[Swaine

Major-General W. Douglas Smith, C.B.

[Frontispiece.

THE HISTORY OF
THE TWENTIETH
(LIGHT) DIVISION

BY

CAPTAIN V. E. INGLEFIELD

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY
LIEUT.-GENERAL

THE EARL OF CAVAN

K.P., G.C.M., K.C.B., M.V.O.

London

NISBET & CO. LTD.

22 BERNERS STREET W.1

First Published in 1921

Printed in Great Britain
by Turnbull & Spears, Edinburgh

PREFACE

This history has been compiled from the official records and from the notes of many of those who took part in the operations described. The fighting troops of the Division necessarily occupy the chief place in the narrative, but it must be remembered throughout that the achievements of these troops would have been impossible without the co-operation of the Royal Army Service Corps, Army Ordnance Corps and Army Veterinary Corps units, and the good work of the Field Ambulances and stretcher-bearers.

Of the great number of honours won, and of the still greater number of gallant actions performed, only a few have been mentioned. These must be taken merely as typical of the many brave deeds which there is no space to record.

The rank of officers and non-commissioned officers given is that which they held at the time of the events described. Every effort has been made to ensure accuracy in this and in all other respects. For any inaccuracies or omissions I offer my apologies.

I wish to thank the many officers of the Division who have helped me by reading the narrative and by giving me most useful information, in particular Lieut.-Colonel A. E. Erskine, whose assistance throughout has been invaluable. I wish to thank also the publishers, Messrs Nisbet & Co., for the interest they have shown and the trouble they have taken in the production of this book.

V. E. I.

INTRODUCTION

When one feels a personal affection for a Division such as I do for the 20th, it is the pleasantest of tasks to record it publicly.

The 20th Division never failed me, and never failed its neighbours, during the time that I had the honour of commanding the XIVth Corps.

How can one say more?

I owe the Division my undying thanks, and I trust this book may perpetuate its great deeds, as an incentive to all to show an equally bold front in the day of trouble.

Cavan

GUARDS CLUB,

S.W.1.

CONTENTS

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

MAPS

HISTORY OF THE
20TH (LIGHT) DIVISION

Chapter I
THE FORMATION OF THE DIVISION AND TRAINING IN ENGLAND
4th August 1914 to 19th July 1915

On the 4th of August 1914 war was declared between England and Germany. Two days later Parliament sanctioned an increase of 500,000 men to the army, and in a letter to the nation on the 7th of August Lord Kitchener appealed for the immediate enrolment of 100,000 men.

The ready response to this appeal soon supplied more than sufficient men for the first six divisions of the New Army, eventually numbered 9 to 14. New battalions continued to be raised to absorb as far as possible the stream of recruits and on the 11th of September the formation of six additional divisions—the 15th to the 20th—was authorised. Thus the 20th (Light) Division came into existence. It was to be composed entirely of Rifle and Light Infantry battalions—formed into the 59th, 60th, and 61st Infantry Brigades—and Divisional troops. A few changes were made later, and the order of battle of the Division as finally constituted was as follows:—

59th Infantry Brigade

10th (Service) Battalion the King’s Royal Rifle Corps.

11th (Service) Battalion the King’s Royal Rifle Corps.

10th (Service) Battalion the Rifle Brigade.

11th (Service) Battalion the Rifle Brigade.

60th Infantry Brigade

6th (Service) Battalion the Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry.

6th (Service) Battalion the King’s (Shropshire Light Infantry).

12th (Service) Battalion the King’s Royal Rifle Corps.

12th (Service) Battalion the Rifle Brigade.

61st Infantry Brigade

12th (Service) Battalion the King’s (Liverpool Regiment).

7th (Service) Battalion Prince Albert’s (Somerset Light Infantry).

7th (Service) Battalion the Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry.

7th (Service) Battalion the King’s Own (Yorkshire Light Infantry).

Pioneer Battalion

11th (Service) Battalion the Durham Light Infantry.

Divisional Artillery

90th Field Artillery Brigade.

91st Field Artillery Brigade.

92nd Field Artillery (Howitzer) Brigade.

93rd Field Artillery Brigade.

Divisional Engineers

83rd Field Company Royal Engineers.

84th Field Company Royal Engineers.

96th Field Company Royal Engineers.

Signal Service

20th Divisional Signal Company Royal Engineers.

Divisional Transport and Supply

20th Divisional Train.

Medical Units

60th Field Ambulance.

61st Field Ambulance.

62nd Field Ambulance.

Originally the 12th King’s did not belong to the Division, but were an attached battalion of army troops; the 11th D.L.I. then formed part of the 61st Brigade. Towards the end of 1914 a pioneer battalion was added to each division. Being composed largely of miners, the 11th D.L.I. became the pioneer battalion of the 20th Division, and the 12th King’s then took their place in the 61st Brigade.

The Division was formed at Blackdown in September 1914. The first officer of the Divisional Staff to join was Major J. E. B. Martin, M.V.O., who at first had charge of the musketry, and who served with the Division in France as A.P.M. until September 1918. Within a few weeks Major-General R. H. Davies, C.B., a New Zealander, who had commanded the 6th Brigade in France through the critical fighting of August and September, was given command of the Division. Major-General Davies applied himself whole-heartedly to the work of training his new command, and by his personality won the complete confidence of his officers and men. It is largely due to him that the 20th on arrival in France was a thoroughly efficient division. He was ably assisted by his two senior staff officers, Lieut.-Colonel W. R. N. Madocks, G.S.O. 1, and Lieut.-Colonel F. C. Dundas, A.A. and Q.M.G., both of whom served with the Division for over two years. At this time the 59th Brigade was commanded by Colonel G. Leslie, the 60th by Colonel A. E. W. Colville, C.B., and the 61st by Colonel O’D. C. Grattan, D.S.O. Brig.-General John Hotham became the C.R.A. and Colonel E. R. Kenyon the C.R.E. Early in 1915 the 20th Divisional Ammunition Column was formed under Lieut.-Colonel J. R. Foster, who although over sixty years of age commanded the column until the end of the war.

The whole of the Division was not concentrated in one area. The 59th and 60th Brigades were at Blackdown, and the artillery near by at Deepcut. The battalions of the 61st Brigade were at Aldershot and later at Woking; the R.E. units were trained at Chatham. The field ambulances remained at Aldershot, where they carried out nearly all their training, joining the Division only in the following June, a little over a month before embarkation for France.

Major-General R. H. Davies, C.B.

Throughout the period of training, but particularly in the early days at Blackdown, there was the greatest difficulty in getting clothing and equipment. No uniform was available until November, when a suit of emergency blue was issued to each man. A certain number of old rifles for drill purposes became available about the same time. There were so few S.M.L.E. rifles in some battalions that only one or two companies could fire at a time, and even then each detail after firing had to hand over the rifles to another detail waiting to fire. The artillery at first had only enough harness for one six-horse team in each brigade. The shortage of saddles was made good to a certain extent by private gifts. Each brigade had two 90-mm. and two 15-pr. guns, but these had no sights. Wooden sights and wooden guns were improvised to carry out battery gun drill. It was not until February that one 18-pr. gun was issued to each battery.

There was no lack of men in the Division, many units being well over establishment; the main difficulty to be contended with was the shortage of regular officers and N.C.O.’s to carry out the training. For a few weeks one or two experienced officers and a few re-enlisted N.C.O.’s in each battalion and artillery brigade were confronted with the task of turning a thousand totally untrained men into an efficient and well-disciplined fighting force. The task was made possible by the unbounded enthusiasm of the men, all of whom had volunteered immediately after the outbreak of the war and whose one desire was to learn their job and to get out to France.

In February 1915 the Division moved to Witley. Some of the units were encamped or billeted near Guildford and Godalming; others, after marching to Witley in the pouring rain, went into a camp there described as a sea of mud with damp and leaky huts. The training now became more interesting, and included tactical schemes. Officers and N.C.O.’s had joined or had been promoted, and the issue of service dress begun at Blackdown was completed. A large number of horses, guns and equipment for the artillery became available, the stamp of draught horse obtained at this time being particularly good. The Divisional Ammunition Column had to be completed with mules.

At the beginning of April the Division moved by road to Salisbury Plain, covering the sixty-three miles in four days—a creditable performance, as the weather was warm and the roads were dusty, and the men marched for the first time in full marching order. Three months of hard work followed; field firing and night operations were carried out in addition to tactical exercises which often involved a long march to the training area and back.

At this time the number of field companies per division was increased to three, and the 96th Field Company, which had originally formed part of the 26th Division, joined the 20th on the 15th of May.

The three field ambulances, having completed nine months of hard training at Aldershot, often under most unpleasant conditions, joined the Division on Salisbury Plain in June.

Meanwhile the transport and equipment of units were being completed, and everything pointed to an early departure. The Division was finally inspected by the King towards the end of June, and a month later embarked for France.

Chapter II
THE LAVENTIE SECTOR
20th July 1915 to 21st January 1916

Arrival of the Division in France—Further training in trench warfare—The Division in the Laventie Sector—Operations in conjunction with the Battle of Loos—Raid—Gas attack—Move out of IIIrd Corps Area.

(Vide [Sketch A.])

The leading units of the Division left Amesbury on the 20th July. The route followed was either by Folkestone and Boulogne or by Southampton and Havre, and then by train from the ports of disembarkation to the area west of St Omer. The various stages of the journey—embarking men and horses, entraining and detraining in France, marches to rest camps and billets—were all accomplished satisfactorily if not without some discomfort, chiefly due to the rough and rainy weather. On the 22nd Divisional Headquarters was established at Lumbres, and the Division was concentrated in this area by the 26th.

The next day orders came for a further move eastwards, and on the 28th the Division started on a hot and trying march into the area of the IIIrd Corps (Lieut.-General Sir W. P. Pulteney), which formed part of the First Army and which was holding a line between Neuve Chapelle and Armentières.

By the 30th the various units had moved into billets in the area bounded roughly by the line Hazebrouck—Bailleul—Steenwerck—Neuf Berquin, with Divisional Headquarters at Merris.

The situation on the British front at this time was briefly as follows:—

The Third Army under Sir Charles Munro held the right of the line from the Somme, where it was in touch with the French, to a point south of Arras. Between this point and Grenay (four miles north-west of Lens) the French Tenth Army intervened, cutting off the Third Army from the First, which, under Sir Douglas Haig, continued the line to near Armentières; north again, Sir Herbert Plumer’s Second Army held the left of the British line as far as the right of the French troops at Boesinghe.

The IIIrd Corps, consisting now of the 8th, 27th and 20th Divisions, was in touch on the right with the Indian Corps near Fauquissart; thence the line ran in a general north-easterly direction parallel to the Rue Tilleloy and some 200 to 500 yards on the south-east side of it, until, opposite Picantin, it turned east for about a mile. North of Rouge Banes it began to turn north-east again, and kept this general direction, passing close in front of La Cordonnerie Farm, La Boutillerie and Rue du Bois to a point on the Armentières-Lille road about half a mile north-west of Wez Macquart.

LAVENTIE, 1915.  Sketch A.

The 20th Division, like other troops in England, had been trained largely with a view to open warfare, so that on its arrival in France schools and courses of instruction had to be organised to carry on the training in trench warfare and in those forms of fighting that had lately come into use. Thus bombing was started almost at once, and the instruction given was thorough. Officers and N.C.O.’s went to the 8th and 27th Divisions for a course of training; bombing schools were opened in the Division, and brigade and battalion bombing officers appointed. Brigade bombing officers at the end of each course picked out any men who were likely to become really expert and kept them for a further course. The rest went back to their battalions as battalion or company bombers. The training was carried on under some difficulty at first, as nothing was provided. No bombs were available for instructional purposes, and therefore they had to be improvised. Machine-gun classes were also formed, and from time to time officers and N.C.O.’s went to Wisques for a course in the use of machine guns in the field. Gas-mask drill was very strict, and was practised every day. Demonstrations and lectures were given, and as many men as possible were made to pass through gas. In addition to these special courses of instruction, ordinary training was carried out.

Between the 2nd and the 17th of August all units, from brigade headquarters downwards, were attached to the 8th and 27th Divisions in the line, thus introducing officers and men to the realities of trench warfare.

By the 18th all units had returned to the Divisional area with the exception of the 83rd and 96th Field Companies R.E. and the 11th D.L.I. (Pioneers), who were working on the defences. The 90th Field Artillery Brigade (Colonel E. Pollock), however, instead of undergoing a tour of instruction, went straight into the line on the 2nd of August, and that night came into action near Laventie in rear of the 19th Infantry Brigade, which held the right of the 8th Division line.

On the 9th of August the Division lost the services of A/92 (Howitzer Battery), which was transferred to the 27th Division.

Between the 15th and 17th the 59th Infantry Brigade moved into the line, taking over the right of the 8th Division front from the 19th Brigade, which went to join the Ist Corps. The 59th Brigade came under the orders of the 8th Division, and Brigade Headquarters was opened at Laventie. The line, after some readjustment on the 18th, ran from near Fauquissart to a point east of Petillon, and was held by two battalions in the front trenches, a third in a line of defended posts about the Rue Bacquerot, and the fourth in reserve at Laventie. Reliefs between battalions took place every four to seven days.

It was not until the end of the month that the Division took over a sector of the line, and while waiting in the reserve area three battalions of the 61st Brigade, as well as the R.E. and 11th D.L.I., were employed as working parties at various points in the IIIrd Corps area.

On the 22nd of August orders came for the Division to move forward. The IIIrd Corps was extending its right by taking over a part of the Indian Corps front as far as a point just north of Mauquissait. This line was to be held by three divisions—the 20th on the right, the 8th in the centre and the 27th on the left, each division keeping one brigade in reserve. The 20th Divisional Artillery (Brig.-General Hotham) began moving to the new area on the night of the 23rd/24th. By the 28th the move of all units was completed, and Divisional Headquarters was opened at Nouveau Monde, near Estaires.

The Divisional front ran from the corps right flank near Mauquissait to Petillon. The 59th Brigade (Brig.-General C. D. Shute), with its left at Petillon, then became the left brigade of the Division. On the right was the 60th Brigade (Brig.-General J. W. G. Roy) in touch with the 59th just east-north-east of Fauquissart. The 61st (Brig.-General C. Ross) was in reserve at Estaires, where the battalions which had been detached rejoined it—the 7th K.O.Y.L.I. and the 7th D.C.L.I. on the 28th, the 12th King’s on the 6th of September. The artillery was organised in two groups, the La Flinque group supporting the right of the line and the Laventie group the left, with headquarters at Estaires. Of the field companies R.E., the 84th and 96th were in the 60th Brigade area, and the 83rd with the 59th Brigade.

Both the 60th and 59th Brigades had two battalions holding the front trenches, with the others either in reserve or holding a line of defended posts which ran about a mile behind the line. These posts were either entrenched positions or farm-houses, more or less battered about but still habitable. They were put into a state of defence, and occupied by a platoon or half a company, and in a few cases the civilian inhabitants of the house went on living there at the same time as the military garrison.

The country in this sector was flat and low—an expanse of grass or mud intersected by small ditches. Though at this time of the year the surface was still very hard and dry, the water level was only some three or four feet below the ground, and this made the normal form of trench, in the southern part of the area, out of the question. Instead, breastworks of sandbags were built up and strengthened with loose earth. Dug-outs, as known in later times or even then in some parts of the line, did not exist. Small recesses in the breastwork and some splinter proofs behind were all that could be made. Many breastworks had no parados to give cover from the backward effect of shells bursting behind, and this had to be made. Fortunately the shelling of the front trenches in this area was not severe except on the 25th of September and during a feint attack in October. In consequence very few casualties were due to this lack of cover from the rear.

The German front line was much on the same level as our own, and anything from 80 to 250 yards away. Behind that, the ground rose gently to the long low ridge running by Aubers, Fromelles and Radinghem—not more than 50 feet above the rest of the country, but for all that a commanding height completely overlooking our positions.

The artillery was to the east and south-east of Laventie, where clumps of trees, orchards and hedges gave good cover for the guns. Excellent observation was obtained from the ruined houses along the Rue Tilleloy.

On the whole of the British front the year 1915 was really a time of preparation. The hard fighting of 1914 and the first four months of 1915 had caused a considerable drain on the personnel of the army, and though many reinforcements had come out both as drafts and as units—the latter for the most part Territorial troops—yet the great bulk of the New Army was still in England, and could not be expected to turn the balance decisively in our favour until well on in 1916. Nevertheless there was much fighting, especially in certain parts of the front such as the Ypres salient and about La Bassée and in the battles of Neuve Chapelle and Loos.

The sector about Laventie during the autumn and winter of 1915 was one of the quietest on the British front. The first month that the Division spent in the line was uneventful, though there was continued activity in some form or other; mining was always being carried out by both sides, and enemy sniping never ceased. The latter caused a certain number of casualties, so that steps had to be taken to deal with it by training snipers of our own. These worked in pairs, the same pair always working on the same ground, so that they got to know every yard of it.

The Germans undoubtedly had an excellent system of intelligence. They seemed to know exactly what reliefs were being carried out, for they often shouted the names of regiments that had just come in, and on one occasion correctly whistled the regimental march. This is explained by the fact that they had listening sets of which at that time we knew nothing. Later many orders were issued to prevent leakage, and open earth circuits were strictly forbidden.

Just at the time when the Division took over this sector, a deserter came in and reported that the Germans were mining against us near Mauquissait, and also had gas cylinders there, and were preparing to attack us on the 30th. To meet this it was decided to fire a camouflet on the 29th and to follow up with a bombardment of the enemy trenches in order to damage them sufficiently to show whether or not he had a gas attack in preparation. The bombardment was carried out by the La Flinque group, in conjunction with the Meerut Divisional Artillery and a brigade of 9·2 howitzers.

It was a hazy day with fine rain falling, and observation was difficult, so the bombardment was curtailed and was resumed on the 30th under better conditions on a section of trench somewhat further south. Considerable damage was done. A part of the parapet was demolished and a magazine exploded, but no evidence of gas was found.

The 93rd Field Artillery Brigade (Lieut.-Colonel A. T. Anderson) and one section of each battery of the 92nd Brigade (Lieut.-Colonel H. G. Ricardo) moved on the 30th to positions south and south-east of Fleurbaix in the 8th Division area. Here they came into action during the first two nights of September, and later, on the 25th of the month, supported an attack by the 8th Division.

On the 5th of September the 61st Brigade relieved the 23rd Brigade of the 8th Division, and took over the line running east and then north-east from the left of the 59th Brigade to a point about 600 yards south-west of La Boutillerie. The line was held by three battalions, with the fourth battalion in support. At first Brigade Headquarters was at Rouge de Bout, near Laventie, but a heavy shelling on the 9th compelled a move to an estaminet some little distance away.

On the night of the 12th/13th the 7th Somerset L.I. relieved the 12th King’s in the front line. At 5.30 A.M. the enemy blew up a mine under a small salient of the front trench held by a platoon of “B” Company. About twenty men were buried by the explosion. In spite of heavy artillery, machine gun and trench mortar fire which the enemy poured into the area of the explosion, the crater was occupied at once, and the rest of the company began to rescue their buried comrades, five of whom were killed and twelve injured. The casualties among the rescuers were two killed and five wounded. Lieut. B. E. F. Mitchell, the platoon commander, was awarded the M.C., and Lance-Corporal C. Ward, who was in charge of the company stretcher-bearers, the D.C.M. for conspicuous gallantry under heavy fire. Major R. P. Preston Whyte, commanding “B” company, received the written congratulations of the Divisional Commander.

The 84th Field Company R.E. (Major H. S. Christie) moved to Rue Biache in the 61st Brigade area. Each field company was now with an infantry brigade, the 96th (Major A. C. Scott) with the 60th Brigade, the 83rd (Major L. E. Hopkins) with the 59th, and the 84th with the 61st, and henceforward this arrangement was kept, each brigade and its field company working together. Similarly the 60th Field Ambulance (Lieut.-Colonel A. C. Osburn), the 61st Field Ambulance (Lieut.-Colonel W. J. S. Harvey), and the 62nd Field Ambulance (Lieut.-Colonel J. G. Gill) worked respectively with the 59th, 60th and 61st Brigades.

The two companies of the 11th D.L.I. (Pioneers), which had remained to work under the R.E. when the Division came into the line, returned in the beginning of September.

Meanwhile, plans had been made for operations on a considerable scale further south, to begin on the 25th of September. The general plan was that the French were to advance in Champagne, and in conjunction with this the British troops were to attack near Loos on a front from about Grenay to the La Bassée canal.

Along the rest of the front subsidiary operations were to be carried out:—

(1) By the 2nd Division of the First Army near Givenchy.

(2) By the Meerut Division (Indian Corps) near Neuve Chapelle.

(3) By the 8th Division (IIIrd Corps) near Le Bridoux.

(4) By the Vth Corps near Bellewarde Farm, east of Ypres.

It is with the operations of the Meerut and 8th Divisions, on the immediate right and left of the 20th, that we are now concerned.

The Meerut Division was to assault the enemy’s trenches about Mauquissait with the ultimate objective, should the enemy show signs of demoralisation, of the high ground between Haut Pommereau and La Cliqueterie Farm. This would pave the way for a further advance of the Indian Corps in a south-easterly direction, breaking the enemy’s line and assisting the advance further south by turning the La Bassée defences. The Gharwal Brigade was detailed to attack on the right and the Bareilly Brigade on the left.

The 8th Division, on the left of the 20th, was to attack the German line from about La Boutillerie to Le Bridoux. Its further objective was the capture of Bas Maisnil, Le Bridoux and Ferme Houssain, to prepare the way for a possible advance of the whole corps to the Aubers-Radinghem ridge. This operation was to be carried out in the first instance by the 25th Brigade.

Between these two operations the 20th Division was to co-operate:—

(1) By making a smoke screen along the whole front, so as to conceal the true points of attack.

(2) By covering its own front and the advance of the assaulting columns on its flanks by fire.

(3) By cutting wire at certain points, both to deceive the enemy and to facilitate a possible advance.

(4) By being prepared to assault the enemy’s line on the right or left and to press forward in the centre, according to the progress made by the divisions on the flanks.

The attack was preceded by a four days’ bombardment of the enemy’s lines. His front and support trenches were badly damaged; strong-points and houses in and behind his line were breached and lanes cut in his wire. Although considerable damage was observed to have been done, the enemy made very little retaliation.

During the bombardment, various means were adopted with the idea of deceiving the enemy as to the actual time of attack. Rapid fire was opened by the artillery as if for the final bombardment, and searchlights were turned on to the enemy’s parapet which was then brought under fire. One night, having fired a rocket, the troops in the front trenches immediately began cheering, showing bayonets over the parapet and throwing empty jam tins into the wire in order to induce the enemy to man his parapet. One round was then fired by each gun on the enemy’s front line.

On the night of the 24th/25th, headquarters of brigades proceeded to their advanced report centres, and units in reserve were moved up to support and assembly trenches which had been dug close behind the front line so as to be ready, if necessary, to assume the offensive.

One battalion of the 59th Brigade was kept at Laventie to form, with the 11th D.L.I. and the Divisional Mounted Troops, the Divisional reserve.

Of the two attacks on the flanks of the 20th Division the first to be launched was that on the left. At 4.30 A.M. the 8th Division advanced and soon gained a footing in the enemy trenches, with the exception of a detached force (on the immediate left of the 61st Brigade) which was unable to get forward.

The 59th and 61st Brigades found the line opposite to them strongly held by the enemy, whom they engaged with rifle and machine-gun fire. No advance was possible on this part of the front.

About 10.30 A.M., the 8th Division asked for machine-gun fire to be opened on its flank. During the afternoon it seemed to have difficulty in holding the line it had gained, and the 61st Brigade and the guns in support of it assisted by bringing artillery and machine-gun fire to bear on parts of the enemy line near Bas Maisnil. About half-past four a counter attack drove back the 8th Division troops, who were reported at 6.40 P.M. to be again holding their original line.

On the right of the 20th Division two battalions of the 60th Brigade were able to advance. Astride the Winchester road the German line ran out into a sharp salient, protruding into a wider re-entrant in our own line. Opposite the north face of this salient, a sap had been dug for a short distance out from the 60th Brigade trenches. It was intended in the case of an advance of our troops, to continue this sap through to the German line and make a fire trench of it, so connecting up the line already held with the ground newly won.

Zero was fixed at 5.50 A.M. on the 25th. Two minutes before this a mine was exploded in the enemy salient, and at zero the final bombardment of the enemy line began. Six minutes later the smoke barrage was started all along the front of the Division. This was effected by means of smoke candles lighted on the parapet, or by phosphorus bombs and grenades of all descriptions thrown by catapults and trench mortars. At 6 A.M. the Bareilly and Gharwal Brigades attacked.

The smoke barrages possibly helped the brigades on the right to advance, but made it very difficult to observe from our line what was going on. About 7 A.M., however, the troops of the Meerut Division were known to be making good progress, and at their request orders were issued at 7.30 A.M. for the 12th R.B. to advance and connect up with the left of the Bareilly Brigade.

“D” Company of the 12th R.B. was ordered into the fire trench to prepare for assault, with “B” and “C” in support, while “A” Company was detailed to work on the sap. The actual order to assault was sent to “D” Company at 8.10 A.M. but telephone communication with the front line had broken down, and the message had to go by orderly and so did not arrive till 8.25 A.M. when the assault began.

By this time the smoke barrages had cleared and all companies, especially those in support, as they appeared in the open, suffered heavy casualties both from shelling and from rifle and machine-gun fire which enfiladed them from the left.

All three companies were across by 9.30 A.M., and once they had gained the enemy’s trenches they met with little immediate opposition, and began to consolidate a line running north and east of Mauquissait. They gained touch with the left of the Bareilly Brigade and bombers were pushed forward along the enemy trenches.

At the request of the Bareilly Brigade, the bombing officer and some bombers of the 12th R.B. were sent forward towards the Moulin du Piètre and joined the bombers of the Black Watch.

Meanwhile “A” Company had been working on the sap, but little progress had been made owing to the heavy enfilade fire from the German trenches. The first two sections who worked on this sap lost all their men except two.

As soon as it was seen that the Bareilly Brigade had gained a footing in the enemy trenches, a platoon of “A” Company got across to the salient and began to sap back towards our line so as to meet the trench which the rest of the company was making. This work also was found to be impossible. The parapet was broken through and the sap pushed some six or eight yards out, when work was practically brought to a standstill by heavy fire further along the German line.

At 9.45 A.M. “A” Company of the 12th R.B. was relieved by “B” Company of the 6th K.S.L.I., who continued to work under heavy fire. The difficulties under which these parties worked were very great, and the sap was never completed.

“A” Company of the 12th R.B. on being relieved from work on the sap re-formed behind the parapet, and two platoons went forward. They were, however, held up about half way across and had to take cover in a ditch.

On the advance of the 12th R.B. the 6th K.S.L.I. occupied the trenches just vacated along the Rue Tilleloy and later were ordered to advance. At 11.30 A.M., just as the leading company reached the trenches forming the north face of the salient, the Germans launched a strong bombing attack against the Bareilly Brigade, which was forced to retire to its original line. The second company advancing in support came under very heavy fire, and was forced to take cover in a ditch where it was pinned to the ground.

It was then about mid-day, and the survivors of the Bareilly Brigade had got back to their own trenches. The right flank of the 12th R.B. was thus uncovered, and the battalion was heavily attacked by bombers on the front and on both flanks. The supply of bombs in the battalion ran short, and casualties were heavy.

At 12.30 P.M., the 12th R.B. and the two companies of the 6th K.S.L.I. were forced to retire. While doing so all companies again lost heavily, though the retirement was gallantly covered by detachments of both battalions from the reverse slope of the enemy’s parapet. These men held their ground until the enemy came within a few yards of them, and eventually got back by working their way along the ditches that ran by the side of Winchester Road.

The bombers and machine gunners of the brigade worked under the brigade bombing and machine-gun officers, and did very good work. The brigade bombing officer—Lieut. Shaw—blocked one of the enemy’s trenches on the left of our position in the salient. He held this block for nearly two hours, and did not withdraw until he and his sergeant were the only two left and all his bombs, including such German ones as he could find, had been used. Lieut. Hankey of the 12th K.R.R.C. also distinguished himself. For his excellent work in covering the withdrawal, he was awarded the Legion of Honour.

Every effort had been made to cut the sap through between our line and the enemy’s salient, but the work went very slowly. All digging in the open was immediately stopped by enfilade machine-gun fire, and even the continuation of the work by sap incurred casualties from shelling. The wounded had to be carried back along the narrow trench and this caused constant interruptions, so that when the retirement began little progress had been made.

After all the other troops had got back, a few men were left in occupation of the saphead until between 3 and 4 P.M., when they also were withdrawn.

The Divisional Artillery did most valuable work during the day, by keeping under fire the enemy’s trenches on the left of the attack, and so reducing the very heavy casualties that must otherwise have been inflicted by the machine guns on that flank.

In the light of later experiences some details of the signal communications are interesting. Advanced Brigade Headquarters was within 300 yards of the original front line, and single trench cables were used up to that line. The shell fire was so local, that on the whole these cables were maintained during the battle without great difficulty. Behind Brigade Headquarters the line was never cut.

The retirement of the 12th R.B. and the 6th K.S.L.I. to the original line was over by 2 P.M., and ended the day’s fighting. The operations had been successful in holding the enemy to his ground, and in preventing him from sending reinforcements to the scene of the main attack. The brunt of the fighting fell on the 12th R.B., who held on with great determination when their flanks had become exposed, and who throughout the day fought splendidly, thoroughly earning the congratulations sent them by the Divisional Commander.

The casualties were heavy considering the number of men actually engaged—19 officers, and 542 other ranks in all; the 12th R.B. alone lost 7 officers and 332 men; the 6th K.S.L.I. lost 4 officers and 59 men. During the day the enemy shelled the front trenches heavily, and caused a considerable number of casualties among some of the battalions that were not actively engaged. Of these the 12th K.R.R.C. suffered the most; they lost altogether 3 officers and 75 other ranks.

The 61st Field Ambulance (Lieut.-Colonel W. J. S. Harvey) which was attached to the 60th Brigade worked extremely well, and all the wounded were cleared during the day. Lieut. G. A. Maling, R.A.M.C., won the V.C. for his continuous bravery during these operations. He “worked incessantly from 6.15 A.M. on the 25th till 8 A.M. on the 26th, collecting and treating in the open under heavy shell fire more than 300 men. At about 11 A.M. on the 25th he was flung down and temporarily stunned by the bursting of a large high explosive shell which wounded his only assistant and killed several of his patients. A second shell soon after covered him and his instruments with débris, but his high courage and zeal never failed him, and he continued his gallant work singlehanded.”[1]

It was expected that there would be a renewal of the fighting the next day, but no further operations took place. On the contrary, a demonstration that had been ordered for the 27th was cancelled the afternoon before, and orders were issued that no gun ammunition of any kind was to be expended for the time being except to repel attack or for retaliation.

The casualties of the day’s fighting had materially reduced the strength of the 60th Brigade, and on the 26th the 11th D.L.I. (Pioneers) were attached as an extra battalion, and for the next six weeks took their turn with the other battalions of the brigade in the front line trenches. The excellent pioneer work that this battalion had done was marked by letters of appreciation received on the 28th from the C.E. IIIrd Corps and from the Corps Commander.

As Divisional reserve a brigade of the 23rd Division was attached to the 20th. This was later reduced to two battalions, but was not completely dispensed with until the 10th of November.

On the 28th the whole Division side-stepped about a mile to the right. This brought the right flank to a sunken road about half a mile north-east of Neuve Chapelle and the left to a point some quarter of a mile north of Rouge Bancs. The line was held by the three brigades in the same order as before, each brigade having two battalions in the front trenches.

The Divisional Artillery was now complete again, the 93rd Brigade and the sections of the 92nd having returned from Fleurbaix, and was divided into four groups. On the right was “Tyler’s Group,” which became “Ricardo’s Group” on the 11th of October, then the La Flinque and Laventie Groups with the Croix Blanche Group on the left.

The movements necessitated by this rearrangement of the Divisional front were much hindered by the state of the ground. There had been a good deal of rain in the last few days, and the communication trenches were thick in mud and in places nearly knee-deep in water. The night was very dark and the trenches—especially in the area taken over from the Meerut Division—were complicated by the labyrinth of assembly and forming-up places which had been made for the attack on the 25th. The relief was completed by 3.30 A.M. on the 29th, though minor adjustments were made the next day.

At one point in the 59th Brigade front the line took a sudden turn back for a short distance and then ran on in its original direction. A corner was thus left which at night might very easily come under fire from further down the line. To prevent this a red lamp was hung out every night at the corner of the trench, which so came to be known as the Red Lamp Salient.

A very gallant act was performed here on the 1st October when a mine shaft got full of foul air and the R.E. listening post was overcome. Captain G. H. Gilbey, Sgt. Toole and Pte. Holmes of “C” Company, 11th R.B., descended the mine shaft at great risk and succeeded in rescuing three out of the five men of the listening post. They persevered in this work until they were exhausted. Captain Gilbey was given the M.C. and Sgt. Toole and Pte. Holmes the D.C.M.

After the 25th of September there was no further offensive action on the Laventie front to assist the operations that were still going on south of the La Bassée Canal. Various measures, however, were adopted from time to time with the purpose of leading the enemy to expect an attack and of holding his troops to this part of the line.

Thus on the night of the 8th/9th of October an attempt to cut the enemy’s wire at two points with gun-cotton torpedoes was made by the 59th Brigade.

Lieut. Hugh Jones and Lieut. Grant, both of the 96th Field Company, R.E., directed the operations, and escorts were found by the 10th R.B. and the 11th K.R.R.C. The enemy was very alert, and the right party under Lieut. Grant was unable to reach the German lines owing to the activity of hostile patrols. Eventually at 2.10 A.M. the charge was fired in on enemy sap, where it did considerable damage; the party then got away under heavy fire without casualties. Lieut. Hugh Jones with the left party reached the wire at 1.30 A.M. and placed the torpedoes in position. He attempted to fire them, but was delayed by a faulty fuze. Suddenly the enemy opened a heavy fire at point-blank range. Lieut. Hugh Jones was badly wounded, but he made another attempt to fire the charge and only when this also failed and two of his four men had been wounded did he withdraw. For his action on this occasion he was awarded the M.C.

Still with the idea of holding the enemy to his ground a demonstration was made on the 13th of October by the IIIrd and Indian Corps. On the 20th Division front the line of the 60th Brigade near Mauquissait was chosen as the scene of a feint attack in which the assaulting troops were to be represented by dummies.

During the preceding night a false parapet was built across a re-entrant in the line. At 7 A.M. on the 13th the Divisional Artillery opened fire, cutting the wire very effectively and shelling various points in rear of the German position. The intense bombardment which begun at 12.30 P.M. badly damaged the enemy’s front line, and one gun firing on certain of his trenches in enfilade is believed to have caused much loss to his troops as they manned the parapet. At the same time a smoke barrage was started along the whole of the 60th Brigade front. Boxes of free phosphorus had been put out during the night between the lines and these were fired electrically from the trenches, while catapults and trench mortars helped by throwing smoke bombs. The screen was very effective, and covered the front with a thick cloud for nearly two hours.

The 60th Brigade front line was at this time held by the 6th K.S.L.I. on the right, the 11th D.L.I. in the centre, and the 12th R.B. on the left. Two battalions—the D.L.I. and the R.B.—used dummies which were made of sacks stuffed with straw and clothed with old salvaged greatcoats and with caps either salvaged or else lent by the men.

On the front of the D.L.I. the smoke was too thick for the dummies to be seen except for the first few minutes, when they were effectively used.

Opposite the 12th R.B. on the left the smoke was not continually dense, and in the clearer intervals the dummies were a great success. They were stuck on bayonets, put over the parapet and then withdrawn; they were rolled over the parapet as if shot, and then pulled back by strings when the smoke became thick again; they were poked out of the sally ports, moved up and down n sap in front of the trenches and laid out in ditches in front so as to be just visible.

When the smoke barrage began the enemy opened heavy rifle and machine-gun fire which he kept up for half an hour. Judging from the intensity of this fire he must have been manning his parapet in strength. At the same time the enemy field guns and howitzers severely shelled our trenches, creating a barrage along the 60th Brigade front. Most of the shells seem to have fallen on the support trenches and on the old assembly places, for the 12th R.B. had only two casualties, and this they attribute to the fact that all men of this battalion were kept in the front trenches during the bombardment and none behind in support. The trench mortars also came in for fairly heavy shelling. One of the detachments had bad luck, for when the gun was being packed up the officer and two men were killed and the third man wounded by the last shell that the Germans fired in the course of these operations. Our bombardment ceased at 2.10 P.M. and by 2.45 all was quiet.

There is no doubt that the demonstration was a success. The enemy must have suffered a good deal from our shell fire, while the casualties in the 20th Division were only about 50. The dummies were most realistically worked so that the enemy was thoroughly deceived and certainly concentrated his artillery on the area of the 60th Brigade. A German communiqué dealing with this demonstration came later into our hands. It ran: “A strong attack by the enemy was stopped at his trenches.”

All this time mining, sniping, and other activities inseparable from trench warfare continued on both sides. Patrols were constantly at work at night examining the German line, noting the state of the wire and the position of new works and showing much coolness and daring in collecting all the information they could. 2nd Lieut. M. L. Cope of the 11th R.B. won the M.C. while out with a patrol on the night of the 16th of October. He raided and bombed a German listening post, killing two of the enemy and routing the rest, and obtaining two greatcoats and a rifle. When his bombs were exhausted he followed up with his revolver and emptied the chambers into the Germans at six yards’ range. Having no more ammunition he immediately went to the assistance of a severely wounded man, whom he helped into cover. The action for which Lieutenants G. Meredith and H. H. de D. Monk, both of the 11th K.R.R.C., were awarded the M.C. may also be given here, though it occurred on the night of the 24th-25th of November. These two officers were reconnoitring with their company officer when the latter was killed. For over an hour, under continuous and heavy fire and over flooded and difficult ground, they dragged the body back until they reached our trenches.

On the 31st a new breastwork was made in order to straighten off a re-entrant near the Duck’s Bill—a projecting trench on the extreme right of the Divisional line. The Meerut Division on the right carried on the work towards the south. One thousand men of the 20th Division were employed in three reliefs, and between 8 P.M. and 3 A.M. they built the breastwork throughout the whole length to a height of four feet. The work was continued the following night until stopped by heavy and continuous rain.

Brig.-General Ross, who had commanded the 61st Brigade since June 1915, left the Division on the 13th of November to take command of the 6th Division. He was succeeded by Brig.-General W. F. Sweny.

During November two more changes were made in the extent of the Divisional front. On the 10th the Indian Corps was relieved by the XIth Corps, a division of which—the Guards—took over the right of the 20th Division line on the 14th. The 60th Brigade thus relieved moved to Laventie in Divisional reserve. The two battalions of the 23rd Division being then no longer required returned to their own area. At the same time the 11th D.L.I. look up their regular duties again as a pioneer battalion.

A further move between the 21st and the 24th left the Division holding the sector from east of Picantin to west of Le Bridoux with the Guards Division on the right and the 23rd on the left. Divisional headquarters was now at Sailly-sur-la-Lys. Two brigades were in the line and one in reserve, and they relieved each other in regular sequence every ten days. The headquarters of the Divisional Artillery moved to Sailly on the 27th, by which date the artillery units were settled in the new area and organised in two groups, the right and the left, with C/92 Battery acting as a counter-battery.

During the remaining two months which the 20th Division spent in this area operations were chiefly confined to artillery bombardments. There was a raid by the 59th Brigade in December, and a modified gas attack was carried out the night before the Division moved out of the line, but otherwise the task of keeping the enemy occupied and damaging his defences fell principally to the artillery, whose accurate fire also played an important part in supporting the infantry raid. On the 20th of November the enemy’s line had been shelled with the object of destroying his mine shafts and as much as possible of his trenches. Other bombardments in which the Divisional Artillery took part were carried out on the 28th and 30th. Although considerable damage was done there was very little retaliation. Between the 6th and the 10th of December the German position at Turk’s Point Salient, just south of La Boutillerie, was shelled with good results, the heavy artillery co-operating both in this bombardment and in another which took place on the 3rd of January.

On the night of the 15th/16th of December a raid was carried out by the 59th Brigade. For seven days beforehand the artillery fired on the German wire, cutting eight lanes in it though only four of them were intended to be used. These lanes were kept under machine-gun fire at night, but in spite of this the Germans put up a certain amount of new wire which had to be cut by infantry parties on the night of the raid. A detailed reconnaissance was carried out and all arrangements were made with the greatest care.

The attack was originally timed to be launched at 1 A.M. but was put off till 2 to allow the moon to set. The night was then dark with a little rain falling, and a slight wind blowing from the German trenches.

Two attacks were made, one by the 10th R.B. on the right, the other by the 11th K.R.R.C. on the left.

The right attack under Major Lascelles had much further to go than the other—about 500 yards—and on this side it was found that the wire had not been so effectively cut. Lieut. C.E.S. Rucker volunteered to take out two wire-cutting parties and proceeded to open the lanes through which the raiding parties were to pass. The wire-cutting parties did most excellent and arduous work, but the task took longer than was expected and before it could be completed the 11th K.R.R.C. on the left had entered the enemy’s trenches. The Germans, now thoroughly alert, manned a listening post just inside their wire. As surprise was impossible it was decided to abandon the raid of the 10th R.B. Lieut. Rucker then took out a bombing party, again volunteering for this task, and under heavy fire threw six bombs into the listening post from a distance of a few yards, almost certainly killing all the men inside it. He was awarded the M.C. for his gallantry in carrying out these duties.

The left attack was under Major J. F. R. Hope. Patrols sent out before the assault found only the centre gap open; the other gaps had to be cut by wire-cutters—a difficult task—to clear a passage through. The attack was divided into three parties. The one on the right was cutting the last strand at the time of the assault, and being discovered in the enemy’s wire did not get in, though severe losses were inflicted on the enemy by bombing from the parapet. About 24 men of the other two parties got in and finding the trenches strongly held had sharp fighting, while the artillery put down a most accurate curtain of fire which effectually prevented the enemy from being reinforced. Once in the trench, these two parties turned inwards, fighting their way along until they met. They then retraced their steps, and the thoroughness with which the trench was cleared and the effectiveness of the barrage are shown by the fact that they came out unmolested.

Very soon, however, the Germans opened fire, making the work of bringing in the wounded difficult and dangerous. Lieut. F. W. Warre of the 11th K.R.R.C. received the M.C. for his gallant conduct in getting all casualties back to our line. Not only was he the last man to return, but on finding that some wounded had been left behind he went back under heavy fire and collected them. He was wounded when returning the second time.

The Germans were completely surprised, but fought with determination. Their trenches were found to be very neat and well made, but with a foot of water in the bottom.

The raid was made under most difficult conditions. Rain had flooded the ditches, forming pools in places thirty yards or more across. Not only had the men to crawl over the mud for 180 yards, but also they had to lie down and wait for the time to attack. Their hands became so numbed with cold that when they reached the objective they had great difficulty in withdrawing the pins from the Mills bombs, and some were seen sitting on the fire step under heavy fire pulling out the pins with their teeth, while an officer was unable to let off his revolver. In spite of all this at least 39 Germans were killed by the raiding parties, and the artillery, trench mortars, and machine guns must have accounted for a good many more. Our casualties were 5 men killed and 1 officer and 10 men wounded.

The artillery was excellent. The infantry report stated: “It would be impossible to have got more accurate and ready support.”

The moral effect of the raid was very good. It was the first fighting that this brigade had seen, and keen as the men were it was a source of great encouragement to them to prove by experience that man for man they were better than the Germans.

For their conspicuous gallantry and ability throughout the operation, Sgt. E. G. Wimpey, Sgt. O. Green and Pte. H. Skeele, all of the 11th K.R.R.C., were awarded the D.C.M.

One of the reasons which made the Divisional Artillery so thoroughly dependable and effective, not only at this time but throughout the war, was the close touch which was always maintained with the infantry. A spirit of real camaraderie existed between the two arms; artillery officers would frequently come to the dug-outs of infantry commanders and discuss with them the best means of giving them all possible assistance. The excellent results of this system were proved over and over again.

In the middle of December preparations were made for a gas attack which was to be delivered on the first suitable night after the 20th of the month, in conjunction with raids by four small columns of the 59th Brigade. By the 20th 800 cylinders had been brought up to the front line near Cordonnerie Farm and 50 to the parapet astride the La Boutillerie road, and all preparations were complete.

The operation, however, was delayed for nearly three weeks by a constantly unfavourable wind. Meanwhile orders arrived for the relief of the 20th Division by the 8th. The move was to begin on the 9th of January. Accordingly on the 6th and 7th 450 gas cylinders were withdrawn from the front trenches. Then, on the 8th, the wind changed, and as by 2 P.M. it was blowing from the north-west, orders were immediately issued that the attack should take place that night with the 400 cylinders which still remained in position.

At this time the Divisional front was held by the 60th Brigade on the light and the 61st on the left. The 59th Brigade, which was to provide the raiding parties, was in reserve. As the number of cylinders had been so much reduced, it was decided to send forward only one raiding party instead of four.

The gas was turned on at 2 A.M. on the 9th, but went slowly, and was blown by gusts of westerly wind across the front of the trenches to be attacked. As the right flank of the raiding party would then have been exposed, and as the enemy throughout showed himself to be particularly alert, the raid was finally abandoned.

Smoke barrages were made at 2.10 A.M. on the flanks of the gas, and the artillery and trench mortars carried out a most excellent and accurate bombardment. Machine guns assisted with indirect fire which was good and never dropped. At 2.40 A.M. the gas was turned off and the smoke barrages and machine gun and trench mortar fire ceased.

During the time spent in the Laventie sector good work was done by the Divisional Mounted Troops—Headquarters, “D” Squadron and the Machine Gun Section, 1/1st Westmoreland and Cumberland Yeomanry—under Lieut.-Colonel C. Beddington. Parties of “D” Squadron (Major E. B. Lees) frequently did a tour of duty in the trenches, and the Machine Gun Section was regularly employed in the line. On the 25th of September Lieut. Leighton acted as Divisional Observation Officer and Captain Curtis as Liaison Officer between Divisional Headquarters and the Meerut Division. On the 8th of December Major Lees was invalided home and Captain C. A. C. Hazelhurst took command of “D” Squadron. By the 16th of January the squadron had 54 trained bombers—72 per cent. of the men available for bombing instruction.

The 20th Divisional Cyclist Company, under Captain C. H. M. Johns, in addition to providing orderlies, police and men for salvage and other duties, provided working parties almost every day and night from the middle of October, and put up a large amount of wire.

The gallant conduct of Lieut. Hankey, 12th K.R.R.C., while instructor at the 60th Brigade bombing school, should be mentioned here. On three separate occasions Lieut. Hankey saved lives by picking up and throwing away lighted bombs which had been dropped or had fallen short. He was later awarded the Albert Medal for these acts.

On the 9th the relief of the 20th by the 8th Division began, and by the 13th all units were in the reserve area, with Divisional Headquarters at Blarnighem Château. Here they stayed for a week carrying out training. Suddenly, on the 20th of January, the Division was ordered to move north to the Second Army, having been specially selected by Lord Cavan to form part of the new XIVth Corps.

Chapter III
THE YPRES SALIENT
22nd January to 26 July 1916

The left sector of the XIVth Corps front—German attacks on the left of the line—Arrival of the Machine Gun Companies and Medium Trench Mortar Batteries—Major-General Davies succeeded by Major-General Douglas Smith—Attack on the 7th D.C.L.I.—The Division in reserve—Reorganisation of the artillery—The sector north of Hooge—Attack on the 7th Somerset L.I.—Attack on the Canadians at Hooge—Gas attacks and raids by the Division—Move south.

(Vide [Map I.])

Although the Division began its march north into the Ypres Salient on the 22nd of January 1916, it was more than a fortnight before any of the troops took over a part of the front line. Twelve days were spent in the area round Cassel. During this time, in order to learn the ground and the local conditions, parties of officers and N.C.O.’s were attached for two or three days at a time to the 14th Division, which was holding the left sector of the VIth Corps front, and which the 20th was under orders to relieve. On the 3rd of February the Division moved to the Reserve Area vacated by the 49th Division, with Headquarters at Château Esquelbecque—an interesting old house built in 1606 and occupied by General Grant with the 15th Hussars for two years after the battle of Waterloo. Next day the VIth Corps handed over to the newlyformed XIVth, which consisted at this time of the Guards, 6th and 20th Divisions.

The new line, held by two brigades with one in reserve, was the left sector of the British front and ran on the north side of Ypres from a point 1500 yards due north of St Jean to the canal bank about 1000 yards south-east of Boesinghe. On the right was the 6th Division and on the left the French Thirty-sixth Corps. The difference between this sector and the area about Laventie immediately became apparent from the daily casualty lists. During the first month alone at Ypres the Division suffered 1000 casualties, equal to the whole number sustained during the five months at Laventie.

In order to make clear the operations that followed, it is necessary to describe in some detail the trenches on this front. They were numbered from the right, B 15 to 17, D 19 to 22, and E 23 (just south-east of Krupp Farm) being in the area of the right brigade. The left brigade trenches—those with which we are at first chiefly concerned—were E 24 to 29 and F 30 to 35. The ground between the canal and the German lines was nothing but a quagmire. It was therefore impossible to construct continuous front line trenches, and those that did exist had in many places been blown in. These isolated sections of trench, separated from each other by gaps which in places were 80 yards or more across, were held by parties varying in strength from 8 or 10 men to a platoon. They were narrow and shallow, the parapets low and rarely bullet-proof, with very little wire in front of them. There was only a very small parados in some places and hardly anywhere any revetment. There were practically no dug-outs. Communication trenches were few and bad; they were extremely difficult to drain and were constantly being demolished by shell fire, so that rations, R.E. material, etc., had to be brought up a long way from the dumps under very difficult conditions. The Germans had constructed concrete blockhouses all along the front at short intervals, and their position on the Pilckem ridge entirely dominated the whole ground as far as Ypres, rendering any movement in the front areas very difficult.

The 60th Brigade, under Brig.-General Roy, moved into these trenches on the night of the 11th/12th of February, coming under the orders of the G.O.C. 14th Division for the following day until the rest of the 20th had come up into the line and Major-General Davies had taken over command. The 6th K.S.L.I. were on the right of the front line and the 12th R.B. on the left. The relief began about 9 P.M. and was still in progress when the Germans opened a very heavy bombardment on the left of the line where the 12th R.B. were taking over from the 9th K.R.R.C. A bombing attack then developed against the two trenches F 34 and F 35 on the extreme left, accompanied by artillery and trench mortar fire on the communication trenches leading to the canal bank. The attack on F 34 came from the right, from the front and from the left front, but failed. In F 35 the number of available bombs soon ran out, owing to two bomb stores having been blown up by shells, and great difficulty was experienced in getting up a further supply through communication trenches knee-deep in mud. The Germans bombed their way up the whole of the trench, at the end of which they were stopped by rifle fire. Major H. L. Riley, commanding the 12th R.B., then asked the 12th K.R.R.C. for two bombing sections; with these in support Lieut. Gribble, the bombing officer of the 12th R.B., counter-attacked, and after half an hour recaptured the whole of F 35 as well as a German bombing post. Lieut. Gribble, who received the M.C. for his action on this day, was severely wounded while making a block in the trench. During this attack valuable help was given by the 20th Divisional Artillery, which had begun moving into the line as early as the 9th of the month.

Having been driven out of F 35, the Germans withdrew and began bombarding the trench with guns and trench mortars. Gradually they blew it in, necessitating successive withdrawals and causing many casualties. Several blocks were built during the 12th, and these were used as one section of the trench after another became untenable. Eventually, when the whole of F 35 had been practically obliterated, a position was taken up a little further back. During the morning of the 12th three bombing sections of the 12th K.R.R.C. and three of the Oxford and Bucks L.I., with two platoons of the 12th K.R.R.C., were sent up to reinforce the 12th R.B., and the garrisons of the trenches in rear were strengthened. The difficulties of communication were increased by the telephone wires having been broken during the bombardment. The 12th R.B. lost three officers and about 100 other ranks, but they made a fine stand—recognised by the Commander-in-Chief and the Army, Corps, Divisional and Brigade Commanders in the messages which they sent next day. One of these messages ran: “The Commander-in-Chief and the Corps Commander both wish to express their gratification at the most successful action of both the artillery and infantry of the 20th Division yesterday under novel conditions which might have placed them at a disadvantage.”

Another, addressed to the 12th R.B., was as follows: “Corps and Divisional Commanders convey thanks and congratulations to all ranks for good work done yesterday under trying conditions. Brigadier also thanks all ranks for excellent work.”

About 3.30 P.M. on the 12th an intense bombardment was put down on the trench F 30, held by 2nd Lieut. Fish and 30 men of the 12th R.B. After ten minutes the barrage lifted, on which about 200 Germans, under cover of heavy machine-gun fire, crossed to an unoccupied trench on the right. A small party reached the right sentry group but was driven back. Later, between 4 and 5 P.M., two bombing attacks were repulsed by 2nd Lieut. Fish and his garrison—reduced during the day to one sergeant and seven men. During the whole time the machine gun of this party was out of action. On request for reinforcements 30 men of the battalion were sent up at 9 P.M., and the garrison worked all night strengthening the parapet and barricades. 2nd Lieut. Fish was awarded the M.C. on the 2nd of March.

The 59th Brigade took over the right of the Divisional front on the night of the 12th/13th, after some delay caused by the heavy shelling of Poperinghe and Vlamertinghe. Next day the 61st Brigade went into the reserve area in and about Poperinghe; Divisional Headquarters moved on the 12th into hutments about two miles north-east of the town, and at 8 A.M. on the 13th Major-General Davies took over command of the sector from the G.O.C. 14th Division.

Infantry action was over for a few days, during which the necessary reliefs were carried out and work on the trenches begun. There was, of course, a tremendous amount to be done to make a good line. Sixteen hundred men of the 59th Brigade worked almost every night at this time, and good progress was made during the month. The line of the 60th Brigade was worse than ever after the recent bombardments, which had destroyed the parapets in many places, and in all parts of the Divisional front shelling continued daily, hampering the working parties and necessitating still more work. The canal bank was under enfilade fire from some German guns, which did a good deal of damage there and caused many casualties on the night of the 12th/13th. The only bridge in the left sub-sector which could be used by day was broken on the 13th, so that communication across the canal on this flank was cut off until the R.E. had repaired the damage at 10 P.M. that night.

All companies of the R.E. and of the 11th D.L.I. were kept working hard during the time spent in this sector, reclaiming the front line system and improving communications. The field companies, working in the areas of their brigades, constructed among other things extensive breastwork trenches in No Man’s Land and a large number of framed machine-gun emplacements with concrete head cover. The amount of work that was done by the R.E. and infantry is indicated by the fact that at one time an average of four tons of material was taken up to the line each night from the workshops and dumps of the 96th Field Company alone. The artillery did a great deal of work constructing new observation posts and improving communications and battery positions. The 11th D.L.I. were employed in digging and revetting trenches, putting out wire, making dug-outs and machine-gun emplacements, sinking wells, and repairing and relaying tramways. Later, in April, one company of the battalion was sent to each of the brigades in the front line, and a letter received from the C.R.E. on the 9th of the month especially praised the work of these companies.

The system of communications taken over by the Signal Company was in keeping with the general condition of the trenches. Shallow buried cables were found in the back areas and open cables forward of brigades. As these were continually being cut, the work of the company became increasingly difficult. The forward communication trenches were so overlooked from Pilckem Ridge that lines could not be mended in daytime. As subsidiary methods which were adopted in later times were not then used, the standard of communication was necessarily less high than it had been in the Laventie area.

The Germans renewed their activities on the extreme left of the line on the 19th, when they made another attack on F 34. This was now no more than a post, quite isolated and in a very exposed position, not more than 20 yards from a strongly held German trench, with which it was connected by a sap. It was held by one officer and 30 men of the 12th K.R.R.C., who had relieved the 12th R.B. four days before. About 4.30 P.M., after sweeping the parapet of F 34 with machine-gun fire, the Germans seem to have come up the sap from their own line and rushed the post. The S.O.S. call was sent, whereupon the artillery, assisted by the French, put down a barrage from the canal bank round trenches F 34 and 33, five batteries of the Divisional Artillery alone firing over 1200 rounds. Another party of the enemy—they were estimated at 200 in all—got in on the right of F 34 and also on the right of F 33, between which post and the next, F 30, there was a gap of 300 yards in dead ground where the intervening trenches had been destroyed. The N.C.O. and 12 men in F 33 were thus cut off, and all except one man were captured. The first intimation received that these men had been taken prisoner came from the German wireless communiqué. F 30 was then isolated. As the Divisional Commander decided that owing to the exposed position of the captured trenches no counter-attack should he made, the garrison of F 30 was ordered to withdraw.

On the 20th of February began a series of most successful artillery bombardments, which were carried out daily up to the 25th, and continued after that date at frequent intervals as long as the Division remained in this sector.

These bombardments produced retaliation from the German guns and trench mortars, which did a good deal of damage to our positions. Infantry action was confined to patrols which were frequently out and did good work.

Meanwhile, on the 18th of February, the Division had received orders to extend the line to the right, taking over as far as Pratt Street, just north-west of Wieltje Farm, from the 6th Division. This added some 1500 yards to the front and included a pronounced salient, the right of which rested on the road 500 yards north of the Farm. The rearrangement was made by each brigade extending its right, the 60th putting three battalions into the front line and the 59th keeping two in front and two behind. The necessary alterations were carried out on the 21st and 22nd, and on the 23rd the 60th Brigade on the left was relieved by the 61st and went into Divisional reserve.

On the 3rd of March an addition was made to the fighting troops of the Division by the arrival from England of the three Brigade Machine Gun Companies. They went to join their respective brigades, with which they served until, under a new organisation in 1918, they became the 20th Battalion of the Machine Gun Corps.

At this time also three Medium Trench Mortar Batteries (X/20, Y/20 and Z/20) were formed, under Captain Buckley, the D.T.M.O. On the 8th Major-General Davies handed over command of the Division. His successor was Major-General W. Douglas Smith, C.B. During this month also Lieut.-Colonel A. Rolland succeeded Colonel Kenyon as C.R.E.

While the trenches were being made more secure and more habitable by hard and continual work, another unpleasantness was added to life in the Salient by a change in the weather. On the 21st of February it become cold and frosty. Two days later snow fell and a hard frost followed, covering the canal with ice. After another fall of snow on the 26th a thaw set in, leaving the ground sodden and the trenches in a very bad state. Cold weather came again at the beginning of March, and snow fell at intervals throughout the month. In these conditions the problem of keeping the troops warm and giving them hot food had to be solved. All rations were carried from dumps near the canal bank in sandbags. Fires in the front line were impossible, as any smoke at once drew hostile artillery fire. The difficulty was met by buying oil and spirit stoves, and by supplying “Thermos” cases and food containers. In this way it was found possible to provide hot tea and food daily.

At 4 P.M. on the 11th of April the enemy began a bombardment of the front trenches of the left sub-sector, held by the 61st Brigade. The fire increased in intensity about 6 P.M., trench mortars being used as much as artillery. Trench E 28, held by the 7th D.C.L.I. in four posts, was destroyed. Most of the men in this trench managed to work their way either to a bombing post on the left or into E 27 on the right, but those in the centre who could not get out were either killed or wounded. The enemy then attacked E 28. The first line, about 70 strong, was caught in enfilade by a party of 12 men of the D.C.L.I., who had taken up a position at the end of the trench, and was practically wiped out before the second line was over the parapet. On receiving the S.O.S. signal the French as well as the Divisional Artillery immediately opened a very accurate fire. The second German line, about 30 men carrying entrenching tools, was caught by the artillery fire and turned back.

At the same time two parties attacked trenches E 25 and 26. These trenches were separated by a gap, in front of which was a large crater caused by a trench mortar. Some Germans got into this crater, but were bombed out again. About 30 more were seen in front of E 27 and 28, and a small party of 15 crawled up and attempted to enter one of the other trenches, but all were driven off. In the course of the evening two platoons of the 7th Somerset L.I. went up to bring ammunition and to reinforce the garrison. During the whole time the enemy kept up a barrage in rear of the trenches attacked, and much courage and coolness were shown by officers and men in passing through this very heavy shell fire and in bringing wounded out of it.

Second Lieut. R. Tawney received the M.C. and Sgt. J. Bristow the M.M. for their gallant action at this time.

The casualties in the D.C.L.I. were about 60. The enemy must have suffered much more heavily, as in front of trenches E 27 and 28 alone 30 dead were found.

The next day a message was received from the Army Commander conveying his appreciation of the gallant defence made by the 7th D.C.L.I., and the quickness of the artillery in supporting them. Recognition of individual acts of courage in this battalion came later, on the 15th May, when Captain W. W. Forestier and 2nd Lieut. L. E. Oudin, who was afterwards killed on the Somme, were awarded the M.C., and Sgt. C. W. Hood, Company-Sgt.-Major W. Burman and Pte. H. Morris the M.M., for their action on this day.

The Division then went back for a month’s rest. The relief by the 6th Division began on the 15th, and units moved into the reserve area some miles west of Poperinghe, with Divisional Headquarters at Esquelbecque. During this time brigade groups went in turn to Calais, first the 61st, then the 60th, and then the 59th, for periods of a week or ten days each. The Division was in turn in G.H.Q. and in Corps reserve, and spent the time training and refitting. The Divisional Band was formed at this time, and Sgt. Eldridge, 11th D.L.I., was appointed Bandmaster. On the 3rd of May it played for the first time in the square at Esquelbecque.

On the 5th Brig.-General the Hon. L. Butler took over command of the 60th Brigade from Brig.-General Roy.

On the 12th the Divisional Artillery held a horse show, which proved a great success. The condition of the artillery horses and the excellence of their turnout evoked the admiration of the whole Corps. Organised sports, horse shows, bombing and bayonet fighting competitions were also held at this period by the brigades at Calais. The march of the 59th Brigade from Calais, on the 13th of May, was rather a severe test, and showed the state of fitness to which the men had been brought. Orders reached battalions only two to two and a half hours before the move, which began at 7 P.M. The brigade marched 16 miles that night in the rain, arriving in billets at 4 A.M. on the 14th. Starting again at 11 A.M., the troops covered another 17 miles, and got into billets between six and seven in the evening. Thus 33 miles had been done in twenty-four hours. Hardly any men fell out and the march was continued in the morning.

Next day the following letter arrived from Corps Headquarters: “The Corps Commander has heard with great pleasure of the soldier-like way in which the 59th Infantry Brigade tackled the difficulties of a sudden move and a wet night march. It was only to be expected of a brigade like the 59th, but it reflects great credit, all the same, on all concerned.”

During May an alteration was made in the organisation of the artillery. The Brigade Ammunition Columns disappeared, and the Divisional Ammunition Column, under Lieut.-Colonel Foster, was divided into a first échelon (Nos. 1, 2 and 3 Section), and a second échelon (No. 4 Section), the latter supplying the wants of the infantry alone.

This was followed by a reorganisation of the batteries. The 92nd Brigade was to be a howitzer brigade no longer. The 91st, 92nd and 93rd Brigades were each to consist of three 18 pdr. batteries and one howitzer battery, and the 90th Brigade to consist of three 18 pdr. batteries. Each battery, as before, consisted of four guns.

On the 20th of May it was arranged to work the ammunition supply from a central dump at Divisional Ammunition Column Headquarters, whence issues would be made to sections, the sections delivering to battery gun positions and to infantry brigade transport lines.

In May the Divisional Mounted Troops left the Division. Headquarters and “D” Squadron of the Westmoreland and Cumberland Yeomanry, after a fortnight’s training with the 2nd Cavalry Division, moved on the 15th to join the remaining squadrons as a regiment under XIth Corps. The Divisional Cyclist Company from the 26th of May became absorbed in the XIVth Corps Cyclist Battalion.

On the 18th of May the Division began to relieve the Guards in the right sector of the Corps line. The G.O.C., 20th Division, took over command of this sector on the 21st. The 60th Brigade was on the right, the 61st on the left, and the 59th in reserve, with Divisional Headquarters at the Mairie in Poperinghe. On the right of the 20th was the Canadian Corps; on the left the 6th Division.

The line ran from some 400 yards north-west of Hooge in a general north-westerly direction, passing in front of Y Wood, through the cast of Railway Wood, and just in front of Crump and Warwick Farms and the village of Wieltje. A few hundreds of yards north-west of Wieltje the sector ended at the point where the Divisional right had formerly rested.

The German front line run at a general distance of 250 to 400 yards from our own, with, however, certain important variations. A sharp German salient at the north-east corner of Railway Wood ran to within 70 yards of the British trenches; opposite Verlorenhoek the lines were a little over 200 yards apart. About 300 yards north of Warwick Farm a sharp triangular salient projected from the German line, and there was a rather blunt German salient on the south-east side of the Wieltje road.

On the night of the 20th/21st of May three bombing attacks covered by the fire of six machine guns were made against the 7th Somerset L.I. in the left sub-sector. This battalion had moved into the trenches the night before, and was still under the G.O.C. Guards Division. The attacks were made simultaneously at 11.45 P.M. against the right, centre and left of the battalion line, and were driven off chiefly by the bombing sections, which had been placed at the weak points in the trench. On the right, a party estimated at 20 tried to force the barricade on the Ypres-Zonnebeke road, but was driven off by two bombing sections and the fire of Lewis guns. The attack in the centre failed to reach the trenches. On the left one of the sentries, Pte. Harris, heard the enemy coming up an old communication trench which ran towards the German lines. As soon as a wiring party which was out in front had been recalled, Pte. Harris began throwing bombs, whereupon the enemy came out of the communication trench and tried to get through the wire. The bombing section stationed in this part of the trench was now reinforced by another, and between them they drove back the attack. Sgt. Tanner then led the two sections up the communication trench in pursuit of the Germans, who, however, had retired to their own line. In the course of the night the Somersets had 1 man killed and 3 officers and 16 other ranks wounded. The G.O.C. Guards’ Division, in his report on these attacks, wrote: “The Somerset L.I. deserve great credit for the manner in which their bombing sections were organised, and for the immediate action taken.... Sgt. Tanner and his bombing sections showed initiative in at once pursuing the enemy.”

June was a month of much greater activity, which began with the German attack on the Canadians at Hooge. On the 2nd of the month, when this action began, the 60th Brigade was still holding the right of the Divisional front, in touch with the 3rd Canadian Division; the 59th Brigade had relieved the 61st about a week before, and was holding the left sub-sector.

On this day Brig.-General Sweny, Major R. Dashwood, his Brigade-Major, and Captain Beddington, his Staff-Captain, were all unfortunately wounded by a shell in Ypres. Brig.-General Hobkirk temporarily took over command of the 61st Brigade.

At 8.50 A.M. on the 2nd the Germans opened an intense bombardment on the Canadians and the 6th K.S.L.I., the right battalion of the 6Oth Brigade. Our artillery responded so effectively that the enemy, who tried to advance on the right of the 6th K.S.L.I. front, was unable to get forward, and lost heavily. At 12.30 P.M. the Germans attacked the Canadians, and during the day succeeded in taking two lines of trenches, including Hill 62 and Sanctuary Wood.

This advance compelled the temporary abandonment of two forward guns of C/92 Battery which had been placed in Maple copse, close to the Canadian front line, in order to enfilade “No man’s land” opposite the front of the 20th Division.

Nearly all the gunners were killed or wounded, the sergeant in charge eventually receiving the M.M. for his gallant defence. The guns, when eventually recovered some days later, were riddled with bullets and badly smashed by shell-fire.

At 9 A.M. on the 2nd the 61st Machine Gun Company at Brandhoek was ordered to stand to. Although the transport was three-quarters of a mile away, the company was ready to move fifty minutes after the order had been received. Later, at 1.30 P.M., one section of this company was sent up through Ypres, which was being severely shelled, to the 60th Brigade, to strengthen the right flank.

“A” and “B” Companies of the 12th K.R.R.C., under Captain D. Gardiner, were sent forward through a heavy barrage at 2 P.M. to reinforce the Canadian Division, and suffered rather severely going up. They rejoined their battalion on the 5th.

The enemy artillery and trench mortars were unusually active all along the line during the day, but no further attack developed on the Divisional front. During the night the Canadians made several counter-attacks, and on the 3rd were reported to have got back some of the lost trenches. Fighting continued about Hooge and Sanctuary Wood on the 4th and 5th, which were, however, comparatively quiet days on the front of the 20th Division. The 6th K.S.L.I. were relieved by the 6th Oxford and Bucks L.I. on the night of the 3rd/4th of June.

At 12.30 P.M. on the 6th the enemy opened an intense fire on the 60th Brigade line; it lasted till 3.45 P.M. On the right, on the front of the 6th Oxford and Bucks L.I., the shelling was chiefly on the support trenches, leaving the front line little damaged, but the front trenches of the 12th R.B. on the left were breached in several places. Telephone communication from this battalion headquarters to all companies was broken.

At the same time the enemy attacked the Canadians, and the 6th Oxford and Bucks L.I. several times got rifle and machine-gun fire well in to parties of Germans moving towards Hooge.

About 2.30 the enemy came over his parapet towards the lines of the 12th R.B. and of the 11th K.R.R.C., who were holding the right of the 59th Brigade front. Rifle fire was opened on them, and the artillery immediately barraged the trenches in answer to the S.O.S. A party of about thirty, advancing towards the 11th K.R.R.C., was seen to turn back hurriedly into cover, under the fire of our Lewis guns. Most of those who attacked the 12th R.B. dropped into long grass when fire was opened, and tried to crawl back; none reached our line.

About 3.15 P.M. the enemy exploded two mines. One was well in front of the 6th Oxford and Bucks L.I. line, and did no damage; but the other, under the trenches of the 12th R.B., about Gully Farm, destroyed fifty yards of trench, and buried Second-Lieut. Messenger and 22 men. Only Second-Lieut. Messenger and 10 men survived.

Meanwhile the main attack, which was being delivered with great determination against the Canadians, was meeting with some success. At 3.26 P.M. the 3rd Canadian Division reported that the enemy was advancing north of the Menin road and through Sanctuary Wood; and at 7.55 P.M. that the Germans had captured Hooge.

The 7th K.O.Y.L.I. left Poperinghe at 4.10 P.M. for Vlamertinghe, and came under the orders of the 60th Brigade. At 10 P.M. the 12th R.B. were reinforced by two platoons of the 12th K.R.R.C. and two Lewis guns; and a working party of 100 men of the 12th K.R.R.C. was sent up to them.

Throughout the operations of this day the trench mortar batteries did most valuable work, Captain Buckley, the D.T.M.O., and Captain Traill, commanding Y/20 Battery, both receiving the M.C.

In the course of the fighting some of the Canadian communications broke down. Fortunately, with the help of recently completed buried cables, some laid in the sewers of Ypres, the 20th Divisional Signal Company was able to maintain communication for the Canadians for a considerable time during the most critical period of the fighting.

During the night the damage done to the trenches was repaired and a new line dug. Patrols searched the front, bringing in prisoners, and discovering parties of the enemy consolidating their line. These parties were brought under fire from our machine guns and snipers, and suffered much loss. Touch with the Canadians, which had been lost during the day’s fighting, was re-established, and was maintained throughout the night.

The casualties of the 60th Brigade were about 100, of which 77, including 25 killed, were in the 12th R.B.

On the 10th of June the following message was received from G.O.C. 3rd Canadian Division: “I am writing on behalf of the whole of the 3rd Canadian Division to thank you most heartily for the immediate and substantial assistance which the 20th Division gave us on June 2nd and on the subsequent days, and to ask you also to repent our thanks to General Butler and to the 12th K.R.R.C., who sent two companies to strengthen our line. We shall always remember with gratitude the help given so promptly and freely by your Division.”

The next few days were spent in harassing the enemy parties working on their new positions, and in work on our own trenches. On the 8th and 9th the 6Oth Brigade was relieved by the 61st in the right sub-sector. Though the 60th went into reserve, the troops had not much rest, for by the 10th, 600 men of the Brigade were working nightly on the new line from Cork Cottages to Dragoon Farm, and 200 men were employed in burying cables. On the 11th an additional 600 men (300 from the artillery and 300 from the reserve brigade) were required to bury cables for the XIVth Corps.

The last phase of these operations was carried out on the 13th, when the Canadians attacked in order to regain the lost ground. To assist them, the 20th Division was ordered to discharge gas and smoke along its front and then push out patrols, following these up by larger raiding parties if possible, at four selected points in the German line. Zero was 1.30 A.M. on the 13th. Owing to the short notice that had been given, it was found impossible to get all the gas cylinders into the trenches in time. By some mistake in one part of the line, the smoke bombs were thrown three minutes before zero. This unfortunately gave alarm to the enemy, who thus had time to put on gas masks.

The gas, discharged at zero from 130 cylinders, went well and quickly. In three minutes practically all the rifle and machine-gun fire from the German trenches had ceased. The artillery barrage also began at zero, and was most effective. After twenty-five minutes it lifted to allow our infantry raiding parties to go forward.

On the right one party of the Somerset L.I., under Captain J. N. C. Peard, was held up by the wire near Railway Wood. Owing to the gas this party had to put on gas masks, and while attempting to cut a passage through the wire 3 men were killed and Captain Peard and 10 men wounded. All the wounded, however, were brought back safely. A party of the 11th K.R.R.C. under Lieut. H. A. Denison got in at the Mound (south-west of Verlorenhoek), which was found to be practically obliterated by our trench mortar bombardment. This party beat off a counter attack, and returned with only five slight casualties. The left party got as far as the German wire and reconnoitered the position, but, being only a small patrol, did not attempt to enter the trenches.

The 1st Canadian Division in a most successful attack regained Mount Sorrel and Observatory Ridge.

On the 24th of June the Division began a series of operations—bombardments and raids—against the enemy. The first day was devoted to wire cutting—very successfully done by the artillery and trench mortar batteries. On the 25th the enemy lines were shelled during the day, and at 10 o’clock that night a raid on the enemy salient east-south-east of Wieltje was carried out by three columns of the 10th K.R.R.C., with the assistance of 1 officer and 4 men of the 84th Field Company R.E. The assaulting troops—3 officers and 80 men—were under the command of Captain R. S. Cockburn; the three raiding parties were led by Lieut. F. V. Le Pavoux, Lieut. R. L. Jones (both of whom were wounded during the raid), and Lieut. G. A. Langley. The R.E. party was under Lieut. Manisty.

This raid had been previously practised against facsimile trenches in the back area, and Lieut.-Colonel Blacklock, D.S.O. (later promoted Major-General), who commanded this battalion, had carefully supervised the training for this operation. It was in a great measure due to him that the raid proved so successful.

All three parties entered the enemy’s lines and went thoroughly through the salient, suffering very few casualties. The German trenches had been badly knocked about by our artillery fire, but a great deal of work had evidently been expended on them. They were found to be deep and strong, well revetted, and absolutely dry. Seven prisoners—including an officer—were taken, but the officer was killed and five of the men were wounded by a German shell after they had reached our lines. A considerable amount of loot—equipment, papers, etc.—was also brought in. Captain R. S. Cockburn, Lieut. F. V. Le Pavoux, Second-Lieut. R. L. Jones, Second-Lieut. G. A. Langley and Lieut. Manisty, were all awarded the M.C. The M.M. was given to Lance-Cpl. J. Frost, Lance-Sgt. F. W. Webb, and Rfm. E. Coates, of the 10th K.R.R.C., Sgt. A. McKay, 84th Field Company, Sapper H. Holland, 20th Divisional Signal Company, and Rfm. J. P. Mansfield, 59th Trench Mortar Battery.

Our casualties during the raid were 1 officer and 3 other ranks. Unfortunately the parties on their return came into the enemy’s barrage on our front and support lines, and lost a good many men. This brought the total casualties to 3 officers and 38 other ranks. The raid was a great success in every way, the information alone which it secured being of the greatest value.

Another raid was carried out on the night of the 29th/30th of June by the 6th K.S.L.I., commanded by Lieut.-Colonel E. A. Wood, D.S.O. A bombardment by the Divisional Artillery and the heavy guns of the XIVth Corps during the day and night did great damage to the trenches and provoked considerable retaliation, especially on Railway Wood. Under cover of these bombardments the trench mortars effectively cut the German wire.

Two raiding parties went forward, each composed of 2 officers and 40 men of the 6th K.S.L.I. They were all volunteers, and had been specially trained for this raid at Vlamertinghe on a model of the German trenches to be attacked. Special equipment was carried, such as revolvers, knobkerries, explosives, rockets and torches, and one party had bells and the other rattles, to be used as the signal to withdraw. The two parties were commanded by Lieut. D. S. A. McKimm on the right and Captain H. M. O’Connor on the left, and were accompanied by a party of the 83rd Field Company R.E., under Second-Lieut. H. Y. V. Jackson, and some of the 177th Tunnelling Company R.E. They moved out at midnight, and on the barrage lifting, made for the enemy trenches.

The right party got in first, and found the line badly knocked about. Lieut. McKimm and his men thoroughly searched the trenches, blocked the enemy’s communications, and did as much damage as possible. Eleven Germans were bayonetted emerging from a shelter into the trench, six dug-outs with parties of four to six inside were bombed, and other casualties caused and prisoners taken. By 12.30 A.M. the party had returned without casualties.

Captain O’Connor’s party also successfully entered German lines. One section, under Corporal Richards, who gallantly continued to lead his men although wounded early in the raid, bombed seven dug-outs and took six prisoners, pushed forward against strong opposition, and then held on until the order to retire was given. Other sections dealt similarly with all the enemy they met. Lance-Cpl. Walker was killed while making a splendid fight with his section, which was able to account for 35 of the enemy.

The casualties of this party were 2 killed, 1 missing and 9 wounded. In the course of the raid 60 or 70 prisoners were taken.

The artillery support was all that could be desired. During the barrage, half the guns fired on the front line and half on the support lines, so as to prevent the enemy from recognising when the lift took place, and the raiding parties, entering as soon as the barrage lifted, took the enemy completely by surprise.

The whole operation was very well carried out, and all ranks showed extraordinary keenness and determination to make the raid a success.

Among the many honours awarded to officers and men of the 6th K.S.L.I. for their services on this occasion were the following: M.C., Captain H. M. O’Connor, Lieut. D. S. A. McKimm; D.C.M., Cpl. R. Richards.

All these raids and bombardments entailed harder work on the troops behind the front line. R.E. material was constantly required for the trenches, but owing to the operations transport for it was difficult to obtain. The ammunition requirements, too, during June were heavy. Great credit must be given to the officers and men of the Divisional Ammunition Column, who were kept working at very high pressure during the whole month.

On the 5th and 6th of July the 59th Brigade relieved the 61st in the left sub-sector.

On the night of the 10th a minor operation was carried out by the 59th Brigade. Gas was turned on at 10.30, accompanied by a smoke screen and an artillery and trench mortar barrage, while four raiding parties formed up ready to go forward. This time the enemy seemed to be well prepared. As soon as the gas was discharged he lighted fires along his parapet to make the cloud rise. Severe artillery, rifle and machine-gun fire prevented the raiding parties from reaching his lines except at one point. This was at the Mound, where Second-Lieut. Rudd and a party of the 11th K.R.R.C. successfully bombed their way up one of the communication trenches.

On the 12th the Germans severely shelled the Wieltje salient. Great damage was done, and one company alone—“A” Company of the 10th R.B.—lost 25 casualties, one-third of its whole strength. On the 12th and 14th the town of Poperinghe was heavily bombarded; over 200 shells fell near the square and railway station on the 12th, so that on the 14th, under the orders of the Corps Commander, all troops moved out of the town. Divisional Headquarters moved to a camp about 1000 yards to the north.

On the night of the 13th/14th, orders were received directing the 60th Brigade to move to Steenwerck, to be placed under the orders of the IInd Anzac Corps. The brigade, with its machine gun company and light trench mortar battery, entrained next morning at Poperinghe, which was being shelled at the time, but fortunately got away without casualties. The troops detrained at Steenwerck, and marched from there to Erquinghem. The 12th R.B. went straight into the trenches, the 6th K.S.L.I. and 6th Oxford and Bucks L.I. extending the line to the left on the 15th, when Brigade Headquarters and the 12th K.R.R.C. went into billets at Fleurbaix. The Brigade held a line running north-east and east from La Cordonnerie Farm on the right to just north of Le Bridoux; covering this line were three attached batteries of the 24th Field Artillery Brigade, of the 6th Division.

The next two days were spent in registering the guns and in cutting the wire, in preparation for an attack which was to be made by the 61st Division and the 5th Australian Division on the right of the 60th Brigade. On the 19th, after a bombardment during the day, a mine was sprung opposite La Cordonnerie Farm at 7 P.M., and the assaulting troops went forward. Delangre Farm was the left of the attack, so that the 60th Brigade was not involved in these operations beyond firing on the Germans, who stood to in their trenches north of the farm and offered a good target for the machine guns. The ground gained could not be held by the attacking troops, who were back in their own trenches by 6.15 A.M. on the 20th.

On the night of the 22nd/23rd the 60th Brigade was relieved and marched back to billets about Bailleul.

Meanwhile, the rest of the 20th Division, with the exception of the artillery, had been relieved between the 14th and the 18th by the 6th Division, and had moved to an area west of Poperinghe, with headquarters at Esquelbecque. Here a warning order was received on the 17th that the Division, less artillery, would be required in the next few days to move to the area of the Vth Corps, to which the 84th Field Company R.E. had been attached since the 15th. On the 19th the move began, and on the 20th Major-General Douglas Smith took over from the G.O.C. 24th Division a line facing Messines and Wytschaete, and extending from the river Douve a little west of the Ploegsteert-Messines road to a point just south-west of the cross-roads at Kruisstraat.

The G.O.C. had not assumed command of this sector more than an hour, and the relief was not yet completed, when he received verbal instructions that the 20th Division would be required to move south as soon as it had been relieved by the 36th and 50th Divisions. Definite orders arrived next day, and the relief began at once. On the 23rd and 24th, units concentrated in the back area about Steenwerck and Hondeghem, where the 60th Brigade rejoined, and on the 25th and 26th the Division, leaving the artillery still at Ypres, went south to Doullens.

Chapter IV
THE SOMME
24th of July to 7th of September 1916

The line between Beaumont Hamel and Hebuterne—Move to the Somme area—Battle of Guillemont.

(Vide [Map II.] [and Sketch B.])

As soon as all units were concentrated in the district round Doullens, the 20th Division was ordered to relieve the 38th in the hilly country between Beaumont Hamel and Hebuterne. Accordingly the 29th of July found the Division once more in the line, though not yet in the area of the great offensive which had been progressing since the first of the month between the Ancre and the Somme.

Brig.-General W. E. Banbury, C.M.G., took over command of the 61st Brigade on the 28th of July from Brig.-General Sweny, who had returned to the Brigade a few days earlier, but was still suffering from the effect of his wounds.

The right of the new line rested about half a mile north-west of Beaumont Hamel on the south side of a spur known as Redan Ridge, overlooking the village, which lay in a narrow valley some hundred feet below. From the crest of Redan ridge the line ran rather east of north into somewhat lower ground, facing Serre and extending to a point 1200 yards north-west of it. Here it formed a salient and turned back, rising to the Divisional left flank at a place known as Sixteen Poplars on the Hebuterne-Puisieux road about 1000 yards from Hebuterne. The 61st Brigade held the right of this line, the 60th the centre opposite Serre and the 59th the left, with Divisional Headquarters at Couin. The 38th Divisional Artillery remained in the line to support the 20th Division, whose own artillery was still at Ypres. The Division was now once more in the XIVth Corps, which had taken over that day from the VIIIth, and which consisted of the Guards, 6th, 20th and 25th Divisions; on the right of the 20th was the 25th Division and on the left the 56th.

Although this country was now outside the main battle area, attacks had been made on the 1st of July between the Ancre and Serre and north of Hebuterne, with a view to holding the enemy reserves and occupying his artillery. To meet these attacks the enemy had concentrated a large force of artillery, with the result that when the 20th Division took over the line the trenches were in an appalling state and the ground still covered with dead. The front line could be held only by advanced parties, and it had to be reclaimed; in places where it was too much damaged and full of dead bodies it had to be filled in and a new line dug in front of it. Communication trenches had to be put in good order for 500 yards behind the front line, deep dug-outs made, the battlefield cleared and a new line built within 200 yards of the enemy, wherever there was a greater distance than this between the opposing trenches. To assist in this task the 3rd Battalion Grenadier Guards was attached to the 20th Division from the 1st to the 7th of August; on the departure of this battalion, a field company of the Guards Division came to help. The field companies of the Division were employed in the areas of their respective brigades, and the 11th D.L.I. and large parties from the battalions in reserve were constantly at work.

GUILLEMONT, 3^RD-4^TH Sep^t 1916. Sketch B.