Transcriber’s note:
This book was published in two volumes, of which this is the first. The second volume was released as Project Gutenberg ebook #44126, available at [http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/44126]. Where possible, references to the second volume in the text are linked to the version at Project Gutenberg.
Following entries in the Index in Vol. II. are erroneous, as there is no Chapter 15 in Book XXXIV and no Chapter 59 in Book VI.:
Sallentini, a tribe in Calabria. 34, 15, Rhyncus, in Aetolia, 6, 59, Morini, a Gallic tribe, 34, 15, Mauretania, 34, 15, Lugdunum, a town in Gaul, 34, 15. and there are no references in the text related to these entries.

The cover image was created by the transcriber and is placed in the public domain.

THE
HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

TRANSLATED FROM THE TEXT OF F. HULTSCH
BY
EVELYN S. SHUCKBURGH, M.A.
LATE FELLOW OF EMMANUEL COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE

IN TWO VOLUMES
VOL. I

London
MACMILLAN AND CO.
AND NEW YORK
1889

All rights reserved

TO

F. M. S.

IN GRATITUDE FOR MUCH PATIENT HELP

PREFACE

This is the first English translation of the complete works of Polybius as far as they are now known. In attempting such a task I feel that I ought to state distinctly the limits which I have proposed to myself in carrying it out. I have desired to present to English readers a faithful copy of what Polybius wrote, which should at the same time be a readable English book. I have not been careful to follow the Greek idiom; and have not hesitated to break up and curtail or enlarge his sentences, when I thought that, by doing so, I could present his meaning in more idiomatic English. Polybius is not an author likely to be studied for the sake of his Greek, except by a few technical scholars; and the modern complexion of much of his thought makes such a plan of translation both possible and desirable. How far I have succeeded I must leave my readers to decide. Again, I have not undertaken to write a commentary on Polybius, nor to discuss at length the many questions of interest which arise from his text. Such an undertaking would have required much more space than I was able to give: and happily, while my translation was passing through the press, two books have appeared, which will supply English students with much that I might have felt bound to endeavour to give—the Achaean league by Mr. Capes, and the sumptuous Oxford edition of extracts by Mr. Strachan-Davidson.

The translation is made from the text of Hultsch and follows his arrangement of the fragments. If this causes some inconvenience to those who use the older texts, I hope that such inconvenience will be minimised by the full index which I have placed at the end of the second volume.

I have not, I repeat, undertaken to write a commentary. I propose rather to give the materials for commentary to those who, for various reasons, do not care to use the Greek of Polybius. I have therefore in the first five complete books left him to speak for himself, with the minimum of notes which seemed necessary for the understanding of his text. The case of the fragments was different. In giving a translation of them I have tried, when possible, to indicate the part of the history to which they belong, and to connect them by brief sketches of intermediate events, with full references to those authors who supply the missing links.

Imperfect as the performance of such a task must, I fear, be, it has been one of no ordinary labour, and has occupied every hour that could be spared during several years of a not unlaborious life. And though I cannot hope to have escaped errors, either of ignorance or human infirmity, I trust that I may have produced what will be found of use to some historical students, in giving them a fairly faithful representation of the works of an historian who is, in fact, our sole authority for some most interesting portions of the world’s history.

It remains to give a brief account of the gradual formation of the text of Polybius, as we now have it.

The revival of interest in the study of Polybius was due to Pope Nicholas V (1447-1455), the founder of the Vatican Library. Soon after his election he seems to have urged Cardinal Perotti to undertake a Latin translation of the five books then known to exist. When Perotti sent him his translation of the first book, the Pope thus acknowledges it in a letter dated 28th August 1452:—[1]

“Primus Polybii liber, quem ad nos misisti, nuper a te de Graeca in Latinam translatus, gratissimus etiam fuit et jucundissimus: quippe in ea translatione nobis cumulatissime satisfacis. Tanta enim facilitate et eloquentia transfers, ut Historia ipsa nunquam Graeca, sed prorsus Latina semper fuisse videatur. Optimum igitur ingenium tuum valde commendamus atque probamus, teque hortamur ut velis pro laude et gloria tua, et pro voluptate nimia singulare opus inchoatum perficere, nec labori parcas. Nam et rem ingenio et doctrina tua dignam, et nobis omnium gratissimam efficies; qui laborum et studiorum tuorum aliquando memores erimus.... Tu vero, si nobis rem gratam efficere cupis, nihil negligentiae committas in hoc opere traducendo. Nihil enim nobis gratius efficere poteris. Librum primum a vertice ad calcem legimus, in cujus translatione voluntati nostrae amplissime satisfactum est.”

On the 3d of January 1454 the Pope writes again to Perotti thanking him for the third book; and in a letter to Torelli, dated 13th November 1453, Perotti says that he had finished his translation of Polybius in the preceding September. This translation was first printed in 1473. The Greek text was not printed till 1530, when an edition of the first five books in Greek, along with Perotti’s translation, was published at the Hague, opera Vincentii Obsopaei, dedicated to George, Marquess of Brandenburg. Perotti’s translation was again printed at Basle in 1549, accompanied by a Latin translation of the fragments of books 6 to 17 by Wolfgang Musculus, and reprinted at the Hague in 1598.

The chief fragments of Polybius fall into two classes; (1) those made by some unknown epitomator, who Casaubon even supposed might be Marcus Brutus, who, according to Plutarch, was engaged in this work in his tent the night before the battle of Pharsalus. The printing of these began with two insignificant fragments on the battle between the Rhodians and Attalus against Philip, Paris, 1536; and another de re navali, Basle, 1537. These fragments have continually accumulated by fresh discoveries. (2) The other class of fragments are those made by the order of Constantinus Porphyrogenitus (911-959), among similar ones from other historians, which were to be digested under fifty-three heads or tituli; one of which (the 27th) has come down to us, discovered in the sixteenth century, containing the selecta de legationibus; and another (the 50th) de virtute et vitio. The printing of the first of these begins with the edition of Fulvius Ursinus, published at Antwerp in 1582. This was supplemented in 1634 (Paris) by an edition by Valesius of excerpta ex collectaneis Constantini Augusti Porphyrogeneti. The first edition of something like a complete text of Polybius, containing the five entire books, the excerptae legationes, and fragments of the other books, was that of Isaac Casaubon, Paris, 1609, fo. It was accompanied by a new and very brilliant Latin translation, and a preface which has been famous among such works. It contains also a Latin translation of Aeneas Tacticus. Altogether it is a splendid book. Some additional annotationes of Casaubon’s were published after his death in 1617, Paris.[2] Other editions followed; that of Gronovius, Amsterdam, 1670: of Ernesti, Leipsic, 1764, containing Casaubon’s translation more or less emended, and additional fragments. But the next important step in the bibliography of Polybius was the publication of the great edition of Schweighaeuser, Leipsic, 1789-1795, in nine volumes, with a new Latin translation,—founded, however, to a great extent on Casaubon,—a new recension of the text, and still farther additions to the fragments; accompanied also by an excellent Lexicon and Onomasticon. This great work has been the foundation from which all modern commentaries on Polybius must spring. Considerable additions to the fragments, collected from MSS. in the Vatican by Cardinal Mai, were published in 1827 at Rome. The chief modern texts are those of Bekker, 1844; Duebner (with Latin translation), 1839 and 1865; Dindorf, 1866-1868, 1882 (Teubner). A new recension of the five books and all the known fragments—founded on a collation of some twelve MSS. and all previous editions, as well as all the numerous works of importance on our Author that have appeared in Germany and elsewhere—was published by F. Hultsch, Berlin, 1867-1872, in four volumes. This must now be considered the standard text. A second edition of the first volume appeared in 1888, but after that part of my translation had passed through the press.

Of English translations the earliest was by Ch. Watson, 1568, of the first five books. It is entitled The Hystories of the most famous Cronographer Polybios; Discoursing of the warres betwixt the Romanes and Carthaginenses, a rich and goodly work, conteining holsome counsels and wonderful devices against the inconstances of fickle Fortune. Englished by C[hristopher] W[atson] whereunto is annexed an Abstract, compendiously coarcted out of the life and worthy Acts perpetrate by oure puissant Prince King Henry the fift. London, Imprinted by Henry Byneman for Tho. Hacket, 1568, 8vo. See Herbert’s Ames, p. 895. Another translation of the five books was published by Edward Grimestone, London, 1634, of which a second and third edition appeared in 1648 and 1673. A translation of the Mercenary War from the first book was made by Sir Walter Raleigh, and published after his death in 1647 (London, 4to). Next, a new translation of the five books was published in London, 1693 (2 vols. 8vo), by Sir H[enry] S[hears], with a preface by Dryden. In 1741 (London, 4to) appeared “A fragment of the 6th book containing a dissertation on government, translated from the Greek of Polybius, with notes, etc., by A Gentleman.” This was followed by the first English translation, which contained any part of the fragments, as well as the five books, by the Rev. James Hampton, London, 4to, 1756-1761, which between that date and 1823 (2 vols., Oxford) went through at least seven editions. Lastly, a translation of Polybius’s account of Hannibal’s passage of the Alps is appended by Messrs. Church and Brodribb to their translation of Livy, 21-22. There is a German translation by A. Haakh and Kraz, Stuttgart, 1858-1875. And a French translation by J. A. C. Buchon, Paris, 1842, Orléans, 1875. For the numerous German essays and dissertations on the text, and particular questions arising from the history, I must refer my readers to Engelmann’s Bibliotheca. In England such studies are rare. Mr. Strachan-Davidson published an essay on Polybius in Hellenica; and his edition of extracts of the text (Oxford, 1888) contains several dissertations of value. Mr. Capes (London, 1888) has published an edition of extracts referring to the Achaean league, with an introductory essay on the author and his work. And a very admirable article on Polybius appears in the recent edition of the Encyclopædia Britannica by Mr. H. F. Pelham. There is also a good paper on Polybius in the Quarterly Review for 1879, No. 296. Criticisms on Polybius, and estimates of his value as an historian, will be found in Thirlwall’s History of Greece, vol. viii.; Arnold’s History of Rome; Mommsen’s History of Rome, book iv. c. xiii.; Freeman’s History of Federal Government and Essays; Bunbury’s Ancient Geography, vol. ii. p. 16; Law’s Alps of Hannibal. For the Roman side of his history, besides the works mentioned by Mr. Strachan-Davidson, a good list of the literature on the 2d Punic war is given by Mr. W. T. Arnold in his edition of Dr. Arnold’s history of that period [London, Macmillan, 1886].

Finally, I have to express my warm thanks to Dr. Warre, Head Master of Eton, for aiding me with his unique knowledge of ancient and modern tactics in clearing up many points very puzzling to a civilian. To Mr. W. Chawner, Fellow and Tutor of Emmanuel College, for reading part of the translation in proof, and making valuable corrections and suggestions. And to Professor Ridgway, of Queen’s College, Cork, for corrections in the geographical fragments of book 34.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

I. POLYBIUS

Fortune cast the life of Polybius in stirring times. His special claim to our admiration is that he understood the importance in the history of the world of the changes which were passing under his eyes, and exerted himself to trace the events which immediately preceded them, and from which they sprang, while it was yet possible to see and question surviving participators in them; to examine places, before they had lost all marks of the great events of which they had been the scene; and records or monuments before time had cast a doubt upon their meaning or authenticity. Nor is this ordinary praise. Men are apt to turn their eyes upon the past, as holding all that is worthy of contemplation, while they fail to take note of history “in the making,” or to grasp the importance of the transactions of their own day. But as every year has its decisive influence on the years which succeed it, the greatest benefactor of posterity is the man who understands and records events as they pass with care and sincerity. Laborious compilation, from the study and comparison of ancient records and monuments, has its value: it may often be all that it is possible to obtain; it may not unfrequently even serve to correct statements of contemporaries which have been deformed by carelessness or coloured by prejudice. But the best compilation is infinitely inferior in interest and instructiveness to the barest report of a contemporary. And when such a man is also an eye-witness of much that he relates; when he knew and conversed with many of the chief actors in the great events which he records; when again he tells us of transactions so remote in time, that all written documents have necessarily perished, and those in more durable bronze and stone all but followed in their train, then indeed the interest rises to the highest pitch. Like Herodotus and Thucydides, then, Polybius tells us of his own times, and of the generations immediately preceding them. It is true that the part of his work which has survived in a complete form deals with a period before his own day, just as the greater part of the history of Herodotus does, but in the larger part of the fragments he is writing with even more complete personal knowledge than Thucydides. He had, again, neither the faculty for story-telling possessed by Herodotus nor the literary and dramatic force of Thucydides. The language which he spoke and wrote had lost the magic of style; had lost the lucidity and grace of Sophocles, and the rugged vigour and terseness of Thucydides. Nor had he apparently acquired any of those artifices which, while they sometimes weary us in the later rhetoricians, yet generally serve to make their writings the easiest and pleasantest of reading. Equally remote again is his style from the elaborate and involved manner of Plutarch, with its huge compound words built up of intricate sentences, more like difficult German than Greek. Polybius had no tricks of this sort;[3] but his style lacks logical order and clearness. It seems rather the language of a man of affairs, who had had neither leisure to study style, nor taste to read widely with a view to literature as such. But after all it is Greek, and Greek that still retained its marvellous adaptability to every purpose, to every shade of thought, and every form of literature. Nor is his style in the purely narrative parts of his work wanting in a certain force, derived from singleness and directness of purpose. He “speaks right on,” and turns neither to the right hand nor the left. It is when he reflects and argues and moralises, that his want of literary skill sometimes makes him difficult and involved; and though the thought is essentially just, and his point of view wonderfully modern, we continually feel the want of that nameless charm which the Greeks called χάρις.

His bent for historical composition was fortunately encouraged by the circumstances of his life, which gave Polybius special opportunities of satisfying his curiosity and completing his knowledge. Not only was he the son of a man who had held the highest office in the league, and so must have heard the politics and history of Achaia discussed from his earliest youth; not only from early manhood was he himself in the thick of political business; but he knew the sovereigns of Egypt and Pergamus, of Macedonia and Syria, and the Roman generals who conquered the latter. He had visited a Roman camp and witnessed its practical arrangements and discipline. And his enforced residence of sixteen years in Italy and Rome was, by the good fortune of his introduction to Aemilius Paullus and his sons, turned into an opportunity of unrivalled advantage for studying the laws, military discipline, and character of the imperial people whose world conquest he chronicles. Unlike his fellow-exiles, he did not allow his depressing circumstances to numb his faculties, exasperate his temper, or deaden his curiosity. He won the confidence of the leading men at Rome; and seems, while pushing on his inquiries with untiring vigour, to have used his influence for the benefit of his countrymen, and of all Greek subjects of Rome.

But, like so many of the writers of antiquity, he has had no one to perform for him the service he had done for others in rescuing their achievements and the particulars of their career from oblivion. Of the many testimonia collected by Schweighaeuser and others from ancient writers, scarcely one gives us any details or anecdotes of the writer, whose work they briefly describe or praise. We are reduced as usual to pick out from his own writings the scattered allusions or statements which help us to picture his character and career.

Polybius of Megalopolis was the son of Lycortas, the friend and partisan of Philopoemen, who had served the Achaean league in several capacities: as ambassador to Rome in B.C. 189, Birth of Polybius. along with Diophanes, on the question of the war with Sparta,[4] and to Ptolemy Epiphanes in B.C. 186, [5] and finally as Strategus in B.C. 184-183. Of the year of his birth we cannot be certain. He tells us that he was elected to go on embassy from the league to Ptolemy Epiphanes in the year of the death of that monarch (B.C. 181), although he was below the legal age.[6] But we do not know for certain what that age was; although it seems likely that it was thirty, that apparently being the age at which a member of the league exercised his full privileges.[7] But assuming this, we do not know how much under that age he was. Two years previously (B.C. 183) he had carried the urn at Philopoemen’s funeral. This was an office usually performed by quite young men (νεανίσκοι)[8], probably not much over twenty years old. As we know that he lived to write a history of the Numantine war, which ended B.C. 133[9], and that he was eighty-two at the time of his death[10], we shall not, I think, be probably far wrong if we place his birth in B.C. 203 and his death in B.C. 121 as Casaubon does, who notes that the latter is just sixteen years before the birth of Cicero. But though this is a good working hypothesis, it is very far from being a demonstrated fact.

Between B.C. 181-168 he was closely allied with his father in politics; and if we wish to have any conception of what he was doing, it is necessary to form some idea of the state of parties in the Peloponnese at the time.

The crowning achievement of Philopoemen’s career had been the uniting of Sparta to the Achaean league, after the murder of the tyrant Nabis by the Aetolians who had come to Sparta as his allies (B.C. 192). In B.C. 191 the Achaeans were allowed to add Messene and Elis to their league, as a reward for their services to Rome in the war against Antiochus. The Aetolian league, the chief enemy and opponent of Achaia, was reduced to a state of humble dependence on Rome in B.C. 189, after the defeat of Antiochus at Thermopylae (B.C. 191) and the Aetolian war (B.C. 191-189). From B.C. 190 then begins the time during which Polybius says that the “name of the Achaeans became the universal one for all the inhabitants of the Peloponnese” (2, [42]). But though Sparta was included in the league she was always a restive and dissatisfied member; and the people of Elis and Messene, who were not very willing members either, were told by Flamininus that if they had any reason to complain of the federal government they were to appeal to him.[11] Now, by a treaty of alliance with Rome, decreed at Sikyon in B.C. 198, it was provided that Rome should receive no envoys from separate states of the league, but only from the league itself.[12] Flamininus, therefore, if he said what Livy reports him to have said, was violating this treaty. And this will be a good instance to illustrate the divisions of parties existing during the period of Polybius’s active political life (B.C. 181-169). We have seen that in B.C. 198 the Achaean league became an ally of Rome as a complete and independent state; that this state was consolidated by the addition of Sparta (192) and Elis and Messene (191) so as to embrace the whole of the Peloponnese; that its chief enemy in Greece, the Aetolian league, was rendered powerless in B.C. 189. The Macedonian influence in the Peloponnese had been abolished after the battle of Cynoscephalae (197) by the proclamation of Greek freedom by Flamininus (196). But all this seeming liberty and growth in power really depended upon the favour of Rome, and was continually endangered not only by the appeals to the Senate from separate states in the league, who conceived themselves wronged, but by treasonable representations of her own envoys, who preferred a party triumph to the welfare and independence of their country[13]. In these circumstances, there were naturally differences of opinion as to the proper attitude for the league government to assume towards a state, which was nominally an equal ally, but really an absolute master. There was one party who were for submissively carrying out the will of the Roman officers who from time to time visited the Peloponnese; and for conciliating the Senate by displaying a perpetual readiness to carry out its wishes, without putting forward in any way the rights which the treaty of 198 had secured to them. The leaders of this party, in the time of Philopoemen, were Aristaenos and Diophanes. The other party, headed till his death by Philopoemen, equally admitting that the Roman government could not be safely defied, were yet for aiming at preserving their country’s independence by strictly carrying out the terms of the Roman alliance, and respectfully but firmly resisting any encroachment upon those terms by the officers representing the Roman government. On Philopoemen’s death (B.C. 183) Lycortas, who had been his most devoted follower, took, along with Archon, the lead of the party which were for carrying out his policy; while Callicrates became the most prominent of the Romanising party. Lycortas was supported by his son Polybius when about B.C. 181 he began to take part in politics. Polybius seems always to have consistently maintained this policy. His view seems to have been that Rome, having crushed Philip and Antiochus, was necessarily the supreme power. The Greeks must recognise facts; must avoid offending Rome; but must do so by keeping to a position of strict legality, maintaining their rights, and neither flattering nor defying the victorious Commonwealth. He believed that the Romans meant fairly by Greece, and that Greek freedom was safe in their hands[14]. But the straightforward policy of the Senate, if it was ever sincere, was altered by the traitor Callicrates in B.C. 179; who, being sent to Rome to oppose what the league thought the unconstitutional restitution of certain Spartan exiles, advised the Senate to use the Romanising party in each state to secure a direct control in Achaia[15]. Acting on this insidious advice, the Roman government began to view with suspicion the legal and independent attitude of the other party, and to believe or affect to believe that they were enemies of the Roman supremacy. Lycortas, Archon, and Polybius, finding themselves the objects of suspicion, not less dangerous because undeserved, to the Roman government, appear to have adopted an attitude of reserve, abstaining from taking an active or prominent part in the business of the assemblies. This, however, did not succeed in averting Roman jealousy; and the commissioners, Gaius Popilius and Gnaeus Octavius, who visited the Peloponnese in B.C. 169, gave out that those who held aloof were as displeasing to the Senate as those who openly opposed it. They were said to have resolved on formally impeaching the three statesmen before the Achaean assembly as being enemies of Rome; but when the assembly met at Aegium, they had failed to obtain any reasonable handle against them, and contented themselves with a speech of general exhortation.[16] This was during the war with Perseus, when the Romans kept a vigilant eye on all parts of Greece, and closely inquired which politicians in the several states ventured to display the least sympathy with the Macedonian king, or were believed to secretly nourish any wish for his success. It speaks strongly both for the independent spirit still surviving in the league, as well as for the character of Archon and Polybius, that they were elected, apparently in the same assembly, the one Strategus and the other Hipparch for the year B.C. 169-168.[17] In this office Polybius doubtless hoped to carry out the principles and discipline of Philopoemen, under whom he had probably served in the cavalry, and whose management of this branch of the service he had at any rate minutely studied.[18] But there was little occasion for the use of the Achaean cavalry in his year. Being sent on a mission to Q. Marcius Philippus at Heracleia to offer the league’s assistance in the war with Perseus, when their help was declined, he remained behind after the other ambassadors had returned, to witness the campaign.[19] After spending some time in the Roman camp, he was sent by Q. Marcius to prevent the Achaeans from consenting to supply five thousand men to Appius Claudius Cento in Epirus. This was a matter of considerable delicacy. He had to choose between offending one or the other powerful Roman. But he conducted the affair with prudence, and on the lines he had always laid down, those, namely, of strict legality. He found the Achaean assembly in session at Sicyon; and he carried his point by representing that the demand of Appius Claudius did not bear on the face of it the order of the Senate, without which they were prohibited from supplying the requisitions of Roman commanders.[20] He thus did not betray that he was acting on the instigation of Quintus Marcius, and put himself and the league in an attitude of loyalty toward the Senate.[21] In the same cautious spirit he avoided another complication. Certain complimentary statues or inscriptions had been put up in various cities of the league in honour of Eumenes, king of Pergamus, and on some offence arising had been taken down. This seems to have annoyed Eumenes exceedingly; and Polybius persuaded the people that it had been ordered by Sosigenes and Diopeithes, as judges, from feelings of personal spite, and without any act of Eumenes unfriendly to the league. He carried his point, and thus avoided offending a king who at that time was on very friendly terms with Rome.[22] But while thus minded to avoid unnecessary offence, Polybius and his party were in favour of strengthening the league by alliances which could be entered upon with safety. Egypt at this time was under the joint government of two Ptolemies, Philometor and Physcon, who were being threatened with an invasion by Antiochus Epiphanes. The friendship of the league with the kings of Egypt had been of long standing, as far back as the time of Aratus; and though that friendship had been afterwards interrupted by the Macedonian policy of Aratus, just before his death the father of these kings had presented the league with ten ships and a sum of money. The two kings now sent to beg for aid; and asked that Lycortas should come as commander-in-chief, and Polybius as hipparch. Lycortas and Polybius were in favour of supplying the assistance asked.[23] But the measure was opposed by Callicrates and his partisans, on the specious ground that their whole efforts should be directed to aid the Romans against Perseus. Lycortas and Polybius replied that the Romans did not require their help; and that they were bound, by gratitude, as well as by treaty, to help the Ptolemies. They carried with them the popular feeling: but Callicrates outwitted them by obtaining a dispatch from Q. Marcius, urging the league to join the senate in effecting a reconciliation between Antiochus and the kings of Egypt. Polybius gave in, and advised compliance. Ambassadors were appointed to aid in the pacification; and the envoys from Alexandria were obliged to depart without effecting their object. They contented themselves with handing in to the magistrates the Royal letters, in which Lycortas and Polybius were invited by name to come to Alexandria.[24]

Careful, however, as he had ever been to avoid giving just offence to Rome, he and his party had long B.C. 167. been marked by the Senate as opponents of that more complete interference in the details of Achaean politics which it wished to exercise. This was partly owing to the machinations of Callicrates; but it was also the result of the deliberate policy of the Senate: and it was doubtless helped by the report of every Roman officer who had found himself thwarted by the appeal to legality, under the influence of the party in the league with which Polybius was connected.[25] Accordingly, soon after the final defeat of Perseus by Aemilius Paulus in B.C. 168, and the consequent dismemberment of Macedonia, the Senate proceeded to execute its vengeance upon those citizens in every state in Greece who were believed to have been opposed to the Roman interests. The commissioners entrusted with the settlement and division of Macedonia were directed to hold an inquiry into this matter also. From every city the extreme partisans of Rome were summoned to assist them, men who were only too ready to sacrifice their political opponents to the vengeance of the power to which they had long been paying a servile and treacherous court. From Boeotia came Mnasippus; from Acarnania, Chremes; from Epirus, Charops and Nicias; from Aetolia, Lyciscus and Tisippus; and from Achaia, Callicrates, Agesias, and Philippus.[26] Instigated by these advisers, the commissioners ordered the supposed covert enemies of Rome in the several states to proceed to Italy to take their trial. To Achaia two commissioners, Gaius Claudius and Gnaeus Domitius, were sent. An Achaean assembly being summoned to meet them, they announced that there were certain men of influence in the league who had helped Perseus by money and other support. They required that a vote should be passed condemning them all to death; and said that, when that was done, they would publish the names. Such a monstrous perversion of justice was too much for the assembly, who refused to vote until they knew the names. The commissioners then said that all the Strategi who had been in office since the beginning of the war were involved. One of them, Xeno, came forward, declared his innocence, and asserted that he was ready to plead his cause before any tribunal, Achaean or Roman. Upon this the commissioners required that all the accused persons should go to Rome. A list of one thousand names was drawn up, under the guidance of Callicrates, of those who were at once to proceed to Italy[27] (B.C. 167). The court of inquiry, before which they were to appear, was never held. They were not allowed even to stay in Rome, but were quartered in various cities of Italy, which were made responsible for their safe custody: and there they remained until B.C. 151, when such of them as were still alive, numbering then somewhat less than three hundred, were contemptuously allowed to return.[28] Among these detenus was Polybius. We do not hear that Lycortas was also one, from which it has been with some probability supposed that he was dead. More fortunate than the rest, Polybius was allowed to remain at Rome. He had made, it seems, the acquaintance of Aemilius Paulus and his two sons in Macedonia, and during the tour of Aemelius through Greece after the Macedonian war.[29] And on their return to Italy he was allowed by their influence to remain in Rome; and, acting as tutor to the two boys,[30] became well acquainted with all the best society in the city. The charming account which he gives[31] of the mutual affection existing between him and the younger son of Aemilius (by adoption now called Publius Scipio Africanus Aemilianus) bears all the marks of sincerity, and is highly to the credit of both. To it we may add the anecdote of Plutarch, that “Scipio, in observance of the precept of Polybius, endeavoured never to leave the forum without having made a close friend of some one he met there.”

But much as he owed to the friendship of the sons of Aemilius, he owed it also to his own energy and cheerful vigour that these sixteen years of exile were not lost time in his life. He employed them, not in fruitless indulgence in homesickness, or in gloomy brooding over his wrongs, but in a careful and industrious study of the history and institutions of the people among whom he was compelled to reside[32]; in ingratiating himself with those members of the Senate who he thought might be useful to his countrymen; and in forming and maturing his judgment as to the course of policy they ought to pursue. Nor was he without means of gratifying lighter tastes. He was an active sportsman: and the boar-hunting in the district of Laurentum not only diverted his attention from the distressing circumstances of his exile, and kept his body in vigorous health, but obtained for him the acquaintance of many men of rank and influence. Thus for instance his intimacy with the Syrian prince Demetrius, afterwards king Demetrius Soter, was made in the hunting-field[33]: and the value which this young man attached to his advice and support is some measure of the opinion entertained generally of his wisdom, moderation, and good judgment. We have no further details of his life in Rome; but we have what is better,—its fruits, in the luminous account of its polity, the constitution of its army, and the aims of its statesmen.

At last the time came when he was once more free to visit his own country, or to extend his knowledge by B.C. 151. Release of the detenus. visiting the countries which he wished to describe. After repeated applications to the Senate by embassies from Achaia, made without avail, in B.C. 151 Polybius appeared in person to plead the cause before the Fathers. There was now, it was thought, no reason for retaining these unfortunate men. The original thousand had shrunk to less than three hundred; middle-aged men had become in sixteen years old and decrepit; they had lost connexions and influence in the Peloponnese; they had learnt by bitter experience the impossibility of resisting the power of Rome, and were no longer likely to venture on organising any opposition. Their longer detention could only be a measure of vengeance, and useless vengeance. Still the debate in the Senate was long and doubtful, until it was brought to a conclusion by the contemptuous exclamation of Cato: “Are we to sit here all day discussing whether some old Greek dotards are to be buried by Italian or Achaean undertakers?” Polybius, elated by a concession thus ungraciously accorded, wished to enter the Senate once more with a further request for a restitution of their property in Achaia. But Cato bluntly bade him “remember Ulysses, who wanted to go back into the cave of the Cyclops to fetch his cap and belt.”[34]

Polybius seems to have returned to the Peloponnese at once, and to have remained there until B.C. 149, Coss. L. Marcius Censornius, Manius Manilius, B.C. 149. Polybius sent for to Lilybaeum. when he was suddenly summoned to serve the government whose enforced guest he had been so long. It was the year in which the Senate had determined to commence their proceedings against Carthage, which were not to be stayed until she was levelled with the ground. In B.C. 150 the victory of Massanissa had restored the oligarchs, who had been superseded by the popular anti-Roman party in Carthage. These men hastened to make every possible offer of submission to Rome. The Senate had made up its mind for war; and yet did not at once say so. After demanding that full satisfaction should be made to Massanissa, it next decreed that the Carthaginians must at once give three hundred of their noblest youths as hostages to the Roman consuls Manilius and Censorinus, who had sailed to Lilybaeum with secret orders to let no concession induce them to stop the war until Carthage was destroyed.[35] There was naturally some hesitation in obeying this demand at Carthage; for the hostages were to be given to the Romans absolutely without any terms, and without any security. They felt that it was practically a surrender of their city. To overcome this hesitation Manilius sent for Polybius, perhaps because he had known and respected him at Rome, and believed that he could trust him; perhaps because his well-known opinion, as to the safety in trusting the Roman fides, might make him a useful agent. But also probably because he was known to many influential Carthaginians, and perhaps spoke their language.[36] He started for Lilybaeum at once. But when he reached Corcyra he was met with the news that the hostages had been given up to the consul: he thought, therefore, that the chance of war was at an end, and he returned to the Peloponnese.[37]

He must soon have learnt his mistake. The Consul, in accordance with his secret instructions,—first to secure the arms in Carthage, and then to insist on the destruction of the town,—gradually let the wretched people know the extent of the submission required of them. These outrageous demands resulted in the Carthaginians taking the desperate resolution of standing a siege. Censorinus and his colleague accordingly began operations; but they were not capable of so great an undertaking. The eyes of the whole army were turned upon Scipio Aemilianus, who was serving as a military tribune. The siege lingered through the summer of B.C. 148 without any result; and when in the autumn Scipio left for Rome, to stand for the Aedileship, he started amidst loud expressions of hope that he might return as Consul, though below the legal age.[38]

The loss of so much of Polybius’s narrative at this point leaves us uncertain when he arrived in Africa: but as he met and conversed with Massanissa,[39] who died in B.C. 148, it seems likely that he did join the army after all in B.C. 149. At any rate he was in Scipio’s train in B.C. 147-146, when he was in chief command of the army, first as consul, and then as proconsul; advised him on sundry points in the formation of his siege works; stood by his side when Carthage was burning; and heard him, as he watched the dreadful sight, utter with tearful eyes the foreboding of what might one day befall Rome.[40] Scipio is also said to have supplied him with ships for an exploring expedition round the coast of Africa;[41] and it seems most likely that this was in his year of consulship (147), as after the fall of Carthage Polybius went home.

The destruction of Carthage took place in the spring of B.C. 146. When Scipio went back to celebrate his triumph, Polybius seems to have returned to the Peloponnese, there to witness another act of vengeance on the part of Rome, and to do what he could to lighten the blow to his countrymen, and to preserve the fragments of their shattered liberties.

Among the restored Achaean exiles were Diaeus, Damocritus, Alcamenes, Theodectes, and Archicrates. They had returned with feelings embittered by their exile; and without any of the experience of active life, which might have taught them to subordinate their private thirst for revenge to the safety of their country. Callicrates died in B.C. 148, and Diaeus was Strategus in B.C. 149-148, 147-146. The appearance of the pseudo-Philip (Andriscus) in Macedonia, and the continued resistance of Carthage during his first year of office (148), encouraged him perhaps to venture on a course, and to recommend the people to adopt a policy, on which he would otherwise not have ventured. Troubles arising out of a disgraceful money transaction between the Spartan Menalchidas, Achaean Strategus, and the Oropians, who had bribed him to aid them against the Athenians, had led to a violent quarrel with Callicrates, who threatened to impeach him for treason to the league in the course of an embassy to Rome. To save himself he gave half the Oropian money to Diaeus, his successor as Strategus (B.C. 149-148). This led to a popular clamour against Diaeus: who, to save himself, falsely reported that the Senate had granted the Achaeans leave to try and condemn certain Spartans for the offence of occupying a disputed territory. Sparta was prepared to resist in arms, and a war seemed to be on the point of breaking out. Callicrates and Diaeus, however, were sent early in B.C. 148 to place the Achaean case before the Senate, while the Spartans sent Menalchidas. Callicrates died on the road. The Senate heard, therefore, the two sides from Diaeus and Menalchidas, and answered that they would send commissioners to inquire into the case. The commissioners, however, were slow in coming; so that both Diaeus and Menalchidas had time to misrepresent the Senate’s answer to their respective peoples. The Achaeans believed that they had full leave to proceed according to the league law against the Spartans; the Spartans believed that they had permission to break off from the league. B.C. 148. Once more, therefore, war was on the point of breaking out.[42] Just at this time Q. Caecilius Metellus was in Macedonia with an army to crush Andriscus. He was sending some commissioners to Asia, and ordered them to visit the Peloponnese on their way and give a friendly warning. It was neglected, and the Spartans sustained a defeat, which irritated them without crushing their revolt. When Diaeus succeeded Damocritus as Strategus in B.C. 147, B.C. 147. he answered a second embassy from Metellus by a promise not to take any hostile steps until the Roman commissioners arrived. But he irritated the Spartans by putting garrisons into some forts which commanded Laconia; and they actually elected Menalchidas as a Strategus in opposition to Diaeus. But finding that he had no chance of success Menalchidas poisoned himself.[43]

Then followed the riot at Corinth.[44] Marcus Aurelius Orestes at the head of a commission arrived at last at Corinth, and there informed the magistrates in council that the league must give up Argos, Corinth, and Sparta. The magistrates hastily summoned an assembly and announced the message from the Senate; a furious riot followed, every man in Corinth suspected of being a Spartan was seized and thrown into prison; the very residence of the Roman commissioners was not able to afford such persons any protection, and even the persons of Orestes and his colleagues were in imminent danger.

Some months afterwards a second commission arrived headed by Sextus Julius Caesar, and demanded, without any express menace, that the authors of the riot should be given up. The demand was evaded; and when Caesar returned to Rome with his report, war was at once declared.

The new Strategus, elected in the autumn of B.C. 147, was Critolaus. He was a bitter anti-Romanist like Diaeus: B.C. 147-146. and these statesmen and their party fancied that the Romans, having already two wars on hand, at Carthage and in Spain, would make any sacrifice to keep peace with Achaia. They had not indeed openly declined the demands of Sextus, but, to use Polybius’s expressive phrase, “they accepted with the left hand what the Romans offered with the right.”[45] While pretending to be preparing to submit their case to the Senate, they were collecting an army from the cities of the league. Inspired with an inexplicable infatuation, which does not deserve the name of courage, Critolaus even advanced northwards towards Thermopylae, as if he could with his petty force bar the road to the Romans and free Greece. He was encouraged, it was said, by a party at Thebes which had suffered from Rome for its Macedonising policy. But, rash as the march was, it was managed with at least equal imprudence. Instead of occupying Thermopylae, they stopped short of it to besiege Trachinian Heracleia, an old Spartan colony,[46] which refused to join the league. While engaged in this, Critolaus heard that Metellus (who wished to anticipate his successor Mummius) was on the march from Macedonia. He beat a hasty retreat to Scarpheia in Locris,[47] which was on the road leading to Elateia and the south; here he was overtaken and defeated with considerable slaughter. Critolaus appears not to have fallen on the field; but he was never seen again. He was either lost in some marshes over which he attempted to escape, as Pausanias suggests, or poisoned himself, as Livy says. Diaeus, as his predecessor, became Strategus, and was elected for the following year also. Diaeus exerted himself to collect troops for the defence of Corinth, nominally as being at war with Sparta. He succeeded in getting as many as fourteen thousand infantry and six hundred cavalry, consisting partly of citizens and partly of slaves; and sent four thousand picked men under Alcamenes to hold Megara, while he himself occupied Corinth. When Metellus approached, however, this outpost at Megara hastily retreated into Corinth. Metellus took up his position in the Isthmus, and offered the Achaeans the fairest terms. Diaeus, however, induced them to reject all offers; and Metellus was kept some time encamped before Corinth.

It was now late in the spring of B.C. 146, and the new Consul, Lucius Mummius, arrived at the Roman camp. B.C. 146. Arrival of Mummius. He at once sent Metellus back to Macedonia, and quietly awaited the arrival of fresh troops, which he had sent for from Crete and Pergamum, as well as from Italy.[48] He eventually had an army of about thirty thousand men, nearly double of the Greek army in Corinth. Nothing apparently was done till the late summer, or autumn. But then the final catastrophe was rapid and complete. The Roman officers regarded the Achaean force with such contempt, that they did not take proper precautions, so that Diaeus won a slight advantage against one of the Roman outposts. Flushed with this success, he drew out for a pitched battle, in which he was totally defeated. He made his way to Megalopolis, where, after killing his wife, he poisoned himself.

Thus by a series of imprudent measures, which Polybius denounces, but was not at home to oppose, the Achaean league had drifted into downright war with Rome; and, almost without a struggle, had fallen helplessly at her feet, forced to accept whatever her mercy or contempt might grant. Mercy, however, was to be preceded by stern punishment. Corinth was given up to plunder and to fire, and Polybius returned from Africa in time to witness it.[49] The destruction or deportation of works of art, of pictures, statues, and costly furniture, he could not prevent; Polybius saves some statues of national interest. but he spoke a successful word to preserve the statues of Philopoemen in the various cities from destruction; and also begged successfully for the restoration of some of the Eponymous hero Achaeus, and of Philopoemen and Aratus, which had already been transported as far as Acarnania on their way to Italy.[50] He also dissuaded his friends from rushing to take their share in the plunder by purchasing the confiscated goods of Diaeus, which were put to auction and could be bought at low rates; and he refused to accept any of them himself.[51]

The settlement of the territories of the league was put into the hands of a commission of ten men who were sent out after the sack of Corinth; The new settlement of the Peloponnese, B.C. 146-145. while Mummius, after seeing that such towns in the Peloponnese as had joined in the war were deprived of their fortifications and arms, and after inflicting punishment upon other towns in Greece which had shown active sympathy with Perseus, especially Thebes and Chalcis, returned home to celebrate his triumph, which was adorned with marble and bronze statues and pictures from Corinth.[52] The commissioners who had been sent out to make a final settlement of Greece, or Achaia, as it was henceforth to be called in official language, settled the general plan in conjunction with Mummius; but the commissioners continued their labours for six months, at the end of which time they departed, leaving Polybius to settle with each town the details of their local legislation. The general principles which the commissioners laid down were first, the entire abolition of all the leagues, and consequently of the league assemblies; each town, with its surrounding district, which had once formed a canton in the league, was to be separate and independent: its magistrates, secondly, were to be selected according to a fixed assessment of property, the old equality or democracy being abolished: thirdly, no member of one canton might own property in another: fourthly, the Boeotians were ordered to pay a heavy compensation to the Heracleots and Euboeans, and the Achaeans to the Spartans: lastly, a fixed tribute to Rome was imposed on all states in Greece.[53] Some of these measures were in a few years’ time relaxed, the fines were mitigated, the rule against inter-possession of property was abolished, and the league assemblies were again allowed for certain local purposes. But this was the end of the league as a free federation. It is often said that “Greece was now reduced to the form of a Roman province under the name of Achaia.” This is true in a sense, and yet is misleading. Achaia did not become a province like the other provinces, yearly allotted to a proconsul or propraetor or legatus, until the time of Augustus. Such direct interference from a Roman magistrate as was thought necessary was left to the governor of Macedonia.[54] Yet in a certain sense Achaia was treated as a separate entity, and had a “formula,” or constitution, founded on the separate local laws which the commissioners found existing, or imposed, with the help of Polybius, on the several states; it paid tribute like other provinces, and was in fact, though called free, subject to Rome.

Polybius performed his task of visiting the various towns in the Peloponnese, explaining when necessary the meaning of the new arrangements, and advising them, when they had to make others for themselves, so much to the satisfaction of every one, that there was a universal feeling that he had been a benefactor to his country, and had made the best of their situation that could be made. Statues of him are mentioned by Pausanias in several places in the Peloponnese: in Mantinea[55] and at Megalopolis,[56] with an inscription in elegiacs to the effect that “he had travelled over every land and sea; was an ally of the Romans, and mitigated their wrath against Greece.” Another in the temple of Persephone, near Acacesium,[57] under which was a legend stating that “Greece would not have erred at all if she had obeyed Polybius; and that when she did err, he alone proved of any help to her.” There were others also at Pallantium,[58] Tegea,[59] and Olympia.[60]

In these services to his country Polybius was occupied in B.C. 145. Of his life after that we have no detailed record. He is believed to have visited Scipio while engaged on the siege of Numantia (B.C. 134-132), on which he wrote a separate treatise.[61] We know also that he visited Alexandria in the reign of Ptolemy Physcon (B.C. 146-117), and expressed his contempt for the state of the people and their rulers.[62] These years must have been also much occupied with the extension of his history, which he originally intended should end with the fall of the Macedonian kingdom (B.C. 168),[63] but which was afterwards continued to the fall of Carthage and Greece (B.C. 146);[64] for even if the history had been completed up to its originally intended limit, and the notice of extension afterwards inserted, there still was enough to do to occupy some years of a busy life; especially as he seems to have carried out his principle that an historian ought to be a traveller, visiting the localities of which he speaks, and testing by personal inspection the possibility of the military evolutions which he undertakes to describe. His travels appear certainly to have embraced the greater part of Gaul, and it even seems possible from one passage that he visited Britain.[65] His explorations on the African coast were doubtless extensive, and he appears to have visited Phoenicia, Cilicia, and Asia Minor. We hear of him at Sardis, though we cannot fix the date of the visit.[66] Lastly, Lucian tells us that, “returning from the country, he had a fall from his horse, from the effects of which he died at the age of eighty-two.” No place is given, and no clue which may help us to be certain of the date.[67] Polybius, besides the general history, had written a treatise on Tactics,[68] a panegyric on Philopoemen,[69] a history of the Numantine war,[70] and perhaps a treatise on public speaking (δημηγορία).[71]

§ 2.—THE SOURCES OF POLYBIUS’S HISTORY

Polybius always maintains that the study of documents is only one, and not the most important, element in the equipment of an historian. The best is personal experience and personal inquiry.

Of the sources of his own history, then, the first and best Personal knowledge. may be set down as knowledge acquired by being actually present at great events, such as the destruction of Carthage and the sack of Corinth; visits to the Roman army in camp; assisting at actual debates in his own country; personal knowledge of and service under men of the first position in Achaia; personal visits to famous localities; voyages and tours undertaken for the definite object of inspection and inquiry; and, lastly, seeing and questioning the survivors of great battles, or the men who had played a leading part in conspicuous political transactions.

From his earliest youth Polybius had enjoyed some special advantages in these respects. As he himself says, “the events in Greece fell within his own generation, or that immediately preceding his own,—and he therefore could relate what he had seen, or what he had heard from eye-witnesses” (4, [2]). And of the later period he “was not only an eye-witness, but in some cases an actor, and in others the chief actor” (3, [4]). When he was probably under twenty we hear of his being present at an important interview between Philopoemen and Archon;[72] and his election as hipparch in B.C. 169, soon after he reached the legal age, was in consequence of his having thrown himself with vigour into the practical working of the cavalry under Philopoemen. In regard to Roman history and polity, we have Cicero’s testimony that he was bonus auctor in primis,[73] and more particularly in regard to chronology, quo nemo fuit in exquirendis temporibus diligentius.[74] Nor is this praise undeserved, as is shown by his energy in pushing minute and personal inquiries. Thus he learnt the details of the Hannibalic war from some of the survivors of those actually engaged; visited the localities, and made the pass of the Alps used by Hannibal;[75] studied and transcribed the stele or bronze tablet placed by Hannibal on the Lacinian promontory;[76] travelled through Libya, Spain, Gaul, and the seas which washed their shores (perhaps even as far as Britain), in order to give a true account of them.[77] Conversed with Massanissa on the character of the Carthaginians, as well as with many of the Carthaginians themselves.[78] Carefully observed Carthagena.[79] Inspected the records at Rhodes,[80] and the Archives at Rome;[81] and studied and transcribed the treaties preserved there.[82] Visited Sardis,[83] Alexandria,[84] and Locri Epizephyrii.[85] To this, which is by no means an exhaustive account of his travels and inquiries, may be added the fact that his intimacy with the younger Africanus, grandson by adoption and nephew by marriage of the elder Scipio, must have placed at his disposal a considerable mass of information contained in the family archives of the Scipios, as to the Hannibalian war, and especially as to the campaigns in Spain.[86]

Such were some of the means by which Polybius was enabled to obtain accurate and trustworthy information.

It remains to inquire how far Polybius availed himself of Use of previous writers by Polybius. the writings of others. He looks upon the study of books as an important part of an historian’s work, but, as we have seen, not the most important. His practice appears to have been conformable to his theory. The greater part of his information he gained from personal observation and personal inquiry. Nevertheless, some of his history must have been learnt from books, and very little of it could have been entirely independent of them. Still, as far as we have the means of judging from the fragments of his work that have come down to us, his obligations to his predecessors are not as extensive as that of most of those who wrote after him; nor is the number of those to whom he refers great.[87]

Of his preliminary sketch contained in books 1 and 2, The Punic wars. the first book, containing the account of the first Punic war and the Mercenary war, appears to have been derived mainly from the writings of Fabius Pictor (b. circ. B.C. 260), and Philinus of Agrigentum (contemporary and secretary of Hannibal). He complains that they were violent partisans, the one of Rome, the other of Carthage.[88] But by comparing the two, and checking both by documents and inscriptions at Rome, he, no doubt, found sufficient material for his purpose.

The second book contains an account of the origin of the Illyrians and Gauls. war between Rome and Illyricum; of the Gallic or Celtic wars from the earliest times; and a sketch of Achaean history to the end of the Cleomenic war. The first two of these must have been compiled with great labour from various public documents and family records, as well as in part from Pictor. The sketch of Achaia. Achaean history rested mainly, as far as it depends on books, on the Memoirs of Aratus; while he studied only to refute the writings of Phylarchus the panegyrist of Cleomenes. He complains of the partiality of Phylarchus: but in this part of the history it was perhaps inevitable that his own views should have been coloured by the prejudices and prepossessions of a politician, and one who had been closely connected from boyhood with the patriotic Achaean party, led by Philopoemen, which was ever at enmity with all that Cleomenes did his utmost to establish.

For his account of Sicilian affairs he had studied the works Sicilian history. of Timaeus of Tauromenium. Although he accuses him bitterly, and at excessive length,[89] of all the faults of which an historian can be guilty, he yet confesses that he found in his books much that was of assistance to him[90] in regard both to Magna Graecia and Sicily; for which he also consulted the writings of Aristotle, especially it appears the now lost works on Polities (πολιτείαι), and Founding of Cities (κτίσεις). The severity of his criticism of Timaeus is supported by later authors. He was nicknamed ἐπιτίμαιος, in allusion to the petulance of his criticism of others;[91] and Plutarch attacks him for his perversion of truth and his foolish and self-satisfied attempts to rival the best of the ancient writers, and to diminish the credit of the most famous philosophers.[92]

As far as we possess his writings, we find little trace in Greek history. Polybius of a reference to the earliest historians. Herodotus is not mentioned, though there may be some indications of acquaintance with his work;[93] nor the Sicilian Philistus who flourished about B.C. 430. Thucydides is mentioned once, and Xenophon three times. Polybius was engaged in the history of a definite period, and had not much occasion to refer to earlier times; and perhaps the epitomator, in extracting what seemed of value, chose those parts especially where he was the sole or best authority.

For the early history of Macedonia, he seems to have relied Macedonia. mostly on two pupils of Isocrates, Ephorus of Cumae and Theopompus of Chios; though the malignity of the latter deprived his authority of much weight.[94] He also studied the work of Alexander’s friend and victim, Callisthenes; and vehemently assailed his veracity, as others have done. More important to him perhaps were the writings of his own contemporaries, the Rhodians Antisthenes and Zeno; though he detects them in some inaccuracies, which in the case of Zeno he took the trouble to correct: and of Demetrius of Phalerum, whose writings he seems to have greatly admired.

For the contemporary history of Egypt and Syria he seems Egypt and Syria. to have trusted principally to personal inquiry. He expressly (2, [37]) declines entering on the early history of Egypt on the ground of its having been fully done by others (referring, perhaps, to Herodotus, Manetho, and Ptolemy of Megalopolis). For the Seleucid dynasty of Syria he quotes no authorities.

On no subject does Polybius seem to have read so widely Geography. as on geography: doubtless as preparing himself not only for writing, but for being able to travel with the knowledge and intelligence necessary to enable him to observe rightly. He had studied minutely and criticised freely the writings of Dicaearchus, Pytheas, Eudoxus, and Eratosthenes. He was quick to detect fallacies in these writers, and to reject their dogmatising on the possibilities of nature; yet he does not seem to have had in an eminent degree the topographical faculty, or the power of giving a graphic picture of a locality. Modern research has tended rather to strengthen than weaken our belief in the accuracy of his descriptions, as in the case of Carthagena and the site of the battle of Cannae; still it cannot be asserted that he is to be classed high in the list of topographers, whether scientific or picturesque.

He appears to have been fairly well acquainted with the General Literature. poets; but his occasions for quoting them, as far as we have his work, are not very frequent. He seems to have known his Homer, as every Greek was bound to do. He quotes the Cypria of Stasinus, who, according to tradition, was son-in-law of Homer; Hesiod, Simonides of Ceos, Pindar, Euripides, and Epicharmus of Cos. He quotes or refers to Plato, whom he appears chiefly to have studied for his political theories; and certain technical writers, such as Aeneas Tacticus, and Cleoxenos and Democlitus, inventors of a new system of telegraphy, if they wrote it rather than taught it practically.

Even allowing for the loss of so great a part of his work, the list of authors is not a long one: and it suggests the remark, which his style as well as his own professions tend to confirm, that he was not primarily a man of letters, but a man of affairs and action, who loved the stir of political agitation, and unbent his mind by the excitement of travel and the chase. Nothing moves his contempt more than the idea of Timaeus living peaceably for fifty years at Athens, holding aloof from all active life, and poring over the books in the Athenian libraries as a preparation for writing history; which, according to him, can only be worth reading when it springs, not from rummaging Record offices, but from taking a personal share in the political strife of the day; studying military tactics in the camp and field; witnessing battles; questioning the actors in great events; and visiting the sites of battles, the cities and lands which are to be described.

§ 3. THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE[95]

To the student of politics the history of Greece is chiefly interesting as offering examples of numerous small states enjoying complete local autonomy, yet retaining a feeling of a larger nationality founded in a community of blood, language, and religion; a community, that is, in the sense that, fundamentally united in these three particulars, they yet acknowledged variations even in them, which distinguished without entirely separating them. From some points of view the experiment may be regarded as having been successful. From others it was a signal failure. Local jealousies and mutual provocations not only continually set city against city, clan against clan, but perpetually suggested invitations sent by one city, or even one party in a city, to foreign potentates or peoples to interfere in their behalf against another city or party, which they hated or feared, but were too weak to resist. Thus we find the Persians, Macedonians, Syrians, and Romans successively induced to interfere in Greek politics with the assurance that there were always some states, or some party in each state, who would welcome them. From time to time men of larger views had conceived the idea of creating a united Empire of Hellas, which might present an unbroken front to the foreigner. From time to time philosophers had preached the impossibility of combining complete local independence with the idea of a strong and vigorous nationality. But the true solution of the problem had never been successfully hit upon: and after various abortive attempts at combination, Greece was left, a helpless collection of disjointed fragments, to fall under the intrigues of Macedonia and Rome.

The Achaean league was not the first attempt at such a formation; though it was the first that ever arrived at anything like a complete scheme of federalism (unless the Aetolian preceded it); and was in many respects a fresh departure in Hellenic policy, and the first experiment in federation which seemed to contain the elements of success. From the earliest times certain Greek states had combined more or less closely, or loosely, for certain specific purposes. Such were the various Amphictyonies, and especially the Amphictyonic league of Thermopylae and Delphi. The object of these was primarily religious: the worship of a particular deity, the care of a particular temple; the first condition of membership being therefore community of blood. But though this was the origin of their being, there were elements in their constitution which might have developed into some form of federalism, had it not been for the centrifugal forces that always tended to keep Greek states apart. Thus we can conceive the idea of the Pylagorae from the various states gradually giving rise to the notion of a central parliament of elected representatives; and the sphere of its activity gradually extending to matters purely political, beginning with those which were on the borderland of religion and politics. And, indeed, the action of the great Amphictyonic league at times seemed to be approaching this.[96]

But the forces tending to decentralisation were always the stronger: and though the league continued to exist for many centuries, it became less and less political, and less and less influential in Greece. So too with other combinations in Greece. The community (τὸ κοινὸν) of the Ionians, beginning with a common meeting for worship at the Panionium, on one memorable occasion at least seemed for a brief space to promise to develop into a federation for mutual succour and defence. In the Ionian revolt in B.C. 500, the deputies (πρόβουλοι) of the Ionian states met and determined to combine against the enemy; they even went so far as to appoint a common general or admiral. But the instinct of separation was too strong; at the first touch of difficulty and hardship the union was resolved into its elements.[97]

The constitution of the Boeotian league was somewhat more regular and permanent. The Boeotarchs appear to have met at regular intervals, and now and again to have succeeded in mustering a national levy. There were also four regularly constituted “Senates” to control them, though we know nothing of their constitution.[98] But the league had come to nothing; partly from the resistance of the towns to the overweening pretensions of Thebes, and later from the severity of the treatment experienced by it at the hands of Alexander and his successors.

Thessaly, again, was a loose confederacy of towns or cantons, in which certain great families, such as the Aleuadae and Scopadae, held the direction of their local affairs; or some tyrannus, as Alexander of Pherae, obtained sovereign powers. Still, for certain purposes, a connexion was acknowledged, and a Tagus of Thessaly was appointed, with the power of summoning a general levy of men. For a short time prior to the Roman conquest these officers appear to have gained additional importance; but Thessaly never was united enough to be of importance, in spite of its famous cavalry, even among Greek nations, far less to be capable of presenting a firm front to the foreigner.

One other early attempt at forming something like a Panhellenic union ought to be noticed. When the Persian invasion of B.C. 480 was threatening, deputies (πρόβουλοι) met at the Isthmus, sat there in council for some months, and endeavoured to unite Greece against the foreigner.[99] But the one expedition which was sent solely by their instigation proved a failure.[100] And when the danger was over, principally by the combined exertion of Athens and Sparta, this council seems to have died a natural death. Still for a time it acted as a supreme parliament of Greece, and assumed the power to punish with fine or death those Greeks who had medised.[101]

Besides these rudimentary leagues, which might, but did not, issue in some form of Panhellenic government, there were periods in Greek history in which the Hegemone of one state did something towards presenting the appearance of union. Thus Polycrates of Samos seemed at one time to be likely to succeed in forming a great Ionian Empire. And in continental Greece, before the Persian wars, we find Sparta occupying the position of an acknowledged court of reference in international questions,[102]—a position in which she probably had been preceded by Argos. And after those wars, by means of the confederacy of Delos, formed at first for one specific purpose—that of keeping the Aegean free of the Persians—Athens gradually rose to the position of an imperial city, claiming active control over the external politics of a considerable portion of Greece and nearly all the islands (B.C. 478-404). But this proved after all but a passing episode in Greek history. Athens perhaps misused her power; and Sparta took up the task with great professions, but in a spirit even less acceptable to the Greek world than that of Athens; and by the peace of Antalcidas (B.C. 387) the issue of the hundred years’ struggle with Persia left one of the fairest portions of Hellas permanently separated from the main body. Asiatic Greece never became Hellenic again. The fall of the Persian empire before the invasion of Alexander for a while reunited it to a semi-Greek power; but Alexander’s death left it a prey to warring tyrants. It lost its prosperity and its commerce; and whatever else it became, it was never independent, or really Hellenic again.

For a few years more Sparta and then Thebes assumed to be head of Greece, but the Macedonian supremacy secured at Chaeronea (B.C. 338), still more fully after the abortive Lamian war (B.C. 323), left Greece only a nominal freedom, again and again assured to it by various Macedonian monarchs, but really held only on sufferance. The country seemed to settle down without farther struggle into political insignificance. The games and festivals went on, and there was still some high talk of Hellenic glories. But one after another of the towns submitted to receive Macedonian garrisons and governors; and Athens, once the brilliant leader in national aspirations, practically abandoned politics, and was content to enjoy a reputation partly founded on her past, and partly on the fame of the philosophers who still taught in her gardens and porches, and attracted young men from all parts of the world to listen to their discourses, and to sharpen their wits by the acute if not very useful discussions which they promoted.[103] Sparta, far from retaining her old ascendency, had been losing with it her ancient constitution, which had been the foundation of her glory, as well perhaps as in some respects the source of her weakness; and for good or evil had ceased to count for much in Hellenic politics.

In the midst of this general collapse two portions of the Hellenic race gradually formed or recovered some sort of united government, which enabled them to play a conspicuous part in the later history of Greece, and which was essentially different from any of the combinations of earlier times of which I have been speaking. These were the Aetolians and Achaeans.

With regard to the former our information is exceedingly Aetolian league. scanty. They were said to have been an emigration from Elis originally;[104] but they were little known to the rest of Greece. Strange stories were told of them, of their savage mode of life, their scarcely intelligible language, their feeding on raw flesh, and their fierceness as soldiers. They were said to live in open villages, widely removed from each other, and without effective means of combination for mutual protection. Their piracies, which were chiefly directed to the coasts of Messenia, caused the Messenians to seize the opportunity of Demosthenes being in their neighbourhood in B.C. 426, with a considerable Athenian army, to persuade him to invade the Aetolians, who were always on the look-out to attack Naupactus, a town which the Athenians had held since B.C. 455,[105] and which was naturally an object of envy to them as commanding the entrance to the Corinthian gulf. But when Demosthenes attempted the invasion, he found to his cost that the Aetolians knew how to combine, and he had to retire beaten with severe loss.[106] The separate tribes in Aetolia seem soon afterwards to have had, if they had not already, some form of central government; for we find them negotiating with Agesilaus in B.C. 390, with the same object of obtaining Naupactus,[107] when the Athenians had lost it, and it had fallen into the hands of the Locrians.[108] The Aetolians appear to have gradually increased in importance: for we find Philip making terms with them and giving them the coveted Naupactus in B.C. 341, which had at some time previous come into the possession of the Achaeans.[109] But their most conspicuous achievement, which caused them to take a position of importance in Greece, was their brilliant defeat of the invading Gauls at Delphi in B.C. 279.[110] By this time their federal constitution must in some shape have been formed. The people elected a Strategus in a general meeting, usually held at Thermus, at the autumn equinox, to which apparently all Aetolians were at liberty to come, and at which questions of peace and war and external politics generally were brought forward; though meanwhile the Strategus appears to have had the right of declaring and carrying on war as he chose. There was also a hipparch and a secretary (21, [22]); and a senate called Apocleti (20, [1]); and a body called Synedri (C. I. G. 2350), which seem to have been judicial, and another called Nomographi (13, [1], C. I. G. 3046), who were apparently an occasional board for legislation. They produced some writers, but their works are lost. Accordingly, as Professor Mahaffy observes, “we know them entirely from their enemies.” Still the acknowledged principle on which they acted, ἄγειν λάφυρον ἀπὸ λαφύρου[111]—that is, that where spoils were going, whether from friend or foe, they were justified in taking a part, speaks for itself, and is enough to stamp them as at least dangerous and unpleasant neighbours.

The Achaeans have a different and more interesting Achaean league. history.

The original Achaean league consisted of a federation of twelve cities and their respective territory (μέρος): Pellene, Aegira, Aegae, Bura, Helice, Aegium, Rhypes, Patrae, Pharae, Olenus, Dyme, Tritaea.[112] This league was of great antiquity, but we know nothing of its history, or how it differed from other leagues, such as I have already mentioned, in adding political to religious unity. In B.C. 454 it submitted to Athens; but was restored to its original position in the same year on the signing of the thirty years’ truce between Sparta and Athens;[113] and though the Athenians demanded that their authority over it should be restored to them in B.C. 425, when they had caught the Spartan army at Sphacteria, no change appears to have been made.[114] Thucydides certainly seems to speak of it, not as entirely free, but as in some special manner subject to the supremacy of Sparta. Polybius, however, claims for them, at an early period, a peculiar and honourable place in Greek politics, as being distinguished for probity and honour. Thus they were chosen as arbitrators in the intestine of Magna Graecia (about B.C. 400-390); and again, after the battle of Leuctra (B.C. 371) to mediate between Sparta and Thebes.[115] They must therefore, between B.C. 425-390, have obtained a virtual independence. They shared, however, in the universal decline of Hellenic activity during the Macedonian period (B.C. 359 to about B.C. 285), and Polybius complains that they were systematically depressed by the intrigues of Sparta and Macedonia; both which powers took care to prevent any Achaean of promising ability from attaining influence in the Peloponnese.[116] The same influence was exerted to estrange the Achaean cities from each other. They were garrisoned by Macedonian troops, or fell under the power of tyrants; and to all appearance the league had fared as other such combinations had fared before, and had been resolved into its original elements.

But the tradition of the old union did not die out entirely. Eight of the old cities still existed in a state of more or less vigour. Revival of the league, B.C. 284-280. Olenus and Helice had long ago disappeared by encroachments of the sea (before B.C. 371), and their places had not been filled up by others. Two other towns, Rhypes and Aegae, had from various causes ceased to be inhabited, and their places had been taken in the league (before the dissolution) by Leontium and Caryneia. There were therefore ten cities which had once known the advantages and disadvantages of some sort of federal union; as well as the misfortunes which attached to disunion, aggravated by constant interference from without.

The first step in an attempt to resuscitate the league was taken in the 124th Olympiad (B.C. 284-280). Macedonia was at the time weakened by the troubles of a disputed succession: Pyrrhus was absorbed in his futile Italian expedition: B.C. 284. First union of Dyme, Patrae, Tritaea, Pharae. a change in the sovereign of Egypt opened a way to a possible change of policy at Alexandria: and the death of Lysimachus gave the monarchs something else to do than to trouble themselves about the Peloponnese. At this period four of the Achaean towns, Dyme, Patrae, Tritaea, and Pharae, formed a league for mutual help. Adherence of Aegium, B.C. 279. This proving, after a trial of five years, to have some stability, it was joined by Aegium, from which the Macedonian garrison was expelled. At intervals, of which we are not informed, this was again joined by Bura and Caryneia. B.C. 279-255. These seven cities continued to constitute the entire league for twenty-five years; the federal magistrates consisting of two Strategi, elected by each city in turns, and a secretary. As to the doings of the league during this period we are entirely in the dark. Margos of Caryneia first sole Strategus, B.C. 255. The next step that we hear of is the abolition of the dual presidency and the election of Margos of Caryneia as sole Strategus. We are not told the reasons of the change; but it is clear that a divided command might often give room for delay, when delay was fatal; and for the conflict of local interests, where the interests of the community should be the paramount consideration. At any rate the change was made: and Margos, who had been a loyal servant of the league, was the first sole Strategus. His immediate successors we do not know. The next fact in the history of the league was the adherence of Sicyon, a powerful town and the first of any, not in the number of the old Achaean federation, to join. This therefore was a great step in the direction of extending the federation over the Peloponnese; and it was the work of the man destined to do much in moulding the league into the shape in which it attained its greatest effectiveness, Aratus of Sicyon. He found it weak; its cities poor and insignificant; with no aid from rich soil or good harbourage to increase its wealth or property;[117] he left it, not indeed free from serious dangers and difficulties,—in part the result of his own policy in calling in the aid of the Macedonians, in part created by the persistent hostility of Aetolia and Sparta,—but yet possessed of great vitality, and fast becoming the most powerful and influential of all the Greek governments; although at no time can it be spoken of as Panhellenic without very considerable exaggeration. Aratus had been brought up in exile at Argos, after the murder of his father Cleinias (B.C. 271); and, when twenty years of age, by a gallant and romantic adventure, had driven out the tyrant Nicocles from Sicyon (B.C. 251). He became the chief magistrate of his native town, which he induced to join the Achaean league, thus causing, as I have said, the league to take its first step towards embracing all the Peloponnese. It seems that for five years Aratus remained chief magistrate of Sicyon, but a private citizen of the league. In B.C. 245 (though of the exact year we have no positive information), he appears to have been first elected Strategus of the league. But it was not until his second year of office, B.C. 243-242, that he began putting in practice the policy which he proposed to himself,—the expulsion of the Macedonian garrisons and the despots from the cities of the Peloponnese, with the view of their joining the league. He began with the Acrocorinthus. Corinth, freed from the foreign garrison, joined the league, and was followed soon after by Megara[118] (B.C. 240). From this time Aratus was Strategus of the league in alternate years to the time of his death, the federal law not allowing two consecutive years of office.[119]

The death of Antigonus Gonatas (B.C. 239) led to a new departure. Hitherto the Aetolians had been in league with the Macedonians to vex and harry the Achaeans. The two leagues now made peace, and the Aetolians aided the Achaeans in their resistance to Gonatas’s successor, Demetrius (B.C. 239-229). Still the despots in many of the Peloponnesian towns held out, trusting to the support of Demetrius. When he died (B.C. 229) there was a general movement among them to abdicate and join their cities to the league. Lydiades of Megalopolis had done so during Demetrius’s lifetime; and now Aristomachus of Argos, Xeno of Hermione, and Cleonymus of Phlius did the same. The rapid extension of the Achaean league, however, could not fail to excite the jealousy of the Aetolians, to whose league belonged certain Arcadian cities such as Mantinea, Tegea, and Orchomenus. These they imagined to be threatened by the policy of Aratus, which was apt to proceed on the line that even a forcible attachment of a Peloponnesian town to the league was in reality a liberation of its people from a constraining power. The Spartan jealousy was aroused by the same fear. And then, as Polybius puts it, the Aetolians connived at the extension of Spartan power, even at the expense of cities in league with themselves, in order to strengthen Cleomenes in his attitude of opposition to the Achaeans.[120] Aratus, however, resolved to wait for some definite act of hostility before moving. This was supplied by Cleomenes building a fort (the Athenaeum) at Belbina, in the territory of Megalopolis, a league city. Cleomenic war, B.C. 227-221. Upon this the league necessarily proclaimed war with Sparta. Thus does Polybius, a warm friend of the league, state the case in its behalf. The league, he argues, had been growing by the voluntary adherence of independent towns: it had shown no sign of an intention to attack Laconian territory, or towns in league with Aetolia: while Cleomenes had committed an act of wanton aggression and provocation by building a hostile fort in its territory. But what the other side had to say may be gathered from Plutarch’s life of Cleomenes, founded principally on the work of Phylarchus the panegyrist of Cleomenes.[121] Here the case is put very differently. Aratus, according to him, had made up his mind that a union of the Peloponnesus was the one thing necessary for the safety of the league. In a great measure he had been already successful; but the parts which still stood aloof were Elis, Laconia, and the cities of Arcadia which were under the influence of Sparta.[122] He therefore harassed these last by every means in his power; and the erection or fortification of the Athenaeum at Belbina by Cleomenes was in truth only a measure of necessary defence. Aratus, indeed, held that some of these Arcadian cities had been unfairly seized by Cleomenes, with the connivance of the Aetolians;[123] but to this Cleomenes might reply that, if the league claimed the right of extending its connexion with the assent, often extorted, of the various cities annexed, the same right could not justly be denied to himself. B.C. 226-221.A series of military operations took place during the next five years, in which Cleomenes nearly always got the better of Aratus; who, able and courageous in plots and surprises, was timid and ineffective in the field. The one important blow struck by Aratus, that of seizing Mantinea, was afterwards nullified by a counter-occupation of it by the Lacedaemonians; and in spite of troubles at home, caused by his great scheme of reform, Cleomenes was by B.C. 224 in so superior a position that he could with dignity propose terms to the league. He asked to be elected Strategus, therefore.[124] At first sight this seemed a means of effecting the desired union of the Peloponnese; and as such the Achaeans were inclined to accept the proposal. Aratus, however, exerted all his influence to defeat the measure: and, in spite of all his failures, his services to the league enabled him to convince his countrymen that they should reject the offer; and he was himself elected Strategus for the twelfth time in the spring of B.C. 223. Aratus has been loudly condemned for allowing a selfish jealousy to override his care for the true interests of his country, in thus refusing a prospect of a united Achaia, in which some one besides himself should be the leading man.[125] But I think there is something to be said on the other side. What Aratus had been working for with a passionate eagerness was a union of free democratic states. Cleomenes, in spite of his liberal reforms at home, was a Spartan to the back bone. Aratus would have no manner of doubt that a league, with Sparta supreme in it, would inevitably become a Spartan kingdom. The forces of Sparta would be used to crush dissenting cities; and soon to put down the free institution which would always be disliked and feared by the Spartan government. Security from Macedonian influence, if it were really obtained,—and that was far from certain,—would be dearly purchased at the price of submission to Spartan tyranny, which would be more galling and oppressive in proportion as it was nearer and more unremitting. With these views Aratus began to turn his eyes to the Macedonian court, as the only possible means of resisting the encroaching policy of Cleomenes. The character of Antigonus Doson, who was then administering Macedonia, gave some encouragement to hope for honest and honourable conduct on his part; and after some hesitation Aratus took the final step of asking for his aid.[126] I do not expect to carry the assent of many readers when I express the opinion that he was right; and that the Greek policy towards Macedonia had been from the first a grievous error,—fostered originally by the patriotic eloquence of Demosthenes, and continued ever since by that ineradicable sentiment for local autonomy which makes Greek history so interesting, but inevitably tended to the political annihilation of Greece. Had some modus vivendi been found with the series of very able sovereigns who ruled Macedonia, a strong Greek nation might have been the result, with a central government able to hold its own even in the face of the great “cloud in the West,” which was surely overshadowing Greek freedom. But this was not to be. The taste for local freedom was too strong; and showed itself by constant appeals to an outside power against neighbours, which yet the very men who appealed to it would not recognise or obey. The Greeks had to learn that nations cannot, any more than individuals, eat their cake and have it too. Local autonomy, and the complete liberty of every state to war with its neighbours as it chooses, and of every one to speak and act as he pleases, have their charms; but they are not compatible with a united resistance to a great centralised and law-abiding power. And all the eloquence of all the Greek orators rolled into one could not make up for the lack of unity, or enable the distracted Greeks to raise an army which might stand before a volley of Roman pila or a charge of Roman legionaries.

The help asked of Antigonus Doson was given with fatal readiness; but it had to be purchased by the admission of a Macedonian garrison into the Acrocorinthus, one of those “fetters of Greece,” the recovery of which had been among Aratus’s earliest and most glorious triumphs. The battle of Sellasia (B.C. 221) settled the question of Spartan influence. Cleomenes fled to Alexandria and never returned. Sparta was not enslaved by Antigonus; who on the contrary professed to restore her ancient constitution,—probably meaning that the Ephoralty destroyed by Cleomenes was to be reconstituted, and the exiles banished by him recalled. Practically she was left a prey to a series of unscrupulous tyrants who one after the other managed to obtain absolute power, Lycurgus (B.C. 220-210), Machanidas, B.C. 210-207; Nabis, B.C. 207-192; who, though differing in their home administrations, all agreed in using the enmity of the Aetolians in order to harass and oppress the Achaeans in every possible way.

Aratus died in B.C. 213. B.C. 213. Death of Aratus. The last seven years of his life were embittered by much ill success in his struggles with the Aetolians; and by seeing Philip V., of whose presence in the Peloponnese he was the main cause, after rendering some brilliant services to the league, both in the Peloponnese and the invasion of Aetolia, develop some of the worst vices of the tyrant; and he believed himself, whether rightly or wrongly, to be poisoned by Philip’s order: “This is the reward,” he said to an attendant when he felt himself dying, “of my friendship for Philip.”[127]

The history of the league after his death followed the same course for some years. The war with the Aetolians went on, sometimes slackly, sometimes vigorously, as Philip V. was or was not diverted by contests with his barbarian neighbours, or by schemes for joining the Carthaginian assaults upon the Roman power.

The next phase of vigorous action on the part of the league is that which corresponds with the career of Philopoemen, B.C. 208-183, Philopoemen. who had already shown his energy and skill at the battle of Sellasia. He was elected Hipparch in B.C. 210, and Strategus in B.C. 209. In his first office he did much to reorganise the Achaean cavalry and restore them to some discipline,[128] and he extended this as Strategus to the whole army.[129] His life’s work, however, was the defeating and either killing or confining to their frontier the tyrants of Sparta. But while he was absent from the country after B.C. 200 a new element appeared in the Peloponnese. In 197 the battle of Cynoscephalae put an end for ever to Macedonian influence, and Flamininus proclaimed the liberty of all Greece in B.C. 195 at the Nemean festival. B.C. 195-194. But Nabis was not deposed; he was secured in his power by a treaty with Rome; and when Philopoemen returned from Crete (B.C. 193), he found a fresh war on the point of breaking out owing to intrigues between that tyrant and the Aetolians. B.C. 193. They suggested, and he eagerly undertook to make, an attempt to recover the maritime towns of which he had been deprived by the Roman settlement.[130]193-192.Nabis at once attacked Gythium: and seemed on the point of taking it and the whole of the coast towns, which would thus have been lost to the league. Philopoemen, now again Strategus (B.C. 192), failed to relieve Gythium; but by a skilful piece of generalship inflicted so severe a defeat on Nabis, as he was returning to Sparta, that he did not venture on further movements beyond Laconia; and shortly afterwards was assassinated by some Aetolians whom he had summoned to his aid.

But the comparative peace in the Peloponnese was again broken in B.C. 189 189-187.by the Spartans seizing a maritime town called Las; the object being to relieve themselves of the restraint which shut them from the sea, and the possible attacks of the exiles who had been banished by Nabis, and who were always watching an opportunity to effect their return. Philopoemen (Strategus both 189 and 188 B.C.) led an army to the Laconian frontier in the spring of B.C. 188, and after the execution of eighty Spartans, who had been surrendered on account of the seizure of Las, and of the murder of thirty citizens who were supposed to have Achaean proclivities—Sparta submitted to his demand to raze the fortifications, dismiss the mercenaries, send away the new citizens enrolled by the tyrants, and abolish the Lycurgean laws, accepting the Achaean institutions instead. This was afterwards supplemented by a demand for the restoration of the exiles banished by the tyrants. Such of the new citizens (three thousand) as did not leave the country by the day named were seized and sold as slaves.[131]

Sparta was now part of the Achaean league, which at this B.C. 188. time reached its highest point of power; and its alliance was solicited by the most powerful princes of the east. 188-183.It is this period which Polybius seems to have in mind in his description of the league at its best, as embracing the whole of the Peloponnese.[132]Lycortas Strategus, B.C. 184-182.was in this third period of the existence of the renewed league that his father Lycortas came to the front, and he himself at an early age began taking part in politics.

But the terms imposed on Sparta were essentially violent and unjust, and, as it turned out, impolitic. Cowed into submission, she proved a thorn in the side of the league. The exiles continually appealed to Rome; and after Philopoemen’s death (B.C. 183) the affairs of the league began more and more to come before the Roman Senate. As usual, traitors were at hand ready to sell their country for the sake of the triumph of their party; and Callicrates, B.C. 179.sent to Rome to plead the cause of the league,[133] employed the opportunity to support himself and his party by advising the Senate to give support to “the Romanisers” in every state. This Polybius regards as the beginning of the decline of the league. And the party of moderation, to which he and his father Lycortas belonged, and which wished to assert the dignity and legal rights of their country while offering no provocation to the Romans, were eventually included under the sweeping decree which caused them, to the number of a thousand, to be deported to Italy. We have already seen, in tracing the life of Polybius, how the poor remnants of these exiles returned in B.C. 151, embittered against Rome, and having learnt nothing and forgotten nothing. And how the old quarrels were renewed, until an armed interference of Rome was brought upon them; and how the victory of Mummius at Corinth (B.C. 146), and the consequent settlement of the commissioners, finally dissolved the league into separate cantons, nominally autonomous, but really entirely subject to Rome.[134]

The constitution of the league presents many points of interest to the student of politics, and has been elaborately discussed by more than one English scholar. I shall content myself here with pointing out some of the main features as they are mentioned by Polybius.[135]

The league was a federation of free towns, all retaining full local autonomy of some form or other of democracy, which for certain purposes were under federal laws and federal magistrates, elected in a federal assembly which all citizens of the league towns might if they chose attend. All towns of the league also used the same standards in coinage and weights and measures (2, [37]). The assembly of the league (σύνοδος) met for election of the chief magistrate in May of each year, at first always at Aegium, but later at the other towns of the league in turn (29, [23]); and a second time in the autumn.[136] And besides these annual meetings, the Strategus, acting with his council of magistrates, could summon a meeting at any time for three days (e.g. at Sicyon, 23, [17]); and on one occasion we find the assembly delegating its powers to the armed levy of league troops, who for the nonce were to act as an assembly (4, [7]). Side by side with this general assembly was a council (βουλή), the functions and powers of which we cannot clearly ascertain. It seems to have acted as representing the general assembly in foreign affairs (4, [26]; 22, [12]); and, being a working committee of the whole assembly, it sometimes happened that when an assembly was summoned on some subject which did not rouse popular interest, it practically was the assembly (29, [24]). Its numbers have been assumed to be one hundred and twenty, from the fact that Eumenes offered them a present of one hundred and twenty talents, the interest of which was to pay their expenses. But this, after all, is not a certain deduction (22, [10]).

The officers of the league were: First, a President or Strategus who kept the seal of the league (4, [7]), ordered the levy of federal troops, and commanded it in the field. He also summoned the assemblies, and brought the business to be done before them, which was in the form of a proposal to be accepted or rejected, not amended. He was not chairman of the assembly, but like an English minister or a Roman consul brought on the proposals. He was assisted by a kind of cabinet of ten magistrates from the several towns, who were called Demiurgi (δημιουργοὶ 23, [5]).[137] This was their technical name: but Polybius also speaks of them under the more general appellation of οἱ ἄρχοντες (5, [1]), οἱ συνάρχοντες (23, [16]), αἱ ἀρχαὶ (22, [13]), αἱ συναρχίαι (27, [2]). Whether the number ten had reference to the ten old towns of the league or not, it was not increased with the number of the towns; and, though we are not informed how they were elected, it seems reasonable to suppose that they were freely selected without reference to the towns from which they came, as the Strategus himself was. There was also a vice-president, or hypo-strategus, whose position was, I think, wholly military. He did not rule in absence of the Strategus, or succeed him in case of death, that being reserved for the Strategus of the previous year; but he took a certain command in war next the Strategus (5, [94]; 4, [59]). Besides these we hear of a Hipparch to command the league cavalry (5, [95]; 7, 10, [22]), an office which seems to have been regarded as stepping-stone to that of Strategus. This proved a bad arrangement, as its holder was tempted to seek popularity by winking at derelictions of duty among the cavalry who were voters.[138] There was also a Navarch to command the regular squadron of federal ships (5, [94]), who does not seem to have been so important a person. There are also mentioned certain judges (δίκασται) to administer the federal law. We hear of them, however, performing duties closely bordering on politics; for they decided whether certain honorary inscriptions, statues, or other marks of respect to king Eumenes should be allowed to remain in the Achaean cities (28, [7]).

The Strategus, on the order of the assembly, raised the federal army (4, [7]). The number of men raised differed according to circumstances. A fairly full levy seems to have been five thousand infantry and five hundred cavalry (4, [15]). But the league also used mercenaries to a great extent. And we hear of one army which was to consist of eight thousand mercenary infantry, with five hundred mercenary cavalry; and in this case the Achaean levy was only to be three thousand infantry, with three hundred cavalry (5, [91]).

The pay of the mercenaries and other league expenses were provided for by an εἰσφορά or contribution from all the states (5, [31], [91]). The contributing towns appear to have been able to recover their payments as an indemnification for damage which the federal forces had failed to avert (4, [60]).

The regular federal squadron of ships for guarding the sea-coasts appears to have consisted of ten triremes (2, [9]; δεκαναία μακρῶν πλοίων 22, [10]).

Such was the organisation of the Federal Government. It was in form purely democratic, all members of thirty years old being eligible for office, as well as possessing a vote in the assemblies. But a mass assembly where the members are widely scattered inevitably becomes oligarchic. Only the well-to-do and the energetic will be able or will care to come a long journey to attend. And as the votes in the assembly were given by towns, it must often have happened that the votes of many towns were decided by a very small number of their citizens who were there. No doubt, in times of great excitement, the attendance would be large and the vote a popular one. But the general policy of the league must have been directed by a small number of energetic men, who made politics their profession and could afford to do so.

ROMAN CAMP FOR TWO LEGIONS

CONTAINING 4,068,289 SQUARE FEET

THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

BOOK I

[1.] Had the praise of History been passed over by former Chroniclers it Introduction. The importance and magnitude of the subject. would perhaps have been incumbent upon me to urge the choice and special study of records of this sort, as the readiest means men can have of correcting their knowledge of the past. But my predecessors have not been sparing in this respect. They have all begun and ended, so to speak, by enlarging on this theme: asserting again and again that the study of History is in the truest sense an education, and a training for political life; and that the most instructive, or rather the only, method of learning to bear with dignity the vicissitudes of fortune is to recall the catastrophes of others. It is evident, therefore, that no one need think it his duty to repeat what has been said by many, and said well. Least of all myself: for the surprising nature of the events which I have undertaken to relate is in itself sufficient to challenge and stimulate the attention of every one, old or young, to the study of my work. Can any one be so indifferent or idle as not to care to know by what means, and under what kind of polity, almost the whole inhabited world was conquered and brought under the dominion of the single city of Rome, and that too within a period of not quite fifty-three years? B.C. 219-167.Or who again can be so completely absorbed in other subjects of contemplation or study, as to think any of them superior in importance to the accurate understanding of an event for which the past affords no precedent.

[2.] We shall best show how marvellous and vast our subject Immensity of the Roman Empire shown by comparison with Persia, Sparta, Macedonia. 1. Persia.is by comparing the most famous Empires which preceded, and which have been the favourite themes of historians, and measuring them with the superior greatness of Rome. There are but three that deserve even to be so compared and measured: and they are these. The Persians for a certain length of time were possessed of a great empire and dominion. 2. Sparta. B.C. 405-394.But every time they ventured beyond the limits of Asia, they found not only their empire, but their own existence also in danger. The Lacedaemonians, after contending for supremacy in Greece for many generations, when they did get it, held it without dispute for barely twelve years. 3. Macedonia.The Macedonians obtained dominion in Europe from the lands bordering on the Adriatic to the Danube,—which after all is but a small fraction of this continent,—and, by the destruction of the Persian Empire, they afterwards added to that the dominion of Asia. And yet, though they had the credit of having made themselves masters of a larger number of countries and states than any people had ever done, they still left the greater half of the inhabited world in the hands of others. They never so much as thought of attempting Sicily, Sardinia, or Libya: and as to Europe, to speak the plain truth, they never even knew of the most warlike tribes of the West. The Roman conquest, on the other hand, was not partial. Nearly the whole inhabited world was reduced by them to obedience: and they left behind them an empire not to be paralleled in the past or rivalled in the future. Students will gain from my narrative a clearer view of the whole story, and of the numerous and important advantages which such exact record of events offers.

[3.] My History begins in the 140th Olympiad. The events from which it starts are these. In B.C. 220-217. The History starts from the 140th Olympiad, when the tendency towards unity first shows itself. Greece, what is called the Social war: the first waged by Philip, son of Demetrius and father of Perseus, in league with the Achaeans against the Aetolians. In Asia, the war for the possession of Coele-Syria which Antiochus and Ptolemy Philopator carried on against each other. In Italy, Libya, and their neighbourhood, the conflict between Rome and Carthage, generally called the Hannibalian war. My work thus begins where that of Aratus of Sicyon leaves off. Now up to this time the world’s history had been, so to speak, a series of disconnected transactions, as widely separated in their origin and results as in their localities. But from this time forth History becomes a connected whole: the affairs of Italy and Libya are involved with those of Asia and Greece, and the tendency of all is to unity. This is why I have fixed upon this era as the starting-point of my work. For it was their victory over the Carthaginians in this war, and their conviction that thereby the most difficult and most essential step towards universal empire had been taken, which encouraged the Romans for the first time to stretch out their hands upon the rest, and to cross with an army into Greece and Asia.

Now, had the states that were rivals for universal empire been familiarly known to us, A sketch of their previous history necessary to explain the success of the Romans.no reference perhaps to their previous history would have been necessary, to show the purpose and the forces with which they approached an undertaking of this nature and magnitude. But the fact is that the majority of the Greeks have no knowledge of the previous constitution, power, or achievements either of Rome or Carthage. I therefore concluded that it was necessary to prefix this and the next book to my History. I was anxious that no one, when fairly embarked upon my actual narrative, should feel at a loss, and have to ask what were the designs entertained by the Romans, or the forces and means at their disposal, that they entered upon those undertakings, which did in fact lead to their becoming masters of land and sea everywhere in our part of the world. I wished, on the contrary, that these books of mine, and the prefatory sketch which they contained, might make it clear that the resources they started with justified their original idea, and sufficiently explained their final success in grasping universal empire and dominion.

[4.] There is this analogy between the plan of my History and the marvellous spirit of the age with which I have to deal. The need of a comprehensive view of history as well as a close study of an epoch.Just as Fortune made almost all the affairs of the world incline in one direction, and forced them to converge upon one and the same point; so it is my task as an historian to put before my readers a compendious view of the part played by Fortune in bringing about the general catastrophe. It was this peculiarity which originally challenged my attention, and determined me on undertaking this work. And combined with this was the fact that no writer of our time has undertaken a general history. Had any one done so my ambition in this direction would have been much diminished. But, in point of fact, I notice that by far the greater number of historians concern themselves with isolated wars and the incidents that accompany them: while as to a general and comprehensive scheme of events, their date, origin, and catastrophe, no one as far as I know has undertaken to examine it. I thought it, therefore, distinctly my duty neither to pass by myself, nor allow any one else to pass by, without full study, a characteristic specimen of the dealings of Fortune at once brilliant and instructive in the highest degree. For fruitful as Fortune is in change, and constantly as she is producing dramas in the life of men, yet never assuredly before this did she work such a marvel, or act such a drama, as that which we have witnessed. And of this we cannot obtain a comprehensive view from writers of mere episodes. It would be as absurd to expect to do so as for a man to imagine that he has learnt the shape of the whole world, its entire arrangement and order, because he has visited one after the other the most famous cities in it; or perhaps merely examined them in separate pictures. That would be indeed absurd: and it has always seemed to me that men, who are persuaded that they get a competent view of universal from episodical history, are very like persons who should see the limbs of some body, which had once been living and beautiful, scattered and remote; and should imagine that to be quite as good as actually beholding the activity and beauty of the living creature itself. But if some one could there and then reconstruct the animal once more, in the perfection of its beauty and the charm of its vitality, and could display it to the same people, they would beyond doubt confess that they had been far from conceiving the truth, and had been little better than dreamers. For indeed some idea of a whole may be got from a part, but an accurate knowledge and clear comprehension cannot. Wherefore we must conclude that episodical history contributes exceedingly little to the familiar knowledge and secure grasp of universal history. While it is only by the combination and comparison of the separate parts of the whole,—by observing their likeness and their difference,—that a man can attain his object: can obtain a view at once clear and complete; and thus secure both the profit and the delight of History.

[5.] I shall adopt as the starting-point of this book the first occasion on which the Romans crossed the sea from Italy. B.C. 264-261. I begin my preliminary account in the 129th Olympiad, and with the circumstances which took the Romans to Sicily.This is just where the History of Timaeus left off; and it falls in the 129th Olympiad. I shall accordingly have to describe what the state of their affairs in Italy was, how long that settlement had lasted, and on what resources they reckoned, when they resolved to invade Sicily. For this was the first place outside Italy in which they set foot. The precise cause of their thus crossing I must state without comment; for if I let one cause lead me back to another, my point of departure will always elude my grasp, and I shall never arrive at the view of my subject which I wish to present. As to dates, then, I must fix on some era agreed upon and recognised by all: and as to events, one that admits of distinctly separate treatment; even though I may be obliged to go back some short way in point of time, and take a summary review of the intermediate transactions. For if the facts with which one starts are unknown, or even open to controversy, all that comes after will fail of approval and belief. But opinion being once formed on that point, and a general assent obtained, all the succeeding narrative becomes intelligible.

[6.] It was in the nineteenth year after the sea-fight at Aegospotami, and the sixteenth before the battle at Leuctra; B.C. 387-386. The rise of the Roman dominion may be traced from the retirement of the Gauls from the city. From that time one nation after another in Italy fell into their hands.the year in which the Lacedaemonians made what is called the Peace of Antalcidas with the King of Persia; the year in which the elder Dionysius was besieging Rhegium after beating the Italian Greeks on the River Elleporus; and in which the Gauls took Rome itself by storm and were occupying the whole of it except the Capitol. With these Gauls the Romans made a treaty and settlement which they were content to accept: and having thus become beyond all expectation once more masters of their own country, they made a start in their career of expansion; and in the succeeding period engaged in various wars with their neighbours. The Latini.First, by dint of valour, and the good fortune which attended them in the field, they mastered all the Latini; then they went to war with the Etruscans; The Etruscans, Gauls, and Samnites.then with the Celts; and next with the Samnites, who lived on the eastern and northern frontiers of Latium. Some time after this the Tarentines insulted the ambassadors of Rome, and, in fear of the consequences, invited and obtained the assistance of Pyrrhus. Pyrrhus, B.C. 280.This happened in the year before the Gauls invaded Greece, some of whom perished near Delphi, while others crossed into Asia. Then it was that the Romans—having reduced the Etruscans and Samnites to obedience, and conquered the Italian Celts in many battles—attempted for the first time the reduction of the rest of Italy. Southern Italy.The nations for whose possessions they were about to fight they affected to regard, not in the light of foreigners, but as already for the most part belonging and pertaining to themselves. The experience gained from their contests with the Samnites and the Celts had served as a genuine training in the art of war. Pyrrhus finally quits Italy, B.C. 274.Accordingly, they entered upon the war with spirit, drove Pyrrhus from Italy, and then undertook to fight with and subdue those who had taken part with him. They succeeded everywhere to a marvel, and reduced to obedience all the tribes inhabiting Italy except the Celts; after which they undertook to besiege some of their own citizens, who at that time were occupying Rhegium.

[7.] For misfortunes befell Messene and Rhegium, the cities built on either side of the Strait, peculiar in The story of the Mamertines at Messene, and the Roman garrison at Rhegium, Dio. Cassius fr. their nature and alike in their circumstances.

Not long before the period we are now describing some Campanian mercenaries of Agathocles, having for some time cast greedy eyes upon Messene, owing to its beauty and wealth, no sooner got an opportunity than they made a treacherous attempt upon that city. 1. Messene.They entered the town under guise of friendship, and, having once got possession of it, they drove out some of the citizens and put others to the sword. Agathocles died, B.C. 289. This done, they seized promiscuously the wives and children of the dispossessed citizens, each keeping those which fortune had assigned him at the very moment of the lawless deed. All other property and the land they took possession of by a subsequent division and retained.

The speed with which they became masters of a fair territory and city found ready imitators of their conduct. 2. Rhegium, Livy Ep. 12.The people of Rhegium, when Pyrrhus was crossing to Italy, felt a double anxiety. They were dismayed at the thought of his approach, and at the same time were afraid of the Carthaginians as being masters of the sea. Pyrrhus in Sicily, B.C. 278-275.They accordingly asked and obtained a force from Rome to guard and support them. The garrison, four thousand in number, under the command of a Campanian named Decius Jubellius, entered the city, and for a time preserved it, as well as their own faith. But at last, conceiving the idea of imitating the Mamertines, and having at the same time obtained their co-operation, they broke faith with the people of Rhegium, enamoured of the pleasant site of the town and the private wealth of the citizens, and seized the city after having, in imitation of the Mamertines, first driven out some of the people and put others to the sword. Now, though the Romans were much annoyed at this transaction, they could take no active steps, because they were deeply engaged in the wars I have mentioned above. But having got free from them they invested and besieged the troops. B.C. 271. C. Quintus Claudius, L. Genucius Clepsina, Coss.They presently took the place and killed the greater number in the assault,—for the men resisted desperately, knowing what must follow,—but took more than three hundred alive. These were sent to Rome, and there the Consuls brought them into the forum, where they were scourged and beheaded according to custom: for they wished as far as they could to vindicate their good faith in the eyes of the allies. The territory and town they at once handed over to the people of Rhegium.

[8.] But the Mamertines (for this was the name which the Campanians gave themselves after they became masters of Messene), Effect of the fall of the rebellious garrison of Rhegium on the Mamertines.as long as they enjoyed the alliance of the Roman captors of Rhegium, not only exercised absolute control over their own town and district undisturbed, but about the neighbouring territory also gave no little trouble to the Carthaginians and Syracusans, and levied tribute from many parts of Sicily. But when they were deprived of this support, the captors of Rhegium being now invested and besieged, they were themselves promptly forced back into the town again by the Syracusans, under circumstances which I will now detail.

Not long before this the military forces of the Syracusans had quarrelled with the citizens, and while stationed near Merganè elected commanders from their own body. The rise of Hiero. He is elected General by the army, B.C. 275-274.These were Artemidorus and Hiero, the latter of whom afterwards became King of Syracuse. At this time he was quite a young man, but had a certain natural aptitude for kingcraft and the politic conduct of affairs. Having taken over the command, and having by means of some of his connexions made his way into the city, he got his political opponents into his hands; but conducted the government with such mildness, and in so lofty a spirit, that the Syracusans, though by no means usually acquiescing in the election of officers by the soldiers, did on this occasion unanimously approve of Hiero as their general. His first step made it evident to close observers that his hopes soared above the position of a mere general.

[9.] He noticed that among the Syracusans the despatch of troops, and of magistrates in command of them, was always the signal for revolutionary movements of some sort or another. Secures support of Leptines by marrying his daughter.He knew, too, that of all the citizens Leptines enjoyed the highest position and credit, and that among the common people especially he was by far the most influential man existing. He accordingly contracted a relationship by marriage with him, that he might have a representative of his interests left at home at such times as he should be himself bound to go abroad with the troops for a campaign. After marrying the daughter of this man, his next step was in regard to the old mercenaries. His device for getting rid of mutinous mercenaries.He observed that they were disaffected and mutinous: and he accordingly led out an expedition, with the ostensible purpose of attacking the foreigners who were in occupation of Messene. He pitched a camp against the enemy near Centuripa, and drew up his line resting on the River Cyamosorus. Fiume Salso.But the cavalry and infantry, which consisted of citizens, he kept together under his personal command at some distance, on pretence of intending to attack the enemy on another quarter: the mercenaries he thrust to the front and allowed them to be completely cut to pieces by the foreigners; while he seized the moment of their rout to affect a safe retreat for himself and the citizens into Syracuse. This stroke of policy was skilful and successful. He had got rid of the mutinous and seditious element in the army; and after enlisting on his own account a sufficient body of mercenaries, he thenceforth carried on the business of the government in security. But seeing that the Mamertines Hiero next attacks the Mamertines and defeats them near Mylae, B.C. 268.were encouraged by their success to greater confidence and recklessness in their excursions, he fully armed and energetically drilled the citizen levies, led them out, and engaged the enemy on the Mylaean plain near the River Longanus. He inflicted a severe defeat upon them: took their leaders prisoners: put a complete end to their audacious proceedings: and on his return to Syracuse was himself greeted by all the allies with the title of King.

[10.] Thus were the Mamertines first deprived of support from Rhegium, and then subjected, from causes which I have just stated, to a complete defeat on their own account. Some of the conquered Mamertines appeal to Rome for help.Thereupon some of them betook themselves to the protection of the Carthaginians, and were for putting themselves and their citadel into their hands; while others set about sending an embassy to Rome to offer a surrender of their city, and to beg assistance on the ground of the ties of race which united them. The Romans were long in doubt. The inconsistency of sending such aid seemed manifest. A little while ago they had put some of their own citizens to death, with the extreme penalties of the law, for having broken faith with the people of Rhegium: and now so soon afterwards to assist the Mamertines, The motives of the Romans in acceding to this prayer,—jealousy of the growing power of Carthage.who had done precisely the same to Messene as well as Rhegium, involved a breach of equity very hard to justify. But while fully alive to these points, they yet saw that Carthaginian aggrandisement was not confined to Libya, but had embraced many districts in Iberia as well; and that Carthage was, besides, mistress of all the islands in the Sardinian and Tyrrhenian seas: they were beginning, therefore, to be exceedingly anxious lest, if the Carthaginians became masters of Sicily also, they should find them very dangerous and formidable neighbours, surrounding them as they would on every side, and occupying a position which commanded all the coasts of Italy. Now it was clear that, if the Mamertines did not obtain the assistance they asked for, the Carthaginians would very soon reduce Sicily. For should they avail themselves of the voluntary offer of Messene and become masters of it, they were certain before long to crush Syracuse also, since they were already lords of nearly the whole of the rest of Sicily. The Romans saw all this, and felt that it was absolutely necessary not to let Messene slip, or allow the Carthaginians to secure what would be like a bridge to enable them to cross into Italy.

[11.] In spite of protracted deliberations, the conflict of motives proved too strong, The Senate shirk the responsibility of decision. The people vote for helping the Mamertines.after all, to allow of the Senate coming to any decision; for the inconsistency of aiding the Messenians appeared to them to be evenly balanced by the advantages to be gained by doing so. The people, however, had suffered much from the previous wars, and wanted some means of repairing the losses which they had sustained in every department. Besides these national advantages to be gained by the war, the military commanders suggested that individually they would get manifest and important benefits from it. They accordingly voted in favour of giving the aid. B.C. 264. Appius Claudius Caudex. M. Fulvius Flaccus, Coss.The decree having thus been passed by the people, they elected one of the consuls, Appius Claudius, to the command, and sent him out with instructions to cross to Messene and relieve the Mamertines. These latter managed, between threats and false representations, to oust the Carthaginian commander who was already in possession of the citadel, invited Appius in, and offered to deliver the city into his hands. The Carthaginians crucified their commander for what they considered to be his cowardice and folly in thus losing the citadel; stationed their fleet near Pelorus; their land forces at a place called Synes; and laid vigorous siege to Messene. Hiero joins Carthage in laying siege to the Mamertines in Messene. Appius comes to the relief of the besieged, B.C. 264.Now at this juncture Hiero, thinking it a favourable opportunity for totally expelling from Sicily the foreigners who were in occupation of Messene, made a treaty with the Carthaginians. Having done this, he started from Syracuse upon an expedition against that city. He pitched his camp on the opposite side to the Carthaginians, near what was called the Chalcidian Mount, whereby the garrison were cut off from that way out as well as from the other. The Roman Consul Appius, for his part, gallantly crossed the strait by night and got into Messene. But he found that the enemy had completely surrounded the town and were vigorously pressing on the attack; and he concluded on reflection that the siege could bring him neither credit nor security so long as the enemy commanded land as well as sea. He accordingly first endeavoured to relieve the Mamertines from the contest altogether by sending embassies to both of the attacking forces. After vain attempts at negotiation, Appius determines to attack Hiero.Neither of them received his proposals, and at last, from sheer necessity, he made up his mind to hazard an engagement, and that he would begin with the Syracusans. So he led out his forces and drew them up for the fight: nor was the Syracusan backward in accepting the challenge, but descended simultaneously to give him battle. Hiero is defeated, and returns to Syracuse. After a prolonged struggle, Appius got the better of the enemy, and chased the opposing forces right up to their entrenchments. The result of this was that Appius, after stripping the dead, retired into Messene again, while Hiero, with a foreboding of the final result, only waited for nightfall to beat a hasty retreat to Syracuse.

[12.] Next morning, when Appius was assured of their flight, his confidence was strengthened, and he made up his mind to attack the Carthaginians without delay. Encouraged by this success, he attacks and drives off the Carthaginians.Accordingly, he issued orders to the soldiers to despatch their preparations early, and at daybreak commenced his sally. Having succeeded in engaging the enemy, he killed a large number of them, and forced the rest to fly precipitately to the neighbouring towns. These successes sufficed to raise the siege of Messene: and thenceforth he scoured the territory of Syracuse and her allies with impunity, and laid it waste without finding any one to dispute the possession of the open country with him; and finally he sat down before Syracuse itself and laid siege to it.

Such was the nature and motive of the first warlike expedition of the Romans beyond the shores of Italy; Such preliminary sketches are necessary for clearness, and my readers must not be surprised if I follow the same system in the case of other towns.and this was the period at which it took place. I thought this expedition the most suitable starting-point for my whole narrative, and accordingly adopted it as a basis; though I have made a rapid survey of some anterior events, that in setting forth its causes no point should be left obscure. I thought it necessary, if we were to get an adequate and comprehensive view of their present supreme position, to trace clearly how and when the Romans, after the disaster which they sustained in the loss of their own city, began their upward career; and how and when, once more, after possessing themselves of Italy, they conceived the idea of attempting conquests external to it. This must account in future parts of my work for my taking, when treating of the most important states, a preliminary survey of their previous history. In doing so my object will be to secure such a vantage-ground as will enable us to see with clearness from what origin, at what period, and in what circumstances they severally started and arrived at their present position. This is exactly what I have just done with regard to the Romans.

[13.] It is time to have done with these explanations, and to come to my subject, after a brief and summary statement of the events of which my introductory books are to treat. Subjects of the two first books of the Histories.
1. War in Sicily or first Punic War, B.C. 264-241.
2. The Mercenary or “inexpiable” war, B.C. 240-237.
3. Carthaginian movements in Spain, B.C. 241-218.
4. Illyrian war, B.C. 229-228.
5. Gallic war, B.C. 225-221.
6. Cleomenic war, B.C. 227-221. Of these the first in order of time are those which befell the Romans and Carthaginians in their war for the possession of Sicily. Next comes the Libyan or Mercenary war; immediately following on which are the Carthaginian achievements in Spain, first under Hamilcar, and then under Hasdrubal. In the course of these events, again, occurred the first expedition of the Romans into Illyria and the Greek side of Europe; and, besides that, their struggles within Italy with the Celts. In Greece at the same time the war called after Cleomenes was in full action. With this war I design to conclude my prefatory sketch and my second book.

To enter into minute details of these events is unnecessary, and would be of no advantage to my readers. It is not part of my plan to write a history of them: my sole object is to recapitulate them in a summary manner by way of introduction to the narrative I have in hand. I will, therefore, touch lightly upon the leading events of this period in a comprehensive sketch, and will endeavour to make the end of it dovetail with the commencement of my main history. In this way the narrative will acquire a continuity; and I shall be shown to have had good reason for touching on points already treated by others: while by such an arrangement the studiously inclined will find the approach to the story which has to be told made intelligible and easy for them. The first Punic war deserves more detailed treatment, as furnishing a better basis for comparing Rome and Carthage than subsequent wars.I shall, however, endeavour to describe with somewhat more care the first war which arose between the Romans and Carthaginians for the possession of Sicily. For it would not be easy to mention any war that lasted longer than this one; nor one in which the preparations made were on a larger scale, or the efforts made more sustained, or the actual engagements more numerous, or the reverses sustained on either side more signal. Moreover, the two states themselves were at the precise period of their history when their institutions were as yet in their original integrity, their fortunes still at a moderate level, and their forces on an equal footing. So that those who wish to gain a fair view of the national characteristics and resources of the two had better base their comparison upon this war rather than upon those which came after.

[14.] But it was not these considerations only which induced me to undertake the history of this war. This is rendered more necessary by the partisan misrepresentations of Philinus and Fabius Pictor.I was influenced quite as much by the fact that Philinus and Fabius, who have the reputation of writing with the most complete knowledge about it, have given us an inadequate representation of the truth. Now, judging from their lives and principles, I do not suppose that these writers have intentionally stated what was false; but I think that they are much in the same state of mind as men in love. Partisanship and complete prepossession made Philinus think that all the actions of the Carthaginians were characterised by wisdom, honour, and courage: those of the Romans by the reverse. Fabius thought the exact opposite. Now in other relations of life one would hesitate to exclude such warmth of sentiment: for a good man ought to be loyal to his friends and patriotic to his country; ought to be at one with his friends in their hatreds and likings. But directly a man assumes the moral attitude of an historian he ought to forget all considerations of that kind. There will be many occasions on which he will be bound to speak well of his enemies, and even to praise them in the highest terms if the facts demand it: and on the other hand many occasions on which it will be his duty to criticise and denounce his own side, however dear to him, if their errors of conduct suggest that course. For as a living creature is rendered wholly useless if deprived of its eyes, so if you take truth from History what is left is but an idle unprofitable tale. Therefore, one must not shrink either from blaming one’s friends or praising one’s enemies; nor be afraid of finding fault with and commending the same persons at different times. For it is impossible that men engaged in public affairs should always be right, and unlikely that they should always be wrong. Holding ourselves, therefore, entirely aloof from the actors, we must as historians make statements and pronounce judgment in accordance with the actions themselves.

[15.] The writers whom I have named exemplify the truth of these remarks. Philinus’s misrepresentations.Philinus, for instance, commencing the narrative with his second book, says that the “Carthaginians and Syracusans engaged in the war and sat down before Messene; that the Romans arriving by sea entered the town, and immediately sallied out from it to attack the Syracusans; but that after suffering severely in the engagement they retired into Messene; and that on a second occasion, having issued forth to attack the Carthaginians, they not only suffered severely but lost a considerable number of their men captured by the enemy.” But while making this statement, he represents Hiero as so destitute of sense as, after this engagement, not only to have promptly burnt his stockade and tents and fled under cover of night to Syracuse, but to have abandoned all the forts which had been established to overawe the Messenian territory. Similarly he asserts that “the Carthaginians immediately after their battle evacuated their entrenchment and dispersed into various towns, without venturing any longer even to dispute the possession of the open country; and that, accordingly, their leaders seeing that their troops were utterly demoralised determined in consideration not to risk a battle: that the Romans followed them, and not only laid waste the territory of the Carthaginians and Syracusans, but actually sat down before Syracuse itself and began to lay siege to it.” These statements appear to me to be full of glaring inconsistency, and to call for no refutation at all. The very men whom he describes to begin with as besieging Messene, and as victorious in the engagements, he afterwards represents as running away, abandoning the open country, and utterly demoralised: while those whom he starts by saying were defeated and besieged, he concludes by describing as engaging in a pursuit, as promptly seizing the open places, and finally as besieging Syracuse. Nothing can reconcile these statements. It is impossible. Either his initial statement, or his account of the subsequent events, must be false. In point of fact the latter part of his story is the true one. The Syracusans and Carthaginians did abandon the open country, and the Romans did immediately afterwards commence a siege of Syracuse and of Echetla, which lies in the district between the Syracusan and Carthaginian pales. For the rest it must necessarily be acknowledged that the first part of his account is false; and that whereas the Romans were victorious in the engagements under Messene, they have been represented by this historian as defeated. Through the whole of this work we shall find Philinus acting in a similar spirit: and much the same may be said of Fabius, as I shall show when the several points arise.

I have now said what was proper on the subject of this digression. Returning to the matter in hand I will endeavour by a continuous narrative of moderate dimensions to guide my readers to a true knowledge of this war.

[16.] When news came to Rome of the successes of Appius and his legions, B.C. 264.the people elected Manius Otacilius and Manius Valerius Consuls, and despatched their whole army to Sicily, and both Consuls in command. (Continuing from chap. xii.), B.C. 263, Manius Valerius Maximus, Manius Otacilius Crassus, Coss. The Consuls with four legions are sent to Sicily. A general move of the Sicilian cities to join them. Hiero submits.Now the Romans have in all, as distinct from allies, four legions of Roman citizens, which they enrol every year, each of which consists of four thousand infantry and three hundred cavalry: and on their arrival most of the cities revolted from Syracuse as well as from Carthage, and joined the Romans. And when he saw the terror and dismay of the Sicilians, and compared with them the number and crushing strength of the legions of Rome, Hiero began, from a review of all these points, to conclude that the prospects of the Romans were brighter than those of the Carthaginians. Inclining therefore from these considerations to the side of the former, he began sending messages to the Consuls, proposing peace and friendship with them. The Romans accepted his offer, their chief motive being the consideration of provisions: for as the Carthaginians had command of the sea, they were afraid of being cut off at every point from their supplies, warned by the fact that the legions which had previously crossed had run very short in that respect. They therefore gladly accepted Hiero’s offers of friendship, supposing that he would be of signal service to them in this particular. The king engaged to restore his prisoners without ransom, and to pay besides an indemnity of a hundred talents of silver. The treaty being arranged on these terms, the Romans thenceforth regarded the Syracusans as friends and allies: while King Hiero, having thus placed himself under the protection of the Romans, never failed to supply their needs in times of difficulty; and for the rest of his life reigned securely in Syracuse, devoting his energies to gaining the gratitude and good opinion of the Greeks. And in point of fact no monarch ever acquired a greater reputation, or enjoyed for a longer period the fruits of his prudent policy in private as well as in public affairs.

[17.] When the text of this treaty reached Rome, and the people had approved and confirmed the terms made with Hiero, The Carthaginians alarmed at Hiero’s defection make great efforts to increase their army in Sicily.the Roman government thereupon decided not to send all their forces, as they had intended doing, but only two legions. For they thought that the gravity of the war was lessened by the adhesion of the king, and at the same time that the army would thus be better off for provisions. But when the Carthaginian government saw that Hiero had become their enemy, and that the Romans were taking a more decided part in Sicilian politics, they conceived that they must have a more formidable force to enable them to confront their enemy and maintain their own interests in Sicily. They select Agrigentum as their headquarters.Accordingly, they enlisted mercenaries from over sea—a large number of Ligurians and Celts, and a still larger number of Iberians—and despatched them to Sicily. And perceiving that Agrigentum possessed the greatest natural advantages as a place of arms, and was the most powerful city in their province, they collected their supplies and their forces into it, deciding to use this city as their headquarters for the war.

On the Roman side a change of commanders had now taken place. B.C. 262.The Consuls who made the treaty with Hiero had gone home, and their successors, Lucius Postumius and Quintus Mamilius, were come to Sicily with their legions. The new Consuls, Lucius Postumius Megellus and Quintus Mamilius Vitulus, determined to lay siege to Agrigentum.Observing the measure which the Carthaginians were taking, and the forces they were concentrating at Agrigentum, they made up their minds to take that matter in hand and strike a bold blow. Accordingly they suspended every other department of the war, and bearing down upon Agrigentum itself with their whole army, attacked it in force; pitched their camp within a distance of eight stades from the city; and confined the Carthaginians within the walls. The Carthaginians make an unsuccessful sally.Now it was just harvest-time, and the siege was evidently destined to be a long one: the soldiers, therefore, went out to collect the corn with greater hardihood than they ought to have done. Accordingly the Carthaginians, seeing the enemy scattered about the fields, sallied out and attacked the harvesting-parties. They easily routed these; and then one portion of them made a rush to destroy the Roman entrenchment, the other to attack the pickets. But the peculiarity of their institutions saved the Roman fortunes, as it had often done before. Among them it is death for a man to desert his post, or to fly from his station on any pretext whatever. Accordingly on this, as on other occasions, they gallantly held their ground against opponents many times their own number; and though they lost many of their own men, they killed still more of the enemy, and at last outflanked the foes just as they were on the point of demolishing the palisade of the camp. Some they put to the sword, and the rest they pursued with slaughter into the city.

[18.] The result was that thenceforth the Carthaginians were somewhat less forward in making such attacks, and the Romans more cautious in foraging.

Finding that the Carthaginians would not come out to meet them at close quarters any more, The Romans form two strongly-entrenched camps.the Roman generals divided their forces: with one division they occupied the ground round the temple of Asclepius outside the town; with the other they encamped in the outskirts of the city on the side which looks towards Heracleia. The space between the camps on either side of the city they secured by two trenches,—the inner one to protect themselves against sallies from the city, the outer as a precaution against attacks from without, and to intercept those persons or supplies which always make their way surreptitiously into cities that are sustaining a siege. The spaces between the trenches uniting the camps they secured by pickets, taking care in their disposition to strengthen the several accessible points. As for food and other war material, the other allied cities all joined in collecting and bringing these to Herbesus for them: and thus they supplied themselves in abundance with necessaries, by continually getting provisions living and dead from this town, which was conveniently near. For about five months then they remained in the same position, without being able to obtain any decided advantage over each other beyond the casualties which occurred in the skirmishes. But the Carthaginians were beginning to be hard pressed by hunger, owing to the number of men shut up in the city, who amounted to no less than fifty thousand: and Hannibal, who had been appointed commander of the besieged forces, beginning by this time to be seriously alarmed at the state of things, kept perpetually sending messages to Carthage explaining their critical state, and begging for assistance. A relief comes from Carthage to Agrigentum. Thereupon the Carthaginian government put on board ship the fresh troops and elephants which they had collected, and despatched them to Sicily, with orders to join the other commander Hanno. This officer collected all his war material and forces into Heracleia, and as a first step possessed himself by a stratagem of Hanno seizes Herbesus.Herbesus, thus depriving the enemy of their provisions and supply of necessaries. The result of this was that the Romans found themselves in the position of besieged as much as in that of besiegers; for they were reduced by short supplies of food and scarcity of necessaries to such a condition that they more than once contemplated raising the siege. The Romans faithfully supported by Hiero.And they would have done so at last had not Hiero, by using every effort and contrivance imaginable, succeeded in keeping them supplied with what satisfied, to a tolerable extent, their most pressing wants. This was Hanno’s first step. His next was as follows.

[19.] He saw that the Romans were reduced by disease and want, owing to an epidemic that had broken out among them, and he believed that his own forces were strong enough to give them battle: he accordingly collected his elephants, Hanno tempts the Roman cavalry out and defeats them.of which he had about fifty, and the whole of the rest of his army, and advanced at a rapid pace from Heracleia; having previously issued orders to the Numidian cavalry to precede him, and to endeavour, when they came near the enemies’ stockade, to provoke them and draw their cavalry out; and, having done so, to wheel round and retire until they met him. The Numidians did as they were ordered, and advanced up to one of the camps. Immediately the Roman cavalry poured out and boldly charged the Numidians: the Libyans retired, according to their orders, until they reached Hanno’s division: then they wheeled round; surrounded, and repeatedly charged the enemy; killed a great number of them, and chased the rest up to their stockade. After this affair Hanno’s force encamped over against the Romans, having seized the hill called Torus, at a distance of about a mile and a quarter from their opponents. After two months, Hanno is forced to try to relieve Agrigentum, For two months they remained in position without any decisive action, though skirmishes took place daily. But as Hannibal all this time kept signalling and sending messages from the town to Hanno,—telling him that his men were impatient of the famine, and that many were even deserting to the enemy owing to the distress for food,—the Carthaginian general determined to risk a battle, the Romans being equally ready, but is defeated in a pitched battle, and his army cut to pieces.for the reasons I have mentioned. So both parties advanced into the space between the camps and engaged. The battle lasted a long time, but at last the Romans turned the advanced guard of Carthaginian mercenaries. The latter fell back upon the elephants and the other divisions posted in their rear; and thus the whole Punic army was thrown into confusion. The retreat became general: the larger number of the men were killed, while some effected their escape into Heracleia; and the Romans became masters of most of the elephants and all the baggage. Now night came on, and the victors, partly from joy at their success, partly from fatigue, kept their watches somewhat more carelessly than usual; Hannibal escapes by night; and the Romans enter and plunder Agrigentum.accordingly Hannibal, having given up hope of holding out, made up his mind that this state of things afforded him a good opportunity of escape. He started about midnight from the town with his mercenary troops, and having choked up the trenches with baskets stuffed full of chaff, led off his force in safety, without being detected by the enemy. When day dawned the Romans discovered what had happened, and indeed for a short time were engaged with Hannibal’s rear; but eventually they all made for the town gates. There they found no one to oppose them: they therefore threw themselves into the town, plundered it, and secured a large number of captives, besides a great booty of every sort and description.

[20.] Great was the joy of the Roman Senate when the news of what had taken place at Agrigentum arrived. This success inspires the Senate with the idea of expelling the Carthaginians from Sicily.Their ideas too were so raised that they no longer confined themselves to their original designs. They were not content with having saved the Mamertines, nor with the advantages gained in the course of the war; but conceived the idea that it was possible to expel the Carthaginians entirely from the island, and that if that were done their own power would receive a great increase: they accordingly engaged in this policy and directed their whole thoughts to this subject. As to their land forces they saw that things were going on as well as they could wish. B.C. 261.For the Consuls elected in succession to those who had besieged Agrigentum, Lucius Valerius Flaccus and Titus Otacilius Crassus, appeared to be managing the Sicilian business as well as circumstances admitted. Yet so long as the Carthaginians were in undisturbed command of the sea, the balance of success could not incline decisively in their favour. For instance, in the period which followed, though they were now in possession of Agrigentum, and though consequently many of the inland towns joined the Romans from dread of their land forces, yet a still larger number of seaboard towns held aloof from them in terror of the Carthaginian fleet. Seeing therefore that it was ever more and more the case that the balance of success oscillated from one side to the other from these causes; and, moreover, that while Italy was repeatedly ravaged by the naval force, Libya remained permanently uninjured; they became eager to get upon the sea and meet the Carthaginians there.

It was this branch of the subject that more than anything else induced me to give an account of this war at somewhat greater length than I otherwise should have done. I was unwilling that a first step of this kind should be unknown,—namely how, and when, and why the Romans first started a navy.

It was, then, because they saw that the war they had undertaken lingered to a weary length, The Romans boldly determine to build ships and meet the Carthaginians at sea.that they first thought of getting a fleet built, consisting of a hundred quinqueremes and twenty triremes. But one part of their undertaking caused them much difficulty. Their shipbuilders were entirely unacquainted with the construction of quinqueremes, because no one in Italy had at that time employed vessels of that description. There could be no more signal proof of the courage, or rather the extraordinary audacity of the Roman enterprise. Not only had they no resources for it of reasonable sufficiency; but without any resources for it at all, and without having ever entertained an idea of naval war,—for it was the first time they had thought of it,—they nevertheless handled the enterprise with such extraordinary audacity, that, without so much as a preliminary trial, they took upon themselves there and then to meet the Carthaginians at sea, on which they had for generations held undisputed supremacy. Proof of what I say, and of their surprising audacity, may be found in this. When they first took in hand to send troops across to Messene they not only had no decked vessels but no war-ships at all, not so much as a single galley: but they borrowed quinqueremes and triremes from Tarentum and Locri, and even from Elea and Neapolis; and having thus collected a fleet, boldly sent their men across upon it. A Carthaginian ship used as a model.It was on this occasion that, the Carthaginians having put to sea in the Strait to attack them, a decked vessel of theirs charged so furiously that it ran aground, and falling into the hands of the Romans served them as a model on which they constructed their whole fleet. And if this had not happened it is clear that they would have been completely hindered from carrying out their design by want of constructive knowledge.

[21.] Meanwhile, however, those who were charged with the shipbuilding were busied with the construction of the vessels; while others collected crews and were engaged in teaching them to row on dry land: which they contrived to do in the following manner. They made the men sit on rower’s benches on dry land, in the same order as they would sit on the benches in actual vessels: in the midst of them they stationed the Celeustes, and trained them to get back and draw in their hands all together in time, and then to swing forward and throw them out again, and to begin and cease these movements at the word of the Celeustes. By the time these preparations were completed the ships were built. They therefore launched them, and, after a brief preliminary practice of real sea-rowing, started on their coasting voyage along the shore of Italy, in accordance with the Consul’s order. B.C. 260. Cn. Cornelius Scipio Asina, C. Duilius, Coss.For Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio, who had been appointed by the Roman people a few days before to command the fleet, after giving the ship captains orders that as soon as they had fitted out the fleet they should sail to the Straits, had put to sea himself with seventeen ships and sailed in advance to Messene; for he was very eager to secure all pressing necessaries for the naval force. While there some negotiation was suggested to him for the surrender of the town of Lipara. Cornelius captured with the loss of his ships.Snatching at the prospect somewhat too eagerly, he sailed with the above-mentioned ships and anchored off the town. But having been informed in Panormus of what had taken place, the Carthaginian general Hannibal despatched Boōdes, a member of the Senate, with a squadron of twenty ships. He accomplished the voyage at night and shut up Gnaeus and his men within the harbour. When day dawned the crews made for the shore and ran away, while Gnaeus, in utter dismay, and not knowing in the least what to do, eventually surrendered to the enemy. The Carthaginians having thus possessed themselves of the ships as well as the commander of their enemies, started to rejoin Hannibal. The rest of the Roman fleet arrive and nearly capture Hannibal.Yet a few days afterwards, though the disaster of Gnaeus was so signal and recent, Hannibal himself was within an ace of falling into the same glaring mistake. For having been informed that the Roman fleet in its voyage along the coast of Italy was close at hand, he conceived a wish to get a clear view of the enemy’s number and disposition. He accordingly set sail with fifty ships, and just as he was rounding the “Italian Headland” he fell in with the enemy, who were sailing in good order and disposition. He lost most of his ships, and with the rest effected his own escape in a manner beyond hope or expectation.

[22.] When the Romans had neared the coasts of Sicily and learnt the disaster which had befallen Gnaeus, their first step was to send for Gaius Duilius, who was in command of the land forces. Until he should come they stayed where they were; but at the same time, hearing that the enemy’s fleet was no great way off, they busied themselves with preparations for a sea-fight. Now their ships were badly fitted out and not easy to manage, and so some one suggested to them as likely to serve their turn in a fight the construction of what were afterwards called “crows.” The “corvi” or #8220;crows” for boarding.Their mechanism was this. A round pole was placed in the prow, about twenty-four feet high, and with a diameter of four palms. The pole itself had a pulley on the top, and a gangway made with cross planks nailed together, four feet wide and thirty-six feet long, was made to swing round it. Now the hole in the gangway was oval shaped, and went round the pole twelve feet from one end of the gangway, which had also a wooden railing running down each side of it to the height of a man’s knee. At the extremity of this gangway was fastened an iron spike like a miller’s pestle, sharpened at its lower end and fitted with a ring at its upper end. The whole thing looked like the machines for braising corn. To this ring the rope was fastened with which, when the ships collided, they hauled up the “crows,” by means of the pulley at the top of the pole, and dropped them down upon the deck of the enemy’s ship, sometimes over the prow, sometimes swinging them round when the ships collided broadsides. And as soon as the “crows” were fixed in the planks of the decks and grappled the ships together, if the ships were alongside of each other, the men leaped on board anywhere along the side, but if they were prow to prow, they used the “crow” itself for boarding, and advanced over it two abreast. The first two protected their front by holding up before them their shields, while those who came after them secured their sides by placing the rims of their shields upon the top of the railing. Such were the preparations which they made; and having completed them they watched an opportunity of engaging at sea.

[23.] As for Gaius Duilius, he no sooner heard of the disaster which had befallen the commander of Victory of Duilius at Mylae, B.C. 260. the navy than handing over his legions to the military Tribunes he transferred himself to the fleet. There he learnt that the enemy was plundering the territory of Mylae, and at once sailed to attack him with the whole fleet. No sooner did the Carthaginians sight him than with joy and alacrity they put to sea with a hundred and thirty sail, feeling supreme contempt for the Roman ignorance of seamanship. Accordingly they all sailed with their prows directed straight at their enemy: they did not think the engagement worth even the trouble of ranging their ships in any order, but advanced as though to seize a booty exposed for their acceptance. Their commander was that same Hannibal who had withdrawn his forces from Agrigentum by a secret night movement, and he was on board a galley with seven banks of oars which had once belonged to King Pyrrhus. When they neared the enemy, and saw the “crows” raised aloft on the prows of the several ships, the Carthaginians were for a time in a state of perplexity; for they were quite strangers to such contrivances as these engines. Feeling, however, a complete contempt for their opponents, those on board the ships that were in the van of the squadron charged without flinching. But as soon as they came to close quarters their ships were invariably tightly grappled by these machines; the enemy boarded by means of the “crows,” and engaged them on their decks; and in the end some of the Carthaginians were cut down, while others surrendered in bewildered terror at the battle in which they found themselves engaged, which eventually became exactly like a land fight. The result was that they lost the first thirty ships engaged, crews and all. Among them was captured the commander’s ship also, though Hannibal himself by an unexpected piece of luck and an act of great daring effected his escape in the ship’s boat. The rest of the Carthaginian squadron were sailing up with the view of charging; but as they were coming near they saw what had happened to the ships which were sailing in the front, and accordingly sheered off and avoided the blows of the engines. Yet trusting to their speed, they managed by a manœuvre to sail round and charge the enemy, some on their broadside and others on their stern, expecting by that method to avoid danger. But the engines swung round to meet them in every direction, and dropped down upon them so infallibly, that no ships could come to close quarters without being grappled. Eventually the Carthaginians turned and fled, bewildered at the novelty of the occurrence, and with a loss of fifty ships.

[24.] Having in this unlooked-for manner made good their maritime hopes the Romans were doubly encouraged in their enthusiasm for the war. Further operations in Sicily.
Segesta and Macella.
Hamilcar.For the present they put in upon the coast of Sicily, raised the siege of Segesta when it was reduced to the last extremity, and on their way back from Segesta carried the town Macella by assault. But Hamilcar, the commander of the Carthaginian land forces happened, after the naval battle, to be informed as he lay encamped near Panormus that the allies were engaged in a dispute with the Romans about the post of honour in the battles: and ascertaining that the allies were encamped by themselves between Paropus and Himeraean Thermae, he made a sudden attack in force as they were in the act of moving camp and killed almost four thousand of them. Hannibal in Sardinia.After this action Hannibal sailed across to Carthage with such ships as he had left; and thence before very long crossed to Sardinia, with a reinforcement of ships, and accompanied by some of those whose reputation as naval commanders stood high. But before very long he was blockaded in a certain harbour by the Romans, and lost a large number of ships; and was thereupon summarily arrested by the surviving Carthaginians and crucified. This came about because the first thing the Romans did upon getting a navy was to try to become masters of Sardinia.

During the next year the Roman legions in Sicily did nothing worthy of mention. B.C. 259.In the next, after the arrival of the new Consuls, Aulus Atilius and Gaius Sulpicius, they started to attack Panormus because the Carthaginian forces were wintering there. B.C. 258. Coss. A. Atilius Calatinus, G. Sulpicius, Paterculus.The Consuls advanced close up to the city with their whole force, and drew up in order of battle. But the enemy refusing to come out to meet them, they marched away and attacked the town of Hippana. This they carried by assault: but though they also took Myttistratum it was only after it had stood a lengthened siege Hippana and Myttistratum.owing to the strength of its situation. It was at this time, too, that they recovered Camarina, which had revolted a short time previously. They threw up works against it, and captured it Camarina.after making a breach in its walls. They treated Henna, and sundry other strong places which had been in the hands of the Carthaginians, in the same way; and when they had finished these operations they undertook to lay siege to Lipara.

[25.] Next year Gaius Atilius, the Consul, happened to be at anchor off Tyndaris, when he observed the Carthaginian fleet sailing by in a straggling manner. Coss. C. Atilius Regulus, Cn. Cornelius, Blasio II. B.C. 257.
Fighting off Tyndaris.He passed the word to the crews of his own ships to follow the advanced squadron, and started himself before the rest with ten ships of equal sailing powers. When the Carthaginians became aware that while some of the enemy were still embarking, others were already putting out to sea, and that the advanced squadron were considerably ahead of the rest, they stood round and went to meet them. They succeeded in surrounding and destroying all of them except the Consul’s ship, and that they all but captured with its crew. This last, however, by the perfection of its rowers and its consequent speed, effected a desperate escape. Meanwhile the remaining ships of the Romans were sailing up and gradually drawing close together. Having got into line, they charged the enemy, took ten ships with their crews, and sunk eight. The rest of the Carthaginian ships retired to the Liparean Islands.

The result of this battle was that both sides concluded that they were now fairly matched, and accordingly made more systematic efforts to secure a naval force, Winter of B.C. 257-256.and to dispute the supremacy at sea. While these things were going on, the land forces effected nothing worth recording; but wasted all their time in such petty operations as chance threw in their way. Therefore, after making the preparations B.C. 256. Coss. L. Manlius, Vulso Longus, M. Atilius Regulus II. (Suff.)I have mentioned for the approaching summer, the Romans, with three hundred and thirty decked ships of war, touched at Messene; thence put to sea, keeping Sicily on their right; and after doubling the headland Pachynus passed on to Ecnomus, because the land force was also in that district. The Carthaginians on their part put to sea again with three hundred and fifty decked ships, touched at Lilybaeum, and thence dropped anchor at Heracleia Minoa.

[26.] Now it was the purpose of the Romans to sail across to Libya and transfer the war there, Preparations for the Battle of Ecnomus.in order that the Carthaginians might find the danger affecting themselves and their own country rather than Sicily. But the Carthaginians were determined to prevent this. They knew that Libya was easily invaded, and that the invaders if they once effected a landing would meet with little resistance from the inhabitants; and they therefore made up their minds not to allow it, and were eager rather to bring the matter to a decisive issue by a battle at sea. The one side was determined to cross, the other to prevent their crossing; and their enthusiastic rivalry gave promise of a desperate struggle. The preparations of the Romans were made to suit either contingency, an engagement at sea or a disembarkation on the enemy’s soil. Accordingly they picked out the best hands from the land army and divided the whole force which they meant to take on board into four divisions. Each division had alternative titles; Roman forces. 330 ships, with average of 420 men (300 rowers + 120 marines) = 138,600 men.the first was called the “First Legion” or the “First Squadron,”—and so on with the others. The fourth had a third title besides. They were called “Triarii,” on the analogy of land armies. The total number of men thus making up the naval force amounted to nearly one hundred and forty thousand, reckoning each ship as carrying three hundred rowers and one hundred and twenty soldiers. The Carthaginians, on the other hand, made their preparations almost exclusively with a view to a naval engagement. Carthaginian numbers, 150,000 men.Their numbers, if we reckon by the number of their ships, were over one hundred and fifty thousand men. The mere recital of these figures must, I should imagine, strike any one with astonishment at the magnitude of the struggle, and the vast resources of the contending states. An actual view of them itself could hardly be more impressive than the bare statement of the number of men and ships.

Now the Romans had two facts to consider: The Roman order at Ecnomus.First, that circumstances compelled them to face the open sea; and, secondly, that their enemies had the advantage of fast sailing vessels. They therefore took every precaution for keeping their line unbroken and difficult to attack. They had only two ships with six banks of oars, those, namely, on which the Consuls Marcus Atilius and Lucius Manlius respectively were sailing. These they stationed side by side in front and in a line with each other. Behind each of these they stationed ships one behind the other in single file—the first squadron behind the one, and the second squadron behind the other. These were so arranged that, as each ship came to its place, the two files diverged farther and farther from each other; the vessels being also stationed one behind the other with their prows inclining outwards. Having thus arranged the first and second squadrons in single file so as to form a wedge, they stationed the third division in a single line at its base; so that the whole finally presented the appearance of a triangle. Behind this base they stationed the horse-transports, attaching them by towing-ropes to the ships of the third squadron. And to the rear of them they placed the fourth squadron, called the Triarii, in a single line, so extended as to overlap the line in front of them at both extremities. When these dispositions were complete the general appearance was that of a beak or wedge, the apex of which was open, the base compact and strong; while the whole was easy to work and serviceable, and at the same time difficult to break up.

[27.] Meanwhile the Carthaginian commanders had briefly addressed their men. The disposition of the Carthaginian fleet.They pointed out to them that victory in this battle would ensure the war in the future being confined to the question of the possession of Sicily; while if they were beaten they would have hereafter to fight for their native land and for all that they held dear. With these words they passed the word to embark. The order was obeyed with universal enthusiasm, for what had been said brought home to them the issues at stake; and they put to sea in the full fervour of excited gallantry, which might well have struck terror into all who saw it. When their commanders saw the arrangement of the enemies’ ships they adapted their own to match it. Three-fourths of their force they posted in a single line, extending their right wing towards the open sea with a view of outflanking their opponents, and placing their ships with prows facing the enemy; while the other fourth part was posted to form a left wing of the whole, the vessels being at right angles to the others and close to the shore. The two Carthaginian commanders were Hanno and Hamilcar. ch. 19. The former was the general who had been defeated in the engagement at Agrigentum. He now commanded the right wing, supported by beaked vessels for charging, and the fastest sailing quinqueremes for outflanking, the enemy. ch. 25.The latter, who had been in the engagement off Tyndaris, had charge of the left wing. This officer, occupying the central position of the entire line, on this occasion employed a stratagem which I will now describe. The battle.The battle began by the Romans charging the centre of the Carthaginians, because they observed that it was weakened by their great extension. The ships in the Carthaginian centre, in accordance with their orders, at once turned and fled with a view of breaking up the Roman close order. They began to retire with all speed, and the Romans pursued them with exultation. The consequence was that, while the first and second Roman squadrons were pressing the flying enemy, the third and fourth “legions” had become detached and were left behind,—the former because they had to tow the horse-transports, and the “Triarii” because they kept their station with them and helped them to form a reserve. But when the Carthaginians thought that they had drawn the first and second squadron a sufficient distance from the main body a signal was hoisted on board Hamilcar’s ship, and they all simultaneously swung their ships round and engaged their pursuers. The contest was a severe one. The Carthaginians had a great superiority in the rapidity with which they manœuvred their ships. They darted out from their line and rowed round the enemy: they approached them with ease, and retired with despatch. But the Romans, no less than the Carthaginians, had their reasons for entertaining hopes of victory: for when the vessels got locked together the contest became one of sheer strength: their engines, the “crows,” grappled all that once came to close quarters: and, finally, both the Consuls were present in person and were witnesses of their behaviour in battle.

[28.] This was the state of affairs on the centre. But meanwhile Hanno with the right wing, which had held aloof when the first encounter took place, crossing the open sea, charged the ships of the Triarii and caused them great difficulty and embarrassment: while those of the Carthaginians who had been posted near the land manœuvred into line, and getting their ships straight, charged the men who were towing the horse-transports. These latter let go the towing-ropes, grappled with the enemy, and kept up a desperate struggle.

So that the engagement was in three separate divisions, or rather there were three sea-fights going on at wide intervals from each other. Three separate battles.Now in these three engagements the opposing parties were in each case fairly matched, thanks to the original disposition of the ships, and therefore the victory was in each case closely contested. However the result in the several cases was very much what was to be expected where forces were so equal. The first to engage were the first to separate: First with Hamilcar’s squadron. for Hamilcar’s division at last were overpowered and fled. But while Lucius was engaged in securing his prizes, Marcus observing the struggle in which the Triarii and horse-transports were involved, went with all speed to their assistance, taking with him all the ships of the second squadron which were undamaged. Second squadron under Regulus. As soon as he had reached and engaged Hanno’s division, the Triarii quickly picked up courage, though they were then getting much the worst of it, and returned with renewed spirits to the fight. It was now the turn for the Carthaginians to be in difficulties. They were charged in front and on the rear, and found to their surprise that they were being surrounded by the relieving squadron. They at once gave way and retreated in the direction of the open sea.

While this was going on, Lucius, who was sailing back to rejoin his colleague, observed that the third squadron had got wedged in by the Carthaginians close in shore. Third squadron relieved by Regulus and Manlius. Accordingly he and Marcus, who had by this time secured the safety of the transports and Triarii, started together to relieve their imperilled comrades, who were now sustaining something very like a blockade. And the fact is that they would long before this have been utterly destroyed had not the Carthaginians been afraid of the “crows,” and confined themselves to surrounding and penning them in close to land, without attempting to charge for fear of being caught by the grappling-irons. The Consuls came up rapidly, and surrounding the Carthaginians captured fifty of their ships with their crews, while some few of them managed to slip away and escape by keeping close to the shore.

Such was the result of the separate engagements. But the general upshot of the whole battle was in favour of the Romans. General result.Twenty-four of their vessels were destroyed; over thirty of the Carthaginians. Not a single Roman ship was captured with its crew; sixty-four of the Carthaginians were so taken.

[29.] After the battle the Romans took in a fresh supply of victual, repaired and refitted the ships they had captured, bestowed upon the crews the attention which they had deserved by their victory, and then put to sea with a view of continuing their voyage to Libya. Their leading ships made the shore just under the headland called the Hermaeum, which is the extreme point on the east of the Gulf of Carthage, and runs out into the open sea in the direction of Sicily. There they waited for the rest of the ships to come up, and having got the entire fleet together coasted along until they came to the city called Aspis. Siege of Aspis. (Clupea.) Here they disembarked, beached their ships, dug a trench, and constructed a stockade round them; and on the inhabitants of the city refusing to submit without compulsion, they set to work to besiege the town. Presently those of the Carthaginians who had survived the sea-fight came to land also; and feeling sure that the enemy, in the flush of their victory, intended to sail straight against Carthage itself, they began by keeping a chain of advanced guards at outlying points to protect the capital with their military and naval forces. But when they ascertained that the Romans had disembarked without resistance and were engaged in besieging Aspis, they gave up the idea of watching for the descent of the fleet; but concentrated their forces, and devoted themselves to the protection of the capital and its environs.

Meanwhile the Romans had taken Aspis, had placed in it a garrison to hold it and its territory, and had besides sent home to Rome to announce the Aspis taken. events which had taken place and to ask for instructions as to the future,—what they were to do, and what arrangements they were to make. Having done this they made active preparations for a general advance and set about plundering the country. They met with no opposition in this: they destroyed numerous dwelling houses of remarkably fine construction, possessed themselves of a great number of cattle; and captured more than twenty thousand slaves whom they took to their ships. In the midst of these proceedings the messengers arrived from Rome with orders that one Consul was to remain with an adequate force, the other was to bring the fleet to Rome. Accordingly Marcus was M. Atilius Regulus remains in Africa, winter of B.C. 256-255. left behind with forty ships, fifteen thousand infantry, and five hundred cavalry; while Lucius put the crowd of captives on board, and having embarked his men, sailed along the coast of Sicily without encountering any danger, and reached Rome.

[30.] The Carthaginians now saw that their enemies contemplated a lengthened occupation of the country. They therefore proceeded first of all to elect two of their own citizens, Hasdrubal son of Hanno, and Bostarus, to the office of general; and next sent to Heracleia a pressing summons to Hamilcar. He obeyed immediately, and arrived at Carthage with five hundred cavalry and five thousand infantry. He was forthwith appointed general in conjunction with the other two, and entered into consultation with Hasdrubal and his colleague as to the measures necessary to be taken in the present crisis. They decided to defend the country and not to allow it to be devastated without resistance.

A few days afterwards Marcus sallied forth on one of his marauding expeditions. Such towns as were unwalled he carried by assault and plundered, B.C. 256-255. The operations of Regulus in Libya. and such as were walled he besieged. Among others he came to the considerable town of Adys, and having placed his troops round it was beginning with all speed to raise siege works. The Carthaginians were both eager to relieve the town and determined to dispute the possession of the open country. They therefore led out their army; but their operations were not skilfully conducted. They indeed seized and encamped upon a piece of rising ground which commanded the enemy; but it was unsuitable to themselves. Their best hopes rested on their cavalry and their elephants, and yet they abandoned the level plain and cooped themselves up in a position at once steep and difficult of access. The enemy, as might have been expected, were not slow to take advantage of this mistake. The Roman commanders were skilful enough to understand that the best and most formidable part of the forces opposed to them was rendered useless by the nature of the ground. They did not therefore wait for them to come down to the plain and offer battle, but choosing the time which suited themselves, began at daybreak a forward movement on both sides of the hill. Defeat of the Carthaginians near Adys. In the battle which followed the Carthaginians could not use their cavalry or elephants at all; but their mercenary troops made a really gallant and spirited sally. They even forced the first division of the Romans to give way and fly: but they advanced too far, and were surrounded and routed by the division which was advancing from the other direction. This was immediately followed by the whole force being dislodged from their encampment. The elephants and cavalry as soon as they gained level ground made good their retreat without loss; but the infantry were pursued by the Romans. The latter however soon desisted from the pursuit. They presently returned, dismantled the enemy’s entrenchment, and destroyed the stockade; and from thenceforth overran the whole country-side and sacked the towns without opposition.

Among others they seized the town called Tunes. This place had many natural advantages for expeditions such as those in which they were engaged, Tunes. and was so situated as to form a convenient base of operations against the capital and its immediate neighbourhood. They accordingly fixed their headquarters in it.

[31.] The Carthaginians were now indeed in evil case. It was not long since they had sustained a disaster at sea: and now they had met with one on land, Distress at Carthage, which is heightened by an inroad of Numidians. not from any failure of courage on the part of their soldiers, but from the incompetency of their commanders. Simultaneously with these misfortunes, they were suffering from an inroad of the Numidians, who were doing even more damage to the country than the Romans. The terror which they inspired drove the country folk to flock for safety into the city; and the city itself had to face a serious famine as well as a panic, the former from the numbers that crowded into it, the latter from the hourly expectation of a siege. Spring of B.C. 255. Regulus proposes harsh terms. But Regulus had different views. The double defeat sustained by the Carthaginians, by land as well as by sea, convinced him that the capture of Carthage was a question of a very short time; and he was in a state of great anxiety lest his successor in the Consulship should arrive from Rome in time to rob him of the glory of the achievement. He therefore invited the Carthaginians to make terms. They were only too glad of the proposal, and sent their leading citizens to meet him. The meeting took place: but the commissioners could not bring their minds to entertain his proposals; they were so severe that it was almost more than they could bear to listen to them at all. Regulus regarded himself as practically master of the city, and considered that they ought to regard any concession on his part as a matter of favour and pure grace. The terms rejected. The Carthaginians on the other hand concluded that nothing worse could be imposed on them if they suffered capture than was now enjoined. They therefore returned home without accepting the offers of Regulus, and extremely exasperated by his unreasonable harshness. When the Carthaginian Senate heard the conditions offered by the Roman general, though they had almost relinquished every hope of safety, they came to the gallant and noble resolution that they would brave anything, that they would try every possible means and endure every extremity, rather than submit to terms so dishonourable and so unworthy of their past history.

[32.] Now it happened that just about this time one of their recruiting agents, who had some time before been despatched to Greece, arrived home. Arrival of the Spartan Xanthippus in Carthage.He brought a large number of men with him, and among them a certain Lacedaemonian named Xanthippus, a man trained in the Spartan discipline, and of large experience in war. When this man was informed of their defeat, and of how it had taken place, and when he had reviewed the military resources still left to the Carthaginians, and the number of their cavalry and elephants, he did not take long to come to a decided conclusion. He expressed his opinion to his friends that the Carthaginians had owed their defeat, not to the superiority of the Romans, but to the unskilfulness of their own commanders. The dangerous state of their affairs caused the words of Xanthippus to get abroad quickly among the people and to reach the ears of the generals; and the men in authority determined to summon and question him. He appeared, and laid his views before the magistrates; in which he showed to what they owed their present disasters, and that if they would take his advice and keep to the flat parts of the country alike in marching, encamping, and giving battle, they would be able with perfect ease to secure safety for themselves and to defeat their opponents in the field. The generals accepted the suggestion, resolved to follow his advice, and there and then put their forces at his command. Among the multitude the observation of Xanthippus was passed from mouth to mouth, and gave rise, as was to be expected, to a good deal of popular rumour and sanguine talk. This was confirmed when he had once handled the troops. The way in which he got them into order when he had led them outside the town; the skill with which he manœuvred the separate detachments, and passed the word of command down the ranks in due conformity to the rules of tactics, at once impressed every one with the contrast to the blundering of their former generals. The multitude expressed their approbation by loud cheers, and were for engaging the enemy without delay, convinced that no harm could happen to them as long as Xanthippus was their leader. The generals took advantage of this circumstance, and of the extraordinary recovery which they saw had taken place in the spirits of the people. They addressed them some exhortations befitting the occasion, and after a few days’ delay got their forces on foot and started. Their army consisted of twelve thousand infantry, four thousand cavalry, and nearly a hundred elephants.

[33.] The Romans at once noticed a change. They saw that the Carthaginians chose level country for their line of march, The new strategy of the Carthaginians. and flat places for their encampments. This novelty puzzled and rather alarmed them, yet their prevailing feeling was an eager desire to come to close quarters with the enemy. They therefore advanced to a position about ten stades from them and employed the first day in pitching a camp there. Next day, while the chief officers of the Carthaginians were discussing in a council of war what dispositions were called for, and what line of strategy they were to adopt, the common soldiers, in their eagerness for the engagement, collected in groups, shouted out the name of Xanthippus, and showed that their opinion was in favour of an immediate forward movement. Influenced by the evident enthusiasm and eagerness of the army, and by the appeals of Xanthippus that they should not let the opportunity slip, the generals gave orders to the men to get ready, and resigned to Xanthippus the entire direction of affairs, with full authority to act as he thought most advantageous. He at once acted upon this authority. The dispositions for the battle. He ordered out the elephants, and placed them in a single line in front of the whole army. The heavy phalanx of the Carthaginians he stationed at a moderate interval in the rear of these. He divided the mercenaries into three corps. One he stationed on the right wing; while the other two, which consisted of the most active, he placed with the cavalry on both wings. When the Romans saw that the enemy were drawn up to offer them battle they readily advanced to accept it. They were however alarmed at the elephants, and made special arrangements with a view to resist their charge. They stationed the velites in the van, and behind them the legionaries, many maniples deep, while they divided the cavalry between the two wings. Their line of battle was thus less extended than usual, but deeper. And though they had thereby made a sufficient provision against the elephants, yet being far out-numbered in cavalry, their provision in that part of the field was altogether inadequate. At length both sides had made their dispositions according to their respective plans of operation, and had placed their several men in the posts assigned to them: and now they were standing drawn up in order, and were each of them watching for the right moment for beginning the attack.

[34.] No sooner had Xanthippus given the order to the men on the elephants to advance and disperse The battle. the lines in front of them, and to his cavalry to outflank both wings and charge the enemy, than the Roman army—clashing their shields and spears together after their usual custom, and simultaneously raising their battle-cry—charged the enemy. The Roman cavalry being far out-numbered by the Carthaginians were soon in full retreat on both wings. But the fortune of the several divisions of the infantry was various. Those stationed on the left wing—partly because they could avoid the elephants and partly because they thought contemptuously of the mercenaries—charged the right wing of the Carthaginians, succeeded in driving them from their ground, and pursued them as far as their entrenchment. Those stationed in front of the elephants were less fortunate. The maniples in front were thrown into utter confusion by the crushing weight of the animals: knocked down and trampled upon by them they perished in heaps upon the field; yet owing to its great depth the main body remained for a time unbroken. The Romans are beaten and annihilated. But it was not for long. The maniples on the rear found themselves outflanked by the cavalry, and were forced to face round and resist them: those on the other hand who forced their way to the front through the elephants, and had now those beasts on their rear, found themselves confronted by the phalanx of Carthaginians, which had not yet been in action and was still in close unbroken order, and so were cut to pieces. This was followed by a general rout. Most of the Romans were trampled to death by the enormous weight of the elephants; the rest were shot down in their ranks by the numerous cavalry: and there were only a very few who attempted to save themselves by flight. But the flatness of the country was unfavourable to escape in this manner. Some of the fugitives were destroyed by the elephants and cavalry; Regulus made prisoner. while only those who fled with the general Regulus, amounting perhaps to five hundred, were after a short pursuit made prisoners with him to a man.

On the Carthaginian side there fell about eight hundred of the mercenaries, those namely who had been stationed opposite the left wing of the Romans. On the part of the Romans about two thousand survived. These were those whom I have already described as having chased the Carthaginian right wing to their entrenchment, and who were thus not involved in the general engagement. The rest were entirely destroyed with the exception of those who fled with Regulus. The surviving maniples escaped with considerable difficulty to the town of Aspis. The Carthaginians stripped the dead, and taking with them the Roman general and the rest of their prisoners, returned to the capital in a high state of exultation at the turn their affairs had now taken.

[35.] This event conveys many useful lessons to a thoughtful observer. Above all, the disaster of Regulus gives the clearest possible warning that no one should feel too confident of the favours of Fortune, especially in the hour of success. Eurip. fr.Here we see one, who a short time before refused all pity or consideration to the fallen, brought incontinently to beg them for his own life. Again, we are taught the truth of that saying of Euripides—

One wise man’s skill is worth a world in arms.

For it was one man, one brain, that defeated the numbers which were believed to be invincible and able to accomplish anything; and restored to confidence a whole city that was unmistakably and utterly ruined, and the spirits of its army which had sunk to the lowest depths of despair. I record these things in the hope of benefiting my readers. There are two roads to reformation for mankind—one through misfortunes of their own, the other through those of others: the former is the most unmistakable, the latter the less painful. One should never therefore voluntarily choose the former, for it makes reformation a matter of great difficulty and danger; but we should always look out for the latter, for thereby we can without hurt to ourselves gain a clear view of the best course to pursue. It is this which forces us to consider that the knowledge gained from the study of true history is the best of all educations for practical life. For it is history, and history alone, which, without involving us in actual danger, will mature our judgment and prepare us to take right views, whatever may be the crisis or the posture of affairs.

[36.] To return to our narrative. Having obtained this complete success the Carthaginians indulged in every sign of exultation. Xanthippus quits Carthage. Thanksgivings were poured out to God, and joyful congratulations interchanged among themselves. But Xanthippus, by whose means such a happy change had been brought about and such an impulse been given to the fortunes of Carthage, did not remain there long, but took ship for home again. In this he showed his wisdom and discernment. For it is the nature of extraordinary and conspicuous achievements to exasperate jealousies and envenom slander; against which a native may perhaps stand with the support of kinsfolk and friends, but a foreigner when exposed to one or the other of them is inevitably overpowered before long and put in danger. There is however another account sometimes given of the departure of Xanthippus, which I will endeavour at a more suitable opportunity to set forth.

Upon this unlooked-for catastrophe in the Libyan campaign, the Roman government at once set to The Romans prepare a fleet to relieve their beaten army. work to fit out a fleet to take off the men who were still surviving there; while the Carthaginians followed up their success by sitting down before Aspis, and besieging it, being anxious to get the survivors of the battle into their hands. But failing to capture the place, owing to the gallantry and determined courage of these men, they eventually raised the siege. When they heard that the Romans were preparing their fleet, and were intending to sail once more against Libya, they set about shipbuilding also, partly repairing old vessels and partly constructing new. Before very long they had manned and launched two hundred ships, and were on the watch for the coming of their enemies. B.C. 255. Coss. Ser. Fulvius Paetinus Nobilior, M. Aemilius Paullus. By the beginning of the summer the Romans had launched three hundred and fifty vessels. They put them under the command of the Consuls Marcus Aemilius and Servius Fulvius, and despatched them. This fleet coasted along Sicily; made for Libya; and having fallen in with the Carthaginian squadron off Hermaeum, at once charged and easily turned them to flight; captured a hundred and fourteen with their crews, and having taken on board their men who had maintained themselves in Libya, started from Aspis on their return voyage to Sicily.

[37.] The passage was effected in safety, and the coast of Camarina was reached: but there they experienced so terrible a storm, and suffered so dreadfully, as almost to beggar description. The fleet is lost in a storm. The disaster was indeed extreme: for out of their three hundred and sixty-four vessels eighty only remained. The rest were either swamped or driven by the surf upon the rocks and headlands, where they went to pieces and filled all the seaboard with corpses and wreckage. No greater catastrophe is to be found in all history as befalling a fleet at one time. And for this Fortune was not so much to blame as the commanders themselves. They had been warned again and again by the pilots not to steer along the southern coast of Sicily facing the Libyan sea, because it was exposed and yielded no safe anchorage; and because, of the two dangerous constellations, Between June 28 and July 26. one had not yet set and the other was on the point of rising (for their voyage fell between the rising of Orion and that of the Dog Star). Yet they attended to none of these warnings; but, intoxicated by their recent success, were anxious to capture certain cities as they coasted along, and in pursuance of this idea thoughtlessly exposed themselves to the full fury of the open sea. As far as these particular men were concerned, the disaster which they brought upon themselves in the pursuit of trivial advantages convinced them of the folly of their conduct. But it is a peculiarity of the Roman people as a whole to treat everything as a question of main strength; to consider that they must of course accomplish whatever they have proposed to themselves; and that nothing is impossible that they have once determined upon. The result of such self-confidence is that in many things they do succeed, while in some few they conspicuously fail, and especially at sea. On land it is against men only and their works that they have to direct their efforts: and as the forces against which they exert their strength do not differ intrinsically from their own, as a general rule they succeed; while their failures are exceptional and rare. But to contend with the sea and sky is to fight against a force immeasurably superior to their own: and when they trust to an exertion of sheer strength in such a contest the disasters which they meet with are signal. This is what they experienced on the present occasion: they have often experienced it since; and will continue to do so, as long as they maintain their headstrong and foolhardy notion that any season of the year admits of sailing as well as marching.

[38.] When the Carthaginians heard of the destruction which had befallen the Roman fleet, they made up their minds that as their late victory had made them a match for their enemy on land, so now the Roman catastrophe had made them a match for him at sea. Accordingly they devoted themselves with still greater eagerness than before to their naval and military preparations. The Carthaginians renew operations in Sicily. And first, they lost no time in despatching Hasdrubal to Sicily, and with him not only the soldiers that they had already collected, but those also whom they had recalled from Heracleia; and along with them they sent also a hundred and forty elephants. And next, after despatching him, they began fitting out two hundred ships and making all other preparations necessary for a naval expedition. Hasdrubal reached Lilybaeum safely, and immediately set to work to train his elephants and drill his men, and showed his intention of striking a blow for the possession of the open country.

The Roman government, when they heard of this from the survivors of the wreck on their arrival home, felt it to be a grievous misfortune; but being absolutely resolved not to give in, they determined once more to put two hundred and twenty vessels on the stocks and build afresh. B.C. 254. Coss. Gn. Cornelius Scipio Asina II., Aulus Atilius, Calatinus II. These were finished in three months, an almost incredibly short time, and the new Consuls Aulus Atilius and Gnaeus Cornelius fitted out the fleet and put to sea. As they passed through the straits they took up from Messene those of the vessels which had been saved from the wreck; and having thus arrived with three hundred ships off Panormus, which is the strongest town of all the Carthaginian province in Sicily, they began to besiege it. They threw up works in two distinct places, and after other necessary preparations brought up their battering rams. The tower next the sea was destroyed with ease, and the soldiers forced their way in through the breach: and so what is called the New Town was carried by assault; while what is called the Old Town being placed by this event in imminent danger, its inhabitants made haste to surrender it. Having thus made themselves masters of the place, the army sailed back to Rome, leaving a garrison in the town.

[39.] But next summer the new Consuls Gnaeus Servilius and Gaius Sempronius put again to sea with their full strength, and after touching at Sicily started thence for Libya. B.C. 253. Coss. Gn. Servilius Caepio, G. Sempronius Blaesus. There, as they coasted along the shore, they made a great number of descents upon the country without accomplishing anything of importance in any of them. At length they came to the island of the Lotophagi called Mēnix, which is not far from the Lesser Syrtis. There, from ignorance of the waters, they ran upon some shallows; the tide receded, their ships went aground, and they were in extreme peril. However, after a while the tide unexpectedly flowed back again, and by dint of throwing overboard all their heavy goods they just managed to float the ships. After this their return voyage was more like a flight than anything else. When they reached Sicily and had made the promontory of Lilybaeum they cast anchor at Panormus. Thence they weighed anchor for Rome, and rashly ventured upon the open sea-line as the shortest; but while on their voyage they once more encountered so terrible a storm that they lost more than a hundred and fifty ships.

The Romans after this misfortune, though they are eminently persistent in carrying out their undertakings, B.C. 252. yet owing to the severity and frequency of their disasters, now yielded to the force of circumstances and refrained from constructing another fleet. All the hopes still left to them they rested upon their land forces: and, B.C. 251. Coss. Lucius Caecilius Metellus, G. Furius Pacilus. accordingly, they despatched the Consuls Lucius Caecilius and Gaius Furius with their legions to Sicily; but they only manned sixty ships to carry provisions for the legions. The fortunes of the Carthaginians had in their turn considerably improved owing to the catastrophes I have described. They now commanded the sea without let or hindrance, since the Romans had abandoned it; while in their land forces their hopes were high. Nor was it unreasonable that it should be so. The account of the battle of Libya had reached the ears of the Romans: they had heard that the elephants had broken their ranks and had killed the large part of those that fell: and they were in such terror of them, that though during two years running after that time they had on many occasions, in the territory either of Lilybaeum or Selinus, found themselves in order of battle within five or six stades of the enemy, they never plucked up courage to begin an attack, or in fact to come down upon level ground at all, all because of their fear of an elephant charge. B.C. 252-251. And in these two seasons all they did was to reduce Therma and Lipara by siege, keeping close all the while to mountainous districts and such as were difficult to cross. The timidity and want of confidence thus displayed by their land forces induced the Roman government to change their minds and once more to attempt success at sea. B.C. 250.Accordingly, in the second consulship of Caius Atilius and Lucius Manlius, we find them ordering fifty ships to be built, enrolling sailors and energetically collecting a naval armament.

[40.] Meanwhile Hasdrubal noticed the terror displayed by the Romans whenever they had lately found themselves in the presence of the enemy. B.C. 251.He learnt also that one of the Consuls had departed and gone to Italy, and that Caecilius was lingering in Panormus with the other half of the army, Skirmishing at Panormus.with the view of protecting the corn-crops of the allies just then ripe for the harvest. He therefore got his troops in motion, marched out, and encamped on the frontier of the territory of Panormus. Caecilius saw well enough that the enemy had become supremely confident, and he was anxious to draw him on; he therefore kept his men within the walls. Hasdrubal imagined that Caecilius dared not come out to give him battle. Elated with this idea, he pushed boldly forward with his whole army and marched over the pass into the territory of Panormus. But though he was destroying all the standing crops up to the very walls of the town, Caecilius was not shaken from his resolution, but kept persistently to it, until he had induced him to cross the river which lay between him and the town. But no sooner had the Carthaginians got their elephants and men across, than Caecilius commenced sending out his light-armed troops to harass them, until he had forced them to get their whole army into fighting order. When he saw that everything was happening as he designed it, he placed some of his light troops to line the wall and moat, with instructions that if the elephants came within range they should pour volleys of their missiles upon them; but that whenever they found themselves being forced from their ground by them, they should retreat into the moat, rush out of it again, and hurl darts at the elephants which happened to be nearest. At the same time he gave orders to the armourers in the market-place to carry the missiles and heap them up outside at the foot of the wall. Meanwhile he took up his own position with his maniples at the gate which was opposite the enemy’s left wing, and kept despatching detachment after detachment to reinforce his skirmishers. The engagement commenced by them becoming more and more general, a feeling of emulation took possession of the officers in charge of the elephants. They wished to distinguish themselves in the eyes of Hasdrubal, and they desired that the credit of the victory should be theirs: they therefore, with one accord, charged the advanced skirmishing parties of the enemy, routed them with ease, and pursued them up to the moat. But no sooner did the elephants thus come to close quarters than they were wounded by the archers on the wall, and overwhelmed with volleys of pila and javelins which poured thick and fast upon them from the men stationed on the outer edge of the moat, and who had not yet been engaged,—and thus, studded all over with darts, and wounded past all bearing, they soon got beyond control. They turned and bore down upon their own masters, trampling men to death, and throwing their own lines into utter disorder and confusion. When Caecilius saw this he led out his men with promptitude. His troops were fresh; the enemy were in disorder; and he charged them diagonally on the flank: the result was that he inflicted a severe defeat upon them, killed a large number, and forced the rest into precipitate flight. Of the elephants he captured ten along with their Indian riders: the rest which had thrown their Indians he managed to drive into a herd after the battle, and secured every one of them. This achievement gained him the credit on all hands of having substantially benefited the Roman cause, by once more restoring confidence to the army, and giving them the command of the open country.

[41.] The announcement of this success at Rome was received with extreme delight; not so much at the blow inflicted on the enemy by the loss of their elephants, as at the confidence inspired in their own troops by a victory over these animals. With their confidence thus restored, the Roman government recurred to their original plan of sending out the Consuls upon this service with a fleet and naval forces; for they were eager, by all means in their power, to put a period to the war. Accordingly, in the fourteenth year of the war, the supplies necessary for the despatch of the expedition were got ready, and the Consuls set sail for Sicily with two hundred ships. B.C. 250. C. Caecilius Regulus II., L. Manlius Vulso II. They dropped anchor at Lilybaeum; and the army having met them there, they began to besiege it by sea and land. Their view was that if they could obtain possession of this town they would have no difficulty in transferring the seat of war to Libya. The Carthaginian leaders were of the same opinion, and entirely agreed with the Roman view of the value of the place. They accordingly subordinated everything else to this; devoted themselves to the relief of the place at all hazards; and resolved to retain this town at any sacrifice: for now that the Romans were masters of all the rest of Sicily, except Drepana, it was the only foothold they had left in the island.

To understand my story a knowledge of the topography of the district is necessary. I will therefore endeavour in a few words to convey a comprehension to my readers of its geographical position and its peculiar advantages.

[42.] Sicily, then, lies towards Southern Italy very much in the same relative position as the Peloponnese does to the rest of Greece. The only difference is that the one is an island, the other a peninsula; and consequently in the former case there is no communication except by sea, in the latter there is a land communication also. The shape of Sicily is a triangle, of which the several angles are represented by promontories: that to the south jutting out into the Sicilian Sea is called Pachynus; that which looks to the north forms the western extremity of the Straits of Messene and is about twelve stades from Italy, its name is Pelorus; while the third projects in the direction of Libya itself, and is conveniently situated opposite the promontories which cover Carthage, at a distance of about a thousand stades: it looks somewhat south of due west, dividing the Libyan from the Sardinian Sea, and is called Lilybaeum. On this last there is a city of the same name. It was this city that the Romans were now besieging. It was exceedingly strongly fortified: for besides its walls there was a deep ditch running all round it, and on the side of the sea it was protected by lagoons, to steer through which into the harbour was a task requiring much skill and practice.

The Romans made two camps, one on each side of the town, and connected them with a ditch, Siege of Lilybaeum, B.C. 250. stockade, and wall. Having done this, they began the assault by advancing their siege-works in the direction of the tower nearest the sea, which commands a view of the Libyan main. They did this gradually, always adding something to what they had already constructed; and thus bit by bit pushed their works forward and extended them laterally, till at last they had brought down not only this tower, but the six next to it also; and at the same time began battering all the others with battering-rams. The siege was carried on with vigour and terrific energy: every day some of the towers were shaken and others reduced to ruins; every day too the siege-works advanced farther and farther, and more and more towards the heart of the city. And though there were in the town, besides the ordinary inhabitants, as many as ten thousand hired soldiers, the consternation and despondency became overwhelming. Yet their commander Himilco omitted no measure within his power. As fast as the enemy demolished a fortification he threw up a new one; he also countermined them, and reduced the assailants to straits of no ordinary difficulty. Moreover, he made daily sallies, attempted to carry or throw fire into the siege-works, and with this end in view fought many desperate engagements by night as well as by day: so determined was the fighting in these struggles, that sometimes the number of the dead was greater than it ordinarily is in a pitched battle.

[43.] But about this time some of the officers of highest rank in the mercenary army discussed among Attempted treason in Lilybaeum. themselves a project for surrendering the town to the Romans, being fully persuaded that the men under their command would obey their orders. They got out of the city at night, went to the enemy’s camp, and held a parley with the Roman commander on the subject. But Alexon the Achaean, who on a former occasion had saved Agrigentum from destruction when the mercenary troops of Syracuse made a plot to betray it, was on this occasion once more the first to detect this treason, and to report it to the general of the Carthaginians. The latter no sooner heard it than he at once summoned a meeting of those officers who were still in their quarters; and exhorted them to loyalty with prayers and promises of liberal bounties and favours, if they would only remain faithful to him, and not join in the treason of the officers who had left the town. They received his speech with enthusiasm, and were there and then commissioned by him, some to go to the Celts accompanied by Hannibal, who was the son of the Hannibal killed in Sardinia, and who had a previous acquaintance with that people gained in the expedition against them; others to fetch the rest of the mercenary troops, accompanied by Alexon, because he was liked and trusted by them. These officers then proceeded to summon a meeting of their men and address them. They pledged their own credit for the bounties promised them severally by the General, and without difficulty persuaded the men to remain staunch. The result was that when the officers, who had joined in the secret mission, returned to the walls and tried to address their men, and communicate the terms offered by the Romans, so far from finding any adherents, they could not even obtain a hearing, but were driven from the wall with volleys of stones and darts. But this treason among their mercenaries constituted a serious danger: the Carthaginians had a narrow escape from absolute ruin, and they owed their preservation from it to that same Alexon whose fidelity had on a former occasion preserved for Agrigentum her territory, constitution, and freedom.

[44.] Meanwhile the Carthaginians at home knew nothing of what was going on. But they could calculate the requirements of a besieged garrison; Hannibal relieves Lilybaeum. and they accordingly filled fifty vessels with soldiers, furnished their commander Hannibal, a son of Hamilcar, and an officer and prime favourite of Adherbal’s, with instructions suitable to the business in hand, and despatched him with all speed: charging him to be guilty of no delay, to omit no opportunity, and to shrink from no attempt however venturesome to relieve the besieged. He put to sea with his ten thousand men, and dropped anchor at the islands called Aegusae, which lie in the course between Lilybaeum and Carthage, and there looked out for an opportunity of making Lilybaeum. At last a strong breeze sprang up in exactly the right quarter: he crowded all sail and bore down before the wind right upon the entrance of the harbour, with his men upon the decks fully armed and ready for battle. Partly from astonishment at this sudden appearance, partly from dread of being carried along with the enemy by the violence of the gale into the harbour of their opponents, the Romans did not venture to obstruct the entrance of the reinforcement; but stood out at sea overpowered with amazement at the audacity of the enemy.

The town population crowded to the walls, in an agony of anxiety as to what would happen, no less than in an excess of joy at the unlooked-for appearance of hope, and cheered on the crews as they sailed into the harbour, with clapping hands and cries of gladness. To sail into the harbour was an achievement of great danger; but Hannibal accomplished it gallantly, and, dropping anchor there, safely disembarked his soldiers. The exultation of all who were in the city was not caused so much by the presence of the reinforcement, though they had thereby gained a strong revival of hope, and a large addition to their strength, as by the fact that the Romans had not dared to intercept the course of the Carthaginians.

[45.] Himilco, the general in command at Lilybaeum, now saw that both divisions of his troops were in A sally from Lilybaeum.high spirits and eager for service,—the original garrison owing to the presence of the reinforcement, the newly arrived because they had as yet had no experience of the hardships of the situation. He wished to take advantage of the excited feelings of both parties, before they cooled, in order to organise an attempt to set fire to the works of the besiegers. He therefore summoned the whole army to a meeting, and dwelt upon the themes suitable to the occasion at somewhat greater length than usual. He raised their zeal to an enthusiastic height by the magnitude of his promises for individual acts of courage, and by declaring the favours and rewards which awaited them as an army at the hands of the Carthaginians. His speech was received with lively marks of satisfaction; and the men with loud shouts bade him delay no more, but lead them into the field. For the present, however, he contented himself with thanking them and expressing his delight at their excellent spirit, and bidding them go early to rest and obey their officers, dismissed them. But shortly afterwards he summoned the officers; assigned to them severally the posts best calculated for the success of the undertaking; communicated to them the watchword and the exact moment the movement was to be made; and issued orders to the commanders to be at the posts assigned with their men at the morning watch. His orders were punctually obeyed: and at daybreak he led out his forces and made attempts upon the siege-works at several points. But the Romans had not been blind to what was coming, and were neither idle nor unprepared. Wherever help was required it was promptly rendered; and at every point they made a stout resistance to the enemy. Before long there was fighting all along the line, and an obstinate struggle round the entire circuit of the wall; for the sallying party were not less than twenty thousand strong, and their opponents more numerous still. The contest was all the hotter from the fact that the men were not fighting in their regular ranks, but indiscriminately, and as their own judgment directed; the result of which was that a spirit of personal emulation arose among the combatants, because, though the numbers engaged were so great, there was a series of single combats between man and man, or company and company. However, it was at the siege-works themselves that the shouting was loudest and the throng of combatants the densest. At these troops had been massed deliberately for attack and defence. The assailants strove their utmost to dislodge the defenders, the defenders exerted all their courage to hold their ground and not yield an inch to the assailants,—and with such emulation and fury on both sides, that they ended by falling at their posts rather than yield. But there were others mingled with these, carrying torchwood and tow and fire, who made a simultaneous attack upon the battering-rams at every point: hurling these fiery missiles against them with such audacity, that the Romans were reduced to the last extremity of danger, being quite unable to overpower the attack of the enemy. But the general of the Carthaginians, seeing that he was losing large numbers in the engagement, It fails.without being able to gain the object of the sortie, which was to take the siege-works, ordered his trumpeters to sound a recall. So the Romans, after coming within an ace of losing all their siege-gear, finally kept possession of the works, and were able to maintain them all without dispute.

[46.] After this affair Hannibal eluded the enemy’s watch, and sailed out of the harbour by night with his ships to Drepana, to join the Carthaginian Commander-in-Chief, Adherbal. Drepana is about one hundred and twenty stades from Lilybaeum, and was always an object of special care to the Carthaginians from the convenience of its position and the excellence of its harbour.

Now the Carthaginian government were anxious to learn the state of affairs at Lilybaeum, but could not do so because the garrison was strictly blockaded, and the Romans were exceedingly vigilant. Hannibal the Rhodian offers to run the blockade. In this difficulty a nobleman, called Hannibal the Rhodian, came to them, and offered to run the blockade, to see what was going on in Lilybaeum with his own eyes, and to report. The offer delighted them, but they did not believe in the possibility of its fulfilment with the Roman fleet lying at the very entrance of the channel. However, the man fitted out his own private vessel and put to sea. He first crossed to one of the islands lying off Lilybaeum. Next day he obtained a wind in the right quarter, and about ten o’clock in the morning actually sailed into the harbour in the full view of the enemy, who looked on with amazement at his audacity. Next day he lost no time in setting about a return voyage. The Roman Consul had determined on taking extra precautions for watching the sea near the channel: with this view he had during the night got ready his ten fastest-sailing vessels, and taking up a position on shore close to the harbour mouth, was watching with his own eyes what would happen. The whole army was watching also; while the ships on both sides of the mouth of the channel got as close to the shallows as it was possible to approach, and there rested with their oars out, and ready to run down and capture the ship that was about to sail out. The Rhodian, on his side, attempted no concealment. He put boldly to sea, and so confounded the enemy by his audacity, and the speed of his vessel, that he not only sailed out without receiving any damage to ship or crew, scudding along the bows of the enemy as though they were fixed in their places, but even brought his ship to, after running a short way ahead, and, with his oars out and ready, seemed to challenge the foe to a contest. When none of them ventured to put out to attack him, because of the speed of his rowing, he sailed away: having thus with his one ship successfully defied the entire fleet of the enemy. From this time he frequently performed the same feat, and proved exceedingly serviceable both to the government at Carthage and the besieged garrison. To the former by informing them from time to time of what was pressingly necessary; and to the latter by inspiring them with confidence, and dismaying the Romans by his audacity.

[47.] What contributed most to encourage him to a repetition of the feat was the fact that by frequent experience he had marked out the course for himself by clear land marks. As soon as he had crossed the open sea, and was coming into sight, he used to steer as though he were coming from Italy, keeping the seaward tower exactly on his bows, in such a way as to be in a line with the city towers which faced towards Libya; and this is the only possible course to hit the mouth of the channel with the wind astern. The successful boldness of the Rhodian inspired His example is followed by others. several of those who were acquainted with these waters to make similar attempts. The Romans felt themselves to be in a great difficulty; and what was taking place determined them to attempt blocking up the mouth of the harbour. The greater part of the attempted work was a failure: the sea was too deep, and none of the material which they threw into it would hold, or in fact keep in the least compact. The breakers and the force of the current dislodged and scattered everything that was thrown in, before it could even reach the bottom. But there was one point where the water was shallow, at which a mole was with infinite labour made to hold together; and upon it a vessel with four banks of oars and of unusually fine build stuck fast as it was making the outward passage at night, The Rhodian is at length captured. and thus fell into the hands of the enemy. The Romans took possession of it, manned it with a picked crew, and used it for keeping a look out for all who should try to enter the harbour, and especially for the Rhodian. He had sailed in, as it happened, that very night, and was afterwards putting out to sea again in his usual open manner. He was, however, startled to see the four-banked vessel put out to sea again simultaneously with himself. He recognised what ship it was, and his first impulse was to escape her by his superior speed. But finding himself getting overhauled by the excellence of her rowers, he was finally compelled to bring to and engage at close quarters. But in a struggle of marines he was at a complete disadvantage: the enemy were superior in numbers, and their soldiers were picked men; and he was made prisoner. The possession of this ship of superior build enabled the Romans, by equipping her with whatever was wanted for the service she had to perform, to intercept all who were adventurous enough to try running the blockade of Lilybaeum.

[48.] Meanwhile, the besieged were energetically carrying on counterworks, having abandoned the hope of damaging or destroying the constructions of the enemy. A storm having damaged the siege-works, the Lilybaeans succeed in burning them. But in the midst of these proceedings a storm of wind, of such tremendous violence and fury, blew upon the machinery of the engines, that it wrecked the pent-houses, and carried away by its force the towers erected to cover them. Some of the Greek mercenaries perceived the advantage such a state of things offered for the destruction of the siege-works, and communicated their idea to the commander. He caught at the suggestion, and lost no time in making every preparation suitable to the undertaking. Then the young men mustered at three several points, and threw lighted brands into the enemy’s works. The length of time during which these works had been standing made them exactly in the proper state to catch fire easily; and when to this was added a violent wind, blowing right upon the engines and towers, the natural result was that the spreading of the fire became rapid and destructive; while all attempts on the Roman side to master it, and rescue their works, had to be abandoned as difficult or wholly impracticable. Those who tried to come to the rescue were so appalled at the scene, that they could neither fully grasp nor clearly see what was going on. Flames, sparks, and volumes of smoke blew right in their faces and blinded them; and not a few dropped down and perished without ever getting near enough to attempt to combat the fire. The same circumstances, which caused these overwhelming difficulties to the besiegers, favoured those who were throwing the fire-brands in exactly the same proportion. Everything that could obscure their vision or hurt them was blown clean away and carried into the faces of the enemy; while their being able to see the intervening space enabled the shooters to take a good aim at those of the enemy who came to the rescue, and the throwers of the fire-brands to lodge them at the proper places for the destruction of the works. The violence of the wind, too, contributed to the deadly effect of the missiles by increasing the force of their blows. Eventually the destruction was so complete, that the foundations of the siege-towers and the blocks of the battering-rams were rendered unusable by the fire. In spite of this disaster, though they gave up the idea of assaulting the place any longer by means of their works, the Romans still persisted. They surrounded the town with a ditch and stockade, threw up an additional wall to secure their own encampment, and left the completion of their purpose to time. Nor were the besieged less determined. They repaired the part of their walls which had been thrown down, and prepared to endure the siege with good courage.

[49.] When the announcement of these events at Rome was followed by reiterated tidings that the larger The Roman army is reinforced. part of the crews of the fleet had been destroyed, either at the works, or in the general conduct of the siege, the Roman government set zealously to work to enlist sailors; and, having collected as many as ten thousand, sent them to Sicily. They crossed the straits, and reached the camp on foot; and when they had joined, Publius Claudius, the Consul, assembled his tribunes, and said that it was just the time to sail to the attack of Drepana with B.C. 249. Coss. P. Claudius Pulcher, L. Junius Pullus. the whole squadron: for that Adherbal,[139] who was in command there, was quite unprepared for such an event, because he as yet knew nothing of the new crews having arrived; and was fully persuaded that their fleet could not sail, owing to their loss of men in the siege. His proposition met with a ready assent from the council of officers, and he immediately set about getting his men on board, the old crews as well as those who had recently joined. As for marines, he selected the best men from the whole army, who were ready enough to join an expedition which involved so short a voyage and so immediate and certain an advantage. Having Claudius sails to attack Drepana. completed these preparations, he set sail about midnight, without being detected by the enemy; and for the first part of the day he sailed in close order, keeping the land on his right. By daybreak the leading ships could be seen coming towards Drepana; and at the first sight of them Adherbal was overwhelmed with surprise. He quickly recovered his self-possession however: and, fully appreciating the significance of the enemy’s attack, he determined to try every manœuvre, and hazard every danger, rather than allow himself and his men to be shut up in the blockade which threatened them. He lost no time in collecting his rowing-crews upon the beach, and summoning the mercenary soldiers who were in the town by proclamation. When the muster had taken place, he endeavoured to impress upon them in a few words what good hopes of victory they had, if they were bold enough to fight at sea; and what hardships they would have to endure in a blockade, if they hesitated from any fear of danger and played the coward. The men showed a ready enthusiasm for the sea-fight, and demanded with shouts that he would lead them to it without delay. He thanked them, praised their zeal, and gave the order to embark with all speed, to keep their eyes upon his ship, and follow in its wake. Having made these instructions clear as quickly as he could, he got under weigh himself first, and guided his fleet close under the rocks, on the opposite side of the harbour to that by which the enemy were entering.

[50.] When the Consul Publius saw, to his surprise, that the enemy, so far from giving in or being dismayed at his approach, Unexpected resistance of Adherbal. The Roman fleet checked. were determined upon fighting him at sea: while of his own ships some were already within the harbour, others just in the very entrance channel, and others still on their way towards it; he at once issued orders to all the ships to turn round and make the best of their way out again. The result of this was that, as some of the ships were in the harbour, and others at the entrance, they fouled each other when they began reversing their course; and not only did a great confusion arise among the men, but the ships got their oars broken also in the collisions which occurred. However, the captains exerted themselves to get the ships into line close under the shore, as they successively cleared the harbour, and with their prows directed towards the enemy. Publius himself was originally bringing up the rear of the entire squadron; but he now, while the movement was actually in execution, turned towards the open sea and transferred himself to a position on the left wing of the fleet. At the same moment Adherbal succeeded in outflanking the left of his opponents with five vessels furnished with charging beaks. He turned his own ship with its prow towards the enemy, and brought to. As each of the others came up, and fell into line with him, he sent orders to them by his staff officers to do the same as he had done. Thus they all fell in and formed a complete line. The signal which had been agreed upon before was given, and an advance was begun, which was made at first without disarranging the line. The Romans were still close in-shore, waiting for the coming out of their ships from the harbour; and this proximity to the land proved of infinite disadvantage to them in the engagement.

[51.] And now the fleets were within a short distance of each other: the signals were raised from the ships The battle. of the respective commanders; the charge was made; and ship grappled with ship. At first the engagement was evenly balanced, because each fleet had the pick of their land forces serving as marines on board. But as it went on the many advantages which, taking it as a whole, the Carthaginians possessed, gave them a continually increasing superiority. Owing to the better construction of their ships they had much the advantage in point of speed, while their position with the open sea behind them materially contributed to their success, by giving them freer space for their manœuvres. Were any of them hard pressed by the enemy? Their speed secured them a sure escape, and a wide expanse of water was open to their flight. There they would swing round and attack the leading ships which were pursuing them: sometimes rowing round them and charging their broadsides, at other times running alongside them as they lurched awkwardly round, from the weight of the vessels and the unskilfulness of the crews. In this way they were charging perpetually, and managed to sink a large number of the ships. Or was one of their number in danger? They were ready to come to the rescue, being out of danger themselves, and being able to effect a movement to right or left, by steering along the sterns of their own ships and through the open sea unmolested. The Romans beaten. The case of the Romans was exactly the reverse. If any of them were hard pressed, there was nowhere for them to retreat, for they were fighting close to the shore; and any ship of theirs that was hard driven by the enemy either backed into shallow water and stuck fast, or ran ashore and was stranded. Moreover, that most effective of all manœuvres in sea fights,—sailing through the enemy’s line and appearing on their stern while they are engaged with others,—was rendered impossible for them, owing to the bulk of their vessels; and still more so by the unskilfulness of their crews. Nor, again, were they able to bring help from behind to those who wanted it, because they were hemmed in so close to the shore that there was not the smallest space left in which those who wished to render such help might move. When the Consul saw how ill things were going for him all along the line; when he saw some of his ships sticking fast in the shallows, and others cast ashore; he took to flight. Thirty other ships which happened to be near him followed him as he sailed from the left, and coasted along the shore. But the remaining vessels, which amounted to ninety-three, the Carthaginians captured with their crews, except in the case of those who ran their ships ashore and got away.

[52.] The result of this sea fight gave Adherbal a high reputation at Carthage; for his success was looked upon as wholly due to himself, and his own foresight and courage: while at Rome Publius fell into great disrepute, and was loudly censured as having acted without due caution or calculation, and as having during his administration, as far as a single man could, involved Rome in serious disasters. He was accordingly some time afterwards brought to trial, was heavily fined, and exposed to considerable danger. Not that the Romans gave way in consequence of these events. The Romans not discouraged send the Consul L. Junius with a large supply of provisions in 800 transports, convoyed by 60 ships of war to Lilybaeum. On the contrary, they omitted nothing that was within their power to do, and continued resolute to prosecute the campaign. It was now the time for the Consular elections: as soon as they were over and two Consuls appointed; one of them, Lucius Junius,[140] was immediately sent to convey corn to the besiegers of Lilybaeum, and other provisions and supplies necessary for the army, sixty ships being also manned to convoy them. Upon his arrival at Messene, Junius took over such ships as he found there to meet him, whether from the army or from the other parts of Sicily, and coasted along with all speed to Syracuse, with a hundred and twenty ships, and his supplies on board about eight hundred transports. Arrived there, he handed over to the Quaestors half his transports and some of his war-ships, and sent them off, being very anxious that what the army needed should reach them promptly. He remained at Syracuse himself, waiting for such of his ships as had not yet arrived from Messene, and collecting additional supplies of corn from the allies in the central districts of the island.

[53.] Meanwhile Adherbal sent the prisoners he had taken in the sea fight, and the captured vessels, to Carthage; and giving Carthalo his colleague thirty vessels, in addition to the seventy in command of which he had come, despatched him with instructions to make a sudden attack upon the enemy’s ships that were at anchor off Lilybaeum, capture all he could, Carthalo tries to intercept the transports. and set fire to the rest. In obedience to these instructions Carthalo accomplished his passage just before daybreak, fired some of the vessels, and towed off others. Great was the commotion at the quarters of the Romans. For as they hurried to the rescue of the ships, the attention of Himilco, the commander of the garrison, was aroused by their shouts; and as the day was now beginning to break, he could see what was happening, and despatched the mercenary troops who were in the town. Thus the Romans found themselves surrounded by danger on every side, and fell into a state of consternation more than usually profound and serious. The Carthaginian admiral contented himself with either towing off or breaking up some few of their vessels, and shortly afterwards coasted along under the pretence of making for Heracleia: though he was really lying in wait, with the view of intercepting those who were coming by sea to the Roman army. When his look-out men brought him word that a considerable number of vessels of all sorts were bearing down upon him, and were now getting close, he stood out to sea and started to meet them: for the success just obtained over the Romans inspired him with such contempt for them, that he was eager to come to an engagement. The vessels in question were those which had been despatched in advance under the charge of the Quaestors from Syracuse. And they too had warning of their danger. Light boats were accustomed to sail in advance of a squadron, and these announced the approach of the enemy to the Quaestors; who being convinced that they were not strong enough to stand a battle at sea, dropped anchor under a small fortified town which was subject to Rome, and which, though it had no regular harbour, yet possessed roadsteads, and headlands projecting from the mainland, and surrounding the roadsteads, so as to form a convenient refuge. There they disembarked; and having set up some catapults and ballistae, which they got from the town, awaited the approach of the enemy. When the Carthaginians arrived, their first idea was to blockade them: for they supposed that the men would be terrified and retreat to the fortified town, leaving them to take possession of the vessels without resistance. Their expectations, however, were not fulfilled; and finding that the men on the contrary resisted with spirit, and that the situation of the spot presented many difficulties of every description, they sailed away again after towing off some few of the transports laden with provisions, and retired to a certain river, in which they anchored and kept a look out for the enemy to renew their voyage.

[54.] In complete ignorance of what had happened to his advanced squadron, the Consul, who had remained behind at Syracuse, after completing all he meant to do there, put to sea; and, after rounding Pachynus, was proceeding on his voyage to Lilybaeum. The appearance of the enemy was once more signalled to the Carthaginian admiral by his look-out men, and he at once put out to sea, with the view of engaging them as far as possible away from their comrades. Junius saw the Carthaginian fleet from a considerable distance, and observing their great numbers did not dare to engage them, and yet found it impossible to avoid them by flight because they were now too close. He therefore steered towards land, and anchored under a rocky and altogether dangerous part of the shore; for he judged it better to run all risks rather than allow his squadron, with all its men, to fall into the hands of the enemy. The Carthaginian admiral saw what he had done; and determined that it was unadvisable for him to engage the enemy, or bring his ships near such a dangerous place. He therefore made for a certain headland between the two squadrons of the enemy, and there kept a look out upon both with equal vigilance. Presently, however, the weather became rough, and there was an appearance of an unusually dangerous disturbance setting in from the sea. The Carthaginian pilots, from their knowledge of the particular localities, and of seamanship generally, foresaw what was coming; and persuaded Carthalo to avoid the storm and round the promontory of Pachynus.[141] He had the good sense to take their advice: The Roman fleet is wrecked.and accordingly these men, with great exertions and extreme difficulty, did get round the promontory and anchored in safety; while the Romans, being exposed to the storm in places entirely destitute of harbours, suffered such complete destruction, that not one of the wrecks even was left in a state available for use. Both of their squadrons in fact were completely disabled to a degree past belief.

[55.] This occurrence caused the Carthaginian interests to look up again and their hopes to revive. The Romans abandon the sea. But the Romans, though they had met with partial misfortunes before, had never suffered a naval disaster so complete and final. They, in fact, abandoned the sea, and confined themselves to holding the country; while the Carthaginians remained masters of the sea, without wholly despairing of the land.

Great and general was the dismay both at Rome and in the camp at Lilybaeum. Yet they did not abandon their determination of starving out that town. Lucius Junius perseveres in the siege. B.C. 248. The Roman government did not allow their disasters to prevent their sending provisions into the camp overland; and the besiegers kept up the investment as strictly as they possibly could. Lucius Junius joined the camp after the shipwreck, and, being in a state of great distress at what had happened, was all eagerness to strike some new and effective blow, and thus repair the disaster which had befallen him. Accordingly he took the first slight opening that offered to surprise and seize Eryx; Eryx. and became master both of the temple of Aphrodite and of the city. This is a mountain close to the sea-coast on that side of Sicily which looks towards Italy, between Drepana and Panormus, but nearer to Drepana of the two. It is by far the greatest mountain in Sicily next to Aetna; and on its summit, which is flat, stands the temple of Erycinian Aphrodite, confessedly the most splendid of all the temples in Sicily for its wealth and general magnificence. The town stands immediately below the summit, and is approached by a very long and steep ascent. Lucius seized both town and temple; and established a garrison both upon the summit and at the foot of the road to it from Drepana. He kept a strict guard at both points, but more especially at the foot of the ascent, believing that by so doing he should secure possession of the whole mountain as well as the town.

[56.] Next year, the eighteenth of the war, the Carthaginians appointed Hamilcar Barcas general, and put the management of the fleet in his hands. B.C. 247. He took over the command, and started to ravage the Italian coast. After devastating the districts of Locri, and the rest of Bruttium, he sailed away with his whole fleet to the coast of Panormus and seized on a place called Hercte, Occupation of Hercte by Hamilcar. which lies between Eryx and Panormus on the coast, and is reputed the best situation in the district for a safe and permanent camp. For it is a mountain rising sheer on every side, standing out above the surrounding country to a considerable height. The table-land on its summit has a circumference of not less than a hundred stades, within which the soil is rich in pasture and suitable for agriculture; the sea-breezes render it healthy; and it is entirely free from all dangerous animals. On the side which looks towards the sea, as well as that which faces the central part of the island, it is enclosed by inaccessible precipices; while the spaces between them require only slight fortifications, and of no great extent, to make them secure. There is in it also an eminence, which serves at once as an acropolis and as a convenient tower of observation, commanding the surrounding district. It also commands a harbour conveniently situated for the passage from Drepana and Lilybaeum to Italy, in which there is always abundant depth of water; finally, it can only be reached by three ways—two from the land side, one from the sea, all of them difficult. Here Hamilcar entrenched himself. It was a bold measure: but he had no city which he could count upon as friendly, and no other hope on which he could rely; and though by so doing he placed himself in the very midst of the enemy, he nevertheless managed to involve the Romans in many struggles and dangers. To begin with, he would start from this place and ravage the seaboard of Italy as far as Cumae; and again on shore, when the Romans had pitched a camp to overawe him, in front of the city of Panormus, within about five stades of him, he harassed them in every sort of way, and forced them to engage in numerous skirmishes, B.C. 247-244. for the space of nearly three years. Of these combats it is impossible to give a detailed account in writing.

[57.] It is like the case of two boxers, eminent alike for their courage and their physical condition, engaged in a formal contest for the prize. As the match goes on, blow after blow is interchanged without intermission; but to anticipate, or keep account of every feint or every blow delivered is impossible for combatants and spectators alike. Still one may conceive a sufficiently distinct idea of the affair by taking into account the general activity of the men, the ambition actuating each side, and the amount of their experience, strength, and courage. The same may be said of these two generals. No writer could set down, and no reader would endure the wearisome and profitless task of reading, a detailed statement of the transactions of every day; why they were undertaken, and how they were carried out. For every day had its ambuscade on one side or the other, its attack, or assault. A general assertion in regard to the men, combined with the actual result of their mutual determination to conquer, will give a far better idea of the facts. It may be said then, generally, that nothing was left untried,—whether it be stratagems which could be learnt from history, or plans suggested by the necessities of the hour and the immediate circumstances of the case, or undertakings depending upon an adventurous spirit and a reckless daring. The matter, however, for several reasons, could not be brought to a decisive issue. In the first place, the forces on either side were evenly matched: and in the second place, while the camps were in the case of both equally impregnable, the space which separated the two was very small. The result of this was that skirmishes between detached parties on both sides were always going on during the day, and yet nothing decisive occurred. For though the men actually engaged in such skirmishes from time to time were cut to pieces, it did not affect the main body. They had only to wheel round to find themselves out of the reach of danger behind their own defences. Once there, they could face about and again engage the enemy.

[58.] Presently however Fortune, acting like a good umpire in the games, transferred them by a bold stroke from the locality just described, Siege of Eryx, B.C. 244. and the contest in which they were engaged, to a struggle of greater danger and a locality of narrower dimensions. The Romans, as we have said, were in occupation of the summit of Eryx, and had a guard stationed at its foot. But Hamilcar managed to seize the town which lay between these two spots. There ensued a siege of the Romans who were on the summit, supported by them with extraordinary hardihood and adventurous daring: while the Carthaginians, finding themselves between two hostile armies, and their supplies brought to them with difficulty, because they were in communication with the sea at only one point and by one road, yet held out with a determination that passes belief. Every contrivance which skill or force could sustain did they put in use against each other, as before; every imaginable privation was submitted to; surprises and pitched battles were alike tried: and finally they left the combat a drawn one, not, as Fabius says, from utter weakness and misery, but like men still unbroken and unconquered. The fact is that before either party had got completely the better of the other, though they had maintained the conflict for another two years, B.C. 243-242. the war happened to be decided in quite a different manner.

Such was the state of affairs at Eryx and with the forces employed there. The obstinate persistence of the Romans and Carthaginians. The two nations engaged were like well-bred game-cocks that fight to their last gasp. You may see them often, when too weak to use their wings, yet full of pluck to the end, and striking again and again. Finally, chance brings them the opportunity of once more grappling, and they hold on until one or other of them drops down dead.

[59.] So it was with the Romans and Carthaginians. They were worn out by the labours of the war; the perpetual succession of hard fought struggles was at last driving them to despair; their strength had become paralysed, and their resources reduced almost to extinction by war-taxes and expenses extending over so many years. And yet the Romans did not give in. For the last five years indeed they had entirely abandoned the sea, partly because of the disasters they had sustained there, and partly because they felt confident of deciding the war by means of their land forces; but they now determined for the third time to make trial of their fortune in naval warfare. They saw that their operations were not succeeding according to their calculations, mainly owing to the obstinate gallantry of the Carthaginian general. They therefore adopted this resolution from a conviction that by this means alone, if their design were but well directed, would they be able to bring the war to a successful conclusion. In their first attempt they had been compelled to abandon the sea by disasters arising from sheer bad luck; in their second by the loss of the naval battle off Drepana. This third attempt was successful: they shut off the Carthaginian forces at Eryx from getting their supplies by sea, and eventually put a period to the whole war. Nevertheless it was essentially an effort of despair. The Romans once more fit out a fleet. The treasury was empty, and would not supply the funds necessary for the undertaking, which were, however, obtained by the patriotism and generosity of the leading citizens. They undertook singly, or by two or three combining, according to their means, to supply a quinquereme fully fitted out, on the understanding that they were to be repaid if the expedition was successful. By these means a fleet of two hundred quinqueremes were quickly prepared, built on the model of the ship of the Rhodian. B.C. 242. Coss. C. Lutatius Catulus, A. Postumius Albinus. Gaius Lutatius was then appointed to the command, and despatched at the beginning of the summer. His appearance on the coasts of Sicily was a surprise: the whole of the Carthaginian fleet had gone home; and he took possession both of the harbour near Drepana, and the roadsteads near Lilybaeum. He then threw up works round the city on Drepana, and made other preparations for besieging it. And while he pushed on these operations with all his might, he did not at the same time lose sight of the approach of the Carthaginian fleet. He kept in mind the original idea of this expedition, that it was by a victory at sea alone that the result of the whole war could be decided. He did not, therefore, allow the time to be wasted or unemployed. He practised and drilled his crews every day in the manœuvres which they would be called upon to perform; and by his attention to discipline generally brought his sailors in a very short time to the condition of trained athletes for the contest before them.

[60.] That the Romans should have a fleet afloat once more, and be again bidding for the mastery at sea, was a contingency wholly unexpected by the Carthaginians. The Carthaginians send Hanno with a fleet. They at once set about fitting out their ships, loaded them with corn and other provisions, and despatched their fleet: determined that their troops round Eryx should not run short of necessary provisions. Hanno, who was appointed to command the fleet, put to sea and arrived at the island called Holy Isle. He was eager as soon as possible, if he could escape the observation of the enemy, to get across to Eryx; disembark his stores; and having thus lightened his ships, take on board as marines those of the mercenary troops who were suitable to the service, and Barcas with them; and not to engage the enemy until he had thus reinforced himself. But Lutatius was informed of the arrival of Hanno’s squadron, and correctly interpreted their design. He at once took on board the best soldiers of his army, and crossed to the Island of Aegusa, which lies directly opposite Lilybaeum. There he addressed his forces some words suitable to the occasion, and gave full instructions to the pilots, with the understanding that a battle was to be fought on the morrow. 10th March B.C. 241. A strong breeze is blowing. At daybreak the next morning Lutatius found that a strong breeze had sprung up on the stern of the enemy, and that an advance towards them in the teeth of it would be difficult for his ships. The sea too was rough and boisterous: and for a while he could not make up his mind what he had better do in the circumstances. Finally, however, he was decided by the following considerations. If he boarded the enemy’s fleet during the continuance of the storm, he would only have to contend with Hanno, and the levies of sailors which he had on board, before they could be reinforced by the troops, and with ships which were still heavily laden with stores: but if he waited for calm weather, and allowed the enemy to get across and unite with their land forces, he would then have to contend with ships lightened of their burden, and therefore in a more navigable condition, and against the picked men of the land forces; and what was more formidable than anything else, against the determined bravery of Hamilcar. He made up his mind, therefore, not to let the present opportunity slip; Lutatius however decides to fight. and when he saw the enemy’s ships crowding sail, he put to sea with all speed. The rowers, from their excellent physical condition, found no difficulty in overcoming the heavy sea, and Lutatius soon got his fleet into single line with prows directed to the foe.

[61.] When the Carthaginians saw that the Romans were intercepting their passage across, they lowered their masts, The battle of Aegusa. and after some words of mutual exhortation had been uttered in the several ships, closed with their opponents. But the respective state of equipment of the two sides was exactly the converse of what it had been in the battle off Drepana; and the result of the battle was, therefore, naturally reversed also. The Romans had reformed their mode of shipbuilding, and had eased their vessels of all freight, except the provisions necessary for the battle: while their rowers having been thoroughly trained and got well together, performed their office in an altogether superior manner, and were backed up by marines who, being picked men from the legions, were all but invincible. The case with the Carthaginians was exactly the reverse. Their ships were heavily laden and therefore unmanageable in the engagement; while their rowers were entirely untrained, and merely put on board for the emergency; and such marines as they had were raw recruits, who had never had any previous experience of any difficult or dangerous service. The fact is that the Carthaginian government never expected that the Romans would again attempt to dispute the supremacy at sea: they had, therefore, in contempt for them, neglected their navy. The result was that, as soon as they closed, their manifold disadvantages quickly decided the battle against them. Victory of the Romans. They had fifty ships sunk, and seventy taken with their crews. The rest set their sails, and running before the wind, which luckily for them suddenly veered round at the nick of time to help them, got away again to Holy Isle. The Roman Consul sailed back to Lilybaeum to join the army, and there occupied himself in making arrangements for the ships and men which he had captured; which was a business of considerable magnitude, for the prisoners made in the battle amounted to little short of ten thousand.

[62.] As far as strength of feeling and desire for victory were concerned, this unexpected reverse did not diminish the readiness of the Carthaginians to carry on the war; but when they came to reckon up their resources they were at a complete standstill. Barcas makes terms. On the one hand, they could not any longer send supplies to their forces in Sicily, because the enemy commanded the sea: on the other, to abandon and, as it were, to betray these, left them without men and without leaders to carry on the war. They therefore sent a despatch to Barcas with all speed, leaving the decision of the whole matter in his hands. Nor was their confidence misplaced. He acted the part of a gallant general and a sensible man. As long as there was any reasonable hope of success in the business he had in hand, nothing was too adventurous or too dangerous for him to attempt; and if any general ever did so, he put every chance of victory to the fullest proof. But when all his endeavours miscarried, and no reasonable expectation was left of saving his troops, he yielded to the inevitable, and sent ambassadors to treat of peace and terms of accommodation. And in this he showed great good sense and practical ability; for it is quite as much the duty of a leader to be able to see when it is time to give in, as when it is the time to win a victory. Lutatius was ready enough to listen to the proposal, because he was fully aware that the resources of Rome were at the lowest ebb from the strain of the war; and eventually it was his fortune to put an end to the contest by a treaty of which I here give the terms. The treaty, B.C. 242. “Friendship is established between the Carthaginians and Romans on the following terms, provided always that they are ratified by the Roman people. The Carthaginians shall evacuate the whole of Sicily: they shall not make war upon Hiero, nor bear arms against the Syracusans or their allies. The Carthaginians shall give up to the Romans all prisoners without ransom. The Carthaginians shall pay to the Romans in twenty years 2200 Euboic talents of silver.”[142]

[63.] When this treaty was sent to Rome the people refused to accept it, but sent ten commissioners to examine into the business. Upon their arrival they made no change in the general terms of the treaty, but they introduced some slight alterations in the direction of increased severity towards Carthage. Thus they reduced the time allowed for the payment of the indemnity by one half; they added a thousand talents to the sum demanded; and extended the evacuation of Sicily to all islands lying between Sicily and Italy.

Such were the conditions on which the war was ended, after lasting twenty-four years continuously. Greatness of the war. It was at once the longest, most continuous, and most severely contested war known to us in history. Apart from the other battles fought and the preparations made, which I have described in my previous chapters, there were two sea fights, in one of which the combined numbers of the two fleets exceeded five hundred quinqueremes, in the other nearly approached seven hundred. In the course of the war, counting what were destroyed by shipwreck, the Romans lost seven hundred quinqueremes, the Carthaginians five hundred. Those therefore who have spoken with wonder of the sea-battles of an Antigonus, a Ptolemy, or a Demetrius, and the greatness of their fleets, would we may well believe have been overwhelmed with astonishment at the hugeness of these proportions if they had had to tell the story of this war.[143] If, further, we take into consideration the superior size of the quinqueremes, compared with the triremes employed by the Persians against the Greeks, and again by the Athenians and Lacedaemonians in their wars with each other, we shall find that never in the whole history of the world have such enormous forces contended for mastery at sea.

These considerations will establish my original observation, and show the falseness of the opinion entertained by certain Greeks. It was not by mere chance or without knowing what they were doing that the Romans struck their bold stroke for universal supremacy and dominion, and justified their boldness by its success. No: it was the natural result of discipline gained in the stern school of difficulty and danger.

[64.] And no doubt the question does naturally arise here as to why they find it impossible in our days to man so many ships, or take the sea with such large fleets, though masters of the world, and possessing a superiority over others many times as great as before. The explanation of this difficulty will be clearly understood when we come to the description of their civil constitution. I look upon this description as a most important part of my work, and one demanding close attention on the part of my readers. For the subject is calculated to afford pleasure in the contemplation, and is up to this time so to speak absolutely unknown, thanks to historians, some of whom have been ignorant, while others have given so confused an account of it as to be practically useless. For the present it suffices to say that, as far as the late war was concerned, the two nations were closely matched in the character of the designs they entertained, as well as in the lofty courage they showed in prosecuting them: and this is especially true of the eager ambition displayed on either side to secure the supremacy. But in the individual gallantry of their men the Romans had decidedly the advantage; while we must credit the Carthaginians with the best general of the day both for genius and daring. I mean Hamilcar Barcas, own father of Rome’s future enemy Hannibal.

[65.] The confirmation of this peace was followed by events which involved both nations in a struggle of an identical or similar nature. At Rome the late war was succeeded by a social war against the Faliscans, which, however, they brought to a speedy and successful termination by the capture of Falerii after only a few days’ siege. War between Rome and Falerii. The Carthaginians were not so fortunate. Just about the same time they found themselves confronted by three enemies at once, their own mercenaries, the Numidians, and such Libyans as joined the former in their revolt. The mercenary war, B.C. 241. And this war proved to be neither insignificant nor contemptible. It exposed them to frequent and terrible alarms; and, finally, it became a question to them not merely of a loss of territory, but of their own bare existence, and of the safety of the very walls and buildings of their city. There are many reasons that make it worth while to dwell upon the history of this war: yet I must give only a summary account of it, in accordance with the original plan of this work. The nature and peculiar ferocity of the struggle, which has been generally called the “truceless war,” may be best learnt from its incidents. It conveys two important lessons: it most conspicuously shows those who employ mercenaries what dangers they should foresee and provide against; and secondly, it teaches how wide the distinction is between the character of troops composed of a confused mass of uncivilised tribes, and of those which have had the benefit of education, the habits of social life, and the restraints of law. But what is of most importance to us is, that we may trace from the actual events of this period the causes which led to the war between Rome and Carthage in the time of Hannibal. These causes have not only been a subject of dispute among historians, but still continue to be so among those who were actually engaged; it is therefore a matter of importance to enable students to form an opinion on this matter as nearly as possible in accordance with the truth.

[66.] The course of events at Carthage subsequent to the peace was as follows: Evacuation of Sicily.As soon as possible after it was finally ratified Barcas withdrew the troops at Eryx to Lilybaeum, and then immediately laid down his command. Gesco, who was commandant of the town, proceeded to transport the soldiers into Libya. But foreseeing what was likely to happen, he very prudently embarked them in detachments, and did not send them all in one voyage. His object was to gain time for the Carthaginian government; so that one detachment should come to shore, receive the pay due to them, and depart from Carthage to their own country, before the next detachment was brought across and joined them. In accordance with this idea Gesco began the transportation of the troops. But the Government—partly because the recent expenses had reduced their finances to a low ebb, partly because they felt certain that, if they collected the whole force and entertained them in Carthage, they would be able to persuade the mercenaries to accept something less than the whole pay due to them—did not dismiss the detachments as they landed, but kept them massed in the city. But when this resulted in the commission of many acts of lawlessness by night and day, they began to feel uneasy at their numbers and their growing licentiousness; and required the officers, until such time as arrangements for discharging their pay should have been made, and the rest of the army should have arrived, to withdraw with The mercenaries sent to Sicca. all their men to a certain town called Sicca, receiving each a piece of gold for their immediate necessities. As far as quitting the city was concerned they were ready enough to obey; but they desired to leave their heavy baggage there as before, on the ground that they would soon have to return to the city for their wages. But the Carthaginian government were in terror lest, considering the length of their absence and their natural desire for the society of wives or children, they would either not quit the city at all; or, if they did, would be sure to be enticed by these feelings to return, and that thus there would be no decrease of outrages in the city. Accordingly they forced them to take their baggage with them: but it was sorely against the will of the men, and roused strong feelings of animosity among them. These mercenaries being forced to retire to Sicca, lived there as they chose without any restraint upon their lawlessness. For they had obtained two things the most demoralising for hired forces, and which in a word are in themselves the all-sufficient source and origin of mutinies,—relaxation of discipline and want of employment.[144] For lack of something better to do, some of them began calculating, always to their own advantage, the amount of pay owing to them; and thus making out the total to be many times more than was really due, they gave out that this was the amount which they ought to demand from the Carthaginians. Moreover they all began to call to mind the promises made to them by the generals in their harangues, delivered on various occasions of special danger, and to entertain high hopes and great expectations of the amount of compensation which awaited them. The natural result followed.

[67.] When the whole army had mustered at Sicca, and Hanno, now appointed general in Libya, The beginning of the outbreak, B.C. 241. far from satisfying these hopes and the promises they had received, talked on the contrary of the burden of the taxes and the embarrassment of the public finances; and actually endeavoured to obtain from them an abatement even from the amount of pay acknowledged to be due to them; excited and mutinous feelings at once began to manifest themselves. There were constant conferences hastily got together, sometimes in separate nationalities, sometimes of the whole army; and there being no unity of race or language among them, the whole camp became a babel of confusion, a scene of inarticulate tumult, and a veritable revel of misrule. For the Carthaginians being always accustomed to employ mercenary troops of miscellaneous nationalities, in securing that an army should consist of several different races, act wisely as far as the prevention of any rapid combinations for mutiny, or difficulty on the part of the commanders in overawing insubordination, are concerned: but the policy utterly breaks down when an outburst of anger, or popular delusion, or internal dissension, has actually occurred; for it makes it impossible for the commander to soothe excited feelings, to remove misapprehensions, or to show the ignorant their error. Armies in such a state are not usually content with mere human wickedness; they end by assuming the ferocity of wild beasts and the vindictiveness of insanity.

This is just what happened in this case. There were in the army Iberians and Celts, men from Liguria and the Balearic Islands, and a considerable number of half-bred Greeks, mostly deserters and slaves; while the main body consisted of Libyans. Consequently it was impossible to collect and address them en masse, or to approach them with this view by any means whatever. There was no help for it: the general could not possibly know their several languages; and to make a speech four or five times on the same subject, by the mouths of several interpreters, was almost more impossible, if I may say so, than that. The only alternative was for him to address his entreaties and exhortations to the soldiers through their officers. And this Hanno continually endeavoured to do. But there was the same difficulty with them. Sometimes they failed to understand what he said: at others they received his words with expressions of approval to his face, and yet from error or malice reported them in a contrary sense to the common soldiers. The result was a general scene of uncertainty, mistrust, and misunderstanding. And to crown all, they took it into their heads that the Carthaginian government had a design in thus sending Hanno to them: that they purposely did not send the generals who were acquainted with the services they had rendered in Sicily, and who had been the authors of the promises made to them; but had sent the one man who had not been present at any of these transactions. Whether that were so or not, they finally broke off all negotiations with Hanno; conceived a violent mistrust of their several commanders; and in a furious outburst of anger with the Carthaginians started towards the city, and pitched their camp about a hundred and twenty stades from Carthage, at the town of Tunes, to the number of over twenty thousand.

[68.] The Carthaginians saw their folly when it was too late. It was a grave mistake to have collected so large a number of mercenaries into one place The mercenaries at Tunes. without any warlike force of their own citizens to fall back upon: but it was a still graver mistake to have delivered up to them their children and wives, with their heavy baggage to boot; which they might have retained as hostages, and thus have had greater security for concerting their own measures, and more power of ensuring obedience to their orders. However, being thoroughly alarmed at the action of the men in regard to their encampment, they went to every length in their eagerness to pacify their anger. They sent them supplies of provisions in rich abundance, Attempts to pacify them. to be purchased exactly on their own terms, and at their own price. Members of the Senate were despatched, one after the other, to treat with them; and they were promised that whatever they demanded should be conceded if it were within the bounds of possibility. Day by day the ideas of the mercenaries rose higher. For their contempt became supreme when they saw the dismay and excitement in Carthage; The demands of the mercenaries.their confidence in themselves was profound; and their engagements with the Roman legions in Sicily had convinced them, that not only was it impossible for the Carthaginians to face them in the field, but that it would be difficult to find any nation in the world who could. Therefore, when the Carthaginians conceded the point of their pay, they made a further claim for the value of the horses they had lost. When this too was conceded, they said that they ought to receive the value of the rations of corn due to them from a long time previous, reckoned at the highest price reached during the war. And in short, the ill-disposed and mutinous among them being numerous, they always found out some new demand which made it impossible to come to terms. Upon the Carthaginian government, however, pledging themselves to the full extent of their powers, they eventually agreed to refer the matter to the arbitration of some one of the generals who had been actually engaged in Sicily. Now they were displeased with Hamilcar Barcas, who was one of those under whom they had fought in Sicily, because they thought that their present unfavourable position was attributable chiefly to him. The dispute referred to the arbitration of Gesco. They thought this from the fact that he never came to them as an ambassador, and had, as was believed, voluntarily resigned his command. But towards Gesco their feelings were altogether friendly. He had, as they thought, taken every possible precaution for their interests, and especially in the arrangements for their conveyance to Libya. Accordingly they referred the dispute to the arbitration of the latter.

[69.] Gesco came to Tunes by sea, bringing the money with him. There he held a meeting first of the officers, and then of the men, according to their nationalities; rebuked them for their past behaviour, and endeavoured to convince them as to their duty in the present: but most of all he dwelt upon their obligation in the future to show themselves well-disposed towards the people whose pay they had been so long enjoying. Finally, he proceeded to discharge the arrears of pay, taking each nationality separately. But there was a certain Campanian in the army, Spendius. a runaway Roman slave named Spendius, a man of extraordinary physical strength and reckless courage in the field. Alarmed lest his master should recover possession of him, and he should be put to death with torture, in accordance with the laws of Rome, this man exerted himself to the utmost in word and deed to break off the arrangement with the Carthaginians. He was seconded by a Libyan called Mathōs, Mathōs. who was not a slave but free, and had actually served in the campaign. But he had been one of the most active agitators in the late disturbances: and being in terror of punishment for the past, he now gave in his adhesion to the party of Spendius; and taking the Libyans aside, suggested to them that, when the men of other races had received their pay, and taken their departure to their several countries, the Carthaginians would wreak upon them the full weight of the resentment which they had, in common with themselves, incurred; and would look upon their punishment as a means of striking terror into all the inhabitants of Libya. It did not take long to rouse the men by such arguments, nor were they at a loss for a pretext, however insignificant. In discharging the pay, Gesco postponed the payment of the valuations of rations and horses. Spendius and Mathōs cause an outbreak. This was enough: the men at once hurried to make a meeting; Spendius and Mathōs delivered violent invectives against Gesco and the Carthaginians; their words were received with every sign of approval; no one else could get a hearing; whoever did attempt to speak was promptly stoned to death, without the assembly so much as waiting to ascertain whether he intended to support the party of Spendius or no.

A considerable number of privates as well as officers were killed in this manner in the various émeutes which took place; and from the constant repetition of this act of violence the whole army learnt the meaning of the word βάλλε. “throw,” although there was not another word which was intelligible to them all in common. The most usual occasion for this to happen was when they collected in crowds flushed with wine after their midday meal. On such occasions, if only some one started the cry “throw,” such volleys were poured in from every side, and with such rapidity, that it was impossible for any one to escape who once ventured to stand forward to address them. The result was that soon no one had the courage to offer them any counsel at all; and they accordingly appointed Mathōs and Spendius as theirō commanders.

[70.] This complete disorganisation and disorder did not escape the observation of Gesco. But his chief anxiety was to secure the safety of his country; and seeing clearly that, if these men were driven to exasperation, the Carthaginians would be in danger of total destruction, he exerted himself with desperate courage and persistence: sometimes summoning their officers, sometimes calling a meeting of the men according to their nationalities and remonstrating with them. But on one occasion the Libyans, not having received their wages as soon as they considered that they ought to have been paid to them, approached Gesco himself with some insolence. Gesco and his staff seized and thrown into chains. With the idea of rebuking their precipitancy he refused to produce the pay, and bade them “go and ask their general Mathōs for it.” This so enraged them, that without a moment’s delay they first made a raid upon the money that was kept in readiness, and then arrested Gesco and the Carthaginians with him. Mathōs and Spendius thought that the speediest way to secure an outbreak of war was for the men to commit some outrage upon the sanctity of law and in violation of their engagements. They therefore co-operated with the mass of the men in their reckless outrages; plundered the baggage of the Carthaginians along with their money; manacled Gesco and his staff with every mark of insolent violence, and committed them into custody. Thenceforth they were at open war with Carthage, having bound themselves together by oaths which were at once impious and contrary to the principles universally received among mankind.

This was the origin and beginning of the mercenary, or, as it is also called, the Libyan war. B.C. 240.Mathōs lost no time after this outrage in sending emissaries to the various cities in Libya, urging them to assert their freedom, and begging them to come to their aid and join them in their undertaking. The appeal was successful: nearly all the cities in Libya readily listened to the proposal that they should revolt against Carthage, and were soon zealously engaged in sending them supplies and reinforcements. They therefore divided themselves into two parties; one of which laid siege to Utica, the other to Hippo Zarytus, because these two cities refused to participate in the revolt.

[71.] Three things must be noticed in regard to the Carthaginians. First, among them the means of life of private persons are supplied by the produce of the land; secondly, all public expenses for war material and stores are discharged from the tribute paid by the people of Libya; and thirdly, it is their regular custom to carry on war by means of mercenary troops. At this moment they not only found themselves unexpectedly deprived of all these resources at once, but saw each one of them actually employed against themselves. Despair at Carthage.Such an unlooked-for event naturally reduced them to a state of great discouragement and despair. After the long agony of the Sicilian war they were in hopes, when the peace was ratified, that they might obtain some breathing space and some period of settled content. The very reverse was now befalling them. They were confronted by an outbreak of war still more difficult and formidable. In the former they were disputing with Rome for the possession of Sicily: but this was a domestic war, and the issue at stake was the bare existence of themselves and their country. Besides, the many battles in which they had been engaged at sea had naturally left them ill supplied with arms, sailors, and vessels. They had no store of provisions ready, and no expectation whatever of external assistance from friends or allies. They were indeed now thoroughly taught the difference between a foreign war, carried on beyond the seas, and a domestic insurrection and disturbance.

[72.] And for these overpowering miseries they had themselves to thank more than any one else. During the late war they had availed themselves of what they regarded as a reasonable pretext for exercising their supremacy over the inhabitants of Libya with excessive harshness. They had exacted half of all agricultural produce; had doubled the tribute of the towns; and, in levying these contributions, had refused to show any grace or indulgence whatever to those who were in embarrassed circumstances. Their admiration and rewards were reserved, not for those generals who treated the people with mildness and humanity, but exclusively for those who like Hanno secured them the most abundant supplies and war material, though at the cost of the harshest treatment of the provincials.

These people therefore needed no urging to revolt: a single messenger sufficed. Revolt of the country people. The women, who up to this time had passively looked on while their husbands and fathers were being led off to prison for the non-payment of the taxes, now bound themselves by an oath in their several towns that they would conceal nothing that they possessed; and, stripping off their ornaments, unreservedly contributed them to furnish pay for the soldiers. They thus put such large means into the hands of Mathōs and Spendius, that they not only discharged the arrears due to the mercenaries, which they had promised them as an inducement to mutiny, but remained well supplied for future needs. A striking illustration of the fact that true policy does not regard only the immediate necessities of the hour, but must ever look still more keenly to the future.

[73.] No such considerations, however, prevented the Carthaginians in their hour of distress from appointing Hanno general; Hanno’s management of the war.because he had the credit of having on a former occasion reduced the city called Hecatompylos, in Libya, to obedience. They also set about collecting mercenaries; arming their own citizens who were of military age; training and drilling the city cavalry; and refitting what were left of their ships, triremes, penteconters, and the largest of the pinnaces. Meanwhile Mathōs, being joined by as many as seventy thousand Libyans, distributed these fresh troops between the two forces which were besieging Utica and Hippo Zarytus, and carried on those sieges without let or hindrance. At the same time they kept firm possession of the encampment at Tunes, and had thus shut out the Carthaginians from the whole of outer Libya. For Carthage itself stands on a projecting peninsula in a gulf, nearly surrounded by the sea and in part also by a lake. The isthmus that connects it with Libya is three miles broad: upon one side of this isthmus, in the direction of the open sea and at no great distance, stands the city of Utica, and on the other stands Tunes, upon the shore of the lake. The mercenaries occupied both these points, and having thus cut off the Carthaginians from the open country, proceeded to take measures against Utica itself. They made frequent excursions up to the town wall, sometimes by day and sometimes by night, and were continually throwing the citizens into a state of alarm and absolute panic.

[74.] Hanno, however, was busying himself with some success in providing defences. In this department of a general’s duty he showed considerable ability; but he was quite a different man at the head of a sally in force: he was not sagacious in his use of opportunities, and managed the whole business with neither skill nor promptitude. It was thus that his first expedition miscarried when he went to Fails to relieve Utica. relieve Utica. The number of his elephants, of which he had as many as a hundred, struck terror into the enemy; yet he made so poor a use of this advantage that, instead of turning it into a complete victory, he very nearly brought the besieged, as well as himself, to utter destruction. He brought from Carthage catapults and darts, and in fact all the apparatus for a siege; and having encamped outside Utica undertook an assault upon the enemy’s entrenchment. The elephants forced their way into the camp, and the enemy, unable to withstand their weight and the fury of their attack, entirely evacuated the position. They lost a large number from wounds inflicted by the elephants’ tusks; while the survivors made their way to a certain hill, which was a kind of natural fortification thickly covered with trees, and there halted, relying upon the strength of the position. But Hanno, accustomed to fight with Numidians and Libyans, who, once turned, never stay their flight till they are two days removed from the scene of the action, imagined that he had already put an end to the war and had gained a complete victory. He therefore troubled himself no more about his men, or about the camp generally, but went inside the town and occupied himself with his own personal comfort. But the mercenaries, who had fled in a body on to the hill, had been trained in the daring tactics of Barcas, and accustomed from their experience in the Sicilian warfare to retreat and return again to the attack many times in the same day. They now saw that the general had left his army and gone into the town, and that the soldiers, owing to their victory, were behaving carelessly, and in fact slipping out of the camp in various directions: they accordingly got themselves into order and made an assault upon the camp; killed a large number of the men; forced the rest to fly ignominiously to the protection of the city walls and gates; and possessed themselves of all the baggage and apparatus belonging to the besieged, which Hanno had brought outside the town in addition to his own, and thus put into the hands of the enemy.

But this was not the only instance of his incompetence. A few days afterwards, near a place called Gorza, he came right upon the enemy, who lay Hanno’s continued ill success. encamped there, and had two opportunities of securing a victory by pitched battles; and two more by surprising them, as they changed quarters close to where he was. But in both cases he let the opportunities slip for want of care and proper calculation.

[75.] The Carthaginians, therefore, when they saw his mismanagement of the campaign, once more placed Hamilcar Barcas at the head of affairs; and despatched him to the war as commander-in-chief, Hamilcar Barcas takes the command. with seventy elephants, the newly-collected mercenaries, and the deserters from the enemy; and along with them the cavalry and infantry enrolled from the citizens themselves, amounting in all to ten thousand men. His appearance from the first produced an immediate impression. The expedition was unexpected; and he was thus able, by the dismay which it produced, to lower the courage of the enemy. He succeeded in raising the siege of Utica, and showed himself worthy of his former achievements, and of the confidence felt in him by the people. What he accomplished on this service was this.

A chain of hills runs along the isthmus connecting Carthage with the mainland, which are difficult of access, and are crossed by artificial passes into the mainland; of these hills Mathōs had occupied all the available points and posted guards there. Besides these there is a river called Macaras (Bagradas), which at certain points interrupts the passage of travellers from the city to the mainland, and though for the most He gets his men across the Macaras. part impassable, owing to the strength of its stream, is only crossed by one bridge. This means of egress also Mathōs was guarding securely, and had built a town on it. The result was that, to say nothing of the Carthaginians entering the mainland with an army, it was rendered exceedingly difficult even for private individuals, who might wish to make their way through, to elude the vigilance of the enemy. This did not escape the observation and care of Hamilcar; and while revolving every means and every chance of putting an end to this difficulty about a passage, he at length hit upon the following. He observed that where the river discharges itself into the sea its mouth got silted up in certain positions of the wind, and that then the passage over the river at its mouth became like that over a marsh. He accordingly got everything ready in the camp for the expedition, without telling any one what he was going to do; and then watched for this state of things to occur. When the right moment arrived, he started under cover of night; and by daybreak had, without being observed by any one, got his army across this place, to the surprise of the citizens of Utica as well as of the enemy. Marching across the plain, he led his men straight against the enemy who were guarding the bridge.

[76.] When he understood what had taken place Spendius advanced into the plain to meet Hamilcar. The force from the city at the bridge amounted to ten thousand men; that from before Utica to more than fifteen thousand men; both of which now advanced to support each other. When they had effected a junction they imagined that they had And defeats Spendius. the Carthaginians in a trap, and therefore with mutual words of exhortation passed the order to engage, and at once commenced. Hamilcar was marching with his elephants in front, his cavalry and light troops next, while his heavy armed hoplites brought up the rear. But when he saw the precipitation of the enemy’s attack, he passed the word to his men to turn to the rear. His instructions were that the troops in front should, after thus turning to the rear, retire with all speed: while he again wheeled to the right about what had been originally his rear divisions, and got them into line successively so as to face the enemy. The Libyans and mercenaries mistook the object of this movement, and imagined that the Carthaginians were panic-stricken and in full retreat. Thereupon they broke from their ranks and, rushing forward, began a vigorous hand to hand struggle. When, however, they found that the cavalry had wheeled round again, and were drawn up close to the hoplites, and that the rest of the army also was being brought up, surprise filled the Libyans with panic; they immediately turned and began a retreat as precipitate and disorderly as their advance. In the blind flight which followed some of them ran foul of their own rear-guard, who were still advancing, and caused their own destruction or that of their comrades; but the greater part were trampled to death by the cavalry and elephants who immediately charged. As many as six thousand of the Libyans and foreign troops were killed, and about two thousand taken prisoners. The rest made good their escape, either to the town on the bridge or to the camp near Utica. After this victory Hamilcar followed close upon the heels of the enemy, carried the town on the bridge by assault, the enemy there abandoning it and flying to Tunes, and then proceeded to scour the rest of the district: some of the towns submitting, while the greater number he had to reduce by force. And thus he revived in the breasts of the Carthaginians some little spirit and courage, or at least rescued them from the state of absolute despair into which they had fallen.

[77.] Meanwhile Mathōs himself was continuing the siege of Hippo Zarytus, and he now counselled Autaritus, the leader of the Gauls, and Spendius to stick close to the skirts of the enemy, avoiding the plains, Mathōs harasses Hamilcar’s march. because the enemy were strong in cavalry and elephants, but marching parallel with them on the slopes of the mountains, and attacking them whenever they saw them in any difficulty. While suggesting these tactics, he at the same time sent messengers to the Numidians and Libyans, entreating them to come to their aid, and not to let slip the opportunity of securing their own freedom. Accordingly, Spendius took with him a force of six thousand men, selected from each of the several nationalities at Tunes, and started, keeping along a line of hills parallel to the Carthaginians. Besides these six thousand he had two thousand Gauls under Autaritus, who were all that were left of the original number, the rest having deserted to the Romans during the period of the occupation of Eryx. Now it happened that, just when Hamilcar had taken up a position in a certain plain which was surrounded on all sides by mountains, the reinforcements of Numidians and Libyans joined Spendius. The Carthaginians, therefore, suddenly found a Libyan encampment right on their front, another of Numidians on their rear, and that of Spendius on their flank; and it seemed impossible to escape from the danger which thus menaced them on every side.

[78.] But there was at that time a certain Narávas, a Numidian of high rank and warlike spirit, who entertained an ancestral feeling of affection for the Carthaginians, Hamilcar is joined by the Numidian Narávas. rendered especially warm at that time by admiration for Hamilcar. He now thought that he had an excellent opportunity for an interview and association with that general; and accordingly came to the Carthaginian quarters with a body of a hundred Numidians, and boldly approaching the out-works, remained there waving his hand. Wondering what his object could be Hamilcar sent a horseman to see; to whom Narávas said that he wished for an interview with the general. The Carthaginian leader still showing hesitation and incredulity, Narávas committed his horse and javelins to the care of his guards, and boldly came into the camp unarmed. His fearlessness made a profound impression not unmixed with surprise. No further objection, however, was made to his presence, and the desired interview was accorded; in which he declared his goodwill to the Carthaginians generally, and his especial desire to be friends with Barcas. “This was the motive of his presence,” he said; “he was come with the full intention of taking his place by his side and of faithfully sharing all his actions and undertakings.” Hamilcar, on hearing these words, was so immensely charmed by the young man’s courage in coming, and his honest simplicity in the interview, that he not only consented to accept his co-operation, but promised also with an oath that he would give him his daughter in marriage if he kept faith with Carthage to the end. The agreement having been thus made, Narávas came with his division of Numidians, numbering two thousand. Thus reinforced Hamilcar offered the enemy battle; which Spendius, having joined forces with the Libyans, accepted; and descending into Again defeats Spendius. the plain engaged the Carthaginians. In the severe battle which followed Hamilcar’s army was victorious: a result which he owed partly to the excellent behaviour of the elephants, but particularly to the brilliant services rendered by Narávas. Autaritus and Spendius managed to escape; but of the rest as many as ten thousand were killed and four thousand taken prisoners. When the victory was complete, Hamilcar gave permission to those of the prisoners who chose to enlist in his army, and furnished them with arms from the spoils of the enemy’s slain: those who did not choose to accept this offer he summoned to a meeting and harangued them. He told them that the crimes committed by them up to that moment were pardoned, and they were permitted to go their several ways, wheresoever they chose, but on condition that none of them bore arms against Carthage again: if any one of them were ever caught so doing, he warned them distinctly that he would meet with no mercy.

[79.] This conspiracy of Mathōs and Spendius caused an outbreak about this same time in another quarter. For the mercenaries who were in Mutiny in Sardinia. garrison in Sardinia, inspired by their example, attacked the Carthaginians in the island; beleaguered Bostarus, the commander of the foreign contingent, in the citadel; and finally put him and his compatriots to the sword. The Carthaginians thereupon sent another army into the island under Hanno. But the men deserted to the mutineers; who then seized Hanno and crucified him, and exercising all their ingenuity in the invention of tortures racked to death every Carthaginian in the island. Having got the towns into their power, they thenceforth kept forcible possession of the island; until they quarrelled with the natives and were driven by them into Italy. This was the way in which Carthage lost Sardinia, an island of first rate importance from its size, the number of its inhabitants, and its natural products. But as many have described it at great length, I do not think that I need repeat statements about which there is no manner of dispute.

To return to Libya. The indulgence shown by Hamilcar to the captives alarmed Mathōs and Spendius and Autaritus the Gaul. B.C. 239. Plan of Spendius for doing away with the good impression made by the leniency of Barcas.They were afraid that conciliatory treatment of this sort would induce the Libyans, and the main body of the mercenaries, to embrace with eagerness the impunity thus displayed before their eyes. They consulted together, therefore, how they might by some new act of infamy inflame to the highest pitch of fury the feelings of their men against the Carthaginians. They finally determined upon the following plan. They summoned a meeting of the soldiers; and when it was assembled, they introduced a bearer of a despatch which they represented to have been sent by their fellow conspirators in Sardinia. The despatch warned them to keep a careful watch over Gesco and all his fellow prisoners (whom, as has been stated, they had treacherously seized in Tunes), as certain persons in the camp were secretly negotiating with the Carthaginians for their release. Taking this as his text, Spendius commenced by urging the men not to put any trust in the indulgence shown by the Carthaginian general to the prisoners of war, “For,” said he, “it is with no intention of saving their lives that he adopted this course in regard to the prisoners; his aim was, by releasing them, to get us into his power, that punishment might not be confined to some of us, but might fall on all at once.” He went on to urge them to be on their guard, lest by letting Gesco’s party go they should teach their enemies to despise them; and should also do great practical damage to their own interests, by suffering a man to escape who was an excellent general, and likely to be a most formidable enemy to themselves. Before he had finished this speech another courier arrived, pretending to have been sent by the garrison at Tunes, and bearing a despatch containing warnings similar to that from Sardinia.

[80.] It was now the turn of Autaritus the Gaul. “Your only hope,” he said, “of safety is to reject all hopes which rest on the Carthaginians. So long as any man clings to the idea of indulgence at their hands, he cannot possibly be a genuine ally of yours. Never trust, never listen, never attend to anyone, unless he recommend unrelenting hostility and implacable hatred towards the Carthaginians: all who speak on the other side regard as traitors and enemies.” After this preface, he gave it as his advice that they should put to death with torture both Gesco and those who had been seized with him, as well as the Carthaginian prisoners of war who had been captured since. Now this Autaritus was the most effective speaker of any, because he could make himself understood to a large number of those present at a meeting. For, owing to his length of service, he knew how to speak Phoenician; and Phoenician was the language in which the largest number of men, thanks to the length of the late war, could listen to with satisfaction. Accordingly his speech was received with acclamation, and he stood down amidst loud applause. But when many came forward from the several nationalities at the same time; and, moved by Gesco’s former kindnesses to themselves, would have deprecated at least the infliction of torture, not a word of what they said was understood: partly because many were speaking at the same time, and partly because each spoke in his own language. But when at length it was disclosed that what they meant was to dissuade the infliction of torture, upon one of those present shouting out “Throw!” they promptly stoned to death all who had come forward to speak; and their relations Murder of Gesco. buried their bodies, which were crushed into shapeless masses as though by the feet of elephants. Still they at least were buried. But the followers of Spendius now seized Gesco and his fellow prisoners, numbering about seven hundred, led them outside the stockade, and having made them march a short distance from the camp, first cut off their hands, beginning with Gesco, the man whom a short while before they had selected out of all Carthage as their benefactor and had chosen as arbitrator in their controversy. When they had cut off their hands, they proceeded to lop off the extremities of the unhappy men, and having thus mutilated them and broken their legs, they threw them still alive into a trench.

[81.] When news of this dreadful affair reached the Carthaginians, they were powerless indeed to do anything, but they were filled with horror; and in a transport of agony despatched messengers to Hamilcar and the second general Hanno, entreating them to rally to their aid and avenge the unhappy victims; and at the same time they sent heralds to the authors of this crime to negotiate for the recovery of the dead bodies. But the latter sternly refused; and warned the messengers to send neither herald nor ambassador to them again; for the same punishment which had just befallen Gesco awaited all who came. And for the future they passed a resolution, which they encouraged each other to observe, to put every Carthaginian whom they caught to death with torture; and that whenever they captured one of their auxiliaries they would cut off his hands and send him back to Carthage. And this resolution they exactly and persistently carried out. Such horrors justify the remark that it is not only the bodies of men, and the ulcers and imposthumes which are bred in them, that grow to a fatal and completely incurable state of inflammation, but their souls also most of all. For as in the case of ulcers, sometimes medical treatment on the one hand only serves to irritate them and make them spread more rapidly, while if, on the other hand, the medical treatment is stopped, having nothing to check their natural destructiveness, they gradually destroy the substance on which they feed; just so at times it happens that similar plague spots and gangrenes fasten upon men’s souls; and when this is so, no wild beast can be more wicked or more cruel than a man. To men in such a frame of mind if you show indulgence or kindness, they regard it as a cover for trickery and sinister designs, and only become more suspicious and more inflamed against the authors of it; while if you retaliate, their passions are aroused to a kind of dreadful rivalry, and then there is no crime too monstrous or too cruel for them to commit. The upshot with these men was, that their feelings became so brutalised that they lost the instincts of humanity: which we must ascribe in the first place, and to the greatest extent, to uncivilised habits and a wretchedly bad early training; but many other things contributed to this result, and among them we must reckon as most important the acts of violence and rapacity committed by their leaders, sins which at that time were prevalent among the whole mercenary body, but especially so with their leaders.

[82.] Alarmed by the recklessness displayed by the enemy, Hamilcar summoned Hanno to join him, being convinced that a consolidation of the two armies would give him the best chance of putting an end to the whole war. Such of the enemy as he took in the field he put to execution on the spot, while those who were made prisoners and brought to him he threw to the elephants to be trampled to death; for he now made up his mind that the only possibility of Quarrels of Hanno and Hamilcar. finishing the war was to entirely destroy the enemy. But just as the Carthaginians were beginning to entertain brighter hopes in regard to the war, a reverse as complete as it was unexpected brought their fortunes to the lowest ebb. For these two generals, when they had joined forces, quarrelled so bitterly with each other, that they not only omitted to take advantage of chances against the enemy, but by their mutual animosity gave the enemy many opportunities against themselves. Finding this to be the case, the Carthaginian government sent out instructions that one of the generals was to retire, the other to remain, and that the army itself was to decide which of them it should be. This was one cause of the reverse in the fortunes of Carthage at this time. Another, which was almost contemporaneous, was this. Their chief hope of furnishing the army with provisions and other necessaries rested upon the supplies that were being brought from a place to which they give the name of Emporiae: but as these supplies were on their way, they were overtaken by a storm at sea and entirely destroyed. This was all the more fatal because Sardinia was lost to them at the time, as we have seen, and that island had always been of the greatest service to them in difficulties of this sort. But the worst blow of all was the revolt of the Revolt of Hippo Zarytus and Utica. cities of Hippo Zarytus and Utica, the only cities in all Libya that had been faithful to them, not only in the present war, but also at the time of the invasion of Agathocles, as well as that of the Romans. To both these latter they had offered a gallant resistance; and, in short, had never at any time adopted any policy hostile to Carthage. But now they were not satisfied with simply revolting to the Libyans, without any reason to allege for their conduct. With all the bitterness of turncoats, they suddenly paraded an ostentatious friendship and fidelity to them, and gave practical expression to implacable rage and hatred towards the Carthaginians. They killed every man of the force which had come from Carthage to their aid, as well as its commander, and threw the bodies from the wall. They surrendered their town to the Libyans, while they even refused the request of the Carthaginians to be allowed to bury the corpses of their unfortunate soldiers. Mathōs and Spendius were so elated by these events that they were emboldened to attempt Carthage itself. But Barcas had now got Hannibal as his coadjutor, who had been sent by the citizens to the army in the place of Hanno,—recalled in accordance with the sentence of the army, which the government had left to their discretion in reference to the disputes that arose between the two generals. Accompanied, therefore, by this Hannibal and by Narávas, Hamilcar scoured the country to intercept the supplies of Mathōs and Spendius, receiving his most efficient support in this, as in other things, from the Numidian Narávas.

[83.] Such being the position of their forces in the field, the Carthaginians, finding themselves hemmed in on every side, were compelled to have recourse to the help of the free states in alliance with them.[145] Now Hiero, of Syracuse, had during this war been all along exceedingly anxious to do everything which the Carthaginians asked him; and at this point of it was more forward to do so than ever, Hiero of Syracuse.from a conviction that it was for his interest, with a view alike to his own sovereignty and to his friendship with Rome, that Carthage should not perish, and so leave the superior power to work its own will without resistance. And his reasoning was entirely sound and prudent. It is never right to permit such a state of things; nor to help any one to build up so preponderating a power as to make resistance to it impossible, however just the cause. Not that the Romans themselves had failed to observe the obligations of the treaty, Friendly disposition of Rome.or were showing any failure of friendly dispositions; though at first a question had arisen between the two powers, from the following circumstance. At the beginning of the war, certain persons sailing from Italy with provisions for the mutineers, the Carthaginians captured them and forced them to land in their own harbour; and presently had as many as five hundred such persons in their prisons. This caused considerable annoyance at Rome: but, after sending ambassadors to Carthage and recovering possession of the men by diplomatic means, the Romans were so much gratified that, by way of returning the favour, they restored the prisoners made in the Sicilian war whom they still retained; and from that time forth responded cheerfully and generously to all requests made to them. They allowed their merchants to export to Carthage whatever from time to time was wanted, and prohibited those who were exporting to the mutineers. When, subsequently, the mercenaries in Sardinia, having revolted from Carthage, invited their interference on the island, they did not respond to the invitation; nor when the people of Utica offered them their submission did they accept it, but kept strictly to the engagements contained in the treaty.

[84.] The assistance thus obtained from these allies encouraged the Carthaginians to maintain their resistance: while Mathōs and Spendius found themselves quite as much in the position of besieged as in that of besiegers; for Hamilcar’s force reduced them to such distress for provisions that they were at last compelled to raise the siege. However, after a short interval, they managed to muster the most B.C. 238. Hamilcar, with assistance from Sicily, surrounds Mathōs and Spendius. effective of the mercenaries and Libyans, to the number in all of fifty thousand, among whom, besides others, was Zarzas the Libyan, with his division, and commenced once more to watch and follow on the flank of Hamilcar’s march. Their method was to keep away from the level country, for fear of the elephants and the cavalry of Narávas; but to seize in advance of him all points of vantage, whether it were rising ground or narrow pass. In these operations they showed themselves quite a match for their opponents in the fury of their assault and the gallantry of their attempts; but their ignorance of military tactics frequently placed them at a disadvantage. It was, in fact, a real and practical illustration of the difference between scientific and unscientific warfare: between the art of a general and the mechanical movements of a soldier. Like a good draught-player, by isolating and surrounding them, he destroyed large numbers in detail without coming to a general engagement at all; and in movements of more importance he cut off many without resistance by enticing them into ambushes; while he threw others into utter dismay by suddenly appearing where they least expected him, sometimes by day and sometimes by night: and all whom he took alive he threw to the elephants. Finally, he managed unexpectedly to beleaguer them on ground highly unfavourable to them and convenient for his own force; and reduced them to such a pitch of distress that, neither venturing to risk an engagement nor being able to run away, because they were entirely surrounded by a trench and stockade, they were at last compelled by starvation to feed on each other: a fitting retribution at the hands of Providence for their violation of all laws human and divine in their conduct to their enemies. To sally forth to an engagement they did not dare, for certain defeat stared them in the face, and they knew what vengeance awaited them if they were taken; and as to making terms, it never occurred to them to mention it, they were conscious that they had gone too far for that. They still hoped for the arrival of relief from Tunes, of which their officers assured them, and accordingly shrank from no suffering however terrible.

[85.] But when they had used up for food the captives in this horrible manner, and then the bodies of their slaves, and still no one came to their relief from Tunes, their sufferings became too dreadful to bear; and the common soldiers broke out into open threats of violence against their officers. Thereupon Autaritus, Zarzas, and Spendius decided to put themselves into the hands of the enemy and to hold a parley with Hamilcar, and try to make terms. They accordingly sent a herald and obtained permission for the despatch of an embassy. It consisted of ten ambassadors, Spendius and Autaritus fall into the hands of Hamilcar.who, on their arrival at the Carthaginian camp, concluded an agreement with Hamilcar on these terms: “The Carthaginians may select any ten men they choose from the enemy, and allow the rest to depart with one tunic a-piece.” No sooner had these terms been agreed to, than Hamilcar said at once that he selected, according to the terms of the agreement, the ten ambassadors themselves. The Carthaginians thus got possession of Autaritus, Spendius, and the other most conspicuous officers. The Libyans saw that their officers were arrested, and not knowing the terms of the treaty, believed that some perfidy was being practised against them, and accordingly flew to seize their arms. Hamilcar thereupon surrounded them with his elephants and his entire force, and destroyed them to a man. This slaughter, by which more than forty thousand perished, took place near a place called the Saw, so named from its shape resembling that tool.

[86.] This achievement of Hamilcar revived the hopes of the Carthaginians who had been in absolute despair: while he, in conjunction with Narávas and Hannibal, Siege of Mathōs in Tunes.employed himself in traversing the country and visiting the cities. His victory secured the submission of the Libyans; and when they had come in, and the greater number of the towns had been reduced to obedience, he and his colleagues advanced to attack Tunes, and commenced besieging Mathōs. Hannibal pitched his camp on the side of the town nearest to Carthage, and Hamilcar on the opposite side. When this was done they brought the captives taken from the army of Spendius and crucified them in the sight of the enemy. But observing that Hannibal was conducting his command with negligence and over-confidence, Defeat and death of Hannibal.Mathōs assaulted the ramparts, killed many of the Carthaginians, and drove the entire army from the camp. All the baggage fell into the hands of the enemy, and Hannibal himself was made a prisoner. They at once took him up to the cross on which Spendius was hanging, and after the infliction of exquisite tortures, took down the latter’s body and fastened Hannibal, still living, to his cross; and then slaughtered thirty Carthaginians of the highest rank round the corpse of Spendius. It seemed as though Fortune designed a competition in cruelty, giving either side alternately the opportunity of outdoing the other in mutual vengeance. Owing to the distance of the two camps from each other it was late before Barcas discovered the attack made from the town; nor, when he had discovered it, could he even then go to the rescue with the necessary speed, because the intervening country was rugged and difficult. He therefore broke up his camp, and leaving Tunes marched down the bank of the river Macaras, and pitched his camp close to its mouth and to the sea.

[87.] This unexpected reverse reduced the Carthaginians once more to a melancholy state of despair. By a final effort the Carthaginians raise a reinforcement for Hamilcar. But though their recent elation of spirit was followed so closely by this depression, they did not fail to do what they could for their own preservation. They selected thirty members of the Senate; with them they associated Hanno, who had some time ago been recalled; and, arming all that were left of military age in the city, despatched them to Barcas, with the feeling that they were now making their supreme effort. They strictly charged the members of the Senate to use every effort to reconcile the two generals Hamilcar and Hanno, and to make them forget their old quarrel and act harmoniously, in view of the imminence of the danger. Accordingly, after the employment of many various arguments, they induced the generals to meet; and Hanno and Barcas were compelled to give in and yield to their representations. The result was that they ever afterwards co-operated with each other so cordially, that Mathōs found himself continually worsted in the numerous skirmishes which took place round the town called Leptis, as well as certain other towns; and at last became eager to bring the matter to the decision of a general engagement, a desire in which the Carthaginians also shared in an equal degree. Both sides therefore having determined upon this course: they summoned all their allies to join them in confronting the peril, and collected the garrisons stationed in the various towns, conscious that they were about to stake their all on the hazard. All being ready on either side for the conflict, they gave each other battle by mutual consent, Mathōs beaten and captured. both sides being drawn up in full military array. When victory declared itself on the side of the Carthaginians, the larger number of the Libyans perished on the field; and the rest, having escaped to a certain town, surrendered shortly afterwards; while Mathōs himself was taken prisoner by his enemies.

[88.] Most places in Libya submitted to Carthage after this battle. But the towns of Hippo and Utica still held out, Reduction of Hippo and Utica, B.C. 238.feeling that they had no reasonable grounds for obtaining terms, because their original acts of hostility left them no place for mercy or pardon. So true is it that even in such outbreaks, however criminal in themselves, it is of inestimable advantage to be moderate, and to refrain from wanton acts which commit their perpetrator beyond all power of forgiveness. Nor did their attitude of defiance help these cities. Hanno invested one and Barcas the other, and quickly reduced them to accept whatever terms the Carthaginians might determine.

The war with the Libyans had indeed reduced Carthage to dreadful danger; but its termination enabled her not only to re-establish her authority over Libya, but also to inflict condign punishment upon the authors of the revolt. For the last act in the drama was performed by the young men conducting a triumphal procession through the town, B.C. 241-238.and finally inflicting every kind of torture upon Mathōs. For three years and about four months did the mercenaries maintain a war against the Carthaginians which far surpassed any that I ever heard of for cruelty and inhumanity.

And about the same time the Romans took in hand a naval expedition to Sardinia upon the request of the mercenaries who had deserted from that island and come to Italy; The Romans interfere in Sardinia.and when the Carthaginians expressed indignation at this, on the ground that the lordship over Sardinia more properly belonged to them, and were preparing to take measures against those who caused the revolt of the island, the Romans voted to declare war against them, on the pretence that they were making warlike preparations, not against Sardinia, but against themselves. The Carthaginians, however, having just had an almost miraculous escape from annihilation in the recent war, were in every respect disabled from renewing their quarrel with the Romans. They therefore yielded to the necessities of the hour, and not only abandoned Sardinia, but paid the Romans twelve hundred talents into the bargain, that they might not be obliged to undertake the war for the present.

BOOK II

[1.] In the previous book I have described how the Romans, having subdued all Italy, began to aim at foreign dominion; Recapitulation of the subjects treated in Book I.how they crossed to Sicily, and the reasons of the war which they entered into against the Carthaginians for the possession of that island. Next I stated at what period they began the formation of a navy; and what befell both the one side and the other up to the end of the war; the consequence of which was that the Carthaginians entirely evacuated Sicily, and the Romans took possession of the whole island, except such parts as were still under the rule of Hiero. Following these events I endeavoured to describe how the mutiny of the mercenaries against Carthage, in what is called the Libyan War, burst out; the lengths to which the shocking outrages in it went; its surprises and extraordinary incidents, until its conclusion, and the final triumph of Carthage. I must now relate the events which immediately succeeded these, touching summarily upon each in accordance with my original plan.

As soon as they had brought the Libyan war to a conclusion the Carthaginian government collected an army B.C. 238, Hamilcar and his son Hannibal sent to Spain. and despatched it under the command of Hamilcar to Iberia. This general took over the command of the troops, and with his son Hannibal, then nine years old, crossing by the Pillars of Hercules, set about recovering the Carthaginian possessions in Iberia. He spent nine years in Iberia, B.C. 238-229.and after reducing many Iberian tribes by war or diplomacy to obedience to Carthage he died in a manner worthy of his great achievements; for he lost his life in a battle against the most warlike and powerful tribes, in which he showed a conspicuous and even reckless personal gallantry. The Carthaginians appointed his son-in-law Hasdrubal to succeed him, who was at the time in command of the fleet.

[2.] It was at this same period that the Romans for the first time crossed to Illyricum and that part of Illyricum. Europe with an army. The history of this expedition must not be treated as immaterial; but must be carefully studied by those who wish to understand clearly the story I have undertaken to tell, and to trace the progress and consolidation of the Roman Empire.

Agron, king of the Illyrians, was the son of Pleuratus, and possessed the most powerful force, both by land and sea, B.C. 233-232. of any of the kings who had reigned in Illyria before him. By a bribe received from Demetrius he was induced to promise help to the Medionians, who were at that time being besieged by the Aetolians, Siege of Medion in Acarnania. who, being unable to persuade the Medionians to join their league, had determined to reduce the city by force. They accordingly levied their full army, pitched their camp under the walls of the city, and kept up a continuous blockade, using every means to force their way in, and every kind of siege-machine. But when the time of the annual election of their Strategus drew near, the besieged being now in great distress, and seeming likely every day to surrender, the existing Strategus made an appeal to the Aetolians. He argued that as he had had during his term of office all the suffering and the danger, it was but fair that when they got possession of the town he should have the apportioning of the spoil, and the privilege of inscribing his name on such arms as should be preserved for dedication. This was resisted by some, and especially by those who were candidates for the office, who urged upon the Assembly not to prejudge this matter, but to leave it open for fortune to determine who was to be invested with this honour; and, finally, the Aetolians decided that whoever was general when the city was taken should share the apportioning of the spoils, and the honour of inscribing the arms, with his predecessor.

[3.] The decision was come to on the day before the election of a new Strategus, and the transference of the command had, according to the Aetolian custom, to take place. But on that very night a hundred galleys with five thousand Illyrians on board, The Illyrians relieve Medion.sailed up to land near Medion. Having dropped anchor at daybreak, they effected a disembarkation with secrecy and despatch; they then formed in the order customary in their country, and advanced in their several companies against the Aetolian lines. These last were overwhelmed with astonishment at the unexpected nature and boldness of the move; but they had long been inspired with overweening self-confidence, and having full reliance in their own forces were far from being dismayed. They drew up the greater part of their hoplites and cavalry in front of their lines on the level ground, and with a portion of their cavalry and their light infantry they hastened to occupy some rising ground in front of their camp, which nature had made easily defensible. A single charge, however, of the Illyrians, whose numbers and close order gave them irresistible weight, served to dislodge the light-armed troops, and forced the cavalry who were on the ground with them to retire to the hoplites. But the Illyrians, being on the higher ground, and charging down from it upon the Aetolian troops formed up on the plain, routed them without difficulty; the Medionians at the same time making a diversion in their favour by sallying out of the town and charging the Aetolians. Thus, after killing a great number, and taking a still greater number prisoners, and becoming masters also of their arms and baggage, the Illyrians, having carried out the orders of their king, conveyed their baggage and the rest of the booty to their boats, and immediately set sail for their own country.

[4.] This was a most unexpected relief to the Medionians. They met in public assembly and deliberated on the whole business, and especially as to the inscribing the arms reserved for dedication. They decided, in mockery of the Aetolian decree, that the inscription should contain the name of the Aetolian commander on the day of battle, and of the candidates for succession to his office. And indeed Fortune seems, in what happened to them, to have designed a display of her power to the rest of mankind. The very thing which these men were in momentary expectation of undergoing at the hands of their enemies, she put it in their power to inflict upon those enemies, and all within a very brief interval. The unexpected disaster of the Aetolians, too, may teach all the world not to calculate on the future as though it were the actually existent, and not to reckon securely on what may still turn out quite otherwise, but to allow a certain margin to the unexpected. And as this is true everywhere and to every man, so is it especially true in war.

When his galleys returned, and he heard from his officers the events of the expedition, Death of Agron, who is succeeded by his wife Teuta, B.C. 231. King Agron was so beside himself with joy at the idea of having conquered the Aetolians, whose confidence in their own prowess had been extreme, that, giving himself over to excessive drinking and other similar indulgences, he was attacked by a pleurisy of which in a few days he died. His wife Teuta succeeded him on the throne; and managed the various details of administration by means of friends whom she could trust. But her woman’s head had been turned by the success just related, and she fixed her gaze upon that, and had no eyes for anything going on outside the country. Her first measure was to grant letters of marque to privateers, authorising them to plunder all whom they fell in with; and she next collected a fleet and military force as large as the former one, and despatched them with general instructions to the leaders to regard every land as belonging to an enemy.

[5.] Their first attack was to be upon the coast of Elis and Messenia, which had been from time immemorial the scene of the raids of the Illyrians. Teuta’s piratical fleet, B.C. 230. For owing to the length of their seaboard, and to the fact that their most powerful cities were inland, troops raised to resist them had a great way to go, and were long in coming to the spot where the Illyrian pirates landed; who accordingly overran those districts, and swept them clean without having anything to fear. However, when this fleet was off Phoenice in Epirus they landed to get supplies. Takes Phoenice in Epirus.There they fell in with some Gauls, who to the number of eight hundred were stationed at Phoenice, being in the pay of the Epirotes; and contracted with them to betray the town into their hands. Having made this bargain, they disembarked and took the town and everything in it at the first blow, the Gauls within the walls acting in collusion with them. When this news was known, the Epirotes raised a general levy and came in haste to the rescue. Arriving in the neighbourhood of Phoenice, they pitched their camp so as to have the river which flows past Phoenice between them and the enemy, tearing up the planks of the bridge over it for security. But news being brought them that Scerdilaidas with five thousand Illyrians was marching overland by way of the pass near Antigoneia, they detached some of their forces to guard that town; while the main body gave themselves over to an unrestrained indulgence in all the luxuries which the country could supply; and among other signs of demoralisation they neglected the necessary precaution of posting sentries and night pickets. The division of their forces, as well as the careless conduct of the remainder, did not escape the observation of the Illyrians; who, sallying out at night, and replacing the planks on the bridge, crossed the river safely, and having secured a strong position, remained there quietly for the rest of the night. At daybreak both armies drew up their forces in front of the town and engaged. In this battle the Epirotes were decidedly worsted: a large number of them fell, still more were taken prisoners, and the rest fled in the direction of the country of the Atintanes.

[6.] Having met with this reverse, and having lost all the hopes which they had cherished, The Aetolian and Achaean leagues send a force to the relief of the Epirotes. A truce is made. The Illyrians depart.the Epirotes turned to the despatch of ambassadors to the Aetolians and Achaeans, earnestly begging for their assistance. Moved by pity for their misfortunes, these nations consented; and an army of relief sent out by them arrived at Helicranum. Meanwhile the Illyrians who had occupied Phoenice, having effected a junction with Scerdilaidas, advanced with him to this place, and, taking up a position opposite to this army of relief, wished at first to give it battle. But they were embarrassed by the unfavourable nature of the ground; and just then a despatch was received from Teuta, ordering their instant return, because certain Illyrians had revolted to the Dardani. Accordingly, after merely stopping to plunder Epirus, they made a truce with the inhabitants, by which they undertook to deliver up all freemen, and the city of Phoenice, for a fixed ransom. They then took the slaves they had captured and the rest of their booty to their galleys, and some of them sailed away; while those who were with Scerdilaidas retired by land through the pass at Antigoneia, after inspiring no small or ordinary terror in the minds of the Greeks who lived along the coast. For seeing the most securely placed and powerful city of Epirus thus unexpectedly reduced to slavery, they one and all began henceforth to feel anxious, not merely as in former times for their property in the open country, but for the safety of their own persons and cities.

The Epirotes were thus unexpectedly preserved: but so far from trying to retaliate on those who had wronged them, or expressing gratitude to those who had come to their relief, they sent ambassadors in conjunction with the Acarnanians to Queen Teuta, and made a treaty with the Illyrians, in virtue of which they engaged henceforth to co-operate with them and against the Achaean and Aetolian leagues. All which proceedings showed conclusively the levity of their conduct towards men who had stood their friends, as well as an originally short-sighted policy in regard to their own interests.

[7.] That men, in the infirmity of human nature, should fall into misfortunes which defy calculation, is the fault not of the sufferers but of Fortune, and of those who do the wrong; but that they should from mere levity, and with their eyes open, thrust themselves upon the most serious disasters is without dispute the fault of the victims themselves. Therefore it is that pity and sympathy and assistance await those whose failure is due to Fortune: reproach and rebuke from all men of sense those who have only their own folly to thank for it.

It is the latter that the Epirotes now richly deserved at the hands of the Greeks. For in the first place, who in his senses, knowing the common report as to the character of the Gauls, would not have hesitated to trust to them a city so rich, The career of a body of Gallic mercenaries, and offering so many opportunities for treason? And again, who would not have been on his guard against the bad character of this particular body of them? For they had originally been driven from their native country by an outburst of popular indignation at an act of treachery done by them to their own kinsfolk and relations. Then having been received by the Carthaginians, because of the exigencies of the war in which the latter were engaged, at Agrigentum, and being drafted into Agrigentum to garrison it (being at the time more than three thousand strong), they seized the opportunity of a dispute as to pay, arising between the soldiers and their generals, to plunder the city; and again being brought by the Carthaginians into Eryx to perform the same duty, at Eryx. they first endeavoured to betray the city and those who were shut up in it with them to the Romans who were besieging it; and when they failed in that treason, they deserted in a body to the enemy: whose trust they also betrayed by plundering the temple of Aphrodite in Eryx. Thoroughly convinced, therefore, of their abominable character, as soon as they had made peace with Carthage the Romans made it their first business to disarm them, put them on board ship, and forbid them ever to enter any part of Italy. Disarmed by the Romans. These were the men whom the Epirotes made the protectors of their democracy and the guardians of their laws! To such men as these they entrusted their most wealthy city! How then can it be denied that they were the cause of their own misfortunes?

My object, in commenting on the blind folly of the Epirotes, is to point out that it is never wise to introduce a foreign garrison, especially of barbarians, which is too strong to be controlled.

[8.] To return to the Illyrians. From time immemorial they had oppressed and pillaged vessels sailing from Italy: Illyrian pirates.and now while their fleet was engaged at Phoenice a considerable number of them, separating from the main body, committed acts of piracy on a number of Italian merchants: some they merely plundered, The Romans interfere, B.C. 230. others they murdered, and a great many they carried off alive into captivity. Now, though complaints against the Illyrians had reached the Roman government in times past, they had always been neglected; but now when more and more persons approached the Senate on this subject, they appointed two ambassadors, Gaius and Lucius Coruncanius, to go to Illyricum and investigate the matter. But on the arrival of her galleys from Epirus, the enormous quantity and beauty of the spoils which they brought home (for Phoenice was by far the wealthiest city in Epirus at that time), so fired the imagination of Queen Teuta, that she was doubly eager to carry on the predatory warfare on the coasts of Greece. At the moment, however, she was stopped by the rebellion at home; but it had not taken her long to put down the revolt in Illyria, and she was engaged in besieging Issa, the last town which held out, when just at that very time the Roman ambassadors arrived. A time was fixed for their audience, and they proceeded to discuss the injuries which their citizens had sustained. Queen Teuta’s reception of the Roman legates. Throughout the interview, however, Teuta listened with an insolent and disdainful air; and when they had finished their speech, she replied that she would endeavour to take care that no injury should be inflicted on Roman citizens by Illyrian officials; but that it was not the custom for the sovereigns of Illyria to hinder private persons from taking booty at sea. Angered by these words, the younger of the two ambassadors used a plainness of speech which, though thoroughly to the point, was rather ill-timed. “The Romans,” he said, “O Teuta, have a most excellent custom of using the State for the punishment of private wrongs and the redress of private grievances: and we will endeavour, God willing, before long to compel you to improve the relations between the sovereign and the subject in Illyria.” The queen received this plain speaking with womanish passion and unreasoning anger. So enraged was she at the speech that, A Roman legate assassinated.in despite of the conventions universally observed among mankind, she despatched some men after the ambassadors, as they were sailing home, to kill the one who had used this plainness. Upon this being reported at Rome the people were highly incensed at the queen’s violation of the law of nations, and at once set about preparations for war, enrolling legions and collecting a fleet.

[9.] When the season for sailing was come Teuta sent out a larger fleet of galleys than ever against the Greek shores, B.C. 229. Another piratical fleet sent out by Teuta.some of which sailed straight to Corcyra; while a portion of them put into the harbour of Epidamnus on the pretext of taking in victual and water, but really to attack the town. Their treacherous attack on Epidamnus, which is repulsed. The Epidamnians received them without suspicion and without taking any precautions. Entering the town therefore clothed merely in their tunics, as though they were only come to fetch water, but with swords concealed in the water vessels, they slew the guards stationed at the gates, and in a brief space were masters of the gate-tower. Being energetically supported by a reinforcement from the ships, which came quickly up in accordance with a pre-arrangement, they got possession of the greater part of the walls without difficulty. But though the citizens were taken off their guard they made a determined and desperate resistance, and the Illyrians after maintaining their ground for some time were eventually driven out of the town. So the Epidamnians on this occasion went near to lose their city by their carelessness; but by the courage which they displayed they saved themselves from actual damage while receiving a useful lesson for the future. The Illyrians who had engaged in this enterprise made haste to put to sea, Attack on Corcyra. and, rejoining the advanced squadron, put in at Corcyra: there, to the terror of the inhabitants, they disembarked and set about besieging the town. Dismayed and despairing of their safety, the Corcyreans, The Corcyreans appeal to the Aetolian and Achaean leagues. acting in conjunction with the people of Apollonia and Epidamnus, sent off envoys to the Achaean and Aetolian leagues, begging for instant help, and entreating them not to allow of their being deprived of their homes by the Illyrians. The petition was accepted, and the Achaean and Aetolian leagues combined to send aid. The ten decked ships of war belonging to the Achaeans were manned, and having been fitted out in a few days, set sail for Corcyra in hopes of raising the siege.

[10.] But the Illyrians obtained a reinforcement of seven decked ships from the Acarnanians, in virtue of their treaty with that people, and, putting to sea, engaged the Achaean fleet off the islands called Paxi. The Acarnanian and Achaean ships fought without victory declaring for either, Defeat of the Achaean ships. and without receiving any further damage than having some of their crew wounded. But the Illyrians lashed their galleys four together, and, caring nothing for any damage that might happen to them, grappled with the enemy by throwing their galleys athwart their prows and encouraging them to charge; when the enemies’ prows struck them, and got entangled by the lashed-together galleys getting hitched on to their forward gear, the Illyrians leaped upon the decks of the Achaean ships and captured them by the superior number of their armed men. In this way they took four triremes, and sunk one quinquereme with all hands, on board of which Margos of Caryneia was sailing, who had all his life served the Achaean league with complete integrity. The vessels engaged with the Acarnanians, seeing the triumphant success of the Illyrians, and trusting to their own speed, hoisted their sails to the wind and effected their voyage home without further disaster. The Illyrians, on the other hand, filled with self-confidence by their success, continued their siege of the town in high spirits, and without putting themselves to any unnecessary trouble; Corcyra submits.while the Corcyreans, reduced to despair of safety by what had happened, after sustaining the siege for a short time longer, made terms with the Illyrians, consenting to receive a garrison, and with it Demetrius of Pharos. After this had been settled, the Illyrian admirals put to sea again; and, having arrived at Epidamnus, once more set about besieging that town.

[11.] In this same season one of the Consuls, Gnaeus Fulvius, started from Rome with two hundred ships, and the other Consul, Aulus Postumius, B.C. 229. The Roman Consuls, with fleet and army, start to punish the Illyrians. with the land forces. The plan of Gnaeus was to sail direct to Corcyra, because he supposed that he should find the result of the siege still undecided. But when he found that he was too late for that, he determined nevertheless to sail to the island because he wished to know the exact facts as to what had happened there, and to test the sincerity of the overtures that had been made by Demetrius. For Demetrius, Demetrius of Pharos. being in disgrace with Teuta, and afraid of what she might do to him, had been sending messages to Rome, offering to put the city and everything else of which he was in charge into their hands. Delighted at the appearance of the Romans, the Corcyreans not only surrendered the garrison to them, with the consent of Demetrius, Corcyra becomes a “friend of Rome.”but committed themselves also unconditionally to the Roman protection; believing that this was their only security in the future against the piratical incursions of the Illyrians. So the Romans, having admitted the Corcyreans into the number of the friends of Rome, sailed for Apollonia, with Demetrius to act as their guide for the rest of the campaign. At the same time the other Consul, Aulus Postumius.Aulus Postumius, conveyed his army across from Brundisium, consisting of twenty thousand infantry and about two thousand horse. This army, as well as the fleet under Gnaeus Fulvius, being directed upon Apollonia, which at once put itself under Roman protection, both forces were again put in motion on news being brought that Epidamnus was being besieged by the enemy. No sooner did the Illyrians learn the approach of the Romans than they hurriedly broke up the siege and fled. The Romans, taking the Epidamnians under their protection, advanced into the interior of Illyricum, subduing the Ardiaei as they went. The Roman settlement of Illyricum. They were met on their march by envoys from many tribes: those of the Partheni offered an unconditional surrender, as also did those of the Atintanes. Both were accepted: and the Roman army proceeded towards Issa, which was being besieged by Illyrian troops. On their arrival, they forced the enemy to raise the siege, and received the Issaeans also under their protection. Besides, as the fleet coasted along, they took certain Illyrian cities by storm; among which was Nutria, where they lost not only a large number of soldiers, but some of the Military Tribunes also and the Quaestor. But they captured twenty of the galleys which were conveying the plunder from the country.

Of the Illyrian troops engaged in blockading Issa, those that belonged to Pharos were left unharmed, as a favour to Demetrius; while all the rest scattered and fled to Arbo. Teuta herself, with a very few attendants, escaped to Rhizon, a small town very strongly fortified, and situated on the river of the same name. Having accomplished all this, and having placed the greater part of Illyria under Demetrius, and invested him with a wide dominion, the Consuls retired to Epidamnus with their fleet and army.

[12.] Then Gnaeus Fulvius sailed back to Rome with the larger part of the naval and military forces, while Postumius, staying behind and collecting forty vessels and a legion from the cities in that district, wintered there to guard the Ardiaei and other tribes that had committed themselves to the protection of Rome. Just before spring in the next year, B.C. 228. Teuta submits. Teuta sent envoys to Rome and concluded a treaty; in virtue of which she consented to pay a fixed tribute, and to abandon all Illyricum, with the exception of some few districts: and what affected Greece more than anything, she agreed not to sail beyond Lissus with more than two galleys, and those unarmed. When this arrangement had been concluded, Postumius sent legates to the Aetolian and Achaean leagues, who on their arrival first explained the reasons for the war and the Roman invasion; and then stated what had been accomplished in it, and read the treaty which had been made with the Illyrians. The envoys then returned to Corcyra after receiving the thanks of both leagues: for they had freed Greece by this treaty from a very serious cause for alarm, the fact being that the Illyrians were not the enemies of this or that people, but the common enemies of all alike.

Such were the circumstances of the first armed interference of the Romans in Illyricum and that part of Europe, and their first diplomatic relations with Greece; and such too were the motives which suggested them. But having thus begun, the Romans immediately afterwards sent envoys to Corinth and Athens. And it was then that the Corinthians first admitted Romans to take part in the Isthmian games.

[13.] We must now return to Hasdrubal in Iberia. He had during this period been conducting his command with ability and success, and had not only given in general a great impulse to the Carthaginian interests there, but in particular had greatly strengthened them by the Hasdrubal in Spain. The founding of New Carthage, B.C. 228. fortification of the town, variously called Carthage, and New Town, the situation of which was exceedingly convenient for operations in Libya as well as in Iberia. I shall take a more suitable opportunity of speaking of the site of this town, and pointing out the advantages offered by it to both countries: I must at present speak of the impression made by Hasdrubal’s policy at Rome. Seeing him strengthening the Carthaginian influence in Spain, and rendering it continually more formidable, the Romans were anxious to interfere in the politics of that country. They discovered, as they thought, that they had allowed their suspicions to be lulled to sleep, and had meanwhile given the Carthaginians the opportunity of consolidating their power. They did not venture, however, at the moment to impose conditions or make war on them, because they were in almost daily dread of an attack from the Celts. Dread of the Gauls.They determined therefore to mollify Hasdrubal by gentle measures, and so to leave themselves free to attack the Celts first and try conclusions with them: for they were convinced that, with such enemies on their flank, they would not only be unable to keep their hold over the rest of Italy, but even to reckon on safety in their own city. Treaty with Hasdrubal.Accordingly, while sending envoys to Hasdrubal, and making a treaty with him by which the Carthaginians, without saying anything of the rest of Iberia, engaged not to cross the Iber in arms, they pushed on the war with the Celts in Italy.

[14.] This war itself I shall treat only summarily, to avoid breaking the thread of my history; but I must go back somewhat in point of time, and refer to the period at which these tribes originally occupied their districts in Italy. For the story I think is worth knowing for its own sake, and must absolutely be kept in mind, if we wish to understand what tribes and districts they were on which Hannibal relied to assist him in his bold design of destroying the Roman dominion. I will first describe the country in which they live, its nature, and its relation to the rest of Italy; for if we clearly understand its peculiarities, geographical and natural, we shall be better able to grasp the salient points in the history of the war.

Italy, taken as a whole, is a triangle, of which the eastern side is bounded by the Ionian Sea and the Adriatic Gulf, The Geography of Italy.its southern and western sides by the Sicilian and Tyrrhenian seas; these two sides converge to form the apex of the triangle, which is represented by the southern promontory of Italy called Cocinthus, and which separates the Ionian from the Sicilian Sea.[146] The third side, or base of this triangle, is on the north, and is formed by the chain of the Alps stretching right across the country, beginning at Marseilles and the coast of the Sardinian Sea, and with no break in its continuity until within a short distance of the head of the Adriatic. To the south of this range, which I said we must regard as the base of the triangle, are the most northerly plains of Italy, the largest and most fertile of any with which I am acquainted in all Europe. This is the district with which we are at present concerned. Taken as a whole, it too forms a triangle, the apex of which is the point where the Apennines and Alps converge, Col di Tenda.above Marseilles, and not far from the coast of the Sardinian Sea. The northern side of this triangle is formed by the Alps, extending for 2200 stades; the southern by the Apennines, extending 3600; and the base is the seaboard of the Adriatic, from the town of Sena to the head of the gulf, a distance of more than 2500 stades. The total length of the three sides will thus be nearly 10,000 stades.

[15.] The yield of corn in this district is so abundant that wheat is often sold at four obols a Sicilian medimnus, Gallia Cis-Alpina.barley at two, or a metretes of wine for an equal measure of barley. The quantity of panic and millet produced is extraordinary; and the amount of acorns grown in the oak forests scattered about the country may be gathered from the fact that, though nowhere are more pigs slaughtered than in Italy, for sacrifices as well as for family use, and for feeding the army, by far the most important supply is from these plains. The cheapness and abundance of all articles of food may also be clearly shown from the fact that travellers in these parts, when stopping at inns, do not bargain for particular articles, but simply ask what the charge is per head for board. And for the most part the innkeepers are content to supply their guests with every necessary at a charge rarely exceeding half an as (that is, the fourth part of an obol)[147] a day each. Of the numbers, stature, and personal beauty of the inhabitants, and still more of their bravery in war, we shall be able to satisfy ourselves from the facts of their history.

[16.] Such parts of both slopes of the Alps as are not too rocky or too precipitous are inhabited by different tribes; those on the north towards the Rhone by the Gauls, The Alps.called Transalpine; those towards the Italian plains by the Taurisci and Agones and a number of other barbarous tribes. The name Transalpine is not tribal, but local, from the Latin proposition trans, “across.” The summits of the Alps, from their rugged character, and the great depth of eternal snow, are entirely uninhabited. Both slopes of the Apennines, The Apennines. towards the Tuscan Sea and towards the plains, are inhabited by the Ligurians, from above Marseilles and the junction with the Alps to Pisae on the coast, the first city on the west of Etruria, and inland to Arretium. Next to them come the Etruscans; and next on both slopes the Umbrians. The distance between the Apennines and the Adriatic averages about five hundred stades; and when it leaves the northern plains the chain verges to the right, and goes entirely through the middle of the rest of Italy, as far as the Sicilian Sea. The remaining portion of this triangle, namely the plain along the sea coast, extends as far as the town of Sena. The Padus, celebrated by the poets under the name of Eridanus, The Po.rises in the Alps near the apex of the triangle, and flows down to the plains with a southerly course; but after reaching the plains, it turns to the east, and flowing through them discharges itself by two mouths into the Adriatic. The larger part of the plain is thus cut off by it, and lies between this river and the Alps to the head of the Adriatic. In body of water it is second to no river in Italy, because the mountain streams, descending from the Alps and Apennines to the plain, one and all flow into it on both sides; and its stream is at its height and beauty about the time of the rising of the Dog Star, 15th July. because it is then swollen by the melting snows on those mountains. It is navigable for nearly two thousand stades up stream, the ships entering by the mouth called Olana; for though it is a single main stream to begin with, it branches off into two at the place called Trigoboli, of which streams the northern is called the Padoa, the southern the Olana. At the mouth of the latter there is a harbour affording as safe anchorage as any in the Adriatic. The whole river is called by the country folk the Bodencus. As to the other stories current in Greece about this river,—I mean Phaethon and his fall, and the tears of the poplars and the black clothes of the inhabitants along this stream, which they are said to wear at this day as mourning for Phaethon,—all such tragic incidents I omit for the present, as not being suitable to the kind of work I have in hand; but I shall return to them at some other more fitting opportunity, particularly because Timaeus has shown a strange ignorance of this district.

[17.] To continue my description. These plains were anciently inhabited by Etruscans,[148] at the same period as what are called the Phlegraean plains round Capua and Nola; which latter, Gauls expel Etruscans from the valley of the Po. however, have enjoyed the highest reputation, because they lay in a great many people’s way and so got known. In speaking then of the history of the Etruscan Empire, we should not refer to the district occupied by them at the present time, but to these northern plains, and to what they did when they inhabited them. Their chief intercourse was with the Celts, because they occupied the adjoining districts; who, envying the beauty of their lands, seized some slight pretext to gather a great host and expel the Etruscans from the valley of the Padus, which they at once took possession of themselves. First, the country near the source of the Padus was occupied by the Laevi and Lebecii; after them the Insubres settled in the country, the largest tribe of all; and next them, along the bank of the river, the Cenomani. But the district along the shore of the Adriatic was held by another very ancient tribe called Venĕti, in customs and dress nearly allied to Celts, but using quite a different language, about whom the tragic poets have written a great many wonderful tales. South of the Padus, in the Apennine district, first beginning from the west, the Ananes, and next them the Boii settled. Next them, on the coast of the Adriatic, the Lingones; and south of these, still on the sea-coast, the Senones. These are the most important tribes that took possession of this part of the country. Their character.They lived in open villages, and without any permanent buildings. As they made their beds of straw or leaves, and fed on meat, and followed no pursuits but those of war and agriculture, they lived simple lives without being acquainted with any science or art whatever. Each man’s property, moreover, consisted in cattle and gold; as they were the only things that could be easily carried with them, when they wandered from place to place, and changed their dwelling as their fancy directed. They made a great point, however, of friendship: for the man who had the largest number of clients or companions in his wanderings, was looked upon as the most formidable and powerful member of the tribe.[149]

[18.] In the early times of their settlement they did not merely subdue the territory which they occupied, but rendered also many of the neighbouring peoples subject to them, whom they overawed by their audacity. Some time afterwards they conquered the Romans in battle, and pursuing the flying legions, in three days after the battle occupied Rome itself with the exception of the Capitol. But a circumstance intervened which recalled them home, Battle of the Allia, 18th July, B.C. 390. an invasion, that is to say, of their territory by the Venĕti. Accordingly they made terms with the Romans, handed back the city, and returned to their own land; and subsequently were occupied with domestic wars. Some of the tribes, also, who dwelt on the Alps, comparing their own barren districts with the rich territory occupied by the others, were continually making raids upon them, and collecting their forces to attack them. Latin war, B.C. 349-340. This gave the Romans time to recover their strength, and to come to terms with the people of Latium. B.C. 360.When, thirty years after the capture of the city, the Celts came again as far as Alba, the Romans were taken by surprise; and B.C. 348. having had no intelligence of the intended invasion, nor time to collect the forces of the Socii, did not venture to give them battle. But when another invasion in great force took place twelve years later, they did get previous intelligence of it; and, having mustered their allies, sallied forth to meet them with great spirit, being eager to engage them and fight a decisive battle. But the Gauls were dismayed at their approach; and, being besides weakened by internal feuds, retreated homewards as soon as night fell, with all the appearance of a regular flight. B.C. 334. After this alarm they kept quiet for thirteen years; at the end of which period, seeing that the power of the Romans was growing formidable, they made a peace and a definite treaty with them.

[19.] They abided by this treaty for thirty years: but at that time, alarmed by a threatening movement on the part of the Transalpine tribes, B.C. 299.and fearing that a dangerous war was imminent, they diverted the attack of the invading horde from themselves by presents and appeals to their ties of kindred, but incited them to attack the Romans, joining in the expedition themselves. They directed their march through Etruria, and were joined by the Etruscans; and the combined armies, after taking a great quantity of booty, got safely back from the Roman territory. But when they got home, they quarrelled about the division of the spoil, and in the end destroyed most of it, as well as the flower of their own force. This is the way of the Gauls when they have appropriated their neighbours’ property; and it mostly arises from brutal drunkenness, and intemperate feeding. B.C. 297. In the fourth year after this, the Samnites and Gauls made a league, gave the Romans battle in the neighbourhood of Camerium, and slew a large number. Incensed at this defeat, the Romans marched out a few days afterwards, and with two Consular armies engaged the enemy in the territory of Sentinum; and, having killed the greater number of them, forced the survivors to retreat in hot haste each to his own land. B.C. 283.Again, after another interval of ten years, the Gauls besieged Arretium with a great army, and the Romans went to the assistance of the town, and were beaten in an engagement under its walls. The Praetor Lucius[150] having fallen in this battle, Manius Curius was appointed in his place. The ambassadors, sent by him to the Gauls to treat for the prisoners, were treacherously murdered by them. At this the Romans, in high wrath, sent an expedition against them, which was met by the tribe called the Senones. In a pitched battle the army of the Senones were cut to pieces, and the rest of the tribe expelled from the country; into which the Romans sent the first colony which they ever planted in Gaul—namely, Sena Gallica.the town of Sena, so called from the tribe of Gauls which formerly occupied it. This is the town which I mentioned before as lying on the coast at the extremity of the plains of the Padus.

[20.] Seeing the expulsion of the Senones, and fearing the same fate for themselves, the Boii made a general levy, summoned the Etruscans to join them, and set out to war. They mustered their forces near the lacus Vadimonis, and there gave the Romans battle; in which the Etruscans indeed suffered a loss of more than half their men, while scarcely any of the Boii escaped. B.C. 282.But yet in the very next year the same two nations joined forces once more; and arming even those of them who had only just reached manhood, gave the Romans battle again; and it was not until they had been utterly defeated in this engagement that they humbled themselves so far as to send ambassadors to Rome and make a treaty.[151]

These events took place in the third year before Pyrrhus crossed into Italy, and in the fifth before the destruction of the Gauls at Delphi. For at this period fortune seems to have plagued the Gauls with a kind of epidemic of war. But the Romans gained two most important advantages from these events. First, their constant defeats at the hands of the Gauls had inured them to the worst that could befall them; and so, when they had to fight with Pyrrhus, they came to the contest like trained and experienced gladiators. And in the second place, they had crushed the insolence of the Gauls just in time to allow them to give an undivided attention, first to the war with Pyrrhus for the possession of Italy, and then to the war with Carthage for the supremacy in Sicily.

[21.] After these defeats the Gauls maintained an unbroken peace with Rome for forty-five years. But when the generation which had witnessed the actual struggle had passed away, and a younger generation of men had taken their places, filled with unreflecting hardihood, and who had neither experienced nor seen any suffering or reverse, they began, as was natural, to disturb the settlement; B.C. 236.and on the one hand to let trifling causes exasperate them against Rome, and on the other to invite the Alpine Gauls to join the fray. At first these intrigues were carried on by their chiefs without the knowledge of the tribesmen; and accordingly, when an armed host of Transalpine Gauls arrived at Ariminum, the Boii were suspicious; and forming a conspiracy against their own leaders, as well as against the new-comers, they put their own two kings Atis and Galatus to death, and cut each other to pieces in a pitched battle. Just then the Romans, alarmed at the threatened invasion, had despatched an army; but learning that the Gauls had committed this act of self-destruction, it returned home again. In the fifth year after this alarm, in the Consulship of Marcus Aemilius Lepidus, the Romans divided among their citizens the territory of Picenum, from which they had ejected the Senones when they conquered them: B.C. 232.a democratic measure introduced by Gaius Flaminius, and a policy which we must pronounce to have been the first step in the demoralisation of the people, as well as the cause of the next Gallic war. For many of the Gauls, and especially the Boii whose lands were coterminous with the Roman territory, entered upon that war from the conviction that the object of Rome in her wars with them was no longer supremacy and empire over them, but their total expulsion and destruction.

[22.] Accordingly the two most extensive tribes, the Insubres and Boii, joined in the despatch of messengers to the tribes living about the Alps and on the Rhone, B.C. 231. who from a word which means “serving for hire,” are called Gaesatae. To their kings Concolitanus and Aneroetes they offered a large sum of gold on the spot; and, for the future, pointed out to them the greatness of the wealth of Rome, and all the riches of which they would become possessed, if they took it. In these attempts to inflame their cupidity and induce them to join the expedition against Rome they easily succeeded. For they added to the above arguments pledges of their own alliance; and reminded them of the campaign of their own ancestors in which they had seized Rome itself, and had been masters of all it contained, as well as the city itself, for seven months; and had at last evacuated it of their own free will, and restored it by an act of free grace, returning unconquered and scatheless with the booty to their own land. These arguments made the leaders so eager for the expedition, that there never at any other time came from that part of Gaul a larger host, or one consisting of more notable warriors. Meanwhile, the Romans, informed of what was coming, partly by report and partly by conjecture, were in such a state of constant alarm and excitement, that they hurriedly enrolled legions, collected supplies, and sent out their forces to the frontier, as though the enemy were already in their territory, before the Gauls had stirred from their own lands.

It was this movement of the Gauls that, more than anything else, helped the Carthaginians to consolidate their power in Iberia. For the Romans, as I have said, looked upon the Celtic question as the more pressing one of the two, as being so near home; and were forced to wink at what was going on in Iberia, in their anxiety to settle it satisfactorily first. Having, therefore, put their relations with the Carthaginians on a safe footing by the treaty with Hasdrubal, which I spoke of a short time back,[152] they gave an undivided attention to the Celtic war, convinced that their interest demanded that a decisive battle should be fought with them.

[23.] The Gaesatae, then, having collected their forces, crossed the Alps and descended into the valley of the Padus with a formidable army, B. C. 225. Coss. L. Aemilius Papus. C. Atilius Regulus.furnished with a variety of armour, in the eighth year after the distribution of the lands of Picenum. The Insubres and Boii remained loyal to the agreement they had made with them: but the Venĕti and Cenomani being induced by embassies from Rome to take the Roman side, the Celtic kings were obliged to leave a portion of their forces behind, to guard against an invasion of their territory by those tribes. They themselves, with their main army, consisting of one hundred and fifty thousand foot, and twenty thousand horse and chariots, struck camp and started on their march, which was to be through Etruria, in high spirits. As soon as it was known at Rome that the Celts had crossed the Alps, one of the Consuls, Lucius Aemilius Papus, was sent with an army to Ariminum to guard against the passage of the enemy, and one of the Praetors into Etruria: for the other Consul, Gaius Atilius Regulus, happened to be in Sardinia with his legions. There was universal terror in Rome, for the danger threatening them was believed to be great and formidable. And naturally so: for the old fear of the Gauls had never been eradicated from their minds. No one thought of anything else: they were incessantly occupied in mustering the legions, or enrolling new ones, and in ordering up such of the allies as were ready for service. The proper magistrates were ordered to give in lists of all citizens of military age; that it might at once be known to what the total of the available forces amounted. And such stores of corn, and darts, and other military equipments were collected as no one could remember on any former occasion. From every side assistance was eagerly rendered; for the inhabitants of Italy, in their terror at the Gallic invasion, no longer thought of the matter as a question of alliance with Rome, or of the war as undertaken to support Roman supremacy, but each people regarded it as a danger menacing themselves and their own city and territory. The response to the Roman appeal therefore was prompt.

[24.] But in order that we may learn from actual facts how great the power was which Hannibal subsequently ventured to attack, The Roman resources.and what a mighty empire he faced when he succeeded in inflicting upon the Roman people the most severe disasters, I must now state the amount of the forces they could at that time bring into the field. The two Consuls had marched out with four legions, each consisting of five thousand two hundred infantry and three hundred cavalry. Besides this there were with each Consul allies to the number of thirty thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry. Of Sabines and Etruscans too, there had come to Rome, for that special occasion, four thousand horse and more than fifty thousand foot. These were formed into an army and sent in advance into Etruria, under the command of one of the Praetors. Moreover, the Umbrians and Sarsinatae, hill tribes of the Apennine district, were collected to the number of twenty thousand; and with them were twenty thousand Venĕti and Cenomani. These were stationed on the frontier of the Gallic territory, that they might divert the attention of the invaders, by making an incursion into the territory of the Boii. These were the forces guarding the frontier. In Rome itself, ready as a reserve in case of the accidents of war, there remained twenty thousand foot and three thousand horse of citizens, and thirty thousand foot and two thousand horse of the allies. Lists of men for service had also been returned, of Latins eighty thousand foot and five thousand horse; of Samnites seventy thousand foot and seven thousand horse; of Iapygians and Messapians together fifty thousand foot and sixteen thousand horse; and of Lucanians thirty thousand foot and three thousand horse; of Marsi, and Marrucini, and Ferentani, and Vestini, twenty thousand foot and four thousand horse. And besides these, there were in reserve in Sicily and Tarentum two legions, each of which consisted of about four thousand two hundred foot, and two hundred horse. Of the Romans and Campanians the total of those put on the roll was two hundred and fifty thousand foot and twenty-three thousand horse; so that the grand total of the forces actually defending Rome was over 150,000 foot, 6000 cavalry:[153] and of the men able to bear arms, Romans and allies, over 700,000 foot and 70,000 horse; while Hannibal, when he invaded Italy, had less than twenty thousand to put against this immense force.

[25.] There will be another opportunity of treating the subject in greater detail; for the present I must return to the Celts. The Gauls enter Etruria.Having entered Etruria, they began their march through the country, devastating it as they chose, and without any opposition; and finally directed their course against Rome itself. But when they were encamped under the walls of Clusium, which is three days’ march from Rome, news was brought them that the Roman forces, which were on duty in Etruria, were following on their rear and were close upon them; upon which they turned back to meet them, eager to offer them battle. The Praetor’s army defeated at Clusium.The two armies came in sight of each other about sunset, and encamped for the night a short distance apart. But when night fell, the Celts lit their watch fires; and leaving their cavalry on the ground, with instructions that, as soon as daylight made them visible to the enemy, they should follow by the same route, they made a secret retreat along the road to Faesulae, and took up their position there; that they might be joined by their own cavalry, and might disconcert the attack of the enemy. Accordingly, when at daybreak the Romans saw that the cavalry were alone, they believed that the Celts had fled, and hastened in pursuit of the retreating horse; but when they approached the spot where the enemy were stationed, the Celts suddenly left their position and fell upon them. The struggle was at first maintained with fury on both sides: but the courage and superior numbers of the Celts eventually gave them the victory. No less than six thousand Romans fell: while the rest fled, most of whom made their way to a certain strongly fortified height, and there remained. The first impulse of the Celts was to besiege them: but they were worn out by their previous night march, and all the suffering and fatigue of the day; leaving therefore a detachment of cavalry to keep guard round the hill, they hastened to procure rest and refreshment, resolving to besiege the fugitives next day unless they voluntarily surrendered.

[26.] But meanwhile Lucius Aemilius, who had been stationed on the coast of the Adriatic at Ariminum, On the arrival of Aemilius the Gauls retire. having been informed that the Gauls had entered Etruria and were approaching Rome, set off to the rescue; and after a rapid march appeared on the ground just at the critical moment. He pitched his camp close to the enemy; and the fugitives on the hill, seeing his watch fires, and understanding what had happened, quickly recovered their courage and sent some of their men unarmed to make their way through the forest and tell the Consul what had happened. This news left the Consul as he thought no alternative but to fight. He therefore ordered the Tribunes to lead out the infantry at daybreak, while he, taking command of the cavalry, led the way towards the hill. The Gallic chieftains too had seen his watch fires, and understood that the enemy was come; and at once held council of war. The advice of King Aneroestes was, “that seeing the amount of booty they had taken,—an incalculable quantity indeed of captives, cattle, and other spoil,—they had better not run the risk of another general engagement, but return home in safety; and having disposed of this booty, and freed themselves from its incumbrance, return, if they thought good, to make another determined attack upon Rome.” Having resolved to follow the advice of Aneroestes in the present juncture, the chiefs broke up their night council, and before daybreak struck camp, and marched through Etruria by the road which follows the coast of the Ligurian bay. While Lucius, having taken off the remnant of the army from the hill, and combined it with his own forces, determined that it would not be by any means advantageous to offer the enemy regular battle; but that it was better to dog their footsteps, watching for favourable times and places at which to inflict damage upon them, or wrest some of their booty from their hands.

[27.] Just at that time the Consul Gaius Atilius had crossed from Sardinia, and having landed at Pisae was on his way to Rome; Atilius landing at Pisa intercepts the march of the Gauls.and therefore he and the enemy were advancing to meet each other. When the Celts were at Telamon in Etruria, their advanced guard fell in with that of Gaius, and the men being made prisoners informed the Consul in answer to questions of what had taken place; and told him that both the armies were in the neighbourhood: that of the Celts, namely, and that of Lucius close upon their rear. Though somewhat disturbed at the events which he thus learnt, Gaius regarded the situation as a hopeful one, when he considered that the Celts were on the road between two hostile armies. He therefore ordered the Tribunes to martial the legions and to advance at the ordinary pace, and in line as far as the breadth of the ground permitted; while he himself having surveyed a piece of rising ground which commanded the road, and under which the Celts must march, took his cavalry with him and hurried on to seize the eminence, and so begin the battle in person; convinced that by these means he would get the principal credit of the action for himself. At first the Celts not knowing anything about the presence of Gaius Atilius, but supposing from what was taking place, that the cavalry of Aemilius had outmarched them in the night, and were seizing the points of vantage in the van of their route, immediately detached some cavalry and light armed infantry to dispute the possession of this eminence. But having shortly afterwards learnt the truth about the presence of Gaius from a prisoner who was brought in, they hurriedly got their infantry into position, and drew them up so as to face two opposite ways, some, that is, to the front and others to the rear. For they knew that one army was following on their rear; and they expected from the intelligence which had reached them, and from what they saw actually occurring, that they would have to meet another on their front.

[28.] Aemilius had heard of the landing of the legions at Pisae, but had not expected them to be already so far on their road; but the contest at the eminence proved to him that the two armies were quite close. The battle of the horse. Atilius falls. He accordingly despatched his horse at once to support the struggle for the possession of the hill, while he marshalled his foot in their usual order, and advanced to attack the enemy who barred his way. The Celts had stationed the Alpine tribe of the Gaesatae to face their enemies on the rear, and behind them the Insubres; on their front they had placed the Taurisci, and the Cispadane tribe of the Boii, facing the legions of Gaius. Their waggons and chariots they placed on the extremity of either wing, while the booty they massed upon one of the hills that skirted the road, under the protection of a guard. The army of the Celts was thus double-faced, and their mode of marshalling their forces was effective as well as calculated to inspire terror. The Insubres and Boii were clothed in their breeches and light cloaks; but the Gaesatae from vanity and bravado threw these garments away, and fell in in front of the army naked, with nothing but their arms; believing that, as the ground was in parts encumbered with brambles, which might possibly catch in their clothes and impede the use of their weapons, they would be more effective in this state. At first the only actual fighting was that for the possession of the hill: and the numbers of the cavalry, from all three armies, that had joined in the struggle made it a conspicuous sight to all. In the midst of it the Consul Gaius fell, fighting with reckless bravery in the thick of the battle, and his head was brought to the king of the Celts. The Roman cavalry, however, continued the struggle with spirit, and finally won the position and overpowered their opponents. Then the foot also came to close quarters.

[29.] It was surely a peculiar and surprising battle to witness, and scarcely less so to hear described. A battle, to begin with, in which three distinct armies were engaged, must have presented a strange and unusual appearance, and must have been fought under strange and unusual conditions. Again, it must have seemed to a spectator open to question, whether the position of the Gauls were the most dangerous conceivable, from being between two attacking forces; or the most favourable, as enabling them to meet both armies at once, while their own two divisions afforded each other a mutual support: and, above all, as putting retreat out of the question, or any hope of safety except in victory. For this is the peculiar advantage of having an army facing in two opposite directions. The Romans, on the other hand, while encouraged by having got their enemy between two of their own armies, were at the same time dismayed by the ornaments and clamour of the Celtic host. For there were among them such innumerable horns and trumpets, which were being blown simultaneously in all parts of their army, and their cries were so loud and piercing, that the noise seemed not to come merely from trumpets and human voices, but from the whole country-side at once. Not less terrifying was the appearance and rapid movement of the naked warriors in the van, which indicated men in the prime of their strength and beauty: while all the warriors in the front ranks were richly adorned with gold necklaces and bracelets. These sights certainly dismayed the Romans; still the hope they gave of a profitable victory redoubled their eagerness for the battle.

[30.] When the men who were armed with the pilum advanced in front of the legions, in accordance with the regular method of Roman warfare, The infantry engage. and hurled their pila in rapid and effective volleys, the inner ranks of the Celts found their jerkins and leather breeches of great service; but to the naked men in the front ranks this unexpected mode of attack caused great distress and discomfiture. For the Gallic shields not being big enough to cover the man, the larger the naked body the more certainty was there of the pilum hitting. And at last, not being able to retaliate, because the pilum-throwers were out of reach, and their weapons kept pouring in, some of them, in the extremity of their distress and helplessness, threw themselves with desperate courage and reckless violence upon the enemy, and thus met a voluntary death; while others gave ground step by step towards their own friends, whom they threw into confusion by this manifest acknowledgment of their panic. Thus the courage of the Gaesatae had broken down before the preliminary attack of the pilum. But when the throwers of it had rejoined their ranks, and the whole Roman line charged, the Insubres, Boii, and Taurisci received the attack, and maintained a desperate hand-to-hand fight. Though almost cut to pieces, they held their ground with unabated courage, in spite of the fact that man for man, as well as collectively, they were inferior to the Romans in point of arms. The shields and swords of the latter were proved to be manifestly superior for defence and attack, for the Gallic sword can only deliver a cut, but cannot thrust. And when, besides, the Roman horse charged down from the high ground on their flank, and attacked them vigorously, the infantry of the Celts were cut to pieces on the field, while their horse turned and fled.

[31.] Forty thousand of them were slain, and quite ten thousand taken prisoners, among whom was one of their kings, Aemilius returns home.Concolitanus: the other king, Aneroestes, fled with a few followers; joined a few of his people in escaping to a place of security; and there put an end to his own life and that of his friends. Lucius Aemilius, the surviving Consul, collected the spoils of the slain and sent them to Rome, and restored the property taken by the Gauls to its owners. Then taking command of the legions, he marched along the frontier of Liguria, and made a raid upon the territory of the Boii; and having satisfied the desires of the legions with plunder, returned with his forces to Rome in a few days’ march. There he adorned the Capitol with the captured standards and necklaces, which are gold chains worn by the Gauls round their necks; but the rest of the spoils, and the captives, he converted to the benefit of his own estate and to the adornment of his triumph.