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TRIAL
OF PEDRO DE ZULUETA, JUN.,
ON A CHARGE OF
SLAVE TRADING.

TRIAL
OF
PEDRO DE ZULUETA, JUN.,
ON A CHARGE OF
SLAVE TRADING,
UNDER THE 5 GEO. IV, CAP. 113,
On Friday the 27th, Saturday the 28th, and Monday the 30th of October, 1843,
AT THE
CENTRAL CRIMINAL COURT, OLD BAILEY,
LONDON.

A Full Report from the Short-hand Notes of W. B. Gurney, Esq.

WITH AN ADDRESS TO
THE MERCHANTS, MANUFACTURERS, AND TRADERS OF GREAT BRITAIN,
BY PEDRO DE ZULUETA, JUN., ESQ.
AND DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE CASE.

LONDON:
C. WOOD & CO., POPPIN’S COURT, FLEET STREET.
1844.

LONDON
C. WOOD & CO., PRINTERS, POPPIN’S COURT, FLEET STREET.

CONTENTS.

TO
THE MERCHANTS,
MANUFACTURERS,
AND
TRADERS OF GREAT BRITAIN.

The case, which will be laid before you in the following pages, must be admitted to be one of an unprecedented character.

A merchant, to all practical purposes a British merchant, the junior member of a firm of unquestioned respectability, in which his father and brother are active partners with himself, which has been established for upwards of seventy years in Spain, and of twenty in the City of London, during which period they have maintained, both as merchants and as individuals in private life, the character which will be found in the following pages to have been given them upon oath by several of the most eminent of their fellow-merchants—this individual finds himself suddenly arrested, in the manner hereafter described, within the precincts of his own private office, which is situated in the most conspicuous spot in the City of London, whilst in the pursuit of his ordinary business, upon a bench-warrant, as it is said (but which was never shown to, or has been since seen by him), a true bill having been found against him by the Grand Jury of the County of Middlesex. The charge will be found in the two indictments inserted in [pages 211] and [214], the former for felony, under the Act of 5 Geo. IV, cap. 113, entitled “An Act to amend and consolidate the Laws relating to the Abolition of the Slave Trade;” the latter for conspiracy, to do that which the former indictment describes as done, viz. “manning,” &c. &c., “and shipping certain goods on board a certain vessel, called the Augusta, for the purpose of dealing in slaves;” and the penalty, amounting, in fact, to a person in the rank and station of the accused and of his family, to a forfeiture of life, and those objects which are dearer than life itself. He is carried in custody to the police-station on Garlick Hill, where shortly afterwards, a London attorney, whose name he had never before heard, appears and prefers a charge of slave dealing. The prisoner is immediately conveyed to the Central Criminal Court, then sitting at the Old Bailey; there the two indictments are read to him pro formâ, for they leave him in utter ignorance of who the prosecutor is, or upon what depositions the Grand Jury had found the bill, although his defence, to be effectual, must be directed against them: they remain to this moment an undisclosed mystery, and no one is answerable for the accuracy of those statements, whilst who the prosecutor was, was only disclosed by the counsel for the prosecution at the trial, before the examination of the witnesses began.

The prisoner’s application to the Central Criminal Court to be admitted to bail was strenuously opposed by the prosecuting attorney in person, when the Court, yielding to the representation of the probable result of the refusal upon the members of an honourable family thus violently taken by surprise and distracted, granted the application on terms indeed which the Court itself deemed excessive, but which were the only terms to which the attorney’s consent could be obtained. It was found impossible, on account of the lateness of the hour, to meet with one of the two individuals who had been approved of by the attorney; and under these circumstances the Court consented to receive one security alone for 2,000l., and the prisoner’s own recognizance for 6,000l. Thus it happened, that he who had left his home, his wife, and his children in the morning, with as assured a conscience as any of you can do, returned about ten o’clock in the evening a prisoner, with the possibility of a sentence of transportation hanging over his head, as ignorant of his accuser, or of the facts deposed to against him, as if he had fallen into the hands of the Inquisition.

The whole transaction, embracing the purchase and dispatch of the vessel Augusta, named in the indictment, had formed part of the subject of an examination, for which the house of Zulueta & Co. tendered themselves in the person of Pedro de Zulueta, before a Select Committee appointed in March, 1842, by the House of Commons, to inquire into the State of the British Possessions on the West Coast of Africa, and which was sitting in July and August, 1842, and the Report of whose proceedings had then been nearly a year before the public. Before that Committee, among several other witnesses, two officers of the navy (whose names may be seen on the back of the indictments), who had been in command of British cruizers on the African coast, and another individual, who it seems has discharged the duties of a Judge at Sierra Leone, appeared and were examined. Their examinations were published in the Report, and from thence are inserted in the following pages; but it should be observed that the last-mentioned of these three individuals did not appear in the prosecution, his evidence being inserted here only from the anxiety that a complete case should be placed before you.

As it is in the power of every reader to verify the correctness of any observations that may be made upon the merits of the evidence given by these individuals before the Committee, it cannot be improper to call attention to the temper which evidently pervades it, not for the purpose of invective, but because it is a circumstance of very great practical application to the matter in hand. It is impossible not to be struck upon its perusal with the absolute recklessness of statement, both as to fact and theory. The most formidable conclusions are built upon the most slender foundations. Facts and theories are so mixed up together, that it is only after much sifting that it turns out that what was stated as fact was no more than a theory in the speaker’s mind; and these theories, too, embracing all questions, whether of commerce, of fiscal science, policy, legislation, international law, education, morals, and religion: after which, the character of individuals, or that of a commercial house, is no doubt a matter about which much circumspection cannot be expected to be exercised. The fate of Africa, the immense interests of British commerce, of the commerce of the world; the interpretation of existing laws, under which property, life, honour, may be forfeited; their modification and adjustment; public opinion with its powerful influence, so dangerous when misled, so difficult to be set right; all these awfully important matters seem to hang upon the lips of those two officers of the navy—and they do not seem to feel any hesitation in disposing of such momentous interests. Can it be expected that they would stop and consider before they make a statement regarding private individuals, even though they may happen to be, to say the least of it, accounted by the first men of this city, and in others of the first cities of the world, honourable by birth, profession, and personal character? The crime of which they would be guilty, were mere assertion to be taken as positive proof, is according to the witnesses so heinous, that it exceeds in their estimation almost every other, not only in the law of man, but in the law of God; and yet it is to be imputed upon their construction of some rumours which they themselves, it is quite possible, indeed very probable, may quite unconsciously have helped to mould into a shape by their readiness to accumulate this miscalled evidence. Whether this representation of the general character of the evidence given before the Committee by these individuals is, or is not, correct, may be seen at once by a reference to it in the following pages.

The first information, which any of the members of the house of Zulueta & Co. had of even the existence of the Committee, was the receipt of a letter (see [p. 1]) accompanying a copy of a lengthy Report, by a Dr. Madden, on the Coast of Africa, which called forth a reply (see [p. 5]) addressed by Zulueta & Co. to the Chairman of the Committee—a reply, which, in truth, contains the whole of their case, and to which they may well look back with just pride, since the keenest appetite for the discovery of guilt has not been able to detect one single circumstance contradictory of one tittle of its contents. Neither the examination before the Committee in 1842, nor the trial in 1843, circumstances which could not be foreseen or anticipated, have elicited one single fact at variance with the statements of that letter, impossible as it was to have contemplated at the time it was written, that its accuracy would be subject to so severe a test as either the examination before the Committee, which took place two months afterwards, or the trial, which did not occur till after the lapse of more than a year.

After that letter was sent, it became known to the house of Zulueta & Co. that further statements, unfavourable to their character as merchants, had been made before the Committee; and in consequence of a verbal representation of the unfairness of such mode of accusation, copies of the examinations of two of the witnesses were sent to them. The individual who now addresses you, then offered himself, at the request of his partners, to be examined, the selection of himself being made for no other reason than that he was thought more capable of making himself understood.

It was thus therefore that I, Pedro de Zulueta the younger, appeared before the Committee, and, as will be seen by the minutes of my evidence, entered into an examination of every statement which was brought before me as having been made by the witnesses concerning my house, contradicted several of them, explained others, and volunteered a description of the nature of the dealings of my firm with the two others (whose names had been flung at us) from the time of the establishment of Zulueta & Co. in London, twenty years ago. I also underwent a cross-examination, of which one very remarkable feature was, that Captain Denman himself, one of the witnesses against me both at this examination and at the trial, was sitting close to several members of the Committee, and was seen by me to whisper repeatedly into the ear of more than one member, what, it is not unnatural to suppose, may have been directions for the more effectual discovery of the truth.

I can hardly restrain the expression of my feelings when I consider now the use which has been made of the unreserved frankness, the unguarded, because unsuspecting, candour of the statements made by me before that Committee. The thought never occurred to me, that evidence, professedly taken for the benefit of the public service, required any thing more than substantive truth, and a general bearing upon the points in question; nor could I ever have conceived that it would be scanned with critical severity, in order to take advantage to my detriment of the worst construction that might be put upon this or that verbal slip, so as to place my very existence at stake upon it. I considered myself as doing nothing more than (whilst attempting to eradicate from the minds of the Committee any unfavourable impression, which might have been made upon them by incorrect statements against the character of my house) affording information for placing the legislation on the subjects before the consideration of the Committee on a more satisfactory basis—not by indulging in assertion of crude theories, or in vague declamations, but by the simple statement of a practical case—anxious to show in the instance of my house the situation in which a firm of acknowledged honour and respectability, whose private character, and the prominent political position of one of its members in another country, renders them at least very unlikely abettors of the slave trade—may yet be placed, because, living in England, they happen to have a mercantile intercourse with persons residing in places where this trade is unhappily one of the existing evils, and in which therefore those persons may be more or less implicated, inasmuch as it is well known that no trade whatever can be carried on with a country where the slave trade exists without its being, in some measure, of more or less direct assistance to this illicit traffic. And as the assertion which had been made against some of our correspondents tended, if true, to place this position of merchants in England in a very striking light, I did think that whilst the statements made might be true (and to disprove them could not be in my power nor in the power of any man in my situation) the proper and fair course was not to controvert the matter at all; but, taking the statements for granted, practically to direct the attention of the Committee to the position in which British merchants are left upon the very case itself, which was made out by the bitterest impugners of the character of British commerce.

I appeal to every man who reads my evidence before the Committee—without a previous determination to find out some one upon whom an experiment of the power of the Act of 5 Geo. IV may be tried, and a corroboration of the theory respecting the alleged existence of British slave trading—whether upon any other hypothesis, but that of conscious innocence or of consummate effrontery, my answers to the questions put by the Committee can be possibly reconciled with common sense or common prudence, much less be consistent with that deep skilfulness and far-seeing intelligence, which have been so lavishly attributed to me and to my partners for the purposes of my destruction.

Not for an instant, even when those outraged feelings, which have not been spared, possessed greatest sway over my mind, has the thought occurred to me, that at the time of my examination the object of any one member of the Committee, or even of Captain Denman himself (for I have alluded to the fact of his being present), could be the collecting materials for a secret accusation before a Grand Jury; and I wish very distinctly to protest against any such inference being drawn from my remarks, not for the sake of the members of the Committee, who are above being injured by insinuations, but for my own sake, who alone could be injured by the supposition. I am conscious of having appeared before several men whose names are, and have been ever since I can recollect having heard them, associated in my mind with nothing but what is honourable and high principled: I received from some of them complimentary expressions upon the apparent candour and openness, the straightforward character of the evidence given; and I cannot help believing that my statements were considered moreover valuable, as tending to show the inexpediency, the gross injustice, of encouraging on the one hand trade with countries in which slave trade prevails, and yet, on the other hand, attempting to make the natural and well-known tendency of all trade to mix itself with the general state of society of the country into which it is carried, the evidence of some peculiar criminal knowledge in the parties necessarily nearest in contact with those countries, and visiting that knowledge upon them, after the community have derived profit and advantage from the transaction, although it is well known that the parties so to be sacrificed have it not in their power to guard any but themselves from being directly instrumental to the deviation of the trade into channels rendered illegal by Act of Parliament. I venture to assert, that the prominent feature of my evidence was felt by the Committee to be its unconnectedness with any party or theory; and this feature stamped it with the character of truth which, if fairly and honestly stated, must at times militate against one theory or another.

This is an offence to all who thrive upon theories, and in exactly the proportion of their affected or unreasonable belief of them. An instinctive alarm takes possession of such minds, and as they themselves cannot conceive that other people may have no theory of their own to serve upon that particular subject, which to them, and therefore in their opinion to all, must be paramount, they are disposed to imagine one theory of their own, which they at once fix upon the party thus offending against the assumed mental necessity of universal theorism. If the writer is not much mistaken, the irritation which is produced by this process of the mind, still more if self-interest is at the bottom, will materially help to reveal the moving-spring of the proceedings which are recorded in the following pages.

Be this as it may, one thing is altogether unquestionable (and indeed there has been no attempt to disguise the fact, and to it I beg to call the attention of every man in Great Britain)—it is this: Pedro de Zulueta could never have been placed in the position in which he was (charged with felony under the finding of the Grand Jury), with the remotest chance of a conviction, if he had not voluntarily offered himself for examination before a Committee of the British House of Commons—the way being this—a London attorney lays hold of the printed Report of the proceedings; every part of the evidence given by Pedro de Zulueta, that was destructive of the hypothesis of his being a well-knowing and wilful abettor of an alleged slave trading speculation in 1840, is disconnected from those passages in which he had stated that, in 1842, when he was speaking (after hearing and reading a mass of evidence given for the first time before that Committee), he had heard statements about his correspondents being participators in the slave trade which might be true, which were not, he felt, material to himself, and which, as he had not the means of disproving, he then stated that he must then believe; and then using this intelligible admission, made in 1842, the only one that could be found at all available, as the only presumptive proof of guilty knowledge in 1840. Nothing could be done or attempted against the house of Zulueta & Co., much less against the individual who was attacked, without this management, this distortion of the evidence—for some knowledge of some kind must be made out in 1840, and although the fallacy was transparent, it might and unfortunately did serve for the purpose of the attack at the heart, and might still serve for the next, but not the sole object, of the prosecution. It is true, that the whole of the evidence given by me was read at the trial, for so the law requires it; but that same law, as was observed, also permits that those parts of a man’s statements which make in his favour should not be believed or taken for any thing, whilst such admissions as might be made to appear criminatory of himself are received as evidence against him. By such a process of distortion alone could a case be made out against my house, or fixed upon myself, who was totally unknown to the so-called witnesses as they themselves admitted, and who did not personally appear in any part of the transactions excepting at my own examination before the Committee. If the facts are not so, let it be at once explained what other circumstance marked me out for prosecution. Let the reader of the following pages, after perusing the trial carefully, attempt to solve the problem for himself of how (apart from the fact of my appearing, and of the application which is made of my statements before the Committee of the House of Commons) the firm of Zulueta & Co. came to be prosecuted in my person to the exclusion of others. Let every other part of the evidence given before and at the trial, of matter of fact, by the witnesses on the transaction of the Augusta be considered, and where is one single fact that can connect Zulueta & Co. with the alleged, and only alleged, designs of the parties by whose orders they had acted in that transaction—an acting in itself admitted to be innocent? And if the reader does not find any other solution of the difficulty, it is clearly demonstrated that Pedro de Zulueta has been prosecuted upon partial statements from his own evidence, given before a Committee of the House of Commons, where he appeared voluntarily, where he was encouraged to explain transactions of business, and neither refused nor even hesitated to answer one single question that was put to him, as conducive to a great public object; but without the slightest intimation of the ulterior object to which it has been perverted.

For the purpose not certainly of clearing up the question, but of sophisticating a very plain case, it will perhaps be asked, whether, if a man should avow himself before a Committee of the House of Commons to have been guilty of a crime, or to have partaken in it, is it meant to be contended that his candour is to be the safeguard of his guilt? One short answer is, that the remark is inapplicable to the case; for no such avowal has been even contended to have been made, but on the contrary a distinct and repeated general and circumstantial disavowal was made. Whether my declarations did or did not amount to such degree of information in my mind, at the time of giving my evidence, as presumed a knowledge two years before, that would be brought under the description of the guilty knowledge described in legal phraseology, in an Act of Parliament, very obscure as is generally admitted, and never before put in practice, this was the utmost that the ingenuity of the prosecution could make out of my evidence—and this cannot be called an avowal of crime. The question is not, whether a crime avowed before a Committee of the House of Commons should or should not be prosecuted, using the avowal as one of the means of conviction—a question, which even so put is argued, I believe, on both sides by eminent lawyers—but whether in my case, such as it is, I have not a right to complain of the grossest and most unparalleled breach of good faith—whether the use made of my evidence is not one against which the conscience of every man revolts—whether it is likely to facilitate the public service, or to increase the respect due to the British Legislature at home and abroad, or to their proceedings—even if in other respects the course adopted is free from legal objections, which I believe is at least doubtful.

The fact itself is unquestionable, and I must repeatedly assert it—that the materials for my prosecution were collected from my own evidence as laid before the public, in the printed Report of the Committee, for whose information it was given—that in collecting these materials the statements, although formally read as they were made, were virtually vitiated—that, although the whole was read, only that part which was thought susceptible of some adverse construction was avowed to be of any necessary weight; and statements, such as they were, which had been made in 1842, after information that was at any rate only furnished in that year, were applied for the purpose of raising a presumption of guilty knowledge in 1840.

I have insisted so much upon this point, because it is very material that it should be borne in mind throughout the perusal of the following pages. I do not hesitate to believe that the unsophisticated sense of the people of this country will revolt at the fact of a Committee of the House of Commons having been turned into a trap wherein to take a man—a snare to his good faith—the more effectual, because the members who happen to compose the Committee stand high for honour and integrity in the land, and therefore their very names seemed to afford a guarantee that the fairest construction would be put upon the words of a respectable individual, who appeared voluntarily before them, without assuming from the outset that he is a self-convicted felon, who comes before them for no other purpose than to deceive, and who must be listened to only in order to see if he does not betray himself into some acknowledgment of his crimes, of which advantage is to be taken to secure the ends of justice, which he craftily endeavours to defeat. It may suit those who want such a monster of craft and subtlety in order to justify the monstrous proceedings, which have been deemed necessary to support a mischievous and unfounded theory that British capital is employed in the slave trade—it may suit them, to make me out to be this desideratum in their system; but, without laying claim to any more extended or more favourable notoriety than that which is on record, I venture to say that the attempt must fall to the ground, by the weight of its intrinsic absurdity, before the common sense of the people of this country.

But what the Committee thought of the evidence, after hearing at length the very individuals who appeared against me at the Old Bailey, and after hearing my own evidence, which formed the chief weapon against me in that Court, will be found in their own Report, printed in the following pages. Every reader may judge for himself, whether, in point of fact, it is not an anticipated condemnation of such proceedings as have been inflicted upon me—a verdict of not guilty, not only upon the transactions of the Augusta, but upon the whole of Zulueta & Co.’s agency for the houses mentioned, in my evidence, if the representation given by me of the transaction be substantially correct. In [page 203] the following words will be found:—“In the first place, it is fair to state that we have no evidence, or reason to believe, that any British merchant, concerned in the trade with the West Coast of Africa, either owns or equips any vessel engaged in the slave trade, or has any share in the risk or profits of any slave trade venture”—a declaration this, the correctness of which every one conversant with the characteristic features of British commerce must acknowledge. Have any facts been elicited subsequent to this Report, and previously to the prosecution being instituted—any new evidence, which was not before the Committee of the House of Commons? This is a question which happily every reader of the following pages may settle for himself. Let him, as he peruses the evidence, at each stage of it ask himself the question—Was this before the Committee of the House of Commons? That it was, must be the answer upon every point. Not one statement was elicited from a single witness which had not been before the Committee. There was indeed an unworthy attempt to create a false impression about some casks and shackles having been left on board, even after the most unsparing of the witnesses for the prosecution had acquitted the vessel of even the shadow of a suspicion of containing the least implement available for a slaving equipment. How the attempt was foiled by their own witness afterwards will be seen; and I will not say a word more about an attempt upon which the very existence of a fellow-creature perhaps might hang, leaving it to be visited with the feeling of abhorrence which it must excite in every reader. Apart from this, there was before the Committee much more against me than there was before the Court, as may be seen by a comparison of the evidence as given before the one with that given before the other; because the nature of legal proceedings keeps the witness, even if otherwise disposed, within the limits of matter of fact—limits, which before the Court they did attempt to transgress, as may be seen very prominently in the case of the chief of them, but from which before the Committee it was in their power to wander, and they did accordingly so wander at every moment. Is it not fair to infer, that it was not to serve the purposes of justice, but at the very best that of some fancied expediency, that this prosecution was undertaken—a prosecution demonstrated to have been undertaken against the recorded sense and opinion of the Select Committee of the House of Commons? Suppose, for a moment, that by some quibble of law, by the forced interpretation of an Act of Parliament, admitted to be sufficiently obscure—not to speak of attempts to pervert evidence, or of the effort to carry off the victory, which constitutes the very essence of all legal conflict between individuals, and which of itself renders the right of private prosecution of public wrongs the destruction of civil liberty and of individual security—suppose, that by such means, what to the deliberate judgment of the Committee of the House of Commons did not appear to deserve even animadversion, might have been made out before an Old Bailey Jury to be such evidence of guilt, as to have procured an adverse verdict—is this the kind of justice which the people of this country would have approved? Impossible! I cannot believe it: the idea cannot be for a moment entertained.

But this is not all. We have seen what the Committee of the House of Commons decided. The Government—the proper, and the only proper agents, in a prosecution of this kind, upon whom, if sufficient ground existed, it was a bounden duty to have taken it in hand—seem to have treated the matter in the same manner as the Committee. All the documents which have been received in evidence, and some which were offered and were not received by the Court—that, in short, which forms all the evidence against the accused at the trial, and more, were in possession of Government before the last Administration went out (the proceedings before the Committee alone excepted)—that Administration did not take up the prosecution. The law-officers of the present Administration have had them also, and moreover the proceedings before the Committee, one of the members of which was a leading member of the preceding Government—they have not taken up the prosecution. A print in the favour and confidence, as it seems, of the parties to the late proceedings, has stated, that the actual law-officers of the Government were consulted and decided against their being undertaken; that again, when the bill was found by the Grand Jury, the prosecution was offered to them, but that they declined to be parties to it. These statements are followed up by remarks upon the apathy and indifference of the Government, which can only serve to render the testimony borne to the fact the more unexceptionable, because unwilling; for, otherwise, they afford only a lamentable specimen of how much mischief is done to a cause, the sole merit of which must consist in its being one purely of humanity, by its being used for the purposes of political warfare. This indeed is to trade with the cause of the slave.

The fact remains unshaken, that neither the Attorney-General of the present nor of the late Administration has prosecuted by himself or by others, and therefore the Queen’s name was as much usurped under the cover of the forms of the Court, as that of the public, whose name is invoked in support of these proceedings. I will venture to say, that no one who has really looked into them for himself, and is possessed of all the facts from the examination before the Committee of the House of Commons, can think with other feelings than those of shame and indignation, that they can take place in England—feelings, the more strong, because such proceedings are pretended to be undertaken in order to serve a cause with which, if they are identified, they will only serve to disgrace it. I cannot but believe that all this is felt by the majority (I know it is felt by very many) of the members of a society, whose zeal may be imposed upon at times, but the majority of whom must have that real benevolence of heart and soundness of judgment, which will make them wish for no other principle of action than that contained in the well-expressed sentiments of a noble lord—“That a good, however eminent, should not be attained otherwise than by lawful means[1]:” it may be added, that by no other can it be permanently attained.

[1] Lord Aberdeen’s Letter to the Lords of the Admiralty, 20th May, 1842.

The Society, to which I am alluding, was not more eager to start or to adopt the prosecution than the Committee of the House of Commons disposed to find a ground for its being undertaken, or than the last and the present Administration; indeed, the Society volunteered a disavowal of any connexion with the proceedings at their commencement, and did not express even an approval of them. In this, their organ only represented faintly the sentiments more strongly and decidedly repeated to myself by many members of that Society in a tone of unequivocal reprobation, and viewing the proceedings as calculated only to injure the cause which they had at heart. That such has been a very generally prevailing impression is fully attested by the plaintive remarks of the organs of the prosecution, and the libellous stimulants which, whilst the proceedings for the trial were in progress, they thought it necessary to apply. It is, indeed, but too true that a society, proposing to itself the accomplishment of some great moral and benevolent object, is most specially bound to confine itself to the use of such means only as are of as unexceptionable and even as benevolent a character as the end. Crime is, indeed, a just object of abhorrence; but a society, like the Anti-Slavery Society, is specially bound to guard themselves against the danger of encouraging one species of crime in their attempt to put down another; every one of the means they employ or sanction must be of as unquestionable purity as the end they profess to aim at: expediency, as distinct from justice, must be jealously guarded against, apt as it is to insinuate itself into all human proceedings, and never more subtilely than under the cloak of zeal in a good, cause: the smallest degree of evil to be done must stand as an insurmountable barrier to the accomplishment of the most undoubted good. It is in the power of man to destroy the very end in view, whilst he thinks he is advancing it; but he cannot alter the law of Providence, which dooms to certain defeat, even amidst the tokens of apparent triumph, whomsoever dares to modify for himself the moral code of the universe: the moment that violent hands are laid upon it, in order to smooth down a difficulty in the way of action, the very end itself becomes contaminated. All this is evident enough, and approves itself to the enlightened conscience. A society, as a body, taken in the abstract, may be supposed less likely to be led away by such apparently short cuts when presenting themselves in their path; but these societies are, in practice, managed by individuals of whom the least scrupulous are sure to appear as the most zealous and most efficient—they are the most busy and the most forward—and, hence, the additional necessity for caution on the part of the more conscientious, inasmuch as the names of the good are too often the cover of the deeds of the bad, whose power consists exclusively in the moral weight attached to the acts which the good are made to appear as having sanctioned.

It would have been well for the credit of the Anti-Slavery Society, therefore, if the London Committee had retained the position in which they placed themselves by their own act of disavowal; instead of which, after being taunted by one or two prints, which have, pending the proceedings, used every exertion in their limited power to stimulate the passions of those whose good sense it was necessary to mislead, the London Committee have passed and published the following resolution:—

“At a meeting of the Committee of the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, held at No. 27, New Broad Street, London, on Friday, December 8, 1843, Josiah Forster in the Chair,—The conduct of Sir George Stephen, in the prosecution of Pedro de Zulueta, Jun., in October last, being taken into consideration, the following resolution was unanimously adopted—

“That this Committee feel it to be due alike to Sir George Stephen himself, and the public interests of justice and humanity, to express their high sense of his philanthropic and public spirited conduct, in carrying on, upon his own responsibility, the prosecution of Pedro de Zulueta, Jun., and another, for slave trading; a course in which the decision of the Grand Jury, and the declared opinion of the Judge, have fully sustained him, and by which it may be hoped a salutary check will be given to the notorious implication of British capital and commerce in that nefarious traffic. Josiah Forster, Chairman.”

Here, after using that description of the charge, which is calculated to convey a false notion of what was, and could alone, even by the worst construction and perversion, be imputed, as if the charge had been dealing in slaves, they express a high sense of the philanthropic and public spirited conduct of the prosecutor—necessarily including the inquisitorial proceeding before the Grand Jury—the mode of apprehension of the accused—the resistance to his being released on even large bail, and to his having time given him to prepare his defence—the shrinking from appearing as a witness in public, and stating there what he, the prosecutor, had been ready to swear before the Grand Jury—the bringing up of a witness to raise an appearance of the existence of facts, the very contrary of which had been deposed to before the Committee of the House of Commons by the leading witness for the prosecution in Court—all this forms that conduct, which must have been taken into the consideration of a committee of a benevolent society, and which in discharge of a duty of both justice and humanity that committee have pronounced as both philanthropic and public spirited.

The resolution proceeds to state, that in the course adopted by the prosecutor he has been fully supported by the decision of the Grand Jury and the declared opinion of the Judge. It is impossible to estimate what value to attach to the finding of a Grand Jury without knowing upon what evidence their finding was based. In the present case, one fact is beyond all dispute, viz. that Sir George Stephen appeared before the Grand Jury as the first witness, his name standing as such on the back of the indictment, and that he did not present himself in the witness-box at the public trial, although in Court from the beginning to the close of it—from which it results, that the Grand Jury had before them a witness, giving to them in private, evidence which he did not think proper to give in public. Must not the inference be permitted, that the Grand Jury would have thrown out the bill, as the Petty Jury threw out the indictment, unless some evidence, which was not offered to the latter, had been given to the former by a witness, and that too, unfortunately, by a witness who seems to have preferred the secret inquisitorial form, which still remains in British law, to the open and public path which was before him, and which is the proper boast of British justice?

Regarding the support derived from the expressions of Judge Maule, when applied to by Serjeant Bompas for an order for the payment of the expenses of the prosecution, it is not for me to speak; but that it does not extend to a sanction, in point of propriety, to the part taken by the prosecutor, nor to the manner in which he has discharged it, is very obvious.

This, however, is not the point to which I wish now to refer. The object of this publication, and of the preceding and following remarks, is not any vindication of myself, nor a crimination of the motives of any one beyond what the statement of facts may carry in itself; my vindication I consider ample in the exhibition of the facts themselves—in the verdict of the Jurors, after hearing a trial of two days duration, after a long and elaborate charge delivered when a clear day had elapsed subsequent to the defence—a verdict, which was not agreed to without consideration, which was pronounced by the foreman in the emphatic manner which the crowded Court witnessed, which was received by the spectators, consisting of some of the most respectable merchants, bankers, and professional men of the City of London, who had sat daily and patient witnesses of the proceedings, in a manner which has been noticed by the public press, and echoed by the leading journals of London, of Liverpool, and of other important mercantile cities of Europe.

The chief object proposed in this publication, and in these observations, is to place before my brother-merchants, in a connected form, the whole of the facts, which form my case, or rather the case of the firm of Zulueta & Co., from the first communication which preceded my examination before the Committee of the House of Commons, to the close of the proceedings at the Old Bailey, in order that the merchants of England may judge for themselves, and reflect upon the position in which they are placed, as resulting from the principle and doctrines which the proceedings contained in the following pages have disclosed to emanate from an Act of Parliament which has been passed these twenty years, but which has been for the first time tried upon my case. It may be said, that by merchants in general it is hardly known: we all know that dealing in slaves is prohibited, under severe penalties, by the law of England—we know that it is repugnant to the prevailing tone of education, to the opinions and feelings of our people—we know that, at all events, as it is carried on and can only be carried on, it is at variance with the spirit of Christianity, and therefore no man need read an Act of Parliament to abstain from having any, the slightest, concern in or with such a traffic; but even if these considerations were not enough—which England surely will not suffer to be supposed of her own merchants—even if these considerations did not go to the extent of precluding British merchants from laying out their capital on slave adventures, whether for themselves or others’ account, common prudence, in which respectable merchants in this country cannot be said to be deficient, does at once warn a man not to trust his funds to the issue of speculations which afford no security, over which he can exercise no control—so much so, that it is hardly possible to conceive in what shape, looking at all like business, British capital could be lent for the purpose or on the security of a slave trade adventure. All this has contributed to maintain merchants in utter ignorance of the provisions of this Act of Parliament, or of the use which might be made of its legal phraseology: but now, when a merchant, not at all suspected by his fellows—for that is on record—has been, to the astonishment of every one, dragged from his office to the police-station, and to the Old Bailey dock (more especially when this is done in spite of the resolution of the House of Commons’ Committee, in spite of the opinion of the law officers of the Crown) by a London attorney, it is time to look at the exposition of the law and the practical application of its provisions, which so extraordinary a proceeding has elicited; the more so, as it has been stated that “higher game is in view,” and that the prosecutor is still occupied in analysing the evidence given before the Committee; and when the Anti-Slavery Committee adopt and publish a resolution, in which it is stated, in reference to the late prosecution, that by it “it may be hoped a salutary check will be given to the notorious implication of British capital and commerce in that nefarious traffic, the slave trade.” At any other time the absolute folly of the assertion would have suffered it to remain unnoticed; experience has shown, however, that there is somewhere the means, and that the will does exist, of doing mischief to an appalling degree.

As explaining the practical operation of the law, then, I shall look upon the summing up of the learned Judge, not with a critical eye, in order to decide whether the law has been well or ill administered—this is the province of a professional man, into which it would be preposterous for me to enter. Upon the propriety or impropriety of the Judge’s acts and opinions, or even of his exposition of the law and its requirements, I must be understood as maintaining a complete reserve. For the present purpose, and for every practical purpose that can affect others, the law must be taken as laid down by his Lordship. As to its meaning, the evidence which is required under the Act to bring an individual to trial, the degree of evidence which will send a case to the Jury, that upon which a case in answer shall be demanded of the accused—until it is otherwise declared by competent authority—until then, those who really wish to obey the law must look upon the late administration of it as that which is to be expected, and the extent and applicability of the Act of Parliament to be that which is exhibited in the late proceedings.

The first consideration which presents itself is the nature and definition of the offence. In the outset of his summing up, the learned Judge stating the nature of the charge, alluding to the vessel which the prisoner is alleged to have employed, lays down, “that it was not necessary to be proved that the ship in question (the Augusta) was intended to be used for the conveyance of slaves from the coast of Africa. If there was a slave adventure—if there was an adventure, of which the object was that slaves should be brought from the coast of Africa, that there should be slave trading there—and if this vessel was dispatched and employed for the purpose of accomplishing that object, although it was intended to accomplish that object otherwise than by bringing home the slaves in that vessel—that is within the Act of Parliament. So, if the goods were loaded for the purpose of accomplishing the slave trade ... the crime charged in this indictment would be committed, the allegations in the indictment would be supported, and the prohibition of the Act of Parliament would be violated.”

Such is the nature of the offence. If there is a slave adventure in the port of destination of the vessel and goods which you dispatch, for the purpose of accomplishing which they may be said to have been intended, the prohibition is violated; but as, in the case of the vessel and the goods in question, no attempt was even made to prove the existence of any such adventure, but only a general slaving character of the port of destination, it follows that not even the existence of such particular slave adventure is necessary to be proved in order to support an indictment under the Act, but it is enough if a general slaving character of the trade at the port of destination is proved, in order to lay the ground of an indictment. Let this general slave trading character be discovered by any one of a port in Africa, to which you may have sent goods—and of course, if a port not in Africa is (as may very well be) largely concerned in the trade, the case is not very much altered—and you stand open to a charge under the Act, for the crime has been committed. It is as when a man is found murdered in the street—the crime has been committed—the only thing is to find out the criminal. How this is done under the Act of Parliament on the slave trade is the next thing to be seen.

“The employment, the dispatch of the vessel,” says the learned Judge, “is no conclusive proof of the guilt, till going further, and showing that the party doing so did it for the illegal purpose charged.” But then, for the purpose of beginning the inquiry, without which there would have been no beginning of it, the foundation must be laid in the employment of the vessel by the person accused. If slave trading is intended, and the vessel be sent for the purpose, the important consideration then is, whether the person employing the vessel is cognizant of the intention. We have seen the large meaning of the terms slave trading. It is not like wine trade—dealing in wine: it is not dealing in slaves, but dealing in Manchester and Birmingham goods, adapted and purposely manufactured for the African markets, so long as it is found that slave traders, that is, as heretofore the term has been understood, dealers in slaves—resort to the port for which they are shipped. Of course the crime having been committed by some one, that is, by the person who intended that slave traders should use them for slave purposes—and no other will be supposed as possible—the existence of the law punishing such an intention demands that an inquiry should be made. For this purpose the commission-agent in England, who employed the vessel, must be laid hold of—not that in that one act there is a conclusive proof of guilt, until it be further shown that he was cognizant of and intended the illegal object, but because an inquiry is imperative under the Act. With whom the right and duty of making it rests it matters not—any one that may be so disposed from a philanthropic and public-spirited motive. It is not enough that a Parliamentary inquiry has been made already—it is not enough that the law-officers of the Crown see no reason to institute a further inquiry—it matters not, if the case has been lying in all its details before the public, the ends of public justice are never satisfied until the so-called inquiry takes the shape of a bill before the Grand Jury—the inquisition of the country. There certain depositions are secretly made upon oath, which you shall never see; and upon this mild and fair procedure you will have your very life, and the life of every one dear to you placed in jeopardy, for I believe that there is nothing in the mercantile profession which is likely to prepare a man, and a man’s family, for his being treated as a felon. It is indeed true, that in the evidence before the Committee of the House of Commons merchants are treated by some of the witnesses in a tone and manner becoming only those times in which merchants were tolerated for the sake of the money that might be extorted from them, but otherwise were considered as a caste whose instinct was money-making by all means, right or wrong, and against whom every crime might be presumed; but, whatever may be in the heart of some, and whatever may rise to their lips, against a profession which England honours and distinguishes, a distinct avowal dare not be made such as will justify the insinuation that there is absolutely nothing in carrying a merchant, considered respectable, from his private office to a felon’s den, without his knowing his accuser, or upon what he is charged, which ought to shake his mind or that of his family.

But, then, unless you are proved to have been cognizant of the intended purpose, you will be acquitted. The nature of the offence has been explained and laid down to embrace a very wide compass. If there existed a slave adventure at the port of destination of a vessel, to accomplish which that vessel carried goods, the offence has been committed. The penalty, to whomsoever committed it, is by the Act only short of the greatest imposed by the law. You employed the vessel—this is not conclusive of guilt, until it is shown further that there was slave trading intended, and that you were cognizant of the intention. Let us see how both things are to be proved and brought home to you. Heretofore the way between your office and the Old Bailey is one which there is no merchant, trading with countries wherein the slave trade is allowed to exist, may not be dragged through without risk or responsibility by any ruffian in London. Now, perhaps, though not exactly at the earliest stage that may be desirable for the safety of the innocent and the repose of honourable families—still now, perhaps, the requirements of the law in regard to proof are commensurate with the facility afforded on the outset, and with the terrible penalty which follows a conviction.

The Judge proceeds upon this part of the evidence as follows: “It appears from the evidence, that the Gallinas is a place described by some witnesses of great experience—two captains in the navy, and Colonel Nichol, who was the governor of a district in the neighbourhood” (about 1,500 miles from it, see [his evidence]), “whose employment was mainly to watch the slave coast, of which the Gallinas forms a part, and to contribute to the putting down the slave trade—that the Gallinas is a place of slave trading, and of no other trade at all.” His Lordship continues as follows: “It is said, and I think with great probability, that the Gallinas is not generally known as a slave trading place, in fact, it seems very little known at all; it seems to be a place where any other description of felons may resort to concert their schemes and hide their stolen goods, and which, of course, they do not make public, and which is not likely to be known by honest and true people. Except those employed as police or otherwise in aid of justice, as these captains were, of course it would not be spoken of at all. There might be slave traders in London knowing it very well, but they would be perfectly silent probably, and hardly mention it by name even in speaking one to another. It is very probable, therefore, that the place was not very well known; that when these persons spoke of the Gallinas, they might say the Gallinas on the coast of Africa; and a person might be very conversant with the geography of Africa in an honest way, who had not been active in putting down the slave trade, and yet might not know where it was, except that it was on the coast of Africa.”

It is impossible more correctly to state, in stronger language, or more clearly, the possibility of the place of destination of a vessel being a slave trading place, and that exclusively, without in the least diminishing the great probability of its being unknown to the party in England who ships goods for that place as a commission-agent, by order and for account of somebody else abroad. Thus, the great probability of my statement before the Committee of the House of Commons of the ignorance of the character of the trade carried on at Gallinas was completely vouched for, and the observation, that those who knew were not likely to tell, and not likely to as much as name the place, was forcible in my favour, since the house had entered and cleared the Augusta for Gallinas, and not for Africa, as ships with destinations for the West Coast are generally dispatched, and as the Augusta might most certainly have been, had the house even suspected an improper object which required concealment. It is singular that, in the explanations prepared for instructing counsel, the case is stated in nearly the same terms as to the ignorance of the character of the place, as those used by Judge Maule. Merchants easily understand this, because it is the case more or less with every one. In shipping goods by foreign order and for foreign account to distant ports in all parts of the world, with which there is hardly any communication, and with which the shipper himself has none, and need not have any for the purpose of such a transaction, it most frequently happens, that the nature of the trade carried on at that particular port is very imperfectly or rather not at all known. In the multitude and the rapidity of operations which must be disposed of almost without thinking, the inquiry (not being either interesting or profitable, and of course quite unnecessary) is not made, or indeed as much as thought of, especially when heretofore, I believe, it will be acknowledged that it has not been considered that the nature of the trade carried on at any place could involve the mere shipper, without a connexion or any interest in that place, in the slightest responsibility.

But what follows? The character of the place is thus settled: “That it is itself a slave trading place appears to be very evident from the case on the part of the prosecution. Probably those honest persons, those honestly dealing persons, who know best about it, are those who have been called upon by their public duty to ascertain it. Such persons have been called, and they give it this character and description, and they state that it is distinguished from other parts of the coast of Africa; for on other parts of that coast, it is said, slaves are sold as one article of export, but that other things, such as palm-oil—I believe that is the principal thing—and ivory, and wood, and other things, are sold in immense quantities on the coast of Africa; but that that is not the case at the Gallinas. They might be carrying out goods to other parts of Africa, intending to bring home palm-oil, or slaves, as might be most profitable; they might intend to bring home an honest commodity, and not have to do with this dishonest and perilous commodity; but it appears difficult to conceive what a person, carrying a cargo of goods to the Gallinas, could intend to do with it, unless he intended to have those goods employed in the slave trade. The prisoner might say they were to be employed by others in the slave trade; that would be plain and simple: it is wrong, but it is a plain and simple account of that which was intended to be done. It is a place, as it appears, without any trade; and if there be an obvious plain interest in a person carrying goods to that place, it appears to me that it may be taken that they were for the purpose of the slave trade. If that be the plain and obvious inference, it appears to me that might be the inference very properly drawn by Colonel Nichol, that this was a slave adventure, unless the contrary were proved.” Here the character of the place seems the only point upon which the observations of the learned Judge bear; and that character having been laid down as very probably indeed unknown to any one but the dealer in slaves, and the police employed against them, they do not seem to touch the prisoner. But at the same time an answer is suggested which the prisoner might give about what was intended, thus seeming to imply, that he ought to be furnished with evidence in answer, capable of accounting for what was intended, without which the full weight of an inference by one of the witnesses must remain, so far attaching to him the knowledge that he must necessarily be supposed to entertain of what was intended by others. I had said before the Committee, in the evidence read in Court, that the house knew nothing of what was to be done with the goods. Therefore, this not being admitted, it seems to follow that the law, as laid down by Judge Maule, requires some plain and simple account of what was intended to be done with the goods from the commission-agent in England who ships them by order and for account of a merchant residing abroad. It had before been laid down, that to ship the goods for slave trade purposes is an offence under the Act, if the shipper was cognizant of the intent: it is now said, that the port is an exclusively slave trading port, and it is not suggested that this was probably unknown, as it had before been said, to any but the dealer in slaves and the police employed against them, nor any account taken of the statement of the accused before the House of Commons, which had been read in Court, disclaiming the very possibility, as a mere shipping-agent, of any knowledge of what was to be done with the goods: the only answer suggested is one which may give a plain and simple account of what the merchant abroad intended to do with the goods at such a port. It seems to follow, therefore, that the mere shipping-agent in England is bound by the Act to be provided with such an account; and if he does not give it, the inference, to be drawn as to the object of the shipment from the character of the port, will not only attach to the adventure, but will cut deeper, since if you are bound to have and to produce a knowledge, and you do not produce it, it seems that the account is to be held not to be producible.

The notion that the Act of Parliament must be understood, not only as punishing a proved guilty knowledge, but as demanding from the accused party proof of an innocent knowledge of the plans and objects of a foreign merchant residing abroad, in respect of a transaction, in which the former has had no other share than that of a simple shipping agency in England, by order and for account of the latter, pervades the whole of the proceedings, and shows itself more clearly in the remarks that follow. “It is possible,” continues the Judge, “that this might be an adventure, not slave trading; if so, nothing can be more simple than to prove it: Martinez & Co. might prove that it is an honest adventure. If it was a dishonest adventure, it could not be expected that Martinez & Co. should be called to give evidence at all; but if it were an innocent adventure, it would be very easy for them to be called. It is true that persons are to be convicted, not by evidence they did not produce, but by evidence produced against them—not on suspicion, but on conviction; but where such evidence is offered of the trade being slave trading, as is offered here, namely, that the vessel was loaded with goods” (in itself, as the learned Judge had formerly stated, not conclusive of guilt)—“that a cargo of goods was dispatched” (to which the same former observation applies) “to a place, where slave trading is the only known object for which vessels ever go” (known to slave traders and the police employed against them, as was also aptly remarked by his Lordship; although one of these, Captain Denman, seems to have known of 800 tons, according to his evidence (see [p. 329]); and upwards of 1,000 tons, according to his official dispatch to the Governor of Sierra Leone, dated 12th December, 1840[2], as having been landed at Gallinas, without being able to say that the object was slave trading)—“a slave-mart and nothing but a slave-mart—you have a case, though it is an answerable case; but if the answer, which if it exist could be easily given, is not given, it may very fairly be inferred that the vessel was proceeding on a slaving voyage, a voyage either for the purpose of bringing home slaves, or of landing those goods for the purchase of slaves.”

[2] Vide “Report. West Coast of Africa. Part II, Appendix,” &c. p. 460.

The learned Judge is still upon the point of the nature of the adventure, as indicated by the nature of the trade said to prevail at Gallinas; and as in the former observations, since the name of Gallinas has been laid down as probably conveying no information to any but slave dealers and the slave police, the prisoner seems to remain untouched. But then it is laid down that an answer, which of course somewhere must exist, could be easily given by the accused. How so? but that the law, this special Act of Parliament, must be so understood as to require the simple shipping-agent in England to prepare himself with a full knowledge of the plans and the objects of the foreign merchant abroad, who orders certain goods to be purchased and shipped for his account. The learned Judge has not lost sight that in the universal practice of law, a conviction is only justifiable by evidence produced—that is, produced against, not by that which the accused party does not produce: but he feels it his duty, under the Act of Parliament he was expounding, to warn the Jury that the case is not so to be treated; for the operation of that Act, when to be applied to a commission-agent in this country, shipping goods to a place about which such evidence is offered as that it is a slave-mart, and a slave-mart only, even although the knowledge of that fact has been previously stated to be most probably confined to dealers in slaves, and the police employed against them, upon whose testimony alone it stood before the Court—in such a case, when dealing with the 5th Geo. IV, the onus probandi lies with the accused. In the course of mercantile transactions, the commission-agent, who buys and ships goods by order and for account of a foreign merchant residing abroad, and to a port with which the former has no intercourse of trade whatever, would not be supposed nor could be expected to possess any further knowledge than that necessary to complete, in England, his own part of the transaction; but not so for the purposes of the Act in question. The reasoning seems to be this: here is a law which makes a certain knowledge guilty, if the object of the party abroad, originating the transaction be in deed and in fact a guilty one. In order to give force and strength to the operation of this law, it must be so laid down as to render necessary some knowledge of either an innocent or of a guilty nature, in the party residing in England, of the plans and objects of the party abroad by whose order and for whose account he has shipped goods to the port indicated to him. This or that knowledge must exist in the agent: he must be called upon to produce even the very foreign merchant himself, over whom the Court can give the accused no control, over whom he himself is not shown to possess any, and whose testimony after all could not be trusted; since that of the accused, as recorded before the Committee, is not. If in this, or in some other way, he does not prove knowledge of an innocent object, the object must be taken to be a guilty one; and as the law must be understood to require a knowledge, and he shows no innocent knowledge, the inference remains of a guilty knowledge: from which it seems evident that shipping agency business cannot be safely undertaken, as has been heretofore done, at least for merchants residing in countries in which slave dealing still exists, not only in Africa, but Cuba, Brazils, the United States, and other places. But merchants in England are required to master the whole object and plan of their correspondents abroad; and that the sincerity of his endeavours will be measured only by the result, is what common prudence will teach a man to expect from the machinery which is set on foot in order to apply to this Act of Parliament that notable remark, that who wills the end wills the means.

And thus, after having laid down that the Act requires a proof of innocence in the party accused, a knowledge of something innocent intended—which, if not given, must leave the inference of guilty knowledge, inasmuch as no knowledge, ignorance of the object, cannot be taken as an answer—the accused, if he cannot produce his correspondent, or if he did not possess himself at the time of making the shipment, of a plain and simple account of his plans, is left to the mercy of such inferences as may be drawn; and upon this view of the requirements of the Act of Parliament he is to be considered as withholding something which cannot be supposed to be favourable to him. This inference will not be counterbalanced—it cannot be when once admitted; it must either be destroyed by the plain and simple account of what the merchant abroad intended, or its edge will be blunted by nothing else. The accused’s character may be “of the very highest,” perfectly unassailable; the position he occupies in the mercantile profession may be very high, the profession itself in this country being reckoned on a level for honour and principle with the highest; and men of unblameable character, of considerable standing and independence, conscientious and upright, moving in society where good taste and right feeling prevail, are not likely to put their property, their character, their consciences, in jeopardy, especially by partaking in transactions to which their habits and feelings, and those of persons around them, stand opposed, and all that for very paltry advantage. It is pointed out by the learned Judge, that although a very grave charge, and of a very highly penal nature, still the slave trade—the dealing in slaves—“is a trade, which till a recent period was lawful for persons in this country, and many persons of very good character certainly did engage in that trade, and a great number of persons justified it. I suppose,” he continues, “those same persons would now say it is not to be engaged in, because it is a prohibited thing—it is a regulation of trade enforced by very severe penalties made by this country—but that the dealing in slaves is in itself a lawful, right, good, and proper thing, which ought not to be prohibited. Those persons would now consider slave trading as a thing prohibited only by positive regulations. There is no one who does not at once perceive that practical distinction between them. There is no person who, in point of feeling and opinion, does not perceive the difference there is between a thing which is prohibited by positive law, and that kind of thing, against which, if there were no law at all against it, the plain natural sense and conscience of mankind would revolt. This trading in slaves, in the opinion of a great many persons, is itself an abomination, a thing which ought to be considered with the greatest horror, whether prohibited or not; but those who think it was right when it was not prohibited, probably do not think it so very bad if it be committed now, since it has been prohibited by law, only that it is to be avoided on account of the penalty to which it subjects the individuals engaged in it. This has some bearing on the question of how far considerations of character would have weight with respect to such an offence.” The opinion entertained by the individual in question against the slave trade may be as strong as the strongest for any thing that appears, who has stated without its having been contradicted, that neither himself nor his family have ever been suspected of having the smallest interest in slave dealing, or in slave property, about which he has stated how his fathers have proceeded: an individual, who may, perhaps, have a very strong opinion as to the moral and religious duty of obedience to positive enactments by competent authority, and who said something to that effect in the evidence before the Committee of the House of Commons, which had been read in Court.

This as to the character of the party. As to the inducement, when it is alleged that the smallness of the agency commission charged shows that the transaction was considered to be one in the ordinary course of shipping business, that consideration is pressed down by the weight of the radical defect in not having given a plain and simple account of what was intended by the foreign merchant. “It is alleged,” says the Judge, “that the profit on this transaction would be extremely small. I do not think that the petty gain of this one transaction is the matter, for it appears that Pedro Martinez & Co. do a great deal of business, and it is possible that whenever persons have a large and valuable business to conduct, there is some small portion that the correspondent and agent would willingly get rid of if he could; but he is not allowed to pick and choose, but he must take the whole.” In short, a London merchant, of the character which has been described, is to be supposed as not at all unlikely to commit a felony, if the alternative be to lose a valuable connexion.

And thus, whilst the most unimpeachable character is not a proof to any extent against the suspicion of a felonious knowledge and intent, and whilst the token of innocence afforded by the charge of the ordinary rates allowed in legitimate business is not considered of weight—as a compensation in some other way is possible, and the disposition to barter conscience and duty for money is such a thing as people who conduct a large business are not quite unlikely to lend themselves to if they are not allowed to pick—so, likewise, the supposed extent of the connexion of the merchant is no bar to their being supposed anxious to retain one more under felonious conditions. Neither the superiority of his knowledge and education, nor his skilfulness, are likely to make him either apprehensive or disinclined to the commission of a crime, whilst these qualities render him obnoxious to the remark, “that it may very generally be taken, that people know what they are about, unless they can show there was some particular concealment, some hinderance to their knowledge;” “unless they,” so accused, “can show,” that they did not know (not if those who accuse them have shown that they did know), then all the qualities of character, station, extent of business, education, are against the accused; and unless the accused can show, that he had a knowledge of something innocent having been intended by the foreign merchant, any peculiar circumstances of the case, which may appear to be of a favourable nature to the accused, must be considered only in that light which may diminish the improbability of his having had a guilty knowledge. Thus, as the employment of the British flag for the purpose of dealing in slaves stares every body in the face, and was a very strong feature in the present case, not only against any knowledge on the part of the charterer of the vessel and shipper of the goods in England, but even against there having been any guilty intent in the merchant abroad, who had the choice of other flags equally secure and less easy of detection and punishment, the favourable inference hence arising must be neutralised. “If Jennings” (the master of the vessel) “was an adventurer, if he were, as suggested, a very clever and intelligent person, and very conversant with every thing to be done on this occasion, a competent master of the vessel, supposing the slave trade to be intended, a thing which requires qualities one is sorry to see exercised so ill—a great deal of courage, sagacity, and presence of mind, and an unscrupulous readiness to employ them for the commission of this felony, not to be found in everybody—a man of such a description would be the paramount object of a slave trader, whose aim would be, whoever the owner may be, to elude all search, so to manage the thing as that the cruizers of any country shall not stop him. Probably, if the adventure succeeds, it must succeed by such means, so that one sees a perfectly good reason why, consistently with this being a slave trading voyage, it may have been English owned.” Not a word appears in the proceedings against the character of this man, neither does it seem intended by the learned Judge to impugn it, simply to say that if the man did possess the qualities of cleverness and courage attributed to him, these qualities being very serviceable for wicked purposes, it is to be inferred that they were intended to be applied to a slave trade adventure, since no plain and simple account of a lawful intent on the part of the foreign merchant has been given by the charterer in England, with whom the law is to be supposed to make a knowledge imperative. The prosecutor knew, although it was not before the Court, that this man had been tried for the very identical offence in this matter of the Augusta at Sierra Leone, and had been acquitted; for the chief witness in this prosecution, in which, be it observed, Jennings is coupled with me (see the indictment, [page 211]), was the prosecutor in the proceedings against him before the criminal court of that colony; and he himself stated before the Committee of the House of Commons (see Lieutenant Hill’s evidence, [page 84]), that Jennings had been acquitted. And here, by the way, let it be noticed, that Jennings is at this moment under a prosecution in London for the very crime for which he was tried at Sierra Leone and there acquitted, the chief and really the only witness, upon whose sworn depositions before the Grand Jury here the bill against Jennings has been found, being the very same person who instituted the prosecution at Sierra Leone, which terminated in the acquittal of Jennings. And thus, while the individual so acting is at this moment on his way to take possession of his appointment as governor of the Gold Coast, the unfortunate man, who he knows cannot be tried a second time, is in prison.

Further, as the vessel had been admitted (how reluctantly may be easily seen) by one witness not to have been furnished with equipment of any sort for slaving purposes, and had been rescued from the attempt to raise a doubt upon this point, by the evidence of another witness, this is shown also as in no way serving the shipping-agent in England without giving the plain and simple account of what was intended by the foreign merchant residing abroad. “I should think it would be quite a matter of course, even if the vessel was intended to be sent to promote the slave trade, that she should not go out with shackles or leagers, or any thing of that kind on board; for if they are on board, the vessel would be at the mercy of any Custom-house officer.”

The vessel had, however, been at Cadiz, where, according to the representation made on behalf of the prosecution she was really meant to go first, in order to provide herself with the slave instructions, which the Court would not receive, though strongly pressed, as evidence against the agent who had managed the vessel in England so far as chartering and loading her; and yet, although it had been said by Serjeant Bompas “that wherever a vessel leaves a place such as Spain, or some place where she may leave with impunity, with all her equipments complete,” she does so; and although this vessel, which has been charged by the prosecution to have gone into Cadiz for the very purpose of helping the illegal object imputed: she is found not to have been there equipped—and that not from any great attention to the safety of the adventure, for the letters contended to be so clearly slave instructions for the voyage seem to have been there put on board—still the observation is not the less applied, that she was not equipped for the slave trade, because she could not have been so in an English port, without any reference to the fact that the prosecution had contended she could and would have so been at a Spanish port. There she had, however, touched; and that too, according to the prosecution, for the very express purpose of helping the illegal object in a manner more condemnatory than any other. The thing demanded from the prisoner is, however, a plain and simple account of the intent of the foreign merchant in this transaction, and without his being able to give that, every other circumstance which may be favourable to him, either vanishes away, or converts itself into a weapon against him.

Again, the counsel for the defence had put the following case to the Jury:—“You may be manufacturers of guns or gunpowder, or commission-agents living in this country, who, for the purpose of shipment, purchase those goods; in either case a party comes and says—I want 1,000 muskets and six tons of gunpowder to be shipped to a certain place on the coast of Africa. I ask you, are you first to consult the map to ascertain the place, and, having ascertained where it is, are you to go to Captain Hill or Captain Denman and inquire whether they have been upon the coast of Africa, and can tell you the character of the trade carried on there? Are you next, the person being a Spaniard or a Portuguese, to inquire whether they ever deal in slaves; and if you find they do, are you to say, I will execute no order you give me?”

Upon this the learned Judge remarks:—“That Zulueta & Co. stand in a very different situation from that of a person who is simply the manufacturer or dealer in goods, and who has those goods ordered, and who, inquiring Where shall I send them? is answered, Send them on board the ‘Augusta,’ now lying at Liverpool. It would be a strong thing from that circumstance to infer that a person sending those goods on board had any thing to do with slave trading; but that appears not to be the nature of this transaction. In regard to there being a slave trading, all that is done, is done by Zulueta & Co. It is not merely that they had goods sent on board the ship, but they chose the number of the goods to be sent on board the ship, goods which they had bought, for which they had negotiated; and they made out such charter-party, and that charter-party provides that the ship shall proceed to Gallinas on the coast of Africa.”

In the case of the manufacturer of the goods, described as receiving an order and executing it, and shipping the goods on board a vessel for the Gallinas, it would be strong to infer that he had any thing to do with the slave trade. Why so, but because every one of these acts is compatible with ignorance of the objects that are or may be intended? Now, the learned Judge had previously established that the acts of buying and shipping, chartering, and dispatching, are not necessarily in themselves conclusive of guilt, which of course they are not; how, then, is the inapplicability of the comparison put by the counsel for the defence to be maintained, but by laying down the principle, that for the purpose of a defence under this charge, the commission-agent must, at all events, be required to be possessed of, and therefore to be able to give, a plain and simple account of what the merchant abroad intended; and this once laid down, nothing that comes short of it must be suffered to tell in his favour.

The preceding remarks are scattered over the whole of the summing up, and accompany a recapitulation of the particulars of the case. They are here brought together in succession, for the purpose of showing the manner in which the circumstances of the case, in a proceeding of this kind, are treated. It is very true that an introductory remark precedes, laying down “that it is necessary undoubtedly, on the part of the prosecution, that there should be a case made of knowledge, on the part of the prisoner, of the purpose for which this adventure was meant.” The whole process which follows is of a nature which would appear contrary to this principle, unless with the qualification that the proof is to consist in the prisoner not giving himself a plain and simple account of something innocent meant by the foreign merchant residing abroad; and as if the law left no alternative to the shipping-agent, who buys and ships the goods in England by his order, but to do this; or, ipso facto, by not doing so, to stand self-convicted of the guilty knowledge.

Under this view of the requirement of the law, which I have now followed throughout this charge, the concluding remarks of the Judge seem to be dictated. “Now, inasmuch as there are two other partners, and it is probable there might be some other persons in the concern, there arises this consideration. It is true, supposing that there were a case made, but that the prisoner was innocent of it, that he could not call Martinez & Co. on that supposition, as he might on the supposition of there being no slave trading; for Martinez & Co. would not be innocent persons, and they would not be willing to come into this country and say, ‘We carried on the slave trading, but it was disguised from our correspondent, Zulueta & Co.’ If you think there is a case requiring an answer, the question then is, would there have been any difficulty in the prisoner calling his two partners, and others conversant with the business of the firm, and proving that Zulueta & Co. knew nothing at all about this, that they had not the least suspicion, that Martinez & Co. never communicated the fact to them, and that the illegal purpose was utterly unknown to them, for some reasons which the prisoner cannot give, but which his partners could? It would be extremely desirable they should do it, if the defence existed in point of fact.” And lastly, the learned Judge concludes his address to the Jury, by directing their attention to the evidence of the character of the prisoner, remarking, that it is “a character I should say very strong indeed, and almost conclusive, supposing the case were one that did not admit of an answer in point of fact.”

Here the same principle of demanding a justification of innocence is carried out, which pervades the whole of the summing up, and of every part of the management of the case by the Court. It is not said, in any one part of the charge, that the prosecution have made out either a case of slave dealing, or any knowledge of such a thing being intended, or known to be intended by the prisoner, against which a contrary case should be opened and proved; but only that evidence which the prisoner should give of innocence is pointed out; and, what is most remarkable, the following circumstance was not thought worthy of notice.

Mr. Fitz-Roy Kelly (the counsel for the defence) had in the outset, when Mr. Serjeant Bompas was opening the evidence for the prosecution, brought into Court every book, letter, and paper of the firm of Zulueta & Co., with the clerks in whose keeping these documents constantly are: they consisted of the journals, ledgers, letters, bill-books, memorandum-books, original letters of the house of Martinez & Co., of the Havannah, and Martinez of Cadiz, since 1839, one year before these transactions originated, up to 1841, one year after their termination; and, as will be found in [page 303], Mr. Kelly made the following tender:—“I ought to add, as the notice to produce has been referred to, and is now upon the table, that the notice calls upon the prisoner, Mr. Zulueta, to produce all the books, documents, and accounts of his house, between certain dates, at all relating to the transaction in question; and all letters written, and copies of letters written by this house, or any body for them in relation to this matter. My Lord, every document there mentioned is here in Court, and in two minutes ready to be put upon the table.... The greater part are in Spanish, and the prisoner at the bar can distinguish them; but the clerks who kept these books, the corresponding clerk, and the clerk in whose handwriting they are, are ready to speak to any thing my learned friend may call for from the beginning to the end.” This is not taken any notice of by the learned Judge, when pointing out that the prisoner should have called his own father and his own brother, the only partners in the house, to prove that Zulueta & Co. had no knowledge of any slave trading being intended, although the prisoner himself had so stated the fact to be before the Committee of the House of Commons, in the evidence which had been read in Court; and if the statement was objectionable, as being from the party now deeply interested himself, when in a very different situation, it is not perceived how that objection would not have held with tenfold strength at that moment against their evidence. Thus it remains on record, that nothing short of a plain and simple account of what the merchant abroad intends, made out by the defendant, will answer any purpose of the slightest advantage to himself. It is enough in the case of a vessel employed by an agent in England to carry goods, bought and shipped by himself, by order and for account of a foreign merchant residing abroad, if the prosecutor show a general slaving at the port of destination.

And thus have I disposed of the last point which I proposed to illustrate out of the summing up of Justice Maule, in order to show the position of merchants who have intercourse of business with countries wherein slavery, and the slave trade, is still permitted to exist.

I began by showing the facility afforded by the law to any individual whomsoever, who may choose to undertake a prosecution, not only without the consent, but against the recorded judgment of the Legislature, and the known opinion of those officers of the Crown who are especially charged with the prosecution of public offenders. I have shown, that this may be done by any man—whether from motives of private resentment, or of private interest, or of wanton malice—whether under a fanatical hallucination, or from a desire of vain-glory, or from a combination of all or of some of the very worst passions of the heart with the less inexcusable errors of the head, it matters not: the search for the particular motive operating in any one given instance is indeed unprofitable, and whilst it cannot do much towards reclaiming the perpetrator of the mischief, would but little improve the moral tone of mind of his victim, yet the fact itself remains unaltered, viz. that a prosecution of this kind, in the name of the Queen, which the forms of justice require to be used, and on the plea of a public spirit, may be taken up by any man in defiance of a recommendation to the contrary by the House of Commons, upon a case canvassed and decided upon by a Committee of that House, and against the opinion of the law officers of the Crown. It has also appeared, that to the general and very powerful objections which are suggested by the common sense and reason of mankind against this practical reversion to the state of savage life in which a man can take such means of attack upon his fellow-man as he thinks will effect his purpose best, with this sole difference, that the self-appointed public prosecutor may inflict even greater mischief with the weapon of the law than the savage with the knife, and more securely, this evil is added, viz. that this private avenger of public wrongs may adopt the form of a secret information before a Grand Jury, thus avoiding the necessity of appearing as the accuser, unless he chooses so to do, at his own most convenient time, and always preserving the secrets of his own statements, by means of which the first blow at all events will have been successfully, irremediably, and fatally inflicted, and thus placing himself above any responsibility on that account. Then it has been seen, that at this stage of the proceedings, and under all the ignorance as to the prosecutor and as to the depositions upon which he is charged, inseparable from the nature of the proceedings, a man, reputed honourable, as unsuspecting himself as unsuspected by his fellow-citizens, may be dragged from his office and from the bosom of his family, with imminent risk to his business, and with still more fearful effect upon his dearest connexions; and under the shock of his own feelings, which so awful a situation must naturally produce, is conducted as a common felon under charge of the police to the station-house, and thence to the Old Bailey, whence he can only be suffered to depart (of course in exactly the same state of ignorance under which he entered the Court), when the person who arrested him shall have consented, and on such terms as he shall consent to; and then only will he be allowed to return to his distracted family and prepare his defence—against what? against a technical definition of some facts in which he has played some part, but which being so defined as to square with the application which may be meant to be made of a certain Act of Parliament, is sure to bear no kind of resemblance to the real manner in which the said facts occurred, and of course none at all to the impression which they left on the mind of the accused, or to the form in which alone they can present themselves to his mind; and, therefore, such a definition can convey no information of the nature of the depositions secretly made against him, and cannot consequently assist him in preparing evidence against them. He must launch into the regions of imagination for every possible construction which may be given by any man to those facts which have been really done by him, and prepare evidence upon every one of such possible constructions, at an expense and amidst perplexity which may be supposed, and after all most likely to no purpose, for probably the construction to which the proof will be directed by the prosecution may be one against which no counterproof has been prepared; and indeed it will be so, for with this very object the proof will be directed to the construction least likely to occur to the accused, and that upon which a counterproof will be most difficult—for all which the nature of the Act of Parliament has been seen to afford peculiar advantages.

In this state of things the trial comes on. The facilities thus far given to an unknown accuser have been seen, and to so frightful an extent, that even if the trial proceeds no further, an amount of incalculable and irreparable evil and misery may have been perpetrated. These facilities, it has been further seen, are not at all balanced by the strictness of the requirements of the law from the prosecution, they are all applied against the accused. The definition of the crime by the Act of Parliament is itself loose and capable of an unlimited application, and it is understood and laid down in the very largest, thereby including acts which are notoriously and expressly admitted to be in themselves perfectly innocent: the only qualification is the knowledge. This is brought to a lower point in the scale, viz. suspicion. With a show of ingenuousness, as if to put down a quibble, which in Court sounds like a zeal for the truth, the question is made to be, not whether you knew, but whether you suspected; and next, whether you had reason to suspect; the tendency really being towards the real point, to which you are only being gently let down, viz. whether witnesses can be found who will say that they themselves knew very well a great many things, which ought therefore to have been known by yourself, and that therefore you must at least have suspected.

Then the prosecution is not limited to the proof of one particular charge: here it is suffered to remain quite at large—they need not define the act they mean to charge, whether it is this, or that, or any thing else, upon the accused. The knowledge of the intent, in which every lawyer in the land whom you may consult previous to entering into any operation, will tell you, before you are indicted, that the guilt consists, after being brought down to a lower point, as observed before, is made out to be, 1st, any knowledge, not the knowledge in the particular case; 2nd, the knowledge of others, not your knowledge; and the proof of it is no further put upon the prosecution than so far as to make out a case of probable knowledge, founded upon evidence of some general acts done by certain persons on other occasions, not the one in question, in distant countries—acts to which you are not shown to have been a party, or even probably acquainted with—persons in respect of whom all your proceedings in England are admitted to be in themselves, and as done towards them, perfectly innocent; such acts being done upon such other occasions by such persons in countries far away, little known, with which no regular means of communication exist—countries almost unknown to every one in England, and not at all proved to be known to yourself: and all this evidence given by individuals not in circumstances analogous to those in which the accused stands, but by individuals, and by no others, who in the exercise of a peculiar duty have sometimes visited the countries in question; and therefore leaving the whole of the case open to this remark, that whilst it is not at all shown, either from your own acts, or from the facts themselves, that you in England must necessarily have known, there is an evident impropriety in pushing the witnesses to the extent of proving, that nothing but what they said to have happened on other occasions in other places, could have been the ultimate issue of an unaccomplished speculation, intercepted by one of the witnesses, to his evident advantage.

It has lately been shown that such a case of probable knowledge, so made out, and so substantiated, will go to the Jury; and in going to the Jury nothing will avail you, as far as the law goes, but your being able to give “a plain and simple account of what was intended by a foreign merchant residing abroad,” whom you must even bring over to give evidence of what he intended to do with goods shipped by yourself in England, in consequence of a simple order as a mere commission-agent, or to show an impossibility of your being aware of that intent whatever it may be. Without complying with one or other of these two requirements, your case shall go to the Jury, accompanied by every unfavourable inference; and what should have been for your advantage is turned against you. The readiness and openness of the party accused in giving every explanation upon the very first intimation of a suspicion existing on the subject—the credit attached by every one capable of correctly estimating those explanations, whatever circumstances of a favourable nature may lie on the very surface of the case itself—the respectability of the accused, his rank in society, and high character, as vouched by men of the first standing, and who have every opportunity of knowing him and his acts—his wealth, his education, his knowledge—qualities peculiarly adapted to this kind of felony, which is intimated to be the felony of the honest, the wealthy, the educated, the well-informed—all these things seem in the exposition of the law to be literally against him. Nevertheless, these circumstances, combined with the impression produced by the inquisitorial nature of the original proceedings, together with the irresistible force of that axiom, that “a man must be proved to be guilty, and not called upon to prove himself innocent,” may—and thanks be to God, did, in the instance before us—blunt the edge of the murderous weapon brandished over the head of the accused.

There may be something so revolting in the whole conduct of such proceedings to the consciences of men, as to stand in the way of a conviction by an English Jury; but it has been seen in what way every other indignity may, at all events, be safely inflicted; and as affecting men and families of certain education and feeling—who, be it never forgotten, are the very parties said to be most obnoxious to the charge—a verdict of guilty need not arrive, to produce evils as great or greater than any penalties which it is possible for any human law to impose. And when it is considered—first, that the legitimate popular sense of words is distorted in order to call slave trading that, which is neither directly nor indirectly dealing in slaves; secondly, that under the guise of a question of fact, a very subtle metaphysical argument about the nature and the degree of knowledge in the mind of an individual, is the thing really submitted to minds the least likely to apprehend the very nice distinction upon which the decision must hang—and, lastly, when every means are industriously resorted to in order to make it appear that the crime largely prevails in the class to which the accused is likely to belong, and to represent that the only difficulty is to get over the technicalities of legal evidence, but that moral evidence abounds—when all these things are taken together, it is easy to discover how much even the failure of such a prosecution as this, facilitates the next attempt: perhaps it may be practically found that it does so, more than its success could have done.

The resolution of the London Committee of the Anti-Slavery Society of the 8th of December, which has been already quoted, broadly states the prevalence of the crime among British merchants; and another, of a still more recent date, besides repeating the same assertion in another form, clearly intimates that the obstacle to its being visited as it deserves, does not consist in the want of proof of the existence of the guilt, but in “the difficulty encountered in the course of the prosecution in an English Court of Law:” that is, in the technicalities of the rules of evidence, even after the stretch of these rules, which this particular Act of Parliament would, by the experience of the late proceedings, seem to demand.

These resolutions, just published, passed by the Committee on the 29th December, are as follows:—

“Zulueta’s Trial.—At a meeting of the Committee of the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, held at 27, New Broad Street, on Friday, December 29, 1843, George William Alexander, Esq., in the chair, the following resolutions were adopted:—

“I. That this Committee, regarding the recent trial of Pedro de Zulueta, Jun., on a charge of slave trading, in the Central Criminal Court, on the 27th of October last, and following days, as an event of the highest interest and importance, feel it their duty to express their sentiments on the state of things which has been developed by it.

“II. That, abstaining from all comment on the verdict of the Jury, this Committee regard the following points as brought out with great force by this trial, viz.—

“1. That articles of British manufacture are principally used on the coast of Africa in barter for slaves.

“2. That British merchants who are engaged in furnishing such supplies to slave traders are practical supporters of the African slave trade.

“3. That, although a British merchant may furnish supplies to the most notorious slave traders in the world, the evidence by which a charge of aiding and abetting the slave trade can be substantiated against him is of such a nature that it is extremely difficult, if not almost impossible, to prosecute such an offender to conviction.

“4. That the practice of aiding and abetting the slave trade by supplying goods to slave traders prevails to a considerable extent among British merchants, and that, by a portion of the mercantile community, it is not regarded with the sentiments due to its flagitious character.

“III. That this Committee regard in particular the last fact now stated with the deepest and most poignant regret; and that they earnestly invoke, not so much the fear of punishment as the sense of honour, of justice, and of benevolence, in the British community, for the correction of so great an evil.

“IV. That the difficulties encountered in the course of this prosecution in an English court of justice, and the extended ramifications of the slave trading interest which have been developed by it, have, in the judgment of this Committee, confirmed the principle held by the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, that the only effectual mode by which the slave trade can be abolished is the abolition of slavery itself.

“John Scoble, Secretary.”

In these resolutions, the Committee describe the particular matter which they had under their consideration, viz. the supply of British goods. Not so in the previous resolution of the 9th of December (see [page xxvi]). In it a hope is expressed, that by the proceedings against Pedro de Zulueta, “a salutary check will be given to the notorious implication of British capital and commerce in that nefarious traffic.” How this implication takes place is not pointed out. Upon the merits of the matters contained in these resolutions, it is not, of course, my intention to enter; I take them as they are put forth, for the only purpose which perhaps gives them any value or importance, viz. as expressions of the sentiments and opinions of people who show every disposition to sanction, and have the pecuniary means required in order to encourage or to assist others in the use of that power of private prosecution which every one possesses, even if they themselves are not inclined to exercise it in their own persons.

Now, although it is not distinctly stated in the resolution just quoted how this notorious implication of British capital is supposed to take place—not to say any thing at present about a most unjustifiable use of the word notorious, which, in these matters, is constantly made—the mode in which the implication takes place must be supposed to be large enough to be notorious—large enough, when even a check to it is made the object of hope and the subject of a resolution, which, as it conveys a serious charge against fellow-citizens, nothing but a very overwhelming sense of the necessity of a check could have induced the Committee to overcome the painfulness of publishing. The term could not properly apply to any direct concern in the slave trade; that would be something more than implication. It cannot be confined to the supply of goods, since this is a subject treated in a separate set of resolutions. It must be taken to apply to other operations also, such as occur in the progress of a mercantile intercourse with other countries in which slavery, or the slave trade, are permitted to exist, and must apply to all or any transactions with those countries, at least, unless a clear and distinct separation can be made that will render it quite certain and quite capable of proof that neither the slave trade nor slavery can possibly be forwarded directly or indirectly by the transaction. This is the only certain way of avoiding implication. This sense of the charge against British merchants at large, is perhaps the only one which can render either intelligible or practicable the observation which was so emphatically delivered by the learned Serjeant Bompas in his opening speech at the trial, that “if merchants in this country would not accept bills drawn by slave traders, if they would not send goods from this country to be employed for the purpose—in fact, the trade could not be carried on at all.”

And whether this rather extraordinary assertion be or be not correct, I deal with it as with the resolutions of the Anti-Slavery Committee—it is quite enough, upon such a question, and with such momentous interests at stake, that such opinions prevail in certain quarters, and that the power exists of giving them that fatal effect which these proceedings reveal, in order to force upon us, as merchants, the consideration of whether any mercantile transactions whatsoever can possibly be carried on with countries wherein the slave trade or slavery exist, with any real safety to our persons and to our property, whilst things remain as they have been shown to be in the practical development of the law.

It is very true, that previous to the late elucidation of its working, there were such high legal authorities on the subject, as will be found in the pages immediately following this address; and even now, if a case is placed before the very highest counsel of the land, you will be told that knowledge, wilful knowledge, of the guilty intent can condemn the acts upon which you are seeking advice—that that, of itself, will condemn the most indirect—and nothing short of that can condemn the most direct act of abetting the slave trade. But, in order to make good a charge, the evidence of a probable knowledge is made up of those very acts which, without presupposing the knowledge, you had been told are innocent, perfectly legal, and such as you could perform. When once that case of probable knowledge is thus made out, you are called upon to meet it with a case of your own, in which you cannot allege, with any success, the innocent nature of your acts; for although those have been already declared to be innocent in themselves, they are also taken as evidence that you must be possessed of a knowledge of what they were intended to be made subservient to by a foreigner at some thousands of miles distant, in a country which to you may be terra incognita.

The question resolves itself therefore into one of prudence, about which you will be told by the learned Counsel, and properly told, that you alone can be, and you alone must be, the judge, viz. whether, under the state of the law which has been developed, it is safe to enter into any dealings, not which you know or suspect (this is a fraud of the law), but which may be rendered subservient, however indirectly by others, to a slave trading purpose. The letter of the law seems to speak of knowingly and wilfully aiding and abetting the slave trade, and so it is expounded by the highest legal authority of the land, when consulted upon any one case in perspective; but the practice renders this a most egregious fraud on the part of the law itself, which presents itself under false colours; for, whilst in theory it does not permit of any other advice being given for its observance than that just mentioned, in practice it has been seen how the proof of your knowledge is established, not by evidence produced against you, but by that which you do not produce when a case of probable knowledge, founded upon knowledge of others in totally different circumstances, has been made out.

These things speak for themselves and show what is the practical situation of merchants trading with countries in which dealing in slaves and slave negotiations are both legal and of common occurrence. I need not say, that the United States, Cuba, Brazils, and a large portion of Europe, without talking of Africa, fall exactly under this description. It has been admitted, for indeed it cannot be denied, that it is impracticable to draw a line of separation, in order to distinguish the illicit from the licit traffic, in countries where they both subsist, for they are interwoven and mix themselves with, and merge the one into, the other. This is perfectly clear, and indeed the only intelligible account of the matter. Under such a view of the nature of the thing—after what has been brought to light in the late proceedings as to the mode in which a man may be attacked, with ruin staring him in the face at the first onset, whatever the subsequent result may be, seized on—laid hold of at any, perhaps the most critical, moment—after what has been seen of the method in which his prosecution will be suffered to be carried on, and the manner in which the evidence will be made to bear, in order to prove the knowledge which constitutes the guilt—after seeing that no precaution can guard a man against the attack, and no endeavour to ascertain the real sense of the treacherous law, which speaks one thing and means a very different one—after seeing that as a merchant of wealth, character, and education, he carries in those very circumstances as many presumptions of guilt—after it has been shown that the only thing which can save him, according as the law is laid down and administered, is that which in the nature of mercantile transactions is, and must be in almost every case impossible—after all this, which the late proceedings have so strongly brought to light—there remains but one safe course, viz. to abstain from all mercantile intercourse with countries in which slavery or the slave trade exists.

The absurdity which appears on the face of such a statement as this just made, involving as it does the cutting off communication with half the world at least, and leaving the communication with the other half very much on the footing of an inconsistency, renders the accuracy of the rule, as a conclusion from the preceding reasoning, very suspicious. I appeal, however, to every candid and honest mind whether it be or it be not the conclusion which, but for its absurdity, (if so it is to be called) would be imperative, and such as could not be avoided without manifest want of honesty. If such is the real fact—if the conclusion is just and legitimate, and yet it leads to something absurd and wrong; then the principles upon which it proceeds must themselves be the wrong-doers. The state of the law, which leaves no other alternative than that of an impracticable absurdity on the one side, and on the other an exposure, imminent and threatening, to an indictment, followed up by the most terrible consequences, even if a conviction does not take place—must be wrong. It deserves a stronger epithet, lest it should be thought that by wrong is only meant unwise—it is positively of the very nature of a national crime—it is a deep moral stain upon the people who suffer this state of things to continue in all its hideous deformity, whilst the victims to such a state of the law could only be looked upon as barbarously sacrificed: the people tolerating its continuance, when once made aware of what was being done, could be considered only as a race of heartless, cruel tyrants. In the pursuit of a praiseworthy object it is very possible, and indeed it is not uncommon, for a nation no less than for an individual to betray itself into a very false position, which is made so much the more mischievous, because, in the case of the nation no less than the individual, people are found ready to take advantage of that position. But so soon as the evil reveals itself in this practical shape, the nation, quite as much as the individual, is called upon to remove the very possibility of a repetition of the act of oppression arising from that false position.

And what is the false position in which this country appears before the whole world in the matter before us? It is this. Here is a people with whom trade and manufactures form very important elements of wealth, independent of the justly admitted tendency of both to promote civilization—a most important, but not the present consideration—these people thrive largely by their mercantile intercourse with Cuba, with the Brazils, with Spain and with Portugal, with the United States, with Africa, so much so, that they cannot dispense with that trade. Those of their people who follow the commercial career in all its branches, their merchants, manufacturers, and ship-owners, and conduct the intercourse with those countries, materially contribute to the welfare and to the prosperity of every class of the community in which they live. They contribute not a little to the support of the State, and when an emergency arises, when the credit of the country and the honour of the Crown are at stake, they are among the first upon whom the call is made, and is not made in vain: and yet the state of the law among this people who derive the important benefits, which have not certainly been exaggerated, from a commercial intercourse with the countries just mentioned, is such as to place those of their fellow-countrymen, who conduct that intercourse, and are therefore nearest in contact with those countries, liable to be dragged from the scene of their labours, so vital to the prosperity of this people, as common felons, upon an indictment secretly procured and obtained; and their very acts, notoriously necessary for carrying on the very operations of commerce, which the country cannot dispense with, are in the first instance to form the presumption of the guilt, and afterwards the proof of it, unless they can prove them to be not guilty. It is true that this people have anathematized a branch of trade which subsists in those countries, and have expunged that trade from their code of licit pursuits at an immense sacrifice to themselves, and are determined to extinguish it among the nations of the earth, as far as it can be done by lawful means; but inasmuch as they cannot dispense with all other intercourse with other countries, although fully aware that from that intercourse the proscribed traffic must necessarily derive assistance (since it cannot be separated from any one licit pursuit in the countries wherein it prevails), they are bound so to construct the law as to protect the men who conduct that intercourse, against any attacks which may be founded more or less on the use to which others, and not themselves, may turn the acknowledged necessary and legitimate acts, without which the intercourse cannot exist. And if such be the meaning of the law, as I have no doubt whatever there is not one man in Great Britain at all acquainted with these matters, who has not been, to this moment, in the understanding that such and no other was the state of the case—if it be not meant that the intention is that a law shall be made with apparently one meaning, and to be used for a quite different purpose—when the perversion which it seems to authorise shall have been discovered, sharpened by the application of the right of private prosecution, and in the form of a secretly procured indictment, which destroys before it convicts—there is only one of these honest courses left—either let the law—a clearer law—be substituted for that which exists, or let it be clearly explained; and, at all events, let the right of prosecution be placed exclusively in hands, and limited to a course of proceeding, which will afford some guarantee for its right use. Let us cast away from us the worst features of the Inquisition.

It cannot be meant to leave matters so—that the nation shall be deriving all the benefits of commercial intercourse with the countries already mentioned, trusting to our desire for profit as merchants to get the better of our prudence as reasonable men—that we shall be content to run the risk of private prosecution, and secretly procured indictments, of arrest, imprisonment, ruin, disgrace, transportation, the sacrifice of all that is dear to a man on earth; and, therefore, that the nation will go on prospering by our labour, whilst we ourselves may be told that we need only be a little more careful. And all this, as if it was meant to be insinuated that if a victim is now and then made, it is expedient that it should be so; that it is not extremely harsh, since merchants are to be thought of only as men accustomed to risks, and therefore who get obdurate against adversity—as if it were assumed, that as to the victim so made, it is sure to be some one who has deserved his fate by a more than ordinary degree of temerity, by going a little too far, or by an act of rebellion against the attempt to fix the brand on his forehead, which really, when once we have suffered ourselves to be so far stigmatised, there can be little doubt will be designated as a degree of fastidiousness to which an exclusively money-making and money-loving race can have no just pretensions. You may trust to their rapacity (it would seem to be argued by this defamatory process, which before it is openly avowed must work its way by implying as much in action, as, if it were not too revolting, would be stated in as many words)—you may trust to their rapacity for any necessary amount of risk being encountered, and therefore no fear of trade being given up, because we make it a little—only just take care that it shall not appear too dangerous.

This is not, I am sure, the position which is meant to be taken by the country towards a profession heretofore deemed honourable, and which has become interwoven with the highest ranks of our society. It is not, it cannot be meant, that such be the state of things at home, as between the merchant and the country.

Neither is another position (in every moral point of view equally indefensible) to be taken by British merchants towards their correspondents abroad, even supposing it could last. It is well known and admitted, that a mercantile intercourse imposes a tacit contract between the two parties who carry on a correspondence, a breach of which can be visited by the law; that in the progress of the intercourse all acts mutually required within the mercantile usage, and not otherwise illegal or improper, shall be performed. If a man carries on a correspondence with another and a course of business, he is not at liberty, either as a matter of principle or of law, to break it off when and how he pleases. Are we called upon as merchants in England, either by the requirements of the law, or by public opinion, to encourage our foreign correspondents to send their sugars and their coffees, their tobacco and their cotton, their copper ore, their minerals, and other produce, to us in England, and when we are quite sure of our profits, when they begin to dispose of the proceeds of their property, and we fancy (which must be very soon, after what the late proceedings have exhibited) that we may render ourselves liable to a prosecution—are we then to turn round upon our correspondents, and say, “I cannot accept your bill until you show me that its proceeds are not going to buy slaves with?” “I cannot honour the credit you have opened in behalf of A, B, or C, because I see in the ‘Anti-Slavery Reporter,’ that ‘he is a notorious slave dealer.’” Are we, when our correspondent sends an order to buy a ship which is on public sale, and which may be employed in any trade, and goods which you, reader, may happen to manufacture yourself—are we then to turn upon our correspondent and say, “Show to us satisfactorily that these things are not intended by you or any one connected with you, indeed that they cannot be used, in promoting the slave trade?”

And again, are we to trust to the circumstance of his being in our power, and to the odium which the simple imputation of slave dealing will attach to him, to bear us out in our justification, should he bring an action against us? Are we, upon receiving an order from our correspondent, to lay it before counsel for their opinion, which we have seen will advance us very little? Shall we disclose the name of our correspondent with the insinuation that he may be a slave dealer, or that we suspect him to be one, or that some one else suspects him, thus helping, as far as we are able, to put his property in peril, and to render every communication with him dangerous? Shall we advertise our counting-houses in England, not, as they have been hitherto considered to be, the symbol of security and good faith, but as nests of treachery, deceit, and suspicion? and shall our intercourse with foreign merchants assume the character of covert espionage? A state of things such as this, inflicting gross injustice, cruel injury, inexpressible degradation, upon one class of men, and that class of which England has had hitherto good reason to be proud—such a state of things at home, and so much scandal and disgrace abroad, is not, cannot be, contemplated without feelings of the deepest horror.

I denounce this state of things as involving a national crime—as attended with national disgrace; I denounce it as a stain which should be wiped off without delay from the character of a nation eminently jealous of its public as much as of its private morality, as an offence to the religious feeling which is not wanting among us; I appeal to the conscience of every man in Great Britain against this state of things. May I not take upon myself to say, that I make this appeal in behalf of a class which yields to no other of the community in high principle or right feeling—a class which is not at all below the standard of morality, religious convictions, tastes, education, which may be set by the most distinguished in this country? I do appeal to the Legislature and to the Government of the land, which do not make laws or maintain them as a snare or a trap against a particular class of their subjects. I appeal to the Honourable Members of the Committee of the House of Commons on the West Coast of Africa, before whom I appeared in 1842; I appeal to them as senators, as gentlemen, as men of honour and principle—I do appeal to all, whether the position of merchants in mercantile intercourse with countries in which the slave trade and slavery exist, should remain as it has been shown to be now by the late proceeding; whether the laws should not be made such, that, whilst we should be answerable for our own acts, and for our participation and consent in the wrong acts of others, we may not be undone before we are even heard in our defence; that we may not be required to prove ourselves innocent before we are proved to be guilty; and, above all, that the right of prosecution may be confined to such hands, and its use to such a procedure as will afford the British merchant a guarantee against private, malicious, secretly conducted attacks, and will make his personal security something more than a mockery. I make this appeal with the same confidence in the result, which my conscience felt when I stood before the British Jury, into whose hands it pleased Providence, by so unexpected a proceeding, to place, in point of fact, my very existence—the existence of all that is dear to me on earth—of much that the world has had opportunities to try and has stamped as honourable in character—of much, not the less valuable because the world can never know of it—the Jury upon whose verdict hung the honour of this country—a country for whose honour and estimation among the nations of the earth I must feel strongly—and from which a gross and cruel injustice would be doubly felt, bound to it as I am by those ties, which it has been attempted barbarously to tear asunder, but which it is only in the power of God to dissolve.

P. DE ZULUETA.

London, 17th January, 1844.

OPINIONS OF THE LEGAL AUTHORITIES
Referred to in [p. lxii].

“1 & 2. There is not any thing in the Act of Parliament in question which renders illegal a commercial dealing on the coast of Africa, in usual lawful merchandise, though such dealing may be with a person known to gain his livelihood by dealing in slaves, and therefore of course, an owner or supercargo making a sale in the manner described to any such person, does not subject himself or the ship to any of the penalties of the Act.

“3. Independently of the above Act, an English owner, or master, or supercargo, or other person who engages in such commercial dealing as above described, is not guilty of any offence against the law, nor subject to any punishment.

(signed) “Fred. Pollock.”

“Temple, 8 June, 1842.

(Vide Report, West Coast of Africa, Part I, p. 344.)

“1. Unless the merchant knew, when he sold the goods, that they were used for carrying on the slave trade, I am clearly of opinion that he is not guilty of felony. The question of knowledge will be for the Jury, if the case is tried by a Jury, or by a Judge or Judges without a Jury, and will depend upon the evidence that is given either of direct knowledge, or that the circumstances were such that he must have known the destination and occupation of the vessel and her crew.

“2. It will appear from the statutes 11th and 12th, and 46th of Geo. III, c. 54, &c., that the merchant might be tried at Sierra Leone, and if so, I am disposed to think that the constituted authorities at Cape Coast would be warranted in apprehending him and sending him for trial to Sierra Leone, as the offence committed is felony.

“3. I hardly know what precautionary measures can be adopted by the Governor in cases where it is unknown whether the vessels are intended for the slave trade or not. The same articles that are used for bartering for slaves are no doubt also used in bartering for palm-oil, elephant’s teeth, and other African products, and to prohibit all dealing in such articles of barter would be greatly prejudicial to the innocent trade carried on with Africa. The Governor can hardly do more than warn merchants not to deal in such articles with suspected vessels upon peril of the consequences.

(signed) “W. Wightman.”

“Inner Temple, July 8th, 1840.

(Vide Report, West Coast of Africa, Part II, Appendix, &c., p. 25.)

“If a person fitted out a vessel to traffic with slave factories and settlements, and sold goods to those factories, out and out, though they were such as might be used for the slave trade, as well as the innocent commerce of the coast; and though, in point of fact, they were used in slave trading, he was of opinion that this did not amount to slave trading: whether it was a commendable use of capital or not, was a different question. If the goods sent out were of such a description that it could not be doubtful that they were to be used in the slave trade alone, such as a cargo of fetters or other implements that could only be employed in such a trade, he had stated that he deemed this much more doubtful, yet he was not prepared to say that it was an act of slave trading which would render the exporter of such articles liable to be tried for felony. But if goods were sent, whether of one kind or the other, whether of an ambiguous description, or plainly fitted for the slave trade alone, and the price of the goods was to depend (as the petitioners stated to be the fact) upon the slave trade, in which such goods were to be employed, he had stated that his opinion was that this was an act of slave trading, being in truth a partnership with slave traders, and the persons exporting such goods would be guilty of a felony within the meaning of the Abolition law.”

(Extract from Lord Brougham’s Speech before the House of Lords, Oct. 5, 1841. Vide Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, Vol. LIX, fo. 1116.)

DOCUMENTS,
&c. &c.

R. R. Gibbons, Esq., to Messrs. Zulueta & Co.
HOUSE OF COMMONS.
Select Committee on West Coast of Africa.

Gentlemen, April 15th, 1842.

By Lord Stanley’s desire I send you a copy of Dr. Madden’s Report, on the Gold Coast, and its dependencies.

I am to add, that this is sent to you as being personally interested therein, but that you will be good enough to consider it as entirely confidential.

I have, &c.
R. R. Gibbons.

The Report of Dr. Madden forms part of the Appendix to the “Report from the Select Committee on the West Coast of Africa[3],” and although the first official communication which was received by the house of Messrs. Zulueta & Co., it is not inserted, in consequence of its want of connexion with the chief subject of this publication. It is entitled, “Report of Her Majesty’s Commissioner of Inquiry on the State of the British Settlements on the Gold Coast, at Sierra Leone, and the Gambia, with some Observations on the Foreign Slave Trading Factories along the Western Coast of Africa, in the Year 1841;” and sets forth its object as follows:—

“Pursuant to the instructions of Her Majesty’s Secretary of State for the Colonies, the following matters were duly examined into, and the result of the best consideration that could be given to these subjects will be found in the following order:—

“1st. The state and condition of our forts and settlements on the Western Coast of Africa, their trade, population, resources, and government.

“2d. The facilities afforded in these settlements to the foreign slave traders resorting to them, by affording supplies in goods or stores that are essential to the trade.

“3d. The prospects and practicability of emigration from Sierra Leone to our West India Colonies.

“4th. The climate, salubrity, and nature of the locality of our settlements on the Western Coast of Africa: and in addition to these subjects, I have to add the consideration of two very important ones, not specified in my instructions, but which, in their execution, became part and parcel of them, and which I conceived I would not have done my duty had I left unnoticed, or taken no steps to remove the evils connected with them; these subjects are:—

“1. The existence of slavery in our settlements on the Gold Coast.

“2. The co-operation of British commerce with slave-trade interests, at the factories of notorious slave dealers on the Western Coast of Africa.”

[3] Vide Part II, p. 9, et seq.

In treating of the last subject here mentioned, the following remarks occur:—

“It is very true the Consolidated Slave Law, the 5th of Geo. IV, comprehends every case of aiding and abetting the slave trade, that I have proposed to have still more formally and specifically prohibited; and there can be no question that any infraction of this law, whether by insuring slave property, selling goods for slave trading objects, lending money, or giving any species of assistance for the promotion of these objects in any court in England, where the case would be tried on its proper merits, and not decided on by a jury implicated or involved in the interests of slavery, that the offender would be convicted of the felony and punished. But few of those employed in judicial situations on the Western Coast of Africa have been persons belonging to the legal professions, and those who did belong to it, and were the advisers of our governors, have not been persons of very profound experience in the law, and the consequence has been that, with few exceptions, our authorities on the Western Coast of Africa hold the opinion that was entertained at Cape Coast as to the legality of aiding and abetting the slave dealers, of supplying them with the goods and stores essential to the purchase of the slaves. The Consolidated Slave Trade Act, of 1824, distinctly states in the very second clause, that it is unlawful ‘in any manner to engage, or to contract to engage, directly or indirectly therein (the slave trade), as a partner, agent, or otherwise, or to ship, tranship, lade, receive, or put on board, &c.... knowing that such ship, vessel, or boat is actually employed, &c.’....

“In the 7th clause, with the customary verbiage, it is declared, that ‘if any person shall knowingly and wilfully ship, or put on board of any vessel any money, goods, or effects, to be employed in accomplishing any of the objects hereinbefore declared unlawful, then and in every other such case the person so offending, and their procurers, counsellors, aiders, and abettors, shall forfeit and pay for every such offence double the value of all the money, goods, or effects so shipped, transhipped, laden, received, or put on board, or contracted so to be as aforesaid.’

“And by the 10th clause, the persons thus aiding and abetting the slave trade, are further declared to be felons, and shall be transported for a term not exceeding fourteen years, or confined and kept to hard labour for a term not exceeding five years, nor less than three years, at the discretion of the Court.

“The right and privilege heretofore exercised of suing in Vice-Admiralty Courts for the forfeitures or penalties incurred by the contravention of this law, are set forth in the 12th clause, notwithstanding any criminal proceedings that may have been instituted against the aiders and abettors of this trade. That the merchant in the case of the Dos Amigos had left himself subject to both sorts of proceedings there can be no doubt. In a case somewhat analogous to this, of recent occurrence, a British vessel, commanded by a British subject, the Augusta, dispatched by a London house, was captured by Lieutenant Hill, of Her Majesty’s ship Saracen, having merchandise on board adapted for the slave trading factories, and having a direct destination to one of these. The vessel was condemned at Sierra Leone, but no proceedings have been taken in the Vice-admiralty Court in England by Lieutenant Hill, to recover the penalties incurred by this breach of the law. The notoriety of this vessel at all the factories on the coast of Africa had its weight in the tribunal where she was ultimately condemned for aiding and abetting the slave trade. In no respect was the evidence against this vessel stronger than that against the Cape Coast merchant, yet that vessel was condemned by the authorities at Sierra Leone, and the merchant is defended by those at Cape Coast. The Augusta, a notorious slaver, had only been captured and sent to England a few months before under the name of the Gollupchik, and under Russian colours, and she was found again on the coast, under the British flag, the property of London merchants. The Spanish slave trader, who was captain of the Gollupchik, when captured by the Saracen, and sent to England was subsequently taken near Whydah by Commodore Tucker of the Wolverine, while I was passenger on board that vessel, in another slaver called the Liberal; and from this man I learned particulars entirely corroborative of the documentary evidence found on board the Augusta. The recent relinquishment of the slave trade on the part of Don Theodore Canot at his slave factory at New Sesters, one of the principal slave dealers on the Kroo Coast, led to the giving up of his books and papers to Lieutenant Segrim, of Her Majesty’s ship Termagant, with whom he entered into arrangements for renouncing his unlawful trade; and, on examining these books on board of Her Majesty’s ship Wolverine, I found that a London house had long been in the habit of supplying stores and merchandise to his slave factory from their vessels on the coast. On the 4th of December, 1839, there is an entry of the arrival at his factory, for the purposes of trade, of the English brig Enterprise.

“1st January, 1840. There is an entry of the arrival of an English brig ‘Corcyra,’ belonging to another house in London, for the purposes of trade, and of having purchased of him 50 guns, 100 cutlasses, 100 large kettles, and 100 bars of irons.

“13th May, 1840. There is an entry of the re-appearance of the captain of the ‘Enterprise,’ at his factory, and having purchased from him 83 cruces of rice, or about 2,000lbs. weight, for which he paid 63 dollars, and 84 dollars for 21 guns.

“1st July, 1840. There is an entry of the arrival of the English schooner ‘Gil Blas,’ of London, and of having purchased two pieces of cloth, eight bars of tobacco, and one gallon of rum.

“On the 5th of December, 1840, Don Theodore Canot placed himself under the protection of the British flag, renounced his traffic, and gave up 104 slaves to Lieutenant Segrim.

“Lieutenant Hill, of Her Majesty’s ship ‘Saracen,’ on the 14th January, 1839, visited the British vessel ‘Medora,’ and was informed by the master that he had just disposed at the Gallinas of 10,000 dollars’ worth of goods to the factories there.

“Lieutenant Segrim, of the ‘Termagant,’ recently boarded the British merchant vessel ‘The Guinea Man,’ and the master admitted having just sold 500l. worth of goods to the slave trade factories at the Gallinas.

“A British trader, a man of colour, who has an establishment at Accra, has one likewise at Little Popoe, where he is known to dabble in this trade.

“This man was an agent of a mercantile house in London; and information reached me of his having embarked for Popoe some time ago, in the neighbourhood of St. Paul’s, a number of slaves on board a British vessel then under discharge. On visiting this part of the coast in Her Majesty’s ship ‘Wolverine,’ on my way to Princes’ Island, we found at Great Popoe a British subject of colour holding a factory, from which Captain Tucker had information he had lately shipped a cargo of slaves. While at anchor off the shore, Captain Tucker addressed a letter to him on the subject, informing him of the report he had heard, and giving him to understand that, on any repetition of his illegal proceedings, he would destroy his factory and carry himself to Sierra Leone. He returned a submissive, and I must add a very proper answer, not denying the transaction alluded to, but promising faithfully in future to abstain from exporting slaves.

“I have noticed these circumstances, though not apparently bearing on the subject of this part of my Report, namely, the resources, trade, and government of our settlements on the Gold Coast, and the influence of the latter on the adjoining districts, in order to show the necessity there is for a new enactment to prevent the facilities that are now afforded by our commerce from supplying the slave trade factories with these commodities which are indispensable to the slave traders. It is evident that those factories are supplied with goods by British traders, and especially by London merchants, to a very great extent.” ...

London, 31st July, 1841.

(signed) R. R. Madden.

COPY OF A LETTER
FROM
MESSRS. ZULUETA & CO. TO LORD VISCOUNT SANDON.

My Lord, London, 25 April, 1842.

A letter has been addressed to us under date of the 15th inst., by Mr. R. R. Gibbons, sending to us, at your Lordship’s desire, a copy of Dr. Madden’s Report on the Gold Coast of Africa, and its dependencies, and stating that this is done in consideration of “our being personally interested therein, but that we are to consider it as entirely confidential.”

In common with all other merchants in this city, we may of course be said to possess more or less of a professional interest in all matters which relate to commerce.

As having occasionally executed shipping orders for ports in the coast of Africa, on foreign account, of lawful merchandise, lawfully, and therefore publicly cleared at Her Majesty’s Customs, in lawful vessels, and as far as we, as mere shipping agents, could be supposed or expected to know, to the best of our knowledge, for no unlawful purpose, without any other interest or emolument in the operation antecedent or subsequent to the shipment than that of the simple and regular commission usually charged in, or legitimately connected with the invoice, and possessing no control, direct or indirect, over either vessels or goods, from the moment they left the shores of Great Britain, we may perhaps be supposed to feel a more direct interest in whatsoever throws light on the subject of trade with ports with which, in the course of our mercantile career, we may have had general business transactions, although they have not been either extensive or frequent.

Still more as shippers, in the form and capacity just described, and in no other, of a cargo consisting not only of legal, but even unsuspected merchandise on board the English schooner Augusta, Captain Jennings, the Report of Dr. Madden, as a document in which the capture of that vessel is alluded to, may also be supposed to form an interesting piece of information, whatever its merits may be in other respects.

Such is the nature and the extent of the interest which we acknowledge to possess in the Report of Dr. Madden, neither more nor less; and we submit that, in describing it as personal, a supposition is advanced which, considering the nature of that Report, we have reason to deem unfavourable to our characters, which the facts will not justify, and which we may say, even appearances will not warrant.

The Report brings together a number of transactions, not one of which have we even the remotest knowledge until the perusal of it, with the sole exception of the case of the Augusta. Now, as when looking at them together as a whole, and in conjunction with the other facts, most probably equally unknown to us, which in the course of the investigation now carried on before the Committee may be brought forward, there is no telling to what extent the association of our name with the matters of the Report may be carried, we have thought it right to explain to your Lordship what kind of interest we have no objection to be supposed to possess in the perusal of Dr. Madden’s Report, or in the inquiry now before the Committee. Beyond casual shipments in the manner described, and the acceptance of credits opened at our establishments by parties abroad, in behalf of parties resident in that coast, we have not even one single correspondent, or have we even consigned or sold, or in fact transacted any business whatsoever, or had any intercourse with individuals resident in those parts. We possess no interest in the trade with them, and even the agency for buying and shipping, which now and then we have had, is so insignificant, that we look with the most perfect indifference, as may easily be believed by any one who knows any thing of our business, as to any future legislation which may be the result of the present Parliamentary inquiry, or, indeed, as to any construction which may be put upon that now in existence. It is not, therefore, with the view of in any degree influencing the deliberations of the Committee, or of offering any remark on the facts or on the opinions contained in Dr. Madden’s Report, that we address your Lordship. Let the result of the labours of the Committee be what they may, and let the merits or the influence of Dr. Madden’s Report be what it may, whatever legislation may emanate from these proceedings, as a matter of business, it is of no moment to us, and therefore it is not our intention to throw the weight of a feather in the balance. Our sole object is to place our position in its true light; and the simple fact of our possessing no interest whatever, either personal or otherwise, in any branch of trade with the coast of Africa, much less with that lamentable branch of it which, much before the law was carried to even its present extent, our firm has shunned in all its branches and ramifications during an existence in business of more than seventy years, independent of the consideration of its illegality, without partaking in many of the views entertained by others concerning it, but from the principle of not wishing to derive profit or advantage from the sufferings of humanity, whether avoidable or unavoidable.

We have, &c.

(signed) Zulueta & Co.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.
Select Committee on West Coast of Africa.
R. R. Gibbons, Esq. to Messrs. Zulueta & Co.

Gentlemen, July 13th, 1842.

I am desired by Lord Sandon, the chairman of this committee, to forward to you copies of evidence taken before them, in which your house is mentioned; and I am to acquaint you that if you are desirous of making any statement thereon, either personally or by letter, the committee will be ready to receive the same.

I have, &c.

(signed) R. R. Gibbons.

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE
TAKEN BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON WEST COAST OF AFRICA.

Veneris, 10º die Junii, 1842.

MEMBERS PRESENT.

Sir T. D. Acland.
Mr. Aldam.
Lord Viscount Courtenay.
Lord Viscount Ebrington.
Mr. Evans.
Captain Fitzroy.

Mr. Forster.
Mr. Hamilton.
Mr. Metcalf.
Mr. Milnes.
Mr. W. Patten.
Mr. Stuart Wortley.

Lord Viscount Sandon in the chair.

Henry William Macaulay, Esq. called in; and further examined.

5003. Chairman.] Will you state what has been your connexion and acquaintance with the coast of Africa?—I went out to Sierra Leone first in the early part of the year 1830 as a merchant, and at the latter end of the year 1831 I was appointed one of the judges in the court of Mixed Commission; I then left business and devoted myself entirely to the business of the court; and I ceased to act as a judge on the 31st of December, 1839.

5004. Since what time have you been at home?—I remained on the coast a short time to recover my health. I was too unwell to move for some months, and then went to the Island of Ascension, from which I came home in the latter end of the year 1840.

5005. Will you state what the court of mixed commission consists of?—The Portuguese court consists of a British commissary judge and a Portuguese commissary judge, who have to decide upon every Portuguese case; in case of any difference of opinion between the two principal judges, the British commissioner of arbitration and the Portuguese commissioner of arbitration draw lots as to which of the two the case is to be referred to for final decision. In the same way, in the Spanish court, the British commissary judge meets the Spanish commissary judge, and in case of difference of opinion, the case is left to either the British or Spanish commissioner of arbitration, as the lot may determine.

5006. Are there any judges for other nations?—The courts at Sierra Leone are the Portuguese court, the Spanish court, the Brazilian court, and the Dutch court; but no court during my time has been perfect in the number of its judges except the Brazilian court.

5007. You mean by perfect, that the British judge has had to sit alone?—The treaties require that after a certain time, in the absence of any foreign judge, the British commissioner of arbitration shall act as the foreign commissary judge.

5008. Who is the British commissioner of arbitration; is he a distinct person from the British commissary judge?—Yes; the British court is always perfect.

5009. What does it consist of?—It consists of the British commissary judge and the British commissioner of arbitration; and the treaties point out how any vacancy, either by death or absence, is to be supplied; the governor in the first instance, attends for the absent judge, whoever he may be, and after him, the chief justice, and then the colonial secretary. It is left to those three officers; but I presume that if those three should all be ill, or their places be vacant by death, the office would then descend to the person next in seniority in the colonial government there; but we never went lower than the colonial secretary. The Brazilian court has been the only one perfect, and the British commissioner of arbitration has always sat in my time for the Portuguese and Spanish commissary judges. No case at all has occurred in the Dutch court.

5010. In case a vessel taken under the colours of any other nation were brought into Sierra Leone, how would that case be decided?—There are other treaties than those I have mentioned. A French case is sent to the French authorities under the French treaty, and in the treaties with all other nations that have treaties on the model of the French treaty, the vessels are handed over to their own judicial authorities.

5011. Within Sierra Leone?—The treaty points out where they are to be taken; if a French vessel is taken, it is sent to Goree.

5012. Then no vessels are brought in for adjudication to Sierra Leone but Dutch and Portuguese, and Spanish and Brazilian vessels?—Not for adjudication by the mixed commission; but there is the vice-admiralty court, which under the late act relating to Portugal, for the suppression of the slave trade, takes cognizance of vessels under that flag which are captured; and may take cognizance of any vessels under any flag that are captured in British waters, wherever they are taken, whether at Sierra Leone, or the Gambia, or any British settlement on the coast, and that has been rather frequent of late.

5013. The mixed commission court has jurisdiction over all cases which are brought within the limits of the treaty with Portugal, and the Vice-Admiralty Court in the Portuguese cases, over which we have assumed jurisdiction by Act of Parliament, that is to say, all cases of vessels captured south of the Line?—Yes; it is optional still for the captor to prosecute a Portuguese vessel, captured under the Act of Parliament, before the admiralty court, if he chooses, instead of bringing her before the mixed commission court, but the process is so much more summary with us, and the expense so much less, that that option is seldom taken.

5014. Will you proceed to explain what is the process which is pursued when a slaver is brought into Sierra Leone for adjudication?—Whenever a vessel appears in the harbour under any of the flags of which we can take cognizance, the marshal of the court goes on board, and he receives from the prizemaster who is on board an account of the capture, which he fills into a printed form, and he sends one of those printed forms to each of the judges, and one to the governor, immediately; in fact, generally before the vessel comes to anchor, and then the court is made aware of the vessel being in the harbour, and is prepared to make arrangements for the landing of the slaves, if there are any, generally the morning after its arrival, if it comes in the evening, or if it comes in early in the morning, the same day. The proctor for the captor brings the papers of the vessel before the court, and they are always accompanied by a declaration of the captor. All the forms of the court are very much the same as those of the Admiralty Court in England. If there are slaves, the proctor petitions for the admission of the vessel into court, and generally accompanies that by a petition to land the slaves; and since I have been there, in every case of inquiry the slaves were landed and handed over to the superintendent of the African department pending the investigation, and held in their character of slaves during the time that the vessel was passing through the court. The proctor then produces his witnesses, and they are examined upon printed interrogatories, which have been used ever since the court was formed. These questions are framed with a view to make out a case, and they always do prove slave dealing wherever it has existed, if the witness answers truly; and in an ordinary case, where slaves are on board, no defence is ever attempted, it is out of the question. Then as soon as the evidence is given, generally by the captain and one of the officers of the captured vessel, the proctor prays for publication; and when the monition which issues in the first instance, calling upon any persons to bring forward a claim if they have any against the capture, or to show cause why the vessel should not be condemned, is returned, trial is prayed for, and it takes place on an early day after arrival of the vessel; in an undefended case, and where the capture has been made properly by the man-of-war, the vessel is condemned, the slaves are emancipated at the same time; a commission of appraisement and sale issues, which directs the particular officer of the court who has the duty of conducting the auctions to expose both the vessel and the goods, and any thing that may be on board, to public auction, after due notice given. Those things are then sold, and the proceeds are divided equally between the British Government and the foreign government, and the proceeds are then paid into the commissariat, which settles with the Government at home, and they pay the money, or set it off against any claim they may have against the foreign government; but the foreign government has a claim to one-half the proceeds of the vessels and cargoes.

5015. Is there any large proportion of cases in which condemnation does not follow, and under what circumstances principally has condemnation not been the consequence?—There have been vessels restored for being seized, for instance, Portuguese vessels from the southward of the Line, contrary to treaty. In two cases there were vessels restored with upwards of 8,000l. damages against the captors in each case, making 16,000l.; and there was again one case of the Pepita, which I remember, when it was proved that the slaves had been embarked under circumstances that would not justify condemnation under the treaty; she was restored with damages. There have been several cases under the equipment article since the new slave treaty came into force, where vessels have been restored because the equipment was not deemed sufficient to warrant condemnation. There have been also vessels taken on the suspicion that black persons on board were slaves, who have been proved to be domestics, and not bought for the purpose of the traffic. There have been a variety of condemnations; but in any case where the treaty would not warrant condemnation, the vessel has been restored; and where the treaty required it, restored with damages.

5016. Have there been a considerable number of restorations; can you state, from statistics, the number?—I have statistics for two years; from the 1st of January to the 31st of December 1838, one vessel only was liberated.

5017. What number were condemned?—Forty-one; during the year 1839 there were two liberated, and 45 condemned; and in addition to those, there was a very large number of American vessels which were seized, with American papers on board, and which I refused to receive into court at all; there were some in 1838, and there was a large number in 1839.

5018. Can you state the number?—I think the number was 13; but the reports of the whole of those cases are in the Parliamentary Papers.

5019. Were they bonâ fide American?—I believe not American, in any one case, but sailing under the American flag, and with American papers, supplied to them by American authority.

5020. Where?—Almost entirely, I think, without one exception, at Havannah.

5021. Supplied by the American consul?—Yes; but I considered that as they sailed with those American papers, however wrongfully they might have been given by the American authority, we had no right to interfere with them.

5022. Mr. Forster.] Have not some vessels belonging to the States been condemned?—Yes; since my time.

5023. You were not a party to the condemnation?—I was not.

5024. Mr. W. Patten.] But in those cases which you mention, you had not the slightest doubt in the world that they would have been condemned if they had not American papers on board?—Certainly they would, with the exception of one case, which seemed to be a sort of experimental seizure: it was known that almost every vessel on the coast under the American flag, at that time was a Spanish vessel in disguise; and this vessel seems to have been seized in the hope that the captain and officers might be able to prove, by some evidence found on board, that she was really Spanish; but though we had access to the papers, we found nothing that would have condemned her if she had been prosecuted in the court; there was a deficiency of papers on board; the captain, perhaps had either destroyed them or concealed them, and we could not get at the proof that would have enabled us to condemn her as being a Spanish vessel; but none of the cases I speak of were prosecuted; I would not allow them to be libelled in court.

5025. So that those cases do not appear upon the records of the court?—No; but I took the opportunity of examining the papers, and sending home all the particulars to the Foreign-office, and the papers are copied in the Parliamentary Returns.

5026. Mr. Forster.] Will those seizures be matter of complaint on the part of the owners?—I do not know that any of those seizures have been matter of complaint; some of the seizures made subsequently have been.

5027. Seizures of vessels belonging to the United States?—Yes; but none of those that came before me have been made matter of complaint.

5028. Are you aware that there are several cases of condemnation that have been the subject of remonstrance with the British Government by the United States?—I believe the whole of them are.

5029. Chairman.] You have not heard that they complain of vessels being brought in for condemnation to Sierra Leone which you did not allow to be libelled in court?—No, except as regards the general right which was exercised. There has been no complaint with respect to a particular vessel, so far as I know; but complaints have been made of the right which was exercised by cruizers on the coast to board any American vessel and search it.

5030. Mr. Aldam.] Has the practice of the court been changed since your time?—Yes, it was changed the day that I left; there was an American vessel waiting at Sierra Leone for adjudication the day I left, and the officer suspecting, that if presented to me, I should refuse her in the same way as I had done the others, detained her till I left, and she was condemned by my successor under orders from Lord Palmerston.

5031. Then the orders from Lord Palmerston changed the practice of the court?—Yes.

5032. Do you know the nature of those orders?—The orders appear in the printed correspondence.

5033. Mr. W. Patten.] Can you state briefly the nature of the orders?—His Lordship stated that the Queen’s advocate was of opinion that the court was justified in making use of information obtained by the search of vessels under the American flag. The court had decided, that having no right to search vessels sailing as American, and recognised as American by American authorities, they could not make use of any information which they obtained by unauthorised and illegal acts, and Lord Palmerston considered that they had a right.

5034. Chairman.] You held that the papers protected the vessel?—I did.

5035. Mr. Forster.] Then it is those condemnations which are appealed against at present by the American government?—I have not seen any appeal of the American government except against the general right exercised by the British cruizers.

5036. The complaint is, of seizing vessels as connected with the slave trade, which, from their papers, ought not to have been subject to that suspicion?—I am not aware of any appeal in any case of that kind.

5037. Mr. Aldam.] Have any vessels with strictly American papers been condemned?—You can hardly call them strictly American papers where the papers have been applied for, and given through fraud. The American authorities at the Havannah who gave them, knew very well that the vessel had no more claim to be styled an American vessel than a Dutch vessel.

5038. Chairman.] But as far as the documents themselves showed, those vessels were American?—Yes, they had an American register, just in the same form as any vessel sailing from New York, or Baltimore; indeed it was a copy of the same document.

5039. What indication was there in other papers taken, to lead you to know that the property was not bonâ fide American?—It appeared, from the very strict overhauling these vessels received from the cruizers, that in many of those cases there were papers on board showing that the man who appeared as the American captain was only a passenger, and that the 30 Spanish passengers who took out passengers’ licences at Havannah were the real crew; and there were also instructions, found on board, to the pretended captain, what he was to answer to the cruizers when they boarded him. The whole thing was a complete fraud without any doubt whatever. There were many of those cases where it was quite plain that the vessels were only Spaniards in disguise; that they only kept the American flag until their cargo was ready. In some cases the vessels that were boarded one day by the cruizers under the American flag, were boarded two or three days afterwards with the Portuguese or Spanish flag hoisted, and full of slaves.

5040. And condemned?—Yes.

5041. What was the object of hoisting the Spanish or Portuguese flag?—If the vessels had been captured by a British cruizer with the American flag hoisted, he would have carried them into America; and if he did carry them into America, every man on board would have been hung as a pirate.

5042. Had he authority to do so?—It was done; the American authorities did not complain of it.

5043. Mr. W. Patten.] Were they hung in that case?—No, there were no slaves on board.

5044. Mr. Aldam.] Every ship of war has a right to capture a pirate?—Yes.

5045. The law of the United States recognizes slavery as piracy?—Yes, but it is not piracy by the law of nations, and indeed our own courts have decided most positively on that point, that the slave trade is not piracy by the law of nations; that it can only be punished by the municipal law of the particular country to which the vessel belongs.

5046. Mr. Forster.] The class of condemnations to which you have alluded are different from the cases which have taken place since you left, under the direction of Lord Palmerston?—No condemnations took place before the 1st of January, 1840; there were vessels condemned by me that were captured under the American flag, and with American papers, but they were taken in British waters, where British ships had a right to visit and search the vessel, and the captor might make use of any information he obtained in the search: when apparent American vessels were boarded on the high seas, we deemed that the captor had not that authority.

5047. Chairman.] What do you consider British waters on the coast of Africa; what would you for instance, on the Gold Coast, consider British waters?—The waters of a nation are those within gun-shot of the shore; generally reckoned three miles; it is the same all over the world.

5048. With regard to the Gold Coast, you are aware that our settlements consist of several forts; do you consider the whole line of coast, from end to end, along which our forts are planted, to be British water?—No, for there are foreign forts there mixed with ours; but in every case we have the sovereignty over three miles of the sea from our own possession, wherever it may be, and the only ports to which a vessel could go, have forts attached to them; a vessel lying at Accra, or lying at Cape Coast, would be within three miles of the fort.

5049. If she was sailing along the coast, should you consider her to be in British waters?—Where an indefinite authority is exercised along a line of coast, without any real right, I do not consider those British waters.

5050. You would consider as British waters only those which were a certain distance from the fort?—Yes; the difficulty occurred in the case of the Jack Wilding, one of the richest prizes that was made during the year 1839; she was seized lying in British Accra roadstead, and she was under the American flag; she was brought up to Sierra Leone, and defended, on the ground that, though the vessel was in British waters, she was within three miles of the Dutch fort, but we considered that that could not make any difference, that we could not allow slave trading within three miles of any acknowledged British fort, and we condemned the vessel.

5051. Have you seen practical evil arise from the mixed commission being fixed at Sierra Leone?—No, certainly not.

5052. Not as to the health of the slaves in the length of the voyage from the place of seizure to the place of condemnation?—I believe that there is a great misapprehension on this subject, which would be corrected by a mere reference to the statistics of the trade; there seems to be an impression that a very great majority of the cases of capture are made to the eastward of Cape Palmas, and in the bights, but a large number have been taken for many years past, and might always have been taken, to the westward of Cape Palmas, and in the neighbourhood of Sierra Leone.

5053. Is there any statement of the length of voyage of each vessel from the time of its seizure to the time of its condemnation?—I do not think there is any table drawn out; but in the printed reports the times and places of capture are stated, which comes to the same thing; because, where the vessels are captured in the immediate neighbourhood of Sierra Leone, the voyage is very short, and in going through the reports the number of days can be calculated. In the detailed reports which are given of each case, the date of the capture is always mentioned, and the date of arrival at Sierra Leone. In some cases the vessels are delayed after capture, and you could not get an exact account; but in most cases the difference between the date of capture and the date of arrival would be the length of voyage.

5054. Mr. Forster.] Has not the great bulk of the seizures been made in the bights and to the eastward of Cape Palmas?—Not a very large majority during the last year, and before that a large portion were made to the westward of Cape Palmas; and if that part of the coast had had the number of cruizers that it ought to have had, there would have been a much larger number of captures made there.

5055. Chairman.] You think that the slave trade has gone on with greater intensity to the westward of Cape Palmas?—With great intensity in the Gallinas, which was unnoticed for some years; and, indeed, that part of the coast was utterly neglected. The admiral and commanding officers seemed to fancy that the slave trade could only be carried on in the bights, but a great deal of slave trade was carried on to the westward.

5056. Where?—In Gallinas, principally, New Sesters, Sherboro’; those are the principal ports in that part; there are others smaller.

5057. For all those ports, of course, Sierra Leone you consider to be the most advantageous position?—Certainly.

5058. Mr. Forster.] But in speaking of the amount of slave trade carried on at those places which you have just named, do you speak of those in comparison with the bights, and also with the Spanish and Portuguese settlements to the south of the Line?—I speak of the amount of captures that have been made there. The south was left very nearly in the same state in which the north was. The cruizing of the squadron was almost entirely confined to the bights.

5059. To the south of the Line they could not cruize, could they?—Yes, they could cruize near the Portuguese settlements, for the court practically got over the article in the treaty under which captures were forbidden to the southward of the Line, by establishing, which they did in 1838, the principle, that the national character of any vessel was to be taken from the residence of the owner, the place where he carried on his mercantile business, and also from the course of trade in which the vessel was engaged; and as there could be no foreign Portuguese slave trade, for Portugal has no colonies to supply with slaves, we were sure to make the vessel either Brazilian or Spanish. She was captured under Portuguese colours, and with Portuguese papers, but the treaty had given us a right to search her any where, either north or south; it had not given us the right to detain her south of the Line, if she was bonâ fide Portuguese; but if captured as a Portuguese vessel under the Portuguese flag, and with Portuguese papers, she was sent up to Sierra Leone, and was almost certain to be condemned either as a Brazilian or a Spaniard.

5060. That decision was come to in 1838?—Yes.

5061. Before that time the impression had prevailed that the slave trade from the Portuguese settlements was protected?—There was no seizure to the south of the Line to render a decision necessary; vessels were seized immediately close to the Line, in several cases, and it was never thought of; that was before the Portuguese flag was so much used, and the cause of the Portuguese flag being so much used by slavers, was the Spanish treaty having given the right to seize, on the ground of equipment; that did not take place till 1836. I was at home in that year, and on my return in December 1837, I found that almost every vessel on the coast was sailing under Portuguese colours, and then we met this new circumstance by an alteration in the interpretation of the treaty.

5062. Mr. Aldam.] If the owner had been a bonâ fide Portuguese, would the vessel have been still condemned?—If the owner had been a Portuguese, resident in Havannah, we should have treated the vessel as a Spanish vessel; and if at Rio Janeiro, we should have treated it as a Brazilian vessel.

5063. But in the case of a Portuguese merchant resident in a Portuguese possession, and carrying on his business there?—We should have looked at the course of trade in which the vessel was engaged, and the Portuguese having no colonies would not require slaves.

5064. Mr. Forster.] Do you consider the Spanish and Portuguese settlements to the south of the Line the places at which the slave trade will be last overcome?—The part of the coast at which the slave trade is carried on depends entirely on the cruizers; you may knock up the slave trade on any part of the coast you please, if the cruizing is properly conducted. The largest slave trade on the coast was the slave trade at the Gallinas; by the system of blockade that Captain Denman adopted there, he completely destroyed it.

5065. That blockade must be continued to make it permanent in its results?—Yes; and he never went away for water or provisions, without leaving a vessel to supply his place. He could always regulate the time that he should remain, knowing of course, to a day, how long his water and provisions would last him.

5066. But to render that remedy effectual and permanent, vessels of war must continue at the Gallinas?—Yes; but if you blockade the rivers, where the slave trade has been carried on for a number of years, and completely shut up the slave trade for a year or two, you destroy the system of slave trade in that part.

5067. Chairman.] You think the machinery cannot be re-established in that part?—It may be re-established, but in the meantime there is no mart for the slaves; they are brought down and lodged in the barracoons, and the feeding of the slaves completely ruins the slave owner.

5068. Mr. Forster.] What is there to prevent the system being resumed there unless you continue the blockade of the place?—There is nothing.

5069. Then it is upon the blockade of the settlements that the success of the cruizers depends, and not upon the destruction of the barracoons?—Exactly; by blockade, I do not mean shutting out legitimate trade, but preventing any vessel fitted for the slave trade going in, and preventing any vessel with slaves coming out.

5070. Chairman.] Do you believe that if you blockade a port, materially interfering with the slave trade for a considerable period, you obstruct it even for some time afterwards?—I think you do; and I think the people are so accustomed to the goods which they procure from slave dealers that they will get them if they can by other means.

5071. Then you think, that if you can blockade for a certain time, and put an end to the power of procuring what the natives desire by the slave trade, that their taste will have to be gratified by lawful traffic, and that that will make it less necessary for them afterwards to have recourse to the slave trade?—Certainly.

5072. Mr. Forster.] By such destruction as took place in the case of Gallinas, do you not interfere with the course of the legitimate trade, as well as with the course of the slave trade?—I am not speaking of the destruction of a settlement.

5073. Had not the operations of Captain Denman the effect of destroying the stores, and in fact the whole settlement?—He destroyed the barracoons; but no one ever kept in barracoons any thing but slaves.

5074. Was not also a considerable property in merchandize destroyed?—Yes, so it appears by the Parliamentary papers. At that time there was no trade whatever carried on at Gallinas except in slaves; there was no legitimate trade at all, I believe.

5075. Do you mean that there was no legitimate trade carried on at the Gallinas previous to the destruction of that place by Captain Denman?—I believe, none whatever; there was certainly none with its nearest large port, which was Sierra Leone; the only trade carried on between the two places was of a very questionable character.

5076. Were not Hamburg vessels and other foreign vessels constantly in the habit of visiting Gallinas for the purpose of legitimate trade previous to the destruction of the settlement?—I am not aware that they did.

5077. I thought you told the Committee in a late answer, that there was no legitimate trade carried on there?—From Sierra Leone; but whether Hamburg vessels went direct to Gallinas, I do not know; from Sierra Leone, I do not believe that any legitimate trade was carried on with the Gallinas.

5078. What opportunities had you at Sierra Leone of knowing the course of trade to Gallinas?—I was in Sierra Leone, where there were a large number of small coasting vessels employed, and those who brought back produce did not go to Gallinas for it.

5079. But had you any opportunity of knowing the nature and extent of the legitimate trade there by foreign vessels, independently of Sierra Leone?—No; but I have always understood, (it is only from hearsay I mention this,) from the men-of-war on the coast, that every vessel they have found lying in the harbour there, has been engaged in the slave trade in some way or other, as American vessels bringing over goods from the Havannah for the supply of factories, or bringing out equipments to be carried away by slavers when they were full.

5080. You have stated that previously to the destruction of Gallinas by Captain Denman, no trade had been carried on between the Gallinas and Sierra Leone, except such as was of a very questionable nature?—I have.

5081. Was that questionable trade to a considerable extent?—No, not with Sierra Leone; but trading vessels that came along the coast have called at Sierra Leone, and gone down the coast afterwards, and probably put into Gallinas amongst other ports; but directly with Sierra Leone the trade was very little indeed.

5082. Up to what period did this questionable trade between Sierra Leone and Gallinas continue?—It continued as long as I was connected with the colony, that is, to the 31st of December, 1839; but we always looked with suspicion upon any merchant there that was connected with that place.

5083. Is it within your knowledge that up to that time the slave dealers, by themselves, or their agents, were in the habit of frequenting Sierra Leone, and making purchases there for the supply of Gallinas?—They generally made their purchases, I believe, through some merchant resident at Sierra Leone; one in particular; they generally had one merchant at a time, I believe, who was employed by them.

5084. Chairman.] Making purchases of prize goods?—Yes, and sometimes of vessels; a vessel that might be put up to auction there he would bid for, and have it sent down to Gallinas; and I have no doubt goods also.

5085. Was he a white merchant, or a black, who was so employed?—He was a white merchant, an English merchant.

5086. Who was he?—The name is mentioned in the Parliamentary Papers, as being connected with the purchase of a slave vessel, Mr. Kidd; and it is mentioned in connection with that of Mr. Zulueta, of London.

5087. Can you refer to the passage?—It appears at the 38th page of the class (B.) of the papers on the subject of the slave trade, presented to Parliament 1839-40. Zulueta, the gentleman in London to whom the vessel was sent, and who sold her again to her former Spanish owner, is a name well known on the coast in connexion with the slave trade; any man ought to have been careful of being connected with such a person as that. I have seen the same vessels over and over again in the slave trade; you can detect them when you get accustomed to the form and build of the vessels.

5088. Mr. Forster.] Were not those vessels sold to the best bidder?—Yes.

5089. Do not you think that the fault was with those who sold them originally, and not those who bought them?—No; you are not bound to suppose that a man will make a bad use of that which he purchases.

5090. Mr. W. Patten.] Are those vessels generally bought by the same person?—Mr. Kidd purchased vessels only during the latter part of the time I was there, for he was not in the colony when I first went there; he was looked upon as the person employed by the Gallinas slave dealers to transact their business at Sierra Leone.

5091. Chairman.] To purchase vessels and goods?—Yes.

5092. Mr. W. Patten.] Is Mr. Kidd the person you alluded to just now, who generally purchased the vessels at auction?—No, they were generally purchased by various people; he purchased a few of them.

5093. Mr. Forster.] Would Mr. Zulueta, if he had entered the auction-room, have been at liberty to bid for the purchase of that vessel?—Certainly; by the treaty it is required that the goods seized shall be exposed to public auction for the benefit of the two governments.

5094. How do you make it out to be criminal in Mr. Kidd to do that which it was innocent for the auctioneer on the part of the British Government to do?—The auctioneer is required to do it by his duty, he is appointed for that purpose under the Act of Parliament; he sells to any body who will purchase; of course, the responsibility of the employment of the purchase rests with the purchaser.

5095. Then it is the fault of the Government, not of the auctioneer?—It is not the fault of the auctioneer; nor do I consider it any fault of the British Government; it is no fault to purchase goods, but to use them unlawfully is wrong; it is the use which he makes of the vessel after purchasing it that is wrong.

5096. How could it be criminal in Mr. Kidd to sell the vessel to Mr. Zulueta when you see no fault in the British Government doing the same thing?—The British Government is obliged to do it under the treaty; there is no compulsion on Mr. Kidd to sell his vessel to a slave dealer, he may sell it to any body.

5097. According to that doctrine, the British Government is obliged to act criminally?—No, certainly not; I do not think it follows. The treaty requires that goods and vessels shall be exposed at auction; the responsibility of the employment of those goods or vessels which are sold, I think, rests with the purchaser; he may employ them lawfully, and I have purchased a vessel at auction myself, in former days, when I was engaged in business; but if I had taken that vessel and sold her to a slave dealer, I should think that I did wrong.

5098. But you admit that the public auctioneer would have sold the same vessel to the same party whom Mr. Kidd sold her to?—Certainly.

5099. Chairman.] You meant to say that the auctioneer had no choice to whom he should sell her, and Mr. Kidd had?—The auctioneer had no choice; the Act is imperative, and requires him to sell to the highest bidder, for the benefit of the two governments.

5100. Mr. Aldam.] Did Mr. Kidd sell his vessel to a slave dealer or to a Spanish house, who subsequently sold it to a slave dealer?—It appears in some of the records that in some cases he sold vessels direct to the slave dealers.

5101 Are those vessels worth more to a slave dealer than if used for any other purpose?—Certainly.

5102. How then is it possible to prevent the ships being applied to that purpose for which they are worth more than for any other?—Spanish ships are prevented from being used for the trade by being cut up when they are condemned.

5103. Mr. Evans.] But you have no power of doing so with the Portuguese ships?—No.

5104. Mr. Aldam.] Those vessels, from their small size, are not worth much for other trades?—There are some trades that they are adapted for, the fruit trade for instance, and they are employed in the smuggling of opium and such trades as those; they are not capable of carrying large burdens.

5105. In all cases it will answer the purpose of the merchant to give a larger price for those ships to be employed in the slave trade than for any other purpose?—Yes, probably.

5106. Viscount Ebrington.] Have you ever considered what the result would be of the British Government buying those ships in?—It would be impossible to buy them all in.

5107. All that are not liable to be broken up?—No. During last year, for instance, the number condemned was so large, that the Government, if they had bought them, could not have found a use for them.

5108. Mr. Forster.] Have you any doubt that those vessels have been sometimes knocked down by the auctioneer to agents of the slave traders on the coast?—It may have been so, and I have no doubt it has; I do not recollect a case at present, but I would have insisted upon it, as head of the court, that it should have been knocked down to any one who made the highest bid.

5109. It is your opinion also, that the prize goods have been frequently sold in the like manner?—Some portion of them, but certainly not the bulk of them.

5110. Was there any thing to prevent the whole of them being sold to the slave dealers, or the agent of the slave dealers?—Nothing whatever.

5111. Had you opportunities of observing, up to the time you left Sierra Leone, whether the agents of the slave dealers on the neighbouring coast frequently appeared in the market of Sierra Leone as purchasers of goods or vessels?—Not often; if the goods came into their hands it was through a third person generally. I have heard of Spaniards going down, and bidding for the vessels, but it was not an ordinary occurrence.

5112. Then you are of opinion that usually slave dealers at Gallinas did not visit Sierra Leone for the purpose of making purchases of goods or vessels?—Not in their own persons, they may have done it through a third party; but, perhaps, it would shorten the questions to state that the greater portion of the goods sold at the auctions captured from vessels in the slave trade were purchased by liberated Africans, by the hawkers there, and they made the best use of them. That a certain portion of the goods so purchased at auctions may get into the hands of slave dealers afterwards, is very possible; but I am convinced, from the description of goods which are sold, which may be used in lawful trade, and from the different appearance of the whole colony since goods were sold so extensively, that the greater portion of them are consumed in the colony, and are made use of in the lawful trade, by liberated Africans in the neighbourhood. I consider that the colony has been very much benefited indeed by those sales; that the condition of the liberated Africans has been very much improved by them, as has been very evident from the great wealth that has been stirring among them; and the liberated Africans have now not only completely bought out the Maroons and settlers, who were the original settlers of the place, but are gradually driving out the white merchants; and I think it a very great advantage, for they are able to live much more cheaply than the white men can do; they carry on their business at one hundredth part of the expense, and turn their money over very much more quickly.

5113. Are any precautions taken by the authorities at Sierra Leone to prevent slave dealers obtaining goods at Sierra Leone, either by public auction or in any other manner?—Certainly not.

5114. Mr. W. Patten.] You have stated that there was an illicit trade going on between Sierra Leone and Gallinas; are there any other circumstances than those you have mentioned, that you can adduce in proof of that?—None; in the trade that has been just referred to, of Spaniards and Portuguese at Gallinas sending up to purchase goods at auctions, they have done so, and they have been sent down to them through a third party, but it is seldom they appear themselves.

5115. You do not, of your own knowledge, know what is the connection between Mr. Kidd and any individuals at Gallinas?—No.

5116. Nor of any other merchant at Sierra Leone?—No.

5117. Do you believe that they act as commission merchants to purchase goods?—Yes; I suppose on commission.