’ theories and neo-Platonic thought, More obviously has attempted reconciliation of two exclusive world views, but with dubious success.
While More stands firmly before a familiar tradition, his belief in an infinity of worlds evidently has little immediate
connection with any predecessors. Even Bruno’s work, or Thomas Digges,’ which could have occupied an important place, seems to have had little, if any, direct influence on More. It was Descartes who stimulated his thought at the most receptive moment: in 1642 to have denied a theory which in 1646 he proclaimed with such force evidently argues in favor of a most powerful attachment. More responded enthusiastically to what he deemed a congenial metaphysical system; as a champion of Descartes, he was first to make him known in England and first in England to praise the infinity of worlds, yet Descartes’ system could give to him little real solace. More embraces God’s plenitude and infinity of worlds, he rejoices in the variety and grandeur of the universe, and he worships it as he might God Himself; but Descartes was fundamentally uninterested in such enthusiasms and found them even repellant—as well as unnecessary—to his thought. For More the doctrine of infinity was a proper corollary of Copernican astronomy and neo-Platonism (as well as Cabbalistic mysticism) and therefore a necessity to his whole elaborate and eclectic view of the world.
In introducing Cartesian thought into England, More emphasized particular physical doctrines mainly described in The Principles of Philosophy; he shows little interest in the Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason (1637), or in the Meditations (1641), both of which were also available to him when he wrote Democritus Platonissans. In the preface to his poem, he refers to Descartes whom he seems to have read hopefully: surely “infinitude” is the same as the Cartesian “indefinite.” “For what is his mundus indefinitè extensus, but extensus infinitè? Else it sounds onely infinitus quoad nos, but simpliciter finitus,” for there can be no space “unstuffd with Atoms.” More thinks that Descartes seems “to mince it,” that difficulty lies in the interpretation of a word, not in an essential idea. He is referring to Part II, xxi, of The Principles, but he quotes, with tacit approval, from Part III, i and ii, in the motto to the poem. More undoubtedly knows the specific discussion of ‘infinity’ in Part I, xxvi-xxviii, where he must first
have felt uneasy delight on reading “that it is not needful to enter into disputes regarding the infinite, but merely to hold all that in which we can find no limits as indefinite, such as the extension of the world . . . .”[4] More asked Descartes to clarify his language in their correspondence of 1648-49, the last year of Descartes’ life.
Democritus Platonissans is More’s earliest statement about absolute space and time; by introducing these themes into English philosophy, he contributed significantly to the intellectual history of the seventeenth century. Newton, indeed, was able to make use of More’s forging efforts; but of relative time or space and their measurement, which so much concerned Newton, More had little to say. He was preoccupied with the development of a theory which would show that immaterial substance, with space and time as attributes, is as real and as absolute as the Cartesian geometrical and spatial account of matter which he felt was true but much in need of amplification.
In his first letter to Descartes, of 11 December 1648, More wrote: “. . . this indefinite extension is either simpliciter infinite, or only in respect to us. If you understand extension to be infinite simpliciter, why do you obscure your thought by too low and too modest words? If it is infinite only in respect to us, extension, in reality, will be finite; for our mind is the measure neither of the things nor of truth. . . .” Unsatisfied by his first answer from Descartes (5 February 1649), he urges his point again (5 March): if extension can describe matter, the same quality must apply to the immaterial and yet be only one of many attributes of Spirit. In his second letter to More (15 April), Descartes answers firmly: “It is repugnant to my concept to attribute any limit to the world, and I have no other measure than my perception for what I have to assert or to deny. I say, therefore, that the world is indeterminate or indefinite, because I do not recognize in it any limits. But I dare not call it infinite as I perceive that God is greater than the world, not in respect to His extension, because, as I have already said, I do not acknowledge in God any proper [extension], but in
respect to His perfection . . . . It is repugnant to my mind . . . it implies a contradiction, that the world be finite or limited, because I cannot but conceive a space outside the boundaries of the world wherever I presuppose them.” More plainly fails to understand the basic dualism inherent in Cartesian philosophy and to sense the irrelevance of his questions. While Descartes is really disposing of the spiritual world in order to get on with his analysis of finite experience, More is keenly attempting to reconcile neo-Platonism with the lively claims of matter. His effort can be read as the brave attempt to harmonize an older mode of thought with the urgency of the ‘new philosophy’ which called the rest in doubt. More saw this conflict and the implications of it with a kind of clarity that other men of his age hardly possessed. But the way of Descartes, which at first seemed to him so promising, certainly did not lead to the kind of harmony which he sought.
More’s original enthusiasm for Descartes declined as he understood better that the Cartesian world in practice excluded spirits and souls. Because Descartes could find no necessary place even for God Himself, More styled him, in Enchiridion Metaphysicum (1671), the “Prince of the Nullibists”; these men “readily acknowledge there are such things as Incorporeal Beings or Spirits, yet do very peremptorily contend, that they are no where in the whole World [;] . . . because they so boldly affirm that a Spirit is Nullibi, that is to say, no where,” they deserve to be called Nullibists.[5] In contrast to these false teachers, More describes absolute space by listing twenty epithets which can be applied either to God or to pure extension, such as “Unum, Simplex, Immobile . . . Incomprehensible ”[6] There is, however, a great difficulty here; for while Space and Spirit are eternal and uncreated, they yet contain material substance which has been created by God. If the material world possesses infinite extension, as More generally believes, that would preclude any need of its having a creator. In order to avoid this dilemma, which Democritus Platonissans ignores, More must at last separate matter and space, seeing the
latter as an attribute of God through which He is able to contain a finite world limited in space as well as in time. In writing that “this infinite space because of its infinity is distinct from matter,”[7] More reveals the direction of his conclusion; the dichotomy it embodies is Cartesianism in reverse.
While More always labored to describe the ineffable, his earliest work, the poetry, may have succeeded in this wish most of all. Although he felt that his poetry was aiming toward truths which his “later and better concocted Prose”[8] reached, the effort cost him the suggestiveness of figurative speech. In urging himself on toward an ever more consistent statement of belief, he lost much of his beginning exuberance (best expressed in the brief “Philosopher’s Devotion”) and the joy of intellectual discovery. In the search “to find out Words which will prove faithful witnesses of the peculiarities of my Thoughts,” he staggers under the unsupportable burden of too many words. In trying so desperately to clarify his thought, he rejected poetic discourse as “slight”; only a language free of metaphor and symbol could, he supposed, lead toward correctness. Indeed, More soon renounced poetry; he apparently wrote no more after collecting it in Philosophical Poems (1647), when he gave up poetry for “more seeming Substantial performances in solid Prose.”[9] “Cupids Conflict,” which is “annexed” to Democritus Platonissans, is an interesting revelation of the failure of poetry, as More felt it: he justifies his “rude rugged uncouth style” by suggesting that sweet verses avoid telling important truths; harshness and obscurity may at least remind one that there is a significance beyond mere words. His lament is characteristic: “How ill alas! with wisdome it accords/ To sell my living sense for liveless words.”
In spite of these downcast complaints, More was quite capable of lively and meaningful poetic ideas. One is the striking image of the cone which occurs in Democritus Platonissans (especially in stanzas 7-8, 66-67, and 88) and becomes the most essential symbol to More’s expression of infinitude and extension. The figure first appears in Antipsychopannychia
(II.9) where his purpose is to reconcile the world Soul with Christian eschatology. In Democritus Platonissans, the cone enables More to adapt the familiar Hermetic paradox:
A Circle whose circumference no where
Is circumscrib’d, whose Centre’s each where set,
But the low Cusp’s a figure circular,
Whose compasse is ybound, but centre’s every where. (st. 8)
Every point on the circumference, or base of the cone, relates to the single point at the top. The world, More wants to say, has no limits, no center, yet there are bounds in its not having any. More recognizes the contradiction when he fancies “some strong arm’d Archer” at the wide world’s edge (st. 37). Where shall he send his shafts? Into “mere vacuity”? But More hardly seems aware of the inappropriateness of the cone: he uses a geometrical figure to locate space, time, and numberless worlds within the universal sight of God, but matter is infinite, “distinct/ And yet proceeding from the Deitie” (st. 68). Obviously, the archer must forever be sending his arrows through an infinitely expanding surface. Nevertheless, the cone has great value as a metaphor, as a richly suggestive and fascinating conception. More, however, does not want to speak metaphorically; he is attempting to disclose truths, literal and plain, where pretty words and metaphors have no place. Even as he is writing his most effective poetry, we are aware that More is denying his poetic office; for he is pleading a reasoned case where the words crack and strain, where poetic meaning gathers, only to be denied.
But these objections momentarily disappear when More forgets himself enough to let us feel his imagination and does not worry that we might miss the proofs of his philosophy. Democritus Platonissans concludes with an apocalyptic vision wherein the poet imagines the reconciliation of infinite worlds and time within God’s immensity. He is also attempting to harmonize
Psychathanasia, where he rejected infinitude, with its sequel Democritus Platonissans, where he has everywhere been declaring it; thus we should think of endless worlds as we should think of Nature and the Phoenix, dying yet ever regenerative, sustained by a “centrall power/ Of hid spermatick life” which sucks “sweet heavenly juice” from above (st. 101). More closes his poem on a vision of harmony and ceaseless energy, a most fit ending for one who dared to believe that the new philosophy sustained the old, that all coherence had not gone out of the world, but was always there, only waiting to be discovered afresh in this latter age.
The University of British Columbia
[ NOTES TO THE INTRODUCTION]
[1.] The quotations from More’s Latin autobiography occur in the Opera Omnia (London, 1675-79), portions of which Richard Ward translated in The Life of . . . Henry More (London, 1710). Cf. the modern edition of this work, ed. M. F. Howard (London, 1911), pp. 61, 67-68, the text followed here. There is a recent reprint of the Opera Omnia in 3 volumes (Hildesheim, 1966) with an introduction by Serge Hutin. The “Praefatio Generalissima” begins vol. II. 1. One passage in it which Ward did not translate describes the genesis of Democritus Platonissans. More writes that after finishing Psychathanasia, he felt a change of heart: “Postea vero mutata sententia furore nescio quo Poetico incitatus supra dictum Poema scripsi, ea potissimum innixus ratione quod liquido constaret extensionem spacii dari infinitam, nec majores absurditates pluresve contingere posse in Materia infinita, infinitaque; Mundi duratione, quam in infinita Extensione spacii” (p. ix).
[2.] Cf. Lee Haring’s unpub. diss., “Henry More’s Psychathanasia and Democritus Platonissans: A Critical Edition,” (Columbia Univ., 1961), pp. 33-57.
[3.] Marjorie Hope Nicolson’s various articles and books which in part deal with More are important to the discussion that follows, and especially “The Early Stage of Cartesianism in England,” SP, XXVI (1929), 356-379; Mountain Gloom and Mountain Glory (Ithaca, 1959), pp. 113-143, and The Breaking of the Circle (New York, 1960), pp. 158-165.
[4.] Cf. The Meditations and Selections from the Principles of René Descartes, trans. John Veitch (Chicago, 1908), p. 143. The quotations from the letters which follow occur in Alexandre Koyré’s very helpful book, From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe (Baltimore, 1957), pp. 114, 122-123, but the complete and original texts can be consulted in Descartes, Correspondance avec Arnaud et Morus, ed. G. Lewis (Paris, 1953).
[5.] This passage occurs at the beginning of “The Easie, True, and Genuine Notion, And consistent Explication Of the Nature of a Spirit,” a free translation of Enchiridion Metaphysicum, I. 27-28, by John Collins which he included in Joseph Glanvil’s Saducismus Triumphatus (London, 1681). I quote from the text as given in Philosophical Writings of Henry More, ed. F. I. MacKinnon (New York, 1925), p. 183.
[6.] Cf. Enchiridion Metaphysicum, VIII. 8, trans. Mary Whiton Calkins and included in John Tull Baker, An Historical and Critical Examination of English Space and Time Theories . . . (Bronxville, N.Y., 1930), p. 12. For the original, cf. Opera Omnia, II. 1, p. 167.
[7.] “Infinitum igitur hoc Extensum à Materia distinctum,” Enchiridion Metaphysicum, VIII. 9, in Opera Omnia, loc. cit. Quoted by MacKinnon, p. 262.
[8.] This and the following reference appear in An Explanation of the grand Mystery of Godliness (London, 1660), “To the Reader,” pp. vi and v.
[9.] Ibid., II. xi. 5 (p. 52).
[ BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE]
The text of this edition is reproduced from a copy in the Henry E. Huntington Library.
[Democritus Platonissans,]
OR,
AN ESSAY
UPON THE
INFINITY OF WORLDS
OUT OF
Platonick Principles.
Hereunto is annexed
CUPIDS CONFLICT
together with
The Philosophers Devotion:
And a Particular Interpretation appertain-
ing to the three last books of the
Song of the Soul.
By H. More Master of Arts, and Fellow of
Christs Colledge in Cambridge.
Ἀγαθὸς ἦν τὸ πᾶν τόδε ὁ συνιστὰς, ἀγαθῷ δὲ οὐδεὶς περὶ οὐδενὸς οὐδέποτε ἐγγίνεται φθόνος. Τούτου δ’ ἐκτὸς ὢν πάντα ὁτι μάλιστα ἐβουλήθη γενέσθαι παραπλήσια αὑτῷ. Plat.
Pythagoras Terram Planetam quendam esse censuit qui circa solem in centro mundi defixum converteretur, Pythagorans secuti sunt Philolaus, Seleucus, Cleanthes, &c. imò PLATO jam senex, ut narrat Theophrastus. Libert. Fromond, de Orbe terræ immobili.
CAMBRIDGE
Printed by Roger Daniel, Printer to
the Universitie. 1646.
[To the Reader.]
READER,
f thou standest not to the judgement of thine eye more then of thy reason, this fragment may passe favourably, though in the neglectfull disguise of a fragment; if the strangenesse of the argument prove no hinderance. INFINITIE of WORLDS! A thing monstrous if assented to, and to be startled at, especially by them, whose thoughts this one have alwayes so engaged, that they can find no leisure to think of any thing else. But I onely make a bare proposall to more acute judgements, of what my sportfull fancie, with pleasure hath suggested: following my old designe of furnishing mens minds with varietie of apprehensions concerning the most weightie points of Philosophie, that they may not seem rashly to have settled in the truth, though it be the truth: a thing as ill beseeming Philosophers, as hastie prejudicative sentence Politicall Judges. But if I had relinquishd here my wonted self, in proving Dogmaticall, I should have found very noble Patronage for the cause among the ancients, Epicurus, Democritus, Lucretius, &c. Or if justice may reach the dead, do them the right, as to shew, that though they be hooted at, by the Rout of the learned, as men of monstrous conceits, they were either very wise or exceeding fortunate to light on so probable and specious an opinion, in which notwithstanding there is so much difficultie and seeming inconsistencie.
Nay and that sublime and subtil Mechanick too, DesChartes, though he seem to mince it must hold infinitude of worlds, or which is as harsh one infinite one. For what is his mundus indefinitè extensus, but extensus infinitè? Else it sounds onely infinitus quoad nos but simpliciter finitus. But if any space be left out unstuffd with Atoms, it will hazard the dissipation of the whole frame of Nature into disjoynted dust. As may be proved by the Principles of his own Philosophie.
And that there is space whereever God is, or any actuall and self-subsistent Being, seems to me no plainer then one of the κοιναί ἔννοιαι.
For mine own part I must confesse these apprehensions do plainly oppose what heretofore I have conceived; but I have sworn more faithfull friendship with Truth then with myself. And therefore without all remorse lay batterie against mine own edifice: not sparing to shew how weak that is, that my self now deems not impregnably strong. I have at the latter end of the last Canto of Psychathanasia, not without triumph concluded, that the world hath not continued ab æterno, from this ground:
Extension
That’s infinite implies a contradiction.
And this is in answer to an objection against my last argument of the souls Immortalitie, viz. divine goodnesse, which I there make the measure of his providence. That ground limits the essence of the world as well as its duration, and satisfies the curiositie of the Opposer, by shewing the incompossibilitie in the Creature, not want of goodnesse in the Creatour to have staid the framing of the Universe. But now roused up by a new Philosophick furie, I answer that difficultie by taking away the Hypothesis of either the world or time being finite: defending the infinitude of both, which though I had done with a great deal of vigour and life, and semblance of assent, it would have agreed well enough with the free beat of Poesie, and might have passed for a pleasant flourish: but the severitie of my own judgement, and sad Genius hath cast in many correctives and coolers into the Canto it self; so that it cannot amount to more then a discussion. And discussion is no prejudice but an honour to the truth: for then and never but then is she Victorious. And what a glorious Trophee shall the finite world erect when it hath vanquished the Infinite; a Pygmee a Giant.
For the better understanding of the connexion of this Appendix, with the Poem of the souls Immortalitie; I have taken off the last stanza’s thereof, and added some few new ones to them for a more easie and naturall leading to the present Canto. Psychathan. lib. 3. Cant. 4.
Stanz. 33d.
But thou who ere thou art that thus dost strive
With fierce assault my groundwork to subvert,
And boldly dost into Gods secrets dive,
Base fear my manly face note make m’ avert.
In that odde question which thou first didst stert,
I’ll plainly prove thine incapacitie,
And force thy feeble feet back to revert,
That cannot climb so high a mysterie,
I’le shew thee strange perplexed inconsistencie.
34
Why was this world from all infinitie
Not made? say’st thou: why? could it be so made
Say I. For well observe the sequencie:
If this Out-world continually hath wade
Through a long long-spun-time that never had
Beginning, then there as few circulings
Have been in the quick Moon as Saturn sad;
And still more plainly this clear truth to sing,
As many years as dayes or flitting houres have been.
35
For things that we conceive are infinite,
One th’ other no’te surpasse in quantitie.
So I have prov’d with clear convincing light,
This world could never from infinitie
Been made. Certain deficiencie
Doth alwayes follow evolution:
Nought’s infinite but tight eternitie
Close thrust into itself: extension
That’s infinite implies a contradiction.
36
So then for ought we know this world was made
So soon as such a Nature could exist;
And though that it continue, never fade,
Yet never will it be that that long twist
Of time prove infinite, though ner’e desist
From running still. But we may safely say
Time past compar’d with this long future list
Doth show as if the world but yesterday
Were made, and in due time Gods glory out may ray.
37
Then this short night and ignorant dull ages
Will quite be swallowed in oblivion;
And though this hope by many surly Sages
Be now derided, yet they’ll all be gone
In a short time, like Bats and Owls yflone
At dayes approch. This will hap certainly
At this worlds shining conflagration.
Fayes, Satyrs, Goblins the night merrily
May spend, but ruddy Sol shall make them all to flie.
38
The roaring Lions and drad beasts of prey
Rule in the dark with pitious crueltie;
But harmlesse Man is matter of the day,
Which doth his work in pure simplicitie.
God blesse his honest usefull industrie.
But pride and covetize, ambition,
Riot, revenge, self-love, hypocrisie,
Contempt of goodnesse, forc’d opinion;
These and such like do breed the worlds confusion.
39
But sooth to say though my triumphant Muse
Seemeth to vant as in got victorie,
And with puissant stroke the head to bruize
Of her stiff so, and daze his phantasie,
Captive his reason, dead each facultie:
Yet in her self so strong a force withstands
That of her self afraid, she’ll not aby,
Nor keep the field. She’ll fall by her own hand
As Ajax once laid Ajax dead upon the strand.
40
For thus her-self by her own self’s oppos’d;
The Heavens the Earth the universall Frame
Of living Nature God so soon disclos’d
As He could do, or she receive the same.
All times delay since that must turn to blame,
And what cannot He do that can be done?
And what might let but by th’ all-powerfull Name
Or Word of God, the Worlds Creation
More suddenly were made then mans swift thought can run?
41
Wherefore that Heavenly Power or is as young
As this Worlds date; or else some needlesse space
Of time was spent, before the Earth did clung
So close unto her-self and seas embrace
Her hollow breast, and if that time surpasse
A finite number then Infinitie
Of years before this Worlds Creation passe.
So that the durance of the Deitie
We must contract or strait his full Benignitie.
42
But for the cradle of the Cretian Jove,
And guardians of his vagient Infancie
What sober man but sagely will reprove?
Or drown the noise of the fond Dactyli
By laughter loud? Dated Divinitie
Certes is but the dream of a drie brain:
God maim’d in goodnesse, inconsistencie;
Wherefore my troubled mind is now in pain
Of a new birth, which this one Canto’ll not contain.
Now Reader, thou art arrived to the Canto it self, from which I have kept thee off by too tedious Preface and Apologie, which is seldome made without consciousnesse of some fault, which I professe I find not in my self, unlesse this be it, that I am more tender of thy satisfaction then mine own credit. As for that high sullen Poem, Cupids Conflict, I must leave it to thy candour and favourable censure. The Philosophers Devotion I cast in onely, that the latter pages should not be unfurnished.
H. M.
Nihil tamen frequentius inter Autores occurrit, quám ut omnia adeò ex moduli ferè sensuum suorum æstiment, ut ea quæ insuper infinitis rerum spatiis extare possunt, sive superbè sive imprudenter rejiciant; quin & ea omnia in usum suum fabricata fuisse glorientur, perinde facientes ac si pediculi humanum caput, aut pulices sinum muliebrem propter se solos condita existimarent, eáque demum ex gradibus saltibúsve suis metirentur. The Lord Herbert in his De Causis Errorum.
De generali totius hujus mundi aspectabilis constructione ut rectè Philosophemur duo sunt imprimis observanda: Unum ut attendentes ad infinitam Dei potentiam & bonitatem nè vereamur nimis ampla & pulchra & absoluta ejus opera imaginari: sed è contra caveamus, nè si quos fortè limites nobis non certò cognitos, in ipsis supponamus, non satìs magnificè de creatoris potentia sentire videamur.
Alterum, ut etiam caveamus, nè nimis superbè de nobis ipsis sentiamus. Quod fieret non modò, si quos limites nobis nullâ cognitos ratione, nec divinà revelatione, mundo vellemus affingere, tanquam si vis nostra cogitationis, ultra id quod à Deo revera factum est ferri posset; sed etiam maximè, si res omnes propter nos solos, ab illo creatas esse fingeremus. Renatus Des-Cartes in his Princip. Philosoph. the third part.
[The Argument.]
’Gainst boundlesse time th’ objections made,
And wast infinity
Of worlds, are with new reasons weigh’d,
Mens judgements are left free.
1
Hence, hence unhallowed ears and hearts more hard
Then Winter clods fast froze with Northern wind.
But most of all, foul tongue I thee discard
That blamest all that thy dark strait’ned mind,
Can not conceive: But that no blame thou find;
What e’re my pregnant Muse brings forth to light,
She’l not acknowledge to be of her kind,
Till Eagle-like she turn them to the sight
Of the eternall Word all deckt with glory bright.
2
Strange sights do straggle in my restlesse thoughts,
And lively forms with orient colours clad
Walk in my boundlesse mind, as men ybrought
Into some spacious room, who when they’ve had
A turn or two, go out, although unbad.
All these I see and know, but entertain
None to my friend but who’s most sober sad;
Although the time my roof doth them contain
Their pretence doth possesse me till they out again.
3
And thus possest in silver trump I found
Their guise, their shape, their gesture and array.
But as in silver trumpet nought is found
When once the piercing sound is past away,
(Though while the mighty blast therein did stay,
Its tearing noise so terribly did shrill,
That it the heavens did shake, and earth dismay)
As empty I of what my flowing quill
In heedlesse hast elswhere, or here, may hap to spill.
4
For ’tis of force and not of a set will.
Ne dare my wary mind afford assent
To what is plac’d above all mortall skill.
But yet our various thoughts to represent
Each gentle wight will deem of good intent.
Wherefore with leave th’ infinitie I’ll sing
Of time, Of Space: or without leave; I’m brent
With eagre rage, my heart for joy doth spring,
And all my spirits move with pleasant trembeling.
5
An inward triumph doth my soul up-heave
And spread abroad through endlesse ’spersed aire.
My nimble mind this clammie clod doth leave,
And lightly stepping on from starre to starre
Swifter then lightning, passeth wide and farre,
Measuring th’ unbounded Heavens and wastfull skie;
Ne ought she finds her passage to debarre,
For still the azure Orb as she draws nigh
Gives back, new starres appear, the worlds walls ’fore her flie.
6
For what can stand that is so badly staid?
Well may that fall whose ground-work is unsure.
And what hath wall’d the world but thoughts unweigh’d
In freer reason? That antiquate, secure,
And easie dull conceit of corporature;
Of matter; quantitie, and such like gear
Hath made this needlesse, thanklesse inclosure,
Which I in full disdain quite up will tear
And lay all ope, that as things are they may appear.
7
For other they appear from what they are
By reason that their Circulation
Cannot well represent entire from farre
Each portion of the Cuspis of the Cone
(Whose nature is elsewhere more clearly shown)
I mean each globe, whether of glaring light
Or else opake, of which the earth is one.
If circulation could them well transmit
Numbers infinite of each would strike our ’stonishd sight;
8
All in just bignesse and right colours dight
But totall presence without all defect
’Longs onely to that Trinitie by right,
Ahad, Æon, Psyche with all graces deckt,
Whose nature well this riddle will detect;
A Circle whose circumference no where
Is circumscrib’d, whose Centre’s each where set,
But the low Cusp’s a figure circular,
Whose compasse is ybound, but centre’s every where.