The Project Gutenberg eBook, The Nineteenth and Their Times, by J. (John) Biddulph

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THE NINETEENTH AND THEIR TIMES

I ordained that the rights of the Warrior should not be infringed; that the soldier who had grown old in the service should not be deprived of his place or his pay; and that the deeds of the soldier should not be concealed. For men who exchange their comfort for perishable glory deserve to be compensated, and are worthy of reward and encouragement.

—Institutes of Timour.

Walker & Boutall ph. sc.

THE NINETEENTH
AND THEIR TIMES

BEING AN ACCOUNT OF THE FOUR CAVALRY REGIMENTS IN THE BRITISH ARMY THAT HAVE BORNE THE NUMBER NINETEEN AND OF THE CAMPAIGNS IN WHICH THEY SERVED

BY

COLONEL JOHN BIDDULPH

FROM AN OLD SEAL

LONDON

JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET

1899

DEDICATED

BY PERMISSION TO

HER ROYAL HIGHNESS

THE PRINCESS OF WALES

[PREFACE]

Four cavalry regiments in the British Army have borne the number Nineteen.

The first was raised in Ireland, in 1759, during the Seven Years’ War, and was known as Drogheda’s Horse. In 1763, its number was changed to Eighteen, which number it bore till it was disbanded in 1821. The history of its achievements has been written by Captain H. Malet.

The second regiment that bore the number was raised at a critical period in our history, in 1779. It had but a brief and uneventful existence, and was disbanded in 1783.

The third regiment was raised as the Twenty-Third Light Dragoons in 1781, for service in India, where it was immediately sent; the first British cavalry regiment that went to India. On the disbandment of the second regiment, in 1783, the Twenty-third was re-numbered the Nineteenth, and, for fourteen years, it continued to be the only British cavalry regiment in India. During the twenty-four years of its sojourn in the East it bore a conspicuous share in every important military undertaking of the time, with the exception of the campaign against Holkar when it was too far distant from the scene of action to take part. Those twenty-four years, from Warren Hastings to Wellesley, mark the turning point of our power in India. When the Nineteenth landed at Madras our very existence in Southern India hung in the balance. The gallantry of our army was paralysed by the feebleness of the administration that directed their efforts. When the regiment re-embarked for England, the supremacy of our military power had been fully established. Under their distinguished leader, John Floyd, the Nineteenth played no small part in the campaigns of 1790, ’91, and ’92, against Tippoo, attracting to themselves an amount of interest in Southern India that no other regiment did. They assisted at the capture of Pondicherry, and the crowning victory of Seringapatam. It was their good fortune to serve under the Duke of Wellington in the first independent commands he held in the field. They took part in the destruction of the noted freebooter Dhoondia Wao; a short but stirring campaign that deserves more notice than it generally receives. At Assaye, the charge of the Nineteenth and the native cavalry brigaded with them restored the fortunes of the fight at a critical moment. They played their part at Argaum, and, a few months before sailing from India, were actors with Gillespie in his remarkable feat at Vellore. Soon after the declaration of war by the United States against Great Britain, in 1812, they were sent to Canada. The conditions of that war afforded little scope for cavalry action, so that the share of the Nineteenth in the various operations was a subordinate one. The campaigns on the Canadian frontier have been so completely eclipsed by our struggles against Napoleon in Europe, that the arduous nature of the lake and forest warfare carried on by a mere handful of British troops and Canadian militia is hardly known. A squadron of the Nineteenth, under an officer whose whole career was identified with the regiment, formed for eighteen months part of the small band that upheld the honour of the British arms under Sir Gordon Drummond, at Lundy’s Lane and other actions on the Niagara frontier. In the course of the wholesale reductions that took place after Waterloo this fine regiment ceased to exist, and its place in the Army List knew it no more.

The fourth regiment, the one that now bears the title of the Nineteenth Princess of Wales’ Own Hussars, was originally raised by the East India Company on the outbreak of the Mutiny of the Bengal Army, and received its present number on the transfer of its services to the Crown. In 1882, they formed part of the expedition to Egypt under Lord Wolseley, to put down the rebellion of Arabi Pasha. In 1884, they formed part of the expedition to Suakin under Sir Gerald Graham, and fought at El-Teb and Tamai, suffering severe losses in the first of the two actions. In 1885, they were selected by Lord Wolseley to form part of the expedition to Khartoum; the only horsemen that accompanied the force. The Head Quarters of the regiment formed part of the Desert Column, under Sir Herbert Stewart, and fought at Abu Klea and Abu Krou, while a squadron of the regiment accompanied the River Column, under General Earle, and were present at the action at Kirbekan. A third portion of the regiment was at the same time employed at Suakin, where it experienced serious losses. For its services in 1885 the regiment was granted the distinctive title it now bears; a proof that it is no unworthy successor of the regiment that helped to strengthen the foundations of our power in India, under Cornwallis, Harris and Wellington, and whose honourable badges it wears, in addition to those it has won for itself.

The history of a regiment of the British Army is part of the history of the Empire at some of its most momentous epochs. To understand it properly, requires a setting of general history that cannot be dispensed with. In compiling these annals I have chiefly aimed at providing a work that shall be of interest and use to those who have served, or, in the future may serve, in the regiment. At the same time there is much which will, I believe, be of interest to the student of Indian Military History, and will not be unacceptable to the general reader.

The bones of British soldiers lie scattered far and wide. In every portion of the globe, their unmarked graves are strewed on mountain and plain, by stream and forest, by swamp and desert; silent witnesses of their devotion to their Sovereign and country. But they have not died in vain, if the remembrance of their achievements survives, to swell the hearts and nerve the arms of their successors, and to remind their countrymen what they owe to their sufferings and their valour.

In compiling these Annals I have received assistance from many unexpected sources. To Mr W. C. L. Floyd I am indebted for much assistance from the papers of his grandfather, under whom the 19th Light Dragoons won their spurs in the Mysore campaigns; to Major General Gillespie, who has kindly placed at my disposal the only authentic portrait of his celebrated grandfather; and to Lieut. General Sir Francis Norman, who collected notes of the career of the old 19th Light Dragoons, many years ago. My thanks are also due to Mr James Wilson and Major Ernest Cruikshank of the Lundy’s Lane Historical Society, who have done so much to rescue from oblivion the details of the war on the Niagara frontier, and to Mr Douglas Brymner, the Dominion Government Archivist at Ottawa. I am also indebted to Mr S. M. Milne for the kindly interest he has taken in my work; to Lt. Colonel Frank Barrow who placed at my disposal the letters written by his distinguished brother during the Soudan campaigns of 1884 and 1885, to Colonel K. J. W. Coghill, C.B., who commanded the regiment at Tel-el-Kebir, and to Colonel J. C. Hanford, C.B. (formerly Hanford-Flood) who commanded the squadron with the River Column, without whose encouragement and aid this work would not have been undertaken. I refrain from adding more names, but the list of those to whom my thanks are due is not exhausted.

[CONTENTS]

[LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS]

[PART I]

THE NINETEENTH LIGHT DRAGOONS
DROGHEDA’S HORSE
1759–1763

State of affairs in Europe in 1756—Declaration of War against France—Increase of the Army—Early Years of the War—Invasion expected—Orders for raising the 19th Light Dragoons—Death of George II.—End of the Seven Years’ War—Reduction of Military Establishments—19th Light Dragoons become the 18th—Uniform of the Regiment.

From the signing of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748), to the outbreak of the Seven Years’ War (1756), the peace, nominally existing between England and France, was continually broken, out of Europe, by both parties. In India, under the veil of alliance with opposing Native Princes, war was actively prosecuted, and it was with difficulty that British interests maintained a precarious footing in that country. In North America, the French claimed the whole continent, except the ill defined New England settlements along the coast, and denied the right of the English to trade in the interior. Keeping themselves in the background, they waged a bloody war against the English settlers, by means of the Indians, whom they subsidized, and whose disguise they often adopted. Both in the East and the West, French officials were acting with the support and countenance of the Court of Versailles, and the English officials on the spot were not slow to retaliate when occasion offered. It was evident that a crisis could not long be averted, but it was advantageous to the French to postpone an open rupture as long as possible, while the French navy was being strengthened. On the other hand, it was the interest of England to hasten the rupture, when war was seen to be inevitable, since the objects to be fought for were beyond the seas. The English navy was, at that time, greatly superior in strength to the French navy, while the French military forces were eight or ten times as strong as the English army, which had been greatly reduced since the conclusion of the late war. As time went on, less pains were taken to conceal the warlike measures undertaken on either side. In the beginning of 1755, Braddock’s ill-fated expedition was dispatched to New England, while a counter-expedition for Canada was sent out from Brest and Rochefort, a few weeks later. Neither side was acting in good faith: on both sides, secret instructions for active hostilities were given to the commanders. In June, two French ships, with troops on board, were captured by Boscawen off the coast of Newfoundland. Exactly a month later, Braddock’s force was cut to pieces by the French and Indians. Still the pretence of peace was preserved. In April 1756, a French expedition sailed from Toulon to attack Minorca, which for half a century had been a British possession. Byng’s well-known failure to relieve Minorca ensued, and the place fell on 27th June.

Meanwhile the absurdity of maintaining the semblance of peace under such circumstances had become patent to the British cabinet, and in May, war was formally declared. In August, the coalition of France and Austria, soon to be joined by Russia, was declared against Prussia, and Great Britain found herself engaged in hostilities in Germany, India and America at the same time.

The early years of the war were neither fortunate nor creditable to Great Britain. After the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, the Army within the three kingdoms had been reduced to about eighteen thousand men. In December 1755, an increase of fifteen thousand men had been voted. But armies are not made in a day, and the direction of affairs was in incompetent hands. Pitt, who alone commanded the confidence of the country, was regarded with disfavour by the King. In November 1756, Pitt was recalled to office, and a new spirit was infused into the management of affairs. A Militia Bill was introduced, the regular Army was increased to forty-five thousand men, and steps were taken for enlisting into the service of the State the Highland clans who had so recently been in arms against the Crown. In April 1757, Pitt was dismissed from office, and all again was confusion. For three months England was without a Government; at the end of that time, Pitt was again in office. But the ill effects of the political contest at home were reflected in the ill-success of our arms abroad, and two years were to elapse before the nation felt secure. The year 1757 was a gloomy one in England. A French invasion was believed to be imminent: an expedition, dispatched in May, against Louisbourg in America, failed, owing to the feebleness and tardiness of execution on the part of those to whom it was entrusted: Fort William Henry was taken by Montcalm, and its garrison massacred by the Indians. In Europe, an expedition, dispatched in September, against Rochefort, failed, through the disagreements of the naval and military officers in command. The Duke of Cumberland was forced to evacuate Hanover, and sign the convention of Kloster-Severn, and many months were to elapse before the triumph of Clive at Plassy became known in England. In 1758, matters improved somewhat. In July, Louisbourg was taken, but an attack on Ticonderago in the same month was defeated, and Lord Howe, described by Wolfe as “the noblest Englishman that has appeared in my time, and the best soldier in the British army,” was slain in a skirmish. In Germany, the British troops, under Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, drove the French out of Hanover, while two successful raids were made on the French coast, in which Cherbourg and St. Servan were temporarily occupied, and a great quantity of warlike stores destroyed or captured.

Pitt’s genius was now beginning to be felt in every branch of the service, and, from this time, matters improved steadily, by land and sea. In May 1759, Guadaloupe was captured. In July, Rodney destroyed the French boats in Havre prepared for the invasion of England, while Hawke blockaded Brest. In August, Boscawen defeated a French fleet in the Bay of Lagos. In the same month, the French were decisively defeated at Minden by an inferior English and Hanoverian force: on the 13th September, Quebec was taken by Wolfe, who fell in the moment of victory, and French interests in America received their death blow. To complete the year’s triumphs, on 20th November, Hawke destroyed a French fleet under Conflans in Quiberon Bay, in an action fought in the midst of a tempest. The nation could breathe freely again; there was no more fear of invasion, and England was confident of ultimate success. But Pitt’s efforts were not relaxed, and many regiments of Cavalry and Infantry were added to the Army during the year.

By Royal Warrants, dated respectively 17th March, 4th August, 10th October and 17th November 1759, the 15th, 16th, 17th, and 18th Light Dragoons were raised for service abroad and at home. In December, steps were taken to raise the 19th Regiment of Light Dragoons in Ireland, and, in the following month, a Notification to that effect was issued from Dublin Castle.

By the Lord Lieutenant General and General
Governor of Ireland.

1760.

Bedford,

His Majesty having been pleased to Order a Regiment of Light Dragoons to be forthwith raised in this Kingdom, under the Command of the Earl of Drogheda,[1] to consist of one Lieutenant Colonel Commandant, one Lieutenant Colonel, one Major, three Captains, six Lieutenants, six Cornets, one Chaplain, one Surgeon, one Surgeon’s Mate, one Adjutant, six Quartermasters, eighteen Serjeants, eighteen Corporals, twelve Drummers, six Hautboys, and six Troops of seventy Men per Troop: and His Majesty’s Letter being shortly expected for placing the said Regiment upon the Military Establishment of this Kingdom from the seventh day of December last past inclusive, to be paid at such times and in such manner as other Regiments of Dragoons in this Kingdom are paid, the pay of such Commission and Staff Officers and the Subsistance of the Non Commission Officers to commence from the date of their respective Commission, Warrants, and Appointments, and the Subsistance of the private Men, approved by the Officer who shall be appointed to review them from the Days of their being severally attested inclusive. And whereas We have authorized and required the said Earl of Drogheda by Beat of Drum or otherwise, forthwith to raise such number of able bodied Protestants in this Kingdom, as shall be willing to enlist themselves and may be wanting to compleat the said Regiment to the Establishment before mentioned, in the Execution of which Service the said Earl of Drogheda or one of the Field Officers of the said Regiment is to make the like returns to your Office as are usually made upon raising Regiments: We do hereby give you Notice thereof and do direct you upon Receipt of the Returns aforesaid to allow the names of all such Recruits on the Muster Rolls of the said Regiment in Order to their being entered for Pay, pursuant to His Majesty’s Letter aforesaid. Given at His Majesty’s Castle of Dublin the 15th Day of January 1760.

By His Grace’s Command

Richard Rigby.

To the Muster Master General of this Kingdom or his Deputy.

A month later followed the Royal Warrant.

1760.

George R.—Right Trusty and Right Entirely Beloved Cousin and Councillor. We greet you well. Whereas the Commissioners of our Treasury have laid before us your Letter of the 29th of December last transmitting unto them the following Establishment of a Regiment of Light Dragoons to be raised according to a Proposal from Charles Earl of Drogheda which had been laid before and approved by Us and also an Estimate of the Expence of each particular to be provided and defrayed by Us for the use of the said Regiment which said Establishment for One Year commencing from the seventeenth day of December last will amount to the sum of seventeen thousand four hundred and thirteen pounds ten shillings and tenpence according to the following particulars thereof that is to say—

And We being graciously pleased to approve thereof and also of the several Particulars by you proposed in your said Letter Our Will and Pleasure is and we do hereby direct authorize and require that you give the necessary orders and Directions for placing the said Regiment on the Military Establishment of that our Kingdom from the seventh day of December last past inclusive for the several allowances of Pay in the said Establishment specified as aforesaid to be paid at such times and in such manner as other Regiments in that Kingdom are paid the Pay of each Commissioned and Staff Officers and the subsistence of the Non Commissioned Officers to commence from the date of their respective Commissions Warrants and Appointments and the subsistence of the private Men approved by the Officer who shall be appointed to review them from the days of their being severally attested inclusive as also for issuing out of our Revenues at Large in that Kingdom to the said Charles Earl of Drogheda or his Agent the sum of seventeen hundred and seventy pounds five shillings clear of all Fees and Deductions for four hundred and seventy four Cloaks at the rate of one pound twelve shillings and sixpence for each Cloak as also for issuing out of our said Revenues at large in that our Kingdom to the said Charles Earl of Drogheda or his Agent the sum Six Thousand Seven hundred and Fifty pounds clear of all Fees and Deductions for Four hundred and Fifty horses at the rate of Fifteen pounds for each Horse and likewise for issuing out of our said Revenues at large there to the Master and Principal Officers of the Ordnance the sum of Seven hundred and Sixty Six pounds clear of all Fees and Deductions for defraying the expense of four hundred and thirty two Firelocks and Bayonets at the rate of one pound fifteen shillings for each Firelock and Bayonet for the use of the said Regiment and for so doing this shall be as well to you as to our Lieutenant Deputy or other Chief Governor or Governors of that our Kingdom as to all other our Officers and Ministers who shall or may be concerned herein a Sufficient Warrant and so we bid you very heartily farewell. Given at our Court of St. James the 12th day of February 1760 in the 33rd Year of our reign.

By His Majesty’s Command,

Holles Newcastle.
H. B. Legge.
James Oswald.

Entered at the Signet office
the 25th February 1760

Geo. Brown, Dy.

To Our Right Trusty and Right Entirely Beloved Cousin and Councillor John Duke of Bedford Lieutenant General and General Governor of our Kingdom of Ireland and to Our Lieutenant Deputy or other Chief Governor or Governors of that Our Kingdom for the time being.

On the 24th March, the Muster Master General was again addressed, and instructed that, in consequence of an application from the Earl of Drogheda, “the orders relating to the Magistrates attesting the men raised to be Protestants and to making returns of the several places where the recruits were enlisted may be dispensed with, proper certificates that the men are Protestants having been obtained from the Clergymen of the Parishes where such men were severally enlisted, and all other requisites in the Earl of Rothes’ said instructions having been complied with.”

On 25th October 1760, George II. died; in February 1763, the Peace of Paris was concluded, and the Seven Years’ War came to an end. During the whole of this time, the Regiment, which was generally known as “Drogheda’s Horse,” remained in Ireland; but little or nothing can be learned concerning it. Considerable reductions of establishment were made directly peace was assured. The 17th (Aberdour’s Horse), which had never been able to complete its strength, ceased to exist, and the 18th Light Dragoons became the 17th. The 19th in the same way became the 18th, under which number it gained much distinction in the West Indies, Holland, the Peninsula, and Waterloo, being finally disbanded in 1821. Lord Drogheda, who had raised the regiment, continued to be its Colonel Commandant till its disbandment, nearly sixty two years afterwards, an unbroken term of service with one regiment probably unparalleled.

It is impossible at this date to ascertain what was the uniform of the regiment, before its number was changed. It certainly wore the red light dragoon coat of the period, and the facings were probably white, with red and white lace, similar to what it wore after its number was changed, until blue was substituted for red in all the Light Dragoon regiments.

[PART II]

THE NINETEENTH LIGHT DRAGOONS
1779–1783

War in America—Declaration of War by France—Increase of the Army—Orders for raising the 19th Light Dragoons—Uniform—Peace proclaimed—Reduction of Military Establishments—Regiment disbanded.

“The year of which we treat, presented the most aweful appearance of public affairs, which this country had perhaps beheld for many ages.”[2] The condition of affairs in England, in 1779, was truly alarming. Since the spring of 1775, Great Britain had been striving to subdue her rebellious colonies in America. The war was mismanaged, the Ministry was incapable: the successes gained were barren of results, while serious disasters had been experienced. In March 1778, France, which had long been secretly aiding the rebellious colonies, threw off the mask, and openly espoused their cause. The warlike spirit of the country was roused, and those who would have conceded peace on almost any terms to American demands, refused to consider it at the intervention of France. The French forces however effected nothing of importance during the year; towards the end of it, the probability of Spain joining the coalition against England became known, though the actual declaration of war was delayed till June 1779. The national spirit was now thoroughly roused, but there was great apprehension of invasion. Supplies were freely voted, great additions were made to the naval and military establishments, camps were formed in many places in the south of England, the militia were embodied, and militia camps formed at Cox Heath, Warley, Portsmouth, Plymouth, Chatham, and Aldborough. The most strenuous efforts were made to place the defences of the country on an efficient footing.

In April, the following Letter of Service was addressed to Major General Russell Manners, Lieutenant-Colonel of the 2nd Dragoon Guards.

Warrant.

George R. Whereas we have thought fit to order a Regiment of Light Dragoons to be forthwith formed under your Command which is to consist of six troops with four Sergeants four Corporals one Trumpeter one Hautboy and fifty-four private men and horses in each Troop beside the usual number of Commissioned Officers: These are to authorize you by beat of drum or otherwise to raise so many men in any County or part of our Kingdom of Great Britain as shall be wanted to complete the said Regiment to the numbers above mentioned. And all Magistrates Justices of the Peace Constables and other our Civil Officers whom it may concern are hereby required to be assisting unto you in providing Quarters impressing carriages and otherwise as there shall be occasion.

Given this 25th day of April 1779 in the 19th year of our Reign.

By His Majesty’s Command

C. Jenkinson.

To Our Trusty and Wellbeloved Russell Manners Esq.
&c. &c. &c.

On the same day, similar Warrants were issued for raising the 20th and 21st Light Dragoons.

In July, a small Corps of Light Dragoons, known as Lister’s Corps, was raised, and in August, the 22nd Light Dragoons was formed. At the same time, all out pensioners of Chelsea were inspected to see which of them “were fit for garrison or other duty.”

The 19th Light Dragoons were formed by drafts from the 1st and 2nd Dragoon Guards, and the 4th and 10th Dragoons, and encamped at Salisbury; where also were the 11th Light Dragoons. The 15th, 20th, and 21st Light Dragoons were encamped on Lexden Heath near Colchester. On the 9th October 1779, the 19th were inspected by Lieutenant-General James Johnston, when the effective strength was 355 Non-Commissioned Officers and Privates, and 347 horses. The Inspecting Officer reported that the Officers wore scarlet, with silver button holes and green lappels, and “were mostly young genteel men with a good air, and great attention, and tolerable horsemen.” The Non-Commissioned Officers were said to be too tall for Light Dragoons, few of them being under 5 ft. 10 in.

Further orders for recruiting were issued in February 1780, and again in February 1781. Regimental clothing accounts were formidable things in those days, and two years after the Regiment was raised it was found that the clothing money of the men drafted to the 19th Light Dragoons from other Regiments had been paid, for two years, to the wrong person; so the following warrant, directing Major-General Manners to refund, was issued.

“Warrant to make good a deficiency in the Offreckonings of the several Regiments of Dragoon Guards and Dragoons within specified from 25th April 1779 to 5th July 1781 out of ye Offreckonings of ye 19th 20th and 21st Regiments of Light Dragoons which were formed by sundry Non Commissioned Officers and Private Men turned over from the said Regiments of Dragoon Guards and Dragoons.”

George R.

1781.

Whereas we were pleased to direct that our several Regiments of Dragoon Guards and Dragoons should be augmented from the 25th March 1778 and also further augmented from 25th August following and Whereas on the 25th April 1779 We were pleased to order three Regts. of Light Dragoons to be formed (out of a proper number of Non Commissioned Officers and Private Men turned over to them from the several Regiments of Dragoon Guards and Dragoons as specified in the State hereunto annexed), and whereas in Consequence of this We were pleased to direct that each Troop of our said Regiments of Dragoon Guards and Dragoons should from the 25th April 1779, be reduced so as to consist of Two Sergeants, Two Corporals, One Trumpeter, One Hautbois and thirty seven Private Men, and no more besides the usual Commissioned and other Officers, whereby a Deficiency hath arisen in the Assignment of the Offreckoning of each of our said Corps between 25th April 1779 and 5th July 1781 and We having been most humbly besought to grant Our Warrants to make good the said deficiency It appearing that the several Colonels above mentioned did turn over the Non Commissioned Officers and Private Men (Specified against each of their names in the State annexed) fully clothed and appointed according to our Regulations, Our Will and Pleasure therefore is that out of the Offreckonings arising on the Establishment of each of the new Corps specified in the annexed State and directed by our Warrant of the 29th March 1781, to be retained in your hands, you do pay from time to time to the said several Colonels or their Assigns the Amount (as the same hath or shall become payable according to the custom of the Service) of the Offreckonings of the Non Commissioned Officers and Private Men turned over to the New Corps that have accrued from 25th April 1779 to 5th July following as also that shall accrue from 6th July 1779 to 5th July 1781, in full satisfaction of the Claims of the said several Colonels of Our said Regiments of Dragoon Guards and Dragoons for the deficiency on their respective Assignments already passed by them up to 5th July 1779 and 5th July 1781, And for so doing &c. Given &c. this 20th day of June 1781 in the 21st Year of our Reign.

By His Majesty’s Command

C. Jenkinson.

“State of the numbers of Non Commissioned Officers and Privates the amount of whose Offreckonings, from 25th April 1779 to 5th July following, as also from 6th July 1779 to 5th July 1781 are to be paid over from the three new Regiments of Light Dragoons.”

From Major General Russell Manners’ 19th Regiment of Light Dragoons as follows Viz:

From Salisbury the 19th Light Dragoons were moved to Shropshire, and were quartered at Ludlow and Bridgenorth during the summer of 1780, with three troops at each place. The declaration of war by Holland, in January 1781, caused their transfer to Norwich, and, during the summer of that year, they were distributed between Saxmundham, Bungay, Beccles, Yarmouth, Halesworth, and Woodbridge, with a troop at each place. In October, the Regiment was inspected at Yarmouth by Major-General Tryon, who reported “This Regiment is a good corps, and fitt for any Service.” Each Dragoon was armed with a sword, a pair of pistols, carbine and bayonet.

In the following spring, the Regiment was at Bury St. Edmunds and Sudbury, three troops at each place. Soon afterwards they were moved to the neighbourhood of London, for employment on revenue duties, and, in August, we find the Head quarters of the Regiment with three Troops at Epsom; the other three troops being quartered at Croydon, Mitcham, and Horsham. Soon afterwards, a Troop was sent to Bromley, and another to Ewell, one Troop being withdrawn from Epsom.

But the Regiment was not destined to see active service. In November 1782, the preliminary articles of peace had been signed, by which England recognised the independence of the United States, and the usual reduction of military establishments took place. In June 1783, the Regiment was disbanded under the following order—

Orders and Instructions for Disbanding the 19th Regiment of Light Dragoons.

1783.

Whereas We have thought fit to Order that Our 19th Regiment of (Light) Dragoons, under your Command be forthwith disbanded, Our Will and Pleasure is, that you, or such person or persons as you shall appoint for this Service, do immediately repair to the respective Quarters of the Troops of Our Said Regiment, and disband them accordingly and that in the disbanding of them the following Rules be observed—

1st.

Before such disbanding You are to cause an exact Muster to be taken of the several Troops of the said Regiment, which You may draw together at some convenient place and You are to transmit to Our Secretary at War, for Our Information, an Account of their Condition and Numbers at the time of Disbanding, together with an exact List of the Names and Rank of the Officers, specifying also if any of them holds their Commissions to which Pay is annexed.

2nd.

It being Our Intention only to pay off at present, and clear the Non Commissioned Officers and Private Men of Our Said Regiments, (and give an allowance of Half Pay to the Commissioned Officers entitled thereto, from the time of their Disbanding), You are to take care before their Disbanding, that the Quarters of each Troop be duly satisfied, that the Accounts between the Non Commissioned Officers and Private Men hereby disbanded, and their Officers, be made up, and that they be fully satisfied, and paid their Arrears, Grass Money, and all other just pretentions, to the day of their being disbanded, whereof the said Officers, are to take Acquittances, and Discharges from them respectively, distinguishing each head of Payment.

3rd.

That care be taken, that the Arms delivered out of Our Stores of Ordnance, and indented for, be returned into Our said Stores again, and Acquittances taken for the same, from such persons as shall be appointed to receive them.

4th.

That care be taken that each Non Commissioned Officer and Private Man hereby to be disbanded be permitted to carry away with him his Cloak and Clothes which he now wears, and that their Horses be disposed of according to the regulation following.

5th.

Where any Dragoon who shall be discharged in pursuance hereof, hath served Us, One whole year, He shall be entitled to Three Pounds in lieu of His Horse, and all the Horses of the disbanded Men are to be Sold, and an account kept, in order to the disposal of the Surplus Money in such Manner as We shall direct.

6th.

That the Dragoons who in pursuance of the above Regulation are entitled to £3 as aforesaid, be paid six days full pay, and those who are not so entitled, be paid Eighteen days full pay, from the day of Disbanding, exclusive; which We are pleased to give them, as of Our Royal Bounty, to carry them to the places of their former Residence: You are therefore to cause payment thereof to be made to each of them respectively and to take Receipts for the same from each Non Commissioned Officer, and Private Dragoon, And all such Acquittances, Discharges, and Receipts, are to be transmitted to the Agent of the Regiment, to be produced to Our Secretary at War, as Vouchers for the several Payments herein directed, and for which You are to draw Bills on the said Agent.

7th.

You are also to send to Our Secretary at War, an Authentic List, attested in the best manner by Yourself, or Officer performing this Service; of the names of the Non Commissioned Officers and Private Men, so disbanded, and to give them passes in case they shall desire the same, to the places of their former Residence, allowing them a convenient time to repair thither, and giving them a strict charge that they do not presume to travel with Arms, nor more than three in Company together, upon pain of the severest punishment, And to the end that the said Non Commissioned Officers and Private Dragoons may be sensible of the care We have taken of them upon their dismission, You are to cause these Our directions to be read at the head of each Troop, for a more ready compliance with Our Pleasure hereby signified, and see the same put into Execution—Given at Our Court at St. James’s, this 12th day of June, 1783, in the twenty third Year of Our Reign.

By His Majesty’s Command,

R. Fitz Patrick.

To Our Trusty and Welbeloved Russell Manners Esq. Lt. Gen. Commandant of our 19th Regt, of (Light) Dragoons or to the Officer Commanding in Chief of our said Regt.

In a “Report of the Lt. Generals Johnston, Mocher and Sloper, relative to the appointments of the 19th, 20th and 21st Regts. of Light Dragoons &c.,” it is stated that the appointments are little better than lumber. The following paragraph refers to the 19th Light Dragoons—

“In regard to the seventh regiment, no report having been sent us with your letter, and no officer having appeared before us to give us any insight into the transaction between the Colonels of that and the 19th Regiment of Light Dragoons, we can only say, that as the 19th light Regt. was raised at the same time, and has had pretty near the same duty, we imagine the same objections will lay against the appointments of that regiment, as to the others.

To Lt. Gen. Fawcett,
Adjt. Gen. &c.”

[PART III]

THE TWENTY-THIRD, AFTERWARDS THE NINETEENTH LIGHT DRAGOONS
(1781–1822)

CHAPTER I.—1781–1782.
THE TWENTY-THIRD LIGHT DRAGOONS.

Alarming state of Public Affairs—Want of Cavalry in India—Orders for raising the 23rd Light Dragoons—Colonel Sir John Burgoyne—Regiment embark for India—Arrive in Madras—Desperate State of Affairs—Madras Misgovernment—Horses for the Regiment.

Alarming as was the state of our affairs in 1779, it was much worse in 1781. In January, a rupture occurred with Holland, so that Great Britain found herself simultaneously at war with France, Spain and Holland, while engaged at the same time with her revolted Colonies in America. The navy was overtaxed and inadequate to the demands made on it, and the command of the sea had passed into the hands of our enemies. Gibraltar had been besieged since July 1779, the siege continuing till February 1783, the only assistance that could be given being in the shape of stores and reinforcements at uncertain intervals. In America, things had gone from bad to worse. On 19th October 1781, Cornwallis was forced to capitulate at Yorktown with the whole of his army, a disaster which practically brought the war in America to a close, though it lingered on for nearly a year and a half longer. In India, affairs were nearly as bad. The three most important of the native powers at that time were Hyder Ali of Mysore, the Mahrattas, and the Nizam of Hyderabad, and matters had so turned out that we were at war with them all three. On the outbreak of war between England and France, the French settlements quickly fell into our hands. Hyder Ali was much under French influence, and the fall of the French Settlement at Mahé, which was detrimental to his interests, aroused his resentment. He was an able soldier and administrator, and his army was, at that time, the best organised among the native powers. Collecting his forces, he fell like an avalanche on the Carnatic which he desolated. Some troops sent against him, under Colonel Baillie, were literally annihilated; another force, under Sir Hector Munro, was obliged to retreat, so that at the end of 1780, the Company’s authority in the South of India extended little beyond the precincts of the town of Madras. Reinforcements were sent from Bengal under Sir Eyre Coote. The results of the campaign of 1781 were, however, indecisive, in spite of a victory gained by Sir Eyre Coote, at Porto Novo (1st July), and some minor successes. It was estimated that one-third of the British forces were lost in the campaign. In Western India, the Bombay Government had engaged in hostilities against the Mahrattas, and met with disaster. On the coast a powerful French fleet had appeared under Suffren, one of the ablest seamen France ever produced. The European forces of the East India Company were at that time in a miserable state. Public recruiting in England was forbidden, and the ranks were filled with the refuse of society. Felons with fetters on them were shipped as soldiers; foreigners and adventurers of all ranks were received; many of whom only wanted a passage to India, in order that they might desert, as soon as possible, after they landed in the country; invalids, vagrants, and men under the proper size for military service. The whole were “in a most wretched condition, almost indeed without subordination.” The only reliable European troops in the country were the King’s troops, and the Company’s Artillery into which the best of their recruits were drafted. Lord Cornwallis, writing six years later of some troops he had recently inspected, says:

“What shall I say of the Company’s Europeans? I did not think Britain could have furnished such a set of wretched objects—I would infinitely rather take the 73rd regiment upon service with me, than the whole six Company’s battalions—Indeed I have great doubts whether by drafting the whole six, I could complete one serviceable battalion to the present establishment.”

It is only by appreciating the condition and circumstances of our military services in India at this time, and the jealousy existing in the highest quarters in England of the exercise of the authority of a Government by the East India Company, that the almost independent position held by the King’s troops in India can be understood. The chief want was in Cavalry, and it is a proof of the ill-judged parsimony or poverty of the Company that, in a country so well adapted for that arm, where the cavalry of the enemy were counted by tens of thousands, they should have failed, till the time treated of, to produce an efficient mounted Corps. M. le Maitre de la Tour, a French officer in the service of Hyder Ali, writing about the events then occurring, says:

“ ... The English have never yet succeeded in the attempt to form a good troop of European horse in India. As they have sent a regiment of dragoons[3] from England, it is probable that their arrival may place the affair on another footing. Though it may not immediately be conceived, the reason of the want of success in forming their intended troop of horse, consisted in the good discipline to which they were desirous of subjecting them.

“The excellence of the English cavalry is sufficiently acknowledged in Europe: and its advantages consist less in the goodness of the horse, than in the choice of the horsemen. The pay of a horseman in England is such as renders his situation very eligible; so that the sons of rich farmers and tradesmen are very desirous of entering into the service. This being the case, it is in the power of the officers to select handsome well-formed men of good character, and to keep them in good discipline merely by the fear of being dismissed. The officers who were first entrusted with the formation of a body of cavalry in India, thought to establish and preserve the same discipline among them, without attending to the great difference of time, place, and persons. The recruits sent from England to India are in general libertines, and people of bad character: and, as the Company will not dismiss a soldier, all the punishment inflicted on a horseman is, to reduce him to serve in the infantry; so that a man is no sooner put among the cavalry, than he is sent back to his former station. The French have succeeded in forming very good cavalry in India, by attending more to their horsemanship, and less to their discipline and manners.”

Hyder Ali’s cavalry numbered at that time about twenty-five thousand horsemen, among which was a body of French dragoons and hussars. The Company maintained no Cavalry establishment, beyond a small European troop formed, as related by M. le Maitre de la Tour. When at war, they borrowed a few hundreds of horsemen from the Nawab of Arcot, unpaid, undrilled, and undisciplined.

Sir Eyre Coote, the Commander-in-chief in India, was loud in his demands for Cavalry. In his dispatch on his victory at Porto Novo he wrote:

“From the want of a corps of cavalry on our side equal in number to the service required, we were, with victory decidedly declared, obliged to halt just beyond the enemy’s grounds, not being able to take advantage of so distinguished a day; for with a corps of cavalry, the enemy’s guns, stores, &c., would, to a certainty have fallen into our hands.”

Again, after the battle of Arnee, (2nd June 1782) he wrote:

“There was nothing wanting to have enabled me on this occasion to ruin and disperse Hyder’s army, but a respectable body of cavalry. One thing is certain, that had I such a corps we should have captured the greatest part, if not the whole of his cannon.”

Under the urgent demands made on them, the Court of Directors applied to the Crown for the loan of a Cavalry Regiment, and, in accordance with the usual practice at that date, it was determined to raise a Regiment for service in India. On the 24th Sept. 1781, the following Warrant was issued to Colonel Sir John Burgoyne Bart., of the 14th Light Dragoons, a cousin of General Burgoyne who surrendered at Saratoga in 1777.

Warrant for forming a Regiment of (Light) Dragoons under the Command of Colonel Sir John Burgoyne Bart.

1781.

George R.

Whereas We have thought fit to Order a Regiment of Light Dragoons to be forthwith formed under your Command which is to consist of Six Troops with Four Serjeants, Four Corporals, One Trumpeter, One Hautboy, and Fifty four Private Men in each Troop, beside the usual Number of Commissioned Officers; These are to Authorize you by beat of Drum or otherwise to raise so many men in any County or part of Our Kingdom of Great Britain, as shall be wanted to complete the said Regiment, to the Numbers above mentioned. And all Magistrates, &c., Given &c. this 24th day of September 1781, in the Twenty first Year of Our Reign.

By His Majesty’s Command,

C. Jenkinson.

To Our Trusty and Well-beloved Sir John Burgoyne Bart. Colonel of Our 23rd Regiment of (Light) Dragoons, or to the Officer appointed by Him to raise Men, for Our said Regiment.

In the London Gazette, for the same date, the following appointments are made.

23rd Light Dragoons.

Colonel Sir John Burgoyne, Bart. of 14th Dragoons is appointed to be Colonel.

Major John Floyd of 21st Dragoons to be Lieutenant Colonel.

Captain Thomas Nash of 16th Dragoons to be Major.

To be Captains of Troops.

Captain Jonathan Thomas of 15th Dragoons.

Captain Lieutenant Lewis Majendie of 15th Dragoons.

Captain Lieutenant John Campbell of 20th Dragoons.

Lieutenant John Beckwith of 15th Dragoons to be Captain Lieutenant.

To be Lieutenants.

Lieutenant William Gilbert Child of 21st Dragoons.

Lieutenant William Walton of 21st Dragoons.

Cornet John Fullerton of 21st Dragoons.

Cornet Guy Henry Crawford of 21st Dragoons.

Cornet T. J. Venables Hinde of 16th Dragoons.

The roll of officers was completed in subsequent Gazettes, but several changes took place before the embarkation of the Regiment.

Colonel Sir John Burgoyne, Bart, of Sutton Park in Bedfordshire, was an officer who had served in several Regiments, the 7th Royal Fusiliers, the 52nd Foot, the 58th Foot, and was Lieutenant Colonel of the 14th Light Dragoons at the time of his appointment as Colonel of the 23rd Light Dragoons. He also held the offices of Comptroller of the Port of Chester, and Muster Master of foreign troops serving in North America. On being appointed to serve in India, he was granted local rank as Major General in the East Indies from 1st June 1781, and was subsequently made Major General in the Army, 20th November 1782.[4] It is probable that the regiment was largely composed of drafts from the regiments that furnished it with officers, viz.: the 8th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 20th, and 21st Light Dragoons. The Regiment was first brought together in the vicinity of his home, and, under order dated 28th December, marched from Bedford to Portsmouth to embark for India. The following orders and instructions had previously been issued, and subsequent events were to show how much the admonition as to disputes with the officers of the East India Company were needed.

Orders and Instructions to Sir John Burgoyne Colonel of the 23rd Regiment of (Light) Dragoons for the Conduct of his Regiment on their passage to the East Indies dated 29th November 1781.

George R.

You will before embarking call together the Officers of the Regiment under Your Command, and recommend to them in a particular manner the avoiding all manner of disputes with the Officers of the East India Company, and that they use their utmost Endeavours to live with them in the greatest harmony, as the contrary behaviour will be very displeasing unto Us, as well as detrimental to the Service they are jointly to be employed in;—the respective Officers of Companies are to recommend the same to the Non Commissioned Officers and Soldiers under their Command; The Officers of the East India Company having the same orders, as to their behaviour to Our Land Forces.

You will give the strictest orders for keeping up good discipline and regularity both whilst the Troops are on board the East India Companie’s Ships, and on Shore, and if any Commissioned, Non Commissioned Officer or Soldier shall be guilty of any Crime or disorder whilst on board the said Ships, he shall be immediately confined, and you will order Courts Martial to be held and the delinquent to be punished there.

The Officers of our said Forces on board the said Ships, shall give the necessary orders for the Men under their Command, consulting with the Commanders of the said Ships, in every thing relating to their Service on board, dividing the Men into Watches, with a proportionable Number of Commissioned and Non Commissioned Officers.

The necessary Orders shall likewise be given for airing the bedding daily, for keeping the births (sic) clean and sweet, for preventing gaming, and selling Drams or spirituous liquors and putting out the Lights between Decks with all which Commissioned Officers shall be chargeable.

No Officers or Soldiers shall go on Shore out of any of the said Ships, without the Consent of the Captain of the Ship as well as ye Commanding Officer of the Land Forces, and whenever any men are allowed to go on Shore, Commissioned or Non Commissioned Officers are to be sent with them, who are to be answerable for their Conduct whilst on Shore, and are to make a report thereof upon their return on board.

Weekly returns of the Officers and Men of Our said Forces, on board each Ship, shall be constantly made out, and sent to You, as often as opportunity offers, and Monthly returns of Our said Forces under your Command shall be transmitted by You for Us, to Our Secretary at War, as also a Report of every thing that happens when you have an opportunity of sending them.

You will transmit with as much expedition as the opportunity of time, distance and place can admit, the original proceedings and Sentences of every General Court Martial, to the Commander in Chief in the East Indies who is to send the same to the Judge Advocate General in London.

In every thing you will consider the honour of Our Forces, the good of Our Service, and the Interest of the East India Company whose Territories and Commerce You are sent to protect and establish, You will therefore chearfully (sic) concur in all things which the principal Officers of the East India Company shall judge conducive thereto, and for that purpose you will use your utmost endeavours to preserve a good harmony and understanding betwixt Our Land Forces and those of the East India Company.

Given at Our Court at St James’s this 29th day of November 1781, in the Twenty first Year of Our Reign.

By His Majesty’s Command

Barrington.

In a letter, dated London 25th January 1782, from the East India Directors to the President and Council at Fort St. George, the Madras authorities were thus advised of the dispatch of the Regiment to India—

“His Majesty having been graciously pleased to order a Regiment of Light Dragoons, dismounted, and two Regiments of Foot[5] to proceed to the East Indies for the protection and defence of the Company’s possessions, we hereby inform you that they embark on board the ships now under dispatch for India. Instructions have been given by our Chairman and Depy. Chairman to provide horses to be in readiness for the Dragoons, in order to render them fit for immediate service upon their arrival: and we rely upon these instructions having been duly complied with. The strength of the Regiments and Lists of the Officers are as follows—

Establishment of a Regiment of Light Dragoons commanded by Colonel Sir John Burgoyne, Bart.

List of the Officers of the Twenty Third Regiment of Light Dragoons.

On the 5th January 1782, the Regiment embarked at Portsmouth, on board the ships Ceres and Royal Henry forming part of the East India fleet sailing under convoy of Vice Admiral Sir Richard Bickerton. In the same fleet sailed the two newly raised Infantry Regiments, a Hanoverian regiment raised to serve the East India Company for seven years, drafts for four King’s regiments then serving in India, and some recruits, raised in Ireland, for the Company’s service. Lieutenant Colonel Floyd, with the greater part of the Regiment, was on board the Ceres. Sir John Burgoyne, with the rest of the Regiment, sailed in the Royal Henry. Floyd was in command of the Regiment: Sir John Burgoyne being apparently in command of the whole of the Troops. The voyage was an uneventful one, though not without some apprehension of meeting a French fleet. It was known that a French fleet was fitting out in Brest, under the Comte de Guiche, to intercept them. On the 27th February, intelligence was received of a combined French and Spanish fleet of 41 sail of the line and 18 frigates, that was cruising to intercept the convoy. The frigate that brought the intelligence had also passed close to a French squadron of 14 sail, that had only just missed the convoy: probably the squadron from Brest. But no enemy was seen, and on 28th April, the fleet was safely anchored in Rio, where it lay till 3rd June. In those days it was the custom to carry beer for troops at sea, as a protection against scurvy. The log of the Ceres records that on 3rd March the beer had come to an end, and spirits were served to the troops. On the 15th March, the log records that there was “delivered to Lieut. Colonel Floyd, Commanding Officer of the troops on board, 1 Chest of Tea belonging to the Honble Company, for the use of the military.” Later on again the issue of spruce beer to the troops is recorded. It is evident that much attention, according to the medical lights of that day, was paid to the health of the troops, with a view to landing them in India in as healthy a condition as possible. On the 31st March, they crossed the line with all the ceremonies observed on those occasions, now long since obsolete. The log records that at P.M. the Captain “mustered the ship’s Company to know who had crossed the Line before, when we found 81 who had not, who all agreed to pay the usual forfeit except one Seaman and two Boys who were accordingly ducked three times from ye Lee Main Yard Arm.” We may be sure that all on board relieved the monotony of the voyage by taking part in the rough festivities of the day. Lt. Colonel Floyd says in a private letter, “Our dragoons are divided into two watches, and relieve each other every four hours, so the half of them are always on deck, chiefly for the sake of their health, and to assist the seamen in the operations of the ship, at which they now begin to be very handy.” On the 15th July, when nearing the Cape, a Danish ship “fresh from the Cape” was spoken, and gave news that, on the 13th, 4 French sail of the line and 9 transports were to have sailed for the Mauritius: also, that on 26th June, a French frigate and 12 transports with troops had sailed from the Cape. But nothing more eventful occurred, and on 6th Sept., the whole fleet anchored in Bombay. There the convoy was broken up, and, on 15th, the Ceres and Royal Henry sailed for Madras, where they cast anchor on 19th and 20th October. Hardly had they done so, when bad weather set in; the ships were blown from their anchorage, and, it was not till 26th and 27th October, that the Regiment disembarked; the first British Cavalry Regiment to land in India. Three deaths occurred among the men during the voyage, Private Jonas Bateman on 23rd April, Private Joseph Gardner on 4th June, and Private Simon Kemp on 23rd September.

The reinforcements were sorely needed. So badly had the East India Company’s affairs prospered that, in October, there appeared a probability of the whole of the British establishments in southern India being destroyed. Every where was discord, and disaster. The relations of the Madras Council, both with the naval and military commanders, were greatly strained. Sir Eyre Coote had been obliged to return to Bengal for a time on account of his health, and Sir Hector Munro, Commander-in-Chief in Madras, had resigned his command, while the pay of the Native Army was many months in arrears. So great had been the losses among the European officers, that, in spite of the stringent orders of the Court of Directors, the Madras Government had granted Commissions to anybody they could lay their hands on. Four naval actions had taken place off the coast during the year, between the French fleet under Suffren and the English fleet under Hughes, without any decisive result, though the balance of advantage was with the French. Trincomalee had been captured by the French, and the shattered English ships had no place nearer than Bombay where they could refit. By land, operations had been equally unsuccessful. In February, a British detachment consisting of about 100 Europeans, 1500 sepoys, 360 Cavalry, and 9 field pieces under Colonel Brathwaite, was forced to surrender to a combined Mysore and French force, and, in April, Cuddalore yielded to the same enemy. The operations of Sir Eyre Coote, who was at that time Commander in Chief in India had not been successful. In an attempt on Arnee he was outmanœuvred by Hyder, several small reverses were experienced, and, finally, he had fallen so seriously ill that he was forced to resign his command, and sail for Bengal. Negapatam was attacked by Suffren and Hyder in July, and was only saved by the timely appearance of the British fleet. To make matters worse, famine was raging in Madras. The country had been abandoned to the undisturbed possession of the enemy; great numbers of natives had flocked into the town for protection from Hyder’s Cavalry, and the ill success of our arms, together with scarcity of funds and bad management, prevented the collection of adequate supplies. “Hundreds perished daily.”[6]

In the beginning of October, there were only 30,000 bags of rice in the place, the monthly consumption being 50,000. A large quantity of rice was afloat in the roads but could not be landed, owing to all the harbour boats being taken up for the service of the fleet.[7] On 15th October, a terrible storm arose: the fleet was blown off the coast, the flag ship being so much damaged that she was kept afloat with difficulty; several merchant ships were stranded or foundered at their anchors, and all the rice afloat was lost. “The shore for several miles was covered with wrecks and with the bodies of the dead and dying.”[8] Before the storm, the Admiral had declared his intention of carrying his ships round to Bombay, and had positively refused to stop on the coast, though the absence of the fleet imperilled the safety of Madras. Some relief had been gained by the establishment of peace with the Mahrattas, in May (treaty of Salbye), though the final ratifications were not exchanged till February 1783: so that even in this quarter peace was not definitely secured.

It was under these depressing circumstances that the 23rd Light Dragoons landed in India, not to leave it again until the British arms were triumphant everywhere; a result to which the Regiment contributed in no small degree. Their arrival gave promise that future successes in the field should not be so barren in results as had frequently been the case in the past. In their dispatch of 31st October 1782, the Madras Government, showing their satisfaction at the arrival of the 23rd Light Dragoons, quote Sir Eyre Coote’s opinion that “a body of cavalry would have procured him the most solid and decisive advantages over the enemy” in the earlier operations.

The regiment landed with a strength of 360 privates fit for duty, and, by all accounts, appears to have been a splendid lot of men. Madras letters described the troops landed as “remarkably healthy, and as fine a body of men as ever came to India ... particularly Burgoyne’s men, who, when mounted, will be as fine a body of men as ever went into the field.” A contemporary writer mentions them as “this sightly corps,” and Burgoyne himself, in the midst of his troubles two years later, writes, “the men are now the finest you can imagine.” Immediately after landing, firelocks were served out to the men, and a party of them were exercised in heavy gun drill. In the course of the general mismanagement that distinguished the Madras administration at that day, the regiment was first quartered in Fort St. George, in what has been described as “a suffocating bombproof, from which three or four hundred French prisoners, afflicted with various pestilential diseases had been recently removed. The consequences were such as might have been expected. A fatal mortality so much prevailed that no less than two or three of the men were daily sent to their graves.” In consequence of the scarcity of provisions, biscuit was issued to all the European troops instead of rice. After a time, the regiment was moved to San Thomé, four or five miles from Madras. The four hundred horses ordered to be in readiness for the regiment, were not forthcoming, the few horses available in Madras not being large enough to carry European dragoons. An application for horses had been made to Bengal, but received a discouraging reply. An allowance of Rs. 600 per horse was therefore made to Sir John Burgoyne, to do his best with in mounting the regiment. The Bengal government were ready to send horses but could not find means of transport. In the Calcutta Gazette for 21st December an advertisement appears, asking owners and freighters of ships to quote rates, and state what number of horses they would convey to Madras for government. A week later, the Gazette mentions that “Lt. Colonel Eyre’s regiment of (native) cavalry is arrived at Cowgatchy from Monghyr. It is reported that this regiment is to be dismounted, and the horses sent to Madras for the European cavalry lately arrived there.” But freight for the horses was not obtained. Bengal had been denuded of troops, and it was impossible to send the horses by land without a strong escort. It was not till June following that four hundred horses arrived from Bengal, by land, and the regiment was at last complete.

CHAPTER II
TROUBLES AT MADRAS

1783—1785

Sultan Tippoo Sahib of Mysore—Operations in Southern India—Death of Sir Eyre Coote—Attack on Cuddalore—Peace with France—Tippoo makes Peace—Strained relations between civil and military in India—The E. I. Company’s military establishment—The King’s troops in India—Misconduct of Madras Government—Quarrel between Council and General Stuart—Complaints of Council against Burgoyne—Arrest of Stuart—Council appoint Lang to supersede Burgoyne—Burgoyne refuses to give over command of the King’s troops—Strange delusions of the Council—Imminent Conflict between King’s and Company’s troops—Unworkable arrangement—Fresh quarrel—Burgoyne arrested—Mutiny of native cavalry—Court Martial on Burgoyne—His acquittal—His death—End of the quarrel—Burgoyne justified.

In little more than a month after the Regiment landed, the death of Hyder Ali occurred. It brought no relief to British interests. His son and successor, Tippoo, was an experienced soldier, though inferior to Hyder in ability. He was noted for his religious fanaticism and a violent temper, joined to a most barbarous cruelty of disposition. To this was added a spirit of implacable hostility to the English, the only European power in the country that appeared formidable to him. Possessed of a full treasury and a powerful army, he at once took the field with a force that contained 900 European troops, 250 Topasses,[9] and 2000 French sepoys, besides many thousands of his own Mysore troops. To oppose him, the Madras Government could dispose only of some 2950 European, and 11,500 native troops. With this force, Major General Stuart took the field in January, and made his way by slow marches to Vellore. Meanwhile, Tippoo was forced to withdraw to the westward to defend Mysore from an attack on that side. On the arrival at Bombay of reinforcements in Sir Richard Bickerton’s convoy, about 500 of the Company’s recruits, destined for Madras, were detained, and, on the arrival of the King’s troops at Madras, about 400 of them were at once sent back to Bombay. Out of this material a force had been organized, under Major General Matthews, to advance against Mysore from the west coast. After the capture of several places, the force was hemmed in at Bednore, and obliged to surrender to Tippoo, on 30th April 1783. A great loss was experienced at this time in the death of Sir Eyre Coote at Madras, on 27th April, three days after his return to resume command of the operations. After this nothing was done till June, when an ineffective attack was made on Cuddalore by Major General Stuart. The French were on the point of striking a counter blow which would probably have proved successful, when the announcement of peace in Europe changed the complexion of affairs. The French force with Tippoo was withdrawn, but otherwise the war continued. At this point the Mahrattas intervened. Tippoo’s character and his great power rendered him a menace to the other native Princes, and it was no part of the Mahratta policy that he should be allowed to crush the English. They therefore called on him to desist from hostilities. On his refusing to comply, they signed a treaty of alliance against him with the English. In the meantime, a successful expedition under Colonel Fullarton, strengthened by the troops set free by the peace with France, had penetrated into Mysore, from the south, and threatened Seringapatam. Under these circumstances, Lord Macartney and the Madras Council induced Tippoo to sign a treaty of peace, 11th March 1784; a treaty discreditable to themselves, and disapproved of by Warren Hastings.

In a letter, dated 6th September 1783, addressed to the Court of Directors, the Select Committee of the Madras Council states that Sir John Burgoyne’s regiment, being reported fit for service, had been ordered to take the field. But the regiment did not move from San Thomé. The Council desired to send the regiment into the field without Burgoyne. On the latter notifying his intention of accompanying his regiment, under orders from General Stuart, the move was countermanded. The incident was part of the fast ripening quarrel between the Civil Government and the King’s officers, which must be mentioned on account of the serious results it had on the fortunes of the Colonel of the 23rd Light Dragoons.

From the time of their first military establishment in India, the Company had always evinced great distrust of their military officers, a feeling that was not without some justification in view of the character of the adventurers, who at first took service with the Company. The Company’s troops on their part were under the influence of the feeling, prevalent in England, that the exercise of sovereign rights by a company of merchants was derogatory to the dignity of the Crown. Hence it arose that the Company’s officers were less deferential to the authority of the Company, than they should have been, while the Company became more exacting of the respect due to them, and made it their policy to keep down the army, in numbers, in rank, and in authority. This feeling of jealousy became intensified when the services of King’s troops were placed at the disposal of the Company; and many quarrels detrimental to the public service ensued. At the time we are treating of, the King’s troops in India were the mainstay of the Company’s power. The Company was under stringent engagements to pay them regularly, instead of allowing their pay to fall into arrears, as was always the case with their own troops. They were to be commanded as far as possible by King’s officers only, and the Commander in Chief at each Presidency was appointed by the Crown. Every King’s officer, whatever the date of his commission, took rank above all Company’s officers holding similar commissions, and every field officer of King’s troops, while in India, was given a step of Brevet rank above his regimental rank. This naturally caused some ill feeling between the King’s and Company’s officers. The arrangement had first been made when there was only a single battalion of King’s troops in India. As the number of King’s troops increased, the extra rank given to the officers became a very serious grievance to the Company’s officers, which was further aggravated by the Company’s policy of maintaining a very small number of field officers, and of having their regiments commanded by Captains. The instructions for avoiding disputes with the Company’s officers, that were issued to Sir John Burgoyne, before sailing from England, had been a stereotyped formula of orders for all officers sent with troops to India for more than twenty years past: but such admonitions were of little use under conditions that made friction inevitable.

The Madras Government was possessed at that time of a perverse spirit, that led them into all kinds of extravagancies and never ending quarrels. The Members of the Council fought amongst themselves; they evaded or disobeyed the orders of the Court of Directors, and ignored the authority of the Governor General. Individually, they commanded little respect. Collectively, they mismanaged everything. They interfered in military matters, that in a time of war were peculiarly in the province of the chief military authority; and they frittered away the forces at their disposal in ill-conceived and badly equipped expeditions that frequently ended in disaster. Finally, they quarrelled with everybody who was not immediately under their orders, and wrote long winded complaints to the Court of Directors and to Bengal, instead of doing their best under the trying circumstances of the time. The King’s officers on their side were also difficult to deal with. They asserted their right to direct how and where the King’s troops should be employed, and, in other respects, claimed an independence of the Civil Government incompatible with public interests. In 1780, when the Commander in Chief, Sir Eyre Coote, had been sent down from Bengal, after the disaster to Colonel Baillie’s army, he was furnished with orders for the suspension of the acting Governor, Mr Whitehill, against whom the gravest charges had been made, and he was specially invested with powers that to a great extent made him independent of the Madras Council, including the exclusive direction of the treasure transmitted for the prosecution of the war. The temporary grant of such powers was necessary under existing circumstances, but was none the less resented by the Madras Council; though there was little active opposition till the assumption of the Governorship by Lord Macartney in June 1781. The Council complained that more was not accomplished, Sir Eyre Coote complained that his troops were sent into the field without supplies; the Council sent an expedition against the Dutch settlements, without consulting the General, and an open rupture occurred, in which the Admiral took part, in consequence of dispatches addressed to both Commanders being opened by the Resident at Tanjore. At this stage of the quarrel, Sir Eyre Coote’s health forced him to leave for Bengal. The command devolved on Major General Stuart, and the quarrel went on worse than ever.

Lord Macartney at once assumed the direction of the campaign, and made himself ridiculous by forcing Stuart to destroy three of his own forts, the preservation of which was anxiously desired by Sir Eyre Coote. Stuart, on his side, claimed the right of exercising the special powers that had been conferred on Sir Eyre Coote. Stuart’s position was a peculiar one. While on the King’s half pay list, in 1775, his services were lent to the Company, who conferred on him the rank of Brigadier General. In October 1781, the Crown gave him the commission of Major General in India, and, three months later, his commission was antedated. His position, however, differed from that of other General Officers, in that he was not borne on the strength of any regiment, and his status in England was only that of a half pay Colonel. He had done good service already in the campaign against Hyder, in which he had lost a leg by a cannon shot.

In December 1782, Stuart withdrew the garrison of Masulipatam for service elsewhere, without consulting the Government, and at once both parties entered into a paper war, that absorbed all the energies that should have been devoted to the war with Tippoo and the French. Each party bombarded the other with notes and minutes, that continued to be exchanged after the army had taken the field for Cuddalore, and the Council wrote to London and Calcutta in the gloomiest terms, expressing their fears of General Stuart’s designs.[10] In neither quarter did they elicit any sympathy. In terms of measured sarcasm Warren Hastings pointed out that their “collected mass of complaint and invective” was directed in turn against every single British authority in India except themselves, including the Naval Commander in Chief, as well as against the Nawab of Arcot and his ministers.

The Madras Government had become contemptible alike in the eyes of friends and enemies, and it was impossible to work with them. Lost to all sense of public duty, they formed the project of refusing to place the troops under command of Sir Eyre Coote on his return in April. Sir Eyre Coote was, on this occasion, nominated by the Bengal Government to take the command of all the troops on the Coast, except the garrison actually required at Madras. Not an unreasonable arrangement, as Sir Eyre Coote was Commander in Chief in India, and the Madras Government was dependent for money on Bengal. The Madras Government sent peremptory orders for Stuart to hasten his march, in order that the troops might be far distant when Sir E. Coote arrived, and passed a resolution that he should not have the command. A letter addressed by the Madras Council to Sir Eyre Coote when he was dying, drew down upon them a censure from Warren Hastings that was calculated to penetrate the most pachydermatous self-conceit, but it had apparently no effect on Lord Macartney and his Council. Even before Sir Eyre Coote’s death, the feeling of Lord Macartney and the Council against the King’s officers was shown by a minute of the Council, at the time of the preparation of the army for the siege of Cuddalore, wherein an attempt was made to deprive the Generals bearing the King’s commission of any employment in the field. In it, an endeavour was made to elicit from Major General Stuart an opinion that the public interests would be best served by leaving those officers, five in number, in garrison. This idea was resisted by Stuart, and Major General Bruce was sent with the army to Cuddalore. The frigate that conveyed the news of the cessation of hostilities with France, to the army before Cuddalore, brought also peremptory orders to Stuart to embark at once for Madras, to answer charges of misconduct. Bruce was forced by ill health to return a few days later.

The command of the force in the field then devolved temporarily on Colonel Gordon, till Sir John Burgoyne took command of the returning army on 13th August. But Sir John Burgoyne had likewise come under the displeasure of the Select Committee. In the same letter[11] to the Court of Directors in which they announced the supersession of Stuart, and their intention to give the command to Burgoyne, they wrote—

“Sir John Burgoyne expecting a Preference to be given to his men in point of accommodations and every other respect above all other Corps of His Majesty’s or the Company’s troops, and making no allowance for the calamities of the times and the Exigencies of our situation, has been loud and frequent in his complaints, and the utmost endeavours on our Part to show attention to himself as well as to his Regiment have fallen short of the sense he entertained of the claims of both.”

In another part of the same letter they stated that Burgoyne had claimed to be a Major General, but they had only his word for it, as the fact had not been notified to them. Yet, in the Directors’ letter of 25th January 1782, Burgoyne’s rank as Major General in the East Indies from 1st June 1781, is precisely stated.

Burgoyne was justifiably angry at the treatment his regiment had experienced. Nothing had been done by the Madras Government to have horses in readiness for the regiment on arrival. The quarters in which the men were first placed were so unhealthy, that by the middle of July, less than nine months after landing, 78 had died. His own claims to the rank and allowances of a Major General were challenged; while, in common with all the senior officers of King’s troops, he was exasperated by the animus displayed against them by Lord Macartney and the Council, and the openly avowed intention to ignore their just claims, in defiance of the intentions of the Crown. In a letter, dated 3rd September 1783, in which he reports to the Ministry at home, the fact of his having assumed the command of the army returning from Cuddalore, he dwells on the grievances of the King’s General officers, especially “the declaration of the Governor, who says no King’s officer shall ever Command in Chief here, let his rank be what it may; and that a junior officer in the Company’s service should have rank given him superior to what any King’s officer may have to entitle him to command.” It is evident that the violent measures shortly afterwards taken by Lord Macartney, were in pursuance of a long contemplated scheme for getting rid of the King’s General officers.

From the beginning, Stuart had been quarrelsome and unreasonable in his dealings with the rest of the Council. The Council complained loudly of the slowness of his advance on Cuddalore. For this he does not appear to have been responsible, as the delay was caused by his having to wait for the squadron and store ships which did not arrive before Cuddalore till after the army had encamped before the place. Among other causes of quarrel was the desire of the General to give effect to the views of the Bengal Government in the affairs of the Nawab of Arcot; views which were strenuously opposed by the rest of the Council. Soon after the return of the army to Madras the Council passed a resolution dismissing Stuart from the service, and conferring the Commander in Chiefship on Burgoyne. On the 17th September this was announced to Burgoyne, who was addressed as Commander in Chief, and requested to attend the Council immediately. In a General order of the same date, the Council, anticipating objections, justified their action by arguing that Stuart held only a half pay commission from the King, and that the Company could do as they pleased with him as he held no position under the Crown in India.

As Burgoyne entered the Fort a salute was fired from the ramparts, but he at once informed the Council that, while they could dispose of the command of the Company’s forces as they pleased, he had no power to supersede Stuart who held the King’s commission of Major General, and the command of the King’s troops de jure, and, so long as he was able to act, could only be deprived of his command by the King’s order. On this he was told that, if he did not accept the command, it was intended to make Lieutenant Colonel Lang a Company’s officer, a Lieutenant General, and appoint him Commander-in-Chief. Burgoyne continued firm in his resolve, but was detained till 8 in the evening on various pretexts. Meanwhile, without his knowledge, arrangements were made for Stuart’s arrest, and a letter was sent to Lieutenant Colonel Lang appointing him Commander-in-Chief of the army with the rank of Lieutenant General. The order issued a few hours previously, appointing Burgoyne Commander-in-Chief, was ignored as if it had never existed. Burgoyne was then told that he might retire. On leaving the Council room, he found the gates closed and the drawbridges drawn up, and learned that Stuart had been arrested by a company of sepoys, in his own house, and brought, a close prisoner, into the Fort, under circumstances of much indignity. The excuse afterwards assigned by the Select Committee for this extraordinary proceeding was, that they believed Stuart was about to seize the Government by force.

On the following day Burgoyne wrote to the Select Committee, expressing his intention of taking command of the King’s troops, since Stuart was incapacitated from acting. He received no reply, and, on arrival at the camp he found two orders, one constituting Lang a Lieutenant General, and the other directing Lang to take command of the whole army; thus superseding Burgoyne and four other Major Generals and several Lieutenant Colonels, who had been senior to Lang.

Burgoyne at once assembled the King’s Officers in his tent, and related to them what had passed. For his own part, he said, he should consider himself wanting in his duty, to pay obedience to any other than a senior officer of the King’s appointment: that General Stuart being deprived of the possibility of acting, the command of the King’s troops devolved on himself. He did not attempt to bias the opinions of any of the gentlemen present: he recommended the avoidance of altercation or even discussion with the Company’s officers, lest unforeseen consequences might ensue. The officers present said they would obey no orders but those of the Commander-in-Chief representing the King, viz.: Sir John Burgoyne.

The same afternoon Lang arrived in camp, and met the King’s officers in Burgoyne’s tent, where he delivered an order from the Council instructing Burgoyne to surrender the command of the Army to him. Burgoyne replied that he would give over the command of the Company’s troops to whomsoever the Council chose to appoint, but that his duty to the King required that he should not deliver over the command of the King’s troops to any person not regularly authorized by His Majesty: he placed his tents at Colonel Lang’s service. Lang replied that he had a house at the Mount, and remained silent some time, till, on the officers calling out that they would obey Sir John Burgoyne only, he got up and went away. On the same day a letter was addressed to the Admiral by Sir John, asking for advice and support, and requesting an asylum on board the flag ship, in the event of any attempt being made on his person. The Admiral was so situated that he might have discreetly acted as mediator between the contending parties had he been so disposed; but, perhaps, his previous experiences of the Madras Council made him unwilling to be mixed up in the quarrel. Anyhow, he refused to have anything to do with the matter.

Very little was needed to produce a conflict between the King’s and Company’s troops that night. The King’s troops had been exasperated at the animosity displayed by the Council towards Sir Eyre Coote and the King’s officers in general. They were alarmed at the violence offered to General Stuart, and were resolved to repel by force any repetition of this violence in Burgoyne’s case. In order to prevent surprise, guards were posted round the Camp. The Council, on their part, had been haunted all along by the idea that the King’s Officers aimed at subverting the Government. Two battalions of Bengal Sepoys with some guns were ordered down to protect Lang’s house, and the gates of the Fort were kept shut. Each party expected to be attacked, and, for the next forty-eight hours, a very slight occurrence might have precipitated a disastrous conflict.

The following day, Burgoyne summoned Major Generals Bruce, Campbell, Ogle, and Adams to confer with him, and a remonstrance, signed by the five, was drawn up and forwarded to the Council; to the effect that they were determined not to act under Lang’s orders. Lang had meanwhile issued orders for the Army to march on the following day, in order to test their obedience. Lieut. Colonel Floyd was also senior to Lang by the date of his commission. Several regiments gave assurances of support to Burgoyne and Floyd. At a conference of the senior officers a course of action was determined on, and Burgoyne withdrew from the camp, at midnight, to his house in Madras. The vedettes round the camp were at once withdrawn. The next morning, Floyd likewise withdrew from the army; handing over his command to Lt. Colonel Mackenzie of the 73rd, who was junior to Lang by date of commission. The force marched, and took up fresh ground in rear of their former position.

On reaching Madras, Burgoyne addressed a letter to the Select Committee notifying his withdrawal from the camp, and offering himself for arrest if Government had a mind to seize his person. The offer was somewhat embarrassing to the Select Committee, who evaded the point by saying that, as Burgoyne had refused to take command of the Army, Lang had been appointed in his place, and there was nothing more to be said in the matter. On this, Burgoyne deputed Floyd to carry a letter to Lord Macartney, in which he asserted his position as senior officer bearing the King’s commission, and pointed out that he alone had power to convene Courts Martial.[12]

Lord Macartney was a man of violent temper and overbearing disposition that kept him in continual hot water. He demanded unhesitating submission to his views from all with whom he came in contact. His relations with the supreme government at Calcutta were as unyielding as with those in immediate contact with him at Madras. His chief merit was his personal honesty in money matters, at a time of great laxity; a merit on which he was by no means silent, and which he did not insist on in his colleagues. He threw himself with ardour into the chronic quarrels carried on by the Madras Council with the Bengal Government and the military authorities, and, in pursuit of the quarrels, lost sight of the great interests at stake, and brought the Madras settlement to the verge of anarchy. Even before Sir Eyre Coote’s death he had been induced to believe that General Stuart had designs against the Government. This belief, for which not a scrap of evidence was ever brought forward, led him into a line of conduct that brought about corresponding and increasing opposition from Stuart. After Stuart’s arrest, the same suspicion was transferred to Burgoyne, with even less presumption of justice than had existed in Stuart’s case. Burgoyne proposed an interview in the presence of witnesses. Had Lord Macartney been less bent on the quarrel, he would have grasped the opportunity of coming to some understanding. Instead of this he used the most uncompromising language to Floyd. “Government would not recede; Government must be peremptory;” and he still affected to treat Burgoyne as having refused the command of the army. The following day, Burgoyne received a letter from the Select Committee arguing the old point of General Stuart’s commission, and asserting that Burgoyne had acknowledged the validity of Lang’s promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General, in spite of which he had withdrawn from camp without Lang’s permission. The Committee would not contest with him about any authority he might undertake to exercise, unless it endangered the public safety, but would not countenance his resumption of command. Lang’s command extended to the King’s as well as the Company’s troops, and they (the Committee) would convey dispatches addressed to either Commander in Chief, to Lang. If Sir John Burgoyne thought proper to act as Commander in Chief, and to convene Courts Martial, the Committee had no objection “unless their duty forced them to interfere.” Such unworkable arrangements were bound to lead to further quarrels. On the same day, as previously proposed by him, Sir John Burgoyne had an interview with Lord Macartney, Major General Bruce and Lt. Colonel Floyd being present. Throughout the quarrel, Burgoyne had been actuated by a desire to arrive at some working arrangement that would enable the public service to be carried on, while preserving the rights of the King whose senior representative he was. In this spirit he sought an interview with the Governor. But there was no corresponding desire for peace on the side of the Governor and Council, and Lord Macartney’s behaviour was disingenuous. Burgoyne asked for explanations to some parts of the Select Committee’s letter, which he discussed generally. Lord Macartney would give no direct answer, and was very guarded in what he said. He was only a Member of the Government, not authorized to decide, but only to speak their sentiments, and to represent matters to the other Members. Would Sir John put down in writing what questions he pleased, he would engage to lay them before the Select Committee, and obtain replies to them. Lord Macartney’s intention was to obtain the same control over the King’s troops, as he exercised over the Company’s troops. To gain this end he was resolved to give the command to a Company’s officer, who would naturally be more pliable than a King’s officer, though it was a recognised principle with the British Government to keep the command of the King’s troops under an officer of their own appointment. It is almost incredible that this miserable quarrel should have gone on at a time of the greatest public distress, when Tippoo was triumphant in the field, and it was still uncertain that the Mahrattas would not take up arms again.

Stuart was, shortly afterwards, shipped off to England under close arrest, in a ship specially purchased for the purpose, though, for want of funds, the pay of the troops was in some instances over two years in arrears. During imprisonment, he was denied the use of pen and ink, and was only allowed to see Burgoyne on public business in presence of the officer on duty over him. At the time of his embarkation, he believed that it was intended to put him to death at sea.

Burgoyne assumed the command of the King’s troops without further direct opposition, but the Council lost no opportunity of thwarting him and lowering his authority, while they encouraged others to resist it. Burgoyne, on his part, cast moderation aside, and was bent on pushing his claims to extremity. He ignored General Lang, and issued orders that clashed with those of the civil government, producing confusion, perplexity, and relaxation of discipline in every rank. The Major Generals, who had joined in signing the protest against Lang’s promotion, and several others among the officers commanding regiments withdrew their support from Burgoyne. In October, Burgoyne placed Lieutenant Colonel Sterling of the 36th under arrest for disobedience of orders: the Select Committee released him. The soldiers too had their grievances about batta which should have been paid to them, but was withheld by Lord Macartney. The men of the 98th were on the eve of mutiny, and the men of Burgoyne’s own regiment formed the project of going to the Fort in a body to ask redress. Burgoyne sternly repressed both movements, but the Select Committee gave him credit for causing them. A fresh crisis in the quarrel was inevitable.

In December, General Ogle reported certain matters seriously affecting the private character of an officer of the 73rd. The rest of the officers of the regiment refused to allow the matter to be patched up, as General Ogle desired. Burgoyne had no option but to convene a General Court Martial, which he did, appointing Lieutenant Colonel Straubenzee of the 52nd as President. The Court was also to try two soldiers of the 98th, who had appealed from a Regimental Court Martial. On such occasions it was customary for the Council to appoint the Judge Advocate. They refused to nominate one for this or any Court Martial Sir John might order to assemble, and refused to grant a place in the Fort for the Court to assemble in. They also forbade Straubenzee to leave Poonamallee where he was commanding. Burgoyne then arranged for the Court to assemble at Poonamallee, but without making the change known, and ordered Straubenzee still to hold himself in readiness to preside. He also ordered Colonel Sterling to appear for trial before the Court. The Select Committee thereupon, on the 31st December, issued an order placing Burgoyne under arrest for disobedience of orders in September, and for exciting mutiny and sedition, and appointed Major General Alan Campbell to command the King’s troops. No attempt was made on this occasion to place the King’s troops under Lang.

The absurdity of the Select Committee’s action, both in Stuart’s and Burgoyne’s cases, was shown by their inability to form a Court Martial for the trial of those officers. They tried to get Burgoyne to proceed to England, but he refused to go. He proceeded, for a time, to Pondicherry under open arrest, while the dual commands of the King’s and Company’s forces continued. For the next eighteen months Lord Macartney’s quarrels and intrigues, added to his unjust measures touching the pay and allowances of the army, produced results that bid fair to end in the ruin of the British government on the Coast.

In April 1784, a mutiny occurred among four newly formed Native Cavalry Regiments at Arnee. Arrears of pay for twelve months were owing to them, and they likewise had unsatisfied claims on the Nawab of Arcot, from whose service they had been transferred. They seized the fort of Arnee, and imprisoned their officers. A month’s pay was given them, but they held out for the whole arrears. The 36th Foot and one hundred men of the 23rd Light Dragoons were dispatched to Arcot, to join General Lang. On the night of the 15th May they marched for Arnee, which they reached soon after daybreak, and after a brief parley the mutineers laid down their arms.[13] In October, one of the King’s infantry regiments at Arcot broke out into open mutiny, but were overawed by the men of the 23rd, and the two other regiments in garrison, who stuck to their officers. These were by no means the only instances of grave insubordination both among King’s or Company’s troops, due to Lord Macartney’s ill-advised measures. The officers had to complain of broken faith as well as the men.

Sir John Burgoyne’s arrest did not prevent him from looking after the welfare of the regiment. There had been many casualties among the horses,[14] as well as among the men; and Lord Macartney is said to have conceived the idea of gradually allowing the 23rd Light Dragoons to disappear from want of horses and men, and of raising a corps of European cavalry in their place. As the men died, the extra horses were taken from the regiment, and Lt. Colonel Floyd was forbidden to entertain recruits, of whom a certain number were procurable, probably from Infantry regiments on the spot. Sir John thereupon addressed the Bengal Government, by whom a reference was made to Madras recommending the deficiencies to be made good. The Madras Government thought the regiment was very well as it was, and demurred to corresponding with Sir John while he was under arrest. The Bengal Govt. pointed out that that need not prevent them from corresponding with the next officer in the regiment. They dwelt on the importance of maintaining the regiment in an efficient state, and expressed their sense of the value of the services rendered by the Regiment in dealing with the Mutiny of the Native Cavalry at Arnee, and their “desire of giving the Company’s service the full benefit of the good discipline of H.M.’s 23rd Light Dragoons.” The Madras Government replied that they would be glad if the Bengal Govt. would take over the whole of the charges of the regiment. For their part, they thought it useless to recruit for the regiment, when there were already more men than horses, and it would be better to transfer the superfluous men to the Infantry, as horses were expensive, and a diminution in their number was a useful economy. Warren Hastings brushed all such cobwebs aside, and sent 147 horses from Hyderabad to remount the regiment. In spite of their protests, the Madras Government entered into a correspondence with Sir John which was characterized on both sides by much bitterness. A detachment of the regiment was at this time at Ellore in the Masulipatum district.

There seems to have been some expectation at this time that the regiment would be recalled to England, probably on account of Lord Macartney’s recommendations to the Court of Directors. Anyhow, a Madras letter, dated 26th May 1785, published in the Calcutta Public Advertiser, says: “The 23rd Regiment is to remain in India. The appointments and recommendations of Sir John Burgoyne, are approved of.” In the middle of July, a detachment of the regiment was sent to Arcot, but was almost immediately recalled to San Thomé.

Meanwhile, Sir John Burgoyne’s troubles were coming to an end. On the news of the quarrels, resulting in Burgoyne’s arrest, reaching England, much interest was excited in the highest quarters. The matter was twice discussed in the House of Commons, on the 19th July and 9th August, and it was generally recognised that the trouble had primarily arisen from a faulty system. Burgoyne was held to have been correct in his behaviour, and received reassuring letters, written by the King’s commands, pending the official settlement of the question. It was determined to appoint at once a new Commander in Chief of Madras, besides filling the vacancy caused by the death of Sir Eyre Coote, and to remove the chief actors in the quarrel on both sides. Burgoyne continued under arrest till the nearly simultaneous arrival in Madras, at the beginning of June, of Lieut. General Robert Sloper as Commander in Chief in India, and Lieut. General Sir John Dalling as Commander in Chief in Madras. General Sloper brought with him instructions to convene a Court Martial for Burgoyne’s trial, and for Burgoyne’s return to England after the trial, whatever its result might be. Lord Macartney, at the same time, received orders for the surrender of the assignment to the Nawab of Arcot, and private intelligence of the appointment of his successor. He had been severely wounded, a few months before, in a duel with one of the Council, due to his own overbearing temper, and his health was bad. Believing that he was about to be recalled, he resigned his post, and sailed for Calcutta to confer with the Bengal Government before sailing for Europe. While in Calcutta, he received news of his appointment to succeed Warren Hastings; but his health would not permit him to stop in India, and he sailed for England.[15]

General Sloper appointed a Court Martial on Burgoyne, with Sir John Dalling as President. The Madras Council at once claimed the right to appoint the Prosecutor, which being disallowed, they wrote complaints in their usual style to the Court of Directors. Another grievance with the Council was, that they were not given a copy of the Proceedings. Their desire apparently was to prosecute the quarrel through Lord Macartney in England. The wish of the Government in England, and of the Court of Directors, was to bury the unseemly quarrel as speedily as possible, and the Proceedings were withheld. A year and a half later, the Madras Government were still writing to the Governor General for a copy. The exact charges, of which there were nineteen, cannot now be ascertained, but they partially related to Sir John Burgoyne’s behaviour in September 1783, more than three months before the date of his arrest, and charged him with causing and exciting mutiny and sedition, and refusing to take command of the King’s troops. On the 11th July, after sitting for nineteen days, the Court came to the following resolutions—

1st.

That Major General Sir John Burgoyne did not refuse to take upon him the command of the King’s troops after Major General Stuart was put under an arrest; but that he declined superseding that Major General, so long as he viewed him especially appointed by the King, and he remained in the capacity of acting as such.

2nd.

That the line of conduct pursued by Major General Sir John Burgoyne on the 19th September and quitting camp the eve of that day, was productive of the happiest consequences.

3rd.

That in no instance whatsoever did Major General Sir John Burgoyne disobey any orders immediately proceeding from the Government.

4th.

That the equivocal situation of Lieut. General Lang, from his standing in both services,[16] and this Government having at present no charter rights to confer such high ranks, well warranted his Majesty’s general officers in witholding from him their obedience.

5th.

That the orders sent to Lieut. Colonel Sterling by Major General Sir John Burgoyne, seem to be solely for promoting good discipline in his Majesty’s troops, and to respect only their internal economy, which, as the King’s Commander in Chief, he had not only a right to give, but enforce also.

6th.

That in the instance for which Major General Sir John Burgoyne was originally put in arrest, it appears the government acted from half information, not having before them the postscript to the General Orders of Major General Sir John Burgoyne.

7th.

That the letters before the Court from Major General Sir John Burgoyne to Lord Macartney or the Presidency, so far from being mutinous or seditious, are not even disrespectful. The facts which they assert are strong; but in the manner and expression they are as decent and proper as the circumstances which gave them birth could reasonably admit.

Sentence.

The Court having thus maturely considered of the evidence and records in support of the prosecution, and likewise the defence and those in support of it, is of opinion that the Prisoner Major General Sir John Burgoyne Bart. is not guilty of the charges alledged against him; and doth therefore most fully and honorably acquit him of all and every part of the same.[17]

(Signed)

John Dalling,

Lieut. General & President.

Immediately on the close of the proceedings, the Council addressed Burgoyne in peremptory and discourteous terms, desiring him to leave the country; and there appeared every chance of a fresh quarrel arising, when some influence (probably Sir John Dalling’s) intervened, and thenceforward there was peace. Burgoyne’s claims for arrears of pay and allowances, for himself as Commander in Chief, his Aide-de-camp, and his secretary, for the period he had been under arrest, were admitted; his passage money was advanced to him, and he was preparing to sail, when death overtook him on the 23rd of September at the age of forty-six. A tablet to his memory was placed in St. Mary’s Church in the Fort, by the officers of the King’s troops. Lang was withdrawn from the service by the Court of Directors who granted him a special pension of one thousand a year. Stuart, a few years later, was given the Colonelcy of H.M.’s 31st. In consequence of these disputes, the offices of Governor and Commander-in-Chief were, soon after, vested in the same person, in each of the Presidencies. In order to prevent a recurrence of the dispute in General Sloper’s case, it was ordered, at the time of his appointment, that in the event of the Company ceasing to employ him, his right to command the King’s troops should also cease. A project for amalgamating the King’s and Company’s forces in India, in order to put an end to the rivalry between the two services, was seriously considered two years later, but the only change made was to put an end to the supersession of the Company’s by the King’s officers.

In studying the details of this unhappy quarrel, the conviction forces itself upon one that there were persons in the background, who, for their own purposes, fomented the dispute, and aggravated the differences between the principal parties, by filling their minds with suspicions and ideas that were equally groundless and mischievous. This is plainly stated to have been the case by an officer of the 73rd Highlanders who published a Narrative of the war with Hyder. “Had it not been for the cordiality and good fellowship which universally subsisted betwixt the King’s and Company’s officers, who had shared the fatigues of war together, notwithstanding the artful steps that had been taken to sow the seeds of dissension amongst them, these broils might have terminated in a manner very fatal to the settlement.”[18] Long afterwards, Lord Macartney acknowledged his mistake. In December 1797, speaking to Sir David Baird, he said, “Had I known as much of you military gentlemen, when I was in India, as I have learned since, we never should have had any difference.” Sir John Burgoyne’s justification was complete.

CHAPTER III
CHANGE OF NUMBER

1786–1789

Regiment moved to Shevtamodoo—John Floyd—Number of regiment changed to 19th—Uniform—Sir William Howe appointed Colonel—Foundation of Indian native cavalry system laid by Floyd and the 19th Light Dragoons.

One of the first acts of Sir John Dalling, after composing the quarrels between the Civil Government and the King’s troops in Madras, was to draw up a scheme for brigading the troops in Cantonments. The scheme never took shape, beyond the formation of a large Cantonment, in February 1786, at Wallajabad, near Conjeveram, about fifty miles from Madras. Among the troops detailed for the new Cantonment were the 23rd Light Dragoons. Before leaving their quarters at San Thomé, they were reviewed by the Commander-in-Chief. Being the only English Cavalry regiment in the country, the review attracted some attention, and the following account was published in the Madras Courier for 29th March 1786.

Walker & Boutall ph. sc.

“The review of the 23rd Dragoons on Saturday last, was far superior to any expectation that had been formed of it, displayed the most brilliant military exhibition that has ever been seen in India, and it is presumed, equal to any that has taken place at anytime in Europe. It reflects the highest honour on the Commanding Officer, whose great military knowledge, joined to indefatigable exertions, has brought the regiment to that degree of perfection which, while it pleases and astonishes, teaches the very useful, though long doubted lesson, that men can be disciplined, and horses trained in this country equally as well as in Europe. The most particularly striking manœuvre was a charge at full speed for near three hundred yards in a perfect line; and that of two squadrons dispersing, and pursuing, supported by the regiment; these were performed with the exactness of mechanical precision, and produced the most beautiful effect; but what is very extraordinary the horses were all perfectly obedient, and scarcely a single accoutrement of the riders was discomposed.

“A Correspondent observes, that too much praise cannot be given to the 23rd dragoons, for the excellent manner in which they performed their manœuvres, at the review on Saturday last; that the men were in the highest perfection of discipline; and that the officers, the finest body belonging to any one corps that he recollects to have seen, were so perfectly masters of every manœuvre, and led each motion with so much judgment, that it were impossible for any troops under them to make a single mistake.”

The 23rd Light Dragoons were not cantoned at Wallajabad, but Floyd was directed to select a spot within a certain indicated area. He fixed on Shevtamodoo, about two miles from Conjeveram, and nine miles from Wallajabad.

“The spot is extremely beautiful, exceeding anything I have met with in India, except among the hills. My barracks are building something within the edge of an open grove of immense tamarinds. The Officers’ barracks are within the grove. A plain extends about half a mile in front, and something less in breadth along the north bank of the river Paliar, above the ordinary level of the country, with a large lake on the other side of the ground towards its extremity, with a small woody island in it skirting the whole plain. The plain is sprinkled by nature’s masterly hand with enormous banyan trees, far exceeding the size of the very largest trees known in Europe. My own barracks will stand at some distance, nearly in the middle of the plain, under the largest of these extraordinary trees.”[19]

It was here that Floyd laid the foundation of that excellence in discipline and efficiency, that fitted the regiment to play the distinguished part it was destined in after years to fill, with such success, in the stirring affairs of southern India. This will be a suitable place to give some account of this distinguished soldier.

John Floyd, born in 1748, was the son of an officer in the 1st Dragoon Guards who served at Minden, and died in Germany six weeks after the battle. In recognition of his father’s services, John Floyd was given a commission in the 15th (Elliott’s) Light Dragoons, in the year after the regiment was raised, and was present with it at the battle of Emsdorf, on the 16th July 1760, when only twelve years old. There he had his horse shot under him, while charging the French ranks, and was only saved by a brother officer who cut down his assailant. The sword of the French hussar is still preserved in the family.

The 15th Light Dragoons under Sir John Elliott and Lord Pembroke were regarded at that time as the school for British Light Cavalry. Lord Pembroke had made a special study of military equitation, concerning which he had written a book,[20] that went through several editions, and was a recognized text book on military riding. He interested himself in Floyd, and took pains to give him a complete education, and made him a proficient horseman. Later, on Lord Pembroke obtaining the command of the Royal Dragoons, he employed Floyd for twelve months in teaching his system to that regiment. In 1777–78–79, Floyd, under Lord Pembroke’s auspices, visited nearly every Court in Europe, and reported on their armies. In December 1778, he was appointed Major of the 21st Light Dragoons, and, on the formation of the 23rd Light Dragoons for Indian service, he was selected to be its Lt. Colonel. No better choice could have been made. A thorough soldier, and a horseman from his youth up, brought up in the school of two such cavalry soldiers as Sir John Elliott and Lord Pembroke, he was an enthusiastic believer in the power of cavalry. Writing from San Thomé in 1784, he says:

“You may depend upon it, the first military miracle that is to be performed in India, will be wrought by cavalry. No one here has an idea of that arm; a small body of well disciplined Europeans on horseback, judiciously led, will defeat and destroy myriads of Indian enemies. If I am of the party, it may perhaps afford me an opportunity of deserving your applause.”

All soldiers know how an able commander can impress his character on a regiment, to endure long after his connexion with it has ceased. Such was the case with the regiment that gathered laurels as the 19th Light Dragoons, and no small part of its glory was due to its first Lieutenant Colonel, John Floyd. The correctness of his views as to the great part cavalry might play, and the excellence of his system, were demonstrated on many a field in which the regiment fought during its career in India.

It has already been shown[21] how, in June 1783, the 19th Light Dragoons and all Cavalry regiments above that number, on the establishment in England, were disbanded. For three years, the fate of the 23rd seems to have hung in the balance. At last, on 26th April 1786, an order was issued to the effect that henceforward the regiment was to be numbered the 19th, instead of the 23rd, a designation under which it was destined to win itself fame and honour.[22]

Before this, a change was made in the uniform of all the Light Dragoon regiments in the service. Hitherto, all mounted regiments had worn scarlet. In 1784, it was determined to distinguish the Light Dragoons, by dressing them in blue, and the following order gives the whole dress in detail.

Regulations for the Clothing of the Light Dragoons, April 1784.

1784.
April.

The Clothing of a private Light Dragoon to consist of a Jacket and Shell under waistcoat and leather Breeches.

The Jacket and Shell to be of blue cloth, the Collars and Cuffs of the Royall Regiments to be Red;—and those of the other Regiments to be of the colour of the facing of the Regiment, looped upon the breast, and edged with white thread Cord, and to be lined with white, the 11th and 13th Regiments excepted, which are to be lined with Buff.

The under waistcoat to be of flannel with Sleeves, and made so as to be buttoned within the waistband of the Breeches.

The Breeches to be of Buckskin.

N.B.—The make of the Dress and method of placing the Cord upon the Breast of the Jacket, to be exactly conformable to the pattern approved of by His Majesty.

Officers and Quarter Masters.

The Dress Uniform of the Officers and Quarter Masters of the Light Dragoons to be made according to the King’s regulation of the 19th December 1768, excepting that the Coats are to be Blue and faced with the same colour as the private Men, and that the Royall Regiments are to be faced with scarlet.

Field Uniform of the Officers and Quarter Masters.

The Jacket and shell to be made up in the same manner as those of the Men, excepting that the Shell is to have Sleeves, and that the Looping is to be of Silver, the 13th Regiment excepted which is to be of gold.

Serjeants.

The Serjeants of the Light Dragoons to be distinguished by Gold or silver looping.

Corporals.

The Corporals of the Light Dragoons to be distinguished by a Gold or Silver Cord round the Collar and Cuff.

Trumpeters.

The Trumpeters to have a Jacket and Shell the Colour of the facing of the Regiment, with Lace instead of Looping in front and down the Seams.