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AMERICAN POLITICS
(NON-PARTISAN)
FROM THE BEGINNING TO DATE.
EMBODYING
A HISTORY OF ALL THE POLITICAL PARTIES,
WITH
THEIR VIEWS AND RECORDS ON ALL IMPORTANT QUESTIONS.
GREAT SPEECHES ON ALL GREAT ISSUES,
AND
TABULATED HISTORY AND CHRONOLOGICAL EVENTS.

By HON. THOMAS V. COOPER,

Member Pennsylvania House of Representatives, 1870–72. Senate, 1874–84. Chairman Republican State Committee of Pennsylvania, 1881–82–83–84–85–86–87.

AND

HECTOR T. FENTON, Esq.,

Of the Philadelphia Bar.

FIFTEENTH AND REVISED EDITION.

PHILADELPHIA:

FIRESIDE PUBLISHING COMPANY.

1892.

Entered according to Act of Congress in the year 1892, by the

FIRESIDE PUBLISHING COMPANY,

in the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington, D. C.

ALTEMUS’ BOOK BINDERY,

PHILADELPHIA.

Respectfully Dedicated

TO THE

PROPOSITION

THAT ALL AMERICAN CITIZENS SHOULD TAKE AN INTEREST IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS.

PREFACE.

The writer of this volume, in the pursuit of his profession as an editor, and throughout an active political life, has always felt the need of a volume from which any important fact, theory or record could be found at a moment’s glance, and without a search of many records. He has also remarked the singular fact that no history of the political parties of the country, as they have faced each other on all leading issues, has ever been published. These things prompted an undertaking of the work on his own part, and it is herewith presented in the hope that it will meet the wants not only of those connected with politics, but of all who take an interest in public affairs. In this work very material aid has been rendered by the gentleman whose name is also associated with its publication, and by many political friends, who have freely responded during the past year to the calls made upon them for records, which have been liberally employed in the writing and compilation of this work.

THOS. V. COOPER.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

AMERICAN POLITICS.

BOOK I.
HISTORY OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES
OF THE
UNITED STATES.

Colonial Parties—Whig and Tory.

The parties peculiar to our Colonial times hardly have a place in American politics. They divided people in sentiment simply, as they did in the mother country, but here there was little or no power to act, and were to gather results from party victories. Men were then Whigs or Tories because they had been prior to their emigration here, or because their parents had been, or because it has ever been natural to show division in individual sentiment. Political contests, however, were unknown, for none enjoyed the pleasures and profits of power; the crown made and unmade rulers. The local self-government which our forefathers enjoyed, were secured to them by their charters, and these were held to be contracts not to be changed without the consent of both parties. All of the inhabitants of the colonies claimed and were justly entitled to the rights guaranteed by the Magna Charta, and in addition to these they insisted upon the supervision of all internal interests and the power to levy and collect taxes. These claims were conceded until their growing prosperity and England’s need of additional revenues suggested schemes of indirect taxation. Against these the colony of Plymouth protested as early as 1636, and spasmodic protests from all the colonies followed. These increased in frequency and force with the growing demands of King George III. In 1651 the navigation laws imposed upon the colonies required both exports and imports to be carried in British ships, and all who traded were compelled to do it with England. In 1672 inter-colonial duties were imposed, and when manufacturing sought to flank this policy, their establishment was forbidden by law.

The passage of the Stamp Act in 1765 caused high excitement, and for the first time parties began to take definite shape and manifest open antagonisms, and the words Whig and Tory then had a plainer meaning in America than in England. The Stamp Act was denounced by the Whigs as direct taxation, since it provided, that stamps previously paid for should be affixed to all legal papers. The colonies resented, and so general were the protests that for a time it seemed that only those who owed their livings to the Crown, or expected aid and comfort from it, remained with the Tories. The Whigs were the patriots. The war for the rights of the colonies began in 1775, and it was supported by majorities in all of the Colonial Assemblies. These majorities were as carefully organized then as now to promote a popular cause, and this in the face of adverse action on the part of the several Colonial Governors. Thus in Virginia, Lord Dunmore had from time to time, until 1773, prorogued the Virginia Assembly, when it seized the opportunity to pass resolves instituting a committee of correspondence, and recommending joint action by the legislatures of the other colonies. In the next year, the same body, under the lead of Henry, Randolph, Lee, Washington, Wythe and other patriots, officially deprecated the closing of the port of Boston, and set apart a day to implore Divine interposition in behalf of the colonies. The Governor dissolved the House for this act, and the delegates, 89 in number, repaired to a tavern, organized themselves into a committee, signed articles of association, and advised with other colonial committees the expediency of “appointing deputies to meet in a general correspondence”—really a suggestion for a Congress. The idea of a Congress, however, originated with Doctor Franklin the year before, and it had then been approved by town meetings in Providence, Boston and New York. The action of Virginia lifted the proposal above individual advice and the action of town meetings, and called to it the attention of all the colonial legislatures. It was indeed fortunate in the incipiency of these political movements, that the people were practically unanimous. Only the far-seeing realized the drift and danger, while nearly all could join their voices against oppressive taxes and imposts.

The war went on for colonial rights, the Whigs wisely insisting that they were willing to remain as colonists if their rights should be guaranteed by the mother country; the Tories, chiefly fed by the Crown, were willing to remain without guarantee—a negative position, and one which in the high excitement of the times excited little attention, save where the holders of such views made themselves odious by the enjoyment of high official position, or by harsh criticism upon, or treatment of the patriots.

The first Continental Congress assembled in Philadelphia in September, 1774, and there laid the foundations of the Republic. While its assemblage was first recommended by home meetings, the cause, as already shown, was taken up by the assemblies of Massachusetts and Virginia. Georgia alone was not represented. The members were called delegates, who declared in their official papers that they were “appointed by the good people of these colonies.” It was called the “revolutionary government,” because it derived its power from the people, and not from the functionaries of any existing government. In it each colony was allowed but a single vote, regardless of the number of delegates, and here began not only the unit rule, but the practice which obtains in the election of a President when the contest reaches, under the constitution and law, the National House of Representatives. The original object was to give equality to the colonies as colonies.

In 1776, the second Continental Congress assembled at Philadelphia, all the colonies being again represented save Georgia. The delegates were chosen principally by conventions of the people, though some were sent by the popular branches of the colonial legislatures. In July, and soon after the commencement of hostilities, Georgia entered the Confederacy.

The Declaration of Independence, passed in 1776, drew yet plainer lines between the Whigs and Tories. A gulf of hatred separated the opposing parties, and the Tory was far more despised than the open foe, when he was not such, and was the first sought when he was. Men who contend for liberty ever regard those who are not for them as against them—a feeling which led to the expression of a political maxim of apparent undying force, for it has since found frequent repetition in every earnest campaign. After the adoption of the Declaration by the Continental Congress, the Whigs favored the most direct and absolute separation, while the Tories supported the Crown. On the 7th of June, 1776, Richard Henry Lee, of Virginia, moved the Declaration in these words:

“Resolved, That these united colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and independent states; that they are absolved from all allegiance to the British Crown, and that all political connection between them and the State of Great Britain is, and ought to be, totally dissolved.”

Then followed preparations for the formal declaration, which was adopted on the 4th of July, 1776, in the precise language submitted by Thomas Jefferson. All of the state papers of the Continental Congress evince the highest talent, and the evils which led to its exhibition must have been long but very impatiently endured to impel the study of the questions involved. Possibly only the best lives in our memory invite our perusal, but certain it is that higher capacity was never called to the performance of graver political duties in the history of the world.

It has been said that the Declaration is in imitation of that published by the United Netherlands, but whether this be true or false, the liberty-loving world has for more than a century accepted it as the best protest against oppression known to political history. A great occasion conspired with a great author to make it grandly great.

Dr. Franklin, as early as July, 1775, first prepared a sketch of articles of confederation between the colonies, to continue until their reconciliation with Great Britain, and in failure thereof to be perpetual. John Quincy Adams says this plan was never discussed in Congress. June 11, 1776, a committee was appointed to prepare the force of a colonial confederation, and the day following one member from each colony was appointed to perform the duty. The report was submitted, laid aside August 20, 1776, taken up April 7, 1777, and debated from time to time until November 15th, of the same year, when the report was agreed to. It was then submitted to the legislatures of the several states, these being advised to authorize their delegates in Congress to ratify the same. On the 26th of June, 1778, the ratification was ordered to be engrossed and signed by the delegates. Those of New Hampshire, Massachusetts Bay, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia and South Carolina signed July 9th, 1778; those of North Carolina July 21st; Georgia July 24th; Jersey November 26th, same year; Delaware February 22d and May 5th, 1779. Maryland refused to ratify until the question of the conflicting claims of the Union and of the separate States to the property of the crown-lands should be adjusted. This was accomplished by the cession of the lands in dispute to the United States, and Maryland signed March 1st, 1781. On the 2d of March, Congress assembled under the new powers, and continued to act for the Confederacy until the 4th of March, 1789, the date of the organization of the government under the Federal constitution. Our political life has therefore three periods, “the revolutionary government,” “the confederation,” and that of the “federal constitution,” which still obtains.

The federal constitution is the result of the labors of a convention called at Philadelphia in May, 1787, at a time when it was feared by many that the Union was in the greatest danger, from inability to pay soldiers who had, in 1783, been disbanded on a declaration of peace and an acknowledgment of independence; from prostration of the public credit and faith of the nation; from the neglect to provide for the payment of even the interest on the public debt; and from the disappointed hopes of many who thought freedom did not need to face responsibilities. A large portion of the convention of 1787 still clung to the confederacy of the states, and advocated as a substitute for the constitution a revival of the old articles of confederation with additional powers to Congress. A long discussion followed, and a most able one, but a constitution for the people, embodying a division of legislative, judicial and executive powers prevailed, and the result is now daily witnessed in the federal constitution. While the revolutionary war lasted but seven years, the political revolution incident to, identified with and directing it, lasted thirteen years. This was completed on the 30th of April, 1789, the day on which Washington was inaugurated as the first President under the federal constitution.

The Particularists.

As questions of government were evolved by the struggles for independence, the Whigs, who of course greatly outnumbered all others during the Revolution, naturally divided in sentiment, though their divisions were not sufficiently serious to excite the establishment of rival parties—something which the great majority of our forefathers were too wise to think of in time of war. When the war closed, however, and the question of establishing the Union was brought clear to the view of all, one class of the Whigs believed that state government should be supreme, and that no central power should have sufficient authority to coerce a state, or keep it to the compact against its will. All accepted the idea of a central government; all realized the necessity of union, but the fear that the states would lose their power, or surrender their independence was very great, and this fear was more naturally shown by both the larger and the smaller states. This class of thinkers were then called Particularists. Their views were opposed by the

Strong Government Whigs

who argued that local self-government was inadequate to the establishment and perpetuation of political freedom, and that it afforded little or no power to successfully resist foreign invasion. Some of these went so far as to favor a government patterned after that of England, save that it should be republican in name and spirit. The essential differences, if they can be reduced to two sentences, were these: The Particularist Whigs desired a government republican in form and democratic in spirit, with rights of local self-government and state rights ever uppermost. The Strong Government Whigs desired a government republican in form, with checks upon the impulses or passions of the people; liberty, sternly regulated by law, and that law strengthened and confirmed by central authority—the authority of the national government to be final in appeals.

As we have stated, the weakness of the confederation was acknowledged by many men, and the majority, as it proved to be after much agitation and discussion thought it too imperfect to amend. The power of the confederacy was not acknowledged by the states, its congress not respected by the people. Its requisitions were disregarded, foreign trade could not be successfully regulated; foreign nations refused to bind themselves by commercial treaties, and there was a rapid growth of very dangerous business rivalries and jealousies between the several states. Those which were fortunate enough, independent of congress, to possess or secure ports for domestic or foreign commerce, taxed the imports of their sister states. There was confusion which must soon have approached violence, for no authority beyond the limits of the state was respected, and Congress was notably powerless in its attempts to command aid from the states to meet the payment of the war debt, or the interest thereon. Instead of general respect for, there was almost general disregard of law on the part of legislative bodies, and the people were not slow in imitating their representatives. Civil strife became imminent, and Shay’s Rebellion in Massachusetts was the first warlike manifestation of the spirit which was abroad in the land.

Alive to the new dangers, the Assembly of Virginia in 1786, appointed commissioners to invite all the states to take part in a convention for the consideration of questions of commerce, and the propriety of altering the Articles of Confederation. This convention met at Annapolis, Sept. 11th, 1786. But five states sent representatives, the others regarding the movement with jealousy. This convention, however, adapted a report which urged the appointment of commissioners by all the states, “to devise such other provisions as shall, to them seem necessary to render the condition of the Federal government adequate to the exigencies of the Union; and to report such an act for that purpose to the United States in Congress assembled, as, when agreed to by them and afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of every state, will effectually provide for the same.” Congress approved this action, and passed resolutions favoring a meeting in convention for the “sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation, and report to Congress and the State legislatures.” The convention met in Philadelphia in May, 1787, and continued its sessions until September 17th, of the same year. The Strong Government Whigs had previously made every possible effort for a full and able representation, and the result did not disappoint them, for instead of simply revising the Articles of Confederation, the convention framed a constitution, and sent it to Congress to be submitted to that body and through it to the several legislatures. The act submitting it provided that, if it should be ratified by nine of the thirteen states, it should be binding upon those ratifying the same. Just here was started the custom which has since passed into law, that amendments to the national constitution shall be submitted after approval by Congress, to the legislatures of the several states, and after approval by three-fourths thereof, it shall be binding upon all—a very proper exercise of constitutional authority, as it seems now, but which would not have won popular approval when Virginia proposed the Annapolis convention in 1786. Indeed, the reader of our political history must ever be impressed with the fact that changes and reforms ever moved slowly, and that those of slowest growth seem to abide the longest.

The Federal and Anti-Federal Parties.

The Strong Government Whigs, on the submission of the constitution of 1787 to Congress and the legislatures, and indirectly through the latter to the people, who elect the members on this issue, became the Federal party, and all of its power was used to promote the ratification of the instrument. Its ablest men, headed by Alexander Hamilton and James Madison, advocated adoption before the people, and their pens supplied much of the current political literature of that day. Eighty-five essays, still noted and quoted for their ability, under the nom de plume of “Publius,” were published in “The Federalist.” They were written by Hamilton, Madison and Jay, and with irresistible force advocated the Federal constitution, which was ratified by the nine needed states, and Congress was officially informed of the fact July 2d, 1788, and the first Wednesday in March, 1789, was fixed as the time “for commencing proceedings under the constitution.”

This struggle for the first time gave the Federalists an admitted majority. The complexion of the State legislature prior to it showed them in fact to be in a minority, and the Particularist Whigs, or Anti-Federals opposed every preliminary step looking to the abandonment of the Articles of Confederation and the adoption of a Federal constitution. They were called Anti-Federals because they opposed a federal government and constitution and adhered to the rights of the States and those of local self-government. Doubtless party rancor, then as now, led men to oppose a system of government which it seems they must have approved after fighting for it, but the earlier jealousies of the States and the prevailing ideas of liberty certainly gave the Anti-Federals a popularity which only a test so sensible as that proposed could have shaken. They were not without popular orators and leaders. Patrick Henry, the earliest of the patriots, and “the-old-man-eloquent,” Samuel Adams, took special pride in espousing their cause. The war questions between Whig and Tory must have passed quickly away, as living issues, though the newspapers and contemporaneous history show that the old taunts and battle cries were applied to the new situation with a plainness and virulence that must still be envied by the sensational and more bitterly partisan journals of our own day. To read these now, and some of our facts are gathered from such sources, is to account for the frequent use of the saying touching “the ingratitude of republics,” for when partisan hatred could deride the still recent utterances of Henry before the startled assembly of Virginians, and of Adams in advocating the adoption of the Declaration, there must at least to every surface view have been rank ingratitude. Their good names, however, survived the struggle, as good names in our republic have ever survived the passions of the law. In politics the Americans then as now, hated with promptness and forgave with generosity.

The Anti-Federals denied nearly all that the Federals asserted. The latter had for the first time assumed the aggressive, and had the advantage of position. They showed the deplorable condition of the country, and their opponents had to bear the burdens of denial at a time when nearly all public and private obligations were dishonored; when labor was poorly paid, workmen getting but twenty-five cents a day, with little to do at that; when even the rich in lands were poor in purse, and when commerce on the seas was checked by the coldness of foreign nations and restricted by the action of the States themselves; when manufactures were without protection of any kind, and when the people thought their struggle for freedom was about to end in national poverty. Still Henry, and Adams and Hancock, with hosts of others, claimed that the aspirations of the Anti-Federals were the freest, that they pointed to personal liberty and local sovereignty. Yet many Anti-Federals must have accepted the views of the Federals, who under the circumstances must have presented the better reason, and the result was as stated, the ratification of the Federal constitution of 1787 by three-fourths of the States of the Union. After this the Anti-Federalists were given a new name, that of “Close Constructionists,” because they naturally desired to interpret the new instrument in such a way as to bend it to their views. The Federalists became “Broad Constructionists,” because they interpreted the constitution in a way calculated to broaden the power of the national government.

The Confederacy once dissolved, the Federal party entered upon the enjoyment of full political power, but it was not without its responsibilities. The government had to be organized upon the basis of the new constitution, as upon the success of that organization would depend not alone the stability of the government and the happiness of its people, but the reputation of the party and the fame of its leaders as statesmen.

Fortunately for all, party hostilities were not manifested in the Presidential election. All bowed to the popularity of Washington, and he was unanimously nominated by the congressional caucus and appointed by the electoral college. He selected his cabinet from the leading minds of both parties, and while himself a recognized Federalist, all felt that he was acting for the good of all, and in the earlier years of his administration, none disputed this fact.

As the new measures of the government advanced, however, the anti-federalists organized an opposition to the party in power. Immediate danger had passed. The constitution worked well. The laws of Congress were respected; its calls for revenue honored, and Washington devoted much of his first and second messages to showing the growing prosperity of the country, and the respect which it was beginning to excite abroad. But where there is political power, there is opposition in a free land, and the great leaders of that day neither forfeited their reputations as patriots, or their characters as statesmen by the assertion of honest differences of opinion. Washington, Adams, and Hamilton were the recognized leaders of the Federalists, the firm friends of the constitution. The success of this instrument modified the views of the anti-Federalists, and Madison of Virginia, its recognized friend when it was in preparation, joined with others who had been its friends—notably,[^[1]] Doctor Williamson, of North Carolina, and Mr. Langdon, of Georgia, in opposing the administration, and soon became recognized leaders of the anti-Federalists. Langdon was the President pro tem. of the Senate. Jefferson was then on a mission to France, and not until some years thereafter did he array himself with those opposed to centralized power in the nation. He returned in November, 1789, and was called to Washington’s cabinet as Secretary of State in March, 1790. It was a great cabinet, with Jefferson as its premier (if this term is suited to a time when English political nomenclature was anything but popular in the land;) Hamilton, Secretary of the Treasury; Knox, Secretary of War, and Edmund Randolph, Attorney-General. There was no Secretary of the Navy until the administration of the elder Adams, and no Secretary of the Interior.

The first session of Congress under the Federal constitution, held in New York, sat for nearly six months, the adjournment taking place September 29th, 1789. Nearly all the laws framed pointed to the organization of the government, and the discussions were able and protracted. Indeed, these discussions developed opposing views, which could easily find separation on much the same old lines as those which separated the founders of constitutional government from those who favored the old confederate methods. The Federalists, on pivotal questions, at this session, carried their measures only by small majorities.

Much of the second session was devoted to the discussion of the able reports of Hamilton, and their final adoption did much to build up the credit of the nation and to promote its industries. He was the author of the protective system, and at the first session gave definite shape to his theories. He recommended the funding of the war debt, the assumption of the state war debts by the national government, the providing of a system of revenue from the collection of duties on imports, and an internal excise. His advocacy of a protective tariff was plain, for he declared it to be necessary for the support of the government and the encouragement of manufactures that duties be laid on goods, wares, and merchandise imported.

The third session of the same Congress was held at Philadelphia, though the seat of the national government had, at the previous one, been fixed on the Potomac instead of the Susquehanna—this after a compromise with Southern members, who refused to vote for the Assumption Bill until the location of the capital in the District of Columbia had been agreed upon; by the way, this was the first exhibition of log-rolling in Congress. To complete Hamilton’s financial system, a national bank was incorporated. On this project both the members of Congress and of the cabinet were divided, but it passed, and was promptly approved by Washington. By this time it was well known that Jefferson and Hamilton held opposing views on many questions of government, and these found their way into and influenced the action of Congress, and passed naturally from thence to the people, who were thus early believed to be almost equally divided on the more essential political issues. Before the close of the session, Vermont and Kentucky were admitted to the Union. Vermont was the first state admitted in addition to the original thirteen. True, North Carolina and Rhode Island had rejected the constitution, but they reconsidered their action and came in—the former in November, 1789, and the latter in May, 1790.

The election for members of the Second Congress resulted in a majority in both branches favorable to the administration. It met at Philadelphia in October, 1791. The exciting measure of the session was the excise act, somewhat similar to that of the previous year, but the opposition wanted an issue on which to rally, they accepted this, and this agitation led to violent and in one instance warlike opposition on the part of a portion of the people. Those of western Pennsylvania, largely interested in distilleries, prepared for armed resistance to the excise, but at the same session a national militia law had been passed, and Washington took advantage of this to suppress the “Whisky Rebellion” in its incipiency. It was a hasty, rash undertaking, yet was dealt with so firmly that the action of the authorities strengthened the law, and the respect for order. The four counties which rebelled did no further damage than to tar and feather a government tax collector and rob him of his horse, though many threats were made and the agitation continued until 1794, when Washington’s threatened appearance at the head of fifteen thousand militia settled the whole question.

The first session of the Second Congress also passed the first methodic apportionment bill, which based the congressional representation on the census taken in 1790, the basis being 33,000 inhabitants for each representative. The second session which sat from November, 1792, to March, 1793, was mainly occupied in a discussion of the foreign and domestic relations of the country. No important measures were adopted.

The Republican and Federal Parties.

The most serious objection to the constitution before its ratification was the absence of a distinct bill of rights, which should recognize “the equality of all men, and their rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness,” and at the first session of Congress a bill was framed containing twelve articles, ten of which were afterwards ratified as amendments to the constitution. Yet state sovereignty, then imperfectly defined, was the prevailing idea in the minds of the Anti-Federalists, and they took every opportunity to oppose any extended delegation of authority from the states of the Union. They contended that the power of the state should be supreme, and charged the Federalists with monarchical tendencies. They opposed Hamilton’s national bank scheme, and Jefferson and Randolph plainly expressed the opinion that it was unconstitutional—that a bank was not authorized by the constitution, and that it would prevent the states from maintaining banks. But when the Bill of Rights had been incorporated in and attached to the constitution as amendments, Jefferson with rare political sagacity withdrew all opposition to the instrument itself, and the Anti-Federalists gladly followed his lead, for they felt that they had labored under many partisan disadvantages. The constitution was from the first too strong for successful resistance, and when opposition was confessedly abandoned the party name was changed, also at the suggestion of Jefferson, to that of Republican. The Anti-Federalists were at first disposed to call their party the Democratic-Republicans, but finally called, it simply Republican, to avoid the opposite of the extreme which they charged against the Federalists. Each party had its taunts in use, the Federalists being denounced as monarchists, the Anti-Federalists as Democrats; the one presumed to be looking forward to monarchy, the other to the rule of the mob.

By 1793 partisan lines under the names of Federalists and Republicans, were plainly drawn, and the schism in the cabinet was more marked than ever. Personal ambition may have had much to do with it, for Washington had previously shown his desire to retire to private life. While he remained at the head of affairs he was unwilling to part with Jefferson and Hamilton, and did all in his power to bring about a reconciliation, but without success. Before the close of the first constitutional Presidency, however, Washington had become convinced that the people desired him to accept a re-election, and he was accordingly a candidate and unanimously chosen. John Adams was re-elected Vice-President, receiving 77 votes to 50 for Geo. Clinton, (5 scattering) the Republican candidate. Soon after the inauguration Citizen Genet, an envoy from the French republic, arrived and sought to excite the sympathy of the United States and involve it in a war with Great Britain. Jefferson and his Republican party warmly sympathized with France, and insisted that gratitude for revolutionary favors commanded aid to France in her struggles. The Federalists, under Washington and Hamilton, favored non-intervention, and insisted that we should maintain friendly relations with Great Britain. Washington showed his usual firmness, and before the expiration of the month in which Genet arrived, had issued his celebrated proclamation of neutrality. This has ever since been the accepted foreign policy of the nation.

Genet, chagrined at the issuance of this proclamation, threatened to appeal to the people, and made himself so obnoxious to Washington that the latter demanded his recall. The French government sent M. Fauchet as his successor, but Genet continued to reside in the United States, and under his inspiration a number of Democratic Societies, in imitation of the French Jacobin clubs, were founded, but like all such organizations in this country, they were short-lived. Secret political societies thrive only under despotisms. In Republics like ours they can only live when the great parties are in confusion and greatly divided. They disappear with the union of sentiment into two great parties. If there were many parties and factions, as in Mexico and some of the South American republics, there would be even a wider field for them here than there.

The French agitation showed its impress upon the nation as late as 1794, when a resolution to cut off intercourse with Great Britain passed the House, and was defeated in the Senate only by the casting vote of the Vice-President. Many people favored France, and to such silly heights did the excitement run that these insisted on wearing a national cockade. Jefferson had left the cabinet the December previous, and had retired to his plantation in Virginia, where he spent his leisure in writing political essays and organizing the Republican party, of which he was the acknowledged founder. Here he escaped the errors of his party in Congress, but it was a potent fact that his friends in official station not only did not endorse the non-intervention policy of Washington, but that they actively antagonized it in many ways. The Congressional leader in these movements was Mr. Madison. The policy of Britain fed this opposition. The forts on Lake Erie were still occupied by the British soldiery in defiance of the treaty of 1783; American vessels were seized on their way to French ports, and American citizens were impressed. To avoid a war, Washington sent John Jay as special envoy to England. He arrived in June, 1794, and by November succeeded in making a treaty. It was ratified in June, 1795, by the Senate by the constitutional majority of two-thirds, though there was much declamatory opposition, and the feeling between the Federal and Republican parties ran higher than ever before. The Republicans denounced while the Federals congratulated Washington. Under this treaty the British surrendered possession of all American ports, and as Gen’l Wayne during the previous summer had conquered the war-tribes and completed a treaty with them, the country was again on the road to prosperity.

In Washington’s message of 1794, he plainly censured all “self-created political societies,” meaning the democratic societies formed by Genet, but this part of the message the House refused to endorse, the speaker giving the casting vote in the negative. The Senate was in harmony with the political views of the President. Party spirit had by this time measurably affected all classes of the people, and as subjects for agitation here multiplied, the opposition no longer regarded Washington with that respect and decorum which it had been the rule to manifest. His wisdom as President, his patriotism, and indeed his character as a man, were all hotly questioned by political enemies. He was even charged with corruption in expending more of the public moneys than had been appropriated—charges which were soon shown to be groundless.

At the first session of Congress in December, 1795, the Senate’s administration majority had increased, but in the House the opposing Republicans had also increased their numbers. The Senate by 14 to 8 endorsed the message; the House at first refused but finally qualified its answers.

In March, 1796, a new political issue was sprung in the House by Mr. Livingstone of New York, who offered a resolution requesting of the President a copy of the instructions to Mr. Jay, the envoy who made the treaty with Great Britain. After a debate of several days, more bitter than any which had preceded it, the House passed the resolution by 57 to 35, the Republicans voting aye, the Federals no. Washington in answer, took the position that the House of Representatives was not part of the treaty-making power of the government, and could not therefore be entitled to any papers relating to such treaties. The constitution had placed this treaty-making and ratifying power in the hands of the Senate, the Cabinet and the President.

This answer, now universally accepted as the proper one, yet excited the House and increased political animosities. The Republicans charged the Federals with being the “British party,” and in some instances hinted that they had been purchased with British gold. Indignation meetings were called, but after much sound and fury, it was ascertained that the people really favored abiding by the treaty in good faith, and finally the House, after more calm and able debates, passed the needed legislation to carry out the treaty by a vote of 51 to 48.

In August, 1796, prior to the meeting of the Congressional caucus which then placed candidates for the Presidency in nomination, Washington issued his celebrated Farewell Address, in which he gave notice that he would retire from public life at the expiration of his term. He had been solicited to be a candidate for re-election (a third term) and told that all the people could unite upon him—a statement which, without abating one jot, our admiration for the man, would doubtless have been called in question by the Republicans, who had become implacably hostile to his political views, and who were encouraged to believe they could win control of the Presidency, by their rapidly increasing power in the House. Yet the address was everywhere received with marks of admiration. Legislatures commended it by resolution and ordered it to be engrossed upon their records; journals praised it, and upon the strength of its plain doctrines the Federalists took new courage, and prepared to win in the Presidential battle which followed. Both parties were plainly arrayed and confident, and so close was the result that the leaders of both were elected—John Adams, the nominee of the Federalists, to the Presidency, and Thomas Jefferson, the nominee of the Republicans, to the Vice-Presidency. The law which then obtained was that the candidate who received the highest number of electoral votes, took the first place, the next highest, the second. Thomas Pinckney of South Carolina was the Federal nominee for Vice-President, and Aaron Burr of the Republicans. Adams received 71 electoral votes, Jefferson 68, Pinckney 59, Burr 30, scattering 48. Pinckney had lost 12 votes, while Burr lost 38—a loss of popularity which the latter regained four years later. The first impressions which our forefathers had of this man were the best.

John Adams was inaugurated as President in Philadelphia, at Congress Hall, March 4th, 1797, and in his inaugural was careful to deny the charge that the Federal party had any sympathy for England, but reaffirmed his endorsement of the policy of Washington as to strict neutrality. To this extent he sought to soften the asperities of the parties, and measurably succeeded, though the times were still stormy. The French revolution had reached its highest point, and our people still took sides. Adams found he would have to arm to preserve neutrality and at the same time punish the aggression of either of the combatants. This was our first exhibition of “armed neutrality.” An American navy was quickly raised, and every preparation made for defending the rights of Americans. An alliance with France was refused, after which the American Minister was dismissed and the French navy began to cripple our trade. In May, 1797, President Adams felt it his duty to call an extra session of Congress, which closed in July. The Senate approved of negotiations for reconciliation with France. They were attempted but, proved fruitless; in May, 1798, a full naval armament was authorized, and soon several French vessels were captured before there was any declaration of war. Indeed, neither power declared war, and as soon as France discovered how earnest the Americans were she made overtures for an adjustment of difficulties, and these resulted in the treaty of 1800.

The Republicans, though warmly favoring a contest, did not heartily support that inaugurated by Adams, and contended after this that the militia and a small naval force were sufficient for internal defense. They denounced the position of the Federals, who favored the enlargement of the army and navy, as measures calculated to overawe public sentiment in time of peace. The Federals, however, through their prompt resentment of the aggressions of France, had many adherents to their party. They organized their power and sought to perpetuate it by the passage of the alien and sedition, and a naturalization law.

The alien and sedition law gave the President authority “to order all such aliens as he shall judge dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States, or shall have reasonable grounds to suspect are concerned in any treasonable or secret machinations against the government thereof, to depart out of the territory of the United States, within such time as shall be expressed in such order.” The provisions which followed were in keeping with that quoted, the 3d section commanding every master of a ship entering a port of the United States, immediately on his arrival, to make report in writing to the collector of customs, the names of all aliens on board, etc. The act was to continue in force for two years from the date of its passage, and it was approved June 25th, 1798.

A resolution was introduced in the Senate on the 25th of April, 1798, by Mr. Hillhouse of Connecticut, to inquire what provision of law ought to be made, &c., as to the removal of such aliens as may be dangerous to the peace of the country, &c. This resolution was adopted the next day, and Messrs. Hillhouse, Livermore and Read were appointed the committee, and subsequently reported the bill. It passed the Senate by 16 to 7, and the House by 46 to 40, the Republicans in the latter body resisting it warmly. The leading opposing idea was that it lodged with the Executive too much power, and was liable to great abuse. It has frequently since, in arguments against centralized power, been used for illustration by political speakers.

The Naturalization law, favored by the Federalists, because they knew they could acquire few friends either from newly arrived English or French aliens, among other requirements provided that an alien must reside in the United States fourteen years before he could vote. The Republicans denounced this law as calculated to check immigration, and dangerous to our country in the fact that it caused too many inhabitants to owe no allegiance. They also asserted, as did those who opposed Americanism later on in our history, that America was properly an asylum for all nations, and that those coming to America should freely share all the privileges and liberties of the government.

These laws and the political resentments which they created gave a new and what eventually proved a dangerous current to political thought and action. They were the immediate cause of the Kentucky and Virginia resolutions of 1798, Jefferson being the author of the former and Madison of the latter.

These resolutions were full of political significance, and gave tone to sectional discussion up to the close of the war for the Union. They first promulgated the doctrine of nullification or secession, and political writers mistake who point to Calhoun as the father of that doctrine. It began with the old Republicans under the leadership of Jefferson and Madison, and though directly intended as protests against the alien and sedition, and the naturalization laws of Congress, they kept one eye upon the question of slavery—rather that interest was kept in view in their declarations, and yet the authors of both were anything but warm advocates of slavery. They were then striving, however, to reinforce the opposition to the Federal party, which the administration of Adams had thus far apparently weakened, and they had in view the brief agitation which had sprung up in 1793, five years before, on the petition to Congress of a Pennsylvania society “to use its powers to stop the traffic in slaves.” On the question of referring this petition to a committee there arose a sectional debate. Men took sides not because of the party to which they belonged, but the section, and for the first time the North and South were arrayed against each other on a question not then treated either as partisan or political, but which most minds then saw must soon become both partisan and sectional. Some of the Southern debaters, in their protests against interference, thus early threatened civil war. With a view to better protect their rights to slave property, they then advocated and succeeded in passing the first fugitive slave law. This was approved February 12, 1793.

The resolutions of 1798 will be found in the book devoted to political platforms. So highly were these esteemed by the Republicans of that day, and by the interests whose support they so shrewdly invited, that they more than counterbalanced the popularity acquired by the Federals in their resistance to France, and by 1800 they caused a rupture in the Cabinet of Adams.

In the Presidential election of 1800 John Adams was the nominee for President and C. C. Pinckney for Vice-President. A “Congressional Convention” of Republicans, held in Philadelphia, nominated Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr as candidates for these offices. On the election which followed the Republicans chose 73 electors and the Federalists 65. Each elector voted for two persons, and the Republicans so voted that they unwisely gave Jefferson and Burr each 73 votes. Neither being highest, it was not legally determined which should be President or Vice-President, and the election had to go to the House. The Federalists threw 65 votes to Adams and 64 to Pinckney. The Republicans could have done the same, but Burr’s intrigue and ambition prevented this, and the result was a protracted contest in the House, and one which put the country in great peril, but which plainly pointed out some of the imperfections of the electoral features of the Constitution. The Federalists proposed to confess the inability of the House to agree through the vote by States, but to this proposition the Republicans threatened armed resistance. The Federalists next attempted a combination with the friends of Aaron Burr, but this specimen of bargaining to deprive a nominee of the place to which it was the plain intention of his party to elect him, really contributed to Jefferson’s popularity, if not in that Congress, certainly before the people. He was elected on the 36th ballot.

The bitterness of this strife, and the dangers which similar ones threatened, led to an abandonment of the system of each Elector voting for two, the highest to be President, the next highest Vice-President, and an amendment was offered to the Constitution, and fully ratified by September 25, 1804, requiring the electors to ballot separately for President and Vice-President.

Jefferson was the first candidate nominated by a Congressional caucus. It convened in 1800 at Philadelphia, and nominated Jefferson for President and Burr for Vice-President. Adams and Pinckney were not nominated, but ran and were accepted as natural leaders of their party, just as Washington and Adams were before them.

Downfall of the Federal Party.

This contest broke the power of the Federal party. It had before relied upon the rare sagacity and ability of its leaders, but the contest in the House developed such attempts at intrigue as disgusted many and caused all to quarrel, Hamilton having early showed his dislike to Adams. As a party the Federal had been peculiarly brave at times when high bravery was needed. It had framed the Federal Government and stood by the powers given it until they were too firmly planted for even newer and triumphant partisans to recklessly trifle with. It stood for non-interference with foreign nations against the eloquence of adventurers, the mad impulses of mobs, the generosity of new-born freemen, the harangues of demagogues, and best of all against those who sought to fan these popular breezes to their own comfort, It provided for the payment of the debt, had the courage to raise revenues both from internal and external sources, and to increase expenditures, as the growth of the country demanded. Though it passed out of power in a cloud of intrigue and in a vain grasp at the “flesh-pots,” it yet had a glorious history, and one which none untinctured with the better prejudices of that day, can avoid admiring.

The defeat of Adams was not unexpected by him, yet it was greatly regretted by his friends, for he was justly regarded as second to no other civilian in the establishment of the liberties of the colonies. He was eloquent to a rare degree, possessed natural eloquence, and made the most famous speech in advocacy of the Declaration. Though the proceedings of the Revolutionary Congress were secret, and what was said never printed, yet Webster gives his version of the noted speech of Adams, and we reproduce it in Book III. of this volume as one of the great speeches of noted American orators.

Mr. Jefferson was inaugurated the third President, in the new capitol at Washington, on the 4th of March, 1801, and Vice-President Burr took his seat in the Senate the same day. Though Burr distinctly disavowed any participancy in the House contest, he was distrusted by Jefferson’s warm friends, and jealousies rapidly cropped out. Jefferson endeavored through his inaugural to smooth factious and party asperities, and so well were his words chosen that the Federalists indulged, the hope that they would not be removed from office because of their political views.

Early in June, however, the first question of civil service was raised. Mr. Jefferson then removed Elizur Goodrich, a Federalist, from the Collectorship of New Haven, and appointed Samuel Bishop, a Republican, to the place. The citizens remonstrated, saying that Goodrich was prompt, reliable and able, and showed that his successor was 78 years old, and too infirm for the duties of the office. To these remonstrances Mr. Jefferson, under date of July 12th, replied in language which did not then, as he did later on, plainly assert the right of every administration to have its friends in office. We quote the following:

“Declarations by myself, in favor of political tolerance, exhortations to harmony and affection in social intercourse, and respect for the equal rights of the minority, have, on certain occasions, been quoted and misconstrued into assurances that the tenure of office was not to be disturbed. But could candor apply such a construction? When it is considered that, during the late administration, those who were not of a particular sect of politics were excluded from all office; when, by a steady pursuit of this measure, nearly the whole offices of the United States were monopolized by that sect; when the public sentiment at length declared itself, and burst open the doors of honor and confidence to those whose opinions they approved; was it to be imagined that this monopoly of office was to be continued in the hands of the minority? Does it violate their equal rights to assert some rights in the majority also? Is it political intolerance to claim a proportionate share in the direction of the public affairs? If a due participation of office is a matter of right, how are vacancies to be obtained? Those by death are few, by resignation none. Can any other mode than that of removal be proposed? This is a painful office; but it is made my duty, and I meet it as such. I proceed in the operation with deliberation and inquiry, that it may injure the best men least, and effect the purposes of justice and public utility with the least private distress, that it may be thrown as much as possible on delinquency, on oppression, on intolerance, on ante-revolutionary adherence to our enemies.

“I lament sincerely that unessential differences of opinion should ever have been deemed sufficient to interdict half the society from the rights and the blessings of self-government, to proscribe them as unworthy of every trust. It would have been to me a circumstance of great relief, had I found a moderate participation of office in the hands of the majority. I would gladly have left to time and accident to raise them to their just share. But their total exclusion calls for prompter corrections. I shall correct the procedure; but that done, return with joy to that state of things when the only questions concerning a candidate shall be: Is he honest? Is he capable? Is he faithful to the constitution?”

Mr. Adams had made few removals, and none because of the political views held by the incumbents, nearly all of whom had been appointed by Washington and continued through good behavior. At the date of the appointment of most of them, Jefferson’s Republican party had no existence; so that the reasons given in the quotation do not comport with the facts. Washington’s rule was integrity and capacity, for he could have no regard for politics where political lines had been obliterated in his own selection. Doubtless these office-holders were human, and adhered with warmth to the administration which they served, and this fact, and this alone, must have angered the Republicans and furnished them with arguments for a change.

Mr. Jefferson’s position, however, made his later conduct natural. He was the acknowledged leader of his party, its founder indeed, and that party had carried him into power. He desired to keep it intact, to strengthen its lines with whatever patronage he had at his disposal, and he evidently regarded the cause of Adams in not rewarding his friends as a mistake. It was, therefore, Jefferson, and not Jackson, who was the author of the theory that “to the victors belong the spoils.” Jackson gave it a sharp and perfectly defined shape by the use of these words, but the spirit and principle were conceived by Jefferson, who throughout his life showed far greater originality in politics than any of the early patriots. It was his acute sense of just what was right for a growing political party to do, which led him to turn the thoughts of his followers into new and popular directions. Seeing that they were at grave disadvantage when opposing the attitude of the government in its policy with foreign nations; realizing that the work of the Federalists in strengthening the power of the new government, in providing revenues and ways and means for the payment of the debt, were good, he changed the character of the opposition by selecting only notoriously arbitrary measures for assault—and changed it even more radically than this. He early saw that simple opposition was not progress, and that it was both wise and popular to be progressive, and in all his later political papers he sought to make his party the party favoring personal freedom, the one of liberal ideas, the one which, instead of shirking, should anticipate every change calculated to enlarge the liberties and the opportunities of citizens. These things were not inconsistent with his strong views in favor of local self-government; indeed, in many particulars they seemed to support that theory, and by the union of the two ideas he shrewdly arrayed political enthusiasm by the side of political interest. Political sagacity more profound than this it is difficult to imagine. It has not since been equalled in the history of our land, nor do we believe in the history of any other.

After the New Haven episode, so jealous was Jefferson of his good name, that while he confided all new appointments to the hands of his political friends, he made few removals, and these for apparent cause. The mere statement of his position had proved an invitation to the Federalists in office to join his earlier friends in the support of his administration. Many of them did it, so many that the clamorings of truer friends could not be hushed. With a view to create a new excuse, Jefferson declared that all appointments made by Adams after February 14th, when the House began its ballotings for President, were void, these appointments belonging of right to him, and from this act of Adams we date the political legacies which some of our Presidents have since handed down to their successors. One of the magistrates whose commission had been made out under Adams, sought to compel Jefferson to sign it by a writ of mandamus before the Supreme Court, but a “profound investigation of constitutional law” induced the court not to grant the motion. All commissions signed by Adams after the date named were suppressed.

Jefferson’s apparent bitterness against the Federalists is mainly traceable to the contest in the House, and his belief that at one time they sought a coalition with Burr. This coalition he regarded as a violation of the understanding when he was nominated, and a supposed effort to appoint a provisional office he regarded as an usurpation in fact. In a letter to James Monroe, dated February 15th, speaking of this contest, he says:

“Four days of balloting have produced not a single change of a vote. Yet it is confidently believed that to-morrow there is to be a coalition. I know of no foundation for this belief. If they could have been permitted to pass a law for putting the government in the hands of an officer, they would certainly have prevented an election. But we thought it best to declare openly and firmly, one and all, that the day such an act passed, the Middle States would arm, and that no such usurpation, even for a single day, should be submitted to.”

It is but fair to say that the Federalists denied all such intentions, and that James A. Bayard, of Delaware, April 3, 1806, made formal oath to this denial. In this he says that three States, representing Federalist votes, offered to withdraw their opposition if John Nicholas, of Virginia, and the personal friend of Jefferson, would secure pledges that the public credit should be supported, the navy maintained, and that subordinate public officers, employed only in the execution of details, established by law, should not be removed from office on the ground of their public character, nor without complaint against their conduct. The Federalists then went so far as to admit that officers of “high discretion and confidence,” such as members of the cabinet and foreign ministers, should be known friends of the administration. This proposition goes to show that there is nothing very new in what are called our modern politics; that the elder Bayard, as early as 1800, made a formal proposal to bargain. Mr. Nicholas offered his assurance that these things would prove acceptable to and govern the conduct of Jefferson’s administration, but he declined to consult with Jefferson on the points. General Smith subsequently engaged to do it, and Jefferson replied that the points given corresponded with his views and intentions, and that Mr. Bayard and his friends might confide in him accordingly. The opposition of Vermont, Maryland and Delaware was then immediately withdrawn, and Mr. Jefferson was made President. Gen’l Smith, twelve days later, made an affidavit which substantially confirmed that of Bayard. Latimer, the collector of the port of Philadelphia, and M’Lane, collector of Wilmington, (Bayard’s special friend) were retained in office. He had cited these two as examples of his opposition to any change, and Jefferson seemed to regard the pledges as not sacred beyond the parties actually named in Bayard’s negotiations with Gen’l Smith.

This misunderstanding or misconstruction of what in these days would be plainly called a bargain, led to considerable political criticism, and Jefferson felt it necessary to defend his cause. This he did in letters to friends which both then and since found their way into the public prints. One of these letters, written to Col. Monroe, March 7th, shows in every word and line the natural politician. In this he says:

“Some (removals) I know must be made. They must be as few as possible, done gradually, and bottomed on some malversation or inherent disqualification. Where we shall draw the line between all and none, is not yet settled, and will not be till we get our administration together; and perhaps even then we shall proceed ā talons, balancing our measures according to the impression we perceive them to make. This may give you a general view of our plan.”

A little later on, March 28, he wrote to Elbridge Gerry:

“Officers who have been guilty of gross abuses of office, such as marshals packing juries, etc., I shall now remove, as my predecessor ought in justice to have done. The instances will be few, and governed by strict rule, not party passion. The right of opinion shall suffer no invasion from me.”

Jefferson evidently tired of this subject, and gradually modified his views, as shown in his letter to Levi Lincoln, July 11, wherein he says:

“I am satisfied that the heaping of abuse on me personally, has been with the design and the hope of provoking me to make a general sweep of all Federalists out of office. But as I have carried no passion into the execution of this disagreeable duty, I shall suffer none to be excited. The clamor which has been raised will not provoke me to remove one more, nor deter me from removing one less, than if not a word had been said on the subject. In the course of the summer, all which is necessary will be done; and we may hope that, this cause of offence being at an end, the measures we shall pursue and propose for the amelioration of the public affairs, will be so confessedly salutary as to unite all men not monarchists in principle.” In the same letter he warmly berates the monarchical federalists, saying, “they are incurables, to be taken care of in a madhouse if necessary, and on motives of charity.”

The seventh Congress assembled. Political parties were at first nearly equally divided in the Senate, but eventually there was a majority for the administration. Jefferson then discontinued the custom established by Washington of delivering in person his message to Congress. The change was greatly for the better, as it afforded relief from the requirement of immediate answers on the subjects contained in the message. It has ever since been followed.

The seventh session of Congress, pursuant to the recommendation of President Jefferson, established a uniform system of naturalization, and so modified the law as to make the required residence of aliens five years, instead of fourteen, as in the act of 1798, and to permit a declaration of intention to become a citizen at the expiration of three years. By his recommendation also was established the first sinking fund for the redemption of the public debt. It required the setting apart annually for this purpose the sum of seven millions and three hundred thousand dollars. Other measures, more partisan in their character, were proposed, but Congress showed an aversion to undoing what had been wisely done. A favorite law of the Federalists establishing circuit courts alone was repealed, and this only after a sharp debate, and a close vote. The provisional army had been disbanded by a law of the previous Congress. A proposition to abolish the naval department was defeated, as was that to discontinue the mint establishment.

At this session the first law in relation to the slave trade was passed. It was to prevent the importation of negroes, mulattoes and other persons of color into any port of the United States within a state which had prohibited by law the admission of any such person. The penalty was one thousand dollars and the forfeiture of the vessel. The slave trade was not then prohibited by the constitution, nor was the subject then generally agitated, though it had been as early as 1793, when, as previously stated, an exciting sectional debate followed the presentation of a petition from Pennsylvania to abolish the slave trade.

Probably the most important occurrence under the first administration of Jefferson was that relating to the purchase and admission of Louisiana. There had been apprehensions of a war with Spain, and with a view to be ready Congress had passed an act authorizing the President to call upon the executives of such of the states as he might deem expedient, for detachments of militia not exceeding eighty thousand, or to accept the services of volunteers for a term of twelve months. The disagreement arose over the southwestern boundary line and the right of navigating the Mississippi. Our government learned in the spring of 1802, that Spain had by a secret treaty made in October, 1800, actually ceded Louisiana to France. Our government had in 1795 made a treaty with Spain which gave us the right of deposit at New Orleans for three years, but in October, 1802, the Spanish authorities gave notice by proclamation that this right was withdrawn. Excitement followed all along the valley of the Mississippi, and it was increased by the belief that the withdrawal of the privilege was made at the suggestion of France, though Spain still retained the territory, as the formalities of ceding it had not been gone through with. Jefferson promptly took the ground that if France took possession of New Orleans, the United States would immediately become allies of England, but suggested to Minister Livingston at Paris that France might be induced to cede the island of New Orleans and the Floridas to the United States. It was his belief, though a mistaken one, that France had also acquired the Floridas. Louisiana then comprised much of the territory west of the Mississippi and south of the Missouri.

The Federalists in Congress seized upon this question as one upon which they could make an aggressive war against Jefferson’s administration, and resolutions were introduced asking information on the subject. Jefferson, however, wisely avoided all entangling suggestions, and sent Monroe to aid Livingston in effecting a purchase. The treaty was formed in April, 1803, and submitted by Jefferson to the Senate in October following. The Republicans rallied in favor of this scheme of annexation, and claimed that it was a constitutional right in the government to acquire territory—a doctrine widely at variance with their previous position, but occasions are rare where parties quarrel with their administrations on pivotal measures. There was also some latitude here for endorsement, as the direct question of territorial acquisition had not before been presented, but only hypothetically stated in the constitutional disputations then in great fashion. Jefferson would not go so far as to say that the constitution warranted the acquisition to foreign territory, but the scheme was nevertheless his, and he stood in with his friends in the political battle which followed.

The Federalists claimed that we had no power to acquire territory, and that the acquirement of Louisiana would give the South a preponderance which would “continue for all time (poor prophets they!), since southern would be more rapid than northern development;” that states created west of the Mississippi would injure the commerce of New England, and they even went so far as to say that the “admission of the Western World into the Union would compel the Eastern States to establish an eastern empire.” Doubts were also raised as to the right of Louisianians, when admitted to citizenship under our laws, as their lineage, language and religion were different from our own. Its inhabitants were French and descendants of French, with some Spanish creoles, Americans, English and Germans—in all about 90,000, including 40,000 slaves. There were many Indians of course, in a territory then exceeding a million of square miles—a territory which, in the language of First Consul Napoleon, “strengthens forever the power of the United States, and which will give to England a maritime rival that will sooner or later humble her pride”—a military view of the change fully justified by subsequent history. Napoleon sold because of needed preparations for war with England, and while he had previously expressed a willingness to take fifty million francs for it, he got sixty through the shrewd diplomacy of his ministers, who hid for the time their fear of the capture of the port of New Orleans by the English navy.

Little chance was afforded the Federalists for adverse criticism in Congress, for the purchase proved so popular that the people greatly increased the majority in both branches of the eighth Congress, and Jefferson called it together earlier for the purpose of ratification. The Senate ratified the treaty on the 20th of October, 1803, by a vote of 24 to 7, while the House adopted a resolution for carrying the treaty into effect by a vote of 90 to 25. Eleven million dollars of the purchase money was appropriated, the remaining four millions being reserved for the indemnity of American citizens who had sustained losses by French assaults upon our commerce—from which fact subsequently came what is known as the French Spoliation Bill.

Impeachment trials were first attempted before the eighth Congress in 1803. Judge Pickering, of the district court of the United States for New Hampshire, was impeached for occasional drunkenness, and dismissed from office. Judge Chase of the U. S. Supreme Court, and Judge Peters of the district court of Pennsylvania, both Federalists, were charged by articles proposed in the House with illegal and arbitrary conduct in the trial of parties charged with political offenses. The Federalists took alarm at these proceedings, and so vehement were their charges against the Republicans of a desire to destroy the judiciary that their impeachments were finally abandoned.

The Republicans closed their first national administration with high prestige. They had met several congressional reverses on questions where defeat proved good fortune, for the Federalists kept a watchful defence, and were not always wrong. The latter suffered numerically, and many of their best leaders had fallen in the congressional contest of 1800 and 1802, while the Republicans maintained their own additions in talent and number.

In 1804, the candidates of both parties were nominated by congressional caucuses. Jefferson and Clinton were the Republican nominees; Charles C. Pinckney and Rufus King, the nominees of the Federalists, but they only received 14 out of 176 electoral votes.

The struggle of Napoleon in Europe with the allied powers now gave Jefferson an opportunity to inaugurate a foreign policy. England had forbidden all trade with the French and their allies, and France had in return forbidden all commerce with England and her colonies. Both of these decrees violated our neutral rights, and were calculated to destroy our commerce, which by this time had become quite imposing.

Congress acted promptly, and on the 21st of December passed what is known as the Embargo Act, under the inspiration of the Republican party, which claimed that the only choice of the people lay between the embargo and war, and that there was no other way to obtain redress from England and France. But the promised effects of the measure were not realized, and so soon as any dissatisfaction was manifested by the people, the Federalists made the question a political issue. They declared it unconstitutional because it was not limited as to time; that it helped England as against France (a cunning assertion in view of the early love of the Republicans for the cause of the French), and that it laid violent hands on our home commerce and industries. Political agitation increased the discontent, and public opinion at one time turned so strongly against the law that it was openly resisted on the eastern coast, and treated with almost as open contempt on the Canadian border. The bill had passed the House by 87 to 35, the Senate by 19 to 9. In January, 1809, the then closing administration of Jefferson had to change front on the question, and the law was repealed on the 18th of March. The Republicans when they changed, went all the way over, and advocated full protection by the use of a navy, of all our rights on the high seas. If the Federals could have recalled their old leaders, or retained even a considerable portion of their power, the opportunity presented by the embargo issue could have brought them back to full political power, but lacking these leaders, the opportunity passed.

Democrats and Federals.

During the ninth Congress, which assembled on the second of December, 1805, the Republicans dropped their name and accepted that of “Democrats.” In all their earlier strifes they had been charged by their opponents with desiring to run to the extremes of the democratic or “mob rule,” and fear of too general a belief in the truth of the charge led them to denials and rejection of a name which the father of their party had ever shown a fondness for. The earlier dangers which had threatened their organization, and the recollection of defeats suffered in their attempts to establish a government anti-federal and confederate in their composition, had been greatly modified by later successes, and with a characteristic cuteness peculiar to Americans they accepted an epithet and sought to turn it to the best account. In this they imitated the patriots who accepted the epithets in the British satirical song of “Yankee Doodle,” and called themselves Yankees. From the ninth Congress the Jeffersonian Republicans called themselves Democrats, and the word Republican passed into disuse until later on in the history of our political parties, the opponents of the Democracy accepted it as a name which well filled the meaning of their attitude in the politics of the country.

Mr. Randolph of Roanoke, made the first schism in the Republican party under Jefferson, when he and three of his friends voted against the embargo act. He resisted its passage with his usual earnestness, and all attempts at reconciling him to the measure were unavailing. Self-willed, strong in argument and sarcasm, it is believed that his cause made it even more desirable for the Republicans to change name in the hope of recalling some of the more wayward “Democrats” who had advocated Jacobin democracy in the years gone by. The politicians of that day were never short of expedients, and no man so abounded in them as Jefferson himself.

Randolph improved his opportunities by getting most of the Virginia members to act with him against the foreign policy of the administration, but he was careful not to join the Federalists, and quickly denied any leaning that way. The first fruit of this faction was to bring forth Monroe as a candidate for President against Madison—a movement which proved to be quite popular in Virginia, but which Jefferson flanked by bringing about a reconciliation between Monroe and Madison. The now usual Congressional caucus followed at Washington, and although the Virginia Legislature in its caucus previously held had been unable to decide between Madison and Monroe, the Congressional body chose Madison by 83 to 11, the minority being divided between Clinton and Monroe, though the latter could by that time hardly be considered as a candidate. This action broke up Randolph’s faction in Virginia, but left so much bitterness behind it that a large portion attached themselves to the Federalists. In the election which followed Madison received 122 electoral votes against 47 for C. C. Pinckney, of South Carolina, and 6 for Geo. Clinton of New York.

Before Jefferson’s administration closed he recommended the passage of an act to prohibit the African slave trade after January 1st, 1808, and it was passed accordingly. He had also rejected the form of a treaty received from the British minister Erskine, and did this without the formality of submitting it to the Senate—first, because it contained no provision on the objectionable practice of impressing our seamen; second,[^[2]] “because it was accompanied by a note from the British ministers, by which the British government reserved to itself the right of releasing itself from the stipulations in favor of neutral rights, if the United States submitted to the British decree, or other invasion of those rights by France.” This rejection of the treaty by Jefferson caused public excitement, and the Federalists sought to arouse the commercial community against his action, and cited the fact that his own trusted friends, Monroe and Pinckney had negotiated it. The President’s party stood by him, and they agreed that submission to the Senate was immaterial, as its advice could not bind him. This refusal to consider the treaty was the first step leading to the war of 1812, for embargoes followed, and Britain openly claimed the right to search American vessels for her deserting seamen. In 1807 this question was brought to issue by the desertion of five British seamen from the Halifax, and their enlistment on the U. S. frigate Chesapeake. Four separate demands were made for these men, but all of the commanders, knowing the firm attitude of Jefferson’s administration against the practice, refused, as did the Secretary of State refuse a fifth demand on the part of the British minister. On the 23d of June following, while the Chesapeake was near the capes of Virginia, Capt. Humphreys of the British ship Leopard attempted to search her for deserters. Capt. Barron denied the right of search, but on being fired into, lowered his flag, Humphreys then took four men from the Chesapeake, three of whom had previously entered the British service, but were Americans by birth, and had been formally demanded by Washington. The act was a direct violation of the international law, for a nation’s ship at sea like its territory is inviolable. The British government disavowed the act of its officer and offered apology and reparation, which were accepted. This event, however, strengthened Jefferson’s rejection of the Monroe-Pinckney treaty, and quickly stopped adverse political criticism at home, Foreign affairs remained, however, in a complicated state, owing to the wars between England and the then successful Napoleon, but they in no wise shook the firm hold which Jefferson had upon the people, nor the prestige of his party. He stands in history as one of the best politicians our land has ever seen, and then as now no one could successfully draw the line between the really able politician and the statesman. He was accepted as both. His administration closed on the 3d of March, 1809, when he expressed great gratification at being able to retire to private life.

Mr. Madison succeeded at a time when the country, through fears of foreign aggression and violence, was exceedingly gloomy and despondent—a feeling not encouraged in the least by the statements of the Federalists, some of whom then thought political criticism in hours of danger not unpatriotic. They described our agriculture as discouraged, our fisheries abandoned, our commerce restrained, our navy dismantled, our revenues destroyed at a time when war was at any moment probable with either France, England or Spain.

Madison, representing as he did the same party, from the first resolved to follow the policy of Jefferson, a fact about which there was no misunderstanding. He desired to avert war as long as possible with England, and sought by skilful diplomacy to avert the dangers presented by both France and England in their attitude with neutrals. England had declared that a man who was once a subject always remained a subject, and on this plea based her determination to impress again into her service all deserters from her navy. France, because of refusal to accede to claims equally at war with our rights, had authorized the seizure of all American vessels entering the ports of France. In May, 1810, when the non-intercourse act had expired, Madison caused proposals to be made to both belligerents, that if either would revoke its hostile edict, the non-intercourse act should be revived and enforced against the other nation. This act had been passed by the tenth Congress as a substitute for the embargo. France quickly accepted Madison’s proposal, and received the benefits of the act, and the direct result was to increase the growing hostility of England. From this time forward the negotiations had more the character of a diplomatic contest than an attempt to maintain peace. Both countries were upon their mettle, and early in 1811, Mr. Pinckney, the American minister to Great Britain, was recalled, and a year later a formal declaration of war was made by the United States.

Just prior to this the old issue, made by the Republicans against Hamilton’s scheme for a National Bank, was revived by the fact that the charter of the bank ceased on the 4th of March, 1811, and an attempt was made to re-charter it. A bill for this purpose was introduced into Congress, but on the 11th of January, 1811, it was indefinitely postponed in the House, by a vote of 65 to 64, while in the Senate it was rejected by the casting vote of the Vice-President, Geo. Clinton, on the 5th of February, 1811—this notwithstanding its provisions had been framed or approved by Gallatin, the Secretary of the Treasury. The Federalists were all strong advocates of the measure, and it was so strong that it divided some of the Democrats who enjoyed a loose rein in the contest so far as the administration was concerned, the President not specially caring for political quarrels at a time when war was threatened with a powerful foreign nation. The views of the Federalists on this question descended to the Whigs some years later, and this fact led to the charges that the Whigs were but Federalists in disguise.

The eleventh Congress continued the large Democratic majority, as did the twelfth, which met on the 4th of November, 1811, Henry Clay, then an ardent supporter of the policy of Madison, succeeding to the House speakership. He had previously served two short sessions in the U. S. Senate, and had already acquired a high reputation as an able and fluent debater. He preferred the House, at that period of life, believing his powers better calculated to win fame in the more popular representative hall. Calhoun was also in the House at this time, and already noted for the boldness of his views and their assertion.

In this Congress jealousies arose against the political power of Virginia, which had already named three of the four Presidents, each for two terms, and De Witt Clinton, the well-known Governor of New York, sought through these jealousies to create a division which would carry him into the Presidency. His efforts were for a time warmly seconded by several northern and southern states. A few months later the Legislature of New York formally opened the ball by nominating DeWitt Clinton for the Presidency. An address was issued by his friends, August 17th, 1812, which has since become known as the Clintonian platform, and his followers were known as Clintonian Democrats. The address contained the first public protest against the nomination of Presidential candidates by Congressional caucuses. There was likewise declared opposition to that “official regency which prescribed tenets of political faith.” The efforts of particular states to monopolize the principal offices was denounced, as was the continuance of public men for long periods in office.

Madison was nominated for a second term by a Congressional caucus held at Washington, in May, 1812. John Langdon was nominated for Vice-President, but as he declined on account of age, Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, took his place. In September of the same year a convention of the opposition, representing eleven states, was held in the city of New York, which nominated De Witt Clinton, with Jared Ingersoll for Vice-President. This was the first national convention, partisan in character, and the Federalists have the credit of originating and carrying out the idea. The election resulted in the success of Madison, who received 128 electoral votes to 89 for Clinton.

Though factious strife had been somewhat rife, less attention was paid to politics than to the approaching war. There were new Democratic leaders in the lower House, and none were more prominent than Clay of Kentucky, Calhoun, Cheves and Lowndes, all of South Carolina. The policy of Jefferson in reducing the army and navy was now greatly deplored, and the defenceless condition in which it left the country was the partial cause, at least a stated cause of the factious feuds which followed. Madison sought to change this policy, and he did it at the earnest solicitation of Clay, Calhoun and Lowndes, who were the recognized leaders of the war party. They had early determined that Madison should be directly identified with them, and before his second nomination had won him over to their more decided views in favor of war with England. He had held back, hoping that diplomacy might avert a contest, but when once convinced that war was inevitable and even desirable under the circumstances, his official utterances were bold and free. In the June following the caucus which renominated him, he declared in a message that our flag was continually insulted on the high seas; that the right of searching American vessels for British seamen was still in practice, and that thousands of American citizens had in this way been impressed in service on foreign ships; that peaceful efforts at adjustment of the difficulties had proved abortive, and that the British ministry and British emissaries had actually been intriguing for the dismemberment of the Union.

The act declaring war was approved by the President on the 18th of June, 1812, and is remarkably short and comprehensive. It was drawn by the attorney-general of the United States, William Pinckney, and is in the words following:—

“An act declaring war between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the dependencies thereof, and the United States of America and their territories.

“Be it enacted, &c. That war be, and the same is hereby declared to exist between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the dependencies thereof, and the United States of America, and their territories; and that the President of the United States is hereby authorized to use the whole land and naval force of the United States to carry the same into effect, and to issue to private armed vessels of the United States commissions, or letters of marque and general reprisal, in such form as he shall think proper, and under the seal of the United States, against the vessels, goods, and effects, of the government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and the subjects thereof.”

This was a soul-stirring message, but it did not rally all the people as it should have done. Political jealousies were very great, and the frequent defeats of the Federalists, while they tended to greatly reduce their numbers and weaken their power, seemed to strengthen their animosity, and they could see nothing good in any act of the administration. They held, especially in the New England states, that the war had been declared by a political party simply, and not by the nation, though nearly all of the Middle, and all of the Southern and Western States, warmly supported it. Clay estimated that nine-tenths of the people were in favor of the war, and under the inspiration of his eloquence and the strong state papers of Madison, they doubtless were at first. Throughout they felt their political strength, and they just as heartily returned the bitterness manifested by those of the Federalists who opposed the war, branding them as enemies of the republic, and monarchists who preferred the reign of Britain.

Four Federalist representatives in Congress went so far as to issue an address, opposing the war, the way in which it had been declared, and denouncing it as unjust. Some of the New England states refused the order of the President to support it with their militia, and Massachusetts sent peace memorials to Congress.

A peace party was formed with a view to array the religious sentiment of the country against the war, and societies with similar objects were organized by the more radical of the Federalists. To such an extreme was this opposition carried, that some of the citizens of New London, Conn., made a practice of giving information to the enemy, by means of blue lights, of the departure of American vessels.

The Hartford Convention.

This opposition finally culminated in the assembling of a convention at Hartford, at which delegates were present from all of the New England states. They sat for three weeks with closed doors, and issued an address which will be found in this volume in the book devoted to political platforms. It was charged by the Democrats that the real object of the convention was to negotiate a separate treaty of peace, on behalf of New England, with Great Britain, but this charge was as warmly denied. The exact truth has not since been discovered, the fears of the participants of threatened trials for treason, closing their mouths, if their professions were false. The treaty of Ghent, which was concluded on December 14th, 1814, prevented other action by the Hartford convention than that stated. It had assembled nine days before the treaty, which is as follows:

Treaty of Ghent.

This treaty was negotiated by the Right Honorable James Lord Gambier, Henry Goulburn, Esq., and William Adams, Esq., on the part of Great Britain, and John Quincy Adams, James A. Bayard, Henry Clay, Jonathan Russell, and Albert Gallatin, on behalf of the United States.

The treaty can be found on p. 218, vol. 8, of Little & Brown’s Statutes at Large. The first article provided for the restoration of all archives, records, or property taken by either party from the other during the war. This article expressly provides for the restoration of “slaves or other private property.” The second article provided for the cessation of hostilities and limitation of time of capture. The third article provided for the restoration of prisoners of war.

The fourth article defined the boundary established by the treaty of 1783, and provided for commissioners to mark the same.

The fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth articles established rules to govern the proceedings of the commissioners.

The ninth article bound the United States and His Britannic Majesty to end all hostilities with Indian tribes, with whom they were then respectively at war.

The tenth article reads as follows:—

“Whereas the traffic in slaves is irreconcilable with the principles of humanity and justice; and, whereas, both His Majesty and the United States are desirous of continuing their efforts to promote its entire abolition, it is hereby agreed that both the contracting parties shall use their best endeavors to accomplish so desirable an object.”

The eleventh and last article provides for binding effect of the treaty, upon the exchange of ratifications.

The position of New England in the war is explained somewhat by her exposed position. Such of the militia as served endured great hardships, and they were almost constantly called from their homes to meet new dangers. Distrusting their loyalty, the general government had withheld all supplies from the militia of Massachusetts and Connecticut for the year 1814, and these States were forced to bear the burden of supporting them, at the same time contributing their quota of taxes to the general government—hardships, by the way, not greater than those borne by Pennsylvania and Ohio in the late war for the Union, nor half as hard as those borne by the border States at the same time. True, the coast towns of Massachusetts were subjected to constant assault from the British navy, and the people of these felt that they were defenceless. It was on their petition that the legislature of Massachusetts finally, by a vote of 226 to 67, adopted the report favoring the calling of the Hartford Convention. A circular was then addressed to the Governors of the other States, with a request that it be laid before their legislatures, inviting them to appoint delegates, and stating that the object was to deliberate upon the dangers to which the eastern section was exposed, “and to devise, if practicable, means of security and defence which might be consistent with the preservation of their resources from total ruin, and not repugnant to their obligations as members of the Union.” The italicized portion shows that there was at least then no design of forming a separate treaty, or of promoting disunion. The legislatures of Connecticut and Rhode Island endorsed the call and sent delegates. Those of New Hampshire and Vermont did not, but delegates were sent by local conventions. These delegates, it is hardly necessary to remark, were all members of the Federal party, and their suspected designs and action made the “Hartford Convention” a bye-word and reproach in the mouths of Democratic orators for years thereafter. It gave to the Democrats, as did the entire history of the war, the prestige of superior patriotism, and they profited by it as long as the memory of the war of 1812 was fresh. Indeed, directly after the war, all men seemed to keep in constant view the reluctance of the Federalists to support the war, and their almost open hostility to it in New England. Peace brought prosperity and plenty, but not oblivion of the old political issues, and this was the beginning of the end of the Federal party. Its decay thereafter was rapid and constant.

The eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth Congresses had continued Democratic. The fourteenth began Dec. 4, 1815, with the Democratic majority in the House increased to 30. Clay had taken part in negotiating the treaty, and on his return was again elected to the House, and was for the third time elected speaker. Though 65 Federalists had been elected, but 10 were given to Federal candidates for speaker, this party now showing a strong, and under the circumstances, a very natural desire to rub out party lines. The internal taxes and the postage rates were reduced.

The Protective Tariff.

President Madison, in his message, had urged upon Congress a revision of the tariff, and pursuant to his recommendation what was at the time called a protective tariff was passed. Even Calhoun then supported it, while Clay proclaimed that protection must no longer be secondary to revenue, but of primary importance. The rates fixed, however, were insufficient, and many American manufactures were soon frustrated by excessive importations of foreign manufactures. The position of Calhoun and Lowndes, well known leaders from South Carolina, is explained by the fact that just then the proposal of a protective tariff was popular in the south, in view of the heavy duties upon raw cotton which England then imposed. The Federalists in weakness changed their old position when they found the Democrats advocating a tariff, and the latter quoted and published quite extensively Alexander Hamilton’s early report in favor of it. Webster, in the House at the time and a leading Federalist, was against the bill. The parties had exchanged positions on the question.

Peace brought with it another exchange of positions. President Madison, although he had vetoed a bill to establish a National Bank in 1815, was now (in 1816) anxious for the establishment of such an institution. Clay had also changed his views, and claimed that the experiences of the war showed the necessity for a national currency. The bill met with strong opposition from a few Democrats and nearly all of the Federalists (the latter having changed position on the question since 1811), but it passed and was signed by the President.

A bill to promote internal improvements, advocated by Clay, was at first favored by Madison, but his mind changed and he vetoed the measure—the first of its kind passed by Congress.

The Democratic members of Congress, before the adjournment of the first session, held a caucus for the nomination of candidates to succeed Madison and Gerry. It was understood that the retiring officers and their confidential friends favored James Monroe of Virginia. Their wishes were carried out, but not without a struggle, Wm. H. Crawford of Georgia receiving 54 votes against 65 for Monroe. The Democrats opposed to Virginia’s domination in the politics of the country, made a second effort, and directed it against Monroe in the caucus. Aaron Burr denounced him as an improper and incompetent candidate, and joined in the protest then made against any nomination by a Congressional caucus; he succeeding in getting nineteen Democrats to stay out of the caucus. Later he advised renewed attempts to break down the Congressional caucus system, and before the nomination favored Andrew Jackson as a means to that end. Daniel B. Tompkins was nominated by the Democrats for Vice-President. The Federalists named Rufus King of New York, but in the election which followed he received but 24 out of 217 electoral votes. The Federalists divided their votes for Vice-President.

Monroe was inaugurated on the 14th of March, 1817, the oath being administered by Chief Justice Marshall. The inaugural address was so liberal in its tone that it seemed to give satisfaction to men of all shades of political opinion. The questions which had arisen during the war no longer had any practical significance, while the people were anxious to give the disturbing ones which ante-dated at least a season of rest. Two great and opposing policies had previously obtained, and singularly enough each seemed exactly adapted to the times when they were triumphant. The Federal power had been asserted in a government which had gathered renewed strength during what was under the circumstances a great and perilous war, and the exigencies of that war in many instances compelled the Republicans or Democrats, or the Democratic-Republicans as some still called them, to concede points which had theretofore been in sharp dispute, and they did it with that facility which only Americans can command in emergencies: yet as a party they kept firm hold of the desire to enlarge the scope of liberty in its application to the citizens, and just here kept their original landmark.

It is not singular then that the administration of Monroe opened what has ever since been known in politics as the “Era of Good Feeling.” Party differences rapidly subsided, and political serenity was the order of the day. Monroe made a tour of the States, with the direct object of inspecting fortifications and means of defence, and in this way spread the good feeling, without seeming to have any such object. He was everywhere favorably greeted by the people, and received by delegations which in many instances were specially made up of all shades of opinion.

The Cabinet was composed of men of rare political distinction, even in that day of great men. It was probably easier to be great then than now, just as it is easier to be a big political hero in the little State of Delaware than it is in the big States of New York or Pennsylvania. Yet these men were universally accepted as great without regard to their localities. All were Republicans or Democrats, with John Quincy Adams as Secretary of State, Wm. H. Crawford (Monroe’s competitor for the nomination) as Secretary of the Treasury, John C. Calhoun as Secretary of War, William Wirt as Attorney-General. All of these united with the President in the general desire to call a halt upon the political asperities which were then recognized as a public evil. On one occasion, during his tour, the citizens of Kennebunk and its vicinity, in Maine, having in their address alluded to the prospects of a political union among the people in support of the administration, the President said in reply:

“You are pleased to express a confident hope that a spirit of mutual conciliation may be one of the blessings which may result from my administration. This indeed would be an eminent blessing, and I pray it may be realized. Nothing but union is waiting to make us a great people. The present time affords the happiest presage that this union is fast consummating. It cannot be otherwise; I daily see greater proofs of it. The further I advance in my progress in the country, the more I perceive that we are all Americans—that we compose but one family—that our republican institutions will be supported and perpetuated by the united zeal and patriotism of all. Nothing could give me greater satisfaction than to behold a perfect union among ourselves—a union which is necessary to restore to social intercourse its former charms, and to render our happiness, as a nation, unmixed and complete. To promote this desirable result requires no compromise of principle, and I promise to give it my continued attention, and my best endeavors.”

Even General Jackson, since held up to public view by historians as the most austere and “stalwart” of all politicians, caught the sweet infection of peace, and thus advised President Monroe:—

“Now is the time to exterminate that monster, called party spirit. By selecting [for cabinet officers] characters most conspicuous for their probity, virtue, capacity, and firmness, without regard to party, you will go far to, if not entirely, eradicate those feelings, which, on former occasions, threw so many obstacles in the way of government. The chief magistrate of a great and powerful nation should never indulge in party feelings. His conduct should be liberal and disinterested; always bearing in mind, that he acts for the whole and not a part of the community.”

This advice had been given with a view to influence the appointment of a mixed political Cabinet, but while Monroe professed to believe that a free government could exist without political parties, he nevertheless sought to bring all of the people into one political fold, and that the Democratic. Yet he certainly and plainly sought to allay factions in his own party, and with this view selected Crawford for the Treasury—the gentleman who had been so warmly supported in the nominating struggle by the Clintonians and by all who objected to the predominating influence of Virginia in national politics.

Monroe, like his immediate predecessor, accepted and acted upon the doctrines of the new school of Republicans as represented by Clay and Calhoun, both of whom still favored a tariff, while Clay had become a warm advocate of a national system of internal improvements. These two statesmen thus early differed on some questions, but they were justly regarded as the leading friends and advisers of the administration, for to both still clung the patriotic recollections of the war which they had so warmly advocated and supported, and the issue of which attested their wisdom. Clay preferred to be called a Republican; Calhoun preferred to be called a Democrat, and just then the terms were so often exchanged and mingled that history is at fault in the exact designation, while tradition is colored by the bias of subsequent events and lives.

Monroe’s first inaugural leaned toward Clay’s scheme of internal improvements, but questioned its constitutionality. Clay was next to Jefferson the most original of all our statesmen and politicians. He was prolific in measures, and almost resistless in their advocacy. From a political standpoint he was the most direct author of the war of 1812, for his advocacy mainly brought it to the issue of arms, which through him and Calhoun were substituted for diplomacy. And Calhoun then stood in broader view before the country than since. His sectional pride and bias had been rarely aroused, and like Clay he seemed to act for the country as an entirety. Subsequent sectional issues changed the views held of him by the people of both the North and South.

We have said that Monroe leaned toward internal improvements, but he thought Congress was not clothed by the Constitution with the power to authorize measures supporting it, and when the opportunity was presented (May 4, 1822) he vetoed the bill “for the preservation and repair of the Cumberland road,” and accompanied the veto with a most elaborate message in which he discussed the constitutional aspects of the question. A plain majority of the friends of the administration, under the leadership of Clay, supported the theory of internal improvements from the time the administration began, but were reluctant to permit a division of the party on the question.

Mississippi and Illinois were admitted to the Union during the “Era of Good Feeling,” without serious political disturbance, while Alabama was authorized to form a state constitution and government, and Arkansas was authorized as a separate territorial government from part of Missouri. In 1819 President Monroe made a tour through the Southern States to examine their defenses and see and get acquainted with the people. From the first inauguration of Monroe up to 1819 party lines can hardly be said to have existed, but in the sixteenth session of Congress, which continued until May, 1820, new questions of national interest arose, prominent among which were additional protective duties for our manufactures; internal improvements by the government; acknowledgments of the independence of the South American States.

The Monroe Doctrine.

Upon the question of recognizing the independence of the South American States, the President made a record which has ever since been quoted and denominated “The Monroe Doctrine.” It is embodied in the following abstract of his seventh annual message, under date of Dec. 2d, 1823:

“It was stated, at the commencement of the last session, that a great effort was then making in Spain and Portugal to improve the condition of the people of those countries, and that it appeared to be conducted with extraordinary moderation. It need scarcely be remarked that the result has been, so far, very different from what was then anticipated. Of events in that quarter of the globe, with which we have so much intercourse, and from which we derive our origin, we have always been anxious and interested spectators. The citizens of the United States cherish sentiments the most friendly in favor of the liberty and happiness of their fellow-men on that side of the Atlantic. In the wars of the European powers, in matters relating to themselves, we have never taken any part nor does it comport with our policy to do so. It is only when rights are invaded or seriously menaced, that we resent injuries, or make preparation for our defense. With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in their respective governments. And to the defense of our own, which has been achieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured by the wisdom of their most enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted. We owe it, therefore, to candor, and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers, to declare, that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered, and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence, and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration, and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States. In the war between those new governments and Spain, we declared our neutrality at the time of their recognition, and to this we have adhered, and shall continue to adhere, provided no change shall occur which, in the judgment of the competent authorities of this government, shall make a corresponding change on the part of the United States indispensable to their security.

“The late events in Spain and Portugal show that Europe is still unsettled. Of this important fact no stronger proof can be adduced, than that the allied powers should have thought it proper, on a principle satisfactory to themselves, to have interposed by force in the internal concerns of Spain. To what extent such interposition may be carried, on the same principle, is a question to which all independent powers, whose governments differ from theirs, are interested; even those most remote, and surely none more so than the United States. Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers; to consider the government, de facto, as the legitimate government for us: to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm, and manly policy; meeting, in all instances, the just claims of every power, submitting to injuries from none. But in regard to these continents, circumstances are eminently and conspicuously different. It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can any one believe, that our southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition, in any form, with indifference. If we look to the comparative strength and resources of Spain and those new governments, and their distance from each other, it must be obvious that she can never subdue them. It is still the true policy of the United States to leave the parties to themselves, in the hope that other powers will pursue the same course.”

The second election of Monroe, in 1820, was accomplished without a contest. Out of 231 electoral votes, but one was cast against him, and that for John Quincy Adams. Mr. Tompkins, the candidate for Vice-President, was only a little less fortunate, there being 14 scattering votes against him. Neither party, if indeed there was a Federalist party left made any nominations.

The Missouri Compromise.

The second session of the 17th Congress opened on the 4th day of March, 1820, with James Monroe at the head of the Executive Department of the Government, and the Democratic party in the majority in both branches of the Federal Legislature. The Cabinet at that time was composed of the most brilliant minds of the country, indeed as most justly remarked by Senator Thomas H. Benton in his published review of the events of that period, it would be difficult to find in any government, in any country, at any time, more talent and experience, more dignity and decorum, more purity of private life, a larger mass of information, and more addiction to business, than was comprised in the list of celebrated names then constituting the executive department of the government. The legislative department was equally impressive. The exciting and agitating question then pending before Congress was on the admission of the State of Missouri into the Federal Union, the subject of the issue being the attempted tacking on of conditions restricting slavery within her limits. She was admitted without conditions under the so-called compromise, which abolished it in certain portions of the then province of Louisiana. In this controversy, the compromise was sustained and carried entirely by the Democratic Senators and members from the Southern and slaveholding States aided and sanctioned by the Executive, and it was opposed by fifteen Senators from non-slaveholding States, who represented the opposite side on the political questions of the day. It passed the House by a close vote of 86 to 82. It has been seriously questioned since whether this act was constitutional. The real struggle was political, and for the balance of power. For a while it threatened the total overthrow of all political parties upon principle, and the substitution of geographical parties discriminated by the slave line, and thus destroying the proper action of the Federal government, and leading to a separation of the States. It was a federal movement, accruing to the benefit of that party, and at first carried all the Northern democracy in its current, giving the supremacy to their adversaries. When this effect was perceived, democrats from the northern non-slaveholding States took early opportunity to prevent their own overthrow, by voting for the admission of the States on any terms, and thus prevent the eventual separation of the States in the establishment of geographical parties divided by a slavery and anti-slavery line.

The year 1820 marked a period of financial distress in the country, which soon became that of the government. The army was reduced, and the general expenses of the departments cut down, despite which measures of economy the Congress deemed it necessary to authorize the President to contract for a loan of five million dollars. Distress was the cry of the day; relief the general demand, the chief demand coming from debtors to the Government for public lands purchased under the then credit system, this debt at that time aggregating twenty-three millions of dollars. The banks failed, money vanished, instalments were coming due which could not be met; and the opening of Congress in November, 1820, was saluted by the arrival of memorials from all the new States praying for the relief to the purchaser of the public lands. The President referred to it in his annual message of that year, and Congress passed a measure of relief by changing the system to cash sales instead of credit, reducing the price of the lands, and allowing present debtors to apply payments already made to portions of the land purchased, relinquishing the remainder. Applications were made at that time for the establishment of the preemptive system, but without effect; the new States continued to press the question and finally prevailed, so that now the preemptive principle has become a fixed part of our land system, permanently incorporated with it, and to the equal advantage of the settler and the government.

The session of 1820–21, is remarkable as being the first at which any proposition was made in Congress for the occupation and settlement of our territory on the Columbia river—the only part then owned by the United States on the Pacific coast. It was made by Dr. Floyd, a representative from Virginia, who argued that the establishment of a civilized power on the American coast of the Pacific could not fail to produce great and wonderful benefits not only to our own country, but to the people of Eastern Asia, China and Japan on the opposite side of the Pacific Ocean, and that the valley of the Columbia might become the granary of China and Japan. This movement suggested to Senator Benton, to move, for the first time publicly in the United States, a resolution to send ministers to the Oriental States.

At this time treaties with Mexico and Spain were ratified, by which the United States acquired Florida and ceded Texas; these treaties, together with the Missouri compromise—a measure contemporaneous with them—extinguished slave soil in all the United States territory west of the Mississippi, except in that portion which was to constitute the State of Arkansas; and, including the extinction in Texas consequent upon its cession to a non-slaveholding power, constituted the largest territorial abolition of slavery that was ever up to that period effected by any political power of any nation.

The outside view of the slave question in the United States, at this time, is that the extension of slavery was then arrested, circumscribed, and confined within narrow territorial limits, while free States were permitted an almost unlimited expansion.

In 1822 a law passed Congress abolishing the Indian factory system, which had been established during Washington’s administration, in 1796, under which the Government acted as a factor or agent for the sale of supplies to the Indians and the purchase of furs from them; this branch of the service then belonged to the department of the Secretary of War. The abuses discovered in it led to the discontinuance of that system.

The Presidential election of 1824 was approaching, the candidates were in the field, their respective friends active and busy, and popular topics for the canvass in earnest requisition. Congress was full of projects for different objects of internal improvement, mainly in roads and canals, and the friends of each candidate exerted themselves in rivalry of each other, under the supposition that their opinions would stand for those of their principals. An act for the preservation of the Cumberland Road, which passed both houses of Congress, met with a veto from President Monroe, accompanied by a state paper in exposition of his opinions upon the whole subject of Federal interference in matters of inter state commerce and roads and canals. He discussed the measure in all its bearings, and plainly showed it to be unconstitutional. After stating the question, he examined it under every head of constitutional derivation under which its advocates claimed the power, and found it to be granted by no one of them and virtually prohibited by some of them. This was then and has since been considered to be the most elaborate and thoroughly considered opinion upon the general question which has ever been delivered by any American statesman. This great state paper, delivered at a time when internal improvement by the federal government had become an issue in the canvass for the Presidency and was ardently advocated by three of the candidates and qualified by two others, had an immense current in its power, carrying with it many of the old strict constructionists.

The revision of the tariff, with a view to the protection of home industry, and to the establishment of what was then called “The American System,” was one of the large subjects before Congress at the session of 1823–24, and was the regular commencement of the heated debates on that question which afterwards ripened into a serious difficulty between the federal government and some of the Southern States. The presidential election being then depending, the subject became tinctured with party politics, in which so far as that ingredient was concerned, and was not controlled by other considerations, members divided pretty much on the line which always divided them on a question of constructive powers. The protection of domestic industry not being among the powers granted, was looked for in the incidental; and denied by the strict constructionists to be a substantive term, to be exercised for the direct purpose of protection; but admitted by all at that time and ever since the first tariff act of 1789, to be an incident to the revenue raising power, and an incident to be regarded in the exercise of that power. Revenue the object, protection the incident, had been the rule in the earlier tariffs; now that rule was sought to be reversed, and to make protection the object of the law, and revenue the incident. Mr. Henry Clay was the leader in the proposed revision and the champion of the American system; he was ably supported in the House by many able and effective speakers; who based their argument on the general distress then alleged to be prevalent in the country. Mr. Daniel Webster was the leading speaker on the other side, and disputed the universality of the distress which had been described; and contested the propriety of high or prohibitory duties, in the present active and intelligent state of the world, to stimulate industry and manufacturing enterprise.

The bill was carried by a close vote in both Houses. Though brought forward avowedly for the protection of domestic manufactures, it was not entirely supported on that ground; an increase of revenue being the motive with some, the public debt then being nearly ninety millions. An increased protection to the products of several States, as lead in Missouri and Illinois, hemp in Kentucky, iron in Pennsylvania, wool in Ohio and New York, commanded many votes for the bill; and the impending presidential election had its influence in its favor.

Two of the candidates, Messrs. Adams and Clay, voted for and avowedly supported General Jackson, who voted for the bill, was for it, as tending to give a home supply of the articles necessary in time of war, and as raising revenue to pay the public debt; Mr. Crawford was opposed to it, and Mr. Calhoun had withdrawn as a Presidential candidate. The Southern planting States were dissatisfied, believing that the new burdens upon imports which it imposed, fell upon the producers of the exports, and tended to enrich one section of the Union at the expense of another. The attack and support of the bill took much of a sectional aspect; Virginia, the two Carolinas, Georgia, and some others, being unanimous against it. Pennsylvania, New York, Ohio, and Kentucky being unanimous for it. Massachusetts, which up to this time had no small influence in commerce, voted, with all, except one member, against it. With this sectional aspect, a tariff for protection, also began to assume a political aspect, being taken under the care of the party, afterwards denominated as Whig. The bill was approved by President Monroe; a proof that that careful and strict constructionist of the constitution did not consider it as deprived of its revenue character by the degree of protection which it extended.

A subject which at the present time is exciting much criticism, viz: proposed amendments to the constitution relative to the election of President and Vice-President, had its origin in movements in that direction taken by leading Democrats during the campaign of 1824. The electoral college has never been since the early elections, an independent body free to select a President and Vice-President; though in theory they have been vested with such powers, in practice they have no such practical power over the elections, and have had none since their institution. In every case the elector has been an instrument, bound to obey a particular impulsion, and disobedience to which would be attended with infamy, and with every penalty which public indignation could inflict. From the beginning they have stood pledged to vote for the candidate indicated by the public will; and have proved not only to be useless, but an inconvenient intervention between the people and the object of their choice. Mr. McDuffie in the House of Representatives and Mr. Benton in the Senate, proposed amendments; the mode of taking the direct vote to be in districts, and the persons receiving the greatest number of votes for President or Vice-President in any district, to count one vote for such office respectively which is nothing but substituting the candidates themselves for their electoral representatives.

In the election of 1824 four candidates were before the people for the office of President, General Jackson, John Quincy Adams, William H. Crawford and Henry Clay. None of them received a majority of the 261 electoral votes, and the election devolved upon the House of Representatives. John C. Calhoun had a majority of the electoral votes for the office of Vice-President, and was elected. Mr. Adams was elected President by the House of Representatives, although General Jackson was the choice of the people, having received the greatest number of votes at the general election. The election of Mr. Adams was perfectly constitutional, and as such fully submitted to by the people; but it was a violation of the demos krateo principle; and that violation was equally rebuked. All the representatives who voted against the will of their constituents, lost their favor, and disappeared from public life. The representation in the House of Representatives was largely changed at the first general election, and presented a full opposition to the new President. Mr. Adams himself was injured by it, and at the ensuing presidential election was beaten by General Jackson more than two to one.

Mr. Clay, who took the lead in the House for Mr. Adams, and afterwards took upon himself the mission of reconciling the people to his election in a series of public speeches, was himself crippled in the effort, lost his place in the democratic party, and joined the Whigs (then called the national republicans). The democratic principle was victor over the theory of the Constitution, and beneficial results ensued. It vindicated the people in their right and their power. It re-established parties upon the basis of principle, and drew anew party lines, then almost obliterated under the fusion of parties during the “era of good feeling,” and the efforts of leading men to make personal parties for themselves. It showed the conservative power of our government to lie in the people, more than in its constituted authorities. It showed that they were capable of exercising the function of self-government, and lastly, it assumed the supremacy of the democracy for a long time, and until lost by causes to be referred to hereafter. The Presidential election of 1824 is remarkable under another aspect—its results cautioned all public men against future attempts to govern presidential elections in the House of Representatives; and it put an end to the practice of caucus nominations for the Presidency by members of Congress. This mode of concentrating public opinion began to be practiced as the eminent men of the Revolution, to whom public opinion awarded a preference, were passing away, and when new men, of more equal pretensions, were coming upon the stage. It was tried several times with success and general approbation, because public sentiment was followed—not led—by the caucus. It was attempted in 1824 and failed; all the opponents of Mr. Crawford, by their joint efforts, succeeded, and justly in the fact though not in the motive, in rendering these Congress caucus nominations odious to the people, and broke them down. They were dropped, and a different mode adopted—that of party nominations by conventions of delegates from the States.

The administration of Mr. Adams commenced with his inaugural address, in which the chief topic was that of internal national improvement by the federal government. This declared policy of the administration furnished a ground of opposition against Mr. Adams, and went to the reconstruction of parties on the old line of strict, or latitudinous, construction of the Constitution. It was clear from the beginning that the new administration was to have a settled and strong opposition, and that founded in principles of government—the same principles, under different forms, which had discriminated parties at the commencement of the federal government. Men of the old school—survivors of the contest of the Adams and Jefferson times, with some exceptions, divided accordingly—the federalists going for Mr. Adams, the republicans against him, with the mass of the younger generation. The Senate by a decided majority, and the House by a strong minority, were opposed to the policy of the new President.

In 1826 occurred the famous debates in the Senate and the House, on the proposed Congress of American States, to contract alliances to guard against and prevent the establishment of any future European colony within its borders. The mission though sanctioned was never acted upon or carried out. It was authorized by very nearly a party vote, the democracy as a party being against it. The President, Mr. Adams, stated the objects of the Congress to be as follows: “An agreement between all the parties represented at the meeting, that each will guard, by its own means, against the establishment of any future European colony within its own borders, may be advisable. This was, more than two years since, announced by my predecessor to the world, as a principle resulting from the emancipation of both the American continents. It may be so developed to the new southern nations, that they may feel it as an essential appendage to their independence.”

Mr. Adams had been a member of Mr. Monroe’s cabinet, filling the department from which the doctrine would emanate. The enunciation by him as above of this “Monroe Doctrine,” as it is called, is very different from what it has of late been supposed to be, as binding the United States to guard all the territory of the New World from European colonization. The message above quoted was written at a time when the doctrine as enunciated by the former President through the then Secretary was fresh in the mind of the latter, and when he himself in a communication to the American Senate was laying it down for the adoption of all the American nations in a general congress of their deputies. According to President Adams, this “Monroe Doctrine” (according to which it has been of late believed that the United States were to stand guard over the two Americas, and repulse all intrusive colonists from their shores), was entirely confined to our own borders; that it was only proposed to get the other States of the New World to agree that, each for itself, and by its own means, should guard its own territories; and, consequently, that the United States, so far from extending gratuitous protection to the territories of other States, would neither give, nor receive, aid in any such enterprise, but that each should use its own means, within its own borders, for its own exemption from European colonial intrusion.

No question in its day excited more intemperate discussion, excitement, and feeling between the Executive and the Senate, and none died out so quickly, than this, relative to the proposed congress of American nations. The chief advantage to be derived from its retrospect—and it is a real one—is a view of the firmness with which the minority maintained the old policy of the United States, to avoid entangling alliances and interference with the affairs of other nations; and the exposition, by one so competent as Mr. Adams, of the true scope and meaning of the Monroe doctrine.

At the session of 1825–26 attempt was again made to procure an amendment to the Constitution, in relation to the mode of election of President and Vice-President, so as to do away with all intermediate agencies, and give the election to the direct vote of the people. In the Senate the matter was referred to a committee who reported amendments dispensing with electors, providing for districts equal in number to the whole number of Senators and Representatives to which the State was entitled in Congress, and obviating all excuses for caucuses and conventions to concentrate public opinion by providing that in the event of no one receiving a majority of the whole number of district votes cast, that a second election should be held limited to the two persons receiving the highest number of votes; and in case of an equal division of votes on the second election then the House of Representatives shall choose one of them for President, as is prescribed by the Constitution. The idea being that the first election, if not resulting in any candidate receiving a majority, should stand for a popular nomination—a nomination by the people themselves, out of which the election is almost sure to be made on the second trial. The same plan was suggested for choosing a Vice-President, except that the Senate was to finally elect, in case of failure to choose at first and second elections. The amendments did not receive the requisite support of two-thirds of either the Senate or the House. This movement was not of a partisan character; it was equally supported and opposed respectively by Senators and Representatives of both parties. Substantially the same plan was recommended by President Jackson in his first annual message to Congress, December 8, 1829.

It is interesting to note that at this Session of 1825 and ’26, attempt was made by the Democrats to pass a tenure of office bill, as applicable to government employees and office-holders; it provided “that in all nominations made by the President to the Senate, to fill vacancies occasioned by an exercise of the President’s power to remove from office, the fact of the removal shall be stated to the Senate at the same time that the nomination is made, with a statement of the reasons for which such officer may have been removed.” It was also sought at the same time to amend the Constitution to prohibit the appointment of any member of Congress to any federal office of trust or profit, during the period for which he was elected; the design being to make the members wholly independent of the Executive, and not subservient to the latter, and incapable of receiving favors in the form of bestowals of official patronage.

The tariff of 1828 is an era in our political legislation; from it the doctrine of “nullification” originated, and from that date began a serious division between the North and the South. This tariff law was projected in the interest of the woolen manufacturers, but ended by including all manufacturing interests. The passage of this measure was brought about not because it was favored by a majority, but because of political exigencies. In the then approaching presidential election, Mr. Adams, who was in favor of the “American System,” supported by Mr. Clay (his Secretary of State) was opposed by General Jackson. This tariff was made an administration measure, and became an issue in the canvass. The New England States, which had formerly favored free trade, on account of their commercial interests, changed their policy, and, led by Mr. Webster, became advocates of the protective system. The question of protective tariff had now not only become political, but sectional. The Southern States as a section, were arrayed against the system, though prior to 1816 had favored it, not merely as an incident to revenue, but as a substantive object. In fact these tariff bills, each exceeding the other in its degree of protection, had become a regular appendage of our presidential elections—carrying round in every cycle of four years, with that returning event; starting in 1816 and followed up in 1820–24, and now in 1828; with successive augmentations of duties; the last being often pushed as a party measure, and with the visible purpose of influencing the presidential election. General Jackson was elected, having received 178 electoral votes to 83 received by John Quincy Adams. Mr. Richard Rush, of Pennsylvania, who was on the ticket with Mr. Adams, was defeated for the office of Vice-President, and John C. Calhoun, of South Carolina, was elected to that office.

The election of General Jackson was a triumph of democratic principle, and an assertion of the people’s right to govern themselves. That principle had been violated in the presidential election in the House of Representatives in the session of 1824–25; and the sanction, or rebuke, of that violation was a leading question in the whole canvass. It was also a triumph over the high protective policy, and the federal internal improvement policy, and the latitudinous construction of the Constitution; and of the democracy over the federalists, then called national republicans; and was the re-establishment of parties on principle, according to the landmarks of the early years of the government. For although Mr. Adams had received confidence and office from Mr. Madison and Mr. Monroe, and had classed with the democratic party during the “era of good feeling,” yet he had previously been federal; and on the re-establishment of old party lines which began to take place after the election of Mr. Adams in the House of Representatives, his affinities and policy became those of his former party; and as a party, with many individual exceptions, they became his supporters and his strength. General Jackson, on the contrary, had always been democratic, so classing when he was a Senator in Congress under the administration of the first Mr. Adams; and when party lines were most straightly drawn, and upon principle, and as such now receiving the support of men and States which took this political position at that time, and maintained it for years afterwards; among the latter, notably the States of Virginia and Pennsylvania.

The short session of 1829–30 was rendered famous by the long and earnest debates in the Senate on the doctrine of nullification, as it was then called. It started by a resolution of inquiry introduced by Mr. Foot of Connecticut; it was united with a proposition to limit the sales of the public lands to those then in the market—to suspend the surveys of the public lands—and to abolish the office of Surveyor-General. The effect of such a resolution, if sanctioned upon inquiry and carried into legislative effect, would have been to check emigration to the new States in the West, and to check the growth and settlement of these States and Territories. It was warmly opposed by Western members. The debate spread and took an acrimonious turn, and sectional, imputing to the quarter of the Union from which it came an old and early policy to check the growth of the West at the outset by proposing to limit the sale of the Western lands, by selling no tract in advance until all in the rear was sold out; and during the debate Mr. Webster referred to the famous ordinance of 1787 for the government of the northwestern territory, and especially the anti-slavery clause which it contained.

Closely connected with this subject to which Mr. Webster’s remarks, during the debate, related, was another which excited some warm discussion—the topic of slavery—and the effect of its existence or non-existence in different States. Kentucky and Ohio were taken for examples, and the superior improvement and population of Ohio were attributed to its exemption from the evils of slavery. This was an excitable subject, and the more so because the wounds of the Missouri controversy in which the North was the undisputed aggressor, were still tender. Mr. Hayne from South Carolina answered with warmth and resented as a reflection upon the Slave States this disadvantageous comparison. Mr. Benton of Missouri followed on the same side, and in the course of his remarks said, “I regard with admiration, that is to say, with wonder, the sublime morality of those who cannot bear the abstract contemplation of slavery, at the distance of five hundred or a thousand miles off.” This allusion to the Missouri controversy, and invective against the free States for their part in it, by Messrs. Hayne and Benton, brought a reply from Mr. Webster, showing what their conduct had been at the first introduction of the slavery topic in the Congress of the United States, and that they totally refused to interfere between master and slave in any way whatever. But the topic which became the leading feature of the whole debate, and gave it an interest which cannot die, was that of nullification—the assumed right of a State to annul an act of Congress—then first broached in the Senate—and in the discussion of which Mr. Webster and Mr. Hayne were the champion speakers on opposite sides—the latter voicing the sentiments of the Vice-President, Mr. Calhoun. This turn in the debate was brought about, by Mr. Hayne having made allusion to the course of New England during the war of 1812, and especially to the assemblage known as the Hartford Convention, and to which designs unfriendly to the Union had been attributed. This gave Mr. Webster an opportunity to retaliate, and he referred to the public meetings which had just then taken place in South Carolina on the subject of the tariff, and at which resolves were passed, and propositions adopted significant of resistance to the act; and consequently of disloyalty to the Union. He drew Mr. Hayne into their defence and into an avowal of what has since obtained the current name of “Nullification.” He said, “I understand the honorable gentleman from South Carolina to maintain, that it is a right of the State Legislature to interfere, whenever, in their judgment, this government transcends its constitutional limits, and to arrest the operation of its laws,*** that the States may lawfully decide for themselves, and each State for itself, whether, in a given case, the act of the general government transcends its powers,*** that if the exigency of the case, in the opinion of any State government require it, such State government may, by its own sovereign authority, annul an act of the general government, which it deems plainly and palpably unconstitutional.” Mr. Hayne was evidently unprepared to admit, or fully deny, the propositions as so laid down, but contented himself with stating the words of the Virginia Resolution of 1798, as follows: “That this assembly doth explicitly and peremptorily declare, that it views the powers of the federal government as resulting from the compact, to which the States are parties, as limited by the plain sense and intention of the instrument constituting that compact, as no farther valid than they are authorized by the grants enumerated in that compact, and that, in case of a deliberate, palpable and dangerous exercise of other powers, not granted by the said compact, the States who are parties thereto have the right, and are in duty bound, to interpose, for arresting the progress of the evil, and for maintaining, within their respective limits, the authorities, rights, and liberties appertaining to them.”

This resolution came to be understood by Mr. Hayne and others on that side of the debate, in the same sense that Mr. Webster stated, as above, he understood the gentleman from the South to interpret it. On the other side of the question, he argued that the doctrine had no foundation either in the Constitution, or on the Virginia resolutions—that the Constitution makes the federal government act upon citizens within the States, and not upon the States themselves, as in the old confederation: that within their Constitutional limits the laws of Congress were supreme—and that it was treasonable to resist them with force: and that the question of their constitutionality was to be decided by the Supreme Court: with respect to the Virginia resolutions, on which Mr. Hayne relied, Mr. Webster disputed the interpretation put upon them—claimed for them an innocent and justifiable meaning—and exempted Mr. Madison from the suspicion of having framed a resolution asserting the right of a State legislature to annul an Act of Congress, and thereby putting it in the power of one State to destroy a form of government which he had just labored so hard to establish.

Mr. Hayne on his part gave (as the practical part of his doctrine) the pledge of forcible resistance to any attempt to enforce unconstitutional laws. He said, “The gentleman has called upon us to carry out our scheme practically. Now, sir, if I am correct in my view of this matter, then it follows, of course, that the right of a State being established, the federal government is bound to acquiesce in a solemn decision of a State, acting in its sovereign capacity, at least so far as to make an appeal to the people for an amendment to the Constitution. This solemn decision of a State binds the federal government, under the highest constitutional obligation, not to resort to any means of coercion against the citizens of the dissenting State.*** Suppose Congress should pass an agrarian law, or a law emancipating our slaves, or should commit any other gross violation of our constitutional rights, will any gentlemen contend that the decision of every branch of the federal government, in favor of such laws, could prevent the States from declaring them null and void, and protecting their citizens from their operation?*** Let me assure the gentlemen that, whenever any attempt shall be made from any quarter, to enforce unconstitutional laws, clearly violating our essential rights, our leaders (whoever they may be) will not be found reading black letter from the musty pages of old law books. They will look to the Constitution, and when called upon by the sovereign authority of the State, to preserve and protect the rights secured to them by the charter of their liberties, they will succeed in defending them, or ‘perish in the last ditch.’”

These words of Mr. Hayne seem almost prophetic in view of the events of thirty years later. No one then believed in anything serious in the new interpretation given to the Virginia resolutions—nor in anything practical from nullification—nor in forcible resistance to the tariff laws from South Carolina—nor in any scheme of disunion.

Mr. Webster’s closing reply was a fine piece of rhetoric, delivered in an elaborate and artistic style, and in an apparent spirit of deep seriousness. He concluded thus—“When my eyes shall be turned to behold, for the last time, the sun in heaven, may I not see him shining on the broken and disfigured fragments of a once glorious Union; on States dissevered, discordant, belligerent; on a land rent with civil feuds, or drenched, it may be, in fraternal blood. Let their last feeble and lingering glance, rather, behold the gorgeous ensign of the Republic, now known and honored throughout the earth, still full high advanced, its arms and trophies streaming in their original lustre, not a stripe erased or polluted, nor a single star obscured, bearing for its motto no such miserable interrogatory as, What is all this worth? nor those other words of delusion and folly, Liberty first and Union afterwards; but everywhere, spread all over in characters of living light, blazing in all its ample folds, as they float over the sea and over the land, and in every wind under the whole heavens, that other sentiment, dear to every true American heart—Liberty and Union, now and forever, one and inseparable!”

President Jackson in his first annual message to Congress called attention to the fact of expiration in 1836 of the charter of incorporation granted by the Federal government to a moneyed institution called The Bank of the United States, which was originally designed to assist the government in establishing and maintaining a uniform and sound currency. He seriously doubted the constitutionality and expediency of the law creating the bank, and was opposed to a renewal of the charter. His view of the matter was that if such an institution was deemed a necessity it should be made a national one, in the sense of being founded on the credit of the government and its revenues, and not a corporation independent from and not a part of the government. The House of Representatives was strongly in favor of the renewal of the charter, and several of its committees made elaborate, ample and argumentative reports upon the subject. These reports were the subject of newspaper and pamphlet publication; and lauded for their power and excellence, and triumphant refutation of all the President’s opinions. Thus was the “war of the Bank” commenced at once in Congress, and in the public press; and openly at the instance of the Bank itself, which, forgetting its position as an institution of the government, for the convenience of the government, set itself up as a power, and struggled for continued existence, by demand for renewal of its charter. It allied itself at the same time to the political power opposed to the President, joined in all their schemes of protective tariff, and national internal improvement, and became the head of the American system. Its moneyed and political power, numerous interested affiliations, and control over other banks and fiscal institutions, was truly great and extensive, and a power which was exercised and made to be felt during the struggle to such a degree that it threatened a danger to the country and the government almost amounting to a national calamity.

The subject of renewal of the charter was agitated at every succeeding session of Congress down to 1836, and many able speeches made for and against it.

In the month of December, 1831, the National Republicans, as the party was then called which afterward took the name of “whig,” held its convention in Baltimore, and nominated candidates for President and Vice-President, to be voted for at the election in the autumn of the ensuing year. Henry Clay was the candidate for the office of President, and John Sergeant for that of Vice-President. The platform or address to the people presented the party issues which were to be settled at the ensuing election, the chief subjects being the tariff, internal improvement, removal of the Cherokee Indians, and the renewal of the United States Bank charter. Thus the bank question was fully presented as an issue in the election by that part of its friends who classed politically against President Jackson. But it had also Democratic friends without whose aid the re-charter could not be got through Congress, and they labored assiduously for it. The first Bank of the United States, chartered in 1791, was a federal measure, favored by General Hamilton, opposed by Mr. Jefferson, Mr. Madison, and the Republican party; and became a great landmark of party, not merely for the bank itself, but for the latitudinarian construction of the constitution in which it was founded, and the precedent it established that Congress might in its discretion do what it pleased, under the plea of being “necessary” to carry into effect some granted power. The non-renewal of the charter in 1811, was the act of the Republican party, then in possession of the government, and taking the opportunity to terminate, upon its own limitation, the existence of an institution whose creation they had not been able to prevent. The charter of the second bank, in 1816, was the act of the Republican party, and to aid them in the administration of the government, and, as such, was opposed by the Federal party—not seeming then to understand that, by its instincts, a great moneyed corporation was in sympathy with their own party, and would soon be with it in action—which the bank soon was—and now struggled for a continuation of its existence under the lead of those who had opposed its creation and against the party which effected it. Mr. Webster was a Federal leader on both occasions—against the charter in 1816; for the re-charter in 1832. The bill passed the Senate after a long and arduous contest; and afterwards passed the House, quickly and with little or no contest at all.

It was sent to the President, and vetoed by him July 10, 1832; the message stating his objections being an elaborate review of the subject; the veto being based mainly on the unconstitutionality of the measure. The veto was sustained. Following this the President after the adjournment removed from the bank the government deposits, and referred to that fact in his next annual message on the second day of December, 1833, at the opening of the first session of the twenty-third Congress. Accompanying it was the report of the Secretary of the Treasury, Hon. Roger B. Taney, afterwards Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, giving the reasons of the government for the withdrawal of the public funds. Long and bitter was the contest between the President on the one side and the Bank and its supporters in the Senate on the other side. The conduct of the Bank produced distress throughout the country, and was so intended to coerce the President. Distress petitions flooded Congress, and the Senate even passed resolutions of censure of the President. The latter, however, held firm in his position. A committee of investigation was appointed by the House of Representatives to inquire into the causes of the commercial embarrassment and the public distress complained of in the numerous distress memorials presented to the two Houses during the session; and whether the Bank had been instrumental, through its management of money, in producing the distress and embarrassment of which so much complaint was made; to inquire whether the charter of the Bank had been violated, and what corruptions and abuses, if any, existed in its management; and to inquire whether the Bank had used its corporate power or money to control the press, to interpose in politics, or to influence elections. The committee were granted ample powers for the execution of these inquiries. It was treated with disdain and contempt by the Bank management; refused access to the books and papers, and the directors and president refused to be sworn and testify. The committee at the next session made report of their proceedings, and asked for warrants to be issued against the managers to bring them before the Bar of the House to answer for contempt; but the friends of the Bank in the House were able to check the proceedings and prevent action being taken. In the Senate, the President was sought to be punished by a declination by that body to confirm the President’s nomination of the four government directors of the Bank, who had served the previous year; and their re-nomination after that rejection again met with a similar fate. In like manner his re-nomination of Roger B. Taney to be Secretary of the Treasury was rejected, for the action of the latter in his support of the President and the removal of the public deposits. The Bank had lost much ground in the public estimation by resisting the investigation ordered and attempted by the House of Representatives, and in consequence the Finance Committee of the Senate made an investigation, with so weak an attempt to varnish over the affairs and acts of the corporation that the odious appellation of “white-washing committee” was fastened upon it. The downfall of the Bank speedily followed; it soon afterwards became a total financial wreck, and its assets and property were seized on executions. With its financial failure it vanished from public view, and public interest in it and concern with it died out.

About the beginning of March, 1831, a pamphlet was issued in Washington, by Mr. John C. Calhoun, the Vice-President, and addressed to the people of the United States, explaining the cause of a difference which had taken place between himself and the President, General Jackson, instigated as the pamphlet alleged, by Mr. Van Buren, and intended to make trouble between the first and second officers of the government, and to effect the political destruction of himself (Mr. Calhoun) for the benefit of the contriver of the quarrel, the then Secretary of State, and indicated as a candidate for the presidential succession upon the termination of Jackson’s term. The differences grew out of certain charges against General Jackson respecting his conduct during the Seminole war which occurred in the administration of President Monroe. The President justified himself in published correspondence, but the inevitable result followed—a rupture between the President and Vice-President—which was quickly followed by a breaking up and reconstructing the Cabinet. Some of its members classed as the political friends of Mr. Calhoun, and could hardly be expected to remain as ministers to the President. Mr. Van Buren resigned; a new Cabinet was appointed and confirmed. This change in the Cabinet made a great figure in the party politics of the day, and filled all the opposition newspapers, and had many sinister reasons assigned to it—all to the prejudice of General Jackson and Mr. Van Buren.

It is interesting to note here that during the administration of President Jackson,—in the year 1833,—the Congress of the United States, as the consequence of the earnest efforts in that behalf, of Col. R. M. Johnson, of Kentucky, aided by the recommendation and support of the President, passed the first laws, abolishing imprisonment for debt, under process from the Courts of the United States: the only extent to which an act of Congress could go, by force of its enactments; but by force of example and influence, has led to the cessation of the practice of imprisoning debtors, in all, or nearly all, of the States and Territories of the Union; and without the evil consequences which had been dreaded from the loss of this remedy over the person. The act was a total abolition of the practice, leaving in full force all the remedies against fraudulent evasions of debt.

The American system, and especially its prominent feature of a high protective tariff was put in issue, in the Presidential canvass of 1832; and the friends of that system labored diligently in Congress in presenting its best points to the greatest advantage; and staking its fate upon the issue of the election. It was lost; not only by the result of the main contest, but by that of the congressional election which took place simultaneously with it. All the States dissatisfied with that system, were satisfied with the view of its speedy and regular extinction, under the legislation of the approaching session of Congress, excepting only South Carolina. She has held aloof from the Presidential contest, and cast her electoral votes for persons who were not candidates—doing nothing to aid the election of General Jackson, with whom her interests were apparently identified. On the 24th November, 1832, two weeks after the election which decided the fate of the tariff, that State issued an “Ordinance to nullify certain acts of the Congress of the United States, purporting to be laws laying duties and imposts on the importation of foreign commodities.” It declared that the Congress had exceeded its constitutional powers in imposing high and excessive duties on the theory of “protection,” had unjustly discriminated in favor of one class or employment, at the expense and to the injury and oppression of other classes and individuals; that said laws were in consequence not binding on the State and its citizens; and declaring its right and purpose to enact laws to prevent the enforcement and arrest the operation of said acts and parts of the acts of the Congress of the United States within the limits of that State after the first day of February following. This ordinance placed the State in the attitude of forcible resistance to the laws of the United States, to take effect on the first day of February next ensuing—a date prior to the meeting of the next Congress, which the country naturally expected would take some action in reference to the tariff laws complained of. The ordinance further provided that if, in the meantime, any attempt was made by the federal government to enforce the obnoxious laws, except through the tribunals, all the officers of which were sworn against them, the fact of such attempt was to terminate the continuance of South Carolina in the Union—to absolve her from all connection with the federal government—and to establish her as a separate government, wholly unconnected with the United States or any State. The ordinance of nullification was certified by the Governor of South Carolina to the President of the United States, and reached him in December of the same year; in consequence of which he immediately issued a proclamation, exhorting the people of South Carolina to obey the laws of Congress; pointing out and explaining the illegality of the procedure; stating clearly and distinctly his firm determination to enforce the laws as became him as Executive, even by resort to force if necessary. As a state paper, it is important as it contains the views of General Jackson regarding the nature and character of our federal government, expressed in the following language: “The people of the United States formed the constitution, acting through the State Legislatures in making the compact, to meet and discuss its provisions, and acting in separate conventions when they ratified those provisions; but, the terms used in the constitution show it to be a government in which the people of all the States collectively are represented. We are one people in the choice of President and Vice-President. Here the States have no other agency than to direct the mode in which the votes shall be given. * * * The people, then, and not the States, are represented in the executive branch. * * * In the House of Representatives the members are all representatives of the United States, not representatives of the particular States from which they come. They are paid by the United States, not by the State, nor are they accountable to it for any act done in the performance of their legislative functions. * * *

“The constitution of the United States, then, forms a government, not a league; and whether it be formed by a compact between the States, or in any other manner, its character is the same. It is a government in which all the people are represented, which operates directly on the people individually, not upon the States—they retained all the power they did not grant. But each State, having expressly parted with so many powers as to constitute, jointly with the other States, a single nation, cannot, from that period, possess any right to secede, because such secession does not break a league, but destroys the unity of the nation, and any injury to that unity, is not only a breach which could result from the contravention of a compact, but it is an offence against the whole Union. To say that any State may at pleasure secede from the Union, is to say that the United States are not a nation; because it would be a solecism to contend that any part of a nation might dissolve its connection with the other parts, to their injury or ruin, without committing any offence.”

Without calling on Congress for extraordinary powers, the President in his annual message, merely adverted to the attitude of the State, and proceeded to meet the exigency by the exercise of the powers he already possessed. The proceedings in South Carolina not ceasing, and taking daily a more aggravated form in the organization of troops, the collection of arms and of munitions of war, and in declarations hostile to the Union, he found it necessary early in January to report the facts to Congress in a special message, and ask for extraordinary powers. Bills for the reduction of the tariff were early in the Session introduced into both houses, while at the same time the President, though not relaxing his efforts towards a peaceful settlement of the difficulty, made steady preparations for enforcing the law. The result of the bills offered in the two Houses of Congress, was the passage of Mr. Clay’s “compromise” bill on the 12th of February 1833, which radically changed the whole tariff system.

The President in his message on the South Carolina proceedings had recommended to Congress the revival of some acts, heretofore in force, to enable him to execute the laws in that State; and the Senate’s committee on the judiciary had reported a bill accordingly early in the session. It was immediately assailed by several members as violent and unconstitutional, tending to civil war, and denounced as “the bloody bill”—the “force bill,” &c. The bill was vindicated in the Senate, by its author, who showed that it contained no novel principle; was substantially a revival of laws previously in force; with the authority superadded to remove the office of customs from one building or place to another in case of need. The bill was vehemently opposed, and every effort made to render it odious to the people, and even extend the odium to the President, and to every person urging or aiding in its passage. Mr. Webster justly rebuked all this vituperation, and justified the bill, both for the equity of its provisions, and the necessity for enacting them. He said, that an unlawful combination threatened the integrity of the Union; that the crisis called for a mild, temperate, forbearing but inflexibly firm execution of the laws; and finally, that public opinion sets with an irresistible force in favor of the Union, in favor of the measures recommended by the President, and against the new doctrines which threatened the dissolution of the Union. The support which Mr. Webster gave to these measures was the regular result of the principles which he laid down in his first speeches against nullification in the debate with Mr. Hayne, and he could not have done less without being derelict to his own principles then avowed. He supported with transcendent ability, the cause of the constitution and of the country, in the person of a President to whom he was politically opposed, whose gratitude and admiration he earned for his patriotic endeavors. The country, without distinction of party, felt the same; and the universality of the feeling was one of the grateful instances of popular applause and justice when great talents are seen exerting themselves for the good of the country. He was the colossal figure on the political stage during that eventful time; and his labors, splendid in their day, survive for the benefit of distant posterity.

During the discussion over the re-charter of the Bank of the United States, which as before mentioned, occupied the attention of Congress for several years, the country suffered from a money panic, and a general financial depression and distress was generally prevalent. In 1834 a measure was introduced into the House, for equalizing the value of gold and silver, and legalizing the tender of foreign coin, of both metals. The good effects of the bill were immediately seen. Gold began to flow into the country through all the channels of commerce, foreign and domestic; the mint was busy; and specie payment, which had been suspended in the country for thirty years, was resumed, and gold and silver became the currency of the land; inspiring confidence in all the pursuits of industry.

As indicative of the position of the democratic party at that date, on the subject of the kind of money authorized by the Constitution, Mr. Benton’s speech in the Senate is of interest. He said: “In the first place, he was one of those who believed that the government of the United States was intended to be a hard-money government; that it was the intention and the declaration of the Constitution of the United States, that the federal currency should consist of gold and silver, and that there is no power in Congress to issue, or to authorize any company of individuals to issue, any species of federal paper currency whatsoever. Every clause in the Constitution (said Mr. B.) which bears upon the subject of money—every early statute of Congress which interprets the meaning of these clauses—and every historic recollection which refers to them, go hand in hand in giving to that instrument the meaning which this proposition ascribes to it. The power granted to Congress to coin money is an authority to stamp metallic money, and is not an authority for emitting slips of paper containing promises to pay money. The authority granted to Congress to regulate the value of coin, is an authority to regulate the value of the metallic money, not of paper. The prohibition upon the States against making anything but gold and silver a legal tender, is a moral prohibition, founded in virtue and honesty, and is just as binding upon the Federal Government as upon the State Governments; and that without a written prohibition; for the difference in the nature of the two governments is such, that the States may do all things which they are not forbid to do; and the Federal Government can do nothing which it is not authorized by the Constitution to do. The framers of the Constitution (said Mr. B.) created a hard-money government. They intended the new government to recognize nothing for money but gold and silver; and every word admitted into the Constitution, upon the subject of money, defines and establishes that sacred intention.

Legislative enactment came quickly to the aid of constitutional intention and historic recollection. The fifth statute passed at the first session of the first Congress that ever sat under the present Constitution was full and explicit on this head. It declared, “that the fees and duties payable to the federal government shall be received in gold and silver coin only.” It was under General Hamilton, as Secretary of the Treasury, in 1791, that the policy of the government underwent a change. In the act constituting the Bank of the United States, he brought forward his celebrated plan for the support of the public credit—that plan which unfolded the entire scheme of the paper system and immediately developed the great political line between the federalists and the republicans. The establishment of a national bank was the leading and predominant feature of that plan; and the original report of the secretary, in favor of establishing the bank, contained this fatal and deplorable recommendation: “The bills and notes of the bank, originally made payable, or which shall have become payable, on demand, in gold and silver coin, shall be receivable in all payments to the United States.” From the moment of the adoption of this policy, the moneyed character of the government stood changed and reversed. Federal bank notes took the place of hard-money; and the whole edifice of the government slid, at once, from the solid rock of gold and silver money, on which its framers had placed it, into the troubled and tempestuous ocean of paper currency.

The first session of the 35th Congress opened December 1835. Mr. James K. Polk was elected Speaker of the House by a large majority over Mr. John Bell, the previous Speaker; the former being supported by the administration party, and the latter having become identified with those who, on siding with Mr. Hugh L. White as a candidate for the presidency, were considered as having divided from the democratic party. The chief subject of the President’s message was the relations of our country with France relative to the continued non-payment of the stipulated indemnity provided for in the treaty of 1831 for French spoliations of American shipping. The obligation to pay was admitted, and the money even voted for that purpose; but offense was taken at the President’s message, and payment refused until an apology should be made. The President commented on this in his message, and the Senate had under consideration measures authorizing reprisals on French shipping. At this point Great Britain offered her services as mediator between the nations, and as a result the indemnity was shortly afterwards paid.

Agitation of the slavery question in the United States really began about this time. Evil-disposed persons had largely circulated through the Southern states, pamphlets and circulars tending to stir up strife and insurrection; and this had become so intolerable that it was referred to by the President in his message. Congress at the session of 1836 was flooded with petitions and memorials urging federal interference to abolish slavery in the States; beginning with the petition of the Society of Friends of Philadelphia, urging the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia. These petitions were referred to Committees after an acrimonious debate as to whether they should be received or not. The position of the government at that time is embodied in the following resolution which was adopted in the House of Representatives as early as 1790, and substantially reaffirmed in 1836, as follows: “That Congress have no authority to interfere in the emancipation of slaves, or in the treatment of them within any of the States; it remaining with the several States to provide any regulations therein which humanity and true policy may require.”

In the Summer preceding the Presidential election of 1836, a measure was introduced into Congress, which became very nearly a party measure, and which in its results proved disastrous to the Democratic party in after years. It was a plan for distributing the public land money among the States either in the shape of credit distribution, or in the disguise of a deposit of surplus revenue; and this for the purpose of enhancing the value of the State stocks held by the United States Bank, which institution, aided by the party which it favored, led by Mr. Clay, was the prime mover in the plan. That gentleman was the author of the scheme, and great calculations were made by the party which favored the distribution upon its effect in adding to their popularity. The Bill passed the Senate in its original form, but met with less favor in the House where it was found necessary. To effectuate substantially the same end, a Senate Bill was introduced to regulate the keeping of the public money in the deposit banks, and this was turned into distribution of the surplus public moneys with the States, in proportion to their representation in Congress, to be returned when Congress should call for it; and this was called a deposit with the States, and the faith of the States pledged for a return of the money. It was stigmatized by its opponents in Congress, as a distribution in disguise—as a deposit never to be reclaimed; as a miserable evasion of the Constitution; as an attempt to debauch the people with their own money; as plundering instead of defending the country. The Bill passed both houses, mainly by the efforts of a half dozen aspirants to the Presidency, who sought to thus increase their popularity. They were doomed to disappointment in this respect. Politically, it was no advantage to its numerous and emulous supporters, and of no disservice to its few determined opponents. It was a most unfortunate act, a plain evasion of the Constitution for a bad purpose; and it soon gave a sad overthrow to the democracy and disappointed every calculation made upon it. To the States it was no advantage, raising expectations which were not fulfilled, and upon which many of them acted as realities. The Bill was signed by the President, but it is simple justice to him to say that he did it with a repugnance of feeling, and a recoil of judgment, which it required great efforts of his friends to overcome, and with a regret for it afterwards which he often and publicly expressed. In a party point of view, the passage of this measure was the commencement of calamities, being an efficient cause in that general suspension of specie payments, which quickly occurred, and brought so much embarrassment on the Van Buren administration, ending in the great democratic defeat of 1840.

The presidential election of 1836 resulted in the choice of the democratic candidate, Mr. Van Buren, who was elected by 170 electoral votes; his opponent, General Harrison, receiving seventy-three electoral votes. Scattering votes were given for Mr. Webster, Mr. Mangum, and Mr. Hugh L. White, the last named representing a fragment of the democracy who, in a spirit of disaffection, attempted to divide the democratic party and defeat Mr. Van Buren. At the opening of the second session of the twenty-fourth Congress, December, 1836, President Jackson delivered his last annual message, under circumstances exceedingly gratifying to him. The powerful opposition in Congress had been broken down, and he had the satisfaction of seeing full majorities of ardent and tried friends in each House. The country was in peace and friendship with all the world; all exciting questions quieted at home; industry in all its branches prosperous, and the revenue abundant. And as a happy sequence of this state of affairs, the Senate on the 16th of March, 1837, expunged from the Journal the resolution, adopted three years previously, censuring the President for ordering the removal of the deposits of public money in the United States Bank. He retired from the presidency with high honors, and died eight years afterwards at his home, the celebrated “Hermitage,” in Tennessee, in full possession of all his faculties, and strong to the last in the ruling passion of his soul—love of country.

The 4th of March, 1837, ushered in another Democratic administration—the beginning of the term of Martin Van Buren as President of the United States. In his inaugural address he commented on the prosperous condition of the country, and declared it to be his policy to strictly abide by the Constitution as written—no latitudinarian constructions permitted, or doubtful powers assumed; that his political chart should be the doctrines of the democratic school, as understood at the original formation of parties.

The President, however, was scarcely settled in his new office when a financial panic struck the country with irresistible force. A general suspension of the banks, a depreciated currency, and insolvency of the federal treasury were at hand. The public money had been placed in the custody of the local banks, and the notes of all these banks, and of all others in the country, were received in payment of public dues. On the 10th of May, 1837, the banks throughout the country suspended specie payments. The stoppage of the deposit banks was the stoppage of the Treasury. Non-payment by the government was an excuse for non-payment by others. The suspension was now complete; and it was evident, and as good as admitted by those who had made it, that it was the effect of contrivance on the part of politicians and the so-called Bank of the United States (which, after the expiration of its national charter, had become a State corporation chartered by the Legislature of Pennsylvania in January, 1836) for the purpose of restoring themselves to power. The whole proceeding became clear to those who could see nothing while it was in progress. Even those of the democratic party whose votes had helped to do the mischief, could now see that the attempt to deposit forty millions with the States was destruction to the deposit banks; that the repeal of President Jackson’s order, known as the “specie circular”—requiring payment for public lands to be in coin—was to fill the treasury with paper money, to be found useless when wanted; that distress was purposely created to throw blame of it upon the party in power; that the promptitude with which the Bank of the United States had been brought forward as a remedy for the distress, showed that it had been held in reserve for that purpose; and the delight with which the whig party saluted the general calamity, showed that they considered it their own passport to power. Financial embarrassment and general stagnation of business diminished the current receipts from lands and customs, and actually caused an absolute deficit in the public treasury. In consequence, the President found it an inexorable necessity to issue his proclamation convening Congress in extra session.

The first session of the twenty-fifth Congress met in extra session, at the call of the President, on the first Monday of September, 1837. The message was a review of the events and causes which had brought about the panic; a defense of the policy of the “specie circular,” and a recommendation to break off all connection with any bank of issue in any form; looking to the establishment of an Independent Treasury, and that the Government provide for the deficit in the treasury by the issue of treasury notes and by withholding the deposit due to the States under the act then in force. The message and its recommendations were violently assailed both in the Senate and House by able and effective speakers, notably by Messrs. Clay and Webster, and also by Mr. Caleb Cushing, of Massachusetts, who made a formal and elaborate reply to the whole document under thirty-two distinct heads, and reciting therein all the points of accusation against the democratic policy from the beginning of the government down to that day. The result was that the measures proposed by the Executive were in substance enacted; and their passage marks an era in our financial history—making a total and complete separation of Bank and State, and firmly establishing the principle that the government revenues should be receivable in coin only.

The measures of consequence discussed and adopted at this session, were the graduation of price of public lands under the pre-emption system, which was adopted; the bill to create an independent Treasury, which passed the Senate, but failed in the House; and the question of the re-charter of the district banks, the proportion for reserve, and the establishment of such institutions on a specie basis. The slavery question was again agitated in consequence of petitions from citizens and societies in the Northern States, and a memorial from the General Assembly of Vermont, praying for the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia and territories, and for the exclusion of future slave states from the Union. These petitions and memorials were disposed of adversely; and Mr. Calhoun, representing the ultra-Southern interest, in several able speeches, approved of the Missouri compromise, he urged and obtained of the Senate several resolutions declaring that the federal government had no power to interfere with slavery in the States; and that it would be inexpedient and impolitic to interfere, abolish or control it in the District of Columbia and the territories. These movements for and against slavery in the session of 1837–38 deserve to be noticed, as of disturbing effect at the time, and as having acquired new importance from subsequent events.

The first session of the twenty-sixth Congress opened December, 1839. The organization of the House was delayed by a closely and earnestly contested election from the State of New Jersey. Five Democrats claiming seats as against an equal number of Whigs. Neither set was admitted until after the election of Speaker, which resulted in the choice of Robert M. T. Hunter, of Virginia, the Whig candidate, who was elected by the full Whig vote with the aid of a few democrats—friends of Mr. Calhoun, who had for several previous sessions been acting with the Whigs on several occasions. The House excluding the five contested seats from New Jersey, was really Democratic; having 122 members, and the Whigs 113 members. The contest for the Speakership was long and arduous, neither party adhering to its original caucus candidate. Twenty scattering votes, eleven of whom were classed as Whigs, and nine as Democrats, prevented a choice on the earlier ballots, and it was really Mr. Calhoun’s Democratic friends uniting with a solid Whig vote on the final ballot that gained that party the election. The issue involved was a vital party question as involving the organization of the House. The chief measure, of public importance, adopted at this session of Congress was an act to provide for the collection, safe-keeping, and disbursing of the public money. It practically revolutionized the system previously in force, and was a complete and effectual separation of the federal treasury and the Government, from the banks and moneyed corporations of the States. It was violently opposed by the Whig members, led by Mr. Clay, and supported by Mr. Cushing, but was finally passed in both Houses by a close vote.

At this time, and in the House of Representatives, was exhibited for the first time in the history of Congress, the present practice of members “pairing off,” as it is called; that is to say, two members of opposite political parties, or of opposite views on any particular subject, agreeing to absent themselves from the duties of the House, for the time being. The practice was condemned on the floor of the House by Mr. John Quincy Adams, who introduced a resolution: “That the practice, first openly avowed at the present session of Congress, of pairing off, involves, on the part of the members resorting to it, the violation of the Constitution of the United States, of an express rule of this House, and of the duties of both parties in the transaction, to their immediate constituents, to this House, and to their country.” This resolution was placed in the calendar to take its turn, but not being reached during the session, was not voted on. That was the first instance of this justly condemned practice, fifty years after the establishment of the Government; but since then it has become common, even inveterate, and is now carried to great lengths.

The last session of the twenty-sixth Congress was barren of measures, and necessarily so, as being the last of our administration superseded by the popular voice, and soon to expire; and therefore restricted by a sense of propriety, during the brief remainder of its existence, to the details of business and the routine of service. The cause of this was the result of the presidential election of 1840. The same candidates who fought the battle of 1836 were again in the field. Mr. Van Buren was the Democratic candidate. His administration had been satisfactory to his party, and his nomination for a second term was commended by the party in the different States in appointing their delegates; so that the proceedings of the convention which nominated him were entirely harmonious and formal in their nature. Mr. Richard M. Johnson, the actual Vice-President, was also nominated for Vice-President.

On the Whig ticket, General William Henry Harrison, of Ohio, was the candidate for President, and Mr. John Tyler, of Virginia, for Vice-President. The leading statesmen of the Whig party were again put aside, to make way for a military man, prompted by the example in the nomination of General Jackson, the men who managed presidential elections believing then as now that military renown was a passport to popularity and rendered a candidate more sure of election. Availability—for the purpose—was the only ability asked for. Mr. Clay, the most prominent Whig in the country, and the acknowledged head of the party, was not deemed available; and though Mr. Clay was a candidate before the convention, the proceedings were so regulated that his nomination was referred to a committee, ingeniously devised and directed for the afterwards avowed purpose of preventing his nomination and securing that of General Harrison; and of producing the intended result without showing the design, and without leaving a trace behind to show what was done. The scheme (a modification of which has since been applied to subsequent national conventions, and out of which many bitter dissensions have again and again arisen) is embodied and was executed in and by means of the following resolution adopted by the convention: “Ordered, That the delegates from each State be requested to assemble as a delegation, and appoint a committee, not exceeding three in number, to receive the views and opinions of such delegation, and communicate the same to the assembled committees of all the delegations, to be by them respectively reported to their principals; and that thereupon the delegates from each State be requested to assemble as a delegation, and ballot for candidates for the offices of President and Vice-President, and having done so, to commit the ballot designating the votes of each candidate, and by whom given, to its committee, and thereupon all the committees shall assemble and compare the several ballots, and report the result of the same to their several delegations, together with such facts as may bear upon the nomination; and said delegation shall forthwith reassemble and ballot again for candidates for the above offices, and again commit the result to the above committees, and if it shall appear that a majority of the ballots are for any one man for candidate for President, said committee shall report the result to the convention for its consideration; but if there shall be no such majority, then the delegation shall repeat the balloting until such a majority shall be obtained, and then report the same to the convention for its consideration. That the vote of a majority of each delegation shall be reported as the vote of that State; and each State represented here shall vote its full electoral vote by such delegation in the committee.” This was a sum in political algebra, whose quotient was known, but the quantity unknown except to those who planned it; and the result was—for General Scott, 16 votes; for Mr. Clay, 90 votes; for General Harrison, 148 votes. And as the law of the convention impliedly requires the absorption of all minorities, the 106 votes were swallowed up by the 148 votes and made to count for General Harrison, presenting him as the unanimity candidate of the convention, and the defeated candidates and all their friends bound to join in his support. And in this way the election of 1840 was effected—a process certainly not within the purview of those framers of the constitution who supposed they were giving to the nation the choice of its own chief magistrate.

The contest before the people was a long and bitter one, the severest ever known in the country, up to that time, and scarcely equalled since. The whole Whig party and the large league of suspended banks, headed by the Bank of the United States making its last struggle for a new national charter in the effort to elect a President friendly to it, were arrayed against the Democrats, whose hard-money policy and independent treasury schemes, met with little favor in the then depressed condition of the country. Meetings were held in every State, county and town; the people thoroughly aroused; and every argument made in favor of the respective candidates and parties, which could possibly have any effect upon the voters. The canvass was a thorough one, and the election was carried for the Whig candidates, who received 234 electoral votes coming from 19 States. The remaining 60 electoral votes of the other 9 States, were given to the Democratic candidate; though the popular vote was not so unevenly divided; the actual figures being 1,275,611 for the Whig ticket, against 1,135,761 for the Democratic ticket. It was a complete rout of the Democratic party, but without the moral effect of victory.

On March 4, 1841, was inaugurated as President, Gen’l Wm. H. Harrison, the first Chief Magistrate elected by the Whig party, and the first President who was not a Democrat, since the installation of Gen’l Jackson, March 4, 1829. His term was a short one. He issued a call for a special session of Congress to convene the 31st of May following, to consider the condition of the revenue and finances of the country, but did not live to meet it. Taken ill with a fatal malady during the last days of March, he died on the 4th of April following, having been in office just one month. He was succeeded by the Vice-President, John Tyler. Then, for the first time in our history as a government, the person elected to the Vice-Presidency of the United States, by the happening of a contingency provided for in the constitution, had devolved upon him the Presidential office.

The twenty-seventh Congress opened in extra session at the call of the late President, May 31, 1841. A Whig member—Mr. White of Kentucky—was elected Speaker of the House of Representatives. The Whigs had a majority of forty-seven in the House and of seven in the Senate, and with the President and Cabinet of the same political party presented a harmony of aspect frequently wanting during the three previous administrations. The first measure of the new dominant party was the repeal of the independent treasury act passed at the previous session; and the next in order were bills to establish a system of bankruptcy, and for distribution of public land revenue. The former was more than a bankrupt law; it was practically an insolvent law for the abolition of debts at the will of the debtor. It applied to all persons in debt, allowed them to institute the proceedings in the district where the petitioner resided, allowed constructive notices to creditors in newspapers—declared the abolition of the debt where effects were surrendered and fraud not proved; and gave exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts, at the will of the debtor. It was framed upon the model of the English insolvent debtors’ act of George the Fourth, and embodied most of the provisions of that act, but substituting a release from the debt instead of a release from imprisonment. The bill passed by a close vote in both Houses.

The land revenue distribution bill of this session had its origin in the fact that the States and corporations owed about two hundred millions to creditors in Europe. These debts were in stocks, much depreciated by the failure in many instances to pay the accruing interest—in some instances failure to provide for the principal. These creditors, becoming uneasy, wished the federal government to assume their debts. The suggestion was made as early as 1838, renewed in 1839, and in 1840 became a regular question mixed up with the Presidential election of that year, and openly engaging the active exertions of foreigners. Direct assumption was not urged; indirect by giving the public land revenue to the States was the mode pursued, and the one recommended in the message of President Tyler. Mr. Calhoun spoke against the measure with more than usual force and clearness, claiming that it was unconstitutional and without warrant. Mr. Benton on the same side called it a squandering of the public patrimony, and pointed out its inexpediency in the depleted state of the treasury, apart from its other objectionable features. It passed by a party vote.

This session is remarkable for the institution of the hour rule in the House of Representatives—a very great limitation upon the freedom of debate. It was a Whig measure, adopted to prevent delay in the enactment of pending bills. It was a rigorous limitation, frequently acting as a bar to profitable debate and checking members in speeches which really impart information valuable to the House and the country. No doubt the license of debate has been frequently abused in Congress, as in all other deliberative assemblies, but the incessant use of the previous question, which cuts off all debate, added to the hour rule which limits a speech to sixty minutes (constantly reduced by interruptions) frequently results in the transaction of business in ignorance of what they are about by those who are doing it.

The rule worked so well in the House, for the purpose for which it was devised—made the majority absolute master of the body—that Mr. Clay undertook to have the same rule adopted in the Senate; but the determined opposition to it, both by his political opponents and friends, led to the abandonment of the attempt in that chamber.

Much discussion took place at this session, over the bill offered in the House of Representatives, for the relief of the widow of the late President—General Harrison—appropriating one year’s salary. It was strenuously opposed by the Democratic members, as unconstitutional, on account of its principle, as creating a private pension list, and as a dangerous precedent. Many able speeches were made against the bill, both in the Senate and House; among others, the following extract from the speech of an able Senator contains some interesting facts. He said: “Look at the case of Mr. Jefferson, a man than whom no one that ever existed on God’s earth were the human family more indebted to. His furniture and his estate were sold to satisfy his creditors. His posterity was driven from house and home, and his bones now lay in soil owned by a stranger. His family are scattered: some of his descendants are married in foreign lands. Look at Monroe—the able, the patriotic Monroe, whose services were revolutionary, whose blood was spilt in the war of Independence, whose life was worn out in civil service, and whose estate has been sold for debt, his family scattered, and his daughter buried in a foreign land. Look at Madison, the model of every virtue, public or private, and he would only mention in connection with this subject, his love of order, his economy, and his systematic regularity in all his habits of business. He, when his term of eight years had expired, sent a letter to a gentleman (a son of whom is now on this floor) [Mr. Preston], enclosing a note of five thousand dollars, which he requested him to endorse, and raise the money in Virginia, so as to enable him to leave this city, and return to his modest retreat—his patrimonial inheritance—in that State. General Jackson drew upon the consignee of his cotton crop in New Orleans for six thousand dollars to enable him to leave the seat of government without leaving creditors behind him. These were honored leaders of the republican party. They had all been Presidents. They had made great sacrifices, and left the presidency deeply embarrassed; and yet the republican party who had the power and the strongest disposition to relieve their necessities, felt they had no right to do so by appropriating money from the public Treasury. Democracy would not do this. It was left for the era of federal rule and federal supremacy—who are now rushing the country with steam power into all the abuses and corruptions of a monarchy, with its pensioned aristocracy—and to entail upon the country a civil pension list.”

There was an impatient majority in the House in favor of the passage of the bill. The circumstances were averse to deliberation—a victorious party, come into power after a heated election, seeing their elected candidate dying on the threshold of his administration, poor and beloved: it was a case for feeling more than of judgment, especially with the political friends of the deceased—but few of whom could follow the counsels of the head against the impulsions of the heart.

The bill passed, and was approved; and as predicted, it established a precedent which has since been followed in every similar case.

The subject of naval pensions received more than usual consideration at this session. The question arose on the discussion of the appropriation bill for that purpose. A difference about a navy—on the point of how much and what kind—had always been a point of difference between the two great political parties of the Union, which, under whatsoever names, are always the same, each preserving its identity in principles and policy, but here the two parties divided upon an abuse which no one could deny or defend. A navy pension fund had been established under the act of 1832, which was a just and proper law, but on the 3d of March, 1837, an act was passed entitled “An act for the more equitable distribution of the Navy Pension Fund.” That act provided: I. That Invalid naval pensions should commence and date back to the time of receiving the inability, instead of completing the proof. II. It extended the pensions for death to all cases of death, whether incurred in the line of duty or not. III. It extended the widow’s pensions for life, when five years had been the law both in the army and navy. IV. It adopted the English system of pensioning children of deceased marines until they attained their majority.

The effect of this law was to absorb and bankrupt the navy pension fund, a meritorious fund created out of the government share of prize money, relinquished for that purpose, and to throw the pensions, arrears as well as current and future, upon the public treasury, where it was never intended they were to be. It was to repeal this act, that an amendment was introduced at this session on the bringing forward of the annual appropriation bill for navy pensions, and long and earnest were the debates upon it. The amendment was lost, the Senate dividing on party lines, the Whigs against and the Democrats for the amendment. The subject is instructive, as then was practically ratified and re-enacted the pernicious practice authorized by the act of 1837, of granting pensions to date from the time of injury and not from the time of proof; and has grown up to such proportions in recent years that the last act of Congress appropriating money for arrears of pensions, provided for the payment of such an enormous sum of money that it would have appalled the original projectors of the act of 1837 could they have seen to what their system has led.

Again, at this session, the object of the tariff occupied the attention of Congress. The compromise act, as it was called, of 1833, which was composed of two parts—one to last nine years, for the benefit of manufactures; the other to last for ever, for the benefit of the planting and consuming interest—was passed, as hereinbefore stated, in pursuance of an agreement between Mr. Clay and Mr. Calhoun and their respective friends, at the time the former was urging the necessity for a continuance of high tariff for protection and revenue, and the latter was presenting and justifying before Congress the nullification ordinance adopted by the Legislature of South Carolina. To Mr. Clay and Mr. Calhoun it was a political necessity, one to get rid of a stumbling-block (which protective tariff had become); the other to escape a personal peril which his nullifying ordinance had brought upon him, and with both, it was a piece of policy, to enable them to combine against Mr. Van Buren, by postponing their own contention; and a device on the part of its author (Mr. Clayton, of Delaware) and Mr. Clay to preserve the protective system. It provided for a reduction of a certain per centage each year, on the duties for the ensuing nine years, until the revenue was reduced to 20 per cent. ad valorem on all articles imported into the country. In consequence the revenue was so reduced that in the last year, there was little more than half what the exigencies of the government required, and different modes, by loans and otherwise, were suggested to meet the deficiency. The Secretary of the Treasury had declared the necessity of loans and taxes to carry on the government; a loan bill for twelve millions had been passed; a tariff bill to raise fourteen millions was depending; and the chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means, Mr. Millard Fillmore, defended its necessity in an able speech. His bill proposed twenty per cent. additional to the existing duty on certain specified articles, sufficient to make up the amount wanted. This encroachment on a measure so much vaunted when passed, and which had been kept inviolate while operating in favor of one of the parties to it, naturally excited complaint and opposition from the other, and Mr. Gilmer, of Virginia, in a speech against the new bill, said: “In referring to the compromise act, the true characteristics of that act which recommended it strongly to him, were that it contemplated that duties were to be levied for revenue only, and in the next place to the amount only necessary to the supply of the economical wants of the government. He begged leave to call the attention of the committee to the principle recognized as the language of the compromise, a principle which ought to be recognized in all time to come by every department of the government. It is, that duties to be raised for revenue are to be raised to such an amount only as is necessary for an economical administration of the government. Some incidental protection must necessarily be given, and he, for one, coming from an anti-tariff portion of the country, would not object to it.”

The bill went to the Senate where it found Mr. Clay and Mr. Calhoun in positions very different from what they occupied when the compromise act was passed—then united, now divided—then concurrent, now antagonistic, and the antagonism general, upon all measures, was to be special upon this one. Their connection with the subject made it their function to lead off in its consideration; and their antagonist positions promised sharp encounters, which did not fail to come. Mr. Clay said that he “observed that the Senator from South Carolina based his abstractions on the theories of books on English authorities, and on the arguments urged in favor of free trade by a certain party in the British Parliament. Now he, (Mr. Clay,) and his friends would not admit of these authorities being entitled to as much weight as the universal practice of nations, which in all parts of the world was found to be in favor of protecting home manufactures to an extent sufficient to keep them in a flourishing condition. This was the whole difference. The Senator was in favor of book theory and abstractions: he (Mr. Clay) and his friends, were in favor of the universal practice of nations, and the wholesome and necessary protection of domestic manufactures.”

Mr. Calhoun in reply, referring to his allusion to the success in the late election of the tory party in England, said: “The interests, objects, and aims of the tory party there and the whig party here, are identical. The identity of the two parties is remarkable. The tory party are the patrons of corporate monopolies; and are not you? They are advocates of a high tariff; and are not you? They are supporters of a national bank; and are not you? They are for corn laws—laws oppressive to the masses of the people, and favorable to their own power; and are not you? Witness this bill.*** The success of that party in England, and of the whig party here, is the success of the great money power, which concentrates the interests of the two parties, and identifies their principles.”

The bill was passed by a large majority, upon the general ground that the government must have revenue.

The chief measure of the session, and the great object of the whig party—the one for which it had labored for ten years—was for the re-charter of a national bank. Without this all other measures would be deemed to be incomplete, and the victorious election itself but little better than a defeat. The President, while a member of the Democratic party, had been opposed to the United States Bank; and to overcome any objections he might have the bill was carefully prepared, and studiously contrived to avoid the President’s objections, and save his consistency—a point upon which he was exceedingly sensitive. The democratic members resisted strenuously, in order to make the measure odious, but successful resistance was impossible. It passed both houses by a close vote; and contrary to all expectation the President disapproved the act, but with such expressions of readiness to approve another bill which should be free from the objections which he named, as still to keep his party together, and to prevent the resignation of his cabinet. In his veto message the President fell back upon his early opinions against the constitutionality of a national bank, so often and so publicly expressed.

The veto caused consternation among the whig members; and Mr. Clay openly gave expression to his dissatisfaction, in the debate on the veto message, in terms to assert that President Tyler had violated his faith to the whig party, and had been led off from them by new associations. He said: “And why should not President Tyler have suffered the bill to become a law without his signature? Without meaning the slightest possible disrespect to him (nothing is further from my heart than the exhibition of any such feeling towards that distinguished citizen, long my personal friend), it cannot be forgotten that he came into his present office under peculiar circumstances. The people did not foresee the contingency which has happened. They voted for him as Vice-President. They did not, therefore, scrutinize his opinions with the care which they probably ought to have done, and would have done, if they could have looked into futurity. If the present state of the fact could have been anticipated—if at Harrisburg, or at the polls, it had been foreseen that General Harrison would die in one short month after the commencement of his administration; so that Vice-President Tyler would be elevated to the presidential chair; that a bill passed by decisive majorities of the first whig Congress, chartering a national bank, would be presented for his sanction; and that he would veto the bill, do I hazard anything when I express the conviction that he would not have received a solitary vote in the nominating convention, nor one solitary electoral vote in any State in the Union?”

The vote was taken on the bill over again, as required by the constitution, and so far from receiving a two-thirds vote, it received only a bare majority, and was returned to the House with a message stating his objections to it, where it gave rise to some violent speaking, more directed to the personal conduct of the President than to the objections to the bill stated in his message. The veto was sustained; and so ended the second attempt to resuscitate the old United States Bank under a new name. This second movement to establish the bank has a secret history. It almost caused the establishment of a new party, with Mr. Tyler as its head; earnest efforts having been made in that behalf by many prominent Whigs and Democrats. The entire cabinet, with the exception of Mr. Webster, resigned within a few days after the second veto. It was a natural thing for them to do, and was not unexpected. Indeed Mr. Webster had resolved to tender his resignation also, but on reconsideration determined to remain and publish his reasons therefor in a letter to the National Intelligencer, in the following words:

“Lest any misapprehension should exist, as to the reasons which led me to differ from the course pursued by my late colleagues, I wish to say that I remain in my place, first, because I have seen no sufficient reasons for the dissolution of the late Cabinet, by the voluntary act of its own members. I am perfectly persuaded of the absolute necessity of an institution, under the authority of Congress, to aid revenue and financial operations, and to give the country the blessings of a good currency and cheap exchanges. Notwithstanding what has passed, I have confidence that the President will co-operate with the legislature in overcoming all difficulties in the attainment of these objects; and it is to the union of the Whig party—by which I mean the whole party, the Whig President, the Whig Congress, and the Whig people—that I look for a realization of our wishes. I can look nowhere else. In the second place if I had seen reasons to resign my office, I should not have done so, without giving the President reasonable notice, and affording him time to select the hands to which he should confide the delicate and important affairs now pending in this department.”

The conduct of the President in the matter of the vetoes of the two bank bills produced revolt against him in the party; and the Whigs of the two Houses of Congress held several formal meetings to consider what they should do in the new condition of affairs. An address to the people of the United States was resolved upon. The rejection of the bank bill gave great vexation to one side, and equal exultation to the other. The subject was not permitted to rest, however; a national bank was the life—the vital principle—of the Whig party, without which it could not live as a party; it was the power which was to give them power and the political and financial control of the Union. A second attempt was made, four days after the veto, to accomplish the end by amendments to a bill relating to the currency, which had been introduced early in the session. Mr. Sargeant of Pennsylvania, moved to strike out all after the enacting clause, and insert his amendments, which were substantially the same as the vetoed bill, except changing the amount of capital and prohibiting discounts on notes other than bills of exchange. The bill was pushed to a vote with astonishing rapidity, and passed by a decided majority. In the Senate the bill went to a select committee which reported it back without alteration, as had been foreseen, the committee consisting entirely of friends of the measure; and there was a majority for it on final passage. Concurred in by the Senate without alteration, it was returned to the House, and thence referred to the President for his approval or disapproval. It was disapproved and it was promulgated in language intended to mean a repudiation of the President, a permanent separation of the Whig party from him, and to wash their hands of all accountability for his acts. An opening paragraph of the address set forth that, for twelve years the Whigs had carried on a contest for the regulation of the currency, the equalization of exchanges, the economical administration of the finances, and the advancement of industry—all to be accomplished by means of a national bank—declaring these objects to be misunderstood by no one and the bank itself held to be secured in the Presidential election, and its establishment the main object of the extra session. The address then proceeds to state how these plans were frustrated:

“It is with profound and poignant regret that we find ourselves called upon to invoke your attention to this point. Upon the great and leading measure touching this question, our anxious endeavors to respond to the earnest prayers of the nation have been frustrated by an act as unlooked for as it is to be lamented. We grieve to say to you that by the exercise of that power in the constitution which has ever been regarded with suspicion, and often with odium, by the people—a power which we had hoped was never to be exhibited on this subject, by a Whig President—we have been defeated in two attempts to create a fiscal agent, which the wants of the country had demonstrated to us, in the most absolute form of proof to be eminently necessary and proper in the present emergency. Twice have we with the utmost diligence and deliberation matured a plan for the collection, safe-keeping and disbursing of the public moneys through the agency of a corporation adapted to that end, and twice has it been our fate to encounter the opposition of the President, through the application of the veto power.*** We are constrained to say that we find no ground to justify us in the conviction that the veto of the President has been interposed on this question solely upon conscientious and well-considered opinions of constitutional scruple as to his duty in the case presented. On the contrary, too many proofs have been forced upon our observation to leave us free from the apprehension that the President has permitted himself to be beguiled into an opinion that by this exhibition of his prerogative he might be able to divert the policy of his administration into a channel which should lead to new political combinations, and accomplish results which must overthrow the present divisions of party in the country; and finally produce a state of things which those who elected him, at least, have never contemplated.

“In this state of things, the Whigs will naturally look with anxiety to the future, and inquire what are the actual relations between the President and those who brought him into power; and what, in the opinion of their friends in Congress, should be their course hereafter.*** The President by his withdrawal of confidence from his real friends in Congress and from the members of his cabinet; by his bestowal of it upon others notwithstanding their notorious opposition to leading measures of his administrations has voluntarily separated himself from those by whose exertions and suffrage he was elevated to that office through which he has reached his present exalted station.*** The consequence is, that those who brought the President into power can be no longer, in any manner or degree, justly held responsible or blamed for the administration of the executive branch of the government; and the President and his advisers should be exclusively hereafter deemed accountable.*** The conduct of the President has occasioned bitter mortification and deep regret. Shall the party, therefore, yielding to sentiments of despair, abandon its duty, and submit to defeat and disgrace? Far from suffering such dishonorable consequences, the very disappointment which it has unfortunately experienced should serve only to redouble its exertions, and to inspire it with fresh courage to persevere with a spirit unsubdued and a resolution unshaken, until the prosperity of the country is fully re-established, and its liberties firmly secured against all danger from the abuses, encroachments or usurpations of the executive department of the government.”

This was the manifesto, so far as it concerns the repudiation of President Tyler, which Whig members of Congress put forth: it was answered (under the name of an address to his constituents) by Mr. Cushing, in a counter special plea—counter to it on all points—especially on the main question of which party the President was to belong to; the manifesto of the Whigs assigning him to the democracy—the address of Mr. Cushing, claiming him for the Whigs. It was especially severe on Mr. Clay, as setting up a caucus dictatorship to coerce the President; and charged that the address emanated from this caucus, and did not embody or represent the sentiments of all Whig leaders; and referred to Mr. Webster’s letter, and his remaining in the cabinet as proof of this. But it was without avail against the concurrent statements of the retiring senators, and the confirmatory statements of many members of Congress. The Whig party recoiled from the President, and instead of the unity predicted by Mr. Webster, there was diversity and widespread dissension. The Whig party remained with Mr. Clay; Mr. Webster retired, Mr. Cushing was sent on a foreign mission, and the President, seeking to enter the democratic ranks, was refused by them, and left to seek consolation in privacy, for his political errors and omissions.

The extra session, called by President Harrison, held under Mr. Tyler, dominated by Mr. Clay, commenced May 31, and ended Sept. 13, 1841—and was replete with disappointed calculations, and nearly barren of permanent results. The purposes for which it was called into being, failed. The first annual message of President Tyler, at the opening of the regular session in December, 1841, coming in so soon after the termination of the extra session, was brief and meagre of topics, with few points of interest.

In the month of March, 1842, Mr. Henry Clay resigned his place in the Senate, and delivered a valedictory address to that body. He had intended this step upon the close of the previous presidential campaign, but had postponed it to take personal charge of the several measures which would be brought before Congress at the special session—the calling of which he foresaw would be necessary. He resigned not on account of age, or infirmity, or disinclination for public life; but out of disgust—profound and inextinguishable. He had been basely defeated for the Presidential nomination, against the wishes of the Whig party, of which he was the acknowledged head—he had seen his leading measures vetoed by the President whom his party had elected—the downfall of the Bank for which he had so often pledged himself—and the insolent attacks of the petty adherents of the administration in the two Houses: all these causes acting on his proud and lofty spirit, induced this withdrawal from public life for which he was so well fitted.

The address opened with a retrospect of his early entrance into the Senate, and a grand encomium upon its powers and dignity as he had found it, and left it. Memory went back to that early year, 1806, when just past thirty years of age, he entered the United States Senate, and commenced his high career—a wide and luminous horizon before him, and will and talent to fill it. He said: “From the year 1806, the period of my entering upon this noble theatre of my public service, with but short intervals, down to the present time, I have been engaged in the service of my country. Of the nature and value of those services, which I may have rendered during my long career of public life, it does not become me to speak. History, if she deigns to notice me, and posterity—if a recollection of any humble service which I may have rendered, shall be transmitted to posterity—will be the best, truest, and most impartial judges; and to them I defer for a decision upon their value. But, upon one subject, I may be allowed to speak. As to my public acts and public conduct, they are for the judgment of my fellow-citizens; but my private motives of action—that which prompted me to take the part which I may have done, upon great measures during their progress in the national councils, can be known only to the Great Searcher of the human heart and myself; and I trust I shall be pardoned for repeating again a declaration which I made thirty years ago: that whatever error I may have committed—and doubtless I have committed many during my public service—I may appeal to the Divine Searcher of hearts for the truth of the declaration which I now make, with pride and confidence, that I have been actuated by no personal motives—that I have sought no personal aggrandizement—no promotion from the advocacy of those various measures on which I have been called to act—that I have had an eye, a single eye, a heart, a single heart, ever devoted to what appeared to be the best interests of the country.”

Mr. Clay led a great party, and for a long time, whether he dictated to it or not, and kept it well bound together, without the usual means of forming and leading parties. It was surprising that, without power and patronage, he was able so long and so undividedly to keep so great a party together, and lead it so unresistingly. He had great talents, but not equal to some whom he led. He had eloquence—superior in popular effect, but not equal in high oratory to that of some others. But his temperament was fervid, his will was strong, and his courage daring; and these qualities, added to his talents, gave him the lead and supremacy in his party, where he was always dominant. The farewell address made a deep impression upon the Senators present; and after its close, Mr. Preston brought the ceremony to a conclusion, by moving an adjournment, which was agreed to.

Again at this session was the subject of the tariff considered, but this time, as a matter of absolute necessity, to provide a revenue. Never before were the coffers and the credit of the treasury at so low an ebb. A deficit of fourteen millions in the treasury—a total inability to borrow, either at home or abroad, the amount of the loan of twelve millions authorized the year before—the treasury notes below par, and the revenues from imports inadequate and decreasing.

The compromise act of 1833 in reducing the duties gradually through nine years, to a fixed low rate; the act of 1837 in distributing the surplus revenue; and the continual and continued distribution of the land revenue, had brought about this condition of things. The remedy was sought in a bill increasing the tariff, and suspending the land revenue distribution. Two such bills were passed in a single month, and both vetoed by the President. It was now near the end of August. Congress had been in session for an unprecedentedly long time. Adjournment could not be deferred, and could not take place without providing for the Treasury. The compromise act and the land distribution were the stumbling-blocks: it was resolved to sacrifice them together; and a bill was introduced raising the duties above the fixed rate of twenty per cent., and that breach of the mutual assurance in relation to the compromise, immediately in terms of the assurance, suspended the land revenue distribution—to continue it suspended while duties above the compromise limit continued to be levied. And as that has been the case ever since, the distribution of the land revenue has been suspended ever since. The bill was passed, and approved by the President, and Congress thereupon adjourned.

The subject of the navy was also under consideration at this session. The naval policy of the United States was a question of party division from the origin of parties in the early years of the government—the Federal party favoring a strong and splendid navy, the Republican a moderate establishment, adapted to the purposes of defense more than of offense. And this line of division has continued. Under the Whig regime the policy for a great navy developed itself. The Secretary of the Navy recommended a large increase of ships, seamen and officers, involving a heavy expense, though the government was not in a condition to warrant any such expenditure, and no emergency required an increase in that branch of the public service. The vote was taken upon the increase proposed by the Secretary of the Navy, and recommended by the President; and it was carried, the yeas and nays being well defined by the party line.

The first session of the twenty-eighth Congress, which convened December 1843, exhibited in its political complexion, serious losses in the Whig following. The Democratic candidate for Speaker of the House of Representatives, was elected over the Whig candidate—the vote standing 128 to 59. Thus an adverse majority of more than two to one was the result to the Whig party at the first election after the extra session of 1841. The President’s message referred to the treaty which had lately been concluded with Great Britain relative to the northwestern territory extending to the Columbia river, including Oregon and settling the boundary lines; and also to a pending treaty with Texas for her annexation to the United States; and concluded with a recommendation for the establishment of a paper currency to be issued and controlled by the Federal government.

For more than a year before the meeting of the Democratic Presidential Convention in Baltimore, in May 1844, it was evident to leading Democrats that Martin Van Buren was the choice of the party. To overcome this popular current and turn the tide in favor of Mr. Calhoun, who desired the nomination, resort was had to the pending question of the annexation of Texas. Mr. Van Buren was known to be against it, and Mr. Calhoun for it. To gain time, the meeting of the convention was postponed from December previous, which had been the usual time for holding such elections, until the following May. The convention met, and consisted of two hundred and sixty-six delegates, a decided majority of whom were for Mr. Van Buren, and cast their votes accordingly on the first ballot. But a chairman had been selected, who was adverse to his nomination; and aided by a rule adopted by the convention, which required a concurrence of two-thirds to effect a nomination, the opponents of Mr. Van Buren were able to accomplish his defeat. Mr. Calhoun had, before the meeting of the convention, made known his determination, in a public address, not to suffer his name to go before that assemblage as a candidate for the presidency, and stated his reasons for so doing, which were founded mainly on the manner in which the convention was constituted; his objections being to the mode of choosing delegates, and the manner of their giving in their votes—he contending for district elections, and the delegates to vote individually. South Carolina was not represented in the convention. After the first ballot Mr. Van Buren’s vote sensibly decreased, until finally, Mr. James K. Polk, who was a candidate for the Vice-Presidency, was brought forward and nominated unanimously for the chief office. Mr. Geo. M. Dallas was chosen as his colleague for the Vice-Presidency. The nomination of these gentlemen, neither of whom had been mentioned until late in the proceedings of the convention, for the offices for which they were finally nominated, was a genuine surprise to the country. No voice in favor of it had been heard; and no visible sign in the political horizon had announced it.

The Whig convention nominated Henry Clay, for President; and Theodore Frelinghuysen for Vice-President.

The main issues in the election which ensued, were mainly the party ones of Whig and Democrat, modified by the tariff and Texas questions. It resulted in the choice of the Democratic candidates, who received 170 electoral votes as against 105 for their opponents; the popular majority for the Democrats being 238,284, in a total vote of 2,834,108. Mr. Clay received a larger popular vote than had been given at the previous election for the Whig candidate, showing that he would have been elected had he then been the nominee of his party; though the popular vote at this election was largely increased over that of 1840. It is conceded that the 36 electoral votes of New York State gave the election to Mr. Polk. It was carried by a bare majority; due entirely to the Gubernatorial candidacy of Mr. Silas Wright, who had been mentioned for the vice-presidential nomination in connection with Mr. Van Buren, but who declined it after the sacrifice of his friend and colleague; and resigning his seat in the Senate, became a candidate for Governor of New York. The election being held at the same time as that for president, his name and popularity brought to the presidential ticket more than enough votes to make the majority that gave the electoral vote of the State to the Democrats.

President Tyler’s annual and last message to Congress, in December 1844, contained, (as did that of the previous year) an elaborate paragraph on the subject of Texas and Mexico; the idea being the annexation of the former to the Union, and the assumption of her causes of grievance against the latter; and a treaty was pending to accomplish these objects. The scheme for the annexation of Texas was framed with a double aspect—one looking to the then pending presidential election, the other to the separation of the Southern States; and as soon as the rejection of the treaty was foreseen, and the nominating convention had acted, the disunion aspect manifested itself over many of the Southern States—beginning with South Carolina. Before the end of May, a great meeting took place at Ashley, in that State, to combine the slave States in a convention to unite the Southern States to Texas, if Texas should not be received into the Union; and to invite the President to convene Congress to arrange the terms of the dissolution of the Union if the rejection of the annexation should be persevered in. Responsive resolutions were adopted in several States, and meetings held. The opposition manifested, brought the movement to a stand, and suppressed the disunion scheme for the time being—only to lie in wait for future occasions. But it was not before the people only that this scheme for a Southern convention with a view to the secession of the slave States was a matter of discussion; it was the subject of debate in the Senate; and there it was further disclosed that the design of the secessionists was to extend the new Southern republic to the Californias.

The treaty of annexation was supported by all the power of the administration, but failed; and it was rejected by the Senate by a two-thirds vote against it. Following this, a joint resolution was early brought into the House of Representatives for the admission of Texas as a State of the Union, by legislative action; it passed the House by a fair majority, but met with opposition in the Senate unless coupled with a proviso for negotiation and treaty, as a condition precedent. A bill authorizing the President and a commissioner to be appointed to agree upon the terms and conditions of said admission, the question of slavery within its limits, its debts, the fixing of boundaries, and the cession of territory, was coupled or united with the resolution; and in this shape it was finally agreed to, and became a law, with the concurrence of the President, March 3, 1845. Texas was then in a state of war with Mexico, though at that precise point of time an armistice had been agreed upon, looking to a treaty of peace. The House resolution was for an unqualified admission of the State; the Senate amendment or bill was for negotiation; and the bill actually passed would not have been concurred in except on the understanding that the incoming President (whose term began March 4, 1845, and who was favorable to negotiation) would act under the bill, and appoint commissioners accordingly.

Contrary to all expectation, the outgoing President, on the last day of his term, at the instigation of his Secretary of State, Mr. Calhoun, assumed the execution of the act providing for the admission of Texas—adopted the legislative clause—and sent out a special messenger with instructions. The danger of this had been foreseen, and suggested in the Senate; but close friends of Mr. Calhoun, speaking for the administration, and replying to the suggestion, indignantly denied it for them, and declared that they would not have the “audacity” to so violate the spirit and intent of the act, or so encroach upon the rights of the new President. These statements from the friends of the Secretary and President that the plan by negotiation would be adopted, quieted the apprehension of those Senators opposed to legislative annexation or admission, and thus secured their votes, without which the bill would have failed of a majority. Thus was Texas incorporated into the Union. The legislative proposition sent by Mr. Tyler was accepted: Texas became incorporated with the United States, and in consequence the state of war was established between the United States and Mexico; it only being a question of time and chance when the armistice should end and hostilities begin. Although Mr. Calhoun was not in favor of war with Mexico—he believing that a money payment would settle the differences with that country—the admission of Texas into the Union under the legislative annexation clause of the statute, was really his act and not that of the President’s; and he was, in consequence, afterwards openly charged in the Senate with being the real author of the war which followed.

The administration of President Polk opened March 4, 1845; and on the same day, the Senate being convened for the purpose, the cabinet ministers were nominated and confirmed. In December following the 29th Congress was organized. The House of Representatives, being largely Democratic, elected the Speaker, by a vote of 120, against 70 for the Whig candidate. At this session the “American” party—a new political organization—first made its appearance in the National councils, having elected six members of the House of Representatives, four from New York and two from Pennsylvania. The President’s first annual message had for its chief topic, the admission of Texas, then accomplished, and the consequent dissatisfaction of Mexico; and referring to the preparations on the part of the latter with the apparent intention of declaring war on the United States, either by an open declaration, or by invading Texas. The message also stated causes which would justify this government in taking the initiative in declaring war—mainly the non-compliance by Mexico with the terms of the treaty of indemnity of April 11, 1839, entered into between that State and this government relative to injuries to American citizens during the previous eight years. He also referred to the fact of a minister having been sent to Mexico to endeavor to bring about a settlement of the differences between the nations, without a resort to hostilities. The message concluded with a reference to the negotiations with Great Britain relative to the Oregon boundary; a statement of the finances and the public debt, showing the latter to be slightly in excess of seventeen millions; and a recommendation for a revision of the tariff, with a view to revenue as the object, with protection to home industry as the incident.

At this session of Congress, the States of Florida and Iowa were admitted into the Union; the former permitting slavery within its borders, the latter denying it. Long before this, the free and the slave States were equal in number, and the practice had grown up—from a feeling of jealousy and policy to keep them evenly balanced—of admitting one State of each character at the same time. Numerically the free and the slave States were thus kept even: in political power a vast inequality was going on—the increase of population being so much greater in the northern than in the southern region.

The Ashburton treaty of 1842 omitted to define the boundary line, and permitted, or rather did not prohibit, the joint occupation of Oregon by British and American settlers. This had been a subject of dispute for many years. The country on the Columbia River had been claimed by both. Under previous treaties the American northern boundary extended “to the latitude of 49 degrees north of the equator, and along that parallel indefinitely to the west.” Attempts were made in 1842 and continuing since to 1846, to settle this boundary line, by treaty with Great Britain. It had been assumed that we had a dividing line, made by previous treaty, along the parallel of 54 degrees 40 minutes from the sea to the Rocky mountains. The subject so much absorbed public attention, that the Democratic National convention of 1844 in its platform of principles declared for that boundary line, or war as the consequence. It became known as the 54–40 plank, and was a canon of political faith. The negotiations between the governments were resumed in August, 1844. The Secretary of State, Mr. Calhoun, proposed a line along the parallel of 49 degrees of north latitude to the summit of the Rocky mountains and continuing that line thence to the Pacific Ocean; and he made this proposition notwithstanding the fact that the Democratic party—to which he belonged—were then in a high state of exultation for the boundary of 54 degrees 40 minutes, and the presidential canvass, on the Democratic side, was raging upon that cry.

The British Minister declined this proposition in the part that carried the line to the ocean, but offered to continue it from the summit of the mountains to the Columbia River, a distance of some three hundred miles, and then follow the river to the ocean. This was declined by Mr. Calhoun. The President had declared in his inaugural address in favor of the 54–40 line. He was in a dilemma; to maintain that position meant war with Great Britain; to recede from it seemed impossible. The proposition for the line of 49 degrees having been withdrawn by the American government on its non-acceptance by the British, had appeased the Democratic storm which had been raised against the President. Congress had come together under the loud cry of war, in which Mr. Cass was the leader, but followed by the body of the democracy, and backed and cheered by the whole democratic newspaper press. Under the authority and order of Congress notice had been served on Great Britain which was to abrogate the joint occupation of the country by the citizens of the two powers. It was finally resolved by the British Government to propose the line of 49 degrees, continuing to the ocean, as originally offered by Mr. Calhoun; and though the President was favorable to its acceptance, he could not, consistently with his previous acts, accept and make a treaty, on that basis. The Senate, with whom lies the power, under the constitution, of confirming or restricting all treaties, being favorable to it, without respect to party lines, resort was had, as in the early practice of the Government, to the President, asking the advice of the Senate upon the articles of a treaty before negotiation. A message was accordingly sent to the Senate, by the President, stating the proposition, and asking its advice, thus shifting the responsibility upon that body, and making the issue of peace or war depend upon its answer. The Senate advised the acceptance of the proposition, and the treaty was concluded.

The conduct of the Whig Senators, without whose votes the advice would not have been given nor the treaty made, was patriotic in preferring their country to their party—in preventing a war with Great Britain—and saving the administration from itself and its party friends.

The second session of the 29th Congress was opened in December, 1847. The President’s message was chiefly in relation to the war with Mexico, which had been declared by almost a unanimous vote in Congress. Mr. Calhoun spoke against the declaration in the Senate, but did not vote upon it. He was sincerely opposed to the war, although his conduct had produced it. Had he remained in the cabinet, to do which he had not concealed his wish, he would, no doubt, have labored earnestly to have prevented it. Many members of Congress, of the same party with the administration, were extremely averse to the war, and had interviews with the President, to see if it was inevitable, before it was declared. Members were under the impression that the war could not last above three months.

The reason for these impressions was that an intrigue was laid, with the knowledge of the Executive, for a peace, even before the war was declared, and a special agent dispatched to bring about a return to Mexico of its exiled President, General Santa Anna, and conclude a treaty of peace with him, on terms favorable to the United States. And for this purpose Congress granted an appropriation of three millions of dollars to be placed at the disposal of the President, for negotiating for a boundary which should give the United States additional territory.

While this matter was pending in Congress, Mr. Wilmot of Pennsylvania introduced and moved a proviso, “that no part of the territory to be acquired should be open to the introduction of slavery.” It was a proposition not necessary for the purpose of excluding slavery, as the only territory to be acquired was that of New Mexico and California, where slavery was already prohibited by the Mexican laws and constitution. The proviso was therefore nugatory, and only served to bring on a slavery agitation in the United States. For this purpose it was seized upon by Mr. Calhoun and declared to be an outrage upon and menace to the slaveholding States. It occupied the attention of Congress for two sessions, and became the subject of debate in the State Legislatures, several of which passed disunion resolutions. It became the watchword of party—the synonym of civil war, and the dissolution of the Union. Neither party really had anything to fear or to hope from the adoption of the proviso—the soil was free, and the Democrats were not in a position to make slave territory of it, because it had just enunciated as one of its cardinal principles, that there was “no power in Congress to legislate upon slavery in Territories.” Never did two political parties contend more furiously about nothing. Close observers, who had been watching the progress of the slavery agitation since its inauguration in Congress in 1835, knew it to be the means of keeping up an agitation for the benefit of the political parties—the abolitionists on one side and the disunionists or nullifiers on the other—to accomplish their own purposes. This was the celebrated Wilmot Proviso, which for so long a time convulsed the Union; assisted in forcing the issue between the North and South on the slavery question, and almost caused a dissolution of the Union. The proviso was defeated; that chance of the nullifiers to force the issue was lost; another had to be made, which was speedily done, by the introduction into the Senate on the 19th February, 1847, by Mr. Calhoun of his new slavery resolutions, declaring the Territories to be the common property of the several States; denying the right of Congress to prohibit slavery in a Territory, or to pass any law which would have the effect to deprive the citizens of any slave State from emigrating with his property (slaves) into such Territory. The introduction of the resolutions was prefaced by an elaborate speech by Mr. Calhoun, who demanded an immediate vote upon them. They never came to a vote; they were evidently introduced for the mere purpose of carrying a question to the slave States on which they could be formed into a unit against the free States; and so began the agitation which finally led to the abrogation of the Missouri Compromise line, and arrayed the States of one section against those of the other.

The Thirtieth Congress, which assembled for its first session in December, 1847, was found, so far as respects the House of Representatives, to be politically adverse to the administration. The Whigs were in the majority, and elected the Speaker; Robert C. Winthrop, of Massachusetts, being chosen. The President’s message contained a full report of the progress of the war with Mexico; the success of the American arms in that conflict; the victory of Cerro Gordo, and the capture of the City of Mexico; and that negotiations were then pending for a treaty of peace. The message concluded with a reference to the excellent results from the independent treasury system.

The war with Mexico was ended by the signing of a treaty of peace, in February, 1848, by the terms of which New Mexico and Upper California were ceded to the United States, and the lower Rio Grande, from its mouth to El Paso, taken for the boundary of Texas. For the territory thus acquired, the United States agreed to pay to Mexico the sum of fifteen million dollars, in five annual installments; and besides that, assumed the claims of American citizens against Mexico, limited to three and a quarter million dollars, out of and on account of which claims the war ostensibly originated. The victories achieved by the American commanders, Generals Zachary Taylor and Winfield Scott, during that war, won for them national reputations, by means of which they were brought prominently forward for the Presidential succession.

The question of the power of Congress to legislate on the subject of slavery in the Territories, was again raised, at this session, on the bill for the establishment of the Oregon territorial government. An amendment was offered to insert a provision for the extension of the Missouri compromise line to the Pacific Ocean; which line thus extended was intended by the amendment to be permanent, and to apply to all future territories established in the West. This amendment was lost, but the bill was finally passed with an amendment incorporating into it the anti-slavery clause of the ordinance of 1787. Mr. Calhoun, in the Senate, declared that the exclusion of slavery from any territory was a subversion of the Union; openly proclaimed the strife between the North and South to be ended, and the separation of the States accomplished. His speech was an open invocation to disunion, and from that time forth, the efforts were regular to obtain a meeting of the members from the slave States, to unite in a call for a convention of the slave States to redress themselves. He said: “The great strife between the North and the South is ended. The North is determined to exclude the property of the slaveholder, and, of course, the slaveholder himself, from its territory. On this point there seems to be no division in the North. In the South, he regretted to say, there was some division of sentiment. The effect of this determination of the North was to convert all the Southern population into slaves; and he would never consent to entail that disgrace on his posterity. He denounced any Southern man who would not take the same course. Gentlemen were greatly mistaken if they supposed the Presidential question in the South would override this more important one. The separation of the North and the South is completed. The South has now a most solemn obligation to perform—to herself—to the constitution—to the Union. She is bound to come to a decision not to permit this to go on any further, but to show that, dearly as she prizes the Union, there are questions which she regards as of greater importance than the Union. This is not a question of territorial government, but a question involving the continuance of the Union.” The President, in approving the Oregon bill, took occasion to send in a special message, pointing out the danger to the Union from the progress of the slavery agitation, and urged an adherence to the principles of the ordinance of 1787—the terms of the Missouri compromise of 1820—as also that involved and declared in the Texas case in 1845, as the means of averting that danger.

The Presidential election of 1848 was coming on. The Democratic convention met in Baltimore in May of that year; each State being represented in the convention by the number of delegates equal to the number of electoral votes it was entitled to; saving only New York, which sent two sets of delegates, and both were excluded. The delegates were, for the most part, members of Congress and office-holders. The two-thirds rule, adopted by the previous convention, was again made a law of the convention. The main question which arose upon the formation of the platform for the campaign, was the doctrine advanced by the Southern members of non-interference with slavery in the States or in the Territories. The candidates of the party were, Lewis Cass, of Michigan, for President, and General Wm. O. Butler, of Kentucky, for Vice-President.

The Whig convention, taking advantage of the popularity of Genl. Zachary Taylor, for his military achievements in the Mexican war, then just ended; and his consequent availability as a candidate, nominated him for the Presidency, over Mr. Clay, Mr. Webster and General Scott, who were his competitors before the convention. Millard Fillmore was selected as the Vice-presidential candidate.

A third convention was held, consisting of the disaffected Democrats from New York who had been excluded from the Baltimore convention. They met at Utica, New York, and nominated Martin Van Buren for President, and Charles Francis Adams for Vice-President. The principles of its platform, were, that Congress should abolish slavery wherever it constitutionally had the power to do so—[which was intended to apply to the District of Columbia]—that it should not interfere with it in the slave States—and that it should prohibit it in the Territories. This party became known as “Free-soilers,” from their doctrines thus enumerated, and their party cry of “free-soil, free-speech, free-labor, free-men.” The result of the election, as might have been foreseen, was to lose New York State to the Baltimore candidate, and give it to the Whigs, who were triumphant in the reception of 163 electoral votes for their candidates, against 127 for the democrats; and none for the free-soilers.

The last message of President Polk, in December following, gave him the opportunity to again urge upon Congress the necessity for some measure to quiet the slavery agitation, and he recommended the extension of the Missouri compromise line to the Pacific Ocean, passing through the new Territories of California and New Mexico, as a fair adjustment, to meet as far as possible the views of all parties. The President referred also to the state of the finances; the excellent condition of the public treasury; government loans, commanding a high premium; gold and silver the established currency; and the business interests of the country in a prosperous condition. And this was the state of affairs, only one year after emergency from a foreign war. It would be unfair not to give credit to the President and to Senator Benton and others equally prominent and courageous, who at that time had to battle against the bank theory and national paper money currency, as strongly urged and advocated, and to prove eventually that the money of the Constitution—gold and silver—was the only currency to ensure a successful financial working of the government, and prosperity to the people.

The new President, General Zachary Taylor, was inaugurated March 4, 1849. The Senate being convened, as usual, in extra session, for the purpose, the Vice-President elect, Millard Fillmore, was duly installed; and the Whig cabinet officers nominated by the President, promptly confirmed. An additional member of the Cabinet was appointed by this administration to preside over the new “Home Department” since called the “Interior,” created at the previous session of Congress.

The following December Congress met in regular session—the 31st since the organization of the federal government. The Senate consisted of sixty members, among whom were Mr. Webster, Mr. Calhoun, and Mr. Clay, who had returned to public life. The House had 230 members; and although the Whigs had a small majority, the House was so divided on the slavery question in its various phases, that the election for Speaker resulted in the choice of the Democratic candidate, Mr. Cobb, of Georgia, by a majority of three votes. The annual message of the President plainly showed that he comprehended the dangers to the Union from a continuance of sectional feeling on the slavery question, and he averred his determination to stand by the Union to the full extent of his obligations and powers. At the previous session Congress had spent six months in endeavoring to frame a satisfactory bill providing territorial governments for California and New Mexico, and had adjourned finally without accomplishing it, in consequence of inability to agree upon whether the Missouri compromise line should be carried to the ocean, or the territories be permitted to remain as they were—slavery prohibited under the laws of Mexico. Mr. Calhoun brought forward, in the debate, a new doctrine—extending the Constitution to the territory, and arguing that as that instrument recognized the existence of slavery, the settlers in such territory should be permitted to hold their slave property taken there, and be protected. Mr. Webster’s answer to this was that the Constitution was made for States, not territories; that it cannot operate anywhere, not even in the States for which it was made, without acts of Congress to enforce it. The proposed extension of the constitution to territories, with a view to its transportation of slavery along with it, was futile and nugatory without the act of Congress to vitalize slavery under it. The early part of the year had witnessed ominous movements—nightly meetings of large numbers of members from the slave States, led by Mr. Calhoun, to consider the state of things between the North and the South. They appointed committees who prepared an address to the people. It was in this condition of things, that President Taylor expressed his opinion, in his message, of the remedies required. California, New Mexico and Utah, had been left without governments. For California, he recommended that having a sufficient population and having framed a constitution, she be admitted as a State into the Union; and for New Mexico and Utah, without mixing the slavery question with their territorial governments, they be left to ripen into States, and settle the slavery question for themselves in their State constitutions.

With a view to meet the wishes of all parties, and arrive at some definite and permanent adjustment of the slavery question, Mr. Clay early in the session introduced compromise resolutions which were practically a tacking together of the several bills then on the calendar, providing for the admission of California—the territorial government for Utah and New Mexico—the settlement of the Texas boundary—slavery in the District of Columbia—and for a fugitive slave law. It was seriously and earnestly opposed by many, as being a concession to the spirit of disunion—a capitulation under threat of secession; and as likely to become the source of more contentions than it proposed to quiet.

The resolutions were referred to a special committee, who promptly reported a bill embracing the comprehensive plan of compromise which Mr. Clay proposed. Among the resolutions offered, was the following: “Resolved, that as slavery does not exist by law and is not likely to be introduced into any of the territory acquired by the United States from the Republic of Mexico, it is inexpedient for Congress to provide by law either for its introduction into or exclusion from any part of the said territory; and that appropriate territorial governments ought to be established by Congress in all of the said territory, and assigned as the boundaries of the proposed State of California, without the adoption of any restriction or condition on the subject of slavery.” Mr. Jefferson Davis of Mississippi, objected that the measure gave nothing to the South in the settlement of the question; and he required the extension of the Missouri compromise line to the Pacific Ocean as the least that he would be willing to take, with the specific recognition of the right to hold slaves in the territory below that line; and that, before such territories are admitted into the Union as States, slaves may be taken there from any of the United States at the option of their owner.

Mr. Clay in reply, said: “Coming from a slave State, as I do, I owe it to myself, I owe it to truth, I owe it to the subject, to say that no earthly power could induce me to vote for a specific measure for the introduction of slavery where it had not before existed, either south or north of that line.*** If the citizens of those territories choose to establish slavery, and if they come here with constitutions establishing slavery, I am for admitting them with such provisions in their constitutions; but then it will be their own work, and not ours, and their posterity will have to reproach them, and not us, for forming constitutions allowing the institution of slavery to exist among them.”

Mr. Seward of New York, proposed a renewal of the Wilmot Proviso, in the following resolution: “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, otherwise than by conviction for crime, shall ever be allowed in either of said territories of Utah and New Mexico;” but his resolution was rejected in the Senate by a vote of 23 yeas to 33 nays. Following this, Mr. Calhoun had read for him in the Senate, by his friend James M. Mason of Virginia, his last speech. It embodied the points covered by the address to the people, prepared by him the previous year; the probability of a dissolution of the Union, and presenting a case to justify it. The tenor of the speech is shown by the following extracts from it: “I have, Senators, believed from the first, that the agitation of the subject of slavery would, if not prevented by some timely and effective measure, end in disunion. Entertaining this opinion, I have, on all proper occasions, endeavored to call the attention of each of the two great parties which divide the country to adopt some measure to prevent so great a disaster, but without success. The agitation has been permitted to proceed, with almost no attempt to resist it, until it has reached a period when it can no longer be disguised or denied that the Union is in danger. You have had forced upon you the greatest and gravest question that can ever come under your consideration: How can the Union be preserved?*** Instead of being weaker, all the elements in favor of agitation are stronger now than they were in 1835, when it first commenced, while all the elements of influence on the part of the South are weaker. Unless something decisive is done, I again ask what is to stop this agitation, before the great and final object at which it aims—the abolition of slavery in the States—is consummated? Is it, then, not certain that if something decisive is not now done to arrest it, the South will be forced to choose between abolition and secession? Indeed as events are now moving, it will not require the South to secede to dissolve the Union.*** If the agitation goes on, nothing will be left to hold the States together except force.” He answered the question, How can the Union be saved? with which his speech opened, by suggesting: “To provide for the insertion of a provision in the constitution, by an amendment, which will restore to the South in substance the power she possessed of protecting herself, before the equilibrium between the sections was destroyed by the action of the government.” He did not state of what the amendment should consist, but later on, it was ascertained from reliable sources that his idea was a dual executive—one President from the free, and one from the slave States, the consent of both of whom should be required to all acts of Congress before they become laws. This speech of Mr. Calhoun’s, is important as explaining many of his previous actions; and as furnishing a guide to those who ten years afterwards attempted to carry out practically the suggestions thrown out by him.

Mr. Clay’s compromise bill was rejected. It was evident that no compromise of any kind whatever on the subject of slavery, under any one of its aspects separately, much less under all put together, could possibly be made. There was no spirit of concession manifested. The numerous measures put together in Mr. Clay’s bill were disconnected and separated. Each measure received a separate and independent consideration, and with a result which showed the injustice of the attempted conjunction; for no two of them were passed by the same vote, even of the members of the committee which had even unanimously reported favorably upon them as a whole.

Mr. Calhoun died in the spring of 1850; before the separate bill for the admission of California was taken up. His death took place at Washington, he having reached the age of 68 years. A eulogy upon him was delivered in the Senate by his colleague, Mr. Butler, of South Carolina. Mr. Calhoun was the first great advocate of the doctrine of secession. He was the author of the nullification doctrine, and an advocate of the extreme doctrine of States Rights. He was an eloquent speaker—a man of strong intellect. His speeches were plain, strong, concise, sometimes impassioned, and always severe. Daniel Webster said of him, that “he had the basis, the indispensable basis of all high characters, and that was unspotted integrity, unimpeached honor and character!”

In July of this year an event took place which threw a gloom over the country. The President, General Taylor, contracted a fever from exposure to the hot sun at a celebration of Independence Day, from which he died four days afterwards. He was a man of irreproachable private character, undoubted patriotism, and established reputation for judgment and firmness. His brief career showed no deficiency of political wisdom nor want of political training. His administration was beset with difficulties, with momentous questions pending, and he met the crisis with firmness and determination, resolved to maintain the Federal Union at all hazards. His first and only annual message, the leading points of which have been stated, evinces a spirit to do what was right among all the States. His death was a public calamity. No man could have been more devoted to the Union nor more opposed to the slavery agitation; and his position as a Southern man and a slaveholder—his military reputation, and his election by a majority of the people as well as of the States, would have given him a power in the settlement of the pending questions of the day which no President without these qualifications could have possessed.

In accordance with the Constitution, the office of President thus devolved upon the Vice-President, Mr. Millard Fillmore, who was duly inaugurated July 10, 1850. The new cabinet, with Daniel Webster as Secretary of State, was duly appointed and confirmed by the Senate.

The bill for the admission of California as a State in the Union, was called up in the Senate and sought to be amended by extending the Missouri Compromise line through it, to the Pacific Ocean, so as to authorize slavery in the State below that line. The amendment was introduced and pressed by Southern friends of the late Mr. Calhoun, and made a test question. It was lost, and the bill passed by a two-third vote; whereupon ten Southern Senators offered a written protest, the concluding clause of which was: “We dissent from this bill, and solemnly protest against its passage, because in sanctioning measures so contrary to former precedents, to obvious policy, to the spirit and intent of the constitution of the United States, for the purpose of excluding the slaveholding States from the territory thus to be erected into a State, this government in effect declares that the exclusion of slavery from the territory of the United States is an object so high and important as to justify a disregard not only of all the principles of sound policy, but also of the constitution itself. Against this conclusion we must now and for ever protest, as it is destructive of the safety and liberties of those whose rights have been committed to our care, fatal to the peace and equality of the States which we represent, and must lead, if persisted in, to the dissolution of that confederacy, in which the slaveholding States have never sought more than equality, and in which they will not be content to remain with less.” On objection being made, followed by debate, the Senate refused to receive the protest, or permit it to be entered on the Journal. The bill went to the House of Representatives, was readily passed, and promptly approved by the President. Thus was virtually accomplished the abrogation of the Missouri compromise line; and the extension or non-extension of slavery was then made to form a foundation for future political parties.

The year 1850 was prolific with disunion movements in the Southern States. The Senators who had joined with Mr. Calhoun in the address to the people, in 1849, united with their adherents in establishing at Washington a newspaper entitled “The Southern Press,” devoted to the agitation of the slavery question; to presenting the advantages of disunion, and the organization of a confederacy of Southern States to be called the “United States South.” Its constant aim was to influence the South against the North, and advocated concert of action by the States of the former section. It was aided in its efforts by newspapers published in the South, more especially in South Carolina and Mississippi. A disunion convention was actually held, in Nashville, Tennessee, and invited the assembly of a Southern Congress. Two States, South Carolina and Mississippi responded to the appeal; passed laws to carry it into effect, and the former went so far as to elect its quota of Representatives to the proposed new Southern Congress. These occurrences are referred to as showing the spirit that prevailed, and the extraordinary and unjustifiable means used by the leaders to mislead and exasperate the people. The assembling of a Southern “Congress” was a turning point in the progress of disunion. Georgia refused to join; and her weight as a great Southern State was sufficient to cause the failure of the scheme. But the seeds of discord were sown, and had taken root, only to spring up at a future time when circumstances should be more favorable to the accomplishment of the object.

Although the Congress of the United States had in 1790 and again in 1836 formally declared the policy of the government to be non-interference with the States in respect to the matter of slavery within the limits of the respective States, the subject continued to be agitated in consequence of petitions to Congress to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia, which was under the exclusive control of the federal government; and of movements throughout the United States to limit, and finally abolish it. The subject first made its appearance in national politics in 1840, when a presidential ticket was nominated by a party then formed favoring the abolition of slavery; it had a very slight following which was increased tenfold at the election of 1844 when the same party again put a ticket in the field with James G. Birney of Michigan, as its candidate for the Presidency; who received 62,140 votes. The efforts of the leaders of that faction were continued, and persisted in to such an extent, that when in 1848 it nominated a ticket with Gerritt Smith for President, against the Democratic candidate, Martin Van Buren, the former received 296,232 votes. In the presidential contest of 1852 the abolition party again nominated a ticket, with John P. Hale as its candidate for President, and polled 157,926 votes. This large following was increased from time to time, until uniting with a new party then formed, called the Republican party, which latter adopted a platform endorsing the views and sentiments of the abolitionists, the great and decisive battle for the principles involved, was fought in the ensuing presidential contest of 1856; when the candidate of the Republican party, John C. Fremont, supported by the entire abolition party, polled 1,341,812 votes. The first national platform of the Abolition party, upon which it went into the contest of 1840, favored the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia and Territories; the inter-state slave trade, and a general opposition to slavery to the full extent of constitutional power.

Following the discussion of the subject of slavery, in the Senate and House of Representatives, brought about by the presentation of petitions and memorials, and the passage of the resolutions in 1836 rejecting such petitions, the question was again raised by the presentation in the House, by Mr. Slade of Vermont, on the 20th December 1837, of two memorials praying the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, and moving that they be referred to a select committee. Great excitement prevailed in the chamber, and of the many attempts by the Southern members an adjournment was had. The next day a resolution was offered that thereafter all such petitions and memorials touching the abolition of slavery should, when presented, be laid on the table; which resolution was adopted by a large vote. During the 24th Congress, the Senate pursued the course of laying on the table the motion to receive all abolition petitions; and both Houses during the 25th Congress continued the same course of conduct; when finally on the 25th of January 1840, the House adopted by a vote of 114 to 108, an amendment to the rules, called the 21st Rule, which provided:—“that no petition, memorial or resolution, or other paper, praying the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, or any state or territory, or the slave-trade between the States or territories of the United States, in which it now exists, shall be received by this House, or entertained in any way whatever.” This rule was afterwards, on the 3d of December, 1844, rescinded by the House, on motion of Mr. J. Quincy Adams, by a vote of 108 to 80; and a motion to re-instate it, on the 1st of December 1845, was rejected by a vote of 84 to 121. Within five years afterwards—on the 17th September 1850,—the Congress of the United States enacted a law, which was approved by the President, abolishing slavery in the District of Columbia.

On the 25th of February, 1850, there was presented in the House of Representatives, two petitions from citizens of Pennsylvania and Delaware, setting forth that slavery, and the constitution which permits it, violates the Divine law; is inconsistent with republican principles; that its existence has brought evil upon the country; and that no union can exist with States which tolerate that institution; and asking that some plan be devised for the immediate, peaceful dissolution of the Union. The House refused to receive and consider the petitions; as did also the Senate when the same petitions were presented the same month.

The presidential election of 1852 was the last campaign in which the Whig party appeared in National politics. It nominated a ticket with General Winfield Scott as its candidate for President. His opponent on the Democratic ticket was General Franklin Pierce. A third ticket was placed in the field by the Abolition party, with John P. Hale as its candidate for President. The platform and declaration of principles of the Whig party was in substance a ratification and endorsement of the several measures embraced in Mr. Clay’s compromise resolutions of the previous session of Congress, before referred to; and the policy of a revenue for the economical administration of the government, to be derived mainly from duties on imports, and by these means to afford protection to American industry. The main plank of the platform of the Abolition party (or Independent Democrats, as they were called) was for the non-extension and gradual extinction of slavery. The Democratic party equally adhered to the compromise measure. The election resulted in the choice of Franklin Pierce, by a popular vote of 1,601,474, and 254 electoral votes, against a popular aggregate vote of 1,542,403 (of which the abolitionists polled 157,926) and 42 electoral votes, for the Whig and Abolition candidates. Mr. Pierce was duly inaugurated as President, March 4, 1853.

The first political parties in the United States, from the establishment of the federal government and for many years afterwards, were denominated Federalists and Democrats, or Democratic-Republicans. The former was an anti-alien party. The latter was made up to a large extent of naturalized foreigners; refugees from England, Ireland and Scotland, driven from home for hostility to the government or for attachment to France. Naturally, aliens sought alliance with the Democratic party, which favored the war against Great Britain. The early party contests were based on the naturalization laws; the first of which, approved March 26, 1790, required only two years’ residence in this country; a few years afterwards the time was extended to five years; and in 1798 the Federalists taking advantage of the war fever against France, and then being in power, extended the time to fourteen years. (See Alien and Sedition Laws of 1798). Jefferson’s election and Democratic victory of 1800, brought the period back to five years in 1802, and reinforced the Democratic party. The city of New York, especially, from time to time became filled with foreigners; thus naturalized; brought into the Democratic ranks; and crowded out native Federalists from control of the city government, and to meet this condition of affairs, the first attempt at a Native American organization was made. Beginning in 1835; ending in failure in election of Mayor in 1837, it was revived in April, 1844, when the Native American organization carried New York city for its Mayoralty candidate by a good majority. The success of the movement there, caused it to spread to New Jersey and Pennsylvania. In Philadelphia, it was desperately opposed by the Democratic, Irish and Roman Catholic element, and so furiously, that it resulted in riots, in which two Romish Churches were burned and destroyed. The adherents of the American organization were not confined to Federalists or Whigs, but largely of native Democrats; and the Whigs openly voted with Democratic Natives in order to secure their vote for Henry Clay for the Presidency; but when in November, 1844, New York and Philadelphia both gave Native majorities, and so sapped the Whig vote, that both places gave majorities for the Democratic Presidential electors, the Whigs drew off. In 1845, at the April election in New York, the natives were defeated, and the new party disappeared there. As a result of the autumn election of 1844, the 29th Congress, which organized in December, 1845, had six Native Representatives; four from New York and two from Pennsylvania. In the 30th Congress, Pennsylvania had one. Thereafter for some years, with the exception of a small vote in Pennsylvania and New York, Nativism disappeared. An able writer of that day—Hon. A. H. H. Stuart, of Virginia—published under the nom-de-plume of “Madison” several letters in vindication of the American party (revived in 1852,) in which he said: “The vital principle of the American party is Americanism—developing itself in a deep-rooted attachment to our own country—its constitution, its union, and its laws—to American men, and American measures, and American interests—or, in other words, a fervent patriotism—which, rejecting the transcendental philanthropy of abolitionists, and that kindred batch of wild enthusiasts, who would seek to embroil us with foreign countries, in righting the wrongs of Ireland, or Hungary, or Cuba—would guard with vestal vigilance American institutions and American interests against the baneful effects of foreign influence.”

About 1852, when the question of slavery in the territories, and its extension or its abolition in the States, was agitated and causing sectional differences in the country, many Whigs and Democrats forsook their parties, and took sides on the questions of the day. This was aggravated by the large number of alien naturalized citizens constantly added to the ranks of voters, who took sides with the Democrats and against the Whigs. Nativism then re-appeared, but in a new form—that of a secret fraternity. Its real name and objects were not revealed—even to its members, until they reached a high degree in the order; and the answer of members on being questioned on these subjects was, “I don’t know”—which gave it the popular name, by which it is yet known, of “Know-nothing.” Its moving causes were the growing power and designs of the Roman Catholic Church in America; the sudden influx of aliens; and the greed and incapacity of naturalized citizens for office. Its cardinal principle was: “Americans must rule America”; and its countersign was the order of General Washington on a critical occasion during the war: “Put none but Americans on guard to-night.” Its early nominations were not made public, but were made by select committees and conventions of delegates. At first these nominations were confined to selections of the best Whig or best Democrat on the respective tickets; and the choice not being made known, but quietly voted for by all the members of the order, the effect was only visible after election, and threw all calculation into chaos. For a while it was really the arbiter of elections.

On February 8, 1853, a bill passed the House of Representatives providing a territorial government for Nebraska, embracing all of what is now Kansas and Nebraska. It was silent on the subject of the repeal of the Missouri Compromise. The bill was tabled in the Senate; to be revived at the following session. In the Senate it was amended, on motion of Mr. Douglas, to read: “That so much of the 8th section of an act approved March 6, 1820, (the Missouri compromise) *** which, being inconsistent with the principles of non-intervention by Congress with slavery in the States and Territories, as recognized by the legislature of 1850, commonly called the Compromise measures, is hereby declared inoperative and void; it being the true intent and meaning of this act not to legislate slavery into any Territory or State, nor to exclude it therefrom, but to leave the people thereof perfectly free to form and regulate their domestic institutions in their own way, subject only to the Constitution of the United States.” It was further amended, on motion of Senator Clayton, to prohibit “alien suffrage.” In the House this amendment was not agreed to; and the bill finally passed without it, on the 25th May, 1854.

So far as Nebraska was concerned, no excitement of any kind marked the initiation of her territorial existence. The persons who emigrated there seemed to regard the pursuits of business as of more interest than the discussion of slavery. Kansas was less fortunate. Her territory became at once the battle-field of a fierce political conflict between the advocates of slavery, and the free soil men from the North who went there to resist the establishment of that institution in the territory. Differences arose between the Legislature and the Governor, brought about by antagonisms between the Pro-slavery party and the Free State party; and the condition of affairs in Kansas assumed so frightful a mien in January, 1856, that the President sent a special message to Congress on the subject, January 24, 1856; followed by a Proclamation, February 11, 1856, “warning all unlawful combinations (in the territory) to retire peaceably to their respective abodes, or he would use the power of the local militia, and the available forces of the United States to disperse them.”

Several applications were made to Congress for several successive years, for the admission of Kansas as a state in the Union; upon the basis of three separate and distinct constitutions, all differing as to the main questions at issue between the contending factions. The name of Kansas was for some years synonymous with all that is lawless and anarchical. Elections became mere farces, and the officers thus fraudulently placed in power, used their authority only for their own or their party’s interest. The party opposed to slavery at length triumphed; a constitution excluding slavery was adopted in 1859, and Kansas was admitted into the Union January 29, 1861.

Under the fugitive slave law, which was passed by Congress at the session of 1850, as one of the Compromise measures, introduced by Mr. Clay, a long and exciting litigation occurred to test the validity and constitutionality of the act, and the several laws on which it depended. The suit was instituted by Dred Scott, a negro slave, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Missouri, in April Term, 1854, against John F. A. Sanford, his alleged owner, for trespass vi et armis, in holding the plaintiff and his wife and daughters in slavery in said District of Missouri, where by law slavery was prohibited; they having been previously lawfully held in slavery by a former owner—Dr. Emerson—in the State of Illinois, from whence they were taken by him to Missouri, and sold to the defendant, Sanford. The case went up on appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, and was clearly and elaborately argued. The majority opinion, delivered by Chief Justice Taney, as also the dissenting opinions, are reported in full in Howard’s U. S. Supreme Court Reports, Volume 19, page 393. In respect to the territories the Constitution grants to Congress the power “to make all needful rules and regulations concerning the territory and other property belonging to the United States.” The Court was of opinion that the clause of the Constitution applies only to the territory within the original States at the time the Constitution was adopted, and that it did not apply to future territory acquired by treaty or conquest from foreign nations. They were also of opinion that the power of Congress over such future territorial acquisitions was not unlimited, that the citizens of the States migrating to a territory were not to be regarded as colonists, subject to absolute power in Congress, but as citizens of the United States, with all the rights of citizenship guarantied by the Constitution, and that no legislation was constitutional which attempted to deprive a citizen of his property on his becoming a resident of a territory. This question in the case arose under the act of Congress prohibiting slavery in the territory of upper Louisiana, (acquired from France, afterwards the State), and of which the territory of Missouri was formed. Any obscurity as to what constitutes citizenship, will be removed by attending to the distinction between local rights of citizenship of the United States according to the Constitution. Citizenship at large in the sense of the Constitution can be conferred on a foreigner only by the naturalization laws of Congress. But each State, in the exercise of its local and reserved sovereignty, may place foreigners or other persons on a footing with its own citizens, as to political rights and privileges to be enjoyed within its own dominion. But State regulations of this character do not make the persons on whom such rights are conferred citizens of the United States or entitle them to the privileges and immunities of citizens in another State. See 5 Wheaton, (U. S. Supreme Court Reports), page 49.

The Court said in The Dred Scott case, above referred to, that:—“The right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution. The right to traffic in it like the ordinary article of merchandise and property was guarantied to the citizens of the United States, in every State that might desire it for twenty years, and the government in express terms is pledged to protect it in all future time if the slave escapes from his owner. This is done in plain words—too plain to be misunderstood, and no word can be found in the Constitution which gives Congress a greater power over slave property, or which entitles property of that kind to less protection than the property of any other description. The only power conferred is the power coupled with the duty of guarding and protecting the owner in his rights. Upon these considerations, it is the opinion of the Court that the Act of Congress which prohibited a citizen from holding and owning property of this kind in the territory of the United States north of the line therein mentioned, is not warranted by the Constitution and is therefore void; and that neither Dred Scott himself, nor any of his family were made free by being carried into this territory; even if they had been carried there by the owner with the intention of becoming a permanent resident.” The abolition of slavery by the 13th amendment to the Constitution of the United States ratified and adopted December 18, 1865, has put an end to these discussions formerly so numerous.

As early as 1854, the Kansas-Nebraska controversy on the territorial government bill, resulted in a division of the Whig party in the North. Those not sufficiently opposed to slavery to enter the new Republican party, then in its incipiency, allied themselves with the Know-Nothing order, which now accepting the name of American party established a separate and independent political existence. The party had no hold in the West; it was entirely Middle State at this time, and polled a large vote in Massachusetts, Delaware and New York. In the State elections of 1855 the American party made a stride Southward. In 1855, the absence of naturalized citizens was universal in the South, and even so late as 1881 the proportion of foreign born population in the Southern States, with the exception of Florida, Louisiana, and Texas was under two per cent. At the early date—1855—the nativist feeling among the Whigs of that section, made it easy to transfer them to the American party, which thus secured in both the Eastern and Southern States, the election of Governor and Legislature in the States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, California and Kentucky; and also elected part of its State ticket in Maryland, and Texas; and only lost the States of Virginia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas, by small majorities against it.

The order began preparations for a campaign as a National party, in 1856. It aimed to introduce opposition to aliens and Roman Catholicism as a national question. On the 21st of February, 1856, the National Council held a session at Philadelphia, and proceeded to formulate a declaration of principles, and make a platform, which were as follows:

“An humble acknowledgement to the Supreme Being, for his protecting care vouchsafed to our fathers in their successful Revolutionary struggle, and hitherto manifested to us, their descendants, in the preservation of the liberties, the independence, and the union of these States.

2d. The perpetuation of the Federal Union, as the palladium of our civil and religious liberties, and the only sure Bulwark of American independence.