Transcriber’s Note: A number of obvious printer’s errors (u for n, inconsistent spelling of Senators’ and Representatives’ names, punctuation, etc) have been amended. Other than that, the original text remains unchanged.
ABRIDGMENT
OF THE
DEBATES OF CONGRESS,
FROM 1789 TO 1856.
FROM GALES AND SEATON’S ANNALS OF CONGRESS; FROM THEIR
REGISTER OF DEBATES; AND FROM THE OFFICIAL
REPORTED DEBATES, BY JOHN C. RIVES.
BY
THE AUTHOR OF THE THIRTY YEARS’ VIEW.
VOL. III.
NEW YORK
D. APPLETON & COMPANY, 443 & 445 BROADWAY.
1861
Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1856, by
D. APPLETON AND COMPANY,
in the Clerk’s Office of the District Court for the Southern District of New York.
EIGHTH CONGRESS.—FIRST SESSION.
BEGUN AT THE CITY OF WASHINGTON, OCTOBER 17, 1803.
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,—THOMAS JEFFERSON.
PROCEEDINGS IN THE SENATE.
LIST OF MEMBERS OF THE SENATE.
New Hampshire.—Simeon Olcott, William Plumer.
Vermont.—S. R. Bradley, Israel Smith.
Massachusetts.—Jonathan Mason, Timothy Pickering.
Rhode Island.—Christopher Ellery, Samuel I. Potter.
Connecticut.—James Hillhouse, Uriah Tracy.
New York.—De Witt Clinton, Theodorus Bailey.
New Jersey.—Jonathan Dayton, John Condit.
Pennsylvania.—George Logan, Samuel Maclay.
Delaware.—William H. Wells, Samuel White.
Maryland.—Robert Wright, Samuel Smith.
Virginia.—Wilson C. Nicholas, John Taylor.
North Carolina.—Jesse Franklin, David Stone.
South Carolina.—Pierce Butler, Thomas Sumter.
Georgia.—A. Baldwin, James Jackson.
Tennessee.—William Cocke, Joseph Anderson.
Kentucky.—John Breckenridge, John Browne.
Ohio.—Thomas Worthington, John Smith.
Monday, October 17, 1803.
The first session of the eighth Congress, conformably to the Constitution of the United States, commenced at the city of Washington, agreeably to the Proclamation of the President of the United States for that purpose; and the Senate assembled on this day.
PRESENT:
Simeon Olcott and William Plumer, from New Hampshire;
Timothy Pickering, from Massachusetts;
James Hillhouse and Uriah Tracy, from Connecticut;
Christopher Ellery and Samuel I. Potter, from Rhode Island;
Stephen R. Bradley and Israel Smith, from Vermont;
De Witt Clinton and Theodorus Bailey, from New York;
Jonathan Dayton and John Condit, from New Jersey;
George Logan and Samuel Maclay, from Pennsylvania;
William Hill Wells and Samuel White, from Delaware;
Robert Wright and Samuel Smith, from Maryland;
John Taylor and Wilson Carey Nicholas, from Virginia;
John Brown and John Breckenridge, from Kentucky;
Jesse Franklin and David Stone, from North Carolina;
Joseph Anderson and William Cocke, from Tennessee;
Abraham Baldwin, from Georgia; and
Thomas Worthington, from Ohio.
The Vice President being absent, the Senate proceeded to the election of a President, pro tem., as the constitution provides, and the ballots being collected and counted, the whole number was found to be twenty-nine, of which fifteen make a majority. Mr. Brown had 24, Mr. Baldwin 2, Mr. Dayton 2, and Mr. Pickering 1.
Consequently, the Honorable John Brown was elected President of the Senate, pro tempore.
The credentials of the following Senators were severally read, to wit:
Of Joseph Anderson, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of Tennessee; of Theodorus Bailey, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of New York; of James Hillhouse, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of Connecticut; of Samuel Maclay, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of Pennsylvania; of Samuel I. Potter, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of Rhode Island; of Israel Smith, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of Vermont; of Samuel White, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of Delaware; for the term of six years from and after the third day of March last, respectively: also, of Thomas Worthington, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of Ohio; of John Condit, appointed a Senator by the Executive of the State of New Jersey; of John Taylor, appointed a Senator by the Executive of the State of Virginia, in place of S. T. Mason, deceased; of Timothy Pickering, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of Massachusetts, in the place of Dwight Foster, resigned; and the oath required by law was, by the President, administered to them respectively.
The oath was also administered to Samuel Smith, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of Maryland, for the term of six years from and after the third day of March last.
Ordered, That the Secretary wait on the President of the United States and acquaint him that a quorum of the Senate is assembled, and that, in the absence of the Vice President, they have elected the Hon. John Brown President of the Senate, pro tempore.
The Secretary was directed to give a similar notice to the House of Representatives.
Resolved, That James Mathers, Sergeant-at-Arms and Doorkeeper to the Senate, be, and he is hereby, authorized to employ one additional assistant and two horses, for the purpose of performing such services as are usually required by the Doorkeeper to the Senate; and that the sum of twenty-eight dollars be allowed him weekly for that purpose during the session, and for twenty days after.
Resolved, That each Senator be supplied during the present session with three such newspapers, printed in any of the States, as he may choose, provided that the same be furnished at the usual rate for the annual charge of such papers.
A message from the House of Representatives informed the Senate that a quorum of the House had assembled, and had elected the Hon. Nathaniel Macon their Speaker, and is ready to proceed to business.
Ordered, That Messrs. Clinton and Breckenridge be a committee on the part of the Senate, together with such committee as the House of Representatives may appoint on their part, to wait on the President of the United States, and notify him that a quorum of the two Houses is assembled, and ready to receive any communications that he may be pleased to make to them.
A message from the House of Representatives informed the Senate, that the House agree to the resolution of the Senate for the appointment of a joint committee to wait on the President of the United States, and have appointed a committee on their part.
On motion, Resolved, That two Chaplains, of different denominations, be appointed to Congress for the present session, one by each House, who shall interchange weekly.
Ordered, That the Secretary desire the concurrence of the House of Representatives in this resolution.
The Senate proceeded to the choice of a Chaplain on their part, and the ballots having been collected and counted, the whole number was twenty-eight; of which fifteen make a majority. Mr. Gantt had 15 votes, and Mr. M’Cormick 13.
Consequently, the Rev. Dr. Gantt was elected.
Mr. Clinton reported, from the joint committee appointed for the purpose, that they had waited on the President of the United States, and that he had acquainted them that he would make a communication to the two Houses, by message, immediately.
The following Message was received from the President of the United States:
To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States:
In calling you together, fellow-citizens, at an earlier day than was contemplated by the act of the last session of Congress, I have not been insensible to the personal inconveniences necessarily resulting from an unexpected change in your arrangements. But matters of great public concernment have rendered this call necessary, and the interest you feel in these will supersede, in your minds, all private considerations.
Congress witnessed, at their late session, the extraordinary agitation produced in the public mind by the suspension of our right of deposit at the port of New Orleans, no assignment of another place having been made according to treaty. They were sensible that the continuance of that privation would be more injurious to our nation than any consequences which could flow from any mode of redress; but, reposing just confidence in the good faith of the Government whose officer had committed the wrong, friendly and reasonable representations were resorted to, and the right of deposit was restored.
Previous, however, to this period, we had not been unaware of the danger to which our peace would be perpetually exposed whilst so important a key to the commerce of the western country remained under a foreign power. Difficulties too were presenting themselves as to the navigation of other streams, which, arising within our territories, pass through those adjacent. Propositions had therefore been authorized for obtaining, on fair conditions, the sovereignty of New Orleans, and of other possessions in that quarter, interesting to our quiet, to such extent as was deemed practicable; and the provisional appropriation of two millions of dollars, to be applied and accounted for by the President of the United States, intended as part of the price, was considered as conveying the sanction of Congress to the acquisition proposed.[1] The enlightened Government of France saw, with just discernment, the importance to both nations of such liberal arrangements as might best and permanently promote the peace, interests, and friendship of both; and the property and sovereignty of all Louisiana, which had been restored to them, has, on certain conditions, been transferred to the United States, by instruments bearing date the 30th of April last. When these shall have received the constitutional sanction of the Senate, they will, without delay, be communicated to the Representatives for the exercise of their functions, as to those conditions which are within the powers vested by the constitution in Congress. Whilst the property and sovereignty of the Mississippi and its waters secure an independent outlet for the produce of the Western States, and an uncontrolled navigation through their whole course, free from collision with other Powers, and the dangers to our peace from that source, the fertility of the country, its climate and extent, promise, in due season, important aids to our Treasury, an ample provision for our posterity, and a wide spread for the blessings of freedom and equal laws.
With the wisdom of Congress it will rest to take those ulterior measures which may be necessary for the immediate occupation and temporary government of the country; for its incorporation into our Union; for rendering the change of government a blessing to our newly adopted brethren; for securing to them the rights of conscience and property; for confirming to the Indian inhabitants their occupancy and self-government, establishing friendly and commercial relations with them, and for ascertaining the geography of the country acquired. Such materials for your information relative to its affairs in general, as the short space of time has permitted me to collect, will be laid before you when the subject shall be in a state for your consideration.
The small vessels authorized by Congress, with a view to the Mediterranean service, have been sent into that sea, and will be able more effectually to confine the Tripoline cruisers within their harbors, and supersede the necessity of convoy to our commerce in that quarter. They will sensibly lessen the expenses of that service the ensuing year.
A further knowledge of the ground in the north-eastern and north-western angles of the United States has evinced that the boundaries established by the treaty of Paris, between the British territories and ours in those parts, were too imperfectly described to be susceptible of execution. It has therefore been thought worthy of attention, for preserving and cherishing the harmony and useful intercourse subsisting between the two nations, to remove, by timely arrangements, what unfavorable incidents might otherwise render a ground of future misunderstanding. A convention has therefore been entered into, which provides for a practicable demarcation of those limits, to the satisfaction of both parties.
An account of the receipts and expenditures of the year ending 30th September last, with the estimates for the service of the ensuing year, will be laid before you by the Secretary of the Treasury, so soon as the receipts of the last quarter shall be returned from the more distant States. It is already ascertained that the amount paid into the Treasury for that year has been between eleven and twelve millions of dollars; and that the revenue accrued, during the same term, exceeds the sum counted on as sufficient for our current expenses, and to extinguish the public debt within the period heretofore proposed.
We have seen with sincere concern the flames of war lighted up again in Europe, and nations, with which we have the most friendly and useful relations, engaged in mutual destruction. While we regret the miseries in which we see others involved, let us bow with gratitude to that kind Providence, which, inspiring with wisdom and moderation our late Legislative Councils, while placed under the urgency of the greatest wrongs, guarded us from hastily entering into the sanguinary contest, and left us only to look on and to pity its ravages. These will be the heaviest on those immediately engaged. Yet the nations pursuing peace will not be exempt from all evil. In the course of this conflict let it be our endeavor, as it is our interest and desire, to cultivate the friendship of the belligerent nations by every act of justice, and of innocent kindness; to receive their armed vessels with hospitality from the distresses of the sea, but to administer the means of annoyance to none; to establish in our harbors such a police as may maintain law and order; to restrain our citizens from embarking individually in a war in which their country takes no part; to punish severely those persons, citizen or alien, who shall usurp the cover of our flag for vessels not entitled to it, infecting thereby with suspicion those of real Americans, and committing us into controversies for the redress of wrongs not our own; to exact from every nation the observance, towards our vessels and citizens, of those principles and practices which all civilized people acknowledge; to merit the character of a just nation, and maintain that of an independent one, preferring every consequence to insult and habitual wrong. Separated by a wide ocean from the nations of Europe, and from the political interests which entangle them together, with productions and wants which render our commerce and friendship useful to them, and theirs to us, it cannot be the interest of any to assail us, nor ours to disturb them. We should be most unwise, indeed, were we to cast away the singular blessings of the position in which nature has placed us, the opportunity she has endowed us with, of pursuing, at a distance from foreign contentions, the paths of industry, peace, and happiness; of cultivating general friendship, and of bringing collisions of interest to the umpire of reason rather than of force. How desirable, then, must it be, in a Government like ours, to see its citizens adopt, individually, the views, the interests, and the conduct, which their country should pursue, divesting themselves of those passions and partialities which tend to lessen useful friendships, and to embarrass and embroil us, in the calamitous scenes of Europe! Confident, fellow-citizens, that you will duly estimate the importance of neutral dispositions towards the observance of neutral conduct, that you will be sensible how much it is our duty to look on the bloody arena spread before us, with commiseration, indeed, but with no other wish than to see it closed, I am persuaded you will cordially cherish these dispositions in all discussions among yourselves, and in all communications with your constituents; and I anticipate, with satisfaction, the measures of wisdom which the great interests now committed to you will give you an opportunity of providing, and myself, that of approving and of carrying into execution with the fidelity I owe to my country.
TH. JEFFERSON.
Oct. 17, 1803.
The Message was read, and five hundred copies thereof ordered to be printed for the use of the Senate.
Tuesday, October 18.
Pierce Butler, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of South Carolina, for the unexpired time for which the late John Ewing Colhoun was elected to serve, produced his credentials, which were read, and the oath required by law was administered to him by the President.
James Jackson, from the State of Georgia, attended.
The credentials of Samuel Smith, a Senator from the State of Maryland, were read.
Friday, October 21.
John Quincy Adams, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of Massachusetts, for six years, commencing the 4th day of March last, produced his credentials, which were read; and the oath required by law was administered to him by the President.
Mr. Clinton, after a few prefatory observations on the necessity of designating the persons, severally, whom the people should wish to hold the offices of President and Vice-President of the United States, and stating that the State which he represented, as well as others in the Union, had, through the medium of their Legislatures, strongly recommended the adoption of the principle, laid on the table the following motion, which he read; and it was made the order of the day for the next day, and printed.
[The amendment proposed by Mr. Clinton grew out of the attempt in the House of Representatives to elect Mr. Burr President, and to prevent such attempt in future, in the event of an equality of votes between the two highest on the list, it required the electors to discriminate between the presidential and vice-presidential office, and name the persons voted for for each.]
Mr. Breckenridge gave notice, that he should, to-morrow, ask leave to bring in a bill to enable the President of the United States to take possession of the territories ceded by France to the United States, by the treaty concluded at Paris on the 30th of April last, and for other purposes.
Saturday, October 22.
The following Message was received from the President of the United States:
To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States:
In my communication to you of the 17th instant, I informed you that conventions had been entered into with the Government of France for the cession of Louisiana to the United States. These, with the advice and consent of the Senate, having now been ratified, and my ratification exchanged for that of the First Consul of France in due form, they are communicated to you for consideration in your Legislative capacity. You will observe that some important conditions cannot be carried into execution, but with the aid of the Legislature; and that time presses a decision on them without delay.
The ulterior provisions, also, suggested in the same communication, for the occupation and government of the country, will call for early attention. Such information relative to its government as time and distance have permitted me to obtain, will be ready to be laid before you in a few days. But, as permanent arrangements for this object may require time and deliberation, it is for your consideration whether you will not forthwith make such temporary provisions for the preservation, in the meanwhile, of order and tranquillity in the country, as the case may require.
TH. JEFFERSON.
Oct. 21, 1803.
The Message was read, and, together with the papers therein referred to, ordered to lie for consideration.
Agreeably to notice given yesterday, Mr. Breckenridge had leave to bring in a bill to enable the President of the United States to take possession of the territories ceded by France to the United States, by the treaty concluded at Paris on the 30th of April last, and for other purposes; which bill was read, and ordered to the second reading. The bill is in the following words:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled, That the President of the United States be, and he is hereby, authorized to take possession of and occupy the territories ceded by France to the United States by the treaty concluded at Paris, on the 30th day of April last, between the two nations; and that he may for that purpose, and in order to maintain in the said territories the authority of the United States, employ any part of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the force authorized by an act passed the 3d day of March last, entitled “An act directing a detachment from the militia of the United States, and for erecting certain arsenals,” which he may deem necessary: And so much of the sum appropriated by the said act as may be necessary is hereby appropriated for the purpose of carrying this act into effect; to be applied under the direction of the President of the United States.
Sec 2.. And be it further enacted, That until Congress shall have made provision for the temporary government of the said territories, all the military, civil, and judicial powers exercised by the officers of the existing government of the same, shall be vested in such person or persons, and shall be exercised by and in such manner, as the President of the United States shall direct.
Amendment to the Constitution.
The order of the day being called for on Mr. Clinton’s motion of yesterday,
Mr. Clinton said that, as the resolution was but now printed, and laid before the Senate, it might be proper to refer it to Monday for further consideration, but if it was requisite, by the rules of the Senate, that the resolution must have three separate readings, and on three different days, he should call for a second reading on Saturday, that it might be in readiness for a third reading on Monday, and be ultimately acted upon that day, as the Legislatures of Tennessee and Vermont were in session, and probably must be at the trouble of an extra session to act upon the amendment, unless it could be sent to them before they separated.
Mr. Brown, of Kentucky, the President pro tem. of the Senate, said the written rule of the Senate determined that bills should have three readings, and on different days, without unanimous consent to the contrary; but the resolutions were not included; and that he should be glad of the opinion of the Senate upon the subject.
Mr. Tracy of Connecticut said, that there was no written rule which would reach the case, but the Vice President, upon the ground that they came within the reason of the rule, had determined that all resolutions which required a joint vote of both Houses to give them efficacy, should take the same course as bills, and have three readings, and on different days, before a final vote; and as this resolution went to the alteration of the supreme law of the land, as the constitution was declared to be, he thought it highly requisite to give the deliberations all the solemnity which was required in passing bills.
Mr. Bradley, of Vermont, then offered two amendments to the resolution; one went to the form only, and the other makes a majority of votes of the electors requisite for the choice of Vice President, and in case such majority is not obtained, places the choice of Vice President in the Senate.
Mr. Butler, of South Carolina, proposed an amendment by adding a new clause, in substance: “That at the next election of President, no person should be eligible who had served more than eight years, and, in all future elections, no person should be eligible more than four years in any period of eight years.”
Mr. Dayton, of New Jersey, moved to refer the resolution, with all the amendments, to a select committee; he said that it was a subject far too important to be carried in this way. There has been no time to consider it. Something more was due in this instance, than, as it were, offering it one moment, and deciding upon it the next.
Mr. Hillhouse, of Connecticut, supported the motion for referring the question to a select committee. He was opposed to entering now upon the business. Why should this subject be hurried? Why not have taken it up last session? We might in that case have had time to consider it. He had not often known a resolution, of the nature of that before the House, disposed of otherwise, in the first instance, than being referred to a committee. He never knew it refused. In a great and free empire, like the United States, this question is of the highest importance—no less than the choice of the First Magistrate. It is laid upon the table to-day, and we are to determine upon it to-morrow. He hoped not, and as he never knew it refused before, he hoped that it would not be adopted now. He wished it to be referred to a select committee; that it should there be examined, line by line, letter by letter. In the present mode of doing business, it is impossible to act with accuracy. He again trusted and hoped that it would be referred to a select committee.
Mr. Jackson, of Georgia, wished the business to be immediately proceeded upon. He was an admirer of Mr. Jefferson; he was happy, and he trusted all were happy, while he was President. But, continued Mr. J., we know not who may follow him; we may have a Buonaparte, or one who will be equally obnoxious to the people. He hoped the motions would be incorporated and immediately come before the House.
Mr. Wright, of Maryland, spoke for some time against the resolution going to a committee. He was against the amendment proposed by Mr. Butler. A committee might report when they pleased. He therefore thought it necessary to proceed with the question immediately.
Mr. Smith, of Maryland, wished to have some principles fixed. If the motion and amendments were to go to a committee, he would not tack them together, for by this mode they might both be lost. It has been said that the subject might have been entered into last session. There was then a multiplicity of business of importance before the House, yet this subject might have been entered into. As it stands, this is the proper place to make objections. The mover of the resolution does not say that it shall be determined on Monday; he means that it shall then be before the whole House.
After some desultory observations, in which one member observed that he thought it disorderly, the question on Mr. Butler’s amendment was put—ayes 16, nays 15.
A committee was then chosen for the purpose, namely:
Mr. Butler, Mr. Bradley, Mr. Clinton, Mr. Nicholas, and Mr. Smith.
Monday, October 24.
Louisiana Cession.
The bill to enable the President of the United States to take possession of the territories ceded by France to the United States, by the treaty concluded at Paris on the 30th of April last, and for other purposes, was read the second time and referred to Messrs. Breckenridge, Dayton, and Baldwin, to consider and report thereon.
Amendment to the Constitution.
Mr. Butler, from the committee, to whom was referred, on the 22d inst., the motion for an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, made report, which was read.
Mr. Dayton moved to strike out all which respected the appointment of a Vice President.
He said the great inducements of the framers of the constitution to admit the office of Vice President was, that, by the mode of choice, the best and most respectable man should be designated; and that the electors of each State should vote for one person at least, living in a different State from themselves; and if the substance of the amendment was adopted, he thought the office had better be abolished. Jealousies were natural between President and Vice President; no heir apparent ever loved the person on the throne. With this resolution for an amendment to the constitution we were left with all the inconveniencies, without a single advantage from the office of Vice President.
Mr. Clinton.—The obvious intention of the amendment proposed by the gentleman from New Jersey, is to put off or get rid of the main question. It would more comport with the candor of the gentleman to meet the question fairly. Can the gentleman suppose that the electors will not vote for a man of respectability for Vice President? True, the qualifications are distinct, and ought not to be confounded; this will stave off the question till the Legislatures of the States of Tennessee and Vermont are out of session, and the object must be very obvious.
Mr. Dayton.—The custom of the gentleman from New York has been of late to arraign motives instead of meeting arguments; on Saturday he accused me of wishing to procrastinate, and now the same is repeated.
The reasons of erecting the office are frustrated by the amendment to the constitution now proposed; it will be preferable, therefore, to abolish the office.
Mr. Clinton.—The charge of the gentleman from New Jersey is totally unfounded that I arraign motives, and do not meet arguments. On Saturday the gentleman accused me of precipitation; I am not in the habit of arraigning motives, as this Senate can witness, and the charge is totally untrue.
Mr. Nicholas.—To secure the United States from the dangers which existed during the last choice of President, the present resolution was introduced. It was impossible to act upon, or pass the amendment offered by the member from New Jersey, with a full view of all its bearings at this time. It ought not to stand in the way of the resolution reported by the committee, for two-thirds or three-quarters of the State Legislatures would be in session in two or three months; the Senate had, therefore, better not admit the amendment, even if convinced that it was correct, because it might jeopardize the main amendment of discriminating.
Mr. Butler moved a postponement until Wednesday, because the amendment was important, and he had not had sufficient time to make up his mind.
Mr. Worthington said the same.
This motion was seconded.
The question for postponement was taken, and lost—ayes 15, noes 16.
The amendment of Mr. Dayton was now before the Senate.
A motion for adjournment was now made and carried—ayes 16, noes 15.
Tuesday, October 25.
John Smith, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of Ohio, attended and produced his credentials, which were read, and the oath required by law was administered to him by the President.
Mr. Breckenridge, from the committee to whom was referred, on the 24th instant, the bill to enable the President of the United States to take possession of the territories ceded by France to the United States, by the treaty concluded at Paris on the 30th of April last, and for other purposes, reported it without amendment.
Ordered, That this bill pass to a third reading.
Wednesday, October 26.
Louisiana Treaty.
The bill to enable the President of the United States to take possession of the territories ceded by France to the United States, by the treaty concluded at Paris on the 30th of April last, and for other purposes, was read the third time. And, on the question, Shall this bill pass? it was determined in the affirmative—yeas 26, nays 6, as follows:
Yeas.—Messrs. Anderson, Bailey, Baldwin, Bradley, Breckenridge, Brown, Butler, Cocke, Condit, Dayton, Ellery, Franklin, Jackson, Logan, Maclay, Nicholas, Potter, I. Smith, J. Smith, S. Smith, Stone, Taylor, Wells, White, Worthington, and Wright.
Nays.—Messrs. Adams, Hillhouse, Olcott, Pickering, Plumer, and Tracy.[2]
Saturday, October 29.
Mr. Breckenridge, from the committee of conference on the amendments of the House of Representatives to the bill, entitled “An act to enable the President of the United States to take possession of the territories ceded by France to the United States, by the treaty concluded at Paris on the 30th of April last, and for the temporary government thereof,” reported, that the Senate recede from their disagreement to the amendments, and agree thereto, with amendments; and a division of the report was called for.
And, on the question to adopt the report, so far as that the Senate recede from their disagreement to the amendments of the House of Representatives, it passed in the affirmative.
And, on the question to adopt the remaining division of the report, it passed in the negative.
So it was Resolved, That the Senate recede from their disagreement to the amendments of the House of Representatives to the said bill, and agree thereto.[3]
Monday, October 31.
On motion, it was,
Resolved, unanimously, That the members of the Senate, from a sincere desire of showing every mark of respect due to the memory of the Hon. Stevens Thompson Mason, deceased, late a member thereof, will go into mourning for him one month, by the usual mode of wearing a crape around the left arm.[4]
Wednesday, November 2.
Louisiana Treaty.
The Senate resumed the second reading of the bill, entitled “An act authorizing the creation of a stock to the amount of eleven millions two hundred and fifty thousand dollars, for the purpose of carrying into effect the convention of the 30th of April, 1803, between the United States of America and the French Republic, and making provision for the payment of the same;” and having amended the bill—
On the question, Shall the bill pass?
Mr. White rose and made the following remarks:
Mr. President, by the provisions of the bill before us, and which are thus far in conformity with the words of the treaty, we have until three months after the exchange of ratifications and the delivery of possession to pay this money in. Where, then, is the necessity for such haste on this subject? It seems to me to be anticipating our business unnecessarily, and perhaps unwisely; it is showing on our part a degree of anxiety that may be taken advantage of and operate to our injury, and that may serve to retard the accomplishment of the very object that gentlemen seem to have so much at heart. It is not at present altogether certain that we shall ever have occasion to use this stock, and it will be time enough to provide it when the occasion arises, when we see ourselves in the undisturbed possession of this mighty boon, or wherefore are we allowed these three months’ credit after the delivery of possession? The ratifications have been already exchanged; the French officer who is to make the cession is said to be at New Orleans, and previous to the adjournment of Congress we shall know with certainty whether the First Consul will or can carry this treaty faithfully into operation. We have already passed a bill authorizing the President to take possession, for which I voted, and it will be time enough to create this stock and to make the other necessary arrangements when we find ourselves in possession of the territory, or when we ascertain with certainty that it will be given to us.
But, Mr. President, it is now a well-known fact, that Spain considers herself injured by this treaty, and if it should be in her power to prevent it, will not agree to the cession of New Orleans and Louisiana to the United States. She considers herself absolved from her contract with France, in consequence of the latter having neglected to comply with certain stipulations in the Treaty of St. Ildefonso, to be performed on her part, and of having violated her engagement never to transfer this country into other hands. Gentlemen may say this money is to be paid upon the responsibility of the President of the United States, and not until after the delivery of possession to us of the territory; but why cast from ourselves all the responsibility upon this subject, and impose the whole weight upon the President, which may hereafter prove dangerous and embarrassing to him? Why make the President the sole and absolute judge of what shall be a faithful delivery of possession under the treaty? What he may think a delivery of possession sufficient to justify the payment of this money, we might not; and I have no hesitation in saying that if, in acquiring this territory under the treaty, we have to fire a single musket, to charge a bayonet, or to lose a drop of blood, it will not be such a cession on the part of France as should justify to the people of this country the payment of any, and much less so enormous a sum of money. What would the case be, sir? It would be buying of France authority to make war upon Spain; it would be giving the First Consul fifteen millions of dollars to stand aloof until we can settle our differences with His Catholic Majesty. Would honorable gentlemen submit to the degradation of purchasing even his neutrality at so inconvenient a price? We are told that there is in the hands of the French Prefect at New Orleans a royal order of His Catholic Majesty, founded upon the Treaty of St. Ildefonso, for the delivery of possession of this territory to France; but which has never been done—the precedent conditions not having been performed on the part of France. This royal order, it is probable, will be handed over to our Commissioner, or to whoever may be sent down to receive possession. We may then be told that we have the right of France, as she acquired it from Spain, which is all she is bound by her treaty to transfer to us; we may be shown the Spaniards, who yet claim to be the rightful owners of the country, and be told that we have the permission of the First Consul to subdue or drive them out, and, according to the words of the treaty, to take possession. Of our capacity to do so I have no doubt; but this we could have done, sir, six months ago, and with one-sixth of fifteen millions of dollars, when they had wantonly violated the sacred obligations of a treaty, had insulted our Government, and prostrated all the commerce of our Western country. Then we had, indeed, a just cause for chastising them; the laws of nations and of honor authorized it, and all the world would have applauded our conduct. And it is well known that if France had been so disposed she could not have brought a single man or ship to their relief; before the news could have reached Europe, she was blockaded in her own ports by the British fleet. But that time was permitted to go by unimproved, and instead of regretting the past, let us provide for the future.
Admitting then, Mr. President, that His Catholic Majesty is hostile to the cession of this territory to the United States, and no honorable gentleman will deny it, what reasons have we to suppose that the French Prefect, provided the Spaniards should interfere, can give to us peaceable possession of the country? He is acknowledged there in no public character, is clothed with no authority, nor has he a single soldier to enforce his orders. I speak now, sir, from mere probabilities. I wish not to be understood as predicting that the French will not cede to us the actual and quiet possession of the territory. I hope to God they may, for possession of it we must have—I mean of New Orleans, and of such other positions on the Mississippi as may be necessary to secure to us for ever the complete and uninterrupted navigation of that river. This I have ever been in favor of; I think it essential to the peace of the United States, and to the prosperity of our Western country. But as to Louisiana, this new, immense, unbounded world, if it should ever be incorporated into this Union, which I have no idea can be done but by altering the constitution, I believe it will be the greatest curse that could at present befall us; it may be productive of innumerable evils, and especially of one that I fear even to look upon. Gentlemen on all sides, with very few exceptions, agree that the settlement of this country will be highly injurious and dangerous to the United States; but as to what has been suggested of removing the Creeks and other nations of Indians from the eastern to the western banks of the Mississippi, and of making the fertile regions of Louisiana a howling wilderness, never to be trodden by the foot of civilized man, it is impracticable. The gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Cocke) has shown his usual candor on this subject, and I believe with him, to use his strong language, that you had as well pretend to inhibit the fish from swimming in the sea as to prevent the population of that country after its sovereignty shall become ours. To every man acquainted with the adventurous, roving, and enterprising temper of our people, and with the manner in which our Western country has been settled, such an idea must be chimerical. The inducements will be so strong that it will be impossible to restrain our citizens from crossing the river. Louisiana must and will become settled, if we hold it, and with the very population that would otherwise occupy part of our present territory. Thus our citizens will be removed to the immense distance of two or three thousand miles from the capital of the Union, where they will scarcely ever feel the rays of the General Government; their affections will become alienated; they will gradually begin to view us as strangers; they will form other commercial connections, and our interests will become distinct.
These, with other causes that human wisdom may not now foresee, will in time effect a separation, and I fear our bounds will be fixed nearer to our houses than the waters of the Mississippi. We have already territory enough, and when I contemplate the evils that may arise to these States, from this intended incorporation of Louisiana into the Union, I would rather see it given to France, to Spain, or to any other nation of the earth, upon the mere condition that no citizen of the United States should ever settle within its limits, than to see the territory sold for a hundred millions of dollars, and we retain the sovereignty. But however dangerous the possession of Louisiana might prove to us, I do not presume to say that the retention of it would not have been very convenient to France, and we know that at the time of the mission of Mr. Monroe, our Administration had never thought of the purchase of Louisiana, and that nothing short of the fullest conviction on the part of the First Consul that he was on the very eve of a war with England; that this being the most defenceless point of his possessions, if such they could be called, was the one at which the British would first strike, and that it must inevitably fall into their hands, could ever have induced his pride and ambition to make the sale. He judged wisely, that he had better sell it for as much as he could get than lose it entirely. And I do say that under existing circumstances, even supposing that this extent of territory was a desirable acquisition, fifteen millions of dollars was a most enormous sum to give. Our Commissioners were negotiating in Paris—they must have known the relative situation of France and England—they must have known at the moment that a war was unavoidable between the two countries, and they knew the pecuniary necessities of France and the naval power of Great Britain. These imperious circumstances should have been turned to our advantage, and if we were to purchase, should have lessened the consideration. Viewing, Mr. President, this subject in any point of light—either as it regards the territory purchased, the high consideration to be given, the contract itself, or any of the circumstances attending it, I see no necessity for precipitating the passage of this bill; and if this motion for postponement should fail, and the question on the final passage of the bill be taken now, I shall certainly vote against it.
The further consideration of the bill was postponed until to-morrow.
Thursday, November 3.
Louisiana Treaty.
The bill, entitled “An act authorizing the creation of a stock to the amount of eleven millions two hundred and fifty thousand dollars, for the purpose of carrying into effect the Convention of the 30th of April, 1803, between the United States of America and the French Republic, and making provision for the payment of the same,” was read the third time; and, having been amended, on the question, Shall this bill pass as amended?
Mr. Wells said: Mr. President, having always held to the opinion that, when a treaty was duly made under the constituted authorities of the United States, Congress was bound to pass the laws necessary to carry it into effect; and as the vote which I am about to give may not at first seem to conform itself to this opinion, I feel an obligation imposed upon me to state, in as concise a manner as I can, the reasons why I withhold my assent from the passage of this bill.
There are two acts necessary to be performed to carry the present treaty into effect—one by the French Government, the other by our own. They are to deliver us a fair and effectual possession of the ceded territory; and then, and not till then, are we to pay the purchase money. We have already authorized the President to receive possession. This co-operation on our part was requisite to enable the French to comply with the stipulation they had made; they could not deliver unless somebody was appointed to receive. In this view of the subject, the question which presents itself to my mind is, who shall judge whether the French Government does, or does not, faithfully comply with the previous condition? The bill on your table gives to the President this power. I am for our retaining and exercising it ourselves. I may be asked, why not delegate this power to the President? Sir, I answer by inquiring why we should delegate it? To us it properly belongs; and, unless some advantage will be derived to the United States, it shall not be transferred with my consent. Congress will be in session at the time that the delivery of the ceded territory takes place; and if we should then be satisfied that the French have executed with fidelity that part of the treaty which is incumbent upon them first to perform, I pledge myself to vote for the payment of the purchase money. This appears to me, arguing upon general principles, to be the course which ought to be pursued, even supposing there were attending this case no particular difficulties. But in this special case are there not among the archives of the Senate sufficient documents, and which have been withheld from the House of Representatives, to justify an apprehension that the French Government was not invested with the capacity to convey this property to us, and that we shall not receive that kind of possession which is stipulated for by the treaty? I am not permitted, by the order of this body, to make any other than this general reference to those documents. Suffice it to say that they have strongly impressed me with an opinion that, even if possession is rendered to us, the territory will come into our hands without any title to justify our holding it.
Mr. Jackson.—Mr. President: The honorable gentleman (Mr. Wells) has said that the French have no title, and, having no title herself, we can derive none from her. Is not, I ask, the King of Spain’s proclamation, declaring the cession of Louisiana to France, and his orders to his Governor and officers to deliver it to France, a title? Do nations give any other? I believe the honorable gentleman can find no solitary instance of feofment or conveyance between States. The treaty of St. Ildefonso was the groundwork of the cession, and whatever might have been the terms to be performed by France, the King of Spain’s proclamation and orders have declared to all the world that they were complied with. The honorable gentleman, however, insists that there is no consideration expressed in the treaty, and therefore it must be void; if the honorable gentleman will but look attentively at the ninth article, I am persuaded he will perceive one: the conventions are made part of the treaty; they are declared to have execution in the same manner, as if they had been inserted in the treaty; they are to be ratified in the same form, and at the same time, so that the one shall not be distinct from the other. What inference can possibly be drawn, but that the payments to be made by them were full consideration for Louisiana? But the honorable gentleman lays stress on that part of the treaty which declares that “the First Consul of the French Republic, desiring to give to the United States a strong proof of his friendship, doth hereby cede to the United States the territory,” &c.; inferring from thence that our title rests on the friendship of Buonaparte alone. Sir, let my opinion of the present Government of France be what it may, and I confess it is not very favorable, Buonaparte, by the consent of the nation, is placed at its head; he is the organ through which the will of the nation is expressed, and is and must be respected as such by all other Powers. No nation has a right to interfere with the rule or police of another. It is enough that the nation wills it, and Buonaparte’s act is the act of the whole nation, which cannot recall it, even if Buonaparte should cease to govern and another form of government be adopted. Last session we were impressed with the necessity of taking immediate possession of the island of New Orleans in the face of two nations, and now we entertain doubts if we can combat the weakest of those Powers; and we are further told we are going to sacrifice the immense sum of fifteen millions of dollars, and have to go to war with Spain for the country afterwards; when, last session, war was to take place at all events, and no costs were equal to the object. Gentlemen seem to be displeased, because we have procured it peaceably, and at probably ten times less expense than it would have cost us had we taken forcible possession of New Orleans alone, which, I am persuaded, would have involved us in a war which would have saddled us with a debt of from one to two hundred millions, and perhaps have lost New Orleans, and the right of deposit, after all. I again repeat, sir, that I do not believe that Spain will venture war with the United States. I believe she dare not; if she does, she will pay the costs. The Floridas will be immediately ours; they will almost take themselves. The inhabitants pant for the blessings of your equal and wise Government; they ardently long to become a part of the United States. An officer, duly authorized, and armed with the bare proclamation of the President, would go near to take them; the inhabitants by hundreds would flock to his standard, the very Spanish force itself would assist in their reduction; it is composed principally of the Irish brigade and Creoles—the former disaffected, and the latter the dregs of mankind. With two or three squadrons of dragoons, and the same number of companies of infantry, not a doubt ought to exist of the total conquest of East Florida by an officer of tolerable talents. Exclusive, however, of the loss of the Floridas, to use the language of a late member of Congress, the road to Mexico is now open to us, which, if Spain acts in an amicable way, I wish may, and hope will, be shut, as respects the United States, for ever. For these reasons, I think, sir, Spain will avoid a war, in which she has nothing to gain and every thing to lose.
Mr. President, the honorable gentleman appears to be extremely apprehensive of vesting the powers delegated by the bill, now on its passage, in the President, and wishes to retain it in the Legislature. Is this a Legislative or an Executive business? Assuredly, in my mind, of the latter nature. The President gave instructions for, and, with our consent, ratified the treaty. We have given him the power to take possession, which his officers are at this moment doing; and surely, as the ostensible party, the representative of the sovereignty to whom France will alone look, he ought to possess the power of fulfilling our part of the contract. Gentlemen, indeed, had doubted, on a former occasion, the propriety of giving the President the power of taking possession and organizing a temporary government, which every inferior officer, in case of conquest or cession, from the general to the subaltern, if commanding, has a right to do; but I little expected these doubts after we had gone so far. For my part, sir, I have none of those fears. I believe the President will be as cautious as ourselves, and the bill is as carefully worded as possible; for the money is not to be paid until after Louisiana shall be placed in our possession.
Mr. Wright.—Mr. President, I presumed from the observations of the honorable gentleman from Delaware, (Mr. Wells,) that he had not minutely attended to the provisions of this bill, on which the transfer of this stock is made expressly to depend. The treaty has in the most guarded manner secured us in the possession of the ceded territory, as a condition precedent to the payment of the purchase money, and this bill has expressly provided that no part of the stock shall be transferred till the possession stipulated by the treaty shall have been obtained. Not such a possession as the gentleman has said the President may be satisfied with—“the delivery of a twig and turf, or the knocker of a door.” The treaty has defined the possession intended: it is the possession of Louisiana, the island and city of New Orleans, with the forts and arsenals, the troops having been withdrawn from thence. But, sir, from his remarks, it would seem that his objections to this bill had been predicated on his want of confidence in the Executive, as he has expressed his fears that the stock would be transferred, before the prerequisite conditions had been performed. He says, we ought to be satisfied that the possession stipulated by the treaty shall have been delivered up before we pass this bill. Has he forgot that, by the constitution, the President is to superintend the execution of the law? Or has he forgot that treaties are the supreme law of the land? Or why, while he professes to respect this constitution, does he oppose the commission of the execution of this law to that organ of the Government to which it has been assigned by the constitution? Why, I ask, does he distrust the President? Has he not been, throughout the whole of this business, very much alive to the peaceful acquisition of this immense territory, and the invaluable waters of the Mississippi? a property which, but the other day, we were told was all-important, and so necessary to our political existence that if it was not obtained the Western people would sever themselves from the Union. This property, for which countless millions were then proposed to be expended, and the best blood of our citizens to be shed, and which then was to be had at all hazards, per fas aut per nefas, seems now to have lost its worth, and it would seem as if some gentlemen could not be satisfied with the purchase, because our title was not recorded in the blood of its inhabitants. But that this is not the wish of the American people, has been unequivocally declared by their immediate representatives in Congress, as well as by this House, who had each expressed their approbation of the peaceful title we had acquired, by majorities I thought not to be misunderstood. And the gentleman, although he voted for the ratification of the treaty, now again calls on us to investigate the title. It is certainly too late.
Mr. Pickering said, if he entertained the opinion just now expressed by the gentleman from Delaware, (Mr. Wells,) of the binding force of all treaties made by the President and Senate, he should think it to be his duty to vote for the bill now under consideration. “The constitution, and the laws of the United States made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land.”—But a treaty to be thus obligatory, must not contravene the constitution, nor contain any stipulations which transcend the powers therein given to the President and Senate. The treaty between the United States and the French Republic, professing to cede Louisiana to the United States, appeared to him to contain such an exceptionable stipulation—a stipulation which cannot be executed by any authority now existing. It is declared in the third article, that “the inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be incorporated in the Union of the United States.” But neither the President and Senate, nor the President and Congress, are competent to such an act of incorporation. He believed that our Administration admitted that this incorporation could not be effected without an amendment of the constitution; and he conceived that this necessary amendment could not be made in the ordinary mode by the concurrence of two-thirds of both Houses of Congress, and the ratification by the Legislatures of three-fourths of the several States. He believed the assent of each individual State to be necessary for the admission of a foreign country as an associate in the Union; in like manner as in a commercial house, the consent of each member would be necessary to admit a new partner into the company; and whether the assent of every State to such an indispensable amendment were attainable, was uncertain. But the articles of a treaty were necessarily related to each other; the stipulation in one article being the consideration for another. If, therefore, in respect to the Louisiana Treaty, the United States fail to execute, and within a reasonable time, the engagement in the third article, (to incorporate that territory into the Union,) the French Government will have a right to declare the whole treaty void. We must then abandon the country, or go to war to maintain our possession. But it was to prevent war that the pacific measures of the last winter were adopted—they were to “lay the foundation for future peace.”
Mr. P. had never doubted the right of the United States to acquire new territory, either by purchase or by conquest, and to govern the territory so acquired as a dependent province; and in this way might Louisiana have become a territory of the United States, and have received a form of government infinitely preferable to that to which its inhabitants are now subject.
Mr. Dayton.—As the honorable gentleman from Massachusetts has quoted what was suggested by me in a former debate, to deduce from it an inference which the information I gave can by no means warrant, I must be allowed the liberty of correcting him. When I said that there existed an essential difference between the French and Spanish officers at New Orleans as to the real boundaries of the province of Louisiana, I did not mean to insinuate that this disagreement extended so far as an opposition to the French taking possession. It was a question of limits only, varying, however, so much in extent as would have produced a serious altercation between those two countries, although closely allied.
The Spanish Governor had taken it upon himself to proclaim that the province lately ceded and about to be given over to France would be confined on the east of the Mississippi to the river Iberville, and the lakes Maurepas and Pontchartrain, or in other words to the island of New Orleans; but the French Prefect on the contrary declared that he neither had nor would give his assent to the establishment of those limits, which would be regarded no longer than until the arrival of their troops.
The same gentleman (Mr. Pickering) has said that the advocates of this measure seem to rely much more upon their power than upon their right, and in this assertion I am compelled to say that he has done us very great injustice. The title of the French is founded upon the often quoted treaty of St Ildefonso, confirmed by the royal order signed by the King of Spain himself, so lately as the 15th October, 1802, directing the delivery of the “colony of Louisiana and its dependencies as well as of the city and island of New Orleans, without any exception, to General Victor, or other officer duly authorized by that Republic to take charge of the said delivery.”
When at New Orleans in July last, I obtained from the best source a translated copy of that royal order, and can aver that it absolutely directs possession to be given without reservation or condition. It is not, and cannot be, denied that the lately ratified treaty of Paris transfers to us completely all the title acquired by France in virtue of the first treaty and order alluded to. We have, then, most incontestably, the right of possession, and our object now is, by passing the bill before us to obtain the possession itself, which we can certainly never effect, consistently with good faith, if the reasonings and objections of my honorable friends from Delaware and Massachusetts should prevail. We are asked by the same gentlemen what will be the consequence if it shall appear that the royal order has been revoked? I answer, first, that it is not in the least degree probable, for neither of them pretend to have heard of such revocation, nor is it intimated in the confidential communications before the Senate. But admitting for argument’s sake that it were revoked, of what avail could it be against a third party, who had in the mean time become a bona fide purchaser? Shall one nation give to another a written, formal evidence of transfer of territory, and revoke it at pleasure, especially after a third shall have been tempted and induced by that very evidence of title to contract for the purchase of it? Would an act so fraudulent be countenanced between individuals in a court of equity? Could it be justified between nations in a high court of honor? The honorable gentleman from Delaware has taken a more delicate ground of objection. He has insinuated that there exists in the knowledge of the Senate, the evidence of a serious opposition to our possessing that country, which, if known to the other branch of the Legislature, would probably have defeated this bill in its progress there. Allusions artfully made in this manner to documents communicated under the injunction of secrecy, place us in an embarrassing situation. Forbidden by our rules to expose the papers referred to, even in argument, we can only declare what impressions they have made upon ourselves. Every Senator must understand him, every one must have heard and read, and weighed deliberately the contents of those documents, and, for myself, I am free to avow my belief, that, if known to every member of the other House, they would have had no effect against this bill, but would rather have quickened and ensured its progress, for such is the influence they have upon me.
Mr. Taylor.—There have been, Mr. President, two objections made against the treaty; one that the United States cannot constitutionally acquire territory; the other, that the treaty stipulates for the admission of a new State into the Union; a stipulation which the treaty-making power is unable to comply with. To these objections I shall endeavor to give answers not heretofore urged.
Before a confederation, each State in the Union possessed a right, as attached to sovereignty, of acquiring territory, by war, purchase, or treaty. This right must be either still possessed, or forbidden both to each State and to the General Government, or transferred to the General Government. It is not possessed by the States separately, because war and compacts with foreign powers and with each other are prohibited to a separate State; and no other means of acquiring territory exist. By depriving every State of the means of exercising the right of acquiring territory, the constitution has deprived each separate State of the right itself. Neither the means nor the right of acquiring territory are forbidden to the United States; on the contrary, in the fourth article of the constitution, Congress is empowered “to dispose of and regulate the territory belonging to the United States.” This recognizes the right of the United States to hold territory. The means of acquiring territory consist of war and compact; both are expressly surrendered to Congress and forbidden to the several States; and no right in a separate State to hold territory without its limits is recognized by the constitution, nor any mode of effecting it possible, consistent with it. The means of acquiring and the right of holding territory, being both given to the United States, and prohibited to each State, it follows that these attributes of sovereignty once held by each State are thus transferred to the United States; and that, if the means of acquiring and the right of holding, are equivalent to the right of acquiring territory, then this right merged from the separate States to the United States, as indispensably annexed to the treaty-making power, and the power of making war; or, indeed, is literally given to the General Government by the constitution.
Having proved, sir, that the United States may constitutionally acquire, hold, dispose of, and regulate territory, the other objection to be considered is, whether the third article of the treaty does stipulate that Louisiana shall be erected into a State? It is conceded that the treaty-making power cannot, by treaty, erect a new State, however they may stipulate for it. I premise, that in the construction of this article, it is proper to recollect that the negotiators must be supposed to have understood our constitution. It became very particularly their duty to do so, because, in this article itself, they have recited “the principles of the constitution” as their guide. Hence, it is obvious, they did not intend to infringe, but to adhere to those principles; and therefore, if the article will admit of a construction consistent with this presumable knowledge and intention of the negotiators, the probability of its accuracy will be greater than one formed in a supposition that the negotiators were either ignorant of that which they ought to have known, or that they fraudulently professed a purpose which they really intended to defeat. The following construction is reconcilable with what the negotiators ought to have known, and with what they professed to intend.
Recollect, sir, that it has been proved that the United States may acquire territory. Territory, so acquired, becomes from the acquisition itself a portion of the territories of the United States, or may be united with their territories without being erected into a State. A union of territory is one thing; of States, another. Both are exemplified by an actual existence. The United States possess territory, comprised in the union of territory, and not in the union of States. Congress is empowered to regulate or dispose of territorial sections of the Union, and have exercised the power; but it is not empowered to regulate or dispose of State sections of the Union. The citizens of these territorial sections are citizens of the United States, and they have all the rights of citizens of the United States; but such rights do not include those political rights arising from State compacts or governments, which are dissimilar in different States. Supposing the General Government or treaty-making power have no right to add or unite States and State citizens to the Union, yet they have a power of adding or uniting to it territory and territorial citizens of the United States.
The territory is ceded by the first article of the treaty. It will no longer be denied that the United States may constitutionally acquire territory. The third article declares that “the inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be incorporated in the Union of the United States.” And these words are said to require the territory to be erected into a State. This they do not express, and the words are literally satisfied by incorporating them into the Union as a Territory, and not as a State. The constitution recognizes and the practice warrants an incorporation of a Territory and its inhabitants into the Union, without admitting either as a State. And this construction of the first member of the article is necessary to shield its two other members from a charge of surplusage, and even absurdity. For if the words “the inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be incorporated in the Union of the United States” intended that Louisiana and its inhabitants should become a State in the Union of States, there existed no reason for proceeding to stipulate that these same inhabitants should be made “citizens as soon as possible, according to the principles of the Federal Constitution.” Their admission into the Union of States would have made them citizens of the United States. Is it not then absurd to suppose that the first member of this third article intended to admit Louisiana into the Union as a State, which would instantly entitle the inhabitants to the benefit of the article of the constitution declaring, that “the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States,” and yet to have gone on to stipulate for citizenship, under the limitation “as soon as possible, according to the principles of the Federal Constitution,” after it had been bestowed without limitation? Again, the concluding member of the article is to bestow “protection in the mean time;” incorporating this stipulation, and the stipulation for citizenship, with the construction which accuses the treaty of unconstitutionality, the article altogether must be understood thus: “The inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be taken into the Union of States, which will instantly give them all the rights of citizenship, after which they shall be made citizens as soon as possible; and after they are taken into the Union of States, they shall be protected in the interim between becoming a State in the Union, and being made citizens, in their liberty, property, and religion.”
By supposing the first member of the article to require that the inhabitants and their territory shall be incorporated in the Union, in the known and recognized political character of a Territory, these inconsistencies are avoided, and the article reconciled to the constitution, as understood by the opposers of the bill; the stipulation also for citizenship “as soon as possible” according to the principles of the constitution, and the delay meditated by these words, and the subsequent words “in the mean time,” so utterly inconsistent with the instantaneous citizenship, which would follow an admission into the Union as a State, are both fully explained. Being incorporated in the Union as a Territory, and not as a State, a stipulation for citizenship became necessary; whereas it would have been unnecessary had the inhabitants been incorporated as a State, and not as a Territory. And as they were not to be invested with citizenship by becoming a State, the delay which would occur between the incorporation of the Territory into the Union and the arrival of the inhabitants to citizenship according to the principles of the constitution, under some uniform rule of naturalization, exhibited an interim which demanded the concluding stipulation, for “protection in the mean time for liberty, property, and religion.” As a State of the Union, they would not have needed a stipulation for the safety of their “liberty, property and religion;” as a Territory, this stipulation would govern and restrain the undefined power of Congress to make “rules and regulations for Territories.”
Mr. Tracy.—Mr. President: I shall vote against this bill, and will give some of the reasons which govern my vote in this case.
It is well known that this bill is introduced to carry into effect the treaty between the United States and France, which has been lately ratified. If that treaty be an unconstitutional compact, such a one as the President and Senate had no rightful authority to make, the conclusion is easy, that it creates no obligation on any branch or member of the Government to vote for this bill, or any other, which is calculated to carry into effect such unconstitutional compact.
The third and seventh articles of the treaty are, in my opinion, unconstitutional.
The third article is in the following words:
“The inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be incorporated into the Union of the United States, and admitted, as soon as possible, according to the principles of the Federal Constitution, to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United States, and, in the mean time, they shall be maintained in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and the religion they profess.”
The obvious meaning of this article is, that the inhabitants of Louisiana are incorporated, by it, into the Union, upon the same footing that the Territorial Governments are, and, like them, the Territory, when the population is sufficiently numerous, must be admitted as a State, with every right of any other State.
Have the President and Senate a constitutional right to do all this?
When we advert to the constitution, we shall find that the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, may make treaties. Now, say gentlemen, this power is undefined, and one gentleman says, it is unlimited.
True, there is no definition in words of the extent and nature of the treaty-making power. Two modes of ascertaining its extent have been mentioned: one is, by ascertaining the extent of the same power among the monarchs of Europe, and making that the standard of the treaty-making power here; and the other is, to limit the power of the President and Senate, in respect to treaties, by the constitution and the nature and principles of our Government.
Upon the first criterion, it is obvious that we cannot obtain any satisfactory definition of the treaty-making power, as applicable to our Government.
The paragraph in the constitution, which says that “new States may be admitted by Congress into this Union,” has been quoted to justify this treaty. To this, two answers may be given, either of which are conclusive in my favor. First, if Congress have the power collectively of admitting Louisiana, it cannot be vested in the President and Senate alone. Secondly, Congress have no power to admit new foreign States into the Union, without the consent of the old partners. The article of the constitution, if any person will take the trouble to examine it, refers to domestic States only, and not at all to foreign States; and it is unreasonable to suppose that Congress should, by a majority only, admit new foreign States, and swallow up, by it, the old partners, when two-thirds of all the members are made requisite for the least alteration in the constitution. The words of the constitution are completely satisfied by a construction which shall include only the admission of domestic States, who were all parties to the Revolutionary war, and to the compact; and the spirit of the association seems to embrace no other. But I repeat it, if the Congress collectively has this power, the President and Senate cannot, of course, have it exclusively.
I think, sir, that, from a fair construction of the constitution, and an impartial view of the nature and principles of our association, the President and Senate have not the power of thus obtruding upon us Louisiana.
The seventh article admits for twelve years the ships of France and Spain into the ceded territory, free of foreign duty. This is giving a commercial preference to those ports over the other ports of the United States; because it is well known that a duty of forty-four cents on tonnage, and ten per cent. on duties, are paid by all foreign ships or vessels in all the ports of the United States. If it be said we must repeal those laws, and then the preference will cease, the answer is, that this seventh article gives the exclusive right of entering the ports of Louisiana to the ships of France and Spain, and if our discriminating duties were repealed this day, the preference would be given to the ports of the United States against those of Louisiana, so that the preference, by any regulation of commerce or revenue, which the constitution expressly prohibits from being given to the ports of one State over those of another, would be given by this treaty, in violation of the constitution. I acknowledge, if Louisiana is not admitted into the Union, and that if there is no promise to admit her, then this part of our argument will not apply; but, in declaring these to be facts, my opponents are driven to acknowledge that the third article of this treaty is void, which answers every purpose which I wish to establish, that this treaty is unconstitutional and void, and that I have, consequently, a right to withhold my vote from any bill which shall be introduced to carry it into effect. I acknowledge, sir, that my opinion ever has been, and still is, that when a treaty is ratified by the constituted authorities, and is a constitutional treaty, every member of the community is bound by it, as a law of the land; but not so by a treaty which is unconstitutional. The terms of this treaty may be extravagant and unwise, yet, in my legislative capacity, that can form no excuse for an opposition; we may have no title, we may have given an enormous sum, we may have made a silly attempt to destroy the discriminating duties, yet, if the treaty be not unconstitutional, every member of the Government is bound to carry it into effect.
Mr. Breckenridge observed, that he little expected a proceeding so much out of order would have been attempted, as a re-discussion of the merits of the treaty on the passage of this bill; but as the gentlemen in the opposition had urged it, he would, exhausted as the subject was, claim the indulgence of the Senate in replying to some of their remarks.
No gentleman, continued he, has yet ventured to deny, that it is incumbent on the United States to secure to the citizens of the western waters, the uninterrupted use of the Mississippi. Under this impression of duty, what has been the conduct of the General Government, and particularly of the gentlemen now in the opposition, for the last eight months? When the right of deposit was violated by a Spanish officer without authority from his Government, these gentlemen considered our national honor so deeply implicated, and the rights of the western people so wantonly violated, that no atonement or redress was admissible, except through the medium of the bayonet. Negotiation was scouted at. It was deemed pusillanimous, and was said to exhibit a want of fellow-feeling for the western people, and a disregard to their essential rights. Fortunately for their country, the counsel of these gentlemen was rejected, and their war measures negatived. The so much scouted process of negotiation was, however, persisted in, and instead of restoring the right of deposit, and securing more effectually for the future our right to navigate the Mississippi, the Mississippi itself was acquired, and every thing which appertained to it. I did suppose that those gentlemen, who at the last session so strongly urged war measures for the attainment of this object, upon an avowal that it was too important to trust to the tardy and less effectual process of negotiation, would have stood foremost in carrying the treaty into effect, and that the peaceful mode by which it was acquired would not lessen with them the importance of the acquisition. But it seems to me, sir, that the opinions of a certain portion of the United States with respect to this ill-fated Mississippi, have varied as often as the fashions. [Here Mr. B. made some remarks on the attempts which were made in the old Congress, and which had nearly proved successful, to cede this river to Spain for twenty-five years.] But, I trust, continued he, these opinions, schemes, and projects will for ever be silenced and crushed by the vote which we are this evening about to pass.
Permit me to examine some of the principal reasons which are deemed so powerful by gentlemen as to induce them to vote for the destruction of this treaty. Unfortunately for the gentlemen, no two of them can agree on the same set of objections; and what is still more unfortunate, I believe there are no two of them concur in any one objection. In one thing only they seem to agree, and that is to vote against the bill. An honorable gentleman from Delaware (Mr. White) considered the price to be enormous. An honorable gentleman from Connecticut, who has just sat down, (Mr. Tracy,) says he has no objection whatever to the price; it is, he supposes, not too much. An honorable gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Pickering) says that France acquired no title from Spain, and therefore our title is bad. The same gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Tracy) says he has no objection to the title from France; he thinks it a good one. The gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Pickering) contends that the United States cannot under the constitution acquire foreign territory. The gentleman from Connecticut is of a different opinion, and has no doubt but that the United States can acquire and hold foreign territory; but that Congress alone have the power of incorporating that territory into the Union. What weight, therefore, ought all their lesser objections to be entitled to, when they are at war among themselves on the greater one?
The same gentleman has told us, that this acquisition will, from its extent, soon prove destructive to the confederacy.
This, continued Mr. B., is an old and hackneyed doctrine; that a republic ought not to be too extensive. But the gentleman has assumed two facts, and then reasoned from them. First, that the extent is too great; and secondly, that the country will be soon populated. I would ask, sir, what is his standard extent for a republic? How does he come at that standard? Our boundary is already extensive. Would his standard extent be violated by including the island of Orleans and the Floridas? I presume not, as all parties seem to think their acquisition, in part or in whole, essential. Why not then acquire territory on the west, as well as on the east side of the Mississippi? Is the Goddess of Liberty restrained by water courses? Is she governed by geographical limits? Is her dominion on this continent confined to the east side of the Mississippi? So far from believing in the doctrine that a republic ought to be confined within narrow limits, I believe, on the contrary, that the more extensive its dominion the more safe and more durable it will be. In proportion to the number of hands you intrust the precious blessings of a free government to, in the same proportion do you multiply the chances for their preservation. I entertain, therefore, no fears for the confederacy on account of its extent.
I had hoped, sir, that the gentleman from Connecticut, (Mr. Tracy,) from the trouble he was so good as to give himself yesterday in assisting to amend this bill, would have voted for it; but it seems he is constrained to vote to-day against it. He asks, if the United States have power to acquire and add new States to the Union, can they not also cede States? Can they not, for example, cede Connecticut to France? I answer they cannot; but for none of the reasons assigned by him. The Government of the United States cannot cede Connecticut, because, first, it would be annihilating part of that sovereignty of the nation which is whole and entire, and upon which the Government of the United States is dependent for its existence; and secondly, because the fourth section of the fourth article of the constitution forbids it. But how does it follow as a consequence, that because the United States cannot cede an existing State, they cannot acquire a new State? He admits explicitly that Congress may acquire territory and hold it as a territory, but cannot incorporate it into the Union. By this construction he admits the power to acquire territory, a modification infinitely more dangerous than the unconditional admission of a new State; for by his construction, territories and citizens are considered and held as the property of the Government of the United States, and may consequently be used as dangerous engines in the hands of the Government against the States and people.
Could we not, says the same gentleman, incorporate in the Union some foreign nation containing ten millions of inhabitants—Africa, for instance—and thereby destroy our Government? Certainly the thing would be possible if Congress would do it, and the people consent to it; but it is supposing so extreme a case and is so barely possible, that it does not merit serious refutation. It is also possible and equally probable that republicanism itself may one day or other become unfashionable, (for I believe it is not without its enemies,) and that the people of America may call for a king. From such hypotheses it is impossible to deduce any thing for or against the construction contended for. The true construction must depend on the manifest import of the instrument and the good sense of the community.
The same gentleman, in reply to the observations which fell from the gentleman from South Carolina, as to the admission of new States, observes, that although Congress may admit new States, the President and Senate, who are but a component part, cannot. Apply this doctrine to the case before us. How could Congress by any mode of legislation admit this country into the Union until it was acquired? And how can this acquisition be made except through the treaty-making power? Could the gentleman rise in his place and move for leave to bring in a bill for the purchase of Louisiana and its admission into the Union? I take it that no transaction of this or any other kind with a foreign power can take place except through the Executive Department, and that in the form of a treaty, agreement, or convention. When the acquisition is made, Congress can then make such disposition of it as may be expedient.
Mr. Adams.—It is not my intention to trespass long upon the patience of the Senate, on a subject which has already been debated almost to satiety; but, as objections on constitutional grounds have been raised against the bill under discussion, I wish to say a very few words in justification of the vote which I think it my duty to give.
The objections against the passage of the bill, as far as my recollection serves me, are two: the first, started by the honorable gentleman from Delaware who opened this debate; the second, urged by several of the other members who have spoken upon the question.
The gentleman from Delaware admits the necessity of making the provision for carrying into execution, on our part, the treaty which has been duly ratified by the Senate, provided we can obtain complete and undoubted possession of the territory ceded us by France, in that treaty. But he observes, that the term possession is indefinite; that it may mean nothing more than the delivery of a twig, or of the knob of a door. That, from sources of the authenticity of which we have no reason to doubt, we are informed that Spain is very far from acquiescing in the cession of this territory to us; that probably the Spanish officers will not deliver peaceable possession; and that we ought not to put out of our own hands the power of withholding the payment of this money, until it shall be ascertained, beyond all question, that the territory, for which it is the consideration, is in our hands. But, sir, admitting that the word possession were of itself not sufficiently precise, I think, with the gentleman last up, that the fourth and fifth articles of the treaty, read by him, render it so in this instance. The fourth, stipulating that the French commissary shall do every act necessary to receive the country from the Spanish officers, and transmit it to the agent of the United States—and the fifth, providing, not only that all the military posts shall be delivered to us, and that the troops, whether of France or Spain, shall cease to occupy them, but that those troops shall all be embarked within three months after the ratification of the treaty. Now, when the country has been formally surrendered to us, when all the military posts are in our hands, and when all the troops, French or Spanish, have been embarked, what possible adverse possession can there be to contend against ours? Until all these conditions shall have been fulfilled on the part of France, neither the convention nor the bill before us requires the payment of money on ours; and we may safely trust the execution of the law to the discretion of the President of the United States. For, even if I could see any reason for distrusting him in the exercise of such a power, under different circumstances, which I certainly do not, still, in the present case, his own interest, and the weight of responsibility resting upon him, are ample security to us, against any undue precipitation on his part, in the payment of the money. On the other hand, I am extremely solicitous that every tittle of the engagements on our part in these conventions should be performed with the most scrupulous good faith, and I see no purpose of utility that can be answered by postponing the determination on the passage of this bill.
But it has been argued that the bill ought not to pass, because the treaty itself is unconstitutional, or, to use the words of the gentleman from Connecticut, an extra-constitutional act; because it contains engagements which the powers of the Senate were not competent to ratify, the powers of Congress not competent to confirm, and, as two of the gentlemen have contended, not even the Legislatures of the number of States requisite to effect an amendment of the constitution are adequate to sanction. It is therefore, say they, a nullity; we cannot fulfil our part of its conditions, and on our failure in the performance of any one stipulation, France may consider herself as absolved from the obligations of the whole treaty on her. I do not conceive it necessary to enter into the merits of the treaty at this time. The proper occasion for that discussion is past. But, allowing even that this is a case for which the constitution has not provided, it does not in my mind follow, that the treaty is a nullity, or that its obligations, either on us or on France, must necessarily be cancelled. For my own part, I am free to confess, that the third article, and more especially the seventh, contain engagements placing us in a dilemma, from which I see no possible mode of extricating ourselves but by an amendment, or rather an addition to the constitution. The gentleman from Connecticut, (Mr. Tracy,) both on a former occasion, and in this day’s debate, appears to me to have shown this to demonstration. But what is this more than saying, that the President and Senate have bound the nation to engagements which require the co-operation of more extensive powers than theirs, to carry them into execution? Nothing is more common, in the negotiations between nation and nation, than for a minister to agree to and sign articles beyond the extent of his powers. This is what your ministers, in the very case before you, have confessedly done. It is well known that their powers did not authorize them to conclude this treaty; but they acted for the benefit of their country, and this House by a large majority has advised to the ratification of their proceedings. Suppose then, not only that the ministers who signed, but the President and Senate who ratified this compact, have exceeded their powers. Suppose that the other House of Congress, who have given their assent by passing this and other bills for the fulfilment of the obligations it imposes on us, have exceeded their powers. Nay, suppose even that the majority of States competent to amend the constitution in other cases, could not amend it in this, without exceeding their powers—and this is the extremest point to which any gentleman on this floor has extended his scruples—suppose all this, and there still remains in the country a power competent to adopt and sanction every part of our engagements, and to carry them entirely into execution. For, notwithstanding the objections and apprehensions of many individuals, of many wise, able and excellent men, in various parts of the Union, yet such is the public favor attending the transaction which commenced by the negotiation of this treaty, and which I hope will terminate in our full, undisturbed and undisputed possession of the ceded territory, that I firmly believe if an amendment to the constitution, amply sufficient for the accomplishment of every thing for which we have contracted, shall be proposed, as I think it ought, it will be adopted by the Legislature of every State in the Union. We can therefore fulfil our part of the conventions, and this is all that France has a right to require of us.
Mr. Nicholas.—Mr. President: The gentlemen on the other side differ among themselves. The two gentlemen from Delaware say, that if peaceable possession is given of Louisiana this bill ought to pass; the other gentlemen who have spoken in opposition to it have declared, that if they believed the constitution was not violated by the treaty, they should think themselves bound to vote for the bill. To this Senate it cannot be necessary to answer arguments denying the power of the Government to make such a treaty; it has already been affirmed, so far as we could affirm it, by two-thirds of this body; it is then only now necessary to show that we ought to pass the bill at this time. In addition to the reasons which have been so ably and forcibly urged by my friends, I will remark, that the treaty-making power of this Government is so limited, that engagements to pay money cannot be carried into effect without the consent and co-operation of Congress. This was solemnly decided, after a long discussion of several weeks, by the House of Representatives, which made the appropriations for carrying the British treaty into effect, and such I believe is the understanding of nine-tenths of the American people, as to the construction of their constitution. This decision must be also known to foreigners, and if not, they are bound to know the extent of the powers of the Government with which they treat. If this bill should be rejected, I ask gentlemen whether they believe, that France would or ought to execute the treaty on her part? It is known to the French Government that the President and Senate cannot create stock, nor provide for the payment of either principal or interest of stock; and if that Government should be informed that a bill, authorizing the issue of stock to pay for the purchase, “after possession shall be delivered,” had been rejected by the only department of our Government competent to the execution of that part of the treaty, they would have strong ground to suspect that we did not mean to execute the treaty on our part; particularly when they are informed, that the arguments most pressed in opposition to the bill were grounded upon a belief that the Government of the United States had not a constitutional power to execute the treaty. Of one thing I am confident, that if they have the distrust of us which some gentlemen have this day expressed of them, the country will not be delivered to the agents of our Government should this bill be rejected.
The gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Tracy) muse consider the grant of power to the Legislature as a limitation of the treaty-making power, for he says, “that the power to admit new States and to make citizens is given to Congress, and not to the treaty-making power;” therefore an engagement in a treaty to do either of these things is unconstitutional. I cannot help expressing my surprise at that gentleman’s giving that opinion, and I think myself justifiable in saying, that if it is now his opinion, it was not always so. The contrary opinion is the only justification of that gentleman’s approbation of the British treaty, and of his vote for carrying it into effect. By that treaty a great number of persons had a right to become American citizens immediately; not only without a law, but contrary to an existing law. And by that treaty many of the powers specially given to Congress were exercised by the treaty-making power. It is for gentlemen who supported that treaty, to reconcile the construction given by them to the constitution in its application to that instrument, with their exposition of it at this time.
If the third article of the treaty is an engagement to incorporate the Territory of Louisiana into the Union of the United States, and to make it a State, it cannot be considered as an unconstitutional exercise of the treaty-making power; for it will not be asserted by any rational man that the territory is incorporated as a State by the treaty itself, when it is expressly declared that “the inhabitants shall be incorporated in the Union of the United States, and admitted as soon as possible, according to the principles of the Federal Constitution.” Evidently referring the question of incorporation, in whatever character it was to take place, to the competent authority; and leaving to that authority to do it, at such time, and in such manner, as they may think proper. If, as some gentlemen suppose, Congress possess this power, they are free to exercise it in the manner that they may think most conducive to the public good. If it can only be done by an amendment to the constitution, it is a matter of discretion with the States whether they will do it or not; for it cannot be done “according to the principles of the Federal Constitution,” if the Congress or the States are deprived of that discretion, which is given to the first, and secured to the last, by the constitution. In the third section of the fourth article of the constitution it is said, “New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union.” If Congress have the power, it is derived from this source; for there are no other words in the constitution that can, by any construction that can be given to them, be considered as conveying this power. If Congress have not this power, the constitutional mode would be by an amendment to the constitution. If it should be conceded then that the admission of this territory into the Union, as a State, was in the contemplation of the contracting parties, it must be understood with a reservation of the right of this Congress or of the States to do it, or not; the words “admitted as soon as possible,” must refer to the voluntary admission in one of the two modes that I have mentioned; for in no other way can a State be admitted into this Union.
The question was then taken on the passage of the bill, and carried in the affirmative—yeas 26, nays 5, as follows:
Yeas—Messrs. Adams, Anderson, Bailey, Baldwin, Bradley, Breckenridge, Brown, Butler, Cocke, Condit, Dayton, Ellery, Franklin, Jackson, Logan, Maclay, Nicholas, Olcott, Plumer, Potter, Israel Smith, John Smith, Stone, Taylor, Worthington, and Wright.
Nays—Messrs. Hillhouse, Pickering, Tracy, Wells, and White.
Friday, November 4.
The following Message was received from the President of the United States:
To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States:
By the copy now communicated of a letter from Captain Bainbridge, of the Philadelphia frigate, to our Consul at Gibraltar, you will learn that an act of hostility has been committed on a merchant vessel of the United States, by an armed ship of the Emperor of Morocco. This conduct on the part of that power is without cause and without explanation. It is fortunate that Captain Bainbridge fell in with and took the capturing vessel and her prize; and I have the satisfaction to inform you that about the date of this transaction, such a force would be arriving in the neighborhood of Gibraltar, both from the east and from the west, as leaves less to be feared for our commerce, from the suddenness of the aggression.
On the 4th of September, the Constitution frigate, Captain Preble, with Mr. Lear on board, was within two days’ sail of Gibraltar, where the Philadelphia would then be arrived with her prize; and such explanations would probably be instituted as the state of things required, and as might perhaps arrest the progress of hostilities.
In the mean while, it is for Congress to consider the provisional authorities which may be necessary to restrain the depredations of this power, should they be continued.
TH. JEFFERSON.
Nov. 4, 1803.
The Message and papers therein referred to were read and ordered to lie for consideration.
Thursday, November 10.
The credentials of John Condit, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of New Jersey, for the time limited in the Constitution of the United States, were presented and read.
Ordered, That they lie on file.
Friday, November 11.
The President communicated a letter from De Witt Clinton, late a Senator from the State of New York, stating that he had resigned his seat in the Senate.
Monday, November 14.
The President administered the oath required by law to Mr. Condit, a Senator from the State of New Jersey.
Tuesday, November 15.
Mr. Worthington presented the petition of a number of the inhabitants of the Indiana Territory, praying to be set off into a separate district, for reasons therein stated.
Ordered, That it be referred to Mr. Bradley and others, the committee to whom were referred on the 7th instant, petitions on the same subject, to consider and report thereon to the Senate.
Wednesday, November 23.
Amendment to the Constitution.
The Senate resumed the consideration of the report of the committee to whom was referred the motion for an amendment to the constitution in the mode of electing the President and the Vice President of the United States; whereupon, the President pro tem. (Mr. Brown) submitted to the consideration of the Senate the following question of order:
“When an amendment to be proposed to the constitution is under consideration, shall the concurrence of two-thirds of the members present be requisite to decide any question for amendments, or extending to the merits, being short of the final question?”
[A debate took place on this proposition, tedious, intricate, and desultory, which it was very difficult to follow, and often to comprehend.]
The proposition offered by the President was then called up for decision, whether two-thirds were necessary—ayes 13, noes 18.
Mr. Butler desired to know from the President if the question now decided did not require a majority of two-thirds?
The President said, according to the rule of the House, the question required only a principal majority to decide.
Mr. Dayton’s motion for striking out what related to the Vice President was called for, and the question taken on striking out—ayes 12, noes 19.
The report of the committee at large being then under consideration,
Mr. Nicholas moved to strike out all following the seventh line of the report, to the end, for the purpose of inserting the following:
“In all future elections of President and Vice President, the Electors shall name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and, in distinct ballots, the person voted for as Vice President, of whom one at least shall not be an inhabitant of the same State with themselves. The person voted for as President, having a majority of the votes of all the Electors appointed, shall be the President; and if no person have such majority, then from the three highest on the list of those voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall choose the President in the manner directed by the constitution. The person having the greatest number of votes as Vice President, shall be the Vice President; and in case of an equal number of votes for two or more persons for Vice President, they being the highest on the list, the Senate shall choose the Vice President from those having such equal number, in the manner directed by the constitution; but no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President, shall be eligible to that of Vice President of the United States.”
Mr. Adams objected to the number “three” instead of five, and wished five to be restored, as the House of Representatives had already agreed to it. He asked for a division of the question; which was not agreed to.
Upon the question for striking out being put, it was carried without a dissenting voice, and the amendment of Mr. Nicholas adopted in the report, leaving the number blank.
Mr. Dayton moved to fill up the blank with the number five; upon the question being put, it was lost—only eleven rose in the affirmative.
Mr. Anderson moved to strike out the word “two” in the nineteenth line—ayes 6. Lost.
Mr. S. Smith then moved to fill the blank with the word “three;” which was carried—ayes 18, noes 13.
Mr. Adams suggested an objection to the amendment as it stood, which appeared to arise out of the treaty of cession of Louisiana. His original idea was adverse to the limitation to natural-born citizens, as superfluous; but, as it stood, the terms upon which Louisiana was acquired had rendered a change necessary, for it appeared to him that there was no alternative, but to admit those born in Louisiana as well as those born in the United States to the right of being chosen for President and Vice President.
Mr. Butler said that, if there was a numerous portion of those who were already citizens of the United States who can never aspire to, nor be eligible for, those situations under the constitution, he did not see how this supposed alternative could be upheld. The people of Louisiana, under the treaty and under the constitution, will clearly come under the description of naturalized citizens. While he was up, he would take the opportunity of speaking to the question at large, and to examine the motives which produced this amendment; the principal cause of solicitude, on this subject, he understood to be the base intrigues which were said to have been carried on at the Presidential election.
Mr. Wright called to order; and a short altercation on the point of order took place.
Mr. Butler proceeded. He had on a former day asked if he might, in this stage of the discussion, take a view of the whole subject; the House had decided in the affirmative. When the proposition was first laid before the House, he had felt a disposition in favor of it; his mind had been shocked by those base intrigues, which had taken place at the late Presidential election, and he was hurried by indignation into a temper which a little cool reflection and some observation on a particular mode of action in that House, had checked and corrected, and finally convinced him that much caution was required in a proceeding of that nature, and that, in all human probability, such a scene of intrigue may never occur again; that it became questionable whether any steps whatever were necessary. Upon a careful review of the subject, it appeared to him that an alteration might make matters worse; for though at present there has been afforded, by a course of accidents and oversights, room for intrigue, it would be preferable to leave it to the care and discretion of the States at large to prevent the recurrence of the danger, than put into the hands of four of the large States the perpetual choice of President, to the exclusion of the other thirteen States. It was a reasonable principle that every State should, in turn, have the choice of the Chief Magistrate made from among its citizens. The jealousy of the small States was natural; and he would not tire the House by bringing to their ears arguments from the history of Greece, because the subject must be familiar to every member of that House, and, indeed, to every school-boy. He would not weary them with the painful history of the conflicts of Athens and Sparta, for the supremacy of Greece, and the fatal effects of their quarrels and ambition on the smaller States of that inveterate confederacy of Republics. Their history is that of all nations in similar circumstances; for man is man in every clime, and passion mingles in all his actions. If the smaller States were to agree to this amendment, it would fix for ever the combination of the larger States, and they would not only choose the President but the Vice President also in spite of the smaller States. It would ill become him who had been a member of that convention which had the honor of forming the present constitution to let a measure such as the present pass without the most deliberate investigation of its effects. Before the present constitution was adopted all the States held an equal vote on all national questions; by the constitution their sovereignty was guarantied, and the instrument of guarantee and right, he had subscribed his name to as a Representative from South Carolina, and had used all the zeal and influence of which he was possessed to promote its adoption. To give his assent to any violation of it, or any unnecessary innovation on its principles, would be a deviation from morality.
The question was immediately taken on the report and carried—yeas 20, nays 11.
Mr. Adams said, that though he had voted for the amendment, he disapproved of the alteration from five to three. He felt, however, though a representative of a large State, a deep interest in this question. Was there no champion of the small States to stand up in that House and vindicate their rights?
Mr. Dayton was not here as champion of the small States; but, as the representative of one of them, he was ready to enter his protest against being delivered over bound hand and foot to four or five of the large States. The gentleman from South Carolina had offered arguments on the subject irrefutable. The little portion of influence left us he has demonstrated to be now about to be taken away, and the gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. Adams,) after aiding the effort with his vote, has taken mercy upon us, and after he has helped to knock us down, asks us why we do not stand up for ourselves.
Mr. S. Smith was not surprised to find those who were members of the old Congress, in which the subject of large and small States was frequently agitated, familiar with the subject of those days. Under the present constitution he had been ten years in Congress and had never heard the subject agitated, nor the least ground given for any apprehension on this subject; he had seen the small States possess all the advantages secured to them without even a moment’s jealousy. The State he represented was once considered a large State; the increase of others in population, however, had rendered it properly belonging to neither class; it was an intermediate State; but from the natural progression of the Union it must be ranked among the small States. In this view then he could speak dispassionately, and the small States could not with reason be apprehensive that a State, which must speedily take rank among them, could be indifferent to their rights if there were the least cause for apprehension.
He had moved for the insertion of three instead of five, with this precise and special intention, that the people themselves should have the power of electing the President and Vice President; and that intrigues should be thereby for ever frustrated. The intention of the convention was that the election of the chief officers of the Government should come as immediately from the people as was practicable, and that the Legislature should possess the power only in such an exigency as accident might give birth to, but which they had considered as likely to occur. Had it not been for these considerations, the large States never would have given up the advantages which they held in point of numbers. If the number five were to be continued, and the House of Representatives made the last resort, he would undertake to say, that four times out of five the choice would devolve upon them.
Mr. Hillhouse.—In avoiding rocks he feared we were steering for quicksands. The evils that are past we know; those that may arrive we know not. The object proposed is to provide against a storm, a phenomenon not rare or unfrequent in republics. You are called upon to act upon a calculation that all the States in the Union will vote for the same persons, or that each of two parties opposed in politics will have an individual candidate. Suppose the two candidates who had the highest votes on the late election had been the champions of two opposite parties, and that neither would recede, what then would be the consequence; according to the gentleman from Maryland, a civil war! When men are bent on a favorite pursuit, they are too apt to shut out all consequences which do not bear out their object. Thus gentlemen can very well discover the danger they have escaped, but they do not perceive that the opposition of two powerful candidates gives, besides the hazard of civil war, the hazard of placing one of them on a permanent throne. The First Magistracy of this nation is an object capable of exciting ambition; and no doubt it would one day or other be sought after by dangerous and enterprising men. It was to place a check upon this ambition that the constitution provided a competitor for the Chief Magistrate, and declared that both should not be chosen from the same State. Here also was a guard against State pride, and this guard you wish to take away; and what will be the consequence? Instead of two or three or five, you will have as many candidates as there are States in the Union. By voting for two persons without designation, the States stood a double chance of a majority, besides the chance of a majority of all the States in the House of Representatives. For once or twice there may be such an organization of party as will secure for a conspicuous character the majority of votes. But that character cannot live always. The evil of the last election will recur, and be greater, because the whole field will be to range in.
He hoped this amendment would not be hastily adopted. The subsisting mode was the result of much deliberation and solemn compromise, after having long agitated the convention. It is now attacked by party, whatever gentlemen may say to the contrary; the gentleman from South Carolina has confessed it. If gentlemen will suffer themselves to look forward without passion, great good may come from the present mode; men of each of the parties may hold the two principal offices of the Government; they will be checks upon each other; our Government is composed of checks; and let us preserve it from party spirit, which has been tyrannical in all ages. These checks take off the fiery edge of persecution. Would not one of a different party placed in that chair tend to check and preserve in temper the overheated zeal of party? he would conduct himself with firmness because of the minor party; he would take care that the majority should have justice, but he would also guard the minority from oppression. If we cannot destroy party we ought to place every check upon it. If the present amendment pass, nine out of ten times the election will go to the other House, and then the only difference will be that you had a comedy the last time, and you’ll have a tragedy the next. Though it was impossible to prevent party altogether, much more when population and luxury increase, and corruption and vice with them, it was prudent to preserve as many checks against it as was practicable. He had been long in Congress and saw the conflicting interests of large and small States operate; the time may not be remote when party will adopt new designations; federal and republican parties have had their day, their designations will not last long, and the ground of difference between parties will not be the same that it has been; new names and new views will be taken; it has been the course in all nations. There has not yet been a rotation of offices in which the small States could look for their share, but the time may, it will come when the small will wrestle with the large States for their rights. Each State has felt that though its limits were not so extensive as others, its rights were not disregarded. Suffer this confidence to be done away, and you may bid adieu to it; three or four large States will take upon them in rotation to nominate the Executive, and the second officer also. This will be felt. A fanciful difference in politics is the bugbear of party now, because no other, no real cause of difference has subsisted. But remedy will create a real disease. States like individuals may say we will be of no party, and whenever this shall happen blood will follow.
Mr. Bradley moved an adjournment. The motion was agreed to.
Thursday, November 24.
Amendment to the Constitution.
The consideration of the report on the amendment to the constitution being taken up, the amendment as directed to be printed on the preceding day, was taken up, and read, as follows:
Resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, two-thirds of both Houses concurring, That the following amendment be proposed to the Legislatures of the several States as an amendment to the constitution of the United States, which, when ratified by three-fourths of the said Legislatures, shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as a part of the said constitution, viz:
In all future elections of President and Vice President, the Electors shall name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and, in distinct ballots, the person voted for as Vice President, of whom one at least shall not be an inhabitant of the same State with themselves. The person voted for as President having a majority of the votes of all the Electors appointed, shall be the President, and if no person have such majority, then from the three highest on the list of those voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall choose the President in the manner directed by the constitution. The person having the greatest number of votes as Vice President, shall be Vice President; and in case of an equal number of votes for two or more persons for the Vice President, they being the highest on the list, the Senate shall choose the Vice President from those having such equal number, in the manner directed by the constitution; but no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President, shall be eligible to that of the President of the United States.
Mr. Bradley did not approve of the amendment as it now stood; he could not see why the Vice President should not be chosen by a majority, as well as the President. He considered the possibility of the Vice President becoming President by any casualty, as a good reason for both being chosen by the same ratio of numbers. If it should be carried as the amendment now stands, the office of Vice President would be hawked about at market, and given as change for votes for the Presidency. And what would be the effect?—that it might so happen that a citizen chosen only for the office of Vice President, might by the death of the President, though chosen only by a plurality, become President, and hold the office for three years eleven months and thirty days. He did not approve of many arguments which he had heard on the preceding day, and however disposed to concur in the principle of designation for the two offices, he could not give it his vote in the present shape. He would, in order to render the report more congenial with his wishes, move to strike out the following words beginning with the words shall, in the thirteenth line, to constitution, in the eighteenth. The motion was seconded.
Mr. Tracy opposed the striking out, as not in order, it being an amendment to an amendment already received by the House. He thought, however, it would be in order to reconcile the whole, and then any part might be amended.
The President said that the motion for amending the amendment was not in order; but if the member from Vermont, or any other gentleman of the majority on the question yesterday chose to move for a recommittal, or even to refer the report to a select committee, it would be in order.
Mr. Bradley then renewed his motion as before, for striking out and inserting after the 13th line; this amendment he thought of great importance, as under the constitution as it now stands the Vice President must be a person of the highest respectability, well known, and of established reputation throughout the United States; but if the discriminating principle prevails without some precautions such as the amendment proposed, that assurance would be lost; and he should not be surprised to hear of as many candidates for Vice President as there are States, as the votes for President would be offered in truck for votes for Vice President, and an enterprising character might employ his emissaries through all the States to purchase them, and your amendment lays the foundation for intrigues. He was desirous that he who is to be set up as candidate for the Vice President should as at present be equally respectable, or that there should be none—that at least he should be the second man in the nation; adopt the designating principle, without the most guarded precautions, and you lose that assurance.
Mr. Hillhouse accorded with the gentleman’s amendment, as it naturally grows out of the principles of the report. There was not a word in the constitution about voting for the Vice President, no vote in fact is given for such an office; the alteration to designation alters the whole thing; and as the gentleman has expressed, will send the Vice President’s office into market to be handed about as change for the candidate supported by larger States; he would prefer leaving the choice of President and Vice President at once to the larger States than take it in this way. In calm times any government may work well, but he wished in calm times to provide against storm. If we designate any, then designate both and on equal terms.
Mr. Jackson said, that though coming from a small State he had not been instructed, and was therefore at perfect liberty to act according to the best of his judgment; though his State was now, in regard to population, small, and though it were to remain so, he could have but one opinion on this subject. He saw abundance of reason for preferring three to five. The constitution under the present form has directed the choice to be made from five. But the reason of this was consistent with the result to be produced; the electors were to vote for two persons indiscriminately, but with the restriction of voting for one only belonging to the State where the vote was given. The voting for two would necessarily bring forward four candidates, and a fifth possibly, for we saw in the two elections before the last that there was one more than the four, though in each case the fifth had but one vote; he alluded to the vote for Mr. Jay. In the amendment proposed you are called upon to designate for each office, and there can be little apprehension of having more than two or three principal candidates; and for twenty years to come he had no apprehension of a greater number of candidates if this amendment prevails.
Mr. Wright.—We need not be told in this house, that the constitution was the result of a compromise, or that care was taken to guard the rights of each State; these things we must be very ignorant, indeed, not to know. But does it therefore follow that it is not susceptible of amendment or correction under experience? Does it follow, because, for mutual interest and security, this compromise was made, that we are precluded from effecting any greater good? No man would accuse him of a wish to see the interest of any State impaired. But we can preserve the spirit and intention of the constitution in full vigor, without impairing any interests. And this is to be done, by the discriminating principle; it fulfills the intention, and it forefends the recurrence of that danger from which you have once escaped. By this principle, each elector may name his man for each office, and this can be done whether the number be three or five. For the latter number he was disposed; because already adopted by the other House, and he did not wish to delay its progress. If we were to form a constitution, he would provide that there should be only two candidates presented to the House. But he did not rely on any number so much as on the discriminating principle.
Mr. Nicholas.—Several gentlemen profess much reluctance to make any change in the constitution; he would make no such profession; and though he should be as jealous of improper alterations, or the introduction of principles incompatible with Republican Government, he would not hesitate to make any alteration calculated to promote, or secure the public liberty upon a firmer basis; nay, if it could be made better he would expunge the whole book. Gentlemen who are for adhering so closely to the constitution, appear not to consider that a choice of President from the number three, is more in the spirit of the constitution than from five; and preserves the relation that the election of two persons, under the present form, holds to the number five. A reason equally forcible with him was, that, by taking the number three instead of five, you place the choice with more certainty in the people at large, and render the choice more consonant to their wishes. With him, also, it was a most powerful reason for preferring three, that it would render the Chief Magistrate dependent only on the people at large, and independent of any party or any State interest. The people held the sovereign power, and it was intended by the constitution that they should have the election of the Chief Magistrate. It was never contemplated as a case likely to occur, but in an extreme case, that the election should go to the House of Representatives. What, he asked, would have been the effect, had Mr. Jay been elected when he had only one vote? What, he would ask, would be the impression made upon our own people, and upon foreign nations, had Mr. Aaron Burr been chosen at the last election, when the universal sentiment was to place the present Chief Magistrate in that station? He did not mean any thing disrespectful or invidious towards the Vice President, he barely stated the fact, so well known, and asked, what would be the effect? Where would be the bond of attachment to that constitution which could admit of an investiture in a case so important, in known opposition to the wishes of the people? The effect would be fatal to the constitution itself; it would weaken public attachment to it, and the affectation, if alone for the small States, would not have been heard of in the deep murmur of discontent.
An adjournment was now called for and carried.
Tuesday, November 29.
Amendment to the Constitution.
The order of the day being called up on the amendments to the constitution, a considerable time elapsed, when
Mr. Dayton rose and said, that since no other gentleman thought proper to address the Chair, although laboring himself under a very severe cold, which rendered speaking painful, he could not suffer the question to pass without an effort to arrest it in its progress; and should consider his last breath well expended in endeavoring to prevent the degradation which the State he represented would suffer if the amendment were to prevail.
As to the question immediately before the Senate for filling the blank with five, he felt himself indebted to the member from Tennessee for renewing the subject. He was grateful, also, to the member from Maryland (Mr. Wright) for declaring he would support it, as well as for giving the assurance that he was disposed to consider and spare the interests of the small States as far as possible, consistently with the great object of discrimination.
Every member who had spoken on this subject seemed to have admitted, by the very course and pointing of their arguments, even though they may have denied it in words, that this was really a question between great and small States, and disguise it as they would, the question would be so considered out of doors. The privilege given by the constitution extended to five, out of which the choice of President should be made; and why should the smaller, for whose benefit and security that number was given, now wantonly throw it away without an equivalent? As to the Vice President, his election had no influence upon the number, because the choice of President in the House of Representatives was as free and unqualified as if that subordinate office did not exist. Nay, he said, he would venture to assert that, even if the number five were continued, and the Vice Presidency entirely abolished, there would not be as great a latitude of choice as under the present mode, because those five out of whom the choice must eventually be made, were much more likely hereafter to be nominated by the great States, inasmuch as their electors would no longer be compelled to vote for a man of a different State. The honorable gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Smith) has said, he was not surprised that those who had seats in the old Congress, should perplex themselves with the distinctions; but he could tell that gentleman, that it was not in the old Congress he had learnt them, for there he had seen all the votes of the States equal, and had known the comparatively little State of Maryland controlling the will of the Ancient Dominion. It was in the Federal Convention that distinction was made and acknowledged; and he defied that member to do, what had been before requested of the honorable gentleman of Virginia, viz: to open the constitution, and point out a single article, if he could, that had not evidently been framed upon a presumption of diversity (he had almost said, adversity) of interest between the great and small States.
Mr. Adams in a former debate had stated that he had not a wish to avoid or seek for the yeas and nays on any question; on the present occasion, however, he would, when the question was taken, call for the yeas and nays. But his own vote on the final question would be governed by the decision of the number five, and he wished to have some record of his vote, that he might be hereafter able to defend himself against any charge of inconsistency. On the principle of the amendment he had formed his opinion, and he was free to confess, that notwithstanding the many able productions which he had seen against it, he thought it calculated to produce more good than evil. He was not, however, influenced in this opinion by the instructions which had been read in a preceding debate from a former Legislature of Massachusetts to their Senators; he presumed these were not read by way of intimidation. To the instructions of those to whom he owed his seat in that House he would pay every respect that was due, but he did not think that the resolutions of a Legislature passed in March 1799 or 1800 ought to have the same weight. Since that time four total and complete changes had taken place, and probably not one third of those who gave those instructions now remained. He held a seat in the Legislature himself three years since, but did not perceive any particular anxiety on the subject, and he did not think that the present Legislature would be extremely offended if he were to give a direct vote against what was recommended four years ago.
The constitution was a combination of federative and popular principles. When you argue upon, or wish to change any of its federative principles, you must use analogies as arguments; popular arguments will not apply to federative principles. The House of Representatives was founded on popular principles; in this House the representation is federative, and not popular; it is in its nature aristocratic. The foundation of all popular representation is equality of votes; but even the ratio of representation is different in different States; the numbers in Massachusetts and Virginia, in Vermont and Delaware, are different in their proportions; but still an equality of representation is preserved, and the only difference is in the details. But if you argue upon the principles of the Senate, this equality of popular representation, or by an equal or relatively equal number, will not apply; you must discuss it upon another species of equality, of sovereignties, and the independence of several States federatively connected. Applying principles then to the election of President, if you reduce the number from which the House of Representatives is authorized to choose, do you not attack the principles of the federal compact, rather than the rights of the small States? The Executive, it had been said, is the man of the people; true, and he is also, as was said, though upon different grounds, the man of the Legislature—it was here a combined principle, federative and popular. Virginia had in that House twenty-two popular representatives, in this she has two federative; Delaware has one popular and two federative representatives. And even in the operation of election in the popular branch of Congress, the federative principle is pursued, and the State which has only one popular representative has an equal voice in that instance with the State that has twenty-two popular representatives. It was therefore evident that the attempt to alter the number from five to three, is an attack upon the federative principle, and not upon the small States.
Mr. S. Smith, when he made the motion for filling up the blank with three, did it after the most deliberate consideration of the theory and the principles of the constitution; which, if he understood it right, intended that the election of the Executive should be in the people, or as nearly as was possible, consistent with public order and security to the right of suffrage. The provision admitting the choice by the House of Representatives, was itself intended only for an extreme case, where great inconvenience might result from sending a defective election back to the people, as is customary in Massachusetts, where, if the majority is deficient, a new election is required. Our object in the amendment is or should be to make the election more certain by the people. This was to be done most effectually by leaving it to them to designate the persons whom they preferred for each office. As under the present form there was an extreme case, so there might be when the change of number should take place; for, although even with the number three, there was a possibility of the choice devolving on the House of Representatives, yet the adoption of the designating principle and the number three, would render the case less probable. It never was the intention of the framers of the constitution that the election should go to the House of Representatives but in the extreme case; nor was it ever contemplated that about one-fifth of the people should choose a President for the rest, which certainly would be the case if what some gentlemen contended for were to take place. When gentlemen contend for such a power as would transfer the choice from the people, and place it in the hands of a minority so small, how happens it that gentlemen will not bear to hear of the efforts which such arguments or such measures would produce on the larger States? It was not the interest of the small States to combine against the large. Suppose it were possible that the four large States should combine—and a combination of the small States alone could produce such an effect—nine States in the Union have but thirty-two votes out of one hundred and forty-two, yet nine States, with one vote each, make a majority of seventeen, though in relation to population they contain only about one-fifth of the whole; and by such a proceeding the one-fifth might choose a President and Vice President in defiance of the other four-fifths. What would be the consequence of such an election? At a subsequent election the large States would combine, and by the use of their votes they would frustrate every object which the small States might use their efforts to accomplish.
Notwithstanding what had been said concerning the jealousy of States, he could see nothing in it but the leaven of the old Congress, thrown in to work up feelings that had been long still. It was the forlorn hope, the last stratagem of party; and he was the more disposed to think so, when he saw gentlemen from the large States coming forward as the champions of the small—this might, to be sure, be magnanimity; but if his discernment did not deceive him, it was a stratagem to divide the friends of the amendment. Why was not the same jealousy entertained of the power of thirteen out of seventeen combining and giving absolute law to the other four? Why have gentlemen paid no regard to the experience which they have had from the last election, when less than one third of the members harassed the public mind, kept the Union in agitation, and Congress engrossed to the exclusion of nearly all other business for two weeks? Suppose that the House had been as accessible to corruption as the diets of other nations have been, and that three men, having in their power the votes of three States, had been seized upon, and the election made contrary to the wishes of the people. What would be the effect—on the minds of the people—on the administration of the Government—and on the attachment which the people feel for the constitution itself? He need not attempt to describe the effects. But it is our duty to prevent the return of such dangers, by keeping the election out of that House. And the most effectual mode is to fix the selection from the number three.
Mr. Pickering had not intended to have spoken on this question so far as it concerned the numbers; but as he should probably vote differently from his colleague, he conceived it proper to give his motives for his vote. His wishes for the entire preservation of the constitution were so strong, that he regretted any change was contemplated to be made in it, and he wished if an alteration was made to keep as near as possible to the spirit of the constitution as it now is, and it appeared to him that the number three conformed more to that spirit than the number five. He believed it to be the intention of the constitution, that the people should elect. As to what gentlemen said concerning the will of the people, he paid but little regard to it. The will of the people! he did not know how the will of the people could be known—how gentlemen came by it; it would not be asserted that it was to be found in the newspapers, or in private society; in truth he believed it never had been fairly expressed on the subject. We have seen an amendment brought forward from New York, but was that an expression of the public opinion? if it was, it was a very remarkable one, for it contained an absurdity—visible to every one. He wished to avoid innovations on the constitution, and to preserve the combined operation of federative and popular principles upon which it rested unimpaired.
Mr. Worthington hoped the number three would be adopted in preference to five. Nevertheless he approved so much of the principle of designation in the election of the President and Vice President, that rather than lose it he would vote for it with either number.
The yeas and nays being called for on filling up the blank with the largest number according to order; the votes were—yeas 12, nays 19, as follows:
Yeas.—Messrs. Adams, Bailey, Butler, Condit, Dayton, Hillhouse, Olcott, Plumer, Tracy, Wells, White, and Wright.
Nays.—Messrs. Baldwin, Bradley, Breckenridge, Brown, Cocke, Ellery, Franklin, Jackson, Logan, Maclay, Nicholas, Pickering, Potter, Israel Smith, John Smith, Samuel Smith, Stone, Taylor, and Worthington.
The question on the number three being inserted was then put, and the yeas and nays being demanded by one fifth of the members present; they were, yeas 21, nays 10, as follows:
Yeas.—Messrs. Bailey, Baldwin, Bradley, Breckenridge, Brown, Cocke, Ellery, Franklin, Jackson, Logan, Maclay, Nicholas, Pickering, Potter, Israel Smith, John Smith, Samuel Smith, Stone, Taylor, Worthington, and Wright.
Nays.—Messrs. Adams, Butler, Condit, Dayton, Hillhouse, Olcott, Plumer, Tracy, Wells, and White.
The House then adjourned.
Friday, December 2.
Mr. White, of Delaware, rose and addressed the chair as follows:
Mr. President: It may be expected that we, who oppose the present measure, and especially those of us who belong to the smaller States, and who think the interests of those States will be most injuriously affected by its adoption, shall assign some reasons for our opinion, and for the resistance we give it: I will for myself endeavor to do so. I know well the prejudices of many in favor of this proposed amendment to the constitution; I know too, and acknowledge with pleasure, the weight of abilities on the other side of the House by which those prejudices, if I may so be permitted to call them, will be sustained; this might perhaps be sufficient to create embarrassment or even silence on my part, but for the consciousness I feel in the rectitude of my views, and my full reliance on the talents of those with whom I have the honor generally to think and act. Upon a subject of the nature and importance of the one before us a great diversity of sentiment must be expected, and is perhaps necessary to the due and proper investigation of it. Without detaining the Senate with further preliminary remarks, presuming upon that patience and polite indulgence that are at all times extended by this honorable body to gentlemen who claim their attention, I will proceed immediately to the subject of the resolution; barely premising that notwithstanding the opinions of the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Taylor) and the gentleman from Georgia, (Mr. Jackson,) whose opinions I highly respect, I must yet think with my honorable friend from New Jersey (Mr. Dayton) that the Constitution of the United States bears upon the face of it the strongest marks of its having been made under the influence of State classifications. It was a work of compromise, though not formed, as stated by the gentleman from Virginia, by the large States yielding most, but by the smaller States yielding much more to the general good.
It will be recollected that, previous to the adoption of the constitution, on all legislative subjects, in fact, on every measure of the constitution, each State had an equal voice; but very different is the case now, when, in the popular branch of your Government, you see one State represented by twenty-two members, and another by but one, voting according to numbers. So that, notwithstanding the ideas of those gentlemen, and the declaration of an honorable member from Maryland, on my right, (Mr. Smith,) that, during his ten years’ service in Congress, he had never seen anything like State jealousies, State divisions, or State classification, I must be permitted to predicate part of my argument upon this business. Should any gentleman be able to show that the foundation is unsound, the superstructure of course will be easily demolished. Admitting, then, sir, for the sake of argument, that there were no very great objections to this proposed alteration in the mode of electing a President and Vice President, and that it were now part of the constitution, it might be unwise to strike it out, unless much stronger arguments had been urged against than I have heard in favor of it; yet I would not now vote for its adoption.
The United States are now divided, and will probably continue so, into two great political parties; whenever, under this amendment, a Presidential election shall come round, and the four rival candidates be proposed, two of them only will be voted for as President—one of these two must be the man; the chances in favor of each will be equal. Will not this increased probability of success afford more than double the inducement to those candidates, and their friends, to tamper with the Electors, to exercise intrigue, bribery, and corruption, as in an election upon the present plan, where the whole four would be voted for alike, where the chances against each are as three to one, and it is totally uncertain which of the gentlemen may succeed to the high office? And there must, indeed, be a great scarcity of character in the United States, when, in so extensive and populous a country, four citizens cannot be found, either of them worthy even of the Chief Magistracy of the nation. But, Mr. President, I have never yet seen the great inconvenience that has been so much clamored about, and that will be provided against in future by substituting this amendment. There was, indeed, a time when it became necessary for the House of Representatives to elect, by ballot, a President of the United States from the two highest in vote, and they were engaged here some days, as I have been told, in a very good-humored way, in the exercise of that constitutional right. They at length decided; and what was the consequence? The people were satisfied, and here the thing ended. What does this prove? that the constitution is defective? No, sir, but rather the wisdom and efficiency of the very provision intended to be stricken out, and that the people are acquainted with the nature of their Government; and give me leave to say, if fortune had smiled upon another man, and that election had eventuated in another way, the consequence would have been precisely the same; the great mass of the people would have been content and quiet; and those factious, restless disorganizers, that are the eternal disturbers of all well administered Governments, and who then talked of resistance, would have had too much prudence to hazard their necks in so dangerous an enterprise. I will not undertake to say that there was no danger apprehended on that occasion. I know many of the friends of the constitution had their fears; the experiment however proved them groundless; but what was the danger apprehended pending the election in the House of Representatives? Was it that they might choose Colonel Burr or Mr. Jefferson President? Not at all; they had, notwithstanding what had been said on this subject by the gentleman from Maryland, (Mr. Wright,) a clear constitutional right to choose either of them, as much so as the Electors in the several States had to vote for them in the first instance; the particular man was a consideration of but secondary importance to the country; the only ground of alarm was, lest the House should separate without making any choice, and the Government be without a head, the consequences of which no man could well calculate.