UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

Pictorial Record

THE WAR AGAINST
GERMANY AND ITALY:
MEDITERRANEAN AND
ADJACENT AREAS

CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY
WASHINGTON, D.C., 1988

First Printed 1951—C M H Pub 12-2

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
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UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

Kent Roberts Greenfield, General Editor

Advisory Committee

James P. Baxter
President, Williams College

Henry S. Commager
Columbia University

Douglas S. Freeman
Richmond News Leader

Pendleton Herring
Social Science Research Council

John D. Hicks
University of California

William T. Hutchinson
University of Chicago

S. L. A. Marshall
Detroit News

E. Dwight Salmon
Amherst College

Col. Thomas D. Stamps
United States Military Academy

Charles S. Sydnor
Duke University

Charles H. Taylor
Harvard University

Office of the Chief of Military History

Maj. Gen. Orlando Ward, Chief

... to Those Who Served

Foreword

During World War II the photographers of the United States Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard created on film a pictorial record of immeasurable value. Thousands of their pictures are preserved in the photographic libraries of the armed services, little seen by the public.

In the volumes of UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II now being prepared by the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, it is possible to include only a limited number of pictures. A subseries of pictorial volumes, of which this is one, has been planned to supplement the other volumes of the series. The photographs have been selected to show important terrain features, types of equipment and weapons, living and weather conditions, military operations, and various matters of human interest. These volumes will preserve and make accessible for future reference some of the best pictures of World War II. An appreciation not only of the terrain on which actions were fought, but of its influence on the capabilities and limitations of weapons, in the hands of both our troops and the enemy’s, can be gained through a careful study of the pictures herein presented. Appreciation of these factors is essential to a clear understanding of military history.

This volume, compiled by Lt. Col. John C. Hatlem, USAF, and Capt. Kenneth E. Hunter, with the assistance of Miss Margaret E. Tackley, and edited by W. Brooks Phillips and Miss Mary Ann Bacon, deals with the Mediterranean Theater of Operations and the Middle East. It is divided into five sections: (1) North Africa and the Middle East; (2) Sicily, Corsica, and Sardinia; (3) Italy: 9 September 1943–4 June 1944; (4) Southern France; and (5) Italy: 5 June 1944-2 May 1945. Each section is arranged in chronological order. The written text has been kept to a minimum. Each section is preceded by a brief introduction recounting the major events set down in detail in the individual narrative volumes of UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. The appendices give information as to the abbreviations used and the sources of the photographs.

Contents

NORTH AFRICA
AND
THE MIDDLE EAST

TUNISIA

SECTION I
North Africa and the Middle East[1]

North Africa

The occupation of French North Africa by Allied troops was determined in July 1942 when the American and British Governments agreed to launch a Mediterranean operation in the fall of 1942. The invasion, designated as Torch, was to coincide with a British advance westward from Egypt. Before American soldiers did any actual fighting in North Africa, however, and before the United States was at war, civilian and military observers had been informally attached in May 1941 to the U. S. military attaché in Cairo. This group was the beginning of a force whose primary function was to service and maintain lend-lease equipment from the United States, instruct the British in its use, and report on how it stood up under battle conditions. The U. S. Air Force also was performing missions in Egypt several months before the Allied landings in North Africa. All these activities contributed to the British victory at El Alamein in October 1942.

Allied troops sailed for North Africa from ports in both the United States and the United Kingdom. The U. S. Navy and the Royal Navy shared in supplying transports and naval escort and were able to prevent any serious losses through enemy submarine action. Vital air support was at first provided from aircraft carriers of both Navies and later by land-based planes of the Allied air forces utilizing recently captured airfields.

The Allies hoped to avoid French resistance to the landings by arranging for the assistance of patriotic Frenchmen ashore and by the participation in the operation of Gen. Henri Giraud, a French military leader and former Army commander of great prestige who had escaped from France. These plans were only partly successful. The landings on the early morning of 8 November at beaches near Algiers, Oran, Casablanca, Port-Lyautey, Fedala, and Safi met resistance at all objectives. The opposition at Algiers and Safi collapsed quickly. Oran could be occupied only after considerable fighting. French forces, especially naval elements, in the neighborhood of Casablanca resisted strongly, but yielded on 11 November, a few minutes before the final assault on the city itself was to start. After a brief period of neutrality, most of the French forces in northwest Africa joined in the war against the Axis.

The Axis reacted to the Allied invasion by rushing troops to Tunisia by air and sea, and captured the local airfields and ports without opposition. British, American, and French troops drove eastward and at the end of November and in early December launched their attack against the Axis bridgehead. The Allied advance, however, was stopped short of Tunis. Air superiority for the moment lay with the Axis. Lack of means to overcome the increased resistance, in addition to weather conditions which interfered with transport and flying, forced the postponement until 1943 of a renewed advance over the difficult terrain of northern Tunisia.

Meanwhile, the British Eighth Army was pressing German and Italian forces back from Egypt through Libya and reached the southern border of Tunisia in January 1943. Plans could then be perfected for a co-ordinated attack against the remaining Axis forces in North Africa by the British Eighth Army in the south and the Allied troops in the north consisting of the British First Army, the American II Corps, the French XIX Corps, and Allied air forces. Attack by Axis forces at points of their own selection repeatedly interfered with Allied preparations. In February the enemy broke through Faïd Pass and in a series of attacks advanced beyond Kasserine almost to the Algerian border. These attacks were stopped on 21–22 February when the enemy started his withdrawal, destroying bridges and mining the passes behind him.

But the Allied forces were closing in. After attacking and turning the Mareth position, the British Eighth Army defeated the enemy there and pursued him along the coast as far as Enfidaville, less than fifty miles from Tunis. Accelerated Allied air and naval attacks choked off the enemy’s supply and weakened his resistance. At the same time the American II Corps was shifted northwest to a new sector on the left of the British First Army. Then after severe infantry fighting the American II Corps made an armored thrust to Mateur, and after a pause it pushed tank forces east to the sea, separating Bizerte from Tunis. Farther south the British First Army drove directly toward Tunis. On 7 May both Bizerte and Tunis were occupied and by 13 May Axis capitulation was complete. The Allies had achieved their initial objective of opening the Mediterranean route to the Middle East and seizing bases in North Africa. At the same time they had inflicted a major defeat on the Axis Powers.

Allied strength in French North Africa had been brought to a total of about a million men. Much of this strength was not intended for the Tunisia Campaign but for later operations against Sicily and southern Italy. Elaborate training establishments were developed by the American Fifth and Seventh Armies and vast supply depots established with a view to future operations from the African base.

Persian Gulf Command

In June 1942 an American theater of operations called U. S. Army Forces in the Middle East was established with headquarters at Cairo. Under this command were merged various groups and military missions that had been active in this area since the spring of 1941. American responsibilities for moving supplies to the Soviet Union led ultimately to a separation of the Persian Gulf activities of USAFIME and their establishment under an organization that was known from December 1943 to October 1945 as the Persian Gulf Command, with headquarters at Tehran, Iran.

From 1941 to 1945 the main business of the U. S. Army in the Middle East was to facilitate the supply of lend-lease goods to British and Soviet forces. This task involved the construction of docks, warehouses, shops, and highways as well as the operation of ports, a railroad, and a motor transport service in Iran. At the same time the Army constructed numerous airfields and bases, stretching across Egypt, the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Eritrea, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iraq, and Iran.

EGYPT

THE PYRAMIDS NEAR CAIRO, EGYPT. For more than six months before the attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States had recognized the military importance of the Middle East. Lend-lease equipment was poured into Egypt to aid the British in the western desert. The type of transport plane shown above performed constant service in the Middle East area. It was known familiarly as “the work horse of the war.” (C-47 transport, Dakota.)

EGYPT

BRITISH SOLDIERS receiving instructions on an American-made engine at the U. S. Ordnance Repair Depot at Heliopolis near Cairo.

EGYPT

TANKS AT THE HELIOPOLIS U. S. ORDNANCE REPAIR DEPOT. On Black Saturday, 13 June 1942, in a battle near Tobruk in Libya, British armor suffered severe tank losses inflicted by German 88-mm. antitank guns. This defeat caused a withdrawal to the El Alamein Line in Egypt. (General Grant M3.)

EGYPT

ITALIAN ANTIAIRCRAFT GUN captured by the British in the western desert of Egypt. Before the United States entered the war, American technicians worked closely with the British in the Middle East to obtain information on German and Italian weapons, equipment, and methods of warfare. (Italian Ansaldo antiaircraft gun, 75-mm.)

EGYPT

INOCULATING EGYPTIAN WORKER WITH TYPHUS VACCINE. In June of 1942 a separate command was formed in Cairo, called the U. S. Army Forces in the Middle East (USAFIME). Natives working with U. S. personnel were usually under Army medical supervision. Those handling food were subject to physical inspection and received medical treatment and whatever immunization inoculations were indicated for the locality. The use of preventive medicine stopped the outbreak of epidemics.

EGYPT

B-25’S OVER THE WESTERN DESERT IN EGYPT. The U. S. Air Forces was active in the Middle East several months before the Allied landings in North Africa. The first mission of these bombers was against the enemy-occupied port of Matruh on the coast of Egypt in July 1942. (Medium bombers, North American B-25 Mitchell.)

EGYPT

SELF-PROPELLED HOWITZER nicknamed the Priest. The crisis which developed when the British were forced to retreat to the El Alamein Line threatened the Suez Canal as well as the Allied air routes to Russia and India. Reinforcements and equipment were rushed to Egypt from the United Kingdom and the United States. The United States sent about 90 of the guns shown above, more than 300 General Sherman M4’s, and a large number of trucks. By October 1942, the situation had improved. The British Eighth Army attacked at El Alamein and drove the enemy out of Egypt, through Libya, and into Tunisia. (105-mm. howitzer, M7 howitzer motor carriage.)

ROMANIA

LIBERATORS BOMBING PLOESTI OIL FIELD installations in Romania. The first U. S. air mission flown against any strategic target in Europe was on the Ploesti oil fields, a twelve-bomber raid by B-24’s from Egypt on 12 June 1942. The next raid on this target, 1 August 1943, was a low-level attack by 177 Liberators from Bengasi in Libya with the loss of 54 bombers. Refinery production was interrupted by these raids from Africa, but was not stopped until the spring of 1944 when continuous large-scale attacks were carried out from bases in Italy. (Heavy bomber Consolidated B-24 Liberator.)

EN ROUTE TO NORTH AFRICA

CONVOY BOUND FOR NORTH AFRICA. Troops in the first landings approached their destinations in several large convoys, escorted by aircraft carriers and other warships. The convoy to Morocco originated in several ports of the United States on 23 October 1942, and when near the African coast separated into three major parts. The convoy steaming to the vicinity of Oran and Algiers left the United Kingdom on 26 October. Before passing through the Straits of Gibraltar it separated into two parts. Inside the Mediterranean the two sections overtook slower cargo convoys and continued on a course toward Malta until sundown of 7 November. That night each section wheeled southward and separated further to reach several landing points near Oran and Algiers. Other convoys had already left both the United States and the United Kingdom before the attacks began.

EN ROUTE TO NORTH AFRICA

NAVY FIGHTER AIRCRAFT on flight deck of a carrier approaching the coast of North Africa. In the background is a destroyer escort. Two to four destroyers operated with each carrier, providing antisubmarine protection, picking up personnel from wrecked aircraft, and augmenting the antiaircraft screen around their charge. (Grumman F4F Wildcat, single seater, carrier fighters.)

EN ROUTE TO NORTH AFRICA

OIL TANKER refueling aircraft carrier en route to North Africa.

EN ROUTE TO NORTH AFRICA

GUNNERY PRACTICE ABOARD A TRANSPORT. Submarines were a danger and gun crews were constantly on the alert. (Left, U. S. Navy 3-inch gun; right .50-caliber water-cooled Browning machine gun.)

EN ROUTE TO NORTH AFRICA

TROOPS ON TRANSPORT HEADED FOR FRENCH MOROCCO. Note rubber life belts on most of the men. These could be inflated instantly by means of gas cartridges in belts. In practice it was found that a fully inflated belt was not capable of supporting a soldier loaded down with his equipment. Men who found themselves in the water could not readily get rid of their packs and ammunition belts and several drownings occurred during the landings.

FRENCH MOROCCO

CASABLANCA, THE MAIN OBJECTIVE on the Atlantic coast of Morocco. The landings were made at Fedala, farther north, in order to attack Casablanca overland partly because of its very strong defenses and partly because of the necessity of capturing the port in usable condition. Casablanca was a naval base. The U. S. Navy had the mission of preventing French warships from interfering with the landings. American ships came under the fire of large coastal guns on El Hank Point (in the foreground, top picture) and engaged in running battles off Casablanca. Moored in the harbor was the battleship Jean Bart which also fired heavy shells to drive the American ships from their protective stations. After three days, when Casablanca was about to be attacked by ground, air, and sea bombardment and occupied by tanks and infantry, the city surrendered. The harbor was put to almost immediate use.

FRENCH MOROCCO

PORT-LYAUTEY AIRPORT on the Oued Sebou north of Casablanca. The Kasba, an old walled fort, is on high ground between the lagoon at upper left and the mouth of the river. Early on 8 November 1942, one landing was made on the north and two south of the river mouth. Those between the lagoon and the river were opposed by coastal defense guns and artillery from the Kasba. Hostile aircraft strafed all beaches and fighting lasted more than two days. Early on the 10th a naval party cut the cable across the river mouth and a U. S. destroyer steamed up the river under fire from the Kasba. Raiders and infantry occupied the airport at 0800 and Army fighter planes from a carrier landed by noon shortly after the Kasba surrendered.

FRENCH MOROCCO

TWO OF THE ATLANTIC PORTS SELECTED FOR INVASION. The main landings on the Atlantic coast took place in the vicinity of Fedala (top). In the early afternoon on the day of invasion, Fedala surrendered and the port was put to immediate use. Two destroyer-transports entered the port of Safi (bottom), 130 miles south of Casablanca, at 0435 on 8 November. Their troops secured the harbor and key points inland while the first landings at the beaches were in progress. Shore batteries firing on the destroyers were silenced within a few minutes. By late afternoon the opposition in and around Safi came to an end. The reason for invading Safi was to obtain port facilities for unloading medium tanks.

FRENCH MOROCCO

CURTISS SEAGULL SCOUT PLANE returning from observing and directing naval gunfire on Casablanca. Soon after the action started the radar on the large naval units was put out of commission by the concussion of the high-caliber guns. Spotting planes took over the task of directing fire and did an excellent job in spite of the difficulties caused by smoke over the port area. Battleships and cruisers had their own observation planes, launched by catapults and picked up by cranes. These planes assisted the infantry during the heavy fighting around Port-Lyautey by dropping antisubmarine depth charges on tanks and columns of vehicles. (Scout Observation-Curtiss SOC.)

FRENCH MOROCCO

NAVY DIVE BOMBER ON DECK OF A CARRIER. In the distance are two Army cubs, artillery observation planes. Three of these were brought across on a carrier for Army use and launched from the carrier to land on the race track at Fedala. Army-Navy teamwork was excellent during the invasion. Navy planes, on Army request, broke up enemy formations, bombed and strafed road blocks and strong points, often within an hour after the call had gone out from the forces ashore. Also on Army call, naval guns shelled points along the coast and some distance inland. (Grumman F4F Wildcat.)

FRENCH MOROCCO

THE JEAN BART, THE LATEST BATTLESHIP OF THE FRENCH NAVY. Although it was not finished at the time of the invasion and only one turret of four 15-inch guns had been installed, it opened fire on U. S. naval units at 0703 on D Day. The fire was returned and her battery was silenced within 15 minutes; five hits were made with 16-inch guns and the turret mechanism of the Jean Bart was jammed. Her guns were again operative at the end of D Day but did not fire until the 10th after which a 10-plane formation of dive bombers scored three hits, with 1,000-pounders. Her guns were still able to fire. Plans to bomb and shell the ship on the 11th were abandoned because of the armistice.

FRENCH MOROCCO

AERIAL VIEW OF INFANTRY LANDING FROM ASSAULT BOATS north of Casablanca. Note heavy surf. Many of the landing craft were damaged on the beaches for lack of facilities to remove craft from the surf line and to repair or salvage them when stranded. At Fedala, for instance, more than half of the boats were unusable after the first landings. This slowed the follow-up unloading and was a contributory cause of the torpedoing of the transports waiting offshore to be discharged.

FRENCH MOROCCO

INFANTRY LANDING ON THE BEACH NEAR FEDALA. The landing itself was unopposed, but fighting developed just off the beach. (Left, landing craft, vehicle, LCV.)

FRENCH MOROCCO

DIRECTING LANDING-CRAFT TRAFFIC OFF FEDALA by means of semaphore flags. The port was captured and put into operation on D Day, but because of its limited capacity, freighters had to stand offshore awaiting their turns to discharge cargo. In the meantime unloading of ships went on with remaining assault craft. On the evening of 11 November a transport was torpedoed and sunk by submarine; a destroyer and tanker were damaged. The next day three additional transports were torpedoed and sunk. (Landing craft in picture: top center, LCV; middle left, landing craft, mechanized, LCM(3); middle right and bottom, landing craft, personnel (Ramp), LCP(R).)

FRENCH MOROCCO

UNLOADING EQUIPMENT IN FEDALA HARBOR. Waterproofed jeep coming off LCV. Note LCM in upper left. (Craft, upper left: LCM (3); upper right: LCV.)

FRENCH MOROCCO

LIGHT TANK IN CASABLANCA shortly after the surrender on 11 November. Only light tanks were brought ashore in assault craft; the medium tanks were unloaded in the port of Safi until D plus 2 and headed north toward Casablanca.

FRENCH MOROCCO

RADAR SETS NEAR CASABLANCA. This type of set was part of the equipment of the invading forces. By the end of December 1942, fifteen of these units were in operation as part of the air warning system of Casablanca. The searchlight automatically followed planes tracked by the radar. The city was almost at the maximum range of enemy bombers and was the target for few raids. (Radar set SCR 268.)

GIBRALTAR

WARSHIP PASSING THE ROCK OF GIBRALTAR. This fortress was temporarily the Allied command post for Torch. It was the only area on the European mainland under Allied control. Land-based aircraft did not take part in the beach assault phase, but aircraft were staged at the Gibraltar airport for take-off for Africa as soon as airfields there were captured. A U. S. fighter group equipped with British Spitfires landed near Oran about noon on D Day and aided in the fighting there; other planes flew to Algiers.

ALGERIA

THE BEACH OF LES ANDALOUSES, west of Oran (top). The landings here were unopposed. Eastern part of Oran harbor (bottom). Early on 8 November two British ships (ex-U. S. Coast Guard cutters), carrying about 400 U. S. soldiers, entered the port between the moles shown in the distance. The ships came under point-blank fire from French naval vessels in the harbor and from shore batteries. They returned the fire but were sunk with great loss of life. When resistance in Oran ceased at noon on 10 November the port was cluttered with ships either sunk by British naval gunfire or sabotaged. Port installations had received only minor damage and were quickly put to use.

ALGERIA

SUPPLIES ON THE BEACH OF LES ANDALOUSES ON D DAY. Most of the Allied supply problems, both on the Atlantic side and in the Mediterranean, were caused by destruction of landing craft. About 95 percent were used during initial landings leaving few reserves for the build-up. The large seaworthy LST’s (landing ship, tank), which were to play a decisive role in all subsequent landings, were introduced by the British in the Oran area to carry light American tanks for beach landings.

ALGERIA

UNLOADING SUPPLIES and laying prefabricated track on the beach in the Golfe d’Arzeu east of Oran (top). Guarding French and French colonial prisoners captured in the same vicinity (bottom). The plan for the capture of Oran and near-by airfields consisted of the frontal attack on the port itself and landings on both sides of the city at Mersatbou Zedjar and Les Andalouses west of Oran, and in the Golfe d’Arzeu east of Oran. Of the beach landings, those at Arzeu were much the largest and were made with little resistance. By afternoon of D Day all opposition in the neighborhood had ceased. (Top picture: 3 LCM (3)’s on beach; at center, offshore, is an LCM (1).)

ALGERIA

CAPTURED TRAIN AT SAINT-LEU ON THE GOLFE D’ARZEU. The railroad from Casablanca to Tunis figured prominently in the planning of the African invasion. If the forces on the Mediterranean coast were to be cut off by sea, supplies could be carried by railroad from Casablanca. During the fighting in Tunisia and the build-up in Africa for the invasion of Europe, this railroad played an important part. After its capture it was repaired and improved. Locomotives and rolling stock were obtained from the United States to speed delivery of supplies.

ALGERIA

TROOPS LOADING INTO ASSAULT CRAFT from transport prior to landing near Algiers. With minor exceptions, the landing craft were manned by Royal Navy personnel. Landings took place on beaches on both sides of the city as well as in the port itself. Although beach landings were not heavily opposed, one of the two British destroyer-transports making a frontal attack on the port had three boilers damaged by fire from shore but discharged her load of U. S. troops on a dock at 0520, D Day. Some troops were surrounded and taken to a French military prison, others regained the ship before she was eventually driven off. The hostilities here ceased the same day and the soldiers were set free by the French. (On davits, center of photograph: LCP(R).)

ALGERIA

ALGIERS, THE MOST IMPORTANT OBJECT of the North African invasion. The ultimate goals for the operation were Bizerte and Tunis, but because of the land-based enemy aircraft in Sardinia, Sicily, and southern Italy, it was decided to land no troops farther east than Algiers until airports had been captured. British-American elements at Algiers re-embarked for a movement eastward to Bougie where they landed on 11 November. Bône was captured the following day by British paratroopers dropped from C-47’s and by seaborn forces from Bougie. From there the advance toward Tunis started. Allied columns reached Djedeida, twelve miles from Tunis, on 29 November 1942, but rapid enemy build-up forced the Allies to abandon it on 13 December.

ALGERIA

ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENSE OVER ALGIERS AT NIGHT. The city suffered practically no damage during the invasion. On the first evening of its surrender it was bombed by enemy planes. This attack was followed by many others, mostly aimed at the concentration of shipping in the harbor. Damage was surprisingly small. Algiers became Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ).

ALGERIA

FRENCH PRISONERS OF WAR CAPTURED DURING THE INVASION. The prisoners were released shortly after the end of hostilities, 11 November, and from then on fought on the side of the Allies. On 15 November orders were issued for the movement of French troops, then at Algiers and Constantine, to protect the southern flank of the American and British units advancing into Tunisia along the northern coast. The French were reinforced by U. S. troops, including tank destroyer units, and one of their assigned missions was the protection of advanced airfields in the Tébessa-Gafsa area.

ALGERIA

AVIATION ENGINEERS AT YOUKS-LES-BAINS lining up for mess. This Algerian airfield near Tébessa and the Tunisian border was occupied by U. S. paratroopers on 15 November 1942. It became operational for P-38 fighter planes (Lockheed Lightnings) shortly afterward. During the first few weeks there were no provisions for landing after dark and on 21 November six P-38’s crashed while trying to land in the evening. It was not an improved field and there was no effective air-raid system. The first warning of enemy aircraft was frequently the strafing or bombing itself. When the rains started, operations were drastically reduced by mud.

TUNISIA

U. S. TANKERS HEATING THEIR C RATIONS, Spam and beans, over an improvised stove at Souk el Arba, Tunisia. The Souk el Arba area was taken by British paratroopers on 16 November. When the attempt to advance to Tunis was officially abandoned on 24 December, both sides started a race to build up strength for the battle to come. The U. S. troops were at first committed piecemeal in different sectors of the line as they arrived from Algeria. Much of the Allied armor was obsolete and none of it was on a par with the best German equipment. (General Grant tank M3.)

TUNISIA

GERMAN TIGER TANK. This heavy tank was encountered early in the campaign. The German High Command was particularly concerned with the performance of the Tiger in the defense of Tunis. Its high-velocity 88-mm. gun, equipped with a muzzle-brake, could knock out Allied tanks before the latter could get within effective range; and within range, Allied tank guns could not penetrate its frontal armor. The Tiger sacrificed mobility for armor and fire power. To avoid weak bridges, it was equipped with telescopic air intake, exhaust extensions, and over-all sealing that enabled it to cross rivers fifteen feet deep, completely submerged on the bottom. The gun has a traverse of 360 degrees. Top picture is rear view of tank; bottom is front view. (Tiger, Pz., Kpfw., gun 8.8-cm., Kw. K. 36.)

TUNISIA

GERMAN STUKA DIVE BOMBERS. These aircraft co-operated closely with ground forces, bombing and strafing ahead of their own advancing columns in addition to roaming behind the lines disrupting traffic and creating confusion. The bombers could operate successfully only where they had air superiority. In the later stages of the Tunisia Campaign, as the Allies gained air superiority, their effectiveness dwindled. The Germans turned a number of these planes over to the Italians. Note Italian and British markings in lower photograph. This Stuka was captured by the British. (Dive bomber, German Stuka JU-87.)

TUNISIA

GERMAN FIGHTER PLANES. The primary mission of these planes was to intercept and destroy bombers but they were also used for strafing and fighter-bombing. The enemy used these types until the end of the war. (Top, German Focke-Wulf 190; bottom, German Messerschmitt 109.)

ALGERIA

CAMOUFLAGING MEDIUM BOMBER at Youks-les-Bains airfield. Camouflaging for hiding purposes in olive groves or on rough terrain was relatively successful; however, camouflaging an aircraft on a flat, featureless landing field for hiding purposes was not practical. Camouflaging was often practiced to the extent of deceiving the enemy about the type or serviceability of planes. Note that the bomber above is minus both of its engines. (Martin B-26 Marauder.)

ALGERIA

REMOVING FILM FROM FIGHTER PLANE after a reconnaissance flight. This long-range plane was adapted for photographic work by removing the armament and installing camera equipment instead. (P-38.)

ALGERIA

LIGHT BOMBER, DOUGLAS A-20. This was a fast, versatile, and heavily armed plane used for both bombing and strafing in Tunisia, The American version was usually called the Havoc and the British version, the Boston.

ALGERIA

HEAVY BOMBER, FLYING FORTRESS. This and the B-24 were the two heavy U. S. four-engined bombers used in the Mediterranean area. (Boeing B-17.)

TUNISIA

FAÏD PASS. This opening in the eastern mountain chain was taken from a weak French garrison and held against U. S. and French counterattacks, 30 January-2 February 1943. Just before daylight, 14 February, very strong German forces came through Faïd Pass and others came from south of the pass to drive the Americans from positions to the west. The enemy cut off and isolated three groups, on Djebel Ksaira and Garet Hadid southwest of the pass, and Djebel Lessouda northwest of it. On 15 February, an American armored counterattack to relieve the troops was made in strength far inferior to that required. Most of the troops were captured trying to escape. On 17 February, the American base at Sbeitla and the airfields at Thelepte were evacuated, as all troops were pulled back into the western mountain chain. The enemy then decided to continue his attack toward the northwest.

TUNISIA

THE GENERAL GRANT TANK. These medium tanks were of the riveted hull type, later models having cast or welded armor, and were equipped with either a short-barreled (top) or long-barreled (bottom) 75-mm. gun. Principal armament was the 75-mm. cannon, in a right-hand sponson, capable of being swung in an arc of about 30 degrees. The entire tank would often have to be turned to bring the gun to bear. In a hull-down position only the secondary gun, the 37-mm. cannon in the turret, could be fired. The silhouette of the M3 was much higher than that of corresponding German tanks.

TUNISIA

CAPTURED GERMAN ARMOR. The Mark IV medium tank (top) was equipped with a 75-mm. cannon of higher velocity and range than any of the Allied tank guns then in use. It was generally superior to Allied tanks and was probably the best tank the enemy had until the Panther made its appearance in Italy, 1944. The Mark IV was used until the end of the war. The eight-wheeled armored car with a 75-mm. howitzer (bottom) was equipped with quite thin armor which was so well angled that machine gun bullets and small fragments were not effective against it. It could be steered from both ends and had a speed of slightly more than thirty miles an hour. (German medium tank Mark IV (Pz. Kpfw. IV); German armored vehicle, 7.5-cm. howitzer.)

TUNISIA

KASSERINE PASS AREA. The enemy broke out of the pass on 20 February 1943. On the 21st he headed toward Tébessa and Thala. The attack on Tébessa was halted; the main attack toward Thala made some progress. A British armored force, with heavy losses in tanks and men, delayed the enemy until U. S. artillery got into position. On the 22d the enemy pounded the defenses of Tébessa and Thala unsuccessfully. Allied planes attacked the enemy near Thala, and in the evening the Germans started to withdraw. The Kasserine push was the high point of enemy fortunes in Tunisia.

TUNISIA

LOADING A TOWED HOWITZER. This gun was designed to give close support to the infantry. The picture was made during the February fight in Kasserine Pass (105-mm. howitzer M2.)

TUNISIA

GENERAL SHERMAN TANK TOWING DISABLED HALF-TRACK at Sidi bou Zid (top). This tank gradually replaced the M3 (General Grant) in Tunisia. Its principal weapon was the 75-mm. cannon. Its turret could traverse an arc of 360 degrees in contrast to the sponson-mounted gun on the General Grant with a traverse of about 30 degrees. Reconnaissance party at Kasserine Pass on the Kasserine-Thala road (bottom). The enemy came up this road on his attack through the pass and stopped just before reaching Thala after indications of increasing Allied strength. (Medium tank M4.)

TUNISIA

GERMAN ARMOR. The Mark III medium tank (top), the standard German tank in Tunisia, had a high-velocity 50-mm. cannon which could penetrate the frontal armor of U. S. light tanks at a thousand yards and the frontal and side armor of the General Grant at five hundred and one thousand yards respectively. The 75-mm. antitank and assault gun (bottom), mounted on the same chassis as the Mark III tank, was encountered early in the Tunisian campaign. Its high-velocity gun was more than a match for any of the Allied tanks. Its low silhouette, characteristic of most German armor, made it difficult to detect and hard to hit. The prototypes of both these vehicles existed in Germany in 1936 and were used until the end of the war.

TUNISIA

ITALIAN MEDIUM TANKS LEFT BEHIND AT KASSERINE PASS. This model was the backbone of the Italian armor in Tunisia. By Allied standards it was inferior in practically every respect, but it was the best the Italians had. (Italian medium tank M13/40 with 47-mm. cannon.)

TUNISIA

U. S. LIGHT TANK, captured by the Germans. The main weapon of this tank was the 37-mm. gun. Its armor was light and riveted together as was the armor on the first models of the medium tanks. A glancing shell could rip off the outside heads of the rivets and send the rivets ricocheting through the interior of the tank with the velocity of bullets. Note German markings on this vehicle. (U. S. light tank M3.)

TUNISIA

U. S. TANK DESTROYERS. The combination truck and 37-mm. antitank gun (top) could not stand up against any type of armor the enemy had. The tank destroyer (bottom) was introduced in Tunisia after the Kasserine fight. The chassis was that of the General Sherman tank, the gun having a higher velocity than that of comparable Allied tank guns. The first time it saw action was in the vicinity of Maknassy during the middle of March 1943. The village of Maknassy was occupied by U. S. forces on 22 March 1943.

TUNISIA

U. S. HALF-TRACK USED AS A MOBILE ANTIAIRCRAFT UNIT (top). AA units like this cut down the effectiveness of the Stuka dive bombers. Half-tracks proved practical for many purposes not originally intended. First designed as a cavalry scout car, it became, with modifications, a gun carriage mounting anything from a 37-mm. cannon to a 105-mm. howitzer, a personnel carrier, an ambulance, or just a truck. The standard half-track had armor protecting the crew. Long Tom or 155-mm. rifle towed by standard caterpillar (bottom). This was the heaviest piece of Allied artillery used during the Tunisia Campaign. (Top: multiple-gun motor carriage with 37-mm. cannon and .50-caliber water-cooled Browning machine gun.)

TUNISIA

U. S. ARMOR NEAR EL GUETTAR IN CENTRAL TUNISIA. In foreground is a radio-equipped half-track personnel carrier, in background a 75-mm. gun motor carriage M3. The latter, lightly armored, was an antitank vehicle with great mobility. The enemy developed a healthy respect for the hit-and-run tactics of U. S. forces using this weapon. The vehicle would wait until enemy armor came within range, get off as many shells as possible, and withdraw. U. S. forces pushed eastward from the Gafsa area to draw enemy units from the Mareth Line then under attack by the British. On 23 March 1943 severe fighting broke out southeast of El Guettar and a German armored division was repulsed by U. S. forces with heavy tank losses to the enemy.

TUNISIA

LOADING A HOWITZER. This was the 1918 Schneider model equipped with highspeed carriage. The action shown above took place during the enemy counterattack starting on 23 March 1943 east of El Guettar. Although the enemy attack was stopped, U. S. advance toward the coast halted for several days. During this action Allied fighters and light bombers accounted for much damage done to enemy armor and other vehicles along the Gafsa-Gabès road east of El Guettar. (155-mm. howitzer.)

TUNISIA

INFANTRY NEAR EL GUETTAR. After the enemy attack in this area on 23 March, the front became almost stabilized until the British Eighth Army broke through Oued el Akarit defenses along the coast north of Gabès on the night of 6–7 April. The junction between the forces fighting in Tunisia and the British Eighth Army from the Middle East took place on the Gafsa-Gabès road on 7 April when a U. S. armored reconnaissance unit made contact with elements of the British army. The British Eighth Army had started its drive westward from El Alamein in Egypt on the night of 23–24 October 1942 and when the junction was made had traveled about 1,500 miles.

TUNISIA

THE FAMOUS GERMAN EIGHTY-EIGHT. The original weapon, an Austrian 88-mm. cannon, was used in World War I. Restrictions imposed by the Allies after that war limited German experimentation on conventional offensive artillery but not on defensive artillery such as antiaircraft types (in photograph). With different sets of aiming fire instruments this antiaircraft gun could be used as an antitank gun or a conventional piece of artillery. It was tested as an antiaircraft gun under battle conditions during the Spanish Civil War in 1936. Encountered throughout the war in increasing numbers, it was probably the most effective all-around piece of artillery the Germans had. (Left: 8.8-cm. Flak 36; right: 8.8-cm. Flak 18.)

TUNISIA

GERMAN ANTITANK GUNS. These guns, effective against Allied armor, fired armor-piercing shells loaded with high-explosive fillers designed to burst inside the armor and to set the tank on fire. Antitank gun (top) could penetrate the armor of any Allied tank, front, side, or rear. Both U. S. and British armor-piercing shells were solid and did not fire the tanks; thus the Germans were able to salvage damaged armored equipment to a greater extent than were the Allies. It was not until well into the Italian campaign that armor-piercing shells equipped with fuzes and high-explosive fillers became available to Allied forces. (Top: German antitank gun, 7.5-cm. Pak. 40; bottom: German antitank gun, 5-cm. Pak. 38.)

TUNISIA

GERMAN SIX-BARRELED ROCKET LAUNCHER. This weapon fired high-explosive, incendiary or smoke rockets and was light enough to be moved with ease. The screaming sound of the rockets had an adverse psychological effect on troops at the receiving end and the rockets were nicknamed “screaming meemies.” Artillery sound-ranging equipment could not locate the rocket launchers because firing did not cause a report. The enemy used this type of weapon until the end of the war. (15-cm. Nebelwerfer, 41.)

TUNISIA

SHERMAN TANK WITH “SCORPION” ATTACHMENT, detonating mines during a test. The Scorpion was a revolving drum with chains attached (insert); when in motion it acted as a flail and could clear a path through a mine field for infantry and other tanks to follow. It was developed by the British and used extensively by them in desert warfare.

TUNISIA

THE S-MINE. This German antipersonnel mine was used profusely and very effectively in Tunisia. It was nicknamed the Bouncing Betty because when stepped on it would bounce a few feet in the air before a secondary fuze set off the main explosive charge scattering some three hundred steel balls in all directions. The suspected presence of these mines naturally retarded troop movements during an advance. When retreating, the enemy would frequently use this mine to booby-trap buildings, dugouts or equipment left behind.

TUNISIA

DJEBEL TAHENT IN NORTHERN TUNISIA, known as Hill 609. The British Eighth Army advancing northward along the coast replaced the U. S. II Corps in the Gafsa-Gabès area in April 1943. The corps then moved northward about 150 miles and went into position from Béja to Cap Serrat. French forces along this coast came under U. S. II Corps, which advanced in two groups, a northern wing astride the Sedjenane road and a southern wing along the Béja road, both converging on Mateur. The hill shown above was a natural fortress blocking the approach to the plains of Mateur. On 28 April 1943 artillery pounded enemy positions and on the next day the infantry attack started. After a three-day infantry fight, supported by tanks, the hill fell on 1 May.

TUNISIA

JEFNA AREA, LOOKING EAST TO THE PLAINS OF MATEUR. The Jefna position, on the Sedjenane-Mateur road, was one of the strongest German defenses in northern Tunisia and included two heavily fortified hills commanding the road to Mateur: Djebel Azag (Green Hill) on the north and Djebel el Ajred (Bald Hill) on the south. On 13 April 1943, U. S. forces relieved the British and took positions on both sides of the road and the mountains along the valley. The fight for the two hills lasted until 3 May when the Jefna positions were outflanked by U. S. and French forces advancing toward Bizerte and the Mateur plain north of Jefna.

TUNISIA

INFANTRY AND ARMOR ADVANCING ON MATEUR. After the fall of Hill 609 the enemy pulled back leaving the road to Mateur open. This small village in the middle of a plain was the center of enemy road communications in the U. S. zone of attack. Its occupation on 3 May opened the way for the advance on Bizerte, the main objective of the U. S.-French drive. (Bottom: General Sherman M4A1.)

TUNISIA

GERMAN SIEBEL FERRIES. These diesel-powered, ponton-raft ferries were used to transport supplies from Italy and Sicily. They usually traveled in convoys and were often heavily armed with 88-mm. antiaircraft guns when moving toward Tunisia as well as with the lighter protection which they retained for the return trip. Of shallow draft, they could unload directly onto the beach, a factor which became especially important after the Allies had gained control of the air and subjected the Tunisian ports to severe bombing.

TUNISIA

GERMAN TRANSPORT PLANES, JU-52, under fire from Allied aircraft. Toward the end of the Tunisia Campaign, the Germans received reinforcements by air from southern Italy and Sicily, using several hundred transports in daylight flights. The Allies gradually built up a force of planes within striking distance of the Sicilian straits and on 5 April the planned attack on the aerial ferry service started. By the 22d the enemy had lost so many planes that daylight operations were discontinued; however, some key personnel and a limited amount of emergency supplies were flown in by night. (Upper left: medium bomber B-25.)

TUNISIA

LA GOULETTE WITH TUNIS IN DISTANCE. These two cities fell to the British on 7 May. The port of Tunis had been heavily damaged by Allied bombers, but damage in the city itself was small. La Goulette, at the entrance to the channel leading to Tunis, housed oil storage and general ship repair facilities which were put to immediate use by the Allies.

FRENCH MOROCCO

TRANSPORT TAKING OFF from a field in French Morocco for the Middle East. After the conquest of most of North Africa a string of airports became available. While the fighting in Tunisia was still going on, regular flights between the west coast of Africa, the Middle East, and India were being established. (Douglas C-54.)

TUNISIA

BIZERTE, THE MAIN OBJECTIVE of the French and U. S. forces of II Corps, fell on 7 May. Bizerte’s harbor and the important naval repair facilities at near-by Ferryville were to play important parts in future operations in the Mediterranean. The enemy had blocked the channel to the inner harbor by sinking ships at the entrance and had destroyed most of the port facilities not already wrecked by Allied bombings. The port, however, became operational a few days after capture; ships and supplies were assembled here for the invasion of Sicily. Insert shows some of the ships a few days before that invasion.

TUNISIA

ENEMY PRISONERS NEAR MATEUR. Allied troops took 252,415 prisoners, together with large quantities of equipment and supplies, when the enemy surrendered in Tunisia on 13 May 1943. Because of Allied air and naval superiority the enemy was unable to evacuate his troops. Of those captured, the Germans were among the finest and best trained troops the enemy had and he could ill afford to lose them.

EN ROUTE TO NORTH AFRICA

TROOP QUARTERS IN THE HOLD OF A TRANSPORT. After the fall of French Morocco and Algeria and while the fighting in Tunisia continued, men and supplies poured into the Mediterranean for use in Tunisia and in the assaults on Sicily and Italy. Bunks were placed in tiers everywhere possible in the transports. The convoy traveled blacked out, with port holes closed. Because of the overcrowded conditions, seasickness was practically universal during the first few days out of port. The men spent as much time as possible on deck.

ALGERIA

ARMY POST OFFICE AT ORAN. Mail from home was probably the most important of all morale factors and usually had first priority in spite of the fact that it occupied valuable shipping space needed for materials of war. Cargo space was saved with the V-Mail system by which letters were written on a special form, photographed on 16-mm. film at certain centers in the country of origin, then printed overseas. To encourage its use, V-Mail was sent by the fastest means available. Letters from men in the services, other than those by regular air mail, were sent free of charge.

ALGERIA

INFANTRY MEN IN TRAINING NEAR ORAN. Training centers for all arms were opened in French Morocco and Algeria soon after the end of hostilities there in November 1942.

ALGERIA

PARACHUTE TROOPS CHECKING EQUIPMENT before boarding planes for practice jump. These troops were essentially infantrymen and were armed with infantry weapons. Their boots, higher than the infantry shoes, were constructed to give ankles a maximum amount of protection when landing.

ALGERIA

PARATROOPERS DURING TRAINING JUMP. Light artillery, food, and light vehicles were dropped separately with different colored parachutes, or came in by glider.

ALGERIA

DOUGLAS C-47 TRANSPORT TOWING GLIDER. The gliders carried both men and equipment and could be landed in almost any flat pasture. The C-47 aircraft—the work horse of the war—was similar to the commercial DC-3, a standard type passenger carrier in the United States for some years prior to the war. The C-47, unarmed, was used during the war for carrying personnel and cargo of all sorts, towing gliders, dropping parachute troops, and parachuting supplies to isolated units and equipment to partisans behind enemy lines. The British called it the Dakota.