TRAINING
INFANTRY

BY

JOHN F. MORRISON

Colonel of Infantry

U. S. CAVALRY ASSOCIATION
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1914

COPYRIGHT. 1914. BY JOHN F. MORRISON
Ketcheson Printing Company
Leavenworth

PREFACE

In my commissioned service of over thirty-three years I have spent over twenty-two years with my regiment and three years in training a battalion of college cadets. I have been intimately associated with the national guard of one state and have had experience with the guard of four other states. I have seen something of foreign troops in both peace and war. In these many years I have observed the methods of training employed by a number of officers.

Our infantry training has improved over what I first knew but there still exists in places a lack of completeness and system. Of late years a much greater interest than formerly has been taken in the tactical instruction and training of our officers and the progress has been marked. The tactician is, however, but the skilled mechanic; the tools with which he works are his troops. New recruits are like the lump of ore, of no use until converted into steel and then forged into shape. The making of this tool from the raw material is our principal business during peace.

At the request of officers with whom I have often talked and corresponded on the subject of training infantry, this little book of suggestions has been prepared. It is based on my own experience and observation and what others have told me of their work. It is offered by an older officer to his younger brothers in the infantry in the hope that it may be of some service to them.

J. F. M.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

Importance of training infantry

There is nothing more important to an army than the correct training of its infantry. The training of all the arms has much in common, but training infantry, owing to the manner of its use in battle, calls for much that is not required in the other arms.

The infantry soldier must work more independently than men in the other branches. He cannot be led or controlled as can men in groups or close formations; hence he needs to be more thoroughly instructed in the part he is to play. This instruction cannot be given him on the field of battle. The man who must steadily advance on an enemy in position requires not only higher training but higher discipline than one who does his fighting in close formation, or at long range and out of sight of the enemy and protected from hostile fire by steel shields.

The mere mechanical part of the drill of all the arms is not difficult as regards its execution on the peaceful drillground but it requires much training to carry out these same things on the battlefield.

Importance of infantry training

It is reported as an incident in the recent Balkan War that a general of division, whose infantry had been reinforced by the addition of fifty per cent of recruits who had only received about a month’s training, prepared for battle by sending all his new men to the rear, preferring to fight without them. His division was successful but the other divisions, which retained their new men in ranks during combat, broke and were routed.

War of today is not a game for amateurs. Infantry to be of any value has not only to be trained but to be properly and thoroughly trained. On the part of those in charge of this training there is necessary an appreciative understanding of the objects sought, earnest effort, tact, enthusiasm, and a real knowledge of men.

I
THE ESSENTIAL AND THE DESIRABLE
KNOWLEDGE AND HABIT

Practise and theory

To ensure the proper training of our infantry there are needed competent officers—officers who know what should be taught and how to teach it. One sometimes hears: “He is a good practical soldier but he knows nothing of the theory.” Such an expression is an absurdity. A man may know the theory yet be unable to apply it or make practical use of it; we have all seen such men. But a man cannot practice what he does not know. The knowledge of theory required by the junior commander is not great and the time it takes to learn it is short compared with the time required to master its practical application and to instruct properly a command.

Needs of the unit commander

The first requisite for a unit commander is a knowledge of the fundamental principles of the tactics of his arm and its employment in combination with the other arms, especially with the artillery. He must have a clear conception of the modern battlefield in order to understand for what he must train his unit. He must train it for battle conditions, not peace conditions. A company trained to be handled exclusively by word of command, as in a close order drill on the parade ground, lacks the training that fits for battle.

Needs of the unit commander

Essential and desirable instruction

The more the enlisted men know of the art of war the better. Time is not available however, to teach them the whole art of war even if the men in ranks were capable of mastering it. The instructor must therefore clearly understand what are the things the men must know and what are merely desirable as additions to their training. Every effort should be spent and all available time devoted to first perfecting the men in the things they must know; afterwards, if more time is available, it is well to extend in other directions their education and training.

Close order drill

Under the first heading, essentials, the men must be taught their close order drill. This is necessary for two reasons: it renders possible the orderly movement of troops and it makes for discipline. So far as the orderly movement of troops is concerned very little is necessary but without precision close order drill is of no value towards discipline. To have a disciplinary value, drill movements must be carried out with exactitude. Discipline is injured if, when an officer gives a command at drill, it is only carried out approximately; the soldier is acquiring the habit of slighting his work and of doing an approximation, not the precise duty demanded of him.

It takes but little longer to learn to execute correctly the few movements prescribed than to learn them incorrectly, but it requires constant attention on the part of the instructor to maintain exactness. The attention and effort required on the part of the instructor are, however, amply compensated by the results.

Extended order drill

The men must know perfectly the mechanism of the extended order drill. A company must be able without confusion or mix-up to form line of skirmishers in the least possible time from any formation and facing in any direction. This will necessitate much practice. It does not take long to learn to form line of skirmishers quietly, from line or column of squads, facing to the front; but that is not sufficient.

Other essentials

The men must know how to estimate distances, how to shoot, how to use the bayonet; they must understand patrolling and outpost duty, the construction of hasty intrenchments, the application of first aid, how to cook the ration and how to care for their arms and equipment.

Especially important is it that the men know how to march and how to care for themselves in the field. However well instructed a soldier may be he is of no use if at the time of battle he is back in the hospital.

Desirable instruction

Under the second heading, of things that it is desirable the men should know, are subjects which are essential for the officers to know but which are not equally essential for the men. Nevertheless it is an advantage to have them know as much as possible, provided the merely desirable instruction does not interfere with the proper training in essentials. Among these subjects are topography and the construction of temporary bridges; the list might be extended almost indefinitely.

Things to be understood and things to be made fixed habits

The instructor must further distinguish between the essential things which the men need merely to know or to understand and those which need to be practiced until they become habits. Those things the men will only be required to do off the battlefield, where they will have time to think and be in condition to use their heads, need only be known.

Psychology teaches us that under great stress of danger and excitement a man can be depended upon to do only those things which have become fixed habits, and further, that under these same trying conditions, a man who has acquired by practice a habit of doing something a certain way cannot do that thing differently. Action contrary to habit requires thought, and mental activity is difficult if not impossible under the circumstances. Acting according to habit is merely following the line of least resistance.

It is difficult to conceive of greater stress of danger and excitement than exists in a modern battle. Certainly there is no other case in which the knowledge of this psychological truth can be used to greater advantage than in training for battle.

Fixed habits in battle

As far as possible, then, all those things which the men must do under fire should be practiced until they become fixed habits. It has been said that if in the heat of battle a man even raises his rifle to his shoulder, before firing, it shows fair discipline. Not only must bringing the rifle to the shoulder be made a habit, but correct aiming and trigger pull whenever the rifle is brought to the shoulder must be made a habit, and one so strongly developed that these acts will always be done mechanically and without mental effort.

Habits of correct aiming and firing

This desired result cannot be accomplished by two or three weeks a year of target practice. The training must be continuous for an extended period. To accomplish it altogether with ball cartridges would be too costly and often impracticable. The desired results can be obtained by pointing and aiming drills and gallery practice, if these are so conducted that the men never pull the trigger without properly bringing the rifle to the shoulder and looking through the sights at some target.

A week of continuous work every six months will not accomplish the results; frequent short drill periods are necessary. A man who starts in by smoking three strong cigars every Christmas and Fourth of July but not touching tobacco between times will not be so likely to acquire the smoking habit as one who starts very moderately and repeats the act daily. Overdoing any kind of training at one time, with long intervals between has a tendency to produce dislike rather than a habit. A few minutes of honest work at least twice every week, in pointing and aiming drill and gallery practice, will accomplish the result desired and my experience convinces me that it also produces much better results on the target range than crowding even more of this practice into the last month before going on the range. Certainly it is worth more than the other as a habit-former.

Estimating the range

The better a man can shoot when the range is known to him the more important it is that his sight elevation be correct. A poor shot will scatter his bullets and may hit something even with a wrong elevation but the accurate shot will not hit anything; yet the correct range is valuable even to the poor shot.

On the battlefield we can count only on our estimate of the range; seldom will it be practicable to determine it otherwise. Thus estimating distances has to be made a habit for two reasons: since habits alone count in battle, only by making it a habit can we depend on its being done; and second, it requires constant practice to enable men to estimate distances with fair accuracy.

Devoting two or three consecutive days annually to estimating distances is almost a waste of time; practice should be had every week. I have seen both methods used and I am certain as to their relative values. How this instruction should be given will be mentioned later.

The deployments, advancing the attack, working by signals, taking advantage of cover, and in fact everything pertaining to combat from the opening of fire until the end of the battle must be practiced until it becomes a fixed habit on the part of the men.

The officer as instructor

If we are to have good infantry the officers as instructors must be competent, have an appreciation of relative values, be able to distinguish between what is essential and what is merely desirable and make sure of essentials before spending time on the latter. Each officer must realize fully what has only to be known and what must be made fixed habit and govern his work accordingly.

Hints as to instruction work

Now a few hints as to the instruction work. Never do this work in a perfunctory manner. Always have in mind what you want to teach and how you are going to do it. Put your heart in your work.

I have seen a well drilled company go to pieces under an officer who gave his commands in an indifferent manner and who gave too much “place rest.” The spirit of indifference is contagious as well as the spirit of enthusiasm. If you have no keen interest simulate it and you will find it grow into the real thing. Remember that you are paid for good work and if you do not give this kind of service you are obtaining money fraudulently.

But not only have you yourself to keep interested; if the best results are to be obtained you must keep up the interest of your men. Nothing kills interest like monotony. There are so many things to be taught and there is so great an opportunity for variety that there is no excuse for not keeping the men interestedly busy for four hours a day.

Make clear to the men in the instruction work, particularly in the field training, not only the object sought but the why and wherefore. In maneuvers always explain the problem to them so far as is necessary to make them understand what the command is trying to do, where the enemy is supposed to be, and the rest. They will respond not only by taking more interest but by doing their part much better.

I have seen a flank patrol out at a maneuver the leader of which knew nothing of the supposed situation and had been given no instructions, except to act as left flank patrol. What interest could he be expected to take in the maneuver? How could he be counted on properly to perform his duty?

Callisthenic drill

I believe in carrying out this principle even in the callisthenic drill. Explain to the men the object of each movement, what muscle is to be developed by it and its advantage. Doing this makes this work much more profitable to the men as well as more interesting. It will also prevent our seeing these movements so executed as to deprive them of all their intended value.

Appeal to the intelligence of the men

In other words, treat the men being instructed as the intelligent men they are. They will both learn faster and do better work when they fully understand what is to be done and the reason why. A horse must be simply made to do certain things in a given way; it is a tedious process and a horse never does know much. Men trained as soldiers on the same plan as the horse give results out of all proportion to the time and effort spent. Why not, therefore, make use of the man’s intelligence and simply help him train himself?

II
GENERAL DISTRIBUTION OF TIME

In this country we cannot follow literally any of the systems of training adopted by the great military powers: our whole military system is too different. We can, however, profit by their experience and, if we translate, not the literal text of their regulations but the spirit, gain much. It is essential that any scheme of instruction adopted should be suited to our organization, method of recruitment and the various conditions surrounding our service.

Requisites of a system of training

The work must be so planned as to utilize all the available time of the year and in that time to cover all the absolute essentials of instruction. In this utilization of the time schools for non-commissioned officers and officers must be included. There is much ground to be covered during the year and unless the time be wisely apportioned it cannot be done.

There is much of the work that can be done indoors; other work can only be done outside. Our troops are so widely scattered and under such varying climatic conditions that the distribution of time cannot profitably be the same for all.

Winter and summer work

Schools

Each post should make its own schedule. The work in each post must, however, be uniform. For example, in the northern part of the United States the year’s training should begin November 1st and end October 31st. All the instruction that can be given during the winter months, should be given, leaving the rest for the open season. The schools for both officers and non-commissioned officers are held during the indoor season; the work done in them should dovetail in with the general scheme of instruction. Particular care should be exercised with respect to the non-commissioned officers’ schools; in them the non-commissioned officers should be taught thoroughly how to play their part in the varied work in the field and be given the reasons for things.

Simply repeating the words of a book should be avoided; teach them to do things. The company commander who is capable and in earnest can do much in winter toward training his company even in garrisons where weather conditions are the worst.

Methods of winter instruction

Most of the captains of one regiment known to me have been doing good work during the past two years in teaching the principles of the conduct of patrols and covering detachments. Some of them made use of the Stacey Relief Map; others simply built a sand table about ten feet by five. On this the sand was moulded to form hills and valleys. Blue strings were laid down for streams, yellow ones for roads. Miniature bridges were constructed and placed where desired. Small twigs were used to make forests.

By means of practical examples worked out on these made or improvised maps the principles were thoroughly taught and more easily than is possible out of doors; when spring came, only a few exercises on the ground were necessary to make these companies proficient.

Entrenching

Another use made of the sand table was in the teaching of entrenching. Bull Durham tobacco sacks were converted into sand bags and the men taught their use in revetting, loop-holing, etc. Similarly on a miniature scale were taught the preparation of headlogs, the making of gabions, facines and hurdle revetment. Brush work thus taught indoors needs only be followed by one outdoor exercise, in which work is done on the scale actually used in the field, in order to render the company proficient.

Gymnasium

Where the post is so fortunate as to be provided with a gymnasium full advantage should be taken during the winter season of the opportunities for physical training which it affords. The physical development of the men is most important. Where no gymnasium is available a well-planned course in callisthenics is the best substitute and should be used. Callisthenics to music or for pure show should be prohibited.

First aid Signalling

The indoor season must be fully utilized to save the full time of the outdoor season for that training which can only be given then. Instruction in such subjects as first aid and signalling naturally is given at this time. A place for gallery practice can always be rigged up.

Estimating distances

The foundation for estimating distances must be laid, and there should be practice in it every week, during the closed season. In this work the whole company should be employed together only for the first one or two exercises when the principles are being explained; after that a platoon or less at a time. Near each barracks there should be two stakes one hundred yards apart and so placed that the men see them every time the company forms. This is their unit of measure and cannot become too familiar to them.

The captain or someone designated by him selects a couple of distances to be estimated. Each subdivision of the company then goes out in turn and upon completing the exercise returns and another goes out.

The men must be taught to estimate distances both from themselves to a given point and between two points, both at some distance from them. The latter is necessary in their patrol work in estimating lengths of column and frontages occupied. If the estimating be conducted in this way the weather will make little difference; the men dress suitably for it and are out only a short time. The work to be of value must be done under varying conditions of light.

There should be no week in the year in which this exercise is not conducted. In summer it should be done on the days when the company is away from the garrison on the weekly practice march; there is ample time for it during the long halt.

This work can be conducted so as only to take about fifteen minutes of each man’s time per week. It is well worth it. I have seen the above plan carried out intelligently in two or three companies and the results were remarkably good; the ability of the men to estimate distance was better than that given for musketry school graduates in foreign services. On the other hand I have seen it indifferently carried out and, like most indifferent work, it was a waste of time.

Position and aiming drills, gallery practice

Position and aiming drills and gallery practice must be a weekly occurrence and holding them twice a week will be better. If the detachments are made small enough gallery practice requires but little time for each man. It is important in conducting this practice to see that no man ever fires a score in a careless or indifferent manner; if this is permitted the result obtained will be the opposite of that desired. I found one very effective means of preventing such careless work: a man found guilty of careless firing was required to repeat his score—but not at that time when it would delay the regular course. He had to remain near the gallery until I, or someone designated by me, came around to supervise his firing and it was usually some little time before I got around.

Bayonet fencing

Throughout the year careful attention should be given to bayonet fencing. I do not believe that there is much probability of a bayonet contest in war but, for psychological reasons, this training is necessary. Positions are carried by the bayonet, but past experience shows that in such charges the bayonets seldom crossed and when they did it was a “rough and tumble.” Our men may go in with the best intentions in the world to use the bayonet according to rule, yet the chances are that, in the excitement of the mélee, habit will assert itself and the gun become a bat.

Nevertheless, troops are very seldom “shot out of a position”; the imminent threat of the bayonet is necessary; but, as the opposing bayonets get close, one side or the other weakens.

Kind of bayonet required

It would be folly to expect men without bayonets to charge an enemy with long and sharp ones, or to expect them without bayonets to stand a charge by an enemy armed with such weapons, even though, if they had bayonets, they would be likely to club their rifles. The moral effect of a line of bayonets is great.

Infantry should be armed with the best of bayonets, long and, in war time, razor sharp. The men must have confidence in their ability to use them with skill and effect; otherwise they will neither charge nor stand the enemy’s charge. At that stage of the fight success largely depends on the confidence of the individual man in his power to win.

Amount of bayonet practice

Bayonet fencing should be continuous throughout the year. At least one-half-hour weekly should be devoted to it and during the indoor season extended and careful instruction should be given to groups not larger than a squad. During the outdoor season this instruction should be so arranged as not to interfere with the regular drills.

Division into sections for instruction

The company should be divided into sections that can be handled conveniently for the instruction work. The success of the indoor work largely depends on keeping the sections small enough.

This is especially necessary in first aid and sandtable work. If the sections are too large at estimating distance and gallery practice it results in too much idle standing around.

Changing sections

The sections must be changed from one class of work to another before the work drags or the men become tired of it. Give them variety.

Selecting instructors

The captain must exercise care in selecting the instructors for the various subjects. The man who will do it the best should be the instructor in each. Perfunctory or indifferent work should never be allowed on the part of an instructor or by the man being instructed.

The captain

The capable, intelligent and honest captain will utilize the indoor season to the great benefit of his company and of his government. He will discover the best ways and means of instructing his own particular men. The incompetent captain, lacking average intelligence, will accomplish nothing under any circumstances.

Initiative in the instruction work

As much latitude as practicable should be given to subordinate commanders in carrying out any system of instruction and they should be held strictly responsible for results. A scheme in which there is laid down just how each thing is to be taught, and how much time and what time is to be devoted to it, is radically wrong. We need to develop our officers as well as our men. The conditions are different at different posts. The needs of different companies at the same posts are varied. Each captain should know just how much time he has and what is absolutely required of him in that time. He should then be allowed to work out his own solution of the problem.

When every detail is prescribed the officer has no initiative, his interest is diminished, he thinks less, exercises less responsibility, and his work is not so good. If that policy be kept up long enough the subordinate officer will never do anything without positive instructions. An officer who exercises no judgment is of no value in war.

The regiment a team

But absolute liberty for the subordinate to do as he pleases is impracticable. The regiment is a team of which his unit is only one member. There must be team play and every member must know and be able to do his part. The company must be taught certain things or it will not fit into the battalion team; the battalion must be fitted for the regimental team. Each larger unit must have time for training and has a right to demand that each lower unit which forms a part of it shall have accomplished its own special work on time and be ready to play its part in the work of the larger unit.

The colonel

The colonel is responsible for the training of his regiment. He should allot the time, supervise the work and see that every member of the team is ready. He is the best judge of the requirements of his regiment. But the colonel should do this so as to leave all the liberty practicable to subordinate commanders.

Orders and restriction

If all our captains were competent and reliable this work of the colonel would be very simple. But there are a few captains, unfortunately, who are far from the best, whose long suit at drill is “place rest” and having a sergeant drill the company in Butts’ Manual. While more restrictions are necessary for such captains these restrictions do not hamper the others; they merely prohibit things the right kind of captain would never think of doing or require what he would never think of omitting.

Time to organizations

Of course most of the instruction time belongs to the companies; it is in them that most of the work must be done. Four well trained companies under a competent major can be made into a well trained battalion in a very few days, and the time required for each higher unit is less than that for the one next below.

Time to target practice

To the company belongs all the indoor season. In dividing the rest of the year for the northern part of the U. S. I believe that the available time from April 1st to October 1st should be allotted in the proportion of 4 days to the company for each 2 to the battalion and 1 to the regiment. The month of October should be devoted to maneuvers and to work in higher units. The time spent on the target range is excluded in computing the available time but no company should be allowed to devote more than two weeks to target practice exclusive of field firing; of the latter we can hardly get too much. It is appreciated that conditions at various posts make different schedules necessary.

In the past we have seen the training done in a back-handed way: work in the higher units first, finally down to the company and soldier. This is so unlikely to occur in future that its evil results are not worth mentioning.

Time to close order drill

Too much time should not be devoted to close order drill, especially during the outdoor season. An hour a day for the first five or six drills and thereafter fifteen minutes a day is ample. There should always be, however, at least ten minutes a day of snappy, precise close order work; this together with the ceremonies will keep the companies up to the standard. Too much close order drill becomes monotonous; when that happens the command fails to improve even if it does not deteriorate.

Length of drills

The drills during the indoor season should be two hours long; for the rest of the year not less than three and generally from four to six hours daily.

III
FIRE SUPERIORITY

We are told that in battle we must have fire superiority to win; and fire control and direction are held as important. I doubt if these terms are fully understood by all. A hope to aid some of our younger officers to a better understanding of these terms, and of the vital importance of fire distribution, is the excuse for this chapter.

Fire effectiveness in battle

A line of men firing with the rifle, if not disturbed or endangered by the fire of an enemy, can do approximately target practice work. Now let a heavy fire be opened on them, one that is fairly accurate and well placed, and their work falls off very greatly; the heavier the fire they are subjected to the less effective becomes their own fire.

Careful study and research by competent men of foreign armies leads to the conclusion that if this line, when not under fire, could make 280 hits in a given time, subjected to a heavy, well placed fire its effectiveness would fall to ¹/₄₀ or ¹/₇₀; that is, from 280 hits to 7 or 4.

This looks extreme at first thought; but what captain with a good company but would know that he could deploy his company at from 800 to 1000 yards from a line of lying down figures and get a hit for at least every 10 shots. Yet history tells us that it takes from 1200 to 2000 shots in battle to put a man out of action. In the light of these facts our first figures look very moderate.

With our present infantry arm an advance against a hostile line doing 280 work is impossible. Bring the enemy’s effectiveness down to the four and keep it there and you can advance and win.

Fire superiority does not mean that you are firing more shots than the enemy, it does not mean he is firing less than you; it means that your fire has become so close and effective that he has lost his nerve and is shooting wildly.

Fire distribution

To obtain this fire superiority certain things are necessary. We must have proper fire distribution. To explain this let us assume that a hostile line is 200 yards long, that our force is the stronger. We concentrate our fire on the right half of the hostile line, leaving the other half untouched. The effectiveness of the fire of half of this line remains at 280, the other half falls to 2, average 141; our advance is impossible. We now cover the entire target and its fire effectiveness falls to 7; our advance is possible.

Fire superiority is possible, then, only if we have fire distribution. It is not sufficient to fire a certain number of shots at part of the line, the whole hostile line must be subjected to a nerve racking fire to reduce the effectiveness of its fire.

Another thing to be considered is that the enemy will conceal himself as much as possible. On a large part of the hostile line no one will be seen; men will be hidden by tufts of grass, bushes, etc. But while this cover conceals the enemy from our view, he sees our location and his fire is not interrupted. There is a strong tendency to shoot only at the men that can be seen. This must be overcome; much of our firing must be aimed at a locality, although unseen the enemy is nevertheless there and his fire effectiveness must be kept down. Our fire must be distributed to cover every part of the hostile line whether the enemy is seen or not.

Fire control

To secure this fire distribution we must be able to direct the fire of our men, to place it where wanted. But direction necessarily implies control; you can not direct what you cannot control. Thus a fire control system which will work on the battlefield is a primary requisite to success.

Fire discipline

Another term used is fire discipline. The word fire adds nothing to its meaning; but discipline is vital to success. No matter what your system of control, if the men do not respond with prompt obedience it is worthless. Disciplined men can be counted on to do what is wanted if they know how, others cannot. There is no fire discipline distinct from other military discipline.

To sum up: fire superiority is necessary to success, to attain fire superiority we must properly distribute our fire, to do this we must be able to control and hence direct it, and this can only be done if our men are disciplined. An attack with raw troops is possible only against still poorer ones.

Method of fire control

Our fire control and direction needs more explanation. A method must be had which will work on the battlefield. No one who has seen a modern battle will think for a moment that it is practicable to control and direct a firing line by verbal orders. A battalion commander must be far enough to the rear to observe his entire line. In the noise of a real battle his voice could not be heard ten yards by men on the firing line. The same is equally true of company and platoon commanders. These officers cannot be running up and down the line giving instructions; if they tried it they would not last long.

Use of signals

Our method must therefore be one that can be executed independently of the voice and with as little exposure of the officers as practicable. The method by signals given in our I. D. R. answers the requirements. The text of it can be learned in a few minutes, but to train a battalion so that it will fully respond under danger requires hours of practice: it is one thing that must become a habit.

After the mechanism of the drill is learned officers should conduct their line as in battle by signals only. Do not teach men to expect you to be running up and down the line personally correcting errors and giving directions, leading them to expect this to be done in battle. The effect of a decided change in conduct when danger is present is apt not to be good. Moreover, the command will not respond to signals alone on the battlefield if, in instruction work, they have never been taught to depend on them exclusively. We should do everything at battle exercises just as nearly as possible as it will be done in battle.

I have seen at battle exercises men stand up in the open and wave their flags to give the signals. This is absurd. In battle it would be needlessly dangerous, would give the enemy too much information, and it is unnecessary. The necessary signals in the battalion can be given by a man lying on the ground with a handkerchief, or flag without the staff, and be seen for the short distances separating the major from his captains or the captain from his platoon commanders. Practice alone is required to enable this to be done efficiently. It must be so done in battle and must therefore be drilled that way.

It should be remembered that the new semaphore code recently adopted does not apply to these signals. The new code requires men to stand; the old must be used for these battle signals.

Additional signals

Additional signals to those given in the I. D. R. may be taught and used in companies. It is doubtful if they are necessary and if not necessary they are wrong. The more signals you have, the more chance of mistakes. Signals for forming squad or platoon columns are unnecessary. These movements are not executed close to the enemy nor when your line is firing, hence verbal commands are practicable and when practicable are desirable, are surer and easier.

Signals are necessary when your line has commenced the fire fight but from there on few commands are necessary; there are so few things that can be ordered, the time for maneuver and instruction is past. One or two of those given might be dispensed with and one for fixing bayonets should be added; possibly there are one or two others that should be added.

Observing fire effectiveness

We have discussed how to obtain fire superiority; how may we know when we have it, if the volume of the enemy’s fire remains practically the same? Company and platoon commanders must watch for the effect of the enemy’s fire, where his bullets are striking. If the hostile bullets are going wild, some striking far short, others way high, and very few are effective, you have fire superiority; that is the time to gain distance to the front. On the other hand, although you may be suffering no loss, you see that the enemy’s bullets, well massed, are striking, say 50 yards in your front; you have no fire superiority; the enemy has simply underestimated the range and your advance will bring you into the center of his beaten zone. But this is your opportunity to gain fire superiority. Your men are suffering little or no loss, should be less affected and should do better work. If this opportunity is well utilized you will gain fire superiority.

When you have fire superiority you must push the advance, take full advantage of your opportunity; if you temporarily lose it, suspend the advance until you regain the necessary superiority.

Distribution of fire

Fire properly distributed is one essential to gaining fire superiority. Proper distribution means it is placed on the target and on all of the target, not just one part. Placing our fire on the target requires that our men be at least fair shots, have their nerve and know the range. To cover all the target rather than concentrate on a part is not easy and to attain practical efficiency in this requires skill and practice.

In the deployment for battle the division is generally given a specific mission, the division commander assigns to each brigade its part of the task, and so on down to the battalion, company, platoon and even squad.

There is little involved in the larger units except the tactical skill to know how to use the larger units to gain the required end; dividing the terrain is easy. It is difficult with the commanders of the smaller units; the division of the target generally becomes harder the smaller the subdivision. The major must divide his target, say between two companies, and do it so that there can be no mistake on the part of the captains as to just what part each is to cover. The company commander must then divide his section among his platoons and the latter often among the squads.

The captain’s problems

The battalion commander has only one difficulty—to find a way to make each captain clearly understand where is the division of target and where its extreme limit. The company commander has a shorter line to divide and has to divide it into more parts. Landmarks are not so common as he will then desire.

The captain has another problem in this connection: shall he divide his target into four parts and assign each platoon a separate part, or into two parts and give two platoons the same target, i. e., 1st and 3d the right half, 2d and 4th the left half? The captain has not only the problem of finding proper dividing points in the target, but he must divide and allot the target so as to get the best fire effect. It might happen, as I once saw in a field firing problem, that the right platoon could not see the corresponding part of the target, hence was given the other extreme flank and the rest of the target divided accordingly. It is not the division alone, but what is the best division and allotment, that must be considered.

Practice in distributing the target

This will all be more clearly understood if you will go in the country and assume a regiment is ordered to attack a certain line under certain conditions, and then give the colonel’s attack order, from that take each major’s target and divide it between the companies and then divide each company target. This should, of course, always be done at the same distance from the target that you would have to make the distribution if a real enemy were there. You should have two or three men with you to act as the subordinates in each case and to determine whether the division is fully and perfectly understood. It is easy on a map, but often very difficult on the ground; distinctive marks are sometimes very scarce.

Each commander should practice this, devising a method for himself that will work. Officers alone or together in small groups should practice it as a sort of tactical walk. But primarily it should be done in each unit: the colonel should take the majors on such a tactical walk; the majors their captains; the captains their platoon commanders. Estimating distance should be worked in the same exercise.

For the companies this is good work for the indoor season. There are days when work can be planned for the company that does not require the presence of the captain or of most of his officers and non-commissioned officers; these can then utilize the drill period as above described. It may be made a real tactical walk with special stress laid on the division and allotment of the target.

Assistance of artillery

It must be borne in mind that in most cases the artillery will play a large part in the gaining and maintaining of fire superiority. But this fact does not alter the work of the infantry; we must still do most of the killing and unnerving of the enemy and this is true whether the enemy consists of infantry alone or of infantry in conjunction with artillery.

In this chapter the first part is much like “right line strategy” mathematics applied to a battlefield where little is subject to such treatment. But that seemed the easiest and simplest way to make clear to beginners terms that must be fully understood. It is hoped that that part of the chapter will be understood as meant, as offering merely a means of illustration and not as implying that a battle can be worked out with mathematical precision.

IV
COMBAT

War, according to Clausewitz, is the continuation of diplomacy. Diplomacy is not always able to settle international disputes, then the army must do what the diplomats have failed to accomplish. In our own history it has been the mass of the people who have forced our wars, and who, in the case of a strong public sentiment arising, will involve us again. On account of the state of preparedness of most great nations and because of the enormous cost of modern war, wars are shorter than formerly.

Object of an army

If this country becomes involved in a war with a military power it will be impracticable to learn the art of war and train an army after the outbreak; the war will not last long enough. The object of having an army is for war not for peace, and the battles alone really decide the issue; the battles are not numerous but each tends one way or the other to end the struggle. Great armies exist for many years between wars and are then trained for these few days of battles which determine the fate of the nation. The whole aim of an army should be to be ready for war and the success or failure in war is determined by a few days of battle. Untrained troops are of no value on the modern battlefield.

Training for battle

Part of our close order drill, the ceremonies and some other things we teach, are accessories and, if given their proper place, are of value, but the battlefield is the crucial test; by our fitness for that must our training be judged. The work of generals and the general staff is vitally important but the best plan will accomplish nothing if there are no trained companies to carry out their part.

In this chapter is considered the training necessary for combat. This is the work executed under the severest strain and under the greatest difficulties of leadership and control. This training must be thorough and the things in combat which have to be done must become a habit.

THE COMPANY

Extended order practice

The first essential is that the men must know the mechanism of the extended order drill, including all signals used. To keep control of the skirmish line in battle, that is to maintain such order therein that it can be directed and used as desired, is far from easy. Excitement and confusion, especially in the last stages of the combat, are apt to occur. Everything possible must be done to preserve organization and control.

Much depends upon the start; if there is confusion at the start and the squads get mixed, success is more than doubtful. In the majority of cases the deployment will be made quietly at long range, but not in all. The company must be drilled until able to deploy from all formations, facing in any direction, in the least time practicable, and without any confusion or mix-up.

Calmness in giving orders

The captain who can give all his orders and commands at the start of a fight in a calm, unexcited manner has a great advantage over the one whose voice or manner indicates excitement. This calm manner should be cultivated during training. As good a way as I know for such training is to have a few men to represent hostile forces conceal themselves at various points in a moderately close country; march the company through this terrain and, as the represented enemy appears, form skirmish line facing the supposed enemy, give the range and the commands for opening fire in the least possible time. The captain himself should not know where the represented enemy will appear. This is training for the captain and also excellent practice for the company.

Restoring order

Occasionally during an advance points are reached where a company is sheltered from fire. Advantage should always be taken of such opportunities to reëstablish perfect order, replace fallen leaders and thus get a new start. Such an opportunity decidedly increases your chance of success in battle; real control is reëstablished. Practice this in your battle training when the opportunity offers, but never do it when, in a real combat, it would be impracticable.

Combat exercises

After the mechanism of the extended order drill is understood all combat exercises should have a problem or situation. These should always be simple; elaborate tactical problems for this instruction work are unnecessary. For a simulated attack as part of a line, all that is necessary is a statement that the enemy, a regiment of infantry, is holding the line from —— to ——, our regiment is to attack it at once, our battalion on the right, we are the right company, our target or objective the part of the line from —— to ——. This of course should be varied but need be no more complicated. The captain should give this to his whole company, let all the men know what they are supposed to be doing.

Situation and orders

Method of conducting exercises

The captain should then give his attack order, always carefully distributing the target. For a company operating alone the following form will answer every purpose: This company belongs to a division engaged with a hostile division five miles north of here. This company was detached to capture that building (pointing) which is assumed to be important. The defending force occupies the line ——. The order for the attack then follows. Usually in such a case, a small support would be held out. Of course the problems will vary according to what it is desired to teach. Always distribute the target and let the men understand what you are trying to do. All combat exercises should be conducted as nearly as possible as though the enemy were real. Allow nothing to be done that would not be attempted were it real war, otherwise you do not give instruction but misinformation. After the mechanism is taught, the captain and platoon commanders must conduct themselves in combat exercises as they would under hostile fire, keep close to the ground, use signals only. After the exercise is over have a critique, point out the errors made and tell the command how they should be corrected.

You must expect that if mistakes are made at the drill they will be made in battle; to correct these mistakes you should use only those means at drill that will be practicable in battle. The captain needs much practice in thus handling a skirmish line and those under him need more practice before the company can be well handled in this manner.

Means of representing enemy’s fire

The effectiveness of the enemy’s fire should be indicated that platoon commanders can practice the control of rushes. The simplest way to do this that I have found is to have a man at the hostile position with two little flags. Holding both of these vertically over his head means the enemy’s fire is wild and nearly harmless. One flag vertical the other horizontal indicates a moderately effective fire. Both flags horizontal indicates the maximum effectiveness—that the enemy has a decided fire superiority. When both flags touch the ground it indicates no fire.

The advance of the attacking force is only practicable by taking advantage of the times when the fire is ineffective or weak to push forward, and, when the hostile fire is too strong, shooting to gain fire superiority. Platoon commanders and men must become accustomed to seizing these opportunities to advance and suddenly getting down when there is a burst of effective fire. The flags on the hostile position may be controlled by an instructor, stationed behind the company officers, indicating how the flags are to be held.

Remember that the hostile fire becomes more effective in proportion as ours is less effective. If we have the most men we should gain fire superiority if our shots are well placed. If the firing line has not distributed its fire properly the instructor causes both flags to be held horizontally; no advance is then possible until the company officers find out the cause of the trouble and correct it. The same is done whenever a serious error in sight elevation is made. Majors should frequently conduct such exercises with their companies. The company officers must become quick in determining why the hostile fire is more effective than suits existing conditions and learn to correct the error.

Judging defects in firing

You may not be able to reduce the effectiveness of the hostile fire so that an advance under it is practicable and, in some cases, it may not be your mission to do so; but in every case where the hostile fire passes a certain point of effectiveness, depending on relative numbers, your range, distribution or something is wrong, or else your men have lost their nerve. Judging the effect of the hostile fire is something in which company and platoon commanders must be proficient, but off the battlefield this can only be taught in theory.

Advance by rushes

In advancing the attack by rushes the size of the fraction rushing will be dependent upon the relative proportion of rifles necessary to hold your fire superiority. If rushes are practicable at all it will seldom be necessary to rush by smaller units than the platoon. But an advance will sometimes have to be made by fractions of only a man or two and sometimes by crawling. All these should be taught.

When the enemy is active the rushes should not be long, if of only 25 or 30 yards the time the men are actually running will be very short, too short for the average man to pick up the target, raise the rifle to his shoulder and fire with careful aim. Too much time is taken by the average man in getting up and down. The men must be practiced in springing to their feet and getting down again in the shortest time possible. There is a knack in this not difficult to acquire.

Reinforcements

Reinforcing a firing line will generally bring about intermingling of squads and platoons. To avoid this by closing in on the center by companies, thus creating gaps for reinforcements, is impracticable on a battlefield when reinforcing is necessary. In battle in the great majority of cases reinforcements will go in as they can and fall into the existing gaps where found. As this will be the rule in battle we should so drill it.

When the next rush is made, say by squads, where do these reinforcements go? In one regiment at least, they solved it satisfactorily. The points of division along the firing line remain where they were; the new man who joins the firing line always goes with the man on his right, he belongs to the squad and to the platoon of the man on his right. This provision should be added in the I. D. R.

Mixing on the firing line

In teaching the mechanism of the extended order, practice should be had in this by dividing the company into firing line and support and then feeding in the support and continuing the advance by rushes. If you expect this to be done in battle it must become a habit. To get the best practice in this mixing, as well as to train officers and sergeants to think quickly and to act properly, there should be many rencontre engagements so planned as to bring about a mixing of units on the firing line.

Practice at war strength

Some practice should be afforded with companies at war strength. This can be had by combining two or more companies. By this means it is sought to accustom officers to the fronts and depths of such a company and also to the greater length of time required to change formation.

Redistributing the target

In combat exercises of the company alone practice must be had in shifting part of the fire to new targets and redistributing the old. In large battles this will seldom if ever be required by men in the firing line, but it will occur in detachment work. The companies should get practice in this and it can be well coupled with the instruction in hasty deployments suggested on page [46].

Work on the defensive

Some work should be done on the defensive. A few men should be detailed to represent the enemy; if the man carries one little flag he represents a squad, if two flags a platoon. These men should be in charge of a competent man who as nearly as is practicable directs their advance as such units would really advance under the assumed conditions. Enveloping movements and surprise attacks can thus be well simulated, giving the company the opportunity to practice meeting such movements by the use of the support, redistribution of targets, etc.

Company against company

The instruction against an outlined enemy having been practiced until the companies are well instructed, the enemy should be represented, one company should work against another. This gives an opportunity for reconnaissance work before and during the attack and introduces the elements of uncertainty as to what the enemy will do.

Night operations

In war, night operations are inevitable and we must recognize this fact and prepare for them. Night marches by large commands, patrolling by both large and small groups, and outpost work, including the establishing of the outpost in the dark, will all occur as well as an occasional night battle. In all this work the principal difficulty seems to be to avoid confusion and mistakes.

Orientation

The men, especially those who are city bred, are unable to orient themselves in the dark. The darkness when coupled with possible unseen foes has a demoralizing effect and this effect will be the greater the more helpless the man feels himself to be in the dark and the less confidence he has in the ability of the company to act as a company. Much of this difficulty can be overcome by a little careful training.

The men should be taken out and taught to orient themselves by the stars and prominent features that can be distinguished at night. The effects of different backgrounds on the visibility of objects should be demonstrated, and especially the prominence of objects on a skyline. Estimating distance by sound should be practiced. The men grouped into small patrols should be made to find their way from place to place and then to operate against other patrols.

Night drill

The company should be drilled at night. Forming line from column, front into line, on right or left into line, and even forming line of skirmishers, should be practiced and an occasional night march made. A very few drills each season, held at night instead of in daylight, will do much toward giving the men that necessary confidence in the ability of the company to work together in the dark.

It will sometimes happen that a command will have to go into camp after dark and establish an outpost. This should be practiced at least once each season after the company has been well instructed in the work by daylight.

Night attacks

Satisfactory training for night attacks is difficult. The first principle governing night attacks is not to shoot but to get in as close as possible undiscovered and then rush with the bayonet. It is impracticable to practice this with a represented enemy; it is too dangerous. To practice it by allowing the opposing sides to fire blanks at each other is all wrong because it is teaching the men to do what they should not do in war.

One method is to place men to represent the enemy behind a suitable fence, then to make the advance and attack, causing the represented enemy to open fire as soon as the attack is discovered. An open wire fence will not prevent the discovery of the attack but will stop the bayonet rush before anyone is hurt. This is not very satisfactory work for the company but is more appropriate for the battalion and regiment. In these latter it is desirable to practice the necessary formations for such attacks and to give the officers experience in such troop leading. For this work to be of benefit the officers must know their night tactics, the proper formations to take and the best methods of troop leading; this knowledge should first be acquired by study and then put to the test at night. It is not well to devote too much time to such work.

Woods fighting

In many posts practice can be had in tactical work in the woods. This opportunity should not be neglected. A good tactician will try to avoid a thick forest as a battlefield but with long lines of battle parts of the line will inevitably extend through forests. Hence the officers must study the principles governing woods fighting and seek to train the men so that they can play their part. Woods combat has many of the difficulties of night work.

Fire problem

There should be considerable work on fire problems; it is excellent practice, especially for the officers and non-commissioned officers. Field firing is not here meant but simulated firing. A simple problem is given and the officer or sergeant with a platoon or company solves it practically. By using a few men with flags to represent the enemy and with a proper critique afterwards for all the company, great benefit should be derived.

As an example of such a problem: dispose one platoon of the company under cover near a ridge with a concealed man watching to the front and stationed about 25 yards from the platoon, the remainder of the company 400 yards in rear but in sight of the platoon. The following situation is then given out:

Fire problem against cavalry

“This company has been detached from a larger force back at X. Hostile cavalry is in this neighborhood and is doing much damage. The orders received when this company was detached stated that other companies were to go out on other roads and this company on this one to inflict as much punishment as practicable on this cavalry if encountered. We have reached this point and just halted for a ten minutes rest.”

As soon as the situation is fully understood and the men are in their respective positions, a troop of cavalry, represented by a few men with yellow flags, comes in view of the sentinel and halts. Either verbally, or by a signal agreed upon, the captain explains that they have dismounted for rest. The sentinel and platoon commander now have their problem.

As another example take the same general situation in such terrain that a glimpse is caught of the troop moving along a road but immediately it passes behind cover; several hundred yards beyond, if it continues on the road, the troop will again come into view and be exposed for a considerable stretch of road and within rifle range. What is done now?

After the exercise the captain assembles the company and criticises the errors made and points out what should have been done. In the first situation opening fire by a few men would result in the hostile troop’s mounting and getting away with little damage or else in their getting their horses back under cover and being prepared to fight on foot. After the company once opens fire it will have a target but for a very short time; hence great care must be exercised in estimating the distance, dividing the target and giving the other necessary orders so as to produce the greatest effect in the least time. The captain should carefully study his problem and be prepared to give an instructive critique.

Suggestions for fire problems

A little book called “Fire Problems” by T. D. Pilcher of the British Army is recommended to our officers; it treats this subject more fully, gives several problems and shows how the solutions should be criticized.

The problems must be gotten up, as a matter of course, to fit the ground you have. A great variety of fire problems is afforded by any terrain. There should be some problems in which more than one target is offered. In getting up problems do not let yourself be hampered by the critics who will tell you that a troop of cavalry would not have crossed your front without having discovered you or without having been warned by its patrols: you are teaching fire tactics, not cavalry tactics, and besides, even cavalry has been known to do foolish and careless things. Try to make the problem reasonable and one which might occur in war but do not discard a good fire problem which teaches a valuable lesson because the situation is one which ought never to arise in battle. Few problems that are tried out in maneuvers will ever be duplicated in that exact form in war but the tactical principles involved will recur often.

Distribution of fire problem

There is one field firing problem which, if practiced once each year, would do a world of good in securing fire distribution. A line of prone figures is placed to represent the enemy on ground so selected that, while the figures cannot all be seen by the attackers, yet a man in the place of each figure could see the ground over which the advance is made. The defensive line should not be straight; it would seldom be so in war, it must conform to the ground. There should be stretches of thirty or forty figures that are concealed, then groups in plain view; brush, clumps of heavy grass afford the kind of cover desired. Have the battalion go through the form of attacking this line, using ball cartridges. Then have the men inspect the targets, see how plainly they could have been seen by the enemy while the latter was out of sight and see the effect of cover on the fire drawn and the faults in distribution. After this carefully explain the results of a lack of distribution; point out that the long stretches of the hostile line not under fire would have been doing target practice work on your advancing line and what the resulting losses would have been.

It is an effective way of impressing on men’s minds the necessity of proper distribution and of firing where directed whether they see anything or not. It also shows the advantage of cover, if only from view. The men must be taught to take advantage of cover, if only from view, whenever offered, if it can be done without interfering with their doing their work.

Combat against cavalry

For combat against cavalry the men must be taught in their bayonet work the proper way to oppose a man on horseback. How to meet a charge with fire must be largely theoretical but it should be carefully explained and, if a few mounted men are available to outline a charging force, some practical work can be had; it is a fire problem.

Special company problems

There are many problems in minor tactics that should form part of every company’s training, such as forcing a defile or a bridge, passing through a village as a patrol or as advance party of an advance guard, passing a woods under the same conditions and, on the side of the defense, preventing a hostile force from doing these things. There may be no gorge or pass through hills in your immediate vicinity but the practice can still be had: two large buildings near together will answer for a defile; the garrison is a village. If there be no bridge, with a little imagination you can improvise something to answer. In this class of problems the captain must know the tactics of his problem and be able to explain it thoroughly. Generally in these problems detachments having important missions have to be made; give their commanders much latitude in carrying them out and in your critique point out the errors and how the work should have been done. It is well in all such problems to precede them by a simple talk to the whole company explaining the tactical principles governing the work. These problems can be made the most interesting part of the company’s training.

Instruction must be given the company in meeting artillery fire and in the work of the various covering detachments but these two subjects, owing to their importance and length, are reserved for consideration in separate chapters.

Hints for company work

The company commander must get the full help and support of his platoon and squad leaders, much depends upon them; they are the real leaders of the men; they require much training and practice, especially in leading the rushes and in controlling and directing fire.

The discipline must be strict in these exercises, the men must never be allowed to slight the work. A certain amount of latitude must be given but prompt obedience to an order must be insisted upon. Without such discipline an attack is hopeless; the drill field is the place to acquire it.

In all this work keep the interest of the men. Occasionally take them to a shady place and instruct them orally, explain the objects sought and the reasons for doing things in anything that is part of their proper training.

Do not keep at one class of work until the men are tired of it; vary the work. You can keep a company interested for four hours a day if you will only vary the instruction and put some soul into it. Give very little place rest; for a rest change the work. Combat exercises must be frequent. They are entitled to a large share of the time; the work of the firing line must be a habit.

THE BATTALION

Hints for battalion training

The period of company training having been completed that of the battalion commences. The same general plan should be followed as in the case of the company. The mechanism of extended order should first be thoroughly learned, then the attack against an outlined enemy, then battalion against battalion. The enlisted men have little new to learn, the work for them is merely practice in what they have learned in the company training. For the captains it is instruction in team work and in tactics.

The battalion is the attack unit and as a tactical unit is most important. An infantry attack is largely a combination of battalion attacks. Every exercise should be a problem which teaches some lesson as well as affords practice. The employment of combat patrols of some size can be made a part of the exercise and their proper use and leading taught. The use of the local support, how it is handled and how maneuvered, is a very important part.

In these exercises the major must control his battalion as in battle. The absurdity of his riding around and giving verbal instructions to his firing line must not be permitted. A great part of the value of these combat exercises lies in the practice given in handling a battalion with the limited means of control possible on the field of battle and accustoming company commanders to carrying out their part under the same conditions. Majors thus learn to give their initial orders so as to insure the carrying out of their plan of action.

The battalion being the attack unit, whether alone or as part of a long line, its rushes are independent of those of other battalions although as a whole it keeps the general line. Each company of course must govern its advance by that of the others in the same battalion. An advance can only start from one flank or the other of the battalion and then continue successively to completion. Rushes never start from both flanks or the center; the reason for this is obvious.

The little flags mentioned under company training can be used in battalion training to even better advantage. Captains are more on their own responsibility in a battalion than are platoon commanders in a company and must act according to assumed existing conditions. In the battalion the shifting of fire from one target to another is less frequent than in the company. New unexpected targets are cared for, as a rule, by the support.

Battalion commanders have more need of reconnaissance and must get experience in ordering it properly and judging the reports and basing their action thereon.

When a battalion operates against battalion the colonel should prepare the problems and act as umpire. If he does not do this the practice should not be omitted, the majors concerned must get up their own although this is not so satisfactory.

The battalion commander or colonel should give a critique after each exercise, pointing out all errors of tactics and of execution. There should be much more of tactical instruction and less of mechanical training in battalion work than in the company.

Majors should not be limited to these drill periods to instruct their officers but be allowed to have tactical walks at other times. A major should have a good knowledge of tactics, be able to give clear and concise orders and enter into the spirit of his work. Four good companies, under a competent major learn with very little practice to work together as a team and become an efficient battalion.

THE REGIMENT

Regimental training

In the period alloted to the regiment the solution of tactical problems and thereby the gaining of experience in team work and imparting tactical instruction to the officers are the ends sought. The same rules as to method of control, giving of orders and critique apply as in the case of the battalion.

The colonel is responsible for the training of his regiment. It is not trained until the three battalions, the band, machine gun platoon and mounted detachment are trained, each in its special work, and then the whole is practiced as a team.

The training of the twelve companies, as such and as battalions, has been discussed.

Band

The band forms a large part numerically of the sanitary detachment of the regiment in battle. It must be trained and made efficient. This should be done by the officers of the Medical Corps serving with the regiment. There should be no perfunctory performance of this work; the colonel should see that it is thoroughly done.

Machine gun platoon

The officer in command of the machine gun platoon must not only instruct his men in the care and working of the guns, but in the proper care of all his equipment, including the animals. The machine gun is an emergency weapon; the commander of the machine gun company must thoroughly understand the tactical use of this weapon and be able to act as circumstances demand even without instructions.

Mounted detachment

The mounted detachment must be trained as scouts.

Objects sought in regimental training

The principal objects sought in the regimental period are practice and experience by the colonel in handling his regiment as a whole, practice by the regiment in team work, and tactical instruction for all. A practical knowledge of tactics on the part of the colonel is essential if these exercises are to be correctly carried out and his critique of value. Overlooking tactical errors in these exercises does much harm, younger officers gain wrong ideas and it is hard to eradicate errors once firmly fixed in the mind.

If the different units of the regiment are separately well trained it requires few exercises to make a team of them, good regimental work is largely a question of the tactical skill and ability of the colonel. If he is competent and the units are separately well trained the regiment is trained. Placing these well trained units in the hands of an incompetent regimental commander is but placing a fine and complicated machine in the hands of an unskilled operator; there is a fair chance that he will ruin the machine.

V
ARTILLERY FIRE

Object of study of artillery

Except in small engagements in detachment warfare the infantry will have the assistance of friendly artillery and will be opposed not only by infantry but by artillery fire. Some knowledge of artillery, its use, the effects it can produce and how best to utilize the aid afforded by our own and to meet the opposition of the enemy’s, is therefore necessary for the infantry officer and also for the men in ranks. While familiarity with the artillery will be far from breeding contempt, it will enable the infantry to escape much unnecessary loss and, by correcting the false conception so many have of its power, it will improve the morale of our men.

This chapter is not intended to teach infantry officers what they should know about artillery and its use. It is offered merely as a suggestion as to what our men should be taught and how to train them to meet certain phases of this fire. The officer should know much more about the subject and must go to more extended works by more competent men for the instruction.

Artillery is effective against infantry both physically and morally. The moral effect is the greater, the less instructed and trained is the man. Most untrained men have very exaggerated ideas as to the effectiveness of artillery, they know nothing but guess much. It is the terror of the unknown.

Classes of artillery

There are two general classes of artillery that accompany an army: light and heavy. The light artillery may be rifles or light howitzers; the first have a flat trajectory, the others, of greater caliber, have the advantage of being able to use high angle fire. Mountain and horse artillery are merely subdivisions of the light artillery and, except that the mountain artillery is less effective at long ranges than the others, “all look alike” to the infantry advancing under their fire.

The heavy field artillery in our service comprises 4.7” and 5” rifles and 6” and 7” howitzers. Their range is much greater than that of the pieces of the light field artillery. In a general way we may say that these heavy pieces will be used only against hostile batteries, earth works and material objects or against troops caught in some mass formation. They will generally not be used against an advancing skirmish line or troops in proper formation to meet light artillery fire. There is no training to be given infantry except discipline to hold them to their duty in an earth work under fire by heavy field artillery, hence in this chapter we may ignore it.

Light artillery

With light field artillery it is very different. The light field artillery is what concerns us most in our training. The extreme range for which these guns are sighted is 6500 yards, and at all ranges under 5000 yards they can produce serious losses on infantry exposed to their fire. They use two classes of projectiles, shell and shrapnel. The high explosive shell has a much smaller radius of action than the shrapnel, but is very effective within this area. It is generally used to batter material objects and with high angle fire to get at men in trenches or behind cover.

Shrapnel

The shrapnel of the 3” rifle contains 252 bullets and on burst these bullets are scattered over an area, roughly speaking, elliptical in form, 200 yards in depth by 25 yards in width. The flatter the trajectory, the deeper becomes the pattern made; the width practically does not vary. In other words the 252 bullets are scattered on burst over an area of 5000 square yards.

If these bullets were uniformly distributed there would be one for every 20 square yards or an area of 15 x 12 feet. They are, however, not evenly distributed, being thicker in a small area near the front end. This bullet will not penetrate the infantry soldier’s pack at any range, so that when lying on the ground his pack affords complete protection to his spine and considerable protection to all vital parts except his head. The chance then of a man being wounded by a single shrapnel, even when inside the cone of dispersion, would only be about 1 in 80 if in the open and very much less with partial cover, as a trench, log, etc. The shrapnel bullet will not pass through one man and wound a second as will the infantry bullet.

Rate of fire

While artillery can fire very rapidly once the range data is accurately determined it requires considerable time to get into position and determine this data. Until then it is harmless.

Moving target

An erratically shifting target is hard for artillery to keep on. The fuze must be so set that the burst is at the proper height and distance to the front of the target to be effective, both not easy especially in case of a moving target, and the more erratic the movement the harder is the task of the artillery-man.

On the defensive

On the defense the man’s protection is much better for he will generally have cover of some kind, but he has also a serious disadvantage, the line remains fixed, the hostile artillery soon locates it, gets its exact range and can place its own fire where it will do the most good. This is a decided offset to the defenders’ diminished vulnerability. The use of high explosive shells by their moral as well as physical effect weakens any advantage the defense might have as concerns artillery fire.

Artillery targets

To determine the relative vulnerability of different infantry formations let us apply to them the target made by a bursting shrapnel. A line of skirmishers at the normal interval extending across this beaten zone would have 19 or 20 men inside its extreme limits; if in squad columns there would be 2 squads at least and generally 3 squads or 24 men and the target, being much deeper, would give the artillery a better chance as it is easier to get direction correctly than the point of burst.

In platoon columns there can be but one platoon in the same burst if fire comes from the front, and platoons are 4 squads strong, but the whole platoon may be within it. If, however, the direction of the artillery fire be very oblique, and the platoons are on a line, more than one platoon may be caught by a single burst but not all of any one column.

In successive thin lines, if the advance be made by one man from a squad, and the fuze and direction be just right, there may be 2 men in the cone of dispersion, which is to say that, in that formation, the artillery has about one chance in forty of wounding a man. If the advance be by one man from each platoon the artillery’s chance, provided range and fuze are correct, is one in two that one man will be within the cone of dispersion of a given shrapnel and, if in there, there is one chance in 80 of his being hit; in other words, the artillery has one chance in 160 of getting one man and no possibility of getting two. Such a target will hardly draw artillery fire.

An infantry battalion in column of squads well closed up can nearly all be covered by the burst of a shrapnel. Such a target would likely draw many shots as would a company in this formation.

The advance under artillery fire