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THE UNITED STATES
AND
LATIN AMERICA

BY

JOHN HOLLADAY LATANÉ

PH. D., LL. D.

PROFESSOR OF AMERICAN HISTORY AND DEAN OF THE
COLLEGE FACULTY IN THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

Author of "From Isolation to Leadership,"
"America as a World Power," etc.

COPYRIGHT, 1920, BY
DOUBLEDAY, PAGE & COMPANY
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED, INCLUDING THAT OF TRANSLATION
INTO FOREIGN LANGUAGES, INCLUDING THE SCANDINAVIAN

SOUTH AMERICA

TO THE MEMORY OF
MY FATHER
WHOSE DAILY COMMENTS ON PUBLIC QUESTIONS
WERE MY FIRST LESSONS IN THE STUDY
OF POLITICS
AND TO
MY MOTHER
WHO IMPARTED TO ME A LOVE OF HISTORY
AND WHOSE APPROVAL IS STILL THE RICHEST
REWARD OF MY EFFORTS

PREFACE

This book is based on a smaller volume issued by the Johns Hopkins Press in 1900 under the title "The Diplomatic Relations of the United States and Spanish America," which contained the first series of Albert Shaw Lectures on Diplomatic History. That volume has been out of print for several years, but calls for it are still coming in, with increasing frequency of late. In response to this demand and in view of the widespread interest in our relations with our Southern neighbors I have revised and enlarged the original volume, omitting much that was of special interest at the time it was written, and adding a large amount of new matter relating to the events of the past twenty years.

Chapters I, II and V are reprinted with only minor changes; III, IV and VI have been rewritten and brought down to date; VII, VIII and IX are wholly new.

J. H. L.

Baltimore,
May 7, 1920.

CONTENTS

THE UNITED STATES
AND
LATIN AMERICA

THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

CHAPTER I

The Revolt of the Spanish Colonies

The English colonies of North America renounced allegiance to their sovereign more through fear of future oppression than on account of burdens actually imposed. The colonies of Spain in the southern hemisphere, on the other hand, labored for generations under the burden of one of the most irrational and oppressive economic systems to which any portion of the human race has ever been subjected, and remained without serious attempt at revolution until the dethronement of their sovereign by Napoleon left them to drift gradually, in spite of themselves, as Chateaubriand expressed it, into the republican form of government. To carry the contrast a step further, when the conditions were ripe for independence, the English colonies offered a united resistance, while the action of the Spanish colonies was spasmodic and disconcerted. The North American revolution gave birth to a federal republic, that of the South to a number of separate and independent republics, whose relations with one another have at times been far from amicable. The causes for these striking differences are to be explained not alone by race psychology, but by a comparison of the English and Spanish colonial systems and of the two revolutions as well. The history of the English colonies and of their revolt has been pretty well exploited, but information in regard to the Spanish-American revolution and its causes, although the sources are abundant, is not easily accessible to English-speaking people.

By virtue of the celebrated Bull of Pope Alexander VI, the Spanish-American colonies were looked upon as possessions of the crown, and not as colonies of Spain. Their affairs were regulated by the king, with the assistance of a board called the Council of the Indies. This council, which was on a footing of equality with the Council of Castile, was established by Ferdinand as early as 1511, and was modified by Charles V in 1524. It was to take cognizance of all ecclesiastical, civil, military, and commercial affairs relating to the colonies. From it proceeded the so-called Laws of the Indies, and all colonial offices in the gift of the crown were conferred by it. In the course of time, however, the personnel of this council became merged with that of Castile, and for all practical purposes the colonies became dependencies of the Spanish nation.

There were from the first establishment of Spanish rule in America, two viceroyalties on the continent. The viceroy of New Spain ruled over Mexico and Central America, whilst all South America subject to Spanish control was for about two centuries under the viceroy of Peru. In regions too remote to be under his immediate control, audiencias, or courts of justice, were established, the president of the audiencia being known by the title of captain-general. Thus audiencias were established at Quito in 1542, at Charcas (in modern Bolivia) in 1559, in New Granada in 1564, in Chile in 1568, and later at Caracas and at Buenos Aires. In 1740, New Granada was raised to the rank of a viceroyalty, with its capital at Bogota; and in 1776 the same dignity was conferred on Buenos Aires. There were thus on the southern continent three viceroyalties widely separated: one on the Main, one on the Atlantic, and one on the Pacific.

The powers of the viceroy, or captain-general, as the case might be, were limited only by the audiencia, consisting of from three to five members, always of Spanish birth, whose functions were largely advisory, but who had the privilege of corresponding directly with the Council of the Indies, and who in case of emergency sometimes went so far as to depose the viceroy.

It should be borne in mind that in Spanish America the native Indian races were not driven beyond the frontier of civilization, as they were by the English settlers, but became, and remain to this day, an integral part of the population. There was thus in the Spanish colonies an unusual admixture of races. There were (1) European Spaniards; (2) Creoles, or children born in America of Spanish parents; (3) Indians, the indigenous race; (4) Negroes of African race; (5) Mestizos, children of whites and Indians; (6) Mulattoes, children of whites and negroes; and (7) Zambos, children of Indians and negroes.

The maladministration of Spain's colonies may be summarized under two heads: (1) acts of oppression against the native Indian race, and (2) regulations of a commercial and political character, which acted in restraint of the economic and social development of her own offspring in America.

Under the first head may be mentioned the mita, or forced labor in mines, farms, and factories, and the repartimiento, or encomienda, which was an allotment to Spaniards of territory including the native inhabitants as peons or vassals. In spite of humane restrictions placed by law upon them, these institutions degenerated into systems of fearful oppression, which led, in 1781, to the heroic but unsuccessful efforts of Tupac Amaru, the last of the Incas, to free the land of his fathers from the cruel rule of the Spaniard. So deep-seated was the dissatisfaction and so formidable the revolt, that it was not suppressed for more than two years. The unfortunate Inca and most of his family were cruelly put to death.

The economic and commercial restrictions imposed upon the colonies require fuller notice. The whole object of Spain's colonial policy was to extract gold and silver from America and to force Spanish manufactures and products upon that country. Commerce was confined to Spain and to Spanish vessels.

No South American could own a ship, nor could a cargo be consigned to him; no foreigner was allowed to reside in the country unless born in Spain; and no capital, not Spanish, was permitted in any shape to be employed in the colonies. Orders were given that no foreign vessel, on any pretence whatever, should touch at a South American port. Even ships in distress were not to be received with common hospitality, but were ordered to be seized as prizes, and the crews imprisoned.[1]

As late as 1816, when the United States protested against the blockade established by General Morillo, as contrary to international law, M. Onis, the Spanish minister, replied that the object of the blockade was to maintain the laws of the Indies, which during the Napoleonic wars had been somewhat relaxed, adding:

You are aware that, agreeably to those laws, no foreign vessel was allowed to trade with the dominions of his majesty on that continent without a special license, and that vessels found near or evidently shaping a course towards them were liable to confiscation as interlopers.

When, later in the year, a United States commissioner was sent to Cartagena to reclaim American vessels so seized, the Spanish viceroy gave him to understand that he did not pretend to be acquainted with the law of nations.[2]

Not only were the colonists prohibited from engaging in manufactures which interfered with those of Spain, but restrictions were even placed on agriculture in the interests of the Spanish producer. Thus the cultivation of flax, hemp, and saffron was forbidden under severe penalty; the cultivation of tobacco was not allowed; and grapes and olives could be raised only for table use, so that oil and wine had to be imported from Spain. Upon one occasion (in 1803) orders were sent "to root up all the vines in certain provinces, because the Cadiz merchants complained of a diminution in the consumption of Spanish wines."[3]

The carrying out of this commercial system in all its details was entrusted to the Casa de Contratacion, or House of Trade, which was located at Seville until 1717, when it was transferred to Cadiz. The India House, as it was called, was established by warrant of Queen Joanna in 1503.[4] To this house were to be brought all merchandise for the colonies and all products from them of whatever character. The colonial trade was thus limited to one Spanish port. The affairs of the house were in charge of three commissioners or judges, who had jurisdiction, civil and criminal, over all cases arising out of the trade with America. Their authority was subordinated to no other court or council but that of the Indies.

Not only were no foreigners allowed to go to the Spanish colonies, but careful restrictions were placed on the movement of Spaniards to and from America. In 1511 King Ferdinand had by a special order permitted all subjects of Spain without distinction to go over to the Indies upon entering their names at the India House; but in the years 1518, 1522, 1530, and 1539 several orders were passed "that no person reconciled, or newly converted to our holy Catholic faith, from Judaism or Mahometanism, nor the children of such, nor the children or grandsons of any that had worn the St. Andrew's Cross of the Inquisition, or been burnt or condemned as heretics, or for any heretical crime, either by male or female line, might go over to the Indies, upon pain of forfeiting all their goods, of an hundred lashes, perpetual banishment from the Indies, and their bodies to be at the king's disposition."[5]

The commissioners might "grant passes to merchants to go over, or return if they came from thence, including married merchants, provided they have leave from their wives, and give 1,000 ducats security to return within three years."[6]

There were also strict rules about passing from one province in America to another. This could not be done without special leave from the king.[7] "The inhabitants of the Indies may not come to Spain without leave from the viceroys, presidents or governors of the places of their habitation, in which they are to express the causes of their coming, and whether it is to stay here or return."[8] "In the Indies, the magistrates are directed to apprehend any persons they find are gone over without leave, to imprison them till they can send them back into Spain, upon pain of losing their employments."[9] In 1594 and 1602 it was decreed that persons going over without leave should be sent to the galleys for four years. In 1622 King Philip IV decreed that a person simply going aboard a ship bound for the Indies without leave should be immediately sent to the galleys for eight years.[10] Other decrees equally severe were issued from time to time.

In order to keep the trade strictly under control and to properly protect it, intercourse with the colonies was held only once a year. Two squadrons, consisting of merchant ships and convoys under command of an admiral and vice-admiral, made the trip each year. The fleet for New Spain (Mexico) sailed in the spring, and that for the mainland in the early fall. The first touched at some of the islands and then went to Vera Cruz; the latter touched first at Cartagena and passed on thence to Porto Bello, where the fair was held about the middle of March. This fair was the great event of the year, and lasted forty days from the time of the arrival of the fleet. From this point goods were distributed by way of Panama to Peru, Chile, and even across the continent to Buenos Aires. The gold bullion was sent in turn to this point by the viceroy of Peru. It came in fifteen days from Potosi to Arica, thence by sea in eight days to Callao, and in twenty days from Callao to Panama. The viceroy of Peru was to take care to have the plate at Panama by the middle of March. At Porto Bello it was taken aboard the galleons. About the middle of June the galleons met the fleet from New Spain at Havana, and from that point the two fleets with their convoys proceeded in greater safety to Spain. Thus for two centuries all intercourse between Spain and her colonies at one end of the line was limited at first to Seville, and then to Cadiz; and at the other to Vera Cruz and Porto Bello.[11] At a later period this arrangement was modified to some extent, and Buenos Aires was made a port of entry. The reason for not permitting trade with Buenos Aires during the earlier period was the fear that the British and Dutch would smuggle through that port.

While the relations of the colonies with Spain were kept under the strictest control, intercourse with foreign nations, although absolutely prohibited under the severest penalties, could not be entirely prevented. In speaking of Spain's restrictive policy, a British naval officer, who was on the South American station during the revolution, says:

Unfortunately, however, for that system, the South Americans, notwithstanding the network of chains by which they were enveloped, had still some sparks of humanity left, and, in spite of all their degradation, longed earnestly for the enjoyments suitable to their nature; and finding that the Spaniards neither could nor would furnish them with an adequate supply, they invited the assistance of other nations. To this call the other nations were not slow to listen; and, in process of time, there was established one of the most extraordinary systems of organized smuggling which the world ever saw. This was known under the name of the contraband or forced trade, and was carried on in armed vessels, well manned, and prepared to fight their way to the coast, and to resist, as they often did with effect, the guarda costas, or coast blockades of Spain. This singular system of warlike commerce was conducted by the Dutch, Portuguese, French, English, and latterly by the North Americans. In this way goods to an immense value were distributed over South America; and although the prices were necessarily high, and the supply precarious, that taste for the comforts and luxuries of European invention was first encouraged, which afterwards operated so powerfully in giving a steady and intelligible motive to the efforts of the Patriots in their struggle with the mother-country. Along with the goods which the contraband trade forced into the colonies, no small portion of knowledge found entrance, in spite of the increased exertions of the Inquisition and church influence, aided by the redoubled vigilance of government, who enforced every penalty with the utmost rigor. Many foreigners, too, by means of bribes and other arts, succeeded in getting into the country, so that the progress of intelligence was gradually encouraged, to the utter despair of the Spaniards, who knew no other method of governing the colonies but that of mere brute force, unsupported by the least shadow of opinion, or of good will.[12]

The trade carried on by foreign interlopers grew to such alarming proportions that before the middle of the eighteenth century Spain found it necessary to relax the restrictions upon the private trade of her own subjects. This led, about 1748, to the discontinuance of the annual fleets or galleon trade.

The political administration of the country was absolutely in the hands of Spaniards, who as a rule were not allowed to marry, acquire property, or form any permanent ties in America. In the summary of charges against Spain appearing in the Argentine Manifesto of 1817, one of the specifications is, that of one hundred and sixty viceroys who had governed in America, four natives of the country alone were numbered; and of six hundred and two captains-general, all but fourteen had been Spaniards.

The monopoly of Spanish trade in South America was partially surrendered by the treaty of Utrecht, signed in 1713, at the close of the War of the Spanish Succession. By this treaty England agreed to recognize Philip V as king of Spain and the Indies, and in turn was granted the assiento, or contract for supplying the Spanish colonies with African slaves.[13] The importation of negroes into the Spanish possessions had been carried on under contract from the very first. The assiento, which had been previously granted to Spanish subjects, was, in 1696, granted to the Portuguese Company of Guinea, and in 1702 to the Royal Guinea Company of France; but in 1713 England secured this lucrative monopoly and became the great slave-trading power of the world.

The assiento of 1713, which was very carefully drawn up in 42 articles, granted to an English company the sole right of supplying slaves to the Spanish West Indies and to South America for the period of thirty years from May 1, 1713. By it the Queen of England undertook to see that the company chartered by her should introduce into the Spanish West Indies, including South America, 144,000 negroes of both sexes and all ages within thirty years, at the rate of 4,800 a year. The company was to pay a duty of 33⅓ pieces of eight (dollars) for each negro imported. In addition to the 4,800 a year, other negroes might be imported at a duty of 16⅔ dollars each, thus encouraging larger importations. The negroes could be brought in either Spanish or English vessels, manned with English or Spanish sailors, provided only no cause of offense be given to the Catholic religion. The majority of the negroes were to be taken to Cuba and Porto Rico, and to the ports on the Main; but of the 4,800, the company had the right to take 1,200 to Buenos Aires, 800 to be sold there and 400 to be carried to the provinces up the Plata and to the kingdom of Chile. They were also allowed to carry negroes across the isthmus from Porto Bello to Panama, and there re-ship them to Peru. Either Englishmen or Spaniards could be employed in the business, provided that there were not more than four or six Englishmen in any port, and that these should be amenable to the laws in all respects as Spanish subjects. By no means the least remarkable provision of this treaty was that their British and Catholic majesties were each to receive one-fourth of the profits of this traffic.

Ships engaged in this trade were to be searched on arrival at port, and all merchandise found on board was to be confiscated and heavy penalties inflicted. On condition, however, that the company should not attempt any unlawful trade, his Catholic Majesty granted them the privilege, during thirty years, of sending annually a ship of 500 tons to the fair at Porto Bello. The Spanish king was to be concerned one-fourth in the profits.[14] It seems that the company stretched this privilege to the utmost. The ship always stopped at Jamaica, took on all the goods she could, and carried along with her five or six smaller vessels laden with goods. When she got near Porto Bello, all her provisions were put in the tenders and the goods these bore taken aboard. She then entered the harbor laden down to the water's edge. Thus this single ship was made to carry more than five or six of the largest galleons.[15]

Thirty years before the Spanish colonies began their war of independence, the British government had entertained the idea of revolutionizing and separating them from Spain. This idea seems to have arisen in 1779, during the administration of Lord North, when Spain joined France in the alliance with the American colonies against Great Britain.[16] It was suggested at first, no doubt, as a measure of retaliation, but was frequently agitated in later years with the avowed object of opening up South America to British commerce. The same idea was the basis of Miranda's scheme for the liberation of his native land.

Francisco de Miranda[17] (1754-1816), a native of Caracas, Venezuela, was the first Spanish-American patriot. He was with the American army for a time during the Revolutionary War, but in what capacity is not quite settled. It is stated by some writers that he held a commission under LaFayette. The success of our war inspired him with the hope of freeing his own country from Spanish control. He confided his views to his friends in the United States, particularly to Alexander Hamilton, "upon whom he fixed his eyes as a coadjutor in the great purpose of his life." Shortly after Miranda had returned to his native land his schemes were discovered. He fled to the United States, and later to England, where he had repeated conferences with Pitt. Finding no help for his revolutionary schemes in England, he went to the continent and traveled through France, Germany, Turkey, and Russia. At the Russian court he was warmly received, but was soon dismissed at the demand of the Spanish minister. At news of the dispute between England and Spain about Nootka Sound in 1790, he hastened to England and communicated his scheme to the British ministry. Pitt lent a ready ear to his views as long as the dispute lasted, with the intention of making use of him in the event of a rupture with Spain. But when the dispute was peaceably settled, Miranda's hopes fell to the ground and he left England. His scheme was only temporarily abandoned, however. He considered himself to have been ill-used by Pitt on this occasion, as he subsequently stated to Rufus King, the American minister to England.

The French Revolution was now well under way, and the wars upon which the republic was entering offered an attractive field for a soldier of republican ideas. In April, 1792, Miranda went to Paris with introductions to Pétion and the leading Girondists, hoping that the revolutionary party might help him in his plans. He was given a commission as brigadier-general in the French army, and served in responsible posts under Dumouriez on the eastern frontier. He conducted the siege of Maestricht and commanded the left wing of the French army at the disastrous battle of Neerwinden, March, 1793, in which Belgium was reconquered by the Austrians. Dumouriez now declared against the Convention, but his troops having refused to follow him, he went over to the Austrians in company with the Duke of Chartres, Louis Philippe. Miranda fell under suspicion of treason and was forced to undergo a court-martial, but was acquitted. For some unexplained reason he was shortly after thrown into prison. He soon secured his release, but for several years disappears from public view. His services in behalf of the republic received in time due recognition. His name appears on the Arc de Triomphe in Paris in the list of the heroes of the Revolution.

In January, 1798, Miranda returned to England. As Spain was now the close ally of France, he hoped to secure the coöperation of Great Britain in his scheme. He also hoped to secure aid from the United States. The people of Kentucky and Tennessee were far from satisfied with the provisions of the Spanish treaty of 1795 in regard to the navigation of the Mississippi River. Then, too, just at this time, war between the United States and France seemed inevitable, on account of the resentment by France of the Jay treaty and her treatment of the American representatives. Washington had been called from his retirement at Mt. Vernon to assume the post of commander-in-chief of the army, while the active command was to be given to Hamilton. Hamilton had expressed great interest in Miranda's projects and was a man of known ambition. His appointment, therefore, as the virtual commander-in-chief of the American army made Miranda hopeful of his coöperation.

Mr. King, the American minister at London, entered heartily into the plans of General Miranda, and his correspondence on that subject, during the year 1798, with his government and with Hamilton is quite voluminous.[18] For a time it seemed as if Great Britain and the United States would coöperate for the purpose of revolutionizing Spanish America. The plan, as entertained by Miranda and Hamilton, was for England to supply the naval force and the United States the land forces. Miranda believed that six or eight vessels of the line and four or five thousand troops would be sufficient,[19] though Hamilton thought it would require ten thousand troops. England's participation in the scheme depended upon the relations between France and Spain. Mr. King wrote to his government, February 26, 1798:

Two points have within a fortnight been settled in the English cabinet respecting South America. If Spain is able to prevent the overthrow of her present government and to escape being brought under the entire control of France, England (between whom and Spain, notwithstanding the war, a certain understanding appears to exist) will at present engage in no scheme to deprive Spain of her possessions in South America. But if, as appears probable, the army destined against Portugal, and which will march through Spain, or any other means which may be employed by France, shall overthrow the Spanish government, and thereby place the resources of Spain and of her colonies at the disposal of France, England will immediately commence the execution of a plan long since digested and prepared for the complete independence of South America. If England engages in this plan, she will at Philadelphia propose to the United States to coöperate in its execution, Miranda will be detained here, under one pretense or another, until events shall decide the conduct of England.[20]

England's policy in regard to South America for the next twenty years substantially confirmed the interpretation of her motives here given by Mr. King.

During the summer of 1798 Mr. King had several conferences with the British ministry in regard to the Spanish-American question, but it was always understood that they were personal and wholly unauthorized. What occurred at these interviews was, of course, always communicated to the American government, but as they were unofficial and communicated merely in the nature of information, the State Department preferred to keep the matter on the same basis and did not refer to the matter in its dispatches to Mr. King. This caused him no little annoyance.[21] In the same way no notice was taken of General Miranda's letter to President Adams.

Hamilton, however, was very frank in the expression of his views both to General Miranda and to Mr. King. Under date of August 22, 1798, he wrote to the latter:

I have received several letters from General Miranda. I have written answers to some of them, which I send you to deliver or not, according to your estimate of what is passing in the scenes where you are. Should you deem it expedient to suppress my letter, you may do it and say as much as you think fit on my part in the nature of a communication through you. With regard to the enterprise in question, I wish it much to be undertaken, but I should be glad that the principal agency was in the United States—they to furnish the whole land force necessary. The command in this case would very naturally fall upon me, and I hope I should disappoint no favorable anticipation.

The United States, however, succeeded in coming to an understanding with France, while England was unwilling to deal such a serious blow to Spain as long as there was a chance of arraying her against Napoleon. The communication of the views of the British government at Philadelphia, to which Mr. King referred as a preliminary, was never made. Miranda's hopes finally fell through at the reëstablishment of peace in Europe by the treaty of Amiens, which lasted until 1803. He lingered in Europe some time longer, until, wearied out by years of fruitless negotiation with the British government, he, for the time being, gave up all hope of success in that quarter and returned once more to the United States.

Arriving in New York from England in November, 1805, Miranda proceeded to lay his cause once more before Mr. King, who had so warmly befriended him in London, and to solicit his coöperation in fitting out an expedition for South America. While expressing his full sympathy with the cause, Mr. King stated emphatically that he could render him no assistance, nor could any individuals safely do so, without the countenance of the government. He, therefore, advised Miranda to go to Washington and lay his plans before the administration. This Miranda did. He was admitted to informal conferences both with President Jefferson and Secretary of State Madison. Upon his return to New York he represented to those interested in his schemes that he had secured from the government a secret sanction of his project, and that the administration, though unwilling to take the initiative, would support the undertaking so soon as the standard of revolution should once have been raised on the Spanish Main. Miranda's chief supporter was Colonel Smith, surveyor of the port of New York, whose influence as a public official in close touch with the administration was decisive in persuading many adventurous spirits to join the expedition with the belief that it was really secretly backed by the government of the United States.

Miranda left New York in the early part of February, 1806, in the Leander, with an imperfectly equipped force of about 200 men, most of whom were commissioned as officers and promised commands in the South American army, which was expected to spring from the soil at the magic touch of Miranda's step upon the shores of his native land. The ship proceeded to Jacquemel, San Domingo, where Miranda expected to get the necessary supplies and reinforcements. Here disappointments awaited him, disputes with the ship's captain ensued, and over a month was fruitlessly spent, while the Spanish authorities on the Main had time to put themselves on the alert. It was not until the last of April that the expedition, reinforced by two schooners, appeared off the coast of Venezuela near Porto Cabello. They were attacked by two Spanish vessels, which captured the schooners with about sixty men and large stores, while the Leander ignominiously took to flight.

Miranda then sailed for Barbados, where he solicited aid from the British admiral, Lord Cochrane, in command on the West Indian station. Lord Cochrane, without definite instructions from his government, but acquainted with its general policy in regard to South America, and knowing of the close relations in which Miranda had stood for years with the British ministry, decided to assist him in landing. With this understanding he signed with Miranda an agreement to the effect that in the event of the success of the expedition, Great Britain should always be held on a footing with the most favored nation, and that British ships should receive a deduction of ten per cent. upon duties paid by all other nations, except the United States.[22] On the twentieth of June, the expedition left Barbados under convoy of a part of Admiral Cochrane's squadron, and on August 2, 1806, effected a landing near Coro, Venezuela. They easily took possession of the town, the unarmed inhabitants fleeing before them. Here Miranda remained about ten days, issuing proclamations and vainly waiting for the natives to join him. His position, meanwhile, was becoming unsafe, so he abandoned it and took possession of the little island of Aruba off the coast. Lord Cochrane, seeing that the expedition was a failure, and not wishing further to compromise his government, sent no reinforcements and finally ordered the withdrawal of the ships that had accompanied the expedition. Miranda was offered a convoy back to Trinidad, which he accepted, leaving Aruba, September 27, 1806. At Trinidad the members of the expedition dispersed.[23]

The Americans who had taken part in the expedition and survived were prosecuted in the United States courts for violation of the neutrality laws. They claimed that they had enlisted in the undertaking with the connivance of the government at Washington. Jefferson's enemies made great political capital of the affair. Members of the cabinet were summoned as witnesses, but refused to appear. Privately Jefferson and Madison both denied most emphatically having in any way committed the government to Miranda's undertaking, or having acted in any way in disregard of our obligations to Spain.[24]

Aside from accomplishing nothing, the expedition of 1806 was a great injury to Miranda's cause. He himself lost prestige as a military leader and brought his character into question as having misrepresented his connection both with the British and United States governments. However, upon the occupation of Spain by Napoleon in 1808, Miranda again hastened to England and urged upon the ministry the claims of his country, in whose interests he had now been laboring incessantly as an exile for more than twenty years. We cannot but admire his tenacity of purpose in the face of the most disheartening failures.

Not only did the British government lend its encouragement, through Lord Cochrane, to the filibustering expedition from the United States with which Miranda hoped to revolutionize Venezuela, but about the same time it sent an expedition against the provinces of the Plate. This attack, like the assistance given to Miranda, was ill-timed and not properly followed up. The policy seems to have been outlined by Pitt, but was put into execution after his death by the short-lived ministry of Grenville and Fox. The government of the Duke of Portland, which succeeded after a few months, and in which Castlereagh and Canning were the most conspicuous figures, did not deem it expedient to follow up the undertaking.[25] In fact, the fate of the expedition was already sealed when Portland came into power.

The victory of Trafalgar had given the English control of the Atlantic. A force of some 6,000 men was dispatched to the South Atlantic without its destination being known. It proceeded to Rio Janeiro, Portugal then being in alliance with England. The viceroy of the Plate became alarmed and prepared to defend Montevideo, which he thought would be the first point of attack. The expedition, however, passed by and proceeded to the Cape of Good Hope, which it wrested from the Dutch. In 1806 a dash was made from the Cape for the river Plate. Sir Home Popham commanded the fleet, and General Beresford the land force, which amounted to 1,635 men. On June 6 the squadron arrived at the mouth of the Plate. The ships had some difficulty in ascending the river, but on the 25th they came to anchor at a point fifteen miles below Buenos Aires. The city was captured with little or no resistance, the inhabitants having been led to believe that the British had come to liberate them. The contents of the public treasury were handed over to the invaders. The inhabitants were required to swear allegiance to George III, private property was respected, the free exercise of their religion was allowed, and all officials who took the oath were continued in office. When Beresford refused to proclaim the independence of the province, or to give any assurance for their future independence, the inhabitants, who had now learned how insignificant the invading force really was, began to prepare for resistance. A leader was readily found in the person of Jacques Liniers, a Frenchman, who had been for thirty years in the service of Spain. He and Juan Martin de Puyrredon began an organized movement for the expulsion of the English. On the 12th of August, Beresford, who had remained all this time without reinforcements, was compelled to surrender. Troops ordered to his support from the Cape did not arrive until later.

Sobremonte, the viceroy, had deserted Buenos Aires and established himself at Montevideo. The people of Buenos Aires, therefore, deposed him and chose Liniers in his place.

During the fall other English reinforcements arrived, and in January, 1807, Montevideo was taken by assault. As soon as the defeat of Beresford was known, General Whitelocke was sent to take command of the united English forces of the Plate, now some twelve thousand in number. He arrived in the spring. The reconquest of Buenos Aires now seemed an easy matter. It had been taken in the first instance by sixteen hundred men; there were now ten thousand available. On June 28 the British landed at the small port of Enseñada, forty-eight miles below Buenos Aires. The fighting continued on the outskirts of the city in a desultory manner and without any decisive action for several days. But finally, owing to the bad generalship and incompetency of Whitelocke, his troops got into such a muddle that half the force was captured or disabled. On July 6, Liniers decided to send a flag of truce with the proposal to surrender all the English prisoners, including those taken with Beresford, provided Whitelocke would evacuate the territory of Buenos Aires. One of Liniers' associates, Alzaga, insisted that the terms of surrender should include Montevideo. This demand seemed preposterous, but the clause was finally inserted, and to their surprise agreed to, so complete was the demoralization of the English. On July 7 the terms of capitulation were signed.[26] Thus through a lack of decision in the cabinet and a display of incapacity in the field, without parallel in British annals, the empire of the Plate was lost.[27]

With Napoleon's invasion of Spain in 1808, the Spanish-American question came to the front once more. Miranda returned to London and was detained there by the cabinet, as before by Pitt, with a view to using him if occasion should require. At the same time Castlereagh, now Foreign Secretary, had other solutions of the question in view. It was proposed, and the matter seriously discussed in the cabinet, to alienate the colonies from Spain, if possible, without revolution; and, instead of establishing republics according to Miranda's plans, to unite them all under a prince of the House of Bourbon. Louis Philippe, Duke of Orleans, was suggested as the most suitable person for the new crown. Some thirty years prior to this, immediately upon the recognition by Spain of the independence of the United States, Count de Aranda had advised Charles III to forestall the movement for independence, which must inevitably come in his own provinces, by establishing among them three great empires—one in Mexico, one in Peru, and one on the Main—each to be ruled by a prince of the royal family of Spain.[28]

Chateaubriand brought forward a similar plan several years later at the Congress of Verona. The present scheme was suggested by General Dumouriez in the interests of his friend, the Duke of Orleans. Several memorials on the subject, both by Dumouriez and the duke, were presented to the British government in 1807 and 1808.[29]

Napoleon's invasion of Spain constitutes at once the most contemptible and the most disastrous chapter in his career. In 1807, under the terms of an agreement with Godoy, the unworthy favorite of the queen and the virtual ruler of Spain, a French army was introduced into the kingdom for the nominal purpose of punishing Portugal for her refusal to join the continental system. The Portuguese royal family, fully appreciating the danger in which they stood, fled to America and founded the empire of Brazil, which in 1815 was declared independent of Portugal. The Spanish rulers attempted to follow their example, but their intended flight became known and they were prevented by the populace from leaving the capital. In the meantime a disgraceful quarrel having arisen between the old king, Charles IV, and Prince Ferdinand, Napoleon, whose troops were now firmly established in Spain, stepped in as arbiter between father and son and summoned them both to meet him on the northern frontier. Having purposely lingered in France beyond the appointed time, he succeeded in enticing them over the border to Bayonne, where he compelled both to renounce forever the crown of Spain and the Indies, which he forthwith bestowed upon his brother Joseph. When the truth dawned upon them, the Spanish nation rose to a man. Napoleon had unwittingly aroused the latent principle of nationality; he had put into action a force which was new and one which the statesmen of Europe had hitherto left out of account, but which was to prove the most potent factor in the new epoch of political history introduced by the French Revolution.

Provisional juntas were rapidly organized in the various provinces of the kingdom of Spain and affairs administered in the name of Ferdinand VII. The Junta, or as it is better known, the Regency of Cadiz, rapidly gained a position of national importance and became the chief executive body of the Spanish nation. The American provinces, which had long been restive under Spanish rule, now claimed the same right of self-government that the provinces of the Peninsula had assumed, and began to depose the Spanish governors and to set up juntas of their own, still acting in the name of Ferdinand VII. The Americans claimed that they were not politically a part of Spain, but connected only through the sovereign, and that with the removal of the sovereign the connection ceased. The Regency of Cadiz, on the other hand, maintained that the colonies were integral parts of Spain, and claimed, therefore, the right to govern them in the absence of the sovereign.

The first throes of revolution were felt in 1809, almost simultaneously in Upper Peru, Quito, and Mexico. These movements were quickly suppressed with great cruelty. In the year 1810 the revolution opened upon a vast scale. All the Spanish colonies on the mainland, with the exception of Lower Peru, revolted at the same time and proclaimed their independence of Spain, although still professing allegiance to Ferdinand VII, the dethroned king.

The colonial authorities were deposed in most cases by force of public opinion and without violence. The revolution was municipal in character, that is to say, the cabildos, or town councils, the only popularly constituted political bodies in the colonies, assumed the initiative in the work of revolution and named the juntas. The junta of the capital city in each province was usually recognized as the chief executive body for that province, and assumed for the time being all the functions of government. National conventions were then called in many cases to decide upon the form of government. These in most cases entrusted the executive power to regencies or triumvirates, almost all of which rapidly gave way to military dictatorships.

The Regency of Cadiz had anticipated trouble from the colonies and had recognized their rights as freemen by inviting them to send deputies to the national Cortes, but at the same time had abridged those rights by allowing them only a very limited representation, absurdly out of proportion to their population and commercial importance. Upon the establishment of the provisional governments or juntas in the colonies, the Regency refused them the freedom of trade that had been promised, declined the proffered mediation of England, and proceeded to stigmatize the Americans as rebels and to declare them guilty of high treason, although they had been guilty only of the same conduct that the Spaniards themselves were pursuing at home.

Venezuela then (1811) declared herself independent of both the Spanish nation and of the Spanish monarch, and adopted a republican constitution. The promulgation of the Spanish constitution of 1812 further encouraged the spirit of independence in the colonies, but when Ferdinand was restored in 1814, the colonies were still governed in his name, for the revolution of Venezuela, which alone had declared for independence, had been crushed out. Had Ferdinand acted with any moderation or judgment, his American possessions would have been saved to his crown. But the refusal of the colonies, which had now enjoyed practical self-government for several years, to take upon them without conditions the yoke of absolute authority, was met with the proclamation of a war of reconquest. Reconciliation was thereafter no longer possible, and independence only a question of time. By the close of 1815 the revolution had been put down in all the provinces except La Plata. There it was never suppressed. For this reason we shall first trace rapidly the course of the revolution in the south, of which San Martin was the directing power.

José de San Martin was born in 1778 in Paraguay, his father being the governor of Misiones. When eight years of age, his family went to Spain and he was entered as a pupil in the Seminary of Nobles at Madrid. At the age of twelve, he joined a regiment as cadet and saw his first service in Africa. He served in the Spanish army for more than twenty years, and won promotion as well as special distinction for bravery. In the battle of Baylen, where a detachment of Napoleon's disciplined troops was beaten by an army of recruits inspired by patriotism, San Martin, then a captain, won a gold medal and a commission as lieutenant-colonel for his conduct. Hearing of the struggle for liberty in his native land, he resigned his commission and returned to America. He was almost unknown personally, but his reputation as a brave soldier and a skilful tactician procured for him immediate employment. At this time the Argentine Republic had two armies in the field, the one operating near at home against the Portuguese in Uruguay and the Spanish in Montevideo, and the other in Upper Peru (Bolivia) against the forces sent by the viceroy of Peru to suppress the Argentine revolution. San Martin was soon given the command of this army in the north, succeeding General Belgrano. He soon placed his army in an excellent state of discipline and put a check to the advances of the Peruvian army.[30]

On May 16, 1814, the Argentine naval force, under command of an Irishman named Brown, defeated and almost entirely destroyed the Spanish squadron stationed at Montevideo, and that city soon after surrendered to the besieging army of Alvear, San Martin's old comrade in the Spanish army. Alvear, whose political influence was much greater than San Martin's, now aspired to the conquest of Peru, and therefore desired the command in the north. This San Martin willingly relinquished to him. He had other plans in mind, and the state of his health demanded rest. Upper Peru had been the high-road from Peru to Buenos Aires in times of peace, and was, therefore, naturally looked upon as the line of advance for the liberating army. San Martin, however, after a careful study of the question, had become convinced that this was not the strategic line of approach, that the Argentine Republic would never succeed in conquering Peru from this quarter. His idea was to carry the war to the west, to cross the Andes, occupy Chile, and, having secured a naval base there, to attack Peru from the coast, continuing military operations in the north merely as a diversion. The success of this plan depended upon the performance of two apparently impossible tasks—the passage of the Andes and the creation of a navy on the Pacific. San Martin was by far too shrewd a man to advocate such an undertaking before maturing his plans. He, therefore, confided it only to a few of his intimate friends, and, taking advantage of his ill health, asked, as a favor for himself, the government of the obscure province of Cuyo, where from its capital of Mendoza he could place himself in communication with the Chilean patriots.

On August 10, 1814, San Martin was appointed governor of Cuyo, and at once devoted himself to the development of the plans which led to the emancipation of half a continent and gave him his place in the world's history. The revolutionary movement in Chile had just been crushed out. It was begun in 1810 and the general course of events had been somewhat similar to the Argentine movement, but it had fallen a victim first to disputes between the Patriot leaders and finally to the troops of the viceroy of Peru. It would require more space than we can give to trace the varying fortunes of the cause in Chile through the stirring events that marked the leadership of Dr. Rosas, of the Carrera brothers, and of Bernardo O'Higgins. After the final collapse, O'Higgins, with a number of other Patriots, fled over the Andes to Mendoza and readily entered into the plans of San Martin. It took the latter two years to organize and equip an army and to convince the government of Buenos Aires of the practicability of his plan.

At length, on January 17, 1817, he began the passage of the Andes with about 5,000 men, 1,600 horses, and 9,000 mules, the latter carrying the field artillery, ammunition, and provisions. The summit of the Uspallata Pass is 12,700 feet above the sea-level, 5,000 feet higher than the Great St. Bernard, by which Napoleon led his army over the Alps. In many other respects San Martin's achievement was more remarkable. Each piece of artillery had to be carried suspended on a pole between two mules, or, where the road was particularly dangerous, dragged by ropes. There were chasms that could be crossed only by cable bridges. The march over the Andes occupied three weeks. Both men and animals suffered greatly from soroche, the illness caused by rarefied atmosphere.

At the foot of the mountain, at Chacabuco, the vanguard of San Martin's army defeated a body of 4,000 Royalists, and thus opened the road to Santiago, which San Martin entered February 14, 1817. The Chileans chose him Supreme Director of their government, but he declined the office, and O'Higgins was chosen.

San Martin's great object was to crush the colonial power of Spain in its stronghold, Peru. Having by the successful passage of the Andes and the victory of Chacabuco in a measure justified his plan of campaign, he returned to Buenos Aires for reinforcements. The Royalists meanwhile retreated to the south. On February 18, 1818, the independence of Chile was proclaimed. A month later the Patriots were surprised at Cancha-Rayada and almost routed, but within two weeks the army was again ready for action, and on April 5, 1818, encountered the Royalists at Maipo. This battle was a complete victory for the Patriots and decided the fate of Chile. Only one or two fortresses in the south were now held for Spain. Five days after the battle of Maipo, San Martin returned once more to Buenos Aires and began organizing an expedition for the liberation of Peru. Puyrredon, now Supreme Director, supported his undertaking.

While San Martin was soliciting aid from the Argentine Republic, the Chileans were not idle. They saw that the only way of insuring their independence was by the creation of a navy. Through its agent in London, the Chilean government secured the services of Lord Cochrane, an English naval officer of great distinction and remarkable talents, who by a curious turn of fortune had been brought into unmerited disgrace and dismissed from the British service.[31] He reached Valparaiso in November and hoisted his flag on board the O'Higgins, December 22, 1818. During the course of the next year, Cochrane made two attempts to take Callao, the seaport of Peru, but without success beyond harassing the enemy in some of the smaller coast towns. In February, 1820, by a brilliant move, he captured Valdivia, a strongly fortified town still held by the Spaniards in southern Chile.

San Martin returned to Chile in January, 1820, and began to assemble at Valparaiso the army destined for the invasion of Peru. Of the 5,000 men, two-thirds were from Buenos Aires, while nearly all of the officers were Argentine or European volunteers. Of 65 foreign officers, 37 were British and 3 were from the United States. There were, besides, 30 English officers in the Chilean navy. The expedition sailed on August 21, 1820, on board the fleet commanded by Cochrane. San Martin landed his army at Pisco, to the south of Lima, and sent an expedition into the interior under General Arenales, who had served the Patriots for years in Upper Peru. In October, San Martin reëmbarked his troops and landed them again at Huacho, a point seventy miles north of Lima. Meanwhile the Spanish squadron, completely demoralized by the appearance on the Pacific of Lord Cochrane, whose daring exploits were well known, was lying under the guns of Callao Castle. On the night of November 5, 1820, Lord Cochrane led a force of volunteers, consisting of 180 seamen and 100 marines, in open boats right under the batteries of Callao, surprised and overpowered the crew of the Esmeralda, the largest Spanish frigate, and, cutting her loose, carried her off to his own squadron.

After Cochrane's exploit at Callao, the moral effect of which was very great, he urged upon San Martin an immediate advance upon Lima, but San Martin had two campaigns before him, the one military, the other political. On first landing at Pisco he had issued an order to his army in which he said, "Remember that you are come not to conquer, but to liberate a people; the Peruvians are our brothers." And in spite of the impatience and restlessness of his officers, he steadily adhered to his plan, to the no small loss of his military prestige and ultimately to his retirement from the scene of activity. His purpose was by the presence of the liberating army to give the people of Peru a chance to rise and throw off the yoke of Spain. To this end he scattered proclamations and addresses of a revolutionary character broadcast through the land and quietly awaited results. The contest in Peru, he said, was not a war of conquest and glory, but entirely of opinion; it was a war of new and liberal principles against prejudice, bigotry, and tyranny.

People ask why I don't march to Lima at once; so I might, and instantly would, were it suitable to my views, which it is not. I do not want military renown; I have no ambition to be the conqueror of Peru; I want solely to liberate the country from oppression. Of what use would Lima be to me if the inhabitants were hostile in political sentiment? How could the cause of independence be advanced by my holding Lima, or even the whole country, in military possession? Far different are my views. I wish to have all men thinking with me, and do not choose to advance a step beyond the gradual march of public opinion. The capital is now ripe for declaring its sentiments, and I shall give them the opportunity to do so in safety. It was in sure expectation of this movement that I have hitherto deferred advancing; and to those who know the full extent of the means which have been put in action, a sufficient explanation is afforded of all the delays that have taken place. I have been gaining, indeed, day by day, fresh allies in the hearts of the people, the only certain allies in such a war. In the secondary point of military strength, I have been, from the same causes, equally successful in augmenting and improving the liberating army; while that of the Spaniards has been wasted by want and desertion. The country has now become sensible of its true interests, and it is right the inhabitants should have the means of expressing what they think. Public opinion is an engine newly introduced into this country; the Spaniards, who are utterly incapable of directing it, have prohibited its use; but they shall now experience its strength and importance.[32]

The campaign of Arenales in the interior was successful. In the presence of the liberating army, the people everywhere rose in revolt. San Martin's method of conducting the campaign was the correct one. Public opinion was soon aroused in the capital itself, and the Royalists finally decided to evacuate Lima. The viceroy retired with his forces to Cuzco in the highlands. In response to an invitation from the city authorities, the Patriots entered Lima July 6, 1821. San Martin himself entered without ceremony after dark a few days later. The independence of Peru was proclaimed July 28 with imposing ceremonies in the great square of Lima. San Martin was proclaimed Protector of Peru. He proceeded to organize a civil government, and established the celebrated Order of the Sun, distinctively aristocratic in character.

San Martin had played a great part thus far, but he had reached the zenith of his influence and power. Dissensions soon arose. The task he had undertaken was difficult in the extreme. It was much easier to acquire power than to use it. At the time of the evacuation of Lima by the Spaniards, he said to Captain Hall:

For the last ten years I have been unremittingly employed against the Spaniards; or rather in favor of this country, for I am not against any one who is not hostile to the cause of independence. All I wish is that this country should be managed by itself, and by itself alone. As to the manner in which it is to be governed, that belongs not at all to me. I propose simply to give the people the means of declaring themselves independent, and of establishing a suitable form of government; after which I shall consider I have done enough and leave them.[33]

When the time came he kept his word.

While San Martin was leading the army of liberation from the Argentine Republic to Chile, and from Chile to Peru, Simon Bolivar, the liberator of the north, was pursuing his chequered career in Venezuela and Colombia, unfurling the standard of revolution wherever he could get a foothold. He was a man, in every respect, the opposite of San Martin, fiery, impetuous, wholly given over to personal ambition, neither a statesman nor a soldier, but one of the greatest revolutionary leaders of any age or country. His ignorance of military affairs led him into undertakings from which an experienced soldier would have held back, but his indomitable pluck carried him safely through all calamities, and his wonderful enthusiasm fired his followers even in the midst of disaster.

This remarkable man, whose reputation in the new world stands second to that of Washington alone, was, like Miranda, a native of Caracas. Sprung from a family of wealth and influence he had, like most young South Americans of his class, received his education abroad, and had for several years led a dissipated life in Paris. At first he held himself aloof from the revolutionary leaders, but after the accomplishment of the revolution of Caracas, April 19, 1810, he was persuaded to join the Patriot cause, and was sent to London to solicit assistance from Great Britain.[34]

The junta of Caracas, like those subsequently formed in the south, professed to act in the name of Ferdinand VII, and fearing the influence of Miranda, then in London, whose advocacy of absolute independence had been open and avowed, they instructed Bolivar and their other agents not to allow him to come to Venezuela. Miranda came in spite of them, however, under an assumed name, and was everywhere received with enthusiasm. Under his influence a congress was elected which, on July 5, 1811, declared Venezuela a republic, free and independent of all foreign dominion. Miranda was appointed Director. This was the first South American declaration of independence. The formal independence of the Argentine Republic was not declared until July 9, 1816, although the country had been self-governing for several years.

The Patriot cause was ruined, however, by the earthquake of March 25, 1812, which almost destroyed the city of Caracas and several towns of importance. Twenty thousand people are supposed to have perished. As the disaster occurred on Holy Thursday, the clergy were not slow to turn it to political account and to persuade the people that it was a direct chastisement of Heaven upon them for their rebellion against Spain. The cause of the Patriots steadily lost ground until the fall of Porto Cabello, through the inefficiency of Bolivar, caused its complete collapse. Miranda was forced to sign with Monteverde the treaty of Vittoria, July 26, 1812, on the basis of complete submission and a general amnesty. It is hardly necessary to add that the Spanish general did not abide by the terms of the capitulation. Miranda himself was detained by Bolivar, as he was on the point of embarking for England, accused of having received bribes from the Spaniards and of being unwilling to share the fate of his followers, and treacherously handed over to the Spaniards. He was sent to Spain and after languishing for three years in a dungeon at Cadiz, died July 14, 1816. His fate was a sad blot upon the reputation of Bolivar.

The revolution in New Granada, which had been inaugurated July 20, 1810, was still holding out and thither Bolivar proceeded to offer his services to the Patriots of that province. As soon as he had firmly established himself in influence and power, he persuaded the government that their only safety lay in the reconquest of Venezuela. He was provided with troops, and in May, 1813 crossed the frontier and took several important cities. He now assumed a new attitude and became a self-appointed dictator. He proclaimed a war of extermination against Spaniards and adopted a new system of dates: "3d year of Independence and 1st of the War to the Death." He entered Caracas in triumph August 6, 1813. He proclaimed himself dictator with the title of Liberator. Meanwhile Marino, another Patriot leader, had landed in the eastern part of Venezuela near Cumana and declared himself dictator. There were thus two dictators and no cordiality between them. Before they could come to an agreement the enemy had recovered their position. In December, 1814, the last Patriot force was defeated.

Bolivar and Marino retired once more to New Granada. Bolivar was made captain-general of the forces of New Granada, his title of Liberator was recognized, and another, that of Illustrious Pacificator, bestowed upon him. A second time he undertook the conquest of Venezuela from the west. Dissensions soon arose between Bolivar and the other leaders. He was refused reinforcements and foolishly marched against the Patriot garrison of Cartagena. He was now forced to give up his command, and embarked for Jamaica, May, 1815.

Meanwhile Ferdinand had been restored to the throne of Spain, and an army of 10,000 men, commanded by Marshal Morillo, the ablest Spanish general of the time, had been sent to reduce the provinces on the Main. This expedition reached Cumana in April, 1815, and before the end of the year all the colonies, with the exception of the provinces of the River Plate, were reduced to submission.

Far from giving up hope, however, Bolivar proceeded to Haiti, and from that island, in May, 1816, made a descent upon the eastern part of Venezuela, but was routed by the Spaniards in July, and soon returned to Haiti. A few of the Patriots still kept the field, and towards the close of the year Bolivar's partisans secured his recall. On December 21 he left Haiti with a second expedition for the relief of his native land. He determined now to direct all his efforts, not as hitherto, to the support of the Patriot cause in the capital, but to the holding of the great plains of the Orinoco. With this territory as a base, he carried on, during the year 1817, in conjunction with the Llanero horsemen of General Paez, a desperate struggle with the Spaniards. When the rainy season of 1818 began, Bolivar's army had been cut almost to pieces, he had lost prestige as a general, and his civil authority amounted to nothing. Only the cavalry of Paez maintained the Patriot cause. Still the position of the Spaniards was not much better. Morillo had 12,000 men scattered about, but neither money, arms, nor supplies. He reported to the viceroy of Peru: "Twelve pitched battles, in which the best officers and troops of the enemy have fallen, have not lowered their pride or lessened the vigor of their attacks upon us."

In February, 1819, the second Congress of Venezuela convened at Angostura. The Dictator resigned, but was unanimously elected President and given absolute power in all provinces which were the actual theater of war. The army was reorganized by the accession of foreign troops, in particular the British legion, consisting of 2,000 well equipped men, which achieved much of the success of the next year. Bolivar now conceived the idea of crossing the Cordillera and reconquering New Granada. General Paez was to attract the attention of Morillo on the plains in front, and a demonstration was to be made on the coast near Caracas, while Bolivar marched to the west. This movement changed the whole face of affairs and had a similar effect to the passage of the Andes by San Martin. New Granada was won by the battle of Boyaca, August 7, 1819. Morillo was now isolated in Venezuela. In December, 1819, a congress of delegates from Venezuela and New Granada met and decreed the union of the two provinces in the Republic of Colombia. Bolivar was named provisional President. An armistice was signed by Bolivar and Morillo in November, 1820, which gave the Patriots breathing time. The Spanish troops remaining in Venezuela were defeated by Bolivar in the battle of Carabobo, June 23, 1821. Only a few fortresses on the coast were still held by the Spaniards.

Bolivar entered Caracas once more in triumph and tendered his resignation, an act always considered by him necessary for giving the proper dramatic setting to such occasions. Congress took no notice of it, but drew up a constitution providing for a limited presidential term of four years. The Liberator, "as he feared," was elected President. He repeated his resignation, but added that he would yield if Congress persisted. Congress did persist.

After the battle of Boyaca, Bolivar had sent General Sucre by sea to Guayaquil, nominally to aid the new state against the Royalists, but in reality to induce it to join the Republic of Colombia. Sucre met with reverses, and had to call on San Martin for assistance from Peru. Meanwhile Bolivar was advancing by land. On July 11, 1822, he entered Guayaquil in triumph, and two days later, on his own responsibility, announced its incorporation with Colombia. The junta resigned and took refuge on board the Peruvian squadron in the harbor. On the 25th San Martin arrived by sea, and Bolivar sent two of his aides to welcome him "on Colombian soil." On the following day San Martin went ashore and he and Bolivar met for the first and last time. They had two private interviews, after which San Martin sent his baggage aboard his ship and announced that he would sail after attending the ball to be given that night in his honor. At the public banquet that evening Bolivar rose and proposed a toast: "To the two greatest men of South America—General San Martin and myself." San Martin also proposed a toast: "To the speedy conclusion of the war; to the organization of the different republics of the continent; and to the health of the Liberator of Colombia"—words which well contrasted the personal and political aims of the two men. San Martin and Bolivar had been unable to agree upon any plan for the expulsion of the Spaniards from the highlands of Peru. The self-denying patriot gave way before the man of ambition. To O'Higgins he wrote: "The Liberator is not the man we took him to be."

Upon his return to Peru, San Martin wrote to Bolivar: "My decision is irrevocable. I have convened the first Congress of Peru; the day after its installation I shall leave for Chile, convinced that my presence is the only obstacle which keeps you from coming to Peru with your army." On the 20th of September, 1822, he laid his resignation before the Congress, and issued an address to the nation. "The presence of a fortunate soldier," he said, "however disinterested he may be, is dangerous to a newly founded state. I have proclaimed the independence of Peru. I have ceased to be a public man." These words, whether intentionally so or not, were prophetic of Bolivar's subsequent career. San Martin wrote to O'Higgins: "I am tired of hearing them call me tyrant, that I wish to make myself king, emperor, the devil. On the other hand, my health is broken, this climate is killing me. My youth was sacrificed to the service of Spain; my manhood to my own country. I think I have now the right to dispose of my old age."

Bolivar's jealousy of San Martin prolonged the war, which might have been brought to a close in a few months, for nearly three years. After the withdrawal of San Martin, Bolivar became Dictator of Peru. On December 9, 1824, was fought the last battle for South American independence. On the little plain of Ayacucho, 11,600 feet above the sea, General Sucre defeated and captured the forces of the viceroy. Upper Peru was organized as a separate republic, with the name of Bolivia.

Bolivar had been proclaimed President of Peru for life, but the unpopularity of this measure led him to leave the country in 1826, never to return. That same year he summoned the Congress of Panama, but his plans for the union of South America in one republic failed. San Martin's idea finally triumphed. In 1829 Venezuela separated itself from Colombia and passed a decree of perpetual banishment against Bolivar. In April, 1830, through pressure of public opinion, Bolivar resigned the presidency of Colombia and retired into private life. Congress voted him an annual pension of $30,000. A month later Quito and Guayaquil separated from Colombia and formed the independent state of Ecuador. Even the name Colombia was dropped by the remaining state, and the old name of New Granada adopted. In 1857 the name Colombia was assumed once more.

Bolivar died in a small house near Santa Martha, December 17, 1831, having witnessed the failure of his most cherished plans. San Martin had retired to Europe in 1823 with his only child, a daughter named Mercedes. They lived a retired life in Brussels. Once only, in 1828, he returned to his native land, but was received with such denunciation by the press of Buenos Aires that he quickly turned his face towards Europe again. He died at Boulogne, August 17, 1850. Thirty years later the Argentine people had his remains brought back to his native land. In May, 1880, with imposing ceremonies, they were laid to rest in the Cathedral of Buenos Aires.

Mexico was twice revolutionized. The first struggle began in 1809 and 1810, and was carried on spasmodically until 1817. The second revolution broke out in 1820 on receipt of the news from Spain of the revolution of March, 1820, and the re-adoption of the constitution of 1812. The old revolutionists demanded the proclamation of this constitution in Mexico, but the Viceroy Apodaca opposed them. Augustin de Iturbide, a native Mexican, who in the first revolution had steadfastly adhered to the cause of the king, now defected to the popular side with a large body of troops which the viceroy had entrusted to his command. On February 24, 1821, he issued the celebrated document known as the Plan of Iguala, from the town of that name. In it he proposed the maintenance of the Roman Catholic religion to the exclusion of all others, the independence of Mexico from Spain, and the establishment of a limited monarchy. The Imperial Crown of Mexico was to be offered first to Ferdinand VII; in the event of his declining, to the younger princes of his house; and in the event of their refusal, the duty of naming an emperor was to fall to the representative assembly of Mexico. The personal and property rights of Spaniards in Mexico were carefully guaranteed. In securing the interests of Spaniards and of the clergy, those who had most to lose, this plan differed essentially from the revolutionary policy of the other Spanish colonies. On the other hand, the Creole element was satisfied with the promise of independence and a representative government. The revolutionary army became known as "the Army of the Three Guarantees," these being (1) the maintenance of the religious establishment in its present form, (2) independence, and (3) the union of Americans and Spaniards.[35] This ingenious document received immediately the widest approval.

The Viceroy Apodaca had practically abdicated when his successor, General O'Donaju, arrived from Spain. As the latter had come without troops, there was nothing left but for him to recognize the revolution as an accomplished fact and make the best terms for his country he could. Accordingly he met Iturbide in conference at Cordova, and after a brief discussion signed the treaty bearing that name, August 24, 1821. It was agreed that a provisional junta should be appointed, that O'Donaju should be a member, and that the junta should proceed to carry into effect the plan of Iguala. O'Donaju then persuaded the Royalists to open the gates of the capital, and on September 27, 1821, Iturbide entered. Shortly thereafter O'Donaju died from the yellow fever, thus leaving Iturbide free to carry out his plans. The Spanish government, of course, repudiated the treaty of Cordova.

The Congress, which assembled in pursuance of the program of Iguala, was divided between Imperialists and Republicans. In spite of the opposition of the latter, Iturbide had himself proclaimed emperor and his family ennobled. Congress soon fell into disputes with the emperor, who finally, in October, 1822, dissolved it by force. A few months later Santa Anna inaugurated a counter-revolution from Vera Cruz, which resulted in the abdication of the emperor. Iturbide was allowed to leave the country. He retired to Italy, where he resided until toward the close of 1823, when he went to London. In May, 1824, at the solicitation of certain of his partisans, he sailed again for Mexico,[36] ignorant of the decree of perpetual banishment passed against him by the Congress a few weeks before. He landed at Tampico July 12, but was seized and executed a few days later. The new assembly then in session adopted a constitution, and the Republic of Mexico was launched upon what was to prove, for years to come, a career of turbulence and anarchy.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Hall's "Journal on Chili, Peru, and Mexico," 2 Vols. Edinburgh, 1824, Vol. I, p. 249.

[2] Am. St. Pap., For. Rel., Vol. IV, pp. 156-159.

[3] Hall's "Journal," Vol. I, p. 296. See also Rodney's report on South America, in Vol. IV, Am. St. Pap., For. Rel.

[4] A full history of the India House and an account of its regulations is given by Veitia Linage in his "Norte de la Contratacion," Seville, 1672; translated into English by Captain John Stevens under the title, "Spanish Rule of Trade to the West Indies," London, 1702. Linage was for a number of years Treasurer and Comptroller of the India House. A good summary of the history and regulations of the House is given by Prof. Bernard Moses in his "Casa de Contratacion" in the Papers of the Am. Hist. Ass. for 1894, and in the third chapter of his "Establishment of Spanish Rule in America."

[5] Linage, "Norte de la Contratacion," p. 107.

[6] Ibid., p. 110.

[7] Ibid., p. 113.

[8] Ibid., p. 114.

[9] Ibid., p. 109.

[10] Ibid., p. 109.

[11] Linage, "Norte de la Contratacion," pp. 191-193.

[12] Hall's "Journal," Vol. I, pp. 253-254.

[13] "The Assiento; or Contract for Allowing to the Subjects of Great Britain the Liberty of Importing Negroes into the Spanish America." Printed by John Baskett, London, 1713.

[14] "The Assiento; or Contract for Allowing to the Subjects of Great Britain the Liberty of Importing Negroes into the Spanish America." London, 1713.

[15] Ulloa, "Voyage to South America." English translation, London, 1806, Vol. I, p. 105.

[16] "Letters and Despatches of Castlereagh," Vol. VII, p. 266 ff. This volume is rich in information in regard to England's Spanish-American policy.

[17] W. S. Robertson, "Francisco de Miranda and the Revolutionizing of Spanish America" (1909).

[18] "Life and Correspondence of Rufus King," New York, 1894, Vol. II, App. 5. For further information regarding his relations with Miranda, see extracts from his Memorandum Book, in Vol. III, App. 3.

[19] See Miranda's letter to President Adams, March 24, 1798. "Life and Corresp. of King," Vol. II, p. 654.

[20] "Life and Corresp. of King," Vol. II, p. 650.

[21] See King's letter to Hamilton, March 4, 1799. "Life and Corresp.," p. 662.

[22] "Letters and Despatches of Castlereagh," Vol. VII.

[23] See Sherman, "General Account of Miranda's Expedition," N. Y., 1808.

[24] H. A. Washington, "Writings of Thomas Jefferson," Vol. V, p. 474; "Madison's Writings," Vol. II, pp. 220, 225.

[25] "Letters and Despatches of Castlereagh," Vol. VII, p. 314 ff.

[26] See Watson, "Spanish and Portuguese South America." 2 Vols. London, 1884, Vol. II, p. 271 ff.

[27] See "Letters and Despatches of Castlereagh," Vol. VII, p. 316 ff.

[28] Romero, "Mexico and the United States," Putnam, 1898, p. 287.

[29] "Letters and Despatches of Castlereagh," Vol. VII.

[30] Mitre, "The Emancipation of South America." Translated by Pilling. London, 1893.

[31] See Cochrane (Earl Dundonald), "Service in Chili." 2 Vols. London, 1859.

[32] Hall's "Journal," Vol. I, p. 181. Report of Conversation with San Martin in Callao Roads.

[33] Hall's "Journal," Vol. I, p. 194.

[34] Holstein, "Life of Bolivar." Boston, 1829.

[35] Hall's "Journal," Vol. II, p. 188.

[36] See the statement of Iturbide in regard to his political life published in the Pamphleteer, London, 1827.

CHAPTER II

The Recognition of the Spanish-American Republics

The struggle of the South American peoples for independence was viewed from the first with feelings of profound satisfaction and sympathy in the United States. From the commencement of the revolution South American vessels were admitted into the ports of the United States under whatever flag they bore. It does not appear that any formal declaration according belligerent rights to the said provinces was ever made, though a resolution to that effect was introduced into the House by committee as early as December 10, 1811.[37] Such formal action was apparently not deemed necessary and, as there was no Spanish minister resident in the United States at that time to protest, our ports were probably thrown open, as a matter of course.[38] The fact that they were accorded full belligerent rights from the first was afterwards stated by President Monroe in his annual messages of 1817 and 1818 and in his special message of March 8, 1822.[39]

At an early date of the revolution commissioners arrived in Washington seeking recognition of independence, and agents were forthwith dispatched to South America to obtain information in regard to the state of the revolutionary governments and to watch the movements of England and other European powers. Joel R. Poinsett was sent to Buenos Aires in 1811, and the following year Alexander Scott was sent to Venezuela.[40] In 1817 Cæsar A. Rodney, Theodorick Bland, and John Graham were dispatched as special commissioners to South America. They proceeded to Buenos Aires, where they arrived in February, 1818, and remained until the last of April. Rodney and Graham then returned to the United States while Bland proceeded across the continent to Chile. Their reports were transmitted to Congress November 17, 1818.[41] In 1820 Messrs. J. B. Prevost and John M. Forbes were sent as commercial agents to Chile and Buenos Aires. Reports from them on the state of the revolutions were transmitted to Congress, March 8 and April 26, 1822.[42]

In the meantime a strong sentiment in favor of the recognition of South American independence had arisen in the United States. The struggling colonies found a ready champion in Henry Clay, who, for a period of ten years labored almost incessantly in their behalf, pleading for their recognition first with his own countrymen and then, as secretary of state under the Adams administration, with the governments of Europe. His name became a household word in South America and his speeches were translated and read before the patriot armies.

In spite of the fact that our own political interests were so closely identified with the struggling republics, the President realized the necessity of following a neutral course, and in view of the aid the colonies were receiving from citizens of the United States, called upon Congress for the enactment of a more stringent neutrality law. Clay delivered a vigorous speech in opposition to this measure in January, 1817. His greatest effort in behalf of South America, however, was his speech of March 25, 1818, on the general appropriation bill. He moved an amendment appropriating $18,000 for the outfit and year's salary of a minister to the United Provinces of the Plate. Without waiting to hear the report of the three commissioners who had been sent to inquire into the state of the revolutionary governments, he urged that a minister be regularly accredited to Buenos Aires at once. In a speech, three hours in length, he concluded the arguments he had begun the day before. Painting with even more than his usual fire and enthusiasm the beauties and resources of the Southern continent, he said:

Within this vast region, we behold the most sublime and interesting objects of creation; the loftiest mountains, the most majestic rivers in the world; the richest mines of the precious metals; and the choicest productions of the earth. We behold there a spectacle still more interesting and sublime—the glorious spectacle of eighteen millions of people struggling to burst their chains and be free.[43]

He went on to say that in the establishment of the independence of the South American states the United States had the deepest interest. He had no hesitation in asserting his firm belief that there was no question in the foreign policy of this country, which had ever arisen, or which he could conceive as ever occurring, in the decision of which we had so much at stake. This interest concerned our politics, our commerce, our navigation. There could be no doubt that Spanish America, once independent, whatever might be the form of the governments established in its several parts, those governments would be animated by an American feeling and guided by an American policy. They would obey the laws of the system of the new world, of which they would compose a part, in contradistinction to that of Europe.[44] The House turned a deaf ear to his brilliant rhetoric. The motion was defeated by a vote of 115 to 45, but Clay did not abandon the cause of South America.

Two years later he reopened the question in a direct attack on the policy of the administration, which greatly disturbed President Monroe. On May 20, 1820, he again introduced a resolution declaring it expedient to send ministers to the "governments in South America which have established and are maintaining their independence of Spain." His arraignment of the administration became more violent than ever:

If Lord Castlereagh says we may recognize, we do; if not, we do not. A single expression of the British minister to the present secretary of state, then our minister abroad, I am ashamed to say, has molded the policy of our government toward South America.

A charge of dependence upon Great Britain in affairs of diplomacy was as effective a weapon then as it has been since in matters financial. Clay's resolution passed the House by a vote of 80 to 75, but still the executive arm of the government did not move. In 1817 and 1818 the question of South American independence was continually before the cabinet for discussion. President Monroe seemed strongly inclined toward recognition, but in this he was opposed by Adams and Calhoun, who were unwilling to act in the matter without some understanding with England, and if possible with France. Our relations with Spain in regard to the Indian troubles in Florida were in a very strained condition and any action taken at that time in recognition of South America would have involved us in war with Spain and almost inevitably with other European powers. The President, therefore, as a matter of expediency postponed the action which his sympathy prompted, and, in his annual message of November 16, 1818, expressed his satisfaction at the course the government had hitherto pursued and his intention of adhering to it for the time being.[45] Under the President's direction, however, efforts were made to secure the coöperation of Great Britain and France in promoting the independence of South America.[46]

In 1819 an amicable adjustment of our differences with Spain seemed to have been reached by the negotiation of a treaty providing for the cession of the Floridas to the United States and the settlement of long-standing claims of American citizens against Spain. An unforeseen difficulty arose, however, which proved embarrassing to the administration. The Spanish monarch very shrewdly delayed ratifying the treaty for two years and thus practically tied the hands of the administration during that time as far as the South American question was concerned.

In spite of the awkward position in which the administration found itself, Clay, who was opposed to the treaty on account of its unwarranted surrender of our claims to Texas, continued to plead the cause of South America. Early in the year, 1821, a declaration of interest in the South American struggle, introduced by him, was carried by an overwhelming majority (134 to 12), but the administration held back another year until the de facto independence of the colonies no longer admitted of reasonable doubt. Meanwhile the Florida treaty had been ratified. On March 8, 1822, President Monroe, in a special message to Congress, expressed the opinion that the time had come for recognition and asked for the appropriations necessary for carrying it into effect. The President's recommendation was received with approval, and in due course the sum of $100,000 was appropriated for "such missions to the independent nations on the American continent as the President of the United States may deem proper." In accordance with this act Mr. R. C. Anderson of Kentucky was appointed minister to Colombia, Mr. C. A. Rodney of New Jersey to the Argentine Republic, and Mr. H. Allen of Vermont to Chile, in 1824, and Mr. Joel R. Poinsett of South Carolina to Mexico in 1826.

While the United States government was concerning itself with the political interests of the Spanish provinces, Great Britain was quietly reaping all the commercial advantages to be derived from the situation and was apparently well satisfied to let things follow the drift they had taken. By the destruction of the combined fleets of France and Spain at Trafalgar, in 1805, Nelson had won for Great Britain undisputed control of the Atlantic and laid open the route to South America. Ever since the assiento of 1713 had placed the slave trade in her hands, Great Britain had realized the possibilities of South American commerce, and the intercourse, which had been kept up with that country after the termination of the slave monopoly by smugglers, now that the danger was removed, became more regular and profitable. During the changes of ministry that followed the death of Pitt, the policy of England in regard to South America was weak and vacillating. We have already called attention to the political indecision that marked the attack upon the provinces of the Plate. With Napoleon's invasion of Spain and the national uprising it occasioned, British policy became once more intelligible. It was wisely deemed of more importance to spare the colonies and to win Spain over to the European alliance against Napoleon, than to take her colonies at the cost of driving her permanently into the arms of France. Meanwhile British commerce with the South American states was steadily growing and that too with the connivance of Spain.

At the close of the Napoleonic wars, Spain, fearing that England, through her desire to keep this trade, would secretly furnish aid to the colonies in their struggle for independence, proposed to the British government to bind itself to a strict neutrality. This England agreed to, and when the treaty was signed, there was, according to Canning, "a distinct understanding with Spain that our commercial intercourse with the colonies was not to be deemed a breach of its stipulations."[47] Notwithstanding this tacit compact, British commerce suffered greatly at the hands of Spanish privateers and even Spanish war vessels. Numbers of British merchantmen were captured by Spanish ships, carried into the few ports left to Spain on the Main, and condemned as prizes for trading with the insurgent colonies. Thus at the time of the acknowledgment of South American independence by the United States, a long list of grievances had accumulated in the hands of the British ambassador at Madrid, and in spite of urgent and repeated remonstrances, remained unredressed.

Canning was deterred from making final demands upon the government of Madrid by the consideration that he did not wish to hamper the constitutional government of Spain, which had come into being by the revolution of March, 1820, and against which the other powers of Europe were preparing to act. The condition of affairs on the Spanish Main was, however, critical and demanded instant redress. He decided, therefore, to take matters into his own hands without harassing the government of Spain, and to dispatch a squadron to the West Indies to make reprisals. In a memorandum to the cabinet on this subject, November 15, 1822, in which he outlines his policy, he commends the course of the United States in recognizing the de facto independence of the colonies, claiming a right to trade with them and avenging the attempted interruption of that right by making reprisals, as a more straightforward and intelligible course than that of Great Britain, forbearing for the sake of Spain to recognize the colonies, trading with them in faith of the connivance of Spain and suffering depredations without taking redress. It was not necessary, he thought, to declare war against Spain, for "she has perhaps as little direct and available power over the colonies which she nominally retains as she has over those which have thrown off her yoke. Let us apply, therefore, a local remedy to a local grievance, and make the ships and harbors of Cuba, Porto Rico, and Porto Cabello answerable for the injuries which have been inflicted by those ships, and the perpetrators of which have found shelter in those harbors." In conclusion, he says that the tacit compact, which subsisted for years, by which Spain was to forbear from interrupting British trade with the South American colonies having been renounced by Spain, and the old colonial system having been revived in as full vigor as if she had still a practical hold over her colonies and a navy to enforce her pretensions, "no man will say that under such circumstances our recognition of those states can be indefinitely postponed."[48]

While Great Britain was thus considering the expediency of following the example of the United States in the recognition of Spain's revolted colonies, the powers of central Europe had taken upon them the task of solving the difficulties of that unfortunate country both at home and in America. The restored rule of the Bourbons in Spain had been far from satisfactory to the great mass of the people. In March, 1820, the army which Ferdinand had assembled at Cadiz to be sent against the rebellious colonies, suddenly turned against the government, refused to embark, and demanded the restoration of the constitution of 1812. The action of the army was everywhere approved and sustained by the mass of the people, and the king was forced to proclaim the constitution and to swear to uphold it. The March revolution in Spain was followed in July by a constitutional movement in Naples, and in August of the same year by a similar movement in Portugal; while the next year saw the outbreak of the Greek struggle for independence. Thus in all three of the peninsulas of Southern Europe the people were struggling for the right of self-government. The movement in Greece was, it is true, of an altogether different character from the others, but it was a revolt against constituted authority and therefore incurred the ill-will of the so-called legitimists. The powers of Europe at once took alarm at the rapid spread of revolutionary ideas and proceeded to adopt measures for the suppression of the movements to which these ideas gave rise. The principle of joint intervention on the part of allied governments in the internal affairs of European states had been developed in the years immediately following the overthrow of Napoleon and was the outcome of the wholly anomalous condition in which he had left the politics of Europe. In the hands of Prince Metternich, the genius of reaction against French revolutionary ideas, this principle had become the most powerful weapon of absolutism and now threatened the subversion of popular institutions throughout Europe.

The rapid development of this doctrine of intervention in the seven years immediately following the second fall of Napoleon not only seriously menaced the liberties of Europe, but also threatened to control the destiny of the new world. At the Congress of Vienna Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia had formed a close union and had signed the treaty upon which the peace of Europe rested for the next half century. The agreement made at Vienna was reaffirmed with some minor changes, after the second overthrow of Napoleon, at Paris, November 20, 1815. France was now practically excluded from the alliance. This treaty undertook especially to guard against any further disturbance of the peace of Europe by Napoleon or France. One of the most significant features of the treaty, or what was to prove so, was the agreement definitely laid down in the sixth article, providing for meetings of the powers at fixed periods.

The first conference held in accordance with this understanding was that at Aix-la-Chapelle in October, 1818. France was readmitted as a member of the alliance and her territory evacuated by the allied armies. The quintuple alliance thus formed declared that it had no other object than the maintenance of peace; that the repose of the world was its motive and its end. The language of the declaration had been in a large measure neutralized to suit the views of the British government. Lord Liverpool had said to Castlereagh before the meeting of the conference: "The Russian must be made to feel that we have a parliament and a public, to which we are responsible, and that we cannot permit ourselves to be drawn into views of policy which are wholly incompatible with the spirit of our government." The members of the British cabinet, except Canning, did not object seriously to the system of congresses at fixed intervals, but to the declarations publicly set forth by them. Canning, on the other hand, objected to the declarations and to the conferences themselves, "meetings for the government of the world," as he somewhat contemptuously termed them.

It had been generally supposed that the question of the Spanish colonies would come up for discussion at Aix-la-Chapelle. Castlereagh assured the United States, through Bagot, the British minister at Washington, that while England would act with the allied powers at Aix-la-Chapelle in mediation between Spain and her colonies, her mediation would be limited entirely to the employment of her influence and good offices and that she would not take any measures that might assume a character of force.[49]

The revolutions that took place in Spain, Naples, and Portugal in 1820 presented an occasion for another meeting of the allies. In November the representatives of Austria, Russia, and Prussia met in conference at Troppau, and issued a circular setting forth what they had already done for Europe in overthrowing the military tyranny of Napoleon and expressing the determination "to put a curb on a force no less tyrannical and no less detestable, that of revolt and crime." The conference then adjourned to Laybach, where they could, with greater dispatch, order the movements they had decided to take against the revolutionists of Naples. Austria, being more intimately concerned with the political condition of the Italian peninsula than either of the other two powers, was entrusted with the task of suppressing the Neapolitan revolution. The Austrian army entered Naples March 23, 1821, overthrew the constitutional government that had been inaugurated, and restored Ferdinand II to absolute power. The revolution which had broken out in Piedmont was also suppressed by a detachment of the Austrian army.

England held aloof from all participation in the proceedings at Troppau and Laybach—though Sir Charles Stuart was present to watch the proceedings. In a circular dispatch of January 21, 1821, the British government expressed its dissent from the principles set forth in the Troppau circular.

The next meeting of the allied powers was arranged for October, 1822, at Verona. Here the affairs of Greece, Italy, and, in particular, Spain came up for consideration. At this Congress all five powers of the alliance were represented. France was uneasy about the condition of Spain, and England had to send a delegate out of self-defense, as her interests were largely involved. Castlereagh was preparing to depart for the congress, when his mind gave way under the stress of work and more remotely of dissipation, and he committed suicide. Canning then became secretary for foreign affairs, and Wellington was sent to Verona.

The congress which now assembled at Verona was devoted largely to a discussion of Spanish affairs. Wellington had been instructed to use all his influence against the adoption of measures of intervention in Spain. When he found that the other powers were bent upon this step and that his protest would be unheeded, he withdrew from the congress. The four remaining powers signed the secret treaty of Verona, November 22, 1822, as a revision, so they declared in the preamble, of the "Treaty of the Holy Alliance." This treaty of the Holy Alliance, signed at Paris, September 26, 1815, by Austria, Russia, and Prussia, is one of the most remarkable political documents extant. It sprang from the erratic brain of the Czar Alexander under the influence of Madame Crudner, who was both an adventuress and a religious enthusiast. Its object was to uphold the divine right of kings and to counteract the spirit of French revolutionary ideas by introducing "the precepts of justice, of charity, and of peace" into the internal affairs of states and into their relations with one another. No one had taken it seriously except the Czar himself and it had been without influence upon the politics of Europe. The agreement reached at Verona gave retrospective importance to the Holy Alliance, and revived the name, so that it became the usual designation of the combined powers. The following alleged text of the secret treaty of Verona soon became current in the press of Europe and America. Although it has never been officially acknowledged and its authenticity has been called in question, it states pretty accurately the motives and aims of the powers. The first four articles are as follows:

The undersigned, specially authorized to make some additions to the Treaty of the Holy Alliance, after having exchanged their respective credentials, have agreed as follows:

Article I. The high contracting parties being convinced that the system of representative government is equally incompatible with the monarchical principles as the maxim of the sovereignty of the people with the divine right, engage mutually, and in the most solemn manner, to use all their efforts to put an end to the system of representative governments, in whatever country it may exist in Europe, and to prevent its being introduced in those countries where it is not yet known.

Art. II. As it cannot be doubted that the liberty of the press is the most powerful means used by the pretended supporters of the rights of nations, to the detriment of those of Princes, the high contracting parties promise reciprocally to adopt all proper measures to suppress it not only in their own states, but also, in the rest of Europe.

Art. III. Convinced that the principles of religion contribute most powerfully to keep nations in the state of passive obedience which they owe to their Princes, the high contracting parties declare it to be their intention to sustain, in their respective states, those measures which the clergy may adopt, with the aim of ameliorating their own interests, so intimately connected with the preservation of the authority of Princes; and the contracting powers join in offering their thanks to the Pope, for what he has already done for them, and solicit his constant coöperation in their views of submitting the nations.

Art. IV. The situation of Spain and Portugal unites unhappily all the circumstances to which this treaty has particular reference. The high contracting parties, in confiding to France the care of putting an end to them, engage to assist her in the manner which may the least compromise them with their own people and the people of France, by means of a subsidy on the part of the two empires, of twenty millions of francs every year, from the date of the signature of this treaty to the end of the war.

Signed by Metternich for Austria, Chateaubriand for France, Bernstet for Prussia, and Nesselrode for Russia.[50]

Such was the code of absolutism against which England protested and against which President Monroe delivered his declaration.

The Congress broke up about the middle of December, and the following April, the Duc d'Angoulême led a French army across the Pyrenees. By October the constitutional party had been overthrown and absolutism reigned supreme once more in western Europe. In England alone was there still any semblance of constitutional government.

The Congress of Verona was the last of the joint-meetings of the powers for the discussion of the internal affairs of states. It marked the final withdrawal of England from the European alliance. Henceforth she took up a position distinctly hostile to the principles advocated by her former allies and her policy in relation to Spanish America practically coincided with that of the United States.

The great majority of the English people sympathized deeply with the constitutional movement in Spain and were ready to take up arms in support of the Spanish people. The protest of England having been disregarded by the powers at Verona, it became necessary for the cabinet, in view of the preparations going on in France for the invasion of the Peninsula, to say what they contemplated doing. In February, 1823, Lord Liverpool circulated among his colleagues a minute prepared by Canning, which gave at length the reasons, military and other, why it would be unwise for England to undertake the defense of Spain. In the first place, the war against Spain was unpopular in France, and if Great Britain should take part in the war, the French government would avail itself of the fact to convert it into an English war and thus render it popular. Second, England would have to undertake the defense of Spain against invasion by land, and her naval superiority would not materially aid the Spaniards or baffle the French. Third, the continental powers were committed to the support of France. Fourth, there was a possibility that the invasion of Spain would be unsuccessful. Fifth, on the other hand, it might meet with success, in which event France might assist Spain to recover her American colonies. Here, he says, England's naval superiority would tell, "and I should have no difficulty in deciding that we ought to prevent, by every means in our power, perhaps Spain from sending a single Spanish regiment to South America, after the supposed termination of the war in Spain, but certainly France from affording to Spain any aid or assistance for that purpose." Sixth, in case of the invasion of Portugal by France and Spain, he thought England would be in honor bound to defend her, in case she asked for aid. The military defense of Portugal would not be so difficult as a land war in Spain.[51]

In accordance with this determination Canning dispatched a letter to Sir Charles Stuart, British ambassador at Paris, March 31, 1823, in which he spoke of recognition of the colonies as a matter to be determined by time and circumstances, and, disclaiming all designs on the part of the British government on the late Spanish provinces, intimated that England, although abstaining from interference in Spain, would not allow France to acquire any of the colonies by conquest or cession. To this note the French government made no reply and England took this silence as a tacit agreement not to interfere with the colonies. The British government continued, however, to watch closely the movements of France.[52]

As the invasion of Spain drew near to a successful termination, the British government had reason to suspect that the allied powers would next direct their attention to the Spanish colonies with a view to forcing them back to their allegiance or of otherwise disposing of them, that is, by cession to some other European power. It was already in contemplation to call another European congress for the discussion and settlement of this question. As this was a subject of vital interest to the United States, Canning invited the American minister, Mr. Rush, to a conference, August 16, 1823, in which he suggested the expediency of an understanding on this question between England and the United States. He communicated to Mr. Rush the substance of his dispatch of March 31 to Sir Charles Stuart. Mr. Rush said he understood the import of this note to be that England would not remain passive to any attempt on the part of France to acquire territory in Spanish America. Mr. Canning then asked what the United States would say to going hand in hand with England in such a policy. Mr. Rush replied that his instructions did not authorize him to give an answer, but that he would communicate the suggestion informally to his government. At the same time he requested to be enlightened as to England's policy in the matter of recognizing the independence of the colonies. Mr. Canning replied that England had taken no steps in the matter of recognition whatever, but was considering the question of sending commissioners to the colonies to inquire into the condition of affairs. For the present these commissioners would be sent to Mexico alone.[53]

Mr. Stapleton in his "Life of Canning" simply says that as Mr. Rush was not authorized to enter into any formal agreement, Canning thought the delay of communicating with Washington would render such proceeding of no effect, and so the matter was dropped.[54] This, however, we learn from Mr. Rush's dispatches, is not the whole truth. Several communications passed between them after the conversation above given, which throw a totally different light upon the affair.

In an unofficial and confidential letter to Mr. Rush, dated August 20, 1823, Canning asked again if the moment had not arrived when the two governments might come to an understanding in regard to the Spanish-American colonies. He stated the views of England as follows: (1) That the recovery of the colonies by Spain was hopeless; (2) That the question of their recognition as independent states was one of time and circumstances; (3) That England was not disposed, however, to throw any obstacle in the way of an arrangement between the colonies and the mother-country by amicable negotiation; (4) That she aimed at the possession of no portion of the colonies for herself; and (5) That she could not see the transfer of any portion of them to any other power with indifference. He added "that if the United States acceded to such views, a declaration to that effect on their part, concurrently with England, would be the most effectual and least offensive mode of making known their joint disapprobation of contrary projects; that it would at the same time put an end to all jealousies of Spain as to her remaining colonies, and to the agitation prevailing in the colonies themselves by showing that England and the United States were determined not to profit by encouraging it."[55]

Prior to the formal recognition of South America, the United States had repeatedly expressed the wish to proceed in the matter hand in hand with Great Britain,[56] but that act placed the United States on an altogether different footing from England. Canning seemed to forget in the wording of his proposal that the United States had already, in the most formal manner, acknowledged the independence of the Spanish colonies. In reply Mr. Rush reminded him of this fact and of the desire of the United States to see the colonies recognized by England. In other respects, he believed that the views unfolded by Mr. Canning in his note were shared by the United States, but he added that he had no authority to avow these principles publicly in the manner suggested.

As soon as Rush's first dispatch was received President Monroe realized fully the magnitude of the issue presented by the proposal of an Anglo-American alliance. Before submitting the matter to his cabinet he transmitted copies of the dispatch to ex-Presidents Jefferson and Madison and the following interesting correspondence took place. In his letter to Jefferson of October 17th, the President said:

I transmit to you two despatches which were receiv'd from Mr. Rush, while I was lately in Washington, which involve interests of the highest importance. They contain two letters from Mr. Canning, suggesting designs of the holy alliance, against the Independence of So. America, & proposing a co-operation, between G. Britain & the U States, in support of it, against the members of that alliance. The project aims, in the first instance, at a mere expression of opinion, somewhat in the abstract, but which, it is expected by Mr. Canning, will have a great political effect, by defeating the combination. By Mr. Rush's answers, which are also enclosed, you will see the light in which he views the subject, & the extent to which he may have gone. Many important considerations are involved in this proposition. 1st Shall we entangle ourselves, at all, in European politicks, & wars, on the side of any power, against others, presuming that a concert, by agreement, of the kind proposed, may lead to that result? 2d If a case can exist in which a sound maxim may, & ought to be departed from, is not the present instance, precisely that case? 3d Has not the epoch arriv'd when G. Britain must take her stand, either on the side of the monarchs of Europe, or of the U States, & in consequence, either in favor of Despotism or of liberty & may it not be presum'd that, aware of that necessity, her government has seiz'd on the present occurrence, as that, which it deems, the most suitable, to announce & mark the commenc'ment of that career.

My own impression is that we ought to meet the proposal of the British govt. & to make it known, that we would view an interference on the part of the European powers, and especially an attack on the Colonies, by them, as an attack on ourselves, presuming that, if they succeeded with them, they would extend it to us. I am sensible however of the extent & difficulty of the question, & shall be happy to have yours, & Mr. Madison's opinions on it.[57]

Jefferson's reply dated Monticello, October 24th, displays not only a profound insight into the international situation, but a wide vision of the possibilities involved. He said:

The question presented by the letters you have sent me, is the most momentous which has ever been offered to my contemplation since that of Independence. That made us a nation, this sets our compass and points the course which we are to steer through the ocean of time opening on us. And never could we embark on it under circumstances more auspicious. Our first and fundamental maxim should be, never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe. Our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic affairs. America, North and South, has a set of interests distinct from those of Europe, and peculiarly her own. She should therefore have a system of her own, separate and apart from that of Europe. While the last is laboring to become the domicil of despotism, our endeavor should surely be, to make our hemisphere that of freedom. One nation, most of all, could disturb us in this pursuit; she now offers to lead, aid, and accompany us in it. By acceding to her proposition, we detach her from the bands, bring her mighty weight into the scale of free government, and emancipate a continent at one stroke, which might otherwise linger long in doubt and difficulty. Great Britain is the nation which can do us the most harm of any one, or all on earth; and with her on our side we need not fear the whole world. With her then, we should most sedulously cherish a cordial friendship; and nothing would tend more to knit our affections than to be fighting once more, side by side, in the same cause. Not that I would purchase even her amity at the price of taking part in her wars. But the war in which the present proposition might engage us, should that be its consequence, is not her war, but ours. Its object is to introduce and establish the American system, of keeping out of our land all foreign powers, of never permitting those of Europe to intermeddle with the affairs of our nations. It is to maintain our own principle, not to depart from it. And if, to facilitate this, we can effect a division in the body of the European powers, and draw over to our side its most powerful member, surely we should do it. But I am clearly of Mr. Canning's opinion, that it will prevent instead of provoking war. With Great Britain withdrawn from their scale and shifted into that of our two continents, all Europe combined would not undertake such a war. For how would they propose to get at either enemy without superior fleets? Nor is the occasion to be slighted which this proposition offers, of declaring our protest against the atrocious violations of the rights of nations, by the interference of any one in the internal affairs of another, so flagitiously begun by Bonaparte, and now continued by the equally lawless Alliance, calling itself Holy.[58]

Madison not only agreed with Jefferson as to the wisdom of accepting the British proposal of some form of joint action, but he went even further and suggested that the declaration should not be limited to the American republics, but that it should express disapproval of the late invasion of Spain and of any interference with the Greeks, who were then struggling for independence from Turkey.[59] Monroe, it appears, was strongly inclined to act on Madison's suggestion, but his cabinet took a different view of the situation. From the diary of John Quincy Adams, Monroe's secretary of state, it appears that almost the whole of November was taken up by cabinet discussions on Canning's proposals and on Russia's aggressions in the northwest. Adams stoutly opposed any alliance or joint declaration with Great Britain. The composition of the President's message remained in doubt until the 21st, when the more conservative views of Adams were, according to his own statement of the case, adopted. He advocated an independent course of action on the part of the United States, without direct reference to Canning's proposals, though substantially in accord with them. Adams defined his position as follows: "The ground that I wish to take is that of earnest remonstrance against the interference of the European powers by force with South America, but to disclaim all interference on our part with Europe; to make an American cause and adhere inflexibly to that."[60] Adams's dissent from Monroe's position was, it is claimed, due partly to the influence of Clay, who advocated a Pan American system, partly to the fact that the proposed coöperation with Great Britain would bind the United States not to acquire some of the coveted parts of the Spanish possessions, and partly to the fear that the United States as the ally of Great Britain would be compelled to play a secondary part. He probably carried his point by showing that the same ends could be accomplished by an independent declaration, since it was evident that the sea power of Great Britain would be used to prevent the reconquest of South America by the European powers. Monroe, as we have seen, thought that the exigencies of the situation justified a departure from the sound maxim of political isolation, and in this opinion he was supported by his two predecessors in the presidency.

The opinions of Monroe, Jefferson, and Madison in favor of an alliance with Great Britain and a broad declaration against the intervention of the great powers in the affairs of weaker states in any part of the world, have been severely criticised by some historians and ridiculed by others, but time and circumstances often bring about a complete change in our point of view. Since our entrance into the great world conflict several writers have raised the question as to whether the three elder statesmen were not right and Adams and Clay wrong.[61] If the United States and England had come out in favor of a general declaration against intervention in the concerns of small states and established it as a world-wide principle, the course of human history during the next century might have been very different, but Adams's diary does not tell the whole story. On his own statement of the case he might be justly censured by posterity for persuading the President to take a narrow American view of a question which was world-wide in its bearing. An important element in the situation, however, was Canning's change of attitude between the time of his conference with Rush in August and the formulation of the President's message. Two days after the delivery of his now famous message Monroe wrote to Jefferson in explanation of the form the declaration had taken: "Mr. Canning's zeal has much abated of late." It appears from Rush's correspondence that the only thing which stood in the way of joint action by the two powers was Canning's unwillingness to extend immediate recognition to the South American republics. On August 27th, Rush stated to Canning that it would greatly facilitate joint action if England would acknowledge at once the full independence of the South American colonies. In communicating the account of this interview to his government Mr. Rush concluded:

Should I be asked by Mr. Canning, whether, in case the recognition be made by Great Britain without more delay, I am on my part prepared to make a declaration, in the name of my government, that it will not remain inactive under an attack upon the independence of those states by the Holy Alliance, the present determination of my judgment is that I will make such a declaration explicitly, and avow it before the world.[62]

About three weeks later Canning, who was growing restless at the delay in hearing from Washington, again urged Rush to act without waiting for specific instructions from his government. He tried to show that the proposed joint declaration would not conflict with the American policy of avoiding entangling alliances, for the question at issue was American as much as European, if not more. Rush then indicated his willingness to act provided England would "immediately and unequivocally acknowledge the independence of the new states." Canning did not care to extend full recognition to the South American states until he could do so without giving unnecessary offense to Spain and the allies, and he asked if Mr. Rush could not give his assent to the proposal on a promise of future recognition. Mr. Rush refused to accede to anything but immediate acknowledgment of independence and so the matter ended.[63] As Canning could not come to a formal understanding with the United States, he determined to make a frank avowal of the views of the British cabinet to France and to this end he had an interview with Prince Polignac, the French ambassador at London, October 9, 1823, in which he declared that Great Britain had no desire to hasten recognition, but that any foreign interference, by force, or by menace, would be a motive for immediate recognition; that England "could not go into a joint deliberation upon the subject of Spanish America upon an equal footing with other powers, whose opinions were less formed upon that question." This declaration drew from Polignac the admission that he considered the reduction of the colonies by Spain as hopeless and that France "abjured in any case, any design of acting against the colonies by force of arms."[64] This admission was a distinct victory for Canning, in that it prepared the way for ultimate recognition by England, and an account of the interview was communicated without delay to the allied courts. The interview was not communicated to Rush until the latter part of November, and therefore had no influence upon the formation of Monroe's message of December 2.[65]

Before the close of the year the British government appointed consuls to the South American states, and about the time of their departure, an invitation was sent to the courts of St. Petersburg, Paris, and Vienna to a conference to be held at Paris to "aid Spain in adjusting the affairs of the revolted colonies." A copy of this invitation was also handed to the British ambassador at Madrid, but in such a form as to leave him in doubt as to whether his government was invited to the conference or not.[66] While the discussion as to the proposed conference was going on and before Canning had announced what action his government would take in the matter, President Monroe's message arrived in Europe.

Spanish America was not the only part of the western continent threatened at this time by European aggression. On the 4th of September, 1821, the emperor of Russia had issued an ukase, in which he claimed the northwestern coast of North America down to the 51st degree. This claim was incompatible with the pretensions of both England and the United States, and was stoutly opposed by them. This was a part of the territory known as the Oregon country, which continued in dispute between England and the United States until 1846. In July, 1823, Adams declared to Baron Tuyll, the Russian minister to the United States, "that we should contest the right of Russia to any territorial establishment on this continent, and that we should assume distinctly the principle that the American continents are no longer subjects for any new European colonial establishments." This language was incorporated substantially in the President's message.

The Monroe Doctrine is comprised in two widely separated paragraphs that occur in the message of December 2, 1823. The first, relating to Russia's encroachments on the northwest coast, and occurring near the beginning of the message, was an assertion to the effect that the American continents had assumed an independent condition and were no longer open to European colonization. This may be regarded as a statement of fact. No part of the continent at that time remained unclaimed. The second paragraph relating to Spanish America and occurring near the close of the message, was a declaration against the extension to the American continents of the system of intervention adopted by the Holy Alliance for the suppression of popular government in Europe.

The language used by President Monroe is as follows:

1. At the proposal of the Russian Imperial Government, made through the minister of the emperor residing here, a full power and instructions have been transmitted to the minister of the United States at St. Petersburg to arrange by amicable negotiation the respective rights and interests of the two nations on the northwest coast of this continent. A similar proposal had been made by His Imperial Majesty to the government of Great Britain, which has likewise been acceded to. The government of the United States has been desirous by this friendly proceeding of manifesting the great value which they have invariably attached to the friendship of the emperor and their solicitude to cultivate the best understanding with his government. In the discussions to which this interest has given rise and in the arrangements by which they may terminate, the occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers.[67]

2. In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy so to do. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defense. With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in their respective governments; and to the defense of our own, which has been achieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured by the wisdom of their most enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted. We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States. In the war between those new governments and Spain we declared our neutrality at the time of their recognition, and to this we have adhered, and shall continue to adhere, provided no change shall occur which, in the judgment of the competent authorities of this government, shall make a corresponding change on the part of the United States indispensable to their security.[68]

The President's message reached England while the discussion in regard to the proposed congress at Paris was still going on. It was received with enthusiasm by the liberal members of Parliament. Lord Brougham said:

The question with regard to South America is now, I believe, disposed of, or nearly so; for an event has recently happened than which none has ever dispersed greater joy, exultation, and gratitude over all the free men of Europe; that event, which is decisive on the subject, is the language held with respect to Spanish America in the message of the President of the United States.

Sir James Mackintosh said:

This coincidence of the two great English commonwealths (for so I delight to call them; and I heartily pray that they may be forever united in the cause of justice and liberty) cannot be contemplated without the utmost pleasure by every enlightened citizen of the earth.[69]

They evidently had reference to the second clause alone, the one relating to Spanish America. The other clause, the one against European colonization in America, seems not to have attracted much attention. Canning, however, saw the bearing of it and objected to the principle it set forth, which was directed against England as much as against the allies. He was evidently a little taken aback at the turn his proposal had taken. The President's message really settled the question before Canning had announced what action his government would take. Some little chagrin is apparent in the tone of his letter to Sir William à Court, British minister at Madrid, December 21, 1823.

While I was yet hesitating [he says], what shape to give to the declaration and protest which ultimately was conveyed in my conference with P. de Polignac, and while I was more doubtful as to the effect of that protest and declaration, I sounded Mr. Rush (the American minister here) as to his powers and disposition to join in any step which we might take to prevent a hostile enterprise on the part of the European powers against Spanish America. He had no powers; but he would have taken upon himself to join with us if we would have begun by recognizing the Spanish-American states. This we could not do, and so we went on without. But I have no doubt that his report to his government of this sounding, which he probably represented as an overture, had a great share in producing the explicit declaration of the President.[70]

The conference with Prince Polignac here referred to was that of October 9th quoted above. It was not until after the receipt of President Monroe's message in Europe that Canning framed his answer to the Spanish communication informing him of the proposed meeting in Paris for the discussion of the South American question. In that reply he stated to the Spanish government very fully his views upon the question at issue. He said that while England did not wish to precede Spain in the matter of recognition, yet she reserved to herself the privilege of recognizing the colonies when she deemed it best for her interests and right to them. He said that these views had been communicated fully from time to time to the powers invited to the congress and he concluded with the statement: "It does not appear to the British cabinet at all necessary to declare that opinion anew, even if it were perfectly clear (from the tenor of M. Ofalia's instruction) that Great Britain was in fact included in the invitation to the conference at Paris."[71]

While Canning and Monroe acted independently of each other, the expression that each gave to the views of his government was rendered more emphatic and of more effect by the knowledge of the other's attitude in the matter. Another point to be noted is that Monroe's message was made public, while Canning's answer was for some time known only to the diplomatic corps.

The determination of both England and the United States to oppose the intervention of the allies in South America had the desired effect. Conferences in answer to the invitation of Spain were held in Paris, but they were participated in only by the ordinary representatives of the powers invited, resident in that capital, and their only result was to advise Spain not to listen to the counsels of England.

All further discussion that took place between England and Spain in reference to recognition of the colonies by Great Britain was confined to the status of the revolutionary governments, and upon this point their views were so divergent that Canning finally announced to the Spanish government that, "His Majesty would, at his own time, take such steps as he might think proper in respect to the several states of Spanish America without further reference to the court of Madrid; but at the same time without any feeling of alienation towards that court, or of hostility towards the real interests of Spain."[72]

The French troops continuing to occupy Spain after the time stipulated by treaty, Canning sought an explanation from France, but without satisfactory results. He therefore determined at a cabinet meeting held December 14, 1824, to recognize Mexico and Colombia forthwith. On January 1, 1825, after the ministers had left England with instructions and full powers, the fact of recognition was communicated officially to the diplomatic corps and two days later it was made public. That this recognition was a retaliatory measure to compensate England for the French occupation of Spain was understood at the time and was distinctly avowed by Canning two years later.[73] In a speech delivered December 12, 1826, in defense of his position in not having arrested the French invasion of Spain, he said:

I looked another way—I sought for compensation in another hemisphere. Contemplating Spain, such as our ancestors had known her, I resolved that, if France had Spain, it should not be Spain with the Indies. I called the New World into existence to redress the balance of the Old.

In spite of the great indebtedness of South America to Canning, this boast falls somewhat flat when we remember that the Spanish colonies had won their independence by their own valor and had been recognized as independent governments by the United States two years before Great Britain acted in the matter.

Mr. Stapleton, Canning's private secretary and biographer, says that the recognition of Spanish-American independence was, perhaps, the most important measure adopted by the British cabinet while Canning was at the head of the foreign office. He sums up the reasons and results of the act as follows:

First, it was a measure essentially advantageous to British interests; being especially calculated to benefit our commerce. Next, it enabled this country to remain at peace, since it compensated us for the continued occupation of Spain by a French force, a disparagement to which, otherwise, it would not have become us to submit. Lastly, it maintained the balance between conflicting principles; since it gave just so much of a triumph to popular rights and privileges, as was sufficient to soothe the irritation felt by their advocates at the victory, which absolute principles had obtained by the overthrow of the constitutions of Spain, Portugal, and Naples; and it dealt a death-blow to the Holy Alliance, by disabusing its members of the strange fancy, with which they were prepossessed, that the differences between them and the British ministers (where they did differ) were merely feints on the part of the latter to avoid a conflict with public opinion.[74]

The United States government did not relax its efforts in behalf of the South American states with the recognition of England, but continued to exert itself in order to secure the acknowledgment of their independence by the other powers of Europe, particularly Spain.[75] Mr. Clay tried to get the other members of the alliance, especially the emperor of Russia, to use their good offices with Spain for the purpose of inducing her to recognize her late colonies, but the emperor of Russia, the head of the alliance, continued to preach to Spain "not only no recognition of their independence, but active war for their subjugation." To the request of the United States he replied that, out of respect for "the indisputable titles of sovereignty," he could not prejudge or anticipate the determination of the king of Spain.[76] It was some ten years before Spain could be persuaded to renounce her ancient claims.

FOOTNOTES:

[37] Am. St. Papers, For. Rel., Vol. III, p. 538.

[38] Wharton's Digest, Sec. 69, and Moore's Digest of Int. Law, Vol. I, p. 177.

[39] "Messages and Papers of the Presidents," Vol. II, pp. 13, 58, and 116.

[40] Lyman, "Diplomacy of the United States." 2 Vols. Boston, 1828, Vol. II, p. 432. Romero, "Mexico and the United States."

[41] Given in full in Am. St. Papers, For. Rel., Vol. IV, pp. 217-270.

[42] Am. St. Papers, For. Rel., Vol. IV, pp. 818-851.

[43] Benton's "Abridgment," Vol. VI, p. 139.

[44] Benton's "Abridgment," Vol. VI, p. 142.

[45] "Messages and Papers of the Presidents," Vol. II, p. 44.

[46] "Adams's Diary," September, 1817, to December, 1818. "Letters and Despatches of Castlereagh," Vol. XI, pp. 404 and 458.

[47] Stapleton, "Political Life of Canning," Vol. II, p. 10.

[48] Stapleton, "Official Correspondence of Canning," Vol. I, p. 48 ff.

[49] Bagot to Castlereagh, October 31, 1818. Mem. of a Conversation with Adams. "Letters and Despatches of Castlereagh," Vol. XII, p. 66.

[50] For the Congresses of Aix-la-Chapelle, Troppau, Laybach, and Verona, see "Letters and Despatches of Castlereagh," Vol. XII; "Life of Lord Liverpool," Vol. III; "Political Life and Official Correspondence of Canning"; Chateaubriand's "Congrès de Verone," and W. A. Phillips, "The Confederation of Europe. 1813-1823." The text of the treaty of Verona is published in Niles' Register, August 2, 1823, Vol. 24, p. 347, and in Elliot's "American Diplomatic Code," Vol. II, p. 179.

[51] "Life of Lord Liverpool," Vol. III, p. 231. "Official Correspondence of Canning," Vol. I, p. 85.

[52] Stapleton, "Political Life of Canning," Vol. II, p. 18.

[53] Rush's "Residence at the Court of London," p. 406.

[54] "Political Life of Canning," Vol. II, p. 24.

[55] Rush's "Residence at the Court of London," p. 412.

[56] "Letters and Despatches of Castlereagh," Vol. XI, p. 458. Bagot's reports of interviews with Adams.

[57] Hamilton, "Writings of James Monroe," Vol. VI, pp. 323-325.

[58] Ford, "Writings of Thomas Jefferson," Vol. X, pp. 277-278.

[59] Hamilton, "Writings of James Madison," Vol. IX, pp. 161-162.

[60] W. C. Ford, "Genesis of the Monroe Doctrine," in Mass. Hist. Soc. Proceedings, second series, Vol. XV, p. 392.

[61] See especially G. L. Beer, "The English-Speaking Peoples," p. 79.

[62] Rush's "Residence at the Court of London," p. 419.

[63] Ibid., pp. 429, 443.

[64] "Political Life of Canning," Vol. II, p. 26.

[65] Rush's "Residence at the Court of London," p. 448.

[66] "Political Life of Canning," Vol. II, p. 33.

[67] "Messages and Papers of the Presidents," Vol. II, p. 209.

[68] "Messages and Papers of the Presidents," Vol. II, p. 218.

[69] "Wharton's Digest," Sec. 57, Vol. I, p. 276.

[70] "Wharton's Digest," Sec. 57, Vol. I, p. 272.

[71] "Political Life of Canning," Vol. II, p. 42.

[72] "Political Life of Canning," Vol. II, p. 54.

[73] "Official Corresp. of Canning," Vol. II, p. 242. Letter to Granville. On the general question of recognition, see "Life of Lord Liverpool," Vol. III, pp. 297-304.

[74] "Political Life of Canning," Vol. II, p. 1.

[75] Am. St. Papers, For. Rel., Vol. V, pp. 794-796, and Vol. VI, pp. 1006-1014.

[76] Am. St. Papers, For. Rel., Vol. V, p. 850 ff.

CHAPTER III

The Diplomacy of the United States in Regard to Cuba

The Cuban question had its origin in the series of events that have been narrated in the two preceding chapters—the Napoleonic invasion of Spain and the resulting paralysis of Spanish power in America. The declaration of President Monroe, enforced by the well-known attitude of England, dealt the death-blow to Spanish hopes of recovering the Southern continent. Hence the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico, which had remained loyal to the king, were clung to with all the greater tenacity as the sole remains of the imperial possessions over which the successors of Ferdinand and Isabella had ruled for three centuries. The "Ever-faithful Island of Cuba" was rewarded for her loyalty by the concession of certain liberties of trade and invited to send representatives to the Spanish Cortes—a privilege which was subsequently withdrawn. Spain was now too weak to protect her two West Indian dependencies—the remains of her former glory, but her very weakness secured their possession to her. The naval and commercial importance of Cuba, "the pearl of the Antilles," made it a prize too valuable to be acquired by any one of the great maritime powers without exciting the jealousy and opposition of the others. Henceforth, to borrow the figure of a contemporary journalist, Cuba was to be the trans-Atlantic Turkey, trembling to its fall, but sustained by the jealousies of those who were eager to share the spoils.

The strategic importance of Cuba, commanding to a large extent the commerce of the West Indies and of the Central American states, and, what was of vital interest to us, the traffic of the Mississippi valley, attracted at an early period the attention of American as well as of European statesmen. In a letter to President Madison in 1809, Jefferson, in speaking of Napoleon's policy in regard to the Spanish-American colonies, said:

That he would give up the Floridas to withhold intercourse with the residue of those colonies cannot be doubted. But that is no price; because they are ours in the first moment of the first war; and until a war they are of no particular necessity to us. But, although with difficulty, he will consent to our receiving Cuba into our Union, to prevent our aid to Mexico and the other provinces. That would be a price, and I would immediately erect a column on the southern-most limit of Cuba, and inscribe on it a ne plus ultra as to us in that direction.[77]

President Madison expressed his views on the Cuban question in a letter to William Pinkney, October 30, 1810:

The position of Cuba gives the United States so deep an interest in the destiny, even, of that island, that although they might be an inactive, they could not be a satisfied spectator at its falling under any European government, which might make a fulcrum of that position against the commerce and security of the United States.[78]

This was the first statement in the evolution of a Cuban policy consistently adhered to by the United States until the successes of the Mexican war super-induced larger ideas of the mission and destiny of the Union.

As early as 1817 fears as to the fate of Cuba were raised in the minds of the American public by newspaper reports to the effect that England had proposed a relinquishment of her claim against Spain for the maintenance of the British army during the Peninsular campaign, amounting to £15,000,000, in return for the cession of the island.[79] Reports of this nature were circulated for several months on both sides of the Atlantic, but the question did not assume any very great importance until 1819, when the treaty for the cession of the Floridas to the United States was being negotiated with Spain. It was then insisted by the British press that the acquisition of the Floridas would give the United States such a preponderating influence in West Indian affairs as to render necessary the occupation of Cuba by Great Britain as the natural and only offset.[80] The Florida treaty was ratified after some delay, which, however, does not appear to have been caused by the British government, as was supposed at the time. The British papers, nevertheless, continued to condemn in strong terms the treaty as well as the inaction of their government in not making it a pretext for the seizure of Cuba.

As the preparations of France for the invasion of Spain in 1823 progressed the fate of Cuba became a question of absorbing interest in America. There was little hope that the island would continue a dependency of Spain. It was rumored that Great Britain had engaged to supply the constitutional government of Spain with money in her struggle with France and would occupy Cuba as a pledge for its repayment. Both Spanish and French journals spoke of British occupation of Cuba as a matter no longer to be doubted, and the presence in the West Indies of a large British squadron, sent nominally for the purpose of suppressing piracy, seemed to lend color to the reports.[81] The British press was clamoring for the acquisition of Cuba. The Packet declared: "The question then comes to this, shall England occupy Cuba, or by permitting its acquisition by the United States (which they have long desired) sacrifice her whole West India trade? There can be no hesitation as to the answer."

The British government, however, officially disclaimed all designs upon Cuba, but this disclaimer did not fully reassure the American government, and our representatives abroad were instructed to exercise a close scrutiny upon all negotiations between Spain and England. In the spring of 1823 Mr. Forsyth was succeeded by Mr. Nelson at the court of Madrid. In his instructions to the new minister, which went much beyond the usual length and were occupied almost exclusively with a discussion of the Cuban question, John Quincy Adams used the following remarkable words:

"In looking forward to the probable course of events for the short period of half a century, it seems scarcely possible to resist the conviction that the annexation of Cuba to our Federal Republic will be indispensable to the continuance and integrity of the Union itself." We were not then prepared for annexation, he continued, "but there are laws of political as well as physical gravitation; and if an apple, severed by the tempest from its native tree, cannot choose but fall to the ground, Cuba, forcibly disjoined from its own unnatural connection with Spain, and incapable of self-support, can gravitate only towards the North American Union, which, by the same law of nature, cannot cast her off from its bosom."[82]

President Monroe consulted Jefferson on the subject of Spanish-American affairs and the entanglements with European powers likely to arise therefrom. Jefferson replied, June 11, 1823:

Cuba alone seems at present to hold up a speck of war to us. Its possession by Great Britain would indeed be a great calamity to us. Could we induce her to join us in guaranteeing its independence against all the world, except Spain, it would be nearly as valuable as if it were our own. But should she take it, I would not immediately go to war for it; because the first war on other accounts will give it to us, or the island will give itself to us when able to do so.[83]

During the summer of 1825 a large French squadron visited the West Indies and hovered for several weeks about the coasts of Cuba. This action on the part of the French government, without explanation, excited the alarm of both England and the United States and drew forth strong protests from Mr. Canning and from Mr. Clay. Canning wrote to Granville, the British minister at Paris, that he could not consent to the occupation of Havana by France, even as a measure of protection against possible attacks from Mexico and Colombia.[84] Again some two months later he wrote:

As to Cuba you cannot too soon nor too amicably, of course, represent to Villèle the impossibility of our allowing France (or France us, I presume) to meddle in the internal affairs of that colony. We sincerely wish it to remain with the mother-country. Next to that I wish it independent, either singly or in connection with Mexico. But what cannot or must not be, is that any great maritime power should get possession of it. The Americans (Yankees, I mean) think of this matter just as I do.[85]

The expressions of the United States, as to the designs of France, were as emphatic as those of England. Mr. Clay declared "that we could not consent to the occupation of those islands by any other European power than Spain under any contingency whatever."[86]

In this connection Canning wished to bring about the signature, by England, France, and the United States, of "ministerial notes, one between France and the United States, and one between France and Great Britain, or one tripartite note signed by all, disclaiming each for themselves, any intention to occupy Cuba, and protesting against such occupation by either of the others."[87] The government of the United States held this proposal under advisement, but on France declining, it was dropped.[88] In 1826 when an attack upon Portugal was feared Canning advised, in case of such an attack, the immediate seizure of Cuba by Great Britain as more effective than half a dozen Peninsular campaigns.[89]

The Cuban question was involved in the long debate on the proposal of the executive of the United States to send delegates to the congress of Spanish-American republics assembled at Panama in 1826. This debate occupied the attention of Congress during the winter and spring of 1826, and was engaged in with great earnestness. One of the chief objections to the proposed mission was the fact that the question of Cuba and Porto Rico would come up and that the United States government had already committed itself to the foreign powers on that subject. The report of the Senate committee on foreign relations declared that,

The very situation of Cuba and Porto Rico furnishes the strongest inducement to the United States not to take a place at the contemplated congress, since, by so doing, they must be considered as changing the attitude in which they hitherto have stood as impartial spectators of the passing scenes, and identifying themselves with the new republics.[90]

The Southern members were united in their opposition to the Panama mission, and in fact to any closer alliance with the new republics, for the reason that the latter had adopted the principle of emancipation and any further extension of their influence would jeopardize the institution of slavery in the United States. For the same reason they were opposed to the transfer of Cuba to any other European power. If a change from its connection with Spain were necessary they favored annexation by the United States, and meantime they were strongly opposed to the government entering into any engagement with foreign powers or in any way committing itself on the Cuban question.[91]

The declaration of Mr. Clay against the interference of England and France in the affairs of Cuba was consistently adhered to under the administrations of Jackson and Van Buren.

In 1838-39, the British government dispatched special commissioners to Cuba and Porto Rico to report on the condition of the slave trade. The presence of these agents in Cuba gave rise to reports that Great Britain contemplated revolutionizing the island, or at least occupying it for the purpose of suppressing the slave trade. The United States gave Spain to understand that we would not consent to British control in whatever way it might be brought about. Mr. Forsyth wrote to Mr. Vail, our representative at Madrid, July 15, 1840:

You are authorized to assure the Spanish government, that in case of any attempt, from whatever quarter, to wrest from her this portion of her territory, she may securely depend upon the military and naval resources of the United States to aid her in preserving or recovering it.[92]

Again, Mr. Webster in January, 1843, wrote to Mr. Campbell, United States consul at Havana:

The Spanish government has long been in possession of the policy and wishes of this government in regard to Cuba, which have never changed, and has repeatedly been told that the United States never would permit the occupation of that island by British agents or forces upon any pretext whatever; and that in the event of any attempt to wrest it from her, she might securely rely upon the whole naval and military resources of this country to aid her in preserving or recovering it.[93]

A copy of this letter was also sent to Washington Irving, our representative at Madrid to make such use of as circumstances might require.[94]

During the first period of our Cuban diplomacy the efforts of this government were directed toward preventing the acquisition of the island, or the establishment of a protectorate over it, by Great Britain or France. With the Mexican war, however, and the growing conviction of "manifest destiny," our foreign policy assumed a much bolder and more aggressive character, and during the next fifteen years all manner of schemes for the southward extension of our territory were suggested and many of them actually undertaken. Cuba became an object of desire, not only in the eyes of the slave-holding population of the South as an acquisition to slave territory, but of a large part of the nation, because of its strategic importance in relation to the inter-oceanic transit routes of Central America, which seemed the only feasible line of communication with our rapidly developing interests in California. Consequently various attempts were made to annex the island to the United States, both by purchase from Spain and forcibly by filibustering expeditions.

In June, 1848, under the administration of President Polk, Mr. Buchanan, secretary of state, wrote to our minister at Madrid, directing him to open negotiations with the Spanish government for the purchase of Cuba. After referring to the dangers of British occupation and to the advantages of annexation, he said: "Desirable, however, as this island may be to the United States, we would not acquire it except by the free will of Spain. Any acquisition not sanctioned by justice and honor would be too dearly purchased." He stated that the President would stipulate for the payment of $100,000,000, as a maximum price.[95] This offer was rejected by the Spanish government. The minister of state after several months' delay finally replied "that it was more than any minister dare to entertain any such proposition; that he believed such to be the feeling of the country, that sooner than see the island transferred to any power, they would prefer seeing it sunk in the ocean."

Under the Whig administration of Taylor and Fillmore no effort was made for the purchase of Cuba. On August 2, 1849, Mr. Clayton wrote to Mr. Barringer that the government did not desire to renew the negotiation for the purchase of Cuba made by the late administration, since the proposition had been considered by the Spanish government as a national indignity; that should Spain desire to part with Cuba, the proposal must come from her.

About this time active preparations were going on for the invasion of Cuba by an armed expedition under the Cuban patriot Narciso Lopez. On August 11, 1849, President Taylor issued a proclamation warning all citizens of the United States against taking part in such expedition and saying, "No such persons must expect the interference of this government in any form on their behalf, no matter to what extremities they may be reduced in consequence of their conduct."[96] A few days later the entire force of Lopez was arrested by the United States marshal just as it was on the point of leaving New York.