The sword is being forced into our hand. I hope that if my efforts at the last hour do not succeed in bringing our opponents to see eye to eye with us and in maintaining peace we shall with God's help so wield the sword that we shall restore it to its sheath again with honor.

War would demand enormous sacrifices of blood and property from the German people, but we should show our enemies what it means to provoke Germany.

And now I commend you to God. Go to church. Kneel down before God and pray for His help for our gallant Army.

FORGIVES ENEMIES.

Kaiser Wilhelm's Speech from the Balcony of the Palace, Berlin, Aug. 2.

I thank you for the love and loyalty shown me. When I enter upon a fight let all party strife cease. We are German brothers and nothing else. All parties have attacked me in times of peace. I forgive them with all my heart. I hope and wish that the good German sword will emerge victorious in the right.

SPEECH FROM THE THRONE.

Kaiser Wilhelm II., Opening Special Session of the Reichstag in White Room of the Royal Palace, Berlin, Aug. 4.

WILHELM II., German Emperor.
(Photo from Charles E. Ritzmann.)

Honored Sirs: It is in an hour fraught with fate that I have assembled about me all the representatives of the German people. For almost half a century we have been able to keep to the path of peace. The attempts to attribute a warlike temperament to Germany and to circumscribe its position in the world have often put to severe tests the patience of our people. With unswerving honesty, my Government, even in provoking circumstances, has pursued as its highest aim the development of all moral, spiritual, and economic powers. The world has been witness how tirelessly we strove in the first rank during the pressure and confusion of the last few years to spare the nations of Europe a war between the great powers.

The very grave dangers which had arisen owing to the events in the Balkans appeared to have been overcome, but then the murder of my friend, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, opened up a great abyss. My high ally, the Emperor and King Francis Joseph, was compelled to take up arms to defend the security of his empire against dangerous intrigues from a neighboring State. In the pursuit of her proper interests the Dual Monarchy has found her path obstructed by the Russian Empire. Not only our duty as an ally calls us to the side of Austria-Hungary, but on us falls also the mighty task of defending the ancient community of culture of the two kingdoms and our own position in the world against the attack of hostile powers. With a heavy heart I have been compelled to mobilize my army against a neighbor with whom it has fought side by side on so many fields of battle. With sincere sorrow I saw a friendship broken of which Germany had given faithful proofs. The Imperial Russian Government, yielding to the pressure of an insatiable nationalism, has taken sides with a State which by encouraging criminal attacks has brought on the evil of this war. That France, also, placed herself on the side of our enemies could not surprise us. Too often have our efforts to arrive at friendlier relations with the French Republic come in collision with old hopes and ancient malice.

Honored Sirs: What human insight and power could do to arm a people against the last extremities has been done with your patriotic help. The hostility which has been smouldering for a long time in the East and in the West has now burst into bright flames. The present situation did not proceed from transient conflicts of interest or diplomatic entanglements, it is the result of an ill will which has for many years been active against the strength and the prosperity of the German Empire. We are not incited by lust for conquest, we are inspired by the unyielding determination to keep for ourselves and all future generations the place which God has given us.

From the proofs which have been given you, you will see how my Government, and especially my Chancellor, strove up to the last moment to avert the worst. We grasp the sword in compulsory self-defense, with clean hands and a clean conscience.

To the peoples and races of the German Empire my call goes forth to defend with all their strength and in brotherly co-operation with our ally that which we have created by peaceful labor. After the example of our fathers, firmly and faithfully, sincerely and with chivalry, humbly before God and battling joyfully before the enemy, let us place our trust in the eternal Omnipotence, and may He strengthen our defense and bring it to a good end!

To you, honored sirs, the whole German people, assembled about its Princes and its leaders, look this day. Make your decision unanimously and quickly. That is my heartfelt wish.

Gentlemen (addressing the Deputies directly): You have read what I said to my people the other day from the balcony of my castle. I repeat now that I no longer know any parties. I know only Germans. And in order to testify that you are firmly resolved without distinction of party to stand by my side through danger and death, I call upon the leaders of the different parties in this House to come forward and lay their hands in mine as a pledge.

TO THE GERMAN ARMY AND NAVY.

Proclamation by Kaiser Wilhelm II.

After three and forty years of peace I call the men of Germany to arms.

It has become necessary to protect our most sacred possessions, the Fatherland, our very hearths against ruthless destruction.

Enemies on every hand! That is the situation. A mighty struggle, a great sacrifice confronts us.

I trust that the old spirit of battle still lives on in the German people, that powerful spirit of battle which grapples with the foe wherever it meets it, be the cost what it may, which has ever been the terror and fear of our enemies.

Soldiers of Germany, in you I place my trust! In each one of you lives the passionate will to conquer, which nothing can subdue. Each one of you knows, if need be, how to die a hero's death.

Remember our great and glorious past!

Remember that you are Germans!

God help us!

WILHELM.

Berlin, Schloss, Aug. 6, 1914.

TO GERMAN WOMEN.

An Appeal from the Kaiserin.

AUGUSTA VICTORIA, German Empress.
(Photo from M.E. Berner.)

On the summons of the Emperor our people are preparing for an unprecedented struggle, which it did not invoke and which it is only carrying on in its defense. Whoever can bear arms will joyfully hasten to the colors to defend the Fatherland with his blood. The struggle will be gigantic and the wounds to be healed innumerable, therefore I call upon you women and girls of Germany, and all to whom it is not given to fight for our beloved home, for help. Let every one now do what lies in her power to lighten the struggle for our husbands, sons, and brothers. I know that in all ranks of our people, without exception, the will exists to fulfill this high ideal, but may the Lord God strengthen us in our holy work of love, which summons us women to devote all our strength to the Fatherland in its decisive struggle.

The organizations primarily concerned who should be supported first have already sent out notices regarding the mustering of volunteers and the collection of gifts of all kinds.

AUGUSTE VICTORIA.

Berlin, Aug. 6.

"TO THE LAST BREATH OF MAN AND HORSE."

Proclamation by Kaiser Wilhelm II.

Since the foundation of the empire it has been for forty-three years the object of the efforts of myself and my ancestors to preserve the peace of the world and to advance by peaceful means our vigorous development. But our adversaries were jealous of the successes of our work. There has been latent hostility on the east and on the west and beyond the sea. It was borne by us till now, as we were aware of our responsibility and power. Now, however, these adversaries wish to humiliate us, asking that we should look on with crossed arms and watch our enemies preparing themselves for a coming attack. They will not suffer that we maintain resolute fidelity to our ally who is fighting for its position as a great power and with whose humiliation our power and honor would equally be lost. So the sword must decide.

In the midst of perfect peace the enemy surprises us. Therefore to arms! Any dallying, any temporizing would be which our fathers founded; to be or not to be, is the question for the empire which our fathers founded. To be or not to be German power and German existence. We shall resist to the last breath of man and horse, and shall fight out the struggle even against a world of enemies. Never has Germany been subdued when it was united. Forward with God, who will be with us as He was with our ancestors!

Berlin, Aug. 6. WILHELM.

JOY IN GLORIOUS VICTORY.

Speech of Kaiser at a Parade During Swift German Advance Toward Paris.

Comrades: I have gathered you around me here in order to take joy with you in the glorious victory which our comrades have in several days of hot battle won with their swords. Troops out of every nook and cranny of the empire helped one another in invincible bravery and unshakable loyalty to win great results. There stood together under the leadership of the son of the Bavarian King and fought, with equal blades, troops of all ages, active, reservists, and landwehr.

For our victory we are thankful, in the first place, to our God, (unserem alten Gott.) He will not desert us, since we stand for a holy cause. Many of our comrades have already fallen in battle. They died as heroes for the Fatherland. We will think of them with honor here, and shout to the honor of those still in the field. Hurrah! Hurrah! Hurrah!

We still have many a bloody battle before us. Let us hope for further successes like this. We shall not relent, and we shall get to the enemy's hide. We shall not lose our faith and trust in our good old God up there, (unserem guten alten Gott dort oben.) We are determined to win, and we must win.

FIRST SUCCESSFUL BATTLE.

Telegram from Kaiser Wilhelm II. to Chief of Troops in Upper Alsace, Aug. 15.

Grateful to God, Who was with us. I thank you and your troops for the first victory. Please convey to all the troops which took part in the fight my imperial thanks in the name of the Fatherland.

YOUR CHIEF WAR CAPTAIN.

A PRAYER FOR VICTORY.

By the Kaiser's Order to Supreme Council of the Evangelical Church—To Be Included in the Liturgy Throughout the War.

Almighty and merciful God! God of the armies! We beseech Thee in humility for Thy almighty aid for our German Fatherland. Bless the entire German war force, lead us to victory, and give us grace that we may show ourselves to be Christians toward our enemies as well. Let us soon arrive at the peace which will everlastingly safeguard our free and independent Germany.

"UP AND AT THE FOES."

Kaiser's Farewell Speech to First Regiment of Foot Guards at Potsdam.

I draw the sword that with God's help I have kept all these years in the scabbard. I have drawn the sword, which without victory and without honor I cannot sheath again. All of you will see to it that only in honor is it returned to the scabbard. You are my guarantee that I can dictate peace to my enemies. Up and at the foes, and down with the enemies of Brandenburg!

ON VICTORY NEAR METZ.

From Cabinet Order of Kaiser Wilhelm II., Published in Berlin Aug. 23.

The mobilization and concentration of the army is now complete, the German railways having carried out the enormous transport movements with unparalleled certainty and punctuality. With a heart filled with gratitude my first thoughts turn to those who since 1870-71 have worked quietly upon the development of an organization which has emerged from its first serious test with such glorious success. To all who have co-operated with them I wish to express my imperial thanks for their loyal devotion to duty in making possible in obedience to my call the transportation of armed masses of German troops against my enemies. The present achievement [near Metz] convinces me that the railways of the country will be equal to the heaviest demands that might be made upon them during the course of the gigantic struggle in which we are engaged for the future of the German Nation.

THE SPIRIT OF THE MEN.

Kaiser's Telegram from Dresden to the King of Saxony, Oct. 2.

I am very glad to be able to send you the best reports of the Nineteenth Army Corps and the Twelfth Reserve Corps. I visited yesterday the Third Army and greeted especially the brave 181st Regiment, to which I expressed my recognition. I found your third son and your brother Max as well as Laffert and Kirchbach in the best of health. The spirit among the men is splendid. With such an army we shall be able to complete victoriously the rest of our difficult task. To this end may the Almighty stand by us.

WILHELM.

HIS INDISCRETION WAS "CALCULATED."

Interview With Kaiser Wilhelm II., Oct. 28, 1908, and Its Consequences.

An interview between the German Emperor and "a representative Englishman, who long since passed from public to private life," appeared in The London Telegraph on Oct. 28, 1908, and was the next day authenticated by the German Foreign Office in Berlin with the comment that it was "intended as a message to the English people." This last expression of the Kaiser toward Great Britain—until his declarations on the eve of the present war—deeply stirred the German people in protest and resulted in the Kaiser's pledge to Chancellor von Buelow that henceforth the imperial views would be subject to the bridle of the Ministry and the Council of the Empire. The interview as recorded by the "representative Englishman" was as follows:

Moments sometimes occur in the history of nations when a calculated indiscretion proves of the highest public service. It is for this reason that I have decided to make known the substance of a lengthy conversation which it was my recent privilege to have with the Emperor.

I do so in the hope that it will help to remove that obstinate misconception of the character of the Emperor's feelings toward England, which I fear is deeply rooted in the ordinary Englishman's breast. It is the Emperor's sincere wish that it should be eradicated. He has given repeated proofs of his desire by word and deed. But, to speak frankly, his patience is sorely tried now; he finds himself so continually misrepresented and has so often experienced the mortification of finding that any momentary improvement in relations is followed by renewed outbursts of prejudice and a prompt return to the old attitude of suspicion.

His Majesty spoke with impulsive and unusual frankness, saying: "You English are as mad, mad, mad as March hares. What has come over you that you are completely given over to suspicions that are quite unworthy of a great nation? What more can I do than I have done? I declared with all the emphasis at my command in my speech at the Guildhall that my heart was set upon peace and that it was one of my dearest wishes to live on the best terms with England. Have I ever been false to my word? Falsehood and prevarication are alien to my nature. My actions ought to speak for themselves, but you will not listen to them, but to those who misinterpret and distort them."

Resents a Personal Insult.

"This is a personal insult which I resent; to be forever misjudged, to have my repeated offers of friendship weighed and scrutinized with jealous, mistrustful eyes taxes my patience severely. I have said time after time that I am a friend of England, and your press, or at least a considerable section of it, bids the people of England to refuse my proffered hand and insinuates that the other hand holds a dagger. How can I convince a nation against its will?"

Complaining again of the difficulty imposed on him by English distrust, his Majesty said: "The prevailing sentiment of large sections of the middle and lower classes of my own people is not friendly to England. I am, therefore, so to speak, in the minority in my own land, but it is a minority of the best element, just as it is in England respecting Germany."

The Englishman reminded the Kaiser that not only England but the whole of Europe viewed with disapproval the recent sending of the German Consul at Algiers to Fez and forestalling France and Spain by suggesting the recognition of Sultan Mulai Hafid. The Kaiser made an impatient gesture and exclaimed: "Yes? that is an excellent example of the way German actions are misrepresented," and with vivid directness he defended the aforesaid incident, as the German Government has already done.

The interviewer reminded the Kaiser that an important and influential section of the German newspapers interpreted these acts very differently, and effusively approved of them because they indicated that Germany was bent upon shaping events in Morocco.

"There are mischief makers," replied the Emperor, "in both countries. I will not attempt to weigh their relative capacity for misrepresentation, but the facts are as I have stated. There has been nothing in Germany's recent action in regard to Morocco contrary to the explicit declaration of my love of peace made both at the Guildhall and in my latest speech at Strassburg."

Kaiser and the Boer War.

Reverting to his efforts to show his friendship for England, the Kaiser said they had not been confined to words. It was commonly believed that Germany was hostile to England throughout the Boer war. Undoubtedly the newspapers were hostile and public opinion was hostile. "But what," he asked, "of official Germany? What brought to a sudden stop, indeed, to an absolute collapse, the European tour of the Boer delegates, who were striving to obtain European intervention?"

"They were fêted in Holland. France gave them a rapturous welcome. They wished to come to Berlin, where the German people would have crowned them with flowers, but when they asked me to receive them I refused. The agitation immediately died away and the delegates returned empty handed. Was that the action of a secret enemy?

"Again, when the struggle was at its height, the German Government was invited by France and Russia to join them in calling upon England to end the war. The moment had come, they said, not only to save the Boer republics, but also to humiliate England to the dust. What was my reply? I said so far from Germany joining in any concerted European action to bring pressure against England and bring about her downfall Germany would always keep aloof from politics that could bring her into complications with a sea power like England.

"Posterity will one day read the exact terms of a telegram, now in the archives of Windsor Castle, in which I informed the sovereign of England of the answer I returned to the powers which then sought to compass her fall. Englishmen who now insult me by doubting my word should know what my actions were in the hour of their adversity.

"Nor was that all. During your black week in December, 1899, when disasters followed one another in rapid succession, I received a letter from Queen Victoria, my revered grandmother, written in sorrow and affliction and bearing manifest traces of the anxieties which were preying upon her mind and health. I at once returned a sympathetic reply. I did more. I bade one of my officers to procure as exact an account as he could obtain of the number of combatants on both sides and the actual positions of the opposing forces.

"With the figures before me I worked out what I considered the best plan of campaign in the circumstances and submitted it to my General Staff for criticism. Then I dispatched it to England. That document likewise is among the State papers at Windsor awaiting the serenely impartial verdict of history.

"Let me add as a curious coincidence that the plan which I formulated ran very much on the same lines as that actually adopted by Gen. Roberts and carried by him into successful operation. Was that the act of one who wished England ill? Let Englishmen be just and say."

The German Navy.

Touching then upon the English conviction that Germany is increasing her navy for the purpose of attacking Great Britain, the Kaiser reiterated the explanation that Chancellor von Bülow and other Ministers have made familiar, dwelling upon Germany's worldwide commerce, her manifold interests in distant seas, and the necessity for being prepared to protect them. He said:

"Patriotic Germans refuse to assign any bounds to their legitimate commercial ambitions. They expect their interests to go on growing. They must be able to champion them manfully in any quarter of the globe. Germany looks ahead. Her horizons stretch far away. She must be prepared for any eventualities in the Far East. Who can foresee what may take place in the Pacific in the days to come, days not so distant as some believe, but days, at any rate, for which all European powers with Far Eastern interests ought to steadily prepare?

"Look at the accomplished rise of Japan. Think of a possible national awakening in China, and then judge of the vast problems of the Pacific. Only those powers which have great navies will be listened to with respect when the future of the Pacific comes to be solved, and if for that reason only Germany must have a powerful fleet. It may even be that England herself will be glad that Germany has a fleet when they speak together in the great debates of the future."

The interviewer concludes:

"The Emperor spoke with all that earnestness which marks his manner when speaking on deeply pondered subjects. I ask my fellow-countrymen who value the cause of peace to weigh what I have written and revise, if necessary, their estimate of the Kaiser and his friendship for England by his Majesty's own words. If they had enjoyed the privilege of hearing them spoken they would no longer doubt either his Majesty's firm desire to live on the best of terms with England or his growing impatience at the persistent mistrust with which his offer of friendship is too often received."

The Consequences.

On Nov. 17 following Prince von Bülow met the Kaiser at Kiel, taking with him evidence of the feeling in Germany regarding the Emperor's published interview and setting forth:

First, that the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Bundesrat, or Federal Council, is firm in the opinion formulated at the meeting held yesterday that it would be wiser for the Emperor not to express views affecting the relations of the empire with other countries except through his responsible Ministers. This expression, derives weight from the fact that the Governments of Bavaria, Württemberg, and Saxony were represented on the committee.

Second, that the entire Reichstag assented to the declarations made by the speakers on Tuesday that the Emperor had exceeded his constitutional prerogatives in private discussion with foreigners concerning Germany's attitude on controverted questions.

Third, that the feeling of the people at large on this matter was accurately indicated by the press of the country.

The Kaiser's reply was published on the same date in the Reichsanzeiger, in the form of a communication, which read:

During today's audience granted to the Imperial Chancellor, his Majesty, the Emperor and King, listened for several hours to a report by Prince von Bülow. The Imperial Chancellor described the feeling and its causes among the German people in connection with the article published in The Daily Telegraph. He also explained the position he had taken during the course of the debates and interpellations on this subject in the Reichstag. His Majesty the Emperor received the statements and explanations with great earnestness, and then expressed his will as follows:

"Heedless of the exaggerations of public criticism, which are regarded by him as incorrect, his Majesty perceives that his principal imperial task is to insure the stability of the policies of the empire, under the guardianship of constitutional responsibilities. In conformity therewith, his Majesty the Emperor approves the Chancellor's utterances in the Reichstag, and assures Prince von Bülow of his continued confidence."

WILHELM II.'S LETTER TO LORD TWEEDMOUTH.

Published by The Morning Post of London, Oct. 30, 1914.

The subjoined letter written to the late Lord Tweedmouth by the German Emperor is made public for the first time. It is a literal transcript of the original document in which occur a few slight errors in spelling. The existence of the document was first made known to the public by the military correspondent of The Times, who published a letter on the subject on March 6, 1908, but its contents were not divulged.

The significance of the letter can be understood only in the light of the naval and political situation six years ago. During the preceding year, 1907, The Hague Conference, ostensibly convened in the interests of international peace, had resolved itself into a committee to determine how to diminish the severities of war. There was a section of opinion in this country which was persuaded that the only method of seeking peace was to reduce the navy and army. At the same time the Imperial German Navy was making swift and steady progress, and its menace to British supremacy aroused considerable alarm in this country. Although the British Navy held superiority over the German Navy in ships not of the dreadnought type, the balance in dreadnoughts was virtually even.

Dreadnought Supremacy.

It was stated in Parliament that in the year 1916 Germany, according to her naval law, would have thirty-six dreadnoughts, a number which would involve the building by this country of forty-four such vessels in the same period, toward which the Government was only providing two in the current year. It was also stated that in the year 1911 Germany would possess thirteen dreadnoughts and Great Britain only twelve, which statement was founded upon reasonable assumptions. Could Germany reckon upon the continuance of such a relative position, the advantage to her would be very great.

It was at this critical moment that the German Emperor indited his letter to the First Lord of the Admiralty, which is printed below. When the fact became known there was a good deal of public feeling aroused both in this country and abroad. Lord Tweedmouth stated that the letter was a private letter and purely personal. Prince von Bülow informed the Reichstag that the letter was of both a private and political character, adding some remarks concerning the "purely defensive character of our naval programme which," said the Chancellor, "cannot be emphasized too frequently."

The German Foreign Office officially announced that "in his letter the Emperor merely corrected certain erroneous views prevalent in England regarding the development of the German fleet."

Readers are now in a position to judge for themselves the accuracy of these statements. It should be remembered that the reduced navy estimates of 1908-9 were followed by national alarm and the publication of Admiral Lord Charles Beresford's shipbuilding programme and large increase in estimates of the following year. Here is the letter:

The Kaiser's Letter.

Berlin, 14th-2, 1908.

My Dear Lord Tweedmouth—May I intrude on your precious time and ask for a few moments' attention to these lines I venture to submit to you? I see by the daily papers and reviews that a battle royal is being fought about the needs of the navy. I therefore venture to furnish you with some information anent the German naval programme, which it seems is being quoted by all parties to further their ends by trying to frighten peaceable British taxpayers with it as a bogy.

During my last pleasant visit to your hospitable shores I tried to make your authorities understand what the drift of German naval policy is, but I am afraid that my explanations have been either misunderstood or not believed, because I see "German danger" and "German challenge to British naval supremacy" constantly quoted in different articles. This phrase, if not repudiated or corrected, sown broadcast over the country and daily dinned into British ears, might in the end create the most deplorable results.

I therefore deem it advisable, as Admiral of the Fleet, to lay some facts before you to enable you to see clearly that it is absolutely nonsensical and untrue that the German naval bill is to provide a navy meant as a challenge to British naval supremacy. The German fleet is built against nobody at all; it is solely built for Germany's needs in relation with that country's rapidly growing trade. The German naval bill was sanctioned by the Imperial Parliament and published ten years ago, and may be had at any large bookseller's. There is nothing surprising, secret, or underhand in it, and every reader may study the whole course mapped out for the development of the German Navy with the greatest ease.

Thirty to Forty Battleships in 1920.

The law is being adhered to, and provides for about thirty to forty ships of the line in 1920. The number of ships fixed by the bill included the fleet then actually in commission, notwithstanding its material being already old and far surpassed by contemporary types. In other foreign navies the extraordinary rapidity with which improvements were introduced in types of battleships, armaments, and armor made the fleet in commission obsolete before the building programme providing additions to it was half finished.

The obsolete fleet had to be struck off the list, thus leaving a gap, lowering the number of ships below the standard prescribed by the bill. This gap was stopped by using the finished ships to replace the obsolete ones instead of being added to them as originally intended. Therefore, instead of steadily increasing the standing fleet by regular additions it came to a wholesale rebuilding of the entire German Navy. Our actual programme in course of execution is practically only the exchange of old material for new, but not an addition to the number of units originally laid down by the bill of ten years ago, which is being adhered to.

It seems to me that the main fault in the discussions going on in the papers is the permanent ventilating of so-called two to three or more power standard and then only exemplifying on one power, which is invariably Germany. It is fair to suppose that each nation builds and commissions its navy according to its needs and not only with regard to the programme of other countries. Therefore, it would be the simplest thing for England to say: "I have a world-wide empire and the greatest trade of the world, and to protect them I must have so and so many battleships, cruisers, &c., as are necessary to guarantee the supremacy of the sea to me, and they shall, accordingly, be built and manned."

That is the absolute right of your country, and nobody anywhere would lose a word about it, and whether it be 60 or 90 or 100 battleships, that would make no difference and certainly no change in the German naval bill. May the numbers be as you think fit, everybody here would understand it, but the people would be very thankful over here if at last Germany was left out of the discussion, for it is very galling to the Germans to see their country continually held up as the sole danger and menace to Great Britain by the whole press of the different contending parties, considering that other countries are building, too, and there are even larger fleets than the German.

Fears German Retaliation.

Doubtless, when party faction runs high there is often a lamentable lack of discrimination in the choice of weapons, but I really must protest that the German naval programme should be only one for her exclusive use, or that such a poisoned view should be forged as a German challenge to British supremacy of the sea. If permanently used mischief may be created at home, and the injured feeling engendering the wish for retaliation in the circle of the German Naval League as a representative of the nation which would influence public opinion and place the Government in a very disagreeable position by trying to force it to change its programme through undue pressure, difficult to ignore.

In a letter which Lord Esher caused to be published a short time ago he wrote that every German, from the Emperor down to the last man, wished for the downfall of Sir John Fisher. Now I am at a loss to tell whether the supervision of the foundations and drains of royal palaces is apt to qualify somebody for the judgment of naval affairs in general. As far as regards German affairs, the phrase is a piece of unmitigated balderdash, and has created immense merriment in the circles of those here who know. But I venture to think that such things ought not to be written by people who are high placed, as they are liable to hurt public feelings over here.

Of course I need not assure you that nobody here dreams of wishing to influence Great Britain in the choice of those to whom she means to give the direction of her navy or to disturb them in the fulfillment of their noble task. It is expected that the choice will always fall on the best and ablest, and their deeds will be followed with interest and admiration by their brother officers in the German Navy.

It is, therefore, preposterous to infer that the German authorities work for or against persons in official positions in foreign countries. It is as ridiculous as it is untrue, and I hereby repudiate such calumny. Besides, to my humble notion, this perpetual quoting of the German danger is utterly unworthy of the great British Nation, with its world-wide empire and mighty navy. There is something nearly ludicrous about it. The foreigners in other countries might easily conclude that Germans must be an exceptionally strong lot, as they seem to be able to strike terror into the hearts of the British, who are five times their superiors.

I hope your Lordship will read these lines with kind consideration. They are written by one who is an ardent admirer of your splendid navy, who wishes it all success, and who hopes that its ensign may ever wave on the same side as the German Navy's, and by one who is proud to wear a British naval uniform of Admiral of the Fleet, which was conferred on him by the late great Queen of blessed memory.

Once more the German naval bill is not aimed at England and is not a challenge to British supremacy of the sea, which will remain unchallenged for generations to come. Let us all remember the warning Admiral Sir John Fisher gave to his hearers in November, when so cleverly he cautioned them not to get scared by using the admirable phrase "if Eve had not always kept her eye on the apple she would not have eaten it, and we should not now be bothered with clothes."

I remain yours truly,

WILLIAM I. R.,

Admiral of the Fleet.

Attacks Kaiser's Veracity.

The Morning Post, commenting on the letter of the Kaiser, says:

It is not usual for an Emperor to address a Minister of a foreign country with reference to the affairs of his department. It is a fact that it is not done. Lord Tweedmouth said the letter was a private letter. The German Chancellor, Prince von Bülow, said the letter partook of both a private and a political character. The fact remains that it involved an extraordinary breach of etiquette. There is no reflection cast upon the late Lord Tweedmouth. No one can help receiving a letter from an Emperor if that monarch condescends to dispatch it. Few persons, perhaps, could help being influenced, albeit unconsciously influenced, by the perusal of such an epistle.

Perhaps the German Emperor reflected upon that psychological contingency; for to what conclusion is the whole tenor of the letter directed? That the German Navy existed solely for purposes of defense in case of aggression and for the protection of German commerce, and that it was no part of German policy, and never had been, to menace the sea power of Britain.

Now turn to the notorious preamble of the German navy law of 1900, which in his letter the Emperor cites as a guarantee of good faith. It is there stated that the German Navy must be made so powerful that it would be dangerous for any nation, even the strongest maritime nation, to attack it.

If that is not a challenge, what is? Had it not been in terms a challenge the preamble would surely have run that it was not the intention to make the German Navy so strong that the strongest naval power could not attack it without danger to that power.

The Mighty Fate of Europe

As Interpreted by Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, German Imperial Chancellor.

"YOUR HEARTS FOR GOD, YOUR FISTS ON THE ENEMY."

Speech from Balcony of Chancellor's Official Residence, Berlin, Aug. 1.

At this serious hour in order to give expression to your feelings for your Fatherland you have come to the house of Bismarck, who with Emperor William the Great and Field Marshal von Moltke welded the German Empire for us.

We wished to go on living in peace in the empire which we have developed in forty-four years of peaceful labor.

The whole work of Emperor William has been devoted to the maintenance of peace. To the last hour he has worked for peace in Europe, and he is still working for it. Should all his efforts prove vain and should the sword be forced into our hands we will take the field with a clear conscience in the knowledge that we did not seek war. We shall then wage war for our existence and for the national honor to the last drop of our blood.

In the gravity of this hour I remind you of the words of Prince Frederick Charles to the men of Brandenburg:

"Let your hearts beat for God and your fists on the enemy."

AS ONE MAN FOR THE KAISER.

Speech from Balcony of Royal Palace, Berlin, Aug. 2.

All stand as one man for our Kaiser, whatever our opinions or our creeds. I am sure that all the young German men are ready to shed their blood for the fame and greatness of Germany. We can only trust in God, Who hitherto has always given us victory.

DECLARES FOR WAR.[01]

Speech Delivered in the Reichstag, Berlin, Afternoon of Aug. 4.

T. VON BETHMANN-HOLLWEG,
German Imperial Chancellor.
(Photo from Brown Brothers.)

A mighty fate has descended upon Europe. Because we were struggling for the esteem of the German Empire in the world, we have for forty-four years lived in peace and safeguarded the peace of Europe. In peaceful industry we have become strong and mighty and in consequence envied. With patience we have borne that, under the pretext that Germany was desirous of war, hostility toward us was being nursed and chains forged for us both in the East and in the West.

We wished to continue to live in peaceful industry, and, like an unexpressed vow, there was passed on from Kaiser to the youngest soldier: "Only in defense of a righteous cause shall our sword be drawn." (Hearty applause.) The day when we must draw it has appeared, contrary to our desire, contrary to our honest efforts to avoid it. Russia has applied the firebrand to the house. We find ourselves in a forced war with Russia and France.

Gentlemen, a series of documents, composed in the rush of events, is in your hands. Allow me to place before you the facts which characterize our attitude.

From the very beginning of the Austrian conflict we strove and worked toward the end that this trouble remain confined to Austria-Hungary and Servia. All Cabinets, especially that of England, take the same stand; only Russia declares that she must have a word in the decision of this conflict. Therewith the danger of European entanglements arises. As soon as the first authentic reports of the military preparations in Russia reached us we declared in a friendly but emphatic manner in St. Petersburg that war measures and military preparations would force us also to prepare, and that mobilization is closely akin to war.

Russia asserts in what is an apparently friendly manner that she is not mobilizing against us. In the meantime England tries to mediate between Vienna and St. Petersburg, in which she is warmly supported by us. On July 28 the Kaiser telegraphed the Czar, asking him to consider that Austria-Hungary has the right and that it is her duty to defend herself against Servian intrigues, which threaten to undermine her existence. The Kaiser called the attention of the Czar to their common monarchical interests with regard to the Serajevo outrage, and asked him personally to support him in order to establish harmony between Vienna and St. Petersburg.

At about the same hour in which this telegram was sent the Czar asked the Kaiser for his support and requested him to advise Vienna to be moderate in its demands. The Kaiser assumed the role of mediator. Hardly had he begun his activity when Russia mobilized its entire fighting force against Austria-Hungary. Austria-Hungary, however, had mobilized only those army corps which were directed against Servia; in the north there were only two army corps and these far from the Russian border.

The Kaiser immediately called the attention of the Czar to the fact that this mobilization of his forces against Austria-Hungary made his position as mediator difficult or absolutely impossible. In spite of this we continued our mediatorial activities in Vienna, going to the utmost limits of consistency with the terms of our federal treaty. ["Very true! Hear, hear!">[ During this time Russia again spontaneously assured us that her military preparations were not directed against us. ["Hear, hear, fie!">[

The 31st of July arrived. In Vienna the decision was to be made. In the meantime we had succeeded with our negotiations to reaching a point where Vienna resumed intercourse with St. Petersburg, which for some time had been discontinued, but before the final decision was reached in Vienna the news arrived that Russia had mobilized its entire fighting force, which meant also against us. ["Hear, hear!">[

Russia's Mobilization.

The Russian Government, which from repeated admonitions knew what mobilizing on our borders meant, did not notify us of this mobilization and gave us absolutely no explanation. ["Hear! hear!">[ Not until the afternoon of July 31 did the Kaiser receive a message from the Czar in which he assured him that the attitude of his army was not hostile toward us. ["Hear! hear!" and laughter.]

However, the mobilization against us on the Russian border was on the night of July 31 already in full progress. While we, at the request of Russia, were mediating in Vienna, the Russian Army appeared on our long, almost entirely open border. France, although not yet mobilizing, was making preparations for war. And we, up to this point, had intentionally not then called a single soldier of the reserve, for the sake of European peace. ["Bravo!">[

Should we continue to wait with patience until the powers by which we are surrounded choose the moment for attack? ["No!">[ To expose Germany to this danger would have been criminal! [Stormy, concerted, prolonged "Very true and bravo!"—also from the Social Democrats.] Therefore, on July 31 we demanded that Russia demobilize, this being the only measure which could save the peace of Europe. [Hearty approval.] The Imperial Ambassador received, furthermore, the order to declare to the Russian Government that in case they did not comply with our demands they should consider that a state of war exists.

The Imperial Ambassador performed this mission. Up till the present we have not learned Russia's answer to this demand. ["Hear, hear!">[ Telegraphic reports concerning it have not yet reached us, although the wire still transmits less important messages. ["Hear, hear!">[ Therefore, on Aug. 1, at 5 o'clock, when the appointed period of grace was long past, the Kaiser considered it necessary to mobilize.

At the same time we had to make sure of the position France would take. To our direct question whether in case of a German-Russian war she would remain neutral, France answered that she would do what she had to do in her own interests. [Laughter.] That was an evasive if not a negative answer to our question.

Declares France Began War.

In spite of this the Kaiser gave the order that the French border should be respected. The command was strictly enforced, with a single exception. France, which mobilized simultaneously with us, declared that she would respect a zone of ten kilometers from the border. ["Hear, hear!">[ And what happened in reality? There were bomb-throwing flyers, cavalry patrols, invading companies in the Reichsland, Alsace-Lorraine. ["Unheard of!">[ Thereby France, although the condition of war had not yet been declared, had attacked our territory.

Concerning the French complaints in regard to violations of the border, I have received from the Chief of the General Staff the following report: Only one offense has been committed. Contrary to an emphatic order a patrol of the Fourteenth Army Corps, led by an officer, crossed the border on Aug. 2. They apparently were killed. Only one man returned. However, long before the crossing of the border French flyers were dropping bombs in Southern Germany, and at Schluchtpass the French troops had attacked our border troops.

Until the present our troops have confined their activity to the protection of our borders. They are now on the defense, and necessity recognizes no law. ["Very true!">[

Our troops have occupied Luxemburg, and perhaps have also found it necessary to enter Belgian territory. [Hearty applause.] This is contrary to international law. The French Government has declared in Brussels they will respect the neutrality of Belgium as long as she respects the opponent. We knew, however, that France was ready to invade Belgium. ["Hear, hear!">[ France could wait; we, however, could not, because a French invasion in our lower Rhein flank would have proved fatal.

So we were forced to disregard the protests of the Luxemburg and Belgian Governments. We shall try to make good the injustice we have committed as soon as our military goal has been reached. [Applause.] Who like we are fighting for the highest, must only consider how victory can be gained. [Enthusiastic applause in entire house.]

Gentlemen, we are standing shoulder to shoulder with Austria-Hungary. With reference to England, the declaration which Sir Edward Grey made in the House of Commons yesterday plainly shows our attitude. We have assured England that as long as she remains neutral our fleet will not attack the northern coast of France and that the territorial integrity and independence of Belgium will not be violated. This declaration I repeat before the whole world, and I can add that so long as England remains neutral we are prepared in case of reciprocity to refrain from all hostile operations against French merchant vessels. [Applause.]

Gentlemen, so much for the events. I repeat the words of the Kaiser: "With a clear conscience Germany goes to the battlefield." [Enthusiastic approval.] We are fighting for the fruits of our peaceful industry, for the inheritance of a great past, and for our future.

The fifty years of which Moltke spoke, and in which we should stand armed and ready to protect our inheritance and the acquisitions of 1870, have not yet passed. The hour of trial for the German nation has struck, but we are facing it with confidence. [Stormy approval.]

Our army is in the field, our fleet is ready for battle, and behind it stands the entire German Nation. [Enthusiastic applause from the entire house.] The entire nation! [with a gesture particularly directed toward the Social Democrats. Renewed applause, in which the Social Democrats also joined.] You, gentlemen, realize your duty in its entirety. The question needs no further consideration, and I request speedy action. [Enthusiastic applause.]

[01] The Times of London contained on Aug. 12, 1914, the following:

"The statement made by the German Imperial Chancellor to the Reichstag on Aug. 4, which we published yesterday and reproduce below, lends piquancy to a communication that reached us from an influential quarter in Germany on Aug. 2. The communication, which we give in its original form, bore the name of a personage holding a prominent position in Germany, and standing in a close personal relationship to the German Emperor. It was evidently timed for publication on the morning of Aug. 3, the day of Sir Edward Grey's historic speech in the House of Commons:

'Aug. 2, 1914.

I hear with astonishment that in France and elsewhere in the world it is imagined that Germany wants to carry on an aggressive war, and that she had with this aim brought about the present situation. It is said that the Emperor was of the opinion that the moment had come to have a final reckoning with his enemies; but what a terrible error that is! Whoever knows the Emperor as I do, whoever knows how very seriously he takes the responsibility of the crown, how his moral ideas are rooted in true religious feeling, must be astonished that any one could attribute such motives to him.

He has not wanted the war; it has been forced upon him by the might of the circumstances. He has worked unswervingly to keep the peace, and has together with England thrown his whole influence into the scales to find a peaceful solution, in order to save his people from the horrors of war. But everything has been wrecked upon the attitude of Russia, which in the middle of negotiations which offered good outlook of success mobilized her forces, wherewith she proved that she did not mean in earnest what her assurances of peaceful intentions indicated.

Now Germany's frontiers are menaced by Russia which drags her allies into the war, now Germany's honor is at stake. Is it possible under these circumstances that the most peace-loving monarch can do otherwise than take to the sword in order to defend the most sacred interests of the nation?

And, finally, the German people! In them is firmly rooted the word of Prince Bismarck against aggressive wars: "One must not try to look into the cards of Fate."

It must be stated again: Russia alone forces the war upon Europe. Russia alone must carry the full weight of responsibility.'"

STATEMENT TO AMERICA.

Issued to The Associated Press from General Headquarters, Sept. 2.

I do not know what is thought of this war in America. I assume there have been published in America the telegrams exchanged between the German Emperor, the Emperor of Russia, and the King of England, containing the history of the events that preceded the outbreak of the war, and which bears irrefutable testimony of how the Emperor, until the last moment, strove hard to preserve the peace.

These efforts had to be futile, as Russia, under all circumstances, had resolved upon war, and as England, which for decades had encouraged the anti-German nationalism in Russia and France, did not avail herself of the splendid opportunity offered her to prove her often-emphasized love of peace, otherwise the war between Germany and France and England could have been averted.

When once the archives are opened the world will learn how often Germany extended to England her friendly hand, but England did not desire the friendship of Germany. Jealous of the development of Germany, and feeling that by German efficiency and German industry she has been surpassed in some fields, she had the desire to crush Germany by brute force, as she in former times subdued Spain, Holland, and France. She believed the moment had arrived, and therefore the entry of German troops into Belgium gave her a welcome pretext to take part in the war.

Germany, however, was forced to enter Belgium because she had to forestall the planned French advance, and Belgium only awaited this advance to join France. That only a pretext was involved as far as England is concerned is proved by the fact that already on the afternoon of Aug. 2, that is, prior to the violation of Belgium neutrality by Germany, Sir Edward Grey assured the French Ambassador unconditionally of the help of England in case the German fleet attacked the French coast.

Moral scruple, however, the English policy does not know. And thus the English people, who always posed as the protagonist of freedom and right, has allied itself with Russia, the representative of the most terrible barbarism, a country that knows no spiritual or no religious freedom, that tramples upon the freedom of peoples as well as of individuals. Already England is beginning to recognize that she has made a mistake in her calculations, and that Germany will master her enemies. She is therefore trying by the pettiest means to injure Germany as much as possible in her commerce and colonies, by instigating Japan, regardless of the consequences to the cultural community of the white race, to a pillaging expedition against Kiao-Chau, and leading the negroes in Africa to fight against the Germans in the colonies.

Having strangled the news service of Germany to the whole world, and having opened the campaign against us with a falsehood, England will tell your countrymen that the German troops burned down Belgian villages and cities, but will pass over in silence the fact that Belgian girls gouged out the eyes of defenseless wounded. Officials of Belgian cities have invited our officers to dinner and shot and killed them across the table. Contrary to all international law, the whole civilian population of Belgium was called out, and after having at first shown friendliness, carried on in the rear of our troops a terrible warfare with concealed weapons.

Belgian women cut the throats of soldiers whom they had quartered in their homes while they were sleeping. England also will say nothing of the dumdum bullets which are being used by the English and French despite all conventions and their hypocritical proclamations of humanity, which can be seen here in their original packing as they were found on French and English prisoners of war.

The Emperor has authorized me to say all this and to state that he has full confidence in the sense of justice of the American people, which will not allow itself to be deceived through the war of falsehood which our enemies are conducting against us.

The statement of the Chancellor concludes as follows:

Every one who has lived in Germany since the outbreak of the war has been able to witness the great moral uprising of all Germans who, pressed hard on all sides, cheerfully take the field for the defense of their rights and their existence; every one knows that this people is not capable of any unnecessary cruelty or of any brutality. We will win, thanks to the great moral strength which our just cause gives to our troops, and in the end the greatest falsehoods will be able to obscure our victories as little as they do our rights.

GERMANY'S ARMAMENTS.

Speech Delivered in the Reichstag, March 30, 1911.

I have asked to speak in order to make a few brief remarks on the question of disarmament and arbitration. The Social Democratic motion proposes that I should take steps to bring about a general limitation of armaments. As a matter of fact, the idea of disarmament is being constantly discussed by pacifists in Parliaments and in Congresses far and wide. Even the first peace conference at The Hague had to confine itself to expressing the wish that the Governments should devote themselves to the continued study of the question.

Germany has responded to this desire, but has been able to find no suitable formula, and I am not aware that other Governments have been more successful. The time when wars were made by Cabinets is past. The feelings which here in Europe may lead to war lie elsewhere.

They have their roots in antagonisms which must be found in popular sentiment. Everybody knows how easily this sentiment is influenced and how, unfortunately, in many cases, it abandons itself helplessly to irresponsible press agitations. A counterpoise to all such and similar influences can but be desired. I shall be the first to welcome it whenever international efforts succeed in creating such a counterpoise.

But if I am to take practical steps and am to propose mutual disarmament to the other powers, then general pacific assurances and adjurations are not enough. With Germany there is no need for such assurances or adjurations, in view of her constant policy throughout forty years, which shows that we seek no quarrels in the world. I should have to submit a fixed, definite programme. Then I should have to consider in all sobriety whether such a programme could be drawn up and carried out. Any one who makes uncertain and vague proposals can easily become a disturber of the peace rather than a peacemaker.

I shall have to decline to draw up such a formula and submit it to an international congress.

England's Naval Police.

England is convinced, and has repeatedly declared, in spite of her desires for the limitation of expenditure on armaments and for the adjustment of any disputes that may arise by arbitral procedure, that her fleet must in all circumstances be superior, or at any rate equal, to any possible combination in the world. England has a perfect right to strive for such a state of things, and, precisely because of the position that I take up toward the disarmament question, I am the last to cast doubts upon it. It is quite another thing, however, to make such a claim the basis of a convention which must be recognized by all the other powers in peaceful agreement. What if counterclaims are raised and the other powers are not satisfied with the rôles assigned to them?

One only requires to propound these questions in order to see things would not go well for European dignity at any world congress which had to decide upon such claims.

And then armies. If, for example, Germany should be required to reduce her army by 100,000 men, by how many men must the other powers diminish their armies? Notwithstanding all the pacific assurances which, thank God, are being given everywhere, every nation would reply to me at any preliminary inquiry that it claims that position in the world which corresponds with the sum of its national power, that the strength of its defensive forces must be adapted to this claim. At any rate, I would give no other reply for Germany. I should be touching the honor and national sentiment of any other people if I expected any other statement from it.

Question of Control.

Every attempt at international disarmament must break down on the question of control, which is absolutely impracticable. A classic example of that is afforded by Prussia when overthrown by Napoleon. Her army was to be limited to 45,000 men, but her patriotism, notwithstanding the most ruthless application of every means of control, managed to raise an army four times as large. The question of disarmament is insoluble so long as men are men and States are States.

In the course of the debate reference has been made to the recent utterances of the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the House of Commons on the disarmament question. The English Minister gave expression to the idea that a reciprocal exchange of information concerning the naval construction of both countries would insure them against surprises, and that thereby both countries would be convinced that they were not trying mutually to outstrip each other, while other powers would thereby be kept informed regarding the relations of Germany and England, and so the exchange of announcements would, on the whole, serve to promote peace.

We were all the more able to adhere to this idea as our naval building programme has always lain open. We have already declared our readiness to come to an understanding on this point with England, in the hope that it may bring about a desired appeasement.

World-embracing international arbitration treaties dictated by an international areopagus I consider just as impossible as general international disarmament. Germany takes up no hostile position toward arbitration. In all the new German treaties of commerce there are arbitration clauses. In the main it was due to Germany's initiative that an agreement was arrived at at the second Hague conference for the establishment of an International Prize Court.

Arbitration treaties can certainly contribute in a great measure to maintain and fortify peaceful relations. But strength must depend on readiness for war. The dictum still holds good that the weak becomes the prey of the strong. If a nation can not or will not spend enough on her defensive forces for her to be able to make her way in the world, then she falls back into the second rank.

Austria-Hungary's Version of the War

By Kaiser Franz Josef and Count Berchtold.

The Imperial Rescript and Manifesto.

Ischl, July 28.

Dear Count Stürgkh:

I have resolved to instruct the Ministers of my Household and Foreign Affairs to notify the Royal Servian Government of the beginning of a state of war between the Monarchy and Servia. In this fateful hour I feel the need of turning to my beloved peoples. I command you, therefore, to publish the inclosed manifesto.

MANIFESTO.

To my peoples! It was my fervent wish to consecrate the years which, by the grace of God, still remain to me, to the works of peace and to protect my peoples from the heavy sacrifices and burdens of war. Providence, in its wisdom, has otherwise decreed. The intrigues of a malevolent opponent compel me, in the defense of the honor of my Monarchy, for the protection of its dignity and its position as a power, for the security of its possessions, to grasp the sword after long years of peace.

With a quickly forgetful ingratitude, the Kingdom of Servia, which, from the first beginnings of its independence as a State until quite recently, had been supported and assisted by my ancestors, has for years trodden the path of open hostility to Austria-Hungary. When, after three decades of fruitful work for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, I extended my Sovereign rights to those lands, my decree called forth in the Kingdom of Servia, whose rights were in nowise injured, outbreaks of unrestrained passion and the bitterest hate. My Government at that time employed the handsome privileges of the stronger, and with extreme consideration and leniency only requested Servia to reduce her army to a peace footing and to promise that, for the future, she would tread the path of peace and friendship. Guided by the same spirit of moderation, my Government, when Servia, two years ago, was embroiled in a struggle with the Turkish Empire, restricted its action to the defense of the most serious and vital interests of the Monarchy. It was to this attitude that Servia primarily owed the attainment of the objects of that war.

The hope that the Servian Kingdom would appreciate the patience and love of peace of my Government and would keep its word has not been fulfilled. The flame of its hatred for myself and my house has blazed always higher; the design to tear from us by force inseparable portions of Austria-Hungary has been made manifest with less and less disguise. A criminal propaganda has extended over the frontier with the object of destroying the foundations of State order in the southeastern part of the monarchy; of making the people, to whom I, in my paternal affection, extended my full confidence, waver in its loyalty to the ruling house and to the Fatherland; of leading astray its growing youth and inciting it to mischievous deeds of madness and high treason. A series of murderous attacks, an organized, carefully prepared, and well carried out conspiracy, whose fruitful success wounded me and my loyal peoples to the heart, forms a visible bloody track of those secret machinations which were operated and directed in Servia.

A halt must be called to these intolerable proceedings and an end must be put to the incessant provocations of Servia. The honor and dignity of my monarchy must be preserved unimpaired, and its political, economic, and military development must be guarded from these continual shocks. In vain did my Government make a last attempt to accomplish this object by peaceful means and to induce Servia, by means of a serious warning, to desist. Servia has rejected the just and moderate demands of my Government and refused to conform to those obligations the fulfillment of which forms the natural and necessary foundation of peace in the life of peoples and States. I must therefore proceed by force of arms to secure those indispensable pledges which alone can insure tranquillity to my States within and lasting peace without.

In this solemn hour I am fully conscious of the whole significance of my resolve and my responsibility before the Almighty. I have examined and weighed everything, and with a serene conscience I set out on the path to which my duty points. I trust in my peoples, who, throughout every storm, have always rallied in unity and loyalty around my throne, and have always been prepared for the severest sacrifices for the honor, the greatness, and the might of the Fatherland. I trust in Austria-Hungary's brave and devoted forces, and I trust in the Almighty to give the victory to my arms.

FRANZ JOSEF.

DECLARATION OF WAR.

Published in Special Edition of Official Gazette, Vienna, July 28.

The Royal Government of Servia not having given a satisfactory reply to the note presented to it by the Austro-Hungarian Minister in Belgrade on July 23, 1914, the Imperial and Royal Government of Austria-Hungary finds it necessary itself to safeguard its rights and interests and to have recourse for this purpose to force of arms. Austria-Hungary, therefore, considers itself from this moment in a state of war with Servia.

"DAYS OF WORLD'S HISTORY."

Congratulatory Telegram to Kaiser Wilhelm II., Aug. 27.

Victory after victory. God is with you. He will be with us also. I most sincerely congratulate you, dear friend, also the young hero, your dear son, the Crown Prince, and the Crown Prince Rupprecht, as well as the incomparably brave German Army. Words fail to express what moves me and, with me, my army, in these days of world's history.

"FRANZ JOSEPH."

WILL OF WILHELM II. THAT SWUNG THE SWORD.

Kaiser Franz Josef's Address in Bestowing the Great Cross on the German Kaiser, September, 1914.

The glorious victories, so crushing to the foe, which the German Army has won in battle under your chief command owe their begetting and their success to your iron will, which sharpened and swung the heavy sword.

To the laurel that crowns you as victor I wish to add, if I may, the highest military honor which we possess, in begging you to take in true brotherhood of arms and as a token of my appreciation the Great Cross of my military Order of Marie Theresa. The decoration itself, dear friend, shall be handed to you by a special envoy as soon as it is convenient for you.

A PURELY DEFENSIVE WAR.

By Count Berchtold, Foreign Minister for Austria-Hungary.

(Copyright, Evening News Publishing Company of Newark, N.J., 1914.)

COUNT LEOPOLD BERCHTOLD.
Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
(Photo from Underwood & Underwood.)

Austria-Hungary looks upon this war as a purely defensive one, which has been forced on her by the agitation directed by Russia against her very existence. Austria-Hungary has given many proofs in late years of her peaceful intention. She refrained from any interference with arms in the Balkan war, though her interests were at stake. Subsequent events have proved what a serious danger the increase in territory and prestige which it brought Servia were for Austria-Hungary. Servia's ambitions have since grown and have been solely directed against the Dual Monarchy. Russia has tacitly approved of Servia's action because Russian statesmen wish to form an iron ring of enemies around Austria-Hungary and Germany in order that Russia's grasp on Constantinople and on Asia should never again be meddled with. Austro-Hungarian soldiers are fighting for their homes and for the maintenance of their country, the Russians are fighting to help the Russian Czar to gain the rule of the world, to destroy all his neighbors who may be dangerous to Russian ambitions. England is helping the Russians to oust her German rival. She feared for some time that German culture and German scientific methods would prove the stronger in a peaceful competition, and she now hopes to crush Germany with the help of Russia and France. And France is fighting to win back Alsace-Lorraine, to take her revenge on Germany, which the French nation has been aiming at for the last forty-four years.

That is how Austria-Hungary looks upon the war. She never wished for territorial increase, she wished for peace and that her people should develop in safety.

Germany equally had nothing to gain by a war, but Germany knows that Austria-Hungary's enemies are her enemies and that the dismemberment of the Hapsburg monarchy would mean the isolation of the German Empire.

And so, after all efforts to keep Russia and England from breaking the peace of Europe had failed, she drew her sword to defend her and her allies' (ally's) interests.

Truth and honor are on the side of the two empires in this war, the unspeakable inventions and prevarications published by the French, Russian, and English press in the last weeks alone must prove to the American people who can afford to tell the truth and nothing but the truth in this war.

The Austro-Hungarian and German people have a clear conscience and need fear no misrepresentation of their action.

A DISCORDANT NOTE.

By Count Michael Karolyi, Leader of Hungarian Independent Party, New York, July 27.

If Austria had pursued a policy of directly helping the Balkan countries, if Austria had in the past made it a point to be actively their friend, this war would not confront us. Since it has come, of course all Hungarians will support the empire and internal differences will be dismissed while the empire is imperiled.

As for the loyalty of the many Serbs within Austria-Hungary it is hard to say. There again we must hope that they will take the Austrian side. But the Austrian policy toward the Balkan countries has been wrong, all wrong.

A German Review of the Evidence

Certified by Dr. Bernhard Dernburg, German Ex-Colonial Secretary.

The following is presented as a complete defense of the German position in the present war and is based upon examination of the German and English "White Papers." It was prepared in Germany and forwarded to Dr. Bernhard Dernburg, who had it translated for THE NEW YORK TIMES of Nov. 1, 1914.

Dr. Dernburg gives this statement his full approval and accepts complete responsibility for it.

Two of the five great European powers that are at present engaged in war, Austria-Hungary and Russia, whose differences for years have been constantly increasing in sharpness, and after the tragedy in Serajevo became impossible to be bridged by diplomacy, conjured up the frightful struggle.

With these two, two other powers are so closely united by alliances that their participation in the war also was unavoidable; they are Germany and France.

There are two other great European powers whose relations to the two aforesaid groups before the war were very much alike in the essential points. Just as Italy was politically tied by alliance to the central powers, so England was with the Franco-Russian Alliance. Hence it was uncertain how these countries, each geographically removed from the main body of the Continent, would act in a war, and it seemed quite possible that both would decide to remain neutral.

As a matter of fact, the Italian Government came to the view that such a stand would be for the best interests of its country.

This decision might have made it considerably more easy for England to also maintain her neutrality, which, from political, economical, and ethical reasons, would have been advantageous and natural for the Island Empire. To the surprise and indignation of all those Germans who for years had been working toward an adjustment of the conflicting interests of both countries—among these ought to be mentioned, above all, the Kaiser and the Imperial Chancellor—the Liberal British Ministry immediately declared war on Germany, and did not confine itself to a naval war, but, in keeping with agreements reached years ago between the English and the French General Staffs, as is now admitted, equipped an expeditionary army, thus considerably strengthening the French forces.

The question arises, "What reasons led British politics to this monstrous step?"

Much has been written during the last weeks from the German side, criticising most sharply and with great justification the motive of the London Cabinet. In the following discussion we will confine ourselves to an impartial review of the documents published by the English Government itself in its own defense.

The essential part of this justification is contained in the "Correspondence Concerning the European Crisis," placed before the British Parliament shortly after the start of the war, which is known as the British "White Paper." In amplification are to be considered the "White Book" placed by the German Government before the Reichstag and the "Orange Book" published by Russia.

I.
THE RUSSIAN MOBILIZATION.

In a public speech, delivered Sept. 19, the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Lloyd George, according to the report of The Westminster Gazette, which may be considered as his organ, characterized the quarrel between Germany and Russia in the picturesque manner which this statesman prefers, as follows:

GERMANY—I insist that you stand aside with crossed arms while Austria strangles your little brother, (Servia.)

RUSSIA—Just you touch this little fellow and I will tear your ramshackle empire limb from limb.

We will not waste words in considering the flippant form here used in a discussion of an unspeakably bloody and world-historic conflict. But this expression in very pregnant form makes Russia appear in the light in which the London powers-that-be desire to show the empire of the Czar to the British people, viz., in the role of the noble-hearted protector of persecuted innocence, while Germany, supporting and egging on Austria-Hungary, is shown as morally responsible for the war.

Cites English Documents.

This, also, is the chain of thought in the speech of the British Prime Minister in the House of Commons on Aug. 4. Translations of this speech have been spread by the British Government in neutral countries in hundreds of thousands of copies under the title: "The Power Responsible for War Is Germany."

Now, we claim that the British "White Paper" itself furnishes irrefutable proof that not Germany, which up to the last moment offered the hand of mediation, but Russia is responsible for the war, and that the Foreign Office at London was fully cognizant of this fact.

Furthermore, the "White Paper" shows that England's claim that she entered this war solely as a protector of the small nations is a fable.

STATE COUNCILLOR SAZONOF
Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.
(Photo (C) by American Press Assn.)

The documents reproduced in the "White Paper" do not begin until July 20, and only a few introductory dispatches before the 24th are given. The first of the very important reports of the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, Sir George Buchanan, to the Secretary of State, Grey, is dated on that day; on the same day the note addressed by Austria-Hungary to the Servian Government had been brought to the knowledge of the European Cabinets, and the British Ambassador conferred with the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Sazonof, over this matter. The French Minister also took part in this conference. When the latter and M. Sazonof, in the most insistent way, tried to prove to Buchanan that England, together with Russia and France, must assume a threatening attitude toward Austria-Hungary and Germany, the British Ambassador replied:

I said that I would telegraph a full report to you of what their Excellencies had just said to me. I could not, of course, speak in the name of his Majesty's Government, but personally I saw no reason to expect any declaration of solidarity from his Majesty's Government that would entail an unconditional engagement on their part to support Russia and France by force of arms. Direct British interests in Servia were nil, and a war on behalf of that country would never be sanctioned by British public opinion.—(British "White Paper" No. 6.)

The British Ambassador thereupon asked the question whether Russia was thinking of eventually declaring war on Austria. The following was the answer:

M. Sazonof said that he himself thought that Russian mobilization would at any rate have to be carried out; but a council of Ministers was being held this afternoon to consider the whole question....

The dispatch continues:

French Ambassador and M. Sazonof both continue to press me for a declaration of complete solidarity of his Majesty's Government with French and Russian Governments.... (British "White Paper" No. 6.)

This shows plainly that the Russian mobilization must have been planned even before July 24, for otherwise M. Sazonof could not have spoken of the necessity of carrying it through.

It is furthermore very remarkable that the Russian Minister on this early day spoke of the mobilization in general and not of the partial mobilization against Austria-Hungary.

Finally we find that the British Government was fully informed at the very latest on July 24—it may have had before it previous documents, but they are not contained in the "White Paper"—concerning Russian mobilization and thereby the development of Russian and French politics that had to be anticipated.

Russian Aggression.

Had there been any doubts concerning these matters on the part of the British Government, the continual urging of Russian and French diplomatists must have made things plain. Russia's aggressive policy, and not the Austrian declaration of war on Servia, which did not come until five days later, led to the European war. Servia meant so little to England, although England traditionally poses as a protector of small nations, that the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg was able to describe England's interest in the kingdom on the Save as "nil." Only later, after the beginning of the war, England warmed up to Servia, and in the aforementioned speech Mr. Lloyd George found the most hearty tones in speaking of the heroic fight of this "little nation," although he was obliged to admit simultaneously that its' history is not untainted.

On the day following that conversation, on July 25, the British Ambassador had another talk with M. Sasonof, during the course of which he felt obliged to express to the Russian Government a serious warning concerning its mobilization.

On my expressing the earnest hope that Russia would not precipitate war by mobilizing until you had had time to use your influence in favor of peace his Excellency assured me that Russia had no aggressive intentions and she would take no action until it was forced on her. Austria's action was in reality directed against Russia. She aimed at overthrowing the present status quo in the Balkans and establishing her own hegemony there. He did not believe that Germany really wanted war, but her attitude was decided by ours. If we took our stand firmly with France and Russia there would be no war. If we failed them now rivers of blood would flow and we would in the end be dragged into war....

I said all I could to impress prudence on the Minister for Foreign Affairs and warned him that if Russia mobilized Germany would not be content with mere mobilization or give Russia time to carry out hers, but would probably declare war at once! His Excellency replied that Russia could not allow Austria to crush Servia and become the predominant power in the Balkans, and, if she feels secure of the support of France, she will face all the risks of war. He assured me once more that he did not wish to precipitate a conflict, but that unless Germany could restrain Austria I could regard the situation as desperate.—(British "White Paper" No. 17.)

A more convincing contradiction of the claim that Germany fell upon unexpectant Russia can hardly be imagined. Sazonof's conversation with the British Ambassador shows that Russia had decided from the beginning to bring about the war, unless Austria would subject itself to Russia's dictation.

Now, Russia was not alone concerned about Servia, but from its viewpoint Austria-Hungary must not maintain the preponderant position in the Balkans.

Sure of French help, Russia was determined to work against this. The reports of the British representative do not suggest with a word that Germany was responsible for the war; on the contrary, Sir Buchanan again, on his own account, warned the Russian Government to keep aloof from military measures, in his conversation with M. Sazonof on July 27, although the "White Paper" does not show that he had received any instructions by Sir Edward Grey.

His Excellency must not, if our efforts were to be successful, do anything to precipitate a conflict. In these circumstances I trusted that the Russian Government would defer the mobilization ukase for as long as possible, and that troops would not be allowed to cross the frontier even when it was issued.—(British "White Paper," No, 44.)

Just as its own Ambassador in Petersburg pointed out to the British Government the dangers of Russian mobilization, England did not lack German warnings. On July 28 the British Ambassador in Berlin, Sir E. Goschen, reported as follows by wire concerning a conversation with the Imperial Chancellor:

... but if the news were true which he had just read in the papers, that Russia had mobilized fourteen army corps in the South, he thought the situation was very serious, and he himself would be in a very difficult position, as in these circumstances it would be out of his power to continue to preach moderation at Vienna. He added that Austria, who as yet was only partially mobilizing, would have to take similar measures, and if war were to result Russia would be entirely responsible.—(British "White Paper" No. 71.)

In a telegram of Mr. Goschen's of July 30, reporting a conversation with the Secretary of State, von Jagow, it is stated:

He begged me to impress on you difficulty of Germany's position in view of Russian mobilization and military measures which he hears are being taken in France.—(British "White Paper" No. 98.)

The British Government has added a few further publications to its "White Paper." Among these is a report of the hitherto British Ambassador in Vienna, Sir Maurice de Bunsen. The document is dated Sept. 1; that is, a full month after the outbreak of the war. The tendency of this publication is not only to unburden Russia and England from all blame and to put it upon German and Austro-Hungarian politics, but it attempts to make Germany responsible for the war to greater extent than Austria-Hungary in trying to sow dissension between the two allies.

Ambassador de Bunsen represents matters as if Germany, through its ultimatum to Russia on July 31, had roughly interrupted negotiations promising success then going on between Vienna and Petersburg. In this report it is stated:

(Retranslated.) M. Schebeko [the Russian Ambassador at Vienna] on July 28th attempted to induce the Austrian Government to authorize Count Scapary to continue negotiations which he had been carrying on with M. Sazonof and which appeared very promising. Count Berchtold on this day declined, but two days later, July 30th, although Russia then had already started partial mobilization against Austria, he received M. Schebeko again in the most courteous manner and gave his consent to continuation of the pour parleurs.... On Aug. 1st M. Schebeko informed me that Austria was ready to submit to mediation those parts of its note to Servia which appeared to be irreconcilable to the independence of Servia.... Unfortunately these pour parleurs in St. Petersburg and Vienna were suddenly broken off by the quarrel being removed to the more dangerous territory of a direct conflict between Germany and Russia. Germany on July 31 stepped between the two with its double ultimatum addressed to St. Petersburg and Paris.... A delay of a few days in all probability would have spared Europe one of the greatest wars in history.

On the other hand, be it remembered that the fact that any negotiations between Austria and Russia were carried on up to the last hour was solely the result of the uninterrupted German efforts to maintain peace, which fact Sir Maurice de Bunsen very wisely buries in silence. These negotiations, by the way, hardly were as promising of success as is made to appear. The Austrian version of it is found in the Vienna Fremdenblatt of Sept. 25, 1914. There the most important spots of Bunsen's report, that Austria-Hungary had been ready to moderate several points of its note to Servia, are mentioned, as follows:

As we are told by a well-informed source, these assertions do not at all correspond to the facts; furthermore, from the very nature of the steps undertaken by the dual monarchy in Belgrade, this would have been entirely inconceivable.

A glance at the date shows that the Bunsen report is misleading, for he himself tells that Count Berchtold, on July 30, had expressed his consent to a continuation of the exchange of thought in Petersburg; the latter, therefore, could not begin before the 31st, while in the night from July 30 to 31 the mobilization of the entire Russian Army against Germany was ordered in Petersburg, finally making impossible the continuation of the last German attempt at mediation in Vienna.

The truth is, in spite of Russian and English twistings, that without the interval caused by Germany's efforts in Vienna, which interval England allowed to pass unused in Petersburg, the war would have broken out a few days sooner.

Let us consider how the fact of the Russian mobilization, the dimensions and tendency of which was brought to the knowledge of the London Cabinet at the very latest on July 24, must affect Germany.

On July 24 the Russian Government declared, in an official communiqué, it would be impossible for it to remain indifferent in an Austro-Servian conflict.

Germany's Hand Forced.

This declaration was followed immediately by military measures which represented the beginning of Russian mobilization long planned. But even on July 27 the Russian Minister of War, Suchomlinof, assured the German Military Attaché upon word of honor (Annex 11 of the German "White Paper") that no order for mobilization had been given and no reservists had been drawn and no horse had been commandeered.

Although in this conversation there had been left no doubt to the Russian Minister of War concerning the fact that measures of mobilization against Austria must be considered by Germany also as very threatening toward itself, during the next days news of the Russian mobilization arrived in quick succession.

On the 29th mobilization of Southern and Southwestern Russia was ordered, which was extended on the 30th to twenty-three provinces.

On the night of the 30th to the 31st, while the efforts of the Kaiser to maintain peace were continuing and were receiving friendly attention in Vienna, in St. Petersburg the mobilization of the entire Russian Army was ordered. Even as late as 2 P.M. on the 31st, however, (German "White Paper," Page 18, of NEW YORK TIMES reprint,) the Czar telegraphed the Kaiser that the military measures now being taken were meant for defensive purposes against Austria's preparations, and he gave his pledge as far away from desiring war.

In the face of such evident duplicity of Russian politics, a further delay such as was desired by Sir Maurice de Bunsen would have been for every German statesman a crime against the security of his own country.

On the other hand, upon what German measures did the Russian Government base its order for mobilization? The British "White Paper" proves how frivolously steps leading to the most serious results were ordered in St. Petersburg. On July 30 Sir George Buchanan telegraphed:

M. Sazonof told us that absolute proof was in possession of the Russian Government that Germany was making military and naval preparations against Russia, more particularly in the direction of the Gulf of Finland,—(British "White Paper" No. 97.)

Proofs Lacking.

On the other hand, Buchanan's telegram of July 31 (British "White Paper" No. 113) states:

Russia has also reason to believe that Germany is making active military preparations, and she cannot afford to let her get a start.—(British "White Paper" No. 113.)

So, from one day to the next the "absolute proof" changed to a reason for the assumption. In reality, both were assertions that lack all proof.

The finishing part of a telegram sent by the British Ambassador in Berlin to Sir Edward Grey on July 31 deserves special mention:

He [the German Secretary of State] again assured me that both the Emperor William, at the request of the Emperor of Russia and the German Foreign Office, had even up till last night been urging Austria to show willingness to continue discussion—and telephonic communications from Vienna had been of a promising nature—but Russia's mobilization had spoiled everything.—(British "White Paper" No. 121.)

Therefore, the German Chancellor, in his memorandum placed before the Reichstag, stated with full justification:

The Russian Government has smashed the laborious attempts at mediation on the part of the European State Chancelleries, on the eve of success, by the mobilization, endangering the safety of the empire. The measures for a mobilization, about whose seriousness the Russian Government was fully acquainted from the beginning, in connection with their constant denial, show clearly that Russia wanted war.

To this is to be added that the English Government also was made fully cognizant of the intentions of the Russian mobilization, by a witness that could not be suspected, namely, its own representative in St. Petersburg, and therefore must bear full responsibility.

II.
GREY'S OMISSIONS AND ERRORS.

We have seen from the "Blue Book" that the Secretary of State in London was informed at the very latest on July 24 by his Ambassador in St. Petersburg of the plan of the Russian mobilization and consequently of the tremendous seriousness of the European situation. Yet eight to nine days had to elapse before the beginning of the war. Let us see whether Sir Edward Grey used this time to preserve peace, according to his own documents.

From this testimony it appears that even at the beginning of the last and decisive part of the European crisis, which began on June 28, 1914, with the assassination of the Austrian heir to the throne, Sir Edward Grey refrained from considering a direct participation of his country in the possible world war. At least, this must be the impression gained from his remarks to the representatives of the two powers with whom England is today at war. Thus, he said to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, Count Mensdorff, on July 23:

The possible consequences of the present situation were terrible. If as many as four great powers of Europe—let us say Austria, France, Russia, and Germany—were engaged in war, it seemed to me that it must involve the expenditure of so vast a sum of money and such an interference with trade that a war would be accompanied or followed by a complete collapse of European credit and industry.—(British "White Paper" No. 3.)

Here Grey speaks only of four of the big powers at most that may go to war, without even hinting at the fifth, namely, England. On July 24 he had another conversation with the Austrian Ambassador, the theme of which was the note—meanwhile presented to Servia. It caused apprehensions on his part, but he declared again:

The merits of the dispute between Austria and Servia were not the concern of his Majesty's Government....

I [Grey] ended by saying that doubtless we should enter into an exchange of views with other powers, and that I must await their views as to what could be done to mitigate the difficulties of the situation.—(British "White Paper" No. 5.)

We are already striking the fateful peculiarity of Grey's policy to hesitate where prompt action, or at least a clear and open conduct, would have been his duty. This weakness of his nature has been used with great art by French and Russian diplomacy. This is illustrated by the conversation of July 24 between him and the French Ambassador, Cambon, in London:

M. Cambon said that, if there was a chance of mediation by the four powers he had no doubt that his Government would be glad to join in it; but he pointed out that we could not say anything in St. Petersburg till Russia had expressed some opinion or taken some action. But, when two days were over, Austria would march into Servia, for the Servians could not possibly accept the Austrian demand. Russia would be compelled by her public opinion to take action as soon as Austria attacked Servia, and, therefore, once the Austrians had attacked Servia it would be too late for any mediation.—(British "White Paper" No. 10.)

Thus, England must not give any advice to Russia before it knows Russia's intent and even its measures. But inasmuch as Austria will have proceeded against Servia by that time Russia must make war, and the conclusion is that even on July 24 the catastrophe is considered unavoidable. Grey shows himself more and more hypnotized by the fatalistic view that it is too late. Hence he reports also on July 24 a conversation of the German Ambassador, Prince Lichnowsky:

I reminded the German Ambassador that some days ago he had expressed a personal hope that if need arose I would endeavor to exercise moderating influence at St. Petersburg, but now I said that, in view of the extraordinarily stiff character of the Austrian note, the shortness of time allowed, and the wide scope of the demands upon Servia, I felt quite helpless as far as Russia was concerned, and I did not believe any power could exercise influence alone.—(British "White Paper" No. 11.)

From a conversation of Grey with the Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador, on July 25:

Alone we could do nothing. The French Government were traveling [this refers to the visit at St. Petersburg by Messrs. Poincaré and Viviani] at the moment, and I had had no time to consult them, and could not, therefore, be sure of their views.—(British "White Paper" No. 25.)

If Sir Edward Grey sincerely desired the maintenance of peace, he must have had to use his entire influence at St. Petersburg to bring about the stopping of the threatening military measures taken by Russia, whereas he was waiting for the opinion of the French Government. He was bound to do this, so much the more in view of the fact that he demanded from Germany that it should exert its influence with Austria.

That this request of Grey's was complied with by Germany in so far as it was in any way in accord with the alliance with Austria-Hungary, and that in Vienna every effort was made to conciliate matters, is shown by the assurance of the Chancellor; he declares:

In spite of this [the Austro-Hungarian Government having remarked with full appreciation of our action that it had come too late] we continued our mediatory efforts to the utmost and advised Vienna to make any possible compromise consistent with the dignity of the monarchy.—(German "White Paper," Page 17, of NEW YORK TIMES reprint.)

Grey well knew that Germany was doing all it could to mediate in Vienna. He expressed his recognition and his joy over it on July 28 ("Blue Book," Page 67):

It is very satisfactory to hear from the German Ambassador here that the German Government have taken action at Vienna in the sense of the conversation recorded in my telegram of yesterday to you.—(British "White Paper" No. 67.)[02]

Neither has Grey been left in the dark by the German side concerning the difficulties, which by the Russian mobilization made every attempt to mediate in Vienna abortive. Even on July 31 the British Ambassador in Berlin telegraphed:

The Chancellor informs me that his efforts to preach peace and moderation at Vienna have been seriously handicapped by the Russian mobilization against Austria. He has done everything possible to obtain his object at Vienna, perhaps even rather more than was altogether palatable at the Ballplatz.—(British "White Paper" No. 108.)

England and Russia.

How, on the other hand, about Grey's action with Russia? From the very beginning one should have had a right to expect that, as Germany acted in Vienna, thus France, if it was active in Grey's spirit, would be working in St. Petersburg for peace. Of this no trace whatsoever can be found. The French Government thus far has not published any series of documents concerning its activity during the crisis, and neither in the Russian "Orange Book" nor in the English "Blue Book" is anything mentioned of the mediating activity on the part of France.

On the contrary, the latter power, wherever she puts in an appearance—as for instance in the conversation of the English Ambassador in St. Petersburg with his French colleague and M. Sazonof, as mentioned above—appears as fully identical with Russia.

It is also stated on July 24:

The French Ambassador gave me to understand that France would fulfill all the obligations entailed by her alliance with Russia if necessity arose, besides supporting Russia strongly in all diplomatic negotiations.... It seems to me from the language held, by French Ambassador that even if we decline to join them, France and Russia are determined to make a strong stand.—(British "White Paper" No. 6.)

One should think that Grey, who in view of this could not possibly expect an influence for peace being brought to bear by France, but only a strengthening of the Russian desire for aggression, now would have acted in the most energetic manner in St. Petersburg for the maintenance of peace.

In reality, however, during the days that still remained, aside from a weak and in St. Petersburg absolutely ineffective advice to postpone mobilization, he did nothing whatsoever, and later placed himself in a manner constantly more recognizable on the side of Russia.

The claim that the time limit given by the Austrian note to Servia was the cause of the war, that Grey's mediation had only miscarried owing to the haste of Germany, is disproved by the British documents themselves. De Bunsen on July 26 telegraphed to Grey from Vienna:

Russian Ambassador just returned from leave, thinks that Austro-Hungarian Government are determined on war and that it is impossible for Russia to remain indifferent. He does not propose to press for more time in the sense of your telegram of the 25th inst.—(British "White Paper" No. 40.)

Therefore Russia has paid little attention to the very shy and timid efforts to maintain peace by the London Secretary of State, even where these were concerned in the attempt to change the position taken by Austria.

Another proof: Sazonof on July 27 sent a telegram to the Russian Ambassador in London which the latter transmitted to Grey, and which concerns itself with the much mentioned proposition of the latter to have the conflict investigated by a conference of the four great powers not immediately concerned.

Russian Sincerity Questioned.

The conference plan was declined without much hesitation and openly by Germany, because it was compelled to see therein an attempt to place Austria before a European court of arbitration, and because it knew the serious determination of its ally in this matter. But did Russia really want the conference? Minister Sazonof declares:

I replied to the [British] Ambassador that I have begun conversations with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, under conditions which I hope may be favorable. I have not, however, received as yet any reply to the proposal made by me for revising the note between the two Cabinets.—(British "White Paper" No. 53.)

Here it is shown plainly how little the conference plan was after the heart of the Russians. Had they accepted it it would have had to be done immediately. As soon as the situation had grown very much more serious by the failure of the negotiations with Austria-Hungary there would have been no more time for this.[03]

A telegram of the English Ambassador in St. Petersburg, dated July 27, (British "White Paper" No. 55,) shows how this conference was expected to be conducted in St. Petersburg:

His Excellency [Sazonof] said he was perfectly ready to stand aside if the powers accepted the proposal for a conference, but he trusted that you would keep in touch with the Russian Ambassador in the event of its taking place.—(British "White Paper" No. 55.)

Russian shrewdness evidently expected to control the conference by keeping in touch with Grey, who of course would have been the Chairman. The dispatches of his own Ambassadors lying before him should have enabled the Secretary of State to see the perfidy of the Russian policy. Buchanan wrote on the 28th from St. Petersburg:

... and asked him whether he would be satisfied with the assurance which the Austrian Ambassador had, I understood, been instructed to give in respect to Servia's integrity and independence.... In reply his Excellency stated that if Servia were attacked Russia would not be satisfied with any engagement which Austria might take on these two points....—(British "White Paper" No. 72.)

Entirely in contrast herewith is one report of the British representative in Vienna, dated Aug. 1, and speaking of a conversation with the Russian Ambassador there:

Russia would, according to the Russian Ambassador, be satisfied even now with assurance respecting Servian integrity and independence. He said that Russia had no intention to attack Austria.—(British "White Paper" No. 141.)

What, then, may one ask, was the opinion which Sir Edward Grey had formed concerning Russia's real intentions? He learns from Russian sources and notes faithfully that Russia will accept Austrian guarantees for independence of Servia, and also that it will not accept such guarantees. It is the same duplicity which Russia, when its own mobilization was concerned, showed toward Germany. Did Sir Edward not notice this duplicity, or did he not wish to notice it? If the documents of the English Government have not been selected with the purpose to confuse, then in London the decision to take part in the war does not seem to have been a certainty at the beginning. We have seen that Ambassador Buchanan in St. Petersburg on July 24 gave the Russian Minister to understand that England was not of a mind to go to war on account of Servia. This position, taken by the Ambassador, was approved by Sir Edward Grey on the following day in the following words:

I entirely approve what you said ... and I cannot promise more on behalf of the Government.—(British "White Paper" No. 24.)

Based upon these instructions, Sir George Buchanan, even on July 27, stated to M. Sazonof, who continued to urge England to unconditionally join Russia and France:

I added that you [Grey] could not promise to do anything more, and that his Excellency was mistaken if he believed that the cause of peace could be promoted by our telling the German Government that they would have to deal with us as well as with Russia and France if she supported Austria by force of arms. Their [the German] attitude would merely be stiffened by such a menace.—(British "White Paper" No. 44.)

But on this same 27th day of July, Grey, submitting to the intrigues of Russian and French diplomacy, had committed one very fateful step (Telegram to Buchanan, July 27):

I have been told by the Russian Ambassador that in German and Austrian circles impression prevails that in any event we would stand aside. His Excellency deplored the effect that such an impression must produce. This impression ought, as I have pointed out, to be dispelled by the orders we have given to the first fleet which is concentrated, as it happens, at Portland not to disperse for manoeuvre leave. But I explained to the Russian Ambassador that my reference to it must not be taken to mean that anything more than diplomatic action was promised.—(British "White Paper" No. 47.)

For Russia this order to the fleet meant very much more than a diplomatic action. Sazonof saw that the wind in London was turning in his favor and he made use of it. Among themselves the Russian diplomatists seem to have for a long time been clear and open in their discussion of their real object. You find among the documents of the Russian "Orange Book" the following telegram of Sazonof of July 25 to the Russian Ambassador in London:

In case of a new aggravation of the situation, possibly provoking on the part of the great powers' united action, [des actions conformes,] we count that England will not delay placing herself clearly on the side of Russia and France, with the view to maintaining the equilibrium of Europe, in favor of which she has constantly intervened in the past, and which would without doubt be compromised in the case of the triumph of Austria.—(Russian "Orange Paper" No. 17.)

There is no mention of Servia here, but Austria should not triumph. Russia's real intention, of course, was not placed so nakedly before the British Secretary of State, hence to him the appearance was maintained that the little State of the Sawe was the only consideration, although the Russian Army was already being mobilized with all energy.

On the 28th he wires to the Russian Ambassador, Count Benckendorff, to London to inform the British Government:

It seems to me that England is in a better position than any other power to make another attempt at Berlin to induce the German Government to take the necessary action. There is no doubt that the key of the situation is to be found at Berlin.—(British "White Paper" No. 54.)

The opinion subtly suggested upon him by Paris and Petersburg diplomacy, namely, that he should not use any pressure upon Russia, but upon Germany, now takes hold of Grey more and more. On July 29 he writes to the German Ambassador as follows:

In fact, mediation was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany thought possible if only Germany would "press the button in the interests of peace."—(British "White Paper" No. 84.)

Petersburg, now assured of the support of Grey, becomes more and more outspoken for war. On the 28th Grey again expressed one of his softhearted propositions for peace. Mr. Sazonof hardly made the effort to hide his contempt. Buchanan telegraphs on the 29th as follows:

The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that proposal referred to in your telegram of the 28th inst. was one of secondary importance. Under altered circumstances of situation he did not attach weight to it.... Minister for Foreign Affairs had given me to understand that Russia would not precipitate war by crossing frontier immediately, and a week or more would in any case elapse before mobilization was completed. In order to find an issue out of a dangerous situation it was necessary that we should in the meanwhile all work together.—(British "White Paper" No. 78.)

Naivete or Cynicism?

Here it really becomes impossible to judge where the naïveté of the British Secretary of State ends and cynicism begins, for Sazonof could not have told to him more plainly than in these lines that all Russia's ostensible readiness for peace served no other purpose than to win time to complete the strategical location of the Russian troops.

This point is emphasized by one document coming from a writer presumably unbiased, but presumably distrustful of Germany, wherein the confirmation is found that England and Russia had come to a full agreement during these days.

On July 30 the Belgian Chargé d'Affaires de l'Escaille in Petersburg reported to the Belgian Government upon the European crisis. Owing to the fast developing events of a warlike nature, this letter did not reach its address by mail, and it was published later on. The Belgian diplomatist writes:

It is undeniable that Germany tried hard here [that is, in Petersburg] and in Vienna to find any means whatsoever in order to forestall a general conflict....

And after M. de l'Escaille has told that Russia—what the Czar and his War Minister with their highest assurances toward Germany had denied—was mobilizing its own army, he continues:

Today at Petersburg one is absolutely convinced, yes, they have even received assurances in that direction, that England and France will stay by them. This assistance is of decisive importance and has contributed much to the victory of the [Russian] war party.

This settles Grey's pretended "attempts at mediation." The truth is that British politics decided to prevent a diplomatic success of Germany and Austria, now worked openly toward the Russian aim. "The exertion of pressure upon Berlin" included already a certain threat, mingled with good advice.

On July 23 Grey had only spoken of four possible powers in war; hence when on the German side some hope of England maintaining neutrality was indulged in, this impression rested upon Grey's own explanations. On July 29, however, after a political conversation with Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador in London, he adds an important personal bit of information. He wires concerning it to Berlin, to Goschen:

After speaking to the German Ambassador this afternoon about the European situation, I said that I wished to say to him, in a quite private and friendly way, something that was on my mind. The situation was very grave.... But if we failed in our efforts to keep the peace, and if the issue spread so that it involved every European interest, I did not wish to be open to any reproach from him, that the friendly tone of all our conversations had misled him or his Government into supposing that we should not take action.... But we knew very well that if the issue did become such that we thought that British interests required us to intervene, we must intervene at once and the decision would have to be very rapid.—(British "White Paper" No. 89.)

But what is especially wrong is that Grey brought this warning, which only could have any effect if it remained an absolute, confidential secret between the English and German Governments, also to the French Ambassador, so that the entire Entente could mischievously look on and see whether Germany really would give in to British pressure. Of course, in his manner of swaying to and fro, he did not wish either that Cambon should not accept this information to the German Ambassador as a decided taking of a position on the part of England:

I thought it necessary [speaking to M. Cambon] to say that because as he knew we were taking all precautions with regard to our fleet and I was about to warn Prince Lichnowsky not to count on our standing aside, but it would not be fair that I should let M. Cambon be misled into supposing that we had decided what to do in a contingency that I still hoped might not arise....—(British "White Paper" No. 87.)

Stirring Up Trouble.

On the German side Grey's open threat, which was presented, however, with smooth and friendly sounding words, was received with quiet politeness. Goschen telegraphed on the 30th concerning a talk with State Secretary von Jagow:

His Excellency added that telegram received from Prince Lichnowsky last night contains matter which he had heard with regret, but not exactly with surprise, and, at all events, he thoroughly appreciated the frankness and loyalty with which you had spoken.—(British "White Paper" No. 98.)

Now the work of stirring up trouble is continued unceasingly. On July 30 the British Ambassador in Paris, Sir F. Bertie, concerning a conversation with the President of the Republic, reports:

He [Poincaré] is convinced that peace between the powers is in the hands of Great Britain. If his Majesty's Government announced that England would come to the aid of France in the event of a conflict between France and Germany ... there would be no war, for Germany would at once modify her attitude.—(British "White Paper" No. 99.)

Did Grey really think for one moment that the German Empire would change its position immediately, in other words, would suddenly leave its ally in need, or is all this only a mass of diplomatic blandishments?

On the same day Grey steps from the personal warning which he had given to the German Ambassador to the sharpest official threat. In a telegram to the Ambassador in Berlin upon the question placed before him by the Chancellor of the empire on the day prior, (British "White Paper" No. 85,) whether England would remain neutral if Germany would bind itself, after possible war, to claim no French territory in Europe whatever, while in lieu of the French colonies a like guarantee could not be accepted, Grey answers with thundering words:

His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms. What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French colonies are taken and France is beaten, so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the colonies. From a material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable, for France without further territory in Europe being taken from her could be so crushed as to lose her position as a great power and become subordinate to German policy. Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country could never recover.—(British "White Paper" No. 101.)

With this telegram the war on Germany was practically declared, for as a price of British neutrality an open humiliation of Germany was demanded. If France—the question of French colonies is of very minor importance in this connection—must not be defeated by Germany, then England forbade the German Government to make war. It was furthermore stated that Germany was absolutely compelled to accept Russian-French dictates, and would have to leave Austria to its own resources. This would have meant Germany's retirement from the position of a great power, even if she had backed down before such a challenge.

III.
THE AGREEMENT WITH FRANCE.

Only in the light of the developments concerning England's relation to France, given at the beginning of the war, Grey's policy, swaying between indecision and precipitate action, becomes apparent.

In all the explanations which the British Government in the course of eight years had presented to the British Parliament concerning the relations to other large powers, the assurance had been repeated that no binding agreements with the two partners of the Franco-Russian alliance had been made, above all, that no agreement with France existed. Only in his speech in the House of Commons on Aug, 3, 1914, which meant the war with Germany, Grey gave to the representatives of the people news of certain agreements which made it a duty for Great Britain to work together with France in any European crisis.

The fateful document, which in the form of an apparently private letter to the French Ambassador, dealt with one of the most important compacts of modern history, was written toward the end of the year 1912, and is published in the British "White Paper" No. 105, Annex 1:

London Foreign Office, Nov. 22, 1912.

My Dear Ambassador:

From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not to be, regarded as an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war.

You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other.

I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them.

Yours, &c.,

E. GREY.

Was Parliament Deceived?

A few members of the English Parliament who on Aug. 3 dared to gingerly protest against the war may have had reason to complain about the hiding of facts from the House of Commons. When such understandings can be made without any one having an idea of their existence, then—so far as England is concerned—the supervision of the Government, theoretically being exercised by a Parliament, becomes a fiction.

Veiled Defensive Alliance.

As a matter of fact, Grey does not desire to have accepted as political obligations the conversations of the French and English Army and Navy General Staffs concerning the future plans of campaign which took place from time to time in times of peace. However, the true tendency of this agreement, for such it is, gives itself away in the promise to immediately enter with France into a political and military exchange of opinions in every critical situation; it means in realty nothing less than a veiled defensive alliance which by clever diplomatic manipulations can be changed without any difficulty to an offensive one, for inasmuch as the English Government promises to consult and work together with France, and consequently also with its ally, Russia, in every crisis, before a serious investigation of the moments of danger, it waives all right of taking an independent position.

How would England ever have been able to enter a war against France without throwing upon itself the accusation of faithlessness against one with whose plans for war it had become acquainted through negotiations lasting through years?

Here a deviation may be permissible, which leaves for a moment the basis of documentary proof.

If one considers how this agreement of such immeasurable consequences was not only hidden from the British Parliament by the Cabinet, but how to the very edge of conscious deceit its existence was denied—in the year 1913 Premier Asquith answered a query of a member of the House of Commons that there were no unpublished agreements in existence which in a case of war between European powers would interfere with or limit free decision on the part of the British Government or Parliament as to whether or not Britain should take part at a war—then certain reports making their appearance with great persistency in June, 1914, concerning an Anglo-Russian naval agreement are seen in a different light.

Persons who were acquainted with the happenings in diplomacy then stated that the Russian Ambassador in Paris, M. Iswolski, during the visit which the King of England and Sir Edward Grey were paying to Paris, had succeeded in winning the English statesmen for the plan of such an agreement. A formal alliance, it was said, was not being demanded by Russia immediately, for good reasons. M. Iswolski was attempting to go nearer to his goal, carefully, step by step.

It had been preliminarily agreed that negotiations should be started between the British Admiralty and the Russian Naval Attaché in London, Capt. Wolkow. As a matter of fact Wolkow during June went to St. Petersburg for a few days to, as was assumed, obtain instructions and then return to London.

Grey's "Twisty" Answer.

These happenings aroused so much attention in England that questions were raised in Parliament concerning them. It was noted how twisty Grey's answer was. He referred to the answer of the Premier, already mentioned, stated that the situation is unchanged, and said then that no negotiations were under way concerning a naval agreement with any foreign nation. "As far as he was able to judge the matter," no such negotiations would be entered into later on.

The big Liberal newspaper, The Manchester Guardian, was not at all satisfied with this explanation; it assumed that certain conditional preliminary agreements might not be excluded.

This Russian plan, which was later worked out in St. Petersburg, went into oblivion on account of the rapidly following European war. In the light of the following revelation of Grey's agreement with France, the news of the naval agreement desired by Iswolski assumed another aspect.

Let us return to the Anglo-French agreement. The following remarks by the French Ambassador in London, reported by Grey, prove that, on the ground of this agreement, France, with very little trouble, would be able to make out of a diplomatic entanglement a case for Allies' interest as far as England is concerned.

A German "Attack."

He [Cambon] anticipated that the [German] aggression would take the form of either a demand to cease her preparations or a demand that she should engage to remain neutral if there was war between Germany and Russia. Neither of these things would France admit.—(British "White Paper" No. 105.)

Therefore, even the demand addressed to France not to, jointly with Russia, attack Germany became a German "attack," which obliged England to come to the aid!

In spite of this, even on July 27 in a conversation with Cambon, Grey gave himself the appearance as if his hands were free. He told the Frenchman:

If Germany became involved and France became involved we had not made up our minds what we should do; it was a case that we should have to consider.... We were free from engagements and we should have to decide what British interests required us to do.—(British "White Paper" No. 87.)

M. Cambon remarked in reply that the Secretary of State had clearly pictured the situation, but on the very following day the French Ambassador took the liberty to remind Grey of the letter written in 1912. (British "White Paper" No. 105.)

Grey did not deny the claim implied in this reminder, but even as late as July 31 he reports as follows concerning the conversation with Cambon:

Up to the present moment we did not feel and public opinion did not feel that any treaties or obligations of this country were involved.... M. Cambon repeated his question whether we would help France if Germany made an attack on her. I said I could only adhere to the answer that, as far as things had gone at present, we could not take any engagement.... I said that the Cabinet would certainly be summoned as soon as there was some new development; that at the present moment the only answer I could give was that we could not undertake any definite engagement.—(British "White Paper" No. 119.)

Now, if we remember that even on the day before Grey had informed the German Imperial Chancellor that it would be a shame for England to remain neutral and allow France to be crushed, we here find a new proof of the unreliability of his conduct. If he has been gullible, the declaration of 1912, the dangerous character of which is increased by its apparently undefined tenor, has enmeshed him more and more. Also the military and naval circles, whose consultations with the representatives of the French Army and Navy certainly have been continued diligently since the beginning of the Servian crisis, were forcing toward a decision.

At all events, it became more impossible with every hour for Germany to keep England out of the way by any offers whatsoever. This is proved by Grey's conversation of Aug. 1 with the German Ambassador:

He asked me whether if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgian neutrality we would engage to remain neutral. I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still free, and we were considering what our attitude should be.... The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions on which we would remain neutral. I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise.... (British "White Paper" No. 123.)

Belgium Not the Cause.

Hence, only if Germany would permit herself to be humiliated war with England could be avoided. The violation of Belgium's neutrality was in no way the cause of England joining Germany's enemies, for while German troops did not enter Belgium until the night from Aug. 3 to 4, Grey gave on Aug. 2 the following memorandum to the French Ambassador after a session of the Cabinet in London:

I am authorized to give an assurance that if the Geman fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power.—(British "White Paper" No. 148.)

As the aim of this decision, of which M. Cambon was informed verbally, was to give France an assurance that it would be placed in a position "to settle the disposition of its own Mediterranean fleet," Grey would not accept the version of Cambon that England would take part in a war with Germany. This is a case of splitting hairs in order to put the blame of starting the war on Germany, for while England promised to protect the French coast and to make it possible for the French fleet to stay in the Mediterranean, she almost immediately proceeded to a warlike action against Germany, especially as the English Minister simultaneously refused to bind himself to maintain even this peculiar neutrality.

IV.
BELGIAN NEUTRALITY.

The highest representatives of the German Empire with emphatic seriousness declared that it was with a heavy heart and only following the law of self-preservation that they decided to violate the neutrality of the Kingdom of Belgium, guaranteed by the great powers in the treaties of 1831 and 1839.

The German Secretary of State on Aug. 4 informed the English Government through the embassy in London that Germany intended to retain no Belgian territory, and added:

Please impress upon Sir E. Grey that German Army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned, according to absolutely unimpeachable information. Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it being with her a question of life or death to prevent French advance.—(British "White Paper" No. 157.)

In answer Grey caused the English Ambassador in Berlin to demand his passports and to tell the German Government that England would take all steps for defense of Belgian neutrality. This, therefore, represents, in the view which very cleverly has been spread broadcast by British publicity, the real reason for the war. But in spite of the moral indignation that is apparent against Germany, the consideration for Belgium, up until very late, does not seem in any way to have been in the foreground. We find on July 31 Grey stated to Cambon:

The preservation of the neutrality of Belgium might be, I would not say a decisive, but an important, factor in determining our attitude.—(British "White Paper" No. 119.)

Here, therefore, there was no talk about England grasping the sword on account of Belgium. Now no one will claim that the assumption that the German troops could march through Belgium would be new or unheard of. For years this possibility had been discussed in military literature.[04]

This expression on the part of the historical Faculty is very interesting. It shows that a plan of campaign between the English and French had long been considered, and that the Belgian entry into the alliance against Germany was a matter agreed upon.

A Sudden Decision.

It must also be assumed that the Belgian Government knew toward the end of July at the latest that the war between Germany and France was probable and the march of Germans through Belgium very possible.

If England had not taken part in the war against Germany, it may be assumed that it would have given Belgium the advice to permit the marching through of the German Army, somewhat in the same manner as the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg did, with a protest. In doing so the Belgian people would have been spared a great deal of misery and loss of blood. On Aug. 3 the Belgian Government replied to an offer of military help by France as follows:

We are sincerely grateful to the French Government for offering eventual support. In the actual circumstances, however, we do not propose to appeal to the guarantee of the powers. Belgian Government will decide later on the action which they may think necessary to take.—(British "White Paper" No. 151.)

One day later London decided to make Belgian neutrality the cause of the war against Germany before the eyes of the world. The Ambassador in Brussels received the following orders:

You should inform Belgian Government that if pressure is applied to them by Germany to induce them to depart from neutrality, his Majesty's Government expects that they will resist by any means in their power and that his Majesty's Government will support them in offering such resistance, and that his Majesty's Government in this event are prepared to join Russia and France.—(British "White Paper" No. 155.)

Not until England thus stirred Belgium up, holding out the deceptive hope of effective French and English help, did Belgian fanaticism break loose against Germany. Without the intervention of England in Brussels the events in Belgium, one may safely assert, would have taken an entirely different course, which would have been far more favorable to Belgium.

But, of course, England had thus found a very useful reason for war against Germany. Even on the 31st of July Grey had spoken of the violation of Belgian neutrality as not a decisive factor. On Aug. 1 he declined to promise Prince Lichnowsky England's neutrality, even if Germany would not violate Belgium's neutrality. On Aug. 4, however, the Belgian question was the cause that suddenly drove England to maintain the moral fabric of the world and to draw the sword.

This suddenly became the new development, which was still lacking for Grey in order to justify this war before public opinion in England.

Another English Advantage.

And something else was secured by the drawing of Belgium into the war by the British Government, which had decided to make war on Germany for entirely different reasons: the thankful part of the protector of the weak and the oppressed.

As an English diplomat, when Russia was mobilizing, openly stated, the interests of his country in Servia were nil, so for Grey even Belgium, immediately before the break with Germany, was not decisive. However, when England had irrevocably decided to enter the war it stepped out before the limelight of the world as the champion of—the small nations.

[02] Recently a book entitled "Why We Make War," in defense of Great Britain, appeared at Oxford, as the authors of which "Members of the Faculty for Modern History in Oxford" are mentioned. This work undertakes, on the ground of the official publications, to whitewash Grey's policy, and of course incidentally the Russian policy. All together this publication, parading in the gown of science, is contradicted by our own presentation of the facts; it may be mentioned also that this work contains in part positive untruths. Thus it states on Page 70 (retranslation):

No diplomatic pressure whatever was exerted [by Germany] on Vienna, which, under the protection of Berlin, was permitted to do with Servia as she liked.

Grey's own words contradict this assertion.

[03] In the aforementioned book of the Oxford historians there is stated on Page 69 (retranslation):

This mediation [namely, Grey's mediation proposition] had already been accepted, by Russia on July 25th.

We have shown in the foregoing that the Russian Government did in no manner subscribe to the conference plan in binding terms. As an additional proof, a part of Buchanan's dispatch of the 25th may be mentioned:

He [Sazonof] would like to see the question placed on international footing.... If Servia should appeal to the powers, Russia would be quite ready to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of England, France, Germany, and Italy. It would be possible in his opinion that Servia might propose to submit the question to arbitration.—(British "White Paper" No. 17.)

Hence, not if England, but only if Servia would propose arbitration by the powers, Mr. Sazonof was willing! The most amusing part of this is that the Russian Minister himself considers such a proposition on the part of Servia merely as "possible"; evidently it would have appeared as a great condescension on the part of the Government at Belgrade if it, standing on the same basis as Austria-Hungary, would appear before a European tribunal! For us there is no additional proof necessary that a mediation conference, which for Austria was not acceptable even when proposed by England, would be unthinkable if the move for such came from Servia. In expressing such an idea. Mr. Sazonof proved that it was his intention to bring war about.

[04] The book, which appeared at Oxford, "Why We Are at War," mentioned previously states on Page 27 (retranslation):

That such a plan [the marching through Luxemburg and Belgium] had been taken into consideration by the Germans has been known in England generally for several years; and it has also been generally accepted that the attempt to carry out this plan would bring about the active resistance of the British armed forces: one assumed that these would be given the task of assisting the left wing of the French, which would have to resist German advance from Belgian territory.

"Truth About Germany"

Attested by Thirty-four German Dignitaries.[05]

Board of Editors.

Paul Dehn, Schriftsteller, Berlin.

Dr. Drechsler, Direktor des Amerika-Instituts, Berlin.

Matthias Erzberger, Mitglied des Reichstags, Berlin.

Prof. Dr. Francke, Berlin.

B. Huldermann, Direktor der Hamburg-Amerika Linie, Hamburg.

Dr. Ernst Jaeckh, Berlin.

D. Naumann, Mitglied des Reichstags, Berlin.

Graf von Oppersdorff, Mitglied des preussischen Herrenhauses, Mitglied des Reichstags, Berlin.

Graf zu Reventlow, Schriftsteller, Charlottenburg.

Dr. Paul Rohrbach, Dozent an der Handelshochschule, Berlin.

Dr. Schacht, Direktor der Dresdner Bank, Berlin.

Honorary Committee.

Ballin, Vorsitzender des Direktoriums der Hamburg-Amerika Linie, Hamburg.

Fürst von Bülow, Hamburg.

Dr. R.W. Drechsler, Direktor des Amerika-Instituts, Berlin.

D. Dryander, Ober-Hof-und Domprediger, Berlin.

Dr. Freiherr von der Goltz, Generalfeldmarschall, Berlin.

Von Gwinner, Direktor der Deutschen Bank, Berlin.

Prof. Dr. von Harnack, Berlin.

Fürst von Hatzfeldt, Herzog zu Trachenberg.

Dr. Heineken, Direktor des Norddeutschen Lloyds, Bremen.

Fürst Henckel von Donnersmarck.

Dr. Kaempf, Praesident des Reichstags, Berlin.

Prof. Dr. Eugen Kühnemann, Breslau.

Prof. Dr. Lamprecht, Leipsic.

Dr. Theodor Lewald, Direktor im Reichsamt des Innern, Berlin.

Franz von Mendelssohn, Praesident der Handelskammer, Berlin.

Fürst Münster-Derneburg, Mitglied des Herrenhauses.

Graf von Oppersdorff, Mitglied des Herrenhauses und des Reichstags, Berlin.

Graf von Posadowsky-Wehner.

Dr. Walther Rathenau, Berlin.

Viktor Herzog von Ratibor.

Dr. Schmidt, Ministerialdirektor, Berlin.

Prof. Dr. von Schmoller, Berlin.

Graf von Schwerin-Löwitz, Praesident des Hauses der Abgeordneten.

Wilhelm von Siemens, Berlin.

Friedrich Fürst zu Solms-Baruth.

Max Warburg, Hamburg.

Siegfried Wagner, Baireuth.

Try to realize, every one of you, what we are going through! Only a few weeks ago all of us were peacefully following our several vocations. The peasant was gathering in this Summer's plentiful crop, the factory hand was working with accustomed vigor. Not one human being among us dreamed of war. We are a nation that wishes to lead a quiet and industrious life. This need hardly be stated to you Americans. You, of all others, know the temper of the German who lives within your gates. Our love of peace is so strong that it is not regarded by us in the light of a virtue, we simply know it to be an inborn and integral portion of ourselves. Since the foundation of the German Empire in the year 1871, we, living in the centre of Europe, have given an example of tranquillity and peace, never once seeking to profit by any momentary difficulties of our neighbors. Our commercial extension, our financial rise in the world, is far removed from any love of adventure, it is the fruit of painstaking and plodding labor.

We are not credited with this temper, because we are insufficiently known. Our situation and our way of thinking are not easily grasped.

Every one is aware that we have produced great philosophers and poets, we have preached the gospel of humanity with impassioned zeal. America fully appreciates Goethe and Kant, looks upon them as cornerstones of elevated culture. Do you really believe that we have changed our natures, that our souls can be satisfied with military drill and servile obedience? We are soldiers because we have to be soldiers, because otherwise Germany and German civilization would be swept away from the face of the earth. It has cost us long and weary struggles to attain our independence, and we know full well that, in order to preserve it, we must not content ourselves with building schools and factories, we must look to our garrisons and forts. We and all our soldiers have remained, however, the same lovers of music and lovers of exalted thought. We have retained our old devotion to all peaceable sciences and arts; as all the world knows, we work in the foremost rank of all those who strive to advance the exchange of commodities, who further useful technical knowledge. But we have been forced to become a nation of soldiers in order to be free. And we are bound to follow our Kaiser, because he ]symbolizes and represents the unity of our nation. Today, knowing no distinction of party, no difference of opinion, we rally around him, willing to shed the last drop of our blood. For though it takes a great deal to rouse us Germans, when once aroused our feelings run deep and strong. Every one is filled with this passion, with the soldier's ardor. But when the waters of the deluge shall have subsided, gladly will we return to the plow and to the anvil.

It deeply distresses us to see two highly civilized nations, England and France, joining the onslaught of autocratic Russia. That this could happen will remain one of the anomalies of history. It is not our fault; we firmly believed in the desirability of the great nations working together, we peaceably came to terms with France and England in sundry difficult African questions. There was no cause for war between Western Europe and us, no reason why Western Europe should feel itself constrained to further the power of the Czar.

The Czar, as an individual, is most certainly not the instigator of the unspeakable horrors that are now inundating Europe. But he bears before God and posterity the responsibility of having allowed himself to be terrorized by an unscrupulous military clique.

Ever since the weight of the crown has pressed upon him, he has been the tool of others. He did not desire the brutalities in Finland, he did not approve of the iniquities of the Jewish pogroms, but his hand was too weak to stop the fury of the reactionary party. Why would he not permit Austria to pacify her southern frontier? It was inconceivable that Austria should calmly see her heir apparent murdered. How could she? All the nationalities under her rule realized the impossibility of tamely allowing Servia's only too evident and successful intrigues to be carried on under her very eyes. The Austrians could not allow their venerable and sorely stricken monarch to be wounded and insulted any longer. This reasonable and honorable sentiment on the part of Austria has caused Russia to put itself forward as the patron of Servia, as the enemy of European thought and civilization.

Russia has an important mission to fulfill in its own country and in Asia. It would do better in its own interest to leave the rest of the world in peace. But the die is cast, and all nations must decide whether they wish to further us by sentiments and by deeds, or the government of the Czar. This is the real significance of this appalling struggle, all the rest is immaterial. Russia's attitude alone has forced us to go to war with France and with their great ally.

The German Nation is serious and conscientious. Never would a German Government dare to contemplate a war for the sake of dynastic interest, or for the sake of glory. This would be against the entire bent of our character. Firmly believing in the justice of our cause, all parties, the Conservatives and the Clericals, the Liberals and the Socialists, have joined hands. All disputes are forgotten, one duty exists for all, the duty of defending our country and vanquishing the enemy.

Will not this calm, self-reliant and unanimous readiness to sacrifice all, to die or to win, appeal to other nations and force them to understand our real character and the situation in which we are placed?

The war has severed us from the rest of the world, all our cable communications are destroyed. But the winds will carry the mighty voice of justice even across the ocean. We trust in God, we have confidence in the judgment of right-minded men. And through the roar of battle, we call to you all. Do not believe the mischievous lies that our enemies are spreading about! We do not know if victory will be ours, the Lord alone knows. We have not chosen our path, we must continue doing our duty, even to the very end. We bear the misery of war, the death of our sons, believing in Germany, believing in duty.

And we know that Germany cannot be wiped from the face of the earth.

[05]

"Athenwood," Newport, R.I.,

Sept. 17, 1914.

Today I have received from Germany a pamphlet entitled "Truth About Germany, Facts About the War." The correctness and completeness of its statements are vouched for by thirty-four persons, whose names are recorded therein as members of an Honorary Committee. I know personally seventeen of these thirty-four persons, and have known them for years, some of them intimately. With six of them I have labored as a colleague in university work. I have been introduced into their homes, have broken bread at their tables and have conversed with them long and often upon the problems of life and culture. They are among the greatest thinkers, moralists and philanthropists of the age. They are the salt of the earth! The great theologian Harnack, the sound and accomplished political scientist and economist von Schmoller, the distinguished philologian von Wilamowitz, the well-known historian Lamprecht, the profound statesman von Posadowsky, the brilliant diplomatist von Bülow, the great financier von Gwinner, the great promoter of trade and commerce Ballin, the great inventor Siemens, the brilliant preacher of the Gospel Dryander, the indispensable Director in the Ministry of Education Schmidt. Two of them are, in a sense, our own countrywomen, the Baroness Speck von Sternburg and Frau Staats-minister von Trott zu Solz. The latter is the granddaughter of our own John Jay. I have known her, her mother and her grandfather. No statement was ever issued which was vouched for by more solid, intelligent, and conscientious people. Its correctness, completeness and veracity cannot be doubted. As I read it the emotions which it arouses make both speech and sight difficult. I wish it might come into the hands of every man, woman, and child in the United States.

(Signed) JOHN W. BURGESS,

Ex-Dean Faculties of Political Science, Philosophy, Pure Science and Fine Arts, Columbia University; Roosevelt Professor of American History and Institutions at Friedrich Wilhelms University, Berlin, 1906; Visiting American Professor at Austrian Universities, 1914-15.

Under the head of "An Anti-British Pamphlet," The London Times of Aug. 23, 1914, noted as follows:

The Vossischezeitung gives extracts from a brochure issued under the auspices of a committee of such prominent Germans as Prince Bülow, Herr Ballin, Dr. von Gwinner, and Field Marshal von der Goltz, for the purpose of "opening the eyes" of the United States regarding the causes of the present war. Copies of this pamphlet are being given to all Americans returning home from Germany. One chapter, headed "Neutrality by Grace of England," scoffs at the idea of England today being the defender of neutral States and declares that it was England who in 1911 was ready to land 160,000 men at Antwerp to help the French against the Germans.

As to who will ultimately win in the war, the pamphlet asks whether it will be the striving nation, the young strength, or the old peoples, France and England, with their flagging civilization in alliance with Muscovite retrogression.

HOW THE WAR CAME ABOUT.

Who is responsible for the war?—Not Germany! England's policy! Her shifting of responsibility and promoting the struggle while alone possessing power to avert it.

It is an old and common experience that after the outbreak of a war the very parties and persons that wanted the war, either at once or later, assert that the enemy wanted and began it. The German Empire especially always had to suffer from such untruthful assertions, and the very first days of the present terrible European war confirm again this old experience. Again Russian, French, and British accounts represent the German Empire as having wanted the war.

Only a few months ago influential men and newspapers of Great Britain as well as of Paris could be heard to express the opinion that nobody in Europe wanted war and that especially the German Emperor and his Government had sincerely and effectively been working for peace. Especially the English Government, in the course of the last two years, asserted frequently and publicly, and was supported by The Westminster Gazette and a number of influential English newspapers in the assertion, that Great Britain and the German Empire during the Balkan crisis of the last few years had always met on the same platform for the preservation of peace. The late Secretary of State, von Kiderlen-Waechter, his successor, Mr. von Jagow, and the Imperial Chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg, likewise declared repeatedly in the Reichstag, how great their satisfaction was that a close and confidential diplomatic co-operation with Great Britain, especially in questions concerning the Near East, had become a fact. And it has to be acknowledged today that at that time the German and British interests in the Near East were identical or at any rate ran in parallel lines.

The collapse of European Turkey in the war against the Balkan Alliance created an entirely new situation. At first Bulgaria was victorious and great, then it was beaten and humiliated by the others with the intellectual help of Russia. There could be no doubt about Russia's intentions: she was preparing for the total subjection of weakened Turkey and for taking possession of the Dardanelles and Constantinople in order to rule from this powerful position Turkey and the other Balkan States. Great Britain and the German Empire, which only had economic interests in Turkey, were bound to wish to strengthen Turkey besides trying to prevent the Muscovite rule on the whole Balkan peninsula.

Servia had come out of the second Balkan war greatly strengthened and with her territory very much increased. Russia had done everything to strengthen this bitter enemy of our ally, Austria-Hungary. For a great number of years Servian politicians and conspirators had planned to undermine the southeastern provinces of Austria-Hungary and to separate them from the Dual Monarchy. In Servia as well as in Russia prevailed the opinion that, at the first attack, Austria-Hungary would fall to pieces. In this case Servia was to receive South Austria and Russia was to dictate the peace in Vienna. The Balkan war had ruined Turkey almost entirely, had paralyzed Bulgaria, that was friendly, and had strengthened the Balkan States that were hostile to Austria. At the same time there began in Rumania a Russian and French propaganda, that promised this country, if it should join the dual alliance, the Hungarian Province of Siebenbuergen.

Thus it became evident in Germany and in Austria that at St. Petersburg, first by diplomatic and political, then also by military, action a comprehensive attack of Slavism under Russian guidance was being prepared. The party of the Grand Dukes in St. Petersburg, the party of the Russian officers, always ready for war, and the Pan-Slavists, the brutal and unscrupulous representatives of the idea that the Russian Czarism was destined to rule Europe—all these declared openly that their aim was the destruction of Austria-Hungary. In Russia the army, already of an immense size, was increased secretly but comprehensively and as quick as possible; in Servia the same was done, and the Russian Ambassador in Belgrade, Mr. von Hartwig, was, after the second Balkan war, the principal promoter of the plan to form against Austria a new Balkan alliance. In Bosnia, during all this time, the Servian propaganda was at work with high treason, and in the end with revolver and the bomb.

In Vienna and in Berlin the greatness and the purpose of the new danger could not remain doubtful, especially as it was openly said in St. Petersburg, in Belgrade, and elsewhere that the destruction of Austria-Hungary was imminent. As soon as the Balkan troubles began Austria-Hungary had been obliged to put a large part of her army in readiness for war, because the Russians and Servians had mobilized on their frontiers. The Germans felt that what was a danger for their ally was also a danger for them and that they must do all in the power to maintain Austria-Hungary in the position of a great power. They felt that this could only be done by keeping perfect faith with their ally and by great military strength, so that Russia might possibly be deterred from war and peace be preserved, or else that, in case war was forced upon them, they could wage it with honor and success. Now it was clear in Berlin that in view of the Russian and Servian preparations, Austria-Hungary, in case of a war, would be obliged to use a great part of her forces against Servia and therefore would have to send against Russia fewer troops than would have been possible under the conditions formerly prevailing in Europe. Formerly even European Turkey could have been counted upon for assistance, that after her recent defeat seemed very doubtful. These reasons and considerations, which were solely of a defensive nature, led to the great German military bills of the last two years. Also Austria-Hungary was obliged to increase its defensive strength.

Whoever considers carefully the course of events that has been briefly sketched here will pronounce the assertion of our enemies, that Germany wanted the war, ridiculous and absurd. On the contrary, it can be said that Germany never before endeavored more eagerly to preserve peace than during the last few years. Germany had plenty of opportunities to attack and good opportunities to boot, for we knew for years that the army of France was no more ready than that of Russia. But the Germans are not a warlike nation and the German Emperor, with his Government, has always shown how earnestly he meant his reiterated assertions that the preservation of peace was his principal aim. He was actuated in this by general considerations of humanity, justice, and culture, as well as by the consideration of the German trade and commerce. This, especially the transoceanic commerce of Germany, has increased from year to year. War, however, means the ruin of commerce. Why expose Germany needlessly to this terrible risk, especially as everything in Germany prospered and her wealth increased? No, the German Army bills were merely meant to protect us against, and prepare us for, the attacks of Muscovite barbarism. But nobody in Germany has ever doubted for a moment that France would attack us at the first Russian signal. Since the first days of the Franco-Russian alliance things have become entirely reversed. Then France wanted to win Russia for a war of revenge against Germany; now, on the contrary, France thought herself obliged to place her power and her existence at the disposal of the Russian lust of conquest.

In the Spring of 1914 the German press reported from St. Petersburg detailed accounts of Russia's comprehensive preparations for war. They were not denied in Russia, and Paris declared that Russia would be ready in two or three years and then pursue a policy corresponding to her power; France, too, would then be at the height of her power. If the German Government had desired war, on the strength of these accounts, which were true, it could have waged a preventive war at once and easily. It did not do so, considering that a war is just only when it is forced upon one by the enemy. Thus Spring went by with the atmosphere at high tension. From St. Petersburg and Paris overbearing threats came in increasing numbers to the effect that the power of the Dual Alliance was now gigantic and that Germany and Austria soon would begin to feel it. We remained quiet and watchful, endeavoring with perseverance and with all our might to win over Great Britain to the policy of preserving peace. Colonial and economic questions were being discussed by the German and English Governments, and the cordiality between the two great powers seemed only to be equaled by their mutual confidence.

Then on the 28th of June occurred that frightful assassination by Servians of the successor to the Austro-Hungarian throne, Archduke Francis Ferdinand. The Greater Servia propaganda of action had put aside the man who was especially hated in Servia as the powerful exponent of Austro-Hungarian unity and strength. This murder is the real cause of the present European war. Austria-Hungary was able to prove to a shuddering world, a few days after the murder, that it had been prepared and planned systematically, yea, that the Servian Government had been cognizant of the plan. The immense extent of the Servian revolutionary organization in the provinces of Southern Austria, the warlike spirit of the Servians and its instigation by Russia and France, imposed upon the Vienna Government the duty to insist upon quiet and peace within and without its borders. It addressed to the Servian Government a number of demands which aimed at nothing but the suppression of the anti-Austrian propaganda. Servia was on the point of accepting the demand, when there arrived a dispatch from St. Petersburg, and Servia mobilized. Then Austria, too, had to act. Thus arose the Austro-Servian war. But a few days later the Russian Army was being mobilized, and the mobilization was begun also in France. At the same time, as the German "White Book" clearly proves, the diplomacy of Russia and France asserted its great love of peace and tried to prolong the negotiations in order to gain time, for, as is well known, the Russian mobilization proceeds slowly. Germany was waiting, and again and again the German Emperor tried to win the Czar over to the preservation of peace, for he considered him sincere and thought him his personal friend. Emperor William was to be cruelly disappointed. He finally saw himself obliged to proclaim a state of war for Germany. But at that time the Russian and French armies were already in a state of complete mobilization. At that time The London Daily Graphic wrote the following article, which shows how an English paper that was only slightly friendly to Germany judged of the situation at that time:

The Mobilization Mystery.

A general mobilization has been ordered in Russia, and Germany has responded by proclaiming martial law throughout the empire. We are now enabled to measure exactly the narrow and slippery ledge which still stands between Europe and the abyss of Armageddon. Will the Russian order be acted upon in the provinces adjoining the German frontier? If it is, then the work of the peacemakers is at an end, for Germany is bound to reply with a mobilization of her own armed forces, and a rush to the frontiers on all sides must ensue. We confess that we are unable to understand the action of Russia in view of the resumption of the negotiations with Austria. It is not likely that these negotiations have been resumed unless both sides think that there is yet a chance of agreement, but if this is the case, why the mobilization which goes far beyond the limits of necessary precaution, and is, indeed, calculated to defeat the efforts of the diplomatists, however promising they may be? There may, of course, be a satisfactory explanation, but as the matter stands it is inexplicable, and is all the more regrettable because it is calculated—we feel sure unjustly—to cast doubts on the loyalty and straightforwardness of the Russian Government.

When Russia had let pass the time limit set by Germany, when France had answered that she would act according to her own interests, then the German Empire had to mobilize its army and go ahead. Before one German soldier had crossed the German frontier a large number of French aeroplanes came flying into our country across the neutral territory of Belgium and Luxemburg without a word of warning on the part of the Belgian Government. At the same time the German Government learned that the French were about to enter Belgium. Then our Government, with great reluctance, had to decide upon requesting the Belgian Government to allow our troops to march through its territory. Belgium was to be indemnified after the war, was to retain its sovereignty and integrity. Belgium protested, at the same time allowing, by an agreement with France, that the French troops might enter Belgium. After all this, and not till France and Belgium itself had broken the neutrality, our troops entered the neutral territory. Germany wanted nothing from Belgium, but had to prevent that Belgian soil be used as a gate of entrance into German territory.

Little has as yet been said of Great Britain. It was Germany's conviction that the sincerity of Britain's love for peace could be trusted. At any rate, Sir Edward Grey and Mr. Asquith asserted again and again in the course of the last few years that England wished friendly relations with Germany and never would lend its support to a Franco-Russian attack on Germany. Now this attack had been made; Germany was on the defensive against two powerful enemies. What would Great Britain do about it? That was the question. Great Britain asked in return for its neutrality that the German forces should not enter Belgium. In other words, it asked that Germany should allow the French and Belgian troops to form on Belgian territory for a march against our frontier! This we could not allow. It would have been suicidal. The German Government made Great Britain, in return for its neutrality, the following offers: we would not attack the northern coast of France, we would leave unmolested the maritime commerce of France and would indemnify Belgium after the war and safeguard its sovereignty and integrity. In spite of this Great Britain declared war on Germany and sides today with those Continental powers that have united for our destruction, in order that Muscovite barbarism may rule Europe. We know that Germany did not deserve such treatment on the part of Great Britain, and do not believe that Great Britain by this action did a service to humanity and civilization.

Today we are facing hard facts. Germany has to fight for her existence. She will fight knowing that the great powers beyond the ocean will do her justice as soon as they know the truth.

REICHSTAG AND EMPEROR.

England, France, and Russia, unthreatened by Germany, go to war for political reasons—Germany defends her independence and fights for her very existence, for her future as a great power—How a peaceful people were imbued with the spirit of war.

The last days of the month of July were days of anxiety and distress for the German people. They hoped that they would be permitted to preserve an honorable peace. A few months earlier, in 1913, when the centennial of the war for independence from French oppression and the twenty-fifth anniversary of Emperor William's ascent of the throne had been celebrated, they had willingly taken upon their shoulders the great sacrifice of the so-called "Wehrvorlage," which increased the peace strength of the standing army enormously and cost 1,000,000,000 marks. They considered it simply as an increase of their peace insurance premium. Our diplomats worked hard for the maintenance of peace, for the localization of the Austro-Servian war. So sure were the leading men of the empire of the preservation of general peace that at the beginning of the week which was to bring general mobilization they said to each other joyfully: Next week our vacation time begins. But they were fearfully disappointed. Russia's unexpected, treacherous mobilization compelled Germany to draw the sword also. On the evening of the first day of August the one word, Mobilization! was flashed by the electric spark all over the country. There was no more anxiety and uncertainty. Cool, firm resolution at once permeated the entire German folk. The Reichstag was called together for an extra session.

Three days later, on the anniversary of the battles of Weissenburg and Spichern, the representatives of the German people met. This session, which lasted only a few hours, proved worthy of the great historical moment marking the beginning of such a conflagration as the world had never seen before. The railroad lines were under military control and used almost exclusively for purposes of mobilization. In spite of all such difficulties, more than 300 of the 397 Deputies managed to get to Berlin in time. The rest sent word that they were unable to come. On the evening of Aug. 3 the Imperial Chancellor called the leaders of all parties, including the Socialists, to his house and explained to them in a concise and impressive statement how frivolously Germany had been driven to war. At the time of this meeting the unanimous acceptance of all war measures by the Reichstag was already assured. In numerous conferences the heads of the several departments explained the content and meaning of the bills to be submitted to the Reichstag. The participants of the conferences showed already what spirit would characterize the next day. The session of the Reichstag filled the entire German nation with pride and enthusiasm; the Reichstag maintained the dignity of the German Empire and the German people.

In greater numbers than ever before the Deputies, high officers of the army and navy and the Civil Government assembled on Aug. 4, first in houses of worship to pray to God, and then in the Royal Castle of Berlin. The military character of the ceremony at the opening of the session showed under what auspices this memorable act took place. The Kaiser entered the hall in the simple gray field uniform, without the usual pomp, unaccompanied by chamberlains and court officials and pages in glittering court dresses. Only State Ministers, Generals, and Admirals followed him to the throne, from where he read his speech, after covering his head with his helmet. His voice betrayed the strain under which he was laboring. Repeatedly he was interrupted by enthusiastic applause, and when he closed, a rousing cheer thundered through the famous White Hall, something that had never before occurred there since the erection of the old castle. Then came a surprise. The Emperor laid down the manuscript of his speech and continued speaking. From now on he knew only Germans, he said, no differences of party, creed, religion or social position, and he requested the party leaders to give him their hands as a pledge that they all would stand by him "in Not und Tod"—in death and distress. This scene was entirely impromptu, and thus so much more impressive and touching. And it was hardly over when the Reichstag—an unheard of proceeding in such surroundings—began to sing the German national hymn, "Heil Dir im Siegerkranz." The magnificent hall, until then only the scene of pompous court festivities, witnessed an outburst of patriotism such as was never seen there before. To the accompaniment of loud cheers the Kaiser walked out, after shaking the hands of the Imperial Chancellor and the Chief of the General Staff, von Moltke.

One hour later the Reichstag met in its own house. The Emperor had begged for quick and thorough work. He was not to be disappointed. Without any formalities the presiding officers of the last session were re-elected—in times of peace and party strife this would have been impossible. This short curtain raiser being over, the first act of the drama began. Before an overcrowded house the Chancellor described simply and clearly the efforts of the Government for the preservation of peace. He stated cold facts, showing unmistakably Russia's double dealing and justifying Germany's beginning of a war which she did not want. The Chancellor had begun in a quiet, subdued tone. Then he raised his voice and when, in words that rang through the hall, he declared that the entire nation was united, the Deputies and the spectators in the galleries could sit still no longer. They rose, with them at first some Socialists, then all of them, carried away by the impulse of the moment; the members of the Federal Council, of the press, diplomats and the crowds in the galleries joined them. The whole multitude cheered and clapped its hands frantically. It reflected truly the spirit of the whole nation. The Speaker, who under ordinary circumstances would have suppressed the clapping of hands as unparliamentary and the demonstrations of the galleries as undignified, let the patriotic outburst go on to its end.

After a short intermission the business meeting began. Sixteen war measures had been introduced, the most important of which was the one asking for 5,000,000,000 marks to carry on the war. The leader of the Social Democrats read a statement explaining why his party, despite its opposition on principle to all army and navy appropriations, would vote for the proposed bills. Without further debates all the bills were passed, and shortly after 5 P.M. the Reichstag adjourned. At 7 P.M. the Emperor received the presiding officers of the Reichstag to thank them for their prompt and useful work. He signed the bills, which were immediately published and thus became laws.

The resolute attitude and quick work of the Reichstag reflected the unity and resolution of the entire nation. Sixty-seven millions of Germans feel, think, and act with their elected representatives. No party, no class, no creed is standing back; all are imbued with one single thought: United Germany is unconquerable.

The entire German people are united as never before in their history. Even 101 years ago, in 1813, the entire population cannot have been so uniformly seized by the spirit of war as at the outbreak of this struggle, which is the people's war in the truest sense of the word, and which was predicted by Bismarck. All reigning Princes are going out to fight with the army and have appointed their wives as regents. Instances include the Kaiser's son-in-law, the Duke of Brunswick, who appointed his consort, the only daughter of the Emperor, as regent. The Princes call their people to arms, and they themselves all stand ready to sacrifice all they have. This example from above carries the nation with them. The Reichstag knew parties and factions no more, and neither does the nation. The Emperor sounded the word which has become common property from Königsberg to Constance, from Upper Silesia to the Belgian frontier: "I know only Germans!" And yet how terribly is our nation otherwise disrupted by party strife. Ill-advised persons across our frontiers hoped that creed differences would make for disunion, Frenchmen and Russians expected to weaken our empire with the aid of Alsatians and Poles. This hope has been destroyed—we are a united people, as united as was the Reichstag, the Socialists included. The latter have for years voted against all army and navy appropriations, have advocated international peace, and last year voted against the bills increasing the army strength. In many foreign quarters strong hopes were nourished that this party would help them. But those men did not know our German people. Our civilization, our independence as a nation was threatened, and in that moment party interest or creed existed no more. The true German heart is beating only for the Fatherland, east and west, north and south, Protestants, Catholics, and Jews are "a united people of brethren in the hour of danger." When Germany was so threatened by Russia, when the German "Peace Emperor" was shamefully betrayed by the Czar of all the Russians, then there was but one sacred party in existence: The party of Germans.

THE GERMAN MOBILIZATION.

The clockworks of mobilization; perfect order and quiet everywhere—General acceptance by all classes and factions of the necessities of a war not sought by Germany.

The German mobilization was the greatest movement of people that the world has ever seen. Nearly four million men had to be transported from every part of the empire to her borders. The manner in which the population is distributed made this task extremely difficult. Berlin, Rhenish Westphalia, Upper Silesia and Saxony especially had to send their contingents in every direction, since the eastern provinces are more thinly settled and had to have a stronger guard for the borders immediately. The result was a hurrying to and fro of thousands and hundreds of thousands of soldiers, besides a flood of civilians who had to reach their homes as soon as possible. Countries where the population is more regularly distributed have an easier task than Germany, with its predominating urban population. The difficulties of the gigantic undertaking were also increased by the necessity for transporting war materials of every sort. In the west are chiefly industrial undertakings, in the east mainly agricultural. Horse raising is mostly confined to the provinces on the North Sea and the Baltic, but chiefly to East Prussia, and this province, the furthest away from France, had to send its best horses to the western border, as did also Schleswig-Holstein and Hanover. Coal for our warships had to go in the other direction. From the Rhenish mines it went to the North Sea, from Upper Silesia to the Baltic. Ammunition and heavy projectiles were transported from the central part of the empire to the borders. And everywhere these operations had to be carried on with haste. One can thus say that the German mobilization was the greatest movement of men and materials that the world has ever seen.

And how was it carried on? No one could have wondered if there had been hundreds of unforeseen incidents, if military trains had arrived at their stations with great delays, if there had resulted in many places a wild hugger-mugger from the tremendous problems on hand. But there was not a trace of this. On the Monday evening of the first week of mobilization a high officer of the General Staff said: "It had to go well today, but how about tomorrow, the main day?" Tuesday evening saw no reason for complaint, no delay, no requests for instructions. All had moved with the regularity of clockwork. Regiments that had been ordered to mobilize in the forenoon left in the evening for the field, fully equipped. Not a man was lacking. There were no deserters, no shirkers, no cowards. Instead, there were volunteers whose numbers far exceeded the number that could be used. Every German wanted to do his duty.

The most noteworthy thing was the earnest quietness with which the gigantic gathering proceeded. Not a city, not a village reported unrest or even an untoward incident. The separation was hard for many a soldier. Many a volunteer tore himself away from his dear ones with bleeding heart, but with face beaming with the light of one who looks forward to victory. Following the Kaiser's wish, those who remained behind filled the churches and, kneeling, prayed to God for victory for the just German cause. The folk-war, brought on by the wantonness of the opponents, in itself brought peace and order, safety and discipline. Never, probably, have the police had fewer excesses to deal with than in the days of the mobilization, although great crowds gathered constantly in every city.

The best criterion of the enthusiasm of the people is without doubt the number of volunteers. More than 1,000,000 of these, a number greater than that of the standing army, presented themselves within a few days. They came from all classes. There were sons of the nobility, university students, farmers, merchants, common laborers. No calling hung back. Every young man sorrowed when he was rejected. No section of the Fatherland was unrepresented, not even the Reichsland Alsace-Lorraine, where, indeed, the number of volunteers was conspicuously great. When the lists in various cities had to be closed, the young men who had not been accepted turned away with tears in their eyes, and telegraphed from regiment to regiment, hoping to find one where there were still vacancies. Where the sons of the wealthy renounced the pleasures of youth and the comforts of their homes to accept the hardships of war in serving the Fatherland, the poor and the poorest appeared in like degree. In families having four or five sons subject to military duty a youngest son, not yet liable for service, volunteered. The year 1870, truly a proud year in our history, saw nothing like this.

A thing that raised the national enthusiasm still higher was the appearance of the troops in brand-new uniforms, complete from head to foot. The first sight of these new uniforms of modest field gray, faultlessly made, evoked everywhere the question: Where did they come from? On the first day of mobilization dozens of cloth manufacturers appeared at the War Ministry with offers of the new material. "We don't need any," was the astonishing reply. Equal amazement was caused by the faultless new boots and shoes of the troops, especially in view of the recent famous "boot speech" of the French Senator Humbert.

Small arms, cannons, and ammunition are so plentiful that they have merely to be unpacked. In view of all this, it is no wonder that the regiments marching in were everywhere greeted with jubilation, and that those marching out took leave of their garrisons with joyful songs. No one thinks of death and destruction, every one of victory and a happy reunion. German discipline, once so slandered, now celebrates its triumph.

There was still another matter in which the troops gave their countrymen cause for rejoicing. Not one drunken man was seen during these earnest days in the city streets. The General Staff had, moreover, wisely ordered that during the mobilization, when every one had money in his pockets, alcoholic drinks were not to be sold at the railroad stations. Despite this, the soldiers did not lack for refreshments on their journey. Women and girls offered their services to the Red Cross, and there was no station where coffee, tea, milk, and substantial food were not at the disposal of the soldiers. They were not required to suffer hunger or any other discomfort. The German anti-alcoholists are rejoicing at this earnest tribute to their principles, which were at first laughed at and then pitied, but triumphed in the days of the mobilization.

The army is increased to many times its ordinary strength by the mobilization. It draws from everywhere millions of soldiers, workmen, horses, wagons, and other material. The entire railway service is at its disposal. The mobilization of the fleet goes on more quietly and less conspicuously, but not less orderly and smoothly. Indeed, it is, even in peace times, practically mobilized as to its greatest and strongest units. For this reason its transports are smaller than those of the army; they are concentrated in a few harbors, and, therefore, do not attract so much public attention. The naval transports, working according to plans in connection with those of the army, have moved their quotas of men and materials with the most punctual exactitude. The naval reserve of fully trained officers and men is practically inexhaustible. The faithful work of our shipbuilding concerns, carried on uninterruptedly day and night under plans carefully prepared in time of peace, has wrought for our navy a strong increase in powerful warships.

As is known, the German fleet is built on the so-called "assumption-of-risk" plan. That is, it is intended that it shall be so strong that even the strongest sea power, in a conflict with the Germans, risks forfeiting its former rôle as a world factor. This "risk" idea has been hammered into the heart of every German seaman, and they are all eager to win for the fleet such glory that it can be favorably contrasted with the deeds of the old and the new armies.

Contrary to general expectation, the German fleet has taken the offensive, and the first loss of the war was on the English side and in English waters, the English cruiser Amphion running on to German mines in the mouth of the Thames. In the Baltic and the Mediterranean also German ships have taken the offensive against the enemies' coast, as is shown by the bombardment by the Germans of the war harbor of Libau and of fortified landing places on the Algerian coast.

Thus the fleet, confiding in the "risk" idea now proved to be true, and in its earnest and courageous spirit, may look forward with confidence to coming events.

But will not civilians have to hunger and thirst in these days? That is an earnest question. The answer is, No. Even in Berlin, city of millions, the milk supply did not fail for a day. Infants will not have to bear the privations of war. All provisions are to be had at reasonable prices. Empire, municipalities and merchants are working successfully together to insure that there shall be a sufficient food supply at not too great a cost. Not only is our great army mobilized, but the whole folk is mobilized, and the distribution of labor, the food question and the care of the sick and wounded are all being provided for. The whole German folk has become a gigantic war camp, all are mobilized to protect Kaiser, Folk and Fatherland, as the closing report of the Reichstag put it. And all Germany pays the tribute of a salute to the chiefs of the army and navy, who work with deeds, not words.

ARMY AND NAVY.

The German Army and Navy on the watch—Four million German men in the field—Thousands of volunteers join the colors to fight for Germany's existence, among them the flower of her scientific and artistic life.

There can be no greater contrast than that between the United States and Germany in one of the most important questions of existence with which a State is confronted. In its whole history the United States has never had a foreign hostile force of invaders upon its territory, foreign armies have never laid waste its fields. Until late in the last century, however, Germany was the battlefield for the then most powerful nations of Europe. The numerous German States and provinces, too, fought among themselves, often on behalf of foreign powers. The European great powers of that day were able, unhindered and unpunished, to take for themselves piece after piece of German territory. In the United States, on the other hand, it was years before the steadily increasing population attained to the boundaries set for it by nature.

Our Bismarck was finally able, in the years from 1864 to 1871, to create a great empire from the many small German States. As he himself often remarked, however, this was possible only because his policies and diplomacy rested upon and were supported by a well trained and powerful army. How the German Empire came into being at that time is well known. A war was necessary because of the fact that the then so powerful France did not desire that North and South Germany should unite. She was not able to prevent this union, was defeated and had to give back to us two old German provinces which she had stolen from the Germans. The old Field Marshal von Moltke said not long after the war of 1870-71 that the Germans would still have to defend Alsace-Lorraine for fifty years more. Perhaps he little realized how prophetic his words were, but he and those who followed him, the German Emperors and the German War Ministers, prepared themselves for this coming defensive struggle and unremittingly devoted their attention to the German Army.

From 1887 on there had been no doubt that in the event of war with France we should have to reckon also with Russia. This meant that the army must be strong enough to be equal to the coming fight on two borders—a tremendous demand upon the resources of a land when one considers that a peaceful folk, devoted to agriculture, industry, and trade, must live for decades in the constant expectation of being obliged, be it tomorrow, be it in ten years, to fight for its life against its two great military neighbors simultaneously. There are, moreover, the great money expenditures, and also the burden of universal military service, which, as is well known, requires every able-bodied male German to serve a number of years with the colors, and later to hold himself ready, first as a reservist, then as member of the Landwehr, and finally as member of the Landsturm, to spring to arms at the call of his supreme war lord, the German Emperor. A warlike, militant nation would not long have endured such conditions, but would have compelled a war and carried it through swiftly. As Bismarck said, however, the German Army, since it is an army of the folk itself, is not a weapon for frivolous aggression. Since the German Army, when it is summoned to war, represents the whole German people, and since the whole German people is peaceably disposed, it follows that the army can only be a defensive organization. If war comes, millions of Germans must go to the front, must leave their parents, their families, their children. They must. And this "must" means not only the command of their Emperor, but also the necessity to defend their own land. Did not this necessity exist, these sons, husbands, and fathers would assuredly not go gladly to the battlefield, and it is likewise certain that those who stayed at home would not rejoice so enthusiastically to see them go as we Germans have seen them rejoicing in these days. Again, then, let us repeat that the German Army is a weapon which can be and is used only for defense against foreign aggressions. When these aggressions come, the whole German folk stands with its army, as it does now.

The German Army is divided into 25 corps in times of peace. In war times reservists, members of the Landwehr, and occasionally also of the Landsturm, are called to the colors. The result is that the German Army on a war footing is a tremendously powerful organ.

Our opponents in foreign countries have for years consistently endeavored to awaken the belief that the German soldier does his obligatory service very unwillingly, that he does not get enough to eat and is badly treated. These assertions are false, and anybody who has seen in these weeks of mobilization how our soldiers, reservists, and Landwehr men departed for the field or reported at the garrisons, anybody who has seen their happy, enthusiastic and fresh faces knows that mishandled men, men who have been drilled as machines, cannot present such an appearance.

On the day the German mobilization was ordered we traveled with some Americans from the western border to Berlin. These Americans said: "We do not know much about your army, but judging by what we have seen in these days there prevails in it and all its arrangements such system that it must win. System must win every time." In this saying there is, indeed, much of truth—order and system are the basis upon which the mighty organization of our army is built.

Now a word concerning the German officer. He, too, has been much maligned, he is often misunderstood by foreigners, and yet we believe that the people of the United States in particular must be able to understand the German officer. One of the greatest sons of free America, George Washington, gave his countrymen the advice to select only gentlemen as officers, and it is according to this principle that the officers of the German Army and Navy are chosen. Their selection is made, moreover, upon a democratic basis, in that the officers' corps of the various regiments decide for themselves whether they will or will not accept as a comrade the person whose name is proposed to them.

One sees that the German Army is not, as many say, a tremendous machine, but rather a great, living organism, which draws its strength and lifeblood from all classes of the whole German folk. The German Army can develop its entire strength only in a war which the folk approve, that is, when a defensive war has been forced upon them. That this is true will have been realized by our friends in the United States before this comes into their hands.

The German fleet is in like manner a weapon of defense. It was very small up to the end of the last century, but has since then been consistently built up according to the ground principles which Mr. Roosevelt has so often in his powerful manner laid down for the American fleet. The question has often been asked, what is there for the German fleet to defend, since the German coastline is so short? The answer is that the strength of a fleet must not be made to depend upon the length of coastlines, but upon how many ships and how much merchandise go out from and enter the harbors, how great oversea interests there are, how large the colonies are and how they are situated, and, finally, how strong the sea powers are with which Germany may have to carry on a war and how they are situated. To meet all these requirements there is but one remedy, namely, either that our fleet shall be strong enough to prevent the strongest sea power from conducting war against us, or that, if war does come, it shall be able so to battle against the mightiest opponent that the latter shall be seriously weakened.

Germany, as especially the Americans know, has become a great merchant marine nation, whose colonies are flourishing. Furthermore, since the land's growing population has greatly increased its strength in the course of the last years, the mistrust and jealousy of Great Britain have in particular been directed steadily against the development of our ocean commerce, and later of our navy. To the upbuilding of the German Navy were ascribed all manner of plans—to attack Great Britain, to make war on Japan, &c. It was even declared by the English press that Germany intended to attack the United States as soon as its fleet was strong enough. Today, when Great Britain has needlessly declared war upon us, the Americans will perhaps believe that our fleet was never planned or built for an attack on any one. Germany desired simply to protect its coasts and its marine interests in the same manner in which it protects its land boundaries. It is realized in the United States as well as here that a fleet can be powerful only when it has a sufficient number of vessels of all classes, and when it is thoroughly and unremittingly schooled in times of peace. We have tried to attain this ideal in Germany, and it may be remarked that the training of the personnel requires greater efforts here, since the principle of universal service is also applied to the fleet, with a resulting short term of service, whereas all foreign fleets have a long term of enlistment.

The nominal strength of the German fleet is regulated by statute, as is also the term—twenty years—at the expiration of which old vessels must automatically be replaced by new ones. This fleet strength is set at forty-one line-of-battle ships, twenty armored cruisers and forty small cruisers, besides 144 torpedo boats and seventy-two submarine vessels. These figures, however, have not been reached. To offset this fact, however, almost the whole German fleet has been kept together in home waters. Great Britain's fleet is much stronger than ours, but despite this the German fleet faces its great opponent with coolness and assurance and with that courage and readiness to undertake great deeds that mark those who know that their land has been unjustifiably attacked. It is utterly incorrect to say, as has been said, that the German naval officers are filled with hatred for other navies, especially for the British. On the contrary, the relations between German and English officers and men have always been good, almost as good as those of the Germans with the American officers. It is not personal hatred that inspires our officers and men with the lust for battle, but their indignation over the unprovoked attack and the realization that, if every one will do his best for the Fatherland in this great hour, it will not be in vain even against the greatest naval power. We, too, are confident of this, for strenuous and faithful effort always has its reward, and this is especially true of our fleet organization. The United States realizes this as well as we, for it, too, has built up a strong and admirably trained fleet by prodigious labor. As is the case with the German fleet, the American Navy also is not built for aggression, but for defense.

Neutrality by the Grace of England.

Janus, a mighty god of the ancient Romans, was represented as having two faces. He could smile and frown simultaneously.

This god Janus is the personification of neutrality according to English ideas. Neutrality smiles when violated by England and frowns when violated by other powers.

The United States got a taste of England's neutrality when, a century ago, the English impressed thousands of American sailors, taking them from American ships on the high seas, when they searched neutral ships and confiscated the enemy's property on board of them, until Congress in Washington voted for the declaration of war against England.

In the great civil war, 1861 to 1864, England had counted on the victory of the Southern States; she recognized them as belligerents and supplied them with warships. This was not considered by England a breach of neutrality until the Minister of the United States declared, on Sept. 5, 1863, that unless England desisted war would result. England yielded.

But, according to the old German proverb, "A cat cannot resist catching mice," she secretly permitted the fitting out of privateers (the Alabama) for the Southern States and was finally forced to pay an indemnity of $15,000,000. England gained, however, more than she lost by this interpretation of neutrality, for by the aid of her privateers American maritime trade passed into English hands and was lost to the Americans.

May God's vengeance fall on Germany! She has violated Belgium's neutrality! the English piously ejaculate. They call themselves God's chosen people, the instrument of Providence for the benefit of the whole universe. They look down upon all other peoples with open or silent contempt, and claim for themselves various prerogatives, in particular the supremacy of the sea, even in American waters, from Jamaica to Halifax.

England's policy has always been to take all, to give back nothing, to constantly demand more, to begrudge others everything. Only where the New World is concerned has England, conscious of her own weakness, become less grasping, since Benjamin Franklin "wrested the sceptre from the tyrants," since the small colonies that fought so valiantly for their liberty rose to form the greatest dominion of the white race.

In the Summer of 1911, during the Franco-German Morocco dispute, the English were determined to assist their old enemies, the French, against Germany, and stationed 160,000 troops along their coast ready for embarkation. For the French coast? No, indeed! For transportation to Antwerp, where the English were to unite with the French Army and combine in the destruction of the German forces. But things did not reach that stage. England was not ready. England and France were resolved not to respect the neutrality of Belgium—the same England that solemnly assures the world that she has never at any time or place committed a breach of neutrality. England has observed neutrality only when compatible with her own interests, which has not often been the case. Her whole dissimulating policy is much more questionable than our one breach of neutrality, committed in self-defense and accompanied by the most solemn promises of indemnity and restitution.

England and France did not give up their plan of attacking Germany through Belgium, and by this means won the approval of the Muscovites. Three against one! It would have been a crime against the German people if the German General Staff had not anticipated this intention. The inalienable right of self-defense gives the individual, whose very existence is at stake, the moral liberty to resort to weapons which would be forbidden except in times of peril. As Belgium would, nevertheless, not acquiesce in a friendly neutrality which would permit the unobstructed passage of German troops through small portions of her territory, although her integrity was guaranteed, the German General Staff was obliged to force this passage in order to avoid the necessity of meeting the enemy on the most unfavorable ground.

The Germans have not forgotten the tone in which the French and Belgian press reported the frequent excursions of French Staff officers and Generals for the purpose of making an exhaustive study of the territory through which the armies are now moving, and who were received with open arms in Belgium and treated like brothers. Belgium has become the vassal of France.

In our place the Government of the United States would not have acted differently. "Inter arma silent leges"—in the midst of arms the laws are silent. Besides, England had interfered beforehand in Germany's plan of campaign by declaring that she would not tolerate an attack upon the northern coast of France.

The German troops, with their iron discipline, will respect the personal liberty and property of the individual in Belgium, just as they did in France in 1870.

The Belgians would have been wise if they had permitted the passage of the German troops. They would have preserved their integrity, and, besides that, would have fared well from the business point of view, for the army would have proved a good customer and paid cash.

Germany has always been a good and just neighbor, to Belgium as well as to the other small powers such as Holland, Denmark and Switzerland, which England in her place would have swallowed up one and all long ago.

The development of industry on the lower Rhine has added to the prosperity of Belgium and has made Antwerp one of the first ports on the Continent, as well as one of the most important centres of exchange for German-American trade.

Without Germany Belgium could never have acquired the Congo.

When England meditated taking possession of the Congo, claiming that great rivers are nothing but arms of the sea and consequently belong to the supreme maritime power, King Leopold turned to Germany for protection and received it from Bismarck, who called the Congo Conference of 1884-5 and obtained the recognition by the powers of the independence of the Congo State.

The struggle of the German States in Europe has some points in common with the struggle of the Independent States of North America (from 1778 to 1783), for it is directed chiefly against England's scheming guardianship, and her practice of weakening the Continental powers by sowing or fostering dissension among them.

While continually protesting her love of peace, England has carried on no fewer than forty wars during the latter half of the nineteenth century, including the great Boer war. She has long imperiled, and in the end has succeeded in disturbing, the peace of Europe by her invidious policy of isolating Germany. Germany, on the other hand, has proved herself since 1871 to be the strongest and most reliable security for the peace of Europe.

The policy of sowing dissension, practiced by England more industriously than ever in recent years, cannot possibly meet with the approval of the peace-loving citizens of the United States, and should be condemned on merely humanitarian as well as commercial grounds.

England aims at being mistress of the Old World in order to occupy either an equal, or a menacing, position toward the New World, as circumstances may dictate. For this purpose she has encouraged this war. The German Federated States of Europe are defending themselves with might and main, and are counting in this struggle for existence on the good-will of the United States of America, for whose citizens they cherish the friendliest feelings, as they have proved at all times. All Americans who have visited Germany will surely bear witness to that effect.

THE ATTITUDES OF GERMANY'S ENEMIES.

Germany overrun by spies for years past.

It goes without saying that in time of war the respective participants seek to gain for themselves every possible advantage, including as not the least of these advantages that of having public opinion on their side. It is equally understandable that Governments, for political or military reasons, often endeavor to conceal their real intentions until the decisive moment. In this matter, however, as in the conduct of war itself, there exists the basic principle, acknowledged throughout the civilized world, that no methods may be employed which could not be employed by men of honor even when they are opponents. One cannot, unfortunately, acquit Russia of the charge of employing improper policies against Germany. It must, unfortunately, be said that even the Czar himself did not, at the breaking out of hostilities against Germany, show himself the gentleman upon a throne which he had formerly been believed by every one to be.

The Russian Emperor addressed himself to Kaiser William in moving and friendly expressions, in which, pledging his solemn word and appealing to the grace of God, he besought the Kaiser, shortly before the outbreak of the war, to intervene at Vienna. There exists between Austria-Hungary and Germany an ancient and firm alliance, which makes it the duty of both Governments to afford unconditional support to each other in the moment that either one's vital interests come into question. There can be no doubt that the existence of Austria-Hungary is threatened by the Servian agitation. Despite this, the German Emperor, in offering his final counsels respecting the treatment of Servia and the concessions to be made to Russia, went, in his desire for peace, almost to the point where Austria could have had doubts of Germany's fidelity to the obligations of the alliance. Nevertheless, Russia at this very time not only continued its mobilization against Austria, but also simultaneously brought its troops into a state of preparedness for war against Germany. It is impossible that this could have been done without the order of the Czar. The conduct of the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, of the Chief of the General Staff and of the War Minister was of a piece with this attitude of the ruler. They assured the German Ambassador and the German Military Attaché upon their word of honor that troops were not being mobilized against Germany and that no attack upon Germany was planned. The facts, however, have proved that the decision to make war upon Germany had already been reached at that time.

The reason which impelled the Czar and his chief advisers to employ such base tactics with the help of their word of honor and appeals to the Supreme Being is plain. Russia requires a longer time for mobilization than Germany. In order to offset this disadvantage, to deceive Germany and to win a few days' start, the Russian Government stooped to a course of conduct as to which there can be but one judgment among brave and upright opponents. No one knew better than the Czar the German Emperor's love of peace. This love of peace was reckoned upon in the whole despicable game. Fortunately the plan was perceived on the German side at the right time. Advices received by Germany's representative in St. Petersburg concerning the actual Russian mobilization against Germany moved him to add to the report given him upon the Russian word of honor a statement of his own conviction that an attempt was obviously being made to deceive him. We find also that the character of the Russian operations had been rightly comprehended by so unimpeachable an organ as the English Daily Graphic of Aug. 1, which said: "If the mobilization order is also carried through in the provinces bordering on Germany, the work of the preservers of peace is ended, for Germany will be compelled to answer with the mobilization of her armed forces. We confess that we are unable to understand this attitude of Russia in connection with the renewal of the negotiations with Austria."

It is customary among civilized nations that a formal declaration of war shall precede the beginning of hostilities, and all powers, with the exception of some unimportant, scattered States, have obligated themselves under international law to observe this custom. Neither Russia nor France has observed this obligation. Without a declaration of war Russian troops crossed the German border, opened fire on German troops, and attempted to dynamite bridges and buildings. In like manner, without a declaration of war, French aviators appeared above unfortified cities in South Germany and sought, by throwing bombs, to destroy the railways. French detachments crossed the German border and occupied German villages. French aviators flew across neutral Holland and the then neutral Belgium to carry out warlike plans against the lower Rhine district of Germany. A considerable number of French officers, disguised in German uniforms, tried to cross the Dutch-German frontier in an automobile in order to destroy institutions in German territory. It is plain that both France and Russia desired to compel Germany to make the first step in declaring war, so that the appearance of having broken the peace might, in the eyes of the world, rest upon Germany. The Russian Government even attempted to disseminate through a foreign news agency the report that Germany had declared war on Russia, and it refused, contrary to the usage among civilized nations, to permit to be telegraphed the report of the German Ambassador that Russia had rejected the final German note concerning war and peace.

Germany for its part, in the hope that peace might yet be maintained, subjected itself to the great disadvantage of delaying its mobilization in the first decisive days in the face of the measures of its probable enemy. When, however, the German Emperor realized that peace was no longer possible, he declared war against France and Russia honorably, before the beginning of hostilities, thus bringing into contrast the moral courage to assume the responsibility for the beginning of the conflict as against the moral cowardice of both opponents, whose fear of public opinion was such that they did not dare openly to admit their intentions to attack Germany.

Germany, moreover, cared in a humane and proper manner at the outbreak of the war for those non-combatant subjects of hostile States—traveling salesmen, travelers for pleasure, patients in health resorts, &c.—who happened to be in the country at the time. In isolated cases, where the excitement of the public grew disquieting, the authorities immediately intervened to protect persons menaced. In Russia, however, in France and especially in Belgium the opposite of decency and humanity prevailed. Instead of referring feelings of national antipathy and of national conflicting interests to the decision of the battlefield, the French mishandled in the most brutal manner the German population and German travelers in Paris and other cities, who neither could nor wished to defend themselves, and who desired solely to leave the hostile country at once. The mob threatened and mishandled Germans in the streets, in the railway stations and in the trains, and the authorities permitted it.

The occurrences in Belgium are infamous beyond all description. Germany would have exposed itself to the danger of a military defeat if it had still respected the neutrality of Belgium after it had been announced that strong French detachments stood ready to march through that country against the advancing German Army. The Belgium Government was assured that its interests would be conscientiously guarded if it would permit the German Army to march through its territory. Its answer to this assurance was a declaration of war. In making this declaration it acted perhaps not wisely but unquestionably within its formal rights. It was, however, not right, but, on the contrary, a disgraceful breach of right, that the eyes of wounded German soldiers in Belgium were gouged out, and their ears and noses cut off; that surgeons and persons carrying the wounded were shot at from houses.

Private dwellings of Germans in Antwerp were plundered, German women were dragged naked through the streets by the mob and shot to death before the eyes of the police and the militia. Captains of captured German ships in Antwerp were told that the authorities could not guarantee their lives, German tourists were robbed of their baggage, insulted and mishandled, sick persons were driven from the German hospital, children were thrown from the windows of German homes into the streets and their limbs were broken. Trustworthy reports of all these occurrences, from respectable and responsible men, are at hand. We perceive with the deepest indignation that the cruelties of the Congo have been outdone by the motherland. When it comes to pass that in time of war among nations the laws of humanity respecting the helpless and the unarmed, the women and children, are no longer observed, the world is reverting to barbarism. Even in wartimes humanity and honor should still remain the distinguishing marks of civilization. That French and Russians, in their endeavors to spy upon Germany and destroy her institutions, should disguise themselves in German uniforms is a sorry testimony to the sense of honor possessed by our opponents. He who ventures to conduct espionage in a hostile land, or secretly to plant bombs, realizes that he risks the penalty of death, whether he be a civilian or a member of the army. Up to the present, however, it has not been customary to use a uniform, which should be respected even by the enemy, to lessen the personal risk of the spy and to facilitate his undertaking.

For a number of years there have been increasing indications that France, Russia and England were systematically spying upon the military institutions of Germany. In the eight years from 1906 to 1913; 113 persons were found guilty of attempted or accomplished espionage of a grave nature. The methods employed by these spies included theft, attacks upon military posts and the employment of German officers' uniforms as disguises. The court proceedings threw a clear light upon the organization and operations of espionage in Germany. This espionage was directed from central points in foreign countries, often in the small neighboring neutral States. Repeatedly it appeared that the foreign embassies and consulates in Germany assisted in this work; it was also discovered that Russia, France and England were exchanging reports which they had received concerning Germany's means of defense.

This espionage system was supported with large funds. It endeavored whenever possible to seduce military persons and officials to betray their country, and, when this was not possible, it devoted its attention to doubtful characters of every sort. It began its work with petty requests of a harmless appearance, followed these with inducements to violations of duty, and then proceeded with threats of exposure to compel its victims to betray their country further. Exact instructions, complete in the minutest detail, were given to the spies for the carrying on of their work; they were equipped with photographic apparatus, with skeleton keys, forged passes, &c.; they received fixed monthly salaries, special bonuses for valuable information, and high rewards for especially secret matters, such as army orders, descriptions of weapons and plans of fortifications. Principal attention was paid to our boundaries, railroads, bridges and important buildings on lines of traffic, which were spied upon by specially trained men. With the reports of these spies as their basis, our opponents have carefully planned the destruction of the important German lines of communication. The extraordinary watchfulness of the German military officials immediately before the declaration of war and since then has been able to render futile the whole system of foreign attempts against our means of communication in every single instance, but a great number of such attempts have been made. All these things prove beyond doubt that a war against Germany has long been planned by our opponents.

LIES ABOUT GERMANY.

The machinations of England and France to put Germany in the wrong—Lies on all sides.

Germany has now not only to battle against a world in arms, but it must also defend itself against lies and slanders which have been piled up around it like a hostile rampart. There is no cable at our disposal. England has either cut the cables, or is in possession of them. No German description of what has actually occurred can be sent by telegraph; the wires are carrying into the world only the distortions of our enemies. Germany is shut off as with a hedge from the outside world, and the world is supplied solely with news given out by our enemies. This language is strictly true; for the boldest, nay, the most impudent imagination would be unable to invent anything to exceed the false and absurd reports already printed by foreign newspapers.

In view of what we have experienced during this first week of the war we can already calmly assert that when the editors of foreign newspapers come later to compare their daily news of this week with the actual occurrences as testified to by authentic history, they will all open their eyes in astonishment and anger over all the lies which the countries hostile to Germany have sent over the cables to bamboozle the whole world. Much of all this has already become ridiculous; we must laugh over it despite the solemnity of the crisis in which we are living—for example, the bestowal of the cross of the Legion of Honor upon the city of Liége by the French President because it victoriously repulsed the attack of the Germans. Witness, too, the telegrams of congratulation sent by the King of England and the Czar of Russia to the Belgian King upon the victory of Liége! The joy over such "German defeats" will prove just as brief as the jubilation over such "Belgian victories." Such lies have short legs, and the truth will in any case soon overtake them.

But there are other lies of a more serious character and of more dangerous import—all such as misrepresent Germany's attitude and defame German character. Such defamation is designed to disturb old friendships and transform them into bitter estrangement; such defamation can also attain its hostile purpose wherever people do not say daily to themselves, "It is an enemy that reports such things about Germany; let us be wise and suspend our judgment till we know actual results, till we know what is surely the truth."

Let us select several facts as examples and as evidence—facts connected with the preparation for this war, as well as with the conduct of it thus far.

All the cables controlled by the English-French-Russian coalition disseminate the lie about the ostensibly "preventive war" that Germany wished and prepared for. The German "White Book" prints documents proving the white purity of the German conscience as represented by Kaiser, Chancellor, and people. It reveals also the profound grief of the German Kaiser over the sly and insidious perfidy of the Czar, toward whom he steadily maintained German fidelity even in hours of grave danger. What Russia did was more than a mere attack, it was a treacherous assault. The following facts prove this:

The German mobilization was ordered on Aug. 1, whereas Russia began to mobilize fully four weeks earlier, or about the beginning of July. Papers found on several Russian harvest laborers arrested in the district of Konitz show that the Russian military authorities had already by the first of July—i.e., immediately after the tragedy at Serajevo—sent to the leaders of these men mustering-in orders, which were to be distributed immediately after a further word should be given. These confiscated papers prove that Russia hoped to be able to mobilize against Austria before Germany could get official information of Russia's measures. The Russian authorities purposely avoided the usual course of sending these orders through the Russian Consuls, and they assigned "military exercises" as the object of this call to the colors.

July 25—Military exercises at Krasnoye-Selo were suddenly broken off and the troops returned at once to their garrisons. The manoeuvres had been called off. The military cadets were advanced at once to officers, instead of waiting, as usual, till Autumn.

July 26—All ships and boats are forbidden to sail in the waters between Helsingfors and Yorkkele; and navigation between Sweden and Finland is closed.

July 28—Partial mobilization; sixteen army corps to be increased to the strength of thirty-two corps. On the same day the Czar begs for friendly mediation; and on the same day the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Russian Minister of War give the German Military Attaché, upon their own initiative, their solemn word of honor that no mobilization has taken place.

July 30—The Second and Third Russian Cavalry Divisions appear on the German frontier between Wirballen and Augustov. The Czar issues a ukase calling to the colors the reserves in twenty-three entire Governments and in eighty districts of other Governments; also the naval reserves in sixty-four districts, or twelve Russian and one Finnish Government; also the Cossacks on furlough in a number of districts; also the necessary reserve officers, physicians, horses and wagons.

July 31—General mobilization of the whole Russian Army and Navy. The German steamer Eitel Friedrich, which keeps up a regular service between Stettin and St. Petersburg, is stopped by a Russian torpedo boat and brought into Revel, where the crew were made prisoners. The Russians blow up the railway bridge on Austrian territory between Szozakowa and Granica.

Night of Aug. 1—Russian patrols attack the German railway bridge near Eichenried and try to surprise the German railway station at Miloslaw. A Russian column crosses the German frontier at Schwidden, and two squadrons of Cossacks ride against Johannisburg.

Aug. 1—(At last) Germany's mobilization.

And France?

July 27—The Fourteenth Army Corps breaks off its manoeuvres.

July 31—General mobilization.

Aug. 2—French troops attack German frontier posts, cross the frontier, and occupy German towns. Bomb-throwing aviators come into Baden and Bavaria; also, after violating Belgium's neutrality by crossing Belgian territory, they enter the Rhine Province and try to destroy bridges.

Only after all this is the German Ambassador at Paris instructed to demand his passports.

And England?

In London war must already have been decided upon by July 31; the English Admiralty had even before that date advised Lloyd's against insuring German ships. On the same day the German Government gave emphatic support in Vienna to the English mediatory proposal of Sir Edward Grey. But the entire English fleet had already been assembled.

Of course, English public opinion was and still is divided. As late as Aug. 1 The Daily Graphic wrote in reference to the Russian mobilization order: "Will the Russian order also be carried out in the provinces on the German frontier? If so, then the labor of the peace-preservers is at an end, for Germany is compelled to answer with the mobilization of its armed forces. We confess that we are not able to understand this attitude of Russia, in view of the resumption of negotiations at Vienna."

And a leaflet distributed in the streets of London said that "a war for Russia is a war against civilization."

So much as to the preparations for the war—and now we take up the conduct of the war itself.

By glancing at the foreign press during this one week we have been able to collect the following specimen pieces of news:

London—The British Admiralty reports that the English fleet had driven back the German fleet to the Dutch coast.

There is not one word of truth in this. The Admiralty itself appears later to have recovered its senses; at least, it denied a Reuter story about a "great English naval victory near the Dogger Bank." But the English manufactories of lies are already so actively at work that members of Parliament have protested in the House itself against the "lying reports of the English press."

Paris—From Paris the assertion was made and disseminated throughout the world that "the landing of English troops in Belgium has begun; they were enthusiastically received by the population. The landing proceeded rapidly and in the best order, as the agreement between the two General Staffs guaranteed the perfect carrying out of the disembarkment plans."

Not a single word of this is true. At present not one English soldier has been landed.

In a similar way the Baltic Sea has become the scene of invented "battles"—of "German defeats," of course; the Russian Baltic Fleet sank a German war vessel in a battle that never occurred.

And, "The Russian vanguard has crossed the German frontier without meeting with opposition." As a matter of fact there is not a single Russian soldier on German soil. All inroads have been repulsed, and the German offensive has everywhere been successful.

A Dutch newspaper prints the following report from France:

Belfort—Many hundreds of Alsatians are joining the French Army with great enthusiasm, also many Italian Swiss. A large number of Alsace-Lorrainers are waiting near the frontier with a view of crossing it at a favorable opportunity to fight on the French side.

Such absurdity in the face of the unbroken unanimity of the entire German people and despite the manifest enthusiasm of the Alsace-Lorrainers for the German cause!

Equally stupid and made up for incurably credulous readers is an official report of the French War Ministry—not a private rumor, be it noted, but an official communication. It says:

A young Frenchman reports under oath that he was arrested, along with several other Frenchmen, at the railway station in Lörrach while on the homeward journey from Baden; and they were led through the whole city under a military escort. One of the Frenchmen shouted, "Hurrah for France," and was at once shot down. Three others who protested against this suffered the same fate; and so did a fifth man who thereupon had called the Germans murderers. The rest of the Frenchmen, proceeding to Switzerland by rail, heard shots fired in the adjoining compartment; they discovered that two Italians had been shot by Germans because one had protested against the opening of the window, and another had jostled a German.

Does such stuff call for any refutation at all?

A typical example of how it is sought to work upon public opinion by means of systematic lying is afforded by the capture of Liége.

The fact is that this Belgian stronghold, along with its forts, which contained a garrison of 20,000 men, was taken by storm on Aug. 7 by the German troops, who fought with unparalleled bravery, and that 3,000 to 4,000 Belgian prisoners of war are already on their way to Germany.

Yet on Aug. 9—two days after the fall of Liége—a dispatch was still sent to the Dutch press, saying: "The Liége forts are still in Belgian hands."

And on Aug. 8, thirty-six hours after the fall of Liége—a dispatch was sent from Paris to the newspapers of Rome, saying:

The Germans lost 20,000 men at Liége and asked for an armistice of twenty-four hours. Liége has not yet fallen. The English landed 100,000 men at Antwerp, who were received with jubilation by the population. President Poincaré, upon the proposal of Doumergue, the Minister of War, conferred on the City of Liége the cross of the Legion of Honor.

Another newspaper reported as follows: "The King of England sent a congratulatory dispatch to the King of Belgium upon his victory at Liége; seven German regiments were slain."

At Paris itself a note of the French War Ministry—published on the evening of Aug. 7, Liége having fallen in the early morning of that day—mentions the resistance of Liége and says that the forts are still holding out; that the Germans who had entered the city on Thursday by passing between the forts had evacuated it on Friday; and that the Belgian division that went to the assistance of the city had therefore not even made an attack. The official note concludes from all this that the resistance of the Belgians was seriously disturbing the plan of the Germans, who were building hopes upon a rapid success.

And four full days after the capture of Liége the French Minister at Berne reported officially: "Liége has not yet been taken; the German troops were repulsed."

At Copenhagen the following dispatches were published: "The English and French troops had effected a junction with the Belgian Army and had entered Liége and made many German prisoners, among them a nephew of the German Kaiser."

Similarly at Stockholm: "The Germans had suffered a severe repulse."

Again a dispatch from Paris to Rome: "The Germans had been driven back behind the Moselle and were begging for an armistice; the French had passed Namur and were pressing forward in forced marches, while 500,000 English were falling upon the German flank."

Still another official report from Paris: "Liége is becoming the grave of the 150,000 Germans who are breaking their heads against its walls; the Belgians had taken 3,000 prisoners, who were in a terrible condition; but for their good fortune of falling into captivity they would have starved to death."

In contrast to all this let us take the unvarnished truth as in the reported simple words of the German Quartermaster General:

We are now able to report upon Liége Without doing any harm.... We had only a weak force at Liége four days ago, for it is not possible to prepare for such a bold undertaking by collecting large masses of men. That we attained the desired end in spite of this is due to the excellent preparation, the valor of our troops, their energetic leadership, and the help of God. The courage of the enemy was broken, and his troops fought badly. The difficulties against us lay in the exceedingly unfavorable topography of the surroundings, which consisted of hills and woods, and in the treacherous participation of the entire population in the fighting, not even excluding women. The people fired upon our troops from ambush, from villages and forests—fired upon our physicians who were treating the wounded, and upon the wounded themselves. Hard and bitter fighting occurred; whole villages had to be destroyed in order to break the resistance, before our brave troops penetrated the girdle of forts and took possession of the city. It is true that a part of the forts still held out, but they no longer fired. The Kaiser did not want to waste a drop of blood in storming the forts, which no longer hindered the carrying out of our plans. We were able to await the arrival of heavy artillery to level the forts one after the other at our leisure, and without the sacrifice of a single life—in case their garrisons should not surrender sooner.... So far as can be judged at present the Belgians had more men for the defense of the city than we had for storming it. Every expert can measure from this fact the greatness of our achievement; it is without a parallel....

(Signed) VON STEIN,

Quartermaster General.

It is not the German people alone that will have cause to remember Liége; the whole world will do well to learn from the case of Liége that an organized manufactory of lies is trying to deceive the public opinion of all the nations. Glorious victories are converted into "defeats with heavy losses," and the strong moral discipline of the German troops is slanderously described in the reports of the imaginative, phrase-loving French as cruelty—just as in 1870 the Prussian Uhlans were described as thrusting through with their lances all the French babies and pinning them fast to the walls.

How far the "grande nation" has already degenerated, and how far the Belgian population, akin to the French both in blood and in sentiments, imitate the French in their Balkan brutality, is illustrated by two examples. One of these, in the form of a German official warning, says: "The reports at hand about the fighting around Liége show that the population of the country took part in the battle. Our troops were fired upon from ambush. Physicians were shot at while following their profession. Cruelties were practiced by the population on wounded soldiers. There is also news at hand showing that German patrols in the vicinity of Metz were fired at from ambush from the French side. It may be that these occurrences are due to the composition of the population in those industrial regions, but it may also be that France and Belgium are preparing for a guerrilla warfare upon our troops. If the latter alternative should prove true, and this proof be strengthened through repetitions of these occurrences, then our opponents will have themselves to thank if this war be carried on with unrelenting severity even against the guilty population. The German troops, who are accustomed to preserve discipline and to wage war only against the armed forces of the hostile State, cannot be blamed if, in just self-defense, they give no quarter. The hope of influencing the result of the war by turning loose the passions of the populace will be frustrated by the unshaken energy of our leaders and our troops. Before neutral foreign countries, however, it must be demonstrated, even at the beginning of this war, that it was not the German troops who caused the war to take on such forms."

The details of the cruelties, here only hinted at, on the Belgian and French side, are supplied and proved by an eye-witness, a German physician, who reports:

We have experienced from the Belgian population, from men, women, and half-grown boys, such things as we had hitherto seen only in wars with negroes. The Belgian civilian population shoots in blind hatred from every house, from every thick bush, at everything that is German. We had on the very first day many dead and wounded, caused by the civilian population. Women take part as well as men. One German had his throat cut at night while in bed. Five wounded Germans were put into a house bearing the flag of the Red Cross; by the next morning they had all been stabbed to death. In a village near Verviers we found the body of one of our soldiers with his hands bound behind his back and his eyes punched out. An automobile column which set out from Liége halted in a village; a young woman came up, suddenly drew a revolver, and shot a chauffeur dead. At Emmenich, an hour by foot from Aachen, a sanitary automobile column was attacked by the populace on a large scale and fired at from the houses. The red cross on our sleeves and on our automobiles gives us physicians no protection at all.

GERMANY AND THE FOREIGNER.

Respect for the foreigner—Russians willing to remain in Germany—Ill-treatment of Germans in Belgium and France.

Enemies on all sides! With dishonorable weapons against us, and with documentary lies for the rest of the world! Let us calmly allow them to continue lying and slandering as they have begun—it will result finally in injuring themselves. The world will very soon see through this impudent, unabashed game; and it will finally side with the people which keeps to the truth, Only the weakling lies and swindles; the strong man loves and honors truth. Let us act like the strong man in this struggle!

Respect for the foreigner, protection for his person and property have at all times been considered sacred among civilized people. Germany can without exaggeration claim to have upheld this respect and this protection in these fateful days. Except for a few insignificant incidents which took place in several large cities, where the natural excitement of the people and the legitimate defense against an insolent system of spying led to the molesting and arrest of foreigners—mostly Russians—the measures taken against the citizens of hostile nations did not exceed what was absolutely necessary to the safety of the country. The Imperial Government and likewise the Federated States have refrained from expelling "en masse" Frenchmen, Russians, Belgians and Englishmen. It was, of course, unavoidable to take measures for the detention of such persons as seemed suspicious and for the internation of strangers liable to be called to take arms against Germany. This took place in cities, e.g., Berlin, where these men were taken away as "prisoners of war," as soon as the "state of war" had been proclaimed, and placed in special rooms or camps. Lodgings and food are such as seem requisite and the treatment of these prisoners is according to their own opinion very kind. The Russian agricultural laborers constitute a special group of foreigners in Germany: There are about 40,000 to 50,000 of them, men and women.

From various parts of the country it is unanimously announced that these people are very glad not to be obliged to return to Russia. They are glad to remain in Germany, and willingly continue their work of gathering the rich German grain, potato and hay crops. Should there be any difficulties, these workmen would also have to be internated. No measures at all have been taken against women and children belonging to hostile States. They are left free to move about as they wish. Should they remain in Germany they can be sure that they will be subject to no other inconvenience except such as the general state of war inflicts upon Germans. The authorities will protect their persons, and their private property is respected. Nobody will touch it—as nobody has touched it so far.

If the German people and the German Government consider the respect they owe the foreigner as a sacred law, even though the foreigner belongs to the enemy, this respect is enhanced by affection and gratitude in the case of foreigners whose countries are friendly or neutral. Thousands and thousands of Americans, Swiss, Dutch, Italians and Scandinavians are still living in German countries. They may be sure that they can live as freely here as any German citizen. Should it be possible for them to return home, the best wishes will accompany them. The property they leave here will be protected. This is guaranteed by the authorities and by influential private persons. Should they stay in Germany, however, the German people will express their sense of gratitude for any friendly help they may lend, by increased respect and protection.

A strong contrast is noticeable between Germany's attitude toward foreigners and the facts revealed just now as to the treatment meted out in inimical countries not only to Germans but to other foreigners. Truly, in England there has been some effort to act according to the usages of civilized nations when engaged in warfare. Germans and Austrians have been insulted and molested; there has been some occasional destruction of property in stores; but as far as can be judged these were excesses of an uncontrollable mob. A general expulsion has not been ordered, and it is to be hoped that the Germans living in the United Kingdom and in its colonies will not suffer too heavy damages, in person or in property. Russia, France and Belgium, on the other hand, have by the ill-treatment and plundering of foreigners living in their countries struck themselves out of the list of civilized nations. Innumerable reports from expelled or fugitive people prove this, and official reports confirm them. Also the press of neutral, neighboring countries, such as Switzerland, Holland, and Italy, is full of similar complaints. Owing to the scarcity of news from Russia, the facts known so far only concern Petersburg, where German and Austrian men and women, residents or transients, were beaten and stoned in the streets. Here were also some cruel mutilations and murders. The beautiful building of the German Embassy in Petersburg was attacked by the mob. And the police watched all these misdeeds with crossed arms or even assisted. Probably what took place in Petersburg also occurred in other Russian cities; we shall soon know.

There are a great many complaints against the French and the Belgians. On the evening of Aug. 1 the mobilization was announced, and the next morning the official order was posted on the walls, that within twenty-four hours from the beginning of that day all Germans and Austrians, irrespective of sex, age or profession, would have to leave France. Those who remained and could not reach the boundary would be taken to the southwestern part of the country and imprisoned. There were few trains for Belgium or Switzerland. Thousands and thousands who had to abandon their property rushed to the stations with wife and children, fought for room in the overcrowded trains, surrounded by a howling mob, and even then were punched and slapped by policemen. During the trip there was nothing but misery. Men and women fell ill, children died. The refugees had to cross the Belgian boundary, walking a distance of six or seven kilometers in the middle of the night, dead tired, their luggage stolen—sometimes, it is said, by officials. In Belgium the same tragedy occurred as in France. And then came the salvation. The cordial, hospitable reception by the Germans in Holland and Switzerland is unanimously praised and appreciated.

The reports of brutal acts from Paris, Antwerp, Brussels, would be incredible were they not confirmed hundredfold. The most brutal and insulting threats of death were flung by processions of people going through the streets to all those who looked like foreigners. They were severely ill-treated. Houses and stores were upset, furniture and the like were thrown into the streets, employers and working people were dragged out, women were stripped and pushed through the streets, children were thrown out of windows. Knives, swords, sticks and revolvers were used. One could fill books with the details, but they are all equally cruel. Not only Germans and Austrians were expelled and ill-treated, but citizens of neutral States shared this awful lot. Thousands of Italians were expelled, as well as numerous Rumanians. The press in both countries complains bitterly and asks what has become of those who remained in France and were imprisoned in the south—but nobody knows.

History will place this ill-treatment and oppression of foreigners on record. The responsibility rests, not with an uncontrollable mob, but with the Government and the authorities of the two countries who have always boasted of their culture.

COMMERCE AND TRADE RELATIONS
BETWEEN GERMANY AND UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA.

Germany's financial rise since 1870—Export and import with the United States of America—The present firm condition of German finance.

Politicians and commercial men must base their plans upon facts, as they are and not as they wish they were, otherwise they fail. France has closed its eyes not only to the great intellectual and moral assists of Germany but also to its commercial resources.

France has repeatedly declared that Germany could not effect a serious political opposition, because a war would result in the ruin of its commercial and financial strength. This we heard in the Morocco crisis, also in the Balkan wars. Germany's love of peace which was tested in the above-mentioned cases strengthened the French in their error. He, however, who has taken the trouble to visit Germany and the Germans in their places of employment—and especially Americans in recent years have done this, however, also many Englishmen, who in vain have protested against the war with Germany—he can testify to the astonishing commercial advancement which Germany has made since its political union by Bismarck.

A few facts and statistics may recall this to memory. The population of Germany has since 1870, immigrants excluded, increased from 40,000,000 to 67,000,000, round numbers. Incomes and wages in particular have approximately doubled during the last generation; savings deposits have increased sixfold. Although, only a generation ago, commerce and trade employed only about two-fifths of the population, now more than three-fifths are engaged in this field of work, and Germany, as a result of its agricultural economy and increased intense farming, is today the third largest agricultural country of the world. In the coal and iron industries Germany is second only to America. In one generation its coal production increased two and a half fold, its raw iron production almost fourfold. During the same period of time the capital of the German banks increased fourfold and their reserve fund eightfold. Characteristic of Germany is the fact that hand in hand with this active private initiative is a strong feeling for the great universal interests and for organic co-operation of private and State resources. This feeling explains the perfect working of our State activities, in particular our railways, 95 per cent. of which are owned by the Government and which yield an essentially higher revenue than those in England or France; it explains further the willing assumption of the great financial burdens which general insurance imposes upon those engaged in private enterprises and which today is proving a blessing to almost the entire laboring force of Germany, to an extent which has not yet been realized by any other country.

What economic value to the world has a nation which for more than forty years has concentrated all its energy in peaceful industry? Does any one deny that Germany's great technical and commercial advancement has been a blessing in respect to the development of the world? Has not the commercial advancement in Germany had the effect of awakening new productive powers in all parts of the world and of adding new territories which engage in the exchange of goods with the civilized nations of the world? Since the founding of the new German Empire, German foreign trade has increased from 5½ to approximately 20 billion marks. Germany has become the best customer of a great number of countries. Not only has the German consumption of provisions and luxuries increased in an unusual degree, also that of meat, tropical fruits, sugar, tobacco and colonial products, but above all else that of raw materials, such as coal, iron, copper and other metals, cotton, petroleum, wood, skins, &c. Germany furnishes a market for articles of manufacture also, for American machinery, English wool, French luxury articles, &c. One is absolutely wrong in the belief that the competition of German industry in the world market has been detrimental to other commercial nations. Legitimate competition increases the business of all concerned.

The United States of America has reaped especial profit from Germany's flourishing commercial condition. Germany purchases more from the United States of America than from any other country of the world. Germany buys annually from the United States of America approximately $170,000,000 worth of cotton, $75,000,000 worth of copper, $60,000,000 worth of wheat, $40,000,000 animal fat, $20,000,000 mineral oil and the same amount of vegetable oil. In 1890 the import and export trade between Germany and the United States amounted to only $100,000,000, in 1913 to about $610,000,000. Germany today imports from the United States goods to the value of $430,000,000, while she exports to the United States nearly $180,000,000 worth. No nation therefore can judge as well as the United States what German commerce means to the world.

In what condition are the finances of Germany? In this field our opponents will be obliged to change their views. In 1912 Germany's national debt was about 14 marks per capita lower than England's. The public debt of France per capita was far more than double that of Germany. Germany, however, has large national assets which offset its liabilities. For example, the stocks of the Prussian railways alone exceed by far the aggregate amount of the Prussian debt, the income of the railways alone is essentially greater than the amount which the interest and amortization of the entire State debt demand. The war, which, according to the French conception, was destined to bring about the financial and commercial ruin of Germany, has brought forth the astonishing result that the famous French money market was the first to fail in this crisis. As early as July 25, before the rejection of the Austrian ultimatum by Servia had been made known, the offer of 3 per cent. redeemable French notes to the French Exchange was so great that the Chambre Syndicale des Agents de Change in the interest of the public prohibited the quotation of a lower rate than 78 per cent., while bids of 74 per cent. had already been submitted. Sale in blank was absolutely forbidden, and in the coulisse business was at a standstill. A few days later the July liquidation, in the official market as well as in the coulisse, was postponed until the end of August, which action proved the necessity of a period of grace. On July 31 the French savings banks, at the command of the Government, suspended daily payments and paid out sums to the amount of 50 francs, fourteen days' notice being necessary. The London money market, too, has hardly stood the war test. On July 30 the Bank of England was obliged to raise its rate of discount from 3 to 4 per cent., several days later to 8 per cent., and again after a few days to the incredible rate of 10 per cent. In contrast to this the President of the German Reichsbank was able, on the 1st of August, to declare that the directorate, because of the strength of the Reichsbank and the solid constitution of the German money market, did not consider it necessary to follow England's example. The German Reichsbank has therefore not exceeded the rate of 6 per cent. Worse yet was the fact that England, on Aug. 2, was obliged to require grace on exchange, and France, on Aug. 3, grace on its accounts-current and Lombard loans. Although along with England and France, also Russia, Austria, Italy, Belgium, and other nations required temporary credit, Germany to date has not deemed it necessary to ask for time in meeting its obligations. Savings banks, other banks and financial institutions are meeting all demands without restriction. The fact that the English money market, which up to the present time has been considered the financial centre of international trade, has failed, will bring many a serious thought to all commercial men interested in the world market.

German commerce has doubtless been temporarily injured by the war, but the esprit de corps and organization which animate the German Nation are not only a firm foundation for German commerce, but also a strong support for the further development of the commerce and trade of the entire civilized world, if, as we hope, peace soon be re-established.

WHO IS TO BE VICTORIOUS?

An appeal to American friends

The American citizen who is now leaving Europe, which has been turned into an enormous military camp, may consider himself fortunate that he will soon be able to set foot in the New World, where he will be enabled again to take up his business pursuits. In the meantime old Europe is being torn asunder by a terrible war among its various peoples. It will make him happy again to greet mountain and valley, field and garden which are not threatened nor trampled down by armies or covered with blood; again to see cities in which business and traffic are not brought to a standstill by calling in all men capable of military service; and he may thank fortune that his people have been given room enough in which to expand and to permit them freely to unfold their power; that they are spared the great necessity of resisting the tightening ring of enemies in the east and west, on land and water, in a struggle for national existence.

But the American will feel the effects of the fate of the Old World. Even though he knows his own country is not directly involved, he will certainly realize that the great net of international traffic and the progress of his country are connected by many strong ties to the life and prosperity of European peoples. He will be affected by every victory and defeat, just as by the sun and rain in his own country. He will doubtless remember that of all European countries Germany is the best customer of the United States, from which she purchases yearly over 1,000,000,000 marks in cotton, food, metal, and technical products. If Germany is economically ruined, which is the wish of Russia, France, and England and all allied friends of wretched Servia, it would mean the loss of a heavy buyer to America, and thereby cause a serious loss to America which could not easily be made good. It would be a great blow to American export trade, of which Germany handles not less than 14 per cent. yearly.

The material loss is not the only feature. In the economic struggle in the world markets American and German commercial men have learned mutually to appreciate one another, to appreciate one another more highly than do any other two rivals. The time is long past when the American pictured the German as one of thousands, shut up in a room, surrounded by documents and parchments, speculating about the unknown outside world, and the same is true of the German's idea of the American—a money-hungry barbarian. Two nations in which so much kindred blood flows and which are connected by so many historical events understand each other better today than formerly. Above all, they have a mutual understanding regarding the ideal in commercial life: A man engaged in work not for the sake of the profit, but for the sake of the work he is doing; one who gives all his strength to his task, and who works for the general welfare of the people as a whole, considering his position as an office and his wealth as an obligation, not as the final aim, but as a basis for the realization of higher attainments. He places the value of character and the development of the creative powers of man higher than all economic success. Two nations united by such common inclinations and ideals, boldness of enterprise, far-sightedness, quickness of decision, and admiration for intellectual achievements, cannot help being exceedingly congenial to each other. What concerns one today concerns the other.

Does it sound like a paradox when I say Germany's struggle concerns not only her own destiny, but to a considerable extent that of America? Does the United States consider itself entirely immune from the warlike complications brought about by the Servian murder of Princes and Russia's breach of faith? In any event, it will be difficult for it to say: "What's Hecuba to me?" One thing should be clearly understood on the shores of the five oceans, that the cause of this most terrible war does not emanate from the dark Balkans, or from a Russian military group, but from envy and hate which healthy, young and striving Germany has aroused in her older rivals; not because this or that demand was made by one Cabinet and refused by another, but because it was believed there was finally an opportunity to destroy the hated opponent who threatened to put the older Western European powers in the shade, and for this reason England and France put their strength into the service of criminal and brutal Servia. The following statistics will, perhaps, throw some light on the development of the foreign trade of the principal countries from 1870 to 1913 (in billions of marks):

	1870.	1913.
Great Britain	9,180	23,280
France	4,540	12,300
Russia	2,000	5,580
Germany	4,240	20,440

In these forty-three years, which have been decisive in the development of international economy, England, France and Russia have not been able even to increase their foreign trade three times, while Germany and the United States have increased theirs five times. The trade of Germany and the United States has increased from 7.6 to 38 billion marks. If these figures show nothing else, they show on which side the American sympathy will be. This war, provoked by Russia because of an outrageous desire for revenge, supported by England and France, has no other motive than envy of Germany's position in economic life, and of her people, who are fighting for a place in the sun. "Right or wrong, Germany must not grow." That is the turning point of a policy which the French Republic drilled into the Muscovites. Let us consider the adversaries of Germany. Russia, the classic land of power and terrible exploitation of the people for the benefit of a degenerated aristocracy. France, a type of a nation in which there is not even enough enterprise to increase the productiveness of the country. England, which has so long felt its glory vanishing and in the meantime has remained far behind its younger rival in financial and economic equipment. One can easily imagine the feelings of these peoples when they observe the rapid and successful growth of Germany, and wonders if these same feelings will not one day be directed against the youthful North American giant. In this war it shall be decided which is the stronger—the organized inertia of the tired and envious, or the unfolding of power in the service of a strong and sacrificing life. To know that we have American friendship in this struggle will mean a great moral support for us in the coming trying days, for we know that the country of George Washington and Abraham Lincoln places itself only on the side of a just cause and one worthy of humanity's blessing.

Speculations About Peace, September, 1914

Report by James W. Gerard, American Ambassador at Berlin, to President Wilson.

By The Associated Press.

WASHINGTON, Sept. 17.—Germany has suggested informally that the United States should undertake to elicit from Great Britain, France, and Russia a statement of the terms under which the Allies would make peace.

WOODROW WILSON,
President of the United States of America.
(Photo (C) by Bradley Studio.)

The suggestion was made by the Imperial Chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg, to Ambassador Gerard at Berlin as a result of an inquiry sent by the American Government to learn whether Emperor William was desirous of discussing peace, as recently had been reported.

No reply was made by Emperor William himself, nor did the Imperial Chancellor indicate whether or not he spoke on behalf of the Emperor. Ambassador Gerard, in a cable dispatch to President Wilson, repeated the Chancellor's remarks from recollection, substantially as follows:

Germany was appreciative of the American Government's interest and offer of services in trying to make peace. Germany did not want war, but had it forced on her. Even if she defeats France, she must likewise vanquish both Great Britain and Russia, as all three have made an agreement not to make peace except by common consent. Similarly, England has announced through Premier Asquith and her diplomatists and the newspapers that she intends to fight to the limit of her endurance. In view of that determination on the part of Great Britain, the United States ought to get proposals of peace from the Allies. Germany could accept only a lasting peace, one that would make her people secure against future attacks. To accept mediation now would be interpreted by the Allies as a sign of weakness on the part of Germany and would be misunderstood by the German people, who, having made great sacrifices, had the right to demand guarantees of security.

The above is all that Ambassador Gerard communicated as to his conversation. He added only the brief comment that he, himself, thought the way might possibly be opened to mediation. President Wilson did not regard the message, however, as bringing anything tangible. He referred to the Chancellor's conversation as non-committal and incidental to the acknowledgment of the American Government's inquiry. The President indicated that he rather expected a reply to the inquiry to be sent eventually from the Emperor himself, although he realizes that the Imperial Chancellor may have consulted the Kaiser by telegraph before talking informally with the American Ambassador.

President Wilson took no action as a result of the message, waiting to hear from Ambassador Gerard whether anything of a more formal character could be obtained by him which the United States might communicate to Great Britain, France, and Russia. It was understood tonight that the British and French Ambassadors who are in Washington were not informed officially or unofficially by Secretary Bryan of the conversation between the Imperial German Chancellor and Ambassador Gerard.

Germany's position is that she will give her opinion on terms of peace when she has received a definite statement from the Allies of their proposals. The statement that Germany did not want war, but had it forced upon her, as well as the declaration that she wanted a lasting peace, is almost identical with the remarks which Sir Edward Grey made to Ambassador Page in London last week. The British Foreign Secretary said England wanted no temporary truce, but a permanent peace, and one that would safeguard her against sudden attacks such as Germany had made.

President's Future Course.

The general belief in well-informed circles tonight was that the President, after waiting a few days for more information from Berlin, probably would instruct the American Ambassadors at London, Paris, and Petrograd to communicate what the Imperial German Chancellor had said to Ambassador Gerard. It was believed the Ambassadors would be asked to reiterate the wish of the American Government to be of service in bringing about peace and to point out the readiness of the United States to communicate to Germany and Austria any statement of terms which the Allies might care to make.

Diplomatists are disposed to believe that through such informal conversations something definite in the way of peace terms may yet be obtained as a working basis. If a concord of opinion for the discussion of peace terms were reached President Wilson then would endeavor to obtain an acceptance by all the belligerents of the original tender of good offices. This would not mean a cessation of hostilities, unless the mediating power specifically made it a condition of mediation and all the belligerents agreed to it. An armistice would not hinder military movements or preparations, serving merely as a truce while peace was discussed.

President Wilson already has indicated that he believes that the final reckoning of the war should be made in a conference of the European powers, and it would be the function of the United States to preside at such a conference if its services as a mediator were accepted.

Various reports were current today that Germany had named several conditions under which she would make peace, that she had refused proposals to alter the territorial status of her empire and possessions, and would cede no territory or dismantle her fleet, but it was said authoritatively that nothing of this character was contained in any of the messages from Berlin to the American Government.

A statement made at the White House today was the first authoritative acknowledgment that any inquiry on the subject of Germany's attitude concerning peace had been made by the United States. Officials heretofore have maintained silence in regard to the effort made by the Government to get at the bottom of the expression in favor of peace reported to have been made by the German Emperor to the Imperial Chancellor and mentioned in a private conversation in New York by Count von Bernstorff, the German Ambassador to the United States.

What was said by Count von Bernstorff in that conversation brought Oscar S. Straus post-haste to Washington, and as a result of what he told Secretary Bryan instructions were sent to Ambassador Gerard to ascertain whether the remarks attributed to the Emperor were to be taken as an indication that the German Government would not be averse to the exercise of the good offices of the United States in an effort to end the hostilities in Europe.

The conversation at which the German Ambassador made the statement occurred at the house of James Speyer, the banker, in New York. Oscar S. Straus, a member of the Permanent Tribunal of Arbitration at The Hague, was present. In the course of a discussion of the war in Europe and the prospects of peace Count von Bernstorff, it is understood, said that, while he had no advices from the Imperial Government since he had left Berlin, he recalled that the Imperial Chancellor had told him that he believed Emperor William would be willing to discuss a proposal of peace through mediation.

With the permission of Count von Bernstorff, Mr. Straus came to Washington and told Secretary Bryan of what the German Ambassador had said. On the following day Count von Bernstorff made a trip from New York to Washington and had an interview with Secretary Bryan.

It has been understood that Mr. Bryan, in an excess of caution, desired to ask Count von Bernstorff personally if he would consent to having Ambassador Gerard instructed to make inquiry of the German Government as to whether the conversation between the Emperor and the Imperial Chancellor might be regarded as indicating that an offer of mediation of the United States would not be unwelcome to Germany. Count von Bernstorff is understood to have assented to Mr. Bryan's suggestion, and the instructions to Mr. Gerard followed.

WHO BEGAN THE WAR, AND WHY?
CASE FOR THE TRIPLE ENTENTE

FIRST WARNINGS OF EUROPE'S PERIL.

Speeches by British Ministers.

Sir John Simon, British Attorney General, in Speech Before Altrincham Liberals, at Manchester, July 25.

We have been so filled with our own political development that some of us may not have noticed how serious a situation is threatening on the Continent of Europe. All I will say about it this afternoon is this—if times of anxiety are coming into relationships between different European powers, we in this country, and I think not only Liberals among us, have reason to be glad that our foreign administration is in the calm, cool hands of Sir Edward Grey.[06] [Cheers.] And let us all resolve that, whatever may be the difficulties and dangers which threaten the peaceful relations in Europe, the part which this country plays shall from beginning to end be the part of a mediator simply desirous of promoting better and more peaceful relations.

[06] On the next day, July 26, Earl Grey addressed to The London Times the following appeal for national unity:

To the Editor of The Times:

Sir: The Lord Chancellor, in his speech on Friday, called on every Liberal to work for the peace of Europe, but to go forward unflinchingly to civil war at home.

It is obvious that the only hope of England's effective mediation lies in the unity and solidarity of the United Kingdom.

Is it not time that the common sense of the nation asserted itself and called upon our rulers to take steps which will enable a united nation to confront with confidence the perils which encompass us?

In moments of national peril every loyal citizen should not hesitate, however painful the process may be, to burst the fetters of party allegiance in order that he may devote his whole energies to an endeavor to safeguard the higher interests of the State.

What is the cause which is dividing a so-called United Kingdom into two hostile camps? It is the endeavor of a tyrannical House of Commons to force upon the acceptance of the people a bill which in the common belief they not only do not want but are strongly opposed to. I approach the consideration of the national crisis from no party standpoint, but from that of one who believes that the peace of Ireland, the honor of England, and the strength of the empire are all concerned in a speedy and satisfactory settlement of the Irish question.

I believe that such a settlement is to be found in a measure which will give to the peoples of Ireland powers of local self-government similar to those enjoyed by the Provinces of Canada and South Africa.

It is because the Ministerial policy of home rule is based on a principle which would not be tolerated in any one of the Legislatures of Washington, Ottawa, or Melbourne that I am so strongly opposed to it. No party, no political group, however small, could be found in Canada, Australia, or the United States which would venture to propose that the Province of Quebec, or the State of Queensland or California, should be endowed by means of a measure like the Home Rule bill with separatist constitutional rights which could not be given to the other provinces and States.

I challenge his Majesty's Ministers to deny this plain, unanswerable statement.

I further challenge his Majesty's Ministers to deny that their home rule policy, if carried into effect, will make slaves of one part of Ireland or another.

If their bill for the better government of Ireland reaches the statute book without the amending bill it will make slaves of the Ulstermen. It will deprive them of half of the representation to which their population entitles them in the House of Commons, thus reducing them to a political inferiority, as compared with the peoples of Great Britain, which can hardly be distinguished from political slavery, and it will further compel them to accept the administration of a Dublin Parliament which they fear and detest in all matters relating to their local government. I have often wondered how any one rejoicing in the inheritance of old Liberal traditions could for a moment suppose that any group of free men would ever accept such dishonoring conditions.

Again, if the Home Rule bill is passed with the amending bill tacked on to it, the chains of slavery from which Ulster will be relieved will be riveted on the rest of Ireland. Ulster will have thirty-three representatives in the Imperial House of Commons, and the rest of Ireland twenty-seven! What germ of a settlement of the Irish question can any one discover in a policy which proposes that one-fourth of the people of Ireland should be able to outvote the other three-fourths in matters affecting their liberties and taxation?

No! The Ministerial bills of home rule are fundamentally bad and should be withdrawn, in order that a new attempt may be made to reach a settlement by general consent in accordance, as I believe, with the wishes of the overwhelming majority of the people.

Is it not better to wait a little for a settlement by consent on lines which will conduce to permanent peace and prosperity than to try to force on the pages of the statute book a measure which must lead to bloodshed and civil war? If party considerations veto the withdrawal of the Ministerial measure of home rule without the aid of a general election, then let us have a general election without one moment's unnecessary delay.

The times are too perilous to allow us even to contemplate with any other feeling than that of horror and dismay the Lord Chancellor's appeal to go forward unflinchingly to civil war.

I have the honor to remain, Sir,

Yours respectfully,

GREY.

22 South Street, Park Lane, July 26.

New York Times Current History: The European War from the Beginning to March 1915, Vol 1, No. 2 / Who Began the War, and Why?

Current History: The European War.

From the Beginning to March 1915.

"Who Began the War, and Why?"

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

[WHO BEGAN THE WAR, AND WHY?THE CASE FOR GERMANY] 209

[Speeches by Kaiser Wilhelm II.]209