The Life of Robert, Lord Clive, Vol. 3 (of 3) / Collected from the Family Papers Communicated by the Earl of Powis

THE

LIFE

OF

ROBERT, LORD CLIVE:

COLLECTED FROM THE FAMILY PAPERS

COMMUNICATED BY

THE EARL OF POWIS.

BY

MAJOR-GENERAL

SIR JOHN MALCOLM, G.C.B. F.R.S. &c.

IN THREE VOLUMES.

WITH A PORTRAIT AND MAP.

VOL. III.

LONDON:

JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET.

MDCCCXXXVI.

London:
Printed by A. Spottiswoode
New-Street-Square.

CONTENTS

OF

THE THIRD VOLUME.

MEMOIRS

OF

LORD CLIVE.

[CHAPTER XV.]

Difficult as was the situation in which Lord Clive was placed when he adopted those active measures to remedy the abuses in the civil administration of Bengal, which have been already described, a much more arduous task awaited him; that of carrying into execution the positive orders he had received from the Directors, to reduce the allowances of the officers of the army of that presidency. This excited a spirit of mutinous defection from their duty in that body, which it required all the energy and decision of Clive to subdue. The subject has importance in various ways, and in none more than as it is so singularly illustrative of his character. To make it clearly understood, it will be useful to give a concise account[1] of the whole transaction.

The plea for the mutinous defection from their duty of a great proportion of the officers of the Bengal army in 1766, was the reduction of double batta, which was first introduced after the battle of Plassey, by the Nabob Jaffier Ally Cawn, who granted it to the English force, of which, according to treaty, he was to pay the expenses. Lord Clive, at the period of this grant, warned the army, that it must be considered as an indulgence on the part of the Nabob, which the Company would not be inclined to continue. It happened as he anticipated; for, when the Nabob assigned certain districts to the Company, in order to defray the expenses of the army, the Court of Directors, unwilling to adopt so expensive a precedent, issued the most positive orders[2], that double batta should be abolished. These orders were several times repeated, but the remonstrances of the army had hitherto prevented the Governor and Council carrying them into execution. In 1764, when Lord Clive accepted for the second time the government of Bengal, this was one of the points most strongly pressed[3] upon him by the Court of Directors.

The whole army had been formed into regiments, and divided into three brigades, according to a plan of Clive. The first, under Lieutenant Colonel Sir R. Fletcher, garrisoned Monghyr; the third brigade, under Colonel Sir Robert Barker, was cantoned at Bankipore; and the second, under Colonel Smith, was stationed at Allahabad, at the request of the Emperor of Delhi and Sujah Dowlah, to keep the Mahrattas in check. The peace which had been established, and the regimenting the troops, offered a favourable opportunity for carrying into effect the positive commands of the Directors; and accordingly an order was issued by the Select Committee, directing that, from the 1st of January, 1766, double batta to the European officers of the army should cease, except at Allahabad, where, on account of the distance from Calcutta, it was continued to the second brigade, as long as it should be actually in the field; but when in cantonments, that corps was to be reduced to single batta. At Patna and Monghyr, the troops were allowed half batta when not on service; while those at the presidency were put upon the same footing as the troops on the coast of Coromandel, who drew no batta, except when actually marching or serving in the field.

In reply to the remonstrances of the officers, the positive commands of the Company were stated; and, on the appointed day, the reduction took place. Though the officers seemed to acquiesce, secret meetings were held in each brigade, at which a general resignation of their commissions was proposed. This plan was originally formed at Monghyr, in December[4] 1765, or January 1766, and, when matured, proposed to the second and third brigades. The second, at first, considering themselves as engaged in actual service by being on the frontier, declined taking an active part; but these sentiments of honour soon gave way to the general infatuation, and nearly two hundred commissions of captains and subalterns were, in a short time collected, to be placed, on the 1st of June, in the hands of the officers commanding the respective brigades; though it was agreed that they should offer to serve as volunteers till the 15th, to give time for an answer to be received from Lord Clive and the Select Committee. The officers combined in this proceeding, bound themselves by an oath to secresy, and to preserve, at the hazard of their own lives, the life of any one of their body who might be condemned by a court-martial to death. In order to avoid the charge of mutiny, they determined to refuse the usual advance of pay for the month of June. Each officer bound himself separately by a bond of 500l., not to accept his commission again, if double batta was not restored. And subscriptions were entered into for those who might be cashiered. To this subscription several civilians were said to have contributed.

The advance of between fifty and sixty thousand Mahrattas towards Corah, about one hundred and fifty miles from Allahabad, inspired those in the plot with fresh hopes of success, as it appeared that the services of one brigade, at least, would be required, at the very time fixed for the general resignation. Colonel Smith, who commanded on the frontier, was ordered to encamp at Serajapoor, with the whole of the second brigade, except the European regiment, who were not to march on account of the great heat.

Such was the state of affairs in March, 1766, when Lord Clive and General Carnac set out from Calcutta, to regulate with Mr. Sykes (the Resident at the Nabob's court) the collections of the revenue at Moorshedabad and Patna for the ensuing year; to receive from Sujah Dowlah the balance of the fifty lacs of rupees stipulated by the treaty of August, 1765, and to form alliances with the princes of the Empire against the Mahrattas.

In April, 1766, Lord Clive arrived at Moorshedabad, when he received a letter, dated 19th April, from Mr. Verelst and the Council at Calcutta, enclosing the remonstrance of the third brigade relative to the reduction of the batta, signed by nine captains, twelve lieutenants, and twenty ensigns.[5] The Board having declined answering it without obtaining Lord Clive's sentiments thereon, Lord Clive, in a letter dated 22d April, 1766[6], recommended that it should be sent to Sir R. Barker for his information, as the Board could take no notice of any paper brought before them, except through the commanding officer. But lest it should have been regularly transmitted through the commanding officer, he proposed that the same answer should be given as had been on a former remonstrance; remarking, at the same time, that many lieutenants of the Sepoy battalions had signed, who, having an extra allowance of two rupees per diem, could not be considered as having any great hardship to complain of. Hitherto no suspicion had been entertained of the intended resignation. On the 28th of April, Lord Clive received a letter from Sir Robert Fletcher, dated 25th April, which contained the first intimation on the subject.[7] He stated that the officers seemed determined to make another attempt for the recovery of batta; that their commissions were to be sent to him at the end of the month; but that they would continue to serve in May as volunteers. To explain the matter further, he enclosed a letter from Sir R. Barker, 21st April[8], informing him of a quarrel among some officers of the third brigade, which had developed a serious combination, which, he had reason to believe, was not confined to that part of the army. Sir R. Fletcher also transmitted his answer[9] to Sir R. Barker, dated the 24th April, in which he states that, though he has for some days heard that the officers had thoughts of resuming their demand, he could not think it deserved much notice; observing, at the same time, that should it prove that they offered to resign, as Lord Clive would probably not alter his resolution, it would afford him an opportunity of "picking out the best officers, and getting rid of the useless ones."

To this communication Lord Clive replied on the 28th April[10], 1766, approving of Sir Robert Fletcher's proceedings, and declaring his determination, that any officer who offered his resignation should be immediately dismissed, and never restored to the service. The quarrel among the officers alluded to in Sir R. Barker's letter, arose from Ensign Davis refusing to give up his commission to Captain Duff, which, connected with the result of a Court of Inquiry, led to a discovery of the whole of their proceedings. In consequence of this premature disclosure of their combination, the 1st of May was fixed on instead of the 1st of June, for the resignation of their commissions, with a view of preventing Lord Clive and the Committee having time to counteract the execution of their intention. A letter signed "Full Batta," dated 15th April[11], addressed to Captain Carnac (who was with Lord Clive), was received about the same time, informing him of the plan of resigning, and calling upon him to send his commission to some friend of his, and to sign the subscription for such officers as might be turned out of the service. The contents of this letter, being communicated to Lord Clive, convinced him that the combination was general; nor was he without apprehension that the troops might follow the example of their officers, and a general mutiny ensue. He was, however, determined not to concede; and resolved to leave Moorshedabad as soon as his important business would allow, and to reach Monghyr before the 15th of May. In conjunction with General Carnac and Mr. Sykes, he despatched an express to the Council at Calcutta, dated the 29th April[12], informing them of the proposed resignation, and desiring them to write to Madras, in order that all officers and cadets that could be spared from that presidency should be held in readiness to embark for Bengal at the shortest notice, promising them rank according to their standing. Alluding to the Bengal officers, he observes, in this letter, "Such a spirit must at all hazards be suppressed at the birth, unless we determine upon seeing the government of these provinces pass from the civil into the hands of the military department." In the same letter he desired that the Presidency of Fort St. George should be informed of the approach of the Mahrattas, of the number of the officers who had placed their commissions at the disposal of the combination (being then one hundred and thirty); and he concludes, by stating the necessity of the Committee at Calcutta coming to an absolute determination that no officer now resigning shall ever hereafter hold any place or station in the East India Company's service. The Council sent off a despatch to Fort St. George[13] to the above effect. Lord Clive wrote also to Colonel Smith, Sir R. Barker, and Sir Robert Fletcher, enclosing a copy of his letter to the Council, and giving those officers leave to make his opinions known to their respective corps, who, he still hoped, when they knew his resolution not to yield to their threats, would change their conduct. From not having heard from Colonel Smith and Sir R. Barker, he was in hopes, as appears by a letter to Mr. Verelst (2d May), that the officers, finding the Committee steady in their resolution, would not venture to brave the consequences. He soon, however, received a letter from Sir R. Barker, dated 27th April, 1766[14], stating what he had discovered, in consequence of the Court of Inquiry respecting the fire at Bankipore; that he had sent Captain Duff and Ensign Davis prisoners to Calcutta, and would send those who were active in the combination there too, as any trial of them by their comrades would be mere trifling; intimating also, that the civilians at Calcutta were supposed to have subscribed in aid of this combination to a large amount. To this Lord Clive replied[15], 2d May, 1766, approving of what he had done, desiring him to arrest such officers as he thought might be tried for mutiny, till a court martial of field officers could be summoned. "The ringleaders," he observed, "of this affair must suffer the severest punishment that martial law can inflict, else there is an end of discipline in the army, and of authority in the East India Company over all their servants!!" Similar letters were sent to Sir R. Fletcher and Colonel Smith.[16] In one of these letters he takes notice of certain inflammatory anonymous letters, and says, that if he could discover their authors, his utmost endeavours should be used "to have them shot." On the 4th of May[17], he received a letter from Sir R. Fletcher, enclosing one signed by forty-two of his officers, complaining of the hardships to which they were subjected by the reduction of their batta, and enclosing their commissions, but informing him at the same time of their intention to serve without pay until the 15th of May.[18] He immediately wrote to Calcutta, directing that officers should be sent for from Fort St. George, and the free merchants at Calcutta be requested to assist. On the 5th of May, a letter was received from Sir R. Barker[19], of the 30th April, informing Lord Clive, that on the 29th of April his officers had informed him of their intention to resign on the 1st of May; that he had assembled them, and informed them of the crime they were committing, and the ruin they were bringing on themselves; but that they had answered, "that they were solemnly engaged with the other brigades, and could not be off." Sir Robert states in this letter his apprehension about the resolution of the men at Monghyr to mutiny, and mentions that one lac and forty thousand rupees (16,000l.) was said to be subscribed for the officers, by gentlemen at Calcutta. These circumstances Lord Clive communicated to the Council[20], requesting them to endeavour to discover the civilians who had granted such encouragement to the army in their mutiny. Directions were also sent to Sir R. Fletcher[21] to be on his guard against any disorders on the part of the troops, and to have every thing necessary for detaching them in small parties. Boats were also ordered to be provided for sending the officers, at twenty-four hours' notice, to Calcutta. On the 1st of May, Sir R. Barker received a letter from Mr. Robertson, the Field-Adjutant, enclosing the commissions of the officers of the third brigade, which Sir Robert returned to them, with an expression of his resolution to put the severity of military law in execution, in case any of them should misbehave. He wrote to Lord Clive[22], informing him of what he had done, and that he had directed Mr. Robertson and three others to proceed instantly as prisoners to Calcutta. Mr. Robertson claimed exemption from military law, on the plea that he had resigned; but nevertheless he was obliged to comply with the orders. Affairs now becoming critical, Lord Clive determined to set off with all expedition for Monghyr; and on the 6th of May, leaving the business at Moorshedabad to the care of Mr. Sykes, he and General Carnac left Mulajyl, sending forward such officers as he had been able to collect at so short a notice, and on whom he could rely.[23] Finding, by a letter he received on the road from Sir R. Fletcher, that the officers still remained determined in their purpose, and that a correspondence was begun by them to induce the Madras officers to refuse to come to the assistance of Government, Lord Clive[24] ordered that all private letters between Calcutta and Madras should be stopped, and directed Sir R. Fletcher to secure the assistance of the serjeants and native officers[25], in case of any appearance of mutiny among the men.[26] In a letter to Sir R. Barker, dated 8th May, 1766, Lord Clive, alluding to the report just received of the determination of the officers to persevere, observes,—

"Will men, so abandoned to all sense of honour, and who still persevere in supporting acts of mutiny and desertion, when they have abandoned one point, cease there? History can furnish but few instances of that nature. For my own part, I must see the soldiers' bayonets levelled at my throat, before I can be induced to give way; and then, not so much for the preservation of my own life, as the temporary salvation of the Company: temporary only it can be, for I shall think Bengal in the utmost danger, when we are reduced to the necessity of submitting the civil power to the mercy of men who have gone lengths that will frighten and astonish all England.

"With me it is beyond a doubt, that if the officers do not resolve to submit, and acknowledge their crime, ruin and destruction must be equally their lot, whether they succeed or not; and if arguments of this kind can make no impression, none will. I cannot help thinking more evil is still intended."

In the mean time, the Council had resolved that all commissions tendered should be accepted, and the officer tendering them immediately sent to Calcutta. On applying to the free merchants to come forward to do duty as officers on the present emergency, two only would accept commissions, which confirmed the suspicions that the greater part of them approved the conduct of the officers, even if they had not entered into a subscription to support the combination.

Advice was received from Colonel Smith, that the Mahrattas were in motion. It appeared that he was still unacquainted with the intended resignation of his officers. Lord Clive, however, in his answer[27] contemplating this act, authorised him to enter into alliance with the neighbouring princes; and, should he find himself reduced to the utmost extremity, but not otherwise, to make terms with the malecontents. The officers who had been sent forward by Lord Clive, on their arrival at Monghyr, endeavoured to impress those who had resigned with a sense of the enormity of their conduct; informing them that Lord Clive was coming, determined not to yield to them; and remarking strongly on their ingratitude towards a person who had lately given up 70,000l.[28], to form a fund for invalids and widows. The officers replied, that it was impossible for them now to retract. They stated that Sir R. Fletcher had never communicated to them Lord Clive's donation to the army; and concluded by accusing Sir Robert as the originator of the whole plan for resisting the orders of government. On the 13th of May, the European soldiers got under arms, intending to follow their officers; but the appearance of Captain Smith with the sepoy battalion restored order; and when Sir R. Fletcher addressed them, and distributed money among them, they informed him, that they had been assured that he was to head them; but as that was not the case, they would return to their duty. The officers offered to assist, but were ordered to quit the garrison immediately. On the 15th of May, Lord Clive arrived at Monghyr, and received the account of past proceedings from Sir R. Fletcher, who added, that he had known of the combination of the officers since January, and had seemed to approve of their schemes, that nothing might be done without his knowledge. It is here to be remarked, that the date of Sir Robert's letter, which first intimated any thing about the resignation of the officers, was the 25th of April. Whatever were Lord Clive's sentiments on this communication, he did not think fit either to express his dissatisfaction, or take any steps at the moment. Immediately on his arrival he addressed the soldiers, explaining the crime of their officers, and mentioning his own donation to the European part of the army. He ordered double pay to be issued to the native troops for May and June.

At Bankipore[29], where Sir Robert Barker commanded, neither officers nor men behaved in so violent a manner as at Monghyr. More of the officers remained with their corps, and there was no appearance of mutiny among the troops.

At Serajipoor, Colonel Smith, who was daily in expectation of a battle, was placed in a peculiarly difficult situation. On the 6th of May, all the officers in camp, except two, requested leave to resign, some immediately, and others from the first of June. The Colonel immediately ordered the first to proceed to Calcutta, and informed the latter that they should have an answer before the time they had fixed; remarking to both, that he should be obliged to place that confidence in the black troops which he had before their recent conduct reposed in the zeal of his own countrymen. The officers answered this, by complaining of the attempt to asperse their honour; to which Colonel Smith replied, that the first point of honour in a soldier was military obedience, and repeated his order, that all those who had offered to resign immediately should leave camp, and go to the presidency. Lieutenant Vertue having been refused permission to resign, and leaving his commission on Colonel Smith's table, was ordered into arrest, to be tried by a court-martial at Patna. The officers of the European regiment who were stationed at Allahabad declared their intention of setting out for Calcutta on the 20th of May, and behaved in so disorderly a manner, that Major Smith, who commanded that fortress, would have ordered them all into arrest, if he could have depended on the men; but, as there was some idea that the soldiers would assist the officers, he sent for an old battalion of sepoys, which had been long under his command. These troops having performed a march of one hundred and four miles from Serajipoor, in fifty-four hours, arrived in camp a few hours before the officers were on the point of leaving the garrison. With their assistance Major Smith compelled the officers to make apologies and submission for the insult they had offered to his authority, and he contented himself with sending off six to Calcutta. Colonel Smith at Serajipoor, pursuing the same vigorous measures, had secured tranquillity at that station, by sending half his officers to Calcutta.

On the 20th of May, Lord Clive arrived at Bankipore; many of the officers who had resigned still continuing to do duty were restored to their commissions. The officers who had been ordered to Calcutta having attempted to assemble on the road, and disturbance being apprehended, some detachments of sepoys were sent to compel them to continue their journey. The principal leaders of this mutinous opposition to authority being now arrested, and ordered to prepare for their trial, repentance and humiliation became general, the objects of the combination were defeated, their union and strength broken, and those who were restored were compelled to sign a contract to serve the Company for three years, and to give a year's notice of their intention to quit the service. Messrs. Duffield and Robertson of the third brigade, who were ringleaders, on being ordered to embark for England, protested against the order, and blockaded themselves in their houses till the ships for England left Calcutta; but, on their making their appearance, they were seized and sent off to Madras, and from thence to England.

Though there was no doubt of the assistance which the military derived from the civilians, yet from the precaution taken by the latter, of sending their letters by private posts in disguised hands, it was difficult to substantiate the charge against any individuals. Mr. Higginson, however, the sub-secretary to the Council, and Mr. Grindal in the secretary's office, having the charge brought home to them, were dismissed. Captain Stainforth, accused of having expressed a determination of assassinating Lord Clive, was tried and condemned to be cashiered. When authority was fully vindicated, as much lenity was shown by Lord Clive as was consistent with the public safety to those concerned in this combination. Out of six officers tried and found guilty of mutiny, not one was sentenced to death. A defect of the Mutiny Act for the East India Company's service, in omitting the contract between the officer and Company, might, it was thought by many, render the legality of the proceedings doubtful; and this inclined the members of the court-martial to mercy. Lieutenant Vertue, on this ground, refused to plead; nevertheless, he was put on his trial, condemned, and cashiered with infamy.

Sir Robert Fletcher, who was publicly accused by many of the officers who resigned, and more particularly by Captain Goddard[30], of having been the instigator of the whole plan, was tried by a court martial, found guilty, and cashiered. It appeared in evidence for the prosecution, that Sir Robert Fletcher was acquainted throughout with the design of the general resignation; and that he, in fact, proposed it, as a scheme by which the officers might recover their double batta.[31]

Such is the detail of a combination of officers, which threatened with the most imminent danger the newly established authority of the Company over the rich provinces of Bengal and Bahar. Never did Lord Clive display more prominently that superior knowledge of human nature, that intimate acquaintance with the feelings and motives of military men, or that firmness and decision by which alone those can be kept in subordination, than on this trying occasion. He never hesitated nor swerved from the resolutions he adopted on the first moment that he learnt the extent of the combination formed against the government. He was well supported by the members of the committee, of which General Carnac, commander of the troops, was a member; and with the conduct of the senior officer of the army, Colonel R. Smith, who commanded one of the brigades, as well as of Sir Robert Barker, who commanded another, he had every reason to be satisfied.

The high opinion he entertained of Sir R. Fletcher as a gallant officer, his apparent zeal and constant communications, long misled Lord Clive into a confidence on his co-operation, which, had he been a man of less talent and less prompt decision, would have occasioned a ruinous compromise of the public interests. But that and all the other evil consequences which this alarming combination threatened, were subdued by his presence, and by the personal display of that calm and unyielding courage, which, in military bodies, extorts, even from those it subdues, respect and admiration.

During these proceedings Clive's mind appears, from his whole correspondence, public and private, to have been resolutely fixed on the accomplishment of the objects for which he abandoned ease and affluence in his native country; namely, those of restoring discipline in the military, and order in the civil, branches of the service. But we are able to trace the motives under which he acted on this momentous occasion more minutely in his private than in his public communications. From his letters to General Carnac and others it is evident that Lord Clive cherished, even at the moment he was reducing them to obedience, the kindest feelings towards the officers of the Bengal army. In one to the General he makes some mild but judicious remarks upon the warm language which his friend had used in representing the discontent of the officers under his orders (prior to the combination) at their being superseded by Captain Macpherson, whom the Council-Board at Calcutta had admitted to the rank of captain in a mode which the Bengal officers deemed injurious to their interests. "I am concerned," Lord Clive observes in this letter[32], "at the warmth of your letter to the Board. Although they have used both you and me extremely ill, and, as individuals, deserved our utmost contempt, yet I think there is some indulgence due to their stations. That they have acted unjustly, as well as contrary to the known rules of the army, in the case of Captain Macpherson, cannot be doubted; yet I cannot think the officers ought to carry matters so far as to insist upon a Governor and Council retracting what they have done. There must be an absolute power lodged somewhere, and that certainly is in the hands of the Governor and Council, until the pleasure of the Court of Directors be known. However, if the account of Captain Macpherson is proved true, I will be answerable that he shall act as youngest of the corps he has been introduced to, and take care that no such unjust proceedings shall be countenanced in future. I hope this will prove satisfactory to the officers, who, by their gallant behaviour, are entitled to every mark of attention and distinction from the Company."

This kind and friendly remonstrance, on the part of Lord Clive, had not the desired effect: on the contrary, it appears by the following letter to his respected friend General Lawrence, that the resentment of the officers at this act of government gave rise to demands of a character that showed how much a spirit of insubordination had spread throughout the Bengal army.

"I[33] should have done myself the pleasure of writing to you sooner, if I had not deferred it from day to day, in hopes of being able to entertain you with some important news from camp. There has, however, but one material circumstance happened, and that I am sure will astonish you. Some time ago, the Governor in Council here permitted Captain Whichcot to dispose of his commission to Captain Macpherson, and appointed the latter to the same rank among the captains, that Whichcot held. Upon a representation of this grievance, Macpherson was ordered to take rank as youngest captain; but the military gentlemen, still dissatisfied, thought fit to remonstrate against his being appointed to any other than that of youngest ensign. Such an unreasonable request could not be granted, and the consequence of the refusal has been, it seems, a general association among the officers, captains as well as subalterns; the former thinking it incumbent on them to support what they are pleased to suppose the rights of the latter. The import of this association is, that all the officers, captains, lieutenants and ensigns are to resign their commissions, unless Macpherson be degraded to the lowest rank! Civil departments, in every state, will now and then entertain abuses, in spite of the most vigilant magistracy; but I appeal, my dear General, to your memory, whether, in the long experience you have had in military affairs, a single instance can be given of a corps of officers, in time of actual service and an enemy in the field, uniting in a combination of this nature. To me it appears so repugnant to every regulation of discipline, so destructive of that subordination, without which no army can exist, and above all, so disobedient to the Mutiny Act and Articles of War, that I am determined to refuse them the liberty of resigning (I mean those at least whose contract with the Company is not expired), and break them, or perhaps proceed to greater extremities by a general court-martial. The expediency of my plan of regimenting the forces, and appointing the proper proportion of field officers, appears now, I think, in a stronger light than ever; and in consequence of this mutiny (must I call it?) I have already ordered all the corps which I brought from Europe to march up to camp, whither I intend to be myself, as soon as the interior policy of affairs will permit. To say truth, every principle of government in this presidency has within these few months past been so debauched, that one can hardly determine upon the branches which ought first to be lopped. Pray tell Mr. Palk that I do not write to him by this post because my politics are not yet ripe for communication, and I consider this as a letter to you both."

Some time before the combination of the officers took place, several efforts were made by Clive to enforce the principles of subordination, which, we find from his private letters, were greatly relaxed in all ranks. He appears to have grounded his chief hopes of restoring and maintaining discipline on his plan of giving shape to the army, by forming it into corps and brigades, and placing it under officers of rank and reputation; but his difficulty was to keep those in order who had been selected to command others. This is strongly evinced in a letter to Sir R. Fletcher, who, while he recommended the introduction of better discipline, objected to serve under Sir R. Barker.

"I have received your letter[34]," Lord Clive observes, "and agree entirely with you in the necessity of introducing discipline and subordination among the officers and soldiers in the service of the Company, although I see no such difficulty in bringing this about, since those who decline complying with the regulations which are to be made will most certainly be dismissed the service.

"I must confess it gives me much concern, that you, who preach up the necessity of discipline and reformation, should be the first to act in contradiction to your own declared sentiments, by declining to serve under Sir R. Barker; but what surprises me still more is, that you who have been removed from one settlement to another, and have actually superseded numbers, should object to serve under an officer, who was a captain when you were only an ensign or volunteer on the same establishment. Without disparagement to your merit, which I shall always be ready to acknowledge, it is not in the eyes of the world equal to that of Sir R. Barker, who has had more time and more opportunities than you possibly could of distinguishing himself. You think he should have remained in the artillery. That would not have hindered him from commanding you, upon all occasions when you were both upon service together. Indeed his rank is so high, that he must always command wherever he is, if Carnac or Smith be not present, which may seldom happen; except, indeed, by being an artillery officer, he should be thought improper to command the whole; and by that means an officer of his rank and merit would be deprived of an opportunity of acting in the field at all. In short, every one who knows Sir R. Barker esteems him equal to any command, both military and artillery; and as a proof of what I affirm, General Lawrence, Mr. Palk, and the Nabob[35] pressed me, in the strongest terms, to have Sir R. Barker; promising that he should have both rank and command next to Colonel Campbell.

"I am persuaded that when you reflect upon the merits and pretensions which Sir Robert Barker has to the Company's favour, you will not hesitate a moment to give up the point. If you consider that Mr. Sulivan alone sent you out, in that distinguished station which you now possess, and that his interest is at best become a very precarious one, I am sure your own good sense will prevail upon you not to oppose my appointment; for I must frankly tell you, that, though I am really inclined to do you every service in my power, yet, in this instance, you must not expect the same indulgence from me which you have received from General Carnac."

In a subsequent letter he states his disapprobation of Sir Robert Fletcher's receipt of a large present from the King, subsequent to the arrival of the covenants, by which all such sources of emolument were prohibited to public servants.

"[36]With regard to the lac of rupees received from the King, I think you ought not to have received it in the manner you did, for three reasons; first, on account of the King's distresses and poverty; secondly, because General Carnac had never received one farthing from his Majesty, whom he had laid under obligations much beyond what you had rendered him; and, lastly, because you knew it was the intent of the Court of Directors that no presents should be received, after the receipt of the covenants, without the consent of the Governor and Council. Indeed, most of the gentlemen of council are under a very severe censure for their accepting of presents after the receipt of the covenants."

Lord Clive appears, from some of his letters at this period, not to have been quite satisfied with some parts of the conduct of his friend General Carnac.

"You will observe," he writes in a letter[37] to Mr. Sumner, "that the General does not mention a word about the conduct of the officers; and I should not be surprised to find them in a disposition, not only to insist upon Macpherson's appointment, by the Governor and Council being set aside, but also to refuse signing the covenants and submitting to the reduction of batta. However, I am determined totally to subdue this mutinous and unsoldierlike behaviour, which may easily be effected with the assistance of the field officers, as soon as we have concluded a peace with Sujah Dowlah."

In a letter written next day to the General, from which I have already quoted, he begs him, if uneasy under the part he is to act, to let the whole weight fall upon his shoulders; concluding with reference to the recent violent representations in the case of the appointment of Captain Macpherson.[38]

"If the officers of the army," he observes, "think it concerns their honour to support and countenance so very unmilitary a proceeding, I think it still more concerns my character and reputation to support the dignity and power of the Governor and Council."

Writing to Mr. Verelst[39] a few days afterwards, he comments on the long silence of the General, and his feelings as a military man, in the following terms:—

"I have at last received a letter from Carnac, copy of which has been sent you. However, his silence upon particular subjects convinces me, he has too much given way to the warmth of his passions; and much I fear, he thinks too highly of the services, dignity, and authority of the military.

"With regard to the first, although a soldier myself, I am of opinion that we imbibe such arbitrary notions, by the absolute power which we are obliged to exercise towards the officers and soldiers, in order to keep up subordination and military discipline, so essentially necessary for the good of the service, that we shall always be endeavouring to encroach upon the civil power, if they do not repeatedly make use of that authority with which they are invested; and I appeal to yourself, whether the commanding officers, whoever they were, since my departure from India, until my second arrival in this quarter, have not, by their conduct, endeavoured to impress upon the minds of the princes of the country, that the power was rather in the Commander-in-chief of the army, than in the Governor and Council. Indeed, a few months more of Mr. Spencer's government would have made them Lords paramount."

Colonel Richard Smith, who was next in rank to General Carnac, and with whose decided conduct, during the combination of the officers, Lord Clive appears to have been fully satisfied, was evidently considered by his Lordship (with whom he had been a passenger in the same ship from England) as a person that required to be kept in as good order, as he was disposed to keep others. To preserve the means of doing this, Clive had acted towards him with a reserve that gave offence; and the Colonel, in the concluding paragraph of an able letter[40], upon the future arrangements of the army observes:—

"Your Lordship well knows what public-spirited motives influenced me to return to India; and by this time, I flatter myself, you are convinced, that I am determined religiously to observe the same uniform conduct which has been my principal object. Your late letters to me seem to breathe that same air of confidence, which only could first prevail on me to think of quitting England. Why there has been any interruption to it, your Lordship can only tell; for I declare myself an utter stranger to the cause. I have been induced to open myself thus frankly, from some conversations that passed with General Carnac on this subject. It remains now in your breast, whether my correspondence with your Lordship, in future, shall be simply from the Colonel to the Commander-in-chief, or, whether I shall go beyond that line, and offer my own sentiments on such matters regarding the public service, as from time to time may occur."

No notice was taken by Lord Clive of these remarks; but, on their being repeated, he replied, in that explicit and manly tone which was characteristic of his mind. He evinced, on all such occasions, an equal disdain for evasion, or the concealment of his sentiments.

"I had resolved," he observes[41], "to give you an answer to your letter of the 31st August last; but, when I considered the explanation required, could neither afford you pleasure, or be of any service to the Company in your present situation, I determined to remain silent upon so disagreeable a subject. But as you have called upon me a second time, I will answer you with a frankness free of all disguise.

"Your behaviour towards Colonel Peach at the Cape, in reprimanding him for not paying his respects to me through you, was, in my opinion, assuming an authority which did not belong to you; and tended to the lessening of mine. Lieutenant Wenthorp, after he had obtained my consent for returning to India, because he did not apply to you first, was discouraged in such a manner, that he chose rather to forego all the advantages he might obtain from my promises, than risk the consequences of your displeasure. Such an authority assumed, and resentment expressed, could not but give me great offence. The warmth shown and dissatisfaction expressed, (because you was not looked upon as one of the Committee, and allowed to sign the letter of instructions to Captain Abercrombie,) by immediately connecting yourself with a person whom you had been but very little connected with before, and who had often declared, in the presence of many witnesses, that he would never be connected with you; the continuance of that very extraordinary connection the rest of the voyage; convinced me at once, I could not be on a footing of intimacy, without subjecting myself to inconveniences which a spirit like mine could never brook. These, Sir, among many other reasons, have occasioned my acting with reserve towards you. Indeed, in the whole course of so long a voyage, I could observe a mind too actuated by ambition: such a tendency in Colonel Smith, to govern and command those who ought to govern and command him, that I could not be unreserved, without giving up that authority which I am determined ever to support; and although I do, and always have allowed you many virtues, so long as you continue to give so much general offence by that kind of behaviour, so long will you be exposed to mortifications and disappointments."

Sir Robert Barker had made an application to Lord Clive to have a share, as Colonel commanding the brigade at Bahar, in the civil government of the country; and to form one of the Committee at Patna. The character of this officer was very different from that of Colonel Smith, and the reply from Lord Clive, which by a curious coincidence was written on the following day, was in very different terms.

"I must confess," he observes[42], "the receipt of your letter of the 2d February, has given me infinite concern, because I feel for you as I should for myself, and there is no officer in this part of the world for whom I entertain so strong and true regard, or whom I am so very desirous of serving. I am sure, if it depended upon me, you should, upon Carnac's departure, succeed to his rank and station; so well acquainted am I with your merits as a soldier, your moderation and temper as a man. Your being hurt, therefore, at not having an appointment which is not in my power to obtain for you, cannot but hurt me. I am convinced that, great as my interest is, were I to propose your being joined with Mr. Middleton in directing the collection of the revenues of the Bahar province, I could not carry that point. Consider, Barker, how very separate and distinct the services are; consider how very jealous the Directors are of military men, and how very attentive they will be to every action of mine, whom they look upon in a military more than in a civil light. Recollect that they would not even allow Coote to have a seat at the Board to give his advice, except upon military matters only. I say further, that were I to take such an unprecedented step, I doubt whether it would not add such weight of argument to those counsellors and malecontents, who are gone home with a full design to exclaim against arbitrary and military power, that the Company might be induced to disapprove of every thing I have done for them, from an apprehension that I meant to accomplish every measure, by the subversion of civil liberty. Persuaded I am, that the joining with Middleton a man of your steadiness, moderation, and discretion, would be of singular advantage to the Company: notwithstanding which, I dare not attempt to do it.

"But, let us suppose for a moment that I could gratify you in this request, what would be the consequence? Would not every officer commanding a brigade insist upon the like privilege? What use do you imagine the man of Allahabad would make of such a concession? Indeed, Barker, if such an appointment were to take place, the letters from this settlement would occasion such an alarm in Leadenhall Street, that I verily believe I should be turned off my government, and all the field officers ordered home in the first ship. Point out to me, my friend, any method of extending your influence, without prejudice to the service we both wish to promote, and no man shall be readier than I to give the strongest proof of friendship and regard for you. Middleton shall have orders to consult with you upon all occasions where military duties are in agitation; so shall Setabroy and Durge Narain, and be ordered often to wait upon you."

Lord Clive, in this letter, after making some observations on the discontents of the officers, and giving an explanation of the origin of double batta, makes some excellent remarks upon those principles that should regulate the distribution of rewards to military bodies; which should, in his opinion, be such as to make men look to service and advanced rank as the means of attaining these objects of ambition. He concludes this letter with some strong observations on the advantages enjoyed by the Company's army, and the determined resolution of the Committee not to yield to unreasonable demands. "I am very glad," he observes, "the officers have been so prudent as to lay aside their intentions of presenting a memorial; and the Company and myself are much obliged to Sir R. Barker for his soldier-like conduct and behaviour upon the occasion; although, I can assure you, there has been no memorial presented from the other brigades on the like subject. It is true, the Governor and Committee have received a remonstrance from the officers of Colonel Smith's brigade, setting forth the dearness of provisions and all other necessaries, at that great distance; and we have, in consequence of its being only a temporary expense to the Company, agreed to let things remain on their present footing, until the brigade be withdrawn from Sujah Dowlah's dominions; but the officers are at the same time informed, in the most positive terms, that this indulgence will cease the instant the troops cross the Carumnapa.

"I need not repeat how positive and absolute the Company's orders from Europe are, about reducing the military expenses to the proportion of the establishments on the coast of Coromandel, nay, even to less, because they imagine the price of provisions is lower; and I believe you are not unacquainted that the officers, for the first year they served in Bengal, were all satisfied with single batta: the double batta was merely an indulgence obtained by me, and came immediately out of the Nabob's own pocket. It has been continued ever since, by the authority of the King's officers; and the Governor and Council have been obliged to acquiesce, in opposition to frequent orders from the Court of Directors. In short, our military gentlemen (countenanced and supported by the King's officers, who over-awed the Governor and Council in such a manner, that, had quadruple batta been demanded, I doubt whether it would have been refused,) have continued to receive the indulgence almost as a matter of right. But now that the Company have appointed so many field officers, who are immediately in their own service, the salutary effects are visible; and I hope not only to see the strictest discipline and subordination enforced, but likewise economy established; for unless luxury and extravagance be abolished, discipline must fail, and the officers and soldiers be rendered incapable of doing their duty to their country and the Company. My grand object, you know, is, that none under the rank of field officers should have money to throw away. When they arrive at that rank, their hands are filled with such large advantages, that they may be certain of acquiring an independency in a few years. This consideration might, one would imagine, induce the officers to rest satisfied with their present appointments, since they have a greater advantage in prospect than they ever enjoyed before. My dear Colonel, let them look at all other services. Is there such another service in the world as this is, upon the footing on which it now stands? In the West Indies, in America, where all European articles and provisions likewise are full as dear as in Bengal, the officers and soldiers have scarce any extraordinary allowances at all. Let them reflect for a moment on the miserable condition of the half-pay officers in England, many of whom have undergone dangers and fatigues much superior to any in India. How many of them would be glad to serve the Company on their own terms? Add to this, that the revenues of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa belong to the Company themselves, and not to the Nabob; that what is now paid comes immediately out of their own pockets; and although the officers may plead prescription for indulgences from the Nabob, they can plead no such prescription from the Company. I may indeed assure you, the Committee are resolutely determined upon carrying the Company's orders into execution, and enforcing the new regulations. The only indulgence they could reconcile to their duty to the Company, was the extra allowance of 40 rupees per diem to each commanding officer of the brigades when in garrison, in order that his table might be a help to the other officers, till a moderate way of living had taken place."

Lord Clive, it has been before mentioned, had received a legacy of five lacs of rupees bequeathed to him by the Nabob Meer Jaffier, which he had lodged in the Company's treasury, in order that it might be converted into a fund for the relief of disabled or decayed European officers and soldiers, and of destitute widows of officers of the Company's army. Noticing, in a letter to Sir R. Fletcher[43], an absurd combination which the officers of his brigade had entered into, against Captain Ducarell and his brothers, he alludes to this munificent act. "On my arrival at Monghyr," (he observes) "I shall consider of some effectual means to put a stop to such unjust resentment." "I have," (he adds) "at present, a scheme on foot for the benefit of officers in the Bengal establishment; but I shall not hesitate to exclude any whom I may think undeserving, in any respect soever."

On the 28th of April, 1766, Lord Clive intimated to Sir R. Fletcher, his decided resolution to treat with the utmost severity, all who proceeded to the extreme of resigning the service; and, on the 29th of April, 1766, he makes the following observations in a letter to Sir R. Barker:—

"During your absence upon the Bettoa expedition, the captains, lieutenants, and ensigns of your brigade have preferred a very extraordinary remonstrance to the Governor and Council, upon the subject of batta. This proceeding was, I think, somewhat contemptuous towards you; and, as the remonstrance was not transmitted through the channel of the commanding officer, I have given it as my opinion, that the Board should pay no other attention to it than that of sending it to you for your information. By the behaviour of our present corps of officers, one would actually conclude that every true idea of military discipline was effaced. I have just received authentic intelligence, that no less than one hundred and thirty officers of the third brigade have deposited their commissions, and entered into an association not to serve, unless the double batta be restored. To this, it seems, is added an agreement to subscribe for the maintenance of the principals (who they imagine will be the only sufferers), till their arrival in Europe, and to purchase for them commissions of equal rank in his Majesty's service. Can any man in his senses imagine that the Secretary at War, being made acquainted with the names and conduct of these officers, will ever give his consent to their admission into the King's regiments? With regard to these who have already served in Europe, and are now upon the half-pay list, they would do well to recollect that they will not be entitled to their half-pay, on their return to England, without producing a certificate of their good behaviour in the service of the Company; for such is his Majesty's declared resolution; and if they cannot obtain half-pay, how can they expect to be admitted upon full pay? The enclosed copy of a letter we have just despatched to the gentlemen of Council at Fort William, will inform you of the measure that must take place, if this unmilitary association be not dissolved. And I will add, for my own part, that any officer who resigns his commission, from no other cause of disgust than the Company's orders for the reduction of batta, shall be absolutely dismissed the service, and never restored. For their own sakes, I hope they will speedily resolve upon a change of conduct, and I doubt not you will use your utmost influence to bring them to a right sense of their duty. If my sentiments have any weight, you are at liberty to make this as public as you please, as also the copy of the letter to the Council."

Lord Clive appears, throughout the whole of the violent proceedings of the officers, to have been convinced that the civil servants of the Company had instigated and aided the military in their mutinous acts; and in answer to a letter from Mr. Verelst[44], he observes,—"With regard to the assistance you say we may have from the civilians on an emergency, I can never consent to receive it, as I am certain they were the original cause of this mutinous association." When he learnt that the combination of officers had taken a formidable shape, he thus expresses himself, in a letter[45] to the same gentleman:—"I am determined to leave this place (Moorshedabad) on Tuesday next, and proceed with all expedition to Monghyr. Our business at this city, material as it is, must for a little while give way to the more pressing occasion which requires our presence at the army. If I find a fair opportunity, my endeavours to get some of the mutinous ringleaders shot will not be wanting. At all events, most of them shall be dismissed the service."

Lord Clive, at this period, felt the greatest annoyance from the want of cordial support from Mr. Sumner, the senior member of the Committee; and, irritated as he was by the continued opposition of several of the members of Council, the discontent of the civil, and the violence of the military, we are not surprised at the first paragraph of a private letter, written at this period to Mr. Palk, Governor of Madras, under date the 6th of May, 1766. "Do you think," he asks, "History can furnish an instance of a man, with 40,000l. per annum, a wife and family, a father and mother, brother and sisters, cousins and relations in abundance, abandoning his native country, and all the blessings of life, to take charge of a government so corrupt, so headstrong, so lost to all principle and sense of honour, as this is?"

When a communication from Sir Robert Barker led him to believe that the officers would proceed to the last extreme, he wrote[46], as we have already seen, in terms that strongly expressed his sense of their conduct, and the resolution to which he had come in respect to his own.

The heavy rains made Lord Clive's progress to Monghyr slow, but he directed every act of the officers commanding brigades, and to each of them he wrote private letters daily. He gave to Sir R. Fletcher and Sir R. Barker powers to promise forgiveness to subalterns, but not the captains, whom it was his fixed resolution to bring to condign punishment, on the just ground that their better experience rendered them less excusable than the young men to whom they gave so evil an example. To Colonel Smith a greater latitude was given. He was authorised, as has been stated, in the event of the Mahrattas invading the country, but in no other case whatever, to make terms with his insubordinate officers, if they tendered their commissions.

On reaching Monghyr, he wrote to Colonel Smith[47] what had occurred, explaining the riotous conduct of the officers on his sending off some of the ringleaders to Calcutta, and the apprehended mutiny of the soldiers, which occurred from their expecting that their commanders were to head them. With respect to the native troops, he observes, "The black Sepoy officers, as well as men, have given great proofs of fidelity and steadiness upon this occasion; and, so long as they remain so, nothing is to be apprehended from the European soldiery, even if they should be mutinously inclined." In the conclusion of this letter, he desired Colonel Smith to inform his brigade, of his having recently vested 70,000l., the legacy left him by Meer Jaffier, for the purpose of its interest being applied for the relief of disabled, worn-out officers and men of the Indian army.

In a letter dated the 4th of May, in which Lord Clive announced his positive intention to Sir R. Fletcher of proceeding to Monghyr as speedily as possible, he informs that officer that he is determined "those who have been most active shall be dismissed the service." Immediately on his arrival at Monghyr, he assembled the troops, and harangued them with the best effect, as far as the men were concerned. "I have this morning," he observes in a letter to Colonel Smith[48], "had all the troops under arms, and made them a speech on the occasion. The sepoys are very firmly attached to their duty; and I am now confident that the Europeans likewise will give us no cause of complaint or apprehension. In short, every thing here is as quiet and as well regulated as could be wished."

From a letter to Mr. Verelst, Lord Clive appears to have learnt, in two days after his arrival at Monghyr, of the encouragement given to the officers by Sir R. Fletcher; a circumstance at the discovery of which he expresses great astonishment. From considerations of prudence, to which we have before alluded, he was, however, withheld from acting in an affair of so delicate a nature, without complete information. But his chief anxiety at this moment was the situation of Colonel Smith, who occupied an advanced position on the frontier, and had to apprehend an attack from the Mahrattas, at the very moment his officers were threatening to leave him. Though Lord Clive expressed great indignation at the conduct of these officers, he appears to have contemplated forgiveness to those who had been led by the influence of bad example, or by fears, weakness, and inexperience, into a guilty association. In answer to a letter from Colonel Smith[49], he observes, "The very infamous behaviour of so many officers will be an everlasting reproach upon the English nation, and cast a stain upon the Company's service, which all the water of the Ganges can never wash away. The Court of Directors will have before them a very convincing proof of the fatal effects of donation money, and extravagant allowances, and will be reduced to the necessity of taking some very extraordinary measures, to prevent such dangerous steps being taken by the officers in future." * * * * *

"When the officers were turned out of Monghyr, and obliged to embark, many of them went away with tears in their eyes, and saw their crime in the proper light. Some were first frightened into the measure, and then threatened with death if they retracted; others were inveigled, and there is not the least doubt but we shall soon have it in our option to choose from among the whole the most moderate and deserving of those who have resigned the service. It will shock you much to hear that there is great reason to imagine that a very principal person at Monghyr has been the chief instigator of this mutinous behaviour; and you will be still more surprised to learn that the civilians have been very active in promoting the association. All the officers at Monghyr affirm there has been a subscription of 160,000 rupees made for that purpose. This last circumstance I can scarce credit."

Alluding, in a subsequent letter to Colonel Smith[50], to the conduct of the officers of his brigade, Lord Clive observes, "The behaviour of those officers who were serving under you in the lines, and who resigned their commissions almost in the face of an enemy, is so very infamous, that no consideration on earth shall induce me to restore one of them to the service." "I wish," he goes on to observe, "with all my heart, your letter to the officers at Allahabad may persuade some of them to return to their duty; though, from the behaviour of the officers of the other brigades, I much doubt it. If any thing can have effect, it will be the fate of the other officers, all of whom I have sent down to Calcutta. Captain Stainforth and Ensign Hoggan having expressed a proper sense of their late misbehaviour, I have permitted them both to return to their duty; and I have no doubt, from the surprise shown, and distress felt, at my accepting all their commissions, as many of them will offer to return to the service as we shall choose to accept of."

At the same time that these communications were made to Colonel Smith, a number of the best officers of the army, who were unassociated with the others, and had been called from different quarters, were sent to Allahabad to render his field brigade efficient for service; and those measures, added to the decided conduct of the Colonel, made Clive deem his own presence at Allahabad unnecessary; and he therefore determined to proceed no further than Chuprah. He had received information that the officers in garrison at Allahabad had left that place, after writing an impertinent letter to Colonel Smith. Orders were immediately given to send detachments of sepoys to make them prisoners, when they were directed to be sent to Calcutta; and Mr. Sumner and the Committee were requested[51] to keep them confined till vessels were ready to sail for England, when he desired that they should be sent home. Orders were given, upon this occasion, that the private letters by the post from Allahabad should be stopped, and sent in a separate bag to the post-master at Calcutta.

It would appear from the contents of several of his private letters of the same date, that Clive did not apprehend the slightest danger to the public interests from the defection of the officers at Allahabad. Major Smith, who commanded that fortress, had exhibited much spirit and firmness. His influence with the native troops gave him great strength; and none of the officers in command of the sepoy corps had joined the combination. Their situation was, at this period, one of consequence and emolument; their influence with their men great; and to this circumstance is, in a great degree, to be ascribed the unshaken fidelity of the sepoys, on a confidence in whom, it may be pronounced, the measures taken by Lord Clive, as well as those of the officers commanding brigades, were chiefly grounded.

Anxiety of mind, fatigue of body, and the extreme heat of the weather, affected Lord Clive's health; and, for one or two days, some letters were written to various quarters, by his secretary, Mr. Henry Strachey. And it is here to be remarked, as illustrative of the character of this extraordinary man, that from the day he received intimation of the discontent of the officers of the army, there are entered in his letter-books never less than three, and sometimes five, six, and seven letters, written daily by himself on the subject; and the same books fully show that, during this period of great mental and bodily exertion, he gave personally the most minute attention to every other branch of public affairs. At the same time, he does not appear to have neglected any private correspondents, either in India or England.

On the 29th of May, Mr. Strachey informed Mr. Verelst, by Lord Clive's desire, that a considerable number of officers had returned to their duty, and desired to have their commissions restored; but that, while Lord Clive was disposed to act with much lenity and indulgence, it was far from his intention to accept the services of all those by whom they had been proffered. Some of these his Lordship (Mr. Strachey writes) is resolved to bring to justice.

"The only observation," he writes[52], "Lord Clive directs me to make upon Mrs. W.'s intelligence about the rage of the civilians, and more than madness of the military, is, that they have mutually encouraged each other to such a degree of licentiousness, in defiance of civil and martial law, that he hardly expects to see a change of sentiments till the severity of example shall have convinced the settlement of his resolution to save it from destruction."

Lord Clive wrote to Monsieur Law[53], the French Governor of Chandernagore, and Monsieur Vernet, the Dutch Chief at Chinsurat, on the subject of the officers who had deserted their duty; and, while he informed them of the dishonourable course of action these officers had pursued, he requested they should not receive or give protection to men who had so dishonoured themselves. These respectable individuals, to whom, both personally, and as representatives of their country, Lord Clive always paid the greatest attention and respect, acted on this, and on all occasions during the time he was in India, in a manner suited to their own high characters.

A short letter from Lord Clive to Mr. Sykes, resident at Moorshedabad, of the 28th of May, in which he states the grounds on which alone he would allow those officers who were repentant to remain with their corps, and his steady resolution to admit of no compromise, shows that he viewed the combination to be, at this date, completely broken and subdued. "I have received," he observes, "your favours of the 19th and 20th. Captains Cummings and Mackenzie, having not yet absolutely declared their resolution to keep or resign their commissions, I desire you will send for these gentlemen, and oblige them to be explicit upon the occasion. If they intend to continue in the service (I do not mean as volunteers for a time of their own limiting), it is well; if not, you will be pleased to inform them you have my orders to dismiss them the service, and insist on their departing, and immediately, for Calcutta. Lieutenants Padman and Clirchue have, by their answers to Mr. Strachey's letters, sufficiently expressed their assent to the combination. You will, therefore, order them down without delay, acquainting them that they are no longer in the service. I shall consider of a proper officer to send you for the command of the troops: in the mean time, as every thing is quiet in the city, you will have no difficulty in preserving discipline.

"Matters are very well regulated in the 1st and 3rd Brigades. The officers of the 2d do not intend to resign till the 1st of June, by which time Colonel Smith will have received a good supply; and I doubt not, with the assistance of the coast, that we shall, ere long, have the satisfaction of seeing our army in a better condition than ever."

The following letter from Lord Clive to Mr. Verelst at Calcutta[54] is too important to have one word omitted; for, while it shows the nature and extent of the combination formed against all authority, it exhibits the master mind by which the danger was foreseen and overcome, and it explains the mode in which it was deemed best to prevent the possibility of its recurrence:—

"Enclosed you will receive two letters, one from Mr. Martin, the other, although not signed, I know to be Higginson's handwriting; so that you see we are betrayed even by our own sub-secretary; and I make no doubt but the assistant-secretary is still deeper in the plot.

"You will observe, in the last general letter, the Directors order us to dismiss, not suspend; and I think near all the Company's servants concerned in exciting this mutiny might not only be dismissed, but sent home in the first ship. Such a behaviour in England would be high treason to the state, and every man of them would be hanged.

"I hope the Council will not hesitate one moment about turning out of the office both Stephenson and Higginson, and dismissing them the service, if concerned in fomenting the late mutinous combination. Indeed, very few are to be trusted; and, in my opinion, the Council should immediately require the assistance of twelve or fourteen junior servants from Madras and Bombay; for, I am fully persuaded, this settlement can never be restored to order, or the honour of the nation or the Company retrieved, until there be a total change in the morals of individuals: and that can only be effected by turning out the most rich and factious, and transplanting others. I have some hopes the Directors will empower me to take such a step in their answer by the Admiral Stevens.

"How shocked must Sulivan and those Directors be, who opposed this appointment of field officers! Certain it is that, without their assistance, we must have given way to the mutiny amongst the officers; and it is equally certain, if we had, Bengal must have been lost, or a civil war carried on to restore to the Company their lost authority, rights, and possessions; for it is beyond a doubt, that men capable of committing such actions as they have lately done would soon have gone such lengths as to have made it impossible ever to return to their native country.

"There was a committee to each brigade, sworn to secrecy; and I have it from undoubted authority, that the officers thought themselves so sure of carrying their point, that a motion was made and agreed to, that the Governor and Council should be directed to release them from their covenants. The next step would, I suppose, have been the turning me and the Committee out of the service. In short, I tremble with horror when I think how near the Company were to the brink of destruction.

"The plot hath been deeply laid, and of four months' standing. I can give a shrewd guess at the first promoters. One of them I have already mentioned to you, who will ere long, I hope, be brought to condign punishment.

"Remember again to act with the greatest spirit; and if the civilians entertain the officers, dismiss them the service; and if the latter behave with insolence, or are refractory, make them all prisoners, and confine them in the new fort. If you have any thing to apprehend, write me word, and I will come down instantly, and bring with me the third brigade, whose officers and men can be depended upon.

"I wish the Board would allow Hare two months longer to settle his affairs: he is one of the best among the servants of Patna.

"I am, &c.
"Clive.

"P.S. A box of intercepted letters will be sent down to-morrow by water, under a guard of Sepoys. I would advise the Board to open every one of them."

Sir Robert Fletcher, of whose guilt, though suspected, no public proof had as yet been adduced, wrote to Lord Clive, expressing his willingness to pay the penalty bond into which three officers in whom he took an interest had entered, in order to remunerate those who might suffer in consequence of their being prominent as advocates of the claims of their brother officers. The following answer of Lord Clive is a valuable document, as it exhibits, in a clear and convincing manner, the erroneous principles and the baneful results of this part of the combination; of the total impossibility of its being recognised as either consistent with law or honour by any constituted authority. It shows, also, that disposition to forgive the young and inexperienced, which his Lordship throughout these proceedings entertained:—

"I have this morning received yours without date.[55] Your proposal to pay the 500l. penalty for the two M'Phersons and Ensign Patton is what I never can approve of. Were they the best officers in the world, I would not consent to receive them again into the service on such terms.

"The engagement entered into among themselves is not only mutinous and absurd, but illegal; and, therefore, the penalty cannot be recoverable by law. Besides, I consider the paying of it actually raising a subscription ourselves for the benefit of those who do not retract: nor is it at all unlikely that, were they to find the penalty money paid, a collusion would follow, for many of them to retract, in order to obtain a maintenance, nay, an independency, for the remainder. If only fifty of them should return on that plan (and I am sure there must be a much greater number who would be glad to return on any terms), a fund amounting to no less than 25,000l. would be established, which, at 4 per cent. interest, would produce 1,000l. per annum. In short, the affair will not bear a moment's reflection; and I must insist upon your dropping all thoughts of it. You will please to communicate my sentiments to Major Ironside, positively forbidding him to pay the penalty for his brother.

"If the young man repents of his association, and is desirous to resume the service, I consent to his being restored, the General and you having no objection; but I expect that the penalty money, that unjust debt of false honour, shall not be paid.

"Be assured that the report of my having written, or in any manner applied for the return of the gentlemen you hint at, is without foundation.

"Neither Lieutenant Britton, nor any of those who signalised themselves in the combination, shall have my consent to be restored, however strongly they may be recommended to my protection.

"Captain Hampton and Kinloch have both resigned. The former, together with Ensign Pellans, I have ordered from Midnapore to Calcutta."

From Lord Clive's private correspondence with the commandants of brigades, in the beginning of June, it appears, that the officers, disheartened and disunited, sought only to save themselves from that ruin and disgrace which they were now sensible they had brought upon themselves. No victory was ever more complete than that which he had gained; and it must have been the more gratifying, as he owed his success almost exclusively to his personal wisdom, firmness, and prompt decision. He met every danger, as it arose, with an unshrinking mind. Satisfied that concessions would only generate further demands, he made none: but when he had vindicated authority, and restored order, he displayed a degree of temper and of clemency worthy of his character. He attended to the petitions of many to be restored to the service which they had too hastily resigned. From such indulgent consideration he excluded most of the senior officers, and all those persons whose character made it desirable to keep them out of the service, with all those who had been prominent as ringleaders; while officers who had not actually resigned, however intemperate their threats and conduct had been, were pardoned on expressing contrition for their past conduct.

After subduing this combination in the military employed in the provinces, Clive appears to have thought that the bad spirit which existed at Calcutta required strong measures.

"The spirit of civil as well as military mutiny," he observes[56], "that has lately appeared in Calcutta deserves so much of our attention, as to mark the most turbulent, whether Company's servants, or free merchants, and resolutely send them to Europe; for Bengal never can be what it ought to be whilst licentiousness is suffered to trample upon authority."

When Captain Goddard, and some others, came forward to accuse Sir R. Fletcher of having encouraged the mutinous combination of the officers of his brigade, Lord Clive placed him under arrest. An appeal was made by Sir Robert to have his case judged by the Governor in Council; but this Lord Clive, though disposed to oblige him, declined. "Your repairing to Calcutta," his Lordship observed[57], "in order to be tried by the President and Council, upon an accusation your exculpation from which depends merely upon military law, is totally unprecedented, and therefore improper for me to comply with. That you may not, however, imagine that I intend to take any other part upon this occasion than my public station requires, be assured that the court-martial to be held upon your late conduct will be assembled by an order from the Board, and the sentence confirmed or disapproved by them."

The junior field officers, who had, by their recent conduct, entitled themselves to the fullest approbation of Lord Clive, presumed upon their services so far as to send a memorial, claiming the right of sharing in the salt revenue; an allowance which, in the military line, had been limited to their seniors.

This memorial Lord Clive prevented being delivered; pointing out, at the same time, to the memorialists the injury they would do themselves, and the impropriety of Government complying with so unreasonable a request. They attended to his advice, and the memorial was withdrawn; on which he addressed to them the following flattering letter:—

"Colonel Smith[58] has undoubtedly acquainted you that I declined presenting your memorial to the Board previous to my receipt of your application for withdrawing it; and I conclude that the arguments I urged against the memorial, in my letter to him, have convinced you of my wish to preserve the enjoyment of the present emoluments to the field officers upon this establishment. The general good of the whole, added to the consideration that every supernumerary Major will succeed, upon vacancies, to a share in the salt trade, will, I hope, prevail upon you to rest satisfied with the present distribution.

"I cannot omit this opportunity of mentioning how sensible I am of the service done by you, and the other field officers, on the late mutinous combination; as without such assistance the resolution of the President and of the Council must have proved ineffectual. And, perhaps, you will not be displeased upon my assuring you, that, in my letters to the Court of Directors, I have represented your conduct, upon that particular occasion, in the very favourable light it so justly deserved."

For Sir Robert Barker Lord Clive had the sincerest regard[59]; but he always regretted the too easy character of that excellent officer. It appears by a letter from Sir Robert Barker, that some observations which had been made by the Governor upon Lieutenant Vertue's court-martial, of which he was President, and upon the subject of bazars, had reached him; and that he addressed Lord Clive in a tone of complaint. The following observations, made by the latter in reply, are interesting, both as they exhibit that frankness with which he ever explained himself to those whom he regarded, and the opinion he entertained of those indirect sources of emolument which military officers in India, who held commands, so long continued to derive from the sale of liquor and bazars:—

"I have received your letter[60] of the 3d of August, and rejoice to find that you have recovered your former state of health. Orders are sent to the commanding officers to appoint a greater number of members than thirteen, which, I hope, will prevent these delays in future.

"I am sorry you should think yourself obliged to defend your own conduct, as well as that of the members of the general court-martial appointed to sit upon the trial of Lieutenant Vertue. When I suggested to you my opinion at Bankepore, I addressed myself to you alone, without mentioning the other members. The liberty I then took very nearly regarded your honour and reputation, as well as the welfare of the East India Company, in which is included the welfare of the nation.

"I must call to your remembrance some particular expressions I made use of that morning at breakfast, as others were present, and can prove the truth of what I assert. I told you, that, where conscience was in the case, exclusive of the sacredness of an oath, the world should not bias me to swerve from my opinion; but where that was not so, and I was convinced in my own mind, a man was guilty, neither apprehensions of law, or any deficiency in forms, should influence me to act in favour of those who were not deserving of it. I told you, at the same time, all the general officers in Great Britain would canvass this general court-martial, and that their attention would be more particularly fixed upon you, the President. These were my words, or words to that purpose; this also is my opinion, which I am not ashamed to declare to the whole world. If, therefore, any busy, intermeddling person has represented to you my expressions in another light, he has represented a falsity.

"With regard to the bazar duties, you may be assured from me, that, when I mentioned the circumstance of Sir Robert Fletcher's conduct, I was an utter stranger to any duties whatever being collected by the commanding officers on the necessaries of life. I never received such myself, or knowingly suffered others under me to receive them, either upon the coast or at Bengal; and had Colonel Smith, when he prided himself upon never having received bazar duties, informed me that he had allowed Colonel Peach to receive them, it would have been more consistent with that sincerity which he has always professed.

"No one has shown himself a greater friend to the field officers than myself; yet they seem already to forget the great advantages they enjoy. However, I must remark, that, to an officer whose pay and emoluments amount to 12,000l. per annum, the bazar duties can scarce be an object.

"I am surprised to find myself accused of erecting Colonel Gunge at Patna. To speak plainly, Barker, I never established a Gunge in my life, and never will; because I never approved of receiving duties on the necessaries of life; although I do not think those officers much in fault who have done the same from prescription only. Colonel Gunge was created by Colonel Caillaud, and revived by Colonel Cook. The Committee have forbid this custom in future.

"To conclude, the style and diction of this last letter is so contrary to Sir Robert Barker's natural disposition, that I am persuaded some evil-minded persons, who have their own interests more than your reputation at heart, have been the occasion, through misrepresentation. However, since my friendship for you is mistrusted, and the regard and attention which I have shown for your welfare, from the day of your embarkation to this hour, forgotten, I can only lament your misfortune and mine, that there should be men in the world who can make these impressions. For my own part, I am almost weary of the burden. I have found the pride, ambition, resentment, and self-interestedness of individuals so incompatible with the public good, that I should have given up the contest long ago, if I had not set the greatest value upon my own reputation, which is all I must expect to preserve upon my return to England, after so odious and disagreeable an undertaking."

In a second letter[61] upon the same subject, Lord Clive observes,—

"With regard to bazars, the vindication of yourself amounted so near to an accusation of me, that I could not avoid replying as I did. You must, however, have been by my letter convinced of your mistake in supposing that I either established, or enjoyed any advantages from, the Gunge at Patna; and I hope you are no less convinced that my arguments against the practice of levying duties upon the necessaries of life were urged with as much tenderness as the nature of the subject would admit. I wished to prevent your doing in future what I was of opinion would affect your reputation, but I did not suppose that what had passed was from the motive of extortion or avarice.

"Be assured, Barker, upon the whole, that all I said and wrote was dictated by a sincere regard to your honour, and by a desire to see you act with propriety and dignity in matters which I judged were of no small importance to your own character."

The officers concerned in the combination, who were brought to a court-martial, were all cashiered except Captain Parker, and he was dismissed by an order of Government. That more severe sentences were not awarded to several who were guilty of mutiny, appears to have been occasioned by some doubts on the part of the Court by which they were tried as to an expression in the Mutiny Act, which subjected those to martial law who have contracted to serve the Company; and it was conceived that the acceptance of a commission formed no contract. This interpretation was erroneous; and had it been otherwise, it would have been as illegal to have deprived an officer of his commission as of his life. But we cannot be surprised that, where a doubt was raised, a body of officers unskilled in law, though they might have deemed it essential to maintain subordination, were disposed to as much lenity as was compatible with that object.

Lieutenant Stainforth, and another officer, were accused, among other crimes, of a declared intention of assassinating the Governor. Such assertions were certainly made, but no overt act warranted the belief of the intention; and it was never credited by Lord Clive, who alluded to it on his addressing the officers and men at Monghyr. He was speaking, he said, he was assured, to Englishmen, not assassins. To Lieutenant Stainforth, when ordered to England with the other officers who were dismissed, his secretary addressed, by his desire, a letter pointing out in kind but decided terms the impossibility of compliance with his request to be restored to the service; and that, even if he were restored, the officers, after what had passed, would refuse to do duty with him. Towards this officer, and others, who had shown in their language and acts the extreme of personal hostility to him, Clive, neither at the moment nor afterwards, cherished any resentment. His efforts to establish discipline, and repress an insubordinate and mutinous spirit, were strong and uncompromising; but, that object gained, he appears to have shown as much lenity and consideration for individuals as was compatible with the maintenance of that authority which had been so violently assailed.

The circumstances under which Lord Clive had to act, and the difficulties he had to overcome, are well stated by his successor, Mr. Verelst, in a work which he subsequently published in defence of his own conduct.

"The impolitic arrangement of affairs[62] was among the least evils of the Company's situation, antecedent to Lord Clive's arrival. The dissolution of government in Calcutta kept pace with that of the country. A general contempt of superiors, a habit of equality among all orders of men, had obliterated every idea of subjection. To reclaim men from dissipation, to revive a general spirit of industry, to lead the minds of all from gaudy dreams of sudden-acquired wealth to a patient expectation of growing fortunes, were no less difficult in execution than necessary to the existence of the Company. Large sums of money, obtained by various means, had enabled many gentlemen to return to Europe. This cause, superadded to the massacre of Patna, occasioned a very quick succession in the service, which encouraged a forward spirit of independency, and produced a total contempt of public orders, whenever obedience was found incompatible with private interest. To check such impatient hopes, where youths aspired to the government of countries at an age scarcely adequate to the management of private affairs, four gentlemen, being called from Madras, were admitted into Council.

"The universal discontent among the civil servants which had arisen from the late measures, restraining the power of individuals, was hereby greatly increased; and, united with the mutinous spirit of the military officers, broke forth, the following year, into a flame, which threatened destruction to the English empire in Bengal.

"This event, though among the transactions of a later period, may, not improperly, be here explained. The military in Bengal had for several years enjoyed an indulgence beyond those in the other settlements of the Company, which first arose from the bounty of the Subahdar, when they were employed in his service. By the advice of an officer who had long commanded the Company's troops upon the coast of Coromandel, with great reputation to himself and honour to the nation, representing this extraordinary allowance as destructive of discipline, the Directors, in their public letters, had frequently ordered the double batta to be withdrawn.[63] Such directions, in a settlement where all idea of subordination was lost, and where the conduct of the superior servants respecting their own interests could ill be reconciled with a rigid exaction of obedience to the Company's commands in others, produced little effect. One feeble effort was made; but a remonstrance from the military induced a ready submission on the part of the Governor and Council. The Select Committee, very justly conceiving, that a regard to private interest would not justify a disobedience to the positive injunction of their superiors[64], resolved to carry the measure into immediate execution."

A historian little disposed to take a favourable view of Lord Clive's motives or actions, commenting upon his conduct on this trying occasion, observes[65]; "It was one of these scenes, however, in which he was admirably calculated to act with success. Resolute and daring, fear never turned him aside from his purpose, or deprived him of the most collected exertions of his mind in the greatest emergencies. To submit to the violent demands of a body of armed men, was to resign the government."

This praise, reserved as it is, has value coming from such a quarter; but it is fair to state, that the historian formed his judgment on this and other acts of Lord Clive solely from public records. He has not, like the writer of these pages, had access to that private correspondence, by which he has been enabled to examine every letter or note which Clive received or wrote daily to persons of all ranks and classes; nor could he trace his feelings, as the writer has done, at every hour of this great crisis, during which, it appears from the most authentic documents, that his mind was not only cool and unshaken, but that, though often ruffled with honest indignation at proofs of cowardice, treachery, and guilt, he was never betrayed into one act unworthy of his private or his public character. He not only warned all of the dangers into which they were rushing headlong, but personally entreated them to remain in the path of duty; or, when they had left it, to return. In the prosecution of the most guilty he never mingled his own name; on the contrary, we find him extending to all such as had attacked him personally, as much clemency and consideration as was compatible with the public interests; and this kindness not only reached those who deceived him most grossly, but was extended to an unfortunate individual who, in a moment of rage, had threatened to become his assassin. On the other hand, when warmth of temper and impatience led him, as it sometimes did, to express himself with unkindness, if not harshness, to those whose efforts and zeal did not keep pace with his own, we find him treating their remonstrances in a manner which, from its frankness and tone of friendship, was alike calculated to establish his own superiority, and to gain their respect, if not their attachment.

There is no event of his life in which Lord Clive showed more knowledge of human nature, and a more intimate acquaintance with all the elements which compose military bodies, than on this occasion. While he visited with severity of punishment bold offenders, he gave the most delicate attention to the high feelings of honour, which had kept others free from guilty associations. When, under an impression that there was a defect in the articles of war, he would restore none of those who had joined the combination, until they signed a contract to serve a certain period, he made no such call upon those who had been true to their duty. The contract might be necessary, he said; but men who had undergone such a trial ought not to be insulted with a suspicion that any further tie was required to bind their allegiance. They repaid this confidence by voluntarily insisting upon signing the contract, into which officers with whom they continued to serve had been compelled to enter.

Lord Clive appears, from both his public and private letters, to have estimated the complete victory he had obtained on this occasion beyond any he ever gained in the field: and, in fact, it was with reason that he did so. Considering that upwards of two hundred officers had not only combined, but had pledged themselves by every tie that could bind men, to oppose authority, Clive had solid ground for exultation in the success of measures, planned and executed by himself, the result of which was to restore subordination, to vindicate an insulted Government, and to save the country from ruin. And this achievement was the more gratifying, from being attended with comparatively few consequences that were ultimately injurious to any great body of individuals. It must, moreover, have been satisfactory to Lord Clive, to know that this combination had not its source in any of those evil designs by which such mutinous proceedings are often marked. It originated in the too long continuance of a temporary grant, of an extra allowance, to which young officers (and almost all concerned were such) soon adapted their expenditure; and when luxuries, recommended by the climate and character of the service, became necessaries, they were not likely to recognise the justice of the distinction, which had been made by the Directors, between the boon of a Nabob (which the double batta first was), and a direct payment from the treasury of Government, which it became after the Company had obtained the grant of the Dewannee.

The opposition which the officers offered to the reduction of their allowances, was in some measure countenanced by the local Government, which had evaded the execution of the orders issued by the Directors for the abolition of double batta. Nor is it very surprising, that the officers should have heedlessly rushed on the extreme measure of resigning their commissions, when we advert to the encouragement which their combination had received from an officer of the rank and reputation of Sir Robert Fletcher; and to the sympathy and support which had been expressed and afforded by the civilians, among whom were some who held confidential situations under the Government, and others who were believed to have great influence in England: these persons were, as well as the military, discontented with the revisions and reductions which Lord Clive had adopted. Under these circumstances, and under the impression that their services could not be dispensed with, at a time when the country was not only unsettled, but threatened with invasion by a large Mahratta army, the officers felt confident that the Governor must have yielded to their demands. But in thus judging, they appear to have little understood the character of him with whom they had to contend; and when they were met, not only with an unyielding spirit, but treated at once as criminals, and every measure adopted for their punishment, they fell without a struggle. They had prepared no means to go beyond their first act; and this, though it was by some brought forward as a proof of want of forethought and weakness, was, in fact, a proof of their innocence of any deliberate intention to injure the interests of their country: though, but for the overruling genius of Clive, the most fatal injury would assuredly have been the consequence of the success of their guilty combination; for, had they succeeded, the civil Government would have lost all respect, and the usurpation of the public authority, by a combination of officers, would have given an example to their men which, if followed, would have been alike destructive of all discipline, and have terminated in the subversion of the English government in Bengal.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] This account is an abstract of a narrative of the mutiny, written by the late Sir Henry Strachey, and which forms Appendix 1st to the 9th Report of the Committee of Secresy of the House of Commons, A.D. 1773.

[2] Vide Ibid. Appendix, No. 1. a. fo. 699.

[3] The Court's orders for this reduction, dated the 11th of June, 1764, are very positive and peremptory.

[4] The order was expected some time before it was issued.

[5] Vide 9th Rep. of Com. of Secresy, App. No. 1. fo. 699. This remonstrance sets forth the high rates of supplies at a distance from the coast, objections of servants to act except in one capacity, and various expenses and hardships entailed by their situation, and aggravated by the reduction of allowances.

[6] Ibid. No. 2. fo. 700.

[7] Vide 9th Rep. of Com. of Secresy, App. No. 4 fo. 702.

[8] Ibid. No. 5. fo. 702.

[9] ibid. No. 6. fo. 702.

[10] Vide 9th Rep. of Com. of Secresy, App. No. 7. fo. 702.

[11] Ibid. No. 8. fo. 702.

[12] Vide 9th Rep. of Com. of Secresy, App. No. 9. fo. 703.

[13] Vide 9th Rep. of Com. of Secresy, App. No. 10. fo. 703.

[14] Ibid. No. 12. fo. 734.

[15] Vide 9th Rep. of Com. of Secresy, App. No. 13. fo. 704.

[16] Ibid. No. 14. fo. 704.

[17] Vide Letter, 1st May. No. 17. fo. 705. No. 18. fo. 705.

[18] Vide 9th Rep. of Com. of Secresy, Letter 4th May, App. No. 21. fo. 706.

[19] Ibid. No. 22. fo. 706.

[20] Vide Letter 5th May, No. 23. fo. 706.

[21] Vide 9th Rep. of Com. of Secresy, Letter 5th May, App. No. 24. fo. 707.

[22] Ibid. No. 27. fo. 707.

[23] Ibid. Nos. 28. and 30. fo. 708.

[24] Vide 9th Rep. of Com. of Secresy, App. No. 29. fo. 708.

[25] Ibid. No. 31. fo. 708.

[26] Ibid. No. 32. fo. 708.

[27] Vide 9th Rep. of Com. of Secresy, App. No. 38. fo. 780.

[28] A legacy of 70,000l. was bequeathed by Meer Jaffier Aly Khan, Nawab of Bengal, in 1765, to Lord Clive, and paid by his Lordship, in the year 1766, into the Company's treasury at Fort William, to run at interest at the rate of 8 per cent., as an annual fund for the support of European officers and soldiers, who may be disabled or decayed in the Company's service in Bengal, and for the widows of officers and soldiers who may die on service there, 8th June, 1766.

The Company extended this donation afterwards to the benefit of all invalided, disabled, or superannuated officers and soldiers, and the widows of such officers and soldiers as may die in their service in any of their settlements in the East Indies, pursuant to an agreement stipulated between them and Lord Clive in the year 1770, by which the former establishment of shares was altered to the present moieties or proportions specified as follows:—

All commissioned or warrant officers shall have half the ordinary stated pay they enjoyed while in service.

Serjeants belonging to the artillery shall receive 9d. per day, and such as have lost a limb 1s. per day: private men of the artillery, 6d. per day; and such as lose a limb, 9d. per day.

All other non-commissioned officers and private men shall receive 4¾d. per day.—23d July, 1771.

Vide Parliamentary Papers, A.D. 1773, vol. iv. report 9. p. 535.

[29] A station adjoining the city of Patna.

[30] Captain Goddard became afterwards a very distinguished officer. He commanded the force that Warren Hastings sent to the relief of the settlement of Bombay in 1778.

[31] It is not unworthy of remark, that Sir Robert Fletcher, thus cashiered by sentence of a court-martial for mutiny, was, in 1775, appointed, by the Court of Directors, Commander-in-chief of the army at Madras. There he headed the opposition which set aside Lord Pigot from the government of Madras in 1776.

No mention is made in the text of John Petrie as one of the ringleaders of the mutiny of the officers of the Bengal army in 1766.

This man was sent home by Lord Clive on that account with a rope about his neck; but so much do things depend on the party who may be in power, or influence, with the Court of Directors, that this very John Petrie obtained an appointment high in the civil service at Bengal, through the interest of his friends the Johnstones, who were in opposition to Lord Clive's party in England.

[32] 20th May, 1766.

[33] Letter to General Lawrence, dated Calcutta, 1st June, 1766.

[34] Letter to Sir R. Fletcher, 28th June, 1765.

[35] Mahommed Ali, at Madras.

[36] Letter to Sir R. Fletcher, under date 6th August, 1765.

[37] Letter to Mr. Sumner, dated 7th July, 1765.

[38] Letter to General Carnac under date 8th July, 1765.

[39] Letter to Mr. Verelst, dated 11th July, 1765.

[40] Vide letter from Colonel Richard Smith to Lord Clive, under date 31st August, 1765.

[41] Vide letter to Colonel Richard Smith from Lord Clive, under date 15th February, 1766.

[42] Letter to Sir R. Barker, under date 16th February, 1766.

[43] Dated 3d February, 1766.

[44] Letter to Mr. Verelst, dated 3d May, 1766.

[45] Letter to Mr. Verelst, 4th May, 1766.

[46] Letter to Sir R. Barker, p. 19.

[47] Letter to Colonel Smith, dated 15th May, 1766.

[48] Dated 16th May, 1766.

[49] Dated 18th May, 1766.

[50] Dated 22d May, 1766.

[51] Letters to Mr. Sumner and Mr. Sykes, dated 23d and 24th May.

[52] Letter to H. Verelst, Esq., 25th May, 1766.

[53]

"Patna, le 27 Mai, 1766.

"Monsieur,

"J'ai eu l'honneur de votre lettre du quinzième courant. Le sujet étant aussi intéressant pour vous, il sera, je crois, essentiel qu'une lettre me soit addressée de votre part et de votre conseil conjointement.

"Un nombre de nos officiers ont très-déshonorablement quitté le service, sous un prétexte le plus injuste; à savoir, qu'ils n'ont pas de quoi subsister; quoique notre militaire est le plus advantageux du monde. Ils sont actuellement en chemin pour Calcutta. Comme ils passeront par votre Colonie, j'ai jugé à propos de vous l'annoncer; et je me persuade que vous ne donnerez point d'accueil à des gens qui ont agi si indignement.

"Je suis, &c.,

"Clive."

[54] Letter to Mr. Verelst, 28th May, 1766. Messrs. Abzal's gardens.

[55] Letter to Sir R. Fletcher, dated 30th May, 1766.

[56] Letter to H. Verelst, Esq., dated 6th June, 1766.

[57] Letter to Sir R. Fletcher, dated 3d July, 1766.

[58] Vide Letter to the Junior Field Officers, 6th October, 1766.

[59] Before Lord Clive left India, he wrote to Sir R. Barker, earnestly advising him to remain till Colonel Smith returned, and assuring him of his support to succeed that officer in the command of the troops in Bengal.

[60] Letter to Sir R. Barker, dated 12th August, 1766.

[61] Letter to Sir R. Barker, dated 8th October, 1766.

[62] Vide Verelst's "View of the English Government in Bengal." Lond. 1772. 4to, p. 56.

[63] A repetition of this command was among the particular instructions to Lord Clive in 1764.

[64] Under the establishment of this double batta, a Captain's commission produced little short of 1000l. per annum: when reduced, it was worth from 650l. to 700l., as appeared upon the action of Captain Parker against Lord Clive.

[65] Mill's "History of British India," vol. iii. p. 376.

[CHAP. XVI.]

In the preceding two chapters, an account has been given of Lord Clive's successful efforts in the arduous task of reforming the abuses, and restoring order and discipline to the civil and military services of Bengal: it remains to notice other public proceedings of importance during his last residence in India.

No question connected with this period of his service was, at the moment and subsequently, the subject of more comment and discussion, both on the part of the Government at home and of individuals, than the monopoly of the salt trade; the profits of which he divided among the Governor, the Counsellors, and the senior civil and military officers; deeming this indulgence, as he repeatedly states in his official and private letters, indispensable to the integrity and efficiency of the public service. Men in high station, he argued, unless some ample and open allowance was given them, could never be expected to be reconciled to a strict observance of the covenants that prohibited presents, nor to the loss of that internal trade which had been denounced as so ruinous and oppressive. The shares in the profits from salt were, by his plan, divided according to the rank and duties of the parties. The amount was known, and, though liberal, it was limited, and, certainly, would not appear, from the statements made of it, to be more than a fair remuneration to men employed as those were to whom it was allotted.

Whether this mode of remunerating service was the best at the period when it was adopted, and whether the monopoly of the salt produced in the lower parts of Bengal, which the East India Company found existing, and have ever since, under one shape or another, continued, was advantageous or hurtful, on sound financial principles, are questions which merit notice, both as connected with the biography of Clive, and with the source of our Indian revenues.

The habits of thinking, and constitution, of the Court of Directors, rendered them very adverse to granting adequate salaries to those employed in high stations. These had all (including the military) the privilege of trading; and to the exercise of this privilege many of the abuses of the earlier times of the service have been justly attributed. Clive appears to have made reiterated representations upon this subject, impressing the necessity of adequate allowances, in some shape, to the superior officers, in order to animate their zeal, and preserve their public integrity. The narrow allowance to military officers, and their being expected to gain by trade, he particularly condemned. Writing to Major Stibbert[66], he observes, "I have received your letter of the 17th inst., and am not a little surprised that you should so soon request leave to return to Calcutta, considering how short a time you have done duty in your brigade. Your attention, I suspect, is too much taken up with commercial affairs; a study very foreign from an officer, even of an inferior rank, as it must frequently interfere with the services of a military station, but particularly reprehensible in those to whom a share in the profits upon salt is allotted. However, I admit that the death of your attorney may make your presence in Calcutta necessary. You have, therefore, my permission to leave the cantonments immediately, if the service will permit, and Colonel Smith has no objection."

The ground on which he felt the necessity of assuring to military officers of rank liberal allowances, in order that they might suitably maintain their station in life, and enjoy a reward for long service; and the necessity he saw for putting an end, on their part, to all indefinite and indirect perquisites, and of giving to their minds a tone that should elevate them above all sordid views, and make them what their stations required they should be, is well stated in a letter[67] to Sir Robert Barker:—"Colonel Smith is making a vigorous progress in reforming the abuses that fall under his notice. The monstrous charges and impositions of quarter-masters, surgeons, &c., &c., require, indeed, the strictest scrutiny; and he seems determined to go through it with great spirit and attention to the Company's interest. Nor shall I be disappointed in the assistance I expect from you in these matters, whilst I shall, at the same time, have the satisfaction of knowing that you can enforce wholesome regulations without creating disgust. The privilege of making bills, and the long track of frauds introduced under the customary disguise of perquisites, I wish to see entirely abolished. Every emolument shall be fixed, plain and open: the medium shall, if possible, be struck between extravagance and niggardly restrictions: but economy shall take place. The allowance to field officers will be so large as to prevent even their wishing for more; and, at the same time, so reasonable, that I think the Company must approve of them. A colonel's share of the salt produce will be from 5000l. to 6000l. per annum, or more[68]; lieutenant-colonel's and major's in proportion; and as a further encouragement, I intend that all the field officers shall be allowed sufficient to defray the expense of their table. When all mean advantages are disclaimed and held in contempt by gentlemen high in the service, reformation will, of course, be with greater ease introduced among inferiors. You will do me the justice to believe that I mean this as a general observation only, and not as a necessary hint, either to yourself or any of the field officers of your regiment, as I know you are all men of honour and principle."

The reasons of expediency that led Clive to recommend that high public officers, civil and military, should be remunerated by shares in the profits of the salt trade, are stated in numerous letters. He thought that an open, direct, pecuniary allowance would not willingly be sanctioned by the Company out of any of the revenues which flowed into their treasury, and still less from the profits of their trade; and that, besides, such large avowed allowances would invite an attack from the Crown on their patronage; and that the grasping character of the administration in England would lead to a ruinous interference in the nomination of men to India who had no recommendation but their high birth and great interest.

It was the above considerations that compelled him to devise the means he deemed least objectionable of adequately rewarding service, in order to gain, by the tie of self-interest as well as honour, those instruments without whose aid he was sensible the great reform he had resolved to introduce could neither be complete nor permanent. In Clive's correspondence and measures, at this period, will be found the origin and introduction of that important principle of a fair and honourable payment for service, suited to its nature and the rank and responsibility of the individuals employed, which has been generally ascribed to the more enlightened policy of a subsequent administration. That his efforts failed, was owing to the conduct of others, and particularly the public authorities in England, who, in their attack upon the salt monopoly and its appropriation, and in the condemnation of his measures, threw, for a period, a disrepute upon all that he had done, which led to a revival of a great proportion of the abuses he had corrected, and a disregard of the principles he had established. As the salt monopoly and its appropriation has been a subject of constant attack upon his character, and continues, so far as the monopoly is concerned, to be still one upon the Indian Government, the subject merits a cursory notice, which is all that the limits and objects of this Memoir will permit.[69]

We have already seen that, by the firman of the King of Delhi, the English Company possessed the right of trading free from duties. This privilege was granted to favour the kind of trade they then carried on, which was confined to exports and imports by sea: and the dustuck, or passport, of the English presidents or chiefs, was respected by the Subahdar's officers to that extent. Under this privilege the President favoured also the private trade of the Company's servants or officers, which, though not strictly according to the words of the firman, was never objected to.

As to the internal or carrying trade of the country, to engage in it never entered into the plans of the Company or its servants, which were confined to the valuable and profitable traffic between Europe and India; and, had they thought of it, it is clear that it could not have been profitably conducted by foreigners under a native government, which had the power of enforcing justice in the transactions between them and its own subjects.

But after the deposition of Suraj-u-Dowlah, and the elevation of Meer Jaffier, the influence of the English in Bengal became paramount; and, as they were all traders, some of them extended their views, and availed themselves of their political superiority to enter into the internal trade also; and, applying their partial freedom from duties on foreign trade to circumstances totally different, employed it to exempt themselves from duties even on their illegal internal commerce; an indulgence which, of course, had never been intended.

As long as Clive remained in Bengal, he checked these pretensions by his characteristic firmness and spirit; but no sooner had he left the country, than there was a general rush of the Company's servants, and of Europeans of all classes, towards the interior trade of the three provinces. In the foreign trade, the Company and its officers had, indeed, the advantage of trading free of duties, but the returns were tardy, and in some instances uncertain; whereas in the internal trade the return was rapid and certain; and, as they most unjustly claimed for this trade the same exemption from duties which they had enjoyed for the articles of their foreign export trade, it is clear that they had it in their power to undersell the native merchant in his own market; that, to the extent of their capital, they had all the advantages of a monopoly; and that, as their trade increased, the revenues of the sovereign must decay. By this assumption they, in fact, made themselves participators in the benefit of the taxes imposed for the public service.

Of all the articles of inland trade, that of salt was by much the most important. Its manufacture and trade had always, to a certain extent, been a monopoly, and was generally farmed or granted for a price, as a boon, to some favourite of the prince. Being a necessary of life, the demand was great and steady; and the capital employed in the trade being limited, the return on it was very large. It seems, under the frugal management of the natives, to have amounted to 200 per cent. After the deposition of Meer Jaffier in favour of Cossim Ali, planned, as we have seen, by Mr. Holwell, and imprudently executed by Mr. Vansittart in 1760, not long after Lord Clive's departure, the abuses of the English private trade in this and all its other branches, no longer sufficiently checked by the Governor, increased daily. Fortunes were amassed with singular rapidity; and such was the certainty of gain, that native capital flowed plentifully into the hands of the English merchant, who employed it himself, or permitted the trade of natives to be carried on covertly under his name. It could not be otherwise; for, while the native purchased the commodity at a high rate, paid an enormous duty, and was subject to all the expense and annoyance of frequent tolls, exactions, and stoppages, the English had become possessed of the principal salt works, paid no duty, and carried their wares at pleasure about the country for sale free from all demand or exaction whatever.

Cossim Ali, a prince of great sagacity, and no mean financier, remonstrated with Mr. Vansittart on the abuses exercised by the English, and still more under their name, all over the country, to the oppression of his subjects, and the ruin of the public revenues; for not only did the Gomashtahs, and others in the service of the English, refuse payment of customs, but they insulted, and sometimes even insolently punished, on their own authority, the officers of the native Government. Mr. Vansittart, quite aware of the justice of the complaints, and not unwilling to remedy them, as far as the little power left in his hands by the rapacity of his Council, and his own want of vigour, would allow, at length entered into a treaty with the Subah[70], by which, among other stipulations, it was agreed, that the English should be allowed to engage in the inland trade, but subject to duties; and, in particular, were to be allowed to purchase salt, subject to a low duty of 9 per cent. only, and might transport it about the country, free from all the transit duties paid by the Subah's own subjects.[71]

This arrangement, such as it was, afforded but a feeble redress to Meer Cossim: but the Council, themselves the principal traders, were indignant, even at this moderate deduction from their commercial gains, and disavowed the act of the Governor. The consequence was what we have seen: Meer Cossim, seeing his subjects deprived of their trade, and himself of his revenues, proclaimed a general exemption from customs and duties for two years, to his subjects and to all others.

The rage of the Council of Calcutta at this step, rendered necessary by their own conduct, led to a bloody war, the massacre of Patna, the deposition of Meer Cossim, and the restoration of Meer Jaffier. It was not without reason that the Court of Directors regarded "the inland trade as the foundation of all the bloodshed, massacres, and confusion which have happened of late years in Bengal."

By the treaty[72] with the restored prince, the English got a right of trading by their own dustuck, free of all taxes, duties, and impositions, excepting one of two and a half per cent. on salt. This was, in effect, giving them a monopoly of that profitable trade; and it appears that even this duty, trifling as it was, was never levied. The arrangement threw the whole inland trade of the country into the hands of the English and their agents, whose violence totally paralysed the native Government.

These proceedings, and their fatal consequences, were viewed by the Court of Directors with indignation and alarm. The new assumptions had not even the air of being for their benefit, but were exclusively for the advantage of their servants. They therefore, in order to repress the evil, on the 8th of February, 1764, sent out an order to put an end to the inland trade in salt, betle-nut, and tobacco, and all other articles produced and consumed in the country.

It was soon after this order was resolved upon that, the news of the massacre of Patna, the war with Meer Cossim, and other events, having reached England, and diffused the greatest consternation every where, and especially at the India House, Lord Clive was solicited once more to return to Bengal, to restore peace and stability to the empire of which he was the founder. In his letter to the Court of Directors[73], accepting of the government, fully aware of one great source of misrule, he recommended an entire abolition of the inland trade in salt, betle-nut, and tobacco, as having, with other circumstances, concurred to hasten and bring on the late troubles.

But, soon after the date of this letter, the Court of Proprietors, among whom were numbers favourable to the claims of the servants, and who saw with alarm a stop likely to be put to a trade which, in the short space of four years, had already sent many large fortunes to England, had come to a resolution[74] to recommend "to the Court of Directors to reconsider the orders sent to Bengal relative to the trade of the Company's servants in salt, betle-nut, and tobacco; and that they do give such directions for regulating the same, agreeably to the interest of the Company and the Subah, as to them may appear most prudent; either by settling here at home the restrictions under which this trade ought to be carried on, or by referring it to the Governor and Council of Fort William to regulate this important point in such a manner as may prevent all future disputes betwixt the Subah and the Company."

The orders of the 8th of February had been dispatched previously to the arrival of the news of the new treaty with Meer Jaffier; "the terms of which, however," the Directors justly observe, "appear to be so very injurious to the Nabob, and to the natives, that they cannot, in the very nature of them, tend to any thing but the producing general heart-burnings and dissatisfaction;" it is therefore directed, that the orders of the 8th of February remain in force, till a more equitable plan can be formed; the Governor and Council being directed to consult the Nabob as to the manner of carrying on the inland trade of salt, and other articles produced and consumed in the country, which may be most to his satisfaction and advantage, the interest of the Company, and likewise of the Company's servants, and to form and transmit home an equitable plan, to enable the Court to give directions. It is to be remembered, therefore, that in this view there was a threefold interest to be considered; that of the Nabob, of the Company, and of the Company's servants.

This letter was carried out to India in the ship which conveyed Lord Clive; though a copy, sent by another vessel, arrived some time before him.

When Lord Clive reached India, one of the first objects that engaged his attention was the manner in which the public servants were to be remunerated.

At that period, their direct salaries were very trifling; that of councillor being only 350l., and the others small in proportion. The Company was originally strictly a trading Company, and its clerks and servants were paid chiefly by being allowed to trade on their own account. When the Company found it necessary to have troops for the defence of their factories, their military officers were paid in the same way. All were merchants and traders, from the governor, the commandant, and the chaplain, down to the youngest writer and ensign.

Now that they were princes with a large territory, and a formidable army, the steps by which they reached that eminence had been so sudden, and the consequences so unforeseen, that their servants still continued to be civil, military, and ecclesiastical traders: the old system remained unchanged.

But a change of circumstances necessarily called for a change of regulations. The relative situation of the English and natives was no longer the same: for instance, the receiving of presents from native princes, or men of rank, had quite altered its nature. While the Company were mere traders, there could be no good reason for hindering their servants and the natives from mutually receiving and bestowing presents. The parties were on a level, bound to each other by common interest, and presents were nothing more than a mark of the good-will that subsisted between them; the consequence of their friendship or relations in trade, exhibited according to the usage and fashion of the country, of which the giving and receiving of presents formed a part.

In the altered situation of the Company, when their servants concluded treaties, influenced the fate of provinces, and made and unmade princes, things were essentially changed. Presents were now liable to become, not the sign and consequence of good-will, but the motive, and sometimes the guilty motive, of public acts; and great sums might be thus extorted, to the injury both of the natives and of the Company: and, indeed, this natural effect did ensue. The paramount influence of the English authority was abused, for purposes of private interest and selfish rapacity. Great fortunes were made in this way during the five years that Lord Clive was absent in England, and these benevolences became a most heavy burden on the men of rank and wealth in India.

To check this evil, the Court of Directors, as we have seen, ordered covenants against receiving presents to be entered into by all their servants.

The orders issued regarding the inland trade nearly shut up another great source of gain. During the five years in which the public servants had carried it on with such amazing profit, the export trade, as an inferior branch, had been left chiefly to free merchants and free mariners. The orders excluding the Company's servants from the inland trade now drove them back, once more, to foreign and general trade, but in more unfavourable circumstances.

They complained to the Directors that, by the course of events, which had done so much for the Company, they were placed in a worse situation than ever, and engaged in an unfavourable competition even with the free traders: that, instead of benefiting, they suffered by being in the Company's service, as they were confined to one spot by the Company's concerns, while the others could run over the country, and had nothing to engage them but their own interests. In this representation there was much truth; though the conclusion might have reached farther than either the Company or their servants would have been willing to allow.

Men who had been accustomed to look to great and immediate returns for their capital, or for the mere use of their name, looked upon the restrictions under which they were now placed as the height of tyranny. The habits of indulgence and expense which they had acquired from the rapid influx of wealth, and the golden prospects which their situation had seemed to hold out to them, were bad preparations for returning to, or for acquiring, the patient, sober, and steady habits of business which general commerce requires. Lord Clive found the settlement in a ferment; and all ranks of the Company's servants resolved to throw every obstacle in the way of executing the Company's orders.

How he triumphed over the civil, as well as military, combinations which threatened ruin to the British ascendency in India, we have already seen: but if he triumphed, it was not by firmness alone; it was equally by the justice, the consideration, the policy, which guided all his measures.

He had all the powers of mind necessary for his new situation; but his instruments were very imperfect. He saw that a grand crisis had arrived in the Company's affairs; that their servants were brought into contact with men possessed of the greatest wealth and power, and whose fate they really held in their hands. "Without proposing a reasonable prospect of independent fortunes," says one of his friends[75], "it was ridiculous to hope that common virtue could withstand the allurements of daily temptation; or that men armed with power would abstain from the spoils of a prostrate nation."

Clive was particularly desirous, as we have seen, that the chief men in the administration of affairs, but especially the Governor, should be withdrawn from trade, and from whatever could warp the freedom of their opinions: it is a subject to which he often reverts in his private correspondence.

But to expect that the Directors would directly sanction large salaries to their servants from the profits of the Company's trade, or from their territorial revenues, was vain. It was quite at variance with the old maxims by which they were accustomed to regulate their concerns.

There seemed to be no alternative, therefore, but either to let things proceed in the ruinous course in which they now were, to enforce the covenants, and enter, unaided, on a hopeless struggle between private interest and public duty; or to find means, from such resources of the country as were not yet claimed by the Company, to pay the superior servants in an adequate and ample manner; and this last he resolved to attempt.

"It was not expedient," says Clive himself, in his speech in the House of Commons[76], "to draw the reins too tight. It was not expedient that the Company's servants should pass from affluence to beggary. It was necessary that some emoluments should accrue to the servants in general, and more especially to those in superior stations, who were to assist in carrying on the measures of Government. The salary of a councillor is, I think, scarcely 300l. per annum; and it is well known that he cannot live in that country for less than 3000l. The same proportion holds among the other servants. It was requisite, therefore, that an establishment should take place; and the Select Committee, after the most mature deliberation, judged that the trade in salt, betle-nut, and tobacco, under proper regulations, might effectually answer the purpose."

One difficulty had been removed when, about the time of the grant of the dewannee, the young Nabob, Nujum-ed-Dowlah, had yielded up to the Company the whole of the revenues of the three provinces, in consideration of a fixed annuity. The question, after that, no longer regarded the Nabob, or his revenues; it was only between the Company, their servants, and the natives; and Clive believed that, by an arrangement regarding the salt trade, the interest of all could be conciliated: and it is to be recollected, that the Directors had ordered that the new plan should have a view to "the interest of the Company, and likewise of the Company's servants."[77]

It is unnecessary to enter into all the details of the plan finally adopted in September, 1765, which were chiefly arranged by Mr. Sumner. The salt trade was to be conducted solely by a society composed of all the higher officers of Government, civil and military; their capital was to consist of a certain number of shares; the civil servants, as low down as factors, the military, as low down as majors, were to hold shares; chaplains and surgeons had also their shares; the capital for carrying on the trade was to be furnished by the sharers, in their due proportions. The affairs of the Society were conducted by a committee; the salt was to be furnished to them by contractors, and was to be sold at various grand stations by agents, generally Europeans, appointed by the Committee, the purchasers from whom could carry and sell it over the country at pleasure; 35 per cent. on the price was allowed as a tax to the company[78], who had now come into the Nabob's place; the selling price, at the different remote stations, was also fixed at rates 12 or 15 per cent. below what was found to have been the average rate of the twenty years preceding.

Besides providing ample allowances to the chief of the Company's servants, the great advantage of this plan was, that it allowed them to withdraw their attention wholly from trade.[79] They were sleeping partners of a sure and profitable concern, the whole details of which, without any care on their part, was managed by a committee devoted to the business.

The profits of this Society were, as might have been expected, very great. "The capital of the salt trade," says Clive, writing to Colonel Call[80], "is 32 lacs of sicca rupees, upon which the most moderate expect to make 50 per cent., clear of all charges; others, 75 per cent.; and the most sanguine, 100 per cent. Take the lowest, and a councillor's and a colonel's profit will be 7000l. sterling per annum; a lieutenant-colonel's and junior merchant's, 3000l.; majors' and factors', 2000l. These advantages, and a free open trade, are in lieu of all presents from the natives, and all perquisites disadvantageous to the Company, and dishonourable to the servants." And in a letter[81] to Mr. Palk, the Governor of Madras, after mentioning the large allowance that the trade would give to the different sharers, he adds, "This extraordinary indulgence is in lieu of perquisites; for I intend the Governor and Council shall take a most solemn oath at the Mayor's Court, in presence of all the inhabitants, that they shall receive no perquisites whatever, or other advantages, excepting what arises from their trade; and to this shall be added a penalty-bond of a very very large sum of money. These articles, upon my arrival, were altogether in the hands of the Company's servants and free merchants, and only yielded to the Company 60,000l. per annum, and to the Nabob nothing, for they did not even pay the 2½ per cent. duties. Neither will the method we are pursuing be attended with the least disadvantage to the inhabitants: the same hands who made and worked the salt are still employed at the same rates; and the salt in general will be sold at a much lower price than formerly. Formerly the salt was sold dear or cheap, according to the demand for that article; we shall endeavour to fix upon a price for every market, and always sell it for the same."

The result of the first year's sales was very prosperous, and even exceeded expectation: insomuch that, in forming the plan for the following year, it was resolved to diminish the profits of the proprietors, and to raise those of the East India Company, the duty to whom was now fixed at 50 per cent., which, at a low valuation of the salt, was to produce about 160,000l. Clive had, however, in the course of his progress through the country, observed the inconvenience of employing European agents in the trade; and a very material improvement was introduced, by dispensing with their agency altogether, and selling the article at Calcutta, or where it was made, to the natives only, with permission to convey it wherever they pleased. In this way Europeans were totally removed from any direct interference with the natives in the interior, and the trade was as free as any monopoly can be. This second year's Society commenced in September, 1766.

Not long after it began its operations, letters from the Court of Directors reached Bengal, disapproving of the plan of the first year's Society, and commanding the trade to be thrown open, and left entirely to the natives. In coming to this resolution, they were not so much influenced by any views of the particular merits or demerits of the new plan itself, as by consideration of the mischiefs which had for several years attended the general system of internal trade carried on by the English gentlemen with a high hand, free of duties. Their orders, repeatedly sent out, to pay the legal duties to the Nabob, and to keep within the meaning of the Emperor's firman, had been totally neglected, or provokingly evaded. Repeated revolutions had been the consequence, and immense suffering to the country. "We are fully sensible," say the Court of Directors[82], "that these innovations, and illegal traffic, laid the foundation of all the bloodshed, massacres, and confusion which have happened of late years. We cannot suffer ourselves to indulge a thought towards the continuance of them, upon any conditions whatsoever. No regulations can, in our opinion, be formed, that can be effectual to prevent the like consequences which we have seen." They desire, however, that the duties, as forming part of the revenues of Bengal, should not be abolished. In a letter of the same date, to Lord Clive, the Directors, after bestowing the greatest and most merited praise on the penetration with which he had at once discerned their true interest in every branch of their concerns; the rapidity with which he had restored order, peace, and tranquillity; and the integrity which governed all his actions, proceed to give their resolutions on the inland trade. "The vast fortunes," they observe, "acquired in the inland trade have been obtained by a scene of the most tyrannic and oppressive conduct that ever was known, in any age or country. We have been uniform in our sentiments and orders on this subject, from the first knowledge we had of it; and your Lordship will not, therefore, wonder, after the fatal experience we had of the violent abuses committed in this trade, that we could not be brought to approve it, even in the limited and regulated manner with which it comes to us, in the plan laid down in the Committee's proceedings. We agree in opinion with your Lordship on the propriety of holding out such advantages to our chief servants, civil and military, as may open to them the means of honourably acquiring a competency in our service; but the difficulty of the subject, and the short time we have at present to consider it, have obliged us to defer giving our sentiments and directions thereupon, until the next despatch." The letter concludes with entreaties to him to remain for another year in India, and with holding out the prospect of some solid permanent retribution, corresponding to his most important services.

The real causes of the resolutions of public bodies do not always appear in their public acts. To deprive their servants of their principal means of subsistence, without substituting any authorised allowance in its place, was bad policy in itself, and was reducing Lord Clive, in the midst of his exertions, to a very painful dilemma. Mr. Scrafton, in a letter[83] to Lord Clive, explains their secret reasons. The Proprietors had begun to clamour for an increase of dividend, which the Directors thought unsuitable to the situation of the Company's affairs. "This," says he, "has induced the Directors to defer the consideration of the gratification of the servants on abolishing the salt trade. Such consideration could not be but for a vast sum; and if it had got wind that such gratifications were ordered, the Proprietors would be outrageous for an increase of the dividend. Though we cannot open our minds upon it, yet it appears to me an increase of dividend must take place at the Quarterly Court in June; and then the Court will be under no restraint, but will give a per centage on the revenues, in which the Governor will have a great share, in lieu of trade; the rest among the Committee, Council, colonels, and ten below Council, but no lower."—"Your Lordship may be assured it will take place; for, when the last paragraph was added to the letter to you, the Committee declared it was their meaning and intention to do it by the next ship."

The letters of the Directors, the first which Clive had received in answer to his communication on the plan which he had formed, as directed by them, for carrying on the internal trade, reached him only in December, 1766, a month before he left India. He had for some weeks been confined to his chamber by a very severe illness, from which his life was in danger. He now felt himself placed in a most painful predicament, between the Court of Directors and the immediate difficulties of his situation with the civil and military servants. He believed that, with long attention and care, he had succeeded in disarming the salt trade of most of its evils, and by its means had secured to the Company's superior servants a lawful for an unlawful income. But the commands of the Directors were positive; and, though he was of opinion that they were founded on mistake, it was his wish to conform to them. The Company, though aware of the address and spirit of command with which he had checked the machinations of their civil servants in 1765, were still ignorant, when their orders were given, of his still more difficult triumph over the mutiny of their military officers. They had, most justly and wisely, deprived their servants of their means of illicit gain; they now rashly deprived them also of what had been substituted as a lawful provision; they referred these discontented and powerful men, who had vast wealth within their reach, to a future and uncertain time, when their masters should be at leisure to pay some attention to their immediate and urgent necessities. An inferior man would have hesitated and faltered: Clive saw that decision was necessary for the crisis. He could not undo his own work of pacification and reform. The affairs of the Society were too far advanced to be discontinued all at once. He therefore confirmed the grant to the Society, but declared that it was to terminate at the conclusion of the current year, the 1st of September, 1767.[84] At the same time, the Select Committee of Calcutta, by their letter of the 26th of January, 1767, while they mentioned that the orders for discontinuing the Society had been complied with, remonstrated strongly with the Court of Directors on the occasion; calling on them to review their opinion.

Such is an outline of the history of the Society of Trade during Clive's government. He formed a society in unison, as he supposed, with the spirit of the orders of the Court of Directors, which desired him, in the new plan of trade intended to be formed, to consult the benefit of three parties—the Nabob, the Company, and its servants. The Nabob's interest had merged in the Company's. The interest of the natives, however, the most important of all, was consulted by their restoration to the benefits of the trade, from which recently they had nearly been excluded; and by the exclusion of Europeans from any participation in the details of it. How the interests of the Company's servants were to be consulted by any plan that admitted them to the profits, yet excluded them in every shape from the trade, it is not easy to imagine. Lord Clive and the Committee did, therefore, what then, and in all succeeding times, it has been found necessary to do, in India, and in every distant possession, to form and execute a plan on their own responsibility, and to leave the future approbation or disapprobation to their distant masters. Inconvenient as this may be, it is an inconvenience inseparable from distant legislation.

A few words may here be said on the future history of the salt trade. The Court of Directors, after receiving the letters of the Select Committee, still persisted in their desire of abolishing the Society, and of removing Europeans from this and all other concern with the inland trade of the country. They therefore, by their letter of the 20th of November, 1767, written eighteen months after their former letter, ordered the Society of Trade to be abolished, and the salt-pans to be sold by public auction, excluding all Europeans from being bidders or owners, directly or indirectly. Instead of the benefits resulting to the senior servants from this trade, an allotment of 2½ per cent. on the net revenue of the dewannee was assigned to them in certain shares; and a small increase of pay to captains and subalterns.[85]

Meanwhile, in Bengal, when September, 1767, arrived, these last orders having not yet been received, nor indeed written, another year was allowed by Mr. Verelst, the new Governor, and his Council, to the Society of Trade, to collect their debts, and realise their capital. It was not till September, 1768, that it ceased; and the Court of Directors having, in December, 1769[86], by a sudden and singular departure from their opinions, so strongly announced, sent out instructions to lay open the inland trade to all persons, as well natives as Europeans, a proclamation to that effect was published at Calcutta, on the 12th of December, 1770. The effect of this essential change in the Company's plans on the future prosperity of the provinces, it is no part of the present Memoir to investigate; but it is very plain, that, by admitting Europeans into the inland trade, in the state in which the country then was, they really did away with all the benefit that could in any way have been expected to arise from abolishing the monopoly.

But whether Lord Clive's opinions regarding the trade in salt were sound or not, one thing at least is evident,—he was perfectly conscientious in the advice he gave, and on the measures he adopted, on that subject. This is plain from his whole conduct, and from his correspondence, public and private, with numerous persons, while in India. Nor did his anxiety on the subject cease, even after he had reached England, when all private interest in the subject, if he can be supposed ever to have had any, must have been over. Finding accidentally, some months after his arrival, that the plan of abolishing the Salt Society continued to be entertained, he explained his views on the subject to the Committee of Treasury and Correspondence of the Directors, in a detailed and laboured letter.[87] He pointed out the advantages of the trade as then regulated, as the best fund that the Company could appropriate for the payment, without grudging or envy, of their superior servants: that it enabled them to regulate the emoluments of their servants, according to their own wishes; that by it, their servants had the appearance of being paid, not by the Company, but by the profits of their own trade,—an advantage not attending any payment by a percentage on the revenue. "If you grant a commission upon the revenue," says he, "the sum will not only be large, but known to the world; the allowance being publicly ascertained, every man's proportion will at times be the occasion of much discourse, envy, and jealousy; the great will interfere in your appointments, and noblemen will perpetually solicit you to provide for the younger branches of their families." It is evident, that his views originated not in principles of political economy, but of policy, forced upon him by the circumstances in which India was placed. His efforts were directed to insure a desirable object, in what he deemed, not certainly the best, but the only practicable mode.

In spite of this remonstrance, the Committee came to the resolution of throwing the trade open, imposing only a duty of 10 rupees on the hundred maunds of salt. Lord Clive again addressed them[88], showing that they were in reality giving up 300,000l. per annum, for a tax of only 31,500l.; and pointed out that, even on their plan, the trade would continue in some degree a monopoly, and that the servants would still be concerned in it to what extent they pleased, under their banyans and black merchants. His expressions in writing the same day to Mr. Verelst, show how sincere and deep-rooted his opinions on the subject were. Sending him a copy of his letter to the Committee, he adds, "What attention they will pay to my representations I know not: but I have such confidence in your honour and zeal for the Company's welfare, that I cannot help hoping you will take care that the Company be not deprived of 300,000l. per annum, however peremptory the orders of the Directors may be."

The letter of the 20th of November, 1767, already mentioned, was written soon after. The only effect of this remonstrance was a change by which the duty was to be advanced to a sum not exceeding 120,000l. Lord Clive points out, in several confidential letters to Mr. Verelst, the want of information of the Directors on this occasion, and the pernicious consequences likely to result from the change. That he was sincere, admits not of a doubt. His opinions on the subject he maintained uniformly to the last hour of his life, and the events seem to have justified his foresight.

The tax, as regulated by him, certainly was a monopoly, and so far was exceptionable; but he might justly maintain that the real question was, Are the evils arising from this monopoly, or from the licentiousness of the rulers of the country, if penuriously paid, most to be dreaded? and of this he had no doubt. Even from the question of the comparative merits of a monopoly and free trade, political considerations, unfortunately, could not be altogether excluded. The society of trade was abolished under pretence of being a monopoly. This was not, however, the real cause. That society excluded from the salt trade a body of powerful and wealthy Europeans, who raised a clamour, in name of the natives, but solely for their own private views. On the plan, as reformed by Lord Clive, the natives were restored to their former employment, and Europeans excluded. But when the trade was thrown open to all indiscriminately, natives and Europeans, the change, though in form the result of sound principles of government and of political economy, was really, in substance, quite the reverse. The two parties did not come into the field on equal terms; the society of trade had a direct interest that no oppression should be exercised on the natives in their dealings over the country; and being composed of the leading men of the government, had the means of affording them protection. But when the trade was reduced to a scramble between Europeans having the whole authority of the country, and natives who had none; when redress was to be sought by the natives from their very rivals and competitors; their condition became hopeless; and that fact sufficiently accounts for the melancholy nature of the history of the inland trade in succeeding years.

Two charges connected with this transaction of the salt trade were afterwards brought against Lord Clive: the first, that he obstinately persisted in disobeying the orders of the Company for its abolition; the other, that by having a share in it as Governor, he in some measure deviated from his plan of not trading, and of deriving no pecuniary benefit to himself from his voyage to India.

As to the first, we have seen that several letters were certainly received from the Court of Directors, after his arrival in Bengal, declaring their decided hostility to their servants engaging in the inland trade at all, and especially in that of salt. But a comparison of dates has shown that these letters were directed, not against any measures of Lord Clive, which were not then known, but against the grossly unjust and pernicious proceedings which took place before his arrival. To the letter of the Select Committee of Calcutta, of the 30th of September, 1765, detailing the plan for the first society of trade, an answer, dated the 17th of May, 1766, was received on the 8th of December following: and so far was Lord Clive from obstinately persisting in continuing the trade, as has been asserted, that on the 24th of the following month, while hardly yet recovered from a dangerous illness, he declared the society abolished, at the close of the season. He had fixed so limited a period as one year for its duration, because it was only experimental, and to admit of any change suggested by the Directors.

The second charge was, that, as a sharer in this society of trade, he had deviated from his intention expressed in his letter to the Company, not to improve his fortune by his voyage to India.

His share as Governor in the society of trade (a concern, the details of which were entirely confided to a committee, and the operations of which he knew only from their result) was certainly very different in its nature from private trade on his own account. To his intention not to increase his private fortune by the emoluments of his office, or by trade in any shape, he religiously adhered. Of the allowances to the Governor, the honorary presents that could not be refused without giving offence, the proceeds of the Governor's share of the society of trade, with all other emoluments annexed to his office, he caused a distinct account to be kept. Out of it were defrayed his expenses as Governor, and by the surplus he did not benefit. He had taken with him to India three gentlemen: Mr. Maskelyne, his friend and near connection; Mr. Henry Strachey, his private secretary; and Mr. Ingham, his family physician;—no large establishment for a Governor leaving his family and going abroad in the circumstances Lord Clive did. The sums in question were employed in remunerating them, and some persons of his household; and by the account kept of these and of all other sums received by him from the time he left England till his return, which was communicated to the Company, and afterwards laid before Parliament, far from having added, in any respect, to his private fortune, as this charge supposes, it has never been disputed that there was a balance of 5816l. 16s. 9d. against it. If these gentlemen were remunerated, therefore, it was not at the Company's expense, by any extraordinary charges upon them; but at the expense of the Governor, who gave up to them the allowances which he might have retained to himself.[89] The charge was really as unfounded as it was ungracious, and, it is to be observed, was brought against him by men who had shown no such pecuniary delicacy.

Of another charge, also brought some years after, against Lord Clive's administration, that of having fixed an improper rate of exchange between the gold and silver coinage of Bengal, it is not necessary to say much. In India, gold and silver coin are articles of trade even more directly than in most countries in the world, and the variation in their relative value is often extremely great. In the year 1766, a scarcity of silver existed in Bengal, from the quantity exported to China, from decreased importation, and other causes. It was known that there was much gold in the country, in various shapes; and to inexperienced political economists it seemed a very reasonable expedient to give a premium for its being brought out. A favourable rate was therefore fixed on the new gold mohur then coined. This certainly had the effect of bringing gold to the mint; but, as might have been foreseen, only increased the evil, by causing still more silver coin to be withdrawn from circulation. The bankers and shroffs of the country, who are proficients in the science of exchange, naturally paid their demands in gold, and exported or hoarded the silver. The gold coin they were unwilling to receive at its legal value, without a large batta, or exchange, in reality to compensate its inferior intrinsic value as compared with silver, the ordinary circulation of the country. This necessary measure of self-defence was regarded as a trick or fraud in trade. The proclamation of 30th June, 1766, directing the coin to be taken at certain rates, was one of those ineffectual attempts to force circumstances, formerly so usual with politicians of every class and of every country. It was, of course, ineffectual; and necessarily occasioned no small inconvenience to merchants and retail traders. Its effects were chiefly felt after Clive had left India. The Court of Directors, from their correspondence, seems to have been nearly as much puzzled as the Council of Calcutta; though the fact, that the difference of market value between the gold and the silver coin rose to 17½ per cent., ought to have afforded an easy explanation of the difficulty.[90] Yet those who recollect the discussions, in our own times, in the British parliament, on the difference of value between the guinea and the bank note, and on the bullion question in general, will not be disposed to view with much surprise a similar difficulty that occurred in a distant country, half a century before.

Though these charges were brought against Lord Clive long afterwards, yet, as they all relate to India, it has been judged best to state them at this period of his career, when he was still engaged in his active services in that country.

Our attention has hitherto been too exclusively directed to Lord Clive's civil and military reforms, to admit of any connected view of the very important treaties which he negotiated with the native powers, and which really changed the face of India. We have seen that one of his first objects, after his arrival in Bengal, was to conclude a peace with Sujah-u-Dowlah, the Vizier, Nabob of Oude, and to make some arrangement with our ally, the King. The war, though successful, had long been carried on at an expense ruinous to the Company's finances. With these objects he resolved to combine a settlement with the young Nabob of Bengal (whose finances were in disorder), so as to place his and the Company's affairs on a definite and solid basis. Clive had left Calcutta on the afternoon of the 25th of June, 1765, and on the 9th of July writes to the Select Committee, that the business of Nujm-u-Dowlah's durbar was perfectly finished. By the arrangement then entered into, provision was made for the management of public affairs at the Nabob's court, and in the three provinces, the immediate administration of which was committed to Mahommed Reza Khan, Doolubram, and Jugget Seit, and regulations were signed by them and the Nabob for that purpose. A barrier was thus provided against the shifting policy and intrigues of a corrupt court, and a weak and ignorant prince. At the same time Lord Clive procured from the Nabob a sunnud for the reversion in perpetuity of his jaghire to the Company. But he now plainly saw that things could not stop where they were. The truth is, that it was now clear enough, that two independent governments could not exist in the country at the same time. The one must swallow up the other; and the Company having the sword in their hand, and not being disposed to recede, it was necessary to reduce the Nabob to a cipher. Two days afterwards[91] Clive writes to the Select Committee;—"We have often lamented that the gentlemen of the Council, by precipitating the late treaty, had lost the most glorious opportunity that could ever happen of settling matters upon that solid and advantageous footing for the Company, which no temporary invasion could endanger. The true and only security for our commerce and territorial possessions in this country is, in a manner, always to have it in our power to overawe the very Nabob we are bound by treaty to support. A maxim contrary to this has of late been much adopted; and from that fundamental error, as I may call it, have sprung the innumerable evils, or at least deficiencies, in our government, which, I have now the pleasure to inform you, are in a fair way of being perfectly removed.

"The Nabob, upon my representation of the great expense of such an army as will be necessary to support him in his government, the large sums due for restitution, and to the navy, together with an annual tribute, which he will be under a necessity of paying to the King, hath consented, and I have agreed, provided it should obtain your approbation, that all the revenues of the country shall be appropriated to those purposes, 50 lacs of rupees excepted. Out of this sum is to be defrayed all his expenses of every nature and denomination. Mahommed Reza Khan, however, being of a disposition extremely timorous, is desirous of having the payment of the cavalry and sepoys pass through his hands, though included in the said 50 lacs. This, I think, will be complied with.

"I am of opinion also, that certain stipends, out of the above mentioned sum, should be fixed for the Begum, for the Chuta Nabob, and for the rest of the Nabob's brothers and nephews, Miriam's son included; or else we must be subject to frequent complaints from those quarters; for I am persuaded that the dependents and parasites of the present Nabob will always keep him in distress, be his income what it may. Although the sum proposed to be stipulated for the Nabob, considering the present great expenses and demands, may appear large, yet, by what I now learn, his expense exceeds the sum to be allowed; and although it is certain that neither his education nor abilities will enable him to appear to any advantage at the head of these great and rich provinces, yet, I think, we are bound in honour to support the dignity of his station, so far as is consistent with the true interest of the Company.

"The particulars of this matter may be farther adjusted in my absence by Mr. Sykes, to whom I have communicated my ideas, if the plan be approved of by the Select Committee; and the whole may be finally concluded to our satisfaction, upon the Company's being appointed the King's Duan, who will be empowered, by the nature of their office, as well as by the King's consent, to settle every point."

Writing the same day to Mr. Verelst, Lord Clive sufficiently characterises the Nabob by a single trait. "He received the proposal of having a sum of money for himself and household at his will with infinite pleasure; and the only reflection he made, upon leaving me, was, 'Thank God! I shall now have as many dancing girls as I please.'"

It is not to be supposed that the Select Committee would object to a plan which threw the greater part of the revenue of Bengal into the hands of the Company, and the treaty was finally concluded in the course of the same month. The allowance made to the Nabob was raised to something more than 53 lacs of rupees.

Lord Clive, proceeding up the river, met the Vizier, as has been mentioned, at Benares. The fortune of war had been against him; his armies had been repeatedly defeated, and his capital, Lucknow, taken. He had given himself up to General Carnac, and was eager for peace. So early as the 2d of August, Lord Clive had an interview with him, and intimated his intention of restoring all his dominions, except Allahabad, worth 10 lacs yearly, and perhaps Corah, valued at 18. "His expressions of joy and gratitude upon this occasion," say Lord Clive and General Carnac, in a joint letter to the Select Committee[92], "were many and warm. Such an instance of generosity in a victorious enemy, exceeded his most sanguine expectations, and we doubt not will be the best foundation of that union and amity which we so earnestly wish to secure. He consents to pay to the Company 50 lacs for indemnification. These terms we think moderate and equitable, both for him and the Company."

This matter being arranged, Lord Clive hastened on to Allahabad, to meet the King: the first visit took place on the 9th of August. The King's demands were numerous, but Clive was steady to his purpose. The demand on the Nabob of Bengal for 32 lacs of rupees as arrears, and of 5½ lacs annually of jaghires, were refused, with several others. It was finally settled, on the 11th, that the King should receive annually, as revenue from Bengal, the sum of 26 lacs, with the countries of Allahabad and Corah, yielding a farther revenue of 28 lacs, from Sujah-u-Dowlah, as a royal demesne for supporting his dignity. "This last cession," says Lord Clive and General Carnac, writing to the Select Committee[93], "we very readily consented to, as Sujah-u-Dowlah made not the least objection, well knowing that, after our departure, he could easily settle this matter with the King, to the satisfaction of both parties." Lord Clive had, it seems, wished to restore Corah to the Vizier, making over Allahabad only to the King.

"We then presented the King with two arzies (petitions), desiring he would grant to Nujm-u-Dowlah the Nizamut of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa, and to the Company, the Dewanny of the same provinces; to both of which His Majesty has signed his fiat, and the proper instruments for both are now drawing out."