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Minor errors in punctuation and formatting have been silently corrected. Please see the transcriber’s [note] at the end of this text for details regarding the handling of any textual issues encountered during its preparation.

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STUDIES ON SLAVERY,
In Easy Lessons.

COMPILED INTO EIGHT STUDIES, AND SUBDIVIDED INTO

SHORT LESSONS FOR THE CONVENIENCE

OF READERS.

By JOHN FLETCHER,

OF LOUISIANA.

FIFTH THOUSAND.

NATCHEZ:

PUBLISHED BY JACKSON WARNER.

CHARLESTON: McCARTER & ALLEN.—NEW ORLEANS: JOHN BALL.

PHILADELPHIA: THOMAS, COWPERTHWAIT & CO.

1852.

Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1851, by

JACKSON WARNER,

sin the Clerk’s Office of the District Court of the Southern District

of Mississippi.

PRINTED BY SMITH & PETERS,

Franklin Buildings, Sixth Street below Arch, Philadelphia.

PUBLISHER’S PREFACE.

This is a legitimate topic of general interest, and it assumes a preponderating importance to the people of the Southern American States, when the fact is taken into consideration that a general league against the institution of African slavery has been entered into and consummated between most of the civilized nations of the earth, and public opinion in many of the sister States of our own National Union has taken the same direction. The result is, to have arraigned the slaveholding States before the mighty bar of public opinion, on the charge of holding, as property, more than ten hundred millions of dollars’ worth of what does not belong to them, which is and never can be the property of man; and this charge embraces, within its scope, the crimes of theft, robbery, rapine, and cruelty.

The time has come when the South must enter her plea of defence, not because the accusers are foreign nations, of which it may justly be said, before their charges are entertained, “Physician, heal thyself,” but because our accusers are among our own brethren, bound to us by freedom’s holiest associations and religion’s most sacred ties.

The author of the “Studies on Slavery” has the double advantage of a full comprehension of the subject both in its Northern and Southern aspect. Born and educated in the former, and qualified by a long residence in the latter section of our Union, he is amply qualified to weigh the prejudices, the teachings, and the arguments of the one, against the facts, the justifications, the religious and political sanctions of the other.

Mr. Fletcher has not only marshalled into his line of impregnable defence the mandates and sanctions of the Sacred Writings concerning the slave institutions, but he has drawn powerful auxiliaries from the sources of ancient history. His exegesis of biblical passages, in the original languages in which they were communicated by inspiration to the world, shows his sound scholarship, as well as his reverence of the literal sense and specific meaning of God’s holy and unimpeachable standard and rule of life and action.

The author has also analyzed the fountain of Moral Philosophy, and detected the bitter waters of error so industriously infused by the eloquent and magical pens of such writers as Dr. Samuel Johnson, Dr. Paley, Dr. Channing, Dr. Wayland, Mr. Barnes, and others. He has confined himself to the moral and ethical bearings of the question, scarcely touching upon its political aspects,—a course calculated to render the book far more useful to the dispassionate seekers after truth, who may belong to different political sects.

Neither time nor labour has been spared in the authorship of the work; and it is believed that, while it is written with candour and calmness, it will be received by the people of the North as well as of the South as a sincere and enlightened endeavour to seek for truth, and thus allay the tumultuous and disorganizing fanaticism of those who have not had opportunity to study the subject, and are incapable of acting upon it with understanding and true decision.

PROEMIAL

Philosophy knows no obligation that binds one man to another without an equivalent. If one man could be subjected to another, who is not bound to render any thing in return, it would be subversive to good morals and political justice. Such a relation cannot exist, only so far as to reach the immediate death of the subjected. But it has been the error of some good men to suppose that slavery presented such a case. It has been their misfortune also to receive the following succedaneums as axioms in the search for truth:—

“All men are born equal.”

“The rights of men are inalienable.”

“No man has power to alienate a natural right.”

“No man can become property.”

“No man can own property in another.”

“The conscience is a distinct mental faculty.”

“The conscience infallibly distinguishes between right and wrong.”

“No man is under any obligation to obey any law when his conscience dictates it to be wrong.”

“The conscience empowers any man to nullify any law; because the conscience is a part and parcel of the Divine mind.”

“Slavery is wholly founded on force.”

“Slavery originates in the power of the strong over the weak.”

“Slavery disqualifies a man to fulfil the great object of his being.”

“The doctrines of the Bible forbid slavery.”

“There is no word, either in the Old or the New Testament, which expresses the idea of slave or slavery.”

“Slavery places its subjects beyond moral and legal obligation: therefore, it can never be a legal or moral relation.”

“Slavery is inconsistent with the moral nature of man.”

“To hold in slavery is inconsistent with the present state of morals and religion.”

“Slavery is contrary to the will of God.”

“No man can hold a slave, and be a Christian.”

Averments of this order are quite numerous. Fanatics receive them; and some others do not distinguish them from truths.

At any age, and in any country, where such errors are generally adopted, and become the rules of political action, morals and religion are always in commotion, and in danger of shipwreck: for, although, where man has only approached so far towards civilization that even the enlightened can merely perceive them as rudimental, yet the great principles that influence human life, morality and religion, are, everywhere, and always have been the same.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

STUDY I.

[Lesson I].—Wayland’s definition of moral law, page [7] to [8]; sin the antecedent of slavery, [9]; the abuse of slavery a sin, [10].

[Lesson II].—Wayland on the elements of consciousness, [10] to [11]; the degeneracy of races, and slavery as the scriptural means of reclamation, [12]; object of punishment, [13].

[Lesson III].—Wayland on conscience as a distinct faculty, [14], [15]; Channing, Barnes, and abolitionists generally on the same, [16], [17], [18].

[Lesson IV].—Wayland on conscience as an independent faculty derived from Shaftesbury, Hutchinson, and Reid, [18]; combated by Archbishop Seeker, [19]; argument that conscience is neither a distinct faculty nor infallible, [20] to [23].

[Lesson V].—Wayland’s doctrine, that slavery sacrifices the slave’s eternal happiness to the master’s temporal, refuted, [23] to [25]; the master’s interest and the slave’s moral improvement identical, [26], [27].

[Lesson VI].—Wayland’s argument, that slavery is at variance with the laws of God, examined, 27; its connection with productive labour and national wealth considered, [28] to [32]; Sismondi’s theory of labour and capital, [32]; Wayland on slavery as impoverishing soil refuted, [33], [34].

[Lesson VII].—Wayland’s doctrine, that the moral principles of the Bible are opposed to slavery, refuted, [34], [35]; Secker’s authority, [36]; Wayland on slavery as a prohibition of gospel privileges and matrimony controverted, [37] to [40]; Luther and Melancthon quoted, [39]; African practice in regard to matrimony, [40]; interest of masters to promote permanent marriages among their slaves, [40] to [42].

[Lesson VIII].—Wayland, Paley, Channing, and Barnes on the opinion that the sacred writers abstained from condemning slavery on motives of policy, [43] to [47].

[Lesson IX].—Wayland’s doubts, caused by Prof. Taylor, [47] to [50]; Wayland’s assertion, that the inculcation of the duties of slaves is no sanction of slavery, combated, [51], [52].

[Lesson X].—Wayland’s assertion, that Scripture is opposed to slavery, contrasted with the declarations of the Bible, [53]; slavery a desirable and ardently sought condition under certain circumstances—historical proofs, [54] to [57].

[Lesson XI].—Dr. Paley on slavery and the laws of nature, [57] to [61].

[Lesson XII].—Paley on cruelty as an argument against slavery, [62]; Lander’s testimony respecting native cruelty in Africa, [63]; Paley’s slander on Jesus Christ and Paul and Peter repelled, [65] to [67].

[Lesson XIII].—Slavery in ancient Britain, [67]; Dr. Samuel Johnson’s argument against negro slavery analyzed, and overthrown by arguments drawn from the laws of nations and the laws of God, [68] to [82].

STUDY II.

[Lesson I].—Relation of guardian and ward a Divine institution, [83] to [85].

[Lesson II].—Slavery a Divine institution, and the reason why, [85] to [88].

[Lesson III].—Slavery the school of adversity to reclaim wicked nations and individuals—Scripture proofs, [89] to [91].

[Lesson IV].—Albert Barnes on the slavery of the Israelites in Egypt refuted, [92] to [96]; his attempt by human reason to determine the will of God, [97] to [99].

[Lesson V].—Barnes’s examination of the Scripture argument on slavery, and the scriptural account of slavery in the days of Abraham, contrasted, [99] to [109].

[Lesson VI].—The smiles of God on the institution of slavery proved from the argument of Barnes against it, [110]; ratio of slaves to whites, and the relative increase in the United States, [111], [112].

[Lesson VII].—The interest of the master and the direct laws of God against the abuses of slavery coincident, [113], [114]; Barnes’s cure for slavery, [115].

[Lesson VIII].—Barnes’s denial that Christ ever came in contact with slavery compared with scriptural assertions, [116] to [119].

[Lesson IX].—The admission of Barnes in regard to slaves escaping to the Hebrew country, [119]; his assertion, that the Hebrews were not a nation of slaveholders, overthrown by Scripture testimony, [120], [121].

[Lesson X].—Distribution by the Hebrews of captives taken in battle, [122], [123]; Greek custom in regard to captives made in war, [124]; proof-texts from the Bible, [125].

[Lesson XI].—The claim of Barnes to identity with the African race, [126]; his views on Paul’s injunction to sympathize with those in bonds controverted, [127], [128].

[Lesson XII].—Legend of Antioch, Margarita, and the Roman Præfect Olybius, [128] to [133]; song of the slaves, [131], [132]; letter of Olybius to the Emperor Probus, manufactured from the language of Mr. Barnes, [133] to [135].

[Lesson #XIII].—Barnes’s admissions of the existence of Hebrew and Roman slavery, [136], 137.

[Lesson XIV].—The denial of Barnes that slavery cannot be defended by Bible arguments, 138; its influence on agriculture, commerce, arts, and the African slave himself considered, idem; Sedgjo, the African slave in Louisiana, [139], [140]; the Periplus of Hanno, [140], [141]; the testimony of the Landers on the depravity of native Africans, 142 to [144]; the Landers made slaves, [145]; various historical authorities on African and Moorish slavery, [145] to [155].

[Lesson XV].—Authorities to prove African degradation continued, [155] to [158]; slavery subservient to the religious conversion of African slaves, [159], [160].

[Lesson XVI].—Paul’s exhortations to slaves considered, [161], [162]; God’s sentence of four hundred years of slavery upon the Hebrews, [163].

[Lesson XVII].—The assertion of Barnes, that a slave bought with money had compensation commanded to be paid him by Scripture, controverted, [163], [164]; Barnes’s declaration of the cunning of the Apostles in not condemning slavery, [165], [166].

[Lesson XVIII].—Argument that the injunctions of the Bible upon God’s ancient people are in force and equally binding upon Christians now, (Christians are the heirs of Abraham,) 160 to [169].

[Lesson XIX].—Authorities quoted by Barnes, [169]; numerous quotations from Barnes on slavery, [170] to [174].

[Lesson XX].—Wayland’s assertion, that, if the New Testament authorized slavery, it would be the greatest of curses, adopted by Barnes, [174] to [176].

STUDY III.

[Lesson I].—Works of Rev. Dr. Channing—his opinion that the worst errors may arise from religious tendencies, [177], [178].

[Lesson II].—Channing’s seven arguments, that a man cannot be held as property, examined, 178, [179]; his doctrine of conscience and indestructible rights, [180] to [182].

[Lesson III].—Examination of Channing’s seven arguments continued, [183] to [188].

[Lesson IV].—That slavery, disease, and death are necessary effects of sin proved by the chapter of curses, (Deut. xxviii.,) 188 to [193]; Channing’s standard of feeling or sense of duty controverted, [194], [195].

[Lesson V].—Channing’s theory of man’s rights and his consciousness examined, [195], [196]; argument that slavery is the best condition for the African race, [197] to [200]; criticism on Channing’s use of the words nature, conscience, law of nature, &c., [200] to [204].

[Lesson VI].—Channing’s position, that the debasement of African slavery arises from the enslavement of the race in America, controverted, [204] to [206]; its influence on the master race, [206], [207].

[Lesson VII].—Channing’s views of slavery, as conducive to licentiousness and unrestrained cohabitation between masters and female slaves, examined, [207] to [211]; his views of the quality and brotherhood of the races, [212] to [214].

[Lesson VIII].—Channing on the relative productiveness of free and slave labour, [215]; his opinion that the admission of slave territory was just cause for the dissolution of the Union, [217], [218]; his deference to the opinion of Europe, [218]; labour and capital, the political influence of slavery, [219] to [221].

[Lesson IX].—Channing’s views of the scriptural argument in favour of slavery overthrown, by a parallel between slavery and polygamy, [222] to [230].

[Lesson X].—Channing adopting and endorsing Paley’s slander on the integrity of Paul, [230] to [232].

[Lesson XI].—Channing’s plan of emancipation and inflammatory counsels to the free States, [232] to [235].

[Lesson XII].—The zeal of abolitionism not according to knowledge, [235], [236]; Channing’s opinion that the negro is one of the best races of the human family, [237]; Channing on West India emancipation and Southern character, [237] to [239].

[Lesson XIII].—Sympathy for those suffering punishment from God, for sin, considered, [239] to [241]; the deterioration of sin the inevitable cause of slavery, [241] to [243].

[Lesson XIV].—God’s government of the universe, and his declaration of the right of man’s property in man, [243] to [246]; God’s blessing on the slave-owners, [247], [248].

[Lesson XV].—Ham’s intermarriage with the race of Cain the cause of his doom and that of his seed to perpetual servitude, [248] to [250]; God never entails a curse without sufficient cause, [250], [251]; the mark on Cain, [252] to [255].

STUDY IV.

[Lesson I].—Extracts from Bower, [256]; the Treuga Dei, [257], [258]; Bishop England quoted on the action and records of the Church, [259], [260].

[Lesson II].—Establishment of Christianity by law, by Constantine, and the rise of Mohammedanism, 261, [262]; the schism of the Greek Church, [263], [264].

[Lesson III].—Nature swarming with life, and life merging in distress and death, [264], [265]; sin the cause of slavery, and the latter as a protection, [266], [267]; slavery in China, [269].

[Lesson IV].—Liberty of less value than life, [270]; the Divine grant to hold slaves, [271].

[Lesson V].—Early church acts and documents approving and providing for slavery, [272]; the canons and the constitutions of the apostles, [272] to [274]; constitution of Antoninus Pius respecting cruelty to slaves, [275]; canons of the Council of Nice and the first appearance of abolitionism in the world, [276], [277]; St. Basil’s canonical writings, [278].

[Lesson VI].—The invasion of Attila and the Pontiff Leo’s successful intercession, [279], 280; Nero’s African slaves, and the white slaves of the Roman Empire, [281].

[Lesson VII].—Church rescripts for the freedom of slaves, and St. Augustin’s mode of manumission in Africa, [282], [283]; Pope Leo’s letters, forbidding slaves to enter the priesthood, and protecting the rights of masters, [284], [285]; barbarian cruelty to slaves ameliorated by Christianity, [286], [287]; canons of the Council of Agdle on slavery, [288]; modes of becoming slaves, [289], [290].

[Lesson VIII].—Muratori on the manumission of slaves in Rome, [291]; colonial and conditional slaves, [292]; arming of slaves in defence of Rome and the glutting of the slave-markets of the world, [293]; canons of the Fourth Council of Orleans, [294], [295]; ditto Fifth Council of Orleans, [296] to [299].

[Lesson IX].—Bishop England’s account of slavery in England and Ireland in remote ages, [299], [300]; Pope Pelagius and the canons of the Third Councils of Paris and Braga, [301], [302]; articles of the Third Council of Toledo, [302], [303].

[Lesson X].—The venerable Bede’s account of the slave-trade of England, A.D. 577, [304] to [306]; Pope Gregory’s purchase of British youth, [306], [307]; Gregory’s pastoral admonitions and epistles, [308] to [311].

[Lesson XI].—Constantine’s edict that none but Christians could hold slaves, [212], [213]; Gregory’s letter to the Præfect of Sicily, [313] to [315]; canons of the Fourth Councils of Orleans and Macon, [315], [316]; Gregory to the Bishop of Luna, and the laws of the empire on slavery, [317], [318].

[Lesson XII].—Gregory to the Bishop of Naples, [319], [320]; the same to the Bishop of Catania, 321.

[Lesson XIII].—Justinian’s law to protect debtors against slavery, [323]; Gregory’s letters about a Syrian deeply in debt, [322]; his letter of emancipation to Montana and Thomas, [324], [325]; Justinian’s law of marriage between slaves and persons on different estates, [327], [328]; Gregory’s letter on the same subject, [329]; his letter to the Bishop of Syracuse on the same, [330], [331].

[Lesson XIV].—Gregory’s deed of gift conveying the slave boy Acorimus to Theodore the counsellor, [331], [332]; his letter about a slave to the Proctor Bonitus, [333]: his document to reclaim runaway slaves, [333], [334]; his various letters concerning slaves and the purchase of Barbary slaves, [334] to [336].

[Lesson XV].—Canons of the Councils of Toledo and Saragossa, [336] to [339]; laws of Ina, king of the West Saxons, and the judgments of Withred, [340] to [343].

[Lesson XVI].—The canons of Theodore, Archbishop of Canterbury, King Pepin, Council of Bavaria, Pope Adrian and Charlemagne, [343] to [349]; canon of the Council of Frankfort, 349, [350].

[Lesson XVII].—Laws of Charlemagne on slavery, [350] to [353]; canons of the Council of Aix-la-Chapelle, [353]; capitulary of the Emperor Lotharius, [353] to [355].

[Lesson XVIII].—Unconnected facts bearing on ancient slavery; prostitutes made slaves; Sclavonian bondage; persecution of the Knights Templars, [355] to [360].

[Lesson XIX].—Derivation of the word war; Divine authority for wars, [361] to [365]; the church claiming the right to declare offensive war under two circumstances, [365]; bull of Pope Gregory XI. against the Florentines, [366], [367]; Papal bulls against the Venitians and Henry VIII. of England, [367] to [369]; the American colonies at New Haven decreeing the Indian tribes to slavery, [369], [370].

[Lesson XX].—Ancient piracy and pirates, [370], [371]; rise of the Vandals, Goths, Huns, and Tartars, [372]; the Northmen, [373] to [379].

[Lesson XXI].—Condition of slavery in Europe, [379] to [381].

[Lesson XXII].—Origin of the Sclavonians, [381]; the descent of the Arabs and Moors, 383, [384].

[Lesson XXIII].—Africans generally slaves in their native country, [384]; African slavery to the Shemitic races foretold by prophecy, [385], [386]; sketch of the life, doctrines, and conquests of Mohammed and his successors, [386] to [390].

[Lesson XXIV].—Slavery introduced into the world as a mercy in favour of life, [390]; duty and interest combine to incite the master to promote religion and good morals in the slave, [391]; slavery commanded by reason and the laws of nature, [392].

STUDY V.

[Lesson I].—Faith and observance of facts in the moral world the true modes of learning God’s will, [393].

[Lesson II].—The works of creation proofs of the Creator, [394] to [398].

[Lesson III].—The question of the admission of evil into the economy of God’s government on earth, and a denial that all men are born equals, [398], [399]; the five races of the human family, and the moral necessity of command in some and subordination in others, [399] to [402].

[Lesson IV].—Intellect correspondent to organization, [403]; inquiry into the nature of instinct by various philosophers, [403] to [405]; inexorable inequality of human condition in this world and the next, [406] to [408].

[Lesson V].—The moral duty of loving our species defined, [409].

[Lesson VI].—Men not equal physically, religiously, mentally, morally, or politically, [410].

[Lesson VII].—Justice and the rules of Christianity identical and inseparable, [411], [412].

[Lesson VIII].-The golden rule considered in relation to slavery, [413] to [416].

[Lesson IX].—The unchangeableness of God, and human misery caused by a general rebellion against his laws, [417] to [420].

[Lesson X].—Christianity incompatible with savage life, [420], [421].

[Lesson XI].—Gradation in intellect and condition no impediment to Christianity, [421].

[Lesson XII].—Christianity and slavery not antagonistic, [422].

[Lesson XIII].—Christian humility inculcated, [423].

[Lesson XIV].—The radiance of Christian hope equalizes all variety of condition, [423], [424]; sketch of the slave’s prospect of immortal happiness, [426] to [428].

[Lesson XV].—The feebleness of finite conceptions of infinity, [428], [429]; hope for the submissive, [430], [431]; the requirement of God that the strong should protect the weak, [432].

STUDY VI.

[Lesson I.]—Nature of sin; the primal transgression, [433], [434].

[Lesson II.]—The occupation and doom of Cain, [435], [436].

[Lesson III.]—The mark upon Cain, Mohammedan traditions, [437], [438]; proof-texts from Scripture, [439], [440].

[Lesson IV.]—The punishment of Cain did not lead him to reformation, [440]; Asiatic hyperbole in description, [441], [442].

[Lesson V.]—The cause of Cain’s degradation renewed upon Canaan, and his masters named, [442], [443].

[Lesson VI.]—Proofs that the descendants of Ham inherited the curse of Cain, and were black, as also were the Canaanites whom God’s chosen people either exterminated or enslaved, [443] to [447].

[Lesson VII.]—The negro lineage of Ham established, [447] to [451].

[Lesson VIII.]—Signification of the name “Naamah” in Hebrew and Arabic, [451] to [455].

[Lesson IX.]—Variations in different languages of the names of Cain and Naamah, also of other remarkable words, [456] to [458].

[Lesson X.]—The names and derivatives of the words Cain and Naamah found only among the descendants of Ham, [459] to [464].

[Lesson XI.]—Proofs scriptural and historical that the descendants of Ham were black, [464] to [470].

[Lesson XII.]—Biblical proofs that the Canaanites were black, [471] to [473].

[Lesson XIII.]—Scriptural testimony respecting the colour of the races of the human family, [473] to [477].

[Lesson XIV.]—Jewish wars against the Ethiopian race; the Philistines black, [478], [479]; the origin of these wars the animosity between the Shemitic and Hamitic races, [480]; difference in the structure of the bones and the hair between the antagonist races, 481; intermarriage with the Hamitic by the Shemitic race a cause of God’s anger, 482; the dispersion of the Canaanites by the Jewish conquest of Palestine, [482].

[Lesson XV.]—Derivation and train of thought connected with the word Ham in the Shemitic languages, [483] to [487]; the Hebrew personal pronoun, [488] to [491]; origin of the word Ethiopian, [493] to [495].

[Lesson XVI.]—Hebrew, Syriac, Greek, and Coptic derivations of the word Ham, [495] to [502].

[Lesson XVII.]—Exegesis of the thirty-third chapter of Ecclesiasticus, [502] to [503]; the providence of God manifested in placing deteriorated races under the control of races less debased, [504], [505].

STUDY VII.

[Lesson I.]—Critical examination into the meaning of the Greek word δουλος, doulos, slave, as used both by the sacred and classical writers, [506].

[Lesson II.]—Abolition denunciation of the Bible, [507], [508]; tendency to mystery in the human mind; the God of Abraham and Moses, who gave command how to treat slaves, to be trustingly worshipped, [508], [509].

[Lesson III.]—The meaning of δουλος as used by the Greek poets, [510]; Valckenaerus on the phonetic relation of Greek words to their derivative, [511] to [514]; the argument that δουλος could not have meant an unconditional slave, refuted, [515], [516].

[Lesson IV.]—Extracts from Grecian historians, philosophers, and poets, showing the classical sense in which they used the word δουλος and its derivatives, [516] to [536].

[Lesson V.]—The use of the word δουλος by Thucydides, Herodotus, and Xenophon, [536] to 546.

[Lesson VI.]—Extracts from Xenophon continued, [546] to [549].

[Lesson VII.]—Extracts from Xenophon’s Cyropædia, [549] to [554].

[Lesson VIII.]—Extracts from Herodotus of Halicarnassus, [554] to [558].

[Lesson IX.]—The Scriptural use of the word δουλος, [559] to [561].

[Lesson X.]—Scriptural extracts continued, [562] to [564].

[Lesson XI.]—The Greek word signifying slave-stealers in 1 Tim. i. 5 to [11], [564] to [566]; quotation from Xenophon in proof, [566]; the appeal of Mr. Barnes to the Dutch, [567]; Greek words from freeman and slave, [568].

[Lesson XII.]—Paul on slave stealing, [569] to [572].

[Lesson XIII.]—Reasons for Paul’s instructions to Timothy and to Christian slaves respecting slave-stealing and the duties of the servile condition, [572] to [575].

[Lesson XIV.]—The use of the word δουλος by Jesus Christ, [576], [577].

[Lesson XV.]—Use of the word δουλος by Paul, Peter, Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John, [578] to [581].

[Lesson XVI.]—Origin of the English word servant and its derivatives, [581]; its use by the sacred writers and Grecian scholars, [582] to [585].

STUDY VIII.

[Lesson I].—Hebrew orthography of the word by which we mean slave, [586] to [588]; the corresponding word in the Arabic, Chaldaic, and Syriac languages, [588] to [590].

[Lesson II].—Tendency of the Shemitic languages to the rhetorical figure prosopopœia, 590 to [594].

[Lesson III].—Examples of the Hebrew word meaning slave, both as a noun and a verb, [595] to [601].

[Lesson IV].—Refutation of the assertion that the root of the Hebrew word meaning slave is also used in a sense signifying worship, [602] to [607].

[Lesson V].—Further quotations from the sacred writers, showing the meaning attached to the Hebrew word signifying slave in the Old Testament, [607] to [609].

[Lesson VI].—Quotations from the sacred authors of the use of the Hebrew verb signifying to slave, or to be slaves to, [610], [611]; identity of welfare and interest between the slave and his master, [612], [613].

[Lesson VII].—The two distinct eras in the Hebrew language; its approximation to the Chaldaic and Persian in the second era, [613] to [615].

[Lesson VIII].—Meaning attached to the Hebrew word signifying slave by Ezra, Nehemiah, Jeremiah, and other prophets, [616] to [618].

[Lesson IX].—The use of the Hebrew word meaning slave in the book of Genesis, and extract from the Rev. J.B. Stratton’s letter to the author on the same, [618] to [620]; the word Eden in the Arabic, [620], [621]; the Hebrew word meaning tilleth, [622].

[Lesson X].—The laws of Moses in Deuteronomy respecting slavery, [623].

[Lesson XI].—The Hebrew use of the word meaning slaves in Samuel, and many other books of the Bible, [624] to [627].

[Lesson XII].—Declension of the Hebrew noun meaning slave, and the conjugation and paradigms of the Hebrew verb signifying to slave, [628] to [637].

STUDIES ON SLAVERY.

Study I.

LESSON I.

“The Elements of Moral Science: By Francis Wayland, D.D., President of Brown University, and Professor of Moral Philosophy. Fortieth Thousand. Boston, 1849.” Pp. 396.

This author informs us that he has been many years preparing the work, with a view to furnish his pupils with a text-book free from the errors of Paley. Like Paley, whom he evidently wishes to supersede, he has devoted a portion of his strength to the abolition of slavery. We propose to look into the book with an eye to that subject alone. President Wayland says:

P. 24. “Moral Law is a form of expression denoting an order of sequence established between the moral quality of actions and their results.”

Pp. 25, 26. “An order of sequence established, supposes, of necessity, an Establisher. Hence Moral Philosophy, as well as every other science, proceeds upon the supposition of the existence of a Universal Cause, the Creator of all things, who has made every thing as it is, and who has subjected all things to the relations which they sustain. And hence, as all relations, whether moral or physical, are the result of his enactment, an order of sequence once discovered in morals, is just as inviolable as an order of sequence in physics.

“Such being the fact, it is evident that the moral laws of God can never be varied by the institutions of man, any more than the physical laws. The results which God has connected with actions will inevitably occur, all the created power in the universe to the contrary notwithstanding.

“Yet men have always flattered themselves with the hope that they could violate the moral law and escape the consequences which God has established. The reason is obvious. In physics, the consequent follows the antecedent, often immediately, and most commonly after a stated and well-known interval. In morals, the result is frequently long delayed; the time of its occurrence is always uncertain:—Hence, ‘because the sentence against an evil work is not speedily executed, therefore the hearts of the sons of men are fully set in them to do evil.’ But time, whether long or short, has neither power nor tendency to change the order of an established sequence. The time required for vegetation, in different orders of plants, may vary; but, yet, wheat will always produce wheat, and an acorn will always produce an oak. That such is the case in morals, a heathen poet has taught us. ‘Raro, antecedentum scelestum deseruit pede pœna claudo.’ Hor. lib. iii. car. 2.

“A higher authority has admonished us, ‘Be not deceived; God is not mocked; whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he reap.’ It is also to be remembered, that, in morals as well as in physics, the harvest is always more abundant than the seed from which it springs.”

To this doctrine we yield the highest approval.

The first obvious deduction from the lesson here advanced is, that the laws of God, as once revealed to man, never lose their high moral qualities nor their divine character, at any subsequent age of the world. The law, which God delivered to Moses from Mount Sinai, authorizing his chosen people to buy slaves, and hold them as an inheritance for their children after them, is, therefore, the law of God now. The action of the law may be suspended at a particular time or place, from a change of contingencies,—yet the law stands unaffected.

We hope no one doubts the accuracy of the doctrine thus fairly stated in these “Elements.” But we shall see how fatal it is to some portions of the author’s positions concerning slavery. And we propose to show how this doctrine, as connected with slavery, has been, and is elucidated in scripture. The twenty-eighth chapter of Deuteronomy shows that the fruits of wickedness are all manner of curses, finally terminating in slavery or death.

Here, slavery, as a threatened punishment, distinctly looks back to a course of wickedness for its antecedent. The same idea is spread through the whole Scriptures: “Whosoever committeth sin, is the servant of sin.” John viii. 34. “I am carnal, sold under sin.” Rom. vii. 14. “Behold, for your iniquities have ye sold yourselves.” Isa. 1. 1. See, also, Jer. xiii. 22.

The biblical scholar will recollect a multitude of instances where this doctrine is clearly advanced, recognising sin as the antecedent of slavery.

Abraham was obedient to the voice of God. His conduct was the antecedent and the consequent was, God heaped upon him many blessings and among them, riches in various things,—“male and female slaves,” some of whom were “born in his house,” and some “bought with his money;” and God made a covenant with him, granting him, and his seed after him, the land of Canaan for an everlasting possession.

But this gift, as is the continuance of all other blessings, was accompanied with a condition, which is well explained in Genesis, xviii. 19: “For I know him, that he will command his children and his household after him, and they shall keep the way of the Lord to do justice and judgment; that the Lord may bring upon Abraham that which he hath spoken of him.”

Scholars will concede the fact that “his household” is a term by which his slaves are particularly included, over whom his government was extended; and, without its proper maintenance, the covenant so far on his part would be broken.

From the wording of the covenant it is evident that Abraham had slaves before the covenant was made, since it embraced regulations concerning slaves, but, in no instance, hints that the existence of slavery was adverse to the law of God, or that the holding of slaves, as slaves, was contrary to his will. The deduction is, that slavery exists in the world by Divine appointment; and that the act of owning slaves is in conformity with the moral law.

The doctrine, that sin is the antecedent of slavery, is further elucidated and made still more manifest by the recognition of the institution by the biblical writers, where they place sin and slavery in opposition to holiness and freedom:—thus, figuratively, making righteousness the antecedent of freedom. “Stand fast, therefore, in the liberty wherewith Christ has made us free, and be not entangled again with the yoke of bondage.” Gal. v. 1. “And ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free.” John iii. 32.

The abuse of slavery, like the abuse of any thing else, is doubtless a great sin. Of the blessings God bestows on man, there is perhaps no one he does not abuse; and while we examine the laws of God, as presenting to the mind the vast field of cause and effect,—of antecedent and consequent,—we may be led to a reflection on the necessity of a conformity thereto, lest a long continuance of such abuses shall become the antecedent to future calamities and woes, either to ourselves or posterity; woes and calamities prefigured by those nations and tribes already under the infliction of slavery, as a just punishment of sin.

Thus far, we thank the Rev. Dr. Wayland for this fair exposé of his views of the moral law of God; and if he will apply them now to the institution of slavery,—if he will unfetter his intellect from the manacles imposed on it by a defective education on that subject, and cut himself loose from the prejudices that his associations have gathered around him, we may yet have occasion to rejoice over him as one once an estray from the fold of truth, but now returned, “sitting in his right mind and clothed.” And will not Mr. Fuller and Professor Taylor rejoice with us!

LESSON II.

In those “Elements of Moral Science,” we find the following, p. 29:

“From what has been said, it may be seen that there exists, in the actions of men, an element which does not exist in the actions of brutes * * * * * * We can operate upon brutes only by fear of punishment, and hope of reward. We can operate upon man, not only in this manner, but also by an appeal to his consciousness of right and wrong; and by such means as may improve his moral nature. Hence, all modes of punishment, which treat men as we treat brutes, are as unphilosophical as they are thoughtless, cruel, and vindictive. Such are those systems of criminal jurisprudence which have in view nothing more than the infliction of pain upon the offender.”

It was unnecessary to inform us that man possesses higher mental endowments than the brute. But the main object of the author in the foregoing paragraph is his deduction; that, because we can operate on man by an appeal to his consciousness of right and wrong, therefore any other mode of governing him is wrong. This consequent we fail to perceive. We also fail in the perception that his postulate is universally true: which we think should have been proved before he can claim assent to the deduction. If this our view be correct, we beg the reverend author to reflect how far he may have made himself obnoxious to the charge of sophistry!

If President Wayland intends, by the clause,—“and by such means as may improve his moral nature,”—to include corporeal punishment, then his mind was unprepared to grapple with the subject; for, in that case, the whole paragraph is obscure, without object, and senseless. We most readily agree that to govern man by appeals to his consciousness of right and wrong is highly proper where the mind is so well cultivated that no other government is required.

But, however unhappy may be the reflection, too large a proportion of the human family will not fall within that class. How often do we see among men, otherwise having some claim to be classed with the intelligent, those of acknowledged bad habits; habits which directly force the sufferer downward to poverty, disgrace, disease, imbecility, and death,—on whom argument addressed to their “consciousness of right and wrong,” “is water spilled on the ground.”

Children, whose ancestors have, for ages, ranked among the highly cultivated of the earth,—each generation surpassing its predecessor in knowledge, in science, and religion,—have been found to degenerate, oftener than otherwise, when trained solely by arguments addressed to their reason, and unaccompanied by physical compulsion.

What then are we to expect from man in a savage state, whose ancestors have been degenerating from generation to generation, through untold ages,—him, who has scarcely a feeling in common with civilized man, except such as is common to the mere animal,—him, whom deteriorating causes have reduced to the lowest grade above the brute?

Domberger spent twelve years in passing through the central parts of Africa, from north to south. He found the negroes, in a large district of country, in a state of total brutality. Their habits were those only of the wild brutes. They had no fixed residences. They lay down wherever they might be when disposed to sleep. They were not more gregarious than the wild goats. So far as he could discover, they had not a language even, by which to hold intercourse with each other. They possessed no power by which they were enabled to exhibit moral degradation, any more than the wild beasts.

Hanno, the Carthaginian navigator, in his Periplus, eight hundred years before the birth of Christ, gives a similar account of a race he calls Gætuli.

It is possible that man, in these extreme cases, where there is very little to unlearn, might sooner be regenerated, elevated to civilization, physical and mental power, than in other cases where there may be far more proof of mental capacity, but where the worst of intellectual and physical habits have stained soul and body with, perhaps, a more indelible degradation.

It would be a curious experiment, and add much to our knowledge of the races of man, to ascertain how many generations, under the most favourable treatment, it would require to produce an equal to Moses, or a David, a Newton, or the learned Dr. Wayland himself, (if such be possible,) from these specimens of man presented before us! And we now inquire, what course of treatment will you propose, as the most practical, to elevate such a race to civilization?

It appears to us God has decided that slavery is the most effectual.

“Therefore my people are gone into captivity, because they have no knowledge.” Isa. v. 13. “And they forsook the Lord, and served Baal and Ashteroth. And the anger of the Lord was hot against Israel, and he delivered them into the hands of the spoilers that spoiled them, and he sold them into the hands of their enemies round about.” Judg. ii. 13, 14. See also, iii. 6–8. “If his children forsake my law and walk not in my judgments: if they break my statutes, and keep not my commandments: then will I visit their transgressions with the rod and their iniquity with stripes.” Ps. lxxxviii. 30–32. “He that troubleth his own house shall inherit the wind: and the fool shall be the servant (עֶבֶדʿebed ebed, slave) to the wise of heart.” Prov. ii. 29. “And her daughters shall go into captivity. Thus will I execute judgments in Egypt: and they shall know that I am the Lord.” Ezek. xxx. 18. See also the preceding part of the chapter.

It is highly probable that among savage tribes, punishment and the infliction of pain are often applied with no higher view than to torture the object of displeasure. But to us it seems remarkably unfortunate, in a student of moral and civil jurisprudence, to suggest that legal punishment, among civilized men, is ever awarded or ordered with any such feeling. If our education has given us a correct view of the subject, the man who inflicts pain even on the brute, solely on the account of such a feeling, instantly, so far as it is known, sinks to the grade of a savage; and much more explicitly when the object of revenge is his fellow man. On the contrary, when “the offender” has given unquestionable evidence of a depravity too deeply seated for any hope of regeneration, and the law orders his death, it selects that mode of execution which inflicts the least suffering, and which shall have also the greatest probable influence to deter others who may be downward bound in the road of moral deterioration. There never has been a code of laws among civilized nations, where the object of punishment was to inflict pain on the implicated; only so far as was thought necessary to influence a change of action for the better. The object of punishment invariably has been the improvement of society.

If the Rev. Dr. Wayland had been teaching legislation to savages, or, perhaps, their immediate descendants, his remarks, to which we allude, might have been in place. But may we inquire to what cause are we indebted for them?

Permit us to inquire of the Doctor, where now are to be found the “systems of criminal jurisprudence” to which he alludes? Does he imagine that such system has some likeness to the government of the civilized man over his slave? Or, in their government, does he propose to abolish corporeal punishment, because he may think that will destroy the institution itself? For “a servant (עָ֑בֶדʿabed abed, a slave) though he understand, he will not answer.” Prov. xxix. 19.

We cannot pass over the paragraph we have quoted, without expressing the most bitter regret to learn from Dr. Wayland’s own words, that he recognises the fact, without giving it reproval, that “we” punish “brutes” with no other view than to inflict pain. To us, such an idea is most repugnant and awful! And we hope—we pray Him who alone hath power to drag up from the deep darkness of degradation, that the minds of such men may be placed under the controlling influence of a rule that will compel to a higher sense of what is proper, and to a more clear perception of what is truth!

LESSON III.

The learned Doctor says:

P. 49. “By conscience, or moral sense, is meant that faculty by which we discern the moral quality of actions, and by which we are capable of certain affections in respect to this quality.

“By faculty is meant any particular part of our constitution, by which we become affected by the various qualities and relations of beings around us?” * * * “Now, that we do actually observe a moral quality in the actions of men, must, I think, be admitted. Every human being is conscious, that, from childhood, he has observed it.” * * * * *

P. 50. “The question would then seem reduced to this: Do we perceive this quality of actions by a single faculty, or by a combination of faculties? I think it must be evident from what has been already stated, that this is, in its nature, simple and ultimate, and distinct from every other notion.

“Now, if this be the case, it seems self-evident that we must have a distinct and separate faculty, to make us acquainted with the existence of this distinct and separate quality.”

And for proof, he adds: “This is the case in respect to all other distinct qualities: it is, surely, reasonable to suppose, that it would be the case in this.”

What! have we a distinct faculty by which we determine one thing to be red, and another distinct faculty by which we discover a thing to be black; another distinct faculty by which we judge a thing to be a cube, and another distinct faculty by which we determine it to be a triangle? Have we one distinct faculty by which we find a melon, and another by which we find a gourd? What! one distinct faculty by which we determine a professor of moral philosophy to be a correct teacher, and another by which we discover him to be a visionary?

This faculty of moral sense puts us in mind of Dr. Testy’s description of the peculiar and distinct particles upon the tongue, which render a man a liar, a lunatic, or a linguist; a treacher, a tattler, or a teacher, and so on. His theory is that every mental and moral quality of a man has its distinct particle, or little pimple, upon the tongue, whereby the quality is developed; or, by the aid of which the man is enabled to make the quality manifest. Long practice in examining the tongues of sick people enabled him, he says, to make the discovery. We should like to know what acuminated elevation of the cuticle of the tongue represented “conscience or moral sense,” as a separate and distinct faculty!

Why does he not at once borrow support from the extravagancies of phrenology, and assert, according to the notions of its teachers, that, since the brain is divided into distinct organs for the exercise of each distinct faculty, therefore there must be a distinct faculty for the conception of each idea? There is surely an evident relation between this theory of the author and the doctrines of Gall; nor will the world fail to associate it with the phantasies of Mesmer.

But we ask the author and his pupils to apply to this theory the truism of Professor Dodd: “It is, at all times, a sufficient refutation of what purports to be a statement of facts, to show that the only kind of evidence by which the facts could possibly be sustained, does not exist.”

The theory by which the Doctor arrives at the conclusion that we possess a separate and distinct faculty for the perception of each separate and distinct quality, assimilates to that of a certain quack, who asserted that the human stomach was mapped off, like Gall’s cranium, into distinct organs of digestion; one solely for beef-steak, one for mutton-chops, and another for plum-pudding!

It is a great point with certain of the higher class of abolition writers to establish the doctrine that man possesses a distinct mental power, which they call conscience, or moral sense, by which he is enabled to discover, of himself, and without the aid of study, teaching, or even inspiration, what is right and what is wrong.

The practice is, the child is taught by them that slavery is very wicked; that no slaveholder can be a good man; and much of such matter. Books are put into the hands of the schoolboy and the youth, inculcating similar lessons, fraught with lamentation and sympathy for the imaginary woes of the slave, and hatred and disgust towards the master; and when maturer years are his, he is asked if he does not feel that slavery is very wicked; and the professors of moral philosophy then inform him that he feels so because he possesses “a distinct mental faculty”—distinct from the judgment—which teaches those who cultivate it, infallibly, all that is right and wrong; that this conscience, or moral sense, is more to be relied on than the Bible—than the ancient inspirations of God!

Hence, Channing says:

“That same inward principle, which teaches a man what he is bound to do to others, teaches equally, and at the same instant, what others are bound to do to him.” * * * “His conscience, in revealing the moral law, does not reveal a law for himself only, but speaks as a universal legislator.” * * * “There is no deeper principle in human nature than the consciousness of right.” Vol. ii. p. 33.

And Barnes, on Slavery, says:

P. 381. “If the Bible could be shown to defend and countenance slavery as a good institution, it would make thousands of infidels; for there are multitudes of minds that will see more clearly that slavery is against all the laws which God has written on the human soul, than they would see, that a book, sanctioning such a system, had evidence of Divine origin.”

And this same author makes Dr. Wayland say:

P. 310. “Well may we ask, in the words of Dr. Wayland, (pp. 83, 84,) whether there was ever such a moral superstructure raised on such a foundation? The doctrine of purgatory from a verse of Maccabees; the doctrine of papacy from the saying of Christ to Peter; the establishment of the Inquisition from the obligation to extend the knowledge of religious truth, all seem nothing to it. If the religion of Christ allows such a license from such precepts as these, the New Testament would be the greatest curse that ever was inflicted on our race.”

This book, as quoted by Barnes, we have not seen.

Such is the doctrine of these theologians, growing out of the possession, as they imagine, of this distinct moral faculty, infallibly teaching them the truth touching the moral quality of the actions of men. And what is its effect upon their scarcely more wicked pupils? One of them, in a late speech in Congress, says:

“Sir, I must express the most energetic dissent from those who would justify modern slavery from the Levitical law. My reason and conscience revolt from those interpretations which

Torture the hallowed pages of the Bible,

To sanction crime, and robbery, and blood,

And, in oppression’s hateful service, libel

‘Both man and God!’”

The ignorant fanaticism, so proudly buoyant even in repose upon its ill-digested reason,—here so flippantly uttered,—to us bespeaks a dangerous man, (as far as he may have capacity,) in whatever station he may be found. The most hateful idolatry has never presented to the world a stronger proof of a distorted imagination giving vent to the rankest falsehood. It is to be deeply regretted that such intellects are ever permitted to have any influence upon the minds of the young. We deem it would be a fearful inquiry, to examine how far the strange assassinations, lately so common at the North, have been the direct result of that mental training of which we here see an example. We fear too little is thought of the quick transition from this erroneous theology to the darkened paths of man when enlightened alone by his own depraved heart.

The saying is true, however awful: He who rejects or dispels the plain meaning of the Bible, rejects our God, and is an idolater; and God alone can give bound to his wicked conceptions.

The foregoing extracts show us a specimen of the arguments and conclusions emanating from the doctrine that the conscience is a distinct mental power, and that it infallibly teaches what is right before God. We deem it quite objectionable—quite erroneous!

We present the proposition: The judgment is as singly employed in the decision of what is right and wrong, as it is in the conclusion that all the parts of a thing constitute the whole of it. True, the judgment, when in the exercise of determining what is right and wrong in regard to our own acts, has been named conscience. But it remains for that class of philosophers, who argue that man possesses a faculty of clairvoyance, to establish that man has also a sister faculty, which they call conscience, or moral sense; and that it exists as an independent mental power, distinct from judgment.

Most men live without reflection. They think of nothing but the objects of sense, of pressing want, and the means of relief. The wonderful works of nature create no wonder. A mine of sea-shells on the Andes excites no surprise. Of the analogies or dissimilarities between things, or their essential relations, the mind takes no notice. Even their intellectual powers exist almost without their cognisance. Their mental faculties are little improved or cultivated; and, as they are forced to the Gazetteer for the description of some distant locality, so they would be to their logic, before they could speak of their own mental functions.

The teaching of this doctrine, untrue as it is, may, therefore, be very harmful; as ill-informed individuals often form a very erroneous judgment about right and wrong, and, under the influence of its teachings, may come to think and believe that their conclusion concerning right and wrong is the product of their infallible guide, the conscience, or moral sense, and therefore past all doubt and beyond question; that their minds are under the influence and control of a new and spiritually higher law than the law of the land, or even the moral law as laid down in the Bible, when not in unison with their feelings. And we venture to prophesy, in case this doctrine shall gain general credence, that such will be the rocks on which multitudes will founder; for simple and ill-informed people may thus be led, and doubtless are, to do very wicked and mischievous acts, under the influence of this belief—a belief of their possessing this power, which no one ever did possess, unless inspired.

“There is a way that seemeth right unto a man, but the end thereof are the ways of death.” Prov. xvi. 25.

Thus we see there is a class of theologians, who, in hot pursuit of abolitionism, seem ready to sacrifice their Bible and its religion to the establishment of such principles as they deem wholly contradictory to, and incompatible with, the existence of slavery; and it is hence that they attempt to teach that man possesses an intuitive sense of its wrong. But shall we not be forced, with regret, to acknowledge, that there are quacks in divinity as well as in physic?

LESSON IV.

We do not charge Dr. Wayland with being the author of this new doctrine that man possesses an independent and distinct power, faculty, or sense, by the exercise of which he perceives right and wrong, or, in other words, the moral quality of the actions of men, and upon which perception he may rest with safety, as to its accuracy and truthfulness; for the same doctrine has been suggested by greater men than Dr. Wayland, long ago. Lord Shaftesbury, Dr. Hutchinson, and Dr. Reid have laid the foundation; the latter of whom says, (p. 242,) “The testimony of our moral faculty, like that of the external senses, is the testimony of nature, and we have the same reason to rely upon it.“ Again: “As we rely upon the clear and distinct testimony of our eyes, concerning the figures and colours of bodies about us, we have the same reason, with security, to rely upon the clear and unbiassed testimony of our conscience with regard to what we ought or ought not to do.”

Such sentiments may seem to some to be deducible from an indistinct and indefinite reference to our judgment after the understanding has been improved by moral culture, when such judgment, by a mere looseness of language, is sometimes described as if the writers confounded it with the state of mind and moral perfectibility produced by the reception of the Holy Ghost. Thus, Archbishop Secker, in his Fourth Lecture on the Catechism, says:

“How shall all persons know what they are taught to believe is really true?

“Answer. The greater part of it, when it is once duly proposed to them, they may perceive to be so by the light of their own reason and conscience.”

Now it is evident that the bishop’s answer is predicated upon the supposition that the understanding has been cultivated in conformity to the principles of moral truth.

But, from such hasty, perhaps thoughtless, snatches of speculation, occasionally found in some few of the older metaphysical writers, our author and his co-associates in this belief have drawn their materials, remodelled the parts, and reared, even as to heaven, a lofty structure upon a doubtful, tottering base, bringing untold social and political evils upon society, and spiritual death, in its fall, to all who shelter under it. But for the good of the world, in opposition to such a doctrine, truth has erected her column of solid masonry, against which the fanaticism and sophistry of these builders can only, like successive drops of water, carry down the walls some useless portions of the cement.

We repeat, how tottering must be the argument founded upon analogy where there is no relation! We all agree that the senses make truthful representations: all see, smell, and taste alike; vinegar will be sour to the savage, as well as the savant. But is their judgment the same about the moral qualities of actions? What says this moral sense, this conscience, in the savage, who is taught to steal from his friend and torture his enemy? Does the reverend doctor think his moral sense will dictate the same conclusion? What right has he, then, to say, it is the voice of nature—of God? Does he fail to perceive that the moral quality of actions is distinguished by man in conformity to his experience, his training, his education?

We see that men often differ about the moral quality of an action. It might be that no two men would have the same idea about the moral quality of a particular action. Would the conscience, this moral sense, or faculty, in such case, be right in each one? If not, who is to determine which is right and which is wrong? And further, of what use to man can be this distinct, independent, and unchangeably truthful power, which, nevertheless, brings him no certainty? But has the mind of man ever found out that God has overdone, or unnecessarily done, any thing? Will these theorists reflect, that, in case God had seen fit to bestow such a sense on man, inspiration would have been useless, and the Bible not wanted? And the condition of man upon the earth would be wholly stationary instead of progressive. And permit us to inquire, whether this notion of theirs is the reason why some of these theorists speak so rashly, we might say blasphemously, of that sacred volume, upon the condition which they dictate?

The truth is, we have no such infallible guide. The idea of right and wrong, either theologically or physically considered, is always fixed through an exertion of the powers of the understanding. We have no instinctive power reaching the case. Our judgment, our feelings are often unstable, irregular, and sometimes antagonistic. In abstruse cases, very often we cannot even satisfy ourselves what is right and will it be said that we do not often fail to see the object, design, and law of God touching a case?

On every decision on a question of right or wrong, a train of mental action is called into operation, comparing the ideas already in the mind with the facts of the case under review, and noting the similarity of these facts to our idea of right, or whether the facts conform to our idea of wrong. This decision we call judgment: but when the decision reaches to the question of right or wrong, touching our own conduct only, logicians have agreed to call it conscience; not a distinct action from judgment—much less a distinct faculty; and by no means carrying with it more proof of accuracy and correctness than is our judgment about any other matter, where the ideas and facts are equally manifest and accurately presented.

There is another consideration which to us gives proof that the conscience or moral sense is not an independent faculty of the mind, nor to be relied on at all as infallible. Many of us have noticed the changes that imperceptibly come over our moral feelings, and judgment of right and wrong, conscience or moral sense, through the influences of association and habit. Our affluent neighbour, who manifests to others many virtues and some follies, our mind, by association and habit, regards as a perfect model of human greatness and perfection. Thus a corrupt government soon surveys a corrupt people; and a somewhat licentious, but talented and accomplished clergyman, soon finds his hearers in fashion. Nor is it unfrequent, that which should stigmatize a father is beheld with admiration by the son. Thus wealth, to most, is desirable, but its desirability has been created by association; we recollect the objects it enables us to command, often the objects of our principal pursuit. The quality the mind associates with these gratifications, it eventually associates with that which procures them. Thus, we perceive, the mind is able to form a moral estimate upon considerations wholly artificial, which could never happen in case the moral sense was independent, and a distinct faculty teaching us infallible truth.

But how are we to account for the fact that some of the finest intellects, as well as the most learned men, have fallen into this most dangerous error? It should be a subject of deep thought!

We discover, in some men of the highest order of intellects, the power of arriving, as it were instantaneously, at a conclusion, giving it the appearance of being intuitive, rather than the result of what would be, when analyzed, a long chain of reasoning. Thus, the instant and happy thought often springing to the mind when in some sudden or unforeseen difficulty. The nice and instant perception, often displayed by medical men, of the condition of the patient, is an example; and hence the astonishing accuracy of judgment, sometimes noticed in the military commander, from a mere glance of the eye.

In such cases the mind is often not conscious of any mental action; and others, who observe these facts, are led, sometimes, to confound what, in such cases, is a deductive judgment, with intuitiveness. The judgment, thus formed without any perceptible succession of thought, is merely the result of acquirement from long experience and habits of active ratiocination. Some few instances of this unconscious and rapid thought have been exemplified by mathematicians, when the calculator could give no account how he arrived at the conclusion. Will any one claim that they abstract their answers from the most abstruse propositions intuitively, or by instinct, or by any new and distinct faculty of the mind? This habit of mind is as applicable to morals as to any thing else. But in mathematics the data are everywhere the same; whereas in morals the data are as different among men as are their conditions of life; because our ideas of right and wrong, existing in the mind before the judgment is formed on the case to be considered, were introduced by the aid of the senses, through the medium of experience and education; and it is, therefore, quite obvious that the idea of right in one man may be quite like the idea of wrong in another.

But it remains to show the fallacy of the argument by which Dr. Wayland arrives at his conclusion. Let us examine the paragraph quoted, and sift from verbiage the naked points of the argument:

“We do actually observe a moral quality in the actions of men.”

“Do we perceive this quality of actions by a single faculty, or a combination of faculties? This notion” (the perception of the moral quality of an action) “is, in its nature, simple and ultimate, and distinct from every other notion.”

“We have a distinct faculty to make us acquainted with the existence of all other distinct qualities.” “Therefore, it is self-evident that this is a separate and distinct faculty.”