SOUTH AFRICA AND THE TRANSVAAL WAR

THE QUEEN LISTENING TO A DISPATCH FROM THE FRONT.
From the Picture by S. Begg

South Africa
and the
Transvaal War

BY

LOUIS CRESWICKE

AUTHOR OF “ROXANE,” ETC.

WITH NUMEROUS ILLUSTRATIONS AND MAPS

IN SIX VOLUMES

VOL. IV.—FROM LORD ROBERTS’ ENTRY INTO THE FREE STATE TO THE BATTLE OF KARREE

EDINBURGH: T. C. & E. C. JACK

MANCHESTER: KENNETH MACLENNAN, 75 PICCADILLY

1900

Printed by Ballantyne, Hanson & Co.

At the Ballantyne Press

CONTENTS——Vol. IV.

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS——Vol. IV.

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE——Vol. IV.

FEBRUARY 1900.

12-13.—General French, following up Hannay’s movement, crossed Riet River, and next day with a strong force marched twenty-five miles into the Free State, seized Klip Drift on the Modder River, occupied the hills to the north, and captured three of the enemy’s laagers, with supplies.

13-14.—6th (Kelly-Kenny’s) Division on north bank of the Riet River at Waterfall Drift.

14.—Lord Roberts advanced to Dekiel’s Drift.

15.—General French reached and relieved Kimberley, captured Boer laager and supplies, and forced the enemy to withdraw.

The Boers evacuated Majersfontein and Spyfontein, retreating to Koodoosrand Drift.

16.—General Kelly-Kenny, in pursuit of Cronje retiring east with 10,000 men on Bloemfontein, captured 78 waggons with stores, 2 waggons with Mauser rifles, and 8 waggons with shell belonging to Cronje’s column.

Capture of Cingolo Hill by Sir Redvers Buller’s force.

Lord Roberts occupied Jacobsdal.

Flight of Cronje’s force and occupation of Majersfontein by the Guards.

17.—Cronje’s force overtaken and surrounded at Paardeberg. General Brabant engaged the enemy near Dordrecht.

Successful reconnaissance by Colonel Henderson from Arundel.

18.—Severe fighting at Paardeberg, where Cronje was being gradually surrounded.

Capture of Monte Cristo. General Lyttelton’s Division, by a brilliant converging movement, drove the Boers across the river.

19.—Capture of Hlangwane by the Fusilier Brigade. The Boers evacuated the hill, and left a large camp behind them.

Bombardment of Cronje’s position began. Boer reinforcements driven back.

Cronje asked for armistice, but Lord Kitchener demanded his surrender; Cronje refused, and was then bombarded heavily.

Reoccupation of Dordrecht. General Brabant entered the town in the morning, the Boers taking to flight.

20.—General Hart occupied Colenso.

Lord Roberts defeated Boer reinforcements at Paardeberg.

21.—5th Division crossed the Tugela at Colenso.

23.—Advance on Ladysmith continued. The Boers’ position at Grobler’s Kloof attacked.

The cordon round Cronje began to close in.

Captain Hon. R. H. L. J. de Montmorency, V.C. (21st Hussars), killed while doing magnificent work with his Scouts near Stormberg.

26.—Finding the passage of the river near Colenso commanded by strong entrenchments, Sir Redvers Buller sent his guns and baggage back to the south side of the Tugela, and found a new crossing.

26-27.—Colesberg and Rensberg, having been evacuated by the Boers, were occupied by General Clements, while Jamestown was occupied by General Brabant.

27 (on anniversary of Majuba, 1881).—Cronje, with 44 commandants and other officers of all grades, and over 3500 men, surrendered unconditionally to Lord Roberts.

Sir Redvers Buller’s force captured the Boer position at Pieters. This action opened the road to Ladysmith. Boers retired north to Ladysmith.

28.—Relief of Ladysmith after 120 day’s investment.

MARCH 1900.

1.—Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchener visited Kimberley and attended a meeting in the Town Hall.

2.—Cronje and his staff, having been moved to Simonstown under a guard of City Imperial Volunteers, were put on board H.M.S. Doris, and sent to St. Helena.

3.—General Buller formally entered Ladysmith.

Skirmish near Osfontein. General French came in contact with a Boer force, who tried to get away, but were held to their position by the British force.

4-5.—General Brabant advanced from Dordrecht against Labuschagne, and was completely successful.

5.—General Gatacre occupied Stormberg without opposition.

7.—Lord Roberts dispersed Boers near Poplar Grove.

General Gatacre reached Burghersdorp.

8.—General Clements occupied Norval’s Pont.

10.—The Boers dispersed near Driefontein, fifteen miles east of Poplar Grove.

11.—Presidents Kruger and Steyn received reply from the Prime Minister refusing to entertain their absurd overtures for peace.

12.—General French (with cavalry, R.H.A., and Mounted Infantry) arrived before Bloemfontein, and captured two hills which command the railway and town.

General French captured the railway near Bloemfontein.

General Gatacre approached Bethulie.

13.—Lord Roberts occupied Bloemfontein. His despatch ran:—“The British flag now flies over the Presidency vacated last evening by Mr. Steyn, late President of the Orange Free State. The inhabitants gave the troops a cordial welcome.”

14.—General Pretyman, C.B., appointed Military Governor of Bloemfontein.

15.—General Gatacre occupied Bethulie.

Boers attacked Colonel Plumer’s camp and were repulsed.

16.—Fighting at Fourteen Streams.

19.—Lord Kitchener occupied Prieska, and received the submission of rebels.

20.—Rouxville occupied by Major Cumming.

21.—Smithfield occupied by British troops.

23.—Party of English officers shot near Bloemfontein.

27.—General Clements occupied Fauresmith, and arrested the landrost.

Death of General Joubert.

29.—Action at Karree Siding. Boer position taken.

Wepener occupied by Brabant’s Horse under Colonel Dalgety.

30.—Colonel Broadwood with Cavalry Brigade and two batteries Royal Horse Artillery at Thabanchu retired on waterworks pressed by the enemy.

31.—Loss of convoy and six guns at Koorn Spruit.

Action at Ramathlabama for the relief of Mafeking, and Colonel Plumer’s small force repulsed by the Boers.

MAP ILLUSTRATING THE MOVEMENTS FOR THE RELIEF OF KIMBERLEY AND THE CAPTURE OF BLOEMFONTEIN
EDINBURGH AND LONDON T. C. & E. C. JACK.

SOUTH AFRICA AND THE TRANSVAAL WAR

CHAPTER I
THE TURNING OF THE TIDE

February 27, 1900.

“Storm, strong with all the bitter heart of hate,
Smote England, now nineteen dark years ago,
As when the tide’s full wrath in seaward flow
Smites and bears back the swimmer. Fraud and fate
Were leagued against her: fear was fain to prate
Of honour in dishonour, pride brought low,
And humbleness whence holiness must grow,
And greatness born of shame to be so great.

The winter day that withered hope and pride
Shines now triumphal on the turning tide
That sets once more our trust in freedom free,
That leaves a ruthless and a truthless foe
And all base hopes that hailed his cause laid low,
And England’s name a light on land and sea.”

—Algernon Charles Swinburne.

THE VOTE OF CENSURE

The terrible events of the month of December had produced a disquieting effect upon the public mind. Agitated questions were asked on all subjects connected with the series of catastrophes, and the replies were so unsatisfactory that one and all became sensible that the actions of those in power were not sufficiently in unison with public sentiment, and even the keenest supporters of the Government numbly experienced a loss of confidence in those at the helm. It was felt that some one must be to blame for the miserable condition of affairs, the hideous series of defeats that had made Great Britain an object of ridicule on the Continent. For the forwarding of our troops “in driblets,” for the ineffectiveness of our guns in comparison with Boer weapons, for the uselessness of the carbine in competition with the Mauser, for the scarcity of horses, for the preparedness of the Boers, for the unpreparedness of the British, for the under-estimation of the strength of the enemy, and for many other things which tended to bring about the national disaster, various members of the Government were blamed. Charges of incapacity were levelled at the Secretary of State for War, the War Office, and the Committee of National Defence. Even the stoutest Tories were found declaiming against the attitude of lethargy—flippancy, some said—adopted by those in whose hands the fate of the nation rested. Mr. Balfour, in certain speeches somewhat ill-advisedly delivered at a critical moment, had contrived almost to wound people who were already deeply wounded by humiliation and anxiety. His mood had not been in sympathy with the public mood. He had endeavoured to brush away the stern problems facing him by minimising their seriousness, by affecting to believe that the Government was, like Cæsar’s wife, beyond reproach. His attitude implied that the Cabinet could do no wrong, and that the misfortunes and errors (if errors there were) were due to a concatenation of circumstances for which neither the Government at home nor the generals abroad could be held responsible. In consequence of this attitude, on one side Mr. Balfour was blamed, on another, Mr. Chamberlain. The Colonial Secretary was accused of the policy of “bluffing with a weak hand,” while the Chancellor of the Exchequer, as was inevitable, came in for his share of obloquy. It was the cheeseparing principle that was at the bottom of it all; cheeseparing and red-tape were responsible for debility and delay of all kinds, and political inertia had undoubtedly spelt defeat. The clamour was reasonable and just. It was felt that prudence and energy should have served as fuel to stoke the engine of public affairs, not as a brake to be put on in the face of disaster. On all hands the public of one consent cried for a new broom and “a great co-ordinating guiding mind,” and the universal clamour awoke the Government to a consciousness that there are times and seasons in the history of nations when party recriminations and crystallised party etiquette must give way before the stress of a great national need—the need to preserve at all costs the honour and the reputation of the Empire in face of the whole world.

Accordingly, the opening debate of the Session was one which cannot be passed over. The Queen’s Speech struck a note of decision that was at once comforting and in sympathy with her people. Thus it ran: “I have witnessed with pride and the heartiest gratification the patriotism, eagerness, and spontaneous loyalty with which my subjects in all parts of my dominions have come forward to share in the common defence of their Imperial interests. I am confident that I shall not look to them in vain when I exhort them to sustain and renew their exertions until they have brought this struggle for the maintenance of the Empire and the assertion of its supremacy in South Africa to a victorious conclusion.”

The Earl of Kimberley commented on the ignorance of the Government regarding the military preparations that for years had been going on in the Transvaal, and indulged in criticisms which might have been weighty had his hearers not been tickled by the strange irony of fate which converted into critic one of the authors of the humiliating drama which had been left to shape itself from the disastrous scena of 1881.

To these criticisms the Prime Minister—somewhat broken by domestic bereavement—offered but a weak and depressing reply. “How,” he asked, in regard to the Boer preparations, “could the Government know what was going on?”

“I believe, as a matter of fact, though this must not be taken as official, that the guns were generally introduced in the boilers of locomotives, and that the munitions of war were introduced in piano-cases and tubs. But we had no power of search, we had no power of knowing what munitions of war were sent out. We certainly had no power of supervising their importation into the Transvaal. It is a very remarkable peculiarity of the public opinion of this country that people always desire to eat their cake and have it. They rejoice very much with a spirit of complacency that we have a very small Secret Service Fund. Information is a matter of money and nothing else. If you want much information you must give much money; if you give little money you will get little information; and considering the enormous sums which are spent by other Powers, not least by the Transvaal Republic, in secret service—which I was told on high diplomatic authority has been £800,000 in one year—and comparing this with the ludicrously small sums which have for a great number of years been habitually spent by English Governments, it is impossible for us to have the omniscience which the noble Earl seems to regard as a necessary attribute of Her Majesty’s Government.”

Further on he said:

“We must all join together to exercise all the power that we can give in order to extricate ourselves from a situation that is full of humiliation and not free from danger, though I do not say the danger may not be easily exaggerated. Many a country has commenced a great war with difficulties of this kind. We have only to look back at what the Northern States of America went through at the opening of the Civil War to see how easy it would be to draw a mistaken inference from the reverses which we have met at the opening of this war. We have every ground to think that if we set ourselves heartily to work and exert all the instruments of power we possess we shall bring this war to a satisfactory conclusion. I think we must defer the pleasing task of quarrelling among ourselves until that result has been obtained. We have a work that now appeals to us as subjects of the Queen, as Englishmen, and it must throw into shadow the ancient claims which party expediency has on the action of all our statesmen.”

This speech concluded, Lord Rosebery suddenly sprang up, and delivered himself with thrilling emphasis of sentiments which went at once to the heart of the nation. Deeply he deplored the Prime Minister’s speech, which made it hard for “the man in the street” to support the policy of the Government.

The country, he insisted, had a right to know if there was adequate information given to the Government before the crisis of the Transvaal affair, or even sufficient to guide them in their diplomacy or their negotiation. “That is a point which the nation will insist on knowing, whether in this House or the other. If you had not sufficient information, dismiss your Intelligence Department, dismiss Mr. Conyngham Greene and your consular agents wherever they had touch with this matter—at Lourenço Marques or elsewhere. If you did know of it, you have a heavy responsibility to bear. The noble Marquis asks, ‘How could we see through a deal board?’ I suppose he meant by that to allude to the pianoforte cases in which, with more knowledge than he gave himself credit for, he unofficially states that the ammunition was brought into Pretoria.”

Passing on to the question of Secret Service money, he declared that the Government was in possession of a very commanding majority in the House, and that if they had the responsibility of Government they were bound to ask for what funds, whether Secret Service or other, which they might think necessary for the safety of the Empire.

“They cannot,” he pursued, “devolve that responsibility on others by speaking of the working of the British Constitution. I ask noble Lords to analyse the speech of the noble Marquis, which is still ringing in their ears. It is the speech of a Minister explaining a disastrous position. He practically has only given two explanations of that situation. They are, first, that the Government had not enough Secret Service money to obtain information, and, secondly, the mysterious working of the British Constitution. I suppose that there are foreign representatives in the gallery listening to this debate, and I suppose that the speech of the Prime Minister will be flashed to-night all over Europe, and Europe, which is watching with a keen and not a benevolent interest the proceedings of our armies in South Africa, will learn that the causes of our disasters are one avoidable and the other inevitable. The avoidable one is the inadequate amount of the Secret Service Fund, and the inevitable one the secular working of the British Constitution.”

Leaving the question of unpreparedness, he came to the great point, and asked what the Government intended to do.

“There is a paragraph in the Queen’s Speech which I rejoice to see, of a somewhat didactic character in its first sentence, but not without interest in its second. ‘The experience of a great war must necessarily afford lessons of the greatest importance to the military administration of the country. You will not, I am convinced, shrink from any outlay that may be required to place our defensive preparations on a level with the responsibilities which the possession of so great an Empire has laid on us.’ The noble Marquis made no reference to that paragraph, except to say that he does not think we shall see compulsory service in the life of the youngest peer present. I do not affirm or question that proposition, but I can say I do not think it is so immeasurably remote as the noble Marquis considers that some form of compulsory service may have to be introduced to meet the growing exigencies of the Empire. I am sure that neither from this nor from any other sacrifice will the nation recoil to preserve the predominance of our Empire. We have sent away from our island a vast mass of troops which usually garrison it. Situated as we are in the centre of a universe by no means friendly to us, that we should not have a hint from the First Minister of the Crown what military measures the Government propose to take in face of the disasters we have met with, and what sacrifices we must inevitably be called on to make to redress them, is one of the most extraordinary features of the working of the British Constitution on which the noble Marquis has laid such great stress. I agree with him in saying that the country will carry this thing through. It will carry it through in spite of all the impediments, both of men and of methods, that have shackled it in the past; but I venture to say that it will have to be inspired by a loftier tone and by a truer patriotism than we have heard from the Prime Minister to-night.”

Mr. Balfour, in the House of Commons, was as damping to popular hopes as the Prime Minister in the House of Lords. Regarding the all-important subject of the under-estimation of the Boer strength, he somewhat airily said:

“It will be asked, How comes it, then, that this great under-estimate of the Boer strength was made if we knew approximately what the Boer armaments were, and what Boers were likely to take the field? I do not know that I have got any very satisfactory answer to give to that question. It is a purely and strictly military problem, and, as history shows, it is a kind of problem very difficult to answer satisfactorily. You can gauge the military strength of a European nation with a fixed army, with all their modern military apparatus, and with all their military statistics at your disposal; but when you come to problems of States whose military organisation is not of that elaborate kind, great mistakes have been made in the past, and I doubt not great mistakes will be made in the future. They certainly have been made by almost every military nation of whom we have any record. But if this is regarded as an attack upon the military experts of the War Office, it is surely an unfair attack, because soldiers, who are not especially given to agreeing with one another, were absolutely unanimous upon this point. I do not believe you will be able to quote the opinion of a single soldier of any position whatever, or of no position, delivered before, say, July 31 or August 31 last, indicating any opinion which will show that the force which we in the first instance sent out would not be amply sufficient, or more than amply sufficient, for all purposes. (Cries of “What about Butler?”) The right hon. gentlemen put a question to me about Sir W. Butler. We had not the slightest trace at the War Office in any communication, public, semi-public, or private—no communication of any sort, kind, or description, which indicated that in Sir W. Butler’s opinion the force we sent out was not sufficient—I was going to say doubly sufficient—for any work that it might be called upon to perform.”

Indeed, the whole tenor of the speech was generally regarded as unsatisfactory and dispiriting. It was felt that, as Lord Rosebery expressed it, the Government must be left to “muddle through” somehow. People who hung anxiously on the lips of the Government for definite statements regarding future resolute action were disappointed, and waited wearily the conclusion of the debate.

On February 1, Sir Charles Dilke drew vigorous comparisons between the present and former campaigns. In regard to our lack of artillery he said:

“All our generals had told us that direct artillery fire had failed against the Boer entrenchments. It had been known for years past that direct artillery fire would be likely to fail against strong entrenchments; yet we sent twenty-one batteries of field-artillery to South Africa before the first one of the three howitzer batteries was despatched. It was one of the strongest charges which he and others had brought against the War Office for some years, that our army was more badly supplied with field-artillery than any other army in the world. It was not even comparable with the field-artillery of Switzerland and Roumania. In regard to our guns, the Leader of the House had stated in a speech at Manchester that we had guns in South Africa sufficient for three army corps of regular troops. He should like to know on whose authority the right hon. gentleman made that statement. The first force sent to South Africa from India was supplied with guns, not on that scale, but still in fairly decent and respectable measure. The forces of Lord Methuen and Sir Redvers Buller fell altogether short of even the scale adopted for the Indian Contingent. Both these generals had themselves called attention to their deficiency in this respect. We had not even now got artillery on anything like the scale laid down by the right hon. gentleman, and we could not have it in South Africa, because we had not got it in the world. In these circumstances he could only characterise the statement of the Leader of the House as entirely erroneous and misleading, and altogether a blunder. With regard to the batteries which were even now being sent out, many of them were manned by reservists and by garrison artillerymen, who had had no experience in the handling of modern field-guns.”

Proceeding to the question of lack of cavalry, he argued:

“With regard to cavalry as with regard to artillery, the first force was well supplied, but the forces of Lord Methuen and General Buller were very deficient in that respect. In that connection the First Lord had made an attack on the critics of the War Office. He said they had not seen, or if they had seen had not insisted on, a novel fact in the present war, namely, that for the first time in the history of the world they had seen an army composed entirely of mounted infantry. The right hon. gentleman had only to read Sir William Butler’s ‘Life of General Colley,’ where he would find very marked attention drawn to that matter. As to the Defence Committee of the Cabinet, of which the right hon. gentleman was a member, though he himself had been spoken of as the author of that body, he must admit that it had failed. It was instituted after a correspondence in which he himself, his hon. friend (Mr. Arnold Foster), and Mr. Spenser Wilkinson took part, and it was not new to the present Government. It was instituted in the time of Lord Rosebery’s Government as a Committee of the Cabinet, but it had been proclaimed to the world in the time of the present Government. It had failed on account of the slackness of those who attended the deliberations of the Committee. It had not been worked as the authors of the proposal thought it might have been worked in the interests of the Empire. The Committee ought to have foreseen these difficulties with respect to mounted men; they were foreseen by military men. Though political differences occurred between Sir A. Milner and Sir W. Butler, Sir A. Milner consulted General Butler on the military aspect of the situation, and General Butler’s opinions were known to the Government, or should have been. They were known to Sir A. Milner at any rate and were not concealed by him when he was in this country a year ago. According to his (Sir C. Dilke’s) information, which reached him immediately after the statement had been made to Sir A. Milner, General Sir W. Butler declared that 60,000 men would be required in Cape Colony and 25,000 men in Natal. Leaving that, however, what was the attitude of the Cabinet with regard to the need for cavalry? They telegraphed to the Colonies to refuse mounted men. They gave their reasons in the telegram of October 3: ‘In view of the numbers already available, infantry most and cavalry least serviceable.’ On December 16 they telegraphed to the Colonies, ‘Mounted men preferred.’ After all the loss of life that had taken place, and the months of checks and reverses, they had discovered what competent soldiers had discovered before the war, and must have told them, that mounted men were essential for a campaign of this kind.”

In reply, the Under-Secretary of State for War made the first telling and apposite statement which had been furnished for the Government during the course of the proceedings. His exposition was straightforwardness itself. Though merely the mouthpiece of the Government, Mr. Wyndham gave utterance to definite statements which created a very favourable impression throughout the country, and served at once to wipe away the taste of foregone pronouncements. He said:

“Every one to his dying day would look back with regret on the great many disasters which had followed, but no one could ever know what would have happened if the other course had been adopted. It was very easy to conceive that if Sir G. White had not stayed at Ladysmith and Sir R. Buller had not gone to his relief disaster might have been developed in another line, and that there might have been that universal rising of the Cape Dutch which, thank Heaven, had not occurred. When it was stated that Lord Methuen had not sufficient cavalry and artillery with him, it must be remembered that Lord Methuen was hurried off to the Orange River, and, as a matter of fact, he arrived on the frontier in fewer days than the German army reached the French frontier, and he had not with him the cavalry, which had been diverted for the relief of Ladysmith and other purposes. On the morrow after Nicholson’s Nek three more battalions were sent from home, though none had been asked for, and Lord Landsowne offered a sixth division. In reply, he was told that preparation was desirable, but that there was no immediate need for its despatch. The situation was again changed by the reverses at Stormberg and Magersfontein and the check at Colenso. Thereupon the sixth division was ordered to embark without any communication from South Africa, and at the same time the seventh division was ordered to be mobilised. On December 15, the day after his check at Colenso, Sir R. Buller asked for the seventh division, the mobilisation of which had already been ordered, and for 8000 mounted irregulars from this country. Lord Landsowne replied that the seventh division would embark on January 4, which it did. Next day the first step was taken in connection with the raising of the Imperial Yeomanry, and volunteers were invited to come forward in order to fill the places left vacant by the raising from each battalion of one company of mounted infantry. The patriotism of the Militia was also appealed to, and fourteen battalions were now serving in South Africa, while others were on the way. A great military authority once said, ‘When a battalion is asked for, send a brigade.’ That had been the course pursued by Lord Landsowne.”

In regard to the number of our guns, Mr. Wyndham continued his argument in the following terms:—

“As the right hon. baronet had pressed for information with regard to the number of guns which had been despatched to South Africa, it would not be out of place to tell the House that we had sent and were sending 36 siege train heavy guns; there were already there 38 mobile naval guns, and in addition to these there were 36 5-inch howitzers carrying a heavy shell charged with 50 lbs. of lyddite, in all 110 guns, some of them with a range of 10,000 yards, and all capable of throwing heavy shells. Besides these there were 54 horse-artillery guns and 234 field-artillery guns, in all, counting the howitzers, 324 guns capable of accompanying troops in the field. Including the two mountain batteries, there were altogether 410 guns in South Africa, without reckoning the guns that were going out with the Volunteers and the Colonials, which would bring the number up to 452.”

THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY, K.G.
PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN SECRETARY.
Photo by Russell & Sons, London.

Then taking the subject of mounted troops, he went on:—

“On the question of mounted troops, it had been said that the Government announced to the world their conviction that unmounted troops were the kind of troops most suitable to South African warfare. The word ‘mounted’ was never used. However, he would not insist on that, but he did think that those who had quoted this opinion so often should consider when they were used, because then they would see that they gave no indication that the Government held the opinion attributed to them. As a matter of fact, since the outbreak of the war the Government had sent out a larger proportion of mounted troops than was usually contemplated, because they believed that mounted troops were especially suited to go to Africa. The time at which the phrase was used that infantry was most wanted and cavalry least wanted was on October 3, before the ultimatum was sent, before the war began, and at a time when Sir R. Buller was satisfied that an army corps, a cavalry division, and the necessary troops for the line of communication, giving 50,000 men in addition to the 25,000 already in South Africa, was an adequate force. When the question of the Colonial Contingents was first raised, Queensland offered 250 and New Zealand 200 mounted infantry, and the 108 New South Wales Lancers then in this country volunteered, making in all 558 mounted men. No specific offer was received from the other Colonies, but they expressed a wish that they might be allowed to take some part in the campaign. He thereon consulted Sir R. Buller as to the number that should be asked for in order that each Colony might be represented more or less in proportion to their respective populations. Sir Redvers stated that it would be easier to give the Colonial troops an immediate place at the front if they were invited to contribute manageable units of 125 men each. If the original offers of the Colonies had been accepted, there would have been 1375 more mounted men at the front at an earlier date, when no one contemplated that the force sent out would be insufficient for its task. The Colonial Legislatures have not changed their note in consequence of the disappointments and reverses which have been experienced, but have made further offers—an example which might well have been followed nearer home. Altogether there had been accepted from the Colonies 2075 unmounted and 4678 mounted men. The proportion of mounted to unmounted troops in South Africa at four different periods were: In the original garrison, 7600 unmounted and 2000 mounted; on October 9, the day of the ultimatum, 12,600 unmounted and 3400 mounted; on January 1, 83,600 unmounted and 19,800 mounted; while the total number of troops in South Africa, not including the Fourth Cavalry Brigade, were 142,800 unmounted and 37,800 mounted, and in the next fortnight or three weeks there would be out there 180,600 of all arms.”

Sir Edward Grey said:—

“He was giving the right hon. gentleman some instances of the value of the support from his side. The primary object of the policy which had ended in the war was not to drive the Boers from British territory, as they were not then on it. The primary object was not to plant the British flag at Pretoria and Johannesburg. These two things might be the result of the war, but they were not the primary objects of the Government policy. The objects which he wished to see attained, and which he would pledge himself to give the utmost support to the Government in attaining, were, first, equal rights between all white men in South Africa, and by that he meant that never again should a situation arise in any part of the British sphere in which a modern industrial community should be placed under the heel of an antiquated minority which was dominated by prejudice and governed by corruption. The second object was that never again in South Africa should it be possible for arsenals to be formed or an accumulation of military material under any control except British control. That was the end to be attained, and to that end the Government would have support.”

On the 3rd of February Mr. Bryce expressed his opinions. He affected to disbelieve that there had been any Dutch conspiracy to drive the British from South Africa, and considered that, owing to the menace of the Government in the arrangement of negotiations, the meek Boer had no resource but to prepare for war.

Mr. Goschen admitted the gravity of the situation and the responsibility of the Government en masse. The Cabinet, he decided, must stand or fall together. The Admiralty, in acceptation of its responsibility, had assisted the army with heavy guns without weakening its resources. Lastly, he touched enthusiastically on the exhibition of Colonial loyalty:—

“Before concluding I must say a word with reference to the Colonists. They have been supporting us with unstinted loyalty and unstinted generosity. There has been a spirit shown by the Colonies of affection to the mother country which has been the admiration of the world. May we not suggest that that unstinted loyalty and that unstinted generosity is to some extent a reward for the consideration which has been shown the Colonies for some time past; and is it not right to remember that for years there has not been a Secretary for the Colonies who has so endeavoured to win the affection of the Colonies as the right hon. gentleman who now holds that office? You tax us with not having shown foresight and judgment. At all events our treatment of the Colonies has ensured, not their loyalty—that will always be there—but the enthusiastic impulse of the Colonies to come to the assistance of the mother country. We have a great work to do; we want to do that work, and now hon. gentlemen opposite move an amendment the only object of which could be to damage and weaken the Government, who are the instruments of the national will. If hon. gentlemen opposite do not wish to take our places and to bear the burden which rests on our shoulders, is it wise to endeavour to shake the confidence of the country in the men who must continue this war, and gather together all the forces of the Empire to bring it to a successful conclusion? Supposing there should be a division which could be called a bad division for the Government, what would the cheers which would greet that division mean? They would mean, ‘We have succeeded in damaging and weakening the Government.’ The time may come when we will be damaged. If the war is not successful, sweep us away as men who have no judgment, but do not lame the arm of the Executive Government when they have such a work on hand as we have got to do. There has been patriotic co-operation between us and some of the Liberal Party. We thank them for it. I believe this is a Parliamentary bad dream—an interlude between the patriotic attitude of these gentlemen a few weeks ago and the patriotic attitude which I hope we may look forward to when this debate closes. They have assured the country they will support us in going forward. I thank them for that, for it is more important than the petty criticisms to which we have been treated. We are the trustees of the nation for the work that has to be done. The nation will support us, I believe; and so long as we receive that support, God willing, we will fulfil our task.”

Sir E. Clarke, among other things, said:—

“He did not believe the annexation of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State would be of the slightest benefit to the country. The annexation of the two Republics would compel us to very greatly increase our already enormous military expenditure, and it would not give us any advantage commensurate with the difficulties of administration. He had no desire to press his own views, which were singular, and certainly not popular, on that side of the House. He only pleaded that this question might be left open, and that Ministers might not pledge themselves to a course which would involve so great a sacrifice. While he agreed generally with the doctrine of Cabinet responsibility, he considered that the real responsibility for the war lay with the Colonial Secretary. The Prime Minister, in whom all England put the greatest confidence, having many other things to deal with, and being distressed by domestic anxieties, might not have been able to attend so closely as he otherwise would have done to South African affairs; but it could not be gainsaid that there were two men, one in this country and the other in South Africa, who must be associated with the beginning of the war. He wished that the highest sentiments of patriotism would induce those two men to leave to others the positions they now occupied. He believed that the difficulties involved in a solution of the questions arising out of the war would be increased by the fact that the lines of communication and action in South Africa were in the hands of the Colonial Secretary and Sir A. Milner. He had not a word to say about the honesty of these two gentlemen; but if, for a few weeks or a few months, in this grave national crisis and time of deep anxiety, others could take their places—if the Prime Minister himself would take under his own control the communications of the Colonial Office with South Africa, and if Lord Rosebery would give his services to the country, and go out to South Africa to assist in a solution of the difficulties, it would be a sacrifice not too great to ask even from the greatest men among us, and one for which the country would be very grateful. He had said that he was not going to make a controversial speech. He did not think he had. If he had, it had been with no intention of personal attack or party bitterness, but with the deep conviction that in deciding on the great issues with which Parliament had to deal we had to consider not only the things of to-day but the things of the future.”

Mr. Chamberlain’s speech on the 5th of February was an advance on former proceedings. Sir William Harcourt dilated on the indomitable energy of a free people fighting for their independence, praised the gallantry of the troops, and blamed the Government for being led by the opinions of the authors of the Jameson Raid, to which the Colonial Secretary made dignified reply. Finally he questioned—

“How do we meet the charge of mistakes? Not by denying the mistakes, but by saying what we have done and what we are doing to repair them. You say we sent too few troops. We are pouring troops into South Africa, and, as you have been told, in a few weeks you will have an army of 200,000. You said we were forgetful of the need for mounted men. We have been increasing the number of horse infantry until in a very short time the number of mounted men in the British forces will be almost as great, if not as great, as the total number of mounted men in the Boer army. You say our artillery is deficient and not heavy enough. We have sent battery after battery, until now you have an unexampled force of that arm. We have at the same time added a number of heavier guns. When the war began, no doubt the needs of the war were under-estimated at that time; it is part of the same mistake. We failed to respond as we ought to have done to the splendid offers that came from our Colonies. We accepted enough to show how much we valued their assistance, but we hesitated to put on them any greater strain than necessary. But what is happening now? They are multiplying their forces, and every offer is gratefully and promptly appreciated and accepted. And we shall have in this war before it is over an army of Colonials called to the aid of Her Majesty who will outnumber the British army at Waterloo and nearly equal to the total British force in the Crimea.”

In conclusion he said:—

“In Africa these two races, so interesting, so admirable, each in its own way, though different in some things, will now, at any rate, have learned to respect one another. I hear a great deal about the animosity which will remain after the war, but I hope I am not too sanguine when I say that I do not believe in it. When matters have settled down, when equal rights are assured to both the white races, I believe that both will enjoy the land together in settled peace and prosperity. Meanwhile, we are finding out the weak spots in our armour, and trying to remedy them. We are finding out the infinite potential resources of the Empire; we are advancing steadily, if slowly, to the realisation of that great federation of our race which will inevitably make for peace, liberty, and justice.”

On the following night Mr. Asquith, on Talleyrand’s principle—that speech is given us to hide our thoughts—dilated interestingly on the position, his sympathies oscillating between the Opposition, the Government, and Mr. Kruger. Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman declared it to be the duty of the Opposition to press Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice’s amendment to a division. He inferred that the conspiracy of the Cape Dutch was a chimera, and went so far as to suggest that when our military supremacy was asserted in South Africa the question of settlement might be left to decide itself sine die! Said he: “Provided that our territories are free and our military supremacy asserted, what matters it at what time or what place a settlement is arrived at?”

In his reply Mr. Balfour distinguished himself. He said that it was discovered that the War Office has more than fulfilled its promises, and appealed to the members of the Opposition who sympathised with the justice of the war to reflect before voting for the amendment. It was necessary to help the soldiers at the front by proving to them that they were supported by a united country, and that every hostile vote might induce or encourage our opponents to prolong the contest. He concluded by saying:—

“Can they contemplate with equanimity that their first action in a session of Parliament meeting under such circumstances should be a weakening of the Government, whose hands they profess to desire to strengthen—whose hands I believe they genuinely desire to strengthen—in every succeeding operation connected with this war? Can they contemplate with equanimity the reflection that possibly their votes may lengthen the war, and, by lengthening it, may increase that tragic list of losses with which we are already too familiar? If in giving their vote they add one fraction to the chances of a European complication, one fraction of a chance that an unnecessary life may be lost or a family thrown into mourning, can they easily reconcile that with their duty towards their own principles and to that country of which they are, I believe, as devoted servants as we on this side of the House? I think it is a violation of every Parliamentary tradition that men who desire to keep in office a Government should vote for an amendment which, if carried, will turn out that Government, and that it is contrary to every patriotic instinct to vote in a minority against the Government. The size of that minority will affect the whole course of European policy, the whole course of the war. I have stated the problem as it presents itself to my mind. I know that you are men of conscience and honour, and I must leave it to you to decide the problem, each man in his own case as his conscience and honour dictate. To the House at large I can only make one appeal. It is that we, who are the representatives of the country, may rise to the height reached by those whom we represent. I ask no more, and I can ask no more, of the House than that they should imitate, for they cannot exceed, the courage, steadfastness, resolution, and firmness under adversity, and the calmness of temper with which our countrymen all over the world have dealt with the situation in its entirety. If the House of Commons do, as no doubt they will, imitate, for they cannot better, the conduct of those who have sent them here, then who can doubt that the clouds by which we are at present surrounded will in a short time be dissipated and the Empire will issue from the struggle in which it is now engaged stronger, not only in its own consciousness of strength, but in the eyes of the civilised world.”

SERGEANT OF THE IMPERIAL YEOMANRY.
Photo by Gregory & Co., London.

In the end, by 352 to 139—a majority of 213—the vote of censure on the Government moved by Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice was defeated. The decision adequately expressed the feelings of the country. It must be remembered that many of the Government supporters were in South Africa, consequently a total poll of 491 represented a heavy vote. The following list serves to show the number of members of both Houses who had sacrificed party spirit to patriotic convictions, and had proceeded to the front:—

House of Lords.—Earl of Airlie, commanding 12th Lancers; Earl of Albemarle, lieutenant-colonel, City of London Imperial Volunteers; Lord Basing, major, 1st Dragoons; Lord Castletown, special service, South Africa; Lord Chesham, commanding a battalion of Imperial Yeomanry; Earl Cowley, lieutenant, Imperial Yeomanry; Lord Denman, lieutenant, Imperial Yeomanry; Earl of Dudley, D.A.A.G. for Imperial Yeomanry; Earl of Dundonald, C.B., major-general, commanding 3rd Brigade (Natal) Cavalry Division; Earl of Dunraven, captain, Imperial Yeomanry; Earl of Erroll, special service, South Africa; Earl of Essex, second in command of battalion of Imperial Yeomanry; Earl of Fingal, lieutenant, Imperial Yeomanry; Lord Kitchener of Khartoum, G.C.B., K.C.M.G., Chief of the Staff; Earl of Leitrim, lieutenant, Imperial Yeomanry; Earl of Longford, captain, Imperial Yeomanry; Lord Lovat, captain, Lord Lovat’s Corps; Duke of Marlborough, staff captain for Imperial Yeomanry; Lord Methuen, K.C.V.O., C.B., commanding 1st Division in South Africa; Duke of Norfolk, K.G., captain, Imperial Yeomanry; Lord Roberts of Kandahar, K.P., G.C.B., G.C.I.E., G.C.S.I., V.C., Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief; Lord Romilly, special service, South Africa; Lord Rosmead, major, 6th Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers; Duke of Roxburghe, lieutenant, Royal Horse Guards; Earl of Scarborough, second in command of battalion of Imperial Yeomanry; Earl Sondes, lieutenant, Imperial Yeomanry; Duke of Westminster, A.D.C. to Governor; Lord Wolverton, second lieutenant, Somersetshire Yeomanry Cavalry; Lord Zouche, lieutenant, Imperial Yeomanry.

House of Commons.—Mr. W. Allen, trooper, Imperial Yeomanry; Hon. A. B. Bathurst, captain, 4th Battalion Gloucester Regiment; Colonel A. M. Brookfield, commanding battalion of Imperial Yeomanry; Lieutenant-Colonel R. G. W. Chaloner, commanding battalion of Imperial Yeomanry; Hon. T. H. Cochrane, captain, 4th Battalion Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders; Lord A. F. Compton, captain, Imperial Yeomanry; Viscount Cranborne, commanding 4th Battalion Bedford Regiment; Mr. W. Bromley-Davenport, captain, Imperial Yeomanry; Sir J. Dickson-Poynder, lieutenant, Imperial Yeomanry; Viscount Folkestone, major, 1st Wilts Volunteer Rifle Corps; Mr. W. R. Greene, lieutenant, Imperial Yeomanry; Hon. J. Guest, lieutenant, Imperial Yeomanry; Mr. G. Kemp, captain, Imperial Yeomanry; Mr. E. H. Llewellyn, major, 4th battalion Somerset Light Infantry; Mr. H. L. B. McCalmont, commanding 6th battalion Royal Warwick Regiment; Mr. F. B. Mildmay, lieutenant, Imperial Yeomanry; Viscount Milton, lieutenant, Imperial Yeomanry; Mr. D. V. Pirie, with Remounts Department, South Africa; Lord Stanley, special service, South Africa; Lord Edmund Talbot, special service, South Africa; Viscount Valentia, A.A.G. for Imperial Yeomanry; Major W. H. Wyndham-Quin, captain, Imperial Yeomanry; Major the Hon. H. V. Duncombe, adjutant, Imperial Yeomanry; Sir Elliott Lees, captain, Imperial Yeomanry; Sir S. Scott, lieutenant, Imperial Yeomanry.

KIMBERLEY

There was little bombardment after the 25th of November, and though not living on the fat of the land, the garrison was not short of provisions. Mr. Rhodes, with characteristic forethought, now caused the formation of a committee to inquire into the resources of those dependent on the men killed, with a view to compensating them for their loss, and in other ways exerted himself for the welfare of sufferers in the town.

Considerable friction occurred between the civil and military authorities. The clashing of wills was inevitable in so small an area, for Colonel Kekewich represented military power, while Mr. Rhodes could be no other than he is, and ever has been—a power in himself. It was unfortunate that two such forces should have been placed in collision, but it remains to the credit of both that, in spite of the tension of the situation, they should have co-operated to the end to save the town from the common enemy, and protect the interests and lives of all who, but for this co-operation, might have suffered much more intensely than they did.

Early on the morning of the 9th of December a force with a battery under Colonel Chamier—to whom the efficient and mobile condition of the artillery was due—made a reconnaissance to the north. The Lancashire’s Mounted Infantry and two guns were posted on Otto’s Kopje while the Cape Police protected the Dam Wall. The Kimberley Light Horse in the centre extemporised some rifle-pits out of some prospectors’ huts in order to cover retreat when necessary.

The enemy were screened by the debris of a wall at Kamfeens, but when the boom of the British gun burst out and a shell roared in their midst, they hurriedly sought cover in their foremost rifle-pits, whence with great energy they “sniped” in the direction of the officers who were superintending the operations. Meanwhile tremendous barking of cannon and pinging of rifles continued, the Boers having got the range of Otto Kopje to perfection. The troops had an exceedingly hard time, but continued their operations till dusk. They lost only one killed and four wounded.

On the wise principle that it is safer to act early on the aggressive if you do not want to have to act late on the defensive, the smart little force indulged in more military movements.

Shell Picked up in Kimberley Streets.
Photo by Alf. S. Hosking, Cape Town.

Colonel Kekewich’s general plan for the defence of Kimberley was based on the principle of always keeping the enemy on the move and constantly in fear of attack from an unexpected quarter, but the immediate object of the numerous sorties and demonstrations in force now made by the garrison was to assist the operations of Lord Methuen. The Colonel explained that, “when the advance of the Relief Column from the Orange River commenced, and I was put in possession of information concerning the probable date of its arrival at Kimberley, I adopted such measures as I hoped would cause the retention of a large force of the enemy in my immediate neighbourhood, and thus enable the Relief Column to deal with the Boer force in detail.” As the portions of mounted corps were continually employed, the work which fell on the detachment, 1st Batt. Loyal North Lancashire Regiment, Cape Police, Diamond Fields Horse, Kimberley Light Horse, and the Diamond Fields Artillery, was very arduous; but the bravery and dash of these troops was unending. Colonel Murray, of the Loyal North Lancashire, was invaluable in many capacities, and Captain O’Brien of the same regiment, in command of a section of the defences, was unfailing in energy and zeal. Cool as the proverbial cucumber were Major Rodger of the Diamond Fields Horse and Major May of the Diamond Fields Artillery. The motto of these officers was the reverse of that of the notable gens d’armes, for they were “always there when wanted,” and generally in the fore-front. The officers of the Kimberley Regiment, too, were conspicuous for courage, coolness, and sagacity. They knew as by intuition what was wanted and did it. From Colonel Finlayson, who commanded the regiment, to Surgeon-Major Smith, who tended the wounded in the field, there was none who did not contribute to the stock of efficiency which was placed at the disposal of the Colonel.

On the 20th of December, the mounted detachments under Colonel Peakman, with maxims and 7-pounders under Colonel May, started off in the pitch darkness of 2 A.M., and marched through Kenilworth in the direction of the wreck of Webster’s Farm, and on towards Tollpan in the Free State. British cannonading then took place, the Kimberley guns shelling Tollpan Homestead at 2500 yards’ range, and the Boer gun on Klippiespan ridge returning the compliment with interest. Fortunately the hostile shells burrowed deep in the sandy soil, and consequently little damage was done. The Boers were found to be very comfortably situated at the three corners of a six-mile triangle—at Coetgie, Scholtz, and Alexandersfontein—commanding three separate sources of water supply. This reconnaissance was of importance, as the positions of the enemy’s guns and outposts were determined, and the garrison was enabled to be on guard against raiders and snipers, and to protect itself, its patrols, and cattle from the fire of the enemy. In the matter of protecting the cattle from the tricks of the Dutchmen, as in many other ways, Mr. Fynn, manager of the De Beers farms, did splendid service. This gentleman was Mr. Rhodes’s right-hand man, and as a natural consequence of the honour he enjoyed rose to every occasion that offered, now managing a corps of scouts, now superintending the conveyance of food, now dealing with truculent natives, and always conducting his varied avocations with immense energy and tact.

On the 22nd of December a good deal of martial activity took place. At cockcrow a detachment of mounted forces, with artillery and infantry, went west for the purpose of reconnoitring Voornitzright and part of Weldermstkuil. On the right were the Diamond Fields Horse under Major Rodger, supported by a company of the North Lancashire Regiment under Lieutenant de Putron. Presently an animated cannonade began between the enemy’s artillery from Kamferdam and the Diamond Fields Artillery guns on Otto’s Kopje. In the centre Colonel Peakman, with the Kimberley Light Horse and Cape Police, proceeded along Lazaretto Ridge. There, before retreating, he made the necessary discoveries—firstly, that the Boer patrols were then the only occupants of the place, and secondly, that the enemy’s reinforcements were advancing behind Wimbledon Ridge. Meanwhile Colonel Chamier on the left, with R.A. guns and an escort under Major Snow, was exchanging salutations with the Boer guns posted in the earthwork in the centre of Wimbledon Ridge. This occupation was pursued for some time, during which the enemy were found to be rapidly approaching. Directly the guns were limbered up some 500 Boers came on the scene, and began to pour a fierce fire from the earthworks at the foot of the Ridge upon the Kimberley troops, who retired to cover. The object of the reconnaissance was gained, however, for it proved in what an inconceivably short space of time the enemy could summon his reinforcements, and, moreover, that three of his guns were yet in the neighbourhood of the town.

On Christmas Eve congratulations were received by flashlight signals from the Military Secretary at Cape Town:—

“Convey to Colonel Kekewich and all the garrison and inhabitants of Kimberley his Excellency’s best wishes for their good luck on Christmas Day and in the coming New Year.”

Colonel Kekewich replied:—

“Kindly inform the Military Secretary that I and the garrison and inhabitants of Kimberley thank his Excellency for his kind message. We also wish respectfully to offer our very best wishes for Christmas and New Year.”

This little interchange of compliments caused infinite pleasure to those whose days were one unvarying round of trial and suspense. The weather was exceedingly hot; at times the thermometer registered 105° in the shade, and life without absolute necessities in torrid weather is trying even to the patience of the active. To those whose intercourse with the world was confined to flashlight signals, it was barren in the extreme. But with much pluck they thus announced their sentiments in a journal called the Diamond Fields Advertiser, which still maintained a languishing existence: “Excepting two or three of our inhabitants who shared the terrible privations of the siege of Paris, few of us have ever spent such a Christmas before, and few will ever care to spend such a Christmas again. The scarcity of turkeys and plum-pudding at this time of traditional plenty need only distress the gourmand. The majority of the people of Kimberley are happily made of sterner stuff, and do not look for luxuries in a time of siege.” They were nevertheless not utterly plum-puddingless. Mr. Rhodes, with characteristic forethought, had caused to be cooked in the Sanatorium some two score of these bombshells to digestion, and had distributed them in each of the camps. Here they were devoured with much merrymaking and a general interchange of felicitations, which went on by telephone from one camp to another. From the Mounted Camp to the Royal Artillery: “Best wishes and longer range to your guns.” From the gunners, in return, while they kept one ear open for movement in the direction of the Boers’ “Susannah:” “May our range be always long enough for us to be guardian-angels to the Mounted Corps.”

On the following day the artillery was at work responding to the salutes of the Boers, who commenced to fire with great activity after their Christmas rest. They dropped some thirty-five shells in the direction of the fort, and received nineteen well-directed replies. Two of the mines were fired by the thunderstorm of the previous night, but no one was injured. Food now was becoming more and more scarce, and those connected with the distribution of provisions had to exercise much forethought and economy.

The task of arranging for the victualling and supply of the garrison and 40,000 people in the town was undertaken by Major Gorle, Army Service Corps, and the zeal and resource which he brought to bear on his onerous duties were applauded on all sides. Of course there were found persons who, on the take-everything-from-everybody-else-and-give-it-all-to-me principle, thought they were badly treated, but these were the exception rather than the rule. The arrangements for milk were made by a special civil committee, consisting of Mr. Oliver, the Mayor, whose courage and energy in keeping up the spirits of the people were wonderful, Mr. Judge, and four visiting surgeons of Kimberley Hospital, Doctors Ashe, Watkins, Mackenzie, and Stoney. These made themselves notable for the untiring energy with which they devoted themselves to their incessant duties. They kept a sharp eye on the milk, serving it out cautiously at the depôt, and only to those who had a medical certificate that they required it. The Colonel was very appreciative of the help given by most of his civilian coadjutors, for, in reference to the difficulties of his position, he stated in his despatch: “It will be realised that, under the peculiar circumstances in which the defence of the scattered town, containing over 40,000 inhabitants and much valuable machinery, was entrusted in the first instance to a force consisting of about 570 Imperial troops and 630 Colonial troops, my efforts would have been of no avail had it not been for the valuable assistance and advice which many citizens afforded me in a military as well as a civil capacity.”

Mr. Henderson, Captain Tyson of the Kimberley Club, and Dr. Smart collaborated with the ruling spirit of the place, organising relief committees, distributing thousands of pints of soup per diem, and apportioning such fruit and vegetables as were to be had for the good of those who were most sorely in need. That green stuffs were scarce may be gathered from the fact that the allowance for nine people for half a week was a bunch of five carrots, four liliputian parsnips, and several beets (duodecimo editions). The garrison, later on, were glad of mangel-wurzels, when quantity rather than quality came to be appreciated.

The Boers were now beginning to build redoubts on Dronfield Kopjes, about a mile east of the railway and in a northerly direction, showing that whatever withdrawals might be going on from besieged places elsewhere, the City of Mines would receive its due of attention up to the last. The Boer prisoners inside the town presented quite a rejuvenated appearance, owing to the delicate attentions of Mr. Rhodes. Christmas saw them provided with new outfits, and a general air of cleanliness and health pervaded them. The invalids in hospital, both British and Boers, were visited frequently by the Colossus, whose generosity in the matter of delicacies, which were now very scarce, was highly appreciated.

Much of the Kimberley news was obtained through the energy and acuteness, almost amounting to genius, of the despatch-runners. Of these, Mr. Lumming of Douglas succeeded in getting in and out of the town with missives for and from Mr. Rhodes, always at tremendous risk. The Boers had offered a large reward for his capture. On one occasion, so as to evade observation in a district swarming with the enemy, he had to travel quadruped fashion on hands and knees for some thirty miles. Tales of the despatch-runners’ ingenuity in all parts of the Colony were many. One Kaffir boy, though caught by the Boers and stripped by them, carried his despatch safely, it having been packed in a quill and hid in his nostril, while another—a canny Scot—concealed his treasure in the inmost recesses of a hard-boiled egg.

On the morning of the 27th of January the mounted troops under the indefatigable Colonel Peakman at an early hour reconnoitred the Boer position near the Premier mine. The Boers were indulging in a last little doze, when some shells were neatly dropped into their laager. The alarum was effective. They were up and doing in no time, and set to work firing with the utmost vigour, but their shots were not accurate and much waste of ammunition took place. It may be remembered that Colonel Peakman, Kimberley Light Horse, after the death of Colonel Turner was selected for the command of the mounted troops in Kimberley. A tower of strength of himself, he was surrounded by a gallant crew, among whom were Major Scott, V.C., Captains Ap-Bowen and Mahoney (both severely wounded on the 25th of November), Captains Robertson and Rickman. There were also in the corps several lieutenants conspicuous for dash and daring, notably Lieutenants Hawker (wounded 22nd November), Harris, and Chatfield. Of the Colonel an amusing tale was told, which, if not vero, was certainly bentrovato, and served to cheer up those who needed to salt the monotonous flavour of daily life. It fell to the duty of Colonel Peakman to introduce horse-flesh at the officers’ mess, a ticklish task, and one that required considerable tact. When the dish was served, the Colonel said, “Gentlemen, as I was unable to get the whole of our ration in beef, a part of it had to be taken in horse-flesh. Here is the beef,” said he, carving at the joint opposite him, “that at the other end of the table is the horse. Any one who prefers it may help himself.” No one accepted the invitation, and after there had been a great run on the beef, the Colonel suddenly said, “By Jove, I’m mistaken; of course this joint is the horse, the other is the beef!” Thus the palates of the heroes of the Kimberley Light Horse were educated to the fare that was shortly to become unvaried.

Later on, a chunk of donkey occasionally replaced the equine morsel, and cats, it was noticed, began to be less in evidence. There were whispers—hints—— But to proceed to facts.

On the 29th a tussle took place between the foe and a man named Sheppy, who, with twelve mounted natives, was herding a thousand De Beers horses and mules. The cattle-drivers were at work when out from the bushes rushed a hundred Boers. These at once opened fire, but the herdsmen managed to return it and effect their escape.

The transformation of diamond-diggers into warriors was an entire novelty, of which Kimberley boasted not a little. The entire community of the De Beers Company were now soldiers of the Queen, receiving the same rate of pay as before, with food in addition. The total white population in the town was 14,000, and of these 6000 were employés of the mine, men from Natal. The Company worked wonders—of course under the auspices of the ruling genius of Kimberley. They stuck at nothing, from assisting with food supplies—distributing soup in gallons—to providing for the employment of upwards of 4000 natives in making improvements in the town. Sanitation too they undertook when contractors failed, and, when the supply of water was cut off at the main reservoir by the enemy, they came to the rescue by providing another source of water supply.

Owing to the excellent management and regulation of stores, the community had hitherto been enabled to live at normal prices, and food had been within the reach of all. But now the pinch of the siege began to be felt. Luxuries such as eggs, vegetables, &c., were naturally scarce, but horse-flesh even grew to be limited, for there was little forage left. The tramcars ceased to work, and Dr. Ashe predicted that presently there would be “no carts save military ones and the doctors’ and the hearse!”

People had to take their meat allowance half in beef and half in horse-flesh, and the over-fastidious were but meagrely nourished. These, however, soon came to “take their whack” of horse-flesh gladly, and some even declared that horse, by any other name, would be quite appetising! Conversation largely consisted of speculations regarding food or its absence, and once or twice there was a rub with the military. Dr. Ashe expressed himself frankly when confronted with red-tape difficulties, addressed the Colonel—of course, minding p’s and q’s, for people had to look to the dotting of i’s and crossing of t’s in those days—and suggested that, “in matters which affected the health and feeding of the people,” the doctors thought that, in virtue of their knowledge of town, climate, and people, they might be consulted. The objection to the red-tape difficulty being proved sound, the Colonel at once altered the routine, but, said Dr. Ashe, “he flatly declined to ask any opinion from the general body of doctors, as they might have ideas which would affect the military situation.”

“Long Cecil,” made at the De Beers Mines.
Photo by D. Barnett, War Correspondent.

The new gun, “Long Cecil,” manufactured in De Beers, was greatly prized. It distinguished itself on its début by plumping a shell in the centre of the Kamfersdam head-laager exactly over the position of the Dutchmen’s gun. Bombardment continued spasmodically, sometimes at night, the shells entering several houses and “making hay” of the furniture; but wantonly barbarous was the attack on the laager containing the women and children, which took place on the 23rd of January. One of the little innocents was killed and another probably maimed for life. On the 24th more bombardment began as early as four in the morning, and firing continued all day. The worst feature in the affair was the attack—deliberate and premeditated it appeared—on the hospital, which caused general grief and indignation. There was no excuse for such inhumanity, as the place was distinguished by two Red Cross flags.

Very lamentable was this habit of the Boers to violate the sacred rules of the Geneva Convention, for it alienated even those who were in sympathy with their cause. They could not plead ignorance of the rules of warfare, for at one time they ignored these rules to play the barbarian, while at another they utilised them to act the poltroon. The history of the Convention may not be generally known. It was promoted in 1864 and subsequently signed by all the Continental Powers. It was decided that—

1. Ambulances and military hospitals were to be recognised as neutral, and as such to be protected and respected by all belligerents.

2. The personnel of these hospitals and ambulances, including the intendance, the sanitary officers, officers of the administration, as well as military and civil chaplains, were to be benefited by the neutrality.

3. The inhabitants of the country rendering help to the sick and wounded were to be respected and free from capture.

4. The sick and wounded were to be attended to without distinction of nation.

5. A flag and a uniform were to be adopted for the hospitals, ambulances, and convoys of invalids; an armlet or badge for the personnel of the ambulances and hospitals.

6. The badge was to consist of a red cross on a white ground.

Committees were formed throughout Europe and America to carry out this convention, and the Society worked under the title of the “International Society of Aid for the Sick and Wounded.” It played its first important part in 1870 in the Franco-German War, before which time battlefields had been scenes of almost inhuman torture.

Now, in consequence of the brutal disregard of a world-appreciated agreement, the Boers—in many ways men of fine character—were placing themselves beneath contempt. Their conduct also to the loyalists and non-belligerents was also causing exasperation.

The ministers of all denominations—Wesleyan, Presbyterian, Baptist, Congregational, and Jewish—all united in condemning the Boer Government and its methods. They were especially scandalised at the inhumanity of the Dutch commandoes, who intermittently poured shells not only into the heart of the town, but into the suburbs, where women and children were known to congregate, while leaving for the most part unmolested the forts occupied by the citizen-soldiers. Homes were destroyed mothers and children stricken down, and some killed. These might have been looked upon as the accidents of war had it not been confessed in Boer papers that such acts were deliberately committed and vaunted.

Spasmodic bombardment took place during the evening of the 24th, and continued through the night, striking some buildings—the hospital and other defenceless positions—and maiming a woman and her child. Another child was killed. Profound admiration was expressed by all in the achievements of “Long Cecil,” and the utility of the new long-range weapon was highly appreciated. Indeed, Mr. Rhodes viewed this Kimberley masterpiece with quite a paternal eye, and his pleasure in firing it was considerable.

Enough could not be said of the splendid valour and pertinacity of the townspeople, who co-operated in the warlike proceedings as though they had been to the manner born. Though the fortification belt was some twelve miles in circumference, at all points it was protected by these amateurs of the sword, who, under no military obligations whatever till sworn in on the immediate emergency, rose to the occasion with a chivalric warmth that was as perfectly amazing as it was admirable. Devotion to the Sovereign Lady who rules the Empire was never more steadfastly shown and more ardently maintained.

The zeal and the “go” of the Cape Police was notable. Among the most prominent of the corps were Colonel Robinson, gallant Major Elliot and Major Ayliff (wounded on December 3), who was brave as he was tactful. Perpetually useful and conspicuously gallant were Captains Colvin, Crozier, White, and Cummings. Their duties, most difficult, were almost interminable.

Life was monotonous in the extreme. From the town it was possible on clear days to view the Modder River balloon, and the occasional sight of it afforded a stimulus to the drooping spirits of the inhabitants. Its rotund form floating so peacefully high in air seemed like a harbinger of hope promising and consoling, and teaching the lesson of patience and perseverance that overcome all things! Of course, it was only the sentimentalists of the community who thus interpreted the language of the aërial monster, but these, like the people who find sermons in stones, promptly took heart, and bore their trials with renewed dignity and pluck. Both these qualities were in great demand, for the Boers and their tactics were exhausting to the patience of the most forbearing. Their pertinacity was great. At one moment they would pour shells into the town, making hearts palpitate or stand still in horror at the gruesome fracas; at others they would persistently “snipe” from hidden corners and bushes, and render movements in the open, to say the least of it—inconvenient.

Sniping always continued, though, for a day or two, no serious bombardment took place. Indeed, there was reason to believe that a Boer gun was hors de combat. The report came in that “Susannah” had burst. There was general jubilation. Later on it filtered out that “Susannah” was “all serene,” but this was doubted. The sanguine hoped against hope. We are ready enough to believe what we wish to be true, and finally, for want of something to discuss, the question of “Has she burst, or has she not burst?” was bandied about in the tone of a popular riddle. Unfortunately “Susannah” was intact, as subsequent experience proved. Not only was “Susannah” herself again, but it was reported that a considerable Boer reinforcement had arrived in the neighbourhood, and that three guns from Spyfontein were being ranged in attitude to defy “Long Cecil,” whose prowess was more decided than pleasant. Still the inhabitants bore up very creditably, and enlivened themselves continually with concerts or entertainments of some kind. The programmes, it must be noted, were always marked “weather and Boers permitting”—a modern adaptation of the customary D.V.

The Boer spies took a lively interest in all that concerned Mr. Rhodes, and hopes were entertained that before long some one would receive the price of his capture. But this gentleman pursued his avocations in the town and its suburbs with unabated interest, arranging for the comfort of the refugees, and evincing paternal solicitude in the laying out of new suburbs, and the construction of a regular row of bomb-proof shelters, which were being excavated at Kenilworth. People now became great connoisseurs on the virtue of brick, old and new, and began to mistrust corrugated iron as affording less protection from the artillery fire of the enemy. They became judges also of shell—of the peculiarities of shrapnel and ring shells—and sapiently discussed the merits of time fuses and percussion fuses. Food, however, was the prime subject of conversation—a subject of “devouring” interest, some one said. The refugee fund now amounted to £3000, owing to the united subscriptions of Mr. Rhodes and the De Beers Company. It was none too much, as the demand on its resources was some £600 weekly.

LIEUT.-GENERAL THOMAS KELLY-KENNY, C.B.
Photo by C. Knight, Aldershot.

The Colossus, regardless of the fate that hung over the town, continued to make plans and projects for the development of the place. On a high plateau he purposed to create a new suburb, and the name will doubtless bear a relationship to the great events of 1900. A column was in course of erection to commemorate the siege, but the tale of bombardment, writ large on many of the buildings, is one that will scarcely be forgotten, and forms memorial enough. Some curious damage was done, a shrapnel shell electing to penetrate the wall of a draper’s shop and wound a feminine dummy and smash a wax effigy of a boy used as a clothes model. Fortunately few human beings suffered. Great precautions were taken for the safety of the inhabitants, and a look-out was kept, so as to give warning by whistle whenever the smoke of the enemy’s guns breathed a hint of coming destruction. A calculation was made as to the sum total expended by guns, British and Dutch, and it was discovered that Kimberley had fired 1005 shells, while the besiegers had spent three times that number. The total loss of life attributable to shell fire amounted at this date to about twelve killed.

Affairs within the town were now growing almost as bellicose as affairs without it. Continued friction generates heat, and of this throughout the siege there had been more and more as time went on. It was quite evident that Kimberley was not sufficiently large to afford an arena for the combat of brains versus military discipline, and that the patience of the besieged was nearing the snapping-point. Indeed there was doubt as to whether operations for the relief of Kimberley would be pursued, and it is averred that the Commander-in-Chief sent a message to Mr. Rhodes, saying, “Hope I shall not be compelled to leave you in the lurch.” Naturally the Kimberley barometer fell to zero. Then came rumours of the coming of Lord Roberts, but these scarcely served to allay the general impatience.

A curious incident occurred on the 29th. Some thirty-five Zulus took their departure. They had been ordered by their chief to leave the town, but when they obeyed they had promptly to return, as they encountered the Boers, who threatened to shoot them.

At this time food was becoming more and more scarce; even horse-flesh was distributed with caution. Milk was obtainable only by the invalids, and some four hundred babes died for want of proper nourishment. It was pathetic to see people standing at the Town Hall waiting eagerly to take their turn for the scanty portion of meat that could be provided for them. The ceremony of the drawing of meat rations had an aspect almost comic in its desperate seriousness. Matutinally at 5.30 A.M. might be seen a vast concourse of persons scampering in hot haste to gain a front place. So animated was the early bird to catch its morning worm, that it was up and doing before the regulated hour, 5.30 (fixed by proclamation), before which time people were forbidden to leave their houses. The police put a stop to this superactivity, and hungry persons were seen from five to the half-hour waiting patiently at their gates till the exact moment should arrive when they could make a dash for a place in the tremendous crush which, two by two, gathered outside the market.

Marvellous was the rapidity with which this vast crowd, at hint of a shell, would drop to earth. As by some mechanical process there would come a bang, and then, like a card castle, the whole procession would drop flat. The Boers, knowing, most probably, that this was an eventful period of the morning, would invariably start off about six with a boisterous “good-morrow.”

Gradually the rations grew shorter and shorter and shorter. They now consisted mainly of horse-meat, served out every second day, mealie meal, stamped mealies, with a sparse allowance of tea, coffee, and bread. For those who had children under three years of age one tin of milk was allowed. With this strong children could get along well, but there were many weakly ones, and these waned and waned till the baby funerals became pathetically frequent.

The Dutchmen were exceedingly ingenious in the invention of tricks and traps. One of these was to move a waggon with sixteen fat oxen in charge of but two men into the open Vlei below Tarantaal Ridge, and there to leave it, apparently unguarded, for two hours. They thought that this bait would lure forth the cattle-guard, but they were disappointed, for the authorities were too acute to allow them to get “a bite.” They knew that in rear of the Vlei was a deep sand-drift, behind which a large body of men might be comfortably concealed, and consequently left waggon and cattle severely alone.

After this began the bombardment by a new Boer gun—a diabolical instrument, whose perfections were hymned by an artillery expert, who declared it to be one of the most perfect pieces of ordnance ever made! A correspondent in the Daily Telegraph described the terrifying effect produced on the nerves of the sick and the weakly. He went on: “The shock caused by the firing of this gun was distinctly perceptible five feet under ground at a distance of five miles, and the miniature earthquake thus created was clearly registered by the new seismograph at Kenilworth, the pendulum of which remained perfectly stationary during the firing of the smaller guns, or the passage of the most heavily laden trains or vehicles at very close quarters.”

The 9th of February was a terrible day. There was crashing and booming from morning till night, and no one dared venture abroad. One inhabitant had his child killed under his very eyes and his wife mortally stricken down. Towards sundown a shell struck the Grand Hotel, killing Mr. Labram, the De Beers chief engineer, whose valuable brains had been the salvation of the place. He had constructed armoured engines, armoured trains, and had completed his ingenious labours by constructing the huge 4.1-inch gun, with carriage and shells complete—a triumph of science considering the conditions under which the achievement was attempted. Now he was gone, and Kimberley was vastly the poorer.

The bombardment was growing daily more severe. Each time the Boers fired their 100-pounder gun a bugle was blown from the conning tower and all ran to cover. There would be an interval of seven minutes between every shell, and the bombardment would last for about two hours. Then the Boers would take a rest, and, after a breathing spell, begin again. By the kindness of Mr. Rhodes the mines now became harbours of refuge for thousands of women and children, who, huddled together in the 1200-feet level, were thus protected from the shells which were launched in the midst of the town. Those days in dark diamondiferous caverns were full of strange experiences. There, over a thousand shrinking beings found asylum, bedding, food, and such comfort as could be secured for them. There, babes were born into the world—human diamonds brought into the daylight from the grottoes of the millionaires—babes which surely should take some strange part in the drama of the century. It was an underground village swarming with the weak and the distressed, a feminine populace, kept from panic and despair by the man who, large enough to make empires, yet proved himself capable of sympathy with the small sorrows and quakings of the sick and the fearful.

Placard Erected by Mr. Rhodes.
Photo by F. H. Hancox, Kimberley.

The experiences of a lady who enjoyed the hospitality of the mine were scarcely exhilarating. She said: “We went down the mine, but only stayed one day. Of course, one felt safe, but it was so miserable; still, it was another siege experience, the crowds of people down there. On the 1000-feet level were 500 persons alone, and the buzz of tongues, and the children crying, and the noises altogether, besides the damp, were horrible; although Mr. Rhodes and those working under him did all in their power to make things as comfortable as possible. Hot coffee, soup, bread, milk for the children, everything obtainable was sent down; and some thousands of people were fed free of charge from the Saturday night till the following Friday morning.... Those people who run down Mr. Rhodes should have been here during the four months of the siege. The soup-kitchen was another of his institutions, threepence a pint for good soup, and those who had no money got it free.”

Now that the nerve-destroying capabilities of the Boers’ 100-pounder gun were proved, and Mr. Rhodes and other citizens were conscious of the immense amount of danger to town and life that must result from the bombardment, the Colossus, in conjunction with the Mayor and others, forwarded to Colonel Kekewich a letter which he begged might be heliographed to headquarters. The letter ran:—

“Kimberley, February 10.

“On behalf of the inhabitants of this town, we respectfully desire to be informed whether there is an intention on your part to make an immediate effort for our relief. Your troops have been for more than two months within a distance of little over twenty miles from Kimberley, and if the Spytfontein hills are too strong for them, there is an easy approach over a level flat. This town, with a population of over 45,000 people, has been besieged for 120 days, and a large portion of the inhabitants has been enduring great hardships. Scurvy is rampant among the natives; children, owing to lack of proper food, are dying in great numbers, and dysentery and typhoid are very prevalent. The chief food of the whites have been bread and horse-flesh for a long time past, and of the blacks meal and malt only. These hardships, we think you will agree, have been borne patiently and without complaint by the people. During the last few days the enemy have brought into action from a position within three miles of us a 6-inch gun throwing a 100-lb. shell, which is setting fire to our buildings and is daily causing death among the population. As you are aware, the military guns here are totally inadequate to cope with this new gun. The only weapon which gives any help is one of local manufacture. Under these circumstances, as representing this community, we feel that we are justified in asking whether you have any immediate intention of instructing your troops to advance to our relief. We understand large reinforcements have recently arrived in Cape Town, and we feel sure that your men at Modder River have at the outside 10,000 Boers opposed to them. You must be the judge as to what number of British troops would be required to deal with this body of men, but it is absolutely necessary that relief should be afforded to this place.”

To this Lord Roberts replied:—

“I beg you represent to the Mayor and Mr. Rhodes as strongly as you possibly can the disastrous and humiliating effect of surrender after so prolonged and glorious a defence. Many days cannot possibly pass before Kimberley will be relieved, as we commence active operations to-morrow. Future military operations depend in a large measure on your maintaining your position a very short time longer.”

A great deal of gossip hung round the suppression of the Diamond Fields Advertiser, but the whole affair was merely a storm in the ink-pot resulting from the clashing of opinions civil and military. After the publication of a leading article on the 10th of February, an article with which Mr. Rhodes was entirely in accord, the military censor addressed the following letter to the editor:—

“Army Headquarters,

Kimberley, February 10, 1900.

“Sir,—Since the Diamond Fields Advertiser has now on two occasions printed leading articles on the military situation which are extremely injurious to the interests of the army and the defence of this town, without previously submitting the same to the military censor, I am directed to inform you that from this date the proof of the Diamond Fields Advertiser must be submitted to me before the copies of any daily number, leaflet, or other form of publication is issued to the public.

“I am further requested to inform you, in your own interests, that on the two occasions referred to you have committed the most serious offences dealt with by the Army Act, under which Act you are liable to be tried.—Yours faithfully, W. A. O’Meara, Major, Military Censor.”

The military censor was within his rights. The editor, after the manner of editors, did not care to be muzzled, so the Diamond Fields Advertiser was temporarily suspended.

The editorial chair at the time was not an enviable berth, owing to the invasion of shells from the 100-pounder gun, therefore the holiday may have been beneficial in more ways than one.

The new gun, mounted on the kopje at Kamferdam, was determined to make life hideous, and so incessantly swept the neighbourhood that a state of panic began to prevail even among those who had hitherto borne themselves with unconcerned front. In addition to this perpetual tornado of horror the pinch of famine was becoming sharper, and the question of relief seemed to be growing into one of “now or never.” Despair seized on many. They began to count the days, and wonder when it would all end, and whether indeed it would ever end at all! Two days—three days—five days—the 15th of February! Then, dramatically, as in a fairy tale or a stage play, came the rumour of help, the whisper that French, the gallant, the energetic, the invincible, was coming, as on the wings of the wind—coming to restore freedom to those who, in their tedious imprisonment, were fainting with hope deferred. In an instant all was changed. The rumour became reality. Colonel Kekewich and his staff rode forth, and it was as though the good fairy had waved a wand. In an instant the dismal streets seemed to grow gaudy with flags, to flutter and flare as with the hues of the butterfly. Panic ceased, and gave way to almost hysterical joy. People laughed, chaffed, threw up their hats. The mines disgorged their human wealth—some thousand of women and children, who came forth alacrious, with swinging step and loudly babbling—babbling like mountain torrents let loose from the ice of winter! It was a scene for painter, not for penman; for who shall describe wrinkles of anxiety swept suddenly away, pangs of hunger allayed by thrills of glad excitation, nervous exhaustion magically forgotten, and all this simply because there was dust in the distance—the dust of coming feet—the dust of the British cavalry sweeping nearer and nearer on a glorious errand of deliverance!

Five minutes later the looked-for moment had arrived. Anticipation had given way to fact—the 124 days’ siege was at an end. Yet there were some who could scarce believe their ears. A man, hearing that General French had arrived, approached a trooper who was holding a horse outside the Club, and asked if the good news was true. “Yes,” was the reply; “I’m ’is horderly; this is ’is ’at, and over there is ’is ’orse!” And the Kimberley man stared at the three objects before him as though he could never take his fill of satisfaction.

GENERAL FRENCH’S RIDE

And now, as the conjuror says, to explain how it was all done. The object of the combined movements was to turn Cronje’s position, which extended west and east from Majersfontein to Koodoesberg Drift on the one side towards Klip Drift on the Modder on the other, to relieve Kimberley, and, if possible, cut off the retreat of the Boers to Bloemfontein and invest the whole force. This stupendous programme was unfolded to General French and his A.A.G. Colonel Douglas Haig at the time already mentioned, when the great cavalry leader mysteriously ran down from Colesberg to the Cape. Here the plans for the future campaign were discussed, and here General French agreed to embark on an enterprise which had it failed in a single particular might have brought about “such a disaster as would have shaken England’s dominion in South Africa to its very foundation.” This is the opinion of Captain Cecil Boyle, a splendid young officer, who, when asked to join General French’s staff as galloper, was almost overcome with joy. But the plan did not fail: indeed it succeeded beyond expectation, and the relief of Kimberley, accomplished solely by the mounted troops—said to be the largest force ever commanded by a British General—was a feat scarcely to be excelled in the annals of warfare. This feat was performed between the 11th and the 15th of February, during which the Division experienced hardships of every kind. Horses and men were worked incessantly, without a day’s rest and in a broiling sun, which literally baked every portion of the human frame exposed to it, and grilled the eyeballs, causing the most acute suffering to man and beast. Supplies and forage ran short, and the horses were reduced to 1½ lb. of corn a day, while the men lived finally from hand to mouth, killing and eating as they went along, now a sheep, now a goat, and presently nothing but boiled mealie cobs. Water was so scarce, and the sufferings of the animals so terrible, that when a stream was once encountered, the brutes, wild with an anguish of delight, tore towards it in their frantic career, becoming absolutely beyond control, and carrying their riders straight into the river. Some in this way were drowned. Many horses died of exhaustion. At the end, out of 8000, only 5400 remained. But all discomforts were forgotten in the success of the achievement, which from first to last was conducted with admirable finesse and consummate dash. Indeed this marvellous ride is looked upon by those who could technically criticise the difficulty and daring of the enterprise as one of the finest achievements of British arms.

On the 11th of February the great cavalry division under General French started. With marvellous rapidity, and with a vast amount of mystery, the troops had gathered together in the neighbourhood of Enslin or Graspan, and commenced to move south-east on the now celebrated march for the relief of Kimberley. So swiftly was everything planned, and so dexterously was it accomplished, that even the wary Cronje, whose spies were everywhere, was incapable of believing that the detested rooineks were advancing with the rapidity of a cyclone for the purpose of sweeping him and his burghers from their comfortable positions. But a clean sweep they made nevertheless. Before the British advance Dutchmen fled precipitately from their farms, leaving their sweet mealie pap in statu quo, and all their effects exactly as they had been using them.

They carried to Cronje wild rumours of British multitudes approaching, and preparing to make a last frontal attack upon Majersfontein, rumours which exactly suited Lord Roberts’ strategic plan. Cronje instantly primed himself for the reception of the British, strengthening his fortifications and keeping his eye on the west, where he knew the Highland Brigade was operating. This again was precisely what Lord Roberts had intended him to do.

Meanwhile, in the light of the stars, the great cavalry division with its batteries of artillery was on the move, rumbling cautiously through the mysterious, Boer-haunted regions under the guidance of the Hon. Major Lawrence, Chief of the Intelligence Department, and travelling many miles before sunrise on its important journey to Ramdam. Here horses were watered, men rested, details and remounts from Orange River picked up. On the morning of Monday the 12th, the troops were again on the move, starting at 3 A.M., and endeavouring to cover as many miles as possible before the sun should rise and make the whole earth into a scorching, blistering wilderness. But now, in return for the cool night air, they had to contend with jetty obscurity. Very slow, therefore, was their progress. When helped by the dawn they got along faster, and soon the whole division reached Waterval. Here extra precautions were taken, for none knew how many Dutchmen might be ensconced in the surrounding kopjes or whether the drift might be swarming with Boers. But they were not long left in doubt. A Boer shell greeted the troops with such nicety of range that the General and his staff barely escaped. Colonel Eustace, R.H.A., immediately turned his attention to the hostile gun, and shortly silenced it, but the enemy still held on.

Dekiel’s Drift is commanded by kopjes, having on the bank an octopus-armed donga which cuts deeply into the soil. At this drift the Boers endeavoured to make a stand, but the Mounted Infantry and Roberts’ Horse were too much for them. Unfortunately, Captain Majendie, second in command of the latter regiment, was shot from Drift Kopje, in the shadow of which his remains were interred. There was no time for expression of mourning and regret; the Boers had to be routed, and presently, finding their rear threatened, they went streaming away from their strong position, taking with them their guns. After this the drift was taken possession of, and in the rays of the setting sun the disciplined hosts—brigade after brigade—crossed the Riet River, keeping possession of both banks.

Horses and men were wearied out, scorched, and famishing, and there was a general sense of relief when at last they were joined by Lord Kitchener and staff and the Sixth Division, with convoys of provisions and fodder. At dawn on Tuesday a great deal had to be done—breakfast finished, nose-bags filled, &c., before it was possible to order the advance. Day was well developed by the time the brigades had started, and now came the exceeding trials of their march. The level veldt was like a mirror to a brazen sky, and all through the sweltering hours when the sun blazed its strongest, men and horses, shadeless, parched, and sparsely fed, moved on mile after mile on their imperative errand without pause and without relief. Even a beautiful well of water, which tempted them to distraction, had to be passed by untouched. It was necessary to reserve it for the infantry, who were following on the morrow. So dry, dejected, yet determined, they went on and on, crossed the districts of Poortje, Zwart Kopjes, Kromkuil, and made a brief halt at Wegdraai. From thence they swung along past pans and kopjes and plains, due north to Klip Drift.

THE DASH FOR KIMBERLEY—THE 10th HUSSARS CROSSING KLIP DRIFT.
Drawing by John Charlton, from a Sketch by G. D. Giles, War Artist.

Captain Boyle, in the Nineteenth Century, gave a fresh and spirited account of their movements on this important and critical march.

“The distance covered in extended order was great, and to save the artillery horses Major Lawrence directed the columns by a slight détour north-easterly, leaving Jacobsdal some seven or eight miles to our left. The heat was now intense, and was further increased by the accidental burning of the veldt over a large area, thereby destroying our field-cable, as we learnt afterwards. From flank to flank the distance was so great that at times the General’s gallopers could not move their horses out of a walk, though the message was important, and everywhere men and horses alike suffered from sun and thirst.

“General Gordon’s brigade, far away on the left, was ordered to bring up its left shoulders to meet what looked like an attack on the right, but the guns of the 1st Brigade put the enemy to flight, and the march was resumed in slightly different order. The left brigade, under General Gordon, was ordered to advance; the centre brigade, under General Broadwood, was deployed to the right; and the right brigade, under Colonel Alexander, was ordered to follow in the rear. From a little stone-covered knoll the General and his staff scanned the distant river and its banks eight miles off, and instantly determined to push on for the drift. ‘Move up the whole division,’ and the three gallopers started back with the order to the brigades, which had been halted meanwhile. General Gordon on the left, with the 9th and 16th Lancers and his guns, and General Broadwood on the right, with the 12th Lancers, Household Composite, and 10th Hussars, moved off at once; but Colonel Alexander’s brigade was far in the rear—he had already lost sixty horses, and the rest could move but slowly. The artillery horses could scarcely drag their guns and waggons, but still the General determined to force the drift; and I believe this decision was one of the most critical in the relief of Kimberley, for, had we not gained the drift directly our presence was known, the enemy would most certainly have fortified a very strong natural position. But the General’s mind was made up, and he was quick to act. Throwing Gordon on to the left to effect a crossing, and Broadwood some five miles away on his right, the advance to the river was made so swiftly that the enemy were absolutely surprised. After shelling for some time, Gordon crossed and went in pursuit. Only four guns out of twelve could come into action in the centre, but with such effect that the enemy shortly retreated over the hills. By this time General Broadwood had crossed on the right, and his brigade trumpeter sounded the ‘pursue.’ The general rout was now complete—camp, waggons, everything was in our hands. New bread was lying about on the veldt and dough-tins ready to be placed on the fire, with such haste had the Boers left their position.

“My horse had died with my last message to the 1st Brigade, and I trudged on over the level veldt partly on foot, partly on ammunition waggons, over the last five miles, crossed the Modder River with the four guns of P and G Batteries, and went to congratulate the General, who was sitting on the north bank, on his splendid achievement; for by this last forced march of nearly ten miles he had won half his way to Kimberley. Little incidents after the rout were full of the humour that hangs around everything grave. One of the staff plunged into the river and caught some geese, but some one else ate them; a pig ran the gauntlet through the camp—amidst roars of laughter, even from the serious General—of lances, bayonets, knives, sticks, boots, water-bottles, anything to hand, and at length was caught by a lucky trooper, who shared his feast that night with his friends. A waggon of fresh fruit was taken, sufficient to make thirsty men’s mouths water, but some thought the grapes were sour. Why the Boers retreated in such a hurry is difficult to understand, for the position and drift were very strong and easy to defend, especially against a spent foe; and, but for the quickness of the advance over the open veldt, which took the Boers completely by surprise, the division would have encountered a very nasty opposition.”

The Dutchmen were pursued with splendid animation by General Gordon’s jaded brigade, who succeeded, worn out as they were, in capturing some ambulance waggons and some Boer doctors; while General Broadwood’s brigade, also worn out, chased the Boers into the far distance till absolute exhaustion forced the abandonment of the pursuit. So at the drift the cavalry division enjoyed its terribly needed repose. They had gone through an appalling ordeal, but it had been wonderfully surmounted, and the command of river both at Klip Drift and Klip Kraal, some miles to the east, had been secured.

On the 14th the Boers still continued to buzz about after the fashion of mosquitoes—now advancing, now retiring, worrying and annoying, but never coming boldly to the attack.

They made strong efforts to fathom the movements and designs of the British, but without success. Colonel Gorringe, Chief of Lord Kitchener’s Staff, now arrived, and announced that Lord Kitchener and General Kelly-Kenny were advancing by night from Dekiel Drift, whereupon Captain Laycock, A.D.C., rode out and succeeded by midnight in conducting these officers safely to camp. In the small hours the Sixth Division, after a hard and really glorious march, which must be described anon, arrived. Thus his left flank being secured, General French was free to pursue his impetuous ride. This he did after handing over to the infantry the positions he had gained. While the cavalry division moved out, Kelly-Kenny’s division—as in the game of “general post”—quickly shifted to the vacant place, thus making any return of the fleeing Boers impossible.

The three cavalry brigades then drew up in columns of brigade masses, with the seven batteries of horse-artillery on their left, where the strongest attack from the laager near Kimberley was expected. How far the Boers were aware and prepared for the British move was uncertain, but it was decided that at all costs the cavalry would cut through them.

Operations began with the shelling and capture of two laagers on the north side of the river, and the way being thus cleared of the enemy, the division made its way to a point where it was met by the contingent from the Modder River. The force, now increased by Scots Greys, Household Cavalry, and two Lancer Regiments, numbered some 10,000 men, seven batteries of horse-artillery and three field-batteries.

Scarcely had the brigades proceeded before the Boers opened fire, and soon men and gunners fell, and horses riderless and pairs devoid of drivers were seen rushing madly over the plain. From a kopje on the right came the rattle and roar of musketry, which was replied to by the guns of the horse-artillery. There was no doubt now that a horde of Boers were hiding in front, and that the way forward was only to be gained by a desperate plunge. There was no hesitation. General Gordon and his gallant men were ordered to charge and clear the right front, and the thing was done. Away went the 9th and 12th Lancers, galloping for all they were worth, on and on like a flash of avenging lightning. At sight of the human avalanche the Boers, who had been “raining hell” from their trenches, suddenly threw up Mausers and hands; but it was too late, the whirlwind was upon them, and over a hundred Dutchmen bit the dust. Others ran helter-skelter, a whimpering and shouting rabble!

Now came the greatest sight that military men have witnessed for years—the rush of the legions across the great plain of Alexandersfontein. This vast area, about three to five miles square, is surrounded by menacing kopjes, which harboured Boers rendered desperate by surprise and consternation. Across the open the Lancer regiments and Scots Greys as advance guard, with the rest of the force deployed at ten yards’ intervals, rushed like a hurricane, a sirocco in the desert. Boers still showered down their lead, but the cavalry, heedless, thundered along, throwing up a volume of dust, while kopje after kopje was swept by the mounted infantry. The enemy was dispersed on every side.

Five long miles the race of the centaurs continued—centaurs galloping as if for dear life—Carabineers and Greys leading the main body, the 12th Lancers on the left, the Household Composite Regiment with the 9th Lancers on the right—a regal show, and one worth a lifetime to have witnessed.

Typical Underground Dwelling at Kimberley.

At De Villiers the exhausted warriors watered their horses and strove to gather together the poor brutes for a final effort. Many were sun-stricken, others had simply used themselves up. The speed that was to outwit Cronje had to be paid for in horse-flesh. But, owing to that speed, much loss of human life was spared. Lieutenant Sweet Escott (16th Lancers) had fallen early in the day, but considering the fire of the enemy it was a marvel that only one officer had been killed. One man was also slain, and there were about thirty wounded.

Kopje held by the Boers.

At two o’clock the troops were halted at the base of a small kopje, from the crown of which it was possible to descry the chimneys of Kimberley in the distance. It was as though they had sighted the Promised Land. Up went a mighty cheer from a thousand throats, ringing almost against the vault of the burnished heaven, and echoing far and wide among the threatening Boer-haunted kopjes! Kimberley was on the eve of relief. The trial, the trouble, the turmoil were over! The triumph was won! On went the Division, riding now with all their might, and at sight of them the enemy, hot-foot, commenced to gallop into space. Soon the Division was within sight of the suburbs, and their guns were addressing themselves to a Boer laager on the east of the town. The extra uproar struck fresh alarm in the people of Kimberley, who had been driven distraught by the Boer’s 100-pounders, and a message was flashed out, “The Boers are shelling the town.” Then came the answer—the glorious answer—“It is General French coming to the relief of Kimberley.” The news to the imprisoned multitude seemed incredible. They dreaded lest it might be a new wile of the Dutchman, and, to make assurance doubly sure, flashed out a fresh query. But by sunset the British troops had appeared: the whole force, battered, bronzed, but jubilant, was galloping into Beaconsfield.

STRATEGY VERSUS TACTICS

Some one has said that strategy is a permanent science whose principles are immutable, while tactics vary with the variations of weapons and modes of warfare. The first example of this permanent science was presented only when Lord Roberts came to South Africa, but so complete and skilful, and withal so subtle, was the initial demonstration, that its fruits within ten days of his arrival at the front were ready to drop to his hand. Looking back, the plan of Lord Roberts’ operations appears simple in the extreme, but at the time only masterly conception and accuracy of execution could have ensured success for so complicated a programme. To appreciate its subtlety and its neat execution, it becomes necessary to follow the other portions of the programme, beginning from the entry into the Free State of the enormous army that was massed on its borders by Monday the 12th. On that day three divisions of infantry, the 6th, 7th, and 9th, General French’s division, two brigades of mounted infantry under Colonels Hannay and Ridley respectively, the artillery under General Marshall, consisting of three brigade divisions of horse-artillery, two brigade divisions of field-artillery, one howitzer battery, and a Naval Contingent of four 4.7-inch and four 12-pounders, marched from Graspan and Honeynest Kloof through Ramdam. The total field force amounted to 23,000 infantry and 11,000 mounted men, with 98 guns, and a transport of over 700 waggons drawn by nearly 9000 mules and oxen. Later on the artillery was reinforced by the arrival of a battery of 6-inch howitzers, throwing 100-lb. shells, and three Vickers-Maxim quick-firers and the Brigade of Guards, which had remained opposite the Boer trenches at Majersfontein.

The following table serves to show roughly the disposition of the troops:—

FIELD-MARSHAL LORD ROBERTS’ FORCE

First Division.—(Lieutenant-General Lord Methuen).—1st (Pole-Carew’s) Brigade—3rd Grenadier Guards; 1st Coldstream Guards; 2nd Coldstream Guards; 1st Scots Guards. 9th (Douglas’s) Brigade—1st Northumberland Fusiliers; 1st Loyal North Lancashire (half); 2nd Northamptonshire; 2nd Yorkshire Light Infantry; 18th, 62nd, 75th Field Batteries.

Sixth Division.—(Lieutenant-General Kelly-Kenny).—12th Brigade—2nd Worcestershire, 1st Royal Irish, 2nd Bedfordshire, 2nd Wiltshire (half battalions). 13th Brigade (Knox’s)—2nd East Kent; 1st Oxfordshire Light Infantry; 1st West Riding; 2nd Gloucester; 76th, 81st, and 82nd Field Batteries; 38th Company Royal Engineers.

Seventh Division.—(Lieutenant-General Tucker).—14th Brigade—2nd Norfolk; 2nd Lincoln; 1st King’s Own Scottish Borderers; 2nd Hants. 15th Brigade—2nd Cheshire; 1st East Lancashire; 2nd South Wales Borderers; 2nd North Stafford; 83rd, 84th, and 85th Field Batteries; 9th Company Royal Engineers.

Ninth Division.—(Major-General Sir H. Colvile).—3rd (Highland) Brigade (MacDonald’s)—1st Argyll and Sutherland; 1st Highland Light Infantry; 2nd Seaforth Highlanders; 2nd Royal Highlanders (Black Watch). 18th Brigade—1st Essex; 1st Yorkshire; 1st Welsh; 2nd Royal Warwick.

Cavalry Division.—(Major-General (Local Lieutenant-General) French).—1st Brigade (Broadwood)—10th Hussars; 12th Lancers; Household Cavalry. 2nd Brigade (Porter)—6th Dragoon Guards; 6th Dragoons (two squadrons); 2nd Dragoons; New Zealanders; Australians. 3rd Brigade (Gordon)—9th Lancers; 16th Lancers; Horse Artillery; G, P, O, R, Q, T, U Batteries.

Troops with Lord Roberts.—Gordon Highlanders; 2nd Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry; 2nd Shropshire Light Infantry; Canadian Regiment; Roberts’ Horse; Kitchener’s Horse; City of London Imperial Volunteers (Mounted Infantry Company); 2nd, 38th, 39th, 44th, and 88th Field Batteries; A Battery R.H.A.; 37th and 65th Howitzer Batteries; three Naval 4.7-in. guns; part of Siege Train.

It will be seen by the above that General Colvile had been appointed to the command of the Ninth Division, while Colonel Pole-Carew was transferred from the command of the Ninth Brigade to that of the Guards Brigade, and was succeeded in the former post by Colonel Douglas, late Chief of the Staff to Lord Methuen.

Having viewed this force, it becomes somewhat interesting to note how smoothly wheel turned within wheel. The movement began by the concentration of General French’s division at Ramdam. On the morning of the 12th the infantry appeared, and General French moved on, crossed Dekiel’s Drift on Tuesday the 13th, and captured Klip Drift and Drieput Drift, on the Modder River. Following him closely on the 12th came the divisions of General Tucker and General Kelly-Kenny. The latter division was accompanied by Lord Kitchener and his staff. The negotiation of the first drift, which was almost impassable for transport, next occupied the ingenuity and tested the perseverance of the troops. The drifts, like the kopjes, are the almost unconquerable bogies of South Africa. They are the natural defences of the country, offering obstruction on every hand, and, however boldly you may storm the kopje, you must with infinite patience negotiate the drift. This is no small undertaking, for drifts, in a way, partake of the paradoxical character of individuals—the weaker the person, the more difficult is he to manage; the more insignificant the river, the greater the perverseness of the drift. It resolves itself in both cases into a question of narrowness. Small streams and small minds are banked up too high to allow moving room in their midst. The result of an attempt to advance is congestion of a painful kind. At this particular drift it was found impossible for the team of mules to lug the formidable waggon-loads up the north bank, and at last the feat had to be accomplished by adding relays of oxen to assist in the tremendous labour. Finally, by 4 A.M. the next morning the troops got across, General Tucker’s division marching to within some three miles of Jacobsdal, and hugging the river all the way, so as to run no risk of being without water. General Kelly-Kenny followed, marching from Waterval Drift to Wegdraai on the morning of the 14th, and proceeding thence at 5 P.M. on the same day to Klip Drift, which was reached in the middle of the night. The rapidity with which this rush on his heels was accomplished enabled General French, who had been awaiting the arrival of the infantry, to proceed on his flying swoop for the relief of Kimberley. This, as we know, was accomplished on Thursday the 15th of February. Meanwhile the wheels of the strategic machinery were going round. A small cavalry patrol had entered Jacobsdal, which town was found to be full of wounded, including many of our own invalids from Rensburg. On the way back the mounted infantry were attacked, and Colonel Henry was fired on by a party of Dutchmen who were concealed in the vicinity of the river, and so sudden was the attack that nine men were wounded. Colonel Henry, Major Hatchell, and ten men were missing. A battery of artillery shelled the environs of the place, and put to flight such Boers as were hanging about, whereupon the British remained masters of the situation. Thus it will be seen that while the Dutchmen were fleeing from Jacobsdal, from Alexandersfontein, and from the neighbourhood of Kimberley, for fear of being cut off, they had surrounding them Lord Methuen at Majersfontein, General Tucker at Jacobsdal, General Kelly-Kenny at the Klip and Rondeval Drifts, General French on the north, and General Colvile wheeling around, ready to suit his movements to any emergency. In this manner Cronje found the teeth of a trap preparing to close on him, and recognised that there was no alternative but to “make a bolt for it.”

Thus the first part of the programme was accomplished. Kimberley was automatically relieved; Cronje was on the run. But his running was no easy matter. Since Lord Roberts’ strategy had come into play, there was a prospect of a neck-and-neck race between the mobile Boer and the mobile Briton, and success depended on General French’s ability not only to rout but to head off the retreat of the Dutchman. That the British cavalry commander should outmatch him in celerity was a contingency which had not occurred to Cronje; that he should advance independently of the rail, and start off across the Riet to trek to the Modder, was described by one of his countrymen as distinctly “un-British.” Whether this epithet was used to denote admiration or contempt we cannot say. Certain it was that the wily persecutor of Mafeking and Kimberley thought that the secret of the art of trekking was confined to himself and his rabble, until he discovered, too late, that the equally wily French with his disciplined legions was ready to ride over him. On the 16th of February the astonished commandant, with a horde of 10,000 Boers, was scudding in full retreat towards Bloemfontein. On all sides were Boer laagers in a state of abandonment—stores, tents, food, Bibles, raiment—everything had been left by the amazed and panic-stricken Dutchmen. Dronfield, Saltpan, Scholtz Nek, and Spyfontein were now evacuated. Under cover of darkness the investing hordes had taken to their heels, leaving behind them even herds of cattle and ammunition, in their desire to gain a loophole of escape. But they soon found that, wherever they might go, there was the rumour of British opposition, an armed and avenging race advancing!

The fact was that the trekking of the Boer hordes had been adroitly discovered by Lord Kitchener, who, having detected an unusual haze of dust in the distance, at once gave orders for the mounted infantry not to follow French, but to pursue the enemy. Accordingly, to quote the Times correspondent, who was present:—

“The mounted infantry rode in pursuit across the plain, endeavouring to get to the north of the convoy, while General Knox’s Brigade was pushed along the north bank of the river, which makes a large bend to the north between Klip Drift and Klipkraal Drift, to strike the convoy on its southern flank. Cronje sent on his waggons to Drieputs Farm, at the north-eastern end of the bend, where they laagered at about eleven, and maintained a running fight with our troops all day. The skill with which the Boers conducted this rear-guard action extorted unqualified praise from all our officers. As the detachments on the extreme right of the Boer line were driven back by our mounted infantry, they rode round behind their centre and took up fresh positions on their left against the 81st Battery and Knox’s Brigade, which were advancing along the north bank of the river. At midday the Boers attempted to hold three low kopjes two miles north-east of Klip Drift, but were driven back to a stronger position at Drieputs.”

CAPTURE OF A BOER CONVOY BY GENERAL FRENCH’S TROOPS NEAR KIMBERLEY.
Drawing by Stanley L. Wood, from a Sketch by an Officer.

Fighting went on throughout the day. At seven o’clock on the evening of the 16th it became almost possible to see the end; the artillery had commenced the vigorous shelling of the laager, and all the divisions moving on the great axis were now aware that Lord Roberts’ strategic plan was likely—how soon they knew not—to be crowned with success.

But we must here break off to eulogise the wonderful activity of Kelly-Kenny’s division, which acquitted itself so honourably. The march from Graspan to Brandvallei beyond Klip Drift, a distance 55¾ miles, was accomplished in five marching days. The Light Brigade on the eve of the battle of Talavera did sixty-two English miles in twenty-six hours, losing only seventeen stragglers by the way. They accomplished this feat by adopting the peculiar step invented by Sir John Moore, three paces walking alternating with three paces running, which enabled them, when tracks were suitable, to cover six miles an hour! No such evolutions as these were possible, owing to the torrid weather and the necessity to take precautions against exposure in the open veldt during midday. The temperature may be imagined when it is stated that in one day about sixty-six soldiers sun-stricken fell out of the ranks. On the morning of the 12th of February the infantry marched some nine and a half miles from Graspan to Ramdam, and from thence on the 13th moved to Waterval Drift. On the 14th they proceeded to Wegdraai, and on to Klip Drift, which was reached in the small hours of the 15th. Here, notwithstanding their fatigues, the 13th Brigade at once engaged with the enemy’s rearguard, and exhibited splendid fighting qualities, which in the circumstances were remarkable even for Englishmen. The West Riding, Gloucesters, Buffs, and Oxfords had a warm time during the whole of the 16th, as the enemy from kopjes beyond the river in the region of Klipkraal assailed them for nearly eight hours, assisted by a pom-pom which caused considerable loss. Though a furious sandstorm later on permitted the Boers under cover of night to get away, abandoning seventy-eight waggons, the next morning the invincible Sixth Division started in pursuit. Captain Trevor (1st East Kent Regiment), Lieutenant Shipway (2nd Gloucester Regiment), and Colonel M’Donnell, R.A., were wounded in the course of the engagement. Major Evelegh, Oxford Light Infantry, while proceeding to join his battalion in the Sixth Division with a small convoy and escort, was surrounded by a large party of Boers, and after a gallant defence was forced to surrender.

Fighting and marching without ceasing, the infantry went to Brandvallei and thence to Paardeberg, where they arrived at 9.30 P.M. on the 17th, in time to take a brief rest prior to the operations which have yet to be described, and in which they took such a prominent part. The marching, considering the tremendous heat and the difficulty of obtaining water, was a feat of which General Kelly-Kenny might justly have felt proud. Though plodding along incessantly through the heavy burning sand under a sun which baked and frizzled even through their uniforms, these men maintained patience and cheerfulness in a rare degree. The whole force was animated by complete faith in their commander, and moved unanimously like some magnificent piece of machinery, scarce taking time to eat or sleep in the zest of their persistent pursuit of the enemy. And they were not alone in their zealous performance of their share in the great scheme. The nicety and precision of the transport arrangements may be imagined when we remember that at one time four divisions were moving independently of their base, making marches across the arid waterless tracks, and carrying with them the necessaries of life for a healthy working multitude. A new regime had begun, and the mobility of our columns had grown equal to that of the Boers, while the railway had been relegated to a subordinate place in the strategical plan.

Colonel Graham, in his “Art of War,” declares that “to organise the means of transport for an army acting at a long distance from its principal magazines, in a country where it is entirely dependent on its own supplies, is a problem difficult of solution.” Now, the solution of this problem was due to the wonderful talent of Lord Kitchener, who was earning his right to be looked upon as the greatest military organiser of his generation. But his gigantic effort did not increase the popularity of the late Sirdar. He ran counter to too many private interests. The army is too intersected with grooves to be crossed without a few nasty jars, and it was scarcely possible for so young and successful a general and a peer—one possessed of almost criminal good luck and amazing moral as well as physical courage—to be looked upon by his contemporaries-in-arms with excessive approval. The secret of discord was given in a nutshell by Mr. Ralph of the Daily Mail. He wrote:—“His first conspicuous act when in South Africa was the withdrawal of the transport service from separated commands in order that it should be managed by the Army Service Corps. Thus it came about that every brigadier and colonel saw a certain amount of his power shifted to what he considered a subordinate branch of the service. A goodish degree of latitude in the enjoyment of comforts and extras, which had been made possible when these officers controlled the waggons, was also curtailed. The army wailed and gnashed its teeth, but I confess I always thought that reason and right were on Lord Kitchener’s side in this matter. Lord Kitchener’s plan was the only one by which an insufficient number of waggons and teams could be utilised for all that they were worth.”

The mobility of an army depends on the reduction of transport, and to the task of organising transport sufficient to ensure the mobility of 100,000 men the hero of Omdurman applied himself with his customary thoroughness. He conceived the gigantic ambition of doing away with all distinctions of transport, regimental, departmental, ammunition, or ambulance, and merging them in an immense whole, thus creating a single general corps, and it was doubtless to this conception and the able way that the scheme—with the assistance of Colonel Richardson—was carried out, that Lord Roberts owed the expedition of his march to Bloemfontein and the further success which resulted from his sure and swift rushes onward. Ordinarily speaking, in the army each unit is allowed its own transport. For instance, colonel, adjutant, and orderly-room are allotted by regulation a tent apiece. Every three officers share a tent, every fourteen men another. Staff-sergeants, batmen, and other details are proportionately provided for. Mounted officers are allowed 80 lbs. baggage, double the amount allowed for “smaller fry.” Without going into minute particulars, we may reckon that a brigade would move with 70 waggons and a division with about 180. To reduce the huge encumbrance of say some 2000 waggons, with their complement of oxen and drivers, was a stupendous labour, from which, with its consequences, this military Hercules did not shrink. Each unit was taken in hand, and its excrescences—regulation excrescences, we may call them—were cut down, peeled of all superfluities, much to the disgust of the staff officers and various other personages who stickle for their rights, and resent any innovation that threatens to dock off an iota of the creature comforts that belong to them by the divine right of red-tape and red-book regulations.

Not only were the rules of transport revised, but special hints tending to the development of the initiative of the private soldier were issued to the troops. Herewith is appended the notable document which may be said to have marked the beginning of the new era:—

Cape Town, February 5, 1900.

The following notes by the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief are communicated for the guidance of all concerned.—By order,

Kitchener of Khartoum, Chief of Staff.

Notes for Guidance in South African Warfare

Cavalry

1. On reconnaissances or patrols not likely to be prolonged beyond one day, the cavalry soldier’s equipment should be lightened as much as possible, nothing being taken that can possibly be dispensed with.

2. It has been brought to my notice that our cavalry move too slowly when on reconnaissance duty, and that unnecessary long halts are made, the result being that the enemy, although starting after the cavalry, are able to get ahead of it. I could understand this if the country were close and difficult, but between the Modder and the Orange Rivers its general features are such as to admit of small parties of cavalry, accompanied by field-guns, being employed with impunity.

Artillery

3. If the enemy’s guns have, in some instances, the advantage of ours in range, we have the advantage of theirs in mobility, and we should make use of them by not remaining in position the precise distance of which from the enemy’s batteries has evidently been fixed beforehand. Moreover, it has been proved that the Boers’ fire is far less accurate at unknown distances. In taking up positions, compact battery formations should be avoided, the guns should be opened out, or it may be desirable to advance by sections or batteries. Similarly retirements should be carried out, at considerably increased intervals, by alternate batteries or sections, if necessary, and care should be taken to travel quickly through the dangerous zone of hostile artillery fire.

The following plan, frequently adopted by the Boers, has succeeded in deceiving our artillery on several occasions.

Suppose A to be a gun emplacement, the gun firing smokeless powder. Simultaneously with the discharge of the gun at A a powder flash of black powder will be exploded at B, a hill in rear, leading us to direct our projectile on B. Careful calculation with a watch, however, will defeat this plan.

Infantry

4. The present open formation renders it difficult for officers to exercise command over their men, except such as may be in their immediate vicinity. A remedy for this would appear to be a system of whistle calls, by which a company lying in extended order could obey orders as readily as if in quarter column. I invite suggestions for such a system of whistle calls as would be useful.

5. It is difficult to recognise officers as equipped at present, and it seems desirable they should wear a distinguishing mark of some kind, either on the collar at the back of the neck or on the back of the coat.

6. Soldiers, when under fire, do not take sufficient advantage of the sandy nature of the soil to construct cover for themselves. If such soil is scraped, even with a canteen tin, a certain amount of cover from rifle fire can be obtained in a short time.

7. The distribution of ammunition to the firing line is one of the most difficult problems of modern warfare. One solution, which has been suggested to me, is for a portion of the supports gradually to creep forward until a regular chain of men is established from the supports (where the ammunition carts should be) right up to the firing line. The ammunition could then be gradually worked up by hand till it reached the firing line, where it could be passed along as required. This would, no doubt, be a slow method of distributing ammunition, but it appears to be an improvement on the present method, which is almost impossible to carry out under fire.

8. Reports received suggest that the Boers are less likely to hold entrenchments on the plain with the same tenacity and courage as they display when defending kopjes, and it is stated that this applies especially to night-time, if they know that British infantry are within easy striking distance from them. How far this is true time only can show.

Roberts, Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief, South Africa.

To return, however, to the great advance. Much of the travelling was done by night, in order to save the oxen from the trying temperature of the day, though even during the night the heat was equal to that of an ordinary British midsummer. In addition to the painful toil of motion over the heavy, sandy, rugged leagues, there was the hourly danger of attack. Cronje had made known his need for reinforcements, and at the time, from the south, Andries Cronje was moving, and from the north, Commandants Snyman and Fournie, while from other quarters and in the direction of Ladysmith there was the belief that Boer hordes might be advancing. There was only one encounter with the Dutchmen, but it ended in a mishap that was a serious one, for the results were felt for days afterwards, and helped to try the heroism of the troops who engaged in the movement to the uttermost. A convoy of 180 waggons, one-quarter of the total transport, containing forage and provisions, was lost at Waterval Drift. An interesting picture of the terrible passage of the drift was given by a sapper who accompanied the convoy:—

“It was a pitiful sight to see the poor infantry fellows played out, some dropping with a slight sunstroke, and the cattle dropping dead in all directions. We moved sometimes by day and sometimes by night. Night-time was the best on account of the oxen working much better in the cool of night. Nothing occurred of note with us—but our fellows were fighting every day in front on their way to Kimberley—till we got to Riet River or Drift, which was a terrible pass in the river. Miles and miles of transport had to pass through a narrow passage across the drift, and it took a terrible time for one waggon to pass over, let alone the hundreds that had to pass. We were lucky to get across and encamp below a hill for the night. Next day they still continued to pass the drift, in fact they had been at it all night, and still hundreds of waggons to come on. The Boers evidently knew of this obstacle, and a party came up from the south and had vengeance on the column, as they couldn’t on the fighting line. It was a lucky thing for us we were clear, or else we might have found our baggage gone and ourselves put over the border (i.e. sent to Pretoria or shot). The Boers took up position in the hills and shelled the waggon convoy. The nigger drivers are terrible cowards, and all fled to the hills or kopjes near at hand, leaving the waggons and oxen to the mercy of the Boers. Some of the oxen we succeeded in driving back into our camp on the other side of the river. The good old New Zealanders (who have proved of great use and very daring in this campaign) rode over to where the nigger drivers were, and threatened to blow their brains out if they didn’t return to the waggons, which they did after the Boers had left off shelling for a bit, after doing a terrible lot of damage. Lord Bobs came up just as they were going to try and get some of the waggons away, and said ‘Let them go.’ Our loss proved to be over £100,000, which I am glad to say we recovered later. The Boers thought this convoy was lost purposely, and when we arrived here we found the whole of it except what had been sent to our prisoners at Pretoria.”

Troop of the 10th Hussars with Nordenfeldt Gun.
Photo by H. Johnston, London.

The unpleasant adventures of E Squadron of Kitchener’s Light Horse, who were taken as prisoners to Pretoria, make a separate narrative of themselves, as they took place while the main body was moving on to the relief of Kimberley.

The squadron was attached to General French’s column, and took part in the engagement at Riet River. On its way to the relief of Kimberley, a halt was made at a farm a short distance from Modder River, and part of E squadron was detached to hold a well of water until the arrival of another column, expected in four hours, and then to advance along with them. The relieving column never arrived. Squadron E held the position for four days without food against a large force of Boers. They (E Squadron) occupied an old farmhouse. They loopholed the walls, and although continuously harassed by the Boer fire, they managed to maintain their position and the post they were placed in charge of. During that time they had to subsist on water only, and that brackish. Their horses were dying daily, as there was not a blade of grass on the veldt, and the stench was abominable. On the third day of the siege a poor goat that had wandered near the besieged was immediately captured and devoured. On the fourth day they commandeered one of the enemy’s horses, which they intended to slaughter, their own being too emaciated for that purpose. But the Boers, having been reinforced, gave them no time to do the butchering. On the evening of the fourth day a messenger bearing a letter from General de Wet arrived, demanding surrender within ten minutes. The Boer force consisted of 500 men and two 12-pounders. The officers consulted together, and decided, in view of the hopeless condition of their little garrison of fifty all told, worn out and starving and their horses dead, to accept the inevitable.

While all this was going on, and Cronje was making the discovery that he might be completely outflanked, and that the position of the Boer army at Spyfontein must become untenable, Lord Roberts was entering into Jacobsdal. The place was orderly and quiet. The three churches were full of patients, the town having been used mainly as an hospital. The invalids, for the most part, were sufferers from enteric, the result of too much Modder River. After a long and painful intimacy with the grilling veldt, the sight of houses and civilised dwellings struck gratefully on the eyes of the incoming troops. A store was hailed as a veritable godsend. Some one bought a tin of oatmeal, and walked off with it as one who had secured a prize; some one else gave a goodly price for a pot of pickles, and came away licking his lips like a modern Eliogabalus. The rejoicing was no mean emotion, for the unfortunate men, with the appetites of athletes, had been existing on lovers’ fare. One of the famished but cheery fellows wrote: “We marched into Jacobsdal, and as soon as we arrived we thronged the stores for provisions. I made the following purchases for three of us:—

Then we gorged ourselves to make up for three weeks’ semi-starvation. The most prominent building of Jacobsdal is the church, which stands in the centre of the town. The town itself lies in a hollow—Sleepy Hollow would be an apt title for the place just now. Most of the houses, including the church, are at present converted into hospitals, and the female population are acting as nurses. Most of them are in mourning for relatives lost during the campaign.” Later, the troops moved on and encamped at a farm which had also been used as an hospital. Sights pathetic were only too common—our own sick and wounded in various stages of suffering, and outside, to use a “Tommy’s” description, “some poor devils wrapped in sheets ready to be put to bed for the last time!”

GENERAL CRONJE.
From a Photo by M. Plumbe.

Lord Roberts visited the large German hospital, and expressed himself well pleased with the splendid cleanliness of the place and the general evidences of good management. Among the sufferers was found Colonel Henry, who had been taken prisoner on the 14th. Strangely enough, all the inhabitants of the place evinced satisfaction at the arrival of the British, particularly on making the discovery that it was not the habit of the British troops to loot and destroy, as they had been led by the Burghers to believe was the case. They were now made acquainted with the proclamation which Lord Roberts issued to the Burghers of the Orange Free State when his force invaded their territory. It was printed both in English and Dutch:—

“The British troops under my command having entered the Orange Free State, I feel it my duty to make known to all Burghers the cause of our coming, as well as to do all in my power to put an end to the devastation caused by this war, so that, should they continue the war, the inhabitants of the Orange Free State may not do so ignorantly, but with full knowledge of their responsibility before God for the lives lost in the campaign.

“Before the war began the British Government, which had always desired and cultivated peace and friendship with the people of the Orange Free State, gave a solemn assurance to President Steyn that, if the Orange Free State remained neutral, its territory would not be invaded, and its independence would be at all times fully respected by Her Majesty’s Government.

“In spite of that declaration, the Government of the Orange Free State was guilty of a wanton and unjustifiable invasion of British territory.

“The British Government believes that this act of aggression was not committed with the general approval and free will of a people with whom it has lived in complete amity for so many years. It believes that the responsibility rests wholly with the Government of the Orange Free State, acting, not in the interests of the country, but under mischievous influences from without. The British Government, therefore, wishes the people of the Orange Free State to understand that it bears them no ill-will, and, so far as is compatible with the successful conduct of the war and the re-establishment of peace in South Africa, it is anxious to preserve them from the evils brought upon them by the wrongful action of their Government.

“I therefore warn all Burghers to desist from any further hostility towards Her Majesty’s Government and the troops under my command, and I undertake that any of them who may so desist, and who are found staying in their homes and quietly pursuing their ordinary occupations, will not be made to suffer in their persons or property on account of their having taken up arms in obedience to the order of their Government. Those, however, who oppose the forces under my command, or furnish the enemy with supplies or information, will be dealt with according to the customs of war.

“Requisitions for food, forage, fuel, or shelter made on the authority of the officers in command of Her Majesty’s troops, must be at once complied with; but everything will be paid for on the spot, prices being regulated by the local market rates. If the inhabitants of any district refuse to comply with the demands made on them, the supplies will be taken by force, a full receipt being given.

“Should any inhabitant of the country consider that he or any member of his household has been unjustly treated by any officer, soldier, or civilian attached to the British army, he should submit his complaint, either personally or in writing, to my headquarters or to the headquarters of the nearest general officer. Should the complaint on inquiry be substantiated, redress will be given.

“Orders have been issued by me prohibiting soldiers from entering private houses or molesting the civil population on any pretext whatever, and every precaution has been taken against injury to property on the part of any person belonging to or connected with the army.

“Roberts, Field-Marshal, Commanding-in-Chief, South Africa.”

THE HERDING OF CRONJE

To return to General French. The cavalry division bivouacked outside the town of Kimberley, but their repose was limited. At 3 A.M. on the morning of the 16th they were up and doing. The enemy in the north was giving trouble. Some sharp fighting took place, during which Lieutenants Brassey (9th Lancers) and P. Bunbury were killed. This early activity was tough work for the already weary troops, who had been fifteen hours without a meal. Indeed, it was generally remarked that the relievers looked sorrier specimens of humanity than the relieved. The Colonial troops, the Queensland and New Zealand Contingents, and the New South Wales Lancers, considering all things, were wonderfully fit after having played a conspicuous part in the operations. These troops had joined General French’s column from the regions of the Orange and Modder Rivers. The New South Wales Lancers rode on the extreme right flank of the first brigade, and their ambulance corps, under Lieutenant Edwards, kept up with the column, and was complimented on being the first ambulance to cross the Modder River. Like the rest of the troops, they had taken their share of small rations, merely nominal rest, sun-scorching, and maddening thirst, and yet were full of zeal—“keen as mustard,” as some one said—to engage in the herding of Cronje and effect his capture. Worn out as they were, they had sprung to attention on a rumour brought in by a despatch-rider to the effect that Cronje had evacuated Majersfontein and was in full retreat.

At midnight on the 16th, no confirmation of this news had been received. The jaded troops, and still more jaded horses—mere skeletons in horse’s skins—were preparing for real repose, when all was changed! A telegram arrived from Lord Kitchener saying that Cronje, with 10,000 men, was in full retreat from Majersfontein, with all his waggons and equipment and four guns, along the north bank of the Modder River towards Bloemfontein; that he had already fought a rearguard action with him; and that if French, with all available horses and guns, could head him and prevent his crossing the river, the infantry from Klip Drift would press on and annihilate or take the whole force prisoners.

Here was a surprise! Pleasant yet unpleasant, for shattered men in the last stage of fatigue. But General French—whom some one has described as possessing the shape of a brick, with all the solid and excellent qualities of one—rose to the occasion. He was on the point of going to sleep, but there was no thought of rest now. Arrangements had to be made, horses weeded—out of a division of 5000 only one brigade was fit to move!—more borrowed from the Kimberley Light Horse, whose holiday-time had come, and other preparations hurriedly set on foot to ensure an immediate rush—a swoop that should be as swift and successful as it was startling!

One may imagine the midnight picture. The dark immensity of veldt—the dust-driven, sweltering veldt—and Cronje, miles ahead with his horde, the remnant of his convoy, his women and children, fleeing along the north bank of the Modder, harassed by the Sixth Division, threatened by the Seventh and Ninth, and yet longing to cross the river, to get safely to Koodoosrand Drift, where he hourly expected reinforcements would come to his succour. French, dead beat after glorious work accomplished, rising from the first hospitable pillow he had seen for days—springing suddenly to action, ordering, organising, deciding how to effect the great swoop on Koodoosrand Drift and head off the fugitive. There was no time for the buckling on of mental and moral armour; only the warrior at soul could have been ready for such a situation. But such an one was here. He gave swift orders. In three hours’ time General Broadwood and his brigade and three batteries of artillery—the only ones available out of seven—sallied forth towards the east, in the dusk of the morning. Their destination—Koodoosrand Drift—was some forty miles off, and once here Cronje’s last loophole of escape would be gone! The General and his staff followed at 4.15 A.M., riding at full speed, and catching up the brigade about fifteen miles off.

The whole nature of their errand and the proposed movement was a surprise, for this manœuvre had not entered into General French’s original calculations.

When the General had seen the Sixth Division safely at Klip Drift and secured his left flank, he proceeded on his rush to Kimberley. Of other movements save his own he was ignorant. Even as he and the troops were riding into the town, Cronje, who had discovered the futility of his position at Majersfontein and the danger of it, was trekking madly across the front of the Sixth Division. On the morning of the 16th Lord Kitchener, hearing that the Majersfontein laager and the Modder River camp were deserted, and seeing a cloud of dust in the distance, had guessed what was happening, and immediately altered his plans to meet the emergency. As we are aware, he instantly gave orders for the mounted infantry not to follow French, but to pursue and attack the Boer convoy, while he telegraphed later to French, with the results just described. General French grasped the position at a glance. He knew no time was to be lost, and soon Broadwood’s brigade, with horses that could barely move, was pushing on as fast as spurs could insist. The early morning dusk broke into the green and grey and gold of dawn; birds flew frightened hither and thither; foxes rushed to their holes; springbok and hares tempted the sportsmen, but never a glance to right or left was wasted. All eyes were strained to the east, to the momentous east, and the wooded banks of the distant river. Nearer and ever nearer they came—specks were seen on the horizon—men?—horses?—the enemy moving?—scudding away before he could be cornered? No—Yes? A moment of excitement, anguish—joy! The General had mounted a kopje, reconnoitred, and discovered the truth. It was Cronje’s force—the remnants of his convoy some 4000 yards off—the convoy streaming down into the drifts that lead to Petrusberg and thence to Bloemfontein! They must never reach that destination! Kitchener’s words—“Head him and prevent his crossing the river”—so simple in sound, so complex in execution, thrilled every heart. Quickly the guns were got into action—grandly—almost magically—the first shot plumped—bang! in front of the leading waggon just as the convoy was preparing to descend the drift! What a reveillé! Cronje, as we know, was rushing from the clutches of the Sixth Division at Drieputs. Breathless, he gathered himself together. Suddenly he found himself assailed by a new force—a new terror! He divined in a moment what had happened. It was French, the ubiquitous French—French redivivus, as it were—who was putting the finishing touch to the chapter of disaster. Poor Captain Boyle, in his letter to the Nineteenth Century, thus described the great Dutchman’s plight:—

“His only chance now was to sacrifice his guns and convoy, and cut his way across the river under the heavy fire of our guns. Immediately on the first shell bursting in the laager, about thirty Boers galloped out to seize a kopje on our right, afterwards called Roberts’ Hill; but the 10th Hussars in a neck-and-neck race had the legs of them, and seizing the hill in advance, beat them off with their carbine and Maxim fire. The Boers from their laager answered our shell fire for a short time with great accuracy from two or three guns. But these were quickly silenced, and shell after shell from Artillery Hill fell plump into the laager. Finally, our second battery was moved to a little distance from Roberts’ Hill and opened fire from the southern slope on to a kopje to which the Boers had retired. All that afternoon at intervals our guns poured shells into the laager, but no response came, and we spent our time watching the Boers, now 3000 yards away, entrenching themselves in the open and along the river-bank. Their waggons caught fire and the ammunition exploded, and as they realised their position more and more, so must their hearts have sunk. Anxiously must they have waited for the first sign of the infantry gathering round, as anxiously as we did in our turn watching from the high kopjes.

“The cavalry, worn out as they were and without food, had to hold the kopjes and water their horses in turn some five miles off. They got what grazing they could in the kopjes as they lay there, for no corn had come on from Kimberley, and neither men nor horses had had any food except the three days’ rations with which they originally started from Klip Drift the Thursday before, a good deal of which had been shaken off the saddles or lost in the long gallop up the plain to Kimberley. The General, the men, the horses, all alike had to live on what was found at Kamilfontein—a few mealies, a few onions, and the crumbs of biscuits in our pockets were all we had until some Free Staters’ sheep and cattle were rounded and killed. Had it not been for this plentiful supply of meat, the men must have fared very badly for the next three days. No transport came in until Monday night, and the horses had but 1½ lb. of corn in three days. The men were put on half rations of biscuits even after the transport arrived.

“Meanwhile, on Saturday afternoon about 5 P.M. Broadwood sent word to French that in the far distance he observed the dust rising, which he took for Kelly-Kenny’s division. French returned to Roberts’ Hill, and, until the sun set, anxiously awaited the arrival of the infantry—but they marched but slowly. From 6 P.M. till 7 P.M. we opened fire again from our batteries to show Lord Kitchener our exact positions.” The splendid work done by the Royal Horse Artillery was described by another eye-witness. He said: “I will give you an idea of what good gunners we have in the Artillery. General French said to one of the gunners, ‘See those three waggons over there? (a distance of about 3½ miles); see what you can do with them.’ The gunner fired three shell, and the waggons were no more.”