TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE

Footnote anchors are denoted by [number], and the footnotes have been placed at the end of the book.

Some minor changes to the text are noted at the [end of the book.] These are indicated by a dashed blue underline.

THE HISTORY OF THE
9TH (SCOTTISH) DIVISION
1914-1919

THE MENIN GATE, YPRES

THE HISTORY OF THE
9TH (SCOTTISH) DIVISION

1914-1919

By JOHN EWING, M.C.

BREVET-MAJOR, LATE 6TH K.O.S.B.

INTRODUCTION BY

FIELD-MARSHAL LORD PLUMER

G.C.B., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O.

WITH COLOURED AND OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS
AND MAPS

LONDON

JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W.

1921

All rights reserved

Dedicated
TO THE CHILDREN
OF ALL THOSE WHO SERVED
IN THE 9TH (SCOTTISH) DIVISION

INTRODUCTION

By FIELD-MARSHAL LORD PLUMER,
G.C.B., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O.

I have been asked, as Commander of the Second Army, to write a short introduction to the history of the work of the Ninth (Scottish) Division during the Great War.

The Division served in other armies and under other Army Commanders, and they could, and I know would, bear testimony similar to mine as to the value of the services of the Division; but it happened that for a considerable period in the early days of the Campaign and in the glorious final advance it was in the Second Army, and presumably on that account the invitation was made to me.

First of the new formations organised by Lord Kitchener in 1914, the Division was one of the earliest to proceed to France in 1915, and from that time till the conclusion of operations in 1918 there was hardly a phase of the war or an important action in which they did not take a prominent part.

Composed as they were of troops drawn from the land which has from time immemorial been famous for its fighting men, they were later in the campaign supplemented and strengthened by soldiers from South Africa, and the combination proved, as it was bound to be, irresistible.

Fortunate in their Divisional Generals, their subordinate leaders and their staffs, the Division was always one which could be relied on to carry out successfully any duties entrusted to them if it was humanly possible to do so, and any Corps or Army Commander to whom they might be allotted considered himself fortunate in having them under his command.

I hope this history will be widely read.

It is a record of a wonderful development of fighting efficiency steadily maintained throughout four very strenuous years.

It is a fine illustration of the determination and dogged pertinacity which we are all proud to know were the characteristics of the troops of the British Empire throughout, and which undoubtedly won the war.

It points the moral of what can be accomplished by a body of men who never recognised defeat, and to whom any temporary failure was merely an incentive to further effort.

Those who served in the Division can feel that they are handing down to their descendants as a legacy of imperishable fame a record of achievements worthy of the glorious traditions of their forefathers and of the regiment whose name they bore.

With troops such as fought in the Ninth Division, however prolonged the struggle may be, there never can be any doubt of the ultimate issue.

Plumer, F.-M.,
Late Commander, Second Army, B.E.F.

Malta, 17th October 1920.

PREFACE

This story has been compiled from Battalion, Brigade, and Divisional diaries, supplemented by the narratives of individual officers, and, it is hoped, will prove a record of interest to all who served or were connected with the Ninth Division.

To the numerous officers of the Division who have assisted me by their suggestions and criticisms and by the loan of documents, I take this opportunity of expressing my deep sense of gratitude. My sincere thanks are due also to the Staff of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence for the ready courtesy with which they placed at my disposal every facility for consulting documents and maps.

To the following officers for constant and ungrudging help I am particularly indebted,

Captain W. Y. Darling,
Lieut.-Colonel P. A. V. Stewart,
Lieut.-Colonel T. C. Mudie,
Major W. Lumsden,

and to my wife for most valuable assistance both in the compilation of the narrative and in the correction of proofs.

J. Ewing.

Edinburgh,
October 1920.

Note.—The titles of infantry battalions are given in full in the Order of Battle, [Appendix I.], but to save space in the narrative the word “battalion” has been omitted, eg., the 11th Bn. The Royal Scots is referred to as the 11th Royal Scots.

With the exception of Loos all battles are described from right to left.

CONTENTS

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

MAPS

At End of Book

[1.] Loos.
[2.] The Somme, Longueval, and Delville Wood.
[3.] The Butte de Warlencourt, October 1916.
[4.] Arras: Action of 9th April 1917.
[5.] Arras: Actions of 12th April to 5th June 1917.
[6.] Passchendaele: Action near Frezenberg, 20th September 1917.
[7.] Passchendaele: Action near St Julien, 12th October 1917.
[8.] The Retreat on the Somme, March 1918.
[9.] Wytschaete and Kemmel, April 1918.
[10.] Meteren and Hoegenacker: July and August 1918.
[11.] The Final Advance, September to October 1918.

HISTORY OF THE NINTH (SCOTTISH)
DIVISION

CHAPTER I
ARMS AND THE MAN
August 1914 to May 1915

The great European War that broke out in 1914 was the inevitable result of the conditions that moulded the nineteenth century. In many respects the history of the century had disappointed the high hopes with which the period opened. The overthrow of Napoleon’s hegemony in 1814 imposed on his conquerors the task of effecting the settlement of Europe, and it was expected that the chief Powers would grasp the opportunity to settle all questions that had been a source of friction, and especially to satisfy those nationalist aspirations which had been the most potent factor in contributing to the defeat of Napoleon. It was even hoped that an attempt would be made to realise the brotherhood of man in some sort of federation.

In all these respects the work accomplished by the Congress, which met at Vienna in 1814, fell short of expectations. The chief statesmen of the Powers had been the foremost opponents of the French Revolution, and they had little sympathy with the nationalist sentiment that found its most vigorous expression in Germany, Italy, and Poland. Moreover, the political ambitions and interests of the allies required the most delicate handling, if Europe was to be saved from another war. Thus the Eastern Question, the cause of considerable uneasiness throughout the century, never came within the consideration of the Congress. No attempt was made to express the unity of Europe in any form of federation, unless the Holy Alliance be accepted as an effort to achieve that end. Above all, the necessity of satisfying the political interests of the various members of the alliance, in many cases already arranged by treaties, caused nationalist aspirations to be neglected, and in some cases flagrantly disregarded, as in the arrangements affecting Belgium, Italy, and Norway. Thus Nationalism could only be developed in opposition to the Vienna Settlement and only by war could its aims be realised. In consequence the development of nationalities, which is the notable fact of the century, was accompanied by the assertion of military force, and the freedom of nations went hand in hand with militarism. What had been won by the sword was maintained by the same means, and towards the close of the nineteenth century Europe formed an armed camp, each nation supporting a huge armament, which drained its resources but which it dared not diminish lest it should fall a prey to a more powerful neighbour.

With Europe thus constituted every question that revealed rivalries and differences was a peril, and there was no influence so baneful as that exercised by the Eastern Question. On more than one occasion it caused the gravest anxiety to the Chancelleries of Europe, and war was averted mainly by reason of the comparative equality of the opposing groups formed by the chief states. In the last quarter of the century the predominance of Germany was the governing factor in the situation. She built up an alliance of the Central European states and her influence displaced that of Russia in Constantinople. The full scope of her ambitions was not realised in this country, but it was vaguely felt that they were not compatible with the interests of the British Empire. Certain definite events showed that German policy, though not actively hostile, was unfriendly to us. She seized the opportunity created by the Jameson Raid to fling the first open challenge to British power, and one of the principal results of the Boer War was the creation of the German Fleet, which could only have been intended as a weapon against Britain. In other directions the claims and threats of Germany constituted a constant danger to the peace of the world. She picked quarrels with France over Morocco in 1904 and 1911, and openly made preparations to support Austria against Russia in 1907. Her increasing truculence in foreign affairs ultimately forced Britain, France, and Russia into a close agreement in order to safeguard their interests.

The occasion of war was the assassination of the Austrian Archduke Francis Ferdinand in the streets of Serajevo on the 28th June 1914. But the emotions aroused by this despicable crime would never have led to war had it not been for the determination of Germany to bring matters to a crisis. Her designs in the Balkans and Asia Minor largely depended upon the cordial co-operation of Austria, of which she could be certain only while the Emperor Francis Joseph was alive. In 1914 he was already over eighty years of age, and it was advisable to turn to account the quarrel between Serbia and Austria caused by the Serajevo murder.

The nature of her ties with France and Russia as well as the invasion of Belgium by German forces compelled Britain to take arms against Germany. No other course was possible. The significant and gratifying feature of our intervention was the unanimity with which general opinion supported the Government, and very few protested against the obligations that honour required the nation to undertake.

The war formed by far the most exacting test to which the democracy of Britain had yet been subjected. The last great European War had been waged by Britain under an aristocracy, which, despite many mistakes, had ultimately achieved victory by steadfast and unquenchable courage. There were many, especially those of the type who, like Thucydides, doubted the ability of a democracy to govern an Empire, who feared that the resolute spirit of Pitt and Castlereagh had vanished, and that the country would take refuge in ignoble neutrality. But all fears and doubts were dissolved by the manner in which the nation as a whole took up the gage that the Kaiser had thrown, and the course of the struggle showed that the Empire possessed in full measure the more robust qualities it had shown under royal and aristocratic rule, though before victory was achieved it had surrendered all power to a small oligarchy, and allowed itself to be subjected to a degree of compulsion and restraint that had not been contemplated when hostilities began.

It was fortunate that the name and services of Lord Kitchener were at the disposal of his country, for no other man enjoyed to such an unusual degree the trust and esteem of his compatriots. He was universally recognised as the man pre-eminently fitted to lead the nation in its hour of peril, and his perspicacity and sanity of judgment inspired general confidence. It is difficult to over-estimate the sobering and steadying influence that his personality exercised throughout the land. Perhaps more quickly than any other man he grasped the gravity of the situation, and his first speech as Secretary of State for War warned the people of Britain that the conflict would not be the short, sharp affair many expected it to be.

All available resources for war were immediately employed. The small but extremely efficient Regular Army, at once transported to France, played no inconsiderable part in checking the first onrush of the German armies, while the Navy swept the seas and bottled up the hostile fleet in its harbours. But our Regular land forces, amounting to little more than 150,000 men, were a scanty and inadequate contribution to the titanic contest that was raging in Europe, and Lord Kitchener asked the civilian population to furnish fresh armies. His appeal was answered with magnificent alacrity; recruiting offices, which were opened in every large town in the United Kingdom, were besieged by volunteers and the staff had to work day and night to cope with the rush.

The pick of the nation offered itself for service. Youth, which had hitherto satisfied in sport and athletics its craving for adventure, was attracted rather than repelled by the novelty and danger of war, and young men in thousands left workshops, offices, and universities to join the Colours. Others, not so numerous, were drawn from the class of casual labourers, and they cheerfully submitted themselves to a routine more irksome though more wholesome than any to which they had been accustomed. There was a minority of more mature men who, having envisaged the situation, bravely sacrificed their prospects on the altar of duty. The standard of physique was exceptionally high, and many who afterwards passed the tests with ease were rejected in the early months of the war. After selection the “First Hundred Thousand,” the salt of their race, were sent to the various battalion depots, and then on to the training camps near Salisbury Plain.

One of the first divisions formed from the New Armies was the Ninth (Scottish) Division, and its composition was as follows:—

The first three brigades had four 18-pounder guns and the 53rd Brigade four 4·5 howitzers, and each brigade had a B.A.C.

In addition to these units the Division was equipped with Ordnance and Veterinary Sections, D.A.D.O.S. being Major J. S. Brogden, and the A.D.V.S. Major W. H. Nicol. There were also a battery of R.G.A., a company of Cyclists, and a squadron of the Glasgow Yeomanry.

During the period of training several changes in command occurred. General Mackenzie went to France in October 1914 and was succeeded by Major-General Sir C. Fergusson, who had commanded the Fifth Division in the original Expeditionary Force. In March 1915 Sir C. Fergusson crossed to France to take over the II. Corps and his successor was Major-General H. J. S. Landon. In the 26th Brigade Brig.-General E. St G. Grogan, C.B., succeeded Brig.-General Kelham on the 16th November, while Lieut.-Colonel Harry Wright, D.S.O., a veteran of the famous Kandahar march, took over the command of the Gordons in February 1915; in the 27th Brigade, Brig.-General C. D. Bruce succeeded Brig.-General Scott Moncrieff in January, and Lieut.-Col. R. C. Dundas was appointed to the command of the 11th Royal Scots in October. Changes occurred also amongst the Gunners and the Sappers, and by the time the Ninth was ready to cross the Channel the 50th Brigade was commanded by Lieut.-Col. C. C. van Straubenzee, the 52nd by Lieut.-Col. A. M. Perreau, and the 53rd by Lieut.-Col. K. K. Knapp, while the 63rd Field Company was commanded by Major L. W. S. Oldham, and the 64th by Major G. R. Hearn.

After the various units were organised, training[2] was carried on with the utmost vigour. An average of eight hours a day was spent in fitting the men for the grim business of war; it was a heavy strain but their keenness and excellent physique enabled them to undergo the hardships without a murmur. The difficulties at this early stage were enormous owing to scarcity of instructors and lack of stores, clothing, and arms, but there was a sprinkling of Regular officers and N.C.Os., and with their skilled assistance the several units soon reached a very creditable state of efficiency.

The problems regarding stores and clothing were solved comparatively quickly, but at first the men in their civilian clothes with various types of headgear presented an appearance more ludicrous than martial. The training was on lines identical with those of the old army and a similar syllabus was carried out with satisfactory results. The hardest lot fell to the young recently commissioned officers; they went through exactly the same routine as the men but they were also obliged to spend their spare time learning their particular duties as officers. The parsimonious scrutiny to which in peace times all army estimates had been subjected now showed its crippling effects. The manual dealing with tactics and strategy, Field Service Regulations, was excellent in its statement of general principles but it did not give a young officer, unfamiliar with military terms, much assistance in such a matter as the handling of a platoon. In this respect the German Army was much better equipped than ours and possessed numerous pamphlets for the guidance of junior and non-commissioned officers in their profession. The war revealed the need of similar assistance for the British Army and a spate of unofficial publications flooded the book-shops, but none were as good or as useful as the official pamphlets, notably S.S. 143 and S.S. 135, which unfortunately did not appear until the war had been long in progress. The lack of such guidance in 1914 was almost as serious as the scarcity of munitions and added enormously to the difficulties of training.

The course of training was naturally affected by experience of the war and lectures by officers from France were followed with the closest attention. The siting of trenches gave rise to a keen controversy which raged for a considerable time; some held that they should be dug on the forward slopes of a hill, others that they should be on the reverse slope. But the experience of France showed that such niceties and distinctions were really unimportant and could be disregarded, since men dug in only where the enemy allowed them to do so. The infantry devoted much time to musketry and digging, and as a fair proportion of the men were miners the Division became very proficient in the rapid excavation of trenches.

As the weeks passed the troops were gradually taken through the various stages necessary for efficiency, and training by units was followed by field manœuvres in which the whole Division took part. Reviews and route marches were always welcome as a change from the ordinary routine and the divisional field days in March and April were an agreeable as well as a useful exercise. Esprit de corps had taken firm root in the several formations, and each unit, after the fashion of all British soldiers, considered itself the salt of the army. The divisional esprit de corps had not yet attained the fierce intensity that was afterwards to distinguish the Ninth; that resulted later from the ordeal of battle, but a good start in the right direction had been made.

After eight months of incessant and strenuous training the men were fit and eager for active service and instructions for a move to France were daily expected. But in 1915 spring had passed into early summer before the orders were received. With them came a rousing exhortation from H.M. King George V. on the 10th May:—

“Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, and Men of
the Ninth (Scottish) Division,

“You are about to join your comrades at the Front in bringing to a successful end this relentless war of more than nine months’ duration. Your prompt patriotic answer to the Nation’s call to arms will never be forgotten. The keen exertions of all ranks during the period of training have brought you to a state of efficiency not unworthy of my Regular Army. I am confident that in the field you will nobly uphold the traditions of the fine regiments whose names you bear. Ever since your enrolment I have closely watched the growth and steady progress of all units. I shall continue to follow with interest the fortunes of your Division. In bidding you farewell I pray God may bless you in all your undertakings.”

CHAPTER II
FIRST EXPERIENCES IN FRANCE
May 1915 to September 1915

All units had practised entraining, and the move to France was accomplished without a hitch. The artillery were the first to go, the advance parties leaving Bordon on 8th May; the infantry brigades left in order of priority, beginning with the 26th on the 10th May. Vehicles, animals, and transport crossed from Southampton to Havre, and the infantry from Folkestone to Boulogne. By the 15th May the whole Division was concentrated around the pleasant and important little town of St Omer. It had the distinction of being the first division of the New Armies to reach France.

After spending two days near St Omer, the Division marched to billets south of Bailleul, the average march for each unit being 15 miles. G.H.Q. were established at the Château le Nieppe; the 26th Brigade was at Bailleul; the 27th at Noote Boom; and the 28th at Outtersteene. Arrangements were quickly made to train the various branches in trench warfare. All the field artillery brigades, except half of the 51st R.F.A., were attached to the Sixth Division for instruction. The 9th Heavy Battery went over to the III. Corps, and from this moment ceased to be a corporate part of the Division. Similarly the infantry received their first experiences of trench duties under the Sixth Division, and spent a spell in the line near Armentières by brigades at a time. The 27th Brigade moved into the front line on the evening of the 20th May; it was relieved on the 22nd by the 28th, and it in turn on the 24th by the 26th Brigade, which remained in the line till the 26th. Sappers were employed by the III. Corps in improving the second line defences near Armentières, and the infantry soon realised that they were expected to be as useful with the shovel as they were with the rifle. On the 27th May the 26th Brigade proceeded to Nieppe and Armentières “under the tactical orders of the Sixth Division”; this fine phrase simply meant that the men had to work on trenches and strong points.

Meantime the Division received constant instruction in bombing. When the opposing trenches lay near each other, it was dangerous for a man to show himself above the surface, and a method had to be discovered by which hostile positions could be attacked without the aggressors having to expose themselves to rifle or machine-gun fire. The only weapon that could fulfil this purpose was the bomb. In the hands of determined men it was a useful and valuable weapon, and against a vigilant and stubborn enemy it was sometimes the only means by which progress could be made. In 1915 and the early part of 1916 there were few men on either side who were not pugnacious, but the trouble was that when troops became stale with months of underground warfare, the bomb fight tended to result in a stationary conflict, no serious effort being made to gain any ground. In 1915, however, there was no staleness, the chief difficulties being the large variety of bombs and the multiplicity of names that each bomb possessed. Most of them were worked by a time fuse, but the stick hand-grenade exploded on percussion and was a weapon probably more dangerous to the thrower and his comrades than to the enemy. The Mills No. 5 Bomb, which afterwards became the standard one used by the British Army, was exploded by a time fuse of five seconds; but more common at that time was the Bethune Bomb, which was the one chiefly used by the Division at Loos. With all these varieties the average man could throw between 20 and 30 yards. For a longer distance, rifle-grenades, that is bombs fired from rifles, had a range up to about 200 yards. Heavier bombs could be thrown by trench mortars, of which there were at first numerous types, and several kinds of catapults were used. An imposing-looking engine was the West Spring Gun. It could hurl a bomb about 400 yards, but required eight men to work it, and needed an enormous emplacement, which a hostile aeroplane would have had little trouble in spotting. It threw up the bomb a tremendous height into the air; if a cricket ball were substituted for the bomb, that gun would form an excellent contrivance for giving cricketers practice in catching. The trench mortars in use at the time had all the same defect: they were cumbersome, and could not be quickly brought into action.

Many hours were devoted to the training of the men in the art of bomb-throwing, and factories for making bombs were started by the Sappers. Unfortunately on the 27th May a deplorable accident caused considerable loss of life. A factory at Nieppe Station was blown up, and Lieut.-Col. Uniacke, the A.A. and Q.M.G., who was riding past at the time, was killed. Six officers and 4 men were wounded, and 7 men killed. Every reasonable precaution had been taken by the Sappers in charge, and the explosion was probably due to the instability of the explosive.

While the Division was still near Bailleul, it was visited by Sir John French who inspected the 27th and 28th Brigades on the 29th May. Near the end of the month the 26th Brigade received a new Commander, Brig.-General Grogan[3] returning to England and his place being taken by Brig.-General A. B. Ritchie, C.M.G., on 30th May. By the 2nd June all detachments had received some slight experience of the trenches. On the 6th, the Division marched by night to training grounds near Busnes where D.H.Q. were installed, and till the 25th, training was carried on vigorously, particular attention being paid to bombing. On the 16th, speculations on the possibility of the Ninth taking part in a battle were aroused by it being placed under readiness to move at two hours’ notice. This order was due to an unsuccessful engagement carried out by the British Army near Festubert, but the Division was not required and training continued without interruption.

On the 26th June orders were received to relieve the Seventh Division in the line near Festubert, and accordingly the 26th and the 27th Brigades took over the front line on the nights of the 1st and 2nd July. The 28th was in reserve. This was the first occasion on which the Division was responsible for a section of the front line, which it held east of Festubert until 18th August, and during this period all ranks became acquainted with the trials of trench warfare.

The advantage of ground was with the enemy. Occupying the ridge east of Festubert the Germans were able to control their artillery-fire by direct observation. The weakest point in our line was “The Orchard,” a sharp salient, which was held at tremendous cost and risk; and it was here that the Division had most of its casualties, as the enemy kept it constantly under fire from artillery and trench mortars. Our artillery could do little at that time to help the infantry. For every shell that we had the Germans had ten, and each attempt to retaliate resulted in a fiercer and heavier bombardment. Until our gunners were supplied with enough material to enable them to compete with the enemy, the best policy was to refrain from annoying him. The infantry particularly disliked the feeble efforts at retaliation by our artillery because they alone felt the consequences. For a similar reason all trench mortar officers[4] were unpopular. When a mortar was fired that particular section of trench was drenched by the enemy with “Minnies.”[5] It was therefore natural for the garrison to treat trench mortars and their teams with disapproval if not hostility, and it was usually only by stealth that the T.M. officer was able to fire at all.

FESTUBERT

Another part of our line to which the enemy paid considerable attention was an old trench lying between the front and support trenches, known as the “Old German Line.” We did not occupy it on account of its stench and filth, but the Germans believed that we did, and persistently shelled it. They were encouraged in their error. A few men were sent to light fires in this trench, and after they had performed their task they withdrew in haste; for as soon as the enemy observed the smoke rising, he commenced to shell vigorously. No one was known voluntarily to enter this trench except the Prince of Wales, who used to prowl round it in search of souvenirs. He paid a number of visits[6] to the line while we held it, and his natural daring must often have caused his escort the keenest anxiety. It was not safe to go up to the forward saps in daylight, but His Royal Highness insisted on doing so, and he also took a photograph of a wounded man who was being carried down from one of them.

In spite of the immense preponderance that the enemy enjoyed in artillery, the men found in the life more of interest than of peril. Patrolling was a new form of enterprise that appealed to the bolder spirits. 2nd Lieut. Bellamy of the 11th Royal Scots took over a patrol of three men in broad daylight on the 5th June, and on reconnoitring found that the enemy had constructed a new trench. On the 13th June, 2nd Lieut. Murray of the 12th Royal Scots stalked a German patrol and shot one man; and on the same night Corporal Morrison of the 6th Royal Scots Fusiliers frightened away a working-party and brought back a chevaux de frise. Even the commonplaces of trench life had at this time the spice of novelty, but an incident that happened to Sergeant J. M’Hardy, of the machine-gun section of the 8th Black Watch, was certainly unusual as well as whimsical. This N.C.O. had just hung up his kilt in the trenches to dry when the back blast of a shell blew it over the parapet towards the enemy’s lines. The unfortunate man had to go kiltless until dusk, when he hopped over and recovered his garment. On the 8th July, the Divisional area was visited by Lord Kitchener, who inspected the 26th Brigade, at that time in reserve, and detachments of the Ninth between Locon and Hinges.

On the 18th August the Division was relieved by the Seventh, and moved to the training area near Busnes, where D.H.Q. were established. On the next day it was again visited by Lord Kitchener, who inspected it in a big field, and he expressed himself as highly pleased. From this date till the end of the month training was carried on continuously, and the men were frequently practised in issuing rapidly from their own trenches and attacking another line. These manœuvres raised hopes that they would soon be tested in an important battle.

The whole Division was anxious for a fight. It had now been more than three months in France, and had become thoroughly acquainted with the ordinary routine of trench warfare. Life had turned out to be much less trying than most of the men had imagined, for casualties had been comparatively few, and there had been no thrills. It was always unpleasant, of course, when the trenches were pounded, but these periods were only occasional and seldom of long duration. It was not the danger, but the drabness of trench life that worried the men, who found that the outstanding features of this kind of warfare were hard work and discomfort. The latter however they were compelled to get rid of as soon as possible, and most of them quickly became skilled in constructing habitable and cosy dug-outs. The trivial round was one of constant toil, and cleanliness was insisted on more as a necessity than as a virtue. The chief strain was due to the interruption of sleep; for the exigencies of trench duties made it impossible for anyone to sleep for more than a few hours at a time.

Above all, the men felt that the reputation of the Ninth could not be solidly established without a battle. They yielded to none in their admiration of the magnificent feats accomplished by the grand regiments of the line, which had borne the first shock of the German hordes; but they were anxious to show that they were both fit and ready to take their place with the regulars. The fierce test of action was needed to reveal the worth of the Division, and every man hoped that it would not be long delayed.

It soon came. When on the 2nd September the Ninth took over from the First Division the trenches east of Vermelles, the men had reached the scene of their first battle.

The plan of a large operation had been adumbrated at the beginning of August, but had it depended on the situation on the Western Front it is doubtful if any important enterprise would have been attempted. The costly failure of the joint British and French offensive in May proved that the Western Allies had not yet accumulated the preponderance in artillery necessary to secure the superiority of fire that was essential for success. Both in numbers and in quality the allied infantry surpassed that of the enemy, but the German defences were skilfully selected, strongly fortified, and powerfully supported by artillery.

Events on the Eastern Front, however, rendered it imperative to create a diversion. The summer was a period of disaster for the Russian Armies; they had been out-generalled and were retiring rapidly before the vast German and Austrian forces, which, focussing on Warsaw, had made those gigantic outflanking movements that had ended in the capture of that city. It was feared that the fate of Petrograd hung in the balance. The Western Allies therefore decided to help the hard-pressed Russians by an attack on a large scale, which might bring some tangible gains, and would at least compel Germany to transfer forces to the West and thus weaken her offensive in the East.

The general scheme drawn up by the High Commands of the Allied Forces reflected their hopes rather than their expectations. The French Tenth Army and the I. and IV. Corps of the British Army were to advance due east in the direction of Valenciennes; at the same time the French main attack was to be made from Champagne on Maubeuge. If these enterprises were successful, the victorious forces would join hands about Valenciennes and Maubeuge, thus cutting off all the enemy within the salient, Rheims-Royon and Arras.

The plan was too ambitious. The reluctance of the British leaders to undertake a premature operation was perfectly justified, and when they committed themselves to an attack, they ought to have limited themselves to a scheme proportionate to their resources. It is therefore impossible to condone the reckless optimism that shaped the plans for the Battle of Loos. They revealed a disposition to underrate the adversary. The lessons of the German failures at Ypres, of the battles at Hill 60, and of the Allied offensive in May were ignored. If an attack had to be made, it should have been confined to the capture of tactical points within a limited objective. A break-through was then impossible. The experience of the war and the resources at the disposal of Sir John French did not justify the attempt in 1915, and the presumptions of the Higher Command were shattered by the facts of the battle.

The task of the First Army was to pierce the first and second lines of the German defences from Haisnes in the north to Hulluch in the south; then, after capturing Meurchin and Pont à Vendin, to move rapidly on Carvin, and so protect the left flank of the French Army. The northern part of the operation was to be carried out by the I. Corps, the southern part by the IV. Corps. In order to give this enterprise every chance of success, subsidiary attacks were to be made on other parts of the British front to prevent the enemy from reinforcing the main point of attack.

Conscious of its weakness in artillery material, the British Command hoped to compass the demoralisation of the foe by a discharge of gas along the front of the principal onslaught. This was the first occasion on which the British Army used gas,[7] and it was hoped that its effect would so paralyse the defenders that the assaulting troops would be able to secure with little resistance the German second line in spite of the wire that was too far distant for the artillery to cut.

The task of forming the northern defensive flank[8] of this attack was entrusted to the Ninth Division, which, after carrying the line Railway Work—Fosse No. 8—to Haisnes, was to push on to Douvrin. Similarly, the southern division of the IV. Corps was to form a defensive flank facing south near Loos. If these flanks were secured and consolidated, it was expected that the intermediate divisions of the I. and IV. Corps, supported by the XI., would be able to force their way between these flanks as far as the Deule Canal, and even farther if the resistance of the enemy was negligible.

There was a gap between the right of the British forces and the left of the Tenth French Army. In this area lay the colliery district of Lens, consisting of masses of miners’ cottages, pits, and slag-heaps, admirably adapted for an obstinate and protracted defence. During the French offensive north of Arras in May and June advance had been slow and losses heavy, owing to the stubborn opposition of the Germans posted in the villages of Carency, Givenchy, and Souchez. The Lens area afforded even greater advantages to the defenders, and it was decided that the French and British forces should work round the south and north of the town and join hands to the east of it.

An operation of importance involves an enormous amount of hard work and anxiety for all branches of the Staff, from G.H.Q. down to brigades. The Staff[9] is the brain of the Army, and its function is to supply everything—from bombs to operation orders. It consists of two distinct branches: the A. and Q. branch, which is responsible for discipline, procuring supplies, and making arrangements for the comfort of the troops in such matters as billets and baths; and the G. branch, which is concerned with training and operations. For success, the best devised plan depends greatly upon the care with which details are worked out. The actual attack is made by the infantry. Upon the dash and gallantry of the soldiers and the initiative and resource of the subordinate commanders, the Higher Command has to rely for the consummation of its hopes; but the arduous task of the infantry is considerably eased if the preliminary preparations are the best possible from the resources at the disposal of the Staff. Good Staff work consists in eliminating chance and hazard and in strengthening assurance of success.

The frontage on which the Ninth Division was to assault was 1600 yards. On the 16th August, the G.O.C., Major-General Landon, held a conference, when the proposed operations were discussed. It was decided to assault with two brigades, each with two battalions in the front line, the 26th on the right and the 28th on the left, with the 27th in reserve.

The objectives of the 26th Brigade were, first, the Hohenzollern Redoubt, Fosse Trench and Dump Trench; and second, a line on the east side of Fosse 8 through the Three Cabarets to the Corons de Pekin (first objective). Should this task be accomplished, the brigade was to go on to the neighbourhood of Pekin Trench (second objective). If at this stage the line was prolonged to the north by the 28th Brigade and the Second Division, the 26th and 28th were to advance east on Douvrin. Should, however, the Second Division fail, these brigades were to attack Haisnes and form a defensive flank facing north-east.

On the left, the 28th Brigade had first to secure the Railway line from the Corons de Marons to the junction of Les Briques and Train Alley (first objective), and then advance to its second objective in the neighbourhood of Pekin Trench. The further action of the brigade depended upon the progress of the Second Division.

The 27th Brigade was to be in reserve some 2000 and 2800 yards in rear of the front line. Its rôle was either to support the attempt on Fosse 8, or if that was successful, to move on to Haisnes and Douvrin. Battalion commanders were given a free hand as to the formations to be adopted, subject to the proviso that each unit was to be in three lines.

The date of battle, after several postponements, was eventually fixed for the 25th September.

The task of the Division in its first important engagement was not an easy one. In the excitement of battle even the best of soldiers are liable to go astray if they are required to change direction at any time during the advance. For this reason it is desirable that objectives should be allotted so that it is possible for the assailing troops to advance at right angles to their position of assembly. In the present case the advance in a north-easterly direction up to the line of the Fosse fulfilled these conditions, but from this point the Ninth was required to swing east and converge on a narrower front. Fortunately the difficulties of this operation were diminished by the presence of such conspicuous landmarks as the villages of Haisnes, Cité St Elie and Douvrin, but it was nevertheless an extremely complicated one for an untried division to undertake.

The Ninth took over the line east of Vermelles on the 2nd September, and arrangements had to be made at once so that all preparations would be completed before the battle. The front trenches, as taken over from the First Division, were too far from the German line to be suitable for the forward assembly trenches. The First Division had projected an attack on the Hohenzollern Redoubt, and for that purpose had pushed forward a number of blind saps. Our first intention was to join up the blinded sap-heads by a parallel, and open them up just before the onset; but as gas was to be used, the saps were opened up at once and then joined by new fire trenches. This was accomplished in one night, each battalion digging 350 yards, thus bringing our front trenches within 150 yards of the German line. In addition, a support line was made in the rear, with numerous short communication trenches running back to the old front line, with the result that it was possible to accommodate the whole Division in the trench system.

As it was imperative to regulate the traffic with a view to preventing congestion on the day of attack, special communication trenches were prepared for the wounded. For each of the attacking brigades two communication trenches were allotted, one to be used for “up” traffic, the other for “down,” and to diminish the chance of confusion, each was labelled and marked. On the capture of the enemy front line, these communication trenches were to be connected with it; and, to save time and labour, blinded saps were run forward 50 yards and more. In all, about 12,000 yards of trenches were dug before the battle.

The chances of success largely depended upon the ability of the artillery to demolish the enemy’s defences. Until the moment of the assault the artillery were under the orders of the Corps. Unfortunately the heavy guns at the disposal of the Corps were few in number, there being only twenty 6-inch Howitzers and twelve of higher calibre.

The infantry attack was to be preceded by a four days’ bombardment. The 18-pounders had to cut the wire along the enemy’s front. Known and suspected strong points were to be shelled; and during night, paths, roads, communication trenches, houses, and all places where the enemy was likely to collect, were to be kept under fire. In the work of sweeping approaches, machine-guns were to co-operate with the artillery. The preliminary bombardment was arranged for the 21st September, its object being to pulverise the German fortifications and to demoralise the defenders. Only in this way could the neutralisation of the hostile rifle and machine-gun fire necessary for an attack by infantry be secured. In order to keep the Germans uncertain of the exact time of the assault, two feint attacks were arranged. At noon on the 21st September, the 26th Brigade was to induce the garrison of the Hohenzollern Redoubt to man its parapets by preparations that seemed to indicate an immediate attack; thereupon the German trenches were to be shelled with shrapnel. A similar operation against Madagascar Trench was to be undertaken by the 28th Brigade on the third day of the bombardment.

The orders for the artillery were issued on the 20th September. On the morning of the battle, first the enemy front line system, then Pekin Trench, and the Three Cabarets were to be shelled for ten minutes. In the following ten minutes the artillery-fire was to be brought back to the front line for five minutes; it was then to move east and remain for thirty minutes in the vicinity of Pekin Trench between Haisnes and Cité St Elie. The great proportion of shell used was shrapnel; H.E. was limited and was used chiefly by the heavy artillery.

The control of its own artillery reverted to the Division at the moment of the assault. In order that no opportunity might be lost in the event of a rapid success, two batteries were earmarked to follow up the infantry. These were to be taken out of their emplacements on the night of the 24th, and kept limbered-up ready to advance at a moment’s notice. Forward positions for these guns and observation posts were reconnoitred from a study of the map and of the country from Annequin Fosse; and three roads were prepared and bridged where they crossed the trenches. Other bridges were to be carried by the batteries to enable them to cross captured trenches. One brigade of artillery was affiliated to each of the assaulting infantry brigades and the remainder was kept under the immediate control of Brig.-General Armitage.

The effect of machine-guns and trench mortars depends chiefly on the resource of the team commanders. Each of the infantry battalions had four machine-guns, while fourteen were distributed in rear of the front line to co-operate with the artillery. Five minutes after the commencement of the bombardment, these guns were to open intensive fire on hostile communication trenches for thirty minutes. During night they were to play on enemy communication trenches, and on the wire to prevent the Germans repairing the gaps cut by the artillery-fire. On the day of the attack they were to open intensive fire five minutes after the beginning of the bombardment for fifteen minutes; they were then to fire deliberately for ten minutes, thereafter resuming intensive fire for other ten.

On the right of the Division an important rôle was assigned to the trench mortars. Between the Ninth and the Seventh Divisions was an interval of 200 yards; and to cover this gap 2-inch trench mortars and 2-inch Stokes mortars were to fire smoke-bombs to prevent the enemy in Big Willie from enfilading the left of the Seventh. It was realised that the most formidable task had been allotted to the 26th Brigade and arrangements were made for one 2-inch mortar, one battery of 1½-inch mortars, and one Stokes gun to go forward with it.

The discharge of gas formed an essential part of the scheme of the British Army; and its effects were expected to make up for deficiency in artillery material.[10] The Germans were known to have safeguards against gas, but it was hoped that they would be taken by surprise, and that the fumes would be rolling over their lines before they had time to don their helmets. At the worst, it was expected that the discomfort of wearing the helmets would impair the efficiency of their troops and partly demoralise them.

The gas was to be discharged from cylinders, each weighing from 130 to 160 lbs., and emplacements were made to accommodate twelve at intervals of 25 yards along the front of the Division. The work of carrying up and fixing the cylinders in position was a heavy business. They were brought by train to a siding east of Bethune, where the road ran alongside the railway, and at night they were transferred to lorries, each of which carried about thirty. The lorries were then driven to Cambrai and Vermelles, where they were met by carrying parties, which conveyed the cylinders to the front line.

These parties were organised in groups of thirty-six men for every twelve cylinders, and each group was commanded by an officer. The work was unpopular as well as arduous, for the men had little liking for gas and none cared to handle anything connected with it. The cylinders had to be carried for more than 2000 yards up long and winding communication trenches, and when the weather was wet the heavy burden of the men was aggravated by the difficulty of maintaining their balance on the slippery duckboards. Occasionally shelled areas had to be traversed, an anxious period for any party with cylinders. To ease the work as far as possible, the communication trenches up which the men had to travel were marked by white arrows, and kept clear of unnecessary traffic. Fortunately the weather was favourable. If it had been otherwise, this weight could scarcely have been managed by three men. Altogether 4000 men were employed in the transference of 1200 cylinders. When these were fixed in their emplacements the infantry had no further responsibility concerning them, for they were then under the care of the Special Gas Company, R.E., which was to discharge the gas on the day of the assault.

In addition to the cylinders, each emplacement had four triple and eight single smoke-candles. These were to be lit by the infantry, and used alternatively with the gas, so that the period of discharge for smoke and gas would extend to forty minutes, as it was known that the enemy had, as a protection against gas, oxygen cylinders which lasted for only thirty minutes. Two minutes before the infantry left the front line, all gas was to be turned off and the smoke thickened by means of triple candles to form a screen behind which the infantry could form up and advance.

One Field Company, R.E., and one company of the 9th Seaforths (Pioneers) were attached to each brigade for the rapid consolidation of captured positions, and the digging of new communication trenches. Thus, the 90th Field Company, R.E. and “B” Company, 9th Seaforth Highlanders, were attached to the 26th Brigade, the 63rd R.E. and “D” Company, 9th Seaforth Highlanders, to the 28th, and the 64th R.E. and “C” Company, 9th Seaforth Highlanders, to the 27th. Supplies of ammunition, stores, and tools were placed at intervals along the whole front and, as far as possible, these dumps were made at the junction of the “up traffic” communication trenches, and the support line. As the bomb was to be the principal weapon of the infantry after the first stages of the attack, numbers of special bomb depots were formed. In addition to S.A.A., picks and shovels, water, medical stores, and rations were placed in the forward dumps.

Medical Aid Posts were arranged at convenient points. In order to effect the evacuation of the wounded from the forward areas with the utmost speed, each brigade dug one communication trench for wounded only. These trenches were wider than the usual communication trench, the corners being rounded off, so that stretchers could be carried with comparatively little inconvenience. A loop was made leading off them, about 2000 yards in rear, and in each loop was a dressing-station in a dug-out about the size of an ordinary room. Serious cases were to be brought round the loop, dressed, and then passed out at the farther end into the communication trench. Walking cases were expected to go straight on without passing through the loop.

The maintenance of communication was a most important matter, and every conceivable means, ranging from the pigeon to the human being, was to be used. The ordinary connection by telephone was to be established as far as possible, and visual stations, from which messages could be transmitted by flag or lamp, were to be set up as well as pigeon stations. Between the battalion commander and his company commanders the medium was the runner, the most reliable of all means of communication. The Division had one wireless set, which was worked by four men, and this was attached to the 26th Brigade H.Q.

The question of the men’s equipment for battle was important. A heavy weight would retard progress and exhaust their strength, yet it was necessary to supply them with sufficient material to consolidate their gains and to enable them to beat off enemy counter-attacks. Accordingly packs were dumped, the men going into action with haversacks only, and each one carrying two empty sand-bags, and all, except bombers, signallers, and runners, were to be supplied with 200 rounds of ammunition. Owing to the use of gas, the men on the morning of the attack were to wear their gas helmets like a cap.

All these preparations were satisfactorily accomplished by the evening of the 24th September. During this period of strain, the health of Major-General Landon broke down, and on the 8th September he returned to England and was succeeded by Major-General G. H. Thesiger, C.B., C.M.G. The G.S.O.I. was Lieut.-Col. S. E. Hollond, who joined the Division at the beginning of September, and the A.A. and Q.M.G. was Lieut.-Col. A. A. M’Hardy.

CHAPTER III
BATTLE OF LOOS[11]
25th to 28th September 1915

The terrain, which was the scene of the Division’s first battle, included the feature of greatest tactical importance on the front of the British attack. The general advantage of ground and observation was held by the enemy. East of Vermelles a railway, which ran north-east to join up with the railway connecting Bethune and La Bassée, screened the country west of it from German observation, except from their highest posts at Fosse 8 and the Tower Bridge at Loos, which overlooked the British lines except right down in the Vermelles valley. East of the railway the country was very open and the only trees were those that fringed the Hulluch road; the whole country bore a close resemblance to Salisbury Plain, or the moors of Linlithgow, with mine-heads and slag-heaps dotted about. East of Vermelles, the country ran nearly flat to a slight but important crest, then falling to a shallow dip where the trenches faced each other, rose again through the German trenches to another crest about 700 yards west of Cité St Elie. This crest concealed the second line of the enemy from ground observation.

LOOS

The main front lines of the British and the enemy were about 500 yards apart and between them jutted out in a south-west direction from the northern part of the German front line the maze of trenches and fortifications known as the Hohenzollern Redoubt. Direct communication between the Redoubt and the main line, which was here known as Dump Trench and Fosse Trench, was secured by two communication trenches, named North Face and South Face, running from north-east to south-west. Two trenches, Big Willie and Little Willie, running respectively east and north, protected the flanks of the Redoubt. But the chief features of the enemy’s defences were Fosse 8 and the Dump—an accumulation of débris, which is a familiar sight in all mining areas—and from these points the enemy could look right up the valley that was the scene of the British attack. Of equal importance was the Double Crassier on the extreme right which, with the Fosse and the Dump, formed the key of the whole tactical position, and until they were captured and held, guns could not be brought up to give close support to the infantry in any advance beyond the first system of trenches. If nothing more was secured, the operation would amply justify itself.

On the 21st September the preliminary bombardment commenced at 7 A.M., and in reply the German artillery fired little beyond their usual. At noon on the same day, the first of the feint attacks was made, when the 26th Brigade opposite the Hohenzollern Redoubt opened two minutes’ rapid fire with rifles and machine-guns on Big and Little Willie. In addition, the men did all that was possible to make the foe believe that an attack on the Redoubt was imminent; bayonets were shown over the parapet, dummies were moved about, the men shouted, and pipes and bugles sounded the charge. This demonstration caused the Germans[12] to man their parapet, and as our artillery deluged their front trenches with shrapnel five minutes after noon, it was believed[13] that heavy losses had been inflicted on the garrison. During the third and fourth days of the bombardment, the reply of the German artillery became more rapid and intense. When on the 23rd an operation, similar to that carried out by the 26th Brigade two days previously, was made by the 28th Brigade against Little Willie and Madagascar Trench, it was noticed that the enemy heavily shelled our reserve trenches. At night infantry patrols were sent out to ascertain the effect of our artillery-fire on the German wire, and their reports showed that numerous gaps had been made, but unfortunately on the front of the 28th Brigade patrols failed to examine the enemy’s wire.[14] This was largely due to the desire to save the men from being exposed to our own artillery-fire; but the omission had lamentable consequences. Not till the small hours of the 25th was the hour of zero communicated to the battalions. As the wind was favourable, the main operation was to be undertaken. Zero was fixed for 5.50 A.M., and forty minutes after zero the infantry were to leave the trenches.

At 5.50 A.M. our artillery opened, and gas and smoke were discharged along the whole front. The scene had a terrible grandeur, and the combination of gun-fire, gas, and smoke produced a wonderful effect of mingled whites, greys, yellows, and browns.

On the left of the Division, Brig.-General Scrase-Dickins arranged to attack with the 6th K.O.S.B. on the right and the 10th H.L.I. on the left. These were supported respectively by the 11th H.L.I. and the 9th Scottish Rifles, and they held the front line till the evening before the 25th, when their places were taken by the attacking battalions; the 63rd Field Coy. R.E. and “D” Coy. 9th Seaforths also took up their assembly positions that night. Unfortunately the arrangements of the brigade were upset at the last moment by the Second Division taking over a portion of its line, the 28th Brigade being left with only one communication trench for the passage of troops and for “up” and “down” traffic. Ten minutes after the crash of our guns had announced the hour of zero, the German counter-bombardment fell on the front and communication trenches; the supporting companies and battalions, which were moving up from the rear trenches to the front, suffered serious losses, which included Lieut.-Colonel H. D. N. Maclean, D.S.O., and his adjutant, Captain Keith of the 6th K.O.S.B.

At 6.30 A.M. the 6th K.O.S.B. and 10th H.L.I. left our front line and advanced in three lines against the German trenches. On the right, the leading companies of the K.O.S.B., now commanded by Major Hosley, pressed forward, at first without suffering very severely. Major Hosley was wounded on the parapet but refused to go back, and insisted on leading his battalion forward. The wind unfortunately was fitful and was not strong enough to carry on the gas, so the leading companies lay down until it had moved on. As soon as the two supporting companies crossed our front parapet, they came under a withering rifle and machine-gun fire, but in spite of many casualties they continued to push on and became mingled with the leading companies. More conspicuous now than the crash of the guns was the menacing and ominous “rat-tat” of the enemy machine-guns, and when the K.O.S.B. resumed their advance, officers and men were mown down by a terrible fire, to which they could not reply. Nevertheless the survivors pressed on with magnificent determination, but the German wire was found to be virtually intact. In front of the enemy’s line was a covered trench crammed with stakes and barbed wire and as soon as the foremost men stepped on the top covering, they fell through and became entangled amongst the wire. The air teemed with bullets, and the survivors, impotent to advance but too stubborn to retreat, had very heavy losses. The battalion was now leaderless. Of the 19 officers who went into action, 12 were killed and 7 wounded, and as a consequence the brigade received no news from the battalion during the morning. It is believed that a few men, favoured by incredible luck, forced their way into the German front trench, but being unsupported they eventually fell back and reached our original front line during the night.

The 10th H.L.I. on the left of the brigade had no better fortune. As the wind was too weak to carry the gas forward from our trenches, many of the men were suffering from the effects of it when they left the front line. At the very start the ranks of the battalion were thinned by a storm of shell, rifle and machine-gun fire, a considerable number being killed and wounded on the parapet. With fine courage the men pushed on but were unable to penetrate the enemy’s wire, which had been scarcely damaged. Before vicious machine-gun fire from Madagascar Trench, Railway Work, and Mad Point, the attack melted away, and most of the survivors struggled back to the trenches from which they had set out, none having broken through the German wire. The losses in officers and men were exceptionally severe; Lieut.-Colonel Grahame was gassed and his adjutant killed. As the whole signalling staff of Battalion H.Q. had been knocked out by a shell, Brigade H.Q. were without definite news of the disaster until noon, when Major H. C. Stuart reported in person.

In war, no news invariably means bad news, and consequently during the early hours of the attack suspense and anxiety reigned at Brigade H.Q. The gloomy forebodings with which the absence of information had filled the minds of Brig.-General Scrase-Dickins and his staff were deepened by a message, received from the 9th Scottish Rifles at 8.15 A.M., that the 10th H.L.I. were asking for reinforcements. As it was also known at 7.50 A.M. that the attack of the Second Division on the left had failed, there was no longer any reason to doubt that the brigade had experienced a serious check. Anxiety about the situation on the front of the 28th Brigade had an unsettling effect on the plans of the Division. The 26th on the right had in the meantime made good progress, but General Thesiger hesitated to support it with the full strength of the 27th until he had definite information concerning his left brigade. At 9.10 A.M., however, the Division learned from a telephone message that the attack of the 28th Brigade had been repulsed.

Since this check exposed the 26th Brigade to the chance of a counter-attack from the north, the left brigade was ordered to launch another attack, and after a thirty minutes’ artillery bombardment the 11th H.L.I. on the right and the 9th Scottish Rifles on the left advanced against the enemy’s lines at 12.15 P.M. But the bombardment was not sufficiently heavy to demolish the German strong points, and the only effect of the hopeless gallantry of the “Rifles” and the H.L.I. was greatly to increase the enormous losses of the brigade. The attack was swept away by the enemy’s rifle and machine-gun fire. As the result of these two attacks the 28th Brigade had lost about two-thirds of its effective strength and the great majority of its officers had been killed or wounded. It was now unfit for further action and was withdrawn to its original line, which it was barely strong enough to hold effectively.

The primary cause of the repulse was the failure of the artillery to cut the enemy’s wire. During the preliminary bombardment that wire ought to have been examined nightly by patrols, and the neglect to do so was a cardinal blunder for which the brigade had to pay a heavy price. The extravagant hopes entertained of the power of gas to demoralise the enemy had been rudely shattered; it was a hindrance and not a help, and its baneful effects were confined to our own men. In face of uncut wire and the enemy’s intact defences the attack could be no more than a forlorn hope, although with well-nigh incredible courage the men did all that men could do to achieve the impossible. It was a failure, but one that shed lustre on the men that failed.

The second attack was an offence against a well-understood military principle that was too often neglected in the warfare in France. When men have failed in an attack, it is generally futile to send other men to make another attack in the same way; it encourages the defenders and doubles the losses of the assailants. The hope of smashing, by an artillery bombardment of thirty minutes, defences that had remained intact after four days’ bombardment, betrayed an almost unbelievable optimism. The most feasible way was to send a part of the 27th Brigade to follow behind the 26th, and attack the enemy in Madagascar Trench from the south. But if no units of the 27th Brigade were available, it would have been wiser to send round some of the 11th H.L.I. and 9th Scottish Rifles to the Dump, from which point they could have assaulted the German positions from flank and rear. Persistence in a frontal attack showed a serious lack of flexibility in the Higher Command in making use of the resources of the Division.

On the front of the right brigade, Brig.-General Ritchie decided to attack with the 7th Seaforths on the right and the 5th Camerons on the left; these were supported respectively by the 8th Gordons and 8th Black Watch. The task of the leading battalions was to secure the first objective, which included the Hohenzollern Redoubt, the German main trench beyond it, and Fosse 8 with the Three Cabarets and the Corons de Pekin. When this was accomplished the Gordons and the Black Watch were to pass through, and, swinging in a south-easterly direction, capture the second objective. The assembly of the brigade and the units attached, the 90th R.E., “B” Coy. 9th Seaforths, and the trench mortar batteries, was completed on the evening of the 24th without a hitch, the two assaulting battalions being in position in the front and support trenches, and the support battalions in the reserve trenches.

The period prior to an attack is always a trying time, and the men welcomed the crash of guns that announced the hour of zero. At the same moment the gas and smoke were discharged, and the 2-inch trench mortars smothered Big Willie and the South Face of the Hohenzollern Redoubt with phosphorous smoke-balls.

At 6.29 A.M. the assaulting battalions jumped out of their trenches, and were marshalled for the assault in front of our own wire, screened by the smoke from the candles. This had the effect of steadying the men and allowed the advance to be made without confusion or disorder.

Between Fosse 8 and the Redoubt there was a hog-back ridge; the Seaforths and the Camerons advanced south and north of it respectively. At the very beginning the former lost touch with the latter, who were delayed for ten minutes by gas hanging in the front trenches. The Seaforths made straight for the Hohenzollern Redoubt, suffering considerable losses from rifle and machine-gun fire from the right flank, and captured the southern portion of it after a brisk fight, in which a good many officers were killed or wounded. Then the battalion bombed its way up the communication trenches to the German main trench, and without waiting for the Camerons, pushed forward past Fosse 8, clearing all the miners’ cottages and seizing the Three Cabarets. At this point the battalion, after being reorganised, lined the Corons Trench immediately east of Fosse 8 about 7.30 A.M. A few of the men slightly lost direction and wandered up the trench that led from the Corons to the ridge in front of Cité St Elie and Haisnes. The battalion had accomplished its job in very fine style and in good time.

On their left the Camerons had a ghastly experience. When, after a ten minutes’ wait to allow the gas to pass on, the men began to advance, they were shot down by a galling fire from the left, the first two lines of the battalion being almost annihilated. To cross that fatal field was a task that even the stoutest of men might have shirked without shame. But the Camerons were inspired by a compelling sense of duty, and undeterred by the fear or spectacle of death, they made of danger the spring-board of a leaping hardihood. With superb heroism they pressed doggedly through the fatal zone, where lay the greater part of the battalion. Nothing but death could stop such men. After capturing the Redoubt they moved on to Fosse 8 and, having made their way through the miners’ cottages, halted at the north edge of the Corons de Pekin about 7.45 A.M. The Camerons had reached their objective, but at a terrible cost; of the 800 men and 20 officers who crossed our line, only 2 officers and 70 men were left. It was a thrilling feat of arms, which men of the 5th Camerons will ever remember, and the very story of which served to inspire future drafts with the courage of the glorious dead.

Thus by 8 A.M. the Seaforths and Camerons had established themselves on the east of Fosse 8, and the men began to consolidate their positions. But there was a gap between the battalions, and the troops were heavily shelled from the Cemetery that lay south of Auchy.

Meantime the supporting battalions were advancing rapidly. At 6.30 A.M. the Gordons and Black Watch moved up from their positions in the reserve line to the front trenches. They crossed our parapet at 7 A.M., and with praiseworthy steadiness pressed through the hostile barrage, which was falling on our front line. The Black Watch lost greatly through heavy machine-gun fire from the north, their gallant C.O., Lieut.-Colonel Lord Sempill, being badly wounded. The Gordons, on reaching the Redoubt, took prisoner a number of Germans who had concealed themselves in shelter when the Seaforths passed over. At Dump Trench the Black Watch had a sharp fight with some of the enemy, who had been overlooked by the Camerons, and captured a number of prisoners. On their right a party of the Gordons bombed down to the Window in the German main trench, in order to clear the front for the Seventh Division.

After passing the main trench the bulk of the Black Watch, instead of swinging to the south-east, pushed on through the Corons and came into line between the Seaforths and Camerons beyond the miners’ cottages. The remainder of the battalion, roughly about a company, went on with the Gordons, who at 7.40 A.M. moved down Fosse Trench and then diverted their attack in an easterly direction on Cité St Elie and Haisnes. They carried and went over Fosse Alley and reached Pekin Trench a few hundred yards short of Haisnes soon after 8 A.M., but they had lost many of their number and could go no farther. The enemy’s resistance was far from being broken and the advance had been made under continuous shell and machine-gun fire. Haisnes was at that time lightly held and would have fallen to fresh troops, but by the time the leading ranks of the 27th Brigade arrived the village had been strongly reinforced.

Farther west and to the left rear of the Gordons, the Black Watch and the Seaforths made an attempt to advance towards Pekin Alley, but a German battery, situated about 1000 yards east of the Cabarets, and flanked by machine-guns, inflicted considerable casualties and pinned the men down to their trenches. This ill-starred effort cost the Seaforths their leader, Lieut.-Colonel Gaisford being killed. The situation of the 26th Brigade was not a happy one. It was clear, as the ordeal of the Camerons and Black Watch had foreboded, that the attack of the 28th Brigade had failed. It was necessary to consolidate the line in front of Fosse 8, and to safeguard the left flank; but under the continuous and accurate shell-fire of the enemy, it was practically impossible to accomplish any work. The trenches were in an appalling mess, having been terribly smashed by our artillery; Corons Alley was particularly bad, since the enemy had flooded it before retiring. About 9.30 A.M. the brigade received some welcome artillery support, when the battery commanded by Major C. W. W. McLean moved into position south-west of the Fosse and opened fire on the Cemetery, Cemetery Alley, and Lone Farm in turn.

At 9 A.M. the position of the 26th Brigade was as follows: the Seaforths, Black Watch, and Camerons held the trenches east of Fosse 8 from Fosse Alley to the north end of the Corons de Pekin, and to guard the left flank, a small party was posted at the Railway crossing. Additional protection was afforded by the machine-guns of the Camerons, which were posted at Little Willie, and commanded the ground on the left of the brigade. The enemy was in strength in Pekin Alley, Cemetery Alley, Lone Farm, and Madagascar Trench. About 600 yards to the right front, the remnants of the Gordons and some Black Watch were established in Pekin Trench, not far from Haisnes. Unsupported on either flank, and exposed to a murderous fire, the position of this garrison was most precarious, and could only be maintained with the help of the 27th Brigade.

On the evening of the 24th September, the battalions of the 27th Brigade were assembled in reserve trenches. From this position to the front line there were two routes, by the communication trenches termed Railway Alley and Fountain Alley. Previous reconnaissance had shown that the time required to reach the front line by these routes was 1 and 1½ hours respectively, and the move of the brigade was arranged to enable it to reach the front trenches as soon as they were vacated by the 26th Brigade. But all the previous plans made for the regulation of traffic in the communication trenches broke down during the action, and the men of the 27th found their advance checked by carrying parties, stragglers, and returning wounded. The average progress seemed to be about 30 yards every 20 minutes, and there were many long halts. Not only were the men exhausted by this tedious and tiring passage, but they suffered heavily from the enemy’s shell-fire. It would have kept the men fresher, and would probably have saved casualties, if the battalions had moved out of the trenches and advanced across the open.

The first battalion to cross the front line was the 12th Royal Scots. It should have been followed by the 11th Royal Scots, but this battalion was seriously delayed in the trenches, and the 10th Argylls were the second battalion to pass the line. The order of battalions, however, as arranged by the brigade, was restored during the advance, the Argylls halting to allow the 11th Royal Scots to get into their proper position. Under orders from General Thesiger, the 6th Royal Scots Fusiliers were kept back in the front trenches owing to the failure of the 28th Brigade. On entering “No-Man’s Land,” the 27th Brigade came under intense rifle and machine-gun fire from Cité St Elie, and from north-east of the Fosse. About 11 A.M. the 11th and 12th Royal Scots passed through the Gordons and advanced on Haisnes, but they were scourged by terrific rifle and machine-gun fire, and could make progress only by short, sharp rushes. A few men penetrated into the outskirts of the village, but they could not maintain their position, and were forced to withdraw. Till the evening, the survivors of the Royal Scots lay out in the open about 300 yards east of Pekin Trench, and in the afternoon the situation of the Royal Scots and men of the Seventh Division on their right became intolerable. They were numbed by cold and rain and suffered grievously from the enfilade-fire which the enemy directed on them from Haisnes, so at 4 P.M. the men were withdrawn to the line of Pekin Trench on the right of the Gordons.

The Argylls, who followed close behind the Royal Scots, established themselves in Fosse Alley. Observing that the left flank of the men in Pekin Trench was exposed, they sent forward a company to protect it, but it was held up by unbroken barbed wire, and, after the company commander had been shot down while trying to cut it, the remainder fell back on Fosse Alley. Haisnes was now strongly held by the enemy, and there was little chance of taking it without strong artillery support. Brig.-General Bruce received orders at 3.30 P.M. to secure the village, and, leaving instructions for the 6th Royal Scots Fusiliers to follow on, he left Central Boyau and went forward to Fosse Alley to reconnoitre the position. As both Haisnes and Cité St Elie were strongly garrisoned by the enemy, and as his brigade had been very heavily punished, he considered that an attack[15] on Haisnes was out of the question. The decision was sound. Even if the village had been captured, the strength of the Division would have been too dissipated to offer any chance of effective defence against a resolute attack.

The presence of Brig.-General Bruce steadied the garrison of Pekin Trench, and under his direction two companies of the Royal Scots Fusiliers were sent forward to support the Royal Scots by occupying the trench on their left. The position at Pekin Trench, however, needed more reinforcements than Brig.-General Bruce had at his command in order to make it secure, and the small garrison had a very bad time. The men were exposed to a continuous and merciless fire, and the trenches were full of dead, dying, and wounded. To add to their misery rain fell heavily, the rifles became clogged with mud and could not be fired, and the fuse-lighters of the Bethune bombs were so damp that it was impossible to ignite them.

The initiative now rested with the enemy,[16] whose numbers were being hourly augmented, and numerous bombing attacks were made on the garrison. Against the most desperate odds a brilliant defence was made. “C” Company of the Gordons, under Captain J. E. Adamson, beat off three powerful and determined attacks from the railway and the village; but with diminishing numbers and want of food, water, ammunition and bombs, it was not possible for it to hold on indefinitely. The great majority of the officers were dead or wounded, and most of the bombers had become casualties. The men could do no more, and during the late afternoon and evening the Gordons retired to Fosse Alley, but here their right flank was attacked by German bombers from Cité St Elie, and they were compelled to fall back on our front line.

The position of the Royal Scots in Pekin Trench became untenable when the Gordons were forced back, and the longer they held on the more dangerous became the situation; for both flanks were exposed, and the enemy was becoming more confident and aggressive. The Germans with abundance of bombs made numerous attacks against the Royal Scots, so to avoid being surrounded, the garrison fell back to Fosse Alley in the evening. After organising the remnants of his brigade along Fosse Alley and satisfying himself that it was in touch with the Seventh Division on the right, Brig.-General Bruce established his H.Q. in the Quarries. This was an unfortunate choice, for though he was now in close touch with the Seventh Division he was too far away for General Thesiger to get quickly into communication with him.

Meantime the main body of the 26th Brigade maintained its position. In spite of rain and a deluge of shells, the sappers of the 90th Coy. R.E., assisted by infantry and pioneers, rapidly improved the trenches and made them stronger for defence. The behaviour of the men was beyond all praise; their dogged endurance and marvellous cheerfulness raised them above the misery of their surroundings. The sappers were always ready to lend a hand to the infantry whenever the enemy counter-attacked, and when the shelling became too severe for any work to be done, they gave invaluable aid by manning the trenches on the flanks of the infantry. More effective artillery support was now available for the harassed brigade. At 10.30 A.M. No. 7 Mountain Battery R.G.A. came into action near Fosse 8 and engaged targets near the Railway and Les Briques; while the whole of the 52nd Brigade R.F.A. and one Howitzer battery under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Perreaux, were in action south-west of the Dump by 4.30 P.M.

When darkness fell on the field of battle, the situation of the Division was as follows: Though the 28th Brigade had been bloodily repulsed, the 26th had captured and was holding the Dump and Fosse 8. The bulk of the brigade held a line east of the Fosse, and this line was extended to the south by the 27th Brigade, which held Fosse Alley and was in touch with the Seventh Division on the right. The task now before the Division was to convert the captured trenches into strong defensive positions and to link them up with our original front line. But the enemy was bent on preventing any work being done, and the difficulties were enormous, owing partly to scarcity of tools and material, and partly to the downpour of shells. In spite of these drawbacks and the constant counter-attacks that frequently interrupted digging, the trenches were considerably strengthened and were protected by wire placed 50 yards in front of them by the sappers and the infantry. Equally emulous in toil and heroism were the pioneers of “B” Coy. 9th Seaforth Highlanders, who laboured hard to complete the two communication trenches from the front line to the Hohenzollern Redoubt. This task was not finished until the forenoon of the 26th, for the men had frequently to drop their tools and drive back bombing parties of Germans who were working up Little Willie. The achievement of the 9th Seaforths was a shining example of pluck and endurance, and they were as notable for their fighting as for the value and quality of their work.

Counter-attack is the soul of defence, and it was clear that the Germans were preparing to make a big effort to regain Fosse 8 and the Dump. The issue of the battle hung on the fate of these two places, and all that could be done was done to strengthen our hold on them. But the enemy knew the whole ground thoroughly and having no longer fear of attack farther north, could draw largely on his reserves to make a strong thrust. The defenders were weary and exhausted, and the Corps decided to relieve the 26th Brigade by fresh troops from the 73rd Brigade of the Twenty-fourth Division.

Accordingly in the evening of the 25th the leading troops of the 73rd Brigade, under their own brigadier who received his orders from General Thesiger, arrived in the neighbourhood of the Fosse. The relief was carried out like any ordinary one, and the defence of the Fosse was taken over by three battalions. The Sussex Regiment held from the junction of Slag and Fosse Alleys to the north end of the Fosse, and this line was continued by the Royal Fusiliers, who held from the left of the Sussex Regiment through the Corons. The Northamptons, whose task it was to protect the left flank, held a line from the north end of the Fosse along Corons Alley and thence down the North Face of the Redoubt. The relief was a lengthy business, owing partly to the guides being uncertain of their position in the dark, and partly to the fact that this was the first acquaintance of the 73rd Brigade with trenches, and it was not till the early hours of the 26th that the last men of the Highland Brigade were relieved. Just after the Sussex Regiment had taken over the trenches from the Seaforths and Black Watch, the enemy made a strong counter-attack and gained a footing in the line, but on learning what had happened, the Highlanders at once turned back and delivering a resolute bayonet charge drove the enemy out. After being relieved, the remnants of the 26th Brigade returned to our original front line trenches, where they were reorganised. The six batteries of R.F.A., which, under Lieut.-Colonel Perreaux had rendered invaluable support to the 26th Brigade, were withdrawn during the night, as their exposed position, when daylight came, would have meant annihilation.

The difficulty of defending the Fosse was increased by the withdrawal of the 27th Brigade during the evening. It is fairly certain that the brigade could not have been in close touch[17] with the Seventh Division, for the Germans, making good use of their knowledge of the ground, penetrated during the night between the Ninth and Seventh Divisions and attacked and captured the Quarries from the rear. To the Seventh Division this attack came as a complete surprise, and amongst the prisoners was Brig.-General Bruce, while Captain Buchan, his brigade major, was killed. This untoward event exposed the right flank of the garrison in Fosse Alley, and enemy bombers, forcing their way up the trench from the south, compelled the 27th Brigade, now commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Loch, to withdraw to its original front line trenches.

The task entrusted to the 73rd Brigade was one of great responsibility. For seasoned troops, the holding of the Fosse was not a very difficult matter. It commanded a field of fire for at least 500 yards, and there were not many trenches to block against enemy bombers. But the 73rd was composed of raw troops—they had recently arrived from England, and, moreover, they were exhausted by their long march from near St Omer. The enemy’s pressure was maintained chiefly by means of bombing attacks, but none of the men of the 73rd Brigade had ever thrown a bomb; few knew how to use one, and all felt an exaggerated respect for a weapon about which they knew so little. Moreover, they carried only 120 rounds of ammunition per man, and they were short of food, water, and tools. These deficiencies could not readily be repaired, for it was hazardous and difficult to carry up supplies to those in the front line through the shell-swept zone between the Hohenzollern Redoubt and the Fosse. The most urgent task of the brigade was to protect the right flank of the Fosse, and two companies of the Middlesex Regiment were sent to hold Big Willie and Slag Alley.

At 6 o’clock on the morning of the 26th all three brigades of the Division were in our original front line trenches, and Fosse 8 and the Hohenzollern Redoubt were garrisoned by the 73rd Brigade. During the night our artillery maintained a constant fire on Madagascar and Les Briques Trenches, and on Cemetery Alley and Pekin Alley, and efforts were made to strengthen the defences of Fosse 8, and open up communications. The 63rd R.E. with great difficulty dug a trench from the front of the left brigade to the corner of Little Willie; it was completed by the 27th, and was held by bombers of the H.L.I.

The chief cause of anxiety to General Thesiger was the gap between the 73rd Brigade and the Seventh Division. At 9.45 A.M., therefore, he ordered the 27th Brigade to reoccupy and hold Dump Trench, and this was done in the afternoon of the 26th. As our command of the right flank, however, was threatened by the Germans occupying the Quarries, it was decided to drive them out. The Seventh Division was to assault the Quarries, and the 6th Royal Scots Fusiliers, who were placed under the orders of the 73rd Brigade for the purpose, were to co-operate by bombing down Fosse Alley. This operation was eventually arranged for 4.30 P.M. Meantime, the 73rd had been severely punished, but though it became slightly unsteady under the ceaseless shell-fire, it clung to its position during the whole of the 26th.

Our attack on the Quarries was repulsed, the Seventh Division gaining only a foothold in the south-east corner. The 6th Royal Scots Fusiliers made their way along Fosse Alley without opposition, but it was too risky to press on until the Seventh Division had captured the Quarries. Another attack was ordered by the Corps, when the Ninth Division was to secure Fosse Alley and join up with the Seventh Division at the Quarries. The operation, which was carried out at 2.30 A.M. on the 27th, was unsuccessful, for although the Royal Scots Fusiliers, supported by the Argylls in Fosse Alley, reached Point 45, the Seventh Division failed to overcome the resistance of the Germans in the Quarries.

[Maull & Fox.

The unsteadiness of the 73rd Brigade on the afternoon of the 26th was a source of great uneasiness to General Thesiger and his staff, and at 5.30 A.M. he moved up to the Fosse to ascertain the exact state of affairs. Early in the morning some of the defenders of the Fosse began to retire, and a telephone message from the 26th Brigade, received at 6.15 A.M., stated that a few men of the 73rd were leaving their positions, and that support was urgently required. The ordeal had been too severe for untried troops. During the 26th they had held the Fosse against many attacks, but the constant storm of shot and shell to which they were exposed, and the general misery of their surroundings, aggravated by the thick drizzle of a grey September dawn, weakened their power of defence.[18] Before the German attacks they gave way, and for a time it seemed that the Hohenzollern Redoubt would be lost as well as the Fosse. It was here that the gallant General Thesiger, who had gone forward to reconnoitre the position in person, was killed. He belonged to a well-known military family, and, though his career with the Ninth had been brief, he had proved himself a sterling and able commander, and his death at the crisis of the battle was a serious calamity.

The situation was saved by men of the 26th Brigade; 70 of the Black Watch and 30 Camerons were sent up to the Redoubt about 10 A.M. This party rallied the remaining defenders, and checked the German advance after stubborn and prolonged bombing fights. The enemy made strenuous efforts to reach the Redoubt from Little Willie, and heavy bombing went on there all day. For his heroic bravery in one of these encounters, Corporal James Dalgleish Pollock of the Camerons was awarded the V.C. When the enemy bombers in superior numbers were storming a way into the Redoubt from Little Willie, Corporal Pollock jumped out of the trench, and, bombing the Germans from above, forced them to retreat. For an hour he maintained his position though exposed to a hail of bullets, and did not retire until he had been severely wounded.

Reserves were at once sent up to meet the danger, and the divisional mounted troops were placed under Brig.-General Ritchie. At the same time, the artillery shelled Madagascar Trench, Mad Point, Cemetery Alley, and Lone Farm. A brigade of the Twenty-eighth Division was ordered by the Corps to relieve the 73rd Brigade, which the Corps still believed to be in possession of the Fosse. Small parties of the 73rd held their positions in the Fosse up to noon; but, long before that hour, the enemy had penetrated the defences, and was even attacking the Redoubt.

On the right of the Division the 27th Brigade maintained its position in Fosse Alley for a considerable time, and at 5 A.M. an attempt of the enemy to rush the trench was easily repulsed by rifle and machine-gun fire. The weak point of the line was on the extreme right, where it was exposed to a flank attack by the Germans from the Quarries and Cité St Elie. From 9 A.M. the Royal Scots Fusiliers were engaged in a continuous and furious bomb fight, and supplies of bombs were passed to them as quickly as they could be brought from the dumps. On the left the Argylls sent up a machine-gun[19] to support the Sussex Regiment of the 73rd Brigade. When the 73rd withdrew from the Fosse, the position of the garrison in Fosse Alley became hopeless. The Argylls and the Fusiliers were now attacked not only from the flanks but from the rear, and it was imperative for them to withdraw before they were surrounded. It was a model retirement. The men never wavered or showed any inclination to retreat until ordered to do so, and their well-directed rapid fire inflicted numerous casualties on the enemy. Under a devastating hail of bullets they faced about to stem the hostile advances on the word of command. Closely followed by the Germans, the Argylls and the Scots Fusiliers withdrew to Dump Trench, which their pursuers did not venture to attack. The operation reflected the greatest credit on all concerned. After Dump Trench was reached, many of the men went back to bring in their comrades who had been wounded. Lieut.-Colonel Mackenzie of the Argylls was hit during the retreat, and Private M’Fadyen with great gallantry went out and brought him in, though previously several men had been wounded in the same attempt.

When the Corps was informed of the loss of Fosse 8, it ordered the 85th Brigade (Twenty-eighth Division) to advance immediately and counter-attack across the open. But this brigade was delayed while coming up, and at 3 P.M. the 26th was ordered to counter-attack the Fosse at once. All the troops of the brigade had been continuously engaged, and most of the men were leg-weary and tired out by the exertions of the last two days. Its total strength now mustered less than 600 bayonets, and there were few officers left. Nevertheless a very gallant charge was made over ground pitted by bullets and shrapnel; the men reached the West Face of the Hohenzollern Redoubt, but beyond this they could make no further progress. From Mad Point and Madagascar Trench the approaches to Fosse 8 were swept by rifle and machine-gun fire under which no man could move and live; and the enemy’s artillery, posted near Auchy, drenched the Redoubt with shrapnel. But although the Highlanders failed to capture Fosse 8, their arrival saved the Hohenzollern, and put new spirit into the officers and men of the 73rd Brigade. The onslaughts of the enemy against the Redoubt were definitely checked, and he was driven back to Fosse 8.

By 8 P.M. the 85th Brigade had arrived. One battalion was in Big Willie, two companies held the West Face of Hohenzollern, one battalion was moving up Central Boyau on Little Willie, and one was still at Vermelles. The remnants of the 26th Brigade and some of the 27th were holding Hohenzollern with part of the 73rd. Portions of the 27th were also in Dump Trench and our original front line. The enemy’s bombardment was still intense, and to avoid casualties it was decided to withdraw the 73rd Brigade and the 26th and 27th Brigades of the Ninth Division. At midnight, therefore, the 26th went back to the old reserve trenches, and the 27th to its old assembly positions; on the 28th both brigades were drawn back to the neighbourhood of Bethune. The 28th Brigade, which ever since the 25th September had been engaged in clearing trenches and burying the dead, was not relieved until the 29th, on which date it joined the rest of the Division at Bethune. The artillery, which remained in the line covering the Twenty-eighth Division until its own artillery arrived, were relieved on the 1st October. Brig.-General Armitage received a letter from Major-General Bulfin thanking him for the efficient support of his batteries.

The active part of the Division in the battle ended on the 27th September. No battle of the war has excited so much controversy as Loos; it has been claimed as a victory and deplored as a defeat. Defeat means not merely the loss of or the failure to secure definite tactical and strategical gains, but also, and chiefly, the decline of the men’s moral. This was emphatically not the case with the men of the Ninth Division. Even the bald narratives of the action as described in the battalion diaries reveal a note of triumph. The moral of the troops of the 28th Brigade, even after disaster, remained unshaken, and many men of the H.L.I. joined in with the Camerons at the Fosse. The capture of the Dump and Fosse 8 by the Highland Brigade will rank as one of the finest feats of arms ever performed by the Division, and the glorious counter-attack on the 27th September was the best evidence that up to the end of the battle the Highlanders never lost heart. If the work of the 27th Brigade was less conspicuous, its several battalions had fought with great courage and tenacity, and the defence of Fosse Alley by the Argylls and the Scots Fusiliers, besides taking heavy toll of the enemy, prevented him from using his full strength in an attack on the Redoubt. When the Division was withdrawn from the conflict it had solidly established its reputation as a first-rate fighting division. From the men’s point of view the main thing achieved was that they had measured themselves against the Germans at their best and had proved themselves the better men, and this was perhaps the chief result of the battle for the New Armies. In future actions, the men always entered into the fray with the consciousness of superiority that is the fundamental basis of moral. At the same time, it would be idle to deny that the resistance of the enemy had shown both gallantry and resource, and the small number of prisoners[20] taken was a sufficient indication that the foe’s courage had not been shaken by the preliminary bombardment. The losses of the Germans on the first day were probably less than ours, as their front defences were held chiefly by machine-guns, and most of their field-guns[21] had been withdrawn in time. Their counter-attack was admirably organised and was carried out with skill and determination, though it was during this phase of the battle that they suffered their most serious losses.

The general feeling of the Division, however, was that if there had been more artillery to support it, and better arrangements to reinforce it or relieve it with fresh troops, a heavy disaster would have been inflicted on the enemy. Under the circumstances, it had accomplished as much as was possible. When the Second Division, which could not have been expected to get forward without the aid of gas, was paralysed by the failure of the gas, the attainment of all the Ninth’s objectives became impossible. Auchy on the left bristled with machine-guns, housed numerous batteries, and was a position of such commanding strength that any attempt to advance far beyond the Fosse became a forlorn hope. How formidable the obstacles were may best be judged by the inability later of such divisions as the Twenty-eighth, Guards, and Forty-sixth to make any impression on the hostile defences.

It was the first action of the Division and it was inevitable that mistakes should be made, but most of them were venial. Not enough consideration had been given to the necessity of guarding the rifles against bad weather, and the Bethune bomb was useless in damp. It also proved a misfortune to allot a complete company of the R.E. to each brigade; owing to the failure of the attack on the left, the 63rd Field Coy. R.E. had no definite task to carry through, and it was impossible to withdraw it, as it had become involved in the fighting. The trench mortar teams attached to the 26th Brigade had a sorry time. The team of the 2-inch mortars were all knocked out, and though two 1½-inch mortars reached Fosse 8 they could find no targets, and the two officers in command were killed. These mortars were too unwieldy to carry forward, and as matters turned out, it would have been better if they had been used on the left to mask the fire from the Railway Work with smoke-bombs. It is possible that if this had been done, the assault of the 28th Brigade would have succeeded.

Perhaps the most deplorable feature of the battle was the comparative breakdown of the medical arrangements for the evacuation of the wounded from the forward areas. Many of them lay out not for hours but for days, and not a few shocking and pathetic sights were to be seen between Hohenzollern and Pekin Trench. This was entirely due to lack of staff. Doctors and regimental stretcher-bearers worked with the greatest heroism to bring in the wounded, but they were too few, and many of them were shot down. In a big engagement, especially in trench warfare, the staff of stretcher-bearers should be enormously increased if the wounded are to be expeditiously and satisfactorily evacuated. The importance of this cannot be over-estimated, because nothing so depresses a man as the fear that if injured he will be left out to die. The memory of such scenes as were too common at Loos lingered with the survivors, and remained after other impressions had become faint.

Most of the battle arrangements were beyond the control of the Division. The use of gas on its front did more harm than good, and there is no evidence to show that it affected the enemy in the least. One of the results of Loos was to give “smoke” a bad name, since in several cases it had caused a serious loss of direction. This, however, was not the case with the Ninth Division. The only complaint of the 26th Brigade was that the wind was hardly strong enough to carry the smoke ahead. It formed an effective screen for the infantry, and, in the opinion of the Seaforths, it saved them many casualties.

Strategically and tactically the results of the battle were disappointing. The Germans received a severe fright, but their system of defence, based on mutually supporting strong points garrisoned mainly by machine-gun crews, answered its purpose by delaying our advance sufficiently long to enable them to bring up reserves with which they counter-attacked our troops weary and spent through the strain of battle. These counter-attacks did not deprive us of all our gains, but the vexatious effects of our failure to keep Fosse 8 and the Dump soon became manifest; for the Loos salient, which had been won in the south, could not be held easily or economically, since from these points the enemy commanded the only valley where we could establish satisfactory artillery positions to support the front line. The employment of new divisions that had not been given an opportunity of completing their training by a spell of trench warfare was unfair to the men, and indicated unsound judgment on the part of the Higher Command. But, indeed, the operation was on a scale too big for the resources at the disposal of the British Field-Marshal.

The battle, however, takes rank as one of the most important of the war. The lessons deduced from it laid down the lines upon which British tactics and strategy were based until the end of 1917. Unbalanced optimism gave place to calculated—perhaps exaggerated—caution; an immediate break-through was given up as impracticable, and the British forces sought to wear down the enemy and to achieve victory largely by weight of numbers and artillery.

CHAPTER IV
THE SALIENT AND “PLUG STREET”
October 1915 to May 1916

It was a sadly battered Division that concentrated near Bethune. Caked in mud, unshaven, and unkempt, with tunics tattered and filthy after three days of continuous exposure, the men showed none of the “spick and span” appearance that it is the pride and custom of the British soldier to present. But they were in high spirits and full of confidence, and their exploits were rewarded with a flattering message[22] from General Gough, the Commander of the I. Corps. The losses[23] of the Division had been exceptionally heavy, and most serious were the casualties amongst the senior officers. The divisional commander had been killed, and out of the 12 infantry C.Os. only 4 remained; grave losses also occurred amongst majors and captains.[24] There is no factor more useful in the difficult task of reorganisation than the experienced control of senior officers; but this work in most of the battalions had to be undertaken by second lieutenants with little experience, and no automatic knowledge of how things should be done.

The Division was most fortunate in its new Commander. Major-General W. T. Furse, C.B., D.S.O., was an officer of proved ability, energy, and imagination. Under his vigorous direction reorganisation was rapidly completed, and deficiencies in stores and equipment were made up. He thoroughly understood that a division was a unit and not a mere congeries of battalions, batteries, and field companies, and he realised that the battle from which the Ninth had recently emerged offered a grand opportunity for fostering and stimulating esprit de corps. “The Ninth (Scottish) Division” soon became a name in which every soldier in it took an intense and jealous pride; each man believed that he belonged to the best unit in the best division in the best army in the world. Such a spirit is not to be despised; it inspires a corporate heroism that is greater than the bravery of any individual, and even the meanest is roused to triumph over his natural timidity rather than allow the glory of his division to be tarnished. No man took a more conspicuous part in building up and encouraging this spirit than General Furse.

[J. Russell & Sons.

For most of the battalions new leaders had to be found. The only C.Os. who remained with the Division were Lieut.-Colonel Cameron of Lochiel of the Camerons, Lieut.-Colonel Loch of the 12th Royal Scots, Lieut.-Colonel Northey of the 9th Scottish Rifles, and Lieut.-Colonel Fergusson of the 11th H.L.I. During the next few months the following Commanders were appointed:—

26TH BRIGADE.

8th Black Watch—

Lieut.-Colonel G. B. Duff of the Camerons, from the end of December 1915 to March 1916.

Major Sir George Abercromby, from March 1916 to April 1916.

Lieut.-Colonel G. W. E. Gordon, from 9th April to 20th September 1916.

7th Seaforth Highlanders—

Major C. P. M. Burn, from 5th October to 16th December 1915.

Lieut.-Colonel F. J. Marshall, from 16th December 1915 to 15th April 1916.

Lieut.-Colonel J. Kennedy, D.S.O., from 2nd May to 5th August 1916.

8th Gordon Highlanders—

Lieut.-Colonel A. D. Greenhill-Gardyne, from 27th October 1915 to March 1916.

27TH BRIGADE.

Brig.-General W. H. Walshe, to 17th March 1916.

Brig.-General G. F. Trotter, C.M.G., D.S.O., M.V.O., to May 1916.

11th Royal Scots—

Lieut.-Colonel W. D. Croft, from 4th December 1915.

6th Royal Scots Fusiliers—

Major J. H. Dutton, D.S.O., to 8th January 1916.

Lieut.-Colonel The Right Hon. Winston Churchill, to May 1916.

10th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders—

Lieut.-Colonel H. Pelham Burn, D.S.O., from 10th December 1915 to April 1916.

28TH BRIGADE.

6th King’s Own Scottish Borderers—

Lieut.-Colonel J. C. W. Connell, D.S.O., from 4th December 1915.

10th Highland Light Infantry—

Lieut.-Colonel H. C. Stuart, D.S.O., to 6th January 1916.

Lieut.-Colonel Grahame, D.S.O., from 6th January 1916.

11th Highland Light Infantry—

Lieut.-Colonel R. F. Forbes, January to May 1916.

In the Sappers, Lieut.-Colonel Livingstone had been wounded, and the new C.R.E. was Lieut.-Colonel Carpenter.

The Division had barely time to scrape off the mud before it was ordered on the 29th September to proceed north to join the V. Corps in the Salient.[25] The move was carried through partly by route march and partly by rail. On the 3rd October, D.H.Q. were established at Hooggraaf, about two miles south of Poperinghe, and on the morning of the 5th the 26th and 27th Brigades relieved the Seventeenth Division in the trenches near Hill 60. The line taken over by the Ninth lay south of Zillebeke, and extended from north of Hill 60 to a point south of the Ypres-Comines Canal near Oosthoek. The enemy’s line ran along the higher ground, and the distance between the British and the German trenches varied from 25 to 400 yards. The salient feature on our front was The Bluff, which rose steeply from the ground on the north side of the Canal and completely dominated the sector.

During the three months that the Division remained in the salient it passed a time of almost unmitigated gloom and discomfort. As the days shortened and winter came on, hardly a day passed without rain, and mud was lord and sovereign over all. It seemed to suck away a man’s vitality and enthusiasm, and even a short march involved an expenditure of physical energy out of all proportion to the distance traversed. The whole of Flanders, engulfed in mud, had the aspect of an enormous swamp; and the leaden skies, in a sombre rain-grey monotint, were in harmony with the drab-coloured earth. Even the roads were ankle-deep in glutinous mud, and the constant traffic was often checked by stoppages caused by particularly bad parts. Thus the passage of the infantry to and from the trenches was like a feverish nightmare; for the men had to march about ten miles through clinging mire along roads choked with transport, and often shelled. The rest huts at Dickebusch and Canada Huts were dismal and repellent shelters; they were swept by draughts, and through their leaky roofs the rain dripped down on the disconsolate inmates. The area round them was one vast sea of mud, where it was impossible for a unit to carry out any training worth the name. Without constant training there is a tendency for discipline to be relaxed, and a man who is allowed to loll about as he pleases is apt to lose all smartness in himself and pride in his unit. As far as possible, everything was done to maintain strict discipline, and the A. & Q. department worked its hardest to secure baths for the men and clean changes of clothing, but in spite of this the rest huts were more demoralising than the front line, where the strictest trench discipline was upheld and where there was constant work to do.

This period was notable as the reign of the second lieutenant. For over a month every company in the 26th Brigade was commanded by one; and this was the case with most of the other battalions. At first this undoubtedly rendered the task of General Furse more difficult, since youth and gallantry do not form a complete substitute for knowledge and experience; but the apprenticeship and training in responsibility, which these months brought to the young officers, supplied him with a large body of keen, confident, and efficient leaders who were later to demonstrate their value at the Battle of the Somme.

The divisional commander was quick to make the most of his opportunities, and he resolved to fortify youth and keenness with knowledge and practice. On the 7th November he opened the Ninth Division School at Poperinghe, which served a double purpose in promoting training and in encouraging esprit de corps. By this means not only did the officers gain a real knowledge of their manifold duties, which it was impossible for them to acquire amongst the swamps at Dickebusch and Canada Huts, but also the company officers of one unit were brought into contact with those of other units, and thus mutual understanding and sympathy were created. The first commandant of the school was Lieut.-Colonel Loch who was assisted by Captain Drew, the adjutant of the 5th Camerons, and the instruction was both theoretical and practical. It is impossible to over-estimate the value of this school in increasing the efficiency of the Division.

Certainly the safest and in many ways the most desirable place during these winter months was the front line system. A battalion spent four days in the front line trenches, four days in support, and four in rest at Dickebusch or Canada Huts. The support positions had most of the discomfort without any of the safety[26] of the front line; they had little protection and were frequently shelled, many casualties being suffered. The most perilous spot on the route to the front line was Ypres. No man of British blood could walk through it without feeling a deep thrill of awe and reverence as he gazed on the ruins of the beautiful town, the name of which will ever be associated with the most heroic and imperishable feat of British valour and endurance. But it was no place to linger in; it formed a nexus of roads, and virtually the whole of the traffic between the trenches and the back areas had to pass through it. Hence it was constantly shelled by the enemy, and any body of men that succeeded in passing through it without loss was extremely fortunate. After the toilsome march, the trenches seemed a veritable haven of refuge. They were in fact partly trenches and partly breastworks; for it was impossible to dig to any depth, since water was quickly reached, and the parapets had to be raised high above the level of the ground to protect the men from enemy bullets. The high parapets made the line unpleasantly conspicuous, for they formed an easy mark for the enemy’s trench mortars and artillery, which had numerous posts for observation.

Between October and December the Division was gradually shifted from the south to the east of Zillebeke. The line taken over from the Seventeenth Division was held until the night of the 15th October, when the 27th Brigade on the right was relieved by the 72nd Brigade of the Twenty-fourth Division. On the day preceding the relief the Argylls had a tragic mishap. At 4 A.M. on the 15th the Germans exploded a mine about 25 yards in front of a trench not far from The Bluff. The explosion was very violent, and although the front trenches had been cleared in view of the known existence of hostile mines on this part of the line, heavy casualties were suffered in the support and communication trenches, 15 being killed and 50 wounded. On the same morning at 1.30 A.M. the enemy blew a small mine just outside the trenches held by the Camerons, who had 5 killed and wounded. During the night of the 16th/17th October the 28th Brigade took over the part of the line held by the 7th Brigade on the left of the 26th; this brought the northern limit of the Division to a point just east of Armagh Wood. A further rearrangement took place on the nights of the 8th/9th and 9th/10th November when the 27th Brigade took over the front line trenches east of Sanctuary Wood, which at that time still presented the appearance of a wood and was full of thick undergrowth.

These alterations brought changes in position without any in conditions, for all along the front the trenches were in a very bad state and could be maintained in tolerable order only by constant labour. After a shower of rain (and it always seemed to rain in the salient), there was the common story of dug-outs collapsed and parapets fallen in. At the best of times the trenches were ankle-deep in water; pumps were used, but they effected only a temporary improvement, because there was no place to which the water could be drained. Long thigh gum-boots were issued to the men, and these helped to keep their feet dry, though they could not make them warm. In spite of whale-oil and anti-frostbite grease, it is not surprising that many were evacuated to hospital suffering from trench feet. Want of sleep, perpetual cold, filth, and wet were the ordinary features of life; notwithstanding the coats of goatskin that were issued it was impossible for the men to keep warm. During a man’s short spell of sleep his feet became numb, and he was forced to get out of his shelter and stamp in order to restore circulation; and when he was awake he had to squelch about continually in mud, which plastered everything up to his head.

The sappers and pioneers did their utmost to improve matters, but as regards getting rid of the water their efforts were as the labours of Sisyphus. They revetted the trenches, made dug-outs, improved and kept in repair a light railway, which was used for bringing up rations and engineering materials, but more could have been done if the infantry had co-operated whole-heartedly with the sappers. The latter were a comparatively small body of skilled men, and they were supplied with working-parties from the infantry. The infantryman, however, believed that he was doing not his own job but the sapper’s, and he did as little as possible unless there was someone standing over him. This was the attitude not merely of N.C.Os. and privates, but of many officers, and in this respect there was a striking contrast to the German Army, where the private was taught to realise that in working under a sapper he was working for himself. It would have been well if the British soldier had been taught the same lesson from the beginning of his training. As it was, the work accomplished by an infantry party depended largely upon the infantry officer who was in charge of it, and too often he considered it the proper thing to let his men do as little as possible.

The position held by the Division from near The Bluff north of the Canal to Sanctuary Wood was about 5000 yards in length, which was a long line for a weak[27] division to hold. Most of the units were still far below strength, and when parties left the front line to bring up rations, the trenches appeared deserted. The line was commanded by the enemy along the entire front, and, lying in a salient, it was shelled from all sides. Any movement east of Ypres was impossible except after dark, and one dared not show a head in Zillebeke during the day. At some points the lines were so close that they could not be safely shelled except by trench mortars. At one part on the front of the 27th Brigade, where the trenches were only about 20 yards apart, the enemy occupied a position known as the “Birdcage.” It was a wooden framework with wire netting and a trap-door in the top. Whenever he was peevish, he opened the trap-door and heaved out a bomb, shutting the door after him. This contrivance was hit by a trench mortar on the 23rd November, but the Germans at once repaired it; however, it was blown to atoms five days later by a mine. The enemy had more guns and more ammunition, but a resolute effort was made by General Furse to dispute his artillery superiority by means of a “Retaliation Tariff.”[28] Whenever the enemy bombarded a part of our lines he was subjected to a bombardment of greater severity; this encouraged the infantry and stimulated the gunners, but failed to silence the Germans. Occasional bombardments also took place at such times as the enemy was suspected to be involved in a relief.

Even more than the shelling the men disliked the constant mining that was being carried on along the front. In this, as in artillery, the Germans were the masters, though our tunnellers, with a view to cheering the infantry, declared that they controlled the situation. Except for the Argylls no serious casualties were suffered from mining, but the men in the front system of trenches lived in a constant state of suspense. This was reflected in the reports of sentries, and never a day passed without someone saying that he heard “subterranean noises, probably enemy mining.”[29] Undoubtedly our miners had an anxious and harassing time. On the night of the 30th November, having heard noises, they sent out a listening post, which came upon some mine cases and broke into a hostile gallery. The tunnelling subaltern and one of his corporals entered it, and though they met some Germans succeeded in firing a charge and destroying the gallery.

Under the most dismal and depressing conditions the work of the A.S.C. and transport was beyond all praise. This was probably the most trying period in the whole war for them, yet in spite of casualties and delays caused by mud and bad roads, they never failed to deliver the rations. Every night they had to run the gauntlet through Ypres, fully conscious that a torrent of shells might descend upon them at any moment. The wear and tear on wagons and limbers was enormous, and numerous losses were suffered both in personnel and horses. Throughout the winter the excellence and regularity of the rations did more than anything to keep the men in good heart.

Before the Division was relieved from the salient an important change was made throughout the whole Army as regards machine-guns. Prior to the war the importance of machine-gun fire had not been realised by our Army, and consequently we neither had enough of them nor knew how to make the best tactical use of those we had. The type employed was the Vickers, of which two, and later four, were issued to each battalion, but the gun was a heavy weapon for infantry to handle, and required a high standard of special training. Since 1915 a new and lighter machine-gun, the Lewis, was being introduced; it was more easily carried, and it was possible for an average man to master it after a fortnight’s instruction. Moreover, it was cooled by air and could be fired from a very light mounting; indeed an expert could fire it without any mounting at all. It was an admirable weapon for infantry, and when issued there was no need for battalions to have their own Vickers Guns. In fact the advantage of using the latter under brigade control had been apparent even before the Battle of Loos, and all brigades in the Division had appointed brigade machine-gun officers. At Loos, all the infantry battalions had at least two Lewis Guns and some had four, but on the 30th November the establishment was fixed at four per battalion, that is, one per company. On the same date the Vickers Gun detachments were formed into machine-gun companies, one company being attached to each brigade, and each company consisted of four sections, with two machine-guns per section.[30]

On the 7th December, the welcome news was received that the Ninth was to be relieved by the Fiftieth Division before the end of the month. The tidings were greeted with unfeigned joy. Though the men had borne the mud and discomfort with wonderful stoicism, they loathed the salient and were glad to leave it.[31] It was undoubtedly the worst and most disagreeable spell of trench life that the Division experienced during the war. Even after the troops had been heavily punished in the Battle of the Somme, many of the men declared that they would rather go through another such battle than return to the salient under the conditions that prevailed in the winter of 1915.

The first to leave were the divisional mounted troops, who departed for the II. Corps’ area on the 12th December. But before the last battalions were relieved on the 20th, they experienced a new alarm. Ever since we had entered the salient there were rumours that the enemy intended to make a gas attack, and on the 14th December information was received from the Corps that the Germans were preparing one on the front of the Second Army. Next day, therefore, the artillery proceeded to pound their front parapets in case they should have installed cylinders. During the small hours of the 19th our whole front was subjected to an exceptionally heavy bombardment, and it was clear that the long threatened gas attack was at last being delivered. Clouds of gas drifted as far back as D.H.Q., but the enemy did not follow up with an infantry attack, for the artillery were ready and proceeded to shell the adversary’s trenches without delay. The main enemy effort was made to the north of the Division, but in no case did he find the defenders unprepared. As if disappointed at the frustration of his designs, he shelled the whole divisional area with vindictive violence throughout the 19th and the 20th, and several casualties were caused among the outgoing and incoming battalions. On the 20th the whole of the Division was relieved except the artillery, the last of which departed on the 22nd.

From the 20th December 1915 till the 26th January 1916, the Division enjoyed a welcome and needed respite from trench warfare, and General Furse made the most of the time to bring it up to concert-pitch. After a long term in the line, when there are few opportunities for training, a man is inclined to become slack; further, trench life is bad for the feet, and several route marches are necessary to bring the men into good condition. The Division, except the artillery, was now in billets round Merris, where D.H.Q. were established. The land was pleasant and undulating, and was covered with numerous cosy and cheery farms, a striking contrast to the mud flats of Flanders. The artillery were stationed at the Artillery Training Camp at Watten, where they underwent a vigorous course.

Cleanliness was the first essential; excellent baths were available and also clean clothing. Then followed smartening-up drill, and each brigade was inspected in turn by the Corps Commander in route marching. It was now that the Ninth began to reap the fruits of the Divisional School that had been established at Poperinghe. General Furse held frequent conferences with his brigadiers and battalion commanders, in order to ensure that the training should be carried out on useful and uniform lines. A high average standard was aimed at in bombing and in rifle shooting and when the men returned to the line their bearing, efficiency, and moral left little to be desired. Yet the time was not all spent in work, the average amount of training being about five hours per day. Football matches were played daily, and the Divisional Band and the Concert Party—“The Thistles”—provided a welcome entertainment during the evenings. The type of football played was, of course, Association. There was one thrilling Rugby match between the officers of the 28th Brigade and those of the 26th, and a stirring game ended in a draw. It was during this period of rest and training that the Right Hon. Winston Churchill arrived to take over the Command of the 6th Royal Scots Fusiliers at the beginning of January 1916.

On its next visit to the trenches, the Division experienced one of its most enjoyable times in France. On the 24th January 1916, it commenced the relief of the Twenty-fifth Division in the Ploegsteert area, and this was completed by the 31st. D.H.Q. were established at Nieppe, but were transferred on the 13th February to Steenwerck on account of shelling. The front trenches lay east of Ploegsteert Wood; they were in comparatively good condition and reliefs could be carried out in daylight. There were excellent billets for the battalions and brigades in reserve, where a considerable amount of training could be carried on. In order that battalions should always occupy the same trenches, and so learn everything about them, the 28th Brigade held always one part of the line, while the 27th and 26th relieved each other in the same trenches. Six days “in” and six days “out” was the rule for each unit.

From the end of January till the end of May 1916, the Ninth held the same line, which was one of the most pleasant areas along the British front. There was constant work to be done, but the results of labour were soon apparent. The trenches were firmly revetted, numerous fire-steps were built, and the communication trenches were kept in good order. In addition, many dug-outs were made and several concrete emplacements for machine-guns constructed, and on leaving the area both sappers and infantry could claim that they had handed over model trenches.

The advent of spring and the peaceful aspect of the cultivated country combined to render everyone cheerful. In this sector the astonishing hardihood of the old French farmers was seen at its best. They used to plough fields almost up to the front line. When shelled, they unharnessed the horses and went back to their farms without accelerating their pace in the slightest, but as soon as the firing ceased, they calmly resumed ploughing as if nothing out of the way had occurred. Ploegsteert Wood itself was a charming spot. As the days lengthened and spring advanced, the wood presented an arcadian appearance. April was a halcyon month. The very huts nestling among the trees, bourgeoning into a beautiful foliage, seemed to fit in with the brightness of their surroundings, and the songs of thousands of birds made one feel at times that the war had ceased to be.

“LAWRENCE FARM”
(From a sketch by the Rt. Hon. Winston S. Churchill of his Battalion Head-quarters)

Life was not altogether a picnic, however. The wood itself was intermittently shelled by the enemy, and the trenches were occasionally subjected to heavy bombardments. The worst experience fell to the 11th Royal Scots. Near their trenches the German position protruded in a salient, which was known to our men as the “Birdcage,” on account of the tangle of wire with which it was protected. Mining operations were undertaken against this salient, and the infantry supplied large working-parties for the purpose. But the enemy must have discovered that there was a mine, and he determined to destroy it. On the evening of the 13th May the position held by the Royal Scots was violently shelled and trench mortared, and shortly after, the Germans came over in three parties of 20 each. Some of them succeeded in entering our trenches, but the Royal Scots, though dazed by the severity of the bombardment, put up a splendid resistance. Captain Henry with a small party made an immediate counter-attack, and after a lively scuffle expelled the enemy. The Royal Scots losses, due mainly to the hostile barrage, were 16 killed, 61 wounded, and 8 missing. The Germans, who were the 104th Saxons, left 10 corpses in our trenches, and had failed in their attempt to destroy the mine-shaft.

General Furse strove to foster the offensive spirit throughout the Division, so sections were known as “fighting” sections, to impress upon each man that his principal duty was to fight. He exhorted all the battalions to make “No-Man’s Land” “Ninth Division Land,” and the men did their utmost to carry out his instructions. Every night the area in front of the battalions in the line was actively and persistently patrolled. But this was not enough for the G.O.C.; he wanted the men to secure prisoners; “Corpses are more important than acres” was his constant injunction. Though the raids engineered in this sector were not successful, the experience gained helped later to make it one of the finest raiding divisions in the Army; it was learning to walk, and was learning rapidly. All ranks realised and never forgot that on taking over trenches it was not their job to sit still and wait for things to happen, but to devise enterprises to worry the enemy as much as possible. The Ninth was never happy until it felt that it had established ascendency over the enemy opposite it.

With this intention, a minor operation was undertaken by the “Rifles” on the 1st March. The scheme was carried out at 11 P.M. A small party went out with Bangalore torpedoes,[32] which they placed in the enemy’s wire and exploded. Then dummies, which had been fixed in “No-Man’s Land,” were worked by string from the front trenches so as to present the appearance of troops moving forward. At the same time, the enemy’s lines were raked by rifle and machine-gun fire, trench mortars and rifle-grenades, and by shells from the artillery. Only two casualties were suffered by the “Rifles,” and as it was probable that the Germans manned their parapets on hearing the explosion and seeing the dummies moving, it is likely that their losses were much heavier. A more ambitious raiding scheme was attempted by the Argylls on the night of the 25th/26th March. At 1.52 A.M. two Bangalore torpedoes were placed under the enemy’s wire, and a party of 2 officers and 30 men left the trenches ready to enter the German line after the explosion had cleared a gap. The torpedoes were fired at 2 A.M., but the raiding party slightly lost direction and missed the gap. The failure was really due to inexperience and insufficient preparations.

If the Division was disappointed with the result of its raids, it had every reason to be pleased with its success in sniping. When it first took over the line, the German snipers held the upper hand. But the sniping officers in each battalion vied with one another in ingenious devices to gain the advantage over the enemy, and before the Division left the sector our snipers were distinctly on top. In every intelligence report from the front line battalions several hits were claimed by the snipers. It was while in this area that the machine-gun companies commenced the practice of indirect fire.[33] This was carried out nightly, in order to sweep the roads and places which the Germans were likely to use at night. Here, too, air fights came to be of frequent occurrence, and excited the greatest interest among the men. One day a hostile plane received a direct hit through the engine and crashed down in our lines; there cannot have been many occasions during the war when an anti-aircraft gun was so conspicuously successful.

The favourite amusement of the artillery was firing at German observation posts. At Les Ecluses a tall factory chimney that overlooked our lines was the chief target, but for a long time defied our gunners, and the German observers had become so confident that they were seen one morning shaking dust out of a carpet or something of that nature over the top of the stalk. This was very exasperating, but our gunners had the best of it when the observation post was knocked out by the third round of a 12-inch Howitzer, which landed at the base of the chimney.

Hitherto the headgear worn by the men was the Balmoral. It had a touch of the picturesque, but it offered no protection against shrapnel. The steel helmet now made its appearance; it was much heavier, and at first required some knack to balance it properly. For a time the men wore it only on compulsion and preferred to use it as a washing basin or a soup bowl, but it became more popular when its manifold advantages in protecting the head, not only from shell splinters but from knocks against overhead traverses and the woodwork of dug-outs, were realised. In the course of a few months a man came to regard the steel helmet as one of his best friends.

A few changes in command took place during this period. Lieut.-Colonel Pelham Burn was transferred to the Gordons, and his place in the Argylls was taken by Lieut.-Colonel W. J. B. Tweedie. Lieut.-Colonel Loch, C.M.G., was promoted to a brigade in the Fifty-sixth Division, and he was succeeded by Lieut.-Colonel H. L. Budge. Lieut.-Colonel Cameron of Lochiel, whose health had broken down, had to give up the command of the Camerons to Lieut.-Colonel Duff. The most important change was in the artillery. On 1st February 1916 Brig.-General H. H. Tudor, C.M.G., succeeded Brig.-General E. H. Armitage, C.B., in the command of the Divisional Artillery. He was destined to influence profoundly the work of the Division by his use of the guns.

In April 1916 three batteries, D/50, D/51, and D/52, were taken away from their own brigades and formed into the 53rd Brigade R.F.A., which was composed entirely of 18-pounders. Thus, in the spring of 1916, the Ninth Divisional Artillery consisted of the 50th, 51st, and 52nd Brigades, each with three 18-pounder batteries and one Howitzer battery, and the 53rd with three 18-pounder batteries. All batteries were on a four-gun basis. About May the Brigade Ammunition Columns of the 50th, 51st, and 52nd Brigades were broken up or absorbed into the Divisional Ammunition Column, so that the reorganised D.A.C. consisted of No. 1, No. 2, and No. 3 sections, and “B” echelon. In addition, the organisation of trench mortars was placed on a more satisfactory basis. The weapon to be used by the infantry was the Stokes Mortar, a mobile and easily managed gun with an ingenious, quick-firing device, which enabled it to fire 30 shells a minute. The shell was a particularly deadly one, and made a most menacing and terrifying sound on explosion. In each brigade, Stokes Mortar Batteries were organised from personnel drawn from each battalion with the purpose—thoroughly attained—of encouraging the entity and esprit of the brigade. Heavier mortars than the Stokes were to be worked by the artillery, and on the 8th March 1916 the 9th T.M. Brigade, of three batteries, was formed. Before this date there had been one T.M. Battery, called the 41st T.M.B., manned by men from the R.G.A. and from the Seaforth Pioneers. At first the brigade had three types of mortar, the 1½-inch, 2-inch, and 3·7-inch, but, after a few months, only the 2-inch mortar was used. In April 1916 a heavy mortar, the 9·45-inch, popularly known as “The Flying Pig,” was introduced, and the V/9 Heavy Trench Mortar Battery was formed to work it.

The period of rest and training, the comparatively pleasant interlude of trench life, and the resourceful and vigorous control of General Furse all combined to make the whole Division a happy family. Each man in it swore by “The Ninth”; and this was the finest tribute to the efficiency of the G.O.C.’s leadership. It was, therefore, with consternation that the news was received on the 16th March that the brigades were to be reorganised. The inherent clannishness of the Scot revolted at the idea of friends being taken away and of strangers coming in. But the reorganisation was made necessary, not by the malicious indifference of G.H.Q., but by the dearth of recruits. Scotland had raised more service battalions than it was possible to find drafts for under the voluntary system, and it was necessary to amalgamate several of them. The battalions marked out by G.H.Q. to leave the Division by the 6th May were the 8th Gordons, the 6th Royal Scots Fusiliers, and the 10th and 11th H.L.I. The arrangement also meant the break-up of the 28th Brigade. This was intensely disliked, but it was recognised as inevitable. The knowledge that these old friends were leaving to join the famous Fifteenth Scottish Division helped to reconcile the Ninth to the change. On the 4th May it was announced that the mounted troops were also to be withdrawn. To take the place of the Gordons in the 26th Brigade, the Argylls were transferred from the 27th; the 6th K.O.S.B. and the 9th Scottish Rifles replaced the Royal Scots Fusiliers, and the Argylls in the 27th Brigade. The South African Brigade had its own Field Ambulance, and the 29th Field Ambulance consequently left the Division. Brig.-General Scrase-Dickins was retained by an accident, which deprived the 27th Brigade of Brig.-General G. F. Trotter who fell from his horse and broke his arm.

PLOEGSTEERT WOOD

The place of the 28th was filled by the South African Brigade, most of whose members had already seen service in Egypt. Nothing much was known about them in the Division except that they were the pick of South Africa, and that was saying a great deal. The brigade was commanded by Brig.-General H. T. Lukin, C.M.G., D.S.O., and consisted of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th South African battalions; the last-named, being the South African Scottish, wore the kilt of the Atholl tartan. They were commanded respectively by Lieut.-Colonel F. G. Dawson, C.M.G., Lieut.-Colonel W. E. C. Tanner, C.M.G., Lieut.-Colonel E. F. Thackeray, C.M.G., and Lieut.-Colonel F. A. Jones, C.M.G., D.S.O. Brig.-General Lukin reported at D.H.Q. on the 22nd April, and on the following day the 2nd and 3rd battalions joined the Division. On the 29th the whole brigade was inspected by Sir Douglas Haig, near Steenwerck. Its appearance was very impressive, and even the most fastidious critic was bound to admit that the South Africans were an exceptionally fine body of men. From the 6th May they took over the trenches lately occupied by the 28th Brigade, and the men rapidly became acquainted with the conditions of warfare on the Western Front. From the first it was apparent that their standard of discipline was very high, and their critical Scottish comrades realised that the Division had been greatly honoured in having such a doughty brigade attached to it.

The stay of the Division near Ploegsteert soon drew to a close. On the 20th May instructions were received from the Corps that it was to be relieved by the Forty-first Division before the 1st June. The relief was commenced on the 27th May, and completed on the 30th. Thus ended a most agreeable experience of trench duty, and all who have survived since that date will ever cherish happy recollections of Ploegsteert Wood.

CHAPTER V
THE CAPTURE OF BERNAFAY WOOD, AND THE BATTLES FOR TRONES WOOD
July 1916

After leaving the Ploegsteert area the Division was concentrated in billets near Bomy, where D.H.Q. were established. The men were in the best of spirits, and training and recreation were carried on with vigour and keenness, while the glory of the summer and the genial weather raised the usual hopes that the year would see the end of the war. The Division had recaptured all the enthusiasm that had animated it on landing in France, and in addition it had behind it a year’s experience of warfare. The sojourn near Bomy was shorter than had been expected, and the design of the G.O.C. to hold a horse show on the 13th and a Divisional Field Day on the 14th June had to be abandoned. This cancellation of the horse show was a huge disappointment; every unit had taken extensive trouble to prove that it had the best turned out transport in the Division, but the men were able at least to console themselves with the knowledge that their transport and horses were in first-rate condition.

Orders were received by the Division on the 11th that it was to join the XIII. Corps,[34] commanded by Lieut.-General Sir W. H. Congreve, V.C., and that the move was to take place by rail on the 16th. These, however, were followed by instructions commanding the Division to move on the 13th, and on that date the entrainment of units was commenced. Two days later the Division was concentrated near Vaux-en-Amienois where D.H.Q. were established.

It was obvious to the dullest man that the Division was intended to take part in some business more enterprising than the mere holding of a section of trenches. The whole hinterland behind the trenches was a hive of industry and traffic. Swarms of troops from every part of the kingdom were to be seen in every village; at night the roads groaned with the passage of guns of all sizes and of transport carrying every conceivable variety of material, and the whole countryside was covered with dumps containing R.E. material, bombs, shells, and stores of all kinds. Hospitals and aerodromes formed additional villages in the district. The back areas of the Somme in the summer of 1916 were the busiest centres of activity in the whole world. It was a wonderful exhibition of the resources of the British Empire, and a visible proof of the diligence with which workers at home had applied themselves to the manufacture of munitions of war. It was not a feverish bustle that one witnessed, but a steady and systematic application of labour; every movement was directed by an organisation that was not surpassed by any other nation in the war. The whole of the work performed by Britain in its administrative arrangements has probably never been appreciated at its full value. It had a most heartening effect on all who saw it, and gave the men an inspiring confidence in the determination and ability of the Allies to achieve a complete victory.

All this industry and all these preparations were the obvious prelude to a great battle, and on the 15th June the Division received from the Corps instructions for the attack that was to be made. The XIII Corps was on the right flank of the British army, and its plan was to assault with two divisions, the Thirtieth on the right and the Eighteenth on the left, with the Ninth Division in reserve.

A feeling of optimism buoyed up both civilians and soldiers, though the events of 1915 had completely shattered the sanguine expectations aroused by the victory of the Marne. The Russians had been driven from Poland and had suffered a smashing defeat, from which they never fully recovered, though a censored press had represented the rout rather as a Russian triumph than as a German victory. That disaster, which was falsely believed in this country to harden the purpose of the great Slav Power, caused Russians to interpret the comparative inactivity of the Western Powers as a selfish neglect of her interests, and to detest the Government that had callously thrown into the slaughter men without arms or equipment. The brutal incompetence of the Russian bureaucracy was revealed in all its nakedness, and inspired the loathing and contempt that led eventually to its downfall. The tale of disaster did not end here; for Von Mackensen, assisted by the crafty and calculating treachery of Bulgaria, drove the Serbs from their country and all but secured Greece in the Teutonic net. The Salonica expedition, though it failed to render any service to Serbia, prevented Greece from joining the enemy. In the East, British prestige suffered two damaging shocks; the Dardanelles project ended in failure, and the Mesopotamian expedition, after a promising beginning, resulted in the surrender of a British force at Kut in April 1916.

The only offset against these misfortunes was the entry of Italy into the war in May 1915, but from the first her armies were employed solely on exclusively Italian interests. The offensive against Trieste, even if successful, could not have exerted a decisive influence on the course of the war, nor did it prevent Austria from using the larger portion of her forces in the East against Russia. Nevertheless a general feeling prevailed that our misfortunes had been due more to bad luck than to bad management, and on the principle that the dawn succeeds the darkest hour, 1916 was expected to prove as glorious as 1915 had been disappointing. More men were now in the field, and the supply of high explosives, which some thought to be more important than generalship, had been greatly increased. The poster of the most blatant of British weeklies, with the glaring inscription, “1916. Thank God!” accurately reflected the mind of the average man.

Thus the time seemed ripe for an action by the British forces on a big scale. The great German offensive against Verdun in April had been watched with feverish interest both in this country and in France. The first five days of that assault brought the enemy within measurable distance of his objective. It was feared that the famous fortress would fall into his hands, and hasty critics denounced the supine inactivity of the British armies. But at that time the preparations of Sir Douglas Haig were not completed, and a premature counter-attack would only have served the interests of the enemy. As it turned out, the defenders of Verdun, under the masterly generalship of Pétain, worked out their own salvation. The German thrust was stopped, but even at the end of June large forces still menaced the fortress, and it was necessary that the British forces, stronger and better prepared than they had ever been, should do something to take the strain off their gallant ally.

Events in other theatres of war seemed also to call for immediate action. The attack by the Austrians in the Trentino in May threatened such serious consequences for Italy, that Russia, which appeared to have recovered from her defeat, was compelled to launch her offensive in the month of June. The brilliant successes of General Brussilov brought immediate relief to the armies of Italy, though they did not lessen the German pressure on Verdun. It was, therefore, sound policy to strike at the enemy, not merely to relieve Verdun, but also to assist our Allies in the other theatres of war by preventing the enemy from transferring troops from the West to other fronts.

The other object of the British Commander-in-Chief[35] was to wear down the strength of the enemy by a steady offensive. The choice of the battlefield was governed by the fact that the British armies were not sufficiently numerous to take the offensive on a large scale without the co-operation of the French, and the district selected was therefore in Picardy, where the two armies joined.

Picardy was one of the most delightful spots in France. Here there were none of the grimy coal-pits and slag-heaps that had figured so prominently in the Battle of Loos. This was the agricultural part of France, with wide open and rolling country, in which there was hardly a fence to be seen. The numerous small villages that broke the fields seldom contained more than a few hundred inhabitants. On the battle front the prominent feature was the extensive ridge running from Thiepval to Combles, with alternate spurs and valleys thrown out to the south-west. This ridge, which afforded the enemy magnificent observation over the British trenches and hinterland, was the main watershed of the high ground that stretched from the valley of the Somme in a north-easterly direction to the low-lying ground between Lens and Cambrai. Beyond this were the plains of Douai. On the western side the slopes, steep and rugged, were a formidable obstacle, but towards the north-east, the ridge fell in a gradual slope, rising again to a gentle ridge on the farther side of Bapaume. Beyond this second ridge, which was about a hundred feet lower than the main one, the country, broad and undulating, offered no great difficulty to an army that had won its way to it. But stiff fighting would be necessary to reach this, because these ridges formed the buttress that shielded the great railway centres of Cambrai and Douai. A feature of the terrain, especially in the south, was the large number of woods thick with summer foliage and carpeted with a dense undergrowth that made progress, except by means of the small paths running through them, all but impossible. These woods played an important part in the battle.

The main object of Sir Douglas Haig is indicated by his description of the Somme campaign as the “wearing-out battle.” It is more commonly referred to as the policy of attrition, and under that name has been subjected to a good deal of criticism. But there is no question that the policy was based upon sound military principles that could not be neglected. The basis of good generalship is to wear down the enemy, force him to absorb his reserves and then smash him with fresh troops, and the Somme was intended to carry out this programme as far as possible.

The method adopted by Sir Douglas Haig to achieve his object was the result of the experience of Loos. On that occasion the Allies had grasped at more than they were able to hold, so it was now decided to carry on the advance by limited stages in order that the infantry, without being unduly exhausted and still within the supporting range of their artillery, would be able without great difficulty to parry the hostile counter-stroke. It was expected that a methodical advance on these lines, always adequately supported by powerful and efficient artillery, would eat into the enemy’s strength and at the same time be carried out at a light cost.

“What we have, we hold” might be said to be the keynote of the limited objective method. It was solid and substantial rather than brilliant and inspiring, and it had certain defects which became clear in the course of the battle. It encouraged the infantry to depend so completely upon the artillery, that the tendency of the former was to lack confidence when unassisted by the latter. This led to a decline of initiative, which was further emphasised by the very fact that the objective was limited. Though the troops were exhorted to lose no opportunities of exploiting success, it was only natural for them to consider that they had done all that was wanted when they had accomplished the definite task assigned to them. Undoubtedly many opportunities were lost, as the Germans noted with thankfulness, and places, which we could have had for the mere trouble of walking up to them, fell into our hands later only after desperate and sanguinary fighting.

Moreover, after the first shock, the element of surprise was lost, as the terrain once selected was fixed, and the enemy was able to fathom our plans and arrange his defence accordingly. The periods between the stages of our advance gave him valuable time in which to reorganise his forces and strengthen his fortifications. With the enemy’s moral high and his forces well trained and disciplined, the cost of progress was bound in any case to be heavy; but with the limited objective system, it was probably heavier than it would have been under a more flexible and elastic one. It is possible, too, that the method of proceeding by slow stages caused us to miss the chance of dealing a paralysing blow.

Prudence is a virtue in military matters as in other things, but excess of prudence is not without danger, especially in the case of coalitions. The exaggerated caution of Marshal Daun in the Seven Years’ War is both an example and a warning. If at that time the continuance of the Austrian coalition could have been guaranteed, Daun’s tactics would have led to the humiliation and probable dismemberment of Prussia; but before they had time to work their effect, the defection of Russia ruined all the hopes of Austria. The general tendency is for coalitions to be weakened rather than strengthened by time, and this should be taken into consideration even in military affairs.

It can easily be seen that the task of Sir Douglas Haig was not a light one, and two substantial reasons weighed him strongly to the side of caution; he was conscious that his margin of numerical superiority[36] was small, and he had a suspicion[37] that his armies had not yet developed the efficiency essential for the carrying out of a campaign with far distant objectives.

On the eve of the battle the attitude of the Germans was one of assured confidence. From the high ground they occupied to the south of Arras they could not fail to detect the signs of an imminent offensive, and though the preliminary bombardment, which commenced on the 25th June, was supplemented by artillery demonstrations at Ypres and Arras, they had realised that the great attack would take place in the Somme, and in this district their defences were the strongest on the whole battle front. For eighteen months there had been no operation of any magnitude in the sector, and the enemy was given time to make his defences as perfect as they could be made. The front line trenches were protected with broad belts of wire entanglements, which had to be swept away before the attackers could come to grips with the defenders, and numerous and elaborate dug-outs had been constructed to protect the garrison during a bombardment. Most of these shelters went down into the earth for at least thirty feet, and some were so strong that even the most powerful shell could not penetrate them. While such shelters are excellent for protection, they have special dangers of their own. To one in a deep dug-out the noise of a bombardment overhead has a peculiarly sinister and terrifying sound; even a shell that bursts a hundred yards away seems to fall at his door. In such a case a man who thinks more of his own skin than of his duty is loth to leave his refuge, and there were many instances during the battle of enemy garrisons being trapped in their dug-outs before they had time to man their parapets. The Germans had also erected skilfully concealed machine-gun posts, strengthened by concrete, and they had several similarly protected posts for snipers. It was therefore with good reason that the Germans believed their positions to be impregnable.

As the time for battle drew near, the Division was moved closer to the front line, and on the 23rd it was concentrated near Corbie, where D.H.Q. were established. All the sappers and pioneers were busy on roads and dumps. Numerous conferences in connection with the battle were held by the G.O.C. On the next day the Ninth moved to Etinehem, and on the 27th to Grovetown, a city of dumps.

The Division was not to take part in the first day of battle, but it was instructed to be ready to do so when called upon. The A. & Q. Staff worked continuously to supply the men with all that was necessary for the fight. Two hundred rounds of S.A.A. per man were carried, except in the case of signallers, orderlies, and Lewis Gunners. The establishment of Lewis Guns per battalion had been doubled, each company having two and for the carriage of these weapons hand-carts had been issued, but they were of little use except in fine weather and on good roads. It was decided by G.H.Q. that each battalion should have a nucleus of officers for reorganisation; 20 were to go into the battle, and the remainder, including the second in command, was to be left at the First Line Transport. To simplify reorganisation during the engagement, each company wore shoulder bands of a distinctive colour.[38] For the carriage of stores, such as Stokes shells, machine-gun ammunition, R.E. Stores, and tools, parties were formed in each brigade from its several units.

The most scrupulous care was given to the question of communications. These form the nerve system of the military body, and if they do not work properly the whole machine is thrown out of gear, and delay in the transmission of messages may lead to the chance of a victory being missed. Communications had not been good at Loos, but the development and extension of the functions of the aeroplane opened up a new and more rapid means of communication. Men were to carry flares, which when lit on the objective would indicate to an observer from the air the general line reached by the troops, and special machines, known as contact aeroplanes and distinguished by streamers, were allotted the task of maintaining communication with the infantry. Should it be impossible to light the flares on account of damp or other causes, the men were to indicate their position by flashing mirrors. In addition, a code of signals was arranged between a battalion H.Q. and the aeroplanes, the messages from the battalion being signalled by means of ground signalling sheets. Further, to allow observers in the rear to distinguish our men from the enemy, each man wore on his back a square of yellow cloth or metal disc, which was attached to the flap of the haversack.

An enormous advantage possessed by the British on the eve of the offensive was the command of the air. At no time during the war were the signs of our air superiority so obvious to the infantry as in the summer of 1916. The passage of an enemy plane over our lines was then an event. The Germans were virtually confined to the observation they secured from their possession of the higher ground, and even the extra observation they got by means of their balloons was denied them. On the first day of the preliminary bombardment our planes crossed the German lines and swooped down on their balloons, which disappeared in wisps of flame as they were hit. The enemy was practically blinded.

The assault was to be made on the 29th June. To prevent the date being conveyed to the enemy this was known and spoken of as “Z” day, and the days prior to the battle were designated by the corresponding letters of the alphabet. Thus the 25th June, on which date the preliminary bombardment commenced, was “V” day. During the last week of June the weather was bad, and zero was wisely postponed until the 1st July. Thick ribbons of mist floated over the landscape and rendered the work of the Flying Corps exceptionally difficult. Until the 27th June there were frequent and heavy showers of rain, and Grovetown became a sea of mud, but on the following day the sun shone from a cloudless sky, and a typical French summer day ushered in the greatest battle fought in history up to that time.

The bombardment that fell on the German lines was of an intensity far exceeding that at Loos, and to the distant observer their positions seemed to be shot into the air. The bursts of our shells resembled the smoke from an endless row of factory chimneys, stretching north and south, and through the fountains of smoke one could see sods of earth and fragments of timber leaping upwards. For six days the ground throbbed under the unceasing cannonade, and the nights, gleaming with the flashes of thousands of guns, were almost as bright as the days. In this bombardment the guns of the Ninth Division contributed their share, for they were in action with the artillery of the Eighteenth and Thirtieth Divisions. During all this period the enemy’s artillery was extraordinarily quiet, as if reserving itself for the final attack.

On the 30th June the dispositions of the XIII. Corps were as follows: North of the Péronne road lay the infantry of the Thirtieth and Eighteenth Divisions assembled ready for the attack next morning. The battle H.Q. of the Ninth Division were at Grovetown, in which were also concentrated two companies of the 9th Seaforths and the South African Brigade, which had attached to it the 64th Field Coy. R.E., and the 28th Machine-Gun Company. The 27th Brigade, supplemented by the 90th R.E. and “C” Company of the 9th Seaforths was in Billon Valley, Copse Valley, and Trigger Wood Valley. The 26th Brigade, with the 63rd R.E. and “A” Company of the 9th Seaforths, was in Grovetown and Celestins Wood. The Corps Cavalry Regiment, the 19th Motor Machine-Gun Battery, and a Corps Cyclist Battalion were also under the orders of the Division, the first being at Grovetown and the latter two at Vaux.

On the morning of the 1st July the frenzied intensity of the bombardment heralded the moment of attack, and at 7.30 A.M. the British troops left their trenches and advanced on the German lines. For the Ninth, lying in reserve, the day was one of feverish suspense. Messages received showed that matters were going well on the front of the XIII. Corps, but it was rumoured that a serious check had been experienced farther north. By nightfall the position was fairly definitely known. In front of Thiepval, Beaumont Hamel, and Serre, our advance had been completely checked, but farther south the attack had met with a success that exceeded expectations. The objectives of the Thirtieth and Eighteenth Divisions, Montauban and the spur on which it stood, had been captured without much difficulty and with slight loss.

On the evening of the 1st July the 27th Brigade placed two battalions, the 12th Royal Scots and the 6th K.O.S.B., at the disposal of the Eighteenth Division for working and digging. The enemy’s artillery, now active, heavily shelled the garrisons of the captured positions, and on the 2nd July the Ninth Division was instructed to relieve the 90th Brigade (Thirtieth Division), which was holding Montauban. This task was entrusted to the 27th Brigade, and the South African Brigade was ordered to occupy the positions held by the former as soon as they were vacated. The relief began at 10 P.M., but owing to the congestion of the trenches and the unfamiliarity of the guides with the captured positions, it was not completed until 3 A.M. on the 3rd July. The 11th Royal Scots held the east and the 9th Scottish Rifles the west of Montauban, with the 6th K.O.S.B. and the 12th Royal Scots in support and reserve; their task was to consolidate and strengthen the defences of the village. The 90th Brigade had reported that the Germans were occupying Montauban Alley from the point where it was cut by the road from the village to Bazentin-le-Grand. This was too near for safety, and at 5 A.M. bombing parties from the 11th Royal Scots and 9th Scottish Rifles worked their way along the trench as far as Triangle Post, which they garrisoned. During the day this position was consolidated, new trenches were sited and commenced, and dumps were formed. All day the village and trenches held by the brigade were incessantly shelled.

At 3 P.M. on the same afternoon the brigade was ordered by the Thirtieth Division to capture and consolidate Bernafay Wood, about 500 yards east and north-east of Montauban. Between the British positions and the German second line system at Longueval and Delville Wood lay the two densely-foliaged woods known as Bernafay and Trones. These had to be cleared before the attack could be resumed, and, but for the check imposed by the limited objective, would in all probability have fallen to our troops on the first day. Brig.-General Scrase-Dickins arranged for the operation to be carried out by the 6th K.O.S.B. on the right, and the 12th Royal Scots on the left. The attacking battalions formed up, each on a company front, in Chimney Trench and the falling ground to the south-west of it. “B” Company of the 12th Royal Scots was to clear Montauban Alley from Triangle Post to the north-west corner of the wood. After a ten-minutes’ bombardment the battalions attacked at 9 P.M., and the whole wood, as well as the trench between it and Triangle Post, was captured after a feeble resistance. Four field-guns and one machine-gun were taken by the 12th Royal Scots, and one machine-gun by the 6th K.O.S.B., while about 12 of the enemy were killed and 7 taken prisoners. The assailants had the greatest difficulty in maintaining direction owing to the darkness and the dense undergrowth of the wood, consequently, when its eastern margin was reached, there was some confusion of units, and the consolidation of positions previously selected was delayed. After the capture of Bernafay, the K.O.S.B. held the southern and eastern sides of the perimeter, and the 12th Royal Scots the remaining post.

The wood had been an easy place to take; it proved a costly one to hold. At 6 A.M. on the 4th July a violent hostile bombardment opened, and continued for six hours. The shelling was particularly severe in the portion of the wood lying south of the railway line, and the majority of the K.O.S.B. in this area had to be withdrawn farther within the wood. The work of consolidation was totally interrupted, and casualties were heavy, the K.O.S.B. losing over 150 killed and wounded. By noon, however, all our original positions were reoccupied, and the work of consolidation was carried on with vigour. “D” Company of the 12th Royal Scots, under Lieut. H. Crowden, constructed a keep in the centre of the wood, a highly creditable piece of work, because it was no light task to dig in a soil through which tentacles of undergrowth ran in all directions. Every day Bernafay Wood and Montauban were plastered with shells from the enemy’s artillery. The ploughed-up village became a heap of brick-dust and rubble, and the wood, which before its capture had been so thick that the rays of the sun could not penetrate it, became so thinned-out that one could see through it from end to end. During one of these bombardments the battalion H.Q. of the K.O.S.B. were hit; the Adjutant, Lieutenant Wright, was killed, and Lieut.-Colonel Connell had a very narrow escape. On the 5th July the garrison was reduced by the withdrawal of a company of the K.O.S.B. to Oxford Copse, and a company of the “Rifles” was also moved back from Montauban Alley to the same place. The lines between brigade and battalions were often broken by shell-fire, and the work of the linesmen in repairing and maintaining them deserved the highest praise.

On the night of the 4th/5th July the remainder of the Thirtieth Division was relieved by the Ninth. The South Africans took over from the 89th Brigade in the Glatz sector, and the Highland Brigade moved up to the positions vacated by the South Africans. The Ninth was now the right flank division of the British Army. The 1st and 4th Regiments of the South Africans held the line from the junction with the French to Briqueterie Trench on the east of Montauban, with the 3rd and 2nd Regiments in support and reserve respectively. It was still necessary for the British to clear the pear-shaped wood of Trones. The first attack was carried out on the 8th July by the Thirtieth Division, and from that date till the 14th the wood was the scene of a bitter conflict, in which it changed hands repeatedly. Trones was a particularly difficult place to take, as it was commanded from Longueval and from the Maltz Horn Ridge. Every possible assistance was rendered by the Ninth Division. On the night of the 6th/7th, the 27th Brigade sent out a patrol, which established a post in Longueval Alley only 300 yards from Trones Wood, while on the morning of the attack the artillery pounded the southern fringe of Longueval and the neighbouring trenches, and the 12th Royal Scots from Bernafay Wood covered the left flank of the Thirtieth Division with machine-gun fire. During this operation a plucky exploit was performed by Private J. Stevenson of the 12th Royal Scots. Having located a German sniper, he engaged him with his Lewis Gun; he advanced across the open, and having fired off all his ammunition sat down and cleaned his rifle until more could be obtained. He was wounded in both arms, but nevertheless when one of his comrades was hit, he went about 600 yards to bring up a stretcher for him. The Thirtieth Division took Trones Wood, but by the end of the day had lost it all to a hostile counter-attack, except the south-west corner and Maltz Horn Trench.

On the night of the 8th July the 27th Brigade was relieved, and moved down to its old position in Billon Valley. The Third Division on the left took over the portion of Montauban Alley lying to the west of the Montauban-Longueval road; the Highland Brigade occupied the trenches in front of Montauban, and the South Africans Bernafay Wood with their 4th Regiment. The 6th K.O.S.B., who had held the worst shelled portion of the wood, lost in five days 16 officers and 300 other ranks.

The attack on Trones was resumed at 3 A.M. next morning, but at the end of the day the position was exactly as it had been on the 8th. The 90th Brigade, which made the assault, was sadly battered, and a company of the 4th Regiment of the South Africans moved up at 9 P.M. to the south-west corner of the wood to its support. In addition a platoon from the same battalion reinforced the garrison of the Briqueterie, and the 3rd Regiment was ordered to be ready to support the 90th Brigade at ten minutes’ notice. The attack was continued on the 10th without any gain, the Germans recapturing what they had lost by a well-timed counter-attack. On the same date the advanced post held by the Ninth in Longueval Alley was supported by the establishment of several intermediate posts. The sanguinary assaults on Trones Wood had no better fortune on the 11th, an attempt of a South African detachment to aid the Thirtieth Division by bombing up Longueval Alley to the apex of the wood being checked by machine-gun fire. During the counter-barrage of the enemy Lieut.-Colonel Jones of the 4th Regiment South Africans was killed, and the command of the battalion was taken over by Major D. M. MacLeod.