THE BATTLE OF THE SWASH
AND
THE CAPTURE OF CANADA.
BY
SAMUEL BARTON.
NEW YORK:
CHARLES T. DILLINGHAM,
718 AND 720 BROADWAY.
Copyright, 1888
by
Samuel Barton
[All Rights Reserved]
DEDICATION
To the Senators and ex-Senators, Members and ex-Members,
of past and present Congresses of the United States
of America, who, by their stupid and criminal
neglect to adopt ordinary defensive
precautions, or to encourage
the reconstruction of
THE AMERICAN MERCHANT MARINE,
have rendered all American seaport towns liable to such
an attack as is herein but faintly and imperfectly
described, this historical forecast is
dedicated; with much indignation and
contempt, and little or no
respect, by
THE AUTHOR.
CONTENTS
Chapter
I. [The United States Prior to 1890]
II. [Secretary Whitney's Efforts to Rebuild the Navy]
III. [Canada and the United States]
IV. [Retaliation]
VI. [The British Fleet Arrives off Sandy Hook]
VII. [The Battle of the Swash]
VIII. [The Return of the Fleet]
XI. [The Armistice and Treaty of Peace]
XII. [Conclusion]
INTRODUCTION.
The only apology which I offer for this authentic account of an event which (having occurred more than forty years ago), can scarcely be supposed to possess much interest for the reader of to-day, is, that having been a participant in the battle myself, I feel a sort of pride in having an accurate and complete account of it handed down to posterity.
In my humble judgment no such account has ever yet appeared; and although I am but indifferently equipped for the task—having dabbled but slightly in literature, during my busy life of three score and ten years,—yet I trust that my earnest desire to relate the facts just as they occurred—and which I propose to do, without fear or favor—will atone for any shortcomings from a purely literary point of view. Although I have said that no accurate and complete narrative of this occurrence has ever been published, the reader must not therefore assume that there exist no published accounts of it whatever. On the contrary, it has been described more or less at length, by so many different writers, both in transitory and permanent form, that my chief embarrassment arises rather from a superabundance than from a paucity of materials.
In the library of the N.Y. Historical Society are to be found no less than ninety-seven books and pamphlets giving what purport to be "full, true and particular" accounts of the attack upon New York by the British fleet in the year 1890.
The titles of some of these contributions to contemporaneous history are decidedly amusing and suggestive of the sensational spirit which was such a marked characteristic of the general literature, and especially of the newspaper press of that period.
For instance, we have among them, "The New Armada;" "The British Blackmailer;" "Modern Piracy;" "The Doom of the Iron Clads;" "The Disappearance of the British flag from North America;" and one, more pretentious than the rest, is entitled "An inquiry into the causes which led to the acquisition of Canada by the United States of America."
In addition to these numerous books and pamphlets, the newspapers of the period contained page after page of the most vivid and sensational accounts, in which truth and falsehood, and sense and absurdity, are so evidently mingled, that no conscientious historian would be willing to utilize them as reliable authorities. Nevertheless, a perusal of them even at this late day, may be found interesting to many of my readers, and as they are kept on file in most of the leading city libraries, they are within easy reach of all.
The reader of to-day will be vastly amused in looking over these old journals, at the evidences to be found on every page, and in almost every column, of intense and bitter rivalry and jealousy between their several editors and proprietors. Indeed the journalistic world at that period seems to have been suffering from an absolute epidemic of sensationalism, which extended not only to the reading matter, but to the "make up" as well; and in addition to the prurient details of social scandals, divorce proceedings, and horrible crimes, the reader's attention was sought to be attracted by glaring and suggestive head lines, such as would be tolerated in no respectable metropolitan journal of the present day. As an evidence of how our tastes are influenced by our surroundings, I may here state, that while I am now shocked at the total lack of good taste and the superabundance of sensational vulgarity displayed by most of the newspapers of that day, yet I cannot remember that I regarded them with any such feelings at that time, although I was a man, and certainly is competent a judge of propriety then, as I am now. But this is to be a history, not a moral treatise.
With such a mass of material at my command, it will be apparent that it has been no slight task to sift out the grain from the chaff, and to condense the vast accumulation of authorities into a comparatively brief volume like this.
I am fully aware that there are many defects in it, both of omission and commission; but of one thing the reader may rest assured.
I have at least been conscientious in my efforts to get at the exact truth, and to correct numerous errors which previous historians have made, either through carelessness, prejudice, or willfulness.
With this brief introduction, and with extreme diffidence, I submit my work to the consideration of the candid, unprejudiced, and I trust, kindly disposed reader.
SAM'L BARTON.
NEW YORK, October, 1930.
THE BATTLE OF THE SWASH
AND
CAPTURE OF CANADA.
CHAPTER I.
THE UNITED STATES PRIOR TO 1890.
Before entering upon a detailed account of what naval experts of all nationalities have conceded to be the most interesting and important naval event of that remarkable century (the nineteenth), whose later years many of my older readers can doubtless remember, I will endeavor to present in as brief and concise a manner as possible, a summary of the events which preceded it, and the causes which led up to it; as without such an explanation the story of the battle itself would possess little or no historical value.
The first thing which it is necessary for me to explain, is my reason for choosing the title "The Battle of the Swash."
I am not aware that this title has ever been used before, but if the reader will consult a chart of the Harbor of New York, he will at once see the propriety of it.
It will be seen that what is known among pilots as the "Swash," is a straight channel, forming a sort of a hypotenuse to the two sides of the main ship channel, which bends almost at a right angle at the Southwest spit.
Assuming, therefore, that the Narrows is effectually blockaded with torpedoes or other obstructions, and that an attacking fleet desired to bombard New York at long range, and at the same time be in a position to withdraw easily and quickly in case of repulse or accident, the Swash Channel is the point which would naturally be chosen. The British Admiral was undoubtedly familiar with the upper and lower Bays of New York, and therefore it is not at all strange that he selected this spot as a base of his operations against the city.
Here he anchored his fleet; and here the battle—such as it was—was fought. I therefore claim that the title which I have chosen, is a most appropriate one; and if this little work is to possess any value as a historical authority, the remarkable contest herein recorded, will be known to future generations as "The Battle of the Swash."
Having thus "made my title clear," I will endeavor to summarize briefly the events, which either directly or remotely, contributed to the final catastrophe, and induced Canada to declare war against the United States.
And here at the very outset of my task, I am confronted with greater difficulties than at any other portion of it.
Our ancestors of the Nineteenth Century were so constantly occupied in making history, that they seemed to have little or no time to record it; and therefore there will probably never be any adequate historical record of the settlement, improvement and development of the vast continent of North America. I regard this as in a measure a calamity to the whole human race; for I think that history may be searched in vain for any such grand and marvelous example of progress and development, as that exhibited by our ancestors of the last century.
In consequence of this dearth of detailed information, I have been obliged to rely upon such data as could be collected from the files of newspapers, magazines and similar publications, for the following meagre sketch of the industrial and political condition of the United States previous to the year 1890.
What has been called the "War of the Rebellion" occurred in the years 1861-5 inclusive; and was an attempt by the southern slave holding States, to secede from the Union, and establish a separate confederacy, based upon Free Trade and Human Slavery. Although the rights of the slaveholders were fully acknowledged by the law of the land, yet the growth of the sentiment in favor of abolition of slavery was so rapid throughout the Northern States, that the Southerners became alarmed lest their property rights should be ignored and denied; and after several years of defiant wrangling and threatening, at length formally seceded from the Union, and by the attack on Fort Sumter—a fort in Charleston Harbor—inaugurated the long and bloody conflict which finally resulted in the total abolition of slavery, and the restoration of the authority of the United States Government, in all portions of United States territory.
Previous to this war, the United States occupied a front rank among the maritime powers of the world.
The "American Clipper Ships" (vessels propelled entirely by sail power; which for purposes of ocean navigation is now practically obsolete) were considered the perfection of marine architecture, and bore the stars and stripes proudly and triumphantly upon every sea.
Over 2000 establishments were engaged in the shipbuilding industry, giving employment to over 20,000 skilled laborers, whose wages amounted to more than $12,000,000 annually; and who built from $30,000,000 to $40,000,000 worth of vessels each year.
During the ten years immediately preceding the "War of the Rebellion," 67 per cent. of the vessels entering the ports of the United States, carried the American flag; as against 33 per cent. carrying foreign flags.
In 1887 only about 15 per cent. were American, as against 85 per cent. foreign.
Several causes had conspired to bring about this vast and disastrous decline in American ownership.
The first, and most effective of these, unquestionably grew out of the almost unconcealed and anxious efforts of England, to prevent the Northern States from bringing the war to a successful issue, and thus assuring the restoration of the Union.
The cause of this animus on the part of England, was, as is always the case, where any of her interests are involved, a purely and intensely selfish one.
The Northern, and especially the New England States, were mercantile and manufacturing States, and had become formidable rivals to England in the two great interests in which the latter power had hitherto deemed herself unapproachable. The American shipowner outsailed and underbid his English competitor in all parts of the world; and the American manufacturer, by improved methods and ingenious mechanical appliances, had begun to successfully compete with his English rival, not only in American markets, but in foreign ones as well; and Englishmen viewed with unconcealed dismay, the imminent prospect of having their immense carrying trade as well as their enormous manufacturing interests, ruined by the competition of their enterprising and ingenious American rivals.
Indeed, so marked had this development been, that an eminent French writer, De Tocqueville, in a book called "Democracy in America," written nearly twenty years previous to the outbreak of the "War of the Rebellion," in a chapter entitled "Some considerations on the causes of the Commercial prosperity of the United States," wrote as follows:
"The inhabitants of the United States constitute a great civilized people, which fortune has placed in the midst of an uncultivated country, at a distance of three thousand miles from the central point of civilization. America consequently stands in daily need of Europe. The Americans will, no doubt, ultimately succeed in producing or manufacturing at home, most of the articles which they require; but the two continents can never be independent of each other, so numerous are the natural ties between their wants, their ideas, their habits, and their manners. The Union has peculiar commodities which have now become necessary to us, as they cannot be cultivated, or can be raised only at an enormous expense, upon the soil of Europe. The Americans consume only a small portion of this produce, and they are willing to sell us the rest. Europe is therefore the market of America, as America is the market of Europe; and maritime commerce is no less necessary to enable the inhabitants of the United States to transport their raw materials to the ports of Europe, than it is to enable us to supply them with our manufactured produce.
"The United States must therefore either furnish much business to other maritime nations, even if they should themselves renounce commerce, as the Spaniards of Mexico have hitherto done, or they must become one of the first maritime powers of the globe.
"The Anglo-Americans have always displayed a decided taste for the sea. The Declaration of Independence by breaking the commercial bonds which united them to England, gave a fresh and powerful stimulus to their maritime genius. Ever since that time, the shipping of the Union has increased almost as rapidly as the number of its inhabitants. The Americans themselves now transport to their own shores nine-tenths of the European produce which they consume. And they also bring three-quarters of the exports of the New World to the European consumer. The ships of the United States fill the docks of Havre and of Liverpool, whilst the number of English and French vessels at New York is comparatively small. Thus, not only does the American merchant brave competition on his own ground, but even successfully supports that of foreign nations in their own ports. This is readily explained by the fact, that the vessels of the United States cross the seas at a cheaper rate....
"It is difficult to say for what reason the Americans can navigate at a lower rate than other nations; one is at first led to attribute this superiority to the physical advantages which nature gives them; but it is not so.
"The American vessels cost almost as much to build as our own; they are not better built, and they generally last a shorter time. The pay of the American sailor is more considerable than the pay on board European ships, which is proved by the great number of Europeans who are to be found in the merchant vessels of the United States. How happens it then, that the Americans sail their vessels at a cheaper rate than we can ours? I am of opinion that the true cause of their superiority must not be sought for in physical advantages, but that it is wholly attributable to moral and intellectual qualities....
"The European sailor navigates with prudence; he sets sail only when the weather is favorable; if an unforeseen accident befals him, he puts into port; at night, he furls a portion of his canvass; and when the whitening billows intimate the vicinity of land, he checks his course, and takes an observation of the Sun.
"The American neglects these precautions and braves these dangers. He weighs anchor before the tempest is over; by night and by day he spreads his sheets to the wind; he repairs as he goes along, such damage as his vessel may have sustained from the storm; and when he at last approaches the term of his voyage, he darts onward to the shore as if he already descried a port.
"The Americans are often shipwrecked, but no trader crosses the seas so rapidly. And, as they perform the same distance in shorter time, they can perform it at a cheaper rate.....
"I cannot better explain my meaning, than by saying that the Americans show a sort of heroism in their manner of trading. The European merchant will always find it difficult to imitate his American competitor who, in adopting the system which I have just described, does not follow calculation, but an impulse of his nature.....
"Reason and experience prove that no commercial prosperity can be durable if it cannot be united, in case of need, to naval force. This truth is as well understood in the United States as anywhere else; the Americans are already able to make their flag respected; in a few years they will make it feared.....
"Nations, as well as men, almost always betray the prominent features of their future destiny in their earliest years. When I contemplate the ardor with which the Anglo-Americans prosecute commerce, the advantages which aid them, and the success of their undertakings, I cannot help believing that they will one day become the first maritime power of the globe. They are born to rule the seas, as the Romans were to conquer the world."[*]
[*] "Democracy in America," by Alexis de Tocqueville. Translated by Henry Reeve, Esquire. Edited with notes by Prof. Francis Owen, of Harvard University, Cambridge, 1863, Vol. 1, p. 648 to 552.
To a reader of the present day, these words, albeit they were written nearly a hundred years ago, seem to have been almost inspired by superhuman wisdom, so accurately do they describe the present position of the United States as a maritime power; but if any American could have read them about the time of the "Battle of the Swash," they would have seemed either to convey the severest sarcasm of which human speech is capable, or else to have been the wild and unmeaning utterances of drivelling idiocy. For at this time, thanks to English privateers, and American stupidity and indifference, the American flag had practically disappeared from the ocean.
As has been already mentioned, English shipowners and manufacturers were suffering severely from American competition; they therefore hailed the possible or probable dismemberment of the American Union with delight, and immediately upon the outbreak of the "War of the Rebellion," determined to aid the seceding States in every possible way. These States were exclusively agricultural communities, raising most of the cotton which formed such an important portion of the raw material required by English factories. Like all partially developed agricultural communities, they had no capital to invest in vessels or factories; and in case they secured their independence, they were pledged to Free Trade, and would thus offer a vast and profitable carrying trade to English ships; and a vast and profitable market for English goods. The temptation was a great one; too great in fact to be resisted; and a short time after the commencement of the war, a number of so-called "Confederate cruisers," which had been built and fitted out in English ports with English money, were scouring the ocean, capturing and destroying American merchant vessels wherever they could find them, and compelling the transfer of such as were not destroyed, to the protection of some neutral flag. As our ancestors were at that time engaged in a life and death struggle to maintain their national existence, they could only protest against this selfish and unfriendly action of England; but the guilt of the latter power was practically conceded at an arbitration conference held at Geneva several years later, at which the sum of $15,000,000 was awarded as damages to be paid by England for the depredations committed by these piratical cruisers upon American commerce. The mischief, however, was done; our ocean commerce had been ruined; and England could well have afforded to pay $15,000,000 annually for having thus paralyzed her great maritime rival.
Concurrently with this wiping out of our shipping by English cruisers, iron and steel began to be used as a substitute for wood in ship building; and by the time that the rebellion had been finally crushed, our shipbuilders found themselves utterly unable to compete with those of Great Britain on account of the greater cost of materials and wages here, as well as the absence of machinery and appliances for building iron and steel vessels. Gold remained at a premium for several years after the conclusion of the war; and this, together with the tariff on imported materials required in ship building, rendered competition with foreign builders absolutely impossible. To make matters worse, all the principal maritime nations of Europe inaugurated a system of subsidies or bounties, which stimulated shipbuilding enormously, and increased the supply of vessels so rapidly, that carrying rates fell to figures, with which unsubsidized vessels could not possibly compete. England, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Holland, and finally Spain, went into the subsidy business; and the latter power actually subsidized lines of steamers to the extent of over $1,000,000 per annum, to run along our whole Atlantic and Pacific Coasts, trading between Mexico and Central America on the south, and Canada and British Columbia on the north, and stopping at all important American ports on their respective routes.
The only demand for American built vessels was for the coasting trade; but this demand was sufficient to induce the establishment of several large iron shipyards, most of which were located on the Delaware River, at or near Philadelphia, Chester, and Wilmington.
Thus was inaugurated that interest which has since attained such enormous proportions, as to give to the Delaware River the sobriquet of "The American Clyde."
The vessels built at these yards, even in those early days, proved conclusively that American shipbuilders were still the best in the world, and then as now, American coastwise steamships were conceded to be the finest and fleetest and best vessels of their class afloat. The absolute refusal of Congress to offer any subsidy, or even to offer decent compensation to American vessels for carrying the mails to foreign countries, effectually prevented the building of any ships suitable for that trade; and while England and France and Germany and Spain were building swift merchant steamers on plans approved by their naval departments, and paying them liberal annual subsidies for the privilege of chartering or purchasing them at a fixed price, at any time, and converting them into aimed cruisers; thus providing themselves at a comparatively trifling cost with a most formidable and efficient auxiliary naval force; the Congress of the United States, with an apathy or indifference which seems utterly unaccountable at the present time, absolutely refused to do anything to encourage the rebuilding of the American Merchant Marine.
That such a suicidal policy should have been persisted in for more than twenty years after the close of the war, at a time when the annual receipts of the Treasury were over $100,000,000 in excess of the government requirements, and when the extraordinary spectacle was presented day after day, of senators and members of Congress, wrangling and arguing over the question of "how to dispose of the surplus," seems absolutely incredible; and yet, a perusal of the files of the newspapers published during this period, (say from 1875 to 1888) will satisfy the most skeptical reader that it is strictly true. For the convenience and satisfaction of such of my readers as may not be able easily to refer to these files, I reproduce a few articles and communications from some of the journals of that period.
SUBSIDIES TO BRITISH STEAMSHIPS—ARRANGEMENTS
WITH THE WHITE STAR AND CUNARD LINES.
From the New York Journal of Commerce, March 31, 1887.
"A Liverpool cablegram received yesterday says: 'At the meeting of the stockholders of the Cunard Steamship Company to-day the chairman announced that the Government had granted the company an annual subvention of $85,000 for a period of five years for the 'carrying of the mails.'
"Details of the agreement entered into between the British Admiralty and the owners of the White Star and Cunard companies, by which certain of their vessels are placed at the disposal of the Government on specified terms, are contained in a late parliamentary paper. The White Star Line agrees to hold at the disposition of the Government for purchase or hire, at the option of the Admiralty, to be exercised from time to time during the continuance of the agreement, the following vessels: Britannic, value £130,000; Germanic, £100,000; Adriatic, £100,000; Celtic, £100,000. In the event of purchase the foregoing prices were to be held as the values of the vessels on January 1, 1887, plus 10 per cent. for compulsory sale, less an abatement of 6 per cent. per annum on the depreciated annual value for the period that might elapse between January 1, 1887, and the date of purchase by the Government. In the event of charter by the Admiralty the rate of hire of the before-mentioned vessels was fixed at the rate of 20s. per gross registered ton per month, the owner providing the crew, or at the rate of 15s. per gross registered ton per month, the Admiralty finding the crew, all risks of capture and of hostilities being assumed by the Admiralty. The company has determined to build one or two vessels of high speed and of such a type and speed as will render them specially suitable for service as armed cruisers, and in accordance with the plans and specifications submitted and approved by the Admiralty. In consideration of this the Admiralty will have to pay to the company an annual subvention at the rate of 15s. per gross registered ton per annum. On February 8, the Admiralty accepted similar proposals made by the Cunard Line in respect to the following vessels: Etruria, value £310,000; Umbria, £301,000; Aurunia, £240,000; Servia, £193,000; Gallia, £102,000—a subvention of 15s. per gross registered ton per annum, to be paid to the company on account of the Etruria, Umbria and Aurania during the continuance of the postal contract, and in the event of the termination of that contract before these three vessels received five years' payment, the company to be entitled to receive for the balance a subvention at the rate of 20s., the five vessels being still held at the disposition of the Government. In the event of the Cunard Company building new vessels for the mail service, they will submit the plans to the Admiralty for approval.
"The subvention will amount to about £6,500 for each of the new vessels of the White Star Line, so long as they carry the mails, or £8,500 should the mails be withdrawn. The annual charge for the retention of the Cunarders Etruria, Umbria and Aurania is stated at £5,400 each.
The Admiralty announce that they are ready to make the same arrangement as with the White Star Company for the first ten steamers that may be offered by any of the British steamship companies."
The following letter from Admiral D. D. Porter shows conclusively the feeling which must have existed in Naval circles upon the subject of the revival of the American Merchant Marine. The letter was addressed to a Mr. Aaron Vanderbilt, representing the American Shipping and Industrial League and was published in the New York World and other journals, some time during the year 1888.
DEAR SIR: I received your letter and pamphlet this morning in relation to American shipping. It is a matter in which I am greatly interested. I only wish I really had some influence in this country to help forward measures for the advancement of our mercantile marine, without which we can never be a great naval power. I have written a great deal on the subject and the files of the Senate have now many letters of mine in favor of granting subsidies to ocean steamships, in order to open lines wherever they could be run to advantage. Indeed, I have been so persistent in this matter ever since the close of the civil war that I ran the risk of being considered queer—for that is the term people apply nowadays to men of progressive ideas, whose opinions come in conflict with those of persons who are altogether guided by local prejudices.
I have written a good deal for the American Protectionist on the subject, also a long article for the Chicago Inter Ocean, covering one side of the paper, which had an extensive circulation in the West. I wrote so much that I was afraid I might come under the head of "penny-a-liner," but all to no purpose, as the cause didn't seem to advance an inch.
This country is a young giant, full of resources, overflowing with wealth, and the people themselves full of progressive ideas, yet you see how difficult it is to get anything done even for the defense of our coast and great cities.
With all our wealth and enterprise we are, owing to the force of circumstances over which our people seem to have no control, Bourbons up to the hub, learning nothing and forgetting nothing.
The nation that can put the most ships and the best ships on the sea will be the one that can set the world at defiance. No nation can put its commerce on its bottom again, after it has been broken up as ours has been, without subsidies, which are considered by some people as opposed to our institutions, although I myself cannot see it: but subsidies to steamships that must carry our products over the world and bring back other products in return must help every industry in the country. Every State in the Union is interested in having our commerce re-established, no matter at what cost. Think what an impetus the establishment of great lines of steamships would give to our iron and steel interests. How many thousands of mechanics who are now out of employment would again enjoy ample compensation for their labor. What rejoicings there would be throughout the land at such an event. How the cotton and hemp manufactories would be crowded with workers. Think how many million yards of canvas would be spread upon the ocean.
The great British steam lines which are running to and from our ports so frequently, bring their coal from England and take little back from this country. Think of the coal-mines that would be worked to supply our great ocean steam lines should we ever establish such as are necessary to the country. Sit down and reckon the different industries that would be benefited by the establishment of great steamship lines, and you will be surprised at the amount that would be thrown into the hands of the laboring people of this country.
What is the object of a government if it is not to build up the industries of a country, as opposed to those of other countries? A republican government should be the best in the world. Its legislators should advance all its industries. It should be more paternal in its organizations than any other, for those who are elected to office are put there by the people to promote their interests. We have gone on for the past twenty-five years, showing no more ability to cope with the matters to which I have referred than the minor republics of South America, which scarcely hold any place in the estimation of the world. Instead of being a government for the people, ours seems to be a government made for the advantage of a select clique.
I almost despair, although not naturally of a despairing nature. I thought when our civil war was over and there was no longer a question which could seriously divide the country, that we would put our household in order and unite to become the great nation of the world, which we are fully capable of doing; but, with thousands of others who helped to fight for the country and put it on its legs again, I have been wofully disappointed, particularly in the decadence of that ocean commerce which was once second only to Great Britain.
Even Spain, that has been for years behind all other nations, and for more than sixty years has been considered the most effete government in Europe—Bourbon all over—has now taken the lead of us, has voted millions in a lump to build up her navy, and is about to establish those very steam lines which should have been American. If this country does not take proper steps to resurrect our commerce and place a number of steamship lines on a footing with those of European countries, foreigners may well say that the resources of the country have been developed faster than the education of the people has progressed, and that the Americans are not sufficiently advanced in intelligence to understand that no nation can be a first-class power that allows another to do its carrying. For my part, I expect to step out soon without witnessing the fulfilment of any of my cherished ideas. As for the "naval reserve" they are talking about at present, it ought to have been established in the days of the Revolution.
Every steamship that we build for ocean service should be able to carry guns, and the Government should condemn her for national use whenever it is considered necessary—in fact, exercise greater power over the mercantile marine than over the militia. An organization of this kind, however, can only be established by stringent acts of Congress, without which no action of the Secretary of the Navy or a board of officers would enable the Government to use merchant vessels.
Nothing, however, in this direction can be done the present session, and we can only hope that a more enlightened feeling in regard to these matters will be shown in the future than has prevailed in the past.
The people who make this outcry against "subsidies" apparently do not reflect that no nation in the world has gone so far in this direction as the United States. For instance, the grants to the great railroads which connect the Atlantic with the Pacific, by which millions of dollars and millions upon millions of the public lands were given, enough to have built up our mercantile marine and navy twenty times over; yet few people have objected to these donations on the part of the Government, as it was felt to be the only means by which we could open the country for settlement and obtain control of the great commerce of the East.
That was the great cry at the time, but unfortunately we only half did the work we started to accomplish, and failed to continue the road to China by not appropriating money to put upon the Pacific a sufficient number of steamships to entirely control the China trade, and give us a large number of fast and powerful vessels that could, when necessary, be transformed into heavily armed men-of-war for the protection of our northwest coast.
At the present time a single powerful vessel of an enemy could devastate the whole of that coast. I remain, very truly yours, DAVID D. POUTER, Admiral.
In a letter to the New York Tribune, published in May, 1887, Mr. H. K. Thurber, Pres't of the N. Y. & Brazil S. S. Co., among other strong language, used the following:
"'Trade is following the flag' with a vengeance. The policy that mails on the ocean should not be paid a much higher rate than 'inanimate freight' is bringing its fruits home to us in a very unpleasant manner. The direct contrary policy of England, France, Germany, Spain and Italy is driving the stars and stripes from the Ocean. Will Americans sit tamely by and see this insane policy continued?"
The following letter addressed to this same Mr. Thurber, and, (curiously enough) signed by a person bearing the same name as the author of this book, (probably a member of the same family) was also published in several newspapers about this time.
NEW YORK, Sept. 16, 1887.
H. K. Thurber, Esq., President U. S. & B. S. S. Co.:
DEAR SIR: I am in receipt of your pamphlet, and I beg to say that in my humble judgment it is entirely unanswerable, and that the mere statement of facts which it contains should bring the blush of shame to every American cheek.
Indeed, if we were not living witnesses and victims of it, it would be utterly beyond belief that such a stupid and vicious system as that under which our mercantile marine is being absolutely strangled "in the house of its friends" could prevail in any country having the slightest pretensions to intelligence or enterprise; and it is certainly not too much to say that if our present laws had been framed by our worst national enemies or our bitterest commercial rivals, they could not be more effectual in paralyzing our foreign commerce and rendering us as nearly as possible a cipher among the nations of the earth.
Two years ago I was obliged to give up active business on account of ill health, and since that time I have traveled quite extensively in Europe, and the most striking fact which confronted me at every turn, was the enormous increase and development of foreign trade among nations which we have hitherto regarded as only second or third rate commercial powers. This remarkable development, in which France and Germany took the lead, has extended to other countries, and Italy, Spain and even little Belgium, are rapidly coming to the front as great maritime nations. Upon inquiring into the causes of this remarkable increase of commercial activity, I found that it was entirely due to the policy of "protection by bounty" or subsidy. Moreover, it has been made principally at the expense of the United States of America.
England has of course suffered to some extent also: but I think it is entirely within bounds to assume that at least 75 per cent. of the foreign traffic secured by these enterprising Europeans within the last fifteen or twenty years, is traffic which rightfully belongs to us, and which we should have had, if our law-makers had exhibited the slightest desire to foster our commercial interests. Walking along the magnificent wharves of Antwerp, I saw steamer after steamer loading and unloading for and from ports in South America, whose trade by every natural law should come to us. It was the same at Southampton and Liverpool and Havre, and even away down in Naples there were evidences on every hand of how we Americans are being robbed of what may be justly considered our birthright; that is, South American, West Indian, and even Mexican trade. The intense and monumental stupidity which permits this process to continue, is doubtless amusing to those who profit by it, but it is death to us as a maritime nation.
It seems inconceivable that with an overflowing Treasury, and with exports of over $700,000,000 per annum, our shipping interest should be thus wiped out of existence merely because a lot of idiots have inherited a political superstition which invariably throws them into spasms of indignant protest whenever the word "subsidy" is mentioned. This inherited superstition is practically all there is behind the opposition to a fair and reasonable system of protection and encouragement to our shipping interest.
Of what use are arguments in the face of patent and notorious facts? Our commerce was swept from the ocean during our civil war. Its place has been usurped by subsidized vessels of other countries. Against these vessels unsubsidized ones cannot compete successfully. This is the whole question in a nutshell.
Shall we, by a judicious system of paying a fair price for American mail service, restore our foreign commerce, and take once more the front rank among maritime nations? Or shall we continue to yield to the paralyzing influence of a mere word, which only represents an idiotic and threadbare superstition; and turn our whole enormous export trade over to our foreign competitors, who, while ridiculing our stupidity, gladly take advantage of it, and pocket the profits which we thus thrust upon them? Public sentiment is gradually changing on this great subject; and the demand for reasonable and sensible legislation in the interest of American shipowners will soon make itself heard with no uncertain sound. Meanwhile, the fact that practical and intelligent business men are taking part in the public discussion of it, is one of the most encouraging signs of the times.
I remain, yours very truly,
SAM BARTON.
It is scarcely necessary for me to say that the foregoing letter expresses what my sentiments would have been at that time, quite as fully and as well, as I could, if I had written it myself.
Not only had our merchant marine thus been permitted to be wiped out of existence, but our navy had also become worn out and decayed, and our antiquated coast fortifications were the laughing stock of military and naval experts all over the world.
Concerning the deplorable condition of the United States Navy, Secretary Whitney, in his annual report for 1885, said, "At the present moment it must be conceded that we have nothing which deserves to be called a navy. It is questionable whether we have a single naval vessel finished and afloat at the present time, that could be trusted to encounter the ships of any important power—a single vessel that has either the armor for protection, speed for escape, or weapons for defense."
This was a notorious fact, as was also the defenseless condition of our seaboard cities.
Mr. Samuel J. Tilden—who was the democratic candidate for President of the United States in 1876, and who was believed by many to have been elected, notwithstanding the decision of the electoral commission in favor of Mr. Hayes—had in a public letter, made a very strong appeal for the utilization of the so-called surplus revenues in fortifying our coasts.
Admiral Porter in his report for the year 1887, also made the following astounding statement in this connection:
"Two heavy iron-clads could commence at the eastern-most point, and proceed along the coast to Texas, laying every city under contribution. In time of war, the torpedo system will be useless for defense in the absence of proper fortifications and guns. For the event of war we are no more prepared than we were a year ago; although we have made a beginning to repair simply the waste in our navy for the past twenty-five years."
A writer in the North American Review of July, 1888, had also called attention to the utterly defenseless condition of our seaports, and showed that a hostile fleet anchored in New York Harbor, could destroy property valued at $1,500,000,000 in New York, $600,000,000 in Brooklyn, and $100,000,000 in Jersey City. The only alternative to such a bombardment would be the payment of a ransom, whose amount would of course bear some relation to the immense amount of property involved.
The New York Herald had also, during the summer of 1887, published a series of sensational articles, showing the enormous amounts of property thus exposed on our Atlantic, Pacific and Gulf coasts. It will thus be seen that our ancestors had not even the excuse of ignorance, in permitting such a state of affairs to continue. The question had been the subject of frequent conferences and investigations; and committees and sub-committees had reported upon it, times without number. The fortification board had estimated the cost of a complete system of coast defences, including armored turrets and casemates, barbette and mortar batteries, rifled guns, torpedoes, torpedo boats and floating batteries, at $126,377,800; and bills had been introduced looking to the gradual expenditure of that amount of money, such expenditure to cover a period of ten years. But all such propositions were met by the "economical" statesmen of that day, with howls of indignant protest; and were characterized as attempts to steal and squander the proceeds of an excessive and burdensome system of taxation, which was levied for the sole benefit of a privileged class of manufacturers, monopolists and capitalists. Thus these backwoods statesmen, nine-tenths of whom would probably have failed, if they had attempted to carry on any business more extensive than the keeping of a peanut stand, assumed to be the judges of what was the best economy for a nation of over 60,000,000 of people, and exemplified their ideas of economy by rolling up an annual pension list of about $150,000,000; spending $30,000,000 or $40,000,000 in so-called river and harbor improvements and public buildings in different parts of the country; and absolutely throwing away $20,000,000 or $30,000,000 in paying exorbitant premiums for the privilege of cancelling a debt not yet due. And thus it had come to pass, that in the year of grace, 1886, the United States of America, with a population of more than 60,000,000, with a coast line whose length was more than double that of any other country, with an annual available revenue of more than $100,000,000, notwithstanding that its system of taxation was lighter and less burdensome than that of any other nation, and its laboring classes better paid, better housed, better clothed, better fed, and better educated than any similar classes in any other portion of the world; and with an annual foreign commerce exceeding $1,600,000,000 in value, found itself practically without any merchant marine, and actually without a single war vessel with the "necessary armor for protection, speed for escape, or weapons for defense;" with its coasts and harbors entirely unprotected, and its seaports,—containing property aggregating more than $10,000,000,000 in value—utterly defenseless, and absolutely inviting attack from any nation which possessed a modern iron-clad, armed with two or more long range guns, capable of throwing a shell ten miles or so. This will doubtless seem an incredible statement to readers of the present day; and yet it is strictly true. Moreover, these rural solons, in their zeal for what they considered "economy," unsettled the industrial interests of the country by an acrimonious discussion of the tariff; and the most lightly taxed, prosperous, intelligent and wealthy community in the world was asked to believe that it was ground down and oppressed by an excessive and burdensome system of taxation; and "the surplus," "the surplus," "THE SURPLUS," was held over it constantly in terrorem, as a monster that was eating out the nation's vitals, and would soon involve it in financial ruin.
Meanwhile, new fortifications were recommended year after year, and the necessity for these was conceded by both political parties; but—they were not built.
Elaborate estimates for the establishment of gun foundries were made and favorably reported on; but—the foundries were not built. Huge appropriations for formidable armored battle ships were talked over and recommended; but—the armored battle ships were not built.
Bills looking to the re-establishment of our mercantile marine by the adoption of a similar system of encouragement to that in vogue among all modern maritime nations, were introduced, and debated on, and argued over; but—the bills were not passed, and our merchants were obliged to continue shipping their goods in foreign bottoms. And all this criminal failure to adopt ordinary defensive precautions, was justified on the ground of "economy." If history ever exhibited a striking instance of the folly of "saving at the spigot and wasting at the bung," our ancestors of the latter part of the nineteenth century may fairly claim pre-eminence as exhibitors in that line. But I must not anticipate.
CHAPTER II.
SECRETARY WHITNEY'S EFFORTS TO REBUILD THE NAVY.
Upon his accession to the Presidency in March, 1885, President Cleveland had appointed a Mr. William C. Whitney, a New York lawyer, secretary of the Navy; and although he had had no previous experience in naval matters, he seems to have been profoundly impressed with the necessity of rebuilding the Navy, and bringing it up to a standard more in consonance with modern methods, and more in keeping with the vast national interests which it might at any time be suddenly called upon to protect and defend. During his entire term of office, Secretary Whitney's reports and official communications were invariably couched in the most earnest and vigorous language; and bore the strongest possible testimony to the serious importance with which he regarded his position; and it is not too much to say that many of the features which at present cause the United States Navy to rank first among the navies of the world, grew out of suggestions and recommendations made by Secretary Whitney.
Like all reformers, however, his path was beset with many difficulties; and although he persisted bravely in the task he had set for himself, he encountered so many obstacles and discouragements, that his health became seriously impaired, and it was only at the earnest solicitation of the President, and leading members of his party, that he consented to serve his full term of four years. During President Cleveland's administration party feeling ran very high, and the Republicans, who had recently been ousted from power, after a continuous enjoyment of it for twenty-four years, seemed to look upon any effort to alter or increase or improve the Navy, as a reflection upon their previous management of the department. Consequently, Secretary Whitney found himself opposed and hampered at every turn; and his well-meant and intelligent efforts in the direction of reform, encountered the open or concealed opposition of Republican Senators and Congressmen; and as the Republicans still held control of the Senate by a narrow majority, but few of his recommendations were at first favorably acted upon. Thus does party prejudice at times outweigh patriotism; and thus the best interests of the country are often neglected or jeopardized in obedience to the behests of a political boss, or in deference to the supposed necessities of a partisan organization.
It is difficult at this late day, to conceive of such a state of affairs as this; but as a partial vindication of our ancestors against a charge of what might almost be called high treason, we must remember that the passions and prejudices which grew out of the "War of the Rebellion," still found a resting-place in the bosoms of most of the older inhabitants; and these extended to the political discussions of the day, rendering party feeling exceedingly bitter and vindictive.
In fact, what would at present be regarded as an absurd impossibility, was then an actual fact; and the two great political parties of the country, twenty years after the close of the Civil War, found themselves divided on precisely the same sectional lines, which had existed previous to and during that conflict; and the most casual reference to the journals of that date can scarcely fail to reveal one or more allusions to "The Solid South," as a political entity whose interests must have necessarily been antagonistic to the other portions of the Union.
The vast manufacturing and mineral interests of Alabama, Georgia and Tennessee, were then in their infancy; and the people of those States still hugged the delusion of free trade, as a sort of an inherited political superstition, in common with the other Southern States, whose interests were almost wholly Agricultural, and which have since found their proper and logical political affiliation with the Agricultural States of the West and Northwest.
During President Cleveland's term of office, the Senate, as has before been remarked, was Republican by a small majority. The House of Representatives, however, was Democratic; so that there was a practical deadlock on all party questions; and as nearly every question that arose became more or less of a party one, scarcely anything in the way of practical legislation was accomplished. In fact it would seem that about the only measures which could safely run the gauntlet of both houses, were bills of the nature of jobs to rob the treasury, which were passed by what were called (in the political slang of that day) "logrolling" methods.
For instance, if a river or harbor needed improvement, the member of Congress in whose district it was situated, looked around for other members who had one or more rivers or harbors similarly affected; and a number of these, combining together, would originate what was called a "river and harbor bill," in which each member's district was to have a good slice of the total appropriation. Then, if there were not votes enough to secure the passage of the bill, other members were drummed up, and were offered appropriations for creeks and harbors in their districts—the expenditure of which would of course be under the direction of their political friends—and thus, at every session of Congress, a gigantic appropriation bill, amounting frequently to $20,000,000 or $25,000,000 was passed; two thirds of which in all probability was sheer robbery. A similar system was pursued with reference to public buildings in different parts of the country; and the extraordinary spectacle was presented, of Senators and Representatives meeting in Washington, year after year, wrangling over these appropriations, and exhibiting their ignorance of the cardinal principles of political economy, in long-winded harangues about "the treasury surplus," while they permitted the United States Navy to go to decay, refused appropriations to fortify the harbors and coasts, and utterly failed to do anything to foster and encourage the re-establishment of the American Merchant Marine, whose value as a nursery or training school for the development of a naval force, had been so conclusively shown in the earlier days of the Republic.
At the time of Secretary Whitney's accession to office, the whole available naval force of the United States consisted of a few old wooden vessels, so rotten as to be scarcely seaworthy, three or four iron-hulled steam corvettes and frigates, of an antiquated and obsolete type, and a few vessels of the "Monitor," or revolving turret style (so called from the fact that the first vessel of this type was called the "Monitor").
These latter, however, were in an unfinished, rotten and rusty condition, having from motives of "economy" been permitted to lie and rot at their docks ever since the conclusion of the Civil War; and were therefore utterly useless for any sudden emergency; as several month's work would have been required to finish the unfinished ones, and repair the completed ones. It is true, that a commencement to rebuild the navy had been attempted during President Arthur's administration, and two modern cruisers, (the Boston and Chicago) and a despatch boat (the Dolphin) were approaching completion when Mr. Whitney became Secretary of the Navy. These vessels, however, were only partially successful; and when finished, were found to fall far below the requirements of the contracts; and it was only after a long series of tests, and many expensive alterations, that they could be rendered serviceable.
In spite of all obstacles, however, Secretary Whitney did make considerable progress in rebuilding the Navy. During the years 1887 and 1888, several new cruisers were added to its effective force, and the construction of two heavily armored battle ships was commenced. Numerous experiments were also made with torpedoes, and various submarine systems were tried with greater or less prospects of success.
A lieutenant in the army named Zalinski, had invented a pneumatic gun, which he claimed would safely throw a dynamite shell a distance of two miles; and a vessel was built expressly to carry guns of this kind. Discussion more or less heated, concerning the disgracefully unprotected condition of our seaboard cities, had been carried on in the newspapers, and at length, early in 1889, the city of New York (or rather a few of its more public-spirited citizens) organized a system of volunteer harbor defense militia.
The Legislature having been appealed to in vain, private subscriptions were started, and a fund was raised sufficient to charter one or two harbor tug boats, and to equip a marine battalion, mostly of longshoremen and stevedores, who were drilled in torpedo practice, electric light signaling, boarding, cable cutting, anchor tripping, night attacks, and various other plans for annoying or disabling supposed hostile ships in our harbor. This drilling and exercise were supervised and carried on under the direction of intelligent naval officers, detailed for that purpose by the Navy Department, and although the limited means at the disposal of the originators of this plan, prevented them from accomplishing any very important results, yet their efforts were instrumental in getting together a splendid body of men, who could be relied upon at any time, in case of a sudden emergency, to volunteer their services; and whose practical skill as a signal corps, and perfect knowledge of the harbor, would render their co-operation of the utmost value to the regular naval force in time of war.
This was in fact the origin of our present magnificent and complete "Harbor Defense Corps," which has so often challenged the admiration of foreign naval experts. Anybody who should at this time publicly advocate its abolition or its curtailment, on mere grounds of "economy," would be ridiculed as an idiot, or branded as a traitor; and yet the Legislature of New York refused even to grant its members exemption from jury duty, on account of the protest of a few intelligent and incorruptible(?) back country members.
Having thus given a general resumé of the condition and situation of the United States up to the years 1887 and 1888, I will in the next chapter endeavor to give a succinct and intelligible review of the events which had a more direct and immediate effect in causing the "Battle of the Swash."
CHAPTER III.
CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES.
It would be foreign to the purpose of this work, besides being a useless reviving of animosities and prejudices, now happily forgotten, were I to discuss the merits of the controversy between Canada and the United States; which from trifling and unimportant beginnings, gradually increased in bitterness and intensity, until it finally embroiled the two countries, and England as well, in war. The contest was long ago waged to its legitimate and final arbitrament; and its results have been acquiesced in by all the interested parties, and are a part of the history of the nineteenth century.
Nevertheless a brief sketch of the origin and progress of this controversy, seems essential to this narrative, as showing the motives which actuated Canada and England in their final action.
This sketch I will endeavor to make as brief as is consistent with a clear presentation of the subject-matter.
Long previous to the Revolutionary War, in which the American Colonies secured their independence from British domination, and founded the United States of America, the vast value of the fisheries on the George's and Grand Banks, and along the North American and Newfoundland coasts, had been fully demonstrated; and even as early as the sixteenth century, nearly all of the maritime nations of Europe sent fleets to catch the fish which were known to abound there.
The French and English, however, at length succeeded in obtaining exclusive possession of the privilege; although as late as 1783, Spain put forward a claim of the right to participate in it.
This claim was, however, not pressed. Previous to the successful revolt of the American Colonists in 1770, several wars had occurred between England and France, the final result of which had been to expel the French from Canada, and to secure to England a practical monopoly of these valuable fisheries. The fishing industry had by this time vastly increased in value and importance, and was very largely engaged in by the people of the New England Colonies.
Indeed the importance of the industry was such, that the long point of Massachusetts was christened Cape Cod; gilded codfish were largely used as weather vanes on church spires, and on the public buildings; a painted codfish hung in the State House in Boston, as a constant reminder to the law-makers of the importance of the fishing interest; and the fortunate and enterprising fishermen, who accumulated wealth sufficient to enable them to pass the autumn of their lives amid quiet and luxurious surroundings, came to be known as the "Codfish Aristocracy."
In the year 1783 a treaty of peace was finally concluded between the United States and Great Britain, which defined the rights of the citizens of the United States to these privileges, as follows:
ARTICLE III.
It is agreed that the people of the United States shall continue to enjoy unmolested the right to take fish of every kind on the Grand Bank, and on all the other banks of Newfoundland; also in the Gulf of St. Lawrence and all other places in the sea where the inhabitants of both countries used at any time heretofore to fish; and also that the inhabitants of the United States shall have liberty to take fish of every kind on such part of the coast of Newfoundland as British fishermen shall use (but not to dry or cure the same on that island), and also on the coasts, bays, and creeks of all other of His British Majesty's dominions in America, and that American fishermen shall have liberty to dry and cure fish in any of the unsettled bays, harbors and creeks of Nova Scotia, Magdalen Islands and Labrador, so long as the same shall remain unsettled; but so soon as the same or either of them shall be settled it shall not be lawful for the said fishermen to dry or cure fish at such settlement without a previous agreement for that purpose with the inhabitants, proprietors or possessors of the ground.
This article clearly defined the rights of the American fishermen, and if it could have remained in force, and its provisions been honorably carried into effect, no further trouble would probably ever have arisen over the subject of the fisheries.
In 1812, however, the United States engaged in a second war with Great Britain, and in the treaty of peace which was negotiated at Ghent, in the year 1814, no mention whatever was made of the right of the American people to take fish in Canadian waters. The reason for this omission, seems to have been that the American representatives, among whom were Henry Clay and John Quincy Adams, maintained that the rights guaranteed by article three of the treaty of 1783, were not created by that treaty, but were merely recognized by it, as permanent rights already existing, and of such a character that they were not to be affected or superseded by any rupture of friendly relations, or even by war.
The same treaty, (1783) had conceded to the British the right to free navigation of the Mississippi River, but since that treaty had been signed, the United States had purchased the Louisiana Territory from France, and had thus metamorphosed that great river into an exclusively American waterway. The American commissioners therefore, being unauthorized to concede navigation rights on the Mississippi, in consequence of this change of ownership, the British commissioners claimed some concession as an offset to this refusal; and a compromise was agreed upon, by which no mention was made either of the British claim to navigate this river, or of the American claim to fish in Canadian waters.
The situation, however, was not satisfactory, and after a long diplomatic correspondence between the two governments, a new treaty was negotiated in London in the year 1818, which among other things, contained the following provision:
"That the inhabitants of the United States shall have forever in common with the subjects of His Britannic Majesty, the liberty of taking fish of any kind, on that part of the southern coast of Newfoundland which extends from Cape Race to the Ramean Islands; on the western and northwestern coasts of Newfoundland, from the said Cape Race to the Quispen Islands; on the shores of the Magdalen Islands; and also on the coasts, bays, harbors, and creeks, from Mount Joly to the southern coast of Labrador, to and through the Straits of Belle Isle, and thence northwardly, indefinitely along the coast. And that the American fishermen shall have liberty forever, to dry and cure fish in any of the unsettled bays, harbors and creeks, in the southern part of Newfoundland hereinbefore described, and of the coasts of Labrador; but as soon as the same or any portion thereof, shall be settled, it shall not be lawful for said fishermen to dry or cure fish at such portion so settled, without previous agreement for such purpose, with the inhabitants, proprietors or possessors of the ground.
"And the United States hereby renounces forever, any liberty heretofore enjoyed or claimed by the inhabitants thereof, to take, dry, or cure fish, on or within three marine miles of any of the coast, bays, creeks, or harbors of His Britannic Majesty's dominions in America not included in the above mentioned limits. Provided, however, that the American fishermen shall be permitted to enter such bays or harbors for the purpose of shelter, of repairing damages therein, of purchasing wood and obtaining water, and for no other purpose whatever. But they shall be under such restrictions as shall be necessary to prevent their taking, drying, or curing fish therein, or in any other manner whatever, abusing the privileges hereby secured to them."
This treaty, which may fairly be said to have been the cause of all the trouble which afterwards arose on the fishery question, was negotiated on the part of the United States, by Mr. Rush, then American Minister at the Court of St. James, and Mr. Gallatin, his associate commissioner; but as it was subsequently ratified by the Senate of the United States, it would be scarcely fair to hold those two gentlemen wholly responsible for the disgraceful and humiliating surrender of rights and privileges which had hitherto been freely conceded to American fishermen.
The treaty, by its very terms, invited disturbances and misunderstandings, which were not slow in manifesting themselves.
In the very next year, (1819) the English Parliament passed an Act, which provided that American vessels found within the three-mile limit might be seized and condemned; and imposed fines on such as refused to depart from such bays or limits, after being warned. The Canadian Parliaments, taking the cue from this legislation of the mother country, passed numerous and stringent laws and regulations, which they claimed were necessary to carry out the provisions of the treaty; but which the Americans claimed were needlessly annoying, oppressive, and unneighborly.
Among other claims, what was known as the "Headland theory" was advanced, under which the three-mile limit was claimed not to follow the sinuosities of the coast, but to be a line three miles outside of a straight line drawn from point to point, or headland to headland of the coast; no matter how far apart these points or headlands might be, or how extensive the bay or gulf might be which lay between them. Under this construction of the treaty, Nova Scotia claimed the right to close the Straits of Canso to our fishermen; and to make her claim to exclusive jurisdiction over that body of water more plausible, annexed Prince Edward's Island.
Numerous seizures of American vessels were made and a strained condition of affairs ensued, which lasted a number of years, and which temporarily culminated in 1843, in the seizure of an American fishing vessel, called the "Washington," in the Bay of Fundy, at a point more than ten miles from the nearest shore. This induced a protest from the United States, in response to which the English Government agreed to waive the Headland theory as far as it related to the Bay of Fundy, but not as to any other bay or gulf.
The contention continued, and in 1851 the English Government announced its intention of sending a fleet to the fishing grounds for the purpose of enforcing its rights.
More diplomatic correspondence ensued, and at length, in 1853, a board of arbitration was empowered to decide this phase of the controversy; and decided that bays ten miles or more in width, were to be considered as part of the open sea. This was followed in 1854, by what has been called the reciprocity treaty; which, in consideration of the abolition of the three-mile restriction, and of the restoration of the rights to take fish, and to cure and dry the same on the Canadian Coasts, which had been conceded without any equivalent in the treaty of 1783, the United States agreed to admit nearly all Canadian products free of duty.
This treaty by its terms was to remain in force for ten years, and to continue in force thereafter until after twelve months' notice of the desire of either party to terminate it.
During the continuance of this treaty, the War of the Rebellion occurred; our national debt assumed enormous proportions; our tariff and internal taxes were vastly increased to meet the expenses of the war and the interest on the debt; and what in 1854 bad seemed a mere bagatelle—viz., the duty on Canadian imports—assumed an importance, as an item of revenue, entirely disproportionate to the value of any additional fishing privileges which the treaty gave us. Consequently, in 1865, the United States gave the requisite twelve months' notice, and in 1866 the treaty came to an end. Canada, having for twelve years experienced the advantages of an unrestricted market in the United States (the direct pecuniary value of which in duties remitted, alone amounted to 14,200,000, or $350,000 a year) was naturally reluctant to give them up, so she returned to her former methods, construed the former treaty in a narrow and illiberal spirit, and let no opportunity slip to annoy and outrage our fishermen.
Meanwhile the United States Government was engaged in a controversy with the English Government over the claim for damages to American shipping, committed by the so-called Confederate cruiser "Alabama" during the "War of the Rebellion," and a joint commission representing the two countries assembled in Washington in 1871 to negotiate a treaty, which should, if possible, arrange all matters in dispute—including, of course, the fisheries question.
Their deliberations resulted in the treaty of Washington, by which our fishermen, in addition to the rights conferred by the treaty in 1818, received permission to fish in the bays, harbors and creeks of Quebec, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward's Island, and the islands adjacent thereto; and by which, also, fish oil and fish of all kinds (except fish of inland lakes and fish preserved in oil) were to be admitted into each country free of duty. A question arose as to whether the admission of Canadian fish free of duty was a sufficient equivalent for the increased fishing privileges granted to the American fishermen. The British Commissioners insisted that it was not; and the American Commissioners insisted that it was; but finally offered to pay Great Britain one million dollars as full consideration for the right to use forever the inshore fisheries in common with the English and Canadian fishermen. The parties could not agree, and the question was referred to a commission of three, consisting of one American, one Canadian, and the Belgian Minister to the United States. Six years later, in 1877, this commission—or rather the Belgian minister (for the Canadian and American Commissioners disagreed)—decided that the United States should pay Great Britain $5,500,000 for this privilege; which, added to the $4,200,000 of duties remitted under the reciprocity treaty of 1854, made the snug sum of $9,700,000 paid by the United States for a privilege which was conceded by the treaty of 1783 to be a vested and permanent right.
This was bad enough in all conscience, but to make it if possible worse, and more galling to Americans, the charge was openly made by Professor Hind, who had been the British scientific witness before the commission, and had acted as the official compiler of the index to the documents used in the investigation, that the statistics in these documents had been manufactured and forged for the purpose of misleading the commission, and defrauding the United States.
The Professor, after trying in vain to induce the Canadian and British governments to remedy this flagrant injustice, laid the matter before Senators and Representatives in Washington.
Some little attention was attracted to these disclosures at the time, but presumably from a fear that a public discussion of them would reflect upon the party in power at the time of the negotiation of the treaty, no official action was taken, and the matter was permitted to drop out of sight.
The treaty of Washington also provided, that either Canada or the United States might export or import goods, wares and merchandise through the other's territory free of duty, and also permitted such goods, wares and merchandise as might be carried through Canada by rail from any point in the United States to another point in the United States, to pass through the Dominion of Canada and re-enter the United States free of duty. It also abandoned the right, which the United States had always claimed—and which England had always dreaded—to send out privateers in case of war.
Indeed, taken as a whole, the treaty of Washington may be fairly ranked as one of the greatest triumphs of British diplomacy. Having by their own privateers (for the "Alabama" and her consorts, although ostensibly "Confederate Cruisers," were in reality nothing more nor less than British privateers, built and equipped for the express purpose of preying on American commerce) effectually driven our flag from the ocean, they hoodwinked our diplomatists into a relinquishment of the right to fit out similar cruisers, as a sort of a "sop," to make the payment by Great Britain of the $13,000,000 damage award, a little more palatable. Verily, it would seem that for the first century of its national existence, the diplomacy as well as the financial policy of the United States was a creature of chance and circumstance. In diplomatic matters, our representatives seemed to be guided by no permanent policy; and to be able to see nothing beyond the immediate question at issue; and our whole financial policy was utterly devoid of anything like consistency or system.
The treaty of Washington was to remain in force for ten years; and was then subject to abrogation, as to certain of its parts, on two years' notice by either party.
Its gross unfairness to the United States was so apparent, that on the 3rd of March, 1883, (almost as soon as the treaty permitted) Congress directed the President to give the requisite notice to terminate certain articles of it, and thus, in 1885, the subject was again a matter of dispute between the two countries. The avowed policy of Canadian statesmen seems to have been to force the United States into a reciprocity treaty, which would practically secure commercial union between that country and Canada, and with that idea in view, Canada immediately commenced to annoy and harass American fishermen, claiming that the setting aside of the Washington Treaty revived that of 1818, and under the provisions of the latter, the right of our fishermen to enter Canadian harbors or bays, or to come within the three-mile limit for any other purpose than shelter, repairing damages, or to purchase wood and water, was absolutely denied; and several American fishing vessels were seized and condemned by the Canadian authorities, who were evidently determined to enforce their own harsh construction of the treaty of 1818, in the most offensive and unneighborly manner. Meanwhile, during the pendency of the treaty of Washington, Canada had been investing largely in railroad enterprises, and had subsidized one trans-continental line (the Canadian Pacific) to the extent of about $130,000,000. These railways, taking advantage of the clause in the treaty of Washington which permitted the transit of goods in bond through Canadian Territory into American, and vice versa, without the payment of duty, had obtained control by building, purchasing or leasing, of numerous connecting lines, which gave them outlets and inlets to all of the principal American cities; and had thus become open competitors with the American trans-continental lines for American business. The following extracts from an address made by General James H. Wilson before the Committee on Commerce of the House of Representatives on March 15, 1888, will show to what an extent this traffic had grown; and also that a feeling of impatience had begun to develop among Americans at the unneighborly and piggish attitude of Canada, in refusing ordinary hospitality to American fishermen, while robbing the American railways of millions of dollars worth of business each year.
"The simple fact is that while the arrangements under consideration are reciprocal in theory they are one-sided in practice, and inure tenfold more to the advantage of the Canadian people than to that of the American railroads or the American people. Nevertheless, as I have stated before, the amendments which I have had the honor to offer to the Inter-State Commerce Act do not cover, nor are they intended to interfere in any way with the particular transit trade carried on under the provisions of Article XXIX of the treaty of 1871. I make this statement clear and distinct, for the special information of the Chicago Board of Trade, and of those who have shared its apprehensions.
"Second. Under the provisions of paragraphs 3000 to 3006 inclusive, of the Revised Statutes, together with certain regulations thereunder, issued by the Secretary of the Treasury, a transit trade of great extent and value is carried on between the Eastern, Western, and Pacific States and Territories through the agency of the Canadian railroads, and certain American railroads owned and controlled by them. And it is to this variety of the transit trade to which I invite your most careful attention.
"It seems to have grown up pari passu with the Dominion system of railroads. It is now carried on principally by three Canadian railroads and railroad systems:
"1. The Canada Southern Railroad, opened for business in 1873. It was built, it is understood, entirely under American auspices, if not with American capital, and is now controlled by the Michigan Central Railroad Company in the interest of the New York Central system. Its main line runs from Windsor, Ontario, to Suspension Bridge, and, with its branches, is 302.44 miles long.
"2. The Grand Trunk Railway of Canada, with a main line extending from Portland, Me., to Detroit, Mich., a distance of 861 miles; another from Niagara Falls to Windsor, Ontario, 229 miles, branches and extensions sufficient to give it a total length of 2,924.5 miles. The road was opened from Portland to Montreal, mostly through American Territory it will be observed, in 1853; from Montreal to Quebec in 1854, from Montreal to Toronto in 1856; and from Montreal to Port Sarnia and Port Huron, on the St. Clair River, in 1858. It acquired by purchase and construction a line now known as the Chicago and Grand Trunk, extending from Port Huron to Chicago in 1879, and the whole line was opened for through business in 1880. A part of this system, known as the Great Western Railway, was completed in 1854, but was not consolidated with the Grand Trunk till 1882.
"This system first began to do a transit business in imported merchandise, in a small way, from Toronto to Collingwood on Georgian Bay, Lake Huron, in 1854; but it never became a great competitor of the American Trunk lines till 1880, nor became a great disturber of rates till 1882.
"It was built for political and military as well as for commercial purposes, has received frequent subsidies from the Canadian Governments, and has always had more or less of their fostering care. Ever since its through lines were opened, it has enjoyed the privilege of unrestricted competition with the American roads between the West and all points in the Atlantic States that it could reach. It has enjoyed all the privileges of an American railroad; it has been active, aggressive, and unscrupulous, and has inflicted great injury upon its competitors.
"3. The Canadian Pacific Railway extends from Montreal to Port Moody and Vancouver, on the Pacific Ocean, a distance of 2,905.3 miles. At Montreal it connects with the Intercolonial Railway, running from that place to Halifax, Nova Scotia, 678 miles. The latter road and its branches are owned and operated by the Government of Canada. The total distance from Halifax to Vancouver is therefore 3,583 miles; and the total length of main line and branches of the two systems is 5,522 miles. Their aggregate cost and capitalization are $206,942,852, besides a subsidy of 25,000,000 acres of public lands, all of which, both money and land, has come directly or indirectly from the Dominion of Canada, which guarantees the interest on the funded debt, and also dividends upon the capital stock till August, 1893. Notwithstanding the princely subsidies which this corporation has received, the length of line which it has constructed, the monopoly which it has secured, and the high political mission it has filled in binding together the widely separated provinces of the Dominion, its managers are not yet satisfied. Spurning all restraint, it has finally overleaped the boundary line and boldly invaded the territory of the United States. With true English effrontery it ignores the authority of Congress, and under the thin disguise of a charter procured by trickery and deception, if not by fraud, from the Legislature of Maine, it is now building a cut off through the northern part of that State to St. Andrews, New Brunswick, with all the rapidity that the unlimited control of men and money can command.
"Just what the volume and value of the transit traffic is, it is impossible for me to state, but the statistics are doubtless in the possession of the Bureau of Statistics, or can be more readily obtained by it than by any private individual, and I venture to suggest that, whatever other action may be taken by your committee in respect to this important matter, it should not fail to call for the statistics in question. Some idea may be had of its enormous volume from the statement made by the Chicago Board of Trade that the Grand Trunk alone 'received from its rail connections at the Detroit River, and at its lake ports on Lake Huron and Georgian Bay, during the year 1888, 1,629,283 tons of United States products,' which it transported eastbound through the Dominion of Canada in bond and reëntered the United States free of duty. This, as near as I can make out, was something like 15 per cent. of the entire volume of east-bound business from that region. The entire business by the various Canadian routes east and west bound cannot be less than 5,000,000 tons dead weight, and has been estimated by an expert at 7,000,000.
"It is well known that the Grand Trunk Railway, by means of its Chicago and Michigan connections and branch lines, and by those which connect it with Portland, Me., under the privilege allowed it by the laws and Treasury regulations heretofore cited, is the great beneficiary of the transit trade. It has been shown that the Canadian Pacific, under the same laws and regulations, has been free almost from the day it was opened, by means of the bonded Pacific Coast Steamship Company, and by its connections with the roads running north and east from St. Paul to the Canadian border, and by its connections at Niagara Falls, Kingston, St. Albans, and Montreal, to carry any business it can secure between San Francisco on the west, to New York and Boston on the east.
"It should be remembered that these roads constitute more than one-half of the entire railroad mileage of the British possessions in North America, that one of them was built for military and political purposes by the Government of the Dominion and under the special encouragement and sanction of the British Government, for the purpose of carrying out its scheme for federating its North American colonies; that both of them have been heavily subsidized by the Dominion Government for purposes antagonistic, if not absolutely hostile, to our national interests, and that they are not only absolutely free from any control by us, or from the Dominion Government to make whatever local or through rates they please, but, as matter of fact, are frequently engaged in cutting the rates of the American trunk lines, paying rebates, granting passes, charging more for a short haul than for a long one, and entering into all kinds of private arrangements with their American connections and their American shippers, to the prejudice and injury of the American Trunk lines, whose hands are bound in respect to all those and many other matters by the Inter-State Commerce Act.
"It is also the fact that, while the Canadian railways are enjoying these extraordinary privileges, unheard of in any other country, the Dominion Government has protected its Pacific line by a practical monopoly of all the business on or tributary to it, and positively refuses to allow American railways to take wheat out of Manitoba, haul it through the United States, and redeliver it in Canada free of duty; and this is a fact which cannot be successfully denied. Not only is it true, but it is also true that the Dominion Government has refused, and still refuses, to permit the people of Manitoba to build an independent railway to connect with the American system of railroads, and this refusal is made for the avowed purpose of continuing and protecting the monopoly which the Canadian Pacific Railway has of the business of that region. The unjust and oppressive conduct of the Dominion Government, controlled as it is by the Canadian Pacific Ring, is matter of public notoriety, and has been the subject of earnest and repeated remonstrances at Ottawa on the part of the people of Manitoba within the last thirty days, but so far without effect.
"But this is not all. While they or their connections at Chicago, Detroit, Buffalo, New York, St. Albans, Boston, Portland, and San Francisco are compelled by the Inter-State Commerce Act to make their through rates to all American points public, the roads lying wholly in Canada, forming parts of their through lines, existing wholly under Canadian law, and managed by officers and directors entirely beyond our jurisdiction, are under no restrictions whatever as to rebates, drawbacks, passes, constructive mileage, car mileage allowances, or any other of the numberless devices by which one line gains advantage over another, or by which a long through line gives advantage to a short connection.
"The trouble with Canada and the Canadian Railroads is that we have become accustomed to treat them as though they were not foreign and did not belong to a foreign empire. They expect to have all the benefits of unrestricted trade without any of the limitations and burdens which are imposed so freely upon our own railroads and citizens.
"They and their attorneys claim that in carrying freights between American points 'the Canadian Railroads have conformed to the letter and spirit of the Inter-State Act as rigidly as have their American competitors.' But inasmuch as that act requires no duty whatever from the roads wholly in Canada, and no duty from their American connections, except to publish their through rates, the absurdity of this claim is at once apparent. No one in his right mind can successfully contend for a moment that the Great Trunk or the Canadian Pacific pays any more attention to the Inter-State Commerce Act in Canada, than if it were so much waste paper. They are perfectly free to violate every one of its provisions, from the first paragraph to the last, and, as a matter of fact, its only effect, so far as they are concerned, is to make it all the easier for them to cheat and deceive, if not to actually pick the pockets of their American rivals, who are bound by the law and subject to the surveillance of the Commissioners and the punishment of the courts.
"It the Canadian railways were not subsidized and supported by the Dominion Government, if they were not an essential part of the machinery used for binding the British empire together, and in case of need to transport armies and military munitions against our frontier; if they were not free from our local and general laws, and also free to do all the things which have been pointed out, and, in short, were not daily doing them to our detriment and injury, we should have no cause of complaint against them. But so long as the facts remain as they are, so long as those railroads run through a foreign country and are controlled by aliens, under foreign laws, and for purposes which, to say the least, are foreign to us and hostile to our permanent national interests, it can be regarded as no more than prudent if we shut them out of our transit traffic along our northern border, just as we shut foreign ships out of our coasting trade.
"The great republic, in the words of Prince Bismarck, 'fears nothing but God.' It has no apprehension for its safety, and but little for its peace from its neighbors of the Dominion; but it should not forget that the Dominion has an area of 3,500,000 square miles and a population of about 5,000,000 souls, and is backed up by the whole British empire, upon whose possessions it is the Englishman's boast that 'the sun never sets,' that 'her drum beat encircles the world,' that 'her ships fill every sea,' and that her population is not less than 300,000,000 souls. It should not forget that it has had difficulties before with that universal bully, and will probably have them again; it should not forget that it has, out of its abundance and good-nature, nurtured and fostered the British bantling on our borders, enriched its railroads, patronized its canals, granted it the right of free transit through our territories, enriched its shopkeepers, and generally treated it with amiable liberality and indifference. Now that the subject has become of enough importance to be considered, Congress should not forget to act in accordance with its own ideas of interest and duty, even if Canada should 'retaliate.' We have had reciprocity enough, such as it has been; now let us try what virtue there is in insisting upon our right to manage our own affairs in our own way, while leaving the Dominion and the other dependencies of the British crown (if there are any others) in North America to manage their own in a similar way. We have played second fiddle long enough. Let the British Government spend just as much money as it pleases for fortifications; let it subsidize and support as many railroads as it thinks necessary to tie the British empire together; let it open and improve one or more of its (Canadian) seaports, and let it retaliate just as and when it pleases. But let it do all these things without our help or connivance; and then, if in God's Providence the Canadian Dominions do not come otherwise under the sway and the uses of the Union, when a great emergency arises which seems to demand it, we shall go and take them."
CHAPTER IV.
RETALIATION.
During the period from 1885 to 1888 the ill feeling growing out of Canada's treatment of the fisheries question increased; and began to assume proportions which indicated a possible outbreak of hostilities between the two countries.
A temporary arrangement was entered into between the then American Secretary of State, Mr. Bayard, of Delaware, and the British Minister; and President Cleveland recommended the appointment of a commission to negotiate a new treaty. Congress, however, refused to authorize such a commission, but in March, 1887, passed a joint resolution authorizing the President in case vessels of the United States were, or then lately had been denied or abridged in the rights secured to them by treaty or law; or any rights secured by Canada to the most favored nations, whether vessels licensed for trading or other vessels, or have been unjustly vexed, to close our ports to vessels of the British Dominion of North America, "and also to deny entry into any port or place of the United States of fresh fish or salt fish, or any other product of said Dominion, or other goods coming from said Dominion to the United States."
President Cleveland, however, did not avail himself of the powers granted by this resolution; but being apparently desirous of securing a permanent settlement of the question by a new treaty, he appointed three commissioners to meet an equal number appointed on behalf of Great Britain, notwithstanding the fact that Congress had expressly disapproved of such a settlement. The commissioners, thus appointed, recommended a treaty, which was in August, 1888, rejected by the United States Senate, by a strict party vote—the Republicans still having control of that body.
Probably, the Republican Senators were largely influenced in their action, by the fact that a Presidential election was then pending; and Mr. Cleveland being a candidate for re-election, they were unwilling that his administration should have the prestige which might accompany the successful settlement of this great controversy.
Whatever their motives may have been, the ultimate results of their narrow-minded partisanship—as will be seen in the sequel—were most disastrous to the country. For the first time in its history, the Senate had discussed this treaty in open session. Diplomatic discussions of this kind had previously always taken place in executive session, with closed doors. But a movement had been made to supercede what some demagogues of that day called the "Star Chamber" system of executive sessions, and this treaty happening to come up for discussion at the time when this agitation was at its height, the Senate, by a close vote, decided that the discussion of it should be held with open doors. Much partisan feeling was exhibited on both sides during the debates. The Republicans took very strong ground against the treaty; claiming that it surrendered valuable rights which had always been conceded to the United States; and gravely charged the President and Secretary Bayard with being desirous of fostering British interests, at the expense of their own countrymen. The Republican press throughout the country took up this cry; the President was roundly denounced as an English sympathizer; and the rejection of the treaty by the Senate was hailed by these party organs as a well-deserved rebuke to a President and a Secretary of State who were willing to make such disgraceful concessions to England.
A few days after the rejection of the treaty, President Cleveland astonished the country, and especially the Republican Senators, by a special message, in which he requested greater powers to inflict retaliatory measures upon Canada, than had been given him by the joint resolution of Congress passed in 1887.
This message, as a matter of course, created a profound sensation in Canada and Great Britain, as well as throughout the United States.
The President was charged by his political opponents with inconsistency; in that he had not attempted to use the retaliatory powers already given him, and proved their insufficiency, before asking for additional ones; but after considerable wrangling and debate, Congress passed an act, giving him the power he asked for. A strict enforcement of this would give almost a deathblow to the Canadian Railway lines; as a very large proportion of their traffic was American business, without which most of them could scarcely expect to pay running expenses. The finances of the Dominion were also in a very bad way, owing to the large subsidies paid these railways, and to indebtedness contracted for canals, and other public improvements; so that practical non-intercourse with the United States meant practical bankruptcy for Canada. And now, the most curious phase of the whole controversy developed itself. The Canadians were divided into two parties; one favorable to continued English rule; and the other desirous of commercial, and if necessary, political union with the United States. Strange to say, both these parties conceived it to be to their interest to increase the tension between the two Governments, even to the point of war; but for reasons which were diametrically opposed to each other. The British sympathizers supposed that a war between England and the United States in the then unquestionably defenseless condition of the latter power, could not fail to result favorably to England, and that the latter's hold upon Canada would thereby become stronger and more direct than before. The other party desired war, because they felt confident that no matter how successful England might be at the outset, in bombarding and destroying the seaport cities of the United States, yet she could never establish a foothold on shore, and that the United States would inevitably take possession of Canada, and thus bring about the union of American and Canadian interests which they so much desired.
In consequence of these two sets of opinions among the Canadian politicians, the Canadian Government adopted a plan of conduct towards Americans which soon became utterly unbearable. American fishing boats were seized and condemned on the most flimsy pretexts. American tourists were stopped at the Canadian frontier, and subjected to the most humiliating and rude treatment, under the pretense of custom-house examination. The mails to and from the United States were delayed and tampered with by Canadian officials, and every possible means of annoyance and insult which Canadian ingenuity could conceive of, was put in operation against the persons and property of such Americans as happened to come under Canadian jurisdiction. Concurrently with this, the newspapers on both sides were full of denunciatory and inflammatory articles, and the old Irish fenian party in the United States came to the front once more, as a disturbing element.
A small body of these men established a so-called "camp of observation," at a point on the Canada boundary line near Rouse's Point; and with the usual flourish and bluster which characterize the race, announced their intention to march on Montreal, as soon as their ranks should be recruited to a certain number. The Governor of the state of New York called out a regiment of militia to hold these fellows in check temporarily, until a detachment of United States troops, which had been ordered to the scene of trouble by the President, could reach there. Meanwhile the Canadian authorities had ordered troops to the scene of action, who encamped on the Canadian side of the boundary line, in plain sight of the American militia and the Irish fenians. The Canadian newspapers went into spasms of indignant protest at what they called this "barefaced threat to invade Canada," and altogether affairs had gotten into such a condition that the merest spark was certain to produce an explosion. This was in the autumn of 1889. In November of that year, the long expected spark made its appearance, and produced the long dreaded explosion. Several of the fenians had left their camp one afternoon, and had visited a drinking saloon on Canadian territory, just over the boundary line.
Meeting some Canadian soldiers there, both parties got drunk, and a quarrel ensued, during which pistol shots were freely exchanged, and numerous bayonet and sabre cuts were given and received. The Irishmen being outnumbered, were gradually driven towards the boundary line, whore they were met by a large party of their friends, who hearing the noise of the fighting, had rushed to the assistance of their companions. Thus reënforced, they beat the Canadians back to their own side of the line, but not being satisfied with this, pursued them for some distance on Canadian territory. Here meeting further Canadian troops, the tide of battle was reversed again, and the Irishmen were driven back to their camp. The American militia regiment was under arms and in line, on the American side of the boundary, having been called to arms at the commencement of the disturbance; and as they marched towards the boundary, with the idea of capturing the Irish men and holding them for punishment, they were fired upon by the Canadian troops, either by mistake or designedly, and several were killed and wounded.
They returned the volley (it is claimed, without orders) and several Canadians were also killed and wounded.
At length, in obedience to the arduous efforts of the officers on both sides, the fighting ceased; but not until there had been six killed and thirty-three wounded among the Irish and Americans, and four killed and twenty-one wounded among the Canadians.
From testimony taken in a subsequent investigation, it seems that both commanders claimed to be on their own territory; and the burden of evidence would seem to confirm their claims that there had been no actual technical violation of territory on either side; but that the two parties had simply stood each on their own ground, and shot at each other across the boundary line.
This outbreak, however, afforded the Canadian politicians the opportunity they had long been waiting for, and a resolution passed both branches of the Dominion parliament, by an almost unanimous vote, declaring war against the United States, subject to the approval of the Imperial Government.
It being just the commencement of the winter season, and therefore a most unfavorable time to undertake hostilities, both sides sought to gain time, and a voluminous diplomatic correspondence ensued; during which both the United States and England were exerting every effort to prepare for the struggle which was considered to be inevitable as soon as spring opened. Work was pushed night and day on the unfinished war vessels; and a large force of men were placed at work upon the sea-coast forts to try and strengthen them as much as possible. Additional guns were brought from the interior and mounted in the forts as rapidly as practicable; and the hurry and bustle of preparation was noticeable from one end of the country to the other. As yet, war had not been definitely declared, except by Canada, and the President had issued no call for troops; but everybody knew that the call could not be long delayed; and the "Grand Army Men," as the veterans of the War of the Rebellion styled themselves, organized themselves into battalions and regiments, and met and drilled two or three times a week, and were ready to respond instantly to the call of the President, as soon as it should be issued. An enrollment of these volunteer associations, taken on January 1, 1890, showed a total of over 300,000 veterans ready and anxious to go to the front once more.
Besides these, there were enthusiastic young men by the million, who had been children during the War of the Rebellion, but who were fired with a patriotic desire to resent the outrages and insults which they thought their country had received at the hands of Canada.
As far as the land forces were concerned, nothing more could be desired. The Government, it was evident, would be embarrassed by a superabundance of force, rather than a lack of it; and the indications were that within thirty days after war was declared, a thoroughly well drilled, well equipped, well armed, and well officered army of at least half a million of men, would be ready to overrun Canada in the shortest possible space of time. The more enthusiastic ones, claimed that the campaign would be over in thirty days after the boundary line was crossed. Others said that the war might last sixty days, and here and there one or two might be found who thought that possibly it might take all summer. There was no difference of opinion as to the result. The only differences were as to the time it would require to bring it about. The idea that this over-whelming and magnificent force could receive anything approaching a defeat, or even a check, in its victorious career through Canada, never entered anybody's head. But there were numerous bets made on the exchanges and elsewhere, as to the number of days the campaign would last. The whole country seemed to be in a blaze of military enthusiasm, and it became all the rage for young men to chaff each other about "spending next summer in Canada." On the surface, therefore, everything appeared satisfactory, and the only apparent drawback was a feeling that Canada couldn't offer resistance enough to make the struggle even an interesting one. Under this apparent confidence, however, there was a vast amount of anxious foreboding in the minds of a few of the more thoughtful residents of our seaboard cities.
These men knew the utterly defenseless condition of our coasts. They knew how absurdly inadequate our Navy was to cope with that of England. They had seen the fast passenger steamships of the Cunard and other English lines, (two of which, belonging to the Inman line, the "City of New York," and the "City of Paris," were owned by Americans) withdrawn from the passenger service, and transformed into armed cruisers in accordance with the terms of the contracts by which the English Government paid them an annual subsidy or rental, amounting to about four per cent. of their cost. The cable had brought news of the feverish activity which reigned in all the English dockyards and arsenals.
Of course, details of these preparations were not forthcoming; but the utmost reticence of the officials could not conceal the fact that war preparations on an immense scale were being pushed forward with the utmost rapidity.
Meanwhile the Americans were not idle. Congress had been called in special session by the President, in view of the gravity of the situation, and immense appropriations, aggregating between $200,000,000 and $300,000,000 were rushed through both houses in frantic haste; and a tremendous effort was made at a vast expense, to lock the stable door, which had so long been invitingly left open. There was no time to build large vessels or heavy guns; so the greatest efforts were made to perfect a system of harbor obstructions and torpedoes. All sorts of experiments were tried in this direction; and the whole inventive genius of the country seemed to be puzzling itself over the problem of self-defense.
Of course it goes without saying that the newspapers in all three countries reaped a rich harvest. No rumor was too absurd or sensational to find believers, and the public mind was wrought up to an intensity of feeling on both sides, that was almost inconceivable in its bitterness and rancor.
In March, 1890, the excitement was, if possible, intensified by a remarkable speech delivered in the British House of Commons by Lord Randolph Churchill. This nobleman had been a prominent figure in English politics for several years, and had held numerous Government positions—among them Chancellor of the Exchequer, and leader of the House of Commons. He was a man of unquestioned ability, but had come to be regarded by the older and more conservative public men, as too eccentric and too unmanageable for a leader.
He had, therefore, been reduced to the ranks—so to speak—in Parliament, and had been chafing for two or three years in what seemed to him to be a position utterly unworthy of his talents and experience as a parliamentarian and debater. The present occasion afforded him an opportunity, which he was not slow to embrace, of putting himself once more in a prominent position before the English public.
His speech was entirely unexpected, and created the utmost excitement on both sides of the ocean. It was during a debate on a bill authorizing some of the extraordinary expenditures for arming and preparing war ships, etc., which the Admiralty were then making. The debate had gone on sleepily and stupidly, as such debates usually do, until one evening in March, Lord Churchill threw what proved to be a veritable bombshell into the discussion. In this remarkable speech, his Lordship traced the whole history of the differences between the United States and Canada, from 1783 to 1889. His point of view, of course, was an intensely English one, and he justified Canada entirely in the course she had thus far seen fit to pursue.
And then, as his listeners were expecting him to announce himself as heartily in favor of the pending bill, he suddenly changed the whole aspect of the debate by asking: "But what has Canada ever done for England, that we should make these enormous expenditures of money, and risk a war with such a powerful nation as the United States, merely for her benefit? Has she ever contributed a penny to the Imperial treasury? Never! Has she even paid the expenses of troops and vessels sent out by the Imperial Government to protect her interests? Never! Has she admitted the products of the Mother Country to her ports free of duty; or, failing in that, has she ever made any discrimination, however small, in favor of our products, as against those of the United States, or any other country? Never! She taxes our products, and while claiming our protection whenever she gets into difficulty, utterly refuses to contribute anything to our treasury. I fail, Sir, to see anything like reciprocity here. To use a homely American comparison, 'It is like the handle of a jug—all on one side.' If Imperial protection is worth having, it is worth paying for; and if Canada or any other outlying portion of this great British Empire, is not willing to contribute its share of taxation to the Imperial treasury, I am distinctly and decidedly in favor of having Imperial protection withdrawn."
At this point of his lordship's address, the interruptions were so numerous and persistent, that he was obliged to suspend his remarks for a few moments. After a semblance of order had been restored, the Premier arose and begged the privilege of asking his Lordship one question.
"Do I understand his Lordship to say that he is in favor of our permitting the United States to overrun and annex Canada, without lifting a hand or firing a gun in her behalf?"
As soon as the applause which greeted this question had subsided, Lord Churchill said he "thanked his Lordship for having put the question to him in that categorical manner, because it enabled him to be equally specific and explicit in his reply."
He then went on, and in a most impassioned manner attacked the United States as a great, overgrown, bullying and conceited nation. He traced our wonderful growth and material prosperity, and characterized it as a standing menace to every monarchical Government in the world. Then suddenly changing his tone, he called attention to our absolutely helpless condition to resist the attacks of a well equipped fleet of modern vessels of war; and waving in the air over his head a copy of the New York Herald of some date in 1887, he exclaimed:
"Here are the figures which prove that property amounting in value to $10,000,000,000 or £2,000,000,000 sterling is absolutely defenseless, and open to attack by any power which possesses one or more modern vessels of war."
And then he continued as follows:
"His Lordship asks me what I would do. I will tell him. I would equip one, two or three powerful fleets, and send them to bombard the principal seaboard cities of the United States. I would give these arrogant and conceited Americans their choice between bombardment and ransom, and I would take good care that the ransom should be a good liberal one. I should be inclined to put the figure at, say £400,000,000 to £500,000,000 sterling. The Americans are wealthy, and could well afford to pay it."
"But," interrupted the Premier, "what would become of Canada?"
"Oh! Let the United States have Canada; and much good may she do them! I cannot see where she has ever done us much. What I would propose in brief, is a "forced sale" of Canada to the United States; but it will be a novelty in forced sales, in that the sale will be forced by the seller upon the buyer."
The effect of this speech was marvelous. What was then known as the "Jingo" element in England, cheered it to the echo; and a popular demand sprung up for war, which was so universal and overwhelming that the Government found it impossible to resist it, and consequently war was formally declared in April, 1890. The words "Ransom or bombardment" were in everybody's mouth, and Lord Randolph Churchill became the idol of the populace. His wife, who was an American lady, lost much of her former popularity, and with her sister-in-law, the Duchess of Marlborough (also an American) made a prolonged visit to the Continent, to avoid the unpleasant attentions of the riotous London mobs.
CHAPTER V.
THE ENGLISH FLEET.
The preparations which had been going on all winter in English Naval circles were nearly completed at the time of England's formal declaration of war, so that there was but little delay before the first fleet was ready to sail.
This was intended to operate against New York and Philadelphia; and was to be followed in about a month by two others, one of which was to operate against Boston and other New England seaports; and the other to attack Baltimore, and thence work southward, bombarding the cities of Washington, Norfolk, Charleston and Savannah.
The first fleet consisted of the turret ships:
Victoria, 11,470 tons, two 110 ton guns.
Sanspareil, 11,470 tons, one 70 ton gun, twelve 6 inch.
Edinburgh, 9,150 tons, four 45 ton guns, five 6 inch.
The armored ships:
Camperdown, 10,000 tons, four 67 ton guns, six 6 inch.
Collingwood, 9,150 tons, four 44 ton guns, six 6 inch.
Howe, 9,700 tons, four 67 ton guns, four 6 inch.
The partially armed cruisers:
Orlando, 5,000 tons, two 9 inch guns, ten 6 inch.
Narcissus, 5,000 tons, two 9 inch guns, ten 6 inch.
Undaunted, 5,000 tons, two 9 inch guns, ten 6 inch.
and the improvised merchant cruisers:
Etruria, Umbria and City of New York.
Besides these large vessels, were numerous second and third class cruisers, despatch boats, and torpedo boats and launches; so that the total number of vessels, large and small, in the fleet, considerably exceeded one hundred—and all of the larger ones were armed with the most formidable weapons known to modern science; many of which had a range of more than ten miles.
he date of the sailing of this formidable fleet (the 20th
of April) was, of course, cabled over the French Cable to New York—the English Cables, having been seized by the Canadian Government, being no longer available to the Americans.
The destination of the fleet could only be surmised, as it sailed under sealed orders; but it was taken for granted that it was New York, and preparations were made accordingly. Immediately after England's declaration of war, the President issued a call for 250,000 volunteers, which had been responded to by more than a million men. The New York City Militia volunteered in a body to do garrison duty in the forts of the harbor, and such of the old guns as didn't burst at the first few experimental discharges at the targets, were burnished up, and made to look as formidable as possible. The marine militia drilled constantly by night and by day; and the bay and harbor seemed fairly alive with small craft of all kinds, rushing hither and thither, each one bent upon some offensive or defensive experiment. Stationary and movable torpedoes were placed in the upper Bay and Narrows, and the whole available naval force of the nation, amounting, great and small, to about thirty vessels, were concentrated in the harbor.
Several submarine torpedo boats—of which great things were expected—were giving exhibitions of their prowess constantly, diving under the bottoms of the excursion steamboats as they went up and down the bay, and inflicting a vast amount of needless terror upon the timid excursionists. Each and every one of these little vessels had demonstrated the fact conclusively that she could dive under the largest man of war afloat, and affixing a torpedo to her bottom, could withdraw to a safe distance, and then by an electric battery, blow the great war ship into a million smithereens. Whenever any of them appeared on the surface of the bay, therefore, they were regarded with great awe by the spectators, and were greeted with such remarks as "I wonder what the Englishmen will think of that little thing." "Who would think that such an insignificant looking little boat could do so much damage?" "She has got dynamite enough on board to blow up all New York," &c., &c., and a feeling of absolute confidence in the defensive preparations, which had been so hastily made, pervaded all classes of citizens.
Interspersed with these expressions of satisfaction, would frequently be heard sarcastic regrets that the Englishmen were running headlong to inevitable death and annihilation, and the comic illustrated journals acquired great éclat from their numerous cartoons, in which John Bull was invariably represented as being in extremis.
Meanwhile, the volunteers who had responded to the President's call, were being rapidly mobilized and equipped; and camps were established at Plattsburgh and Buffalo and Detroit; as well as at a point on the Pacific coast near Victoria in British Columbia. Thus the Dominion was threatened with invasion at points nearly three thousand miles apart; and the prospect was that before the summer was over, the military operations on both sides would assume proportions as gigantic as those which had astonished the world during the War of the Rebellion.
Many of the volunteers were veterans of that war; and therefore the work of drilling them and making competent soldiers of them, went forward with incredible rapidity; and within less than sixty days from the issuing of the President's proclamation, the United States had a thoroughly well armed, well drilled, and well equipped force of over 200,000 men in the field, ready to march across the frontier. On the fifteenth of April the first entry was made on Canadian Territory. Ten thousand men in two detachments crossed the Detroit River, and took possession of Windsor, opposite Detroit. A slight opposition to the landing of this force was attempted by a small detachment of Canadian Militia, who after firing a scattering volley at the ferry-boats containing the Americans, beat a hasty retreat when the latter began to return the fire.
Two days later, a force of about 25,000 men crossed the Niagara River near Buffalo, and at once marched inland, with a view of taking possession of the Welland Canal, and damaging it in such a manner as to prevent the passage of some British gunboats, which had been reported as on their way from Halifax to the Upper Lakes. This was a most wise and timely movement; for if these vessels had gotten through the canal, the cities of Buffalo, Erie, Cleveland, Toledo, Sandusky, Detroit and Chicago, would have been completely at their mercy; as under an old treaty between the United States and England, neither power could have more than one war vessel at any time on the Lakes.
For this reason, the news of the success of this detachment in destroying the locks of the Welland Canal, so as to effectually prevent these vessels from reaching Lake Erie, was hailed with great delight by the entire press of the United States, and a grand chorus of jubilation was echoed from one end of the country to the other. The main body of the American troops, however, had been concentrated near Plattsburgh, in New York State, and were intended to operate against Montreal and Ottawa. This consisted of 75,000 men, under the immediate command of General Schofield, and this army crossed the Canadian frontier at the point where the Irish fenians had established their camp the preceding season, on the first day of May, 1890. No opposition to speak of was encountered, and the army advanced at once, by easy marches, towards the St. Lawrence River, with a view to the rapture of Montreal.
The movements of the detachment on the Pacific Coast had not been so prompt us those of the others. Numerous delays occurred in the arrival of equipments and supplies, and therefore that division of the force found itself utterly unable to move at the time specified—which had been fixed for not later than the 1st of May. This was the general situation on the 1st of May, 1890.
CHAPTER VI.
THE BRITISH FLEET ARRIVES OFF SANDY HOOK.
On the morning of the 10th of May, the telegraph operator stationed at Fire Island, telegraphed to New York that four large war vessels were in sight, proceeding slowly westward towards Sandy Hook.
Later in the day, numbers of other vessels were reported as also passing in the same direction; and it became evident that the long expected fleet had at length reached our shores. The excitement which this news caused in the cities of New York and Brooklyn was intense and indescribable.
Although it had been the uppermost thought in people's minds for months past, and in spite of the fact that there had been scarcely any other subject of conversation among the citizens, and notwithstanding the almost universal feeling of confidence which had possessed them in the efficiency of their defensive preparations, the news of the actual arrival of a hostile fleet—representing the most formidable naval power in the world, and presumably containing all the best and most approved offensive weapons known to modern science—seemed to exert an almost paralyzing effect upon the inhabitants of the two cities. The noisy and boisterous ebullitions, which usually accompany occasions of great public excitement, were entirely wanting. Business of all kinds was suspended, and in all of the down-town centers, groups of anxious and pale-faced men were to be encountered at every corner and street crossing, engaged in earnest, but quiet conversation. The lively spirit of braggadocio and bravado, which had heretofore been such a prominent feature of every gathering, large or small, when the pending "invasion" happened to be the subject of conversation, was noticeable by its total absence. Conversation was carried on almost entirely in hurried and anxious whispers; and anybody who raised his voice above a colloquial tone—whether it was an excited newsboy, shouting out the latest extra; or a half intoxicated tramp, yelling patriotic defiance to the hated British—was looked upon, much as the deliberate violator of some sacred spot would be regarded, by an enthusiastic believer in its sanctified character.
A complete hush seemed to have fallen upon the two cities; and a subdued air, as if some impending calamity had proclaimed its near approach, seized upon the people. For the first time, a faint idea of the real gravity of the situation seemed to dawn upon the public mind. Here was war, bitter, relentless, destructive, cruel war, at their very doors. In a day or two at the latest, possibly within a few hours, the thunder of distant cannon would be faintly heard, and the bursting and crashing of deadly shells would involve the city in ruin and desolation. What was to be done? How could this frightful downpour of dynamite shells be averted? What if those formidable marine monsters were able to defy the attacks of our insignificant looking little torpedo boats and rams. Supposing some of them should be destroyed; what if two, or three, or even one, should remain uninjured, and should proceed to pour its hail of deadly projectiles upon these defenseless and exposed cities? Who could tell where the shells might strike, or who would be safe from their deadly work? Many of the more timid of the inhabitants took time by the forelock and sought safety in flight. The newspapers, however, did much to avert what threatened to become a panic, by treating the whole subject in a light and cheerful vein, and their optimistic predictions were regarded as gospel truths by the great majority of the citizens.
CHAPTER VII.
THE BATTLE OF THE SWASH.
On the morning of the 11th of May, 1890, the British fleet crossed the bar, and steamed leisurely past Sandy Hook, and into the Swash and main ship channels. The movements of the fleet seemed to be characterized by great deliberation; as though there was nothing to fear, and no occasion for haste. The larger vessels were especially slow in their movements, and felt their way along in the most cautious manner, each one being guided or piloted by two or more torpedo boats, which kept a good distance in advance, and sounded the channel carefully and constantly, indicating by signals the course for the larger vessels to pursue. There was no haste, no confusion, no noise or cheering, and no apparent notice was taken of the balls and shells with which the antiquated guns on the forts on Long and Staten Islands,—with much noise and banging, but no harmful results,—managed to splash the water about half a mile or a mile away from anything that they were aimed at. Most of the smaller vessels gathered together near the point of Sandy Hook, with the evident intention of anchoring in the Horseshoe. Here the first real fighting took place. Some old wooden gunboats, (relics of the War of the Rebellion) had been hastily repaired and equipped with one or two guns; and had been stationed in the Horseshoe to act as a sort of a harassing or observing force. The intention had evidently been for them to watch the movements of the enemy from behind the shelter of Sandy Hook, possibly exchanging a few shots with some of his weaker vessels; and then, having acquired some knowledge of his movements and intentions, as well as a taste of his quality, to retire up the harbor, and join the remainder of the American fleet in the Upper Bay. They acquired much more knowledge than they bargained for; and, instead of a mere taste, they got a surfeit of the enemy's quality.
As the first large iron-clad—the "Camperdown,"—came within range, they opened fire on her from their eight-inch guns. Having to fire across the land (Sandy Hook) their first shots went away over the "Camperdown," and the shells exploded harmlessly in the shallow water miles away near the Coney Island shore.
The gunboats sat so low in the water, that their crews were obliged to elevate their guns considerably, so as to have the projectiles go clear of the land. This, of course, sent them away over the vessels at which they were aimed; and although the low point of Sandy Hook afforded them protection against the guns of the British, it also prevented their own guns from being of any service. This attack, however, seemed to spur the British Admiral into counter-action. A vigorous exchange of signals was made between various members of the fleet, and in a short time several of the torpedo boats and smaller armored cruisers ran close in, by Sandy Hook, and running up past the point and around into the Horseshoe, brought the American gunboats into plain sight, and point blank range. Of course the result of the contest between these modern iron-clads and the antiquated wooden tubs of the Americans, was a foregone conclusion, and in less than fifteen minutes from the time that the first gun was fired, the latter were disposed of in the most summary manner. One sank where she lay, her wooden hull having been perforated from stem to stern with the projectiles fired from two rapid firing machine guns on one of the British gunboats. Another one was disabled by a huge ten-inch shell, which struck her nearly amidships, and literally blew her all to pieces. The third one sought such safety as she could, by running aground, and her crew, having first set her on fire, took to their boats, and rowing ashore, disappeared in the thick cedar forest which covers this part of Sandy Hook. No appreciable loss or damage was inflicted upon the English vessels—all but one of which proceeded quietly to anchor in the Horseshoe. This one steamed rapidly out to the Flagship, communicated the result of the action to the Admiral, and received orders to escort the remaining smaller vessels of the fleet to the sheltered anchorage which had been so quickly and easily won. The merchant cruisers, "Umbria," "Etruria" and "City of New York" also anchored in the Horseshoe. Shortly after these vessels had anchored, fire was opened upon them from an earth-work on the Highlands of Navesink, which had been hastily thrown up, and mounted with five or six old smoothbore Dahlgreen guns.
A few well aimed shells soon drove the men away from this battery, and although on occasional shell was sent in that direction at intervals during the remainder of the day, the Dahlgreens were thenceforward dumb.
Meanwhile the balance of the fleet, consisting of the larger iron-clad battle ships and cruisers, had anchored in the Swash Channel, in a line extending nearly a mile and a half southeasterly from the point of intersection of the Swash with the Main Channel, near buoy fourteen. This position had evidently been previously selected by the English Admiral as the best one outside of the Narrows; which were supposed to be thoroughly protected by torpedoes and other submerged obstructions. Nothing had as yet been been of the American fleet. It was known to be assembled in the Upper Bay; but it seemed strange that it should thus permit the enemy to establish himself in a position of his own choosing, without any hindrance or opposition.
The position was a remote one, it is true; but, still, if the enemy's guns had a range as claimed—of over eleven miles,—a very large part of New York, and nearly the whole of Brooklyn, were within reach of his shells. There has never, so far as I can learn, any satisfactory reason been given for this strange lack of action on the part of the Americans. The only plausible explanation of it lies in the fact that they appreciated the vast disproportion between their own fleet and that of the enemy, and realizing the utter hopelessness of attacking the latter successfully by daylight, and on equal terms, determined to husband such strength as they possessed, and concentrate the whole of it in the night attack upon the English, which had been determined upon.
Thus it happened that the afternoon of the 11th of May passed quietly and uneventfully, save when the silence was broken by the distant reports of the guns from the Staten Island forts, or by the occasional shelling of the abandoned earthwork on the Highlands. Towards sundown a sort of a reconnaisance was made in the direction of the Narrows by three torpedo boats; but, as they approached within closer range of the guns of the forts, they abandoned their purpose without reaching the first line of submerged obstructions. One of them was disabled by a solid shot from Fort Richmond, and was towed back to the Horseshoe by her two consorts in an apparently sinking condition. As nightfall approached, there was an evident increase of excitement and activity on all the English vessels. Torpedo boats and steam launches, darted hither and thither from one of the anchorages to the other, evidently conveying orders and instructions for the coming night. Torpedo booms and nets were placed in position, and elaborate instructions were issued to each separate commander what to do in case of attack—steam was kept up on all vessels, and the electric search lights were thoroughly tested, so as to leave no doubt of their being in perfect order. Every preparation which experience or ingenuity could suggest, was made to resist any attack, no matter what its character might be, and no matter whence it came.
For the first time in the memory of living men, there were no harbor lights lighted that night. Orders had been given by telegraph to all the different light-house keepers not to light their lamps, for fear that the enemy might want to make some movement by night, which the lighthouses would aid him in accomplishing. So from Sandy Hook to Bobbin's Reef, in the Upper Bay, not a light was to be seen, except such as was shown by the English vessels.
As soon as darkness set in, the firing both from the forts and from the ships ceased; and an utter stillness fell upon the scene, broken only now and then by the shrill whistle of some boatswain, or the hoarse murmur of some loud-voiced petty officer, giving orders to the watch on duty.
This quiet condition of things continued until after midnight. At one o'clock A.M. all the light-houses in the harbor were lighted simultaneously, and the surprised Englishmen saw themselves surrounded with stationary and revolving lights, from Sandy Hook and the Navesink Highlands on the south, to Cheesequake and Princess Bay on the southwest and west; Elm Tree and Toad Hill on the north-west, and the Narrows and Robbin's Reef in the distant north.
A hasty consultation of their charts convinced them that these were merely the regular light-houses of the harbor; but if so, why had they not been lighted earlier? Evidently their darkness all the evening, and their simultaneous lighting at this late hour, proved that instructions had been given to their keepers in advance, and if so, must have been given with some object in view. So guns were fired, and signals were exchanged, and orders were given to the whole fleet to prepare for instant action, and the whole surface of the Lower Bay seemed to be illuminated as if by magic, by the powerful electric search lights which were turned in all directions, making everything plainly visible almost to the horizon.
A faint sound, as of the distant rushing of waters, was heard in the direction of the Narrows, and the word was passed quietly from officers to men: "They're coming now, boys. Look sharp; and be ready for them." It was the last of the ebb tide, and aided by it the American fleet made rapid progress down the bay.
Suddenly, to the great bewilderment and dismay of the English, a vast number of powerful electric lights seemed to spring out of the water in almost every direction around them. These were nearly as powerful as the search lights on their own vessels; and dazzled the eyes of the British so completely, that their search lights were rendered comparatively useless. Presuming, of course, that each of these was on board of a vessel, and therefore represented something to be destroyed, the English commenced blazing away with their guns, both great and small, directing them against these lights.
"I had no idea the beggars had such a big fleet," said the British Admiral to an officer standing near him on the dock of the flagship. "Why there must be nearly two hundred of them. But they must be small things, or we would know all about them. We have a list of every ship in their navy up to last winter, and all told, there were less than forty, so I don't fear them much."
If the admiral had only known then, what he discovered later on, he need have had still less fear of these lights, and moreover, might have saved a vast amount of valuable ammunition which was needlessly wasted; for these powerful lights, instead of proceeding from the deck or spars of hostile ships, were nothing more than decoy lights on long spar buoys, whose lower ends being loaded, permitted them to float upright with the tide, with about half their length out of water, thus raising the lights about fifteen to twenty feet above the surface of the bay. The lights were fed by powerful storage batteries, and had been turned on as they had been launched overboard from two swift little torpedo launches about a mile up the bay. The tide being ebb, carried them quickly down to where the enemy's fleet lay at anchor, and the latter, almost before they could realize their position, found themselves, as they supposed, in the midst of the American fleet.
These "Blinding buoys" as they were called, were one of the numerous ingenious devices which had been called into existence by the supposed approach of war.
They served their purpose of blinding and confusing the enemy admirably; and if the Americans had only had force enough to have enabled them to take advantage of the fright and confusion they occasioned, the result of the conflict would have been very different from what it was. When we consider however, the very limited means at their disposal, it will be seen that they accomplished results which seem well nigh incredible. The time of launching the "blinding buoys" had been carefully chosen, so as to utilize them for the longest possible period. The idea was to have them reach the anchored vessels about a quarter of an hour before the tide turned, so that they would remain among them as long as the slack water ebb lasted. So the Englishmen kept blazing away at them for nearly half an hour, without either inflicting any damage, or discovering their fraudulent character. In the noise and confusion, it became impossible to signal the other vessels of the fleet; and the wisdom of issuing detailed orders in advance was now apparent.
In pursuance of these orders, the "Etruria," and "Umbria," and "City of New York," and several of the other unarmored cruisers, slipped their cables, and ran quietly out to sea. The smaller gunboats, at anchor in the Horseshoe, extinguished all their lights, and gave no indication whatever of their presence. But the torpedo boats hastened to the scene of battle, eager to come to the assistance or the rescue of their more formidable consorts. And it was one of these, which first discovered the fraudulent character of the "blinding buoys."
This boat—the "Terror"—having fixed upon one of these electric lights as her own especial prey, made a dash for it, with the idea of affixing a torpedo to it, and blowing it skyward. Nearer and nearer it came—its dazzling brilliancy illuminating every part of the deck of the little vessel, whose officers and crew stood with bated breath, waiting for the crash which would indicate that their prey was within their reach.
"Now! Lookout! Hold fast! Here she is!" Every man braced himself and grasped some portion of the vessel nearest to him;—the rail—a stanchion—a rope—anything to steady himself by, until the force of the collision should have spent itself—when—behold! the light disappears under the bow; and reappears a moment later, swaying wildly from side to side, a dozen yards or more astern. There is no crash—no collision—no shock—no tangible thing against which to launch the waiting torpedo; only an exclamation by the man who had been quietly waiting for the proper moment to launch his deadly missile, of—"Well! I'll be d——d!" That was all.
The true character of the buoys having been thus discovered, no time was lost in conveying the information to the nearest of the large ships; which immediately ceased firing, and endeavored to signal her consorts to do the game. Owing to the smoke, however, it was some time before she could make her signals understood; and just she did so, an immense explosion took place under her side, which seemed almost to lift her, (monster though she was) out of the water; a shivering and crashing of machinery and iron work ensued, and the rushing waters poured into her hull, through a vast yawning chasm, which the dynamite shell had made in her side. She sank in about fifteen minutes—the first victim of Zalinski's dynamite gun. Most of her crew were rescued; although quite a number went down with her.
By this time, the smoke had cleared away, and the search lights were again beginning to be of some service, because the flood tide had commenced running, and had carried the buoys away in towards Staten Island. The lights enabled the English to discover several vessels; among which was the dynamite gun boat "Vesuvius," whose maiden effort had been so successful.
The slanting muzzles of her three guns could be plainly seen projecting above her deck; and their attendants were evidently getting them ready for another discharge. Two fast gun-boats, armed with rapid firing four-inch guns, were signalled to attack her, and disable her at once—which they proceeded to do with great promptness and despatch.
The vessel herself withstood the onslaught fairly well; but the muzzles of the long guns being entirely exposed, they were soon rendered useless; and the commander of the "Vesuvius," seeing that her usefulness was ended, sought safety in flight up the Bay.
Meanwhile the numerous torpedo boats were rushing to and fro, now and then succeeding in exploding a torpedo in the vicinity of one of the larger English vessels; but more frequently kept at a safe distance by the torpedo booms and nets.
The submarine boat "Destroyer," succeeded in partially destroying two iron-clads before she met destruction herself.
As this occurred in a most unexpected and curious manner, I will give an account of it, while describing the battle; although the particulars as to the manner of her destruction were not known until long after the conflict was over. She had successfully exploded large torpedoes directly under the bottoms of two of the English ships; completely disabling one, and nearly sinking the other; and had retired to a short distance from the scene of conflict, where she lay partially submerged, evidently preparing to attack the "Camperdown," one of the most formidable vessels of the fleet.
After a delay of about a half an hour, she was seen to start in the direction of the "Camperdown," and shortly before reaching that vessel, to disappear under water; presumably to go under her great adversary's bottom.
This was the last that was seen of her. The panic and excitement on the "Camperdown" was intense, as the officers and crew waited minute after minute for the inevitable crash, which would in all probability, sink their vessel, and involve the majority of themselves in certain death. But notwithstanding the suspense and terror which possessed them, not a man left his post, or refused to obey the orders of his superiors. The whole crew was mustered on deck, the boats were manned, life belts distributed among the men, crews were told off to each boat; and in a grim and deathlike silence they awaited the shock which would be the signal for them to leave their vessel, and trust themselves to the mercy of the waters. But they waited in vain. The shock never came. The "Destroyer" not only failed to destroy her vast antagonist, but failed also to re-appear herself on the surface of the water.