ILLUSTRATED MICHELIN GUIDES
TO THE BATTLE-FIELDS (1914-1918)

THE
SOMME

VOLUME 2.
THE SECOND BATTLE OF THE SOMME
(1918)
(AMIENS, MONTDIDIER, COMPIÈGNE)

MICHELIN & CIE —CLERMONT-FERRAND.
MICHELIN TYRE CO LTD —81, FULHAM ROAD, LONDON, S. W
MICHELIN TIRE CO —MILLTOWN. N.J. U.S.A.

HOTELS

AMIENS

Hôtel du Rhin, 4, rue de Noyon. Tel. 44.
Belfort-Hôtel, 42, rue de Noyon. Tel. 649.
Hôtel de l'Univers, 2, rue de Noyon. Tel. 2.51.
Hôtel de la Paix, 15, rue Duméril. Tel. 9.21.
Hôtel de l'Ecu de France, 51, place René-Goblet. Tel. 3.37.

COMPIÈGNE

Hôtel du Rond-Royal, av. Thiers. I Rond-Royal. Tel. 4.15.
Palace-Hôtel, place du Palais. I Palace, Tel. 1.15.
Hôtel de la Cloche, 27, place de l'Hôtel-de-Ville. Tel. 0.85.
Hôtel de Flandre, 2, rue d'Amiens. Tel. 36.

The above information, extracted from the MICHELIN TOURIST GUIDE (1920), may no longer be exact when it meets the reader's eye. Tourists are therefore recommended to consult the MICHELIN TOURING OFFICES, 81, Fulham Rd., London. S.W. 3, or 99, Boulevard Pereire, Paris, 17^e.

AN INDISPENSABLE AUXILIARY:

The Michelin Map

On sale
at booksellers
and
MICHELIN
stockists.

For the
present
GUIDE,
take sheet
n^o 6.

MOTORISTS

this map
was made
specially
for you.

The "Michelin Wheel"

BEST of all detachable wheels
because the least complicated

Smart

It embellishes even the finest coachwork.

Simple

It is detachable at the hub and fixed by six bolts only.

Strong

The only wheel which held out on all fronts during the War.

Practical

Can be replaced in 3 minutes by anybody and cleaned still quicker.

It prolongs the life of tyres by cooling them.

AND THE CHEAPEST

In Memory
of the Michelin Workmen and Employees
who died gloriously for their Country.

THE
SOMME.
VOLUME II.
The Second Battle of the Somme
(1918)
AMIENS—MONTDIDIER—COMPIÈGNE.

Compiled and published by
MICHELIN & Cie., Clermont-Ferrand, France.

All rights of translation, adaptation or reproduction (in part or
whole) reserved in all countries

The Front Line,
March 21, 1918.

THE BATTLEFIELD.

THE SECOND BATTLE OF THE SOMME.

At different periods during the War, important events took place in the Plains of Picardy, in the region which extends between Amiens and St. Quentin, Bapaume and Noyon, between the valleys of the rivers Ancre, Avre and Oise.

The Franco-British Offensive of July-September 1916, and the German Retreat of March 1917, are described in the Michelin Guide "The First Battle of the Somme, 1916-1917", which includes carefully prepared itineraries, enabling the reader to cover the whole battlefield of that period.

The present guide describes the operations which took place in Picardy in March-April 1918 (The German Offensive), and in August 1918 (The Franco-British Offensive); in a Word, the ebb and flow of the German Armies in 1918, from St. Quentin to Montdidier.

THE BATTLEFIELD.

Driven from the banks of the Somme by the Franco-British Offensive of 1916, the Germans were compelled, in March 1917, to retreat, before the menace of the Allied offensives on their flank.

They then established themselves on the Hindenburg Line, and in 1917, in consequence of British attacks in the Arras sector and before Cambrai, they unceasingly increased the number of their fortified lines. This redoubtable position stretched to the west of the Cambrai-La Fère road, via Le Catelet and St. Quentin, utilising a series of natural obstacles, the most important of which were the Escaut, the St. Quentin Canal and the marshy valley of the Oise. (See the Michelin Guide "The Hindenburg Line".)

But in the early days of 1918, having crushed Russia, Germany decided to assume the offensive, using the Hindenburg positions as a kind of spring-board, from which her mighty armies rushed forward to conquer France.

In February 1918, the British positions extended in front of the Hindenburg Line, as far as the village of Barisis, opposite the Forest of St. Gobain, to the south of the Oise. Three successive positions, widely separated from one another, had been actively strengthened. Moreover, the water-lines of the marshy valley of the Oise, the Crozat Canal, the loop in the Somme, and the North Canal, formed so many natural obstacles.

The Picardian Plain, with its broad and gentle undulations, dotted here and there with small woods, is closed, on the south, near the valley of the Oise, by the wooded hills of Genlis, Frières and La Cave, and to the west of the bend in the Oise, by the hills of Porquericourt and the wooded massif of Le Plémont, with its promontory, Mount Renaud, to the south of Noyon. Further west, the high ground of Boulogne-la-Grasse does not close the Plain of Santerre, which, between the slopes of Le Plémont and Montdidier, communicates freely with the Plain of Ile-de-France. The enclosed and wooded valleys of the rivers Avre, Trois-Doms and Luce intersect the tablelands of Santerre. Further north, stretches the old battlefield of 1916,—a chaotic waste of winding trenches and barbed wire entanglements.

In the Picardian Plain, beyond the bounds of the old battlefield, were numerous country villages, with their cottages grouped around the church. The long, straight roads, bordered with fine elms or fruit-trees, stretched as far as the eye could reach. This rich and prosperous region, with its vast fields of corn and beet, was completely ravaged by the War.

General View of the Second Battle of the Somme (1918).
The German Offensive: Formation of the Montdidier Pocket(March 21-April 24.)

The Allied Offensive: Reducing the Pocket as far as the Hindenburg Line
(August 8-September 25.).

In March 1918, the British and French Armies, under separate commands, opposed the furious attacks of numerically superior and more powerfully equipped enemy forces, grouped under the command of a single chief: Ludendorff.

THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE OF MARCH 21.

The Opposing Forces—Their Material and Moral Strength.

Towards the end of 1917, the abandonment of the Allies, by Russia, was consummated by the Russo-German Armistice of December 20, followed by the Peace of Brest-Litowsk, of February 9, 1918. As early as November 1917, Germany began to transfer her legions from the eastern to the western front. Arriving, via Belgium, in ever-increasing numbers, sixty-four new divisions were thus added to her Western Armies, already one hundred and forty-one divisions strong, giving a total strength of 205 German divisions against the Allies' 177 divisions.

The material resources, accumulated on the Russian front, were likewise transferred to the western front. The enemy's artillery was reinforced all along the line, the number of heavy batteries being doubled in many of the sectors.

Ludendorff.

Besides this numerical and material superiority, Germany possessed the additional advantage of a unique commander: Ludendorff, master of the hour, at once absolute military chief and political dictator. On the other hand, whilst the Allies were closely united by cordial friendship, sealed on the field of battle, their armies were independant units, separately commanded, each having its own reserves concentrated behind its particular front.

General Pétain among his "poilus"

On February 3, 1917, the United States of America ranged themselves on the side of the Allies, but their eventually powerful effort could not make itself seriously felt before the summer of 1918. In March 1918, four American divisions were in France, and a million more men were expected by the following Autumn, but the Germans were convinced that they would have the Allies beaten before then.

The moral strength of the opposing forces constituted one of the most important factors of victory.

During 1917, after the Allies' Spring Offensives, a wave of lassitude had lowered the fighting spirit of certain units of the French Army. However, the morale of the French Army had fully regained its former high level, when the great German offensive of March 1918 was launched.

The British Army had in the meantime perfected its training, and acquired, in addition to experience, splendid fighting qualities.

The Germans, badly shaken in 1916 by their failure at Verdun and by the Allies' Offensive on the Somme, had, in consequence of Russia's collapse, recovered all their former arrogant confidence and pride.

But the Allies' blockade, despite Germany's ruthless submarine warfare, tightened, and each day the menace of famine increased.

Triumphal announcements of victory, and promises of an early German peace appeared periodically in their press, yet still the war dragged on. Something had to be done to end it all, whatever the cost, and so the "Peace Offensive" was decided on.

Although inferior in numbers and equipment, the Allies had acquired moral superiority.

Driven from home by the German Push.
(Photo Imperial War Museum).

The German Strategy and Tactics.

In all the previous offensives, especially that of the Somme in 1916, the artillery had been used, prior to the attack, to destroy the adversary's defences. The great number of fortified works and their ever increasing strength necessitated a proportionately longer and more intense artillery preparation. Thus warned, the enemy were able to make dispositions to counteract the effects of the attack, and to bring up reinforcements.

Moreover, the tremendous pounding of the ground greatly hampered the advance of the storming troops, who were hindered at every step by the enormous shell-holes and craters.

Breaking away from past errors, and adopting and perfecting the methods inaugurated the previous year before Riga, the German High Command attacked by surprise, in March 1918, thereby securing a crushing numerical superiority. The Allies were thrown into confusion, and all attempts at resistance were unavailing, until the arrival of the reserves. During this period of complete demoralisation, the enemy were able to exploit their initial success to the full.

The method employed was that of a sudden, violent shock, preceded by a short artillery preparation, mostly with smoke and gas shells, the aim of which was to put the men out of action, rather than to crush the defences. To this end, huge concentrations of troops were effected, in such wise that the masses of men could be thrown quickly and secretly at the presumed weak part of the Allies' front.

The semi-circular disposition of the front facilitated the enemy's task, as the German reserves, grouped in the Hirson-Mézières region, in the centre of the semi-circle, could be used with the same rapidity against any part of the front-line from Flanders to Champagne.

The point chosen by Ludendorff was the junction of the Franco-British Armies. To separate these two groups, by driving back the British, on the right, and the French, on the left; to exploit the initial success in the direction of the sea, isolating the British and forcing them back upon their naval bases of Calais and Dunkirk; then, having crushed the British, to concentrate the whole of his efforts against the French, who, unsupported and demoralized, would soon be driven to their knees,—such was apparently the strategical conception of the enemy's "Kaiserschlacht" or "Emperor's Battle".

The Opposing Forces.

On March 21, three German armies attacked along a 54-mile front, from the Scarpe to the Oise.

In the north, the XVIIth Army (von Below) and the IInd Army (von Marwitz) attacked on either side of the Cambrai salient, but the main effort was made by the XVIIIth Army (von Hutier), which stretched from the north of St. Quentin to the Oise.

Facing these armies were: the right of the British 3rd Army (Byng), extending from the Scarpe to Gouzeaucourt, and the British 5th. Army (Gough), from Gouzeaucourt to south of the Oise.

The British expected the brunt of the attack to fall between the river Sensée and the Bapaume-Cambrai road, i.e. on the right of Byng's Army, which was reinforced accordingly, whilst the sector in front of the Oise, south of St. Quentin, against which von Hutier's huge army had been concentrated, was only held by 4 divisions.

More than 500,000 Germans were about to attack the 160,000 British under Gough and Byng, whilst from the outset of the battle, large enemy reserves swelled the number of the attacking divisions to 64, i.e., more than the total number of British divisions in France. In all, no less than 1,150,000 Germans were engaged in these tremendous onslaughts.

During the five nights which preceded the attack, the German divisions had been brought up secretly, the artillery having previously taken up its positions and corrected its range, without augmenting the volume of firing, so that nothing revealed the increased number of the batteries.

The shock troops, after several weeks of intensive training, were brought up by night marches to the points of attack. During the day, they were kept out of sight in the woods or villages. At night, whether on the march or bivouacking, lights and fires were strictly forbidden. Aeroplanes hovered above the columns to see that these orders were carried out. The ammunition parks and convoys were concealed in the woods. Until the last moment, the troops and most of the officers were kept in ignorance of their destination.

These huge forces moving silently under the cover of night, symbolized the enemy's might and cunning. "It is strange", wrote a German officer in his note-book, "to think of these huge masses of troops—all Germany on the march—moving westward to-night".

THE BATTLE.

On March 21, during this, the "Einbruch" or piercing stage, the enormous enemy mass crushed, in less than 48 hours, the three British positions situated in front of St. Quentin. Carrying the battle into the open country beyond, the enemy transformed the "piercing" into a break-through ("Durchbruch").

This sudden, powerful thrust was followed by a "tidal wave" of German infantry which at first submerged all before it, but which, dammed by degrees, finally spent itself, a week later, against the Allies' new front.

THE DISRUPTION OF THE BRITISH FRONT.

On March 21, at daybreak (4.40 a.m.) a violent cannonade broke out, and for five hours the intensity of this drum-fire steadily increased.

First, a deluge of shells, mostly gas, pounded the British batteries, some of which were silenced. Then the bombardment ploughed up the first positions, spreading dense clouds of gas and fumes over a wide zone.

"Michael" hour.

Under cover of the smoke and fog, the German Infantry speedily crossed No-Man's Land, and at 9.30 a.m. ("Michael" hour) penetrated the British defences.

General Gough.
Photo "Daily Mirror
Studios".

General Byng.
Photo Russell, London.

The front assigned to each attacking division was only two kilometres wide, the troops being formed into two storm columns of one regiment each. The third regiment was kept as sector reserves, to develop initial successes.

The storm-troops, led by large numbers of non-commissioned officers, advanced in waves, shoulder-to-shoulder, preceded by a rolling barrage some 300 yards ahead of the first line. This barrage afterwards moved forward at the rate of about 200 yards every five minutes.

The waves advanced resolutely, protected first by the rolling barrage, then by the accompanying artillery and Minenwerfer. Wherever the resistance was too strong, a halt was made, allowing the neighbouring waves to outflank the obstacle on either side, and crush it.

The Germans straightway threw the greatest possible mass of infantry into the Allies' defences.

Amid clouds of gas, smoke and fog, the British in the advanced positions were surrounded and overwhelmed, often before they had realized what was happening.

Nearly all their machine-guns, posted to sweep the first zone, were put out of action.

The First Day (March 21).

The first day of the attack, General Byng's Army from Fontaine-les-Croisilles to Demicourt, withstood the shock steadily, the Germans penetrating the first lines only.

In the centre, before St. Quentin, and to the south, in front of Moy and La Fère, General Gough's Army, overwhelmed by numbers, and notwithstanding the courage of the men, was broken early in the attack.

Opposite Le Catelet, the enemy storm divisions advanced 6 to 8 kilometres, penetrating at noon the second-line positions along the Epéhy-Le Verguier line. Further south, in front of Moy, they reached Essigny-Fargnières.

General Gough withdrew his right behind the water-line of the Crozat and Somme Canals.

The Disruption of the Front. March 21-22.

The Second Day—March 22.

Tergnier fell, and the water-line was turned from the right. Still favoured by the fog, the Germans crossed the Crozat Canal. Fresh divisions harassed the British without respite, the losses, both in men and material, being very heavy.

Their reserves, greatly outnumbered, were quickly submerged, and the third positions were lost after a desperate but ineffectual resistance.

In spite of its stubborn resistance, the 3rd Army (Byng) was forced to fall back, pivoting on its left, to line up with the retreating 5th Army (Gough).

The enemy advance developed rapidly. Within forty-eight hours, over 60 German divisions (750,000 men) had been thrown into the battle, which now raged in the open.

THE INTERVENTION OF THE FRENCH.

Phases of the French Intervention.

The crushing of the right and centre of the British 5th Army opened a large breach north of the Oise, through which, as early as March 21, the Germans streamed south and west. The situation was critical, as the enemy hordes, having broken through the fortified zone, threatened to submerge all before them. Prompt intervention was imperative, in order to retard the enemy at all cost.

General Pellé reviewing the troops of the
5th Corps in 1917.

As early as the evening of the 21st, General Pétain made dispositions to support the British right. The 9th and 10th Div. (5th Corps) and the 1st Div. of unmounted Cuirassiers (Pellé), in reserve near Compiègne, received orders to hold themselves in readiness. At the same time, the staff of Gen. Fayolle's Army Group, and that of Gen. Humbert's Army, prepared to take over the direction of the operations.

The 125th Inf. Div. was pushed forward to the Oise, whilst the 22nd, 62nd, and 1st. Cavalry. Divn. (Robillot's Group) were rapidly despatched to the weak points of the battle line.

This newly formed group was placed under the command of Gen. Robillot of the 2nd Cavalry Corps.

Rushed up in lorries, the first French divisions were thrown into the thick of the battle without waiting for their artillery. Heroism often made good the lack of equipment and munitions.

THE BATTLE OF DISRUPTION.

Once the fortified zone crossed, the German armies pushed westward rapidly.

On March 23, the French Cavalry Divisions were engaged, with their armoured cars and groups of cyclists. Thanks to their great mobility, the situation was repeatedly saved. Galloping from breach to breach, the Cavalry, dismounting, stayed the enemy advance until the arrival of the infantry.

The armoured cars raided the enemy's lines unceasingly and harassed their troops with machine-gun fire. They were also used for bringing up supplies to the first-line troops and for maintaining the different liaisons. Their splendid work, with that of the Cyclist Corps, greatly helped to stay the enemy thrust.

The retreat of the British was also covered by detachments of cavalry, mounted artillery, armoured cars and tanks, which vigorously attacked the assaillants.

The Air Service likewise rendered invaluable aid.

On the evening of the 22nd, General Pétain gave orders for every available bombing plane to be used to retard the enemy advance, until reinforcements could be brought up. The air squadrons met a few hours later at the assigned point, some of them having flown ninety miles. On the way, they dropped their loads of bombs on German troops which were crossing the Somme, north of Ham, thereby retarding the advance of two enemy divisions which were preparing to outflank the British.

On the 23rd, at noon, a hundred aeroplanes, skimming just over the Germans' heads, wrought indescribable havoc and confusion in their ranks. Priceless hours were thus gained.

The Effects of aerial bombardment.
Photographed in the Ardennes, in October 1918. A German munition train, bombed by aeroplanes, blew up, destroying the line and the artillery limbers which were being loaded. The dead horses and broken limbers are plainly visible. One may imagine the ravage caused by the Allies' aerial bombardments among the enemy concentrations in the Somme.

Crossing the Water-line of the
Crozat Canal, Somme and Tortille (March 23-24).

Whilst Byng's Army withstood the enemy's onslaughts, that commanded by Gough was dislocated by the powerful thrust of von Hutier's Army.

On the morning of the 23rd, the remnants of the British 3rd and 18th Corps were thrown back across the Crozat Canal, among the French divisions which were taking part in the battle between the Somme and Oise, and with which they were assimilated.

Further north, his divisions heavily depleted, and reinforcements coming up only slowly, General Gough abandoned the strong Somme-Tortille line, and continued his retreat westward, towards his reserves in the old battlefield of 1916.

The same day, the first French units to arrive were thrown between Crozat Canal and the woods of Genlis and Frières, linking up, on their right, with the 125th Division, detached from the left of the 6th Army, and established astride of the Oise, in front of Viry. (Sketch below).

The 1st Division of dismounted Cuirassiers (Brécart) vigorously attacked the enemy, and succeeded in staying their thrust towards the Oise. The 9th Division (Gamelin) barred the Ham-Noyon road, along a ten mile front. On their left, the 10th Division (Valdant) held the zone north of Guiscard.

The French Divisions were engaged from the Oise to
Nesle, before Noyon, which the British retreat left unprotected.

On the evening of the 23rd, the situation was critical. General Pellé's divisions retarded the German advance in front of the Chauny-Noyon region, which they were covering, but the enemy held Ham. In their retreat, the British constantly bore to the north-west.

The 1st Cavalry Division (Rascas), and the 22nd (Capdepont) and 62nd (Margot) Divisions arrived, and were thrown into the battle between Guiscard and Nesle, where they attempted to join hands with the French 10th Division on their right and with the British on their left.

Converging on Noyon, the Germans effected a breach
north of Nesle.

The same day, the German long range "Bertha" guns began to bombard Paris, in the hope of spreading panic and disorder there.

General Humbert.

On March 24, the crushing effect of the German thrust was further accentuated by the arrival of new enemy divisions.

Favoured by the fog, which entirely hid the valleys of the Oise and Somme, their advance-guards swept the plain with machine-gun fire, in their search for gaps and weak places in the thin French line.

All the attacks converged towards Noyon. At 9 a.m., in the valley of the Oise, the capture of Viry-Noureuil threatened Chauny, whilst in the centre, Villequier-Aumont and Genlis Wood were taken. Overwhelmed by numbers, the Cuirassiers, after firing their last cartridges, fell back on Caillouel Hill. The divisions on the left took up positions south of Guiscard. In spite of the unequal struggle, the fighting spirit of the troops remained admirable.

On the left of General Pellé's group, between Nesle and Guiscard, the situation was still more desperate, as, having crossed the Somme, the Germans now greatly intensified their thrust. The depleted British units continued their retreat westward, leaving a gap north of Nesle. The French 22nd Div. was hurriedly despatched towards Nesle, and elements of the 1st Cav. Div. to the east of Chaulnes.

On March 24, south of Péronne, the German IInd Army crossed with difficulty the marshy valley of the Somme, then pushing on towards Chaulnes, opened a gap at Pargny.

North of Péronne, the enemy reached Sailly-Saillisel, Rancourt and Cléry in the morning, and pushed west with 3,000 cavalry. In danger of being turned, Byng's Army, which had abandoned the Havrincourt Salient during the night of the 22nd, evacuated Bertincourt and retreated westward.

Sharpshooters at the side of the road.

Franco-British line of infantry in which "Tommies"
mingled with "poilus"
(Photo Imperial War Museum).

One of the gravest consequences of the retreat of Gough's Army was the temporary severance of the French from the British. To restore and consolidate the liaison was the constant aim of the French General Staff.

These units coolly withdrew, whenever they found themselves outflanked and in danger of being cut off, often fighting furious rearguard actions, and repulsing the enemy with heavy loss, each time a frontal attack was attempted. (Field-Marshal Haig).

On the contrary, we read in Ludendorff's Memoirs that the German XVIIth Army was exhausted, having suffered too heavy losses before the Cambrai Salient on March 21 and 22.

During the night, the enemy continued to press forward in the fog, in an attempt to rout the precariously installed and ill-supplied French units, and to harass Gough's Army, in retreat towards the Santerre Plateau. On this, Palm Sunday evening, Holy Week opened tragically.

The Fall of Noyon and the Fighting on
the old Battlefield of the Somme.

The 25th, at daybreak, fresh German divisions violently attacked the exhausted French units, seeking to turn their left wing, and at the same time crush General Pellé's group in the centre.

In face of the increasing danger, General Pellé received orders to "check the enemy advance, whatever the condition of the men might be".

The 1st Inf. Div. (Grégoire), hastily brought up and reinforced by the remnants of the British 18th Div. and of various French Divisions picked up on the way, established itself on the hills which cover Noyon to the north-east. They had scarcely taken up their positions, when the Germans attacked, only to be repulsed. Further to the left, the enemy were unable to debouch from Crisolles, but on the French right, the 55th and 125th Div., which had been fighting incessantly since the 22nd, were forced back across the Oise, near Brétigny. Pushing on, the Germans captured Babœuf, but a British counter-attack forced them to fall back slightly.

The battle continued to rage and the danger of being outflanked became more and more acute. Catigny and Beaurains fell, leaving Noyon unprotected on the north-west. In the course of a fierce counter-attack, the 144th Inf. Reg. succeeded in recapturing these villages, but the German hordes still pressed on, opening a gap between Beaurains and Genvry, through which they poured, following the little valley of the Verse which slopes down towards Noyon. The troops defending the northern and north-eastern approaches to that town were now threatened with being surrounded.

General Pellé endeavoured to stop this fresh gap with the few units left at his disposal, and organized a new line of support on Porquericourt Hill and Mont Renaud (sketch, p. 18), at the same time urging the troops which were fighting to the north of Noyon to "hold out a few hours longer, each hour being worth a day".

One French division, and units of a second division, comprising some British remnants, were now fighting against odds of four to one.

The enemy threatened Noyon, through the valleys of
the Oise and Verse. To the north of Nesle, the
Montdidier road was open.

Fall of Noyon. Gen. Pellé's Group organized
positions on Porquericourt Hill and Mont-Renaud.
Gen. Robillot's forces fell back on Roye.

On the evening of the 25th, they fell back in good order, on Noyon. The 57th Inf. Reg. resisted all night in the town, to enable the final line of resistance to be organized.

At midnight, the front line passed in front of Porquericourt Hill and Mont Renaud, at Pont-l'Évêque, thence following the Oise. It was along this line that Gen. Pellé's Corps had orders to hold the German advance, and bar the road to Paris.

General Humbert declared on the evening of the 25th: The troops of the 5th A.C. and of the 2nd C. of unmounted Cavalry are defending the very heart of France. The consciousness of the grandeur of their task will point out the path of duty to them.

This day (25th) was still more tragical on General Humbert's left. At daybreak, a violent battle broke out around Nesle, the town being abandoned at 11 a.m.

Spread over a too wide front, from Nesle to Guiscard, the troops under Gen. Robillot had orders to maintain the liaison on their right with Gen. Pellé's forces (retreating southward) and on the left with the depleted British units which were falling back to the north-west. The gap widened, and the enemy pressed through. The situation was highly critical, the road to Montdidier being now open.

General Fayolle, in command of the Humbert-Debeney Army Group

Despite their desperate resistance and the untiring activity of the 1st Cav. Div. and 2nd Corps—units of which galloped from breach to breach to re-establish the liaison and retard the enemy onrush—General Robillot's group fell back towards Roye.

March 25.
The road to Amiens open to the enemy.

South of the Somme, the situation was still more critical. The remains of the British 18th and 19th Corps withdrew to the line Chaulnes-Frise, which they were, however, unable to hold.

Their retreat continued to the line Proyart-Rosières. No more reserves were expected for four days. Should the Germans succeed in crushing these exhausted units the road to Amiens would be open.

About six miles behind the Proyart-Rosières front, there was an old French line, partly filled in, on the Santerre Plateau, between the Somme (at Sailly-le-Sec) and the Luce (at Demuin).

A battalion of Canadian Engineers was ordered to restore it. However, there were no troops to hold it, and as its abandonment would have imperilled Amiens, Gen. Gough decided to muster an emergency detachment of engineers, miners, electricians, mechanics, staff personnel, pupils and instructors from the schools of the 3rd and 5th Armies, and American sappers, in all about 2,200 men. This detachment, under Maj.-Gen. Carey, was ordered to hold an eight-mile front and bar the road to Amiens.

North of the Somme, the Germans attacked from Ervillers to the river; the British left stood firm, whilst on the right, the hinge formed by Byng's Army, likewise resisted. Further south, the Germans captured Maricourt, and broke through the curtain of British troops, which lost contact with one another. The Ancre was crossed, and Byng's right, pivoting on Boyelles, fell back on the line Bucquoy, Albert, Bray-sur-Somme.

General Pétain issued a stirring appeal to the men:

The enemy is attacking in a supreme effort to separate us from the British, and open the road to Paris. At all cost, he must be held. Stick to the ground, stand firm, reinforcements are at hand. United, you will fling yourselves on the invader. Soldiers of the Marne, Yser and Verdun, the fate of France is in your hands.

From all parts of the front, French divisions poured in. Long lines of motor-lorries sped along all the roads converging towards Montdidier. The high spirits and fine bearing of the men reassured the anxious population, who, for several days past, had heard the guns drawing nearer, and seen the endless stream of refugees fleeing before the invader.

General Debeney arrived with his staff from Toul, to take command of the 1st Army (in formation), divisions of which arrived each day.

The 77th. Inf. Div. (d'Ambly) was added to the 3rd Army (Humbert). The operations of these two armies, whose task it was to bar the road to Paris and cover Amiens, were co-ordinated by Gen. Fayolle.

The Push towards Montdidier and Fall of Roye.
The Push towards Amiens and Fall of Albert.

On the 26th, Gen. Pellé's group occupied Mont Renaud—a natural rampart protecting the valley of the Oise.

Determined to force a passage at all cost, the enemy attacked with fresh troops.

The present positions must be held at all cost. The honour of each commanding officer is at stake, proclaimed Gen. Pellé. Trenches were dug, and Mont Renaud organised. The road to Compiègne was barred and the hills to the south and south-west of Noyon became the pivot of the defences. Repeatedly attacked, Mont Renaud changed hands several times, finally resting with the French. The exhausted 10th Div. fell back on the massif of Le Plémont, where the 77th Div. had just taken up its positions.

However, although Gen. Humbert's right checked all enemy advance, Gen. Robillot's group and the first units of Gen. Debeney's Army, on the left, were unable to hold their ground in the Picardy Plain. Forming but a thin line, the enemy's powerful thrust opened gaps in places.

Units of the 56th and 133rd Inf. Divns. and of the 4th and 5th Cav. Divns. under Gen. de Mitry, were pushed forward, with orders to establish the liaison, on their right, with the 22nd Div., and on their left, with the British who were falling back on the Santerre Plateau. This liaison was necessarily weak, as the troops had to be deployed. Fighting day and night for every inch of ground given up, these splendid troops succeeded in retarding the enemy's advance until the arrival of reinforcements on the line of the Avre.

The Germans attempted with their left to turn
General Humbert's Army, strongly established at Le
Plémont. Roye fell.

The exhausted 22nd Div. fell back, carrying with it the 62nd on its right. Roye, outflanked from the south and attacked on the north, was lost. A breach, opened between the 22nd and 62nd Div. was filled by an emergency detachment hastily got together on the spot by General Robillot.

On the evening of the 26th, the front was established on the line Echelle-St.-Aurin, Dancourt, Plessis-Cacheleux.

Roye. The Place d'Armes at the end of the War.

General Humbert made a strong appeal to his men: Let all commanding officers firmly resolve to accomplish their duty to the extreme limit of sacrifice, and imbue their men with the same spirit.

North of the Somme, the Germans took Albert—an important junction—but were checked further north, by the left wing of Byng's Army.

The Mont Renaud.

Allied Unity of Command.

Events had forcibly demonstrated the urgent necessity for Allied unity of command. On March 26, a War Council, composed of M.M. Poincaré, Clemenceau, Lord Milner, Haig, Pétain and Foch, empowered the latter to coordinate the action of the Allied Armies on the Western Front.

"At the moment when Foch was to take precedence of Pétain and Haig, what was the position of the armies, as regards the directives of the High Command? In other words, how was the Anglo-French battle being directed? The position is defined in the General Orders of Pétain and Haig, the former of whom prescribed:

"To keep the French forces grouped, to protect the Capital; essential mission;

"To ensure the liaison with the British; secondary mission;

"The latter prescribed that everything possible should be done to avoid severance from the French;

"Should this be unavoidable, to fall back slowly, covering the Channel Ports.

"If we place these two orders side by side, their divergence strikes us painfully. It is patent that the instructions of the two great chiefs had not the same object in view, and did not tend towards the same end. One was thinking of Paris, the other of the Channel Ports. Each would evidently consecrate the bulk of his forces and resources to what he considered the essential task. To sum up: on the German side, there was only one battle; on the Allies' side, there were two: the battle for Paris, and the battle for the ports. Had this situation continued, our defeat was certain.

British and French reinforcements in a village. (Photo imperial War Museum)

"Foch's first thought, from the moment he took over the direction, was to cause this disastrous divergence to cease. To the two commanders-in-chief he prescribed the maintenance, at all cost, of the liaison between their armies. The accessory thus became the essential. The vital point was to ensure the junction between the Allied Armies, and to that end, to cover neither Paris, nor Calais, but Amiens. The battle which, till then, had been double, became single, i. e. the Battle for Amiens.

"Such was the strategical idea which, during the following days, Foch strove to materialise. Motoring from G.H.Q. to G.H.Q., he impressed the same thing upon all; on Haig, Pétain, Gough, the latter's successor, Rawlinson, Fayolle, Debeney and Humbert. By dint of repetition, this idea was to be deeply impressed into the minds of the executants.

"To ensure liaison, to keep the troops where they were, to prevent voluntary retreat, above all, to avoid effecting relief during the battle, to throw the divisions into the line of fire, as they arrived—such were the orders which were constantly on his lips during the days which followed". (La bataille de Foch, by Raymond Recouly).

On March 28, General Pershing offered Foch the direct and immediate help of the American Forces: I come to tell you that the American people would consider it a great honour for our troops to take part in the present battle. I ask this of you in my name and theirs. At this time, the only question is to fight. Infantry, artillery, aviation, all we have is yours.

Henceforth, the battle was directed from Foch's headquarters, temporarily installed at Beauvais. Twice a day, couriers maintained communications between Foch and the British and French G.H.Q's.

Line of British and French Sharpshooters. (Photo Imperial War Museum).

The Fall of Montdidier.
The Growing Resistance on the Wings.

By the 27th, the German attacks had lost much of their earlier sting. The French, whose resistance was stiffening steadily, harassed the enemy unceasingly.

Their infantry, now thirty-six miles from their base, could only be revictualled with great difficulty. The Allied airmen bombed their convoys and the railway stations incessantly.

Their artillery had difficulty in keeping up with the infantry, and the latter were not always efficiently supported.