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MICHELIN ILLUSTRATED GUIDES
TO THE BATTLEFIELDS (1914-1918)
THE AMERICANS
IN THE
GREAT WAR
VOLUME II.
THE BATTLE OF SAINT MIHIEL
(ST. MIHIEL, PONT-à-MOUSSON, METZ.)
MICHELIN & Cie., CLERMONT=FERRAND
MICHELIN TYRE Co. Ltd., 81 Fulham Road, LONDON, S. W.
MICHELIN TIRE Co., MILLTOWN, N. J., U. S. A.
The Michelin Wheel
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because the least complicated
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It embellishes even the finest coachwork.
Simple
It is detachable at the hub and fixed by six bolts only.
Strong
The only wheel which held out on all fronts during the war.
Practical
Can be replaced in 3 minutes by anybody and cleaned still quicker.
It prolongs the life of tires by cooling them.
AND THE CHEAPEST
THE “TOURING CLUB DE FRANCE”
———
WHAT IS IT? WHAT ARE ITS USES?
The “Touring Club de France” (founded in 1890), is at the present time the largest Touring Association in the whole world. Its principal aim is to introduce France—admirable country and one of the loveliest on earth—to French people themselves and to foreigners.
It seeks to develop travel in all its forms—on foot, on horseback, on bicycle, in carriage, motor, yacht, or railway, and soon in aeroplane.
Every member of the Association receives a badge and an identity ticket free of charge, also the “Revue Mensuelle” every month.
Members have also the benefit of special prices in a certain number of affiliated hotels; and this holds good for the purchase of guide-books and Staff (Etat-major) maps, as well as those of the “Ministère de l’Intérieur,” the T. C. F., etc. They may insert notices regarding the sale or purchase of travelling requisites in the “Revue” (1 fr. per line). The “Comité des Contentieux” is ready to give them counsel with regard to travelling, and 3,000 delegates in all the principal towns are able to give them advice and information about the curiosities of art or of nature in the neighborhood, as well as concerning the roads, hotels, motor-agents, garages, etc.
Members are accorded free passage across the frontier for a bicycle or motor-bicycle. For a motor-car the Association gives a “Triptyque” ensuring free passage through the “douane,” etc.
ONE TRAVELS BEST IN FRANCE WHEN A MEMBER
OF THE “TOURING CLUB DE FRANCE”
IN MEMORY
OF THE MICHELIN WORKMEN AND EMPLOYEES WHO
DIED GLORIOUSLY FOR THEIR COUNTRY
THE AMERICANS
IN THE
GREAT WAR
VOLUME II.
THE BATTLE OF ST. MIHIEL
(ST. MIHIEL, PONT-À-MOUSSON, METZ.)
Published by
Michelin & Cie, Clermont-Ferrand, (France)
—————
Copyright, 1920, by Michelin & Cie
All rights of translation, adaptation or reproduction (in part or whole), reserved
in all countries.
FOREWORD
THE ST. MIHIEL VICTORY, SEPTEMBER, 1918
The world already knows of the undying glory achieved in the Great War by the American Soldiers, but perhaps less is known about the historic ground over which they fought.
The purpose of the present volume is more to describe, for the benefit of the tourist, that section of France where the battle of Saint-Mihiel raged, than to dwell on the splendid achievements of the brave troops from across the seas, who took that ancient stronghold, and thus opened the way to Metz.
At the same time it is fitting to remind the reader that at Saint-Mihiel the Americans liberated over 150 square miles of French territory; took over 15,000 German prisoners, and captured upwards of 200 guns.
President Poincaré, in a message to President Wilson, expressed in the following words, the feelings of France regarding the glorious achievements of the American troops: “I congratulate you, Mr. President, on a victory which has been completed so brilliantly. General Pershing’s magnificent divisions have just liberated with admirable dash, cities and villages of Lorraine which have been groaning for years under the yoke of the enemy. I express the warmest thanks of France to the people of the United States.”
Marshal Foch, also, expressed the greatest possible admiration for the way the American troops fought their way to the great victory at Saint-Mihiel. In describing the battle Marshal Foch said: “This was where the Americans for the first time showed their worth. This is where we were able to judge of these admirable soldiers, strong in body and valiant in soul. In one swoop they reduced the famous salient, which during so long we did not know how to approach.”
In closing this brief introduction the publisher wishes to say that it would have been an easy matter to fill the pages following with many high-sounding phrases and verbose descriptions, but it has been thought better to adhere to the facts (they speak for themselves), and to furnish the tourist as briefly as possible with an historically correct account of the great victory of Saint-Mihiel.
AMERICAN FORCES ENGAGED
FIRST ARMY CORPS
Major-General Hunter Liggett
| comprising the | ||
| 82nd Division | Major-General | W. P. Burnham |
| 90th „ | „„ | Henry T. Allen. |
| 5th „ | „„ | John McMahon. |
| 2nd„ | „ „ | John A. Le Jeune. |
MAJOR-GENERAL HUNTER LIGGETT
Commanding the 1st Army Corps.
FOURTH ARMY CORPS
Major-General Joseph T. Dickman
| comprising the | ||
| 89th Division | Brig.-General | Frank L. Winn. |
| 42nd „ | Major-General | C. A. Flagler. |
| 1st „ | „„ | E. F. McGlachlin. |
| 3rd„(Res.) | „„ | B. B. Buck. |
MAJOR-GENERAL JOSEPH T. DICKMAN
Commanding the 4th Army Corps.
FIFTH ARMY CORPS
Major-General George H. Cameron
| comprising the | ||
| 26th Division | Major-General | Harry C. Hale. |
| 4th„ | „ „ | Mark L. Hersey. |
MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE H. CAMERON
Commanding the 5th Army Corps.
MAJ.-GEN.
J. A. LE JEUNE,
2nd Inf. Divn.
MAJ.-GEN. E. F. McGLACHLIN, JR. 1st Inf. Divn.
MAJOR-GENERAL HENRY T. ALLEN
90th Inf. Divn.
MAJ.-GEN. C. A. F. FLAGLER
42nd Inf. Divn.
MAJ.-GEN. M. L. HERSEY
4th Inf. Divn.
THE FRONTIER IN 1914 AND DEFENCES OF THE MEUSE
In constructing these defences, Gen. Séré de Rivières’ plans provided for the concentration of the French Armies to the west of the Meuse, the bridges being within range of the guns of the forts on the Meuse Heights. The quadrilateral formed by Woëvre Plain was open to the enemy.
THE MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE ST. MIHIEL SALIENT (1914-1918).
The Frontier in 1914
(See map, [p. 8.])
If we look at a map of the Franco-German frontier of 1914, between Nancy and Verdun, it will be seen that two rivers—the Meuse and the Moselle—ran parallel with the frontier, forming a double line of defences. The Moselle is protected by the hills of that name, and the Meuse by the Heights of Meuse, the eastern side of which, facing Germany, consists of a series of steep cliffs.
When, in 1875, General Séré de Rivières was instructed to fortify this frontier, his plans provided for the construction of a line of forts along the Meuse Heights, capable of holding the bridges across the Meuse under gunfire, and thus enable the French Armies to concentrate behind the river near Neufchâteau. The three northern forts, therefore, faced the Meuse; the southern forts, viz., Gironville and Liouville, commanded both the Meuse and the Woëvre.
The drawback to this plan was that the vast Woëvre Plain lying between Stenay, Longwy, Toul and Nancy, would be sacrificed in the event of a surprise attack. The importance of this possible loss was made all the greater by the discovery of coalfields in the Briey district. It was therefore decided that a number of battalions of Chasseurs should be garrisoned in the Woëvre towns. Moreover, the passing of the Three Years’ Military Service Bill made it possible to increase considerably the number of covering troops. In 1914, the Plan of Concentration provided for the grouping of the French Third Army in the Woëvre Plain. However, no permanent defences were erected. The fortress of Longwy, being isolated and of little military value, could not give effective protection.
The German Government had on several occasions given the French Government to understand that they would disapprove the erection of fortifications in Woëvre. On the other hand, the Germans unceasingly strengthened their own frontier from Metz to Thionville, increasing the perimeter of the entrenched camp of Metz from 25 to 90 kilometres and erecting ten new forts. All the attacks against the Meuse Heights started from this vast entrenched camp, which, for four years, also furnished the German lines of St. Mihiel with troops.
September 7, 1914, and the following days were particularly anxious ones for General Sarrail’s army which, resting as it did on Verdun, was to form the pivot of Joffre’s famous manœuvre (see the Michelin Illustrated Guide: “The Battlefields of the Marne, 1914”).
HOW THE ST. MIHIEL SALIENT WAS FORMED
First Attempt during the Battle of the Marne
(See map, [p. 10.])
A furious frontal attack was made on this army by the ex-Crown Prince of Germany, while at the same time it was taken in the rear, on the Meuse Heights, by the Bavarian Crown Prince. Had the latter succeeded in crossing the Meuse, Verdun would have become untenable; General Sarrail would have been forced to retreat southwards, and, as in this gigantic battle of the Marne all the armies were interdependent, such a withdrawal would have been felt all along the line, and Joffre’s plans for a strategical recovery would have failed.
On September 8, the Germans bombarded the Fort of Troyon. The Governor of Verdun telegraphed to the officer in command of the fort that victory depended upon his resistance, and requested him to hold out “indefinitely.” As a precautionary measure, General Sarrail ordered several of the bridges across the Meuse to be destroyed.
On September 9, the fort’s guns were put out of action, but the defenders repulsed several assaults. Génicourt Fort was next bombarded.
THE FIRST GERMAN ATTACKS AGAINST THE MEUSE HEIGHTS
While the Battle of the Marne was raging, the Germans attempted in vain to capture the Meuse Heights, in order to take Gen. Sarrail’s Army—the pivot of Joffre’s manoeuvre—in the rear.
On the 10th, the forts were still holding out, although deluged with shells. Meanwhile the German infantry advanced towards St. Mihiel.
However, the Battle of the Marne had now been won on the left wing, and the German retreat, which was to extend as far as the Verdun—St. Mihiel district, had begun.
General de Castelnau despatched the 73rd Reserve and 2nd Cavalry Divisions of his army to Troyon, and the fort was relieved on September 13. The mobile defence forces of Verdun pursued the retreating Germans across the Meuse and established themselves to the east of the town, while General Sarrail’s army advanced towards the north and west.
The German plan had completely failed.
THE FORMATION OF THE ST. MIHIEL SALIENT (Sept. 20-29, 1914)
Their set-back at Troyon did not prevent the Germans reforming, and they attacked the Meuse Heights again on September 20, in an endeavour to outflank Verdun from the south. Four army corps under General von Strantz, starting from Metz, advanced rapidly on the 22nd to the Combres-Vigneulles-Thiaumont line, and began a methodical bombardment of the forts on the Meuse Heights. These were soon pounded into shapeless heaps of débris, but the gallant defenders still held on and repulsed all assaults.
On the 23rd, the enemy advanced to Seicheprey. The mobile defence forces of the region, greatly outnumbered (two or three to one), formed only a very thin line, the depth of which steadily decreased as it extended beyond Verdun to the south.
On September 24, the German attacks were renewed with increased fury. On the 25th, they succeeded in gaining a footing on the Meuse Heights near Vigneulles, whence they advanced to St. Mihiel, which they entered without, however, crossing the Meuse. At this point the river was only defended by one battalion of Territorials, and the Germans were able to cross on the 26th, after which they began to advance towards the valley of the Aire, in the direction of Verdun. The situation was critical. The 16th Corps from Nancy met and defeated the German forces, and obliged them to fall back in disorder on the suburbs of St. Mihiel, but were unable to force them back across the river. On September 29, the front line ran through Combres, Chauvoncourt, Apremont and Seicheprey.
THE DESTROYED BRIDGE AT ST. MIHIEL
In the background: Temporary foot-bridge built by the Allies in Sept., 1918.
THE ST. MIHIEL SALIENT—Oct., 1914, to Sept., 1918
(See map, [p. 13.])
FORTIFIED STREET IN FEY-EN-HAYE (1915)
From November 17-20 the French endeavoured to drive the Germans from the bridgehead which the enemy held at Chauvoncourt, opposite St. Mihiel. In a spirited attack they drove the Germans from the suburb and barracks of Chauvoncourt. However, the latter had been mined, the Germans, taking advantage of the confusion caused by the explosion, counter-attacked and reoccupied Chauvoncourt.
This was the last attack made at the point of the salient. Only local fighting of extreme violence now took place in Apremont Forest, the result of which was, the French prevented the Germans extending the salient.
French offensives were launched against the northern and southern sides of the salient, at Eparges and Prêtre Wood, in the hope of narrowing the salient and forcing the Germans to evacuate it. Eparges Crest was conquered after more than two months of the fiercest possible fighting, ending on April 9, 1915.
ST. MIHIEL SALIENT, FROM OCT., 1914, to SEPT., 1918
However, these local actions were insufficient, and little by little the line became fixed. Both sides entrenched themselves and bombarded each other unceasingly, while the sappers carried out long and strenuous mining operations. Attacks were henceforth confined to small local objectives: a wood, house, bridge or crater, and it required the great American offensive of September, 1918, to flatten out this salient which, for four years, had formed a huge “pocket” inside the French lines.
The Salient during the Battle of Verdun
The German offensive, which began on February 21, 1916, caused a slight withdrawal along the whole of the French Verdun-Nancy line (see the Michelin Illustrated Guide: “Verdun”). The French line was withdrawn behind Fresnes, passing thence round Eparges Crest, which formed a hinge.
After the French counter-offensive of July-September, 1917, which disengaged Verdun and the immediate vicinity, their positions were further improved by a series of local operations at Eparges and around Pont-à-Mousson.
ON BEAUMONT HEIGHTS
Gen. F. E. Bamford, commanding the American 2nd Brigade, watching the advance of his troops before Beaumont, Sept. 12, 1918.
THE AMERICAN OFFENSIVE OF SEPTEMBER, 1918
It has been seen in the Michelin Illustrated Guide: “The Americans in the Great War,” Vol. I., that the 1st and 3rd American Corps, under the respective commands of Major-Generals Liggett and Bullard, reached the Vesle at the beginning of August, 1918. General Pershing’s intention at that time was to use these two army corps to form the American First Army which, under his personal command, was to relieve the French 6th Army (General Degoutte). However, the Germans having given proof of their intention to defend the Vesle line at all cost, Marshal Foch decided to attack at another point of the front, and entrusted the task of flattening out the salient to the American Army.
FLIREY VILLAGE (Sept. 14, 1918)
American Sappers pulling down the walls of the ruined houses to fill in the German trenches across the roads in the salient.
This operation had already been carefully studied by the American Staff, for it was in this region that the first American divisions were trained in active warfare.
The 1st Division was holding the sector extending from Ailly Wood to Mortmare Wood, when it was relieved by the 26th Division on April 2, 1918, and despatched to the Somme, where it covered itself with glory by the capture of Cantigny. On April 20, the 26th Division withstood a powerful surprise attack at Seicheprey, where, after losing part of the village, it succeeded in fully re-establishing its front. On July 10, it was sent from the Woëvre district to take part in the Battle of the Ourcq.
From January, 1918, the 2nd Division held that part of the front lying between Eparges and Spada Pass, where it received a thorough training, the effects of which the Germans were destined to feel around Château-Thierry in June, 1918.
On August 30, General Pershing took over the command of the First Army, with Headquarters at Ligny-en-Barrois. At that time, the front line of the salient ran as follows: from Eparges Crest it descended in an almost straight line to St. Mihiel, along the Meuse Heights; passing thence round St. Mihiel, the great bend in the Meuse and the Camp-des-Romains, it described a vast semicircle; then turning sharply eastwards, it proceeded towards Pont-à-Mousson, passing through the woods of Apremont, Ailly, Mortmare and Le Prêtre.
The total length of the salient front was about 65 km., and its width along the German lines between Eparges and Regniéville (near Prêtre Wood) about 39 km. It penetrated the French lines to a maximum depth of 22 km.
ST. MIHIEL SALIENT PRIOR TO THE OFFENSIVE OF SEPT., 1918
It measured 39 km. across its greatest width, 22 km. in depth, and about 65 km. along its front.
Since 1916 this important salient had been fairly quiet, and beyond intermittent bombardments—which showed that the lines on both sides were defended and that the artillery was on the alert—and a few local attacks, the communiqués had nothing to report. This salient, however, greatly hampered the French lines of communication, cutting as it did the railway between Verdun and Toul. This line, which runs as far as Epinal and Belfort, linked up these four great eastern fortresses before the war.
The Defences of the Salient
(See map below.)
Through aerial observations and prisoners taken during raids, the American High Command knew that the enemy possessed several lines of defences, one behind the other, in the salient, and that beyond the first line of trenches facing the front was a second line known as the Schroeter Zone, which formed a second salient about 5 km. within the first. This line began north-east of Eparges, and went southwards across the Meuse Heights, then descending eastwards near Varvinay as far as Buxières, afterwards passing behind the deep valley of the Rupt-de-Mad, and lastly going in a north-easterly direction through Nonsard, Lamarche, Beney and Xammes, where it joined up with the Michel line. The latter formed part of the system of defences known as the Hindenburg Line or Kriemhilde Position—considered impregnable by the Germans, and of which they said to the Allies: “Thus far, and no further”—and it was there that the final enemy stand in the salient was to be made.
THE GERMAN DEFENCE WORKS IN THE SALIENT
The German lines of defence extended in échelons over the whole depth of the salient, and rested on the zone of the advanced forts of Metz.
The Opposing Forces
(See map below.)
Lieutenant-General Fuchs, Commander of the German forces in the salient, had eight divisions in the line and five divisions of reserves.
These divisions formed part of the forces of General von Gallwitz, commanding the army group, and it was he who really opposed the Americans.
On this front General Pershing had four army corps disposed as follows:—
The 1st Corps, comprising the 82nd, 90th, 5th and 2nd Divisions, commanded by Major-General Hunter Liggett, operated from Clémery, east of the Moselle, to Limey.
The 4th Corps, consisting of the 89th, 42nd and 1st Divisions, commanded by Major-General Joseph T. Dickman, operated from Limey to Xivray.
THE OPPOSING FORCES AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 1918 OFFENSIVE
To these two Corps was assigned the task of carrying out the main attack, their objective being the Vigneulles-St. Benoit-Xammes line, which was to be reached in three successive rushes.
The 5th American Corps, composed of the 26th and 4th Divisions under Major-General George H. Cameron, and supported by the French 15th Division, carried out a secondary attack from Mouilly to Watronville, the objectives being, first the capture of the crests of Eparges and Combres, then the Combres-Vigneulles line. The Corps was to join hands in the latter village with the troops engaged in the main attack.
The French 2nd Colonial Corps, first under General Blondlat and afterwards General Claudel, operated in the centre of the salient, from Xivray to Mouilly, with orders to protect the flanks of the two American attacks.
The attacking forces consisted of some 216,000 Americans and 48,000 French, in addition to the American Reserves (190,000 men), who were ready at a moment’s notice to take part in the battle.
In his official report General Pershing stated that he had mustered a body of troops three times as large as General Grant’s Army of the Potomac in 1864-1865.
SHOWING THE AMERICAN-FRENCH ADVANCE FROM SEPT. 12 (12/9) TO NOV. 11 (11/11), 1918
Two secondary attacks on Sept. 12 held the enemy at the bottom of the salient, while the main attacks on the flanks crushed in the latter, as in the jaws of a vise. On Sept. 13, the Germans, in danger of being cut off, were forced to evacuate the salient.
Flattening out the Salient, Sept. 12, 1918
(See map above.)
Despite all the precautions taken by General Pershing to ensure the secrecy of his troops’ movements in the St. Mihiel sector, the Germans expected the attack, and as early as the beginning of September began to withdraw their heavy guns, and to make active preparations for the total evacuation of the salient. However, General Pershing did not give them time to do this, and ordered the attack to be made on September 12, at 5 a.m. for the 1st and 4th Corps, and at 8 a.m. for the 5th Corps.
The attack had been worked out in minute detail, and the time-table of the advance exactly laid down. Everything took place as arranged. After an artillery preparation lasting four hours, the American divisions advanced, supported by a certain number of tanks, half of them driven by Americans and the other half by Frenchmen. Accompanied by soldiers whose duty it was to cut the barbed wire, and by men armed with “bangalore torpedoes,” the Americans advanced in successive waves. They soon reached the enemy trenches and fell unexpectedly on the demoralized foe in the middle of a fog.
On September 12 (12/9) the 1st Corps quickly took Thiaucourt, whilst the 4th Corps, operating on the left, advanced beyond Montsec and reached Nonsard, further north. At the point of the salient, the 2nd French Colonial Corps gradually attained the objectives assigned to it. The 2nd Cavalry Division captured more than 2,500 prisoners with a loss of only fourteen men killed and 116 wounded. At the other end, the 5th American Corps carried the crests of Eparges and Combres, repulsed a counter-attack, and quickly joined hands with the patrols of the 4th Corps at Vigneulles.
On the morning of September 13 (13/9), Generals Pershing and Pétain entered St. Mihiel. In the evening the new front line ran as follows: Herbeuville, Thillot-sous-les-Côtes, Hattonville, St. Benoit, Xammes, Jaulny, Norroy.
It was a fine victory: 16,000 prisoners, 443 guns of all calibres, and huge quantities of stores and munitions were captured, with a loss of only 7,000 killed and wounded.
The German retreat continued on September 14 and 15 (14/9 and 15/9) to the line Fresnes—Hautmont—Rembercourt.
The offensive was finished; the jaws of the vise had closed on the salient, and the latter had disappeared. From the American advance-posts the out-works of Metz were now plainly visible, and Wagner Fort, situated in front of the town, was already under the fire of the American guns.
German Comments on the Attack
A German report on the American attack of the St. Mihiel salient contains the following:—“The Americans made a clever use of their machine-guns. They are stubborn in defence, and rely greatly upon this weapon, of which they have large numbers.
“The artillery preparation, which preceded the attack, was well carried out. The objectives were efficiently bombarded. The American gunners were able to change their targets in the minimum of time, and with great accuracy. The liaison between the infantry and the artillery was faultless. Whenever the infantry were stopped by a nest of machine-guns, they immediately fell back, and their artillery promptly shelled the nest of machine-guns.
“Numerous tanks were ready, but only a few actually used; the masses of infantry alone ensured the victory.”
COMRADES IN ARMS
MARSHAL FOCH
GENERAL PERSHING
France’s Congratulations
Immediately after the first American successes in the salient, the President of the French Republic cabled his warmest congratulations to President Wilson for the victory of “General Pershing’s magnificent divisions, fraternally seconded by French troops.”
The praise was well deserved, as in two days the Americans had liberated 150 square miles of French territory which had been occupied four years by the enemy.
THE OPPOSING FORCES ON ARMISTICE DAY
A crushing offensive was on the eve of being launched. The enemy, incapable of effectual resistance, hauled down their flag and capitulated.
St. Mihiel Front from Sept. 15 to Armistice Day
During the great Meuse-Argonne Battle, fought by General Pershing’s troops after September 26, the operations on the St. Mihiel front were limited to intermittent bombardments and local attacks.
When the Armistice was signed on November 11, General Pershing was making dispositions to invest Metz by an offensive towards Longwy with the 1st Army, and towards Briey with the 2nd Army, while a detachment of six American divisions was to co-operate on the right bank of the Moselle with General Mangin’s Army, in an attack on Château-Salins. Meanwhile, the Germans had already begun to evacuate Metz. The Allies’ advance began on November 10 and 11, but the general capitulation of the Germans, on terms dictated by the Allies, robbed the Americans of a new and crushing victory, which would have fittingly crowned their fine success at St. Mihiel.
A VISIT TO THE BATTLEFIELDS
IN THREE ITINERARIES
FIRST ITINERARY (p. [22])
Distance: 80 km. (See [pp. 23-71])
VERDUN to COMMERCY, via Calonne Trench, Eparges, Apremont
Forest, Ailly Wood and St. Mihiel, including
A VISIT TO ST. MIHIEL (pp. [55-69])
SECOND ITINERARY (pp. [72-137])
Distance: 142 km. (See pp. [72-137])
COMMERCY to METZ, via Pont-à-Mousson, including
A VISIT TO PRÊTRE WOOD (pp. [102-119])
A VISIT TO METZ ([120-137])
THIRD ITINERARY (pp. [138-145])
METZ to VERDUN, via Etain (pp. [138-145])
FIRST DAY—VERDUN TO COMMERCY
Follow the roads indicated by the continuous black lines, in the direction of the arrows. See sheets 7 and 12 of the Michelin Touring Map.
FAÇADE OF THE HÔTEL-DE-VILLE, OVERLOOKING THE PUBLIC GARDENS
(From the Michelin Guide: The Battle of Verdun.)
FIRST DAY
FROM VERDUN TO COMMERCY
Leave Verdun by the Rue de l’Hôtel-de-Ville, Rue St. Sauveur, Rue and Gate of St. Victor (photo below) and N. 3.
Ten kilometres down this road, Rozellier Fort will be seen on the left. One kilometre further on, take the strategic I.C. 3, also known as Calonne Trench, on the right.
VERDUN—ST. VICTOR’S GATE
(From the Michelin Guide: The Battle of Verdun.)
CALONNE TRENCH