PLUTARCH'S LIVES.

Translated from the Greek

WITH

NOTES AND A LIFE OF PLUTARCH.

BY

AUBREY STEWART, M.A.,

Late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge,

AND THE LATE

GEORGE LONG, M.A.,

Formerly Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge,.

IN FOUR VOLUMES.

VOL. III.

LONDON:

GEORGE BELL & SONS, YORK ST., COVENT GARDEN, AND NEW YORK.

1892.

LONDON:

REPRINTED FROM THE STEREOTYPE PLATES BY WM. CLOWES & SONS, LTD.,

STAMFORD STREET AND CHARING CROSS.

CONTENTS.

PLUTARCH'S LIVES.

LIFE OF NIKIAS.

As it appears to me that the life of Nikias forms a good parallel to that of Crassus, and that the misfortunes of the former in Sicily may be well compared with those of the latter in Parthia, I must beg of my readers to believe that in writing upon a subject which has been described by Thucydides with inimitable grace, clearness, and pathos, I have no ambition to imitate Timæus, who, when writing his history, hoped to surpass Thucydides himself in eloquence, and to show that Philistius was but an ignorant bungler, and so plunges into an account of the speeches and battles of his heroes, proving himself not merely one

"Who toils on foot afar
Behind the Lydian car,"

as Pindar has it, but altogether unfit for the office of historian, and, in the words of Diphilus,

"Dull-witted, with Sicilian fat for brains."

He often seeks to shelter himself behind the opinions of Xenarchus, as when he tells us that the Athenians thought it a bad omen that the general whose name was Victory refused to command the expedition to Sicily; and when he says that by the mutilation of the Hennas the gods signified that the Athenians would suffer their chief disasters at the hands of Hermokrates the son of Hermon; or, again, when he observes that Herakles might be expected to take the side of the Syracusans because of Proserpine, the daughter of Demeter, who gave him the dog Kerberus, and to be angry with the Athenians because they protected the people of Egesta, who were descended from the Trojans, whereas he had been wronged by Laomedon, king of Troy, and had destroyed that city. Timæus was probably led to write this sort of nonsense by the same critical literary spirit which led him to correct the style of Philistius, and to find fault with that of Aristotle and Plato. My own opinion is that to pay too much attention to mere style and to endeavour to surpass that of other writers, is both trifling and pedantic, while any attempt to reproduce that of the unapproachable masterpieces of antiquity springs from a want of power to appreciate their real value. With regard, then, to the actions of Nikias described by Thucydides and Philistius, more especially those which illustrate his true character, having been performed under the stress of terrible disasters, I shall briefly recapitulate them, lest I be thought a careless biographer, adding to them whatever scattered notices I have been able to collect from the writings of other historians and from public documents and inscriptions; and of these latter I shall quote only those which enable us to judge what manner of man he was.

II. The first thing to be noted in describing Nikias is the saying of Aristotle, that there had been in Athens three citizens of great ability and patriotism, namely, Nikias, the son of Nikeratus, Thucydides, the son of Melesias, and Theramenes, the son of Hagnon; though the latter was not equal to the two former, but was reproached with being a foreigner from the island of Keos; and, also, because he was not a stable politician but always inclined to change sides, he was nicknamed Kothornos, which means a large boot which will fit either leg. Of these three statesmen the eldest was Thucydides, who was the leader of the conservative opposition to Perikles; while Nikias, who was a younger man, rose to a certain eminence during the life of Perikles, as he acted as his colleague in the command of a military force, and also filled the office of archon. On the death of Perikles, Nikias at once became the foremost man in Athens, chiefly by the favour of the rich and noble, who wished to make use of him to check the plebeian insolence of Kleon; yet Nikias had the good-will of the common people, and they were eager to further his interests. Kleon, indeed, became very powerful by caressing the people and giving them opportunities for earning money from the State, but in spite of this, many of the lower classes whose favour he especially strove to obtain, became disgusted with, his greed and insolence, and preferred to attach themselves to Nikias. Indeed, there was nothing harsh or overbearing in the pride of Nikias, which arose chiefly from his fear of being thought to be currying favour with the people. By nature he was downhearted and prone to despair, but in war these qualities were concealed by his invariable success in whatever enterprise he undertook; while in political life his retiring manner and his dread of the vulgar demagogues, by whom he was easily put out of countenance, added to his popularity; for the people fear those who treat them with haughtiness, and favour those who respect and fear them. The reason of this is that the greatest honour which the populace can receive from a great man is not to be treated with contempt by him.

III. Perikles, indeed, used to govern Athens by sheer force of character and eloquence, and required no tricks of manner or plausible speeches to gain him credit with the populace; but Nikias had no natural gifts of this sort, and owed his position merely to his wealth. As he could not vie with Kleon in the versatile and humorous power of speech by which the latter swayed the Athenian masses, he endeavoured to gain the favour of the people by supplying choruses for the public dramatic performances and instituting athletic sports on a scale of lavish expenditure which never before had been equalled by any citizen. The statue of Pallas, erected by him in the Acropolis, is standing at this day, although it has lost the gold with which it was formerly adorned, and also the building which supports the choragic tripods in the temple of Dionysus, for he often gained a victory when choragus, and never was vanquished.

It is said that once during the performance of a play at his expense, a slave of his appeared upon the stage habited as Dionysus; a tall and handsome youth, and still beardless. The Athenians were charmed with his appearance, and applauded for a long time, at the end of which Nikias rose and said that he did not think it right that one whose body was thus consecrated to a god should be a slave; and consequently he gave him his freedom. Tradition also tells us how magnificently and decorously he arranged the procession at Delos. In former times the choruses sent by the cities of Ionia to sing to the glory of the god used to sail up to the island in a disorderly fashion, and were at once met by a rude mob, who called upon, them to sing, so that they disembarked in a hurry, huddling on their garlands and robes with unseemly haste and confusion. Nikias disembarked with his chorus upon the little island of Rhenea close by, with all their vestments and holy things, and then during the night bridged the strait—which is very narrow—with a bridge of boats which he had had made at Athens expressly, which was beautifully ornamented with gilding and rich tapestry. Next morning at daybreak, he led the procession to the god over this bridge, with his chorus very richly dressed, and singing as they passed over the strait. After the sacrifice, the public games, and the banquet, he set up the brazen palm-tree as an offering to the god, and also set apart an estate which he had bought for ten thousand drachmas, as sacred to the god. With the revenues of this land the people of Delos were to offer sacrifice and to provide themselves with a feast, and were to pray the gods to bestow blessings on Nikias. All these injunctions to the people of Delos were inscribed upon a pillar which he left there to guard his bequest. The palm-tree was afterwards overturned by a high wind, and in its fall destroyed the great statue which had been set up by the people of Naxos.

IV. These acts of Nikias may have been prompted by ambition and desire for display, but when viewed in connection with his superstitious character they seem more probably to have been the outcome of his devotional feelings; for we are told by Thucydides that he was one who stood greatly in awe of the gods, and was wholly devoted to religion. In one of the dialogues of Pasiphon, we read that he offered sacrifice daily, and that he kept a soothsayer in his house, whom he pretended to consult upon affairs of state, but really sought his advice about his own private concerns, especially about his silver mines. He had extensive mines at Laurium, the working of which afforded him very large profits, but yet was attended with great risks. He maintained a large body of slaves at the works; and most of his property consisted of the silver produced by them. For this reason he was surrounded by hangers-on, and persons who endeavoured to obtain a share of his wealth, and he gave money to all alike, both to those who might do him harm, and to those who really deserved his liberality, for he gave to bad men through fear, and to good men through good nature. We may find proof of this in the writings of the comic poets. Telekleides, speaking of some informer, says:

"Charikles a mina gave him, fearing he might say
Charikles himself was born in a suspicious way;
And Nikias five minas gave. Now, what his reasons were
I know full well, but will not tell, for he's a trusty fere."

Eupolis, too, in his comedy of Marikas has a scene where an informer meets with a poor man who is no politician, and says:

"A. Say where you last with Nikias did meet.
B. Never. Save once I saw him in the street.
A. He owns he saw him. Wherefore should he say
He saw him, if he meant not to betray
His crimes?
C. My friends, you all perceive the fact,
That Nikias is taken in the act.
B. Think you, O fools, that such a man as he
In any wicked act would taken be."

Just so does Kleon threaten him in Aristophanes's play:

"The orators I'll silence, and make Nikias afraid."

Phrynichus, too, sneers at his cowardice and fear of the popular demagogues, when he says:

"An honest citizen indeed he was,
And not a coward like to Nikias."

V. Nikias feared so much to give the mob orators grounds for accusation against him, that he dared not so much as dine with his follow citizens, and pass his time in their society. Nor did he have any leisure at all for such amusements, but when general, he used to spend the whole day in the War office, and when the Senate met he would be the first to come to the house and the last to leave it. When there was no public business to be transacted, he was hard to meet with, as he shut himself up in his house and seldom stirred abroad. His friends used to tell those who came to his door that they must pardon him for not receiving them, as he was not at leisure, being engaged on public business of great importance. One Hieron, whom he had brought up in his house and educated, assisted him greatly in throwing this air of mystery and haughty exclusiveness over his life. This man gave out that he was the son of Dionysius, called Chalkus, whose poems are still extant, and who was the leader of the expedition to Italy to found the city of Thurii. Hiero used to keep Nikias supplied with prophetic responses from the soothsayers, and gave out to the Athenians that Nikias was toiling night and day on their behalf, saying that when he was in his bath or at his dinner he was constantly being interrupted by some important public business or other, so that, said he, "His night's rest is broken by his labours, and his private affairs are neglected through his devotion to those of the public. He has injured his health, and besides losing his fortune, has been deserted by many of his friends on account of his not being able to entertain them and make himself agreeable to them; while other men find in politics a means of obtaining both friends and fortune, at the expense of the state." In very truth the life of Nikias was such that he might well apply to himself the words of Agamemnon.

"In outward show and stately pomp all others I exceed,
And yet the people's underling I am in very deed."

VI. Perceiving that the Athenian people were willing enough to make use of the talents of men of ability, and yet ever viewed them with suspicion and checked them when in full career, as we may learn from their condemnation of Perikles, their banishment of Damon by ostracism, and their mistrust of Antiphon the Rhamnusian, and especially in their treatment of Paches the conqueror of Lesbos, who while his conduct as general was being enquired into, stabbed himself in the open court—perceiving this, Nikias always avoided, as far as he could, taking the command in any important military expedition. Whenever he was employed as general, he acted with extreme caution, and was usually successful. He was careful to attribute his success, not to any skill or courage of his own, but to fortune, being willing to lessen his glory to avoid the ill-will of mankind. His good fortune was indeed shown in many remarkable instances: for example, he never was present at any of the great defeats sustained by the Athenians at that time, as in Thrace they were defeated by the Greeks of Chalkidike, but on that occasion Kalliades and Xenophon were acting as generals, while the defeat in Ætolia took place when Demosthenes was in command, and at Delium, where a thousand men were slain, they were led by Hippokrates. For the pestilence Perikles was chiefly blamed, because he shut up the country people in the city, where the change of habits and unusual diet produced disease among them. In all these disasters Nikias alone escaped censure: while he achieved several military successes, such as the capture of Kythera, an island conveniently situated off the coast of Laconia, and inhabited by settlers from that country. He also captured several of the revolted cities in Thrace, and induced others to return to their allegiance. He shut up the people of Megara in their city, and thereby at once made himself master of the island of Minoa, by means of which he shortly afterwards captured the port of Nisæa, while he also landed his troops in the Corinthian territory, and beat a Corinthian army which marched against him, killing many of them, and amongst others Lykophron their general. On this occasion he accidentally neglected to bury the corpses of two of his own men who had fallen. As soon as he discovered this omission, he at once halted his army, and sent a herald to the enemy to demand the bodies for burial, notwithstanding that by Greek custom the party which after a battle demand a truce for the burial of the dead, are understood thereby to admit that they have been defeated, and it is not thought light for them to erect a trophy in commemoration of their victory; for the victors remain in possession of the field of battle, and of the bodies of the dead, and the vanquished ask for their dead because they are not able to come and take them. Nevertheless, Nikias thought it right to forego all the credit of his victory rather than leave two of his countrymen unburied. He also laid waste the seaboard of Laconia, defeated a Lacedæmonian force which opposed him,and took Thyrea, which was garrisoned by Æginetans, whom he brought prisoners to Athens.

VII. Now when Demosthenes threw up a fortification at Pylos, and after the Peloponnesians had attacked him by sea and by land, some four hundred Spartans were left on the island of Sphakteria, the Athenians thought that it was a matter of great importance, as indeed it was, to take them prisoners. Yet, as it proved laborious and difficult to blockade them on the island, because the place was desert and waterless, so that provisions had to be brought from a great distance by sea, which was troublesome enough in summer, and would be quite impossible in winter, they began to be weary of the enterprise, and were sorry that they had rejected the proposals for peace which had shortly before been made by the Tasmanians. These proposals were rejected chiefly because Kleon opposed them. Kleon's opposition was due to his personal dislike to Nikias; and when he saw him enthusiastically exerting himself on behalf of the Lacedæmonians, he at once took the other side, and persuaded the people to reject the proffered peace. Now as the blockade dragged on for a long time, and the Athenians learned to what straits their army was reduced, they became angry with Kleon. He threw the blame upon Nikias, asserting that it was through his remissness and want of enterprise that the Spartans still held out, and declaring that, were he himself in chief command they would soon be captured. Upon this the Athenians turned round upon him and said, "Why, then, do not you yourself proceed thither and capture them?" Nikias at once offered to transfer his command to Kleon, and bade him take what troops he thought necessary, and, instead of swaggering at home where there was no danger, go and perform some notable service to the state. At first Kleon was confused by this unexpected turn of the debate, and declined the command; but as the Athenians insisted upon it, and Nikias urged him to do so, he plucked up spirit, accepted the office of general, and even went so far as to pledge himself within twenty days either to kill the Spartans on the island or to bring them prisoners to Athens. The Athenians were more inclined to laugh at this boast than to believe it; for they were well acquainted with the vainglorious character of the man, and had often amused themselves at his expense. It is said that once the public assembly met early and sat for a long time waiting for Kleon, who came at last very late with a garland on his head, and begged them to put off their debate till the next day. "To-day," said he, "I am not at leisure, as I have just offered a sacrifice, and am about to entertain some strangers at dinner." The Athenians laughed at his assurance, and broke up the assembly.

VIII. However, on this occasion, by good fortune and good generalship, with the help of Demosthenes, he brought home prisoners all those Spartans who had not fallen in the battle, within the time which he had appointed. This was a great reproach to Nikias. It seemed worse even than losing his shield in battle that he should through sheer cowardice and fear of failure give up his office of general, and give his personal enemy such an opportunity of exalting himself at his expense, depriving himself voluntarily of his honourable charge. Aristophanes sneers at him in his play of the 'Birds,' where he says:

"We must not now, like Nikias, delay,
And see the time for action pass away."

And again in the play of the 'Farmers,' where this dialogue occurs:

"A. I want to till my farm.
B. And wherefore no?
A. 'Tis you Athenians will not let me go;
A thousand drachmas I would give, to be
From office in the state for ever free.
B. Your offer we accept. The state will have
Two thousand, with what Nikias just gave."

Moreover, Nikias did Athens much harm by permitting Kleon to attain to such a height of power and reputation, which gave him such exaggerated confidence in himself that he grew quite unmanageable, and caused many terrible disasters, by which Nikias suffered as much as any man. Kleon also was the first to break through the decorum observed by former public speakers, by shouting, throwing back his cloak, slapping his thigh, and walking up and down while speaking, which led to the total disregard of decency and good manners among public speakers, and eventually was the ruin of the state.

IX. About this time Alkibiades began to gain credit in Athens as a public speaker, less licentious than Kleon, and like the soil of Egypt described by Homer, which bears

"A mingled crop of good and bad alike."

Thus Alkibiades, with immense powers both for good and evil, produced great changes in the affairs of Athens. Nikias, even if he had been freed from the opposition of Kleon, could not now have quietly consolidated the power of the state, for as soon as he had arranged matters in a fair way to produce peace and quiet, Alkibiades, to satisfy his own furious ambition, threw them again into confusion and war. This was brought about by the following circumstances. The two chief hindrances to peace were Kleon and Brasidas; as war concealed the baseness of the former, and added to the glory of the latter. Kleon was able to commit many crimes undetected, and Brasidas performed many great exploits while the war lasted; wherefore, when both of these men fell before the walls of Amphipolis, Nikias, perceiving that the Spartans had long been desirous of peace, and that the Athenians no longer hoped to gain anything by continuing the war, and that both parties were weary of it, began to consider how he might reconcile them, and also pacify all the other states of Greece, so as to establish peace upon a durable and prosperous basis. At Athens, the richer classes, the older men, and the country farmers all wished for peace. By constantly arguing with the others he gradually made them less eager for war, and at length was able to intimate to the Spartans that there were good hopes of coming to terms. They willingly believed him because of his high character for probity, and more especially because he had shown great kindness to the Spartan prisoners taken at Pylos. A truce for one year had already been arranged between them, and during this they conversed freely with one another, and, enjoying a life of leisure and freedom from the restraints and alarms of war, began to long for an unbroken period of peace, and to sing:

"My spear the spider's home shall be,"

remembering with pleasure the proverb that in time of peace men are awakened, not by trumpets, but by crowing cocks. They railed at those who said that it was fated that the war should last thrice nine years, and, having thus accustomed themselves to discuss the whole question, they proceeded to make peace, and thought that now they were indeed free from all their troubles. The name of Nikias was now in every man's mouth, and he was called the favourite of heaven, and the man chosen by the gods for his piety to confer the greatest of blessings upon the Greeks. For they regarded the peace as the work of Nikias, just as the war had been the work of Perikles. The latter, they thought, for no adequate reasons, had involved the Greeks in the greatest miseries, while the former had relieved them of their troubles by persuading them to become friends. For this reason this peace is to this day called the peace of Nikias.

X. The terms of the peace were that each party should restore the cities and territory which it had taken, and that it should be determined by lot which side should restore its conquests first. We are told by Theophrastus that Nikias, by means of bribery, arranged that the lot should fall upon the Lacedæmonians to make restitution first. When, however, the Corinthians and Bœotians, dissatisfied with the whole transaction, seemed likely by their complaints and menaces to rekindle the war, Nikias induced Athens and Sparta to confirm the peace by entering upon an alliance, which enabled them to deal with the malcontents with more authority, and give them more confidence in one another.

All these transactions greatly displeased Alkibiades, who was naturally disinclined to peace, and who hated the Lacedæmonians because they paid their court to Nikias and disregarded him. For this reason, Alkibiades from the very outset opposed the peace, but ineffectually at first. When, however, he observed that the Lacedæmonians were no longer regarded with favour by the Athenians, and were thought to have wronged them by forming an alliance with the Bœotians, and not restoring to Athens up the cities of Panaktus and Amphipolis, he seized the opportunity of exciting the people by exaggerated accounts of the misdeeds of the Lacedæmonians. Moreover he prevailed upon the people of Argos to send ambassadors to Athens to conclude an alliance. As, however, at the same time ambassadors, with full powers to settle all matters in dispute, came from Lacedæmon, and in a preliminary conference with the Senate were thought to have made very reasonable and just proposals, Alkibiades, fearing that they might create an equally favourable impression when they spoke before the popular assembly, deceived them by solemnly declaring with an oath that he would assist them in every way that he could, provided that they would deny that they came with full powers to decide, saying that by this means alone they would effect their purpose. The ambassadors were deceived by his protestations, and, forsaking Nikias, relied entirely upon him. Upon this Alkibiades brought them into the public assembly, and there asked them if they came with full powers to treat. When they said that they did not, he unexpectedly turned round upon them, and calling both the Senate and the people to witness their words, urged them to pay no attention to men who were such evident liars, and who said one thing in one+ assembly and the opposite in another. The ambassadors, as Alkibiades expected, were thunderstruck, and Nikias could say nothing on their behalf. The people at once called for the ambassadors from Argos to be brought before them, in order to contract an alliance with that city, but an earthquake which was felt at this moment greatly served Nikias's purpose by causing the assembly to break up. With great difficulty, when the debate was resumed on the following day, he prevailed upon the people to break off the negotiations with Argos, and to send him as ambassador to Sparta, promising that he would bring matters to a prosperous issue. Accordingly he proceeded to Sparta, where he was treated with great respect as a man of eminence and a friend of the Lacedæmonians, but could effect nothing because of the preponderance of the party which inclined to the Bœotian alliance. He was therefore forced to return ingloriously, in great fear of the anger of the Athenians, who had been persuaded by him to deliver up so many and such important prisoners to the Lacedæmonians without receiving any equivalent. For the prisoners taken at Pylos were men of the first families in Sparta, and related to the most powerful statesmen there. The Athenians, however, did not show their dissatisfaction with Nikias by any harsh measures, but they elected Alkibiades general, and they entered into a treaty of alliance with the Argives, and also with the states of Elis and Mantinea, which had revolted from the Lacedæmonians, while they sent out privateers to Pylos to plunder the Lacedæmonian coasts in the neighbourhood of that fortress. These measures soon produced a renewal of the war.

XI. As the quarrel between Nikias and Alkibiades had now reached such a pitch, it was decided that the remedy of ostracism must be applied to them. By this from time to time the people of Athens were wont to banish for ten years any citizen whose renown or wealth rendered him dangerous to the state. Great excitement was caused by this measure, as one or the other must be utterly ruined by its application. The Athenians were disgusted by the licentiousness of Alkibiades, and feared his reckless daring, as has been explained at greater length in his Life, while Nikias was disliked because of his great wealth and his reserved and unpopular mode of life. Moreover he had frequently offended the people by acting in direct opposition to their wishes, forcing them in spite of themselves to do what was best for them. On the one side were arrayed the young men and those who wished for war, and on the other the older men and the party of peace, who would be sure to vote respectively, one for the banishment of Nikias, the other for that of Alkibiades. Now

"In revolutions bad men rise to fame,"

and it appears that the violence of these factions at Athens gave an opportunity for the lowest and basest citizens to gain reputation. Amongst these was one Hyperbolus, of the township of Peirithois, a man of no ability or power, but who owed his elevation to sheer audacity, and whose influence was felt to be a disgrace to Athens. This man, who never dreamed that ostracism would be applied to him, as the pillory would have been more suitable to his deserts, openly showed his delight at the discord between Nikias and Alkibiades, and excited the people to deal severely with them, because he hoped that if one of them were to be banished, he might succeed to his place, and become a match for the one who was left behind. But the parties which supported Nikias and Alkibiades respectively made a secret compact with one another to suppress this villain, and so arranged matters that neither of their leaders, but Hyperbolus himself was banished by ostracism for ten years. This transaction delighted and amused the people for the moment, but they were afterwards grieved that they had abused this safeguard of their constitution by applying it to an unworthy object, as there was a kind of dignity about the punishment which they had inflicted. Ostracism in the case of men like Thucydides and Aristeides, was a punishment, but when applied to men like Hyperbolus, it became an honour and mark of distinction, as though his crimes had put him on a par with the leading spirits of the age. Plato, the comic poet, wrote of him

"Full worthy to be punished though he be,
Yet ostracism's not for such as he."

The result was that no one was ever again ostracised at Athens, but Hyperbolus was the last, as Hipparchus of Cholargus, who was some relation to the despot of that name, was the first. Thus the ways of fortune are inscrutable, and beyond our finding out. If Nikias had undergone the trial of ostracism with Alkibiades, he would either have driven him into banishment, and governed Athens well and wisely during his absence, or he would himself have left the city, and avoided the terrible disaster which ended his life, and would have continued to enjoy the reputation of being an excellent general. I am well aware that Theophrastus says that Hyperbolus was ostracised in consequence of a quarrel of Alkibiades with Phæax and not with Nikias; but my account agrees with that given by the best historians.

XII. When ambassadors came to Athens from Egesta and Leontini, inviting the Athenians to commence a campaign in Sicily, Nikias opposed the project, but was overruled by Alkibiades and the war party. Before the assembly met to discuss the matter, men's heads were completely turned with vague hopes of conquest, so that the youths in the gymnasia, and the older men in their places of business or of recreation, did nothing but sketch the outline of the island of Sicily and of the adjacent seas and continents. They regarded Sicily not so much as a prize to be won, but as a stepping-stone to greater conquests, meaning from it to attack Carthage, and make themselves masters of the Mediterranean sea as far as the Columns of Herakles. Public opinion being thus biassed, Nikias could find few to help him in opposing the scheme. The rich feared lest they should be thought to wish to avoid the burden of fitting out ships and the other expensive duties which they would be called upon to fulfil, and disappointed him by remaining silent. Yet Nikias did not relax his exertions, but even after the Athenian people had given their vote for the war, and had elected him to the chief command, with Alkibiades and Lamachus for his colleagues—even then, on the next meeting of the assembly, he made a solemn appeal to them to desist, and at last accused Alkibiades of involving the city in a terrible war in a remote country merely to serve his own ambition and rapacity. However, he gained nothing by this speech, for the Athenians thought that he would be the best man to command the expedition because of his experience in war, and that his caution would serve as a salutary check upon the rashness of Alkibiades and the easy temper of Lamachus; so that, instead of dissuading them his words rather confirmed them in their intention. For Demostratus, who of all the popular orators was the most eager promoter of the expedition, rose, and said that he would put an end to these excuses of Nikias: and he prevailed upon the people to pass a decree that the generals, both at home and in the field, should be invested with absolute irresponsible power.

XIII. Yet it is said that the expedition met with great opposition from the priests; but Alkibiades found certain soothsayers devoted to his own interests, and quoted an ancient oracle which foretold that the Athenians should one day win great glory in Sicily. Special messengers also came from the shrine of Ammon,[1] bringing an oracular response to the effect that the Athenians would take all the Syracusans. Those oracles which made against the project, people dared not mention, for fear of saying words of ill-omen. Yet even the most obvious portents would not turn them from their purpose, such as the mutilation of all the Hermæ, or statues of Hermes, in Athens, in a single night, except only one, which is called the Hermes of Andokides, which was erected by the tribe Ægeis, and stands before the house in which Andokides lived at that time. A man likewise leaped upon the altar of the Twelve Gods, sat astride upon it, and in that posture mutilated himself with a sharp stone. At Delphi too there is a golden statue of Pallas Athene standing upon a brazen palm tree, an offering made by the city of Athens from the spoils taken in the Persian war. This was for many days pecked at by crows, who at last pecked off and cast upon the ground the golden fruit of the palm tree. This was said to be merely a fable invented by the people of Delphi, who were bribed by the Syracusans. Another oracle bade the Athenians bring to Athens the priestess of Athena at Klazomenae, and accordingly they sent for her. Her name happened to be Hesychia, signifying Repose; and this is probably what the oracle meant that the Athenians had better remain quiet. The astronomer, Meton, who was appointed to some office in the army, either because of these adverse omens and prophecies, or because he was convinced that the expedition would miscarry, pretended to be mad and to set fire to his house. Some historians relate that he did not feign madness, but that he burned down his house one night, and next morning appeared in the market-place in a miserable plight, and besought his countrymen that, in consideration of the misfortune which had befallen him, they would allow his son, who was about to sail for Sicily in command of a trireme, to remain at home. We are told that Sokrates the philosopher was warned by one of the signs from heaven which he so often received that the expedition would be the ruin of the city. And many were filled with consternation at the time fixed for the departure of the armament. It was during the celebration of the Adonia, or mourning for the death of Adonis, and in all parts of the city were to be seen images of Adonis carried along with funeral rites, and women beating their breasts, so that those who were superstitious enough to notice such matters became alarmed for the fate of the armament, and foretold that it would start forth gloriously, but would wither untimely away.

XIV. The conduct of Nikias in opposing the war when it was being deliberated upon, and his steadfastness of mind in not being dazzled by the hopes which were entertained of its success, or by the splendid position which it offered himself, deserves the utmost praise; but when, in spite of his exertions, he could not persuade the people to desist from the war, or to remove him from the office of general, into which he was as it were driven by main force, his excessive caution and slowness became very much out of place. His childish regrets, his looking back towards Athens, and his unreasonable delays disheartened his colleagues, and spoiled the effect of the expedition, which ought at once to have proceeded to act with vigour, and put its fortune to the test. But although Lamachus begged him to sail at once to Syracuse and fight a battle as near as possible to the city walls, while Alkibiades urged him to detach the other Sicilian states from their alliance with Syracuse, and then attack that place, he dispirited his men by refusing to adopt either plan, and proposed to sail quietly along the coast, displaying the fleet and army to the Sicilians, and then, after affording some slight assistance to the people of Egesta, to return home to Athens. Shortly after this, the Athenians sent for Alkibiades to return home for his trial on a charge of treason, and Nikias, who was nominally Lamachus's colleague, but really absolute, proceeded to waste time in idle negotiations and languid manœuvres, until his troops had quite lost the high spirits and hopes with which they had arrived at Sicily; while the enemy, who were at first terrified, began to recover their spirits, and despise the Athenians. While Alkibiades was still with them they had sailed to Syracuse with sixty ships, and while the rest remained in line of battle outside, ten of these had entered the harbour to reconnoitre. These ships, approaching the city, made a proclamation by a herald that they were come to restore the people of Leontini to their city, and they also captured a Syracusan vessel, in which they found tables on which were written the names of all the inhabitants of Syracuse, according to their tribes and houses. These tables were kept far away from the city, in the temple of the Olympian Zeus, but at that time the Syracusans had sent for them in order to discover the number of men able to bear arms. These tables were now taken by the Athenians, and carried to their general. When the soothsayers saw this roll of names, they were much alarmed, fearing that this was the fulfilment of the prophecy that the Athenians should capture all the Syracusans. However, some declare that the prophecy was really fulfilled when the Athenian Kallippus slew Dion, and captured Syracuse.

XV. Shortly after this, Alkibiades left Sicily, and the supreme command devolved upon Nikias. For Lamachus, though a brave and honest man, and one who always freely risked his life in battle, was but a plain simple man, and was so excessively poor, that whenever he was appointed general he was forced to ask the Athenians to advance him a small sum of money to provide him with clothes and shoes. Now Nikias was excessively haughty, both on account of his great wealth, and his military renown. It is said that once when the generals were debating some question together, Nikias bade Sophokles the poet give his opinion first, because he was the eldest man present, to which Sophokles answered, "I am the eldest, but you are the chief." Thus when in Sicily he domineered over Lamachus, although the latter was a far abler soldier, and by sailing about the coast at the point furthest removed from the enemy, gave them confidence, which was turned into contempt, when he was repulsed from Hybla, a little fort in the interior. At last he returned to Katana, without having effected anything, except the reduction of Hykkara, a town of the aborigines, not of the Greeks, from which it is said the celebrated courtezan Lais, then a very young girl, was carried away captive and sent to Peloponnesus.

XVI. As the summer advanced, and Nikias remained inactive, the Syracusans gained so much confidence that they called upon their generals to lead them to the attack of the Athenian position at Katana, since the Athenians did not dare approach Syracuse; while Syracusan horsemen even went so far as to insult the Athenians in their camp, riding up to ask if they were come to settle as peaceful citizens in Katana, instead of restoring the Leontines. This unexpected humiliation at length forced Nikias to proceed to Syracuse, and he devised a stratagem by which he was able to approach that city and pitch his camp before it unmolested.

He despatched to Syracuse a citizen of Katana, who informed the Syracusans that if they desired to seize the camp and arms of the Athenians, they would only have to appoint a day and to march in force to Katana. Many of the Athenians, he said, spent all their time within the walls of Katana, and it would be easy for the Syracusan party there to close the gates, assail the Athenians within, and set fire to their ships. A numerous body of Kataneans, he added, were eager to co-operate in the plan now proposed.

This was by far the ablest piece of strategy accomplished by Nikias during all the time that he remained in Sicily. The Syracusans were induced to march out their entire force, leaving their city with scarcely any defenders. Meanwhile, Nikias sailed round from Katana, took possession of the harbour, and encamped his forces on the mainland in a position where he could not be attacked by the enemy's cavalry. When the Syracusan army returned from Katana, he marched out the Athenians and defeated them, but with little loss on their side, as their cavalry covered their retreat. Nikias now broke down the bridges over the river Anapus, which gave occasion to Hermokrates to say, when he was making a speech to encourage the Syracusans, that it was a ridiculous thing for Nikias to try to avoid fighting, as though it were not for the express purpose of fighting that he had been sent thither. But in spite of all that Hermokrates could say, the Syracusans were very much cast down and disheartened. Instead of the fifteen generals who usually commanded their troops they chose three, upon whom they conferred absolute powers, and swore a solemn oath that they would leave them unfettered in the exercise of those powers.

The Athenians were very anxious to occupy the temple of Olympian Zeus, which was near their camp, and full of offerings of gold and silver. Nikias, however, purposely delayed the attack until a force was sent from Syracuse to defend the temple. He thought that if the soldiers did succeed in plundering it, the state would be none the better for it, and he himself would have to bear all the blame of sacrilege.

Nikias made no use of his boasted victory, and after a short time drew off his forces to Naxos, where he passed the winter, expending an enormous sum of money for the maintenance of so large a force, and effecting little or nothing except the reduction of a few disorderly tribes in the interior. The Syracusans now took heart again, marched into the Katanean territory and laid it waste, and attempted to burn the camp of the Athenians. Upon this all men blamed Nikias for deliberating and taking precautions until the time for action was gone by. No one could find any fault with him when he was actually fighting; but though a bold and energetic man in action, he was slow to form plans and begin an enterprise.

XVII. Thus when he did at length return to Syracuse, he managed the operation so swiftly and so skilfully that he disembarked his troops at Thapsus before the enemy were aware of his approach, took Epipolæ by surprise, took prisoners three hundred of the force of picked men who endeavoured to recapture that fort, and routed the Syracusan cavalry, which had hitherto been supposed to be invincible. Moreover, what chiefly terrified the Sicilians, and seemed wonderful to all Greeks, was the speed with which he built a wall round Syracuse, a city quite as large as Athens itself, but one which is much more difficult to invest completely, because of the sea being so near to it, and the rough ground and marshes by which it is surrounded on the land side. Yet he all but succeeded in accomplishing this feat, although he was not in a condition of body to superintend such works personally, for he suffered greatly from a disease of the kidneys, to which we must attribute whatever was left undone by his army. For my own part I feel great admiration for the diligence and skill of the general, and for the bravery of the soldiers, which enabled them to gain such successes. The poet Euripides, after their defeat and utter overthrow wrote this elegy upon them:

"Eight times they beat the Syracusan host,
Before the gods themselves declared them lost."

Indeed, they beat the Syracusans far more than eight times, before the gods turned against the Athenians and dashed them to the ground when at the height of their pride.

XVIII. Nikias was present, in spite of his sufferings, at most of these actions; but when his disease grew worse, he was forced to stay in the camp with a small guard, while Lamachus took the command of the army, and fought a battle with the Syracusans, who were endeavouring to build a counter-wall which would obstruct the Athenians in building their wall of circumvallation. The Athenians were victorious, but followed up their success in such a disorderly manner that Lamachus was left alone and exposed to the attacks of the Syracusan cavalry. He at once challenged their leader, a brave man named Kallimachus, to single combat, and both received and inflicted a mortal wound. His dead body and arms fell into the hands of the Syracusans, who at once charged up to the Athenian walls, where Nikias lay helpless. The extremity of the danger roused him, and he ordered his attendants to set fire to a quantity of timber which had been brought thither to construct military engines, and to some of the engines themselves. This desperate expedient checked the Syracusans, and saved Nikias and the Athenians; for the rest of the Syracusan forces on perceiving so great a body of flame returned in haste to their city.

This affair left Nikias in sole command, and he had great hopes of taking the place; for many cities in Sicily had formed alliances with him, ships laden with corn kept arriving to supply his camp, and all began to be eager to be on his side, and to share in the fruits of his success. The Syracusans themselves sent to propose terms of peace, for they despaired of being able to defend their city any longer against him. At this time Gylippus too, a Lacedæmonian who was sent to assist them, heard during his voyage that they were completely enclosed and reduced to great straits, but held on his voyage notwithstanding, in order that even if, as he imagined, all Sicily had fallen into the hands of the Athenians, he might at any rate defend the Greek cities in Italy from sharing its fate. The air indeed was full of rumours that the Athenians were carrying all before them, and that the good fortune and skill of their general rendered him invincible. Even Nikias himself was so elated by his apparent good fortune, that he forgot his wonted prudence, and imagining from the secret intelligence which he had from his friends within Syracuse that it was on the point of surrender, neglected Gylippus altogether, and kept so bad a watch at the straits of Messina with his fleet, that Gylippus managed to cross there and land in Sicily. Here he at once proceeded to gather an army together, but in a quarter of the island far away from Syracuse, so that the people of Syracuse knew nothing of his arrival. They even appointed a day for the public assembly to meet and discuss terms of surrender with Nikias, and were about to attend it, as they thought that it would be best for them to come to terms before the city was quite surrounded by the wall of the Athenians. There was now only a very small portion of this left to be finished, and all the materials for building it were collected on the spot.

XIX. At this crisis there arrived at Syracuse Gongylus, a Corinthian, in one trireme. All crowded round him, to hear what news he brought. He informed them that Gylippus would soon come to their aid by land, and that other triremes besides his own were on their way by sea. This intelligence was scarcely believed, until it was confirmed by a message from Gylippus himself, bidding them march out and meet him. They now took courage and prepared for battle. Gylippus marched into the town, and at once led the Syracusans out to attack the Athenians. When Nikias had likewise brought his army out of their camp, Gylippus halted his men, and sent a herald to offer them an armistice for five days, on condition that they would collect their effects and withdraw from Sicily. Nikias disdained to answer this insulting message; but some of his soldiers jeeringly enquired whether the presence of one Spartan cloak and staff had all at once made the Syracusans so strong that they could despise the Athenians, who used to keep three hundred such men, stronger than Gylippus and with longer hair, locked up in prison, and feared them so little that they delivered them up to the Lacedæmonians again. Timæus says that the Sicilian Greeks despised Gylippus for his avaricious and contemptible character, and that when they first saw him, they ridiculed his long hair and Spartan cloak. Afterwards, however, he tells us that as soon as Gylippus appeared they flocked round him as small birds flock round an owl, and were eager to take service under him. This indeed is the more probable story; for they rallied round him, regarding his cloak and staff to be the symbols of the authority of Sparta. And not only Thucydides, but Philistus, a Syracusan citizen by birth, who was an eye-witness of the whole campaign, tells us that nothing could have been done without Gylippus. In the first battle after his arrival, the Athenians were victorious, and slew some few Syracusans, amongst whom was the Corinthian Gongylus, but on the following day Gylippus displayed the qualities of a true general. He used the same arms, horses, and ground as before, but he dealt with them so differently that he defeated the Athenians. Checking the Syracusans, who wished to chase them back to their camp, he ordered them to use the stones and timber which had been collected by the Athenians, to build a counter-wall, reaching beyond the line of circumvallation, so that the Athenians could no longer hope to surround the city. And now the Syracusans, taking fresh courage, began to man their ships of war, and to cut off the stragglers with their cavalry. Gylippus personally visited many of the Greek cities in Sicily, all of whom eagerly promised their aid, and furnished him with troops; so that Nikias, perceiving that he was losing ground, relapsed into his former desponding condition, and wrote a despatch to Athens, bidding the people either send out another armament, or let the one now in Sicily return to Athens, and especially beseeching them to relieve him from his command, for which he was incapacitated by disease.

XX. The Athenians had long before proposed to send out a reinforcement to the army in Sicily, but as all had gone on prosperously, the enemies of Nikias had contrived to put it off. Now, however, they were eager to send him assistance. It was arranged that Demosthenes should employ himself actively in getting ready a large force, to go to reinforce Nikias in the early spring, while Eurymedon, although it was winter, started immediately with a supply of money, and with a decree naming Euthydemus and Menander, officers already serving in his army, to be joint commanders along with him. Meanwhile, Nikias was suddenly attacked by the Syracusans both by sea and land. His ships were at first thrown into confusion, but rallied and sank many of the enemy, or forced them to run on shore; but on land Gylippus managed at the same time to surprise the fort of Plemmyrium, where there was a magazine of naval stores and war material of all kinds. A considerable number of the garrison, also, were either slain or taken prisoners; but the most serious result was the stoppage of Nikias's supplies, which heretofore had been easily and quickly brought through the Great Harbour, while it remained in the hands of the Athenians, but which now could not reach his camp by sea without a convoy and a battle.[2] Moreover, the Syracusan fleet had not been defeated by any superiority of force of the Athenians, but by the disorder into which it had been thrown by pursuing the enemy. They therefore determined to renew the conflict with better success.

Nikias, on his part, was unwilling to fight a second time, thinking it was folly to fight with a diminished and disheartened force when he knew that Demosthenes was hurrying to his aid with a large and unbroken armament. However, Menander and Euthydemus, the newly-elected generals, were eager to distinguish themselves by performing some brilliant action before the arrival of Demosthenes, and to eclipse the fame of Nikias himself. The pretext they used was the glory of Athens, which they said would be dishonoured for ever if they should now appear afraid to accept the Syracusans' offer of battle. The battle was fought: and the Athenian left wing, we are told by Thucydides, was utterly defeated by the skilful tactics of the Corinthian steersman Aristion. Many Athenians perished, and Nikias was greatly disheartened, for he had now proved unfortunate both when sole commander and when acting with colleagues.

XXI. Matters were in this posture when Demosthenes was descried in the offing, approaching with a splendid armament which struck terror into the hearts of the enemy. His fleet consisted of seventy-three ships, on board of which were five thousand heavy-armed troops, and three thousand javelin men, archers, and slingers. The glittering arms of the troops, the flaunting banners of the ships of war, and the music of the flutes to which the rowers kept time with their oars, made a gallant display, which delighted the Athenians as much as it depressed the Syracusans. These latter, indeed, were struck with dismay, and thought that their last victory had been won in vain, and that they were labouring to no purpose against a foe whose ranks were continually reinforced.

Nikias was not long allowed to feast his eyes on this welcome spectacle undisturbed. Demosthenes, as soon as he landed, insisted on the necessity of instantly attacking Syracuse, and putting an end to the siege, either by capturing the place, or by returning at once to Athens in case of failure. Against this Nikias, who was alarmed at the idea of such vigorous action, urged that it would be unwise to run such a risk. Delay, he argued, favoured the besiegers more than the besieged, as their resources must soon fail, in which case their allies would desert them and they would again be brought to the necessity of capitulating. Nikias adopted this view because of what he heard from his secret correspondents within the city, who urged him to continue the siege, telling him that already the Syracusans began to feel the war too great a burden for them to support, and that Gylippus was very unpopular among them, so that in a short time they would utterly refuse to hold out any longer, and would come to terms with the Athenians. Nikias could only hint at these secret sources of information, and so his counsels were thought by his colleagues to be mere cowardice. They declared loudly that the original mistake was about to be repeated, and the first terror-stricken impression of the armament frittered away, until familiarity with the sight of it had bred contempt in the breasts of their enemies. They therefore eagerly seconded the proposal of Demosthenes, and forced Nikias, though sorely against his will, to yield to their representations. Accordingly, Demosthenes with the land force assaulted the outlying fort on the high ground of Epipolæ by night, and took it by surprise, killing part of its garrison and putting the remainder to flight. He did not halt there, but followed up his success by marching further on towards the city, until he was met by some Bœotian heavy-armed troops, who had been the first to rally, and now in a compact mass met the Athenians with their spears levelled, and with loud shouts forced them to give way with severe loss. The whole Athenian army was by this thrown into confusion and panic, as the fugitives broke the formation of those troops who were still marching to the front, so that in some cases they actually fought with one another, each believing the others to be enemies. Thus the Athenians fell into sad disorder and ruin; for they were unable to distinguish friends from foes in the uncertain light, as the moon, now nearly setting, glanced upon spear-points and armour without showing them clearly enough to enable men to see with whom they had to deal. The moon was behind the backs of the Athenians: and this circumstance was greatly against them, for it made it hard for them to see the numbers of their own friends, but shone plainly on the glittering shields of their antagonists, making them look taller and more terrible than they were. Finally, attacked as they were on every side, they gave way and fled. Some were slain by the enemy, some by their own countrymen, and some were dashed to pieces by falling down the precipices; while the rest, as they straggled about the country, were cut off by the Syracusan cavalry. Two thousand men perished, and of the survivors few brought back their arms.

XXII. Nikias, who had expected this reverse, now cast the blame of it upon Demosthenes; and he, admitting his error, besought Nikias to embark his army and sail away as quickly as possible, pointing out that no further reinforcement could be hoped for, and that they could not hope for success with the force now at their disposal. Even had they been victorious, he argued, they had intended to leave their present camp, which was unhealthy at all times, and was now in the hot season becoming pestilential. The time was the beginning of autumn, and many of the Athenians were sick, while all were disheartened. Nikias, however, opposed the idea of retreat, not because he did not fear the Syracusans, but because he feared the Athenians more, and the treatment which as an unsuccessful general he would probably meet with. He declared that he saw no reason for alarm, and that even if there was, that he would rather perish by the hands of the enemy than those of his countrymen. A very different sentiment to that which was afterwards uttered by Leon the Byzantine, who said, "My countrymen, I had rather be put to death by you than to be put to death together with you."

With regard to the place to which it would be best for them to remove their camp, that, Nikias said, was a question which they might take time to discuss.

Demosthenes, seeing that Nikias was thus obstinate, and conscious that his own project, when adopted, had led to a frightful disaster, ceased pressing him to raise the siege, and gave the other generals to understand that Nikias must have secret reasons, from his correspondents within the city, which led him to persevere thus obstinately in remaining where he was. This caused them also to withdraw their objections to remaining; but when another army came to assist the Syracusans, and the Athenians began to perish from malaria, even Nikias himself agreed that it was time to retreat, and issued orders to his men to hold themselves in readiness to embark.

XXIII. When all was ready, and the enemy off their guard, as they did not expect the Athenians to retreat, an eclipse of the moon took place, which greatly terrified Nikias and some others who, from ignorance or superstition, were in the habit of taking account of such phenomena. That the sun should be sometimes eclipsed even the vulgar understood to be in some way due to the moon intercepting its light: but what body could intercept the moon's light, so that suddenly the full moon should pale its light and alter its colour, they could not explain, but thought that it was a sinister omen and portended some great calamity.

The treatise of Anaxagoras, the first writer who has clearly and boldly explained the phases and eclipses of the moon, was then known only to a few, and had not the credit of antiquity, while even those who understood it were afraid to mention it to their most trusted friends. Men at that time could not endure natural philosophers and those whom they called in derision stargazers, but accused them of degrading the movements of the heavenly bodies by attributing them to necessary physical causes. They drove Protagoras into exile, and cast Anaxagoras into prison, from whence he was with difficulty rescued by Perikles; while Sokrates, who never took any part in these speculations, was nevertheless put to death because he was a philosopher. It was not until after the period of which I am writing that the glorious works of Plato shed their light upon mankind, proving that Nature obeys a higher and divine law, and removing the reproach of impiety which used to attach to those who study these matters, so that all men might thereafter investigate natural phenomena unreproved. Indeed, Plato's companion Dion, although the moon was eclipsed when he was starting from the island of Zakynthus to attack the despot Dionysius, was not in the least disturbed by the omen, but sailed to Syracuse and drove out the despot. Nikias at this time was without a competent soothsayer, for his intimate friend, Stilbides, who used to check a great deal of his superstition, died shortly before this. Indeed, the omen, if rightly explained, as Philochorus points out, is not a bad one but a very good one for men who are meditating a retreat; for what men are forced to do by fear, requires darkness to conceal it, and light is inimical to them. Moreover men were only wont to wait three days after an eclipse of the moon, or of the sun, as we learn from Autokleides in his book on divination; but Nikias persuaded them to wait for another complete circuit of the moon, because its face would not shine upon them propitiously before that time after its defilement with the gross earthy particles which had intercepted its rays.[3]

XXIV. Nikias now put all business aside, and kept offering sacrifices and taking omens, until the enemy attacked him. Their infantry assailed the camp and siege works, while their fleet surrounded the harbour, not in ships of war; but the very boys and children embarked in what boats they could find and jeered at the Athenians, challenging them to come out and fight. One of these boys, named Herakleides, the son of noble parents, ventured too far, and was captured by an Athenian ship. His uncle Pollichus, fearing for his safety, at once advanced with ten triremes which were under his command; and this movement brought forward the rest of the Syracusan fleet to support him. An obstinate battle now took place, in which the Syracusans were victorious, and many of the Athenians perished, amongst whom was their admiral Eurymedon. And now the Athenians refused to remain before Syracuse any longer, and called upon their generals to lead them away by land, for the Syracusans after their victory had at once blockaded the entrance to the harbour, so that no passage was left. Nikias and the other generals refused to agree to this proposal, as they thought it would be a pity to abandon a fleet of so many transports, and nearly two hundred ships of war. They placed the flower of the land force on board the ships, with the best of the slingers and darters, and manned one hundred and ten triremes, for they had not sufficient oars for a larger number. Nikias now abandoned the great camp and walls of investment, which reached as far as the temple of Herakles, and drew the army up on the beach as spectators of the battle. Thus the Syracusan priests and generals were able for the first time since the siege began to sacrifice to Herakles, as they were wont to do, while the people were manning their fleet.

XXV. The Syracusan soothsayers promised them the victory if they awaited attack and did not begin the attack: for Herakles himself never struck the first blow, but always waited for his enemies to attack him. The sea-fight which now took place was the fiercest and most obstinately contested of all those which took place throughout the war, and its varying fortunes were shared with agonizing interest by the Athenian army and the citizens on the walls of Syracuse, who were able from their respective positions to overlook the whole battle and watch the manœuvres of each ship. The Athenians were placed at a great disadvantage by having all their ships collected into one mass, where they were attacked from all sides by the lighter and more manageable vessels of the enemy. The Syracusans also used stones as missiles, which strike with equal effect, however they are thrown, while the Athenians replied with volleys of arrows and javelins, whose aim was often spoiled by the motion of the vessels, and which are useless unless they fly with the point foremost. All these details had been foreseen and taught to the Syracusans by Aristion the Corinthian steersman, who fell in the moment of victory. The Athenians were finally routed and driven ashore with great slaughter, and their retreat by sea completely cut off. Knowing how difficult it would be to make their way to any place of safety by land, they allowed themselves to be so paralyzed by despair, that they let the Syracusans tow away their ships as prizes, without making an effort to save them, and actually neglected to ask for a truce for the burial of their dead. They seemed to think that the case of the sick and wounded whom they saw amongst them, and whom they must perforce abandon when they left their camp, was even more pitiable than that of the floating corpses, and they actually envied the lot of the slain, knowing well that after a few more days of suffering they themselves were all destined to share their fate.

XXVI. They were all eager to depart during the night which followed this disastrous day; but Gylippus, perceiving that the people of Syracuse were so given up to feasting and merry-making, celebrating both their victory and the festival of their national hero Herakles, to whom the day was sacred, that they could not be either forced or persuaded into attempting to harass the enemy's retreat, sent some of those men who had formerly been in correspondence with Nikias to tell him not to attempt to retreat that night, as all the roads were occupied by Syracusans lying in wait to attack him. Deceived by this intelligence, Nikias waited to find what he feared in the night turned into a reality on the following day. At daybreak the passes were occupied by the Syracusans, who also threw up entrenchments at all the places where rivers had to be forded, and broke all the bridges, stationing their cavalry upon the level ground, so that the Athenians could not advance a step without fighting. The Athenians remained for all that day and the following night in their camp, and then set out, with such weeping and lamentation that it seemed rather as if they were leaving their native country than a hostile one, so distressed were they to see the miseries of their friends and relatives, and of the sick and wounded who were unable to accompany their march and had to be left to their fate, while they themselves had a presentiment that their present sufferings were nothing in comparison with those which awaited them. Among all these piteous sights, Nikias himself offered a glorious example. Worn out by disease, compelled by the exigencies of the retreat to forego the medicines and treatment which his condition required, he nevertheless, weak as he was, did more than many strong men could do, while all his men knew well that he made those efforts, not from any wish or hope to save his own life, but that it was solely on their behalf that he did not give way to despair. The tears and lamentations of the rest were prompted by their own private sorrows and fears, but the only grief shown by Nikias was that so splendid an expedition should have ended in such miserable failure. Those who watched his noble bearing and remembered how earnestly he had opposed the whole scheme, were filled with compassion for his undeserved sufferings. They began to despair of the favour of Heaven being shown to themselves, when they reflected that this man, careful as he had always been to perform every religious duty, was now no better off than the humblest or the most wicked soldier in his army.

XXVII. Nikias made heroic efforts by cheerful looks, encouraging speeches, and personal appeals to his followers, to show himself superior to fortune. Throughout the retreat, although for eight days in succession he was constantly harassed by the attacks of the enemy, he nevertheless kept the division under his command unbroken and undefeated, until the other part of the army under Demosthenes was forced to surrender, being completely surrounded in an enclosed olive-ground, the property of Polyzelus, brother of the despot Gelon. Demosthenes himself drew his sword and stabbed himself, but not mortally, for the Syracusans quickly interposed and forced him to desist. When the Syracusans told Nikias of this disaster, and allowed him to send horsemen to convince him of its truth, he proposed terms to Gylippus, which were that the Athenians should be allowed to leave Sicily, on condition of the repayment of the whole expenses of the war, for which he offered to give hostages. These terms were refused, and the enemy with insulting cries and threats proceeded to shoot with missiles of all kinds at the Athenians, who were now completely without food or drink. Yet Nikias prevailed upon them to hold out during that night, and on the following day he led them, still under fire from the enemy, across the plain leading to the river Asinarus. There some were forced into the stream by the enemy, while others cast themselves in to quench their thirst. A most dreadful slaughter now took place, the Athenians being wild with thirst, and the Syracusans killing them as they drank, until Nikias surrendered himself to Gylippus, saying, "I beseech you, now that you are victorious, to show some mercy, not to me, but to the Athenian troops. Consider how changeful is the fortune of war, and how gently the Athenians dealt with your men in their hour of victory."

Gylippus was visibly affected by the words, and by the sight of Nikias; for he knew how well the Spartan prisoners had been treated by him, when the peace was made with Athens; moreover, he thought that it would be a great honour to him if he could carry home the enemy's commander-in-chief as a prisoner. He received Nikias with kindness, and gave orders to take the rest of the Athenians alive. It was long, however, before these orders were understood and obeyed, so that more Athenians were slain than survived, although many were spared by the Syracusans in order that they might be sold for slaves.

The prisoners were now assembled together, and their arms and armour hung upon the trees by the river side, as a trophy of the victory. The victors next crowned themselves with garlands, decorated their horses, cut off the manes and tails of the captured horses, and marched back into their own city, having by their courage and skill won the most complete victory ever gained by one Greek state over another.

XXVIII. At a public assembly of the Syracusans and their allies which was shortly afterwards held, the orator Eurykles proposed that the day on which Nikias was taken should be kept as a festival for ever, upon which no work should be done, and sacrifice should be offered to the gods, and that the feast should be called the Asinaria, from the name of the river where the victory was won. The day was the twenty-sixth of the Dorian month Karneius, which the Athenians call Metageitnion (September 21st). Furthermore, he proposed that the Athenian slaves and allies should be sold, that the Athenians themselves, with what native Sicilians had joined them, should be confined in the stone quarries within the city of Syracuse, and that their generals should be put to death.

These propositions wore accepted by the Syracusans, who treated Hermokrates with contempt when he urged that to be merciful in victory would be more honourable to them than the victory itself. Gylippus too, when he begged that he might carry the Athenian generals alive to Sparta, was shamefully insulted by the excited Syracusans, who had long disliked the irritating Spartan airs of superiority natural to Gylippus, and now, flushed with victory, no longer cared to conceal their feelings. Timæus tells us that they accused him of avarice and peculation, a hereditary vice, it appears, in his family since his father Kleandrides was banished from Sparta for taking bribes, while he himself afterwards stole thirty of the hundred talents which Lysander sent home to Sparta, and hid them under the roof of his house, but was informed against, and exiled in disgrace. This will be found described at greater length in the Life of Lysander.

In his account of the death of Nikias and Demosthenes, Timæus does not exactly follow the narrative of Thucydides and Philistus, as he informs us that while the assembly was still sitting, Hermokrates sent to their prison to inform them that they were condemned to death, and to afford them the means of dying by their own hands, while the other historians state that the Syracusans put them to death.[4] Be this as it may, their dead bodies were exposed before the gates of Syracuse as a spectacle for the citizens. I have heard also that at the present day a shield is shown in one of the temples at Syracuse, which is said to be that of Nikias, and which is beautifully adorned with woven coverings of purple and gold.

XXIX. Of the Athenians, the most part perished in the stone quarries of disease and insufficient food, for they received only a pint of barley-meal and half-a-pint of water each day. Not a few, however, were sold into slavery, being stolen for that purpose by Syracusans, or having escaped disguised as slaves. The rest were at length branded upon their foreheads with the figure of a horse, and sold into slavery. Yet even in this extremity their well-bred and dignified behaviour came to their aid; for they soon either obtained their freedom, or gained the confidence and respect of their masters. Some gained their freedom by their knowledge of Euripides. It appears that the dramas of Euripides were especially popular in Sicily, but that only a few fragments of his works had hitherto reached the Greek cities in that island. We are told that many of these captives on their return to Athens affectionately embraced Euripides, and told him how some of them had been sold into slavery, but had been set free after they had taught their masters as much of his poetry as they could remember, while others, when wandering about the country as fugitives after the battle, had obtained food and drink by reciting passages from his plays. We need not then wonder at the tale of the people of Kaunus, who, when a ship pursued by pirates was making for their harbour at first refused to admit it, but afterwards enquired whether any on board knew the plays of Euripides; and on hearing that they did, allowed them to enter the harbour and save themselves.

XXX. At Athens the news of the catastrophe was at first disbelieved, because of the unsatisfactory way in which it reached the city. A stranger, it is said, disembarked at Peiræus, went into a barber's shop, and began to converse about what had happened as upon a theme which must be uppermost in every man's mind. The astonished barber, hearing for the first time such fearful tidings, ran up to Athens to communicate it to the archons, and to the public in the market-place. All were shocked and astonished at hearing this, and the archons immediately convoked the public assembly, and brought the barber before it. When he was asked to explain from whom he had heard this intelligence, as he could give no satisfactory account, he was regarded as a disturber of the public tranquillity by fabricating idle tales, and was even put to the torture. Soon, however, men arrived who confirmed his tale, and described all the details of the catastrophe as far as they had witnessed them. Then at last the countrymen of Nikias believed, after his death, what he had so often foretold to them during his life.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] In North Africa, the modern oasis of Siwah.

[2] Plemmyrium on one side, and the city of Syracuse on the other, command the entrance of the gulf known as the Great Harbour, inside of which lay the Athenian fleet and camp.

[3] Grote.

[4] Grote, Part II. ch. lx, points out that there is no real contradiction between the statement cited from Timæus, and the accounts gives of the transaction by Thucydides and Philistus.

LIFE OF CRASSUS.

I. Marcus Crassus[5] was the son of a father who had been censor, and enjoyed a triumph; but he was brought up with his two brothers in a small house. His brothers were married in the lifetime of their parents, and all had a common table, which seems to have been the chief reason that Crassus was a temperate and moderate man in his way of living. Upon the death of one of his brothers, Crassus married the widow,[6] and she became the mother of his children; for in these matters also he lived as regular a life as any Roman. However, as he grew older, he was charged with criminal intercourse with Licinia,[7] one of the Vestal Virgins, who was brought to trial; the prosecutor was one Plotinus. Licinia had a pleasant estate in the suburbs, which Crassus wished to get at a small price, and with this view he was continually about the woman and paying his court to her, which brought on him the suspicion of a criminal intercourse; but he was acquitted by the judices, being indebted in some degree to his love of money for his acquittal from the charge of debauching the vestal. But he never remitted his attentions to Licinia till he got possession of the property.

II. Now, the Romans say that the many good qualities of Crassus were obscured by one vice, avarice; but the fact appears to be that one vice, which was more predominant in his character than all the rest hid his other vices. They allege, as the chief proof of his avarice, the mode in which he got his money and the amount of his property. Though he did not at first possess above three hundred talents, and during his first consulship he dedicated the tenth part of his property to Hercules,[8] and feasted the people, and gave every Roman out of his own means enough to maintain him for three months; yet, before the Parthian expedition, upon making an estimate of his property, he found it amount to seven thousand one hundred talents. The greatest part of this, if one must tell the truth, though it be a scandalous story, he got together out of the fire and the war, making the public misfortunes the source of his wealth; for, when Sulla took the city, and sold the property of those whom he put to death, considering it and calling it spoil, and wishing to attach the infamy of the deed to as many of the most powerful men as he could, Crassus was never tired of receiving or buying. Besides this, observing the accidents that were indigenous and familiar at Rome, conflagrations, and tumbling down of houses owing to their weight and crowded state, he bought slaves, who were architects and builders. Having got these slaves to the number of more than five hundred, it was his practice to buy up houses on fire, and the houses which were adjoining to those on fire; for the owners, owing to fear and uncertainty, would sell them at a low price; and thus the greatest part of Rome fell into the hands of Crassus: but, though he had so many artizans, he built no house except his own; for he used to say that those who were fond of building were ruined by themselves, without the aid of any opponent. Though he had many silver mines, and much valuable land, and many labourers on it, still one would suppose that all this was of little value, compared with the value of his slaves: so many excellent slaves he possessed,—readers, clerks, assayers of silver,[9] house-managers, and table-servants; and he himself superintended their education, and paid attention to it and taught them, and, in short, he considered that a master was mainly concerned in looking after his slaves, who were the living implements of domestic economy. And here Crassus was right, if, as he used to say, it was his opinion that he ought to effect everything by the instrumentality of slaves, and that he himself should direct the slaves; for, we observe, that what is economical with respect to things lifeless is political with respect to men. But he was not right in thinking and saying that nobody was rich who could not maintain an army out of his substance; for war feeds not by a fixed allowance, according to Archidamus;[10] and, consequently, the wealth that is required for war is unlimited; and this opinion of Crassus was very different from the opinion of Marius; for when Marius, after giving to each man fourteen jugera of land, found that they wanted more, he said, "May there never be a Roman who thinks that too little which is enough to maintain him."

III. Besides this, Crassus was hospitable to strangers, for his house was open to all, and he used to lend money to his friends without interest; but he would demand it back immediately on the expiration of the time of the borrower, which made the gratuitous loan more burdensome than heavy interest. In his entertainments the invitation was usually to persons of the plebeian class, and general: and the frugality of the banquet, which was accompanied with neatness and a friendly welcome, made it more agreeable than a sumptuous feast. In his literary pursuits he mainly studied oratory,[11] and that kind which was of practical use; and, having attained an ability in speaking equal to the first among the Romans, he surpassed in care and labour those who had the greatest talents; for they say, there was no case, however mean and contemptible, which he approached without preparation; and often, when Pompeius, and Cæsar, and Cicero, were unwilling to get up to speak, he would perform all the duties of an advocate: and for this reason he became more popular, being considered a careful man, and always ready to give his help. He pleased people, also, by his friendly and affable manner in taking them by the hand, and addressing them; for Crassus never met a Roman, however low and humble his condition might be, without returning his salute,[12] and addressing him by his name. He is also said to have been well versed in history, and to have paid some attention to philosophy by studying the writings of Aristoteles, in which he had for his teacher Alexander, a man who gave a proof of his moderation and easy temper in his intercourse with Crassus; for it was not easy to say whether he was poorer when he became acquainted with Crassus, or after the acquaintance was made. He was, indeed, the only friend of Crassus, who always accompanied him when he travelled abroad; and he used to wear a cloak,[13] lent him for the purpose, which on his return he was asked to give back. Oh, the submission[14] of the man! for the poor fellow did not consider poverty among the things that are indifferent. But this belongs to a later period.

IV. When Marius and Cinna had got the upper hand, and it was soon apparent that they would reinstate themselves in Rome, not for the benefit of their country, but plainly for the destruction and ruin of the nobles, those who were caught in the city were put to death: among whom were the father and brother of Crassus. Crassus, being very young, escaped immediate danger; but, seeing that he was hemmed in on all sides, and hunted by the tyrants, he took with him three friends and ten slaves; and, using wonderful expedition, made his escape to Iberia, having been there before, when his father was Prætor,[15] and having made himself friends. Finding all in great alarm and trembling at the cruelty of Marius, as if he were close at hand, he did not venture to make himself known, but sought refuge in a tract bordering on the sea, belonging to Vibius Pacianus,[16] where he hid himself in a large cave. He sent a slave to Vibius to sound his disposition; for the provisions that Crassus brought with him were now exhausted. On hearing the news, Vibius was pleased that Crassus had escaped; and inquiring about the number of persons with him, and where the place was, he did not go himself to see them, but he took his villicus near the spot, and ordered him to have food daily prepared, and to carry it and place it near the rock, and to go away without speaking a word, and not to be curious about the matter, or make any inquiries; and he gave him notice, that if he did meddle at all he should be put to death, but if he faithfully helped in the matter he should have his freedom. The cave is not far from the sea, and the precipices which shut it in leave a small and hardly perceptible path[17] which leads into the cave; but when you have entered, it opens to a wonderful height, and spreads out wide, with recesses which open into one another, and are of a large circuit. It is also neither without water nor light: for a spring of the purest water oozes out at the base of the precipice; and there are natural clefts about that part where the rock closes, by which the external light is admitted, and in the daytime the spot is fully illuminated. The air within is free from all moisture caused by dropping, and is quite pure, owing to the compactness of the rock, which diverts all the wet and droppings to the spring.

V. While Crassus stayed in the cave, the slave came daily to bring provisions; but he did not see the persons who were concealed, or know who they were; though he was seen by them, inasmuch as they knew, and watched the times of his coming. Now, the provision that was made for their meals was ample enough even for luxury, and not merely sufficient for their necessities. But Vibius determined to show Crassus every kind of friendly attention; and it occurred to him to consider the youth of Crassus, that he was a very young man, and that provision should be made in some degree also for the pleasures suitable to his age, and that merely to supply his wants would argue that he was serving Crassus as little as he could, rather than with hearty zeal; accordingly, he took with him two handsome female slaves, and went down to the sea-coast. When he came to the place, he pointed to the road that led up to it, and told them to go in boldly. Crassus, seeing them approach, was afraid that the spot was known, and had been discovered; and, accordingly, he asked them what they wanted, and who they were. The women replied, as they had been instructed, that they were looking for their master, who was concealed there; on which Crassus perceived the joke which Vibius was playing off upon him, and his kind attentions, and received the women; and they stayed with him for the rest of the time, telling and reporting to Vibius what he requested them. Fenestella[18] says, that he saw one of these slaves when she was an old woman, and that he had often heard her mention this, and tell the story with pleasure.

VI. In this way Crassus spent eight months in concealment; but as soon as he heard of Cinna's end, he showed himself, and out of the numbers that flocked to him he selected two thousand five hundred, with whom he went round to the cities; and one city, Malaca,[19] he plundered, according to the testimony of many authors, though they say that he denied the fact, and contradicted those who affirmed it. After this he got together some vessels, and crossed over to Libya, to Metellus Pius,[20] a man of reputation who had collected a force by no means contemptible. But he stayed no long time there; for he quarrelled with Metellus, and then set out to join Sulla, by whom he was treated with particular respect. When Sulla had passed over the sea to Italy, he wished all the young men who were with him to aid him actively, and he appointed them to different duties. Crassus, on being sent into the country of the Marsi to raise troops, asked for a guard, because the road lay through a tract which was occupied by the enemy; Sulla replied to him in passion and with vehemence, "I give thee as guards thy father, thy brother, thy friends, thy kinsmen, who were cut off illegally and wrongfully, and whose murderers I am now pursuing." Stung by these words, and pricked on to the undertaking, Crassus immediately set out, and, vigorously making his way through the enemy, he got together a strong force, and showed himself active in the battles of Sulla. The events of that war, it is said, first excited him to rivalry and competition with Pompeius for distinction. Pompeius was younger than Crassus, and his father had a bad repute at Rome, and had been bitterly hated by the citizens; but still Pompeius shone conspicuous in the events of that period and proved himself to be a great man, so that Sulla showed him marks of respect which he did not very often show to others of more advanced years and of his own rank, by rising from his seat when Pompeius approached, and uncovering his head, and addressing him by the title of Imperator. All this set Crassus in a flame, and goaded him, inasmuch as he was thus slighted in comparison with Pompeius; and with good reason; Crassus was deficient in experience, and the credit that he got by his military exploits was lost by his innate vices,—love of gain and meanness; for, upon taking Tudertia,[21] a city of the Umbri, it was suspected that he appropriated to himself most of the spoil, and this was made a matter of charge against him to Sulla. However, in the battle near Rome,[22] which was the greatest in all the war, and the last, Sulla was defeated, the soldiers under his command being put to flight, and some of them trampled down in the pursuit: Crassus, who commanded the right wing, was victorious, and, after continuing the pursuit till nightfall, he sent to Sulla to ask for something for his soldiers to eat, and to report his success. But, during the proscriptions and confiscations, on the other hand, he got a bad name, by buying at low prices large properties, and asking for grants. It is said that, in the country of the Bruttii, he also proscribed a person, not pursuant to Sulla's orders, but merely to enrich himself thereby, and that, on this account, Sulla, who disapproved of his conduct, never employed him again in any public business. However, Crassus was most expert in gaining over everybody by flattery; and, on the other hand, he was easily taken in by flattery from any person. It is further mentioned as a peculiarity in his character, that, though very greedy of gain,[23] he hated and abused those most who were like himself.

VII. But Crassus was most annoyed at the military success of Pompeius, and his enjoying a triumph before he became a senator, and being called by the citizens Magnus, which means Great. On one occasion, when somebody observed that Pompeius the Great was approaching, Crassus smiled, and asked, How great he was? But, as Crassus despaired of equalling Pompeius in military reputation, he entered upon a political career, and, by his activity, by pleading in the courts, and lending money, and by canvassing for candidates, and subjecting himself to all kinds of scrutiny in conjunction with those who wanted anything of the people, he acquired a power and reputation equal to what Pompeius had got by his many and great military services. And the result to each of them was something unusual; for, when Pompeius was absent from Rome, his name and his influence in the State, by reason of his military exploits, was superior to that of Crassus; but when Pompeius was at Rome, he often fell short of Crassus in influence, for his haughty temper and habitual pride made him avoid crowds and retire from the Forum, and seldom give his aid to those who sought it, and then not readily; his object being to keep his power at a higher pitch, by exercising it only on his own behalf. But Crassus was always ready to make himself useful, and he did not keep himself retired, nor was he difficult of access, but he was always busy in everything that was going on, and by the general kindness of his behaviour he got the advantage over the proud bearing of Pompeius. In personal dignity, in persuasive speech, and attractive expression of countenance it is said they were both equally fortunate. However, this rivalry did not hurry Crassus into any personal enmity or ill-will, and though, he was annoyed at Pompeius and Cæsar receiving greater honour than himself, he never allowed this jealous feeling to be associated with any hostility or ill disposition. It is true that when Cæsar was taken and detained by the pirates, he cried out, "What pleasure you will have, Crassus, when you hear of my capture!" But afterwards, at least, they were on friendly terms, and, when Cæsar was going to Iberia, as prætor,[24] and had no money in consequence of his creditors having come upon him and seizing all his outfit, Crassus did not leave him in this difficulty, but got him released, by becoming security for him to the amount of eight hundred and thirty talents. When all Rome became divided into three parties,—that of Pompeius, Cæsar and Crassus,—(for Cato[25] had more reputation than power, and was more admired than followed), the sober and conservative part of the citizens adhered to Pompeius; the violent and those who were lightly moved, were led by the hopes that they had from Cæsar; Crassus, by keeping a middle position, used both parties for his purposes, and, as he very often changed in his political views, he was neither a firm friend nor an irreconcilable enemy, but he would readily give up either his friendship or his enmity on calculation of interest; so that within a short interval, he often came forward to speak both for and against the same men and the same measures. He had also great influence, both because he was liked and feared, but mainly because he was feared. Accordingly Sicinius,[26] who was the most violent in his attacks on the magistrates and popular leaders of the day, in reply to one who asked, "Why Crassus was the only person whom he did not worry, and why he let him alone?" said, "That he had hay on his horn:" now, the Romans were accustomed to tie some hay round the horn of an ox that butted, as a warning to those who might meet it.

VIII. The insurrection of the gladiators and their devastation of Italy, which is generally called the war of Spartacus,[27] originated as follows:—One Lentulus Batiates kept gladiators in Capua, of whom the majority, who were Gauls and Thracians, had been closely confined, not for any misbehaviour on their part, but through the villainy of their purchaser, for the purpose of fighting in the games. Two hundred of these resolved to make their escape; but their design being betrayed, those who had notice of the discovery, and succeeded in getting away, to the number of seventy-eight, took knives and spits out of a cook's shop, and sallied out. Meeting on the way with some waggons that were conveying gladiators' arms to another city, they plundered the waggons, and armed themselves. Seizing on a strong position, they chose three leaders, of whom the first was Spartacus, a Thracian of nomadic race, a man not only of great courage and strength, but, in judgment and mildness of character, superior to his condition, and more like a Greek than one would expect from his nation. They say that when Spartacus was first taken to Rome to be sold, a snake was seen folded over his face while he was sleeping, and a woman, of the same tribe with Spartacus, who was skilled in divination, and possessed by the mysterious rites of Dionysus, declared that this was a sign of a great and formidable power which would attend him to a happy termination. This woman was at that time cohabiting with Spartacus, and she made her escape with him.

IX. The gladiators began by repelling those who came against them from Capua and getting a stock of military weapons, for which they gladly exchanged their gladiators' arms, which they threw away as a badge of dishonour, and as barbaric. Clodius[28] the prætor was next sent against them from Rome, with three thousand men, and he blockaded them on a mountain which had only one ascent, and that was difficult and narrow, and Clodius had possession of it; on all other sides there were steep smooth-faced precipices. On the top of the hill there grew a great quantity of wild vines, and the men of Spartacus cutting off all the shoots that were adapted to their purpose, and, intertwining them, made strong and long ladders, so that when fastened above, they reached along the face of the precipice to the level ground, and they all safely descended by them except one man, who stayed to take care of the arms; and, when all the rest had descended, he let the arms down, and, having done this, he got down safe himself. The Romans did not know what was going on; and accordingly, when the gladiators surrounded them, they were put in alarm by the surprise, and fled, on which the enemy took their camp. Many of the herdsmen and shepherds in those parts also joined the gladiators, men ever ready for a quarrel, and light of foot, some of whom the gladiators armed, and others they employed as scouts and light troops. Publius Barinus[29] the prætor was next sent against them, whose legatus, one Furius, at the head of two thousand soldiers, the gladiators engaged and put to flight. Cossinus was then despatched, with a large force, to advise with Barinus, and to be associated in the command; but Spartacus, watching his opportunity, while Cossinus was bathing at Salenæ,[30] was very near seizing him. Cossinus made his escape with great difficulty, and Spartacus, seizing the baggage, closely followed up the pursuit, with great slaughter of the Romans, and he took the camp. Cossinus also fell. Spartacus, after defeating the prætor himself in many other battles, and at last seizing his lictors and his horse, now became great and formidable: but still he formed a just judgment of the state of affairs and, not expecting to get the advantage over the power of the Romans, he designed to lead his forces to the Alps; thinking that it was advisable for them to cross the mountains and to go to their several homes, some to Thrace and some to Gaul. But the gladiators being strong in numbers, and confident, would not listen to him, and they went about ravaging Italy. The Senate were now no longer troubled merely at the humiliation and disgrace that they suffered by the revolt; but, moved by fear and the danger, they sent out both the consuls[31] as to a war of the utmost difficulty and importance. Gellius, suddenly falling on the Germans, who, by reason of their arrogance and self-confidence, had separated from the troops of Spartacus, destroyed the whole body; and after Lentulus had hemmed in Spartacus with large armies, Spartacus, rushing upon them and joining battle, defeated the legates and got all the baggage. Spartacus now attempted to force his way towards the Alps; and Cassius[32] who "was the governor of Gaul upon the Padus, met him with ten thousand men, and a battle was fought, in which Cassius was defeated with great lose, and with difficulty made his escape.

X. The Senate, on receiving this news, angrily bade the consuls keep quiet, and they appointed Crassus to the command of the war, whose reputation and popularity induced many of the nobles to serve under him. Crassus took his station on the frontiers of Picenum, with the view of waiting for Spartacus, who was moving in that direction; and he sent Mummius, his legatus, at the head of two legions, to make a circuit, and with orders to follow the enemy, but not to engage with them, nor come to close quarters. But Mummius, as soon as he got what he thought a favourable opportunity, fought a battle, and was defeated; many of his men fell, and many, flying without their arms, made their escape. Crassus received Mummius himself roughly, and arming the soldiers again, he required of them security for their arms, that they would keep them; and five hundred, who had been the first to run, and had shown most cowardice, he distributed into fifty decades,[33] and out of each decade he took one man, by lot, and put him to death; thus inflicting on the soldiers this ancient mode of punishment which had long fallen into disuse; for disgrace also is added to the manner of death, and many things horrible and dreadful to see accompany the punishment, in the presence of all the spectators. After inflicting this punishment, he made his men again face about and march against the enemy. Spartacus, however, avoided Crassus, and made his way through Lucania to the sea, and, falling in with some Cilician piratical vessels, in the Straits, he formed a design to seize Sicily, and by throwing two thousand men into the island, to kindle again the servile war there, the flames of which had not long since been quenched, and required only a few sparks to set it again in a blaze. The Cilicians[34] came to terms with Spartacus, and received his presents; but they deceived him, and sailed off. Under these circumstances, he marched back from the coast, and fixed his army in the peninsula of the Rhegine territory. Crassus now came up, and observing that the nature of the ground suggested what was to be done, he resolved to build a wall across the isthmus, for the purpose of keeping his soldiers employed, and cutting off the supplies of the enemy. Though the undertaking was great and difficult, he accomplished it, and completed the work, contrary to all expectation, in a short time, by digging a ditch[35] from sea to sea, through the neck of land, three hundred stadia in length, fifteen feet deep, and as many wide; and above the ditch he raised a rampart of surprising height and strength. At first Spartacus paid no attention to what was going on, and treated it with contempt; but when forage began to fail, and he wanted to advance further into the interior, he discovered the lines of Crassus; and as there was nothing to be got in the peninsula, taking advantage of a night when there was a fall of snow and a wintry storm, he filled up a small part of the ditch with earth, and wood, and the branches of trees, and so carried over a third part of his army.

XI. Now Crassus was afraid that Spartacus might form a design to march against Rome; but he was encouraged by many of the followers of Spartacus quitting their leader, in consequence of some disputes, and encamping by themselves upon the banks of the lake Lucanis,[36] which they say is subject to changes, at certain intervals becoming sweet, and then again salt, and not potable. Crassus coming upon this band, drove them from the lake; but he was prevented from cutting them to pieces and pursuing them, by the sudden appearance of Spartacus, who checked the flight. Crassus had, before this, written to the Senate, to say that they ought to summon Lucullus[37] from Thrace, and Pompeius from Iberia; but he now changed his mind, and made every effort to put an end to the war before they arrived, knowing that the success would be attributed to him who came last, and brought help, and not to himself. Accordingly, he determined to attack first those who had separated from the main body, and were carrying on the campaign by themselves, under the command of Caius Cannicius and Castus; and he dispatched six thousand men, with orders to occupy a certain hill, and keep themselves concealed. The men of Crassus endeavoured to escape notice by covering their helmets; but, being seen by two women, who were sacrificing for the enemy, they would have been in danger, if Crassus had not quickly appeared, and fought a battle, the most severely contested of all in this war, in which he destroyed twelve thousand three hundred men, of whom he found only two wounded in the back: all the rest died in the ranks, fighting against the Romans. After the defeat of this body, Spartacus retired to the mountains of Petilia,[38] followed by Quintius,[39] one of the generals of Crassus, and Scrofas, his quæstor, who hung close on his rear. But, upon Spartacus facing about, the Romans were thrown into disorderly flight, and made their escape, after having with difficulty rescued their quæstor, who was wounded. This success was the ruin of Spartacus, in consequence of the self-confidence which it infused into the slaves: they would not now consent to avoid a battle, nor yet would they obey their commanders, whom they surrounded, with arms in their hands, on the march, and compelled to lead them back through Lucania against the Romans, wherein they did the very thing that Crassus desired; for it was reported that Pompeius was now approaching, and there were not a few who openly said that the victory in this war belonged to him; for he would fight as soon as he arrived, and put an end to the campaign. While Crassus, therefore, who was eager to decide the affair by a battle, and to fix his camp near the enemy, was engaged in digging his trenches, the slaves came up to them and attacked the men who were at work. As fresh men from both sides kept coming up to help their comrades, Spartacus, seeing that he must fight, arranged all his army in order of battle. When his horse was brought to him, he drew his sword and said, that if he won the battle he should have plenty of fine horses from the enemy, and if he was defeated he should not want one; upon which he killed his horse, and then he made his way towards Crassus himself, through many men, and inflicting many wounds; but he did not succeed in reaching Crassus, though he engaged with and killed two centurions. At last, after those about him had fled, he kept his ground, and, being surrounded by a great number, he fought till he was cut down. But, though Crassus had been successful, and had displayed the skill of a great general, and had exposed his person to danger, yet the credit of the victory did not escape being appropriated to Pompeius; for those who fled from the battle were destroyed by him, and Pompeius wrote to the Senate that Crassus had defeated the slaves in the open field, but he had cut up the war by the roots.[40] Now Pompeius had a splendid triumph for his victory over Sertorius and his exploits in Iberia; but Crassus did not venture to ask for the greater triumph; and even as to the foot triumph called the ovation, which he did enjoy, it was considered but a mean thing, and below his dignity that he had a triumph for a servile war. But how the ovation differs from the other triumph, and about the name, I have spoken in the 'Life of Marcellus.'[41]

XII. After these events, Pompeius was forthwith invited to the consulship,[42] and, though Crassus had hopes of becoming his colleague, still he did not hesitate to solicit the assistance of Pompeius. Pompeius gladly listened to his proposal, for he was desirous in any way always to have Crassus his debtor for some obligation, and he actively exerted himself on behalf of Crassus; and finally he said, in his address to the public assembly, that he should feel no less grateful for the return of Crassus as his colleague than for his own election. They did not, however, continue in this harmony after entering on their office, but they differed on almost every subject, and quarrelled about everything, and by their disputes rendered their consulship unfruitful in all political measures, and ineffectual: however, Crassus made a great festival in honour of Hercules, and feasted the people at ten thousand tables, and gave them an allowance of corn for three months. It was at the close of their consulship, when Pompeius and Crassus happened to be addressing the public assembly, that a man, not of any distinction, a Roman eques, a rustic in his mode of life, and one who did not meddle with public affairs, Onatius Aurelius,[43] got up on the rostra, and, coming forward, told a dream which he had had. "Jupiter," he said, "appeared to me, and bade me tell the citizens not to let the consuls lay down their office before they have become friends." Upon the man saying this, and the assembly bidding the consuls be reconciled, Pompeius stood silent; but Crassus offering his right hand first, said, "Citizens, I do not consider that I am humbling myself or doing anything unworthy of me when I make the advance towards good-will and friendship to Pompeius, to whom you gave the name of Magnus before he had a beard, and voted a triumph before he was a senator."

XIII. These were the things worthy of commemoration in the consulship of Crassus. But his censorship[44] passed over altogether without results, and without any active measures; for he neither revised the senate, nor inspected the equites, nor made a census of the citizens, though he had for his colleague Lutatius Catulus, the mildest of the Romans. But it is said that Crassus designed a shameful and violent measure, to make Egypt tributary to the Romans, and that Catulus opposed him vigorously, on which a difference arising between them, they voluntarily laid down their office. In the affair of Catiline,[45] which was a serious matter, and one that came near overthrowing Rome, some suspicion, it is true, attached to Crassus, and a man came forward to name him as implicated in the conspiracy, but nobody believed him. However, Cicero, in one of his orations, evidently imputed to Crassus and Cæsar participation in the plot; but this oration was not published till after the death of both of them. But in the oration on his consulship, Cicero says that Crassus came to him by night and brought a letter[46] which contained information on the affair of Catiline, as if his object was to establish the truth of the conspiracy. Now Crassus always hated Cicero for this, but his son stood in the way of his doing Cicero any open injury. For Publius,[47] who was fond of oratory and of improving himself, was much attached to Cicero, and went so far as to change his dress when Cicero did at the time of his trial, and he induced the other young men to do the same. At last he prevailed upon his father, and reconciled him to Cicero.

XIV. When Cæsar returned from his province,[48] he made preparations to be a candidate for the consulship; but, observing that Crassus and Pompeius were again at enmity, he did not choose by applying to one of them for his help to have the other for his enemy, and he did not think that he could succeed if neither of them assisted him. Accordingly, he set about reconciling them, by continually urging upon them, and showing that by their attempts to ruin one another they would increase the power of the Ciceros, and Catuli, and Catos, who would lose all their influence if they would unite their friends and adherents, and so direct the administration with combined strength, and one purpose. By persuasion and effecting a reconciliation, he brought them together, and he formed out of the union of all three an irresistible power by which he put down the Roman senate and the people, though he did not make Pompeius and Crassus more powerful, one through the other, but by means of the two he made himself most powerful; for immediately on being supported by Pompeius and Crassus, he was elected consul by a great majority. While Cæsar was ably discharging the business of the consulship, Crassus and Pompeius, by procuring for him the command of armies, and by delivering Gaul into his hands, fixed him in a kind of acropolis, thinking that they should administer the rest of the State as they mutually agreed, after securing to Cæsar the authority which the lot had given him. Now Pompeius did all this through unbounded love of power; but to the old vice of Crassus, his avarice, there was now added a new passion, ambition for trophies and triumphs excited by the great exploits of Cæsar, since it was in this alone that he was Cæsar's inferior; for he had the superiority in everything else; and his passion remitted not nor diminished till it resulted in an inglorious death and public misfortunes. Cæsar had come down from Gaul to the city of Luca, and many of the Romans went to him there, and Pompeius and Crassus had private conferences with him, in which they agreed to take affairs in hand more vigorously, and to hold the whole power of the State at their disposal, to which end Cæsar was to remain in his military command, and Pompeius and Crassus were to have other provinces and armies. To this object there was only one road, which was to ask for a second consulship, and Cæsar was to assist them in their canvass by writing to his friends and sending many of his soldiers to support them at the comitia.

XV. As soon as Crassus and Pompeius[49] returned to Rome, suspicion was excited, and there was much talk through the whole city that their meeting had been held for no good. In the Senate Marcellinus and Domitius asked Pompeius if he intended to be a candidate for the consulship, to which Pompeius replied that perhaps he should, and perhaps he should not; being asked again, he said that he was a candidate for the votes of the good citizens, but not a candidate for the votes of the bad. It was considered that Pompeius had made a haughty and arrogant answer; but Crassus said, in a more modest tone, that he would be a candidate, if it was for the interest of the State; if it was not, he would decline. This encouraged certain persons to become candidates, among whom was Domitius. However, when Pompeius and Crassus had openly declared themselves candidates, the rest were afraid and withdrew; but Domitius was encouraged by Cato, who was his kinsman and friend, and stimulated and urged him to stick to his hopes, with the view of defending the common liberties; he said "it was not the consulship that Pompeius and Crassus wanted, but a tyranny; that their conduct showed they were not asking for the consulship, but aiming to seize on the provinces and the armies." By such arguments, which were also his real opinions, Cato, all but by force, brought Domitius to the Forum, and many sided with them. And those who were surprised at the canvassing of Pompeius and Crassus were no small number. "Why then do they want a second consulship? And why do they wish to be colleagues again? And why will they not have the consulship with other colleagues? There are many men among us who are surely not unworthy to be colleagues with Crassus and Pompeius." This alarmed the partizans of Pompeius, who now abstained from no proceeding, however disorderly and violent; but, in addition to all the rest, they placed a body of men to lie in wait and attack Domitius as he was going down to the Forum, while it was still dark, with his partizans, and they killed the man that held the light, and wounded many, among whom was Cato. After putting the party of Domitius to flight, and driving them back to the house,[50] Pompeius and Crassus were proclaimed consuls. Shortly after, they again surrounded the Senate-house with armed men, and, after driving Cato out of the Forum, and killing some persons who opposed them, they procured another five years[51] of administration to be added to Cæsar's term, and the two provinces of Syria and Iberia to be given to them. When the lots were cast, Crassus got Syria, and Pompeius had Iberia.

XVI. The result of the lot was not universally disliked; for the majority wished Pompeius not to be far from the city, and Pompeius, who was much attached to his wife,[52] intended to spend his time chiefly in Rome. Crassus showed by his joy, immediately on the falling out of the lot, that he considered no greater good fortune had ever befallen him, and he could scarcely keep quiet before strangers and in public; to his friends he uttered many foolish and puerile expressions quite inconsistent with his years and temper, for he had never before shown himself in the least degree a braggart or arrogant. But now, being mightily elated, and his head completely turned, he was not for making Syria or Palestine the limit of his victories; but, designing to make the exploits of Lucullus against Tigranes, and those of Pompeius against Mithridates appear mere child's play, he extended his hopes as far as to the Bactrians, and the Indians, and the external sea. And yet there was no mention of a Parthian war in the law[53] that was drawn up on this occasion. But everybody knew that Crassus was passionately bent on a Parthian war, and Cæsar wrote to him from Gaul, approving of his design, and urging him to it. When it was known that Ateius,[54] the tribune, intended to offer some opposition to his leaving the city, and many persons joined him who complained that Crassus was going to make war upon a people who were doing the Romans no wrong, and had a treaty with them, Crassus in alarm prayed Pompeius to accompany him, and escort him out of the city. Now, the reputation of Pompeius with the multitude was great, and, by showing himself in front of Crassus, with cheerful looks and countenance, he tranquillized a numerous body of people who were prepared to obstruct Crassus, and to raise a shout against him, so that they made way and let him pass through them quietly. But Ateius met Crassus, and, first of all, endeavoured to stop him by words, and he protested against his marching out: in the next place, he ordered his attendant to lay hold of Crassus, and to detain him; but, as the rest of the tribunes would not allow this, the attendant quitted his hold of Crassus, and Ateius running to the gate, placed there a burning brazier, and, as soon as Crassus arrived, he threw incense and poured libations upon it, and, at the same time, he denounced against Crassus curses, in themselves dreadful and terrific, and, in addition thereto, he uttered the names of certain awful and inauspicious deities. The Romans say that these mysterious and ancient curses have great efficacy, that no man can escape upon whom they are laid, and that he who utters them also has an unlucky end, and, accordingly, they are not denounced either on ordinary occasions, or by many persons. Ateius was blamed for letting loose such imprecations and religious fears upon a State, on behalf of which he was hostile to Crassus.

XVII. When Crassus arrived at Brundisium, though the sea was still rough owing to the wintry weather, he would not wait, but he set sail, and so lost many of his vessels. After getting together the remnant of his forces, he marched through Galatia.[55] Finding King Deiotarus, who was now a very old man, founding a new city, Crassus said sarcastically, "King, you are beginning to build at the twelfth hour." The Galatian, with a smile, replied, "You, too, Imperator, I observe, are not very early with your Parthian expedition." Now Crassus was past sixty, and he looked older than he was. On his arrival, matters at first turned out fully equal to his expectation; for he easily threw a bridge over the Euphrates, and got his army across safely, and he also obtained possession of many cities in Mesopotamia which surrendered. Before one of them, of which Apollonius was tyrant, he lost a hundred men, upon which he brought his force against the place, and, having got possession of it, he made plunder of all the property, and sold the people: the Greeks called the city Zenodotia.[56] On the capture of the city, Crassus allowed his soldiers to proclaim him Imperator, wherein he greatly disgraced himself, and showed the meanness of his spirit, and that he had no good hopes of greater things, as he was content with so slight a success. Having put garrisons in the cities that had surrendered, to the amount of seven thousand infantry and a thousand cavalry, he retired to winter in Syria, and there to await his son,[57] who was coming from Cæsar in Gaul, with the decorations that he had gained by his valour, and with a thousand picked horsemen. This seemed to be the first blunder of Crassus, or at least, it was the greatest blunder that he committed next to the expedition itself; for he ought to have advanced and to have secured Babylon and Seleukeia,[58] two cities which were always hostile to the Parthians; instead of which, he gave his enemies time to make preparation. The next thing the people blamed was his waste of time in Syria, which was employed more for purposes of money profit than for military purposes; for he did not occupy himself in reviewing the numbers of his troops, nor establishing games to keep the soldiers in exercise, but he busied himself about estimating the revenues of cities, and he was for many days with weights and scales in his hands among the treasures of the goddess in Hierapolis,[59] and, after requiring from the towns and princes contingents of men, he would remit his requisitions for a sum of money; by all which he lost his reputation, and fell into contempt. The first sign that happened to him proceeded from this goddess herself, whom some consider to be Aphrodite (Venus); and others Hera (Juno); others again believe her to be the cause that has supplied from moisture the seeds for all things, and nature, and the power that has pointed out the source of all good things for men; for, as they were going out of the temple, young Crassus first stumbled at the gate, and then his father fell upon him.

XVIII. While Crassus was getting together his forces out of the winter quarter, there came ambassadors from Arsakes[60] with a short message. They said, if the army was sent by the Romans, there was nothing but war without truce, and without any terms; but if Crassus, contrary to the wish of his country, as they heard, had brought arms against the Parthians and occupied territory for his private profit, Arsakes would act with moderation, and would take pity on the old age of Crassus, and give up to the Romans the men whom he had in his power, and who were rather under guard themselves than keeping guard over others. Crassus haughtily replied, that he would give an answer in Seleukeia; on which Vagises, the oldest of the ambassadors, smiled, and, showing the palm of his hand, said, "From here, Crassus, hair will grow before you see Seleukeia." The ambassadors now returned to Hyrodes, to inform him that he must be ready for war. From the cities of Mesopotamia, in which there were Roman garrisons, some soldiers, who made their escape at great hazard, brought reports that caused much anxiety, having been eye-witnesses of the numbers of the enemy, and of their mode of attacking the cities; and, as is usual, they magnified everything which they reported. "When the enemy pursued," they said, "no man could escape from them, and when they fled, they could not be overtaken; that strange missiles preceded the appearance of the enemy, and before one could see who sent them, they pierced through everything that they struck; and as to the arms of the mailed[61] soldiers, some were made to push through every obstacle, and others to give way to nothing." When the soldiers heard this their courage sank; for they had been led to believe that the Parthians did not differ at all from the Armenians and Cappadocians, whom Lucullus plundered and robbed till he was weary, and they thought that the hardest part of the war would be a long march, and the pursuit of men who would not come to close quarters; but now, contrary to their hopes, they were in expectation of a contest and great danger, so that some of the officers thought that Crassus ought to stop, and again submit to their deliberation the general state of affairs. Among these was Cassius[62] the quæstor. The seers, also, in gentle terms showed that bad and unfavourable signs were always prognosticated to Crassus by the victims. But Crassus paid no attention to them, nor to those who advised anything else except to move on.

XIX. But Crassus was in no small degree encouraged by Artabazes[63] the king of the Armenians, who came to the camp with six thousand horsemen. These were said to be the guards and attendants of the king; and he promised ten thousand men clothed in mail and thirty thousand infantry, who were to be maintained at his own cost. He attempted to persuade Crassus to invade Parthia through Armenia; for, he said, the army would not only have abundance of provision in its march through the country by reason of him supplying them, but would also advance safely, having in their front many mountains and continuous hills, and ground unfavourable for cavalry, in which alone lay the strength of the Parthians. Crassus was well enough satisfied with the zeal of the king and the splendour of the proffered aid; but he said he would march through Mesopotamia, where he had left many brave Romans; upon this the Armenian went away. As Crassus was taking his army over at the Zeugma,[64] many extraordinary claps of thunder broke around, and many flashes of lightning came right in front of the army; and a wind, mingled with cloud and hurricane,[65] falling on the raft, broke up and crushed to pieces a large part of it. The spot also, on which Crassus intended to encamp, was struck with two thunderbolts.[66] A horse, belonging to the general, which was caparisoned in splendid style, violently dragged along the man who held the reins, and plunging into the stream, disappeared. It is said also, that the first eagle which was raised, turned round spontaneously. Added to this, it happened that, as they were giving out the rations to the soldiers after crossing the river, lentils and salt were given first, which the Romans consider to be symbols of lamentation, and are accustomed to place before the dead; and, as Crassus was haranguing the soldiers, an expression escaped him which greatly alarmed the army. He said he would destroy the raft over the river, that no one among them might return; and though he ought, upon seeing the imprudence of his words, to have recalled what he had said and explained it to the soldiers, he neglected to do so, through his arrogant temper. Finally, when he was offering the usual expiatory sacrifice, and the priest had put the viscera into his hands, he threw them away, on which, observing that the standers-by were greatly disturbed, he said with a smile, "Such is old age; but no arms at least shall drop from its hands."

XX. After this he advanced along the river, with seven legions and nearly four thousand horsemen, and almost as many light-armed troops as horsemen. Some of the scouts now returned from their exploration and reported that the country was clear of men, and that they had fallen in with the tracks of many horses, which indicated that they had turned about and were retreating. This gave Crassus still better hopes, and made the soldiers completely despise the Parthians, who, as they supposed, would not come to close quarters. However, Cassius again had some conversation with Crassus, and advised him at least to give his troops rest in some of the garrisoned cities, till he should get some certain information about the enemy; but if he would not do this, to advance towards Seleukeia along the river. He urged that the boats which carried the provisions would furnish them with supplies by stopping at the places of encampment, and that, by having the river as a protection against being hemmed in by the enemy, they would always be able to fight them on fair terms.

XXI. While Crassus was considering and reflecting on these matters, there comes an Arab chieftain, Ariamnes[67] by name, a cunning and faithless man, and of all the misfortunes that were by chance combined to ruin the Romans the chief and crowning mischief. Some of them who had served with Pompeius knew him as one who had received favours from Pompeius, and was supposed to be a friend to the Romans; but he now came to Crassus with a treacherous intent, and with the privity of the royal generals, to try if he could draw him far away from the river and the foot of the hills, into a boundless plain, where he might be surrounded by the enemy; for nothing was further from the intentions of the Parthians than to attack the Romans right in front. Accordingly, the barbarian coming to Crassus (and he was a plausible talker), spake in high terms of Pompeius as his benefactor, and praised the force of Crassus; but he blamed him for his tardiness, inasmuch as he was delaying and making preparation, as if he would have occasion to employ arms instead of hands and the most active feet, against an enemy who had long been trying to get together, as quick as they could, their most valuable property and their best slaves, and to move off to the Scythians or Hyrkanians. "And yet," he said, "if you intend to fight, you ought to press on before the king recovers his courage and all his forces are concentrated; for now Surena and Sillakes have been thrown in your way to stand the attack, and the king is no where to be seen." But all this was false. For Hyrodes had at first divided his forces into two parts, and he was himself ravaging Armenia to take vengeance on Artavasdes; but he sent Surena against the Romans, not because he despised them, as some say, for it was not consistent for him to disdain Crassus as an antagonist, the first of the Romans, and to war against Artavasdes and take the villages of Armenia; but it seems that he really feared the danger, and that he was on the watch to await the result, and that he put Surena in the front to try the fortune of a battle, and so to divert the enemy. For Surena was no person of mean estate: in wealth, birth, and consideration, he was next to the king; but, in courage and ability, the first of the Parthians of his time; and, besides all this, in stature and beauty of person he had no equal. He used always to travel, when he was on his own business, with a thousand camels to carry his baggage, and he had following him two hundred carriages for concubines; and a thousand mailed horsemen, with a larger number of light cavalry, escorted him; and he had in all, horsemen, clients,[68] and slaves, no less than ten thousand. Now by hereditary right he had the privilege of first placing the diadem on the head of him who became king of the Parthians;[69] and this very Hyrodes, who had been driven out, he restored to the Parthian empire, and took for him Seleukeia the Great, being the first to mount the wall and to put to flight with his own hand those who opposed him. Though he was not yet thirty years of age at that time, he had the first reputation for prudent counsel and judgment, by which qualities particularly he caused the ruin of Crassus, who through his confidence and pride in the first place, and next through his fears and his misfortunes, became a most easy victim to fraud.

XXII. The barbarian, after persuading Crassus, drew him away from the river, and led him through the plains by a track at first convenient and easy, but which soon became toilsome; for it was succeeded by deep sand, and plains treeless and waterless, not bounded in any direction by any object that the eye could reach, so that, not only through thirst and the difficulty of the march, was the army exhausted, but even the aspect of all around caused the soldiers to despond past all comfort, seeing neither plant, nor stream, nor top of sloping hill, nor blade of grass sprouting or rising through the earth, but a bare sea-like wave of desert heaps of sand environing the army. Now this of itself made the Romans suspect treachery. Messengers also came from Artavasdes the Armenian, with a message that he was engaged in a heavy struggle since Hyrodes had fallen upon him, and that he could not send Crassus aid; but he advised Crassus above all things to change his route immediately, and, by joining the Armenians, to bring the contest with Hyrodes to a close: but, if he would not do this, he recommended him to advance, and always to avoid encamping in such places as were adapted for the movements of cavalry, and to keep close to the mountainous parts: to all which Crassus sent no written answer, but, under the influence of passion and perverse disposition, he answered, that he had no leisure at present to deal with the Armenians, but he would come at another time to punish Artavasdes for his treachery. Cassius was again much dissatisfied: but he gave over advising Crassus, who was out of humour with him, though Cassius himself abused the barbarian. "What evil dæmon," he said, "vilest of men, brought you to us, and by what drugs and witchcraft have you persuaded Crassus to plunge his army into a boundless wilderness and an abyss, and to pursue a path more fit for a nomadic chief of robbers than for a Roman Imperator?" But the barbarian, who was a cunning follow, with abject servility, prayed him to endure a little longer; and, while running along with the soldiers and giving them his help, he would jeer at them in a laughing mood, and say, "I suppose you think that you are marching through Campania, and you long for the fountains, and streams, and shades, and baths, and taverns? Have you forgotten that you are crossing the confines of the Arabs and Assyrians?" Thus the barbarian amused the Romans, and before his treachery was discovered he rode off, not, however, without the knowledge of Crassus, after making him believe that he would serve the Roman army, and put the affairs of the enemy in confusion.

XXIII. It is said that on that day Crassus did not appear, as is the custom of Roman generals, in a purple dress, but in black, which he immediately changed on observing what he had done: and it is also said that the men who carried the standards had much difficulty in raising some of them up, for they stuck in the ground as if they were firmly rooted there. Crassus ridiculed all these omens, and quickened his march, urging the infantry to follow after the cavalry, till at last a few of those who had been sent forward as scouts came up, and reported that the rest of them had been cut off by the enemy, and they had escaped with difficulty, and that the Parthians were advancing with a large force, and full of confidence. This threw all the army into confusion, and Crassus was completely confounded, and began to put his men in order hastily, and with no great presence of mind: at first, as Cassius recommended, he extended the line of the legionary soldiers as far as possible in the plain, and making it of small depth, in order to prevent the enemy from attacking them on the flank, he distributed the cavalry on the wings; but he changed his plan and, drawing his men together, formed them into a deep square of four fronts, with twelve cohorts on each side. By the side of each cohort he placed a body of horse, in order that no part of the army might be without the aid of the cavalry, but might make the attack equally protected on all sides. He gave one of the wings to Cassius, and the other to young Crassus; he himself took his station in the centre. Thus advancing, they came to a stream called Balissus,[70] which was neither large nor copious; but it was a joyful sight to the soldiers in the midst of the drought and heat, and by comparison with the rest of their laborious march through a country without water. Now most of the commanders thought that they ought to encamp and spend the night there, and learn what was the number of the enemy, and the nature and disposition of their force, and so advance against them at daybreak; but Crassus, being prevailed upon by the importunity of his son, and the cavalry with him, to advance immediately, and engage with the enemy, gave orders for the men who required it to eat and drink in their ranks. And before this could be well accomplished all through the ranks, he led on his men, not slowly, nor halting at intervals, as is usual when men are marching to battle, but he kept them up to a quick, unbroken pace, until the enemy were in sight, who, contrary to expectation, did not appear to the Romans to be either numerous or formidable; for Surena disguised his numbers by placing the mass of his force behind the front ranks, and he prevented their bright armour from being seen by ordering his men to cover themselves with cloaks and skins. But when they were near the Romans, and the standard was raised by the general, first of all they filled the plain with a deep sound and a terrific noise; for the Parthians do not excite themselves to battle with horns or trumpets, but they have hollow instruments,[71] made of skin, and furnished with brass bells, on which they strike at the same time in various parts; and these instruments produce a kind of deep and dismal sound, compounded of the roaring of wild beasts and the harsh crash of thunder; for the Parthians rightly judge that of all the senses the hearing is that which causes the greatest alarm in the mind, and that, when this sense is affected, there is the speediest and greatest disturbance in the judgment.

XXIV. The Romans were startled at the noise, when all of a sudden throwing off the covering of their armour the Parthians appeared, with their helmets and breastplates flashing like flame, the Margian steel[72] glittering sharp and bright, and the horses equipped in mail of brass and iron; but Surena was most conspicuous of all, being the tallest and handsomest man among them, though his personal appearance, owing to his feminine beauty, did not correspond to his reputation for courage, for he was dressed more in the Median fashion, with his face painted[73] and his hair parted, while the rest of the Parthians, still keeping to the Scythian fashion, wore their hair long and bushy to make themselves more formidable. At first the Parthians intended to fall upon them with their long spears, and to drive the front ranks from their ground; but when they saw the depth of their close-locked ranks, and the firmness and stability of the men, they drew back; and while they seemed to be at the same time dispersing themselves and breaking their ranks, they threw themselves around the square before the Romans were aware of it. Crassus ordered the light-armed troops to spring forward; but they had not advanced far before they were met by a shower of arrows, which galled them, and they ran back for shelter among the legionary soldiers, and caused the beginning of disorder and alarm among the Romans, who saw the vigour with which the arrows were discharged and their strength, for they tore the armour and made their way through everything alike, whether hard or soft defence. The Parthians, dispersing themselves at considerable distances from one another, began to discharge their arrows from all points at once, not taking any very exact aim (for the close and compact ranks of the Romans did not give a man the opportunity of missing if he wished it), but sending their arrows with vigorous and forcible effect from bows which were strong and large, and, owing to their great degree of bending, discharged the missiles with violence. Now the condition of the Romans was pitiable from the beginning: for, if they kept their position, they were exposed to be wounded, and if they attempted to close with the enemy, they were just as far from doing the enemy any harm, and they suffered just as much; for the Parthians while retreating[74] still discharged their arrows, and they do this most effectually next to the Scythians: and it is a most subtle device to make their escape from danger while they are still fighting, and to take away the disgrace of flight.

XXV.[75] The Romans endured so long as they had hopes that the Parthians would withdraw from the contest when they had discharged their arrows, or would come to close quarters; but when they perceived that there were many camels standing there, loaded with arrows, and that the Parthians who had first shot all their arrows, turned round to the camels for a fresh supply, Crassus, seeing no end to this, began to lose heart, and he sent messengers to his son with orders to force the enemy to engage before he was surrounded, for the Parthians were mainly attacking and surrounding with their cavalry the wing commanded by young Crassus, with the view of getting in his rear. Accordingly, the young man taking thirteen hundred horsemen,—a thousand of whom he had brought from Cæsar,—and five hundred archers, and eight cohorts of the legionary soldiers, who were nearest to him, wheeled about to attack the Parthians. But the Parthians, who were manœuvring about Crassus, either because they fell in with some marshes,[76] as some say, or because it was their design to attack Crassus when they had drawn him as far as they could from his father, turned round and fled. On this Crassus, calling out that the Parthians did not stand their ground, advanced with Censorinus and Megabacchus,[77] of whom Megabacchus was distinguished for courage and strength, and Censorinus[78] was a senator and a powerful speaker, both of them companions of Crassus, and about the same age. The cavalry pursued the enemy, nor did the infantry allow themselves to be left behind, being full of alacrity and hope of victory; for they thought that they were victorious and in pursuit: but they had not gone far before they perceived the stratagem; for the Parthians, who were supposed to be flying, began to face about, and others, in greater numbers, joined them. Upon this the Romans halted, thinking that the enemy would come to close quarters with them, as they were only few in number. But the Parthians placing their mailed horsemen in the front, to oppose the Romans, rode about them with the rest of the cavalry dispersed, and, by trampling the ground, they raised from the bottom heaps of sand, which threw up such an immense cloud of dust that the Romans could neither see clearly nor speak; and, being driven into a narrow compass, and falling one on another, they were wounded and died no easy nor yet a speedy death, for tortured with violent convulsions and pain, and writhing with the arrows in them, they broke them in the wounds, and, by trying to pull out by force the barbed points, which had pierced through their veins and nerves, they increased the evil by breaking the arrows, and thus injured themselves. Many thus fell, and the survivors also were unable to fight; for, when Publius encouraged them to attack the mailed horsemen, they showed him that their hands were nailed to their shields, and their feet fastened right through to the ground, so that they were unable either to fly or to defend themselves. However, Publius cheering the cavalry, made a vigorous attack with them, and closed with the enemy; but the Romans were under a disadvantage, both as to attack and defence, striking with small and feeble spears against breastplates of raw hide and iron, and receiving the blows of long spears on the lightly-equipped and bare bodies of the Gauls, for Crassus trusted most to them, and with them indeed he did wonderful feats; for the Gauls, laying hold of the long spears, and closing with the Parthians, pushed them from their horses, the men, owing to the weight of their armour, being unable to stir themselves; and many of the Gauls, quitting their own horses, and slipping under those of the enemy, wounded them in the belly, and the horses springing up through pain, and, at the same time, trampling on their riders and the enemy, fell dead. The Gauls were most oppressed by the heat and thirst, being unaccustomed to both, and they had lost most of their horses by driving them against the long spears. They were, therefore, compelled to retreat to the legionary soldiers, taking with them Publius, who was badly wounded. Seeing a sandy eminence near, they retreated to it, and fastened their horses in the middle, and closing in their front by close-locking their shields, they thought they could thus more easily repel the enemy: but it turned out just the other way; for, while they were on the level ground, the front ranks did, in some sort, give relief to those who were behind; but on this spot, which raised the men one above another, by reason of the inequality of the ground, and placed every one who was in the rear above the man in front of him, there was no one who could escape, and they were all alike exposed to the missiles, lamenting their inglorious and unresisting death. There were with Publius two Greeks, who belonged to the dwellers in those parts in Carrhæ,[79] Hieronymus and Nikomachus, both of whom attempted to persuade Publius to retire with them, and to make his escape to Ichnæ[80] a city which had taken the side of the Romans, and was not far off. But he replied that no death was so dreadful as to make Publius, through fear of it, desert those who were losing their lives for his sake, and bade them save themselves, and taking leave of them, he allowed them to go: himself being unable to use his hand effectually, for it was pierced by an arrow, presented his side to his shield-bearer[81] and ordered him to despatch him with his sword. They say that Censorinus perished in the same way, and that Megabacchus killed himself, and all the rest of the most distinguished men. The Parthians, ascending the hill, transfixed with their spears the survivors; and it is said that not more than five hundred were taken prisoners. The Parthians, cutting off the head of Publius, immediately rode off to attack Crassus.

XXVI. With Crassus matters were thus. After ordering his son to make an attack on the Parthians, and receiving intelligence that they were routed to a great distance, and were hotly pursued; seeing also that the enemy in front were no longer pressing on him so much as before, for most of them had crowded to the place where young Crassus was, he recovered his courage a little, and drawing his forces together, posted them on a sloping ground, being in immediate expectation that his son would return from the pursuit. Of those who were sent by Publius to his father, when he began to be in danger, the first fell into the hands of the enemy and were killed; and the next, after escaping with great difficulty, reported that Publius was lost, if he did not receive speedy and sufficient aid from his father. Now, Crassus was affected by many contending feelings at once, and he no longer viewed anything with sober judgment. Distracted by alarm for the whole army, and love of his son at the same time, he was urged by one motive to go to his aid, and by the other not to go: but finally he began to move in advance. In the mean time the enemy came up, making themselves more formidable by their shouts and pæans, and many of the drums again bellowed around the Romans, who were in expectation of a second attack. The Parthians, carrying the head of Publius fixed on a spear, rode close up to the Romans, and, displaying it insultingly, asked who were his parents and family, for it was not decent to suppose that so noble and brave a youth was the son of so cowardly and mean a man as Crassus. The sight of this broke and unstrung the spirit of the Romans more than all the rest of their dangers; and it did not fill them with a spirit for revenge, as one might have supposed, but with shuddering and trembling. Yet they say that the courage of Crassus on that dreadful occasion shone forth more brightly than ever before; for he went along the ranks, crying out, "Mine alone, Romans, is this misfortune: but the great fortune and glory of Rome abide in you, if your lives are saved, unbroken and unvanquishcd: and, if you have any pity on me, who have been deprived of the noblest of sons, show this in your fury against the enemy. Take from them their rejoicing, avenge their cruelty: be not cast down at what has happened, for it is the law that those who aim at great things must also endure. Neither did Lucullus vanquish Tigranes without loss of blood, nor Scipio Antiochus; and our ancestors of old lost a thousand ships on the coast of Sicily, and in Italy many Imperatores and generals, not one of whom, by being first vanquished, prevented them from vanquishing the victors; for it is not by good fortune that the Roman state has advanced to such a height of power, but by the endurance and courage of those who meet danger."

XXVII. Though Crassus used such words to encourage them, he did not see many eager to follow his exhortations: but, by ordering them to shout the battle cry, he discovered the dispirited condition of his men, so weak, and feeble, and irregular a shout they made; while the cries on the side of the enemy were clear and bold. When the Parthians began the attack, their slaves and clients, riding about on the flanks of the Romans, galled them with their arrows: and the horsemen in front, using their long spears, kept driving the Romans into a narrow compass, except those who, to avoid death from the arrows, made a desperate attempt to rush upon the Parthians; wherein they did the enemy little damage, but met with a speedy death by great and mortal wounds; for the Parthians drove their spears, heavy with iron, against the horsemen; and, from the force of the blow, they often went even through two men. After thus fighting, as dark came on the Parthians retired, saying, that they allowed Crassus a single night to lament his son, unless he should take better counsel for himself, and choose rather to come to King Arsakes than to be taken. The Parthians encamped near the Romans, in high hopes. A painful night followed to the Romans, who neither paid any attention to the interment of the dead, nor care to the wounded, and those who were in the agonies of death; but every man was severally lamenting his own fate; for it appeared that they could not escape, either if they waited there till daybreak, or if they plunged by night into a boundless plain. And the wounded caused a great difficulty; for they would be an obstacle to the quickness of their flight if they attempted to carry them off: and, if they should leave them, their shouts would betray the attempt to escape unobserved. Though they considered Crassus to be the cause of all their sufferings, the soldiers still wished to see him and hear his voice. But Crassus, wrapping himself up in his cloak, lay concealed in the dark, an example to the many of fortune's reverses, and to the wise of want of judgment and of ambition, which made him dissatisfied unless he was the first and greatest among so many thousands, and think that he lacked everything because he was judged to be inferior to two men only. However, Octavius the legate, and Cassius, endeavoured to rouse and comfort him; but, finding that he had entirely given himself up to despair, they called together the centurions and tribunes, and, after deliberating, they resolved not to stay on the ground, and they made an attempt at first to put the army in motion without the sound of the trumpet, and in silence. But when the soldiers who were disabled, perceived that they were going to be deserted, terrible disorder and confusion, mingled with groans and shouts, filled the camp; and this was followed by disorder and panic as they began to advance, for they thought that the enemy was coming upon them. After frequently turning from their route, and frequently putting themselves in order of battle, and taking up the wounded who followed, and then laying them down again, they lost much time on the march, with the exception of three hundred horsemen, with Ignatius[82] at their head, who reached Carrhæ about midnight. Ignatius, calling out in the Roman language to the watch upon the walls, and making them hear, told them to tell Coponius, the commander, that there had been a great battle between Crassus and the Parthians; and, without saying more or who he was, he rode off to the Zeugma, and saved all his men; but he got a bad name for deserting his general. However, the information thus conveyed to Coponius was some advantage to Crassus; for Coponius concluded that this hasty and confused message indicated that he who brought it had no good news to report: and, accordingly, he immediately ordered the soldiers to arm; and, as soon as he learned that Crassus was on his march, he went out to meet him, and, taking charge of him and his army, conducted them into the city.

XXVIII. Though the Parthians during the night discovered that the Romans were making their escape, they did not pursue, but at daybreak they came upon those who were left in the camp, to the number of four thousand, and massacred them; and they rode about the plain and overtook many who were there rambling about. Four complete cohorts, while it was still dark, under the command of Varguntinus the legate, got separated from the rest and lost their way, and, being surrounded by the Parthians on an eminence, they fought till they were all killed, with the exception of twenty men. The Parthians, admiring the courage of these twenty men, who were endeavouring to push through them with their bare swords, made way and allowed them a passage through their ranks, and to march slowly to Carrhæ. A false report reached Surena, that Crassus and all the men of rank had made their escape, and that those who had fled to Carrhæ were a mingled rabble not worth notice. Thinking, then, that he had lost the end of his victory, but being still doubtful and wishing to know the truth, in order that he might either stay there and besiege the town, or leave the people of Carrhæ behind and pursue Crassus, he sends one of the men with him, who could speak both languages, with instructions to approach the walls, and in the Roman language to call out for Crassus himself or Cassius, and to say that Surena wished to have a conference with them. The man did as he was ordered; and when it was reported to Crassus, he accepted the invitation, and soon after there came from the barbarians some Arabs who well knew Crassus and Cassius by sight, having been in the camp before the battle. The Arabs, observing Cassius on the wall, said that Surena proposed a truce, and offered, if they would become friends to the king, to let them go safe, if they would leave Mesopotamia; for he considered this proposal advantageous to both sides, rather than to let matters come to extremities. Cassius accepted the proposal, and asked for a place and time to be fixed where Surena and Crassus should meet: the men replied that this should be done, and rode off.

XXIX. Now Surena was delighted at the Romans being besieged, and at daybreak he led the Parthians against the city, who, with many insulting expressions, bade the Romans, if they wished to have a truce, deliver up to them Crassus and Cassius[83] in chains. The Romans were vexed at being deceived; and, telling Crassus to give up all hopes of aid from the Armenians as too remote and groundless, they prepared to make their escape by stealth; and none of the people of Carrhæ were to know this before the time came. But Andromachus, that most faithless wretch, heard of it from Crassus, who confided to him the secret, and also the guidance on the route. Accordingly, all was known to the Parthians; for Andromachus reported to them every particular. But as it is not the custom of the Parthians to fight in the dark, and indeed they cannot easily do it, and Crassus had left the city by night, Andromachus contrived that the Parthians should not be far behind in the pursuit, by leading the Romans first by one route and then by another, till at last he brought them out of their course into deep marshes and ground full of ditches, and thus made the march difficult and circuitous to all who followed him; for there were some who suspected that Andromachus had no honest object in turning and twisting about, and therefore did not follow. Cassius, indeed, returned to Carrhæ; and when the guides, who were Arabs, advised him to wait till the moon had passed the Scorpion, he replied, "I fear the Archer more than the Scorpion," and, saying this, he rode off to Syria, with five hundred horsemen. Others, who had faithful guides, got into a mountainous country, called Sinnaca,[84] and were in a safe position before daybreak: they were about five thousand in number, and were commanded by a brave man, Octavius. But daybreak found Crassus exposed to the treachery of Andromachus in the unfavourable ground and the marshes. Crassus had with him four cohorts of the legionary soldiers, and a very few horsemen, and five lictors, with whom he got upon the road with great difficulty just as the enemy was falling upon him; and now being about twelve stadia short of joining Octavius, he fled to another hill not so difficult for cavalry nor yet so strong, but one that lay below Sinnaca, and was connected with it by a long ridge, which stretched through the middle of the plain. His danger was apparent to Octavius, who ran before any one else with a few men, from the higher ground to aid Crassus, upon which the rest of the men, abusing themselves for cowards, rushed forward, and, falling on the enemy, and repulsing them from the hill, put Crassus in the midst of them, and threw their shields before him, proudly exclaiming that there was no Parthian missile which should strike the Imperator until all of them had fallen in defence of him.

XXX. Surena observing that the spirit of the Parthians was somewhat dulled towards the contest, and, if the night should come on and the Romans get among the mountains, they could not by any means be overtaken, employed the following stratagem against Crassus. Some of the captives were let loose, who, in the Parthian camp, had heard the barbarians saying to one another, in pursuance of a concerted plan, that the king did not wish the war with the Romans to be carried to extremities, but desired to have their friendship again, by doing them the favour of treating Crassus kindly. Accordingly the barbarians stopped fighting; and Surena, with his chief officers, riding gently up to the hill, unstrung his bow, and holding out his right hand, invited Crassus to come to terms, saying, that Crassus had put the king's courage and power to the test, though the king did not wish it, and yet the king of his own free will made the Romans an offer of mercy and friendship by being ready to make a truce with them if they would retire, and by giving them the opportunity of a safe retreat. Upon Surena saying this the Romans eagerly accepted his proposal, and were overjoyed; though Crassus, having been always over-reached by their fraud, and considering the suddenness of the change to be inexplicable, would not listen to them and hesitated. But the soldiers began to call out and urge him to accept the terms, and they fell to abusing and reproaching him, for wishing to expose them to the risk of fighting with those whom he did not venture to go to a conference with, even when they laid aside their arms. Crassus at first attempted to prevail on them by entreaty, and he said that, if they would hold out for the rest of the day, they would be able to march by night through the rough and mountain country, and he pointed out to them the route, and entreated them not to throw away their hopes when safety was so near; but, as the soldiers began to be exasperated and to clatter their arms and threaten him, he was alarmed, and advanced towards Surena, after first turning round and merely saying, "Octavius and Petronius, and you Roman officers who are here, you see that I go under compulsion, and you are witnesses that I am treated in a shameful way and am under constraint; but, if you get safe home, tell all the world, that Crassus lost his life through the treachery of the enemy, and was not surrendered by his fellow-citizens."

XXXI. Yet Octavius and those about him did not stay behind, but descended the hill with Crassus. However, Crassus made the lictors who were following him turn back. The first who met them, on the part of the barbarians, were two Greeks of half-breed, who, leaping down from their horses, made their obeisance to Crassus, and, addressing him in the Greek language, urged him to send forward some persons, who, as they said, would see that Surena himself and those about him were advancing without armour and without their weapons. Crassus replied, that if he had the least concern about his life, he should not have put himself into their hands; however, he sent two Roscii, brothers, to inquire upon what terms they should meet, and how many of them. Surena immediately seized and detained the two brothers, and he himself advanced on horseback with the chief officers, and said, "What is this? the Roman Imperator on foot while we are riding!" and he ordered them to bring a horse to Crassus. Crassus observed that neither himself nor Surena was acting wrong in coming to the conference according to the fashion of their respective countries; on which Surena said that from that moment there was a truce and peace between king Hyrodes and the Romans; but that it was requisite to advance to the river,[85] and there have the agreement put in writing; "for you Romans," he said, "have not a very good memory about contracts;" and he held out his right hand to Crassus. When Crassus was going to send for a horse, Surena said there was no occasion; "for the king gives you this." At the same time a horse with golden bits stood close by Crassus, and the grooms raised him up and mounted him, and then followed, quickening the horse's pace with blows. Octavius first laid hold of the bridle of the horse, and, after him, Petronius, one of the tribunes, and then the rest got round the horse of Crassus, endeavouring to stop it, and dragging away those who pressed close upon Crassus on each side. This led to a struggle and tumult, and finally to blows; Octavius drew his sword and killed the groom of one of the barbarians, and another struck Octavius from behind and killed him. Petronius had no weapon, and, being struck on the breastplate, he leapt down from the horse unwounded; and a Parthian, named Pomaxathres, killed Crassus.[86] Some say that it was not Pomaxathres, but another, who killed Crassus, and that Pomaxathres cut off the head and right hand when Crassus was lying on the ground. But these are rather matters of conjecture than of certain knowledge; for of those who were present some fell there fighting about Crassus, and the rest immediately fled back to the hill. Upon this the Parthians came and said, that Crassus had been punished as he deserved, but Surena invited the rest to come down and fear nothing: whereupon, some of the Romans came down and surrendered, and the rest dispersed themselves under cover of night, of whom a very few escaped; the rest the Arabs hunted out, and put to death when they caught them. It is said that twenty thousand perished in all, and ten thousand were taken alive.

XXXII. Surena sent the head[87] and hand of Crassus to Hyrodes in Armenia; and, causing a report to be carried by messengers to Seleukeia that he was bringing Crassus alive, he got ready a kind of ridiculous procession which, in mockery, he called a triumph. One of the Roman prisoners who bore the greatest resemblance to Crassus, Caius Paccianus, putting on a barbarian female dress, and being instructed to answer as Crassus and Imperator to those who addressed him, was conducted, seated on a horse, and in front of him trumpeters, and some lictors rode upon camels; and there were purses[88] suspended from the fasces, and, by the side of the axes, heads of Romans newly cut off. Behind these followed courtesans of Seleukeia, singing girls, who chanted many obscene and ridiculous things about the effeminacy and cowardice of Crassus. All this was public. But Surena assembling the Senate of Seleukeia,[89] laid before them certain licentious books of the Milesiaca of Aristeides,[90] and, in this matter, at least, there was no invention on his part; for they were found among the baggage of Rustius,[91] and they gave Surena the opportunity of greatly insulting and ridiculing the Romans, because they could not, even when going to war, abstain from such things and such books. To the Senate of Seleukeia, however, Æsopus[92] appeared to be a wise man, when they saw Surena with the wallet of Milesian obscenities in front of him, and dragging behind him a Parthian Sybaris in so many waggons full of concubines, in a manner forming a counterpart to those vipers and skytalæ[93] so much talked of, by presenting the visible and the front parts formidable and terrific, with spears, and bows, and horses, but in the rear of the phalanx, terminating in harlots, and rattling cymbals, and lute-playing, and nocturnal revels with women. Rustius, indeed, merits blame, but the Parthians were shameless in finding fault with the Milesian stories; for many of the kings who have reigned over them, as Arsakidæ, have been the sons of Milesian and Ionian concubines.

XXXIII. While this was going on, Hyrodes happened to have been reconciled to Artavasdes the Armenian, and had agreed to receive the sister of Artavasdes as wife to his son Pacorus: and there were banquets and drinking-parties between them, and representations of many Greek plays; for Hyrodes was not a stranger either to the Greek language or the literature of the Greeks: and Artavasdes used to write tragedies, and speeches, and histories, some of which are preserved. When the head of Crassus was brought to the door, the tables were taken away, and a tragedy actor Jason,[94] by name, a native of Tralles, chanted that part of the Bacchæ[95] of Euripides which relates to Agave. While he was receiving applause. Sillakes, standing by the door of the apartment, and making a reverence, threw the head of Crassus before the company. The Parthians clapped their hands with shouts of joy and the attendants, at the command of the king, seated Sillakes, while Jason handed over to one of the members of the chorus the dress of Pentheus, and, laying hold of the head of Crassus, and, putting on the air of a bacchant, he sung these verses with great enthusiasm:—

We bring from a mountain
A young one new killed to the house,
A fortunate prey.

This delighted all the company; and, while the following verses were being chanted, which are a dialogue with the chorus,

A. Who killed him?
B. Mine is the honour,

Pomaxathres, springing up (for he happened to be at the banquet), laid hold of the head, as if it was more appropriate for him to say this than for Jason. The king was pleased, and made Pomaxathres a present, according to the fashion of the country, and he gave Jason a talent. In such a farce[96] as this, it is said, that the expedition of Crassus terminated just like a tragedy. However, just punishment overtook Hyrodes for his cruelty, and Surena for his treachery. Not long after, Hyrodes put Surena to death, being jealous of his reputation. Hyrodes also lost his son Pacorus,[97] who was defeated by the Romans in a battle; and having fallen into an illness which turned out to be dropsy, his son, Phraates,[98] who had a design on his life, gave him aconite.[99] But the poison only operated on the disease, which was thrown off together with it, and Hyrodes thereby relieved; whereupon Phraates took the shortest course and strangled his father.

FOOTNOTES:

[5] Crassus belonged to the Licinia Gens. His name was M. Licinius Crassus Dives. He was the son of P. Licinius Crassus Dives, who was consul B.C. 97, and afterwards governor of the nearer Spain. In B.C. 93 P. Crassus had a triumph. He was afterwards employed in the Marsic war; and in B.C. 89 he was censor with L. Julius Cæsar, who had been consul in B.C. 90.

M. Licinius Crassus, whose life Plutarch has written, was the youngest son of the Censor. The year of his birth is uncertain; but as he was above sixty when he left Rome for his Parthian campaign B.C. 55, he must have been born before B.C. 115. Meyer (Orator. Roman. Fragment.) places the birth of Crassus in B.C. 114.

[6] Kaltwasser makes this passage mean that Crassus merely took his brother's wife and her children to live with him; which is contrary to the usual sense of the Greek words and readers the following sentence unmeaning.

Kaltwasser observes that we do not know that such marriages were in use among the Romans. I know no rule by which they were forbidden. (Gaius, i. 58, &c.)

[7] The punishment of a Vestal Virgin for incontinence was death. She was placed alive in a subterranean vault with a light and some food. (Dionysius, ix. 40: Liv. 8. c. 15; Juvenal, Sat. iv. 8.) The man who debauched a Vestal was also put to death. The Vestal Virgins had full power of disposing of their property; they were emancipated from the paternal power by the fact of being selected to be Vestal Virgins (Gaius, i. 130); and they were not under the same legal disabilities as other women (Gaius, i. 145; according to Dion Cassius, 49. c. 38, Octavia and Livia received privileges like those of the Vestals).

Another Licinia, a Vestal, had broken her vow, and was punished B.C. 113.

[8] See the Life of Crassus, c. 12; and the Life of Sulla, c. 35.

[9] This may hardly be a correct translation of ἀργυρογνωμόνας: but it is something like the meaning.

[10] King Archidamus of Sparta, the second of the name, who commanded the Peloponnesian war, B.C. 431. Plutarch (Life of Demosthenes, c. 17) puts this saying in the mouth of one Krobylus, a demagogue.

[11] Cicero (Brutus, c. 66) speaks of the oratory of Crassus, and commends his care and diligence; but he speaks of his natural parts as not striking. Crassus spoke on the same side as Cicero in the defence of Murena, of Caelius, and of Balbus (Meyer, Orator. Roman. Fragmenta, p. 382).

[12] A Roman who aspired to the highest offices of the State, prepared his way by the magnificence of his public entertainments during his curule ædileship, and by his affable manners. An humble individual is always gratified when a great man addresses him by name, and a shake of the hand secures his devotion. Ovidius (Ars Amat. ii. 253) alludes to this way of winning popular favour, and judiciously observes that it costs nothing, which would certainly recommend it to Crassus. If a man's memory was not so good as that of Crassus, he had only to buy a slave, as Horatius (1 Epist. i. 50) recommends, who could tell him the name of every man whom he met. Such a slave was called Nomenclator. If the nomenclator's memory ever failed him, he would not let his master know it: he gave a person any name that came into his head.

[13] The Greek is στέγαστρου, 'something that covers;' but whether cloak or hat, or covered couch, or sedan, the learned have not yet determined.

[14] These words may not be Plutarch's, and several critics have marked them as spurious. The Peripatetics, of whom Alexander was one, did not consider wealth as one of the things that are indifferent to a philosopher; the Stoics did.

[15] This is Plutarch's word; but the father of Crassus was Proconsul in Spain. When Cinna and Marius returned to Rome, B.C. 87, Crassus and his sons were proscribed. Crassus and one of his sons lost their lives: the circumstances are stated somewhat differently by different writers. (Florius, iii. 21; Appian, Civil Wars, i. 72.)

Drumann correctly remarks that Plutarch and other Greek writers often use the word στρατηγός simply to signify one who has command, and that στρατηγός is incorrectly rendered 'Prætor' by those who write in Latin, when they make use of the Greek historians of Rome. But Plutarch's στρατηγός sometimes means prætor, and it is the word by which he denotes that office; he probably does sometimes mean to say 'prætor,' when the man of whom he speaks was not prætor. Whether στρατηγός in Plutarch is always translated prætor or always Commander, there will be error. To translate it correctly in all cases, a man must know whether the person spoken of was prætor or not; and that cannot always be ascertained. But besides this, the word 'Commander' will not do, for Plutarch sometimes calls a Proconsul στρατηγός, and a Proconsul had not merely a command: he had a government also.

[16] So the name is written by Sintenis, who writes it Paccianus in the Life of Sertorius, c. 9. Some editions read Paciacus; but the termination in Paciacus is hardly Roman, and the termination in Pacianus is common. But the form Paciacus is adopted by Drumann, where he is speaking of L. Junius Paciacus (Geshichte Roms, iv. p. 52).

Drumann observes that the flight of Crassus to Spain must have taken place B.C. 85, for he remained eight months in Spain and returned to Rome on the news of Cinna's death, B.C. 84.

[17] The MSS. have αὖραν, 'breeze,' which Coræs ingeniously corrected to λαύπαν, 'path,' which is undoubtedly right.

[18] If Fenestella died in A.D. 19 at the age of seventy, as it is said, he would be born in B.C. 51, and he might have had this story from the old woman. (Clinton, Fasti, A.D. 14.) See Life of Sulla, c. 28.

[19] Malaca, which still retains its name Malaga, was an old Phœnician settlement on the south coast of Spain. Much fish was salted and cured there; but I know not on what ground Kaltwasser concludes that the word 'Malach' means Salt. It is sometimes asserted that the name is from the Aramaic word Malek, 'King;' but W. Humboldt (Prüfung der Untersuchungen über die Urbewohner Hispaniens) says that it is a Basque word.

[20] The son of Metellus Numidicus. See the Lives of Marius and Sertorius. Sulla lauded in Italy B.C. 83. See the Life of Sulla, c. 27.

[21] This is the town which the Romans called Tuder. It was situated in Umbria on a hill near the Tiber, and is represented by the modern Todi.

[22] See the Life of Sulla, c. 29.

[23] There is nothing peculiar in this. It is common enough for a man to blame in others the faults that he has himself.

[24] See the Life of Cæsar, c. 1. 2. and 11.

[25] M. Porcius Cato, whose Life Plutarch has written.

[26] Cn. Sicinius was Tribunus Plebis B.C. 76. He is mentioned by Cicero (Brutus, c. 60) as a man who had no other oratorical qualification except that of making people laugh. The Roman proverb to which Plutarch alludes occurs in Horatius, 1 Sat. 4. 34:—

"Foenum habet in cornu, longe fuge."

[27] The insurrection of the gladiators commenced B.C. 73, in the consulship of M. Terentius Varo Lucullus, the brother of Lucius Lucullus, and of C. Cassius Longinus Verus. The names of two other leaders, Crixus and Oenomaus, are recorded by Floras (iii. 20) and by Appian (Civil Wars, i. 116). The devastation caused by these marauders was long remembered. The allusion of Horatius (Carm. ii. 14) to their drinking all the wine that they could find,is characteristic.

[28] This Clodius is called Appius CloDius Glaber by Florus (iii. 20). Compare the account of Appian (i. 116). Spartacus commenced the campaign by flying to Mount Vesuvius, which was the scene of the stratagem that is told in this chapter (Frontinus, Stratagem, i. 5) Drumann (Geschichte Roms, iv. 74. M. Licinius Crassus, N. 37) has given a sketch of the campaign with Spartacus.

[29] P. Varinius Glaber who was prætor; and Clodius was his legatus. He seems to be the same person whom Frontinus (Stratagem, i. 5) mentions under the name of L. Varinus Proconsul.

[30] The place is unknown. Probably the true reading is Salinæ, and the place may be the Salinæ Herculeæ, in the neighbourhood of Herculaneum. But this is only a guess.

[31] The consuls were L. Gellius Publicola and Cn. Lentulus Clodianus B.C. 72.

[32] This was C. Cassius Longinus Verus, proconsul of Gaul upon the Po (see c. 8). Plutarch calls him στρατηγός. Appian (Civil Wars, i. 117) says that one of the consuls defeated Crixus, who was at the head of 30,000 men, near Garganus, that Spartacus afterwards defeated both the consuls, and meditated advancing upon Rome with 120,000 foot soldiers. Spartacus sacrificed three hundred Roman captives to the manes of Crixus, who had fallen in the battle in which he was defeated; 20,000 of his men had perished with Crixus.

Cassius was defeated in the neighbourhood of Mutina (Modena) as we learn from Florus (iii. 20).

[33] Appian (i. 118) gives two accounts of the decimation, neither of which agrees with the account of Plutarch. This punishment which the Romans called Decimatio, is occasionally mentioned by the Roman writers (Liv. ii. 59).

[34] Kaltwasser with the help of a false reading has mistranslated this passage. He says that Spartacus sent over ten thousand men into Sicily. Drumann has understood the passage as I have translated it.

[35] If the length is rightly given, the ditch was about 38 Roman miles in length. There are no data for determining its position. The circumstance is briefly mentioned by Appian (Civil Wars, i. 118). Frontinus (Stratagem., i. 5) states that Spartacus filled up the ditch, where he crossed it, with the dead bodies of his prisoners and of the beasts which were killed for that purpose.

[36] This lake, which Plutarch spells Leukanis, is placed by Kaltwasser in the vicinity of Paestum or Poseidonia, but on what grounds I do not know. Strabo indeed (p. 251) states that the river makes marshes there, but that will not enable us to identify them. Cramer (Ancient Italy, ii. 366) places here the Stagnum Lucanum, where Plutarch "mentions that Crassus defeated a considerable body of rebels under the command of Spartacus (Plut. Vit. Crass.)": but nothing is given to prove the assertion. He adds, "In this district we must also place the Mons Calamatius and Mons Cathena of which Frontinus speaks in reference to the same event (Stratagem, ii. 4); they are the mountains of Capaccio." This is founded on Cluverius, but Cluverius concludes that the Calamatius of Frontinus (ii. 4, 7), or Calamarcus as the MSS. seem to have it, is the same as the Cathena of Frontinus (ii. 5, 34); for in fact Frontinus tells the same story twice, as he sometimes does. It is a mistake to say that Frontinus is speaking "of the same event," that is, the defeat of the gladiators on the lake. He is speaking of another event, which is described farther on in this chapter, when Crassus attacks Cannicius and Crixus, and "sent," as Frontinus says (ii. 4, 7), " twelve cohorts round behind a mountain."

[37] This was Marcus Lucullus, the brother of Lucius.

[38] 'To the Peteline mountains' in the original. Strabo speaks of a Petelia in Lucania (p. 254), which some critics suppose that he has confounded with the Petilia in the country of the Bruttii. The reasons for this opinion are stated by Cramer (Ancient Italy, ii. 367, 390).

[39] 'Quintus' in the text of Plutarch, which is a common error. 'L. Quintius' in Frontinus (ii. 5, 34).

[40] The same thing is told in the Life of Pompeius, c. 21.

[41] In the Life of Marcellus, c. 22, Plutarch describes the minor triumph, called the Ovatio, which name is from the word 'ovis' a sheep; for a sheep only was sacrificed by the general who had the minor triumph; he who had the greater triumph, sacrificed an ox. In an ovatio the general walked in the procession, instead of riding in a chariot drawn by four horses, as in the Triumphus Curulis; and he wore a crown of myrtle, instead of a crown of bay which was worn on the occasion of the greater triumph. But Plinius (Hist. Nat. xv. 29) says that Crassus wore a crown of bay on the occasion of this ovation.

[42] The first consulship of M. Licinius Crassus and Cn. Pompeius Magnus belongs to B.C. 70.

[43] The story is told again in the Life of Pompeius, c. 23, where Aurelius is called Caius Aurelius, which is probably the true name.

[44] Crassus was censor with Lutatius Catulus in B.C. 65. The duties of the censors are here briefly alluded to by Plutarch. One of the most important was the numbering of the people and the registration of property for the purposes of taxation. This quarrel of the censors is mentioned by Dion Cassius (37. c. 9).

[45] The conspiracy of Catiline was in B.C. 63, the year when Cicero was consul. See the Life of Cicero.

There seems to be no evidence that Crassus was implicated in the affair of Catiline. Dion Cassius (37. c. 31) speaks of anonymous letters about the conspiracy being brought to Crassus and other nobles; and Plutarch states on the authority of Cicero that Crassus communicated the letters to Cicero. Dion Cassius in another passage (37. c. 35) mentions the suspicion against Crassus, and that one of the prisoners informed against him, "but there were not many to believe it." If Dion did not believe it, we need not; for he generally believes anything that is to a man's discredit. Sallustius (Bellum Catilin. c. 48) has given us a statement of the affair, but his own opinion can scarcely be collected from it. He says, however, that he had heard Crassus declare that Cicero was the instigator of this charge. The orations of Cicero which Plutarch refers to are not extant.

[46] The text is corrupt, though the general meaning is plain. See the note of Sintonis.

[47] The son of Crassus, who is introduced abruptly in Plutarch's fashion.

[48] After Cæsar had been prætor in Spain he was elected consul B.C. 59, with M. Calpurnius Bibulus (see the Life of Cæsar, c. 14). After his consulship Cæsar had the Gauls as his province. The meeting at Luca (Lucca), which was on the southern limits of Cæsar's province, took place B.C. 56; and here was formed the coalition which is sometimes, though improperly, called the first Triumvirate.

[49] The second consulship of Pompeius and Crassus was B.C. 55. Cn. Cornelius Lentulus Marcellinus was one of the consuls of the year B.C. 56, during which the elections for the year 55 took place. This Domitius, L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, was consul B.C. 54. In the quarrel between Pompeius and Cæsar, he joined Pompeius, and after various adventures finally he lost his life in the battle of Pharsalus B.C. 48.

[50] The first 'house' (οἰκία) is evidently the house of Domitius. The second house (οἴκημα), which may be more properly rendered 'chamber,' may, as Sintenis says, mean the Senate-house, if the reading is right. Kaltwasser takes the second house to be the same as the first house; and he refers to the Life of Pompeius, c. 51, 52, where the same story is told.

In place of οἴκημα some critics have read βῆμα the Rostra.

[51] Appian (Civil Wars, ii. 18) says that Pompeius received Iberia and Libya. The Romans had now two provinces in the Spanish peninsula, Hispania Citerior or Tarraconensis, and Ulterior or Bætica. This arrangement, by which the whole power of the state was distributed among Pompeius, Crassus and Cæsar, was in effect a revolution, and the immediate cause of the wars which followed.

Appian (Civil Wars, ii. 18) after speaking of Crassus going on his Parthian expedition in which he lost his life, adds, "but the Parthian History will show forth the calamity of Crassus." Appian wrote a Parthian History; but that which is now extant under the name is merely an extract from Plutarch's Life of Crassus, beginning with the sixteenth chapter: which extract is followed by another from Plutarch's Life of Antonius. The compiler of this Parthian History has put at the head of it a few words of introduction. The extract from Crassus is sometimes useful for the various readings which it offers.

[52] This wife was Cæsar's daughter Julia, whom Pompeius married in Cæsar's consulship (Vell. Paterc. ii. 44). She was nearly twenty-three years younger than Pompeius. Julia died B.C. 54, after giving birth to a son, who died soon after her. She possessed beauty and a good disposition. The people, with whom she was a favourite, had her buried in the Field of Mars. See the Lives of Pompeius and Cæsar.

[53] That is the Lex which prolonged Cæsar's government for five years and gave Iberia (Spain) and Syria to Pompeius and Crassus for the same period. The Lex was proposed by the Tribune Titus Trebonius (Livius, Epitome, 105; Dion Cassius, 39. c. 33).

[54] C. Ateius Capito Gallus and his brother tribune P. Aquillius Gallius were strong opponents of Pompeius and Crassus at this critical time. Crassus left Rome for his Parthian campaign at the close of B.C. 55, before the expiration of his consulship (Clinton, Fasti, B.C. 54).

[55] We learn that Crassus sailed from Brundisium (Brindisi), the usual place of embarkation for Asia, but we are told nothing more of his course till we find him in Galatia, talking to old Deiotarus.

[56] Zenodotia or Zenodotium, a city of the district Osrhoene, and near the town of Nikephorium. These were Greek cities founded by the Macedonians. I have mistranslated the first part of this passage of Plutarch from not referring at the time to Dion Cassius (40. c. 13) who tells the story thus:—"The inhabitants of Zenodotium sent for some of the Romans, pretending that they intended to join them like the rest; but when the men were within the city, they cut off their retreat and killed them; and this was the reason why their city was destroyed." The literal version of Plutarch's text will be the true one. "But in one of them, of which Apollonius was tyrant, a hundred of his soldiers were put to death, upon," &c.

[57] This was his son Publius, who is often mentioned in Cæsar's Gallic War.

[58] See Life of Lucullus, c. 22.

[59] Hierapolis or the 'Holy City' was also called Bambyke and Edessa. Strabo places it four schoeni from the west bank of the Euphrates. The goddess who was worshipped here was called Atargatis or Astarte. Lucian speaks of the goddess and her temple and ceremonial in his treatise 'On the Syrian Goddess' (iii. p. 451, ed. Hemsterhuis). Lucian had visited the place. Josephus adds (Jewish Antiq. xiv. 7) that Crassus stripped the temple of Jerusalem of all its valuables to the amount of ten thousand talents. The winter occupation of the Roman general was more profitable than his campaign the following year turned out.

[60] This was a general name of the Parthian kings, and probably was used as a kind of title. The dynasty was called the Arsakidæ. The name Arsakes occurs among the Persian names in the Persæ of Aeschylus. Pott (Etymologische Forschungen, ii. 272) conjectures that the word means 'King of the Arii,' or 'the noble King.' The prefix Ar or Ari is very common in Persian names, as Ariamnes, Ariomardus, and others.

Plutarch in other passages of the Life of Crassus calls this Arsakes, Hyrodes, and other authorities call him Orodes. He is classed as Arsakes XIV. Orodes I. of Parthia, by those who have attempted to form a regular series of the Parthian kings.

Crassus replied that he would give his answer in Seleukeia, the large city on the Tigris, which was nearly pure Greek. The later Parthian capital was Ktesiphon, in the neighbourhood of Seleukeia, on the east bank of the Tigris and about twenty miles from Bagdad. The foundation of Ktesiphon is attributed by Ammianus Marcellinus (xxiii. 6, ed. Gronov.) to Bardanes, who was a contemporary of the Roman emperor Nero, if he is the Arsakes Bardanes who appears in the list of Parthian kings. But Ktesiphon is mentioned by Polybius in his fifth book, in the wars of Antiochus and Molon, and consequently it existed in the time of Crassus, though it is not mentioned in his Life. Ktesiphon is mentioned by Dion Cassius (40. c. 14) in his history of the campaign of Crassus, but this alone would not prove that Ktesiphon existed at that time.

[61] The Greek word here and at the beginning of ch. xix., translated 'mailed' by Mr. Long, always refers to cuirassed cavalry soldiers.

[62] C. Cassius Longinus, the friend of M. Junius Brutus, and afterwards one of the assassins of the Dictator Cæsar.

[63] He is afterwards called Artavasdes. He was a son of the Tigranes whom Lucullus defeated, and is called Artavasdes I. by Saint-Martin. He is mentioned again in Plutarch's Life of M. Antonius. c. 39, 50.

[64] Zeugma means the Bridge. Seleukus Nikator is said to have established a bridge of boats here, in order to connect the opposite bank with Apameia, a city which he built on the east side of the Euphrates (Plinius, Hist. Nat. v. 24). Zeugma afterwards was a usual place for crossing the river; but a bridge of boats could hardly be permanently kept there, and it appears that Crassus had to construct a raft. Zeugma is either upon or near the site of Bir, which is in about 37° N. Lat.

[65] Probably these great hurricanes are not uncommon on the Euphrates. In the year 1831 a gale sent Colonel Chesney's "little vessel to the bottom of the river;" but a still greater calamity befel the Tigris steamer in the Euphrates expedition which was under the command of Colonel Chesney, in May 1836. A little after one P.M. a storm appeared bringing with it clouds of sand from the west-north-west. The two steam-boats the Tigris and the Euphrates were then passing over the rocks of Es-Geria, which were deeply covered with water. The Euphrates was safely secured; but the Tigris, being directed against the bank, struck with great violence; the wind suddenly veered round and drove her bow off; "this rendered it quite impossible to secure the vessel to the bank, along which she was blown rapidly by the heavy gusts; her head falling off into the stream as she passed close to the Euphrates, which vessel had been backed opportunely to avoid the concussion." The Tigris perished in this violent hurricane and twenty men were lost in her. The storm lasted about eight minutes. Colonel Chesney escaped by swimming to the shore just before the vessel went down: he was fortunate "to take a direction which brought him to the land, without having seen anything whatever to guide him through the darkness worse than that of night."—"For an instant," says Colonel Chesney after getting to land, "I saw the keel of the Tigris uppermost (near the stern); she went down bow foremost, and having struck the bottom in that position, she probably turned round on the bow as a pivot, and thus showed part of her keel for an instant at the other extremity; but her paddle beams, floats, and parts of the sides were already broken up, and actually floated ashore, so speedy and terrific had been the work of destruction." (Letter from Colonel Chesney to Sir J. Hobhouse, 28th May, 1836; Euphrates Expedition Papers printed by order of the House of Commons, 17th July, 1837.)

Ammianus Marcellinus (xxiv. 1) speaks of a violent storm at Anatha (Annah) on the Euphrates, during the expedition of the Emperor Julian. It blew down the tents and stretched the soldiers on the ground.

[66] A place struck with lightning was considered religious (religiosus), that is, it could no longer be used for common purposes. "The deity," says Festus (v. Fulguritum), "was supposed to have appropriated it to himself."

Dion Cassius (40. c. 17, &c.) gives the story of the passage of the river. The eagle, according to him, was very obstinate. It stuck fast in the ground, as if it was planted there; and when it was forced up by the soldiers, it went along very unwillingly.

The Roman eagle was fixed at one end of a long shaft of wood, which had a sharp point at the other end for the purpose of fixing it in the ground. The eagle was gold, or gilded metal; and, according to Dion Cassius, it was kept in a small moveable case or consecrated chapel. The eagle was not moved from the winter encampment, unless the whole army was put in motion. The Vexilla (σημεῖα of the Greek writers) were what we call the colours.

(See the note of Reimarus on Dion Cassius, 40. c. 18.)

[67] Dion Cassius (40. c. 20), who tells the story, names the man Augarus. See the note of Reimarus.

[68] This is the translation of Plutarch's word πελάτης, which word πελάτης is used by the Greek writers on Roman history to express the Latin Cliens. It is not here supposed that Parthian clients were the same as Roman clients; but as Plutarch uses the word to express a certain condition among the Parthians, which was not that of slavery, it is proper to retain his word in the translation.

[69] This "very Hyrodes" and his brother Mithridates are said to have murdered their father Arsakes XII. Phraates III., who is spoken of in the Life of Lucullus. The two brothers quarrelled. Mithridates is mentioned by some authorities as the immediate successor of his father under the title of Arsakes XIII. Mithridates III. Mithridates was besieged in Babylon by Hyrodes; and Mithridates, after surrendering to his brother, was put to death. (Dion Cassius, 39. c. 56; Appian, On the Affairs of Syria, c. 51; Justinus, xlii. 4.)

[70] This river is probably the same as the Bilecha, now the Belejik, a small stream which joins the Euphrates on the left bank at Racca, the old Nikephorium. This river is mentioned by Isidorus of Charax and by Ammianus Marcellinus (xxiii. c. 3), who calls it Belias.

[71] Plutarch seems to mean something like drums furnished with bells or rattles; but his description is not very clear, and the passage may be rendered somewhat differently from what I have rendered it: "but they have instruments to beat upon (ῥόπτρα), made of skin, and hollow, which they stretch round brass sounders" (ἠχείοις, whatever the word may mean here). The word ῥόπτρον properly means a thing to strike with; but it seems to have another meaning here. (See Passow's Greek Lexicon.) The context seems to show that a drum is meant.

[72] Margiana was a country east of the Caspian, the position of which seems to be determined by the Murg-aub river, the ancient Margus. Hyrcania joined it on the west. Strabo (p. 516) describes Margiana as a fertile plain surrounded by deserts. He says nothing of its iron. Plinius (Hist. Nat. vi. 16) says that Orodes carried off the Romans who were captured at the time of the defeat of Crassus, to Antiochia, in Margiana.

[73] So Xenophon (Cyropædia, i. 3. 2) represents King Astyages. The king also wore a wig or false locks.

[74] The peculiarity of the Parthian warfare made a lasting impression on the Romans; and it is often alluded to by the Latin writers:—

Fidentemque fuga Parthum versisque sagittis.

Virgil, Georgic iii. 31.

[75] In reading the chapter, it must be remembered that Publius is young Crassus. If there is any apparent confusion between the father and son, it will be removed by reading carefully. I have chosen to translate Plutarch, not to mend him.

[76] The reading of this passage in Appian (Parthica, c. 29) is τέλμασιν ἐντυχόντες, which Sintenis has adopted. The common reading is συντάγμασιν ἐντυχόντες, which various critics variously explain.

[77] In the old Latin translation of Guarini, the name Cn. Plancus occurs in place of Megabacchus. Kaltwasser conjectures that Megabacchus was a Greek, but the context implies that he was a Roman. Orelli (Onomastic. C. Megaboccus) takes him to be the person mentioned by Cicero (Ad Attic. ii. 7), which Gronovius had already observed, and again by Cicero, Pro Scauro, c. 2.

[78] Censorinus was a cognomen of the Marcia Gens, and several of the name are mentioned in the history of Rome; but this Censorinus does not appear to be otherwise known.

[79] Carrhæ was a Mesopotamian town, south of Orfa or Edessa, and about 37° N. lat. It is supposed to be the Haran of Genesis (xi. 31).

[80] Ichnæ was a town on the Bilecha, south of Carrhæ. Dion Cassias (40. c. 12) calls it Ichniæ, and adds that Crassus before taking Nikephorium had been defeated by Talymenus Eilakes. Eilakes is probably a blunder in the copies of Dion; and it is conjectured that he is the Sillakes mentioned by Plutarch (c. 21), Appian, and Orosius (vi. 3).

[81] The death of young Crassus, and the subsequent misfortunes of the Romans, are described by Dion Cassius, 40. c. 21, &c.

[82] Or Egnatius. He is called Gnatius by Appian.

[83] Cassius escaped to Syria, which he successfully defended against the invading Parthians, who lost their commander, Osakes. (Dion Cassius. 40. c. 28, 29; Cicero, Ad Attic. v. 20; Orosius, vi. 13.)

Cicero was proconsul of Cilicia during the Parthian invasion of Syria B.C. 51.

[84] Sinnaca is mentioned by Strabo p. 747, but he says nothing which enables us to fix its position. If Plutarch's narrative is correct; it was not far from Carrhæ; and Carrhæ was considered by the Romans to be the scene of the death of Crassus, probably because it was the nearest known place to the spot where he fell.

[85] 'The river' is the Euphrates.

[86] The stories about the death of Crassus varied, as we might suppose. Dion Cassius (40. c. 27) remarks that, according to one version of the story, Crassus was badly wounded, and was killed by one of his own people to prevent him from being taken alive. He adds that the chief part of the army of Crassus made their escape.

[87] The story of molten gold being poured into the mouth of the head of Crassus is given by Dion Cassius as a report. Floras (iii. 11) has the same story; and he says that it was the right hand of Crassus which was sent to the king, as we might conjecture it would be, if only one was sent.

[88] Kaltwasser asks, "Was this perchance intended as an allusion to the avarice of Crassus, as the female dress was intended to refer to his cowardice?" The probable answer is Yes.

[89] As this was a Greek town, it had a Greek constitution, and was governed by a body which the Romans called a Senate. The Senate of Seleukeia is mentioned by Tacitus (Annal. vi. 42): "Trecenti opibus, aut sapientia delecti, ut Senatus: sua populo vis; et quoties concordes agunt, spernitur Parthus."

[90] This Aristeides wrote lewd stories called Milesiaca, of which there were several books. They were translated into Latin by the historian L. Cornelius Sisenna, a contemporary of Sulla. It is not said whether the original or the translation formed a part of the camp furniture of this unworthy Roman soldier. The work of Aristeides was known to Ovidius (Tristia, ii. 413, 443), who attempts to defend his own amatory poetry by the example of Sisenna, who translated an obscene book.

[91] Probably there is an error in the name: Roscius has been proposed as the probable reading.

[92] Plutarch is alluding to the fable of the two wallets, which every man carries, one in front with his neighbours' faults in it, and the other behind containing his own. Phædrus (iv. 10, ed. Orelli) has pithily told the apologue:—

Peras imposuit Iuppiter nobis duas:
Propriis repletam vitiis post tergum dedit,
Alienis ante pectus suspendit gravem.
Hac re videre nostra mala non possumus:
Alii simul delinquunt, censores sumus.
Two wallets Juppiter has placed upon us:
Our own faults fill the bag we bear behind,
Our neighbour's heavy wallet hangs in front.
And so we cannot see our own ill deeds;
But if another trips, forthwith we censure.

[93] This word means a thick stick; and a snake of like form.

[94] Greek adventurers were always making their way to the courts of these barbarous Asiatic kings to serve in the capacity of physicians, mountebanks, or impostors of some kind. Several instances are mentioned by Herodotus. Tralles was a considerable town near the west coast of Asia Minor, from which this actor came.

[95] Pentheus, king of Thebes, son of Agave; would not recognise the divinity of Bacchus, whereupon Bacchus infuriated the women, and among them Agave, who killed her own son. She is introduced in the Bacchæ with his head in her hand, exulting over the slaughter of the supposed wild beast.

The passage which is cited is from the Bacchæ of Euripides, v. 1168, ed. Elmsley. The exact meaning of the word ἕλικα in the passage is uncertain. See Elmsley's note.

[96] The word is Exodium (ἐξόδιον), a kind of entertainment common among the Romans, though it is a Greek word. Plutarch means that this exhibition before the kings was like the farce which is acted after a tragedy. It seems as if Jason was first playing the part of Agave, and was then going to play that of Pentheus; but on seeing the head he put aside the mask and dress of Pentheus, and recited the words of the frantic mother. Plutarch sometimes leaves things in a kind of mist: he gives his reader opportunity for conjecture.

[97] Pacorus was completely defeated B.C. 38 near the Euphrates by P. Ventidius Bassus, who was the legatus of M. Antonius. Pacorus lost his life in the battle (Dion Cassius, 49. c. 20; Plutarch, Life of Antonius, c. 34). It is said that Pacorus fell on the same day on which Crassus lost his life fifteen years before, the 9th of June (Dion Cassius, 49. c. 21, and the note of Reimarus).

[98] He began his reign under the name of Arsakes XV. Phraates IV., according to some authorities, B.C. 37. He was not satisfied with murdering his father: he murdered his brothers, and many distinguished Parthians. His name occurs again in Plutarch's Life of Antonius. Phraates delivered up to Augustus, B.C. 20, the Roman soldiers, eagles, and standards which had been taken by Crassus; an event which is commemorated by extant medals, and was recorded by Augustus among his other exploits in the Monumentum Ancyranum.

[99] This is the Greek word (ὰκόνιτον): the same name is now given to Monkshood or Wolfsbane, a genus of Ranunculaceae. Aconite is now used as a medicine; "The best forms are either an alcoholic extract of the leaves, or an alcoholic tincture of the root made by displacement." It is a poisonous plant, and death has followed from the careless use of it ("Aconite," Penny Cyclopædia and Supplement to the P. Cyc.).

With this farce, as Plutarch remarks, the history of Crassus terminates. If Plutarch designed to make Crassus contemptible, he has certainly succeeded. And there is nothing in other authorities to induce us to think that he has done Crassus injustice. With some good qualities and his moderate abilities, he might have been a respectable man in a private station. But insatiable avarice, and that curse of many men, ambition without the ability that can ensure success and command respect, made Crassus a fool in his old age, and brought him to an ignominious end.

COMPARISON OF NIKIAS AND CRASSUS.

I. In the first place, the wealth of Nikias was much more honestly and creditably obtained than that of Crassus. Generally speaking, one cannot approve of men who make their money from mines, which are as a rule worked by criminals, or savages, labouring in chains in unhealthy subterranean dungeons; but yet this method of amassing a fortune seems much the more honourable, when compared with Crassus's purchase of confiscated lands and his habit of bidding for houses that were on fire. Crassus too used to practise these openly, like a trade: while he was also accused of taking bribes for his speeches in the Senate, of defrauding the allies of Rome, of currying favour with great ladies and assisting them to shield offenders from justice. Nothing of this sort was ever laid to the charge of Nikias, who, however, was ridiculed for giving money to common informers because he feared their tongues. Yet this action of his, though it would have been a disgrace to Perikles, or Aristeides, was a necessity for Nikias, who was naturally of a timid disposition. Thus Lykurgus the orator excused himself when accused of having bought off some informers who threatened him. "I am glad," said he, "that after so long a public life as mine I should have been at last convicted of giving bribes rather than of receiving them."

The expenditure of Nikias was all calculated to increase his popularity in the state, being devoted to offerings to the gods, gymnastic contests and public dramatic performances. But all the money he spent that way, and all that he possessed was but a small part of what Crassus bestowed upon a public feast at Rome for some tens of thousands of guests, whom he even maintained at his own cost for some time after. So true it is that wickedness and vice argue a want of due balance and proportion in a man's mind, which leads him to acquire wealth dishonestly, and then to squander it uselessly.

II. So much for their riches. Now in their political life, Nikias never did anything bold, daring or unjust, for he was outwitted by Alkibiades, and always stood in fear of the popular assembly. Crassus, on the other hand, is accused of great inconsistency, in lightly changing from one party to another, and he himself never denied that he once obtained the consulship by hiring men to assassinate Cato and Domitius. And in the assembly held for the dividing for the provinces, many were wounded and four men slain in the Forum, while Crassus himself (which I have forgotten to mention in his Life) struck one Lucius Annalius, a speaker on the other side, so violent a blow with his fist that his face was covered with blood. But though Crassus was overbearing and tyrannical in his public life, yet we cannot deny that the shrinking timidity and cowardice of Nikias deserve equally severe censure; and it must be remembered that when Crassus was carrying matters with so high a hand, it was no Kleon or Hyperbolus that he had for an antagonist, but the great Julius Cæsar himself, and Pompeius who had triumphed three several times, and that he gave way to neither of them, but became their equal in power, and even excelled Pompeius in dignity by obtaining the office of censor. A great politician should not try to avoid unpopularity, but to gain such power and reputation as will enable him to rise above it.

Yet if it were true that Nikias preferred quiet and security to anything else, and that he stood in fear of Alkibiades in the assembly, of the Spartans at Pylus, and of Perdikkas in Thrace, he had every opportunity to repose himself in Athens and to "weave the garland of a peaceful life," as some philosopher calls it. He had indeed a true and divine love of peace, and his attempt to bring the Peloponnesian war to an end, was an act of real Hellenic patriotism. In this respect Crassus cannot be compared with Nikias, not though he had carried the frontier of the Roman empire as far as the Caspian and the Indian seas.

III. Yet a statesman, in a country which appreciates his merits, ought not when at the height of his power to make way for worthless men, and place in office those who have no claim to it, as Nikias did when he laid down his own office of commander-in-chief and gave it to Kleon, a man who possessed no qualification whatever for the post except his brazen effrontery. Neither can I praise Crassus for having so rashly and hurriedly brought the war with Spartacus to a crisis, although he was actuated by an honourable ambition in fearing that Pompeius would arrive and take from him the glory of having completed the war, as Mummius took from Marcellus the glory of winning Corinth. But on the other hand the conduct of Nikias was altogether monstrous and inexcusable. He did not give up his honourable post to his enemy at a time when there was hope of success and little peril. He saw that great danger was likely to be incurred by the general in command at Pylus, and yet he was content to place himself in safety, and let the state run the risk of ruin, by entrusting an incompetent person with the sole management of affairs. Yet Themistokles, rather than allow an ignorant commander to mismanage the war against Persia, bribed him to lay down his office. So also Cato at a most dangerous crisis became a candidate for the office of tribune of the people in order to serve his country. But Nikias, reserving himself to play the general at the expense of the village of Minoa, the island of Kythera, and the miserable inhabitants of Melos,[100] when it came to fighting the Lacedæmonians eagerly stripped off his general's cloak, and entrusted to an inexperienced and reckless man like Kleon, the conduct of an enterprise involving the safety of a large Athenian fleet and army, showing himself no less neglectful of his own honour than he was of the interests of his country. After this he was forced against his will into the war with Syracuse, in which he seems to have imagined that his army would capture the city by remaining before it doing nothing, and not by vigorous attacks. No doubt it is a great testimony to the esteem in which he was held by his countrymen, that he was always opposed to war and unwilling to act as general, and was nevertheless always forced by them to undertake that office: whereas Crassus, who always wished for an independent command, never obtained one except in the servile war, and then only because all the other generals, Pompeius, Metellus, and Lucullus, were absent. Yet at that time Crassus was at the height of his power and reputation: but his friends seem to have thought him, as the comic poet has it,

"Most excellent, save in the battle-field."

And in his case also, the Romans gained no advantage from his ambitious desire of command. The Athenians sent Nikias to Sicily against his will, and Crassus led the Romans to Parthia against their will. Nikias suffered by the actions of the Athenians, while Rome suffered by the actions of Crassus.

IV. However, in their last moments we incline rather to praise Nikias than to blame Crassus. Nikias, a skilful and experienced commander, did not share the rash hopes of his countrymen, but never thought that Sicily could be conquered, and dissuaded them from making the attempt. Crassus, on the other hand, urged the Romans to undertake the war with Parthia, representing the conquest of that country as an easy operation, which he nevertheless failed to effect. His ambition was vast. Cæsar had conquered the Gauls, Germans, Britons, and all the west of Europe, and Crassus wished in his turn to march eastward as far as the Indian Ocean, and to conquer all those regions of Asia which Pompeius and Lucullus, two great men and actuated by a like desire for conquest, had previously aspired to subdue. Yet they also met with a like opposition. When Pompeius was given an unlimited command in the East, the appointment was opposed by the Senate, and when Cæsar routed thirty thousand Germans, Cato proposed that he should be delivered up to the vanquished, and that thus the anger of the gods should be turned away from the city upon the author of so great a crime as he had committed by breaking his word. Yet the Romans slighted Cato's proposals and held a solemn thanksgiving for fifteen days to show their joy at the news. How many days then must we imagine they would have spent in rejoicing if Crassus had sent despatches announcing the capture of Babylon, and then had reduced Media, Persia, Hyrkania, Susa, and Bactria to the condition of Roman provinces. "If a man must do wrong," as Euripides says of those who cannot live in peace, and be contented when they are well off, they should do it on a grand scale like this, not capture contemptible places like Skandeia or Mende, or chase the people of Ægina, like birds who have been turned out of their nests. If we are to do an injustice, let us not do it in a miserable pettifogging way, but imitate such great examples as Crassus and Alexander the Great. Those who praise the one of these great men, and blame the other, do so only because they are unable to see any other distinction between them except that the one failed and the other succeeded.

V. When acting as general, Nikias did many great exploits, for he was many times victorious, all but took Syracuse, and ought not justly to bear the blame of the whole Sicilian disaster, because of his disease, and the ill will which some bore him at Athens. Crassus on the other hand committed so many mistakes as to put it out of the power of fortune to aid him, so that one wonders not so much that his folly was overcome by the Parthians as that it could overcome the good fortune of the Romans. Now as the one never disregarded religious observances and omens, the other despised them all, and yet both alike perished, it is hard to say what inference we ought to draw, as to which acted most wisely, yet we must incline rather to the side of him who followed the established rule in such matters rather than that of him who insolently discarded all such observances. In his death Crassus is more to be commended, because he yielded himself against his will in consequence of the entreaties of his friends, and was most treacherously deceived by the enemy, while Nikias delivered himself up to his enemies through a base and cowardly desire to save his life, and thus made his end more infamous.

FOOTNOTES:

[100] I cannot find that Nikias took any part in the massacre of the people of Melos in 416 B.C.

LIFE OF SERTORIUS.

I. It is perhaps not a matter of surprise, if in the lapse of time, which is unlimited, while fortune[101] is continually changing her course, spontaneity should often result in the same incidents; for, if the number of elemental things is not limited, fortune has in the abundance of material a bountiful supply of sameness of results; and, if things are implicated in a dependence upon definite numbers, it is of necessity that the same things must often happen, being effected by the same means. Now, as some are pleased to collect, by inquiry and hearsay, from among the things which accidentally happen, such as bear some likeness to the works of calculation and forethought: such, for instance, as that there were two celebrated Atteis,[102] the one a Syrian and the other an Arcadian, and that both were killed by a wild boar; that there were two Actæons, one of whom was torn in pieces by his dogs and the other by his lovers; that there were two Scipios,[103] by one of whom the Carthaginians were first conquered, and by the other were cut up root and branch; that Troy was taken by Hercules, on account of the horses of Laomedon, and by Agamemnon by means of the wooden horse, as it is called, and was taken a third time by Charidemus, by reason of the Ilians not being able to close the gates quick enough, owing to a horse having got between them; that there are two cities which have the same name with the most fragrant of plants, Ios[104] and Smyrna, and that Homer was born in one of them and died in the other: I may be allowed to add to these instances, that the most warlike of commanders and those who have accomplished most by a union of daring and cunning, have been one-eyed men, Philippus,[105] Antigonus, Annibal, and the subject of this Life—Sertorius; he whom one may affirm to have been more continent as to women than Philip, more true to his friends than Antigonus, more merciful to his enemies than Annibal,[106] inferior in understanding to none of them, but in fortune inferior to all; and, though he always found Fortune more hard to deal with than his open enemies, yet he proved himself her equal by opposing the experience of Metellus, the daring of Pompeius, the fortune of Sulla, and the power of the whole Roman state; a fugitive and a stranger putting himself at the head of barbarians. Of all the Greeks, Eumenes[107] of Kardia presents the nearest resemblance to him. Both of them were men qualified to command; both were warlike, and yet full of stratagem; both became exiles from their native land and the commanders of foreign troops; and both had the same violent and unjust fortune in their end, for both of them were the objects of conspiracy, and were cut off by the hands of those with whom they were victorious over their enemies.

II. Quintus Sertorius belonged to a family not among the meanest in Nussa,[108] a Sabine city. He was carefully brought up by a widowed mother, for he had lost his father, and he appears to have been exceedingly attached to her. His mother's name, they say, was Rhea. He had a competent practical education in the courts of justice, and, as a young man, he attained some influence in the city by his eloquence. But his reputation and success in war diverted all his ambition in that direction.

III. Now, first of all, after the Cimbri and Teutones had invaded Gaul, he was serving under Cæpio[109] at the time when the Romans were defeated and put to flight; and, though he lost his horse and was wounded in the body, he crossed the Rhone swimming in his cuirass and with his shield against the powerful stream—so strong was his body and disciplined by exercise. On a second occasion, when the same barbarians were advancing with many thousand men and dreadful threats, so that for a Roman to stand to his ranks at such a time, and to obey his general, was a great matter, Marius had the command, and Sertorius undertook to be a spy upon the enemy. Putting on a Celtic dress, and making himself master of the most ordinary expressions of the language, for the purpose of conversation when occasion might offer, he mingled with the barbarians, and, either by his own eyes or by inquiry, learning all that was important to know, he returned to Marius. For this he obtained the prize of merit; and in the rest of the campaign, having given many proofs of his judgment and daring, he was honoured and trusted by his general. After the close of the war with the Cimbri and Teutones, he was sent as tribune by Didius[110] the prætor to Iberia, and he wintered in Castlo,[111] a city of the Celtiberi. The soldiers, being in the midst of abundance, lost all discipline, and were generally drunk, which brought them into contempt with the barbarians, who, by night, sent for aid from their neighbours the Gyrisœni, and, coming on the soldiers in their lodgings, began to slaughter them. Sertorius with a few others stole out, and, collecting the soldiers who made their escape, surrounded the city. Finding the gates open through which the barbarians had secretly entered, he did not make the same mistake that they did, but he set a watch there, and, hemming in the city on all sides, he massacred every man who was of age to bear arms. When the massacre was over, he ordered all his soldiers to lay down their own armour and dress, and, putting on those of the barbarians, to follow him to the city from which the men came who had fallen on them in the night. The barbarians were deceived by the armour, and he found the gates open, and a number of men expecting to meet friends and fellow-citizens, returning from a successful expedition. Accordingly, most of them were killed by the Romans near the gates, and the rest surrendered and were sold as slaves.

IV. This made the name of Sertorius known in Iberia; and as soon as he returned to Rome he was appointed quæstor in Gaul upon the Padus at a critical time; for the Marsic[112] war was threatening. Being commissioned to levy troops and procure arms, he applied so much zeal and expedition to the work, compared with the tardiness and indolence of the other young men, that he got the reputation of being a man likely to run an active career. Yet he remitted nothing of the daring of a soldier after he was promoted to the rank of commander; but he exhibited wonderful feats of courage, and exposed himself without any reserve to danger, whereby he lost one of his eyes through a wound. But he always prided himself on this. He used to say that others did not always carry about with them the proofs of their valour, but put them aside, at times, as chains and spears, and crowns, while the proofs of his valour always abided with him, and those who saw what he had lost saw at the same time the evidences of his courage. The people also showed him appropriate marks of respect; for, on his entering the theatre, they received him with clapping of hands and expressions of their good wishes—testimonials which even those who were far advanced in age, and high in rank, could with difficulty obtain. However, when he was a candidate for the tribuneship, Sulla raised a party against him, and he failed; and this was, apparently, the reason why he hated Sulla. But when Marius was overpowered by Sulla and fled from Rome, and Sulla had set out to fight with Mithridates, and the consul Octavius adhered to the party of Sulla, while his colleague Cinna, who aimed at a revolution, revived the drooping faction of Marius, Sertorius attached himself to Cinna, especially as he saw that Octavius was deficient in activity, and he distrusted the friends of Marius. A great battle was fought in the Forum between the consuls, in which Octavius got the victory, and Cinna and Sertorius took to flight, having lost nearly ten thousand men. However, they persuaded most of the troops, which were still scattered about Italy, to come over to their side, and they were soon a match for Octavius.

V. When Marius had returned from Libya, and was proposing to join Cinna, himself in a mere private capacity and Cinna as consul, all the rest thought it politic to receive him; but Sertorius was against it: whether it was because he thought that Cinna would pay less respect to him when a general of higher reputation was present, or because he feared the ferocious temper of Marius, and that he would put all in confusion in his passion, which knew no bounds, transgressing the limits of justice in the midst of victory. However this may be, Sertorius observed that there remained little for them to do, as they were now triumphant; but if they received the proposal of Marius, he would appropriate to himself all the glory and all the troops, being a man who could endure no partner in power, and who was devoid of good faith. Cinna replied that what Sertorius suggested was true, but he felt ashamed and had a difficulty about refusing to receive Marius, after having invited him to join their party; whereupon Sertorius rejoined: "For my part, I thought that Marius had come to Italy on his own adventure, and I was merely considering what was best; but it was not honourable in you to make the thing a matter of deliberation at all after the arrival of the man whom you had thought proper to invite, but you ought to have employed him and received him; for a promise leaves no room for any further consideration." Accordingly Cinna sent for Marius, and the forces being distributed among them, the three had the command. The war being finished, Cinna and Marius were filled with violence and bitterness, so that they made the evils of war as precious gold to the Romans, compared with the new state of affairs. Sertorius alone is said to have put no person to death to gratify his vengeance, nor to have abused his power; but he was much annoyed at the conduct of Marius, and he moderated Cinna by private interviews and entreaties. At last, the slaves whom Marius had used as allies in war, and kept as guards to protect his tyranny, becoming formidable and wealthy, partly from the grants of Marius and his direct permission; partly from their violent and outrageous treatment of their masters, whom they butchered, and then lay with their masters' wives, and violated their children, Sertorius unable to endure any longer, speared the whole of them in their camp, to the number of four thousand.[113]

VI. But when Marius[114] had died, and Cinna shortly after was cut off, and the younger Marius, contrary to the wish of Sertorius, and by illegal means, obtained the consulship, and the Carbos and the Norbani and Scipios were unsuccessfully contending against Sulla on his march to Rome, and affairs were being ruined, partly through the cowardice and laziness of the commanders, and partly through treachery; and there was no use in his staying to see things still go on badly, owing to the want of judgment in those who had more power than himself; and finally, when Sulla, after encamping near Scipio, and holding out friendly proposals, as if peace was going to be made, had corrupted the army, though Sertorius had warned Scipio of this, and given his advice, but without effect—altogether despairing about the city, Sertorius set out for Iberia, in order that if he should anticipate his enemies in strengthening his power there, he might offer protection to such of his friends as were unfortunate at Rome. Sertorius, having fallen in with bad weather in the mountainous parts, was required by the barbarians to pay them a tribute, and to purchase a free passage. His companions were much incensed at this, and declared it to be a great degradation for a Roman proconsul[115] to pay a tribute to wretched barbarians; but Sertorius cared little for what they considered disgrace, and he said that he was buying time, the rarest of things for a man who was aiming at great objects: and so he pacified the barbarians with money, and hurrying into Iberia, got possession of the country. He there found nations strong in numbers and fighting men, but owing to the greediness and tyranny of the governors who had from time to time been sent among them, ill-disposed to the Roman administration in general; however, he regained the good will of the chiefs by his personal intercourse with them, and the favour of the mass by remission of taxes. But he got most popularity by relieving the people from having soldiers quartered on them; for he compelled the soldiers to fix their winter tents in the suburbs of the towns, and he was the first to set the example. However, Sertorius did not depend altogether on the attachment of the barbarians, but he armed all the Roman settlers in Iberia who were able to bear arms, and by commencing the construction of all kinds of military engines and building ships he kept the cities in check; showing himself mild in all the affairs of civil administration, but formidable by his preparations against the enemy.

VII. Hearing that Sulla was master of Rome,[116] and that the party of Marius and Carbo was on the wane, and being in immediate expectation of an army coming to fight against him under some commander, he sent Julius Salinator to occupy the passes of the Pyrenees, with six thousand heavy armed soldiers. Shortly after this, Caius Annius[117] was sent from Rome by Sulla; but, seeing that the position of Julius could not be attacked, he was perplexed, and seated himself at the base of the mountains. But one Calpurnius, named Lanarius, assassinated Julius, on which the soldiers left the summits of the Pyrenees, and Annius, crossing the mountains, advanced with a large force and drove all before him. Sertorius, being unable to oppose him, fled with three thousand men to New Carthage,[118] and there embarking and crossing the sea, landed in Mauritania, in Libya. His soldiers, while getting water without due precautions, were fallen upon by the barbarians, and many of them were killed, upon which Sertorius sailed again for Iberia. He was, however, driven off the coast, and, being joined by some Cilician piratical vessels,[119] he attacked the island of Pityussa,[120] and landing there drove out the garrison of Annius. Annius soon arrived with a large fleet and five thousand heavy armed men, and Sertorius ventured on a naval battle with him, though his vessels were light and built for quick sailing and not for fighting; but the sea was disturbed by a strong west wind, which drove most of the vessels of Sertorius upon the reefs, owing to their lightness, and Sertorius, with a few ships, could not get out to sea by reason of the wind, nor land on account of the enemy, and being tossed about for ten days, with the wind and a violent sea against him, he held out with great difficulty.

VIII. As the wind abated he set sail, and put in at some scattered islands, which had no water. Leaving them, and passing through the Straits of Gades,[121] he touched at those parts of Iberia on the right which lie out of the strait, a little beyond the mouths of the Bætis,[122] which flows into the Atlantic Sea,[123] and has given name to those parts of Iberia which lie about it. There he fell in with some sailors, who had returned from a voyage to the Atlantic[124] Islands, which are two in number, separated by a very narrow channel, and ten thousand stadia from the coast of Libya, and are called the islands of the Happy. These islands have only moderate rains, but generally they enjoy gentle breezes, which bring dews; they have a rich and fertile soil, adapted for arable cultivation and planting; they also produce fruit spontaneously, sufficient in quantity and quality to maintain, without labour and trouble, a population at their ease. The air of the island is agreeable, owing to the temperature of the seasons, and the slightness of the changes; for the winds which blow from our part of the world from the north and east, owing to the great distance, fall upon a boundless space, and are dispersed and fail before they reach these islands; but the winds which blow round them from the ocean, the south and west, bring soft rains at intervals, from the sea, but in general they gently cool the island with moist clear weather, and nourish the plants; so that a firm persuasion has reached the barbarians that here are the Elysian Plains and the abode of the Happy which Homer[125] has celebrated in song.

IX. Sertorius, hearing this description, was seized with a strong desire to dwell in the islands, and to live in quiet, free from tyranny and never-ending wars. The Cilicians, who did not want peace and leisure, but wealth and spoil, observing this inclination, sailed off to Africa, to restore Ascalis, the son of Iphtha, to the Moorish kingdom.[126] Sertorius, however, did not despond, but he determined to help those who were fighting against Ascalis, in order that his companions, by getting some renewal of hope and opportunity for other deeds, might not disperse through their difficulties. The Moors were well pleased at his arrival, and Sertorius setting himself to work defeated Ascalis, and besieged him. Sulla sent Paccianus to help Ascalis, but Sertorius engaging him with his forces killed Paccianus, and after his victory brought over the army and took Tigennis, to which Ascalis and his brother had fled. It is here that the Libyans say Antæus[127] is buried. Sertorius dug into the mound, as he did not believe what the barbarians said, so enormous was the size. But, finding the body there, sixty cubits in length, as they say, he was confounded, and, after making a sacrifice, he piled up the earth, and added to the repute and fame of the monument. The people of Tigennis have a mythus, that, on the death of Antæus his wife Tinge cohabited with Hercules, that Sophax was the issue of their connexion, and became king of the country, and named a city after his mother; they further say that Sophax had a son, Diodorus, whom many of the Libyan nations submitted to, as he had a Greek army of Olbiani and Mycenæi, who were settled in those parts by Hercules. But this may be considered as so much flattery to Juba,[128] of all kings the most devoted to historical inquiry; for they say that Juba's ancestors were the descendants of Diodorus and Sophax. Sertorius, now completely victorious, did no wrong to those who were his suppliants and trusted to him, but he restored to them both property and cities and the administration, receiving only what was fair and just for them to offer.

X. While Sertorius was considering where he should betake himself to, the Lusitani sent ambassadors to invite him to be their leader; for they were much in want of a commander of great reputation and experience, to oppose the formidable power of the Romans, and Sertorius was the only man whom they would trust, as they knew his character from those who had been about him. Now it is said that Sertorius was a man who never yielded either to pleasure or to fear, and while he was naturally unmoved by danger, he could bear prosperity with moderation; in the open field he was equal to any general of his time in enterprise, and as to all military matters that required stealthy manœuvres, the taking advantage of strong positions and rapid movements, and also craft and deception, he was in the moment of need most cunning in device. In rewarding courage he was bountiful, and in punishing for offences he was merciful. And yet, in the last part of his life, his cruel and vindictive treatment of the hostages may be alleged as a proof that his temper was not naturally humane, but that he put on the appearance of mildness through calculation and as a matter of necessity, But it is my opinion that no fortune can ever change to the opposite character a virtue which is genuine and founded on principle; still it is not impossible that good intentions and good natural dispositions, when impaired by great misfortunes[129] contrary to desert, may together with the dæmon change their habit; and this I think was the case with Sertorius when fortune began to fail him; for as his circumstances became unfavourable, he became harsh to those who had done him wrong.

XI. However, he then set sail from Libya, at the invitation of the Lusitanians,[130] and got them into fighting condition, being immediately made commander with full powers, and he subjected the neighbouring parts of Iberia, most of which, indeed, voluntarily joined him, chiefly by reason of his mild treatment and his activity; but in some cases he availed himself of cunning to beguile and win over the people, the chief of which was in the affair of the deer, which was after this fashion:

Spanos, a native, and one of those who lived on their lands, fell in with a deer[131] which had just brought forth a young one and was flying from the hunters; he missed taking the deer, but he followed the fawn, being struck with its unusual colour (it was completely white), and caught it. It happened that Sertorius was staying in those parts, and when people brought him as presents anything that they had got in hunting, or from their farms, he would readily receive it and make a liberal return to those who showed him such attentions. Accordingly the man brought the fawn and gave it to Sertorius, who accepted the present. At first he took no particular pleasure in the animal, but in course of time, when he had made it so tame and familiar that it would come to him when he called it, accompany him in his walks, and cared not for a crowd and all the noise of the army, by degrees he began to give the thing a supernatural character, saying that the fawn was a gift from Artemis (Diana), and he gave out as a token of this that the fawn showed him many hidden things; for he knew that it is the nature of barbarians to be easily accessible to superstition. He also resorted to such tricks as these: whenever he had got secret information that the enemy had invaded any part of the country, or were attempting to draw any city away from him, he would pretend that the deer had spoken to him in his sleep, and bid him keep his troops in readiness; and, on the other hand, when he heard that his generals had got a victory, he would keep the messenger concealed, and bring forward the deer crowned with chaplets, as is usual on the occasion of good news, and tell his men to rejoice and sacrifice to the gods, as they would hear of some good luck.

XII. By these means he tamed the people, and had them more manageable for all purposes, as they believed they were led, not by the counsels of a foreigner, but by a deity, and facts also confirmed them in this opinion, inasmuch as the power of Sertorius increased beyond all expectation; for with the two thousand six hundred men whom he called Romans, and four thousand Lusitanian targetiers, and seven hundred horsemen, whom he joined to a motley band of seven hundred Libyans, who crossed over with him to Lusitania, he fought with four Roman generals, who had under them one hundred and twenty thousand foot soldiers, six thousand horsemen, two thousand bowmen and slingers, and cities innumerable, while he had only twenty cities in all under him. But though so feeble and insignificant at first, he not only subdued great nations, and took many cities, but of the generals who were opposed to him he defeated Cotta[132] in a naval engagement in the channel near Mellaria;[133] he put to flight Fufidius,[134] the governor of Bætica, on the banks of the Bætis, with the slaughter of two thousand of his Roman soldiers; Lucius Domitius,[135] proconsul of the other Iberia,[136] was defeated by his quæstor; Thoranius, another of the commanders of Metellus, who was sent with a force, he destroyed; and on Metellus[137] himself, the greatest man among the Romans in his day, and of the highest repute, he inflicted several discomfitures, and brought him to such straits, that Lucius Manlius[138] came from Narbo,[139] in Gaul, to his relief, and Pompeius Magnus[140] was hastily despatched from Rome with an army; for Metellus was perplexed at having to deal with a daring man, who evaded all fighting in the open field, and could adapt himself to any circumstances by reason of the light and easy equipment and activity of his Iberian army; he who had been disciplined in regular battles fought by men in full armour and commanded a heavy immovable mass of men, who were excellently trained to thrust against their enemies, when they came to close quarters, and to strike them down, but unable to traverse mountains, to be kept always on the alert by the continual pursuing and retreating of light active men, and to endure hunger like them, and to live under the open sky without fire or tent.

XIII. Besides this, Metellus was now growing old, and after so many great battles was somewhat inclined to an easy and luxurious mode of life; and he was opposed to Sertorius, a man full of the vigour of mature age, whose body was wonderfully furnished with strength, activity, and power of endurance. He was never intoxicated with drink, even in his seasons of relaxation, and he was accustomed to bear great toil, long marches, and continued watchfulness, content with a little food of the meanest quality; and, inasmuch as he was always rambling about and hunting, when he had leisure, he became intimately acquainted with all the spots, both impracticable and practicable, which gave chance of escape if he had to fly, or opportunity of hemming in an enemy if he was in pursuit. Consequently, it happened that Metellus, being prevented from fighting, was damaged as much as men who are beaten in battle, and Sertorius by flying had all the advantage of the pursuer. He used to cut off the supplies of water, and check the foraging; and when Metellus was advancing Sertorius would get out of his way, and when he was encamped he would not let him rest; when Metellus was occupied with a siege, Sertorius would all at once show himself, and put Metellus in his turn in a state of blockade, owing to the want of the necessary supplies, so that the soldiers were quite wearied; and when Sertorius challenged Metellus to a single combat, the men cried out and bid him fight, as it would be a match between a general and a general, and a Roman and a Roman; and when Metellus declined, they jeered him. But he laughed at them, and he did right; for a general, as Theophrastus[141] said, should die the death of a general, not that of a common targetier. Metellus perceiving that the Langobritæ[142] assisted Sertorius in no small degree, and that their town could easily be taken, as it was ill supplied with water, for they had only one well in the city, and any one who blockaded the place would be master of the streams in the suburbs and near the walls, he advanced against the city, expecting to finish the siege in two days, as there was no water; and accordingly his soldiers received orders to take provisions with them for five days only. But Sertorius quickly coming to their aid, gave orders to fill two thousand skins with water, and he offered for each skin a considerable sum of money. Many Iberians and Moors volunteered for the service, and, selecting the men who were strong and light-footed, he sent them through the mountain parts, with orders, when they had delivered the skins to the people in the city, to bring out of the town all the useless people, that the water might last the longer for those who defended the place. When the news reached Metellus he was much annoyed, for his soldiers had already consumed their provisions; but he sent Aquinius,[143] at the head of six thousand men, to forage. Sertorius got notice of this, and laid an ambush on the road of three thousand men who starting up out of a bushy ravine, fell on Aquinius as he was returning. Sertorius attacked in front and put the Romans to flight, killing some and taking others prisoners. Aquinius returned with the loss of both his armour and horse, and Metellus made a disgraceful retreat amidst the jeers of the Iberians.

XIV. By such acts as these Sertorius gained the admiration and love of the barbarians; and, by introducing among them the Roman armour, and discipline, and signals, he took away the frantic and brutal part of their courage, and transformed them from a huge band of robbers into an efficient regular army. Besides, he employed gold and silver unsparingly for the decoration of their helmets, and he ornamented their shields, and accustomed them to the use of flowered cloaks and tunics, and, by supplying them with money for such purposes, and entering into a kind of honourable rivalry with them, he made himself popular. But they were most gained by what he did for their children. The youths of noblest birth he collected from the several nations at Osca,[144] a large city, and set over them teachers of Greek and Roman learning; and thus he really had them as hostages under the show of educating them, as if he intended to give them a share in the government and the administration when they attained to man's estate. The fathers were wonderfully pleased at seeing their children dressed in robes with purple borders, and going so orderly to the schools of Sertorius, who paid for their education, and often had examinations into their proficiency, and gave rewards to the deserving, and presented them with golden ornaments for the neck, which the Romans call "bullæ."[145] It was an Iberian usage for those whose station was about the commander to die with him when he fell in battle, which the barbarians in those parts express by a term equivalent to the Greek "devotion."[146] Now only a few shield-bearers and companions followed the rest of the commanders; but many thousands followed Sertorius, and were devoted to die with him. It is said that, when the army of Sertorius was routed near a certain city and the enemy was pressing on them, the Iberians, careless about themselves, saved Sertorius, and, raising him on their shoulders, every one vying with the rest helped him to the walls; and when their general was secure they then betook themselves to flight, each as well as he could.

XV. Sertorius was not beloved by the Iberians only, but also by the soldiers of Italy, who served with him. When Perpenna Vento,[147] who belonged to the same party as Sertorius, had arrived in Iberia with much money and a large force, and had determined to carry on war against Metellus on his own account, his soldiers were dissatisfied, and there was much talk in the camp about Sertorius, to the great annoyance of Perpenna, who was proud of his noble family and his wealth. However, when the soldiers heard that Pompeius was crossing the Pyrenees, taking their arms and pulling up the standards, they assailed Perpenna with loud cries, and bade him lead them to Sertorius; if he did not, they threatened to leave him, and go of themselves to a man who was able to take care of himself and others too. Perpenna yielded, and led them to join the troops of Sertorius, to the number of fifty-three cohorts.

XVI. All the nations within the Iber river[148] were now joining Sertorius at once, and he was powerful in numbers; for they were continually flocking and crowding to him from all quarters. But he was troubled by the loose discipline and self-confidence of the barbarians, who called on him to attack the enemy, and were impatient of delay, and he attempted to pacify them with reasons. Seeing, however, that they were discontented, and were unwisely pressing him with their demands, he let them have their way, and winked at their engaging with the enemy, in so far as not to be completely crushed, but to get some hard knocks, which he hoped would render them more tractable for the future. Things turning out as he expected, Sertorius came to their aid when they were flying, and brought them back safe to the camp. However, as he wished also to cheer their spirits, a few days after this adventure he had all the army assembled, and introduced before them two horses,[149] one very weak and rather old, the other of a large size and strong, with a tail remarkable for the thickness and beauty of the hair. There stood by the side of the weak horse a tall strong man, and by the side of the strong horse a little man of mean appearance. On a signal given to them, the strong man began to pull the tail of the horse with all his might towards him, as if he would tear it off; the weak man began to pluck out the hairs from the tail of the strong horse one by one. Now the strong man, after no small labour to himself to no purpose, and causing much mirth to the spectators, at last gave up; but the weak man in a trice, and with no trouble, bared the tail of all its hairs. On which Sertorius getting up, said, "You see, fellow allies, that perseverance will do more than strength, and that many things which cannot be compassed all at once, yield to continued efforts; for endurance is invincible, and it is thus that time in its course assails and vanquishes every power, being a favourable helper to those who with consideration watch the opportunities that it offers, but the greatest of enemies to those who hurry out of season." By contriving from time to time such means as these for pacifying the barbarians, he managed his opportunities as he chose.

XVII. His adventure with the people called Charicatani[150] was not less admired than any of his military exploits. The Charicatani are a people who live beyond the river Tagonius: they do not dwell in cities or villages; but there is a large lofty hill, which contains caves and hollows in the rocks, looking to the north. The whole of the country at the foot of the hill consists of a clayey mud and of light earth, easily broken in pieces, which is not strong enough to bear a man's tread; and if it is only slightly touched will spread all about, like unslaked lime or ashes. Whenever the barbarians through fear of war hid themselves in their caves, and, collecting all their plunder there kept quiet, they could not be taken by any force; and now, seeing that Sertorius had retired before Metellus, and had encamped near the hill, they despised him as being beaten, on which Sertorius, whether in passion or not wishing to appear to be flying from the enemy, at daybreak rode up to the place and examined it. But he found the mountain unassailable on all sides; and while he was perplexing himself to no purpose and uttering idle threats, he saw a great quantity of dust from this light earth carried by the wind against the barbarians; for the caves are turned, as I have said, to the north, and the wind which blows from that quarter (some call it "caecias") prevails most, and is the strongest of all the winds in those parts, being generated in wet plains and snow-covered mountains; and at that time particularly, it being the height of summer, it was strong, and maintained by the melting of the ice in the sub-arctic regions, and it blew most pleasantly both on the barbarians and their flocks, and refreshed them. Now, Sertorius, thinking on all these things, and also getting information from the country people, ordered his soldiers to take up some of the light ashy earth, and bringing it right opposite to the hill to make a heap of it there; which the barbarians thought to be intended as a mound for the purpose of getting at them, and they mocked him. Sertorius kept his soldiers thus employed till nightfall, when he led them away. At daybreak a gentle breeze at first began to blow, which stirred up the lightest part of the earth that had been heaped together, and scattered it about like chaff; but when the caecias began to blow strong, as the sun got higher, and the hills were all covered with dust, the soldiers got on the heap of earth and stirred it up to the bottom, and broke the clods; and some also rode their horses up and down through the earth, kicking up the light particles and raising them so as to be caught by the wind, which receiving all the earth that was broken and stirred up, drove it against the dwellings of the barbarians, whose doors were open to the caecias. The barbarians, having only the single opening to breathe through, upon which the wind fell, had their vision quickly obscured, and they were speedily overpowered by a suffocating difficulty of breathing, by reason of respiring a thick atmosphere filled with dust. Accordingly, after holding out with difficulty for two days, they surrendered on the third, and thus added not so much to the power as to the reputation of Sertorius, who had taken by stratagem a place that was impregnable to arms.

XVIII. Now, as long as Sertorius had to oppose Metellus, he was generally considered to owe his success to the old age and natural tardiness of Metellus, who was no match for a daring man, at the head of a force more like a band of robbers than a regular army. But when Pompeius had crossed the Pyrenees, and Sertorius had met him in the field, and he and Pompeius had mutually offered one another every opportunity for a display of generalship, and Sertorius had the advantage in stratagem and caution, his fame was noised abroad as far as Rome, and he was considered the most able general of his age in the conduct of a war: for the reputation of Pompeius was no small one; but at that time particularly he was enjoying the highest repute by reason of his distinguished exploits in the cause of Sulla, for which Sulla gave him the name of Magnus, which means Great, and Pompeius obtained triumphal honours before he had a beard. All this made many of the cities which were subject to Sertorius turn their eyes towards Pompeius, and feel inclined to pass over to him; but their intentions were checked by the loss at Lauron,[151] which happened contrary to all expectation. Sertorius was besieging this town, when Pompeius came with all his force to relieve it. There was a hill, well situated for enabling an enemy to act against the place, which Sertorius made an effort to seize, and Pompeius to prevent its being occupied. Sertorius succeeded in getting possession of the hill, on which Pompeius made his troops stop, and was well pleased at what had happened, thinking that Sertorius was hemmed in between the city and his own army; and he sent a message to the people in Lauron, bidding them be of good cheer, and to keep to their walls and look on while Sertorius was blockaded. Sertorius smiled when he heard of this, and said he would teach Sulla's pupil (for so he contemptuously called Pompeius) that a general should look behind him rather than before. As he said this he pointed out to his men, who were thus blockaded, that there were six thousand heavy armed soldiers, whom he had left in the encampment, which he had quitted before he seized the hill, in order that if Pompeius should turn against them, the soldiers in camp might attack him in the rear. And Pompeius too saw this when it was too late, and he did not venture to attack Sertorius for fear of being surrounded; and though he could not for shame leave the citizens in their danger, he was obliged to sit there and see them ruined before his eyes; for the barbarians in despair surrendered. Sertorius spared their lives, and let them all go; but he burnt the city, not for revenge or because he was cruel, for of all commanders Sertorius appears to have least given way to passion; but he did it to shame and humble the admirers of Pompeius, and that the barbarians might say that Pompeius did not help his allies, though he was close at hand, and all but warmed with the flames of their city.

XIX. However, Sertorius was now sustaining several defeats, though he always saved himself and those with him from defeat; but his losses were occasioned by the other generals. Yet he gained more credit from the means by which he repaired his defeats than the generals on the other side who won the victories; an instance of which occurred in the battle against Pompeius, on the Sucro, and another in the battle near Tuttia,[152] against Pompeius[153] and Metellus together. Now the battle on the Sucro is said to have been brought about by the eagerness of Pompeius, who wished Metellus to have no share in the victory. Sertorius, on his part, also wished to engage Pompeius before Metellus arrived; and, drawing out his forces when the evening was coming on, he commenced the battle, thinking that, as the enemy were strangers and unacquainted with the ground, the darkness would be a disadvantage to them, whether they were the pursued or the pursuers. When the battle began, it happened that Sertorius was not engaged with Pompeius, but with Afranius at first, who commanded the left wing of the enemy, while Sertorius commanded his own right. But, hearing that those who were opposed to Pompeius were giving way before his attack and being defeated, Sertorius left the right wing to the care of other generals, and hastened to the support of the wing that was giving way. Bringing together the soldiers who were already flying, and those who were still keeping their ranks, he encouraged them and made a fresh charge upon Pompeius, who was pursuing, and put his men to the rout; on which occasion Pompeius himself nearly lost his life, and had a wonderful escape after being wounded. The Libyans of Sertorius seized the horse of Pompeius, which was decked with golden ornaments and loaded with trappings; but while they were dividing the booty and quarrelling about it, they neglected the pursuit. As soon as Sertorius quitted the right wing to relieve the other part of the army, Afranius[154] put to flight his opponents and drove them to their camp, which, he entered with the captives, it being now dark, and began to plunder, knowing nothing of the defeat of Pompeius, and being unable to stop his soldiers from seizing the booty. In the mean time Sertorius returned, after defeating the enemy who were opposed to him, and falling on the soldiers of Afranius, who were all in disorder and consequently panic-stricken, he slaughtered many of them. In the morning he again armed his troops and came out to fight; but observing that Metellus was near, he broke up his order of battle, and marched off saying, "If that old woman had not come up, I would have given this boy a good drubbing by way of lesson, and have sent him back to Rome."

XX. About this time Sertorius was much dispirited, because that deer[155] of his could nowhere be found; for he was thus deprived of a great means of cheering the barbarians, who then particularly required consolation. It happened that some men, who were rambling about at night for other purposes, fell in with the deer and caught it, for they knew it by the colour. Sertorius hearing of this, promised to give them a large sum of money if they would mention it to nobody; and, concealing the deer for several days, he came forward with a joyful countenance to the tribunal, and told the barbarian chiefs that the deity prognosticated to him in his sleep some great good fortune. He then ascended the tribunal, and transacted business with those who applied to him. The deer being let loose by those who had charge of it close by, and, seeing Sertorius, bounded joyfully up to the tribunal, and, standing by him, placed its head on his knees, and touched his right hand with its mouth, having been accustomed to do this before. Sertorius cordially returned the caresses of the animal, and even shed tears. The spectators were at first surprised; then clapping their hands and shouting, they conducted Sertorius to his residence, considering him to be a man superior to other mortals and beloved by the gods; and they were full of good hopes.

XXI. Sertorius, who had reduced the enemy to the greatest straits in the plains about Seguntum[156] was compelled to fight a battle with them when they came down to plunder and forage. The battle was well contested on both sides. Memmius, one of the most skillful of the commanders under Pompeius, fell in the thick of the fight, and Sertorius, who was victorious, and making a great slaughter of those who opposed him, attempted to get at Metellus, who stood his ground with a resolution above his years, and, while fighting bravely, was struck by a spear. This made the Romans who were on the spot, as well as those who heard of it, ashamed to desert their leader, and inspired them with courage against their enemies. After covering Metellus with their shields and rescuing him from danger, by making a vigorous onset they drove the Iberians from their ground; and, as the victory now changed sides, Sertorius, with a view of securing a safe retreat for his men, and contriving the means of getting together another army without any interruption, retired to a strong city in the mountains, and began to repair the walls and strengthen the gates, though his object was anything rather than to stand a siege: but his design was to deceive the enemy, in which he succeeded; for they sat down before the place, thinking they should take it without difficulty, and in the mean time they let the defeated barbarians escape, and allowed Sertorius to collect a fresh army. It was got together by Sertorius sending officers to the cities, and giving orders that when they had collected a good body of men, they should dispatch a messenger to him. When the messenger came, he broke through the besiegers without any difficulty and joined his troops; and now he again advanced against the enemy in great force, and began to cut off their land supplies by ambuscades, and hemming them in, and showing himself at every point, inasmuch as his attacks were made with great expedition; and he cut off all their maritime supplies by occupying the coast with his piratical vessels, so that the generals opposed to him were obliged to separate, one to march off into Gaul, and Pompeius to winter among the Vaccæi[157] in great distress for want of supplies, and to write to the Senate, that he would lead his army out of Iberia, if they did not send him money, for he had spent all his own in defence of Italy. There was great talk in Rome that Sertorius would come to Italy before Pompeius[158] to such difficulties did Sertorius, by his military abilities, reduce the first and ablest of the generals of that age.

XXII. Metellus also showed, that he feared the man and thought he was powerful; for he made proclamation, that if any Roman killed Sertorius he would give him a hundred talents of silver and twenty thousand jugera of land; and, if he was an exile, permission to return, to Rome: thus declaring that he despaired of being able to defeat Sertorius in the field, and therefore would purchase his life by treachery. Besides this, Metellus was so elated by a victory which on one occasion he gained over Sertorius, and so well pleased with his success, that he was proclaimed Imperator[159] and the cities received him in his visits to them with sacrifices and altars. It is also said, that he allowed chaplets to be placed on his head, and accepted invitations to sumptuous feasts, at which he wore a triumphal vest; and Victories[160] which were contrived to move by machinery, descended and distributed golden trophies and crowns, and companies of youths and women sang epinician hymns in honour of him. For this he was with good reason ridiculed, for that after calling Sertorius a runaway slave of Sulla, and a remnant of the routed party of Carbo, he was so puffed up and transported with delight because he had gained an advantage over Sertorius, who had been compelled to retire. But it was a proof of the magnanimous character of Sertorius, first, that he gave the name of Senate to the Senators who fled from Rome and joined him, and that he appointed quæstors and generals from among them, and arranged everything of this kind according to Roman usage; and next, that though he availed himself of the arms, the money and the cities of the Iberians, he never yielded to them one *tittle of the Roman supremacy, but he appointed Romans to be their generals and commanders, considering that he was recovering freedom for the Romans, and was not strengthening the Iberians against the Romans; for Sertorius loved his country and had a great desire to return home. Notwithstanding this, in his reverses he behaved like a brave man, and never humbled himself before his enemies; and after his victories he would send to Metellus and to Pompeius, and declare that he was ready to lay down his arms and to live in a private station, if he might be allowed to return home; for, he said, he would rather be the obscurest citizen in Rome than an exile from his country, though he were proclaimed supreme ruler of all other countries in the world. It is said, that he longed to return home chiefly on account of his mother, who brought him up after his father's death, and to whom he was completely devoted. At the time when his friends in Iberia invited him to take the command, he heard of the death of his mother, and he was near dying of grief. He lay in his tent for seven days without giving the watchword, or being seen by any of his friends; and it was with difficulty that his fellow-generals and those of like rank with himself, who had assembled about his tent, prevailed on him to come out to the soldiers, and take a share in the administration of affairs, which were going on well. This made many people think that Sertorius was naturally a man of mild temper, and well disposed to a quiet life; but that, owing to uncontrollable causes, and contrary to his wishes, he entered on the career of a commander, and then, when he could not ensure his safety, and was driven to arms by his enemies, he had recourse to war as the only means by which he could protect his life.

XXIII. His negociations with Mithridates also were a proof of his magnanimity; for now that Mithridates, rising from the fall that he had from Sulla, as it were, to a second contest, had again attacked Asia, and the fame of Sertorius was great, and had gone abroad to all parts, and those who sailed from the West had filled the Pontus with the reports about him, as if with so many foreign wares, Mithridates was moved to send an embassy to him, being urged thereto mainly by the fulsome exaggerations of his flatterers, who compared Sertorius to Hannibal and Mithridates to Pyrrhus, and said that if the Romans were attacked on both sides, they could not hold out against such great abilities and powers combined, when the most expert of commanders had joined the greatest of kings. Accordingly, Mithridates sent ambassadors to Iberia, with letters to Sertorius and proposals. On his part he offered to supply money and ships for the war, and he asked from Sertorius a confirmation of his title to the whole of Asia, which he had given up to the Romans pursuant to the treaty made with Sulla. Sertorius assembled a council, which he called a senate, and all the members advised to accept the king's proposal, and to be well content with it; they said the king only asked of them a name and an empty answer touching things that were not in their power, in return for which they were to receive what they happened to stand most in need of. But Sertorius would not listen to this; he said he did not grudge Mithridates having Bithynia and Cappadocia; these were nations that were accustomed to a king, and the Romans had nothing to do with them; but the province which belonged to the Romans by the justest of titles, which Mithridates took from them and kept, from which, after a contest, he was driven out by Fimbria, and which he gave up by treaty with Sulla,[161] -that province he would never allow to fall again into the power of Mithridates; for it was fit that the Roman state should be extended by his success, not that his success should be owing to her humiliation. To a generous mind, victory by honest means was a thing to desire, but life itself was not worth having with dishonour.

XXIV. When this was reported to Mithridates he was amazed, and it is said that he remarked to his friends—what terms, then, will Sertorius impose when he is seated on the Palatium,[162] if now, when he is driven to the shores of the Atlantic, he fixes limits to our kingdom, and threatens us with war if we make any attempt upon Asia? However, a treaty was made, and ratified by oath, on the following terms: Mithridates[163] was to have Cappadocia and Bithynia, and Sertorius was to send him a general and soldiers; and Sertorius was to receive from Mithridates three thousand talents, and forty ships. Sertorius sent as general to Asia Marcus Marius, one of the Senators who had fled to him; and Mithridates, after assisting him to take some of the Asiatic cities,[164] followed Marius as he entered them with the fasces and axes, voluntarily taking the second place and the character of an inferior. Marius restored some of the cities to liberty, and he wrote to others to announce to them their freedom from taxation through the power of Sertorius; so that Asia, which was much troubled by the Publicani,[165] and oppressed by the rapacity and insolence of the soldiers quartered there, was again raised on the wings of hope, and longed for the expected change of masters.

XXV. In Iberia, the senators and nobles about Sertorius, as soon as they were put into a condition to hope that they were a match for the opposite party, and their fears were over, began to feel envious, and had a foolish jealousy of the power of Sertorius. Perpenna encouraged this feeling, being urged by the empty pride of high birth to aspire to the supreme command, and he secretly held treasonable language to those who were favourable to his designs. "What evil dæmon," he would say, "has got hold of us, and carried us from bad to worse—us who did not brook to stay at home and do the bidding of Sulla, though in a manner he was lord of all the earth and sea at once, but coming here with ill luck, in order to live free, have voluntarily become slaves by making ourselves the guards of Sertorius in his exile, and while we are called a senate, a name jeered at by all who hear it, we submit to insults, and orders, and sufferings as great as the Iberians and Lusitanians endure." Their minds filled with such suggestions as these, the majority did not, indeed, openly desert Sertorius, for they feared his power, but they secretly damaged all his measures, and they oppressed the barbarians by severe treatment and exactions, on the pretext that it was by the order of Sertorius. This caused revolts and disturbances in the cities; and those who were sent to settle and pacify these outbreaks returned after causing more wars, and increasing the existing insubordination; so that Sertorius, contrary to his former moderation and mildness, did a grievous wrong to the sons of the Iberians, who were educating at Osca,[166] by putting some to death, and selling others as slaves.

XXVI. Now Perpenna, having got several to join him in his conspiracy, gained over Manlius, one of those who were in command. This Manlius was much attached to a beautiful boy, and to give the youth a proof of his attachment he told him of the design, and urged him not to care for his other lovers; but to give his affections to him alone, as he would be a great man in a few days. The youth reported what Manlius said to Aufidius, another of his lovers, to whom he was more attached. On hearing this, Aufidius was startled, for he was engaged in the conspiracy against Sertorius, but he did not know that Manlius was a party to it. But when the youth named Perpenna and Graecinus,[167] and some others whom Aufidius knew to be in the conspiracy, he was confounded, yet he made light of the story to the youth, and told him to despise Manlius for a lying braggart; but he went to Perpenna, and, showing him the critical state of affairs, and the danger, urged him to the deed. The conspirators followed his advice, and having engaged a man to bring letters they introduced him to Sertorius. The letters gave information of a victory gained by one of the generals, and a great slaughter of the enemy. Upon this Sertorius was overjoyed, and offered a sacrifice for the happy tidings; and Perpenna proposed to feast him and his friends (and they were of the number of the conspirators), and after much entreaty he prevailed on Sertorius to come. Now whenever Sertorius was present, an entertainment was conducted with great propriety and decorum; for he would not tolerate any indecent act or expression, but accustomed his companions to enjoy mirth and merriment with orderly behaviour, and without any excess; but, on this occasion, in the midst of the feast, seeking to begin a quarrel, they openly used obscene language, and, pretending to be drunk, behaved indecently, for the purpose of irritating Sertorius. Whether it was that he was vexed at this disorderly conduct, or had now suspected their design by the flagging of the conversation[168] and their unusual contemptuous manner towards him, he changed his posture on the couch by throwing himself on his back, as if he was paying no attention to them, and not listening. On Perpenna taking a cup of wine, and in the middle of the draught throwing it from him and so making a noise, which was the signal agreed on, Antonius, who lay next to Sertorius, struck him with his sword. On receiving the blow, Sertorius turned himself, and at the same time attempted to rise, but Antonius, throwing himself upon his chest, held his hands, and he was despatched by blows from many of the conspirators, without even making any resistance.

XXVII.[169] Now most of the Iberians immediately sent ambassadors to Pompeius and Metellus, to make their submission; those who remained Perpenna took under his command, and attempted to do something. After employing the means that Sertorius had got together, just so far as to disgrace himself, and show that he was not suited either to command or to obey, he engaged with Pompeius. Being quickly crushed by him and taken prisoner, he did not behave himself even in this extremity as a commander should do; but having got possession of the papers of Sertorius, he offered to Pompeius to show him autograph letters from consular men and persons of the highest influence at Rome, in which Sertorius was invited to Italy, and was assured that there were many who were desirous to change the present settlement of affairs, and to alter the constitution. Now Pompeius, by behaving on this occasion, not like a young man, but one whose understanding was well formed and disciplined, relieved Rome from great dangers and revolutions. He got together all those letters, and all the papers of Sertorius, and burnt them, without either reading them himself or letting any one else read them; and he immediately put Perpenna to death, through fear that there might be defection and disturbance if the names were communicated to others. Of the fellow-conspirators of Perpenna, some were brought to Pompeius, and put to death; and others, who fled to Libya, were pierced by the Moorish spears. Not one escaped, except Aufidius, the rival of Manlius, and this happened, either because he escaped notice, or nobody took any trouble about him, and he lived to old age, in some barbarian village, in poverty and contempt.