Transcriber’s Note:

Footnotes were lettered, beginning with ‘a’, on each page. They have been numerically resequenced for uniqueness and moved to follow the Book in which they are referenced.

Marginal Notes.

All marginal notes will appear prior to the paragraph they annotated as, prefixed with ‘Sidenote:’

The table of contents includes references in Book III to sections printed in the text as marginal notes. Each has been linked, including those that have no explicit page number, appearing as ‘——’, which serves as a ditto.

The Index serves for both Volume I and II. References to Volume I are underlined, and will open a separate browser. Your e-reader may not follow those links.

There was an Errata included in the text. The corrections listed there were made.

Minor errors, attributable to the printer, have been corrected. Please see the transcriber’s [note] at the end of this text for details regarding the handling of any textual issues encountered during its preparation.

The cover image was created by superimposing title page information on the original (and otherwise empty) cover.

Any corrections are indicated using an underline highlight. Placing the cursor over the correction will produce the original text in a small popup.

Any corrections are indicated as hyperlinks, which will navigate the reader to the corresponding entry in the corrections table in the note at the end of the text.

AN
INQUIRY
INTO THE
PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL OECONOMY:

BEING AN

ESSAY ON THE SCIENCE

OF

Domestic Policy in Free Nations.

IN WHICH ARE PARTICULARLY CONSIDERED

POPULATION, AGRICULTURE, TRADE, INDUSTRY,

MONEY, COIN, INTEREST, CIRCULATION, BANKS,

EXCHANGE, PUBLIC CREDIT, AND TAXES.

By Sir JAMES STEUART, Bart.

Ore trahit quodcumque potest atque addit acervo. Hor. Lib. I. Sat. 1

VOL. II.

LONDON:

Printed for A. Millar, and T. Cadell, in the Strand.

MDCCLXVII.

CONTENTS
OF THE
SECOND VOLUME.

BOOK III.

OF MONEY AND COIN.

PART II.

AN

INQUIRY

INTO THE

PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL OECONOMY.

BOOK III.
OF MONEY AND COIN.

PART II.
THE PRINCIPLES OF MONEY APPLIED TO TRADE.

CHAP. I.
Consequences of imposing the Price of Coinage, and the Duty of Seignorage upon the Coin of a Nation, so far as they affect the Price of Bullion, and that of all other Commodities.

The political oeconomy of modern states is so involved with the interests of commerce, that it is necessary at every step we make, to keep in our eye the combinations which arise from that quarter.

Whatever tends to simplify an intricate theory, greatly assists the mind: dividing this book into two parts, seems, as it were, dividing the burden it has to carry: the principles already deduced may there ripen by a short pause, and the analogy of the matter which is to follow in the second part, where new combinations are taken in, will recall them to the mind and fix them in the memory.

Intricacy of this subject.

I am now to examine one of the nicest principles in the whole doctrine of money, to wit, the effects of imposing the price of coinage, and the duty of seignorage upon coin.

When this question is considered in relation to all the combinations which arise, 1. from the nature of coin considered as a metal, and at the same time as a money of accompt; 2. from the influence this duty has upon the price of commodities; and 3. from the imposition as[as] affecting, directly, the nation which lays it on, and all other nations trading with it occasionally: when all these combinations are taken together, I say nothing will be found more difficult than to reduce this question to a distinct theory.

What I have to say upon it has found a place in this inquiry, rather with a view to suggest ideas to men of a better capacity, than from the hopes of satisfying my readers in every particular.

Recapitulation of some principles.

I have said, that gold and silver are commodities merely like every other thing. I have shewn the utter impossibility of their being a scale, or an invariable measure of value. I have observed that their being made into coin (among trading nations) has not the effect of rendring them less a commodity than they were before, except so far, as by that operation every piece, instead of being valued by its own weight, comes to be in the mean proportion of all the pieces which compose the currency: and I have shewn how the operations of trade are capable to sift out and establish this mean proportion, in spite of very great irregularities. These are the principles laid down in the first part, which we must keep in our eye while we examine the question.

Since gold and silver, then, are commodities like every other thing, the invariable scale of value must measure them as well as every other commodity, and money of accompt must be considered in no other light, than as a scale for expressing the proportional value of grains of metals, yards of stuffs, pounds of wares, bushels of grain, or gallons of liquors. In this view, when we mention a hundred pounds, it is just as proper to consider this value relatively to the measure of any merchandize, as to the metalic measure of the coin. Every merchandize, when considered by itself, should be measured by its own measure, gold by grains, liquors by gallons, wheat by bushels, &c. The denominations of pounds, shillings, and pence, are only necessary for reducing all other sorts of weights and measures to an equation of value. This is what is understood by the universal scale of proportional value. I think this idea is sufficiently clear.

The first introduction of coinage must make prices fall.

Let us now suppose a country where the invention of coin is not known, and where a yard of cloth of a certain quality, is commonly sold for 100 grains of either silver or gold, no matter which. The state falls upon the invention of coining, the conveniency of which every body understands. This coinage, I suppose, costs 2 per cent. Coin is introduced, and commodities are ordered to be bought with it. I ask, what effect ought this revolution to produce upon the price of the cloth, according to strict theory, and without taking in any other combination of circumstances? I answer, that the cloth ought in reason to fall 2 per cent. that is, that the price of a yard ought to be a coin of 98 grains. Here is the reason: He who formerly had the 100 grains, had the value of the yard of cloth, and could change the one for the other when he would. Now he has the 100 grains, but he must give two grains to have it coined, before he can buy; because after this invention people will not trust to the weighing of private people, nor to the purity of the metals; but they will believe, upon the authority of the stamp, that in every piece a certain number of grains of the fine metal is contained. He, therefore, who has a coin of 98 grains, comes to the merchant, and offers him his coin for his yard of cloth; the merchant demands a coin of 100 grains, says the other, these 98 grains which I give you in coin, cost me two grains to have their weight and fineness ascertained; and if you refuse to repay me for what I have paid for this manufacture which I offer you for your cloth, I may with equal reason refuse to pay you for what you paid for weaving your wool into cloth. Now since I, in buying your cloth, must pay the weaver, so you, in buying my piece, must pay the mint. The merchant, convinced by this reasoning, takes the piece, and as it circulates from hand to hand, every commodity given in exchange for it, must fall 2 per cent. relatively to the grains of metal it was worth before.

Consequences of the exclusive privilege of coinage.

Farther, if by the laws and customs of a country, coin is absolutely necessary for buying and selling, this coin must be had; and if there be but one person who can make it, the price he thinks fit to demand for it is the only measure of the value of fabrication. The grains of the metals, therefore, in the coin, must rise in their proportional value to yards of cloth, and to gallons of liquor, in proportion to the cost of coinage, as the pounds of wool and silk must rise in their value in proportion to their manufacture.

From this it follows, that since the value of coin must rise in proportion to every commodity, it must also rise with respect to the metals it is made of, just as wool manufactured rises with respect to wool which is not manufactured.

Now let us suppose that a Prince finding that he has the exclusive privilege of making coin, shall raise his price of coinage to 8 per cent. what will the consequence be?

The first consequence of this will be to destroy, or at least to perplex the ideas of his subjects with regard to coin, and to make them believe, that it is the stamp, and not the metal which constitutes the value of it.

The next consequence will be, to reduce the price of the yard of cloth, which was worth 100 grains of metal before the invention of coinage, from 98, where it stood, to 92. Now let us suppose that this country, which we shall call (F), is in the neighbourhood of another which we shall call (E), where there is both cloth of the same quality, and coin of the same weight and fineness, which costs nothing for the coinage. In the country (E), cæteris paribus, the yard of cloth must be sold for 100 grains, as it sold formerly in the country (F) before the coinage was imposed. If the country (F) wants the cloth of the country (E), the cloth they demand must cost (F) 100 grains the yard. If the country (E) wants the cloth of the country (F), this cloth will also cost 100 grains; because to procure a coin of 92 grains of the country (F), (E) must pay 8 grains for the coinage, which raises the price of the cloth to 100 grains.

A wrong balance of trade raises the price of bullion to the value of coin,

Let us now suppose, that for a certain time the country (F) has absolute occasion for the cloth of the country (E). The merchants of (F) who carry on this trade, must send bullion to (E) to pay for this cloth. But the merchants of the country (F) who deal in bullion, perceiving the usefulness of it for this trade, will then raise the price of the 100 grains of it above the 92 grains in coin (the common market price of bullion before this trade was known) and according to the demand made for the foreign cloth, the bullion will rise in the country (F), until 100 grains of it become exactly worth 100 grains in coin. The bullion can never rise higher; because at that period, the coin itself will be exported for bullion; and the country of (E) will accept of 100 grains in their coin as willingly as in any other form. Nor will it ever fall lower than 92 grains; because the mint in the country (F) is always ready to give that price for all the bullion which is brought to be coined.

Here then is a case, where the coin is made to lose all its advanced price as a manufacture, and this is owing entirely to its being a metal as well as a money of accompt.

Now as the coin has lost this additional value, by a circumstance purely relative to itself as a metal, there is no reason why other merchandize should sink in value along with it.

and ought to raise proportionally the price of commodities.

The consequence, therefore, of this revolution ought to be, that as the merchandize, bullion, has got up 8 per cent. with regard to the coin, and as the price of all merchandize ought to be in proportion to the grains of bullion to which that price amounts, the revolution having annihilated the 8 per cent. advance upon the coin, ought to have the same effect with respect to prices as if coinage were given gratis, as in the country of (E); that is, the yard of cloth ought at this time to cost, in the country of (F), 100 grains, either of coin or bullion, since they are of the same value.

Farther, in proportion as this demand for bullion comes to diminish, that is to say, in proportion as the balance of trade becomes less unfavourable to the country of (F), in the same proportion will coin rise in its price, when compared with bullion; and when the country of (E), in its turn, comes to have occasion for the country of (F), then (E) must pay as formerly for a yard of cloth 92 grains in bullion, and the remaining 8 grains to have it coined; in which case, the yard of cloth will fall to the old price of 92 grains in coin, and will stand at 100 grains in bullion as before.

Did the price of a manufacture rise and fall as has been here represented, it is plain that these variations would be constantly determined by the proportion of the grains of the metals it costs to acquire the coin which is the price of the manufacture.

We have seen that upon the institution of coinage and seigniorage, the yard of cloth fell to 92 grains; because then it was impossible to procure coin at a less price than 8 per cent. but when the balance of trade had sunk the coin to the value of bullion, then the 92 grains of the coin being to be purchased with 92 grains of bullion, it was reasonable that the cloth should rise to its former price; because then no body could say that the coin of 92 grains had cost 100 to procure it.

But this theory does not hold in practice, nor can it possibly hold, as long as the greatest part of a people are ignorant of, and even do not feel the revolutions we have been here describing.

How traders obstruct the operation of these principles, while the balance of trade continues fluctuating,

The price of bullion is entirely regulated by merchants, who have the whole correspondence in their hands. It rises and falls in countries where coinage is imposed, in proportion to the state of the balance of trade at the time. The smallest rise or fall in the demand for bullion in the market, is immediately marked by the price of it, and that ought (by the principles we have been laying down) to regulate the rise and fall of every commodity. But this is by no means the case. Commodities rise and fall only after a certain time; and of this interval merchants will constantly profit. Does the price of bullion rise, they immediately sell to strangers as if all prices were immediately risen; but with regard to manufacturers[manufacturers], they hide the revolution with great care, and preserve prices from rising, until the competition among themselves discovers the secret. Does the price of bullion fall, they do all they can to keep up the prices of every commodity which they sell to strangers, until the competition among themselves obliges them to bring them down; and with regard to manufactures, they are all in one interest to reduce the prices in proportion to the fall of the bullion, which works its effects by slow degrees.

and how an overturned balance of trade attaches prices to the denominations of coin.

These are the operations of traders, in times when there is a fluctuation in the balance of the trade of a country; that is to say, in times when the balance is sometimes favourable and sometimes not.

At such times the true influence which trade ought to have upon prices is never exactly known, but to the merchants, who seldom fail to profit of their knowledge, in place of communicating it for the benefit of the society. But that is not the case when the balance of trade is quite overturned, that is, when it remains for a long time against a nation, without any favourable vibration; as we shall presently explain.

We have seen how, by the changes in the balance of trade, the price of bullion is made susceptible of a variation in its value, equal to the price of coinage; and we have pointed out the principle which confines the variation within certain limits; to wit, the value of the coin as a metal, which prevents bullion from rising higher; and the mint price, which preserves it from falling lower.

We have observed how merchants may profit of such variations, and how they obstruct the operation of principles upon the rise and fall of prices. We now proceed to another chain of causes, which tend greatly to destroy the due proportion of value between coin and merchandize. This with justice may be put also to the account of the imperfection of the metals in performing the functions of money of accompt.

Universal experience shews that the prices of merchandize are so attached to the denominations of coin, that they do not fluctuate as principles point out, any more than projectiles describe parabolas, or that machines operate the effects, which by calculation they ought to do. The resistance of the air in one case, the friction of the parts in the other, tend to render theory incorrect. Just so here, our theory represents prices as rising and sinking in the most harmonious proportion together with the metals; but in practice it is not so. They have their frictions and political resistances, which only render the theory delusive when every circumstance is not combined. A good gunner must calculate the resistance of the air upon his bomb, or he never will hit the mark.

We have already shewn how the interests of mercantile people tend to obstruct the due fluctuation of prices; we must now take in other combinations.

Although this be not a proper place to resume a discussion of the particular theory of the rise and fall of prices, yet still something must be said upon that subject, in order to bring the question we are upon to some sort of solution.

How profits consolidate into prime cost,

First then, it will be agreed that it is far easier to make a price rise, than to make it fall. I believe I might take this for granted, without giving the reason for it. At all times, a price which has long stood low, may be made to rise; but it is next to impossible to make a price which has long stood high, to fall in the same manner. Here is the reason: Let me suppose the yard of an extensive manufacture which occupies a number of hands, to be worth 100 grains. The workmen here live nearly at the same expence, and I suppose them to live upon the profits of their work, when they sell at 100 grains a yard. The price rises to 120; here is an additional profit of 20 grains. If a sudden turn should diminish the demand which raised the price of the merchandize, it will fall to the old rate without much difficulty; the workmen will consider the 20 grains addition as a precarious profit upon which they cannot reckon: but let the price of 120 grains remain uniformly for some years, the 20 grains will cease to be precarious profits; they will consolidate, as we have called it, into the value of the merchandize; because the workmen, by having long enjoyed them, will have bettered their way of living; and as they are many, and live uniformly, any thing which obliges them to retrench a part of their habitual expence, is supposed to deprive them of necessaries.

and are preserved upon articles of home consumption,

This is sufficient, as a hint, upon a subject which branches out into an infinity of different relations, not at all to the present purpose. But it is very much to the purpose to shew how the imposition of coinage must, on many occasions, have the effect of attaching the price of commodities to the denominations of the coin, instead of preserving them attached to the grains of the metals which compose them, as in theory they ought to be.

When wars, e. g. occasion a wrong balance to continue for many years against a nation, this keeps coin at par with bullion for a long time. Is it not very natural, that during that time manufacturers should estimate their work according to the coin, and not as formerly, according to the bullion? The consequence of this is, that when peace returns, and when coin begins to rise above the price of bullion, the manufacturers stick to the denominations of the coin, instead of descending in value (as they ought to do by theory) along with the bullion. What is the consequence of this? It is that the prices of manufactures for home consumption, and of commodities peculiar to the country, stand their ground; that is, prices do not descend, and cannot be brought down by merchants.

but are torn away by foreign competition for articles of exportation.

But as to manufactures for exportation, which are not peculiar, but which are produced by different countries, their prices are violently pulled down by foreign competition; and the workmen are forced to diminish them. This hurts them effectually, not because of the diminution of the prices; because, properly speaking, this diminution is only relative to the denominations of the coin; their gains[gains] will purchase as many grains of bullion in the market as before, but not so much coin, and consequently not so much of any commodity which, by the principles just laid down, have attached themselves to the denominations of the coin, and have risen in their price along with it.

From this short exposition of a very intricate matter, we may conclude, that the imposition of coinage does not raise the price of such merchandize as is in common to several nations, and which trade demands from each, without any competition with the natives; that is to say, the prices of them stand as formerly with respect to strangers; because although the prices be made to sink at home, with respect to the denominations of the coin, yet strangers, being obliged to pay for them in those denominations, are also obliged to pay an advanced price for the coin, in order to procure them. This is the price of coinage. This, I confess, is a little subtil, but I believe the reasoning will be found just.

On the other hand, when trade extends itself to other commodities, to those, I mean, which it buys in competition with the natives (and which are made to rise and fall from the vicissitudes of inland demand) or to such commodities as are peculiar to the country; in these cases, I have little doubt but the prices, once raised and continued high for some time, attach themselves to the denominations of the coin, and rise along with it; that is to say, coinage is included over and above the price which the merchandize would have born had no coinage been imposed.

How this hurts the industrious, and how the state may indemnify them.

The conclusion I draw from this reasoning, is, that the imposition of coinage has not, in fact, the effect of reducing the prices of commodities to fewer grains of bullion than before, excepting those of such commodities as are sold in competition with other nations; and even then it may be said, that it is not the imposition of the coinage, but the competition with strangers, which reduces them to the minimum of their value, as well as the profits of those who work in them, to the minimum of a physical necessary. This last circumstance shews why those who work for foreign exportation, are the poorest class of all the industrious of a state, but the most useful to it, at the same time. I believe experience supports the truth of these conclusions. I shall here by the bye observe, that as the state is made to profit by the diminution of the profits of this most useful class; as she receives the coinage which strangers pay, and which is really deducted from the manufacturers who support exportation, she ought to indemnify this class (as may be done in a thousand ways, by premiums, for example, upon exportation) out of the profits arising upon coinage, instead of making coinage free, to the evident loss of the nation, and benefit to strangers, as we shall now endeavour to prove.

CHAP. II.
Concerning the Influence which the imposing the Price of Coinage, and the Duty of Seigniorage in the English Mint, will have upon the Course of Exchange, and Trade of Great Britain.

Theory of prices upon articles of exportation.

In the preceding chapter we have examined a very nice theory, into which such a number of circumstances have been combined, depending upon facts, that little stress is to be laid upon several conclusions which have been drawn from it, unless they be approved by experience.

Let the best workman in London make a watch, he cannot depend upon its being a good one, until it be tried; and when that is done, the application of his theory will enable him to discover all the defects and irregularities in the movement. It is just so in political matters. The force of theory is not sufficient to form a good plan; but it is useful for discovering many faults which would not have been foreseen without it. The more extensive, therefore, any theory is made, the more it is useful for these purposes. It is proper only to observe that the more complicated any principle of it is, the less dependance can be had upon its operation when applied to practice.

It is impossible to lay down a distinct theory for the rise and fall of the prices of all sorts of commodities in a nation such as Great Britain. All that can be said with certainty, is, that competition on the part of the consumers will make them rise, and that competition on the part of the furnishers will make them fall. Now the competition among the furnishers may be reduced to theory; because it is fixed within determinate limits, which it cannot exceed, and is influenced by this principle, viz. that when profits are reduced to the minimum (that is to the exact physical-necessary of the workman) all competition among furnishers must cease.

But the competition among consumers is fixed within no determinate limits: some demand to satisfy physical wants; others those of vanity and caprice. Most inland demand for consumption is of this kind, and consequently it is impossible to foresee what effect the imposition of coinage will have upon the prices of many commodities. Perhaps they will fluctuate with bullion; perhaps they will adhere to the denominations of the coin: experience alone can bring this matter to light.

But with regard to such commodities as are the object of foreign trade, prices are influenced by certain principles on both sides. Merchants, not the consumers themselves, are the demanders here. Neither vanity or caprice, but profit, regulates the price they offer. Thus it is, that as all competition among furnishers must cease upon the reduction of profits to the minimum, so all demand from merchants (who in this case represent the consumers) must cease, so soon as prices rise above what they can afford to give, consistent with their minimum of profit upon the sale of what they buy.

The degree, therefore, of foreign competition will alone regulate the prices of several exportable commodities, and of consequence the profits of such as are employed in them, as has been said. This premised, we come to examine the influence which the imposition of coinage would have upon the course of exchange and trade of a nation.

How the course of exchange is regulated.

In speaking of exchange, so far as it influences the decision of this question, we must throw out all extraneous circumstances, and endeavour to reduce it to the plainest theory.

When one nation pays to another the price of what they buy, the interposition of bullion is unavoidable; and the whole operation consists in comparing the value of coin with the value of bullion in the one and in the other.

Price of exchange what?

Suppose France to owe to England 1000 pound sterling; what regulates exchange here, is the price of bullion in Paris and in London. The French merchant inquires first, what is the quantity of bullion in London, which at that time is equal to the sum he wants to pay? And next, what that quantity of bullion costs to procure in the Paris market? Upon this the par of exchange ought to be regulated. Whatever is given more than this quantity is the price of transportation, when the balance of trade is against France. Whatever is given less, may be considered as the price of transportation which the English would be obliged to pay were the balance against England, if the French merchant, by sending his paper to London, did not save them the trouble, by diminishing so far the balance against them; and of this he profits, until the balance turns to the other side. Now let us leave the price of transportation out of the question, and consider only how the imposition of coinage, by affecting the price of bullion, may influence the course of exchange.

Where coinage is free the price of bullion ought to be invariable,

We have seen how the imposition of coinage renders the price of bullion susceptible of a variation in its price, equal to the amount of the imposition. Wherever, therefore, coinage costs nothing, there bullion and coin must always be of the same value. This would be the case in England, without doubt, were the metals in the coin exactly proportioned, were all the coin of a legal weight, and were neither melting down, or exporting made penal.

and fluctuating where coinage is imposed.

The bullion, therefore, in France may vary 8 per cent. in its price, according to the balance of trade; the bullion in England must be supposed invariable, let the balance stand as it will.

Bullion in England dearer than in France,

According to this representation of the matter, may we not say, that bullion in England is always at the highest price it ever can be in France, since it is at the price of the coin? Is not this the condition of France, when the balance of her trade is the most unfavourable it possibly can be?

because the price of it is kept up by the mint,

If therefore England, herself, contributes to keep the price of her bullion higher than it is in France, is not this an advantage to France, since France can buy the bullion with which she pays her English debts cheap in her own market, and can sell it dear in that of her creditor? Is there not a profit in buying an ox cheap in the country, and selling him dear in Smithfield market?

and is allowed to fall in France 8 per cent. below the coin.

Now why is bullion sometimes cheaper in France than in England? I answer, that in France it is allowed to fall 8 per cent. below the coin, and the King only takes it at times when no body can get a better price for it: and that in England the King gives always coin for bullion, and by that keeps the price of it from ever falling lower. Let the English mint pay the pound troy standard silver at the rate of thirteen ounces of coin, the price of bullion in England will always be ¹⁄₁₃ dearer than the coin.

When bullion in France falls to 8 per cent. below the coin, it is carried to the mint: when it is worth more no body carries any to be coined.

The wise regulation.

No body in France (except upon a general coinage) is forced to sell their bullion at this price. Is it not, therefore, a very wise regulation, to permit the operations of trade to reduce, as low as possible, the value of that commodity with which all they owe is paid, and this more especially, as the fall of its price is a proof of the prosperity of their trade.

If, therefore, it be supposed, that the effect of having a material money for a scale of value, is, that the denominations in the coin, and not the grains of the bullion, must measure the value of commodities for home consumption; then it follows, that the variations in the price of bullion, should not affect the price of commodities.

This is a question, however, which I do not pretend to determine, and I apprehend that nothing but experience can resolve it.

England loses by this sometimes 8 per cent. upon her trade with France.

Now let me consider the difference there is between the trade of France and that of England as matters now stand; and what would be the case, were the regulations of the mint the same in both countries.

I shall suppose that England buys of French goods as much as may be paid with one thousand pounds troy weight of English guineas. I ask for what weight of French louis d’ors must France buy of English goods to make the balance even? Will it not be answered (according to the ordinary method of calculating the true par of exchange) that if France buys for one thousand pounds troy of her louis d’ors (supposing the guineas and the louis d’ors of the same fineness) that the balance is even?

Is it not true, that England must send this thousand pounds weight either in gold bullion or in guineas, and is it not the same thing to the English merchant to send the one or the other, providing the guineas be full weight?

But when France comes to send the thousand pounds weight of her louis d’ors, she finds at market a thousand pounds weight of gold bullion 8 per cent. cheaper, and this bullion is as good to the Englishman as if he had got the louis d’ors.

Let me state the case otherwise. Suppose France buys in England for 1000 pounds weight of her guineas in Virginia tobacco; and that England buys in France for 1000 pounds weight of her louis d’ors of Bourdeaux claret. Is not this called par?[par?] Will not France pay her debt to England with 1000 pound of gold bullion? Whereas England must pay 1080 pounds to France; because 1000 pounds weight of her louis d’ors, is worth in France 1080 pounds of any bullion of the same standard. The 1000 pounds then compensates the 1000 pounds; the 80 pounds over must be sent to France, and the carriage of this quantity only, must be paid for according to the principles of exchange.

Here is evidently a balance of trade against England of 8 per cent. above the real par of the metals. Will any body say that the 8 per cent. is paid for the transportation of 80 pounds of bullion due? Certainly not.

Now if the English should declare that they, for the future, would coin neither gold or silver bullion for any person, but at the rate of 8 per cent. below the value of the coin; and if it be true, that this regulation would have the effect of linking the price of bullion, on many occasions, to 8 per cent. below the coin; in that case, would not the English and the French acquit their debts of the 1000 pounds weight of their respective coin upon the same conditions? In this case, would not the price of exchange vanish, since there would be no bullion to be sent by either party? But in the first case, would not England be obliged to send 8 per cent. above the quantity of gold bullion she received from France, and would not the transportation of this cost money, and would not this transportation be marked by a certain price of exchange, and consequently, would not the price of exchange rise against England?

But to this it is objected, that by the former example, the exchange marked 8 per cent. against England with great reason; because it is plain, that there is a balance of 8 per cent. against England, since she has sent that proportion over to France in bullion. Very true. But had England, instead of taking to the value of 1000 pounds weight of louis d’ors in claret, taken only for 100 pounds weight, the exchange would have still marked 8 per cent. loss; because the 100 pounds of louis d’ors must be paid with the 108 pounds of bullion, although England by this trade has evidently gained 892 pounds of bullion, which France must send her as a balance.

As matters of fact, when they can be procured, tend greatly to confirm theory, by forming a solid basis whereupon to reason, I shall here profit of one which has fallen into my hands, and by applying it to the present question, endeavour to give some additional force to this reasoning.

and at a medium 4 per cent. as is proved by a matter of fact.

Mr. Cantillon, in his Analysis of Trade, which I suppose he understood by practice as well as by theory, has the following passage in his 99th page.

“The course of exchange between Paris and London since the year 1726, has been at a medium price of 32 pence sterling for the crown of three livres; that is to say, we pay for this French crown of three livres, 32 pence sterling, when calculated on gold, when in fact it is worth but thirty pence and three farthings, which is giving four pounds in the hundred for this French money; and consequently, upon gold, the balance of trade is 4 per cent. against England in favour of France.”

In this place, Mr. Cantillon calculates the par of exchange according to the common rule, to wit, gold bullion against gold bullion in the coins of both nations, where both are of legal weight; and he finds that there has been, these thirty four years past, a balance of 4 per cent. against England.

Now according to my theory, this is exactly what the coinage in France ought to produce, supposing on an average that the trade had been at par. Here is the reason.

The coinage in France costs 8 per cent.

When the balance of trade is favourable for France, coin is worth 8 per cent. above bullion.

The proof is plain. Were it not 8 per cent. above bullion, no man would ever carry bullion to the mint; because the mint price is 8 per cent. below that of the coin.

When the balance of trade is against France, coin must fall nearly to the price of bullion.

Supposing then that the balance of the trade of France (at a medium of thirty four years) is found to have been at par, will it not follow, that at a medium also of these thirty four years, French coin must have been at 4 per cent. (the half of the coinage) above bullion? Consequently England having taken merchandize from France, and France having merchandize from England, for the same weight and fineness in their respective coins, must not England have been obliged to send to France 4 per cent. more bullion in order to pay the coinage? This reasoning appears conclusive to me, who am no merchant, and who do by no means pretend to a perfect understanding of those affairs; but I think this circumstance is at least of sufficient importance to make the matter be inquired into. For this purpose, I shall suggest a method of making the discovery.

Easy to be verified at all times by the price of bullion and course of exchange in the Paris market.

If it shall be found, that English draughts on Paris, or French remittances to England, shall at any time occasion bullion to rise in the market of Paris above the mint price, will it not be allowed that such a circumstance demonstrates that the balance of trade is then in favour of England? If at that same time it shall be found, that exchange (when reckoned upon the gold as Cantillon has done) is against England, will it not be a demonstration of the truth of what I have here suggested as a question worthy of examination?

When bullion is exported to England, exchange is against France.

For if the balance of trade be against France, so as to make her buy bullion to send to England, this is a proof that she owes England a balance; and if at the same time the English are paying above the intrinsic value of the metals (in their respective coins) in what they owe to France, that additional value cannot be paid by England as the price of exchange, or to pay for the transportation of their bullion, but to pay the French creditors the additional value of their coin above the price of bullion.

Course of exchange no rule of judging of the balance of trade, but only of the value of coin.

May we not also conclude, that in a kingdom such as England, where coinage is free, the course of exchange is no certain rule for judging of the balance of trade with France; but only of the value of French coin above French bullion. All authors who have written upon exchange, represent the advanced price given upon bills above the intrinsic value of the coins, to be the price of carriage and insurance, &c. in which case exchange, no doubt, may mark the balance of trade; but if an advanced price must be given in order to put bullion into coin, or in other words, if the metals in the coin are worth 8 per cent. more than any bullion of the same fineness, is it not evident that a nation may be drawing a great balance of bullion from another, although she be, at the same time, paying 8 per cent. above the rate of bullion in the sums she repays to the nation which is her debtor upon the whole; that is to say, although she be paying above the real par of exchange, as it is commonly calculated.

If it be here objected that this cannot be the case, because when the balance of trade is against the nation which imposes coinage, their coin falls to the price of bullion: I answer, that a balance may be against such a nation, without producing so great a fall in the coin. Coin is reduced to the par of bullion only when the balance is at the height against a nation, and when it has remained so for a long time. Who would give coin at a discount of 8 per cent. if there was a prospect that in a few days, weeks, or even months, it was to rise to its former value?

These are the reasons which engaged me, in a former chapter, to lay it down as a rule, that trading states should endeavour, as nearly as possible, to observe the same regulations with their neighbours, in every thing relating to their coin. It is also in order to facilitate such a regulation, that I shall insert, at the end of this book, a very particular state of the French coinage, and of what I can gather with regard to that of Holland.

The real par not to be calculated by the intrinsic value of the coin, unless bills were drawn in weight of fine bullion.

From what has been said, it appears that the common method of calculating the real par of exchange is not correct, since it is calculated by comparing the quantity of fine bullion in different coins, and attributing the difference between the bullion paid for the paper, and the bullion received in payment of it, as the price of transportation. This, I say, is by no means correct; nor is it possible it should be so, unless bills of exchange were specified in the weight of fine bullion, instead of being specified in the denominations of the coin: an example will make this plain.

Were a merchant in London to ask of another who has a correspondence in Paris, to give him an order for a hundred yards of Abbeville cloth, and to offer him, in exchange, the same quantity of cloth of a worse quality, would not the merchant to whom the proposal is made, immediately calculate the value of both commodities, and demand the difference of the value between what he was to give, and what he was to receive? Could ever this difference be considered as any thing else than the difference between the real worth of the commodities? But were they to exchange at London an hundred pounds of fine silver bullion, for the same weight at Paris; then if the merchant demanded one grain more than he was to give, it must be upon the account of transportation; because, weight for weight, there is not the smallest difference between equal weights of the fine metals.

Bills of exchange, then, being all conceived in denominations of money of accompt, realized in coin; and coin changing in its value with regard to bullion; it is evident that the real par cannot be computed upon the bullion alone contained in the coin.

Obj. Exchange regulates the price of bullion.

If it is objected, that since it is the course of exchange which regulates the price of bullion, all variations between bullion and coin ought to be ascribed to that cause.

Answ. Denied: exchange only raises its price; the mint price pulls it down.

I answer, that it is not the course of exchange which regulates the price of bullion; but exchange makes it ascend from the price to which it is regulated.

Balance upon the real par, no mark of a balance upon trade; proved by examples.

The mint price regulates the price of bullion; and there it will nearly stand, while the balance of trade is either at par, or favourable to a country. Exchange therefore, or a wrong balance, can only make it rise; and it returns to where it was, by the force of another principle.

In the next place, were I to allow that the balance of trade regulates the price of bullion, it would not follow that what is called the real par of exchange is a rule to judge of the balance of trade of a nation. Is it not plain, that if France, for example, being at present obliged to send great sums into Germany, upon account of the war (anno 1760,) has reduced the price of her coin to a par with bullion, that all nations will profit of it as much in their trade with France, as if the balance was become favourable to them; since the course of exchange will then answer according to the conversion of bullion for bullion in all remittances to France.

But were France at present to remit money to any other country, which has the balance favourable, and where coinage is paid, suppose to Spain, while the balance between France and Spain is supposed to be exactly even; would not the real par between the money of Spain and of France mark an exchange against France, for the value of the coinage imposed by Spain? This is the reason why, in time of war, exchange between France and England appears more favourable to England than in time of peace. But does this anywise prove that the balance of trade is then more in favour of England? by no means: for let me suppose the balance of their trade to remain the same after the peace as at present; is it not evident, that in proportion as the coin of France shall rise above the bullion, that the balance of trade will become, in appearance, against England?

Balance of trade, what?

By the balance of trade, I here constantly understand a certain quantity of bullion sent by one nation to another, to pay what they have not been able to compensate by an exchange of their commodities, remittances, &c. and not that which they compute in their bills as the difference between the respective values of coin and bullion in both countries.

How, then, is the real par of exchange to be regulated, so as to determine which nation pays a balance upon the exchange of their commodities?

The real par of exchange to be fixed by the fluctuating value of the coin, not by the permanent quantity of the bullion it contains.

I answer, To determine that question, let bullion over all the commercial world be stated at 100, and let coin in every country be compared with it, according to the current price. In England, for example, (were all disorders of the coin removed) coin must always be as 100. In France, when the balance is favourable, at 108.27. In Germany (were the Emperor’s late regulation with Bavaria to be made general) at 101. And so forth, according to the price of coinage imposed every where. These advanced values above the 100, never can rise higher; and the more the balance of their respective trade is unfavourable, the nearer they will severally come to 100; below which they never can fall. These fluctuations will constantly be marked in exchange; because all circumstances are exactly combined by merchants; but the balance of the trade will only be marked by what exchange is made to vary from these proportions.

Proof of this proposition.

Let me suppose the trade of France favourable upon the whole, by great commissions from Cadiz, and bullion at the same time to be carried to the mint at 8 per cent. below the price of coin.

Let me suppose, that upon all the trade of England with France, there shall be, at that time, a balance of 2 per cent. sent from France to England in bullion; and upon the trade with Germany a balance of 1 per cent.

I say, that the par of exchange between England and France is 8 per cent. against England; and that the par of exchange between Germany and France is 7 per cent. I state it at this rate; because the balance being supposed favourable for the three nations, the value of their coin with respect to their bullion ought to be in proportion to the mint price.

The course of exchange, therefore, if it be a rule to judge by, ought to mark 6 per cent. against England; which I say is 2 per cent. in her favour: and the exchange with Germany ought to mark 6 per cent. against Germany; which I call 1 per cent. in her favour.

An example will make this plain.

Suppose English guineas, German carolins, and French Louis, to be all of the same weight and fineness; I say, the real par in the example we have stated is, between Paris and London, 100 Louis are equal to 108 guineas; because the 100 Louis are worth 100 guineas in London, and 108 guineas are worth no more than 100 Louis in Paris. Again, between Paris and Francfort, 100 Louis are equal to 107 carolins; because 108 carolins are worth at Paris 100 Louis; and 101 Louis at Francfort are worth 100 carolins; consequently, the difference between 7 and 8 is the real par, to wit, 100 Louis for 101 carolins. Next, as to the par between London and Francfort, here 100 carolins equal 101 guineas; because 100 carolins in London are worth 100 guineas; and 101 guineas at Francfort are worth no more than 100 carolins.

Now in the ordinary way of reckoning the real par, the 100 Louis, 100 carolins, and 100 guineas, are all supposed to be of the same value, in the three markets; and the difference between this supposed value, and what is paid for it, is supposed to be a loss upon trade. In this light, the nation’s loss resembles the loss incurred by him, who, when he goes to the bank, and pays ten pounds sterling in coin, for a bank-note, says, that he has given ten pounds for a bit of paper, not worth one farthing; reckoning the value of the note, at the real par of the paper it is writ upon.

The general rule, therefore, as I apprehend, is, to settle the real par of different coins, not according to the bullion they contain, but according to the bullion they can buy with them in their own market at the time.

If 1000 pounds weight of guineas can purchase at London 1000 pounds weight of standard bullion; and that 1000 pounds of the same weight of Louis can buy at Paris 1080 pounds weight of the same standard bullion; then the 1000 pounds weight of guineas is at the real par with 925⁶⁄₁₀₀₀ pounds weight of the Louis, and not worth 1000, as is commonly supposed.

If the doctrine laid down in this chapter be found solid; if no essential circumstance has been overlooked, which ought to have entred into our combinations, (points left to the reader to determine) then we may conclude,

1mo, That the course of exchange, in the way people take to calculate the real par, is no rule for judging of the balance of trade.

2do, That the great duty laid upon the fabrication of the French coin, either deceives the English nation, and makes them conclude, from the course of exchange, that their commerce with France is extremely disadvantageous: or, if it be really disadvantageous, that it is the imposition of a duty on coinage in the French mint which occasions it.

It is a question belonging to the theory of commerce, and not to that which we are now upon, to examine the nature of a disadvantageous trade, and to investigate the principles pointing out the commodities which every country ought to encourage for exportation, and those which are the most profitable to take in return.

Application of these principles to the English trade with France.

Upon these principles the trade of England with France must be examined, and upon examination it will be found whether that trade be advantageous or hurtful. Here the question is reduced to this; Whether from the course of exchange it may be concluded that the balance of trade is against England, because the French crown is commonly paid with thirty-two pence sterling? We have decided that it cannot. If there be no other objections against the trade of France but this loss upon exchange; and if it be true that this is no proof of trade being against England, but only the consequence of her free coinage; then it will follow, that England may lay as many restrictions, duties, and clogs, upon the French trade, as she pleases, and may even reduce it to nothing, without ever removing the cause of complaint; while at the same time she may be ruining a trade, which pays her upon the whole a great balance, and upon which trade she has it in her power, by following a different system in her mint, to render her exchange as favourable as with any other nation in Europe.

This point seems to be a matter of no small importance to England; since (from a mistake in point of fact, into which she is led from a delusive appearance) a very lucrative trade, when considered by the balance it produces, may, upon false principles, be proscribed as disadvantageous.

These questions, however, are not as yet considered as entirely discussed, and they shall be a little farther examined in the following chapter.

CHAP. III.
Is the loss which the course of exchange marks upon the trade of Great Britain with France real or apparent?

Reason for proposing this question.

Questions are here proposed, which I do not pretend to resolve; all I aim at is to discover how they may be resolved.

If this inquiry shall prove an incitement to men of better capacity to review the same subjects, who have more extensive combinations, more experience, and better information as to facts, in that respect it has some degree of merit.

Suppositions.

I answer to the question proposed, that if the imposition of a duty on coinage in England would have the effect of rendring her trade with France more lucrative, then the loss marked by the course of exchange is real, at least in part; if otherwise, it is only apparent.

Principles.

What makes the commerce with any country lucrative, is the balance paid upon the exchange of their commodities.

What regulates the quantity of commodities taken from any country, in the way of trade, is the wants of the country demanding; and what sets the balance even, is the reciprocal wants of the other country. Nations do not give up correspondence with their neighbours, because these do not accept of merchandize in exchange for merchandize, but because they find their advantage in supplying their wants upon easier terms elsewhere.

Every merchant seeks to sell dear; and the dearer he can sell, the greater is his profit: that merchant, therefore, must thrive most, who sells dearest, and who at the same time can afford to sell cheapest.

If an imposition on coinage shall enable England to sell dearer, without depriving her of the advantage of being able to sell as cheap as at present, then it will follow, that an imposition on coinage will be advantageous. If it shall lay her under a necessity of selling dearer, and deprive her of the possibility of selling so cheap as formerly, then the imposition of coinage will be hurtful.

How the paying for coinage affects the profits on goods exported.

These principles premised, as a foundation for our reasoning, let us first consider the influence of coinage upon the profits on exportation; and then proceed to inquire into the influence it has upon articles of importation.

As to the first, I must observe, that England, as well as every other country, has several articles of exportation which are peculiar to herself, and others which she must sell in competition with other nations.

The price of what is peculiar is determined by the competition of those who furnish at home, and the lowest price is regulated by their minimum of profit. The price of what is common is regulated by the competition of those who furnish from different countries.

If the prices of what is peculiar shall remain, as before, attached to the denominations of the coin, after the imposition of a duty on coinage, the competition of those who furnish will remain the same as before; because prices will not vary; but the stranger, who buys, must nevertheless pay an advanced price for such merchandize, because the nation’s coin, with which they are purchased, will be raised in its value with respect to bullion, the only price he can pay with. This is the price of coinage: and this imposition has the good effect of obliging strangers to pay dearer than before, in favour of a benefit resulting therefrom to the state.

Now, if it be observed that the demand made by the English for goods peculiar to France, (while these remain in France at the same price as formerly) does not diminish in proportion as the loss upon exchange happens to rise; why should we suppose that the demand for goods peculiar to England should diminish, for a similar reason?

If the rise, however, in the price of exchange should diminish the foreign demand for such English goods, by raising the price of them in the foreign market, this, at least, will prove that coinage does not make prices fall proportionally at home; because, if they should fall, strangers would buy as cheap as formerly: the prime cost (as it would appear upon the accounts of their English correspondents) would diminish in proportion to the loss upon exchange in remitting to England, and would just compensate it: so upon the whole, the price of the merchandize would be the same in the foreign market as before.

If the imposition of coinage, therefore, be said to raise the price of English merchandize in foreign markets, it must be allowed that it will not raise the value of the pound sterling at home, by sinking the value of commodities: that is to say, the prices of commodities will adhere to the denominations of the coin; and the coin bearing an advanced value, above what it bore formerly, strangers must pay it.

But will not this diminish the demand for English goods? Not if they be peculiar to England, as we here suppose. But allowing it should, will not this diminution of demand sink the value of the English coin, by influencing the balance of trade? If so, it will render remittances to England more advantageous: consequently, it will recall the demand. The disease, therefore, in this case, seems to draw the remedy along with it.

Now what appears here to be a remedy against a disease, is at present, as we may call it, the ordinary English diet, since it is sinking the coin to the price of bullion. If, therefore, the having coin always as cheap as bullion, can be any advantage to trade, the nation is sure of having it, whenever the balance is unfavourable, notwithstanding the imposition of a duty on coinage.

When the balance is favourable.

Trade has its vicissitudes, and all nations find, at times, that their neighbours must depend upon them. On such occasions, the balance of their commerce is greatly in their favour.

Is it not, therefore, an advantage to have a principle at home, which, upon such occasions, is capable of diminishing with us the value of that merchandize (bullion) which strangers must give as the price of all they buy?

And how, when unfavourable.

On the other hand, the same principle seems to fly to the assistance of trade, when the balance becomes unfavourable, as it virtually diminishes to strangers the price of all our commodities, by raising in our market the value of that commodity, (bullion) which they must give as the price of what they buy.

This may suffice, in general, upon exportation. It is a hint from a person not versed in commerce; and as such it is humbly submitted.

How the paying for coinage affects the profits on goods imported.

I now pass to the second part of this operation, to wit, the influence which the imposition of coinage has upon the interests of trade, when the question is to purchase the commodities of other countries. These operations are quite different, and in examining this theory they must be carefully distinguished.

When the balance is favourable.

We have seen how the imposition of coinage, during the favourable balance of trade, procures to the nation an advanced price upon the sale of her exports. As long as it remains favourable, it must produce the same good effect with regard to her importations, by sinking at home the price of the bullion with which she must pay for them. Bullion must become cheap in the English market, in proportion as the balance of her trade is favourable, and in proportion as it is cheaper there than in other nations (with respect to their respective coins) in the same proportion, the nation has an advantage in paying what she buys, or in employing her bullion for extending the fund of her own commerce.

And how, when unfavourable.

Upon the other hand, should the balance of her trade turn against her, her bullion rises. This renders the price of all foreign merchandize dearer to the importers than otherwise they would be; because they must pay them in bullion. But this loss is at present constantly incurred; and when incurred, is not national, the national loss is upon the balance of the trade; but whether this balance be paid in bullion at the mint price, or in bullion at the price of coin, the balance of the trade is just the same. Now, if this wrong balance (which I here suppose to proceed only from the imports exceeding the exports upon trade in general) renders the purchase of foreign commodities dearer to the merchants, without costing more to the nation; is not this so far advantageous, that it discourages importations, just at the time they ought to be discouraged, and thereby may tend to set the balance even again?

Thus I have endeavoured to analize the influence of this principle in the four cases; to wit, upon exportation and importation, under a favourable and unfavourable balance of trade. These different combinations must always be examined separately, or else obscurity and confusion will ensue.

We must also observe, that there are still other combinations to be attended to, although it be superfluous to apply the principles to them; because the variations proceeding from them are self-evident. I mean, that this question may be considered as relative to a nation which has coinage free, with respect to another nation where that duty is imposed. In this case we may decide, that as far as the situation of the latter is advantageous, so far must that of the former be disadvantageous, and vice versa.

The question may also be considered in relation to countries who have either the duty on coinage the same, or different. When they have the same, there can be no advantage on either side; excepting in this respect, that the nation which has, upon an average, the balance of trade in her favour, will thereby render her trade still more favourable than it would be, were the coinage free on both sides.

The more trade is favourable, the more adviseable it is to impose a duty upon coinage.

From which we may conclude, that the more a nation has the advantage in point of trade, the more it is her interest to impose the duty of coinage. When the imposition is unequal in the two countries, I apprehend that the country which lays the smallest duty upon her coinage, may be considered as having it altogether free, and that the other may be considered as imposing no more than the difference.

Upon these principles must the question here proposed be resolved. They never can decide as to the matter of fact, to wit, whether the French trade is hurtful or lucrative: all we are warranted to conclude from them is, that the trade of Great Britain would be more advantageous with France than it is, were a duty on coinage to be laid in England as high as there. In that sense, we may say, that the apparent loss by exchange is a proof that coin is commonly dearer in France than in England; from which a loss may be implied; but the loss upon exchange no way denotes the degree of loss upon the trade, and much less does it certify that the balance upon the whole is against Great Britain.

CHAP. IV.
Of the different methods of imposing coinage; and of the influence they respectively have upon the value of the money-unit, and upon the domestic interests of the nation.

Two ways of imposing coinage.

There are two ways of imposing coinage; one by positive law, and by the force of that authority which is every where lodged in the legislature; the other, which is more gentle, renders the imposition almost insensible, and is effectuated by the influence of the principles of commerce.

By the one and the other the same end may be obtained; with this difference, that all circumstances must yield to the force of authority: and when this is employed, coinage is imposed as a tax upon coin, in spight of all resistance; whereas, in the other case, the effect takes place by degrees: it is no tax upon coin; but it is liable to interruptions; and therefore, upon a general recoinage of all the specie of a nation, it is not so effectual as the first; although it may answer perfectly well for supporting a fund of good specie, and for replacing all the diminutions it may suffer from melting down or exportation.

Plan laid down in this chapter.

I shall now give examples of the one and the other method: I shall point out some of the consequences which attend both: I shall chalk out a rough draught of the principles, which may be applied in forming a plan for laying on that imposition in the English mint: and last of all, I shall shew how the experiment may be made.

How coinage is imposed by authority.

Were the government of England to call in, at present, all the coin in the nation, in order to be recoined, and to fix the mint price of it, as gold and silver standard bullion, at —— per cent. below the value of the new coin; this would be imposing coinage by positive law; and being an arbitrary operation upon the coin of the nation, could not fail of influencing the value of the money-unit.

How by consent.

Were the government, on the other hand, to give orders to the mint, to pay gold and silver bullion for the future, no dearer than —— per cent. below the coin, this would be no arbitrary operation on the coin of the nation, and would not (as I imagine) influence the value of the money-unit, although it might sink the price of bullion, by the influence of the principles of commerce.

The different consequences of these two methods of imposing coinage are now to be explained.

When by authority, what is the consequence?

Were England, during a war, or at any time when the balance of her trade is unfavourable, to impose coinage by law, in the manner proposed, the consequence would be, that all the specie in Great Britain, or at least a considerable part of it, might possibly be melted down, and sold in the market for bills of exchange. |The metals are exported.|In a nation of trade, where credit is so extensively and solidly established, there would, in such a case, be no difficulty to find an outlet abroad for all the metals in the kingdom; because then every thing would be considered as profit, which was less than the —— per cent. loss in carrying the coin to the mint.

If it is objected, that this plan has been many times executed in France, particularly in 1709, and 1726, without any such inconveniences; I answer, as I have done upon other occasions, circumstances are to be examined.

How, in France, this is prevented in some measure.

Upon such occasions, in France, the coin is ordered to the mint, upon penalties against those who shall not obey; melting down is strictly inquired into, and severely punished; all the roads which lead to foreign countries are beset with guards, and no coin is suffered to be exported; all debts may be demanded in coin; and all internal commerce is carried on with specie.

This is a violent method of imposing a tax upon all the coin in the nation; and the general coinage is made with no other intention. In the coinage 1709, this tax amounted to 23¹⁄₁₃ per cent. (Dutot, Vol. I. p. 104.)

French politics, as to coin, not generally understood.

Under these circumstances, it is very evident, that those who have coin or bullion must either carry it to the mint, or bury it: there is no middle course to be followed.

Let me here observe by the bye, how frequent it is to see people blame the greatest ministers rashly, and impute to them the most absurd opinions concerning the most simple matters. How much have the ministers of France been laugh’d at, for pretending to forbid the exportation of coin, to pay the balance of their trade? They did not forbid the exportation of the coin for paying of their debts: On the contrary, the King has sometimes had his bankers, whose business it was to send coin to Holland for that purpose, as we shall explain in another place. This, I think, is common sense.

If the ridicule is turned against those states, who forbid the melting down and exportation of coin, where coinage is free, I must also make answer, that there the prohibition is laid on, to save to government the expence of perpetually recoining what is melted down, or of coining the foreign specie, imported in return for that of the nation which has been exported without necessity.

Let us next examine the consequence of imposing coinage by law, when the plan is so laid down (no matter how) as not to be frustrated by the total desertion of the mint.

How coinage influences the price of inland commodities.

Is it not evident, from the principles laid down in the first chapter, that, in this case, the value of the coin must rise, not only with respect to bullion, but with respect to every commodity: or in other words, that the prices of commodities must fall universally with respect to the denominations of the coin. For who will pay the same price for a commodity, after he has been obliged to pay —— per cent. to purchase the price with which he must buy? But the moment the great operation of the general coinage is over, and that trade begins to work its former effects, while the balance of it is supposed to remain unfavourable, all prices will return to their former rate, with regard to the denominations of the coin, by the operation of another principle. The new coin procured at so much cost will then fall to the price of bullion; that is to say, all the price paid for coinage will be lost, and consequently money will return to its former value; or in other words, prices will be made to rise to their former height; because then no body will be obliged to pay — per cent. to procure the price.

A case not to be resolved by this theory, but left to be verified by experiment.

Now, it is the effect operated upon prices by the return of a favourable balance, when coin regains an advanced price above bullion by the influence of commerce, which my theory does not reach to. I cannot discover a principle, which can force the prices of articles of inland consumption to fall and fluctuate with the prices of bullion; because I find them too closely attached to the denominations of the coin; and that foreign commerce has not sufficient influence upon them. As that combination is beyond my reach to extricate, I leave it to the decision of experiment.

An objection answered.

Here a plain objection occurs against what has been said in the twelfth chapter of the first part, viz. That the wearing of the English coin has the effect of raising the price of corn in the market, which would be made to fall upon a restitution of the coin to legal weight. But the answer is plain. In the former case, the diminution of the value of the coin was supposed real and permanent; in which case, with time, it works its effects of raising prices without doubt: but here the augmentation is not real, and the fluctuations of the value of the coin with respect to bullion, are both imperceptible to any but merchants, and at the same time so uncertain, that they have not time to work their effects upon the price of other commodities.

Were a balance of trade to continue long favourable, and were coin to preserve, during all that time, the same advanced value with regard to bullion, in that case I have little doubt but the value of that universal commodity (bullion) in conjunction with the operations and influence of foreign commerce, might reach inland markets, and reduce the price of commodities. But this is seldom the case (as I am apt to believe,) and in proportion as it is so, more or less, will a duty on coinage influence the price of commodities.

Coinage affects the price of bullion immediately; and that of commodities indirectly.

Coinage therefore ought, upon many occasions, to be considered as affecting immediately the price of bullion only, and that of commodities indirectly: whereas the diminution of the intrinsic value of the coin, by immediately affecting price, must consequently affect the rate of every thing which is given for it.

Let us next examine the consequence of imposing coinage by the influence of the principles of commerce.

Consequence of the price of coinage imposed with consent.

The method here is to leave every one free to do with their coin, or with their bullion, what they please. Do they incline to melt down or export the coin, they may have entire liberty to do it: no penalty ought to be imposed, other than that which will necessarily follow, viz. the expence of procuring new coin.

In order to make our reasoning here more distinct, let us form a supposition with regard to a new regulation of the British coin.

The present confusion has convinced every man, that a reformation of the coin is necessary; and the opinions of those who have writ best upon that subject seem to be divided upon one main article. The metals are disproportioned in the coin, the gold being there to the silver, as 1 to 15.21, instead of being as 1 to 14.5. By law, 113 grains of gold are made equal to 1718.7 grains of silver. One party would have the silver adjusted to the gold; the other would have the gold adjusted to the silver. This is the question, in a few words. Now, suppose a middle course were taken, and that the standard were to be fixed at the mean proportion of these two values; that is, at the value of the half of 1718.7 grains fine silver, added to the half of 113 grains fine gold; which, in the first part of this book, we have shewn, by many arguments, to be the only method of preserving an equality in the money-unit; this will make the new pound consist of 1678.6 grains of fine silver, and 115.77 grains fine gold: and this is also a sort of medium between the two opinions.

At that rate, the pound troy standard silver must be coined into 63 shillings and 6 pence, and the pound troy standard gold into 46 guineas, or pound-pieces, each worth 20 shillings.

Now, if upon both species 8 per cent. coinage were imposed, (for as all this is a pure supposition, it is no matter at what rate the coinage be stated) then the mint price of the pound troy fine silver must be fixed at 63s. 1¾d. and the mint price of a pound troy of fine gold at 45l. 5s. ¾d. sterling.

That bullion is brought to the mint when trade is favourable.

Suppose then (as an example) that the mint price of fine bullion should be fixed at 8 per cent. below the coin in England; What principle could oblige people to carry bullion to be coined?

I answer, When the balance of trade is favourable for England, that balance must sooner or later be paid in bullion. If trade still continues favourable, after the first balance is paid, what use can those who have the bullion make of it, if there be no demand for it to work it into plate? To export it, by employing it in trade, does not remove the difficulty; because, while the balance stands favourable, export as much as you will, more bullion must enter than it is possible to export, in the way of trade; for we do not suppose that in exporting it, it is to be given away gratis. The bullion, therefore, not being demanded for exportation; not being permitted to pass current for money; and not being demanded for making into plate; must be employed so as to be profitable to the owner one way or other. For this purpose it must be lent, or employed within the country for purchasing some sort of effects which produce an income. For this purpose the bullion must be coined, in order to render it capable of circulation, and of becoming price.

At all times, therefore, when in a country there is bullion, not demanded as such, the proprietor carries it to the mint, he sells it at the mint price; and as this mint price is stated at 8 per cent. below the price of coin, he gives it for the price he can get for it: this he does without regret, because, if next day he should want to change his coin into bullion again, he will find it in the market at the same value.

If it be farther objected, that rather than carry it to the mint at 8 per cent. discount, people will lend it to foreigners: I answer, that if it be lent to foreigners, this lending will turn what we call the balance of trade against England, and then certainly no body will carry bullion to be coined; for in which ever way it happens that more bullion is exported than is imported, in every case the price of exchange and of bullion must rise; and this is constantly constructed, though very improperly, as a balance of trade against England; which, to mention it by the bye, is another reason to prove how ill people judge of the prosperity of trade by the course of exchange, since the lending of money, as well as the paying of debts, equally turns exchange against the country.

Bullion, therefore, never will be carried to the mint, when it can be disposed of above the mint price; and both theory and experience, over all Europe, where, England excepted, coinage is imposed, proves, that bullion is carried to the mint, and sold below the price of coin, weight for weight of equal fineness.

How the mint price of the metals may be allowed to vary.

By fixing the mint price at 8 per cent. below the value of the coin, it is not necessary that this price be made invariable: a power may be lodged somewhere, by the state, to make deviations from the standard price. A war breaks out; large quantities of coin are exported; specie becomes scarce: May not the state, at such a time, deliver coin at the mint at the current price of the bullion? Let matters come to the worst, the price can never possibly rise above the present value, to wit, that of the coin, when it is preserved at its true weight. If peace returns, and trade becomes favourable, the mint may then be ordered to sink its price, in proportion to circumstances. In short, the mint may receive bullion at different prices, at different times, without occasioning the smallest confusion by such variations in the intrinsic value of the current specie, which must constantly be the same. It is of no consequence to any person who receives it, whether the coinage costs nothing, or whether it costs 8 per cent.

Influence of this method of imposing coinage on the price of commodities, and value of the pound sterling.

By this method of imposing coinage, all the advantages reaped by France may be reaped by England. The bullion will be allowed to fall as low as with them, when trade is favourable. If it rises, upon a wrong balance, the mint need not be stopped, in case coin be found wanting for the uses of the state; and when that necessary demand is satisfied, the mint price may be reduced again.

I do not see how the value of the pound sterling can be anywise influenced by this plan of imposing coinage: because the imposition is not arbitrary; nor can it either add to or take from the mass of the metals appointed by statute to enter into the coin.

The only possible influence coinage can have upon the value of the pound sterling, is by lowering the price of commodities. If it has this effect, I still agree that it is the same thing as if an addition were made to the metals in the coin. Experience alone will resolve the question: and if by this it is found that prices are not affected by it, then we may safely declare, that no variation has been occasioned in the value of the money-unit, and consequently no injury done to any interest within the state.

This proposition, however, requires some limitations. The prices of commodities, certainly, will not be affected immediately by the imposition of coinage, in the way it has been proposed to lay it on; but I do not say that, upon some occasions, they may not be affected by slow degrees.

When the balance of trade at any time has stood long favourable for England; when the coin has remained long considerably above the price of bullion; and when, consequently, the mint has been well employed; then the value of commodities, as has been said, may become influenced by the operations of foreign commerce, and be sunk in their price. Yet even here this consequence is by no means certain; for this reason, that what turns the balance of trade in favour of a nation is the demand which foreign markets make for her commodities: now this demand, as it raises the value of her coin above her bullion, so it raises the price of her commodities, by increasing foreign competition to acquire them.

These combinations are very intricate, and more properly belong to the doctrine of commerce than to that which we are now upon. I have thrown them in here, for the sake of extending the present theory a little farther, and for enabling us to account for appearances which may happen upon the imposition of coinage, supposing it should be thought proper to make the experiment.

CHAP. V.
How an Experiment may be made to discover with Certainty the real Effects of the Imposition of Coinage.

We have dwelt very long upon this part of our subject, and after all our endeavours to elucidate the principles which ought to decide whether or not the imposition of coinage will raise the value of the pound sterling, in a kingdom which, like Great Britain, is in a mercantile correspondence with nations where that duty is introduced, we have still been obliged to leave the final decision of the question to an experiment.

By that alone it will be clearly discovered, whether coinage will have the effect, 1mo, of sinking the prices of commodities, to the prejudice of manufacturers; 2do, of raising the price of the pound sterling, to the prejudice of all the classes of debtors within the nation; and 3tio, of hurting trade, by putting England under the necessity of selling dearer, without being able to sell as cheap as before: or whether commodities will remain at their former prices; the pound sterling at the same value; and England be enabled to sell dearer to foreigners, when her commerce is favourable, without being obliged upon other occasions to sell one bit dearer than at present.

I shall now give a hint concerning a proper method of making the experiment.

The plan of an experiment proposed.

Suppose peace[^[1]] restored, and a balance of trade favourable to England; that government shall take the resolution to set about the reformation of the coin; that they shall publish the plan of reformation three years before it is intended to commence, according to what was proposed in the 14th chapter of the first part; that they shall make a change in the mean time upon the regulation of the mint, by ordering all silver coin, and all guineas, except those of George II. to pass by weight; that shillings shall be ordered to be coined at 65 in the pound troy; the mint price, when at par with the coin, remaining as at present with regard to the gold, and raised to 65 new pence per ounce with regard to the silver. This, I imagine, will furnish specie sufficient to the nation, and will make no change upon the value of the pound sterling at present.

[1]. Written in the year 1761.

The consequence of this will be to recall the old guineas from abroad.