Cover created by Transcriber and placed in the Public Domain.

INVESTIGATION OF
THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY

HEARINGS
Before the President's Commission
on the Assassination
of President Kennedy

Pursuant to Executive Order 11130, an Executive order creating a Commission to ascertain, evaluate, and report upon the facts relating to the assassination of the late President John F. Kennedy and the subsequent violent death of the man charged with the assassination and S.J. Res. 137, 88th Congress, a concurrent resolution conferring upon the Commission the power to administer oaths and affirmations, examine witnesses, receive evidence, and issue subpenas

Volume
V

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON, D.C.

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, WASHINGTON: 1964

For sale in complete sets by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Washington, D.C., 20402

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION
ON THE
ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY

Chief Justice Earl Warren, Chairman

• Senator Richard B. Russell
• Senator John Sherman Cooper
• Representative Hale Boggs
• Representative Gerald R. Ford
• Mr. Allen W. Dulles
• Mr. John J. McCloy
• J. Lee Rankin, General Counsel
• Assistant Counsel
• Francis W. H. Adams
• Joseph A. Ball
• David W. Belin
• William T. Coleman, Jr.
• Melvin Aron Eisenberg
• Burt W. Griffin
• Leon D. Hubert, Jr.
• Albert E. Jenner, Jr.
• Wesley J. Liebeler
• Norman Redlich
• W. David Slawson
• Arlen Specter
• Samuel A. Stern
• Howard P. Willens[A]
• Staff Members
• Phillip Barson
• Edward A. Conroy
• John Hart Ely
• Alfred Goldberg
• Murray J. Laulicht
• Arthur Marmor
• Richard M. Mosk
• John J. O'Brien
• Stuart Pollak
• Alfredda Scobey
• Charles N. Shaffer, Jr.

Biographical information on the Commissioners and the staff can be found in the Commission's Report.

[A] Mr. Willens also acted as liaison between the Commission and the Department of Justice.

[Preface]

The testimony of the following witnesses is contained in volume V: Alan H. Belmont, assistant to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; Jack Revill and V. J. Brian of the Dallas police, who testified concerning conversations Revill had with James Patrick Hosty, Jr., a special agent of the FBI; Robert A. Frazier, a firearms expert with the FBI; Drs. Alfred Olivier, Arthur Dziemian, and Frederick W. Light, Jr., wound ballistics experts with the U.S. Army laboratories at Edgewood Arsenal, Md.; J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; John A. McCone, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency; Richard M. Helms, Deputy Director for Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency; Thomas J. Kelley, Leo J. Gauthier, and Lyndal L. Shaneyfelt, who testified concerning efforts to reconstruct the facts of the assassination; Mrs. John F. Kennedy; Jack Ruby; Henry Wade, district attorney of Dallas; Sgt. Patrick T. Dean, of the Dallas police, who testified concerning a conversation with Ruby; Waggoner Carr, attorney general of Texas; Richard Edward Snyder, John A. McVickar, Abram Chayes, Bernice Waterman, and Frances G. Knight, of the U.S. Department of State; Secretary of State Dean Rusk; Mrs. Lee Harvey Oswald; Harris Coulter, an interpreter with the Department of State; Robert Alan Surrey, a Dallas citizen who testified regarding his relationship with General Walker; James J. Rowley, Chief of the U.S. Secret Service; Robert Carswell, special assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury; Bernard William Weissman, who testified concerning an advertisement signed by him which appeared in the Dallas Morning News on November 22, 1963; Robert G. Klause, a Dallas citizen who testified regarding a "Wanted For Treason" handbill; Mark Lane, a New York attorney; President Lyndon B. Johnson and Mrs. Lyndon B. Johnson; Llewellyn E. Thompson, former U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, and Secretary of the Treasury C. Douglas Dillon.

[Contents]

COMMISSION EXHIBITS INTRODUCED

Hearings Before the President's Commission
on the
Assassination of President Kennedy

[Wednesday, May 6, 1964]
TESTIMONY OF ALAN H. BELMONT

The President's Commission met at 9:25 a.m. on May 6, 1964, at 200 Maryland Avenue NE., Washington, D.C.

Present were Chief Justice Earl Warren, Chairman; Representative Gerald R. Ford, John J. McCloy, and Allen W. Dulles, members.

Also present were J. Lee Rankin, General Counsel; David W. Belin, assistant counsel; Norman Redlich, assistant counsel; Samuel A. Stern, assistant counsel; and Charles Murray, observer.

The Chairman. Well, gentlemen, the Commission will come to order.

Mr. Belin, you had something you wanted the record to show in connection with our testimony yesterday.

Mr. Belin. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Would you present it to the Commission now, please.

Mr. Belin. Yes, sir. We have a report from an FBI document that states that Roy Truly when interviewed on November 22, advised that "it is possible Oswald did see him with a rifle in his hands within the past few days," that is as of November 22, "as a Mr. Warren Caster, employed by Southwestern Publishing Co., which company has an office in the same building, had come to his office with two rifles, one was a .22 caliber rifle which Caster said he had purchased for his son, and the other a larger more high-powered rifle which Caster said he had purchased with which to go deer hunting if he got a chance," and Truly said that he examined the high-powered rifle and raised it to his shoulder and sighted over it and then returned it to Caster and Caster left with both rifles.

Then Truly went on to state that he does not own a rifle and has had no other rifle in his hands or in his possession for a long period of time. Now because of the problem that did arise, I believe the staff will promptly go down to Dallas to take the deposition of both Mr. Truly and Mr. Caster to fully get this in deposition form and find out where these rifles were as of November 22.

The Chairman. And their caliber, and so forth.

Mr. Belin. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Yes, sir; I think that is desirable. You ought to do that.

Mr. Belmont, the purpose of today's hearing is to take your testimony concerning the general procedures of the FBI and explain their relationship to the case of Lee Harvey Oswald.

Would you please rise and raise your right hand. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give before this Commission will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Belmont. I do.

The Chairman. Will you be seated, please.

Mr. Stern, will you conduct the examination, please?

Mr. Stern. Thank you, sir. Would you state your full name for the record, please?

Mr. Belmont. Alan H. Belmont.

Mr. Stern. And your address, Mr. Belmont?

Mr. Belmont. 2711 North Yucatan Street, Arlington, Va.

Mr. Stern. Mr. Belmont, what was your education at the college level?

Mr. Belmont. Graduate of Stanford University in California, with an A.B. degree, majoring in accounting.

Mr. Stern. What year?

Mr. Belmont. 1931.

Mr. Stern. What was your employment briefly before joining the Federal Bureau of Investigation?

Mr. Belmont. I joined the Bureau, the FBI, in 1936, and in the interim I worked for public accountants and as a public accountant myself in California.

Mr. Stern. Would you describe, please, for the Commission briefly your experience in the Federal Bureau of Investigation since 1936?

Mr. Belmont. I entered the FBI November 30, 1936, and after the period of training, was assigned to Birmingham, Ala., as my first office. I transferred to Chicago in about August 1937, and remained there until the summer of 1938 when I was transferred to Washington, D.C., headquarters.

In January of 1941 I was transferred to New York as supervisor of applicant and criminal investigative matters, remained there until the fall of 1942, when I was made assistant agent in charge of our Chicago office. In January of 1943 I was made agent in charge of our Cincinnati office and remained there until the summer of 1944 when I was transferred to New York as assistant agent in charge of criminal matters in New York.

Subsequently, I was placed in charge of all security work in New York for a number of years and was transferred to Washington in charge of the domestic intelligence division in February 1950. I headed that division until about June of 1961 when I was made assistant to the director in charge of all investigative work of the FBI and that is my present position.

Mr. Stern. Could you describe the organization of the FBI with two purposes in mind: First, to fix your position in the organization. Second, to provide a framework for describing the investigation of the case of Lee Harvey Oswald.

Mr. Belmont. The headquarters of the FBI is, of course, or the FBI is headed by Mr. J. Edgar Hoover as Director. Directly under him is Mr. Clyde Tolson, Associate Director. There are 10 divisions broken down in particular types of administration.

Mr. Dulles. May I say if any of this is classified, highly classified, you had better let us know because then we could go off the record.

Mr. Belmont. There is nothing classified here.

Mr. Dulles. Right. I know that you would have that in mind.

Mr. Belmont. Thank you.

Basically, the division of the 10 divisions at headquarters is between administrative and investigative. The 10th division is the inspection division and reports directly to Mr. Hoover. I am in charge of the investigative divisions which are comprised of the general investigative divisions handling general criminal work, the special investigative division handling special inquiries of applicant nature, and our aggressive approach to organized crime.

The laboratory division handles all examinations of a scientific nature, and the domestic intelligence division handles all types of security work. I am in charge of those four divisions, and thus am in charge and responsible for our investigative work.

Our field offices, numbering 55, are geographically located in accordance with the amount of work in a particular area. Each division in the field is headed by a special agent in charge, assisted by an assistant special agent in charge. They are responsible for the proper conduct of the work within their divisions. They are answerable to Mr. Hoover. They are also supervised, of course, in the particular area of the work concerned by the division at headquarters.

Depending on——

Mr. Dulles. May I ask is that 55 in the United States?

Mr. Belmont. United States and its possessions.

Mr. Dulles. And Puerto Rico?

Mr. Belmont. Yes.

Mr. Dulles. It doesn't include your legal——

Mr. Belmont. Legal attachés abroad?

Mr. Dulles. Yes.

Mr. Belmont. No; they are under the direct supervision of our headquarters.

Depending on the size of the division in the field, we will have a supervisory staff in order to properly supervise the work of the agents in the field.

Mr. Stern. Can you describe the establishment of a typical case, indicating the meaning of the terms office of origin and auxiliary office?

Mr. Belmont. A case is opened by the FBI upon the receipt of information indicating a matter within the jurisdiction of the FBI. We restrict our investigations to those matters which are within our jurisdiction.

The office of origin is the office where the major part of the work is to be done. Thus it should be the controlling office of the investigation.

Normally, if an individual is under investigation, it will be the office where he resides. There will be in many cases investigation to be conducted by other offices. Those offices that have investigations in that case are considered auxiliary offices, and will cover the investigation sent to it, sent to them, by the office of origin or by another auxiliary office if a lead develops within that area that requires attention elsewhere.

I may say that the office of origin can be changed and is changed if during the investigation it becomes apparent that the focus of the investigation has shifted to another area.

It is logical, therefore, that that office which bears the brunt of the investigation should be in possession of all the material pertinent to the investigation and should be charged with the supervision and running of the investigation and the direction of it.

In the event the office of origin is changed at any given time, the previous office of origin will forward to the new office of origin all material pertaining to the case so that it will have a complete file and the necessary knowledge to run the case.

Mr. Stern. Can you tell us a bit more about how information is maintained and how it flows through the system from headquarters to office of origin, to the auxiliary office or in the other directions that are possible?

Mr. Belmont. Since the information is maintained in a standard and uniform filing system in both our field offices and our headquarters so that there is complete uniformity in the handling of information, our main filing system is at headquarters. Consequently, we need here all pertinent information in any case. Consequently, the reports and information developed during a case are sent to our headquarters for filing.

It is pertinent to observe that we conduct close to 2 million name checks a year for other agencies and departments of the Federal Government. Consequently, we must have here all pertinent information so that a name check will reflect the information in possession of the Bureau.

When a report is prepared in our field office—an investigation, and there are leads or investigation to be performed in another office, copies of this report are designated for that office, together with the lead or the investigation to be covered. Upon receipt of that the office gathers the background information from the report and proceeds with the investigation.

Mr. Stern. This is the auxiliary office?

Mr. Belmont. The auxiliary office.

If there is a matter of urgency rather than wait for an investigative report, the information will be transmitted by more rapid means, such as teletype. All of our offices have teletypes; radio, our offices have a radio system; telephone.

Mr. Dulles. Is that teletype from the office to Washington only, or is there some interoffice teletypes?

Mr. Belmont. Each office is connected with each other office by teletype.

Mr. Dulles. It is; all over the country?

Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir; permitting rapid communication.

Mr. Dulles. That is, New Orleans and Dallas would have teletype between these two offices?

Mr. Belmont. Yes.

The Chairman. What kind of radio communication, Mr. Belmont, did you say?

Mr. Belmont. We have an emergency radio communication so that both for normal use, in the matter of expense, to reduce expenses, and for an emergency, our offices can communicate with headquarters and with each other.

The Chairman. On your own transmission system?

Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir; that is correct. We feel that in any type of an emergency we must, because of our heavy responsibilities——

The Chairman. Yes.

Mr. Belmont. Be able to communicate. As a matter of fact, during the recent disaster in Alaska, one of the few means of communication with the mainland was our radio system.

The Chairman. Is that so?

Mr. Belmont. And we assisted in passing messages down from Alaska.

We have a communication called AIRTEL which is simply a communication in letter form on a particular form which upon receipt is regarded as a matter of urgency and requires special handling.

So that you will understand that, in an effort to cut expenses, we determined that a matter which could not wait for a report or a letter was normally sent by teletype, which is a relatively expensive means of communication.

By sending an AIRTEL which would be recognized for special handling, the office could receive the same information by mail with a delay of perhaps 12 hours and it would still receive the urgent handling that we require for that particular thing. That is the purpose of the AIRTEL.

Mr. Stern. I think we might turn now to a description of your role in the investigation of Lee Harvey Oswald, both before and after the assassination.

Mr. Belmont. As the individual in charge of all investigative operations, the Lee Harvey Oswald investigation is my responsibility, the same as any other investigative case in the Bureau.

Mr. Stern. Did you have any particular involvement that you can recall in the investigation of his case before November 22—personally?

Mr. Belmont. No; this case was not of the importance or urgency that it was considered necessary to call to my personal attention for personal direction. You must bear in mind that during the fiscal year 1963 the FBI handled something in the nature of 636,000 investigative matters. Necessarily, then, those matters which would be called to my personal attention for personal handling would have to be on a selective basis.

Mr. Stern. Have you been personally involved in the investigation since the assassination?

Mr. Belmont. I have indeed.

Mr. McCloy. Before we get to this, how many cases of defections to the Soviet Union would you be investigating in the course of a fiscal year?

Mr. Belmont. I couldn't give you an exact figure on that. It is our system to investigate any individual where there is information or evidence that indicates a necessity for investigation within our jurisdiction. I do know that we have investigated, and currently are investigating, defectors not only to the Soviet Union but in other areas of the world.

Mr. McCloy. They also would not come per se to your attention, your personal attention?

Mr. Belmont. Depending on the case. If there is a matter which has some urgency or there is a question of policy, it would and does come to my attention, and indeed comes to the attention of Mr. Hoover.

I would not seek to give you any impression that I am not advised of many cases, I am. I am kept daily advised, as is Mr. Hoover, of all matters of policy or urgency or where there is a question of procedure. That is inherent in our system of close supervision.

Mr. McCloy. What I am getting at is, I think, is the matter of defection just out of its own character of such significance that it becomes a matter of out of the ordinary importance to the Bureau when you learn of it.

Mr. Belmont. Again, Mr. McCloy, I have no way of knowing the extent to which those particular cases would be called to my attention.

As shown in the Oswald case itself, we do take cognizance of these. Immediately upon the publicity on Oswald, there was a case opened. I do know that I see many such cases and where there is an indication of possible damage to the country through the leak of information, classified or in some other instance where there is a question of policy or urgency it is immediately called to my attention. I can only say in general I do see many such cases.

Mr. McCloy. Well, we had testimony here yesterday that in a preassassination investigation of Oswald that they learned he was a defector, they had interviews with him, and then they marked the case closed.

At one stage it was reopened and then it was closed again because, as I gather it, there was no indication other than his defection that would lead to their, to the agents, feeling that this man was capable of violence or that he was a dangerous character in any sense.

I gather that whether or not he was thought to be a dangerous character or whether he was capable of violence would be settled by the man in the field office, in the office that had charge, the man who was in charge of the office that was dealing with that case locally, is that right?

Mr. Belmont. That is a judgment that he would render, but that judgment would be passed on by our headquarters staff.

Mr. McCloy. Passed on by Washington?

Mr. Belmont. Yes, indeed. In this instance by the domestic intelligence division.

Mr. McCloy. In this case then the decision to close that case, I am talking always about the preassassination business, was approved or tacitly approved by the Washington staff.

Mr. Belmont. Not tacitly approved. Approved.

Mr. McCloy. Approved. Well, you mark the paper approved or you just accept it, accept the file with a notation "return for closing."

Mr. Belmont. When the closing report comes to our headquarters, it is reviewed by our supervisory staff, and if we do not agree with the action then the field office is notified to continue the investigation. That is a decision of substance.

Mr. McCloy. Well, I can understand that but I gather when the report comes in you simply let the report lie unless you feel from your examination of it that it justified further action. You don't notify the field office, do you, that the closing of the case is approved?

Mr. Belmont. No, Mr. McCloy. With the volume of work that we have that would be an unnecessary move.

Mr. McCloy. I can understand that.

Mr. Belmont. It is, however, thoroughly understood through our service, through the system that we follow, that if that report comes in and it is reviewed and it is filed here, if there is disagreement as to the handling of the closing of the case or any other matter pertaining to the investigation, the seat of government will then go out with instructions to the field.

Mr. McCloy. All right.

Mr. Dulles. Could I ask one question further on that point?

The Chairman. Yes, indeed.

Mr. Dulles. As I recall from the testimony of your people yesterday, with regard to the situation in Dallas and later in New Orleans, that after the case was marked closed in Dallas, there was this incident in New Orleans of the distribution of the Fair Play for Cuba pamphlets, and then a case there, a live case, an open case was started.

Now, it wasn't quite clear to me yesterday from all the testimony, I missed a bit of it, unfortunately, as to whether the opening of a new case in New Orleans, because of the new incident, would operate to reopen it or change the closed status of the case in Dallas, and the case was then transferred from New Orleans to Dallas later. If you could clear that up for us I think it would be helpful.

Mr. Belmont. The agent, Fain at the time, who handled the case, closed the case after two interviews with Oswald, arriving at the conclusion that the purpose of our investigation of Oswald which was to determine whether he had been given an assignment by Soviet intelligence, had been served. He closed the case, as he felt there was no further action to be taken. The purpose had been satisfied. Headquarters agreed.

In March 1963 Agent Hosty received information in Dallas to the effect that Oswald had been in communication with The Worker, the east coast Communist newspaper. He therefore reinstituted the case, and sent out a lead to check Oswald's employment. He also received information, as I recall it, that Oswald had been in communication with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, so there were two incidents that aroused his interest.

In June 1963 our New Orleans office likewise received information that Oswald had communicated with The Worker or was on a subscription list for The Worker. So that the case was revived in Dallas by Hosty.

Mr. Dulles. That was even before what we call the New Orleans incident?

Mr. Belmont. Correct.

Mr. Dulles. Yes.

Mr. Belmont. And he learned that Oswald had left Dallas, the residence was then picked up in New Orleans, and the case was revived. So that actually there was a joint revival of the case.

Then on August 9, 1963, Oswald was arrested by the New Orleans police in connection with a disturbance of the peace in passing out these pamphlets, which further aroused our interest. So that the reopening of the case after the closing was due to these incidents that I have mentioned.

Mr. Dulles. Thank you. So that at the time of the assassination, this was an open and not a closed case as regards the Dallas office.

Mr. Belmont. That is correct. At the time that Oswald was found to be living in New Orleans, and this was definitely established that he was actually residing there, the Dallas office in accordance with the procedure that I mentioned, transferred the case to New Orleans as office of origin.

Subsequently, the case was again transferred back to Dallas when it was determined that Oswald was again residing in the Dallas area.

The Chairman. All right, Mr. Stern.

Mr. Stern. We were getting, Mr. Belmont, to the question of whether you had been personally involved in the investigation since the assassination.

Mr. Belmont. I said I have indeed.

Mr. Stern. Yes. As a part of that you have reviewed in detail the investigation made prior to the assassination?

Mr. Belmont. Yes.

Mr. Stern. Have you participated in or supervised the preparation of reports and other correspondence to the Commission in response to questions from the Commission?

Mr. Belmont. Yes.

Mr. Stern. I show you a letter with attached memorandum which has been marked for identification Commission Exhibit No. 833. Can you identify this document, Mr. Belmont?

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 833 for identification.)

Mr. Belmont. This is a letter transmitted on April 6, 1964, to Mr. Rankin by the FBI with enclosure answering a number of questions which the Commission posed to the FBI.

Mr. Stern. Did you supervise the preparation of this letter?

Mr. Belmont. Yes.

Mr. Stern. And you have reviewed it and are familiar with it?

Mr. Belmont. Yes.

Mr. Stern. We have covered in your answers to Mr. Dulles and Mr. McCloy a good deal of the material in here.

I would like briefly to touch upon several of the questions, the more important questions, regarding the nature of the FBI's interest in Lee Harvey Oswald at various times, and I would like you to refer to each question that I indicate but not read your answer. Paraphrase it. I think we have had a good deal of the specific detail but what I am interested in is a description from your examination of the investigation as it was carried on, of the nature of the FBI interest in Oswald.

I would like to turn to the first question in which we asked——

The Chairman. You mean by that that you could get, we could get, a better idea from paraphrasing the answer than we could get from the exact answer itself?

Mr. Stern. I think he might be able to highlight the answer. We have the exact answer on the record, and I thought it might——

The Chairman. Well, highlight it, if there is anything in addition I would think that would be relevant and pertinent. But to ask him to paraphrase that which he has done with great meticulousness would seem to me to be abortive and would take a lot of our time, and I don't see what it would prove. If you have anything in addition that you want to ask him, if you want to ask him if there is anything in addition he has not put in there, that is all right. But to just ask him to paraphrase answers that have been done with great care would seem to me to be confusing the record, and serve no purpose.

Mr. Stern. I might ask, Mr. Belmont, whether there is anything you would like to add or amplify in these questions?

Mr. Belmont. I believe the answers speak for themselves, although in view of Mr. McCloy's questions a little while ago, I would be very happy to make clear our approach to this matter. For example, the fact that our interest in defectors, in this case, is shown by the fact that in early November 1959 we opened a file on Oswald based on the newspaper publicity as to his defection. And the fact that he had applied to renounce his citizenship. We checked our files then to see was this a man we had a record on, and found that we had a fingerprint record solely based on his enlistment in the Marines.

We had no other record on him but we placed a stop or a flash notice in our fingerprint files, at that time so that if he should come back into the country unbeknownst to us and get into some sort of trouble we would be immediately notified. That is our opening interest in the case with the thought in mind that should he come back to the country we would want to know from him whether he had been enlisted by Soviet intelligence in some manner.

That is our procedure because of our experience that these things have happened, and we consider it our responsibility to settle that issue whenever we can.

Mr. Stern. Could you explain, Mr. Belmont, this procedure of placing a stop in the files that you just referred to?

Mr. Belmont. We merely notify our identification division to place what we call a flash notice in the man's fingerprint file, which means that should he be arrested and the fingerprints be sent to the FBI, that the appropriate division, in this case the domestic intelligence division, would be notified that the man had been arrested, for what and where he was arrested, thus enabling us to center our attention on him.

Our next interest in this man arose as a result of the fact that his mother had sent, I believe, $25 to him in Moscow, so we went to her in April 1960 and we talked to her. At that time she told us that he had told her that he would possibly attend the Albert Schweitzer College in Switzerland.

So as a followup, we had our legal attache in Paris make inquiry to see whether he had enrolled in this college. The resultant check showed that while they had expected him and a deposit had been placed that he did not show up at the college.

Mr. Stern. I think that is all covered in quite adequate detail in the answer to the first question.

Mr. Dulles. I have one question I would like to put to you on the first question and answer in your letter of April 6, in Exhibit 833—the Bureau's letter of April 6. You refer, first, to the fact that the first news you got about Oswald was from a news service item, and then later on at the bottom of the second full paragraph you state, "A file concerning Oswald was prepared and as communications were received from other U.S. Government agencies those communications were placed in his file."

The record may show the other communications, I guess our record does show, but do you feel that you adequately were advised by the State Department as this case developed or by the CIA or other agencies that might have known about it?

Mr. Belmont. Yes. We received a number of communications from other agencies, and we set up a procedure whereby we periodically checked the State Department passport file to be kept advised of his activities or his dealings with the Embassy in Moscow so that on a periodic basis we were sure we had all information in the State Department file.

We received communications from the Navy, and from other agencies.

Mr. Dulles. Is there any general procedure with respect to Americans abroad who get into trouble. Do you get informed so in case they come back you can take adequate precautionary measures? Is that established SOP?

Mr. Belmont. Yes, Mr. Dulles. We do receive such information, and if we pick up the information initially as we did here, from press reports or otherwise, we go to the other agencies and ask them whether they have any information and establish an interest there so that if they have not voluntarily furnished us the information they will do so upon our request.

Mr. Dulles. Thank you.

Mr. Stern. On page 3, Mr. Belmont, in the answer to question No. 3, the second paragraph, could you tell us why the FBI preferred to interview Oswald after he had established residence and why it was not preferable to interview him upon his arrival in New York?

Mr. Belmont. This is a matter of experience. Generally speaking when an individual such as Oswald arrives back in the country and the press is there, there is an unusual interest in him. Immigration and Naturalization Service has a function to perform, and we prefer, unless there is a matter of urgency, to let the individual become settled in residence. It is a much better atmosphere to conduct the interview, and to get the information that we seek. If it is a matter of urgency, we will interview him immediately upon arrival.

Mr. Stern. On page 4, Mr. Belmont, in your answer to question No. 6, was it ordinary procedure for Agent Fain to re-interview Oswald so soon after his first interview under the circumstances? Is there anything unusual about that?

Mr. Belmont. There is nothing unusual whatsoever. Agent Fain interviewed Oswald on June 26, 1963—1962, I believe it was, was it not?

The Chairman. Yes; 1962.

Mr. Belmont. And was not satisfied that he had received all the information he wanted nor that it was a matter that should be closed at that time.

Therefore, he set out a lead to re-interview Oswald, and after an appropriate period he went back and re-interviewed him. This is within the prerogative of the investigative agent, and certainly if he was not satisfied with the first interview it was his duty and responsibility to pursue the matter until he was satisfied.

Mr. Stern. In your answer to question No. 5, does the response of Oswald to the question why he went to Russia seem typical to you of the returned defector, or unusual?

Mr. Belmont. There is no such thing as a typical response. Each case is an individual case, and is decided on its merits and on the background of the individual, and the circumstances surrounding it.

Mr. Stern. Would it be usual for the defector to agree to advise you if he got a contact? Are they generally that cooperative?

Mr. Belmont. We ask them because we want to know, and the purpose of our interview with him was to determine whether he had been recruited by the Soviet intelligence, and we asked him whether he would tell us if he was contacted here in this country. He replied he would. Whether he meant it is a question. However, you must bear in mind that this man, I believe it was when he was interviewed in July of 1961 in the American Embassy, the interviewing official there said it was apparent that he had learned his lesson the hard way, and that he had a new concept of the American way of life, and apparently had decided that Russia was not for him.

When we interviewed him likewise he told us that he had not enjoyed his stay in Russia. He likewise commented that he had not enjoyed his stay in the Marines. So that in direct answer to your question, it is customary for us in such a case as this, to ask the man if he will report a contact, and it is customary for him to say yes, because frankly, he would be putting himself in a rather bad light if he didn't say yes.

Mr. Stern. Turning to——

Mr. Dulles. Could I ask a question there: Do I correctly read your report and those of your agents to the general effect that you had no evidence that there was any attempt to recruit Oswald in the United States?

Mr. Belmont. No evidence whatsoever.

Mr. Stern. Question 8, Mr. Belmont, on page 5, sets out the information from a report by Agent Hosty regarding alleged Fair Play for Cuba Committee activity by Oswald while he was still residing in Dallas. Have you found that an investigation was conducted to determine whether that was accurate and do you think it should have been investigated?

Mr. Belmont. As to whether he was active with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in Dallas? We did check. We have rather excellent coverage of such activities. There is no evidence whatsoever to indicate that he was active with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in Dallas. And, as a matter of fact, I can go a step further and say that following his dissemination of pamphlets and his activities in New Orleans, our inquiry of our sources who are competent to tell us what is going on in the organizations such as Fair Play for Cuba Committee, advised that he was not known to them in New Orleans. So that his activities in New Orleans were of his own making, and not as a part of the organized activities of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee.

Mr. McCloy. On that point, Mr. Belmont, where did he get his material, the printed material that he was distributing? Must he not have gotten that from some headquarters?

Mr. Belmont. It is my recollection that he had that printed up himself.

The Chairman. That is right.

Mr. McCloy. All of it, so far as you know, was self-induced, so to speak?

Mr. Belmont. Correct.

Mr. Stern. Does your answer imply, Mr. Belmont, that there were Fair Play for Cuba activities in Dallas and New Orleans that you knew about?

Mr. Belmont. No; we do not have information of Fair Play for Cuba activities in Dallas nor any organized activity in New Orleans. So that this letter that you refer to, which was undated, was, as in so many things that Oswald wrote, not based on fact.

Mr. Stern. On page 7 in the answer to question 12, you refer to the inconsistencies and contradictions between the information Oswald gave to Agent Quigley when he interviewed him in the New Orleans jail and the facts as they were known to the FBI before that, and say that "in the event the investigation of Oswald warranted a further interview, these discrepancies would have been discussed with him."

Can you explain why the fact of these inconsistencies and contradictions and perhaps outright lies to Agent Quigley was not itself reason for a further interview?

Mr. Belmont. Let me turn this just a little bit and say why should we re-interview him?

Our interest in this man at this point was to determine whether his activities constituted a threat to the internal security of the country. It was apparent that he had made a self-serving statement to Agent Quigley. It became a matter of record in our files as a part of the case, and if we determined that the course of the investigation required us to clarify or face him down with this information, we would do it at the appropriate time.

In other words, he committed no violation of the law by telling us something that wasn't true, and unless this required further investigation at that time, we would handle it in due course, in accord with the whole context of the investigation.

Mr. Stern. Do you know whether the fact of these contradictions was called to the attention of the Dallas office at the time of Oswald's return to Dallas?

Mr. Belmont. The entire file, of course, or the pertinent serials were sent to Dallas at the time that the case was transferred back to Dallas so they would have that information.

Mr. Stern. I gather what you are saying is they would note the contradictions from the reports?

Mr. Belmont. Yes.

Mr. Stern. In the answer to question 14 on page 8, again in connection with these inconsistencies, the letter reads "These inconsistencies were considered in subsequent investigation."

Can you expand on that and tell us how they were considered?

Mr. Belmont. That is right along the line of my previous explanation to you, namely, that they were recorded in the file. In the event it was desired to talk to him further at a future date, they would be considered as to whether we desired to have him further explain.

Mr. Stern. On page 12, in response to question 22, which asked for an explanation of the reason for the investigation to ascertain his whereabouts, the letter reads, "In view of Oswald's background and activities the FBI had a continuing interest in him."

What was the nature of that continuing interest at that time?

Mr. Belmont. On August 21, 1963, because of his activities in distributing these pamphlets, and his arrest in New Orleans, headquarters here in Washington sent a letter to the New Orleans and Dallas offices instructing them to pursue the investigation. In other words, in evaluating this information we felt it desirable that we further explore his activities to determine whether they were inimical to the internal security of the country. So that we had this continuing interest based on our evaluation, and so instructed our field offices.

Mr. Stern. Mr. Chairman, I believe the answers to the other questions give us a complete enough record.

The Chairman. Very well.

Mr. Stern. May this exhibit which has been marked 833 for identification be admitted?

The Chairman. It may be admitted in evidence under that number.

(The document referred to, previously marked Commission Exhibit No. 833 for identification, was received in evidence.)

Mr. McCloy. Is there anything else, Mr. Belmont, that you may want to add? You have already been asked this question as you went through all these questions and answers, but is there anything else you would like to add in view of your answers this morning in further elaboration of the answers that have been given?

Mr. Belmont. No, sir; unless the Commission has further questions at this point, I believe that the questions are answered properly and sufficiently.

Mr. McCloy. You think that if you are interviewing a defector which is something that provokes your interest, and I guess the mere fact of defection and return to the United States would do so, and if you found that defector was lying to you, you think that without something in addition to that there would be no further necessity of examining him. Is that a fair question? Let me put it another way.

Mr. Belmont. I have just a little difficulty following you.

Mr. McCloy. Here is my point. Here was a defector who comes within the category of interesting cases naturally.

Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir.

Mr. McCloy. And you question him and you find he is lying to you. At that stage, as I understand your testimony, you say without something more you don't necessarily go any further, is that right?

Mr. Belmont. No; that is not correct. We had talked to this man twice in detail concerning the question of possible recruitment by Soviet intelligence. We had checked his activities. He was settling down. He had a wife and a child. He had, according to what he had told us, in our interview with him, he had not enjoyed his stay in Russia. The State Department evaluation of him in Moscow was that he had learned his lesson and, as a matter of fact, he had made some statement to the effect that he now recognized the value of the American way of life, along those lines.

So that we had pretty well settled that issue. At the time that we interviewed him in the jail in New Orleans, we had again been following his activities because of his communications, his contacts with The Worker and the Fair Play for Cuba Committee and our interest there was to determine whether he was a dangerous subversive. The interview in the jail was very apparently a self-serving interview in an attempt to explain his activities in the New Orleans area, and if I recall correctly, he took the position that the policy as directed against Cuba was not correct, and that the Fair Play for Cuba Committee was merely addressing itself to the complaints of Cuba, and was not in effect a subversive organization.

If, Mr. McCloy, during those first two interviews where we were pursuing this matter of him being a defector and his recruitment, he had lied to us, and the agent was not satisfied we would have pursued it to the bitter end. Or if during any other time information came to our attention which indicated a necessity to pursue that further we would have pursued it to the bitter end.

Mr. McCloy. You speak of this as a self-serving interview. Do you think that he sought the interview with you, with Mr. Quigley eventually, because he had known of the prior contacts that he had had with the FBI, and he simply wanted to keep out of trouble?

Mr. Belmont. I don't know why he asked to see an agent. I simply do not know why.

Mr. McCloy. I think that is all.

Mr. Stern. Mr. Belmont, I show you a letter marked for identification Commission Exhibit No. 834. Can you identify that for the Commission, please?

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 834 for identification.)

Mr. Belmont. This is a letter dated May 4, 1964, addressed to the Commission which sets forth in summary the contents of the headquarters file on Oswald prior to the assassination.

Mr. Stern. Do you have that file with you?

Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir.

Mr. Stern. Would you explain generally to the Commission what materials there are in that file that for security reasons you would prefer not to disclose?

Mr. Belmont. The file contains the identity of some of our informants in subversive movements. It contains information as to some of the investigative techniques whereby we were able to receive some of the information which has been made available to the Commission.

Mr. Stern. I think that is enough, Mr. Belmont, on that.

Mr. McCloy. You didn't have anything further to add to that, did you?

Mr. Belmont. No.

The Chairman. I think as to those things if it is agreeable to the other members of the Commission, we will not pursue any questioning that will call for an answer that would divulge those matters that you have just spoken of.

Mr. Belmont. I would like to make it clear, Mr. Chairman, that—I think that is very kind of you—I would like to make it clear that Mr. Hoover has expressed a desire to be of the utmost help to the Commission, and to make any information available that will be helpful to the Commission. I think your observation is very much worthwhile.

Mr. Stern. Mr. Belmont, have you reviewed the actual file and this letter of May 4 which summarizes each document in the file?

Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir.

Mr. Stern. And to your knowledge, is this an accurate summary of each piece of information in the file?

Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir.

Mr. Stern. The file is available to the Commission?

Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir.

Mr. Stern. If they want to look at any item in it?

Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. The file does not include that security matter that you mentioned, or does it?

Mr. Belmont. This file is as it is maintained at the Bureau with all information in it.

The Chairman. With all information in it?

Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir; this is the actual file.

The Chairman. I see.

Mr. Rankin. Mr. Belmont, are you willing to leave the file a reasonable time in case any of the Commissioners desire to examine it personally?

Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin. We will return it.

The Chairman. I wonder if we do want it on those conditions. If we want to get anything from it don't you think, Mr. Rankin, that we ought to make it known here while the witness is here. I personally don't care to have this information that involves our security unless it is necessary, and I don't want to have documents in my possession where it could be assumed that I had gotten that information and used it, so I would rather, I would rather myself confine our questions to this file to the testimony of Mr. Belmont. Then if we want it, if we want any of those things, it then becomes a matter to discuss here in the open, and not just in privacy.

Mr. Rankin. Mr. Chairman, I felt it made a better record if the file is available only to the Commissioners in case they do want to examine it, and then it will be taken back and the staff will not examine it.

The Chairman. I think he has stated that the file will be made available to us whenever we want it.

Mr. Rankin. Yes.

The Chairman. If we do want it to read it that is one thing. For myself, I think we can get what we want from examining the witness, and then if there is any portion of it that comes into play why we can determine the question here, but I really would prefer not to have a secret file, I mean a file that contains matters of that kind in our possession.

Mr. Rankin. There is one factor that I wanted to get before the Commission and in the record, and that is that you had all the information that the FBI had in regard to this matter, and I thought that was important to your proceedings, so that we would not retain such a file, and we had an accurate summary but that it is available so that the Commission can be satisfied that nothing was withheld from it in regard to this particular question. That was the purpose of the inquiry.

Mr. Dulles. I assume, Mr. Belmont, if later other testimony arises that would make us desire to refer to this file we could consult it in your offices or you would make it available to us?

Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. I think I would personally rather have it done on that basis. What do you think, Mr. McCloy?

Mr. McCloy. I was just glancing at the file, and it seems to have the regular, the usual type of reports that we have seen. But there is a good bit of elaboration in those, in that file of the summary which is here. This summary I don't think can purport to be a complete description of the documents that are in here, as I glance through them here.

I just happened to see a good bit of detail in here which doesn't have anything to do with the security problem we talked about, but I would think that probably it would be wise for some member of the Commission or members of the Commission as a whole, to run through that file in order to be sure that we have seen the material elements of the file that we would not perhaps, might not, be able to get from this letter of May 4.

The Chairman. Well, there are so many of these questions in here that are obviously matters that we would have no more concern with than just to know about them.

Start from the very beginning, a news clipping from the Corpus Christi Times, dated October 2, 1959. Now if that excites any interest on the part of any member, why we could say, "Well, could you show us that?" Then the next is the United Press release, dated October 31 at Moscow, and a great many of these.

Now, I wonder if it wouldn't be better for us to look over all of these various things, items that are in the file, and then if there are any that happen to excite our interest, we can ask Mr. Belmont about it. If it is a matter that involves security, we could then discuss it and make our determination as to whether we wanted to see it. I would think that when we are dealing with things that are as sensitive as the FBI has to deal with in that respect, that that would be adequate; that is my opinion of it.

But if the rest of the Commission feel that they want to see it notwithstanding the security measure, I would, of course, have no objection.

Mr. Rankin. Mr. Chief Justice, what I was trying to deal with was a claim by someone that the Commission never saw all there was in the hands of the FBI about Lee Harvey Oswald, and we recognize that some of these items should not be considered important by anyone, as we look at the matter, but we wanted you to be able to satisfy the public and the country that whatever there was that the FBI had, the Commission had it, and we didn't think that in light of the security problems the whole file should be a part of the files of the Commission. And we tried to present here a summary, even of items that did not seem important, but we did want the record in such condition that the Commission could say in its report, "We have seen everything that they have." I think it is important to the case.

Mr. McCloy. I notice, Mr. Belmont, in running through this file, a note here that symbols are used in instances where the identities of the sources must be concealed.

Mr. Belmont. That is correct, sir.

Mr. McCloy. If that is so——

Mr. Belmont. In some instances.

Mr. McCloy. Only in some instances. There are other cases where that is not the case.

Mr. Belmont. Yes; that is right.