The Works of the Rev. John Wesley
Transcriber’s Notes
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Punctuation has been standardized.
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THE
WORKS
OF THE
Rev. JOHN WESLEY, M.A.
Late Fellow of Lincoln-College, Oxford.
Volume VI.
BRISTOL:
Printed by WILLIAM PINE, in Wine-Street.
MDCCLXXII.
THE
CONTENTS
Of the Sixth Volume.
An extract from Mr. Law’s Serious Call to a Holy Life.
Recommending devotion at three o’clock, called in scripture the ninth hour of the day. The subject of prayer at this hour may be resignation to the divine pleasure. The nature and duty of conformity to the will of God in all our actions and designs.
Of the excellency and greatness of a devout spirit.
An Extract from Mr. Law’s Later Works.
An extract from the case of reason, or natural religion, fairly and fully stated. In answer to a book, entitled Christianity as Old as the Creation.
[The introduction], shewing the state of the controversy.
Enquiring, whether there be any thing in the nature and condition of man, to oblige him to think, that he is not to admit of any doctrines or institutions, as revealed from God, but such as his own reason can prove to be necessary from the nature of things.
Shewing from the relation between God and man, that human reason cannot be a competent judge of the fitness and reasonableness of God’s proceedings with mankind, either as to the time, or matter, or manner of an external revelation.
Shewing how far human reason is able to judge of the reasonableness, truth, and certainty of divine revelation.
Of the state and nature of reason, as it is in man; and how its perfection in matters of religion is to be known.
Shewing that all the mutability of our tempers, the disorders of our passions, the corruption of our hearts, all the reveries of the imagination, all the contradictions and absurdities that are to be found in human life, and human opinions, are in effect the mutability, disorders, corruption, and absurdities of human reason.
[An extract] from Mr. Law’s Serious Answer to Dr. [♦]Trapp’s four sermons, on the sin, folly, and danger of being Righteous overmuch.
[Some animadversions] upon Dr. [♦]Trapp’s late reply.
[♦] “Trap’s” replaced with “Trapp’s”
[A short] but sufficient confutation of Bishop Warburton’s projected defence (as he calls it) of Christianity, in his divine legation of Moses in a letter to the Right Reverend the Lord Bishop of London.
An Extract from Mr. Law’s
SERIOUS CALL
TO A HOLY LIFE.
CHAPTER XVIII.
Recommending devotion at three o’clock, called in scripture the ninth hour of the day. The subject of prayer at this hour may be resignation to the divine pleasure. The nature and duty of conformity to the will of God in all our actions and designs.
1. * THERE is nothing wise, or holy, or just, but the great will of God. This is as strictly true as that nothing is infinite and eternal but God.
* No beings therefore, whether in heaven or on earth, can be wise, or holy, or just, but so far as they conform to this will of God. It is conformity to this will, that gives virtue and perfection to the highest services of angels in heaven; and it is conformity to the same will, that makes the ordinary actions of men on earth become an acceptable service to God.
* The whole nature of virtue consists in conforming, and the whole nature of vice in declining from the will of God. All God’s creatures are created to fulfil his will; the sun and moon obey his will, by the necessity of their nature; angels conform to his will, by the perfection of their nature: if therefore you would shew yourself not to be a rebel and apostate from the order of the creation, you must act like beings both above and below you; it must be the great desire of your soul, that God’s will may be done by you on earth, as it is done in heaven. It must be the settled purpose of your heart, to will nothing, design nothing, do nothing, but so far as you have reason to believe, it is the will of God.
2. ’Tis as necessary to think thus of God and yourself, as to think that you have any dependance upon him. And it is as great a rebellion against God, to think that your will may ever differ from his, as to think that you have not received the power of willing from him.
You are therefore to consider yourself as a being, that has no other business in the world, but to be that which God requires you to be; to have no tempers, no rules, no designs of your own, but to fill some place, and act some part in strict conformity, and thankful resignation to the divine pleasure.
To think that you are your own, or at your own disposal, is as absurd as to think that you created yourself. It is as plain that you are thus God’s, that you thus belong to him, and are to act and suffer all in thankful resignation to his pleasure, as that in him you live, and move, and have your being.
3. * Resignation to the divine will, signifies a chearful approbation, and thankful acceptance of every thing that comes from God. It is not enough patiently to submit, but we must thankfully receive, and fully approve of every thing, that by the order of God’s providence, happens to us.
* For there is no reason why we should be patient, but what is as strong a reason why we should be thankful. If we were under the hands of a wise and good physician that could not mistake, or do any thing to us, but what tended to our benefit; it would not be enough to be patient, and abstain from murmuring against such a physician; it would be as much a breach of gratitude, not to be thankful for what he did, as it would be to murmur at him.
* Now this is our true state with relation to God; we cannot be said so much as to believe in him, unless we believe him to be of infinite wisdom. Every argument therefore for patience under his disposal of us, is as strong an argument for thankfulness. And there needs no more to dispose us to this gratitude towards God, than a full belief in him, that he is this being of infinite wisdom, love and goodness.
Do but fully assent to this truth, and then you will cheerfully approve of every thing that God has already approved for you.
When you are satisfied that God does not only do that which is wise, and good, but which is the effect of infinite wisdom, and love in the care of you; it will be as necessary to be pleased with every thing which God chuses for you, as to wish your own happiness.
4. Whenever therefore you find yourself disposed to murmuring, at any thing that is the effect of God’s providence over you, you must look upon yourself as denying either the wisdom or goodness of God. For every complaint supposes this. You would never complain of your neighbour, but that you suppose you can shew either his unwise, unjust, or unkind behaviour towards you.
Now every impatient reflection under the providence of God, is the same accusation of God. A complaint always supposes ill usage.
Hence you may see the great necessity of this thankful state of heart, because the want of it implies an accusation of God’s want either of wisdom, or goodness in his disposal of us. It is not therefore any high degree of perfection, founded in any uncommon nicety of thinking, but a plain principle founded in this plain belief, that God is a being of infinite wisdom and goodness.
5. This resignation to the divine will, may be considered in two respects: first, As it signifies a thankful approbation of God’s general providence over the world: secondly, As it signifies a thankful acceptance of his particular providence over us.
* First, Every man is, by the first article of his creed, obliged to acknowledge the wisdom and goodness of God, in his general providence over the world. He is to believe that it is the effect of God’s great wisdom and goodness, that the world itself was formed at such a particular time, and in such a manner: that the general order of nature, the whole frame of things, is contrived and formed in the best manner. He is to believe that God’s providence over states and kingdoms, times and seasons, is all for the best: that the revolutions of state, and changes of empire, the rise and fall of monarchies, persecutions, wars, famines and plagues, are all permitted, and conducted by God’s providence, to the general good of man in this state of trial.
A good man is to believe all this, with the same fullness of assent, as he believes that God is in every place, tho’ he neither sees, nor can comprehend the manner of his presence.
* This is a noble magnificence of thought, a true greatness of mind, to be thus affected with God’s general providence, admiring and magnifying his wisdom in all things; never murmuring at the course of the world, or the state of things, but looking upon all around, at heaven and earth, as a pleased spectator; and adoring that invisible hand, which gives laws to all motions, and over-rules all events to ends suitable to the highest wisdom and goodness.
6. It is very common for people to allow themselves great liberty in finding fault with such things, as have only God for their cause.
* Every one thinks he may justly say, what a wretched, abominable climate he lives in. This man is frequently telling you, what a dismal, cursed day it is, and what intolerable seasons we have. Another thinks it is hardly worth his while to live in a world so full of changes and revolutions. But these are tempers of great impiety, and shew that religion has not yet its seat in the heart.
It sounds indeed much better to murmur at the course of the world, than to murmur at providence; to complain of the seasons and weather, than to complain of God; but if these have no other cause but God, it is a poor excuse to say, that you are only angry at the things, but not at the cause and director of them.
How sacred the whole frame of the world is, how all things are to be considered as God’s, and referred to him, is fully taught by our blessed Lord in the case of oaths: But I say unto you, swear not at all; neither by heaven, for it is God’s throne; nor by the earth, for it is his footstool; neither by Jerusalem, for it is the city of the great king; neither shalt thou swear by thy head, because thou canst not make one hair white or black, Matthew v. 37. That is, because the whiteness or blackness of thy hair is not thine, but God’s.
* Here you see all things in the whole order of nature, from the highest heavens to the smallest hair, are to be considered, not separately as they are in themselves, but as in some relation to God. And if this be good reasoning, thou shalt not swear by the earth, a city, or thy hair, because these things are God’s, and in a certain manner belong to him; is it not the same reasoning to say, Thou shalt not murmur at the seasons of the earth, the states of cities, and the change of times, because all these things are in the hands of God, have him for their author, are directed and governed by him to such ends as are most suitable to his wise providence?
* For whoso murmurs at the course of the world, murmurs at God that governs the course of the world. Whoso repines at seasons and weather, and speaketh impatiently of times and events, repines and speaks impatiently of God, who is the sole Lord and Governor of times, seasons, and events.
7. * As therefore when we think of God himself, we are to have no sentiments but of praise and thanksgiving; so when we look at those things which are under the direction of God, we are to receive them with the same tempers.
* And tho’ we are not to think all things right, and just, and lawful, which the providence of God permits; for then nothing could be unjust, because nothing is without his permission; yet we must adore God in the greatest public calamities, the most grievous persecutions, as things that are suffered by God, like plagues and famines, for ends suitable to his wisdom and glory in the government of the world.
* There is nothing more suitable to the piety of a reasonable creature, or the spirit of a Christian, than thus to approve, admire, and glorify God in all the acts of his general providence; considering the whole world as his particular family, and all events as directed by his wisdom.
* Every one seems to consent to this, as an undeniable truth, That all things must be as God pleases. And is not this enough to make every man pleased with them himself? And how can a man be a peevish complainer of any thing that is the effect of providence, but by shewing that his own will and wisdom are of more weight with him, than the will and wisdom of God? And what can religion be said to have done for a man, whose heart is in this state?
For if he cannot thank and praise God as well in calamities and sufferings, as in prosperity and happiness, he is as far from the piety of a Christian, as he that only loves them that love him, is from the charity of a Christian. For to thank God only for such things as you like, is no more a proper act of piety, than to believe only what you see, is an act of faith.
8. Thus much concerning resignation to the divine will, as it signifies a thankful approbation of God’s general providence: it is now to be considered, as it signifies a thankful acceptance of God’s particular providence over us.
* Every man is to consider himself as a particular object of God’s providence, under the same care and protection of God, as if the world had been made for him alone. It is not by chance that any man is born at such a time, of such parents, and in such place and condition. It is as certain, that every soul comes into the body at such a time, and in such circumstances, by the express designment of God, according to some purposes of his will, and for some particular ends; this is as certain, as that it is by the express designment of God, that some beings are angels, and others are men.
9. The scriptures assure us, it was by divine appointment, that our blessed Saviour was born at Bethlehem, and at such a time. Now altho’ it was owing to the dignity of his person, and the great importance of his birth, that thus much of the divine counsel was declared to the world concerning the time and manner of it; yet we are as sure from the same scriptures, that the time and manner of every man’s coming into the world, is according to the direction of divine providence, and in such time, and place, and circumstances, as are directed and governed by God for particular ends of his wisdom and goodness.
This we are as certain of from plain revelation, as we can be of any thing. * For if we are told, that not a sparrow falleth to the ground without our heavenly Father, Can any thing more strongly teach us, that much greater beings, such as human souls, come not into the world without the care and direction of our heavenly Father? If it is said, The very hairs of your head are all numbered, Is it not to teach us, that nothing, not the smallest things imaginable, happen to us by chance? But if the smallest things we can conceive, are declared to be under the divine direction, need we, or can we be more plainly taught, that the greatest things of life, such as the manner of our coming into the world, our parents, the time, and other circumstances of our birth, and condition, are all according to the direction, and appointment of divine providence.
10. When the disciples put this question to our blessed Lord concerning the blind man, Master, Who did sin, this man, or his parents, that he was born blind? He made this answer, Neither hath this man sinned, nor his parents; but that the works of God should be made manifest in him, John ix. 2, 3. plainly declaring, that the particular circumstances of every man’s birth, the body that he receives, and the state of life into which he is born, are appointed by a secret providence, which directs all things to their particular times, and seasons, and manner of existence, that the wisdom and works of God may be made manifest in them all.
As therefore it is certain, that all that is particular in our state, is the effect of God’s particular providence over us, and intended for some particular ends, both of his glory and our own happiness, we are, by the greatest obligations, called upon to resign our will to the will of God in all these respects; thankfully approving and accepting every thing that is particular in our state; praising and glorifying his name for our birth of such parents, and in such circumstances; being fully assured, that it was for some reasons of infinite wisdom and goodness, that we were so born into such particular states of life.
11. If the man above-mentioned was born blind, that the works of God might be manifested in him, had he not great reason to praise God, for appointing him in such a particular manner to be the instrument of his glory? And if one person is born here, and another there; if one falls amongst riches, and another into poverty; if one receives his flesh and blood from these parents, and another from those, for as particular ends as the man was born blind; have not all people the greatest reason to bless God, and to be thankful for their particular state and condition, because all that is particular in it, is as directly intended for the glory of God, and their own good, as the particular blindness of that man, who was so born, that the works of God might be manifested in him?
* How noble an idea does this give us of the divine omniscience, presiding over the whole world, and governing such a long chain and combination of seeming accidents, to the common and particular advantage of all beings? So that all persons, in such a wonderful variety of causes and events, should fall into such particular states, as were foreseen and fore-ordained to their best advantage, and so as to be most serviceable to the wise and glorious ends of God’s government of all the world!
12. * Had you been any thing else than what you are, you had, all things considered, been less wisely provided for than you are now; you had wanted some circumstances that are best fitted to make you happy yourself, and serviceable to the glory of God.
* Could you see all that which God sees, all that happy chain of causes and motives which are to move and invite you to a right course of life, you would see something to make you like that state you are in, as fitter for you than any other.
* But as you cannot see this, so it is here that your trust in God is to exercise itself, and render you as thankful for the happiness of your state, as if you saw every thing that contributes to it with your own eyes.
* But now, if this is the case of every man in the world, thus blessed with some particular state that is most convenient for him, how reasonable is it for every man to will that which God has already willed for him? And by a trust in the divine goodness, thankfully adore that wise providence, which he is sure has made the best choice for him of those things which he could not chuse for himself.
13. Every uneasiness at our own state, is founded upon comparing it with that of other people; which is full as unreasonable, as if a man in a dropsy should be angry at those that prescribe different things to him, from those which are prescribed to people in health. For all the different states of life are like the different states of diseases; and what is a remedy to one man, may be poison to another.
* So that to murmur because you are not as some others are, is as if a man in one disease should murmur that he is not treated like him that is in another; whereas, if he was to have his will, he would be killed by that which will prove the cure of another.
* It is just thus in the various conditions of life; if you complain at any thing in your state, you may, for ought you know, be so ungrateful to God, as to murmur at that very thing which is to prove the cause of your salvation.
Had you it in your power to get that which you think it so grievous to want, it might perhaps be that very thing which would expose you to eternal damnation.
* So that, whether we consider the infinite goodness of God, that cannot chuse amiss for us, or our own great ignorance of what is most [♦]advantageous to us, there can be nothing so reasonable, as to have no will but that of God’s, and desire nothing for ourselves, in our persons, our state, and condition, but that which the good providence of God appoints us.
[♦] “adtageous” replaced with “advantageous”
14. * Farther, as the good providence of God introduces us into the world, into such states and conditions as are most convenient for us; so the same unerring wisdom orders all events and changes in the whole course of our lives, in such a manner, as to render them the fittest means to exercise and improve our virtue.
Nothing hurts us, nothing destroys us, but the ill use of that liberty with which God has entrusted us.
* We are as sure that nothing happens to us by chance, as that the world itself was not made by chance; we are as certain that all things happen, and work together for our good, as that God is goodness itself. So that a man has as much reason to will every thing that happens to him, because God wills it, as to think that is wisest which is directed by infinite wisdom.
The providence of God is not more concerned in the government of night and day, and the variety of seasons, than in the common course of events, that seem most to depend upon the meer wills of men. So that it is as strictly right, to look upon all worldly changes, all the various turns in your own life, to be the effects of divine providence, as the rising and setting of the sun, or the alterations of the seasons of the year. As you are therefore always to adore the wisdom of God in the direction of these things; so it is the same reasonable duty, always to magnify God, as an equal director of every thing that happens to you in the course of your own life.
15. There is nothing that so powerfully governs the heart, as a true sense of God’s presence; and nothing so constantly keeps us under a lively sense of the presence of God, as this holy resignation, which attributes every thing to him, and receives every thing as from him.
Could we see a miracle from God, how would our thoughts be affected with an holy awe and veneration of his presence! But if we consider every thing as God’s doing, either by order or permission, we shall then be affected with common things, as they would be who saw a miracle.
For as there is nothing to affect you in a miracle, but as it is the action of God, and bespeaks his presence; so when you consider God, as acting in all things, and all events, then all things will become venerable to you, like miracles, and fill you with the same awful sentiments of the divine presence.
16. Now you must not reserve the exercise of this pious temper to any particular times or occasions, or fancy how resigned you will be to God, if such or such trials should happen: for this is amusing yourself with the notion of resignation instead of the virtue itself.
Don’t therefore please yourself with thinking, how piously you would act and submit to God in a plague, a famine, or persecution; but be intent upon the perfection of the present day; and be assured, that the best way of shewing a true zeal, is to make little things the occasions of great piety.
* Begin therefore in the smallest matters, and most ordinary occasions, and accustom your mind to the daily exercise of this pious temper, in the lowest occurrences of life. And when a contempt, an affront, a little injury, loss, or disappointment, or the smallest events of every day, continually raise your mind to God in proper acts of resignation, then you may justly hope, that you shall be numbered amongst those that are resigned, and thankful to God in the greatest trials and afflictions.
CHAPTER XIX.
Of the excellency and greatness of a devout spirit.
1. I HAVE now finished what I intended in this treatise. I have explained the nature of devotion, both as it signifies a life devoted to God, and as it signifies a regular method of prayer. I have now only to add a word or two in recommendation of a life governed by this Spirit.
And because in this polite age, we have so lived away the spirit of devotion, that many seem afraid even to be suspected of it, imagining great devotion to be great bigotry; that it is founded in ignorance and poorness of spirit; and that little, weak, and dejected minds, are generally the greatest proficients in it.
It shall here be shewn, that great devotion is the noblest temper of the greatest and noblest souls; and that they who think it receives any advantage from ignorance, are themselves entirely ignorant of the nature of devotion, the nature of God, and the nature of themselves.
People of fine parts and learning, or of great knowledge in worldly matters, may perhaps think it hard to have their want of devotion charged upon their ignorance. But if they will be content to be tried by reason and scripture, it may soon be made appear, that a want of devotion, wherever it is, either amongst the learned or unlearned, is founded in gross ignorance, and the greatest blindness and insensibility that can happen to a rational creature.
And that devotion is so far from being the effect of a little and dejected mind, that it must and will be always highest in the most perfect natures.
2. And first, Who reckons it a sign of a poor, little mind, for a man to be full of reverence and duty to his parents, to have the truest love and honour for his friend, or to excel in the highest instances of gratitude to his benefactor?
Are not these tempers, in the highest degree, in the most exalted and perfect minds?
And yet what is high devotion, but the highest exercise of these tempers, of duty, reverence, love, honour, and gratitude to the amiable, glorious parent, friend, and benefactor of all mankind?
Is it a true greatness of mind, to reverence the authority of your parents, to fear the displeasure of your friend, to dread the reproaches of your benefactor; and must not this fear, and dread, and reverence, be much more just, and reasonable, and honourable, when they are in the highest degree towards God?
So that as long as duty to parents, love to friends, and gratitude to benefactors, are thought great and honourable tempers, devotion, which is nothing else but duty, love, and gratitude to God, must have the highest place amongst our highest virtues.
If a prince, out of his mere goodness, should send you a pardon by one of his slaves, would you think it a part of your duty to receive the slave with marks of love, esteem, and gratitude, for his kindness of bringing you so great a gift, and at the same time think it a meanness and poorness of spirit, to shew love, esteem, and gratitude to the prince, who of his own goodness freely sent you the pardon?
And yet this would be as reasonable, as to suppose that love, esteem, honour, and gratitude, are noble tempers, and instances of a great soul, when they are paid to our fellow-creatures; but the effects of a poor, ignorant mind, when they are paid to God.
3. Even that part of devotion which expresses itself in sorrowful confessions, and penitential tears of a broken and contrite heart, is very far from being any sign of a little and ignorant mind.
For who does not acknowledge it an instance of an ingenuous, generous, and brave mind, to acknowledge a fault, and ask pardon for any offence? And are not the finest and most improved minds, the most remarkable for this excellent temper?
Is it not also allowed, that the ingenuousness and excellence of a man’s spirit is much shewn, when his sorrow and indignation at himself rises in proportion to the folly of his crime, and the goodness and greatness of the person he has offended?
Now if things are thus, then the greater any man’s mind is, the more he knows of God and himself, the more will he be disposed to prostrate himself before God in all the humblest acts and expressions of repentance.
And the greater the generosity and penetration of his mind is, the more will he indulge a passionate, tender sense of God’s just displeasure; and the more he knows of the greatness, the goodness, and perfection of the divine nature, the fuller of shame and confusion will he be at his own sins and ingratitude.
And on the other hand, the more dull and ignorant any soul is, the more base and ungenerous, the more senseless it is of the goodness of God, the more averse to humble confession and repentance.
Devotion therefore is so far from being best suited to little, ignorant minds, that a true elevation of soul, a lively sense of honour, and great knowledge of God and ourselves, are the greatest helps that our devotion hath.
4. On the other hand, it shall be made appear, that indevotion is founded in the most excessive ignorance.
And, first, Our blessed Lord and his apostles were eminent instances of great devotion. Now if we will grant, (as all Christians must grant) that their great devotion was founded in a true knowledge of the nature of devotion, the nature of God, and the nature of man, then it is plain, that all those that are insensible of devotion, are in this excessive state of ignorance; they neither know God, nor themselves, nor devotion.
Again, how comes it that most people have recourse to devotion, when they are in sickness, distress, or fear of death? Is it not because this state shews them more of the want of God, and their own weakness, than they perceive at other times? Is it not because their approaching end, convinces them of something which they did not half perceive before?
Now if devotion, at these seasons, is the effect of a better knowledge of God and ourselves, then the neglect of devotion at other times is owing to ignorance of God and ourselves.
5. Farther, as indevotion is ignorance, so it is the most shameful ignorance, and such as is to be charged with the greatest folly.
This will fully appear to any one that considers by what rules we are to judge of the excellency of any knowledge, or the shamefulness of any ignorance.
Now knowledge itself would be no excellence, nor ignorance any reproach to us, but that we are rational creatures.
It follows plainly, that knowledge which is most suitable to our rational nature, and which most concerns us, as such, to know, is our highest, finest knowledge; and that ignorance which relates to things that are most essential to us, as rational creatures, and which we are most concerned to know, is, of all others, the most gross and shameful ignorance.
6. If a gentleman should fancy that the moon is no bigger than it appears to the eye, that it shines with its own light, that all the stars are only so many spots of light; if after reading books of astronomy, he should still continue in the same opinion, most people would think he had but a poor apprehension.
But if the same person should think it better to provide for a short life here, than to prepare for a glorious eternity hereafter; that it was better to be rich, than to be eminent in piety, his ignorance and dulness would be too great to be compared to any thing else.
That is the most clear and improved understanding, which judges best of the value and worth of things; all the rest is but the capacity of an animal; it is but meer seeing and hearing.
If a man had eyes that could see beyond the stars, or pierce into the heart of the earth, but could not see the things that were before him, or discern any thing that was serviceable to him, we should reckon that he had but a very bad sight.
If another had ears that received sounds from the world in the moon, but could hear nothing that was said or done upon earth, we should look upon him to be as bad as deaf.
In like manner, if a man has a memory that can retain a great many things, if he has a wit that is sharp and acute in arts and sciences, but has a dull, poor apprehension of his duty and relation to God, of the value of piety, or the worth of moral virtue, he may very justly be reckoned to have a bad understanding. He is but like the man that can only see and hear such things as are of no benefit to him.
7. To proceed: We know how our blessed Lord acted in an human body; it was his meat and drink to do the will of his Father which is in heaven.
And if any number of heavenly spirits were to leave their habitations in the light of God, and be for awhile united to human bodies, they would certainly tend towards God in all their actions, and be as heavenly as they could, in a state of flesh and blood.
They would certainly act in this manner, because they would know that God was the only good of all spirits; and that whether they were in the body, or out of the body, in heaven or on earth, they must have every degree of their greatness and happiness from God alone.
All human spirits therefore, the more exalted they are, the more they know their divine original, the nearer they come to heavenly spirits, the more will they live to God in all their actions, making their whole life a state of devotion.
Devotion therefore is the greatest sign of a great and noble genius; it supposes a soul in its highest state of knowledge; and none but little and blinded minds, that are sunk into ignorance and vanity, are destitute of it.
8. If a human spirit should imagine some mighty prince to be greater than God, we should take it for a poor ignorant creature; all people would acknowledge such an imagination to be the height of stupidity.
But if this same human spirit should think it better to be devoted to some mighty prince, than to be devoted to God, would not this still be a greater proof of a poor, ignorant, and blinded nature?
Yet this is what all people do, who think any thing better, greater, or wiser than a devout life.
So that which way soever we consider this matter, it plainly appears, that devotion is an instance of great judgment, of an elevated nature; and the want of devotion is a certain proof of the want of understanding.
The greatest spirits of the Heathen world, such as Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, Epictetus, Marcus Antoninus, owed all their greatness to the spirit of devotion.
They were full of God; their wisdom and deep contemplations tended only to deliver men from the vanity of the world, the slavery of bodily passions, that they might act as spirits that came from God, and were soon to return to him.
9. Let libertines but grant that there is a God, and a providence, and then they have granted enough to justify the wisdom, and support the honour of devotion.
For if there is an infinitely wise and good Creator, in whom we live, move, and have our being, whose providence governs all things in all places, surely it must be the highest act of our understanding to conceive rightly of him; it must be the noblest instance of judgment, the most exalted temper of our nature, to worship and adore this universal providence, to conform to its laws, to study its wisdom, and to live and act every where, as in the presence of this infinitely good and wise Creator.
Now he that lives thus, lives in the spirit of devotion.
And what can shew such great parts, and so fine an understanding, as to live in this temper?
For if God is wisdom, surely he must be the wisest man in the world, who most conforms to the wisdom of God, who best obeys his providence, who enters farthest into his designs, and does all he can, that God’s will may be done on earth, as it is done in heaven.
A devout man makes a true use of his reason; he sees through the vanity of the world, discovers the corruption of his nature, and the blindness of his passions. He lives by a law which is not visible to vulgar eyes; he enters into the world of spirits; he compares the greatest things, sets eternity against time; and chuses rather to be for ever great in the presence of God when he dies, than to have the greatest share of worldly pleasures whilst he lives.
11. Lastly, Courage and bravery are words of a great sound, and seem to signify an heroic spirit; but yet humility, which seems to be the lowest, meanest part of devotion, is a more certain argument of a noble mind.
For humility contends with greater enemies, is more constantly engaged, more violently assaulted, suffers more, and requires greater courage to support itself, than any instances of worldly bravery.
A man that dares be poor and contemptible in the eyes of the world, to approve himself to God; that resists and rejects all human glory; that opposes the clamour of his passions, that meekly puts up all injuries, and dares stay for his reward till the invisible hand of God gives to every one their proper places, endures a much greater trial, and exerts a nobler fortitude, than he that is bold and daring in the fire of battle.
For the boldness of a soldier, if he is a stranger to the spirit of devotion, is rather weakness than fortitude; it is at best but mad passion, and heated spirits, and has no more true valour in it than the fury of a tyger.
Reason is our universal law, that obliges us in all places, and all times; and no actions have any honour, but so far as they are instances of our obedience to reason.
And it is as base to be bold and daring against the principle of reason and justice, as to be bold and daring in lying and perjury.
Would we therefore exercise a true fortitude, we must do all in the spirit of devotion, be valiant against the corruptions of the world, and the lusts of the flesh, and the temptations of the devil: for to be daring and courageous against these enemies, is the noblest bravery that an human mind is capable of.
I have made this digression for the sake of those, who think great devotion to be bigotry and poorness of spirit; that by these considerations they may see, how poor and mean all other tempers are, if compared to it: that they may see all worldly attainments, whether of greatness, wisdom, or bravery, are but empty sounds; and there is nothing wise, or great, or noble, in an human spirit, but rightly to know, and heartily worship and adore the great God, that is the support and life of all spirits, whether in heaven, or on earth.
An extract from the Rev. Mr. Law’s
LATER WORKS.
An extract from the Case of Reason, or Natural Religion, fairly and fully stated. In answer to a book, entitled Christianity as Old as the Creation.
The Introduction, shewing the state of the Controversy.
THE infidelity which is now openly declared for, pretends to support itself upon the sufficiency, excellency, and absolute perfection of reason, or natural religion.
The author with whom I am engaged, makes no attempt to invalidate the historical evidence on which Christianity is founded; but by arguments drawn from the nature of God, and natural religion, pretends to prove that no religion can come from God, which teaches any thing more than that, which is fully manifest to all mankind by the mere light of nature.
His chief principles may be reduced to these following propositions.
1. That human reason, or natural light, is the only means of knowing all that God requires of us.
2. That reason, or natural light, is so full, sufficient, plain, and certain a rule in all religious duties, that no external divine revelation can add any thing to it, or require us to believe or practise any thing, that was not as fully known before. A revelation, if ever made, can only declare those very same things externally, which were before equally declared by the internal light of nature.
3. That this must be the case of natural and revealed religion, unless God be an arbitrary being. For if God be not an arbitrary being, but acts according to the reason and nature of things; then he can require nothing of us by revelation, but what is already required by the nature and reason of things. And therefore, as he expresses it, reason and revelation must exactly answer one another like two tallies[¹].
[¹] Page 60.
4. That whatever is at any time admitted as matter of religion, that is not manifest from the reason of the thing, and plainly required by the light of nature, is gross superstition.
5. That it is inconsistent with the divine perfections, to suppose, that God can by an external revelation give any religious knowledge, at any time, to any people, which was not equally given at all times, and to all people.
This is the state of the controversy. As to the railing accusations, which this author pours out, at all adventures, upon the clergy, I shall wholly pass them over; my intention being only to appeal to the reason of the reader, and to add nothing to it, but the safe, unerring light of divine revelation.
CHAPTER I.
Enquiring, whether there be any thing in the nature and condition of man, to oblige him to think, that he is not to admit of any doctrines or institutions, as revealed from God, but such as his own reason can prove to be necessary from the nature of things.
I BEGIN with enquiring what there is to oblige a man to hold this opinion, because if there is not some strong and plain proof arising from the nature and condition of man, to oblige him thus to abide by the sole light of his own reason; it may be so far from being a duty, which he owes to God, that it may be reckoned amongst his most criminal presumptions. And the pleading for this authority of his own reason; may have the guilt of pleading for his greatest vanity. And if, as this writer observes, spiritual pride be the worst sort of pride,[¹] a confident reliance upon our own reason, as having a right to determine all matters between God and man, if it should prove to be a groundless pretension, bids fair to be reckoned the highest instance of the worst kind of the worst of sins.
[¹] Page 150.
Every other instance of vanity, every degree of personal pride, and self-esteem, may be a pardonable weakness in comparison of this. For how small is that pride which only makes us prefer our own personal beauty or merit to that of our fellow-creatures, when compared with a self-confiding reason, which is too haughty to adore any thing in the divine counsels, which it cannot fully comprehend; or to submit to any directions from God, but such as its own wisdom could prescribe? Thus much is certain, that there can be no medium in this matter. The claiming this authority to our own reason, must either be a very great duty, or among the greatest of sins.
If it be a sin to admit of any secrets in divine providence, if it be a crime to ascribe wisdom and goodness to God in things we cannot comprehend: if it be a baseness and meanness of spirit to believe that God can teach us better or more than we can teach ourselves: if it be a shameful apostacy from the dignity of our nature, to submit to any mysterious providence over us, to comply with any other methods of homage and adoration, than such as we could of ourselves contrive and justify; then it is certainly a great duty to assert and maintain this authority of our own reason.
On the other hand; if the profoundest humility towards God, be the highest instance of piety: if every thing within us and without us, if every thing we know of God, every thing we know of ourselves preaches up humility to us, as the foundation of every virtue, as the life and soul of all holiness: if sin had its beginning from pride, and hell be the effect of it, if devils are what they are through spiritual pride and self-conceit, then we have great reason to believe, that the claiming this authority to our reason, in opposition to the revealed wisdom of God, is not a frailty of flesh and blood, but that same spiritual pride which turned angels into apostate spirits.
Since therefore this appealing to our own reason, as the absolutely perfect rule of all that ought to pass between God and man, has an appearance of a pride of the worst kind, and such as unites us both in temper and conduct with the fallen spirits of darkness, it highly concerns every pleader on that side, to consider what grounds he proceeds upon, and to ask himself, what there is in the state and condition of human nature, to oblige him to think, that nothing can be divine or holy, or necessary, in religion, but what human reason dictates?
I hope the reader will think this a fair state of the case, and that all the light we can have in this matter, must arise from a thorough consideration of the state and condition of man in this world. If without revelation he is free from mysteries as a moral and religious agent, then he has some plea from his state and condition to reject revealed mysteries.
But if in a state of natural religion, he can’t acknowledge a divine providence or worship God, without as much implicit faith, and submission of his reason, as any revealed mysteries require; then his state and condition in the world, condemns his refusal of any revelation sufficiently attested to come from God. This enquiry therefore into the state and condition of man, being so plainly the true point of the controversy, I hope to obtain the reader’s impartial attention to it.
Had mankind continued in a state of perfect innocence, without ever failing in their duty either to God or man, yet even in such a state, they could never have known what God would or would not reveal to them, but by some express revelation from him. And as God might intend to raise them to some higher, and unknown state of perfection; so he might raise them to it by the revelation of such things as their own reason, though uncorrupt, yet could not have discovered.
But if man, in a state of innocence, could have no pretence to set himself against divine revelation, and make his own reason the final judge of what God could, or could not reveal to him; much less has he any pretence for so doing in his present state of sin, ignorance, and misery. His nature and condition is so far from furnishing him with reasons against revelation, against any supernatural help from God; that it seems to be inconsolable without it; and every circumstance of his life prepares him to hope for terms of mercy and deliverance from his present guilt and misery, not according to schemes of his own contrivance, not from his own knowledge of the nature, and reason, and fitness of things, but from some incomprehensible depth of divine goodness.
For if sin, and misery, and ignorance, cannot convince us of our own weakness, cannot prepare us to accept of any methods of atoning for our guilt, but such as our own disordered reason can suggest, we are not far from the hardened state of those miserable spirits, that make war against God.
For to insist upon the prerogative of our own nature, as qualifying us to make our own peace with God, and to reject the atonement which he has provided for us, because we esteem it more fit and reasonable, that our own repentance should be sufficient without it, is the same height of pride and impiety, as to affirm, that we have no need of any repentance at all.
For as mankind, if they had continued in a state of innocence, could not have known how their innocence was to be rewarded, or what changes of state God intended them for, but as revelation had discovered these things unto them: so after they were fallen into a state of guilt and sin, they could never know what misery it would expose them to, or when, or how, or whether they were ever to be delivered from it, and made as happy as if they had never sinned; these are things that nothing but a revelation from God could teach them.
So that for a sinner to pretend to appoint the atonement for his own sins, or to think himself able to tell what it ought to be, is as foolish and vain a presumption, as if man in innocence should have pretended to appoint his own method of being changed into a cherub.
The writers against revelation appeal to the reason and nature of things, as infallibly discovering every thing that a revelation from God can teach us.
Thus our author; If the relations between things, and the fitness resulting from thence, be not the sole rule of God’s actions, must not God be an arbitrary being? But if God only commands what the nature of things shew to be fit, it is scarce possible that men should mistake their duty; since a mind that is attentive can as easily distinguish fit from unfit, as the eye can beauty from deformity[¹].
[¹] Page 30.
It is granted, that there is a fitness and unfitness of actions founded in the nature of things, and resulting from the relations that persons and things bear to one another. It is also granted, that the reasonableness of most of the duties of children to their parents, of parents to their children, and of men to men, is very apparent, from the relations they bear to one another; and that several of the duties which we owe to God, plainly appear to us, as soon as we acknowledge the relation that is between God and us.
But then, this whole argument proves directly the contrary to that which this author intended to prove by it.
I here therefore join with this author; I readily grant, that the nature, reason and relations of things and persons, and the fitness of actions resulting from thence, is the sole rule of God’s actions. And I appeal to this one common principle, as a sufficient proof that a man cannot thus abide by the sole light of his own reason, without contradicting the nature and reason of things, and denying this to be the sole rule of God’s actions.
* For if the fitness of actions is founded in the nature of things and persons, and this fitness be the sole rule of God’s actions, it is certain that the rule by which he acts, must in many instances be entirely inconceivable by us, so as not to be known at all, and in no instances fully known, or perfectly comprehended.
* For if God is to act according to a fitness founded in the nature of things, and nothing can be fit for him to do, but what has its fitness founded in his own incomprehensible nature, must he not necessarily act by a rule above all human comprehension? If he must govern his actions by his own nature, he must act by a rule that is just as incomprehensible to us as his own nature.
* And we can be no farther competent judges of the fitness of the conduct of God, than we are competent judges of the divine nature; and can no more tell what is, or is not infinitely wise in God, than we can raise ourselves to a state of infinite wisdom.
So that if the fitness of actions is founded in the particular nature of things and persons, and the fitness of God’s actions must arise from that which is particular to his nature, then we have from this argument, the utmost certainty that the rule or reasons of God’s actions must in many cases be entirely inconceivable by us, and in no cases perfectly apprehended; and for this very reason, because he is not an arbitrary being, that acts by mere will, but is governed in every thing he does, by the reason and nature of things.
How mistaken therefore is this author, when he argues after this manner. If God requires things of us, whose fitness our reason can’t prove from the nature of things, must he not be an arbitrary being? For how can that prove God to be an arbitrary agent, which is the necessary consequence of his not being arbitrary?
Supposing God not to be an arbitrary being, but to act constantly, as the perfections of his own nature make it fit and reasonable for him to act, then there is an utter impossibility of our comprehending the reasonableness and fitness of many of his actions.
* For instance; look at the reason of things, and the fitness of actions, and tell me how they moved God to create mankind in the state and condition they are in. Nothing is more above the reason of men, than to explain the reasonableness of God’s providence in creating man of such a form and condition, to go through such a state of things as human life is. No revealed mysteries can more exceed the comprehension of man, than the state of human life itself.
Shew me according to what fitness, founded in the nature of things, God’s infinite wisdom was determined to form you in such a manner, bring you into such a world, and suffer and preserve such a state of things, as human life is, and then you may have some pretence to believe no revealed doctrines, but such as your own reason can deduce from the nature of things.
But whilst your own form, whilst creation and providence are depths which you cannot thus look into, ’tis strangely absurd to pretend, that God cannot reveal any thing to you as a matter of religion, except your own reason can shew its foundation in the nature and reason of things.
Revelation, you say, is on your account, and therefore you ought to see the reasonableness and fitness of it. And don’t you also say, that God has made you for your own sake; ought you not therefore to know the reasonableness and fitness of God’s forming you as you are? Don’t you say, that providence is for the sake of man? Is it not therefore fit and reasonable, in the nature of things, that there should be no mysteries, or secrets, in providence, but that man should so see its methods, as to be able to prove all its steps to be constantly fit and reasonable?
Don’t you say, that the world is for the sake of man; is it not therefore fit and reasonable that man should see, that the past and present state of the world has been such as the reason and fitness of things required it should be?
* Now if the imperfect state of human nature, the calamities of this life, the diseases and mortality of human bodies, the methods of God’s continual providence in governing human affairs, are things that as much concern us, as any methods of revealed religion; and if these are things that we cannot explain, according to any fitness or unfitness founded in the nature of things, but must believe a great deal more of the infinite wisdom of God, than we can so explain; have we any reason to think, that God cannot, or ought not to raise us out of this unhappy state of things, help us to an higher order of life, and exalt us to a nearer enjoyment of himself, by any means, but such as our own poor reason can grope out of the nature and fitness of things?
Now what is the reason, that all is thus mysterious and unmeasurable by human reason, in these matters so nearly concerning human nature? ’Tis because God is not an arbitrary being, but does that which the incomprehensible perfections of his own nature, make it fit and reasonable for him to do. Do but grant that nothing can be fit for God to do, but what is according to his own infinite perfections: let but this be the rule of his actions, and then you have the fullest proof, that the fitness of his actions must be above our comprehension, who can only judge of a fitness according to our own perfections; and then we must be surrounded with mystery for this very reason, because God acts according to a certain rule, his own nature.
Again: What is the nature of a human soul, upon what terms, and in what manner it is united to the body, how far it is different from it, how far it is subject to it, what powers and faculties it derives from it; are things wherein the wisdom and goodness of God, and the happiness of man are deeply concerned. Is it not necessary that these things should have their foundation in the reason and fitness of things? And yet what natural reason, uninspired from above, can shew that this state of soul and body is founded therein?
* Again: The origin of sin and evil, or how it entered into the world consistently with the infinite wisdom of God, is a mystery of natural religion, which reason cannot unfold. For can we shew from the reason and nature of things, that it was fit and reasonable, for the providence of God to suffer sin to enter, and continue in the world? Here therefore the man of natural religion must drop his method of reasoning from the fitness of things, and that in an article of the highest concern to the moral world, and be as mere a believer, as he that believes the most incomprehensible mystery of revealed religion.
Now as there have been in the several ages of the world, some impatient, restless and presuming spirits, who, because they could not in these points explain the justice of God’s providence, have taken refuge in horrid atheism, so they made just the same sober use of their reason, as our modern unbelievers, who because they can’t comprehend the fitness and necessity of certain Christian doctrines, resign themselves up to an hardened infidelity. For it is just as reasonable to allow of no mysteries in revelation, as to allow of no mysteries in creation and providence.
And whenever this writer shall think it proper to attack natural religion with as much freedom as he has revealed, he need not enter upon any new hypothesis, or different way of reasoning. For the same turn of thought, may soon find materials in the natural state of man, for as large a bill of complaints against natural religion, and the mysteries of providence, as is here brought against revealed doctrines.
To proceed: If the fitness of actions is founded in the nature and relation of beings, then nothing can be fit for God to do, but so far as it is fit for the Governor of all created beings, whether on earth, or in any other part of the universe; and he cannot act fitly towards mankind, but by acting as is fit for the Governor of all beings.
* Now what is fit for the Governor of all created nature to do in this or that particular part of his creation, is as much above our reason to tell, as it is above our power to govern all beings. And how mankind ought to be governed, with relation to the whole creation, of which they are so small a part, is a matter equally above our knowledge; because we know not how they are a part of the whole, or what relation they bear to any other part, or how their state affects the whole, or any other part, than we know what beings the whole consists of.
Now there is nothing that we know with more certainty than that God is governor of the whole, and that mankind are a part of the whole; and that the uniformity and harmony of divine providence, must arise from his infinite wise government of the whole; and therefore we have the utmost certainty, that we are vastly incompetent judges of the fitness or unfitness of any methods that God uses in the government of so small a part of the universe, as mankind are.
Again: If the fitness of actions is founded in the relations of beings to one another, then the fitness of the actions of God’s providence over mankind, must be in many instances altogether incomprehensible to us.
For the relation which God bears to mankind, as their all-perfect Creator and continual Preserver, is a relation that our reason conceives as imperfectly, and knows as little of, as it does of any of the divine attributes. When it compares it to that of a father and his children, a prince and his subjects, a proprietor and his property, it has explained it in the best manner it can, but still has left it as much a secret, as we do the divine nature when we only say, it is infinitely superior to every thing that is finite.
By the natural light of our reason we may know with certainty, several effects of this relation, as that it puts us under the care and protection of a wise, and just, and merciful providence, and demands from us the highest instances of humility, adoration and thanksgiving. But what it is in its own nature, what kind of state, it is to exist in and by God, what it is to see by a light that is his, to act by a power from him, to live by a life in him; are things as incomprehensible to reason, left to itself, as what it is to be in the third heavens, or to hear words that cannot be uttered.
But if this relation consists in these inconceivable things, in a communication of life, light and power, if these are enjoyed in God, and in ourselves, in a manner not to be explained by any thing that we ever heard, or saw; then we must necessarily be poor judges of what is fit for God to require of us, because of this relation. It teaches us nothing but the superficialness of our own knowledge, and the unfathomable depths of the divine perfections.
How little this writer has considered the nature of this relation between God and man, may be seen by the following paragraphs. The Holy Ghost, says he, cannot deal with men as rational creatures, but by proposing arguments to convince their understandings; and influence their wills, in the same manner as if proposed by other agents. As absurd, as to say, God cannot create us as rational beings, unless he creates us in the same manner, as if we were created by other agents. For to suppose that other agents can possibly act upon our understanding, and will, in the same manner that God does; is as gross an absurdity, as to suppose that other agents can create us in the same manner that God creates us.
And to confine the manner of the Holy Ghost’s acting upon us, to the manner of our acting upon one another by arguments and syllogisms, is as great a weakness, as to confine the manner of God’s creating us, to the manner of our making a statue with tools and instruments.
But he proceeds and says, For to go beyond this, would be making impressions on men, as a seal does on wax; to the confounding of their reason, and their liberty in chusing; and the man would then be mearly passive, and the action would be the action of another being acting upon him, for which he could be no way accountable[¹].
[¹] Page 199.
Here you see the Holy Spirit has but these two possible ways of acting upon men, it must either only propose an argument, just as a man may propose one, or it must act like a seal upon wax.
I only ask this writer, whether God communicates life, and strength, and understanding, and liberty of will to us, only as men may communicate any thing to one another? or as a seal acts upon wax? If so, it may be granted, that the Holy Ghost cannot act upon us any other way.
But it must be affirmed, that we do, by a continual influx from God, enjoy all these powers, and receive the continuance of all these faculties from him, not as men receive things from one another, nor as wax receives the impression of the seal, but in a way as much above our conception, as creation is above our power; if we have all our power of acting, by a continual communication from him, and yet as free agents, have all our light from him, and yet are accountable intelligent beings; then it must be great weakness to affirm, that the Holy Ghost cannot act upon us in the same manner: for it would be saying, God cannot act upon us as he does act upon us.
The short of the matter is this. Either this writer must affirm, that our rational nature, our understanding faculties, our power of action, our liberty of will, must necessarily subsist without the continual action of God upon them, or else he must grant, that God can act upon our understandings and wills without making us as merely passive as the wax under the seal.
This writer says, Though the relation we stand in to God, is not artificial, as most are amongst men—yet this does not hinder, but that we may know the end he had in being related to us as Creator and Governor, and what he requires of his creatures and subjects. But how are we to know this? This, says he, the divine nature, which contains in it all perfection and happiness, plainly points out to us[¹].
[¹] Page 29.
If he had said, since God must act over us as Creator and Governor, according to his own infinite perfection and happiness, therefore his conduct over us may be very mysterious, he had drawn a plain conclusion. But he proves all to be plain, because God is to govern us according to something that is not plain, according to his own incomprehensible nature.
His argument therefore proceeds thus. God must govern us according to his own infinite perfection and happiness; but we do not know what his infinite perfections and happiness are:
Therefore we plainly know how he is to govern us.
Now if this writer is capable of taking such an argument as this to be demonstrative, it is no wonder that all his principles of religion are founded upon demonstration.
But if he knows no more of what arises from the relation between God and his creatures, than he has here demonstrated, he might be very well content with some farther knowledge from divine revelation.
It is because of this incomprehensible relation between God and his creatures, that we are unavoidably ignorant of what God may justly require of us either in a state of innocence or sin. For as the fitness of actions between beings related, must result from their respective natures, so the incomprehensibility of the divine nature, on which the relation between God and man is founded, makes it utterly impossible for mere natural reason to say, what kind of homage, or worship, he may fitly require of man in a state of innocence; or what different worship and homage he may, or must require of men, as sinners.
And to appeal to the infinite perfections of God, as plainly pointing this out, is the same extravagance, as to appeal to the incomprehensibility of God as a plain proof of our comprehending what God is.
As to the obligations of moral or social duties, which have their foundation in the several relations we bear to one another, these are the same in the state of innocence or sin, and we know that we truly act according to the divine will, when we act according to what these relations require of us.
But the question is, What distinct kind of homage, or service, or worship, God may require us to render to him, either in a state of innocence or sin, on account of that relation he bears to us as an all-perfect Creator and Governor?
But this is a question that God alone can resolve.
Human reason cannot enter into it, it has no principle to proceed upon in it. For as the necessity of divine worship, so the particular manner of it, must have its reason in the divine nature.
Sacrifice, if considered only as an human invention, could not be proved to be a reasonable service. Yet considered as a divine institution, it would be the greatest folly not to receive it as a reasonable service. For as we could see no reason for it, if it was of human invention, so we should have the greatest reason to comply with it because it was of divine appointment. Not as if the divine appointment altered the nature and fitness of things; but because nothing has the nature and fitness of divine worship, but as it is of divine appointment.
Man therefore, had he continued in a state of innocence, and without revelation, might have lived in an awful fear, and pious regard of God, and observed every duty both of moral and civil life, as an act of obedience to him. But he could have no foundation either to invent any particular manner of divine worship himself, or to reject any that was appointed by God, as unnecessary. It would have been ridiculous to have pleaded his innocence, as having no need of a divine worship. For who can have greater reason, or be fitter to worship God, than innocent beings? It would have been more absurd, to have objected the sufficiency of their reason; for why should men reject a revealed manner of divine worship, because God had given them reason of their own, sufficient for the duties of social and civil life?
And as reason in a state of innocence and perfection, could not have any pretence to appoint the manner of divine worship, so when the state of innocence was changed for that of sin, it became more difficult for bare reason to know what kind of worship could be acceptable to God from sinners.
For what the relation betwixt God and sinners makes it fit for God to require or accept of them, cannot be determined by human reason.
This is a new state, and the foundation of a new relation, and nothing can be fit for God to do in it, but what has its fitness resulting from it. We have nothing to help our conceptions of the fore-mentioned relative characters of God, as our Governor and Preserver, but what we derive from our idea of human fathers and governors: which idea only helps us to comprehend these relations, just as our idea of human power helps us to comprehend the omnipotence of God. For a father or governor, no more represents the state of God as our Governor and Preserver, than our living in our father’s family, represents the manner of our living in God.
These relations are both very plain, and very mysterious; they are very plain, as to the reality of their existence; and highly mysterious and inconceivable, as to the manner of their existence.
That which is plain, in these relative characters of God, plainly shews our obligations to every instance of duty, homage, love, and gratitude.
And that which is inconceivable in them, is a solid foundation of that profound humility, awful reverence, internal piety and tremendous sense of the divine Majesty, with which devout persons think of God, and assist at the offices of religion. Which excites in them a higher zeal for doctrines and institutions of divine revelation, than for all things human; that fills them with reverence for all things, places, and offices, that are either by divine or human authority, appointed to assist their desired intercourse with God.
And if some people, by a long and strict attention to reason, and the fitness and unfitness of things, have at last arrived at a demonstrative certainty, that all these sentiments of piety and devotion, are mere bigotry, superstition, and enthusiasm; I shall only now observe, that youthful extravagance, passion, and debauchery, by their own natural tendency, without the assistance of any other guide, seldom fail of making the same discovery. And though it is not reckoned any reflection upon great wits, when they hit upon the same thought, yet it may seem some disparagement of that reason and philosophy, which teaches old men to think the same of religion, that passion and extravagance teach the young.
To return: As there is no state in human life, that can give us a true idea of any of the fore-mentioned relative characters of God, so this relative state of God towards sinners is still less capable of being comprehended by any thing observable in the relations, betwixt a judge and criminals, a creditor and his debtors, a physician and his patients, a father or prince, and their disobedient children and subjects.
For none of these states separately, nor all of them jointly considered, give us any full idea, either of the nature and guilt of sin or how God is to deal with sinners, on the account of the relation he bears to them.
To ask, whether sin hath solely the nature of an offence, against a prince or a father, and so is pardonable by mere goodness; whether it is like an error in a road or path, and so is entirely at an end, when the right path is taken; whether its guilt hath the nature of a debt, and so is capable of being discharged, just as a debt is; whether it affects the soul, as a wound or disease affects the body, and so ought only to move God to act as a good physician? All these questions are as vain, as to ask, whether knowledge in God is really thinking, or his nature a real substance. For as his knowledge and nature cannot be strictly defined, but are capable of being signified by the terms thinking and substance, so the nature of sin is not strictly represented under any of these characters, but is capable of receiving some representation from every one of them.
When sin is said to be an offence against God, it is to teach us, that we have infinitely more reason to dread it on God’s account, than to dread any offence against our parents, or governors.
When it is compared to a debt, it is to signify, that our sins make us accountable to God, not in the same manner, but with the same certainty, as a debtor is answerable to his creditor; and because it has some likeness to a debt, that of ourselves we are not able to pay.
When it is compared to a wound, or disease, it is not to teach us, that it may as justly and easily be healed as bodily wounds, but to help us to conceive the greatness of its evil; that, as diseases bring death to the body, so sin brings a worse kind of death upon the soul.
Since therefore the nature and guilt of sin can only so far be known, as to make it highly to be dreaded, but not so known as to be fully understood, by any thing we can compare to it:
Since the relation which God bears to sinners, can only be so known, as to make it highly reasonable to prostrate ourselves before him, in every instance of humility and penitence; but not so fully known as to teach us, in what manner, God must deal with us: it plainly follows, that if God is not an arbitrary being, but acts according to a fitness resulting from this relation, he must, in this respect, act by a rule known only to himself, and such as we cannot possibly state from the reason and nature of things.
For if the nature of things, and the fitness of actions resulting from their relations, is to be the rule of our reason, then reason must be here at a full stop, and can have no more knowledge to proceed upon, in stating the nature, the guilt, or proper atonement of sin in men, than of sin in angels.
For reason can no more tell us what the guilt of sin is, what hurt it does us, how far it enters into, and alters our very nature, what contrariety to, and separation from God, it necessarily brings upon us, or what supernatural means are, or are not, necessary to abolish it; our reason can no more tell this, than our senses can tell us, what is the inward, and what is the outward light of angels.
Ask reason what effect sin has upon the soul, and it can tell you no more, than if you had asked, what effect the omnipresence of God has upon the soul.
Ask reason, and the nature of things, what is, or ought to be, the true nature of an atonement for sin, how far it is like paying a debt, or healing a wound, or how far it is different from them? And it can tell you no more, than if you had asked, what is the true degree of power that preserves us in existence, how far it is like that which at first created us, and how far it is different from it.
All these enquiries are, by the nature of things, made impossible to us, so long as we have no light but from our own natural capacities, and we cannot take upon us to be philosophers in these matters, but by deserting our reason, and giving ourselves up to vision and imagination.
And we have as much authority from the nature of things, to appeal to hunger and thirst, and sensual pleasure, to tell us how our souls shall live in the beatific presence of God, as to appeal to our reason and logic, to demonstrate how sin is to be atoned, or the soul prepared, and purified, for future happiness.
For God has no more given us our reason to settle the nature of an atonement for sin; or to find out what can, or cannot, take away its guilt, than he has given us senses and appetites to state the nature, or discover the ingredients of future happiness.
And he who rejects the atonement for sins made by the Son of God, as needless, because he cannot prove it to be necessary, is as extravagant, as he that should deny that God created him by his only Son, because he did not remember it. For our memory is as proper a faculty to tell us, whether God at first created us, by his only Son, as our reason is to tell us, whether we ought to be restored to God, with, or without the mediation of Jesus Christ.
When therefore this writer says, Can any thing be more evident, than that if doing evil be the only cause of God’s displeasure, the ceasing to do evil, must take away that displeasure?[¹]
[¹] Page 4.
* Just as if he had said, if conversing with a leper has been the only cause of a man’s getting a leprosy, must not departing from him, be the removal of the leprosy? For if any one, guessing at the guilt of sin, and its effects on the soul, should compare it to a leprosy in the body, he can no more say, that he has reached its real, internal evil, than he, that comparing the happiness of heaven to a crown of glory, can be said to have described its real happiness.
This writer has no occasion to appeal to the nature of things, if he can be thus certain about things, whose nature is not only obscure, but impossible to be known. For it is as impossible for him to know the guilt and effects of sin, as to know the shape of an angel. It is as impossible to know by the mere light of reason, what God’s displeasure at sin is, what separation from sinners it implies, or how it obliges God to deal with them; as to know what the internal essence of God is. Our author therefore has here found the utmost degree of evidence, where it was impossible for him to have the smallest degree of knowledge.
If a man, having murdered twenty of his fellow-creatures, should afterward be sorry for it, and wish that he had a power to bring them to life again, or to create others in their stead, would his ceasing to kill, and wishing he had a power to create others in their stead, put him just in the same state with God, as if he had never murdered a man in his life? But unless this can be said, it cannot be said that repentance is sufficient to put a man in the same state, as if he never had sinned.
The writer has two more objections against the atonement for sin, made by Jesus Christ. First, as it is an human sacrifice, which nature itself abhors: and which was looked upon as the great abomination of idolatrous Pagan worship.
The cruelty, injustice, and impiety, of shedding human blood in the sacrifices of the Pagans is fully granted; but reason cannot thence bring the smallest objections against the sacrifice of Christ.
For how can reason be more disregarded, than in such an argument as this? The Pagans were unjust, cruel, and impious, in offering human blood to their false gods; therefore the true God cannot receive any human sacrifice, or allow any persons to die, as a punishment for sin.
For, if no human sacrifice can be fit for God to receive, because human sacrifices, as parts of Pagan worship, were unjust and impious; then it would follow, that the mortality, to which all mankind are appointed by God, must have the same cruelty and injustice in it. Now that death is a punishment for sin, and that all mankind are by death offered as a sacrifice for sin, is not only a doctrine of revealed religion, but the plain dictate of reason. But if reason must acknowledge the death of all mankind, as a sacrifice for sin, then it can have no just objection against the sacrifice of Christ, because it was human.
I need not take upon me to prove the reasonableness of God’s procedure in the mortality of mankind; revelation is not under any necessity of proving this; because it is no difficulty that arises from revelation, but equally belongs to natural religion; and both of them must acknowledge it to be reasonable; not because it can be proved to be so from the nature of things, but is to be believed to be so, by faith and piety.
But if natural religion, will not suffer us to think it inconsistent with the justice and goodness of God, to appoint all mankind victims to death on the account of sin, then natural religion, can have no objection against the sacrifice of Christ, as it is an human sacrifice.
And all that revelation adds to natural religion, on the point of human sacrifice, is only this; the knowledge of one, that gives merit and effect, to all the rest.
Secondly, It is objected, that the atonement made by Jesus Christ, represents God as punishing the innocent and acquitting the guilty; or, as punishing the innocent instead of the guilty.
But this proceeds all upon mistake: for the atonement made by Jesus Christ, though it procures pardon for the guilty, yet it does not acquit them, or excuse them from any punishment, or suffering for sin, which reason could impose upon them. Natural religion calls men to repentance for their sins: the atonement made by Jesus Christ does not acquit them from it, or pardon them without it; but calls them to a severer repentance, than natural religion alone prescribes.
God therefore does not by this proceeding, shew his dislike of the innocent and his approbation of the wicked.
For how can God be thought to punish our blessed Saviour out of dislike, if his sufferings are represented of such infinite merit with him? Or how can he shew thereby his approbation of the guilty, whose repentance is not acceptable to him, till recommended by the infinite merits of Jesus Christ?
As to the fitness of our Lord’s sufferings, as God and man; and the nature and degree of their worth; reason can no more enter into this matter, or prove or disprove any thing about it, than it can enter into the state of the whole creation, and shew, how it could, or could not, be in the whole, better than it is.
For you may as well ask any of your senses, as ask your reason this principal question, Whether any supernatural means be necessary for the atonement of the sins of mankind? Or, supposing it necessary, whether the mediation, death, and intercession of Jesus Christ, as God and man, be that true supernatural means?
For as the fitness or unfitness of any supernatural means, for the atonement of sin, must result from the incomprehensible relation God bears to sinners, as it must have such necessity, and dignity, as this relation requires, it necessarily follows, that if God acts according to this relation, the fitness of his actions cannot be according to our comprehension.
Again: Supposing some supernatural means to be necessary, for destroying the guilt and power of sin; or that the sufferings, and intercession, of the Son of God incarnate, is that true supernatural means, it necessarily follows, that a revelation of such, or any other supernatural means, cannot possibly be made obvious to our reason and senses, as the things of human life, or the transactions amongst men are; but can only be so revealed, as to become just occasions of our faith, humility, and pious resignation, to the divine wisdom and goodness.