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CURRENT HISTORY

A MONTHLY MAGAZINE

THE EUROPEAN WAR

VOLUME II.

From the Beginning to March, 1915

With Index

Number 1, April, 1915

NEW YORK
THE NEW YORK TIMES COMPANY
1915

Contents - Number I, April, 1915.

H.M. Hussein Kemal—The New Sultan of Egypt,
Which Was Recently Declared a British Protectorate

The Russian Royal Family—The Children of the Czar Have Inherited the Regal Beauty of Their Mother—(Photo from Paul Thompson)

The New York Times Current History

A Monthly Magazine

The European War

April, 1915 - September, 1915

Germany's War Zone and Neutral Flags

The German Decree and Interchange of Notes Answering American Protests to Germany and Britain

BERLIN, Feb. 4, (by wireless to Sayville, L.I.)—The German Admiralty today issued the following communication:

The waters around Great Britain and Ireland, including the whole English Channel, are declared a war zone on and after Feb. 18, 1915.

Every enemy merchant ship found in this war zone will be destroyed, even if it is impossible to avert dangers which threaten the crew and passengers.

Also neutral ships in the war zone are in danger, as in consequence of the misuse of neutral flags ordered by the British Government on Jan. 31, and in view of the hazards of naval warfare, it cannot always be avoided that attacks meant for enemy ships endanger neutral ships.

Shipping northward, around the Shetland Islands, in the eastern basin of the North Sea, and a strip of at least thirty nautical miles in breadth along the Dutch coast, is endangered in the same way.

AMERICAN NOTE TO GERMANY.

Feb. 10, 1915.

The Secretary of State has instructed Ambassador Gerard at Berlin to present to the German Government a note to the following effect:

The Government of the United States, having had its attention directed to the proclamation of the German Admiralty, issued on the 4th of February, that the waters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland, including the whole of the English Channel, are to be considered as comprised within the seat of war; that all enemy merchant vessels found in those waters after the 18th inst. will be destroyed, although it may not always be possible to save crews and passengers; and that neutral vessels expose themselves to danger within this zone of war because, in view of the misuse of neutral flags said to have been ordered by the British Government on the 31st of January and of the contingencies of maritime warfare, it may not be possible always to exempt neutral vessels from attacks intended to strike enemy ships, feels it to be its duty to call the attention of the Imperial German Government, with sincere respect and the most friendly sentiments, but very candidly and earnestly, to the very serious possibilities of the course of action apparently contemplated under that proclamation.

The Government of the United States views those possibilities with such grave concern that it feels it to be its privilege, and, indeed, its duty, in the circumstances to request the Imperial German Government to consider before action is taken the critical situation in respect of the relation between this country and Germany which might arise were the German naval forces, in carrying out the policy foreshadowed in the Admiralty's proclamation, to destroy any merchant vessel of the United States or cause the death of American citizens.

It is, of course, not necessary to remind the German Government that the sole right of a belligerent in dealing with neutral vessels on the high seas is limited to visit and search, unless a blockade is proclaimed and effectively maintained, which this Government does not understand to be proposed in this case. To declare or exercise a right to attack and destroy any vessel entering a prescribed area of the high seas without first certainly determining its belligerent nationality and the contraband character of its cargo would be an act so unprecedented in naval warfare that this Government is reluctant to believe that the Imperial Government of Germany in this case contemplates it as possible.

The suspicion that enemy ships are using neutral flags improperly can create no just presumption that all ships traversing a prescribed area are subject to the same suspicion. It is to determine exactly such questions that this Government understands the right of visit and search to have been recognized.

This Government has carefully noted the explanatory statement issued by the Imperial German Government at the same time with the proclamation of the German Admiralty, and takes this occasion to remind the Imperial German Government very respectfully that the Government of the United States is open to none of the criticisms for unneutral action to which the German Government believes the Governments of certain other neutral nations have laid themselves open; that the Government of the United States has not consented to or acquiesced in any measures which may have been taken by the other belligerent nations in the present war which operate to restrain neutral trade, but has, on the contrary, taken in all such matters a position which warrants it in holding those Governments responsible in the proper way for any untoward effects on American shipping which the accepted principles of international law do not justify; and that it, therefore, regards itself as free in the present instance to take with a clear conscience and upon accepted principles the position indicated in this note.

If the commanders of German vessels of war should act upon the presumption that the flag of the United States was not being used in good faith and should destroy on the high seas an American vessel or the lives of American citizens, it would be difficult for the Government of the United States to view the act in any other light than as an indefensible violation of neutral rights, which it would be very hard, indeed, to reconcile with the friendly relations now happily subsisting between the two Governments.

If such a deplorable situation should arise, the Imperial German Government can readily appreciate that the Government of the United States would be constrained to hold the Imperial Government of Germany to a strict accountability for such acts of their naval authorities, and to take any steps it might be necessary to take to safeguard American lives and property and to secure to American citizens the full enjoyment of their acknowledged rights on the high seas.

The Government of the United States, in view of these considerations, which it urges with the greatest respect and with the sincere purpose of making sure that no misunderstandings may arise, and no circumstances occur, that might even cloud the intercourse of the two Governments, expresses the confident hope and expectation that the Imperial German Government can and will give assurance that American citizens and their vessels will not be molested by the naval forces of Germany otherwise than by visit and search, though their vessels may be traversing the sea area delimited in the proclamation of the German Admiralty. It is stated for the information of the Imperial Government that representations have been made to his Britannic Majesty's Government in respect to the unwarranted use of the American flag for the protection of British ships.

AMERICAN NOTE TO ENGLAND.

Feb. 10, 1915.

The Secretary of State has instructed Ambassador Page at London to present to the British Government a note to the following effect:

The department has been advised of the declaration of the German Admiralty on Feb. 4, indicating that the British Government had on Jan. 31 explicitly authorized the use of neutral flags on British merchant vessels, presumably for the purpose of avoiding recognition by German naval forces. The department's attention has also been directed to reports in the press that the Captain of the Lusitania, acting upon orders or information received from the British authorities, raised the American flag as his vessel approached the British coasts, in order to escape anticipated attacks by German submarines. Today's press reports also contain an alleged official statement of the Foreign Office defending the use of the flag of a neutral country by a belligerent vessel in order to escape capture or attack by an enemy.

Assuming that the foregoing reports are true, the Government of the United States, reserving for future consideration the legality and propriety of the deceptive use of the flag of a neutral power in any case for the purpose of avoiding capture, desires very respectfully to point out to his Britannic Majesty's Government the serious consequences which may result to American vessels and American citizens if this practice is continued.

The occasional use of the flag of a neutral or an enemy under the stress of immediate pursuit and to deceive an approaching enemy, which appears by the press reports to be represented as the precedent and justification used to support this action, seems to this Government a very different thing from an explicit sanction by a belligerent Government for its merchant ships generally to fly the flag of a neutral power within certain portions of the high seas which are presumed to be frequented with hostile warships. The formal declaration of such a policy of general misuse of a neutral's flag jeopardizes the vessels of the neutral visiting those waters in a peculiar degree by raising the presumption that they are of belligerent nationality regardless of the flag which they may carry.

In view of the announced purpose of the German Admiralty to engage in active naval operations in certain delimited sea areas adjacent to the coasts of Great Britain and Ireland, the Government of the United States would view with anxious solicitude any general use of the flag of the United States by British vessels traversing those waters. A policy such as the one which his Majesty's Government is said to intend to adopt would, if the declaration of the German Admiralty be put in force, it seems clear, afford no protection to British vessels, while it would be a serious and constant menace to the lives and vessels of American citizens.

The Government of the United States, therefore, trusts that his Majesty's Government will do all in their power to restrain vessels of British nationality in the deceptive use of the United States flag in the sea area defined by the German declaration, since such practice would greatly endanger the vessels of a friendly power navigating those waters and would even seem to impose upon the Government of Great Britain a measure of responsibility for the loss of American lives and vessels in case of an attack by a German naval force.

You will impress upon his Majesty's Government the grave concern which this Government feels in the circumstances in regard to the safety of American vessels and lives in the war zone declared by the German Admiralty.

You may add that this Government is making earnest representations to the German Government in regard to the danger to American vessels and citizens if the declaration of the German Admiralty is put into effect.

GERMANY'S ANSWER.

BERLIN, (via London,) Feb. 18.—German Government's reply to the American note follows:

The Imperial Government has examined the communication from the United States Government in the same spirit of good-will and friendship by which the communication appears to have been dictated. The Imperial Government is in accord with the United States Government that for both parties it is in a high degree desirable to avoid misunderstandings which might arise from measures announced by the German Admiralty and to provide against the occurrence of incidents which might trouble the friendly relations which so far happily exist between the two Governments.

With regard to the assuring of these friendly relations, the German Government believes that it may all the more reckon on a full understanding with the United States, as the procedure announced by the German Admiralty, which was fully explained in the note of the 4th inst., is in no way directed against legitimate commerce and legitimate shipping of neutrals, but represents solely a measure of self-defense, imposed on Germany by her vital interests, against England's method of warfare, which is contrary to international law, and which so far no protest by neutrals has succeeded in bringing back to the generally recognized principles of law as existing before the outbreak of war.

In order to exclude all doubt regarding these cardinal points, the German Government once more begs leave to state how things stand. Until now Germany has scrupulously observed valid international rules regarding naval warfare. At the very beginning of the war Germany immediately agreed to the proposal of the American Government to ratify the new Declaration of London, and took over its contents unaltered, and without formal obligation, into her prize law.

The German Government has obeyed these rules, even when they were diametrically opposed to her military interests. For instance, Germany allowed the transportation of provisions to England from Denmark until today, though she was well able, by her sea forces, to prevent it. In contradistinction to this attitude, England has not even hesitated at a second infringement of international law, if by such means she could paralyze the peaceful commerce of Germany with neutrals. The German Government will be the less obliged to enter into details, as these are put down sufficiently, though not exhaustively, in the American note to the British Government dated Dec. 29, as a result of five months' experience.

All these encroachments have been made, as has been admitted, in order to cut off all supplies from Germany and thereby starve her peaceful civil population—a procedure contrary to all humanitarian principles. Neutrals have been unable to prevent the interruption of their commerce with Germany, which is contrary to international laws.

The American Government, as Germany readily acknowledges, has protested against the British procedure. In spite of these protests and protests from other neutral States, Great Britain could not be induced to depart from the course of action she had decided upon. Thus, for instance, the American ship Wilhelmina recently was stopped by the British, although her cargo was destined solely for the German civil population, and, according to the express declaration of the German Government, was to be employed only for this purpose.

Germany is as good as cut off from her overseas supply by the silent or protesting toleration of neutrals, not only in regard to such goods as are absolute contraband, but also in regard to such as, according to acknowledged law before the war, are only conditional contraband or not contraband at all. Great Britain, on the other hand, is, with the toleration of neutral Governments, not only supplied with such goods as are not contraband or only conditional contraband, but with goods which are regarded by Great Britain, if sent to Germany, as absolute contraband, namely, provisions, industrial raw materials, &c., and even with goods which have always indubitably been regarded as absolute contraband.

The German Government feels itself obliged to point out with the greatest emphasis that a traffic in arms, estimated at many hundreds of millions, is being carried on between American firms and Germany's enemies. Germany fully comprehends that the practice of right and the toleration of wrong on the part of neutrals are matters absolutely at the discretion of neutrals, and involve no formal violation of neutrality. Germany, therefore, did not complain of any formal violation of neutrality, but the German Government, in view of complete evidence before it, cannot help pointing out that it, together with the entire public opinion of Germany, feels itself to be severely prejudiced by the fact that neutrals, in safeguarding their rights in legitimate commerce with Germany according to international law, have up to the present achieved no, or only insignificant, results, while they are making unlimited use of their right by carrying on contraband traffic with Great Britain and our other enemies.

If it is a formal right of neutrals to take no steps to protect their legitimate trade with Germany, and even to allow themselves to be influenced in the direction of the conscious and willful restriction of their trade, on the other hand, they have the perfect right, which they unfortunately do not exercise, to cease contraband trade, especially in arms, with Germany's enemies.

In view of this situation, Germany, after six months of patient waiting, sees herself obliged to answer Great Britain's murderous method of naval warfare with sharp counter-measures. If Great Britain in her fight against Germany summons hunger as an ally, for the purpose of imposing upon a civilized people of 70,000,000 the choice between destitution and starvation or submission to Great Britain's commercial will, then Germany today is determined to take up the gauntlet and appeal to similar allies.

Germany trusts that the neutrals, who so far have submitted to the disadvantageous consequences of Great Britain's hunger war in silence, or merely in registering a protest, will display toward Germany no smaller measure of toleration, even if German measures, like those of Great Britain, present new terrors of naval warfare.

Moreover, the German Government is resolved to suppress with all the means at its disposal the importation of war material to Great Britain and her allies, and she takes it for granted that neutral Governments, which so far have taken no steps against the traffic in arms with Germany's enemies, will not oppose forcible suppression by Germany of this trade.

Acting from this point of view, the German Admiralty proclaimed a naval war zone, whose limits it exactly defined. Germany, so far as possible, will seek to close this war zone with mines, and will also endeavor to destroy hostile merchant vessels in every other way. While the German Government, in taking action based upon this overpowering point of view, keeps itself far removed from all intentional destruction of neutral lives and property, on the other hand, it does not fail to recognize that from the action to be taken against Great Britain dangers arise which threaten all trade within the war zone, without distinction. This a natural result of mine warfare, which, even under the strictest observance of the limits of international law, endangers every ship approaching the mine area. The German Government considers itself entitled to hope that all neutrals will acquiesce in these measures, as they have done in the case of the grievous damages inflicted upon them by British measures, all the more so as Germany is resolved, for the protection of neutral shipping even in the naval war zone, to do everything which is at all compatible with the attainment of this object.

In view of the fact that Germany gave the first proof of her good-will in fixing a time limit of not less than fourteen days before the execution of said measures, so that neutral shipping might have an opportunity of making arrangements to avoid threatening danger, this can most surely be achieved by remaining away from the naval war zone. Neutral vessels which, despite this ample notice, which greatly affects the achievement of our aims in our war against Great Britain, enter these closed waters will themselves bear the responsibility for any unfortunate accidents that may occur. Germany disclaims all responsibility for such accidents and their consequences.

Germany has further expressly announced the destruction of all enemy merchant vessels found within the war zone, but not the destruction of all merchant vessels, as the United States seems erroneously to have understood. This restriction which Germany imposes upon itself is prejudicial to the aim of our warfare, especially as in the application of the conception of contraband practiced by Great Britain toward Germany—which conception will now also be similarly interpreted by Germany—the presumption will be that neutral ships have contraband aboard. Germany naturally is unwilling to renounce its rights to ascertain the presence of contraband in neutral vessels, and in certain cases to draw conclusions therefrom.

Germany is ready, finally, to deliberate with the United States concerning any measures which might secure the safety of legitimate shipping of neutrals in the war zone. Germany cannot, however, forbear to point out that all its efforts in this direction may be rendered very difficult by two circumstances: First, the misuse of neutral flags by British merchant vessels, which is indubitably known to the United States; second, the contraband trade already mentioned, especially in war materials, on neutral vessels.

Regarding the latter point, Germany would fain hope that the United States, after further consideration, will come to a conclusion corresponding to the spirit of real neutrality. Regarding the first point, the secret order of the British Admiralty, recommending to British merchant ships the use of neutral flags, has been communicated by Germany to the United States and confirmed by communication with the British Foreign Office, which designates this procedure as entirely unobjectionable and in accordance with British law. British merchant shipping immediately followed this advice, as doubtless is known to the American Government from the incidents of the Lusitania and the Laertes.

Moreover, the British Government has supplied arms to British merchant ships and instructed them forcibly to resist German submarines. In these circumstances, it would be very difficult for submarines to recognize neutral merchant ships, for search in most cases cannot be undertaken, seeing that in the case of a disguised British ship from which an attack may be expected the searching party and the submarine would be exposed to destruction.

Great Britain, then, was in a position to make the German measures illusory if the British merchant fleet persisted in the misuse of neutral flags and neutral ships could not otherwise be recognized beyond doubt. Germany, however, being in a state of necessity, wherein she was placed by violation of law, must render effective her measures in all circumstances, in order thereby to compel her adversary to adopt methods of warfare corresponding with international law, and so to restore the freedom of the seas, of which Germany at all times is the defender and for which she today is fighting.

Germany therefore rejoices that the United States has made representations to Great Britain concerning the illegal use of their flag, and expresses the expectation that this procedure will force Great Britain to respect the American flag in the future. In this expectation, commanders of German submarines have been instructed, as already mentioned in the note of Feb. 4, to refrain from violent action against American merchant vessels, so far as these can be recognized.

In order to prevent in the surest manner the consequences of confusion—though naturally not so far as mines are concerned—Germany recommends that the United States make its ships which are conveying peaceful cargoes through the British war zone discernible by means of convoys.

Germany believes it may act on the supposition that only such ships would be convoyed as carried goods not regarded as contraband according to the British interpretation made in the case of Germany.

How this method of convoy can be carried out is a question concerning which Germany is ready to open negotiations with the United States as soon as possible. Germany would be particularly grateful, however, if the United States would urgently recommend to its merchant vessels to avoid the British naval war zone, in any case until the settlement of the flag question. Germany is inclined to the confident hope that the United States will be able to appreciate in its entire significance the heavy battle which Germany is waging for existence, and that from the foregoing explanations and promises it will acquire full understanding of the motives and the aims of the measures announced by Germany.

Germany repeats that it has now resolved upon the projected measures only under the strongest necessity of national self-defense, such measures having been deferred out of consideration for neutrals.

If the United States, in view of the weight which it is justified in throwing and able to throw into the scales of the fate of peoples, should succeed at the last moment in removing the grounds which make that procedure an obligatory duty for Germany, and if the American Government, in particular, should find a way to make the Declaration of London respected—on behalf, also, of those powers which are fighting on Germany's side—and there by make possible for Germany legitimate importation of the necessaries of life and industrial raw material, then the German Government could not too highly appreciate such a service, rendered in the interests of humane methods of warfare, and would gladly draw conclusions from the new situation.

BRITAIN'S ANSWER.

LONDON, Feb. 19.—The full text of Great Britain's note regarding the flag, as handed to the American Ambassador, follows:

The memorandum communicated on the 11th of February calls attention in courteous and friendly terms to the action of the Captain of the British steamer Lusitania in raising the flag of the United States of America when approaching British waters, and says that the Government of the United States feels certain anxiety in considering the possibility of any general use of the flag of the United States by British vessels traversing those waters, since the effect of such a policy might be to bring about a menace to the lives and vessels of United States citizens.

It was understood that the German Government announced their intention of sinking British merchant vessels at sight by torpedoes, without giving any opportunity of making any provision for the saving of the lives of non-combatant crews and passengers. It was in consequence of this threat that the Lusitania raised the United States flag on her inward voyage.

On her subsequent outward voyage a request was made by United States passengers, who were embarking on board of her, that the United States flag should be hoisted presumably to insure their safety. Meanwhile, the memorandum from your Excellency had been received. His Majesty's Government did not give any advice to the company as to how to meet this request, and it understood that the Lusitania left Liverpool under the British flag.

It seems unnecessary to say more as regards the Lusitania in particular.

In regard to the use of foreign flags by merchant vessels, the British Merchant Shipping act makes it clear that the use of the British flag by foreign merchant vessels is permitted in time of war for the purpose of escaping capture. It is believed that in the case of some other nations there is similar recognition of the same practice with regard to their flag, and that none of them has forbidden it.

It would, therefore, be unreasonable to expect his Majesty's Government to pass legislation forbidding the use of foreign flags by British merchant vessels to avoid capture by the enemy, now that the German Government have announced their intention to sink merchant vessels at sight with their non-combatant crews, cargoes, and papers, a proceeding hitherto regarded by the opinion of the world not as war, but piracy.

It is felt that the United States Government could not fairly ask the British Government to order British merchant vessels to forgo a means, always hitherto permitted, of escaping not only capture but the much worse fate of sinking and destruction.

Great Britain always has, when a neutral, accorded to vessels of other States at war the liberty to use the British flag as a means of protection against capture, and instances are on record when United States vessels availed themselves of this facility during the American civil war. It would be contrary to fair expectation if now, when conditions are reversed, the United States and neutral nations were to grudge to British ships the liberty to take similar action.

The British Government have no intention of advising their merchant shipping to use foreign flags as a general practice or to resort to them otherwise than for escaping capture or destruction. The obligation upon a belligerent warship to ascertain definitely for itself the nationality and character of a merchant vessel before capturing it, and a fortiori before sinking and destroying it, has been universally recognized.

If that obligation is fulfilled, the hoisting of a neutral flag on board a British vessel cannot possibly endanger neutral shipping, and the British Government holds that if loss to neutrals is caused by disregard of this obligation it is upon the enemy vessel disregarding it and upon the Government giving the orders that it should be disregarded that the sole responsibility for injury to neutrals ought to rest.

ALLIES' DECLARATION OF REPRISALS.

LONDON, March 1.—Following is the text of the statement read by Premier Asquith in the House of Commons today and communicated at the same time to the neutral powers in their capitals as an outline of the Allies' policy of retaliation against Germany for her "war zone" decree:

Germany has declared the English Channel, the north and west coasts of France, and the waters around the British Isles a war area, and has officially given notice that all enemy ships found in that area will be destroyed, and that neutral vessels may be exposed to danger.

This is, in effect, a claim to torpedo at sight, without regard to the safety of the crew or passengers, any merchant vessel under any flag. As it is not in the power of the German Admiralty to maintain any surface craft in these waters, the attack can only be delivered by submarine agency.

The law and customs of nations in regard to attacks on commerce have always presumed that the first duty of the captor of a merchant vessel is bringing it before a prize court, where it may be tried and where regularities of the capture may be challenged, and where neutrals may recover their cargo.

The sinking of prizes is, in itself, a questionable act, to be resorted to only in extraordinary circumstances, and after provision has been made for the safety of all crews and passengers.

The responsibility of discriminating between neutral and enemy vessels and between neutral and enemy cargoes obviously rests with the attacking ship, whose duty it is to verify the status and character of the vessel and cargo, and to preserve all papers before sinking or capturing the ship. So, also, the humane duty to provide for the safety of crews of merchant vessels, whether neutral or enemy, is an obligation on every belligerent.

It is upon this basis that all previous discussions of law for regulating warfare have proceeded. The German submarine fulfills none of these obligations. She enjoys no local command of the waters wherein she operates. She does not take her captures within the jurisdiction of a prize court. She carries no prize crew which can be put aboard prizes which she seizes. She uses no effective means of discriminating between neutral and enemy vessels. She does not receive on board for safety the crew of the vessel she sinks. Her methods of warfare, therefore, are entirely outside the scope of any international instruments regulating operations against commerce in time of war.

The German declaration substitutes indiscriminate destruction for regulated captures. Germany has adopted this method against the peaceful trader and the non-combatant, with the avowed object of preventing commodities of all kinds, including food for the civilian population, from reaching or leaving the British Isles or Northern France.

Her opponents are, therefore, driven to frame retaliatory measures in order in their turn to prevent commodities of any kind from reaching or leaving Germany.

These measures will, however, be enforced by the British and French Governments without risk to neutral ships or neutral or non-combatant lives, and in strict observation of the dictates of humanity. The British and French Governments will, therefore, hold themselves free to detain and take into port ships carrying goods of presumed enemy destination, ownership, or origin.

It is not intended to confiscate such vessels or cargoes unless they would otherwise be liable to confiscation. Vessels with cargoes which sailed before this date will not be affected.

Britain's New and Original Blockade

American Protests Following the "War Zone" Decrees Defined

The first definite statement of the real character of the measures adopted by Great Britain and her allies for restricting the trade of Germany was obtained at Washington on March 17, 1915, when Secretary Bryan made public the text of all the recent notes exchanged between the United States Government and Germany and the Allies regarding the freedom of legitimate American commerce in the war zones. These notes, six in all, show that Great Britain and France stand firm in their announced intention to cut off all trade with Germany. The communications revealed that the United States Government, realizing the difficulties of maintaining an effective blockade by a close guard of an enemy coast on account of the newly developed activity of submarines, asked that "a radius of activity" be defined. Great Britain and France replied with the announcement that the operations of blockade would not be conducted "outside of European waters, including the Mediterranean."

The definition of a "radius of activity" for the allied fleet in European waters, including the Mediterranean, is the first intimation of the geographical limits of the reprisal order. Its limits were not given more exactly, the Allies contend, because Germany was equally indefinite in proclaiming all the waters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland a "war zone." The measures adopted are those of a blockade against all trade to and from Germany—not the historical kind of blockade recognized in international law, but a new and original form.

The several notes between the United States and the belligerent Governments follow. The stars in the German note mean that as it came to the State Department in cipher certain words were omitted, probably through telegraphic error. In the official text of the note the State Department calls attention to the stars by an asterisk and a footnote saying "apparent omission." In the French note the same thing occurs, and is indicated by the footnote "undecipherable group," meaning that the cipher symbols into which the French note was put by our Embassy in Paris could not be translated back into plain language by the State Department cipher experts. From the context it is apparent that the omitted words in the German note are "insist upon," or words to that effect.

AMERICAN NOTE TO THE BELLIGERENTS.

The following identic note was sent by the Secretary of State to the American Ambassadors at London and Berlin:

WASHINGTON, Feb. 20, 1915.

You will please deliver to Sir Edward Grey the following identic note, which we are sending England and Germany:

In view of the correspondence which has passed between this Government and Great Britain and Germany, respectively, relative to the declaration of a war zone by the German Admiralty, and the use of neutral flags by the British merchant vessels, this Government ventures to express the hope that the two belligerent Governments may, through reciprocal concessions, find a basis for agreement which will relieve neutral ships engaged in peaceful commerce from the great dangers which they will incur in the high seas adjacent to the coasts of the belligerents.

The Government of the United States respectfully suggests that an agreement in terms like the following might be entered into. This suggestion is not to be regarded as in any sense a proposal made by this Government, for it of course fully recognizes that it is not its privilege to propose terms of agreement between Great Britain and Germany, even though the matter be one in which it and the people of the United States are directly and deeply interested. It is merely venturing to take the liberty, which it hopes may be accorded a sincere friend desirous of embarrassing neither nation involved, and of serving, if it may, the common interests of humanity. The course outlined is offered in the hope that it may draw forth the views and elicit the suggestions of the British and German Governments on a matter of capital interest to the whole world.

Germany and Great Britain to agree:

First—That neither will sow any floating mines, whether upon the high seas or in territorial waters; that neither will plant on the high seas anchored mines, except within cannon range of harbors for defensive purposes only; and that all mines shall bear the stamp of the Government planting them, and be so constructed as to become harmless if separated from their moorings.

Second—That neither will use submarines to attack merchant vessels of any nationality, except to enforce the right of visit and search.

Third—-That each will require their respective merchant vessels not to use neutral flags for the purpose of disguise or ruse de guerre.

Germany to agree: That all importations of food or foodstuffs from the United States (and from such other neutral countries as may ask it) into Germany shall be consigned to agencies to be designated by the United States Government; that these American agencies shall have entire charge and control without interference on the part of German Government of the receipt and distribution of such importations, and shall distribute them solely to retail dealers bearing licenses from the German Government entitling them to receive and furnish such food and foodstuffs to non-combatants only; that any violation of the terms of the retailers' licenses shall work a forfeiture of their rights to receive such food and foodstuffs for this purpose, and that such food and foodstuffs will not be requisitioned by the German Government for any purpose whatsoever, or be diverted to the use of the armed forces of Germany.

Great Britain to agree: That food and foodstuffs will not be placed upon the absolute contraband list, and that shipments of such commodities will not be interfered with or detained by British authorities, if consigned to agencies designated by the United States Government in Germany for the receipt and distribution of such cargoes to licensed German retailers for distribution solely to the non-combatant population.

In submitting this proposed basis of agreement this Government does not wish to be understood as admitting or denying any belligerent or neutral right established by the principles of international law, but would consider the agreement, if acceptable to the interested powers, a modus vivendi based upon expediency rather than legal right, and as not binding upon the United States either in its present form or in a modified form until accepted by this Government.

BRYAN.

II.—GERMANY'S REPLY.

The German reply, handed to the American Ambassador at Berlin, follows:

BERLIN, March 1, 1915.

The undersigned has the honor to inform his Excellency, Mr. James W. Gerard, Ambassador of the United States of America, in reply to the note of the 22d inst., that the Imperial German Government have taken note with great interest of the suggestion of the American Government that certain principles for the conduct of maritime war on the part of Germany and England be agreed upon for the protection of neutral shipping. They see therein new evidence of the friendly feelings of the American Government toward the German Government, which are fully reciprocated by Germany.

It is in accordance with Germany's wishes also to have maritime war conducted according to rules, which, without discriminatingly restricting one or the other of the belligerent powers in the use of their means of warfare, are equally considerate of the interests of neutrals and the dictates of humanity. Consequently it was intimated in the German note of the 16th inst. that observation of the Declaration of London on the part of Germany's adversaries would create a new situation from which the German Government would gladly draw the proper conclusions.

Proceeding from this view, the German Government have carefully examined the suggestion of the American Government and believe that they can actually see in it a suitable basis for the practical solution of the questions which have arisen.

With regard to the various points of the American note, they beg to make the following remarks:

First—With regard to the sowing of mines, the German Government would be willing to agree, as suggested, not to use floating mines and to have anchored mines constructed as indicated. Moreover, they agree to put the stamp of the Government on all mines to be planted. On the other hand, it does not appear to them to be feasible for the belligerents wholly to for ego the use of anchored mines for offensive purposes.

Second—The German Government would undertake not to use their submarines to attack mercantile of any flag except when necessary to enforce the right of visit and search. Should the enemy nationality of the vessel or the presence of contraband be ascertained, submarines would proceed in accordance with the general rules of international law.

Third—As provided in the American note, this restriction of the use of the submarines is contingent on the fact that enemy mercantile abstain from the use of the neutral flag and other neutral distinctive marks. It would appear to be a matter of course that such mercantile vessels also abstain from arming themselves and from all resistance by force, since such procedure contrary to international law would render impossible any action of the submarines in accordance with international law.

Fourth—The regulation of legitimate importations of food into Germany suggested by the American Government appears to be in general acceptable. Such regulation would, of course, be confined to importations by sea, but that would, on the other hand, include indirect importations by way of neutral ports. The German Government would, therefore, be willing to make the declarations of the nature provided in the American note so that the use of the imported food and foodstuffs solely by the non-combatant population would be guaranteed. The Imperial Government must, however, in addition (* * * * *)[1] having the importation of other raw material used by the economic system of non-combatants, including forage, permitted. To that end the enemy Governments would have to permit the free entry into Germany of the raw material mentioned in the free list of the Declaration of London, and to treat materials included in the list of conditional contraband according to the same principles as food and foodstuffs.

The German Government venture to hope that the agreement for which the American Government have paved the way may be reached after due consideration of the remarks made above, and that in this way peaceable neutral shipping and trade will not have to suffer any more than is absolutely necessary from the unavoidable effects of maritime war. These effects could be still further reduced if, as was pointed out in the German note of the 16th inst., some way could be found to exclude the shipping of munitions of war from neutral countries to belligerents on ships of any nationality.

The German Government must, of course, reserve a definite statement of their position until such time as they may receive further information from the American Government enabling them to see what obligations the British Government are, on their part, willing to assume.

The undersigned avails himself of this occasion, &c.

VON JAGOW.

Dated, Foreign Office, Berlin, Feb. 28, 1915.

GERARD.

III.—GREAT BRITAIN'S REPLY.

The reply of Great Britain to the American note of Feb. 20, handed to the American Ambassador at London, was as follows:

LONDON, March 15, 1915.

Following is the full text of a memorandum dated March 13, which Grey handed me today:

"On the 22d of February last I received a communication from your Excellency of the identic note addressed to his Majesty's Government and to Germany respecting an agreement on certain points as to the conduct of the war at sea. The reply of the German Government to this note has been published and it is not understood from the reply that the German Government are prepared to abandon the practice of sinking British merchant vessels by submarines, and it is evident from their reply that they will not abandon the use of mines for offensive purposes on the high seas as contrasted with the use of mines for defensive purposes only within cannon range of their own harbors, as suggested by the Government of the United States. This being so, it might appear unnecessary for the British Government to make any further reply than to take note of the German answer.

"We desire, however, to take the opportunity of making a fuller statement of the whole position and of our feeling with regard to it. We recognize with sympathy the desire of the Government of the United States to see the European war conducted in accordance with the previously recognized rules of international law and the dictates of humanity. It is thus that the British forces have conducted the war, and we are not aware that these forces, either naval or military, can have laid to their charge any improper proceedings, either in the conduct of hostilities or in the treatment of prisoners or wounded. On the German side it has been very different.

"1. The treatment of civilian inhabitants in Belgium and the North of France has been made public by the Belgian and French Governments and by those who have had experience of it at first hand. Modern history affords no precedent for the sufferings that have been inflicted on the defenseless and non-combatant population in the territory that has been in German military occupation. Even the food of the population was confiscated until in Belgium an international commission, largely influenced by American generosity and conducted under American auspices, came to the relief of the population and secured from the German Government a promise to spare what food was still left in the country, though the Germans still continue to make levies in money upon the defenseless population for the support of the German Army.

"2. We have from time to time received most terrible accounts of the barbarous treatment to which British officers and soldiers have been exposed after they have been taken prisoner, while being conveyed to German prison camps. One or two instances have already been given to the United States Government founded upon authentic and first-hand evidence which is beyond doubt. Some evidence has been received of the hardships to which British prisoners of war are subjected in the prison camps, contrasting, we believe, most unfavorably with the treatment of German prisoners in this country. We have proposed, with the consent of the United States Government, that a commission of United States officers should be permitted in each country to inspect the treatment of prisoners of war. The United States Government have been unable to obtain any reply from the German Government to this proposal, and we remain in continuing anxiety and apprehension as to the treatment of British prisoners of war in Germany.

"3. At the very outset of the war a German mine layer was discovered laying a mine field on the high seas. Further mine fields have been laid from time to time without warning, and, so far as we know, are still being laid on the high seas, and many neutral as well as British vessels have been sunk by them.

"4. At various times during the war German submarines have stopped and sunk British merchant vessels, thus making the sinking of merchant vessels a general practice, though it was admitted previously, if at all, only as an exception, the general rule to which the British Government have adhered being that merchant vessels, if captured, must be taken before a prize court. In one case already quoted in a note to the United States Government a neutral vessel carrying foodstuffs to an unfortified town in Great Britain has been sunk. Another case is now reported in which a German armed cruiser has sunk an American vessel, the William P. Frye, carrying a cargo of wheat from Seattle to Queenstown. In both cases the cargoes were presumably destined for the civil population. Even the cargoes in such circumstances should not have been condemned without the decision of a prize court, much less should the vessels have been sunk. It is to be noted that both these cases occurred before the detention by the British authorities of the Wilhelmina and her cargo of foodstuffs, which the German Government allege is the justification for their own action.

"The Germans have announced their intention of sinking British merchant vessels by torpedo without notice and without any provision for the safety of the crews. They have already carried out this intention in the case of neutral as well as of British vessels, and a number of non-combatant and innocent lives on British vessels, unarmed and defenseless, have been destroyed in this way.

"5. Unfortified, open, and defenseless towns, such as Scarborough, Yarmouth, and Whitby, have been deliberately and wantonly bombarded by German ships of war, causing in some cases considerable loss of civilian life, including women and children.

"6. German aircraft have dropped bombs on the east coast of England, where there were no military or strategic points to be attacked. On the other hand, I am aware of but two criticisms that have been made on British action in all these respects:

"1. It is said that the British naval authorities also have laid some anchored mines on the high seas. They have done so, but the mines were anchored and so constructed that they would be harmless if they went adrift, and no mines whatever were laid by the British naval authorities till many weeks after the Germans had made a regular practice of laying mines on the high seas.

"2. It is said that the British Government have departed from the view of international law which they had previously maintained, that foodstuffs destined for the civil population should never be interfered with, this charge being founded on the submission to a prize court of the cargo of the Wilhelmina. The special considerations affecting this cargo have already been presented in a memorandum to the United States Government, and I need not repeat them here.

"Inasmuch as the blockade of all foodstuffs is an admitted consequence of blockade, it is obvious that there can be no universal rule based on considerations of morality and humanity which is contrary to this practice. The right to stop foodstuffs destined for the civil population must therefore in any case be admitted if an effective 'cordon' controlling intercourse with the enemy is drawn, announced, and maintained. Moreover, independently of rights arising from belligerent action in the nature of blockade, some other nations, differing from the opinion of the Governments of the United States and Great Britain, have held that to stop the food of the civil population is a natural and legitimate method of bringing pressure to bear on an enemy country as it is upon the defense of a besieged town. It is also upheld on the authority of both Prince Bismarck and Count Caprivi, and therefore presumably is not repugnant to German morality.

"The following are the quotations from Prince Bismarck and Count Caprivi on this point. Prince Bismarck in answering, in 1885, an application from the Kiel Chamber of Commerce for a statement of the view of the German Government on the question of the right to declare as contraband foodstuffs that were not intended for military forces said: 'I reply to the Chamber of Commerce that any disadvantage our commercial and carrying interests may suffer by the treatment of rice as contraband of war does not justify our opposing a measure which it has been thought fit to take in carrying on a foreign war. Every war is a calamity which entails evil consequences not only on the combatants but also on neutrals. These evils may easily be increased by the interference of a neutral power with the way in which a third carries on the war to the disadvantage of the subjects of the interfering power, and by this means German commerce might be weighted with far heavier losses than a transitory prohibition of the rice trade in Chinese waters. The measure in question has for its object the shortening of the war by increasing the difficulties of the enemy and is a justifiable step in war if impartially enforced against all neutral ships.'

"Count Caprivi, during a discussion in the German Reichstag on the 4th of March, 1892, on the subject of the importance of international protection for private property at sea, made the following statements: 'A country may be dependent for her food or for her raw products upon her trade. In fact, it may be absolutely necessary to destroy the enemy's trade.' 'The private introduction of provisions into Paris was prohibited during the siege, and in the same way a nation would be justified in preventing the import of food and raw produce.'

"The Government of Great Britain have frankly declared, in concert with the Government of France, their intention to meet the German attempt to stop all supplies of every kind from leaving or entering British or French ports by themselves stopping supplies going to or from Germany. For this end, the British fleet has instituted a blockade effectively controlling by cruiser 'cordon' all passage to and from Germany by sea. The difference between the two policies is, however, that, while our object is the same as that of Germany, we propose to attain it without sacrificing neutral ships or non-combatant lives, or inflicting upon neutrals the damage that must be entailed when a vessel and its cargo are sunk without notice, examination, or trial.

"I must emphasize again that this measure is a natural and necessary consequence of the unprecedented methods repugnant to all law and morality which have been described above which Germany began to adopt at the very outset of the war and the effects of which have been constantly accumulating."

American Ambassador, London.

IV.—AMERICAN INQUIRY ON REPRISAL METHOD.

The American Government on March 5 transmitted identic messages of inquiry to the Ambassadors at London and Paris inquiring from both England and France how the declarations in the Anglo-French note proclaiming an embargo on all commerce between Germany and neutral countries were to be carried into effect. The message to London was as follows:

WASHINGTON, March 5, 1915.

In regard to the recent communications received from the British and French Governments concerning restraints upon commerce with Germany, please communicate with the British Foreign Office in the sense following:

The difficulty of determining action upon the British and French declarations of intended retaliation upon commerce with Germany lies in the nature of the proposed measures in their relation to commerce by neutrals.

While it appears that the intention is to interfere with and take into custody all ships, both outgoing and incoming, trading with Germany, which is in effect a blockade of German ports, the rule of blockade that a ship attempting to enter or leave a German port, regardless of the character of its cargo, may be condemned is not asserted.

The language of the declaration is "the British and French Governments will, therefore, hold themselves free to detain and take into port ships carrying goods of presumed enemy destination, ownership, or origin. It is not intended to confiscate such vessels or cargoes unless they would otherwise be liable to condemnation."

The first sentence claims a right pertaining only to a state of blockade. The last sentence proposes a treatment of ships and cargoes as if no blockade existed. The two together present a proposed course of action previously unknown to international law.

As a consequence neutrals have no standard by which to measure their rights or to avoid danger to their ships and cargoes. The paradoxical situation thus created should be changed and the declaring powers ought to assert whether they rely upon the rules governing a blockade or the rules applicable when no blockade exists.

The declaration presents other perplexities. The last sentence quoted indicates that the rules of contraband are to be applied to cargoes detained. The rules covering non-contraband articles carried in neutral bottoms is that the cargoes shall be released and the ships allowed to proceed.

This rule cannot, under the first sentence quoted, be applied as to destination. What, then, is to be done with a cargo of non-contraband goods detained under the declaration? The same question may be asked as to conditional contraband cargoes.

The foregoing comments apply to cargoes destined for Germany. Cargoes coming out of German forts present another problem under the terms of the declaration. Under the rules governing enemy exports only goods owned by enemy subjects in enemy bottoms are subject to seizure and condemnation. Yet by the declaration it is purposed to seize and take into port all goods of enemy "ownership and origin." The word "origin" is particularly significant. The origin of goods destined to neutral territory on neutral ships is not, and never has been, a ground for forfeiture, except in case a blockade is declared and maintained. What, then, would the seizure amount to in the present case except to delay the delivery of the goods? The declaration does not indicate what disposition would be made of such cargoes if owned by a neutral or if owned by an enemy subject. Would a different rule be applied according to ownership? If so, upon what principles of international law would it rest? And upon what rule, if no blockade is declared and maintained, could the cargo of a neutral ship sailing out of a German port be condemned? If it is not condemned, what other legal course is there but to release it?

While this Government is fully alive to the possibility that the methods of modern naval warfare, particularly in the use of submarines for both defensive and offensive operations, may make the former means of maintaining a blockade a physical impossibility, it feels that it can be urged with great force that there should be also some limit to "the radius of activity," and especially so if this action by the belligerents can be construed to be a blockade. It would certainly create a serious state of affairs if, for example, an American vessel laden with a cargo of German origin should escape the British patrol in European waters only to be held up by a cruiser off New York and taken into Halifax.

Similar cablegrams sent to Paris.

BRYAN.

V.—BRITISH REPLY TO THE AMERICAN INQUIRY.

The reply from the British Government transmitted by the American Ambassador at London to the Secretary of State concerning the method of enforcing the reprisal order follows:

LONDON, March 15, 1915.

Following is the full text of a note dated today and an Order in Council I have just received from Grey:

"1. His Majesty's Government have had under careful consideration the inquiries which, under instructions from your Government, your Excellency addressed to me on the 8th inst., regarding the scope and mode of application of the measures foreshadowed in the British and French declarations of the 1st of March, for restricting the trade of Germany. Your Excellency explained and illustrated by reference to certain contingencies the difficulty of the United States Government in adopting a definite attitude toward these measures by reason of uncertainty regarding their bearing upon the commerce of neutral countries.

"2. I can at once assure your Excellency that subject to the paramount necessity of restricting German trade his Majesty's Government have made it their first aim to minimize inconvenience to neutral commerce. From the accompanying copy of the Order in Council, which is to be published today, you will observe that a wide discretion is afforded to the prize court in dealing with the trade of neutrals in such manner as may, in the circumstances, be deemed just, and that full provision is made to facilitate claims by persons interested in any goods placed in the custody of the Marshal of the prize court under the order. I apprehend that the perplexities to which your Excellency refers will for the most part be dissipated by the perusal of this document, and that it is only necessary for me to add certain explanatory observations.

"3. The effect of the Order in Council is to confer certain powers upon the executive officers of his Majesty's Government. The extent to which those powers will be actually exercised and the degree of severity with which the measures of blockade authorized will be put into operation are matters which will depend on the administrative orders issued by the Government and the decisions of the authorities specially charged with the duty of dealing with individual ships and cargoes, according to the merits of each case. The United States Government may rest assured that the instructions to be issued by his Majesty's Government to the fleet and customs officials and Executive Committees concerned will impress upon them the duty of acting with the utmost dispatch consistent with the object in view, and of showing in every case such consideration for neutrals as may be compatible with that object, which is, succinctly stated, to establish a blockade to prevent vessels from carrying goods for or coming from Germany."

HERR VON JAGOW—
German Secretary for Foreign Affairs—(Photo from Rogers)

MAXIMILIAN HARDEN—Editor of Die Zukunft,
Germany's Most Brilliant Journalist, Who Has Been Severe
in His Strictures Upon the United States—(Photo from Brown Bros.)

"4. His Majesty's Government has felt most reluctant, at the moment of initiating a policy of blockade, to exact from neutral ships all the penalties attaching to a breach of blockade. In their desire to alleviate the burden which the existence of a state of war at sea must inevitably impose on neutral sea-borne commerce, they declare their intention to refrain altogether from the exercise of the right to confiscate ships or cargoes which belligerents have always claimed in respect of breaches of blockade. They restrict their claim to the stopping of cargoes destined for or coming from the enemy's territory.

"5. As regards cotton, full particulars of the arrangements contemplated have already been explained. It will be admitted that every possible regard has been had to the legitimate interests of the American cotton trade.

"6. Finally, in reply to the penultimate paragraph of your Excellency's note, I have the honor to state that it is not intended to interfere with neutral vessels carrying enemy cargo of non-contraband nature outside European waters, including the Mediterranean."

(Here follows the text of the Order in Council, which already has been printed.)

American Ambassador, London.

VI.—FRENCH GOVERNMENT'S ANSWER.

The French Government transmitted the following message:

PARIS, March 14, 1915.

French Government replies as follows:

"In a letter dated March 7 your Excellency was good enough to draw my attention to the views of the Government of the United States regarding the recent communications from the French and British Governments concerning a restriction to be laid upon commerce with Germany. According to your Excellency's letter, the declaration made by the allied Governments presents some uncertainty as regards its application, concerning which the Government of the United States desires to be enlightened in order to determine what attitude it should take.

"At the same time your Excellency notified me that, while granting the possibility of using new methods of retaliation against the new use to which submarines have been put, the Government of the United States was somewhat apprehensive that the allied belligerents might (if their action is to be construed as constituting a blockade) capture in waters near America any ships which might have escaped the cruisers patrolling European waters. In acknowledging receipt of your Excellency's communication I have the honor to inform you that the Government of the republic has not failed to consider this point as presented by the Government of the United States, and I beg to specify clearly the conditions of application, as far as my Government is concerned of the declaration of the allied Governments. As well set forth by the Federal Government, the old methods of blockade cannot be entirely adhered to in view of the use Germany has made of her submarines, and also by reason of the geographical situation of that country. In answer to the challenge to the neutrals as well as to its own adversaries contained in the declaration, by which the German Imperial Government stated that it considered the seas surrounding Great Britain and the French coast on the Channel as a military zone, and warned neutral vessels not to enter the same on account of the danger they would run, the allied Governments have been obliged to examine what measures they could adopt to interrupt all maritime communication with the German Empire and thus keep it blockaded by the naval power of the two allies, at the same time, however, safeguarding as much as possible the legitimate interests of neutral powers and respecting the laws of humanity which no crime of their enemy will induce them to violate.

"The Government of the republic, therefore, reserves to itself the right of bringing into a French or allied port any ship carrying a cargo presumed to be of German origin, destination, or ownership, but it will not go to the length of seizing any neutral ship except in case of contraband. The discharged cargo shall not be confiscated. In the event of a neutral proving his lawful ownership of merchandise destined to Germany, he shall be entirely free to dispose of same, subject to certain conditions. In case the owner of the goods is a German, they shall simply be sequestrated during the war.

"Merchandise of enemy origin shall only be sequestrated when it is at the same time the property of an enemy. Merchandise belonging to neutrals shall be held at the disposal of its owner to be returned to the port of departure.

"As your Excellency will observe, these measures, while depriving the enemy of important resources, respect the rights of neutrals and will not in any way jeopardize private property, as even the enemy owner will only suffer from the suspension of the enjoyment of his rights during the term of hostilities.

"The Government of the republic, being desirous of allowing neutrals every facility to enforce their claims, (here occurred an undecipherable group of words,) give the prize court, an independent tribunal, cognizance of these questions, and in order to give the neutrals as little trouble as possible it has specified that the prize court shall give sentence within eight days, counting from the date on which the case shall have been brought before it.

"I do not doubt, Mr. Ambassador, that the Federal Government, comparing on the one hand the unspeakable violence with which the German Military Government threatens neutrals, the criminal actions unknown in maritime annals already perpetrated against neutral property and ships, and even against the lives of neutral subjects or citizens, and on the other hand the measures adopted by the allied Governments of France and Great Britain, respecting the laws of humanity and the rights of individuals, will readily perceive that the latter have not overstepped their strict rights as belligerents.

"Finally, I am anxious to assure you that it is not and it has never been the intention of the Government of the republic to extend the action of its cruisers against enemy merchandise beyond the European seas, the Mediterranean included."

SHARP.

British Order in Council

Declaring a Blockade of German Ports

LONDON, March 15.—The British Order in Council decreeing retaliatory measures on the part of the Government to meet the declaration of the Germans that the waters surrounding the United Kingdom are a military area, was made public today. The text of the order follows:

Whereas, the German Government has issued certain orders which, in violation of the usages of war, purport to declare that the waters surrounding the United Kingdom are a military area in which all British and allied merchant vessels will be destroyed irrespective of the safety and the lives of the passengers and the crews, and in which neutral shipping will be exposed to similar danger in view of the uncertainties of naval warfare, and

Whereas, in the memorandum accompanying the said orders, neutrals are warned against intrusting crews, passengers, or goods to British or allied ships, and

Whereas, such attempts on the part of the enemy give to his Majesty an unquestionable right of retaliation; and

Whereas, his Majesty has therefore decided to adopt further measures in order to prevent commodities of any kind from reaching or leaving Germany, although such measures will be enforced without risk to neutral ships or to neutral or non-combatant life and in strict observance of the dictates of humanity; and

Whereas, the allies of his Majesty are associated with him in the steps now to be announced for restricting further the commerce of Germany, his Majesty is therefore pleased by and with the advice of his Privy Council to order, and it is hereby ordered, as follows:

First—No merchant vessel which sailed from her port of departure after March 1, 1915, shall be allowed to proceed on her voyage to any German port. Unless this vessel receives a pass enabling her to proceed to some neutral or allied port to be named in the pass, the goods on board any such vessel must be discharged in a British port and placed in custody of the Marshal of the prize court. Goods so discharged, if not contraband of war, shall, if not requisitioned for the use of his Majesty, be restored by order of the court and upon such terms as the court may in the circumstances deem to be just to the person entitled thereto.

Second—No merchant vessel which sailed from any German port after March 1, 1915, shall be allowed to proceed on her voyage with any goods on board laden at such port. All goods laden at such port must be discharged in a British or allied port. Goods so discharged in a British port shall be placed in the custody of the Marshal of the prize court, and if not requisitioned for the use of his Majesty shall be detained or sold under the direction of the prize court.

The proceeds of the goods so sold shall be paid into the court and dealt with in such a manner as the court may in the circumstances deem to be just, provided that no proceeds of the sale of such goods shall be paid out of the court until the conclusion of peace, except on the application of a proper officer of the Crown, unless it be shown that the goods had become neutral property before the issue of this order, and provided also that nothing herein shall prevent the release of neutral property, laden at such enemy port, on the application of the proper officer of the Crown.

Third—Every merchant vessel which sailed from her port of departure after March 1, 1915, on her way to a port other than a German port and carrying goods with an enemy destination, or which are enemy property, may be required to discharge such goods in a British or allied port. Any goods so discharged in a British port shall be placed in the custody of the Marshal of the prize court, and unless they are contraband of war shall, if not requisitioned for the use of his Majesty, be restored by an order of the court upon such terms as the court may in the circumstances deem to be just to the person entitled thereto, and provided that this article shall not apply in any case falling within Article 2 or 4 of this order.

Fourth—Every merchant vessel which sailed from a port other than a German port after March 1, 1915, and having on board goods which are of enemy origin, or are enemy property, may be required to discharge such goods in a British or allied port. Goods so discharged in a British port shall be placed in the custody of the Marshal of the prize court, and, if not requisitioned for the use of his Majesty, shall be detained or sold under the direction of the prize court. The proceeds of the goods so sold shall be paid into the court and be dealt with in such a manner as the court may in the circumstances deem to be just, provided that no proceeds of the sale of such goods shall be paid out of the court until the conclusion of peace except on the application of a proper officer of the Crown, unless it be shown that the goods had become neutral property before the issue of this order, and provided also that nothing herein shall prevent the release of neutral property of enemy origin on application of the proper officer of the Crown.

Fifth—Any person claiming to be interested in or to have any claim in respect of any goods not being contraband of war placed in the custody of the Marshal of the prize court under this order, or in the proceeds of such goods, may forthwith issue a writ in the prize court against the proper officer of the Crown and apply for an order that the goods should be restored to him, or that their proceeds should be paid to him, or for such other order as the circumstances of the case may require.

The practice and procedure of the prize court shall, so far as applicable, be followed mutatis mutandis in any proceedings consequential upon this order.

Sixth—A merchant vessel which has cleared for a neutral port from a British or allied port, or which has been allowed to pass as having an ostensible destination to a neutral port and proceeds to an enemy port, shall, if captured on any subsequent voyage be liable to condemnation.

Seventh—Nothing in this order shall be deemed to affect the liability of any vessel or goods to capture or condemnation independently of this order.

Eighth—Nothing in this order shall prevent the relaxation of the provisions of this order in respect of the merchant vessels of any country which declares that no commerce intended for or originating in Germany, or belonging to German subjects, shall enjoy the protection of its flag.

Germany's Submarine War

LONDON, March 13.—The Admiralty announced tonight that the British collier Invergyle was torpedoed today off Cresswell, England, and sunk. All aboard were saved.

This brings the total British losses of merchantmen and fishing vessels, either sunk or captured during the war, up to 137. Of these ninety were merchant ships and forty-seven were fishing craft.

A further submarine casualty today was the torpedoing of the Swedish steamer Halma off Scarborough, and the loss of the lives of six of her crew.

The Admiralty announces that since March 10 seven British merchant steamers have been torpedoed by submarines. Two of them, it is stated, were sunk, and of two others it is said that "the sinking is not confirmed." Three were not sunk.

The two steamers officially reported sunk were the Invergyle and the Indian City, which was torpedoed off the Scilly Islands on March 12. The crew of the Indian City was reported rescued.

The two steamers whose reported sinking is not yet officially confirmed are the Florazan, which was torpedoed at the mouth of the Bristol Channel on March 11, all of her crew being landed at Milford Haven, with the exception of one fireman, and the Andalusian, which was attacked off the Scilly Islands on March 12. The crew of the Andalusian is reported to have been rescued.

The Adenwen was torpedoed in the English Channel on March 11, and has since been towed into Cherbourg. Her crew was landed at Brisham.

The steamer Headlands was torpedoed on March 12 off the Scilly Islands. It is reported that her crew was saved. The steamer Hartdale was torpedoed on March 13 off South Rock, in the Irish Channel. Twenty-one of her crew were picked up and two were lost.

Supplementary to the foregoing the Admiralty tonight issued a report giving the total number of British merchant and fishing vessels lost through hostile action from the outbreak of the war to March 10. The statement says that during that period eighty-eight merchant vessels were sunk or captured. Of these fifty-four were victims of hostile cruisers, twelve were destroyed by mines, and twenty-two by submarines. Their gross tonnage totaled 309,945.

In the same period the total arrivals and sailings of overseas steamers of all nationalities of more than 300 tons net were 4,745.

Forty-seven fishing vessels were sunk or captured during this time. Nineteen of these were blown up by mines and twenty-eight were captured by hostile craft. Twenty-four of those captured were caught on Aug. 26, when the Germans raided a fishing fleet.

Dotted portion indicates the limits of "War Zone" defined in the German order which became effective Feb. 18, 1915.

German People Not Blinded

By Karl Lamprecht

[Published in New York by the German Information Service, Feb. 3, 1915.]

Denying flatly that the German people were swept blindly and ignorantly into the war by the headlong ambitions of their rulers—the view advanced by Dr. Charles W. Eliot, President Emeritus of Harvard University, and Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler, President of Columbia—Dr. Karl Lamprecht, Professor of History in the University of Leipsic and world-famous German historian, has addressed the open letter which appears below to the two distinguished American scholars. Dr. Lamprecht asserts that under the laws which govern the German Empire the people as citizens have a deciding will in affairs of state and that Germany is engaged in the present conflict because the sober judgment of the German people led them to resort to arms.

Dr. C.W. Eliot, President Emeritus of Harvard University; Dr. N.M. Butler, President of Columbia University.

Gentlemen: I feel confident that you are not in ignorance of my regard and esteem for the great American Republic and its citizens. They have been freely expressed on many occasions and have taken definite form in the journal of my travels through the United States, published in the booklet "Americana," 1905.

My sentiments and my judgment have not changed since 1905. I now refer, gentlemen, to the articles and speeches which you have published about my country and which have aroused widespread interest. I will not criticise your utterances one by one. If I did that I might have to speak on occasion with a frankness that would be ungracious, considering the fine appreciation which both of you still feel for old Germany. It would be specially ungracious toward you, President Eliot, for in quite recent times you honored me by your ready help in my scientific labors. All I want to do is to remove a few fundamental errors—in fact, only one. I feel in duty bound to do so, since many well-disposed Americans share that error.

The gravest and perhaps most widely spread misconception about us Germans is that we are the serfs of our Princes. (Fuerstenknechte,) servile and dependent in political thought. That false notion has probably been dispelled during the initial weeks of the present war.

With absolute certainty the German Nation, with one voice and correctly, diagnosed the political situation without respect to party or creed and unanimously and of its own free will acted.

But this misconception is so deep rooted that more extended discussion is needed. I pass on to other matters.

The essential point is that public opinion have free scope of development. Every American will admit that. Now, public opinion finds its expression in the principles that govern the use of the suffrage. The German voting system is the freest in the world, much freer than the French, English, or American system, because not only does it operate in accordance with the principle that every one shall have a direct and secret vote, but the powers of the State are exercised faithfully and conscientiously to carry out that principle in practice. The constitutional life of the German Nation is of a thoroughly democratic character.

Those who know that were not surprised that our Social Democrats marched to war with such enthusiasm. Already among their ranks many have fallen as heroes, never to be forgotten by any German when his thoughts turn to the noble blood which has saturated foreign soil—thank God, foreign soil! Many of the Socialist leaders and adherents are wearing the Iron Cross, that simple token that seems to tell you when you speak of its bearer, "Now, this is a fearless and faithful soul."

Let it be said once and for all: He who wants to understand us must accept our conception that constitutionally we enjoy so great a political freedom that we would not change with any country in the world. Everybody in America knows that our manners and customs have been democratic for centuries, while in France and England they have been ever aristocratic. Americans, we know, always feel at home on German soil.

But the Kaiser, you will say, speaks of "his monarchy," therefore must the Germans be Fuerstenknechte, (servants of Princes.)

First of all, as to the phrase "Fuerstenknechte." Does not the King of England speak of his "subjects"? That word irritates a German, because he is conscious that he is not a subject, but a citizen of the empire. Yet he will not infer from the English King's use of the term in formal utterances that an Englishman is a churl, a "servant of his King." That would be a superficial political conception.

As to our Princes, most of us, including the Social Democrats, are glad in our heart of hearts that we have them. As far back as our history runs, and that is more than 2,000 years, we have had Princes. They have never been more than their name, "Fuerst," implies, the first and foremost of German freemen, "primi inter pares." Therefore they have never acted independently, never without taking the people into counsel. That would have been contrary to the most important fundamental principles of German law; hence our people have never been "de jure" without their representatives. Even in the times of absolute monarchy the old "estates of the realm" had their being as a representative body, and wherever and whenever these privileges were suppressed it was regarded as a violation of our fundamental rights and is so still regarded.

Our princely houses are as old as our monasteries, our cities, and our cathedrals. A thousand years ago the Guelphs were a celebrated family, and the Wettins have ruled over their lands for eight centuries. In the twelfth century the Wittelsbachs and Thuringians were Princes under the great Kaisers of the Hohenstaufen dynasty. Among these great families the Hapsburgs (thirteenth century) and the Hohenzollerns (fifteenth century) are quite young. All have their roots in Germany and belong to the country.

We glory in our Princes. They link our existence with the earliest centuries of our history. They preserve for us the priceless independence of our small home States.

We are accused of militarism. What is this new and terrible crime? Since the years of the wars of liberation against France and Napoleon we have had what amounts practically to universal conscription. Only two generations later universal suffrage was introduced. The nation has been sternly trained by its history in the ways of discipline and self-restraint. Germans are very far from mistaking freedom for license and independence for licentiousness.

Germany has a long past. She enjoys the inheritance of an original and priceless civilization. She holds clearly formulated ideals. To the future she has all this to bequeath and, in addition, the intellectual wealth of her present stage of development. Consider Germany's contributions to the arts, the poetical achievements of the period of Schiller and Goethe, the music of Handel, Bach, Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven; the thought systems of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel!

The last decade has reawakened these great men in the consciousness of the German Nation. Enriched by the consciousness and message of an intellectual past, our people were moving forward to new horizons.

At that moment the war hit us. If you could only have lived these weeks in Germany I do not doubt that what you would have seen would have led your ripe experience to a fervent faith in a Divinely guided future of mankind. The great spiritual movement of 1870, when I was a boy growing up, was but a phantom compared to July and August of 1914. Germany was a nation stirred by the most sacred emotions, humble and strong, filled with just wrath and a firm determination to conquer—a nation disciplined, faithful, and loving.

In that disposition we have gone to war and still fight. As for the slanders of which we have been the victims, ask the thousands of Frenchmen who housed German soldiers in 1870 and 1871, or ask the Belgians of Ghent and Bruges! They will give you a different picture of the "Furor Teutonicus." They will tell you that the "raging German" generally is a good-natured fellow, ever ready for service and sympathy, who, like Parsifal, gazes forth eagerly into a strange world which the war has opened to his loyal and patriotic vision.

KARL LAMPRECHT.

Reveille

By JOHN GALSWORTHY.

[From King Albert's Book.]

In my dream I saw a fertile plain, rich with the hues of Autumn. Tranquil it was and warm. Men and women, children, and the beasts worked and played and wandered there in peace. Under the blue sky and the white clouds low-hanging, great trees shaded the fields; and from all the land there arose a murmur as from bees clustering on the rose-colored blossoms of tall clover. And, in my dream, I roamed, looking into every face, the faces of prosperity, broad and well favored—of people living in a land of plenty, of people drinking of the joy of life, caring nothing for the morrow. But I could not see their eyes, that seemed ever cast down, gazing at the ground, watching the progress of their feet over the rich grass and the golden leaves already fallen from the trees. The longer I walked among them the more I wondered that never was I suffered to see the eyes of any, not even of the little children, not even of the beasts. It was as if ordinance had gone forth that their eyes should be banded with invisibility.

While I mused on this, the sky began to darken. A muttering of distant winds and waters came traveling. The children stopped their play, the beasts raised their heads; men and women halted and cried to each other: "The River—the River is rising! If it floods, we are lost! Our beasts will drown; we, even we, shall drown! The River!" And women stood like things of stone, listening; and men shook their fists at the black sky and at that traveling mutter of the winds and waters; and the beasts sniffed at the darkening air.

Then, clear, I heard a Voice call: "Brothers! The dike is breaking! The River comes! Link arms, brothers; with the dike of our bodies we will save our home! Sisters, behind us, link arms! Close in the crevices, children! The River!" And all that multitude, whom I had seen treading quietly the grass and fallen leaves with prosperous feet, came hurrying, their eyes no longer fixed on the rich plain, but lifted in trouble and defiance, staring at that rushing blackness. And the Voice called: "Hasten, brothers! The dike is broken. The River floods!"

And they answered: "Brother, we come!"

Thousands and thousands they pressed, shoulder to shoulder—men, women, and children, and the beasts lying down behind, till the living dike was formed. And that blackness came on, nearer, nearer, till, like the whites of glaring eyes, the wave crests glinted in the dark rushing flood. And the sound of the raging waters was as a roar from a million harsh mouths.

But the Voice called: "Hold, brothers! Hold!"

And from the living dike came answer: "Brother! We hold!"

Then the sky blackened to night. And the terrible dark water broke on that dike of life; and from all the thin living wall rose such cry of struggle as never was heard.

But above it ever the Voice called: "Hold! My brave ones, hold!"

And ever the answer came from those drowning mouths, of men and women, of little children and the very beasts: "Brother! We hold!" But the black flood rolled over and on. There, down in its dark tumult, beneath its cruel tumult, I saw men still with arms linked; women on their knees, clinging to earth; little children drifting—dead, all dead; and the beasts dead. And their eyes were still open facing that death. And above them the savage water roared. But clear and high I heard the Voice call: "Brothers! Hold! Death is not! We live!"

Can Germany Be Starved Out?

An Answer by Sixteen German Specialists[2]

[From The Annalist of New York, March 1, 1915.]

BERLIN, Feb. 1, 1915.

Probably the most interesting economic problem in the world at this moment is whether England can succeed in starving out Germany. While the world at large is chiefly interested in the vast political issues involved, the question interests the Germans not only from that standpoint, but also—and how keenly!—from the mere bread-and-butter standpoint. For if Germany cannot feed its own population during the long war that its foes are predicting with so much assurance, her defeat is only a question of time.

That the German Government is keenly aware of the dangers of the situation is evident from the rigorous measures that it has taken to conserve and economize the food supply. After having fixed maximum prices for cereals soon after the war began, the Government last week decided to requisition and monopolize all the wheat and rye in the country, and allow the bakers to sell only a limited quantity of bread (2.2 pounds per capita a week) to each family. It had previously taken measures to restrict the consumption of cereals for other purposes than breadmaking; the feeding of rye was prohibited and its use in producing alcohol was restricted by 40 per cent.; a percentage of potato flour was ordered added to rye flour, and of the latter to wheat flour in making bread. These are but a few of the economic measures adopted by the Government since the outbreak of the war.

The general opinion of the people in Germany is that the country cannot be starved out, and this opinion is asserted with a great deal of patriotic fervor, particularly by newspaper editors. The leading scientists of the country, moreover, have taken up the question in a thoroughgoing way and investigated it in all its bearings. A little book ("Die Deutsche Volksernährung und der Englische Aushungerungsplan") has just been issued, giving the conclusions of sixteen specialists in various fields, which will be briefly summarized here. Economists, statisticians, physiologists, agricultural chemists, food specialists, and geologists have all taken part in producing a composite view of the whole subject; it is not a book of special contributions by individual specialists, but is written in one cast and represents the compared and boiled-down conclusions of the sixteen scholars.

The authors by no means regard the problem of feeding Germany without foreign assistance as an easy and simple one; on the contrary, they say it is a serious one, and calls for the supreme effort of the authorities and of every individual German; and only by energetic, systematic, and continued efforts of Government and people can they prevent a shortage of food from negativing the success of German arms. Yet they feel bound to grapple the problem as one calling for solution by the German people alone, for very small imports of food products can be expected from the neutral countries of Europe, and none at all from the United States and other oversea countries, and the small quantities that do come in will hardly be more than enough to make good the drain upon Germany's own available stocks in helping to feed the people of Belgium and Poland.

The simplest statistical elements of the problem are the following: Germany, with a population of 68,000,000, was consuming food products, when the war broke out, equivalent to an aggregate of 90,420 billion calories, including 2,307,000 tons of albumen; whereas the amount now available, under unchanged methods of living and feeding, is equal to only 67,870 billion calories, with 1,543,000 tons of albumen. Thus, there will be an apparent deficit of 22,590 billion calories and 764,000 tons of albumen. On the other hand, the authors hold that the minimum physiological requirements are only 56,750 billion calories, containing 1,605,000 tons of albumen, which would give a large surplus of calories and a small deficit of albumen, but they make certain recommendations which, if carried into effect, would bring the available supply up to 81,250 billion calories and 2,023,000 tons of albumen.

Germany raises (average for 1912-13) about 4,500,000 tons of wheat and imports nearly 2,000,000 tons, (about 73,000,000 bushels.) On the other hand, it exports about 530,000 tons net of the 11,900,000 tons of rye produced. It imports nearly 3,000,000 tons of low-grade barley and about 1,000,000 of maize, both chiefly for feeding stock. Its net imports of grain and legumes are 6,270,000 tons. Of its fruit consumption, about 30 per cent. has been imported. While Germany has been producing nearly its entire meat supply at home, this has been accomplished only by the very extensive use of foreign feedstuffs. The authors of this work estimate that the imports of meats and animals, together with the product from domestic animals fed with foreign feedstuffs, amount to not less than 33 per cent. of the total consumption. They also hold that about 58 per cent. of the milk consumed in Germany represents imports and the product of cows fed with foreign feedstuffs. Nearly 40 per cent. of the egg consumption was hitherto imported. The consumption of fish has averaged 576,000 tons, of which not less than 62 per cent. was imported; and the home fisheries are now confined, besides the internal waters, almost wholly to the Baltic Sea—which means the loss of the catch of 142,000 tons hitherto taken from the North Sea. Even the German's favorite beverage, beer, contains 13 per cent. of imported ingredients.

The authors assume, as already intimated, that nearly all of these imports will be lost to Germany during the full duration of the war, and they take up, under this big limitation, the problem of showing how Germany can live upon its own resources and go on fighting till it wins. They undertake to show how savings can be made in the use of the supplies on hand, and also how production can be increased or changed so as to keep the country supplied with food products.

In the first place, they insist that the prohibition of the export of grain be made absolute; in other words, the small exception made in favor of Switzerland, which has usually obtained most of its grain from Germany, must be canceled. Savings in the present supplies of grain and feedstuffs must be made by a considerable reduction in the live stock, inasmuch as the grain, potatoes, turnips, and other stuffs fed to animals will support a great many more men if consumed directly by them. From the stock of cattle the poorer milkers must be eliminated and converted into beef, 10 per cent. of the milch cows to be thus disposed, of. Then swine, in particular, must be slaughtered down to 65 per cent. of the present number, they being great consumers of material suitable for human food. In Germany much skim milk and buttermilk is fed to swine; the authors demand that this partial waste of very valuable albumens be stopped. The potato crop—of which Germany produces above 50,000,000 tons a year, or much more than any other land—must be more extensively drawn upon than hitherto for feeding the people. To this end potato-drying establishments must be multiplied; these will turn out a rough product for feeding animals, and a better sort for table use. It may be added here that the Prussian Government last Autumn decided to give financial aid to agricultural organizations for erecting drying plants; also, that the Imperial Government has decreed that potatoes up to a maximum of 30 per cent. may be used by the bakers in making bread—a measure which will undoubtedly make the grain supply suffice till the 1915 crop is harvested. It is further recommended that more vegetables be preserved, whether directly in cold storage or by canning or pickling. Moreover, the industrial use of fats suitable for human food (as in making soaps, lubricating oils, &c.) must be stopped, and people must eat less meat, less butter, and more vegetables. Grain must not be converted into starch. People must burn coke rather than coal, for the coking process yields the valuable by-product of sulphate of ammonia, one of the most valuable of fertilizers, and greatly needed by German farmers now owing to the stoppage of imports of nitrate of soda from Chile.

In considering how the German people may keep up their production of food, the authors find that various factors will work against such a result. In the first place, there is a shortage of labor, nearly all the able-bodied young and middle-aged men in the farming districts being in the war. There is also a scarcity of horses, some 500,000 head having already been requisitioned for army use, and the imports of about 140,000 head (chiefly from Russia) have almost wholly ceased. The people must therefore resort more extensively to the use of motor plows, and the State Governments must give financial assistance to insure this wherever necessary; and such plows on hand must be kept more steadily in use through company ownership or rental. It may be remarked here, again, that the Prussian Government is also assisting agricultural organizations to buy motor plows. The supply of fertilizers has also been cut down by the war. Nitrate has just been mentioned. The authors recommend that the Government solve this problem by having many of the existing electrical plants turn partly to recovering nitrogen from the atmosphere. This, they say, could be done without reducing the present production of electricity for ordinary purposes, since only 19 per cent. of the effective capacity of the 2,000,000 horse power producible by the electrical plants of Germany is actually used. The supply of phosphoric fertilizers is also endangered through the stoppage of imports of phosphate rock (nearly 1,000,000 tons a year) as well as the material from which to make sulphuric acid; also, through the reduction in the production of the iron furnaces of the country, from the slag of which over 2,000,000 tons of so-called Thomas phosphate flour was produced, will involve a big reduction in the make of that valuable fertilizer. Thus, there is a lack of horses, of fertilizers, and of the guiding hand of man. This last, however, can be partly supplied by utilizing for farm work such of the prisoners of war as come from the farm. As Germany now holds considerably more than 600,000 prisoners, it can draw many farm laborers from among them. Prisoners are already used in large numbers in recovering moorland for agricultural purposes.

This latter remark suggests one of the recommendations of the authors for increasing agricultural production—the increased recovery of moorlands. They show that Germany has at least 52,000 square miles (more than 33,000,000 acres) of moors convertible into good arable land, which, with proper fertilizing, can be made at once richly productive; they yield particularly large crops of grain and potatoes. Moreover, the State Governments must undertake the division of large landed estates among small proprietors wherever possible—and this is more possible just now than ever, owing to the fact that many large owners have been killed in battle. The reason for such a division is that the small holder gets more out of the acre than the large proprietor.

As Germany makes a large surplus of sugar, the authors advise that the area planted in beets be reduced and the land thus liberated be planted in grain, potatoes, and turnips; as a matter of fact, it is reported that the Government is now considering the question of reducing the beetroot acreage by one-fourth. The authors also recommend that sugar be used to some extent in feeding stock, sweeting low-grade hay and roots with it to make them more palatable and nutritious. It is also regarded as profitable to leave 20 per cent. of sugar in the beets, so as to secure a more valuable feed product in the remnants. Still another agricultural change is to increase the crops of beans, peas, and lentils—vegetables which contain when dried as much nutrition as meat. Germany will need to increase its home production of these crops to replace the 300,000 tons of them hitherto imported.

Such are the principal points covered by these experts. Their conclusion is that, if their recommendations be carried out fully, and various economies be practiced—they could not be touched on in the limits of this article—Germany can manage to feed its people. But they insist, in their earnest, concluding words, that this can only be done by carrying out thoroughly all the methods of producing and saving food products advised by them. It is a serious problem, indeed, but one which, all Germany is convinced, can and will be solved.

Hoch Der Kaiser

BY GEORGE DAVIES

HOCH DER KAISER! Amen! Amen!

We of the pulpit and bar,

We of the engine and car;

Hail to the Caesar who's given us men,

Our rightful heritage back again.

Who kicks the dancing shoes from our feet;

Snatches our mouths from the hot forced meat;

Drags us away from our warm padded stalls;

From our ivory keys, our song books and balls;

Orders man's hands from the children's go-carts;

Closes our fool schools of "ethics" and "arts."

Puts our ten fingers on triggers and swords,

Marshals us into War's legions by hordes.

Hoch der Kaiser! Amen! Amen!

We of the sea and the land;

We of the clerking band;

Hail to the Caesar who's given us men

Our rightful heritage back again.

WHO SUMMONS:

These women who write of loves that are loose,

(Those little perversionist scribes of the Deuce!)

Laughter of lies lilting lewd at their lips,

Their souls and brains both in a maudlin eclipse;

Their bosoms as bare as their stories and songs;

These coaxers of dogs with their "rights" and their wrongs.

WHO COMMANDS:

Strike from their shoulders the transparent mesh;

Mark the Red Cross on the cloth for their flesh.

WHO ORDAINS:

Ye, men who seem women in work and at play;

Ye, who do blindly as women may say;

Ye, who kill life in the smug cabarets;

Ye, all, at the beck of the little tea-tray;

Ye, all, of the measure of daughters of clay.

Waken to face me: be women no more;

But fellow-men born, from top branch to the core;

Men who must fight—who can kill, who can die,

While women once more shall be covered and shy.

Hoch der Kaiser! Amen! Amen!

We of the hills and the homes;

We of the plows and the tomes;

Hail to the Caesar who's given us men

Our rightful heritage back again.

The Submarine of 1578

[From The London Times, Jan. 16, 1915.]

The earliest description of a practical under-water boat is given by William Bourne in his book entitled "Inventions or Devices," published in 1578. Instructions for building such a boat are given in detail, and it has been conjectured that Cornelius van Drebbel, a Dutch physician, used this information for the construction of the vessel with which in the early part of the seventeenth century he carried out some experiments on the Thames. It is doubtful, however, whether van Drebbel's boat was ever entirely submerged, and the voyage with which he was credited, from Westminster to Greenwich, is supposed to have been made in an awash condition, with the head of the inventor above the surface. More than one writer at the time referred to van Drebbel's boat and endeavored to explain the apparatus by which his rowers were enabled to breathe under water.

Van Drebbel died in 1634, and no illustration of his boat has been discovered. Nineteen years later the vessel illustrated here was constructed at Rotterdam from the designs of a Frenchman named de Son. This is supposed to be the earliest illustration of any submarine, and the inscription under the drawing, which was printed at Amsterdam in the Calverstraat, (in the Three Crabs,) is in old Dutch, of which the following is a translation:

The inventor of this ship will undertake to destroy in a single day a hundred vessels, and such destruction could not be prevented by fire, storm, bad weather, or the force of the waves, saving only that the Almighty should otherwise will it.

The figures on the drawing refer to the following explanations:

1. The beam wherewith power shall be given to the ship.

2. The rudder of the ship, somewhat aft.

3. The keel plate.

4. The two ends of the ship, iron plated.

5. Iron bolts and screws.

6. How deep the ship goes into the water when awash.

7. The pivots on which the paddle-wheel turns.

8. Air holes.

9. Gallery along which men can move.

The inset is a drawing of the paddle-wheels which fill the centre portion of the boat and which work upon the pivot marked 7.

Vain would it be for ships lying in harbor to be regarded as safe, for the inventor could reach anywhere unless prevented by betrayal. None but he could control the craft. Therefore it may truly be called the lightning of the sea.

Its power shall be proven by a trip to the East Indies in six weeks or to France and back in a day, for as fast as a bird flieth can one travel in this boat.

This boat was 72 feet in length, and her greatest height was 12 feet, while the greatest breadth was 8 feet, tapering off to points at the end. Capt. Murray Sueter in his book on submarines gives these and other particulars of the vessel. At either end the boat had a cabin, the air in which remained good for about three hours, and in the middle of the boat was a large paddlewheel rotated by clockwork mechanism, which, it was claimed, would run for eight hours when once wound up. The iron tips at the ends of the vessel were intended for ramming, and the inventor was confident he could sink the biggest English ship afloat by crushing in her hull under water. The boat was duly launched, but on trial of the machinery being made the paddlewheel, though it revolved in air, would not move in the water, the machinery being not powerful enough. This, says Capt. Sueter, was apparently the only reason for de Son's failure, for his principles were distinctly sound, and he was certainly the first inventor of the mechanically propelled semi-submarine boat. After her failure de Son exhibited her for a trifle to any casual passer-by.

The Torpedo.

By Katharine Drayton Mayrant Simons, Jr.

Death, our mother, gave us her three gray gifts from the sea—

(Cherish your birthright, Brothers!)—speed, cunning, and certainty.

And mailèd Mars, he blest us—but his blessing was most to me!

For the swift gun sometimes falters, sparing the foe afar,

And the hid mine wastes destruction on the drag's decoying spar,

But I am the wrath of the Furies' path—of the war god's avatar!

Mine is the brain of thinking steel man made to match his own,

To guard and guide the death disks packed in the war head's hammered cone,

To drive the cask of the thin air flask as the gyroscope has shown.

My brother, the gun, shrieks o'er the sea his curse from the covered deck,

My brother, the mine, lies sullen-dumb, agape for the dreadnought's wreck,

I glide on the breath of my mother, Death, and my goal is my only check!

More strong than the strength of armored ships is the firing pin's frail spark,

More sure than the helm of the mighty fleet are my rudders to their mark,

The faint foam fades from the bright screw blades—and I strike from the under dark!

Death, our mother, gave us her three gray gifts from the sea—

(Cherish your birthright, Brothers!)—speed, cunning, and certainty.

And mailèd Mars, he blest us—but his blessing was most to me!

"God Punish England, Brother"

A New Hymn of Germany's Gospel of Hatred

[From Public Opinion, London, Feb. 5, 1915.]

The amazing outburst of hatred against England in Germany is responsible for a new form of greeting which has displaced the conventional formulas of salutation and farewell: "God punish England!" ("Gott strafe England!") is the form of address, to which the reply is: "May God punish her!" ("Gott mög'es strafen!")

"This extraordinary formula," says The Mail, "which is now being used all over Germany, is celebrated in a set of verses by Herr Hochstetter in a recent number of the well-known German weekly, Lustige Blätter. In its way this poem is as remarkable as Herr Ernst Lissauer's famous 'Hymn of Hate.'"

Among the prayers at Bruges Cathedral on the Kaiser's birthday was this German chant of hate, "God Punish England!"

A HYMN OF HATE.

Translated by

G. VALENTINE WILLIAMS.

This is the German greeting

When men their fellows meet,

The merchants in the market-place,

The beggars in the street.

A pledge of bitter enmity,

Thus runs the wingèd word:

"God punish England, brother!—

Yea! Punish her, O Lord!"

With raucous voice, brass-throated,

Our German shells shall bear

This curse that is our greeting

To the "cousin" in his lair.

This be our German battle cry,

The motto on our sword:

"God punish England, brother!—Yea!

Punish her, O Lord!"

By shell from sea, by bomb from air,

Our greeting shall be sped,

Making each English homestead

A mansion of the dead.

And even Grey will tremble

As falls each iron word:

"God punish England, brother!—

Yea! Punish her, O Lord!"

This is the German greeting

When men their fellows meet,

The merchants in the market-place,

The beggars in the street.

A pledge of bitter enmity,

Thus runs the winged word:

"God punish England, brother!—

Yea! Punish her, O Lord!"

"What German Lutheran pastors think of the gospel of hate that is at present being preached throughout the Fatherland may be judged from an article on the subject written for the Vossische Zeitung of Berlin, by Dr. Julius Schiller of Nürnberg, who describes himself as a royal Protestant pastor," says The Morning Post.

"Before the war, the pastor writes, it was considered immoral to hate; now, however, Germans know that they not only may, but they must hate. Herr Lissauer's 'Hymn of Hate' against England is, he declares, a faithful expression of the feelings cherished in the depths of the German soul.

"'All protests against this hate,' the pastor writes, 'fall on deaf ears; we strike down all hands that would avert it. We cannot do otherwise; we must hate the brood of liars. Our hate was provoked, and the German can hate more thoroughly than any one else. A feeling that this is the case is penetrating into England, but the fear of the German hate is as yet hidden. There is a grain of truth in Lord Curzon's statement that the phlegmatic temperament of his countrymen is incapable of hating as the Germans hate.

"'We Germans do, as a matter of fact, hate differently than the sons of Albion. We Germans hate honorably, for our hatred is based on right and justice. England, on the other hand, hates mendaciously, being impelled by envy, ill-will, and jealousy. It was high time that we tore the mask from England's face, that we finally saw England as she really is.

"'We hate with a clean conscience, although religion seems to condemn as unæsthetic everything that is included in the word hate.' The Pastor concludes by asserting that 'we, who are fighting for truth and right with clean hands and a clean conscience, must have Him on our side Who is stronger than the strongest battalions. Hence our courage and our confidence in a fortunate outcome of the world conflagration. The dawn will soon appear that announces that the "Day of Harvest" for Germany has broken.'"

"The avowal that the love of good Germans for Germany is inseparable from hatred of other countries shows how deeply the aggressiveness of German policy has sunk into the nation's mood," says The Times. "Only by constantly viewing their own country as in a natural state of challenge to all others can Germans have come to absorb the view that hatred is the normal manifestation of patriotism. It is a purely militarist conception.

"Hate is at bottom a slavish passion, and remote from that heroic spirit of the warrior with which the Germans represent themselves as facing a world in arms. The hater subjects his mind to the domination of what he hates; he loses his independence and volition and becomes the prey of the hated idea. At last he cannot free his mind from the obsession; and the deliberate cultivation of hate in the conscientious German manner is a kind of mental suicide."

The Great Hour.

By HERMANN SUDERMANN.

Whether, O Father in Heaven, we still put our trust in You,

Whether You are but a dream of a sacred past,

See now, we swear to You, Witness of Truth,

Not we have wanted it—

This murder, this world-ending murder—

Which now, with blood-hot sighs,

Stamps o'er the shuddering earth.

True to the earth, the bread-giving earth,

Happy and cheery in business and trade,

Peaceful we sat in the oak tree's shade,

Peaceful,

Though we were born to the sword.

Circled around us, for ever and ever,

Greed, sick with envy, and nets lifted high,

Full of inherited hatred.

Every one saw it, and every one felt

The secret venom, gushing forth,

Year after year,

Heavy and breath-bated years.

But hearts did not quiver

Nor hands draw the sword.

And then it came, the hour

Of sacred need, of pregnant Fate,

And what it brings forth, we will shape,

The brown gun in our mastering hand.

Ye mothers, what ye once have borne,

In honor or in vice,

Bring forth to every sacred shrine—

Your country's sacrifice.

Ye brides, whom future happiness,

Once kissed—it but seemed true,

Bring back to fair Germania

What she has given you.

Ye women, in silks or in linen,

Offer your husbands now.

Bid them goodbye, with your children,

With smiles and a blessing vow.

Ye all are doomed to lie sleepless,

Many a desolate night,

And dream of approaching conquests

And of your hero's might.

And dream of laurel and myrtle,

Until he shall return,

Till he, your master and shepherd,

Shall make the old joys burn.

And if he fell on the Autumn heath

And fell deep into death,

He died for Germania's greatness,

He died for Germania's breath.

The Fatherland they shall let stand,

Upon his blood-soaked loam,

And ne'er again shall they approach

Our sacred, peaceful home.

—Translated by Herman J. Mankiewicz.

H.M. GUSTAF V—King of Sweden—
(Photo from Underwood & Underwood)

H.M. HAAKON VII—King of Norway—
(Photo from Underwood & Underwood)

The Peace of the World

A Famous Englishman's Diagnosis of the War Disease and His Prescription for a Permanent Cure

By H.G. Wells

(COPYRIGHT, 1915, BY THE NEW YORK TIMES COMPANY.)

(Copyrighted in Great Britain and Ireland.)

I.

Probably there have never been before in the whole past of mankind so many people convinced of the dreadfulness of war, nor so large a proportion anxious to end war, to rearrange the world's affairs so that this huge hideousness of hardship, suffering, destruction, and killing that still continues in Europe may never again be repeated.

The present writer is one of this great majority. He wants as far as possible to end war altogether, and contrive things so that when any unavoidable outbreak does occur it may be as little cruel and mischievous as it can be.

But it is one thing to desire a thing and another thing to get it. It does not follow because this aspiration for world-peace is almost universal that it will be realized. There may be faults in ourselves, unsuspected influences within us and without, that may be working to defeat our superficial sentiments. There must be not only a desire for peace, but a will for peace, if peace is to be established forever. If out of a hundred men ninety-nine desire peace and trouble no further, the one man over will arm himself and set up oppression and war again. Peace must be organized and maintained. This present monstrous catastrophe is the outcome of forty-three years of skillful, industrious, systematic world armament. Only by a disarmament as systematic, as skillful, and as devoted may we hope to achieve centuries of peace.

No apology is needed, therefore, for a discussion of the way in which peace may be organized and established out of the settlement of this war. I am going to set out and estimate as carefully as I can the forces that make for a peace organization and the forces that make for war. I am going to do my best to diagnose the war disorder. I want to find out first for my own guidance, and then with a view to my co-operation with other people, what has to be done to prevent the continuation and recrudescence of warfare.

Such an inquiry is manifestly the necessary first stage in any world pacification. So manifestly that, of course, countless others are also setting to work upon it. It is a research. It is a research exactly like a scientific exploration. Each of us will probably get out a lot of truth and a considerable amount of error; the truth will be the same and the errors will confute and disperse each other. But it is clear that there is no simple panacea in this matter, and that only by intentness and persistence shall we disentangle a general conception of the road the peace-desiring multitude must follow.

Now, first be it noted that there is in every one a certain discord with regard to war. Every man is divided against himself. On the whole, most of us want peace. But hardly any one is without a lurking belligerence, a lurking admiration for the vivid impacts, the imaginative appeals of war. I am sitting down to write for the peace of the world, but immediately before I sat down to write I was reading the morning's paper, and particularly of the fight between the Sydney and the Emden at Cocos Island.

I confess to the utmost satisfaction in the account of the smashing blows delivered by the guns of the Australian. There is a sensation of greatness, a beautiful tremendousness, in many of the crude facts of war; they excite in one a kind of vigorous exaltation; we have that destructive streak in us, and it is no good pretending that we have not; the first thing we must do for the peace of the world is to control that. And to control it one can do nothing more effective than to keep in mind the other side of the realities of war.

As my own corrective I have at hand certain letters from a very able woman doctor who returned last week from Calais. Lockjaw, gangrene, men tied with filthy rags and lying bitterly cold in coaly sheds; men unwounded, but so broken by the chill horrors of the Yser trenches as to be near demented—such things make the substance of her picture. One young officer talked to her rather dryly of the operations, of the ruined towns and villages, of the stench of dead men and horses, of the losses and wounds and mutilations among his men, of the list of pals he had lost. "Suddenly he began to cry. He broke down just like an overtaxed child. And he could not stop crying. He cried and cried, and I could do nothing to help him." He was a strong man and a brave man, and to that three months of war had brought him.

And then this again:

There were a fair number of Belgian doctors, but no nurses except the usual untrained French girls, almost no equipment, and no place for clean surgery. We heard of a house containing sixty-one men with no doctor or nurses—several died without having received any medical aid at all. Mrs. —— and I even on the following Wednesday found four men lying on straw in a shop with leg and foot wounds who had not been dressed since Friday and had never been seen by a doctor. In addition there were hundreds and hundreds of wounded who could walk trying to find shelter in some corner, besides the many unwounded French and Belgian soldiers quartered in the town.

As if this inferno of misery were not enough, there were added the refugees! These were not Belgians, as I had imagined, but French. It appears that both English and French armies have to clear the civil population out of the whole fighting area—partly to prevent spying and treachery, (which has been a curse to both armies,) and partly because they would starve. They are sent to Calais, and then by boat to Havre.

That first Sunday evening an endless procession flowed from the station to the quays in the drenching rain. Each family had a perambulator, (a surprisingly handsome one, too,) piled with sticks of bread, a few bundles of goods, and, when we peered inside, a couple of crying babies. There were few young people; mostly it was whimpering, frightened-looking children and wretched, bent old men and women. It seemed too bad to be true; even when they brushed past us in the rain we could not believe that their sodden figures were real. They were dematerialized by misery in some odd way.

Some of them slept in skating rinks, trucks, some in the Amiral Ganteaume. (One's senses could not realize that to the horrors of exile these people had added those of shipwreck next day.) Some certainly stood in the Booking Hall outside our hotel all night through. This sort of thing went on all the week, and was going on when we left.

Nevertheless, I was stirred agreeably by the imagination of the shells smashing the Emden and the men inside the Emden, and when I read the other day that the naval guns had destroyed over 4,000 men in the German trenches about Middlekirche I remarked that we were "doing well." It is only on the whole that we who want to end war hate and condemn war; we are constantly lapsing into fierceness, and if we forget this lurking bellicosity and admiration for hard blows in our own nature then we shall set about the task of making an end to it under hopelessly disabling misconceptions. We shall underrate and misunderstand altogether the very powerful forces that are against pacifist effort.

Let us consider first, then, the forces that are directly opposed to the pacification of the world, the forces that will work openly and definitely for the preservation of war as a human condition. And it has to be remembered that the forces that are for a thing are almost always more unified, more concentrated and effective than the forces that are against it. We who are against war and want to stop it are against it for a great multitude of reasons. There are other things in life that we prefer, and war stops these other things. Some of us want to pursue art, some want to live industrious lives in town or country, some would pursue scientific developments, some want pleasures of this sort or that, some would live lives of religion and kindliness, or religion and austerity.

But we all agree in fixing our minds upon something else than war. And since we fix our minds on other things, war becomes possible and probable through our general inattention. We do not observe it, and meanwhile the people who really care for war and soldiering fix their minds upon it. They scheme how it shall be done, they scheme to bring it about. Then we discover suddenly—as the art and social development, the industry and pleasant living, the cultivation of the civil enterprise of England, France, Germany, and Russia have discovered—that everything must be pushed aside when the war thinkers have decided upon their game. And until we of the pacific majority contrive some satisfactory organization to watch the war-makers we shall never end war, any more than a country can end crime and robbery without a police. Specialist must watch specialist in either case. Mere expressions of a virtuous abhorrence of war will never end war until the crack of doom.

The people who actually want war are perhaps never at any time very numerous. Most people sometimes want war, and a few people always want war. It is these last who are, so to speak, the living nucleus of the war creature that we want to destroy. That liking for an effective smash which gleamed out in me for a moment when I heard of the naval guns is with them a dominating motive. It is not outweighed and overcome in them as it is in me by the sense of waste, and by pity and horror and by love for men who can do brave deeds and yet weep bitterly for misery and the deaths of good friends. These war-lovers are creatures of a simpler constitution. And they seem capable of an ampler hate.

You will discover, if you talk to them skillfully, that they hold that war "ennobles," and that when they say ennobles they mean that it is destructive to the ten thousand things in life that they do not enjoy or understand or tolerate, things that fill them, therefore, with envy and perplexity—such things as pleasure, beauty, delicacy, leisure. In the cant of modern talk you will find them call everything that is not crude and forcible in life "degenerate." But back to the very earliest writings, in the most bloodthirsty outpourings of the Hebrew prophets, for example, you will find that at the base of the warrior spirit is hate for more complicated, for more refined, for more beautiful and happier living.

The military peoples of the world have almost always been harsh and rather stupid peoples, full of a virtuous indignation of all they did not understand. The modern Prussian goes to war today with as supreme a sense of moral superiority as the Arabs when they swept down upon Egypt and North Africa. The burning of the library of Alexandria remains forever the symbol of the triumph of a militarist "culture" over civilization. This easy belief of the dull and violent that war "braces" comes out of a real instinct of self-preservation against the subtler tests of peace. This type of person will keep on with war if it can. It is to politics what the criminal type is to social order; it will be resentful and hostile to every attempt to fix up a pacific order in the world.

This heavy envy which is the dominant characteristic of the pro-military type is by no means confined to it. More or less it is in all of us. In England one finds it far less frequently in professional soldiers than among sedentary learned men. In Germany, too, the more uncompromising and ferocious pro-militarism is to be found in the frock coats of the professors. Just at present England is full of virtuous reprehension of German military professors, but there is really no monopoly of such in Germany, and before Germany England produced some of the most perfect specimens of aggressive militarist conceivable. To read Froude upon Ireland or Carlyle upon the Franco-German War is to savor this hate-dripping temperament in its perfection.

Much of this literary bellicosity is pathological. Men overmuch in studies and universities get ill in their livers and sluggish in their circulations; they suffer from shyness, from a persuasion of excessive and neglected merit, old maid's melancholy, and a detestation of all the levities of life. And their suffering finds its vent in ferocious thoughts. A vigorous daily bath, a complete stoppage of wine, beer, spirits, and tobacco, and two hours of hockey in the afternoon would probably make decently tolerant men of all these fermenting professional militarists. Such a regimen would certainly have been the salvation of both Froude and Carlyle. It would probably have saved the world from the vituperation of the Hebrew prophets—those models for infinite mischief.

The extremist cases pass to the average case through insensible degrees. We are all probably, as a species, a little too prone to intolerance, and if we do in all sincerity mean to end war in the world we must prepare ourselves for considerable exercises in restraint when strange people look, behave, believe, and live in a manner different from our own. The minority of permanently bitter souls who want to see objectionable cities burning and men fleeing and dying form the real strength in our occasional complicities.

The world has had its latest object lesson in the German abuse of English and French as "degenerates," of the Russians as "Mongol hordes," of the Japanese as "yellow savages," but it is not only Germans who let themselves slip into national vanity and these ugly hostilities to unfamiliar life. The first line of attack against war must be an attack upon self-righteousness and intolerance. These things are the germ of uncompromising and incurable militarism everywhere.

Now, the attack upon self-righteousness and intolerance and the stern, self-satisfied militarism that arises naturally out of these things is to be made in a number of ways. The first is a sedulous propaganda of the truth about war, a steadfast resolve to keep the pain of warfare alive in the nerves of the careless, to keep the stench of war under the else indifferent nose. It is only in the study of the gloomily megalomaniac historian that aggressive war becomes a large and glorious thing. In reality it is a filthy outrage upon life, an idiot's smashing of the furniture of homes, a mangling, a malignant mischief, a scalding of stokers, a disemboweling of gunners, a raping of caught women by drunken soldiers. By book and pamphlet, by picture and cinematograph film, the pacifist must organize wisdom in these matters.

And not only indignation and distress must come to this task. The stern, uncompromising militarist will not be moved from his determinations by our horror and hostility. These things will but "brace" him. He has a more vulnerable side. The ultimate lethal weapon for every form of stupidity is ridicule, and against the high silliness of the militarist it is particularly effective. It is the laughter of wholesome men that will finally end war. The stern, strong, silent man will cease to trouble us only when we have stripped him of his last rag of pretension and touched through to the quick of his vanity with the realization of his apprehended foolishness. Literature will have failed humanity if it is so blinded by the monstrous agony in Flanders as to miss the essential triviality at the head of the present war. Not the slaughter of ten million men can make the quality of the German Kaiser other than theatrical and silly.

The greater part of the world is in an agony, a fever, but that does not make the cause of that fever noble or great. A man may die of yellow fever through the bite of a mosquito; that does not make a mosquito anything more than a dirty little insect or an aggressive imperialist better than a pothouse fool.

Henceforth we must recognize no heroic war but defensive war, and as the only honorable warriors such men as those peasants of Visé who went out with shotguns against the multitudinous overwhelming nuisance of invasion that trampled down their fields.

Or war to aid such defensive war.

II.

But the people who positively admire and advocate and want war for its own sake are only a small, feverish minority of mankind. The greater obstacle to the pacification of the world is not the war-seeker, but the vast masses of people who for the most various motives support and maintain all kinds of institutions and separations that make for war. They do not want war, they do not like war, but they will not make sacrifices, they will not exert themselves in any way to make war difficult or impossible.

It is they who give the war maniac his opportunity. They will not lock the gun away from him, they will not put a reasonable limit to the disputes into which he can ultimately thrust his violent substitute for a solution. They are like the people who dread and detest yellow fever, but oppose that putting of petrol on the ponds which is necessary to prevent it because of the injury to the water flowers.

Now, it is necessary, if we are to have an intelligently directed anti-war campaign, that we should make a clear, sound classification of these half-hearted people, these people who do not want war, but who permit it. Their indecisions, their vagueness, these are the really effective barriers to our desire to end war forever.

And first, there is one thing very obvious, and that is the necessity for some controlling world authority if treaties are to be respected and war abolished. While there are numerous sovereign States in the world each absolutely free to do what it chooses, to arm its people or repudiate engagements, there can be no sure peace. But great multitudes of those who sincerely desire peace forever cannot realize this. There are, for example, many old-fashioned English liberals who denounce militarism and "treaty entanglements" with equal ardor; they want Britain to stand alone, unaggressive, but free; not realizing that such an isolation is the surest encouragement to any war-enamored power. Exactly the same type is to be found in the United States, and is probably even more influential there. But only by so spinning a web of treaties that all countries are linked by general obligations to mutual protection can a real world-pacification be achieved.

The present alliance against the insufferable militarism of Germany may very probably be the precursor of a much wider alliance against any aggression whatever in the future. Only through some such arrangement is there any reasonable hope of a control and cessation of that constant international bickering and pressure, that rivalry in finance, that competition for influence in weak neutral countries, which has initiated all the struggles of the last century, and which is bound to accumulate tensions for fresh wars so long as it goes on.

Already several States, and particularly the Government of the United States of America, have signed treaties of arbitration, and The Hague Tribunal spins a first web of obligations, exemplary if gossamer, between the countries of the world. But these are but the faint initial suggestions of much greater possibilities, and it is these greater possibilities that have now to be realized if all the talk we have had about a war to end war is to bear any fruit. What is now with each week of the present struggle becoming more practicable is the setting up of a new assembly that will take the place of the various embassies and diplomatic organizations, of a mediaeval pattern and tradition, which have hitherto conducted international affairs.

This war must end in a public settlement, to which all of the belligerents will set their hands; it will not be a bundle of treaties, but one treaty binding eight or nine or more powers. This settlement will almost certainly be attained at a conference of representatives of the various Foreign Offices involved. Quite possibly interested neutral powers will also send representatives. There is no reason whatever why this conference should dissolve, why it should not become a permanent conference upon the inter-relations of the participating powers and the maintenance of the peace of the world. It could have a seat and officials, a staff, and a revenue of its own; it could sit and debate openly, publish the generally binding treaties between its constituent powers, and claim for the support of its decisions their military and naval resources.

The predominance of the greater powers could be secured either by the representatives having multiple votes, according to the population represented, or by some sort of proportional representation. Each power could appoint its representatives through its Foreign Office or by whatever other means it thought fit. They could as conveniently be elected by a legislature or a nation. And such a body would not only be of enormous authority in the statement, interpretation, and enforcement of treaties, but it could also discharge a hundred useful functions in relation to world hygiene, international trade and travel, the control of the ocean, the exploration and conservation of the world's supplies of raw material and food supply. It would be, in fact, a World Council.

Today this is an entirely practicable and hopeful proposal if only we can overcome the opposition of those who cling to the belief that it is possible for a country to be at the same time entirely pacific and entirely unresponsible to and detached from the rest of mankind.

Given such a body, such a great alliance of world powers, much else in the direction of world pacification becomes possible. Without it we may perhaps expect a certain benefit from the improved good feeling of mankind and the salutary overthrow of the German military culture, but we cannot hope for any real organized establishment of peace.

I believe that a powerful support for the assembly and continuance of such a world congress as this could be easily and rapidly developed in North and South America, in Britain and the British Empire generally, in France and Italy, in all the smaller States of northern, central, and western Europe. It would probably have the personal support of the Czar, unless he has profoundly changed the opinions with which he opened his reign, the warm accordance of educated China and Japan, and the good will of a renascent Germany. It would open a new era for mankind.

III.

Now, this idea of a congress of the belligerents to arrange the peace settlements after this war, expanding by the accession of neutral powers into a permanent world congress for the enforcement of international law and the maintenance of the peace of mankind, is so reasonable and attractive and desirable that if it were properly explained it would probably receive the support of nineteen out of every twenty intelligent persons.

Nevertheless, its realization is, on the whole, improbable. A mere universal disgust with war is no more likely to end war than the universal dislike for dying has ended death. And though war, unlike dying, seems to be an avoidable fate, it does not follow that its present extreme unpopularity will end it unless people not only desire but see to the accomplishment of their desire.

And here again one is likely to meet an active and influential opposition. Though the general will and welfare may point to the future management of international relations through a world congress, the whole mass of those whose business has been the direction of international relations is likely to be either skeptical or actively hostile to such an experiment. All the foreign offices and foreign ministers, the diplomatists universally, the politicians who have specialized in national assertion, and the courts that have symbolized and embodied it, all the people, in fact, who will be in control of the settlement, are likely to be against so revolutionary a change.

For it would be an entirely revolutionary change. It would put an end to secrecy. It would end all that is usually understood by diplomacy. It would clear the world altogether of those private understandings and provisional secret agreements, those intrigues, wire-pullings, and quasi-financial operations that have been the very substance of international relations hitherto. To these able and interested people, for the most part highly seasoned by the present conditions, finished and elaborated players at the old game, this is to propose a new, crude, difficult, and unsympathetic game. They may all of them, or most of them, hate war, but they will cling to the belief that their method of operating may now, after a new settlement, be able to prevent or palliate war.

All men get set in a way of living, and it is as little in human nature to give up cheerfully in the middle of life a familiar method of dealing with things in favor of a new and untried one as it is to change one's language or emigrate to an entirely different land. I realize what this proposal means to diplomatists when I try to suppose myself united to assist in the abolition of written books and journalism in favor of the gramophone and the cinematograph. Or united to adopt German as my means of expression. It is only by an enormous pressure of opinion in the world behind these monarchs, ministers, and representatives that they will be induced even to consider the possibility of adapting themselves to this novel style of international dealing through a permanent congress. It is only the consideration of its enormous hopefulness for the rest of the world that gives one the courage to advocate it.

In the question of the possible abolition of the present diplomatic system, just as in the case of the possible abolition of war, while on the side for abolition there must be a hugely preponderating interest and a hugely preponderating majority, it is, nevertheless, a dispersed interest and an unorganized, miscellaneous majority. The minority is, on the other hand, compact, more intensively and more immediately interested and able to resist such great changes with a maximum of efficiency. There is a tremendous need, therefore, for a world congress organization propaganda if this advantageously posted minority is to be overcome.

And from such countries as the American States in particular, and from the small liberal neutrals in Europe, whose diplomacy is least developed and least influential, liberal-minded people through the world are most disposed to expect, and do expect, a lead in this particular matter. The liberal forces in Britain, France, and Russia are extraordinarily embarrassed and enslaved by the vast belligerent necessities into which their lives have been caught. But they would take up such a lead with the utmost vigor and enthusiasm.

No one who has followed the diplomatic history of the negotiations that led to this war can doubt that if there had been no secret treaties, but instead open proclamations of intentions and an open discussion of international ambitions, the world might have been saved this catastrophe. It is no condemnation of any person or country to say this. The reserves and hesitations and misconceptions that led Germany to suppose that England would wait patiently while France and Belgium were destroyed before she herself received attention were unavoidable under the existing diplomatic conditions. What reasonable people have to do now is not to recriminate over the details in the working of a system that we can now all of us perceive to be hopelessly bad, but to do our utmost in this season of opportunity to destroy the obscurities in which fresh mischief may fester for our children.

Let me restate this section in slightly different words. At the end of this war there must be a congress of adjustment. The suggestion in this section is to make this congress permanent, to use it as a clearing house of international relationships and to abolish embassies.

Instead of there being a British Ambassador, for example, at every sufficiently important capital, and an ambassador from every important State in London, and a complex tangle of relationships, misstatements, and misconceptions arising from the ill-co-ordinated activities of this double system of agents, it is proposed to send one or several ambassadors to some central point, such as The Hague, to meet there all the ambassadors of all the significant States in the world and to deal with international questions with a novel frankness in a collective meeting.

This has now become a possible way of doing the world's business because of the development of the means of communication and information. The embassy in a foreign country, as a watching, remonstrating, proposing extension of its country of origin, a sort of eye and finger at the heart of the host country, is now clumsy, unnecessary, inefficient, and dangerous. For most routine work, for reports of all sorts, for legal action, and so forth, on behalf of traveling nationals, the consular service is adequate, or can easily be made adequate. What remains of the ambassadorial apparatus might very well merge with the consular system and the embassy become an international court civility, a ceremonial vestige without any diplomatic value at all.

IV.

Given a permanent world congress developed out of the congress of settlement between the belligerents, a world alliance, with as a last resort a call upon the forces of the associated powers, for dealing with recalcitrants, then a great number of possibilities open out to humanity that must otherwise remain inaccessible. But before we go on to consider these it may be wise to point out how much more likely a world congress is to effect a satisfactory settlement at the end of this war than a congress confined to the belligerents.

The war has progressed sufficiently to convince every one that there is now no possibility of an overwhelming victory for Germany. It must end in a more or less complete defeat of the German and Turkish alliance, and in a considerable readjustment of Austrian and Turkish boundaries. Assisted by the generosity of the doomed Austrians and Turks, the Germans are fighting now to secure a voice as large as possible in the final settlement, and it is conceivable that in the end that settlement may be made quite an attractive one for Germany proper by the crowning sacrifice of suicide on the part of her two subordinated allies.

There can be little doubt that Russia will gain the enormous advantage of a free opening into the Mediterranean and that the battle of the Marne turned the fortunes of France from disaster to expansion. But the rest of the settlement is still vague and uncertain, and German imperialism, at least, is already working hard and intelligently for a favorable situation at the climax, a situation that will enable this militarist empire to emerge still strong, still capable of recuperation and of a renewal at no very remote date of the struggle for European predominance. This is a thing as little for the good of the saner German people as it is for the rest of the world, but it is the only way in which militant imperialism can survive at all.

The alternative of an imperialism shorn of the glamour of aggression, becoming constitutional and democratic—the alternative, that is to say, of a great liberal Germany—is one that will be as distasteful almost to the people who control the destinies of Germany today, and who will speak and act for Germany in the final settlement, as a complete submission to a Serbian conqueror would be.

At the final conference of settlement Germany will not be really represented at all. The Prussian militarist empire will still be in existence, and it will sit at the council, working primarily for its own survival. Unless the Allies insist upon the presence of representatives of Saxony, Bavaria, and so forth, and demand the evidence of popular sanctions—a thing they are very unlikely to demand—that is what "Germany" will signify at the conference. And what is true of Germany will be true, more or less, of several other of the allied powers.

A conference confined purely to the belligerents will be, in fact, a conference not even representative of the belligerents. And it will be tainted with all the traditional policies, aggressions, suspicions, and subterfuges that led up to the war. It will not be the end of the old game, but the readjustment of the old game, the old game which is such an abominable nuisance to the development of modern civilization. The idealism of the great alliance will certainly be subjected to enormous strains, and the whole energy of the Central European diplomatists will be directed to developing and utilizing these stresses.

This, I think, must be manifest even to the foreign offices most concerned. They must see already ahead of them a terrible puzzle of arrangement, a puzzle their own bad traditions will certainly never permit them to solve. "God save us," they may very well pray, "from our own cleverness and sharp dealing," and they may even welcome the promise of an enlarged outlook that the entry of the neutral powers would bring with it.

Every foreign office has its ugly, evil elements, and probably every foreign office dreads those elements. There are certainly Russian fools who dream about India, German fools who dream about Canada and South America, British fools who dream about Africa and the East; aggressionists in the blood, people who can no more let nations live in peace than kleptomaniacs can keep their hands in their own pockets. But quite conceivably there are honest monarchs and sane foreign ministers very ready to snatch at the chance of swamping the evil in their own Chancelleries.

It is just here that the value of neutral participation will come in. Whatever ambitions the neutral powers may have of their own, it may be said generally that they are keenly interested in preventing the settlement from degenerating into a deal in points of vantage for any further aggressions in any direction. Both the United States of America and China are traditionally and incurably pacific powers, professing and practicing an unaggressive policy, and the chief outstanding minor States are equally concerned in securing a settlement that shall settle.

And moreover, so wide reaching now are all international agreements that they have not only a claim to intervene juridically, but they have the much more pressing claim to participate on the ground that no sort of readjustment of Europe, Western Asia, and Africa can leave their own futures unaffected. They are wanted not only in the interests of the belligerent peoples, but for their own sakes and the welfare of the world all together.

V.

Now a world conference, once it is assembled, can take up certain questions that no partial treatment can ever hope to meet. The first of the questions is disarmament. No one who has watched the politics of the last forty years can doubt the very great share the business and finance of armament manufacture has played in bringing about the present horrible killing, and no one who has read accounts of the fighting can doubt how much this industry has enhanced the torment, cruelty, and monstrosity of war.

In the old warfare a man was either stabbed, shot, or thrust through after an hour or so of excitement, and all the wounded on the field were either comfortably murdered or attended to before the dawn of the next day. One was killed by human hands, with understandable and tolerable injuries. But in this war the bulk of the dead—of the western Allies, at any rate—have been killed by machinery, the wounds have been often of an inconceivable horribleness, and the fate of the wounded has been more frightful than was ever the plight of wounded in the hands of victorious savages. For days multitudes of men have been left mangled, half buried in mud and filth, or soaked with water, or frozen, crying, raving between the contending trenches. The number of men that the war, without actual physical wounds, has shattered mentally and driven insane because of its noise, its stresses, its strange unnaturalness, is enormous. Horror in this war has overcome more men than did all the arrows of Cressy.

Almost all this enhanced terribleness of war is due to the novel machinery of destruction that science has rendered possible. The wholesale mangling and destroying of men by implements they have never seen, without any chance of retaliation, has been its most constant feature. You cannot open a paper of any date since the war began without reading of men burned, scalded, and drowned by the bursting of torpedoes from submarines, of men falling out of the sky from shattered aeroplanes, of women and children in Antwerp or Paris mutilated frightfully or torn to ribbons by aerial bombs, of men smashed and buried alive by shells. An indiscriminate, diabolical violence of explosives resulting in cruelties for the most part ineffective from the military point of view is the incessant refrain of this history.

The increased dreadfulness of war due to modern weapons is, however, only one consequence of their development. The practicability of aggressive war in settled countries now is entirely dependent on the use of elaborate artillery on land and warships at sea. Were there only rifles in the world, were an ordinary rifle the largest kind of gun permitted, and were ships specifically made for war not so made, then it would be impossible to invade any country defended by a patriotic and spirited population with any hopes of success because of the enormous defensive capacity of entrenched riflemen not subjected to an unhampered artillery attack.

Modern war is entirely dependent upon equipment of the most costly and elaborate sort. A general agreement to reduce that equipment would not only greatly minimize the evil of any war that did break out, but it would go a long way toward the abolition of war. A community of men might be unwilling to renounce their right of fighting one another if occasion arose, but they might still be willing to agree not to carry arms or to carry arms of a not too lethal sort, to carry pistols instead of rifles or sticks instead of swords. That, indeed, has been the history of social amelioration in a number of communities; it has led straight to a reduction in the number of encounters. So in the same way the powers of the world might be willing to adopt such a limitation of armaments, while still retaining the sovereign right of declaring war in certain eventualities. Under the assurances of a world council threatening a general intervention, such a partial disarmament would be greatly facilitated.

And another aspect of disarmament which needs to be taken up and which only a world congress can take up must be the arming of barbaric or industrially backward powers by the industrially and artillery forces in such countries as efficient powers, the creation of navies Turkey, Servia, Peru, and the like. In Belgium countless Germans were blown to pieces by German-made guns, Europe arms Mexico against the United States; China, Africa, Arabia are full of European and American weapons. It is only the mutual jealousies of the highly organized States that permit this leakage of power. The tremendous warnings of our war should serve to temper their foolish hostilities, and now, if ever, is the time to restrain this insane arming of the less advanced communities.

But before that can be done it is necessary that the manufacture of war material should cease to be a private industry and a source of profit to private individuals, that all the invention and enterprise that blossoms about business should be directed no longer to the steady improvement of man-killing. It is a preposterous and unanticipated thing that respectable British gentlemen should be directing magnificently organized masses of artisans upon the Tyneside in the business of making weapons that may ultimately smash some of those very artisans to smithereens.

At the risk of being called "Utopian" I would submit that the world is not so foolish as to allow that sort of thing to go on indefinitely. It is, indeed, quite a recent human development. All this great business of armament upon commercial lines is the growth of half a century. But it has grown with the vigor of an evil weed, it has thrown out a dark jungle of indirect advertisement, and it has compromised and corrupted great numbers of investors and financial people. It is perhaps the most powerful single interest of all those that will fight against the systematic minimization and abolition of war, and rather than lose his end it may be necessary for the pacifist to buy out all these concerns, to insist upon the various States that have sheltered them taking them over, lock, stock, and barrel, as going businesses.

From what we know of officialism everywhere, the mere transfer will involve almost at once a decline in their vigor and innovating energy. It is perhaps fortunate that the very crown of the private armaments business is the Krupp organization and that its capture and suppression is a matter of supreme importance to all the allied powers. Russia, with her huge population, has not as yet developed armament works upon a very large scale and would probably welcome proposals that minimized the value of machinery and so enhanced that of men. Beyond this and certain American plants for the making of rifles and machine guns only British and French capital is very deeply involved in the armaments trade. The problem is surely not too difficult for human art and honesty.

It is not being suggested that the making of arms should cease in the world, but only that in every country it should become a State monopoly and so completely under Government control. If the State can monopolize the manufacture and sale of spirits, as Russia has done, if it can, after the manner of Great Britain, control the making and sale of such a small, elusive substance as saccharin, it is ridiculous to suppose that it cannot keep itself fully informed of the existence of such elaborated machinery as is needed to make a modern rifle barrel. And it demands a very minimum of alertness, good faith, and good intentions for the various manufacturing countries to keep each other and the world generally informed upon the question of the respective military equipments. From this state of affairs to a definition of a permissible maximum of strength on land and sea for all the high contracting powers is an altogether practicable step. Disarmament is not a dream; it is a thing more practicable than a general hygienic convention and more easily enforced than custom and excise.

Now none of this really involves the abandonment of armies or uniforms or national service. Indeed, to a certain extent it restores the importance of the soldier at the expense of machinery. A world conference for the suppressing of the peace and the preservation of armaments would neither interfere with such dear incorrigible squabbles as that of the orange and green factions in Ireland, (though it might deprive them of their more deadly weapons,) nor absolutely prohibit war between adjacent States. It would, however, be a very powerful delaying force against the outbreak of war, and it would be able to insist with a quite novel strength upon the observation of the rules of war.

It is no good pretending that mere pacifism will end war; what will end war, what, indeed, may be ending war at the present time, is war—against militarism. Force respects itself and no other power. The hope for a world of peace in the future lies in that, in the possibility of a great alliance, so powerful that it will compel adhesions, an alliance prepared to make war upon and destroy and replace the Government of any State that became aggressive in its militarism. This alliance will be in effect a world congress perpetually restraining aggressive secession, and obviously it must regard all the No-Man's Lands—and particularly that wild waste, the ocean—as its highway. The fleets and marines of the allied world powers must become the police of the wastes and waters of the earth.

VI.

Now, such a collective control of belligerence and international relations is the obvious common sense settlement of the present world conflict, it is so manifest, so straight-forward that were it put plainly to them it would probably receive the assent of nineteen sane men out of twenty in the world. This, or some such thing as this, they would agree, is far better than isolations and the perpetual threat of fresh warfare.

But against it there work forces, within these people and without, that render the attainment of this generally acceptable solution far less probable than a kind of no-solution that will only be a reopening of all our hostilities and conflicts upon a fresh footing. Some of these forces are vague and general, and can only be combated by a various and abundant liberal literature, in a widely dispersed battle in which each right-thinking man must do as his conscience directs him. There are the vague national antagonisms, the reservations in favor of one's own country's righteousness, harsh religious and social and moral cant of the Carlyle type, greed, resentment, and suspicion. The greatest of these vague oppositions is that want of faith which makes man say war has always been and must always be, which makes them prophesy that whatever we do will become corrupted and evil, even in the face of intolerable present evils and corruptions.

When at the outbreak of the war I published an article headed "The War That Will End War," at once Mr. W.L. George hastened to reprove my dreaming impracticability. "War there has always been." Great is the magic of a word! He was quite oblivious to the fact that war has changed completely in its character half a dozen times in half a dozen centuries; that the war we fought in South Africa and the present war and the wars of mediaeval Italy and the wars of the Red Indians have about as much in common as a cat and a man and a pair of scissors and a motor car—namely, that they may all be the means of death.

If war can change its character as much as it has done it can change it altogether; if peace can be kept indefinitely in India or North America, it can be kept throughout the world. It is not I who dream, but Mr. George and his like who are not yet fully awake, and it is their somnolence that I dread more than anything else when I think of the great task of settlement before the world.

It is this rather hopeless, inert, pseudo-sage mass of unbelievers who render possible the continuation of war dangers. They give scope for the activities of the evil minority which hates, which lives by pride and grim satisfactions, and which is therefore anxious to have more war and more. And it is these inert half-willed people who will obstruct the disentanglement of the settlement from diplomatic hands. "What do we know about the nuance of such things?" they will ask, with that laziness that apes modesty. It is they who will complain when we seek to buy out the armaments people. Probably all the private armament firms in the world could be bought up for seventy million pounds, but the unbelievers will shake their heads and say: "Then there will only be something else instead."

Yet there are many ungauged forces on the side of the greater settlement. Cynicism is never more than a half-truth, and because man is imperfect it does not follow that he must be futile. Russia is a land of strange silences, but it is manifest that whatever the innermost quality of the Czar may be, he is no clap-trap vulgar conqueror of the Wilhelm-Napoleon pattern. He began his reign, and he may yet crown his reign, with an attempt to establish peace on a newer, broader foundation. His religion, it would seem, is his master and not his servant. There has been no Russian Bernhardi.

And there has been much in America, much said and much done, since the war broke out that has surprised the world. I may confess for myself, and I believe that I shall speak for many other Europeans in this matter, that what we feared most in the United States was levity. We expected mere excitement, violent fluctuations of opinion, a confused irresponsibility, and possibly mischievous and disastrous interventions. It is no good hiding an open secret. We judged America by the peace headline. It is time we began to offer our apologies to America and democracy. The result of reading endless various American newspapers and articles, of following the actions of the American Government, of talking to representative Americans, is to realize the existence of a very clear, strong national mentality, a firm, self-controlled, collective will, far more considerable in its totality than the world has ever seen before.

We thought the United States would be sentimentally patriotic and irresponsible, that they would behave as though the New World was, indeed, a separate planet, and as though they had neither duties nor brotherhood in Europe. It is quite clear, on the contrary, that the people of the United States consider this war as their affair also, and that they have the keenest sense of their responsibility for the general welfare of mankind.

So that as a second chance, after the possibility of a broad handling of the settlement by the Czar, and as a very much bigger probability, is the insistence by America upon her right to a voice in the ultimate settlement and an initiative from the Western Hemisphere that will lead to a world congress. There are the two most hopeful sources of that great proposal. It is the tradition of British national conduct to be commonplace to the pitch of dullness, and all the stifled intelligence of Great Britain will beat in vain against the national passion for the ordinary. Britain, in the guise of Sir Edward Grey, will come to the congress like a family solicitor among the Gods. What is the good of shamming about this least heroic of Fatherlands? But Britain would follow a lead; the family solicitor is honest and well-meaning. France and Belgium and Italy are too deeply in the affair, or without sufficient moral prestige, for a revolutionary initiative in international relationship.

There is, however, a possible third source from which the proposal for a world congress might come, with the support of both neutrals and belligerents, and that is The Hague. Were there a man of force and genius at The Hague now, a man speaking with authority and not as the scribes, he might thrust enormous benefits upon the world.

It is from these three sources that I most hope for leading now. Of the new Pope and his influence I know nothing. But in the present situation of the world's affairs it behooves us ill to wait idle until leaders clear the way for us. Every man who realizes the broad conditions of the situation, every one who can talk or write or echo, can do his utmost to spread his realization of the possibilities of a world congress and the establishment of world law and world peace that lie behind the monstrous agonies and cruelties and confusions of this catastrophic year. Given an immense body of opinion initiatives may break out effectively anywhere; failing it, they will be fruitless everywhere.

Small But Great-souled.

By EMMELINE PANKHURST.

[From King Albert's Book.]

The women of Great Britain will never forget what Belgium has done for all that women hold most dear.

In the days to come mothers will tell their children how a small but great-souled nation fought to the death against overwhelming odds and sacrificed all things to save the world from an intolerable tyranny.

The story of the Belgian people's defense of freedom will inspire countless generations yet unborn.

Zeppelin Raids on London

By the Naval Correspondent of The London Times

[From The London Times, Jan. 22, 1915.]

Some doubt has been thrown by correspondents upon the ability of the Zeppelins to reach London from Cuxhaven, the place from which the raiders of Tuesday night appear to have started. The distance which the airships traveled, including their manoeuvres over the land, must have been quite 650 miles. This is not nearly as far as similar airships have traveled in the past. One of the Zeppelins flew from Friedrichshafen, on Lake Constance, to Berlin, a continuous flight of about 1,000 miles, in thirty-one hours. Our naval officers will also recall the occasion of the visit of the First Cruiser Squadron to Copenhagen in September, 1912, when the German passenger airship Hansa was present. The Hansa made the run from Hamburg to Copenhagen, a distance of 198 miles, in seven hours, and Count Zeppelin was on board her. Supposing an airship left Cuxhaven at noon on some day when the conditions were favorable and traveled to London, she could not get back again by noon next day if she traveled at the half-power speed which the vessels on Tuesday appear to have used. But if she did the run at full speed—that is to say, at about fifty miles an hour—she could reach London by 9 o'clock the same evening, have an hour to manoeuvre over the capital, and return by 7 o'clock next morning. With a favorable wind for her return journey, she might make an even longer stay. Given suitable conditions, therefore, as on Tuesday, there appears to be no reason why, as far as speed and fuel endurance are concerned, these vessels should not reach London from Cuxhaven.

With regard also to the amount of ammunition a Zeppelin can carry, this depends, of course, on the lifting power of the airship and the way in which it is distributed. The later Zeppelins are said to be able to carry a load of about 15,000 pounds, which is available for the crew, fuel for the engines, ballast, provisions, and spare stores, a wireless installation, and armament or ammunition. With engines of 500 horse power, something like 360 pounds of fuel is used per hour to drive them at full speed. Thus for a journey of twenty hours the vessel would need at least 7200 pounds of fuel. The necessary crew would absorb 2000 pounds more, and probably another 1500 pounds would be taken up for ballast and stores. Allowing a weight of 250 pounds for the wireless equipment, there would remain about 4000 pounds for bombs, or something less than two tons of explosives, for use against a target 458 miles from the base. This amount of ammunition could be increased proportionately as the conditions were altered by using a nearer base, or by proceeding at a slower and therefore more economical speed, &c.

It is noteworthy that although the German airships were expected to act as scouts in the North Sea they do not appear to have accomplished anything in this direction. Possibly this has been due to the fear of attack by our men-of-war or aircraft if the movements were made in daytime, when alone they would be useful for this purpose. What happened during the Christmas Day affair, when, as the official report said, "a novel combat" ensued between the most modern cruisers on the one hand and the enemy's aircraft and submarines on the other, would not tend to lessen this apprehension. On the other hand, the greater stability of the atmosphere at night makes navigation after dark easier, and I believe that it has been usual in all countries for airships to make their trial trips at night.

Radius of Action of a Modern Zeppelin

The above outline map, which we reproduce from "The Naval Annual," shows in the dotted circle the comparative radius of action of a modern Zeppelin at half-power—about 36 knots speed—with other types of air machines, assuming her to be based on Cologne. It is estimated that aircraft of this type, with a displacement of about 22 tons, could run for 60 hours at half-speed, and cover a distance equivalent to about 2160 sea miles. This would represent the double voyage, out and home, from Cologne well to the north of the British Isles, to Petrograd, to Athens, or to Lisbon. The inner circle shows the radius of action of a Parseval airship at half-power—about 30 knots—based on Farnborough, and the small inner circle represents the radius of action of a hydro-aeroplane based on the Medway.]

It is customary also for the airships to carry, in addition to explosive and incendiary bombs, others which on being dropped throw out a light and thereby help to indicate to the vessel above the object which it is desired to aim at. Probably some of the bombs which were thrown in Norfolk were of this character. It is understood that all idea of carrying an armament on top of the Zeppelins has now been abandoned, and it is obvious that if searchlight equipment or guns of any sort were carried the useful weight for bombs would have to be reduced unless the range of action was diminished. It will have been noticed that the Zeppelins which came on Tuesday appear to have been anxious to get back before daylight, which looks as if they expected to be attacked if they were seen, as it is fairly certain they would have been.

Assuming the raid of Tuesday to have been in the nature of a trial trip, it is rather curious that it was not made before. Apparently the Zeppelins can only trust themselves to make a raid of this description in very favorable circumstances. Strong winds, heavy rain, or even a damp atmosphere are all hindrances to be considered. That there will be more raids is fairly certain, but there cannot be many nights when the Germans can hope to have a repetition of the conditions of weather and darkness which prevailed this week. It should be possible, more or less, to ascertain the nights in every month in which, given other suitable circumstances, raids are likely to be made. In view of the probability that the attacks made by British aviators on the Zeppelin bases at Düsseldorf and Friedrichshafen caused a delay in the German plans for making this week's attack, it would appear that the most effective antidote would be a repetition of such legitimate operations.

JULIUS CAESAR ON THE AISNE

[From The New Yorker Herold (Morgenblatt.)]

It has repeatedly been pointed out that 2000 years ago Julius Caesar fought on the battlegrounds of the Aisne, which are now the location of the fierce fighting between the Germans and the French. It is probably less known, however, that in this present war Caesar's "Commentarii de Bello Gallico" are used by French officers as a practical text book on strategy. The war correspondent of the Corriere della Serra reports this some what astonishing fact.

A few weeks ago he visited his friend, a commanding Colonel of a French regiment, in his trench, which was furnished with bare necessities only. In a corner on a small table lay the open volume of "Commentarii Caesaris," which the visitor took into his hand out of curiosity in order to see what passage the Colonel had just been reading. There he found the description of the fight against the Remer, who, at that time, lived in the neighborhood of the present city of Rheims. Principally with the aid of his Numidian troops, Caesar at that time had prevented the Remer from crossing the River Axona, today called the Aisne.

Caesar's camp was only a few kilometers from Berry-au-Bac, in the vicinity of Pontavert, the headquarters of the division to which the regiment of the Colonel belonged. This Colonel had received the order to cross the River Aisne with Moroccans and Spahis, and for this purpose he had studied the description of Caesar. To the astonished question of the reporter, what made him occupy his mind with the study of Caesar, the Frenchman replied:

"Caesar's battle descriptions form a book from which even in this present day war a great deal may be learned. Caesar is by no means as obsolete as you seem to think. I ask you to consider, for instance, that the trenches which have gained so much importance in this war date back to Julius Caesar."

H.M. CHRISTIAN X—King of Denmark—
(Photo from Paul Thompson)

PRESENT AND FUTURE QUEENS OF THE NETHERLANDS—
Queen Wilhelmina with Her Little Daughter Juliana, Princess of Orange

Sir John French's Own Story

Continuing the Famous Dispatches of the British Commander in Chief to Lord Kitchener

The previous dispatches, reviewing the operations of the British regular and territorial troops on the Continent under Field Marshal French's chief command, appeared in THE NEW YORK TIMES CURRENT HISTORY of Jan. 23, 1915, bringing the account of operations to Nov. 20, 1914. The official dispatch to Earl Kitchener presented below records the bitter experiences of the Winter in the trenches from the last week of November until Feb. 2, 1915.

The following dispatch was received on Feb. 12, 1915, from the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief, the British Army in the Field.

To the Secretary of State for War, War Office, London, S.W.

General Headquarters,

Feb. 2, 1915.

My Lord: I have the honor to forward a further report on the operations of the army under my command.

1. In the period under review the salient feature was the presence of his Majesty the King in the field. His Majesty arrived at Headquarters on Nov. 30 and left on Dec. 5.

At a time when the strength and endurance of the troops had been tried to the utmost throughout the long and arduous battle of Ypres-Armentières the presence of his Majesty in their midst was of the greatest possible help and encouragement.

His Majesty visited all parts of the extensive area of operations and held numerous inspections of the troops behind the line of trenches.

On Nov. 16 Lieutenant his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales, K.G., Grenadier Guards, joined my staff as aide de camp.

2. Since the date of my last report the operations of the army under my command have been subject almost entirely to the limitations of weather.

History teaches us that the course of campaigns in Europe, which have been actively prosecuted during the months of December and January, have been largely influenced by weather conditions. It should, however, be thoroughly understood throughout the country that the most recent development of armaments and the latest methods of conducting warfare have added greatly to the difficulties and drawbacks of a vigorous Winter campaign.

To cause anything more than a waste of ammunition long-range artillery fire requires constant and accurate observation; but this most necessary condition is rendered impossible of attainment in the midst of continual fog and mist.

Again, armies have now grown accustomed to rely largely on aircraft reconnoissance for accurate information of the enemy, but the effective performance of this service is materially influenced by wind and weather.

The deadly accuracy, range, and quick-firing capabilities of the modern rifle and machine gun require that a fire-swept zone be crossed in the shortest possible space of time by attacking troops. But if men are detained under the enemy's fire by the difficulty of emerging from a water-logged trench, and by the necessity of passing over ground knee-deep in holding mud and slush, such attacks become practically prohibitive owing to the losses they entail.

During the exigencies of the heavy fighting which ended in the last week of November the French and British forces had become somewhat mixed up, entailing a certain amount of difficulty in matters of supply and in securing unity of command.

By the end of November I was able to concentrate the army under my command in one area, and, by holding a shorter line, to establish effective reserves.

By the beginning of December there was a considerable falling off in the volume of artillery fire directed against our front by the enemy. Reconnoissance and reports showed that a certain amount of artillery had been withdrawn. We judged that the cavalry in our front, with the exception of one division of the Guard, had disappeared.

There did not, however, appear to have been any great diminution in the numbers of infantry holding the trenches.

3. Although both artillery and rifle fire were exchanged with the enemy every day, and sniping went on more or less continuously during the hours of daylight, the operations which call for special record or comment are comparatively few.

During the last week in November some successful minor night operations were carried out in the Fourth Corps.

On the night of Nov. 23-24 a small party of the Second Lincolnshire Regiment, under Lieut. E.H. Impey, cleared three of the enemy's advanced trenches opposite the Twenty-fifth Brigade, and withdrew without loss.

On the night of the 24th-25th Capt. J.R. Minshull Ford, Royal Welsh Fusiliers, and Lieut. E.L. Morris, Royal Engineers, with fifteen men of the Royal Engineers and Royal Welsh Fusiliers, successfully mined and blew up a group of farms immediately in front of the German trenches on the Touquet-Bridoux Road which had been used by German snipers.

On the night of Nov. 26-27 a small party of the Second Scots Guards, under Lieut. Sir E.H.W. Hulse, Bart., rushed the trenches opposite the Twentieth Brigade, and after pouring a heavy fire into them returned with useful information as to the strength of the Germans and the position of machine guns.

The trenches opposite the Twenty-fifth Brigade were rushed the same night by a patrol of the Second Rifle Brigade, under Lieut. E. Durham.

On Nov. 23 the One Hundred and Twelfth Regiment of the Fourteenth German Army Corps succeeded in capturing some 800 yards of the trenches held by the Indian Corps, but the general officer commanding the Meerut Division organized a powerful counter-attack, which lasted throughout the night. At daybreak on Nov. 24 the line was entirely re-established.

The operation was a costly one, involving many casualties, but the enemy suffered far more heavily.

We captured over 100 prisoners, including 3 officers, as well as 3 machine guns and two trench mortars.

On Dec. 7 the concentration of the Indian Corps was completed by the arrival of the Sirhind Brigade from Egypt.

On Dec. 9 the enemy attempted to commence a strong attack against the Third Corps, particularly in front of the trenches held by the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders and the Middlesex Regiment.

They were driven back with heavy loss, and did not renew the attempt. Our casualties were very slight.

During the early days of December certain indications along the whole front of the allied line induced the French commanders and myself to believe that the enemy had withdrawn considerable forces from the western theatre.

Arrangements were made with the commander of the Eighth French Army for an attack to be commenced on the morning of Dec. 14.

Operations began at 7 A.M. by a combined heavy artillery bombardment by the two French and the Second British Corps.

The British objectives were the Petit Bois and the Maedelsteed Spur, lying respectively to the west and the southwest of the village of Wytschaete.

At 7:45 A.M. the Royal Scots, with great dash, rushed forward and attacked the former, while the Gordon Highlanders attacked the latter place.

The Royal Scots, commanded by Major F.J. Duncan, D.S.O., in face of a terrible machine gun and rifle fire, carried the German trench on the west edge of the Petit Bois, capturing two machine guns and fifty-three prisoners, including one officer.

The Gordon Highlanders, with great gallantry, advanced up the Maedelsteed Spur, forcing the enemy to evacuate their front trench. They were, however, losing heavily, and found themselves unable to get any further. At nightfall they were obliged to fall back to their original position.

Capt. C. Boddam-Whetham and Lieut. W.F.R. Dobie showed splendid dash, and with a few men entered the enemy's leading trenches; but they were all either killed or captured.

Lieut. G.R.V. Hume-Gare and Lieut. W.H. Paterson also distinguished themselves by their gallant leading.

Although not successful, the operation was most creditable to the fighting spirit of the Gordon Highlanders, most ably commanded by Major A.W.F. Baird, D.S.O.

As the Thirty-second French Division on the left had been unable to make any progress, the further advance of our infantry into the Wytschaete Wood was not practicable.

Possession of the western edge of the Petit Bois was, however, retained.

The ground was devoid of cover and so water-logged that a rapid advance was impossible, the men sinking deep in the mud at every step they took.

The artillery throughout the day was very skillfully handled by the C.A.R.A.'s of the Fourth and Fifth Divisions—Major Gen. F.D.V. Wing, C.B.; Brig. Gen. G.F. Milne, C.B., D.S.O., and Brig. Gen. J.E.W. Headlam, C.B., D.S.O.

The casualties during the day were about 17 officers and 407 other ranks. The losses of the enemy were very considerable, large numbers of dead being found in the Petit Bois and also in the communicating trenches in front of the Gordon Highlanders, in one of which a hundred were counted by a night patrol.

On this day the artillery of the Fourth Division, Third Corps, was used in support of the attack, under orders of the General Officer Commanding Second Corps.

The remainder of the Third Corps made demonstrations against the enemy with a view to preventing him from detaching troops to the area of operations of the Second Corps.

From Dec. 15 to 17 the offensive operations which were commenced on the 14th were continued, but were confined chiefly to artillery bombardment.

The infantry advance against Wytschaete Wood was not practicable until the French on our left could make some progress to afford protection to that flank.

On the 17th it was agreed that the plan of attack as arranged should be modified; but I was requested to continue demonstrations along my line in order to assist and support certain French operations which were being conducted elsewhere.

4. In his desire to act with energy up to his instructions to demonstrate and occupy the enemy, the General Officer Commanding the Indian Corps decided to take the advantage of what appeared to him a favorable opportunity to launch attacks against the advanced trenches in his front on Dec. 18 and 19.

The attack of the Meerut Division on the left was made on the morning of the 19th with energy and determination, and was at first attended with considerable success, the enemy's advanced trenches being captured. Later on, however, a counter-attack drove them back to their original position with considerable loss.

The attack of the Lahore Division commenced at 4:30 A.M. It was carried out by two companies each of the First Highland Light Infantry and the First Battalion, Fourth Gurkha Rifles of the Sirhind Brigade, under Lieut. Col. R.W.H. Ronaldson. This attack was completely successful, two lines of the enemy's trenches being captured with little loss.

Before daylight the captured trenches were filled with as many men as they could hold. The front was very restricted, communication to the rear impossible.

At daybreak it was found that the position was practically untenable. Both flanks were in the air, and a supporting attack, which was late in starting, and, therefore, conducted during daylight, failed, although attempted with the greatest gallantry and resolution.

Lieut. Col. Ronaldson held on till dusk, when the whole of the captured trenches had to be evacuated, and the detachment fell back to its original line.

By the night of Dec. 19 nearly all the ground gained during the day had been lost.

From daylight on Dec. 20 the enemy commenced a heavy fire from artillery and trench mortars on the whole front of the Indian Corps. This was followed by infantry attacks, which were in especial force against Givenchy, and between that place and La Quinque Rue.

At about 10 A.M. the enemy succeeded in driving back the Sirhind Brigade and capturing a considerable part of Givenchy, but the Fifty-seventh Rifles and Ninth Bhopals, north of the canal, and the Connaught Rangers, south of it, stood firm.

The Fifteenth Sikhs of the Divisional Reserve were already supporting the Sirhind Brigade. On the news of the retirement of the latter being received, the Forty-seventh Sikhs were also sent up to reinforce Gen. Brunker. The First Manchester Regiment, Fourth Suffolk Regiment, and two battalions of French territorials under Gen. Carnegy were ordered to launch a vigorous counter-attack to retake by a flank attack the trenches lost by the Sirhind Brigade.

Orders were sent to Gen. Carnegy to divert his attack on Givenchy village, and to re-establish the situation there.

A battalion of the Fifty-eighth French Division was sent to Annequin in support.

About 5 P.M. a gallant attack by the First Manchester Regiment and one company of the Fourth Suffolk Regiment had captured Givenchy, and had cleared the enemy out of the two lines of trenches to the northeast. To the east of the village the Ninth Bhopal Infantry and Fifty-seventh Rifles had maintained their positions, but the enemy were still in possession of our trenches to the north of the village.

Gen. Macbean, with the Secunderabad Cavalry Brigade, Second Battalion, Eighth Gurkha Rifles, and the Forty-seventh Sikhs, was sent up to support Gen. Brunker, who, at 2 P.M., directed Gen. Macbean to move to a position of readiness in the second line trenches from Maris northward, and to counter-attack vigorously if opportunity offered.

Some considerable delay appears to have occurred, and it was not until 1 A.M. on the 21st that the Forty-seventh Sikhs and the Seventh Dragoon Guards, under the command of Lieut. Col. H.A. Lempriere, D.S.O., of the latter regiment, were launched in counter-attack.

They reached the enemy's trenches, but were driven out by enfilade fire, their gallant commander being killed.

The main attack by the remainder of Gen. Macbean's force, with the remnants of Lieut. Col. Lempriere's detachment, (which had again been rallied,) was finally rushed in at about 4:30 A.M., and also failed.

In the northern section of the defensive line the retirement of the Second Battalion, Second Gurkha Rifles, at about 10 A.M. on the 20th, had left the flank of the First Seaforth Highlanders, on the extreme right of the Meerut Division line, much exposed. This battalion was left shortly afterward completely in the air by the retirement of the Sirhind Brigade.

The Fifty-eighth Rifles, therefore, were ordered to support the left of the Seaforth Highlanders, to fill the gap created by the retirement of the Gurkhas.

During the whole of the afternoon strenuous efforts were made by the Seaforth Highlanders to clear the trenches to their right and left. The First Battalion, Ninth Gurkha Rifles, reinforced the Second Gurkhas near the orchard where the Germans were in occupation of the trenches abandoned by the latter regiment. The Garhwal Brigade was being very heavily attacked, and their trenches and loopholes were much damaged; but the brigade continued to hold its front and attack, connecting with the Sixth Jats on the left of the Dehra Dun Brigade.

No advance in force was made by the enemy, but the troops were pinned to their ground by heavy artillery fire, the Seaforth Highlanders especially suffering heavily.

Shortly before nightfall the Second Royal Highlanders, on the right of the Seaforth Highlanders, had succeeded in establishing touch with the Sirhind Brigade; and the continuous line (though dented near the orchard) existed throughout the Meerut Division.

Early in the afternoon of Dec. 20 orders were sent to the First Corps, which was then in general army reserve, to send an infantry brigade to support the Indian Corps.

The First Brigade was ordered to Bethune, and reached that place at midnight on Dec. 20-21. Later in the day Sir Douglas Haig was ordered to move the whole of the First Division in support of the Indian Corps.

The Third Brigade reached Bethune between 8 A.M. and 9 A.M. on the 21st, and on the same date the Second Brigade arrived at Lacon at 1 P.M.

The First Brigade was directed on Givenchy, via Pont Fixe, and the Third Brigade, through Gorre, on the trenches evacuated by the Sirhind Brigade. The Second Brigade was directed to support, the Dehra Dun Brigade being placed at the disposal of the General Officer Commanding Meerut Division.

At 1 P.M. the General Officer Commanding First Division directed the First Brigade in attack from the west of Givenchy in a northeasterly direction, and the Third Brigade from Festubert in an east-northeasterly direction, the object being to pass the position originally held by us and to capture the German trenches 400 yards to the east of it.

By 5 P.M. the First Brigade had obtained a hold in Givenchy, and the ground south as far as the canal; and the Third Brigade had progressed to a point half a mile west of Festubert.

By nightfall the First South Wales Borderers and the Second Welsh Regiment of the Third Brigade had made a lodgment in the original trenches to the northeast of Festubert, the First Gloucestershire Regiment continuing the line southward along the track east of Festubert.

The First Brigade had established itself on the east side of Givenchy.

By 3 P.M. the Third Brigade was concentrated at Le Touret, and was ordered to retake the trenches which had been lost by the Dehr Dun Brigade.

By 10 P.M. the support trenches west of the orchard had been carried, but the original fire trenches had been so completely destroyed that they could not be occupied.

This operation was performed by the First Loyal North Lancashire Regiment and the First Northamptonshire Regiment, supported by the Second King's Royal Rifle Corps, in reserve.

Throughout this day the units of the Indian Corps rendered all the assistance and support they could in view of their exhausted condition.

At 1 P.M. on the 22d Sir Douglas Haig took over command from Sir James Willcocks. The situation in the front line was then approximately as follows:

South of the La Bassée Canal the Connaught Rangers of the Ferozepore Brigade had not been attacked. North of the canal a short length of our original line was still held by the Ninth Bhopals and the Fifty-seventh Rifles of the same brigade. Connecting with the latter was the First Brigade, holding the village of Givenchy and its eastern and northern approaches. On the left of the First Brigade was the Third Brigade. Tenth had been lost between the left of the former and the right of the latter. The Third Brigade held a line along, and in places advanced to, the east of the Festubert Road. Its left was in communication with the right of the Meerut Division line, where troops of the Second Brigade had just relieved the First Seaforth Highlanders. To the north, units of the Second Brigade held an indented line west of the orchard, connecting with half of the Second Royal Highlanders, half of the Forty-first Dogras, and the First Battalion Ninth Gurkha Rifles. From this point to the north the Ninth Jats and the whole of the Garhwal Brigade occupied the original line which they had held from the commencement of the operations.

The relief of most units of the southern sector was effected on the night of Dec. 22. The Meerut Division remained under the orders of the First Corps, and was not completely withdrawn until Dec. 27.

In the evening the position at Givenchy was practically re-established, and the Third Brigade had reoccupied the old line of trenches.

During the 23d the enemy's activities ceased, and the whole position was restored to very much its original condition.

In my last dispatch I had occasion to mention the prompt and ready help I received from the Lahore Division, under the command of Major Gen. H.B.B. Watkis, C.B., which was thrown into action immediately on arrival, when the British forces were very hard pressed during the battle of Ypres-Armentières.

The Indian troops have fought with the utmost steadfastness and gallantry whenever they have been called upon.

Weather conditions were abnormally bad, the snow and floods precluding any active operations during the first three weeks of January.

5. At 7:30 A.M. on Jan. 25 the enemy began to shell Bethune, and at 8 A.M. a strong hostile infantry attack developed south of the canal, preceded by a heavy bombardment of artillery, minenwerfers, and, possibly, the explosion of mines, though the latter is doubtful.

The British line south of the canal formed a pronounced salient from the canal on the left, thence running forward toward the railway triangle and back to the main La Bassée-Bethune Road, where it joined the French. This line was occupied by half a battalion of the Scots Guards, and half a battalion of the Coldstream Guards, of the First Infantry Brigade. The trenches in the salient were blown in almost at once, and the enemy's attack penetrated this line. Our troops retired to a partially prepared second line, running approximately due north and south from the canal to the road, some 500 yards west of the railway triangle. This second line had been strengthened by the construction of a keep half way between the canal and the road. Here the other two half battalions of the above-mentioned regiments were in support.

These supports held up the enemy, who, however, managed to establish himself in the brick stacks and some communication trenches between the keep, the road, and the canal—and even beyond the west of the keep on either side of it.

The London Scottish had in the meantime been sent up in support, and a counter-attack was organized with the First Royal Highlanders, part of the First Cameron Highlanders, and the Second King's Royal Rifle Corps, the latter regiment having been sent forward from the Divisional Reserve.

The counter-attack was delayed in order to synchronize with a counter-attack north of the canal which was arranged for 1 P.M.

At 1 P.M. these troops moved forward, their flanks making good progress near the road and the canal, but their centre being held up. The Second Royal Sussex Regiment was then sent forward, late in the afternoon, to reinforce. The result was that the Germans were driven back far enough to enable a somewhat broken line to be taken up, running from the culvert on the railway, almost due south to the keep, and thence southeast to the main road.

The French left near the road had also been attacked and driven back a little, but not to so great an extent as the British right. Consequently the French left was in advance of the British right, and exposed to a possible flank attack from the north.

The Germans did not, however, persevere further in their attack.

The above-mentioned line was strengthened during the night, and the First Guards Brigade, which had suffered severely, was withdrawn into reserve and replaced by the Second Infantry Brigade.

While this was taking place another and equally severe attack was delivered north of the canal against the village of Givenchy.

At 8:15 A.M., after a heavy artillery bombardment with high explosive shells, the enemy's infantry advanced under the effective fire of our artillery, which, however, was hampered by the constant interruption of telephonic communication between the observers and batteries. Nevertheless, our artillery fire, combined with that of the infantry in the fire trenches, had the effect of driving the enemy from its original direction of advance, with the result that his troops crowded together on the northeast corner of the village and broke through into the centre of the village as far as the keep, which had been previously put in a state of defense.

The places underlined in the above map indicate the points around La Bassée and southward to Arras, where part of the British Expeditionary Force was heavily engaged.

The Germans had lost heavily, and a well-timed local counter-attack, delivered by the reserves of the Second Welsh Regiment and First South Wales Borderers, and by a company of the First Royal Highlanders, (lent by the First Brigade as a working party—this company was at work on the keep at the time,) was completely successful, with the result that after about an hour's street fighting all who had broken into the village were either captured or killed, and the original line around the village was re-established by noon.

South of the village, however, and close to the canal, the right of the Second Royal Munster Fusiliers fell back in conformity with the troops south of the canal, but after dark that regiment moved forward and occupied the old line.

During the course of the attack on Givenchy the enemy made five assaults on the salient at the northeast of the village about French Farm, but was repulsed every time with heavy loss.

6. On the morning of Jan. 29 attacks were made on the right of the First Corps, south of the canal in the neighborhood of La Bassée.

The enemy, (part of the Fourteenth German Corps,) after a severe shelling, made a violent attack with scaling ladders on the keep, also to the north and south of it. In the keep and on the north side the Sussex Regiment held the enemy off, inflicting on him serious losses. On the south side the hostile infantry succeeded in reaching the Northamptonshire Regiment's trenches, but were immediately counter-attacked and all killed. Our artillery co-operated well with the infantry in repelling the attack.

In this action our casualties were inconsiderable, but the enemy lost severely, more than 200 of his killed alone being left in front of our position.

7. On Feb. 1 a fine piece of work was carried out by the Fourth Brigade in the neighborhood of Cuinchy.

Some of the Second Coldstream Guards were driven from their trenches at 2:30 A.M., but made a stand some twenty yards east of them in a position which they held till morning.

A counter-attack, launched at 3:15 A.M., by one company of the Irish Guards and half a company of the Second Coldstream Guards, proved unsuccessful, owing to heavy rifle fire from the east and south.

At 10:05 A.M., acting under orders of the First Division, a heavy bombardment was opened on the lost ground for ten minutes; and this was followed immediately by an assault by about fifty men of the Second Coldstream Guards with bayonets, led by Capt. A. Leigh Bennett, followed by thirty men of the Irish Guards, led by Second Lieut. F.F. Graham, also with bayonets. These were followed by a party of Royal Engineers with sand bags and wire.

All the ground which had been lost was brilliantly retaken, the Second Coldstream Guards also taking another German trench and capturing two machine guns.

Thirty-two prisoners fell into our hands.

The General Officer Commanding First Division describes the preparation by the artillery as "splendid, the high explosive shells dropping in the exact spot with absolute precision."

In forwarding his report on this engagement, the General Officer Commanding First Army writes as follows:

Special credit is due—

(i) To Major Gen. Haking, commanding First Division, for the prompt manner in which he arranged this counter-attack and for the general plan of action, which was crowned with success.

(ii) To the General Officer commanding the Fourth Brigade (Lord Cavan) for the thorough manner in which he carried out the orders of the General Officer commanding the division.

(iii) To the regimental officers, non-commissioned officers, and men of the Second Coldstream Guards and Irish Guards, who, with indomitable pluck, stormed two sets of barricades, captured three German trenches, two machine guns, and killed or made prisoners many of the enemy.

8. During the period under report the Royal Flying Corps has again performed splendid service.

Although the weather was almost uniformly bad and the machines suffered from constant exposure, there have been only thirteen days on which no actual reconnoissance has been effected. Approximately, 100,000 miles have been flown.

In addition to the daily and constant work of reconnoissance and co-operation with the artillery, a number of aerial combats have been fought, raids carried out, detrainments harassed, parks and petrol depots bombed, &c.

Various successful bomb-dropping raids have been carried out, usually against the enemy's aircraft material. The principle of attacking hostile aircraft whenever and wherever seen (unless highly important information is being delivered) has been adhered to, and has resulted in the moral fact that enemy machines invariably beat immediate retreat when chased.

Five German aeroplanes are known to have been brought to the ground, and it would appear probable that others, though they have managed to reach their own lines, have done so in a considerably damaged condition.

9. In my dispatch of Nov. 20, 1914, I referred to the reinforcements of territorial troops which I had received, and I mentioned several units which had already been employed in the fighting line.

In the positions which I held for some years before the outbreak of this war I was brought into close contact with the territorial force, and I found every reason to hope and believe that, when the hour of trial arrived, they would justify every hope and trust which was placed in them.

The Lords Lieutenant of Counties and the associations which worked under them bestowed a vast amount of labor and energy on the organization of the territorial force; and I trust it may be some recompense to them to know that I, and the principal commanders serving under me, consider that the territorial force has far more than justified the most sanguine hopes that any of us ventured to entertain of their value and use in the field. Commanders of cavalry divisions are unstinted in their praise of the manner in which the yeomanry regiments attached to their brigades have done their duty, both in and out of action. The service of divisional cavalry is now almost entirely performed by yeomanry, and divisional commanders report that they are very efficient.

Army corps commanders are loud in their praise of the territorial battalions, which form part of nearly all the brigades at the front in the first line, and more than one of them have told me that these battalions are fast approaching—if they have not already reached—the standard of efficiency of regular infantry.

I wish to add a word about the Officers' Training Corps. The presence of the Artists' Rifles (Twenty-eighth Battalion, the London regiment) with the army in France enabled me also to test the value of this organization.

Having had some experience in peace of the working of the Officers' Training Corps, I determined to turn the Artists' Rifles (which formed part of the Officers' Training Corps in peace time) to its legitimate use. I therefore established the battalion as a training corps for officers in the field.

The cadets passed through a course, which includes some thoroughly practical training, as all cadets do a tour of forty-eight hours in the trenches, and afterward write a report on what they see and notice. They also visit an observation post of a battery or group of batteries, and spend some hours there.

A commandant has been appointed, and he arranges and supervises the work, sets schemes for practice, administers the school, delivers lectures, and reports on the candidates.

The cadets are instructed in all branches of military training suitable for platoon commanders.

Machine-gun tactics, a knowledge of which is so necessary for all junior officers, is a special feature of the course of instruction.

When first started, the school was able to turn out officers at the rate of seventy-five a month. This has since been increased to 100.

Reports received from divisional and army corps commanders on officers who have been trained at the school are most satisfactory.

10. Since the date of my last report I have been able to make a close personal inspection of all the units in the command. I was most favorably impressed by all I saw.

The troops composing the army in France have been subjected to as severe a trial as it is possible to impose upon any body of men. The desperate fighting described in my last dispatch had hardly been brought to a conclusion when they were called upon to face the rigors and hardships of a Winter campaign. Frost and snow have alternated with periods of continuous rain.

The men have been called upon to stand for many hours together almost up to their waists in bitterly cold water, only separated by one or two hundred yards from a most vigilant enemy.

Although every measure which science and medical knowledge could suggest to mitigate these hardships was employed, the sufferings of the men have been very great.

In spite of all this they presented, at the inspections to which I have referred, a most soldierlike, splendid, though somewhat war-worn, appearance. Their spirit remains high and confident; their general health is excellent, and their condition most satisfactory.

I regard it as most unfortunate that circumstances have prevented any account of many splendid instances of courage and endurance, in the face of almost unparalleled hardship and fatigue in war, coming regularly to the knowledge of the public.

Reinforcements have arrived from England with remarkable promptitude and rapidity. They have been speedily drafted into the ranks, and most of the units I inspected were nearly complete when I saw them. In appearance and quality the drafts sent out have exceeded my most sanguine expectations, and I consider the army in France is much indebted to the Adjutant General's Department at the War Office for the efficient manner in which its requirements have been met in this most essential respect.

With regard to these inspections I may mention in particular the fine appearance presented by the Twenty-seventh and Twenty-eighth Divisions, composed principally of battalions which had come from India. Included in the former division was the Princess Patricia's Royal Canadian Regiment. They are a magnificent set of men, and have since done excellent work in the trenches.

It was some three weeks after the events recorded in Paragraph 4 that I made my inspection of the Indian Corps, under Sir James Willcocks. The appearance they presented was most satisfactory and fully confirmed my opinion that the Indian troops only required rest and a little acclimatizing to bring out all their fine inherent fighting qualities.

I saw the whole of the Indian Cavalry Corps, under Lieut. Gen. Rimington, on a mounted parade soon after their arrival. They are a magnificent body of cavalry and will, I feel sure, give the best possible account of themselves when called upon.

In the meantime, at their own particular request, they have taken their turn in the trenches and performed most useful and valuable service.

11. The Right Rev. Bishop Taylor Smith, C.V.O., D.D., Chaplain General to the Forces, arrived at my headquarters on Jan. 6, on a tour of inspection throughout the command.

The Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster has also visited most of the Irish regiments at the front and the principal centres on the line of communications.

In a quiet and unostentatious manner the Chaplains of all denominations have worked with devotion and energy in their respective spheres.

The number with the forces in the field at the commencement of the war was comparatively small, but toward the end of last year the Rev. J.M. Simms, D.D., K.H.C., principal Chaplain, assisted by his secretary, the Rev. W. Drury, reorganized the branch and placed the spiritual welfare of the soldier on a more satisfactory footing. It is hoped that the further increase of personnel may be found possible.

I cannot speak too highly of the devoted manner in which all the Chaplains, whether with the troops in the trenches or in attendance on the sick and wounded in casualty clearing stations and hospitals on the line of communications, have worked throughout the campaign.

Since the commencement of hostilities the work of the Royal Army Medical Corps has been carried out with untiring zeal, skill, and devotion. Whether at the front under conditions such as obtained during the fighting on the Aisne, when casualties were heavy and accommodation for their reception had to be improvised, or on the line of communications, where an average of some 11,000 patients have been daily under treatment, the organization of the medical service has always been equal to the demands made upon it.

The careful system of sanitation introduced into the army has, with the assistance of other measures, kept the troops free from any epidemic, in support of which it is to be noticed that since the commencement of the war some 500 cases only of enteric have occurred.

The organization for the first time in war of motor ambulance convoys is due to the initiative and organizing powers of Surgeon General T.J. O'Donnell, D.S.O., ably assisted by Major P. Evans, Royal Army Medical Corps.

Two of these convoys, composed entirely of Red Cross Society personnel, have done excellent work under the superintendence of regular medical officers.

Twelve hospital trains ply between the front and the various bases. I have visited several of the trains when halted in stations, and have found them conducted with great comfort and efficiency.

During the more recent phase of the campaign the creation of rest depots at the front has materially reduced the wastage of men to the line of communications.

Since the latter part of October, 1914, the whole of the medical arrangements have been in the hands of Surgeon General Sir A.T. Sloggett, C.M.G., K.H.S., under whom Surgeon General T.P. Woodhouse and Surgeon General T.J. O'Donnell have been responsible for the organization on the line of communications and at the front respectively.

12. The exceptional and peculiar conditions brought about by the weather have caused large demands to be made upon the resources and skill of the Royal Engineers.

Every kind of expedient has had to be thought out and adopted to keep the lines of trenches and defense work effective.

The Royal Engineers have shown themselves as capable of overcoming the ravages caused by violent rain and floods as they have been throughout in neutralizing the effect of the enemy's artillery.

In this connection I wish particularly to mention the excellent services performed by my Chief Engineer, Brig. Gen. G.H. Fowke, who has been indefatigable in supervising all such work. His ingenuity and skill have been most valuable in the local construction of the various expedients which experience has shown to be necessary in prolonged trench warfare.

13. I have no reason to modify in any material degree my views of the general military situation, as expressed in my dispatch of Nov. 20, 1914.

14. I have once more gratefully to acknowledge the valuable help and support I have received throughout this period from Gen. Foch, Gen. D'Urbal, and Gen. Maud'huy of the French Army. I have the honor to be, your Lordship's most obedient servant,

J.D.P. FRENCH, Field Marshal, Commanding in Chief, the British Army in the Field.

The Cathedral of Rheims

BY EMILE VERHAEREN

(From Les Blés Mouvants)

Done into English verse by Joyce Kilmer.

He who walks through the meadows of Champagne

At noon in Fall, when leaves like gold appear,

Sees it draw near

Like some great mountain set upon the plain,

From radiant dawn until the close of day,

Nearer it grows

To him who goes

Across the country. When tall towers lay

Their shadowy pall

Upon his way,

He enters, where

The solid stone is hollowed deep by all

Its centuries of beauty and of prayer.

Ancient French temple! thou whose hundred Kings

Watch over thee, emblazoned on thy walls,

Tell me, within thy memory-hallowed halls

What chant of triumph, or what war-song rings?

Thou hast known Clovis and his Frankish train,

Whose mighty hand Saint Remy's hand did keep

And in thy spacious vault perhaps may sleep

An echo of the voice of Charlemagne.

For God thou hast known fear, when from His side

Men wandered, seeking alien shrines and new,

But still the sky was bountiful and blue

And thou wast crowned with France's love and pride.

Sacred thou art, from pinnacle to base;

And in thy panes of gold and scarlet glass

The setting sun sees thousandfold his face;

Sorrow and joy, in stately silence pass

Across thy walls, the shadow and the light;

Around thy lofty pillars, tapers white

Illuminate, with delicate sharp flames,

The brows of saints with venerable names,

And in the night erect a fiery wall,

A great but silent fervor burns in all

Those simple folk who kneel, pathetic, dumb,

And know that down below, beside the Rhine—

Cannon, horses, soldiers, flags in line—

With blare of trumpets, mighty armies come.

Suddenly, each knows fear:

Swift rumors pass, that every one must hear,

The hostile banners blaze against the sky

And by the embassies mobs rage and cry.

Now war has come, and peace is at an end,

On Paris town the German troops descend.

They turned back, and driven to Champagne.

And now, as to so many weary men,

The glorious temple gives them welcome, when,

It meets them at the bottom of the plain.

At once, they set their cannon in its way.

There is no gable now, nor wall

That does not suffer, night and day,

As shot and shell in crushing torrents fall,

The stricken tocsin quivers through the tower;

The triple nave, the apse, the lonely choir

Are circled, hour by hour,

With thundering bands of fire

And Death is scattered broadcast among men.

And then

That which was splendid with baptismal grace;

The stately arches soaring into space,

The transepts, columns, windows gray and gold,

The organ, in whose tones the ocean rolled,

The crypts, of mighty shades the dwelling places,

The Virgin's gentle hands, the Saints' pure faces,

All, even the pardoning hands of Christ the Lord

Were struck and broken by the wanton sword

Of sacrilegious lust.

O beauty slain, O glory in the dust!

Strong walls of faith, most basely overthrown!

The crawling flames, like adders glistening

Ate the white fabric of this lovely thing.

Now from its soul arose a piteous moan.

The soul that always loved the just and fair.

Granite and marble loud their woe confessed,

The silver monstrances that Pope has blessed.

The chalices and lamps and crosiers rare

Were seared and twisted by a flaming-breath;

The horror everywhere did rage and swell,

The guardian Saints into this furnace fell,

Their bitter tears and screams were stilled in death.

Around the flames armed hosts are skirmishing,

The burning sun reflects the lurid scene;

The German Army fighting for its life,

Rallies its torn and terrified left wing;

And, as they near this place

The imperial eagles see

Before them in their flight,

Here, in the solemn night,

The old cathedrals, to the years to be

Showing, with wounded arms, their own disgrace.

Music of War

By Rudyard Kipling

The following speech was delivered by Mr. Kipling on Jan. 27, 1915, at a meeting in London promoted by the Recruiting Bands Committee, and held with the object of raising bands in the London district as an aid to recruiting.

The most useful thing that a civilian can do in these busy days is to speak as little as possible, and if he feels moved to write, to confine his efforts to his check book. [Laughter.] But this is an exception to that very sound rule. We do not know the present strength of the new armies. Even if we did it would not be necessary to make it public. But we may assume that there are several battalions in Great Britain which were not in existence at the end of last July, and some of them are in London. Nor is it any part of our national policy to explain how far these battalions are prepared for the work which is ahead of them. They were born quite rightly in silence. But that is no reason why they should continue to walk in silence for the rest of their lives. [Cheers.] Unfortunately up to the present most of them have been obliged to walk in silence or to no better accompaniment than whistles and concertinas and other meritorious but inadequate instruments of music with which they have provided themselves. In the beginning this did not matter so much. More urgent needs had to be met; but now that the new armies are what they are, we who cannot assist them by joining their ranks owe it to them to provide them with more worthy music for their help, their gratification, and their honor. [Cheers.]

I am not a musician, so if I speak as a barbarian I must ask you and several gentlemen on the platform here to forgive me. From the lowest point of view a few drums and fifes in the battalion mean at least five extra miles in a route march, quite apart from the fact that they can swing a battalion back to quarters happy and composed in its mind, no matter how wet or tired its body may be. Even when there is no route marching, the mere come and go, the roll and flourishing of drums and fifes around the barracks is as warming and cheering as the sight of a fire in a room. A band, not necessarily a full band, but a band of a dozen brasses and wood-winds, is immensely valuable in the district where men are billeted. It revives memories, it quickens association, it opens and unites the hearts of men more surely than any other appeal can, and in this respect it aids recruiting perhaps more than any other agency. I wonder whether I should say this—the tune that it employs and the words that go with that tune are sometimes very remote from heroism or devotion, but the magic and the compelling power is in them, and it makes men's souls realize certain truths that their minds might doubt.

Further, no one, not even the Adjutant, can say for certain where the soul of the battalion lives, but the expression of that soul is most often found in the band. [Cheers.] It stands to reason that 1,200 men whose lives are pledged to each other must have some common means of expression, some common means of conveying their moods and their thoughts to themselves and their world. The band feels the moods and interprets the thoughts. A wise and sympathetic bandmaster—and the masters that I have met have been that—can lift a battalion out of depression, cheer it in sickness, and steady and recall it to itself in times of almost unendurable stress. [Cheers.] You may remember a beautiful poem by Sir Henry Newbolt, in which he describes how a squadron of weary big dragoons were led to renewed effort by the strains of a penny whistle and a child's drum taken from a toyshop in a wrecked French town. I remember in India, in a cholera camp, where the men were suffering very badly, the band of the Tenth Lincolns started a regimental sing-song and went on with that queer, defiant tune, "The Lincolnshire Poacher." It was their regimental march that the men had heard a thousand times. There was nothing in it—nothing except all England, all the East Coast, all the fun and daring and horse play of young men bucketing about big pastures in the moonlight. But as it was given, very softly at that bad time in that terrible camp of death, it was the one thing in the world that could have restored, as it did restore, shaken men back to their pride, humor, and self-control. [Cheers.] This may be an extreme instance, but it is not an exceptional one. Any man who has had anything to do with the service will tell you that the battalion is better for music at every turn, happier, more easily handled, with greater zest in its daily routine, if that routine is sweetened with melody and rhythm—melody for the mind and rhythm for the body.

Our new armies have been badly served in this essential. Of all the admirable qualities which they have shown none is more wonderful than the spirit which has carried them through the laborious and distasteful groundwork of their calling without one note of music, except that which the same indomitable spirit provided out of their own heads. We have all seen them marching through the country, through the streets of London, in absolute silence and the crowds through which they passed as silent as themselves for the lack of the one medium that could convey and glorify the thoughts that are in us all today.

We are a tongue-tied brood at the best. The bands can declare on our behalf without shame and without shyness something of what we all feel and help us to reach a hand toward the men who have risen up to save us. In the beginning the more urgent requirements of the new armies overrode all other considerations. Now we can get to work on some other essentials. The War Office has authorized the formation of bands for some of the London battalions, and we may hope presently to see the permission extended throughout Great Britain. We must not, however, cherish unbridled musical ambitions, because a full band means more than forty pieces, and on that establishment we should even now require a rather large number of men; but I think it might be possible to provide drums and fifes for every battalion, full bands at the depots, and a proportion of battalion bands on half, or even one-third, establishments.

But this is not a matter to be settled by laymen; it must be discussed seriously between bandmasters and musicians—present, past, and dug up. [Laughter.] They may be trusted to give their services with enthusiasm. We have had many proofs in the last six months that people only want to know what the new army needs, and it will be gladly and cheerfully given. The army needs music, its own music, for, more than in any other calling, soldiers do not live by bread alone. From time immemorial the man who offers his life for his land has been compassed at every turn of his service with elaborate ceremonial and observance, of which music is no small part, all carefully designed to support and uphold him. It is not seemly and it is not expedient that any portion of that ritual should be slurred or omitted now. [Cheers.]

America and a New World State

How the United States May Take the Lead in the Formation of a World Confederation for the Prevention of Future Wars

By Norman Angell

The object of this article is to show that however much America may attempt to hold herself free in Europe she will very deeply feel the effects, both material and moral, of upheavals like that which is now shaking the old Continent; that even though there be no aggressive action against her, the militarization of Europe will force upon America also a militarist development; and that she can best avoid these dangers and secure her own safety and free development by taking the lead in a new world policy which is briefly this:

To use her position to initiate and guide a grouping of all the civilized powers having as its object the protection of any one of its members that is the victim of aggression. The aid to be given for such an object should not be, in the case of the United States, military but economic, by means of the definite organization of non-intercourse against the recalcitrant power. America's position of geographical and historical remoteness from European quarrels places her in a particularly favorable position to direct this world organization, and the fact of undertaking it would give her in some sense the moral leadership of the western world, and make her the centre of the World State of the future.

(COPYRIGHT, 1915, BY THE NEW YORK TIMES COMPANY.)

I.

In the discussion of America's relation to the rest of the world we have always assumed almost as an axiom that America has nothing to do with Europe, is only in the faintest degree concerned with its politics and developments, that by happy circumstance of geography and history we are isolated and self-sufficing, able to look with calm detachment upon the antics of the distant Europeans. When a European landed on these shores we were pretty certain that he left Europe behind him; only quite recently, indeed, have we realized that we were affected by what he brought with him in the way of morals and traditions, and only now are we beginning dimly to realize that what goes on on the other side of the world can be any affair of ours. The famous query of a certain American statesmen, "What has America to do with abroad?" probably represented at bottom the feelings of most of us.

In so far as we established commercial relations with Europe at all, we felt and still feel probably that they were relations of hostility, that we were one commercial unit, Europe another, and that the two were in competition. In thinking thus, of course, we merely accepted the view of international politics common in Europe itself, the view, namely, that nations are necessarily trade rivals—the commercial rivalry of Britain and Germany is presumed to be one of the factors explaining the outbreak of the present war. The idea that nations do thus compete together for the world's trade is one of the axioms of all discussion in the field of international politics.

Well, both these assumptions in the form in which we make them involve very grave fallacies, the realization of which will shortly become essential to the wise direction of this country's policy. If our policy, in other words, is to be shrewd and enlightened, we must realize just how both the views of international relationship that I have indicated are wrong.

I will take first the more special one—that of the assumed necessary rivalry of nations in trade—as its clearer understanding will help in what is for us the larger problem of the general relationship of this country to other civilized powers. I will therefore try and establish first this proposition—that nations are not and can not be trade rivals in the sense usually accepted; that, in other words, there is a fundamental misconception in the prevailing picture of nations as trading units—one might as well talk of red-haired people being the trade rivals of black-haired people.

And I will then try and establish a second proposition, namely, that we are intimately concerned with the condition of Europe, and are daily becoming more so, owing to processes which have become an integral part of our fight against nature, of the feeding and clothing of the world; that we cannot much longer ignore the effects of those tendencies which bind us to our neighbors; that the elementary consideration of self-protection will sooner or later compel us to accept the facts and recognize our part and lot in the struggles of Christendom; and that if we are wise, we shall not take our part therein reluctantly, dragged at the heels of forces we cannot resist, but will do so consciously, anticipating events. In other words, we shall take advantage of such measure of detachment as we do possess, to take the lead in a saner organization of western civilization; we shall become the pivot and centre of a new world State.

There is not the faintest hope of America taking this lead unless a push or impetus is given to her action by a widespread public feeling, based on the recognition of the fallacy of the two assumptions with which I began this article. For if America really is independent of the rest of the world, little concerned with what goes on therein, if she is in a position to build a sort of Chinese wall about herself, and, secure in her own strength, to develop a civilization and future of her own, still more if the weakness and disintegration of foreign nations, however unfortunate for them, is for America an opportunity of expanding trade and opportunities, why then, of course, it would be the height of folly for the United States to incur all the risks and uncertainties of an adventure into the sea of foreign politics.

What as a matter of simple fact is the real nature of trade between nations? If we are to have any clear notion at all as to just what truth there is in the notion of the necessary commercial rivalry of States, we must have some fairly clear notion of how the commercial relationship of nations works. And that can best be illustrated by a supposititious example. At the present time we are talking, for instance, of "capturing" German or British or French trade.

Now, when we talk thus of "German" trade in the international field, what do we mean? Here is the ironmaster in Essen making locomotives for a light railway in an Argentine province, (the capital for which has been subscribed in Paris)—which has become necessary because of the export of wool to Bradford, where the trade has developed owing to sales in the United States, due to high prices produced by the destruction of sheep runs, owing to the agricultural development of the West.

But for the money found in Paris, (due, perhaps, to good crops in wine and olives, sold mainly in London and New York,) and the wool needed by the Bradford manufacturer, (who has found a market for blankets among miners in Montana, who are smelting copper for a cable to China, which is needed because the encouragement given to education by the Chinese Republic has caused Chinese newspapers to print cable news from Europe)—but for such factors as these, and a whole chain of equally interdependent ones throughout the world, the ironmaster in Essen would not have been able to sell his locomotives.

How, therefore, can you describe it as part of the trade of "Germany" which is in competition with the trade of "Britain" or "France" or "America"? But for the British, French, and American trade, it could not have existed at all. You may say that if the Essen ironmaster could have been prevented from selling his locomotives the order would have gone to an American one.

H.M. PETER I—King of Servia

WALTER H. PAGE—American Ambassador to Great Britain
—(Photo from Paul Thompson)

But this community of German workmen, called into existence by the Argentina trade, maintains by its consumption of coffee a plantation in Brazil, which buys its machinery in Chicago. The destruction, therefore, of the Essen trade, while it might have given business to the American locomotive maker, would have taken it from, say, an American agricultural implement maker. The economic interests involved sort themselves, irrespective of the national groupings. I have summarized the whole process as follows, and the need for getting some of these simple things straight is my excuse for quoting myself:

Co-operation between nations has become essential for the very life of their peoples. But that co-operation does not take place as between States at all. A trading corporation, "Britain" does not buy cotton from another corporation, "America." A manufacturer in Manchester strikes a bargain with a merchant in Louisiana in order to keep a bargain with a dyer in Germany, and three or a much larger number of parties enter into virtual, or, perhaps, actual, contract, and form a mutually dependent economic community, (numbering, it may be, with the work people in the group of industries involved, some millions of individuals)—an economic entity, so far as one can exist, which does not include all organized society.

The special interests of such a community may become hostile to those of another community, but it will almost certainly not be a "national" one, but one of a like nature, say a shipping ring or groups of international bankers or Stock Exchange speculators. The frontiers of such communities do not coincide with the areas in which operate the functions of the State.

How could a State, say Britain, act on behalf of an economic entity such as that just indicated? By pressure against America or Germany? But the community against which the British manufacturer in this case wants pressure exercised is not "America" or "Germany"—both Americans and Germans are his partners in the matter. He wants it exercised against the shipping ring or the speculators or the bankers who are in part British....

This establishes two things, therefore: The fact that the political and economic units do not coincide, and the fact which follows as a consequence—that action by political authorities designed to control economic activities which take no account of the limits of political jurisdiction is necessarily irrelevant and ineffective.—(From "Arms and Industry: A Study of the Foundations of International Polity." Page 28. Putnams: New York.)

The fallacy of the idea that the groups we call nations must be in conflict because they struggle together for bread and the means of sustenance is demonstrated immediately when we recall the simple facts of historical development. When, in the British Islands, the men of Wessex were fighting with the men of Sussex, far more frequently and bitterly than today the men of Germany fight with those of France, or either with those of Russia, the separate States which formed the island were struggling with one another for sustenance, just as the tribes which inhabited the North American Continent at the time of our arrival there were struggling with one another for the game and hunting grounds. It was in both cases ultimately a "struggle for bread."

At that time, when Britain was composed of several separate States, that struggled thus with one another for land and food, it supported with great difficulty anything between one and two million inhabitants, just as the vast spaces now occupied by the United States supported about a hundred thousand, often subject to famine, frequently suffering great shortage of food, able to secure just the barest existence of the simplest kind.

Today, although Britain supports anything from twenty to forty times, and North America something like a thousand times, as large a population in much greater comfort, with no period of famine, with the whole population living much more largely and deriving much more from the soil than did the men of the Heptarchy, or the Red Indians, the "struggle for bread" does not now take the form of struggle between groups of the population. The more they fought, the less efficiently did they support themselves; the less they fought one another, the more efficiently did they all support themselves.

This simple illustration is at least proof of this, that the struggle for material things did not involve any necessary struggle between the separate groups or States; for those material things are given in infinitely greater abundance when the States cease to struggle. Whatever, therefore, was the origin of those conflicts, that origin was not any inevitable conflict in the exploitation of the earth. If those conflicts were concerned with material things at all, they arose from a mistake about the best means of obtaining them, exploiting the earth, and ceased when those concerned realized the mistake.

Just as Britain supported its population better when Englishmen gave up fighting between themselves, so the world as a whole could support its population better if it gave up fighting.

Moreover, we have passed out of the stage when we could massacre a conquered population to make room for us. When we conquer an inferior people like the Filipinos, we don't exterminate them, we give them an added chance of life. The weakest don't go to the wall.

But at this point parenthetically I want to enter a warning. You may say, if this notion of the rivalry of nations is false, how do you account for the fact of its playing so large a part in the present war?

Well, that is easily explained—men are not guided necessarily by their interest even in their soberest moments, but by what they believe to be their interest. Men do not judge from the facts, but from what they believe to be the facts. War is the "failure of human understanding." The religious wars were due to the belief that two religions could not exist side by side. It was not true, but the false belief provoked the wars. Our notions as to the relation of political power to a nation's prosperity are just as false, and this fallacy, like the older one, plays its part in the causation of war.

Now, let us for a moment apply the very general rule thus revealed to the particular case of the United States at this present juncture.

American merchants may in certain cases, if they are shrewd and able, do a very considerably increased trade, though it is just as certain that other merchants will be losing trade, and I think there is pretty general agreement that as a matter of simple fact the losses of the war so far have for America very considerably and very obviously overbalanced the gains. The loss has been felt so tangibly by the United States Government, for instance, that a special loan had to be voted in order to stop some of the gaps. Whole States, whose interests are bound up with staples like cotton, were for a considerable time threatened with something resembling commercial paralysis.

While we may admit advances and gains in certain isolated directions, the extra burden is felt in all directions of commerce and industry. And that extra burden is visible through finance—the increased cost of money, the scarcity of capital, the lower negotiability of securities, the greater uncertainty concerning the future. It is by means of the financial reaction that America, as a whole, has felt the adverse effects of this war. There is not a considerable village, much less a considerable city, not a merchant, not a captain of industry in the United States that has not so felt it. It is plainly evident that by the progressive dearness of money, the lower standard of living that will result in Europe, the effect on immigration, and other processes which I will touch upon at greater length later, any temporary stimulus which a trade here and there may receive will be more than offset by the difficulties due to financial as apart from industrial or commercial reactions.

This war will come near to depriving America for a decade or two of its normal share of the accumulated capital of the older peoples, whether that capital be used in paying war indemnities or in paying off the cost of the war or in repairing its ravages. In all cases it will make capital much dearer, and many enterprises which with more abundant capital might have been born and might have stimulated American industry will not be born. For the best part of a generation perhaps the available capital of Europe will be used to repair the ravages of war there, to pay off the debts created by war, and to start life normally once more. We shall suffer in two ways.

In a recent report issued by the Agricultural Department at Washington is a paragraph to the effect that one of the main factors which have operated against the development of the American farm is the difficulty that the farmer has found in securing abundant capital and the high price that he has to pay for it when he can secure it. It will in the future be of still higher price, and still less abundant, because, of course, the capital of the world is a common reservoir—if it is dearer in one part, it is dearer to some extent in all parts.

So that if for many years the American farmhouse is not so well built as it might be, the farm not so well worked, rural life in America not so attractive as it might be, the farmer's wife burdened with a little more labor than she might otherwise have, and if she grows old earlier than she might otherwise, it will be in part because we are paying our share of the war indemnities and the war costs.

But this scarcity of capital operates in another way. One of the most promising fields for American enterprise is, of course, in the undeveloped lands to the south of us, but in the development of those lands we have looked and must look for the co-operation of European capital. Millions of French and British money have poured into South America, building docks and railroads and opening up the country, and that development of South America has been to our advantage because quite frequently these enterprises were under the actual management of Americans, using to the common advantage the savings of the thrifty Frenchman and the capital of the wealthy Englishman.

For, of course, as between the older and the newer worlds there has gone on this very beneficent division of labor: the Old World having developed its soil, built its cities, made its roads, has more capital available for outside employment than have the population of newer countries that have so much of this work before them. And now this possibility of fruitful co-operation is, for the time being, and it may be for many years, suspended. I say nothing of the loss of markets in the older countries which will be occasioned by sheer loss of population and the lower standard of living. That is one of the more obvious but not perhaps the most important of the ways in which the war affects us commercially.

Speaking purely in terms of commercial advantage—and these, I know, do not tell the whole story (I am not for a moment pretending they do)—the losses that we shall suffer through this war are probably very much more considerable than those we should suffer by the loss of the Philippines in the event, say, of their being seized by some hostile power; and we suffer these losses, although not a single foreign soldier lands upon our soil. It is literally and precisely true to say that there is not one person from Hudson Bay to Cape Horn that will not be affected in some degree by what is now going on in Europe. And it is at least conceivable that our children and children's children will feel its effects more deeply still.

Nor is America escaping the military any more than she has escaped the commercial and financial effects of this war. She may never be drawn into active military co-operation with other nations, but she is affected none the less. Indeed the military effects of this war are already revealing themselves in a demand for a naval programme immensely larger than any American could have anticipated a year ago, by plans for an enormously enlarged army. All this is the most natural result.

Just consider, for instance, the ultimate effect of a quite possible outcome of the present conflict—Germany victorious and the Prussian effort next directed at, say, the conquest of India. Imagine India Prussianized by Germany, so that, with the marvelous efficiency in military organization which she has shown, she is able to draw on an Asiatic population of something approaching 400,000,000.

Whether the situation then created would really constitute a menace for us or not, this much would be certain—that the more timid and timorous among us would believe it to be a menace, and it would furnish an irresistible plea for a very greatly enlarged naval and military establishment. We too, in that case would probably be led to organize our nation on the lines on which the European military nations have organized theirs, with compulsory military service, and so forth.

Indeed, even if Germany is not victorious the future contains possibilities of a like result; imagine, what is quite possible, that Russia becomes the dominant factor in Europe after this war and places herself at the head of a great Slav confederacy of 200,000,000, with her power extending incidentally to the Pacific coast of Asia, and, it may be the day after tomorrow, over 100,000,000 or 200,000,000 of Asiatics. We should thus have a militarized power of 200,000,000 or 300,000,000 or 400,000,000 souls, autocratically governed, endowed with western technical knowledge in the manipulation of the instruments of war, occupying the Pacific coast line directly facing our Pacific coast line. It is quite conceivable, therefore, that as the outcome of either of the two possible results of this war we may find ourselves embarked upon a great era of militarization.

Our impregnability does not protect us from militarism. It is quite true that this country, like Russia, cannot be permanently invaded; it is quite true that hostile navies need not necessarily be resisted by navies of our own so far as the protection of our coasts is concerned. But there is no such thing as absolute certainty in these matters. While personally I believe that no country in the world will ever challenge the United States, that the chances are a hundred to one against it, it is on just that one chance that the militarist bases his plea for armaments and secures them.

But, unfortunately, we are already committed to a good deal more than just mere defense of American territory; problems arising out of the Philippines and the Panama Canal and the Monroe Doctrine have already committed us to a measure of intervention in the political affairs of the outside world. In brief, if the other nations of the world have great armies and navies—and tomorrow those other nations will include a reorganized China as they already include a westernized Japan—if there is all that weight of military material which might be used against us, then in the absence of those other guarantees which I shall suggest, we shall be drawn into piling up a corresponding weight of material as against that of the outside world.

And, of course, just as we cannot escape the economic and the military reaction of European development, neither can we escape the moral. If European thought and morality did, by some fatality, really develop in the direction of a Nietzschean idealization of military force, we might well get in the coming years a practical submergence of that morality which we believe to be distinctively American, and get throughout the older hemisphere a type of society based upon authority, reproducing it may be some features of past civilizations, Mongol, Asiatic, or Byzantine. If that were to happen, if Europe were really to become a mere glorified form of, say, certain Asiatic conceptions that we all thought had had their day, why, then, of course America could not escape a like transformation of outlook, ideals, and morals.

For there is no such thing as one nation standing out and maintaining indefinitely a social spirit, an attitude toward life and society absolutely distinct and different from that of the surrounding world. The character of a society is determined by the character of its ideas, and neither tariffs nor coastal defenses are really efficient in preventing the invasion of ideas, good or bad. The difference between the kind of society which exists in Illinois today and that which existed there 500 years ago is not a difference of physical vigor or of the raw materials of nature; the Indian was as good a man physically as the modern Chicagoan, and possessed the same soil. What makes the difference between the two is accumulated knowledge, the mind. And there never was yet on this planet a change of ideas which did not sooner or later affect the whole planet.

The "nations" that inhabited this continent a couple of thousand years ago were apparently quite unconcerned with what went on in Europe or Asia, say, in the domain of mathematical and astronomical knowledge. But the ultimate effect of that knowledge on navigation and discovery was destined to affect them—and us—profoundly. But the reaction of European thought upon this continent, which originally required twenty, or, for that matter, two hundred or two thousand years to show itself, now shows itself, in the industrial and commercial field, for instance, through our banking and Stock Exchanges, in as many hours, or, for that matter, minutes.

It is difficult, of course, for us to realize the extent to which each nation owes its civilization to others, how we have all lived by taking in each other's washing. As Americans, for instance, we have to make a definite effort properly to realize that our institutions, the sanctity of our homes and all the other things upon which we pride ourselves, are the result of anything but the unaided efforts of a generation or two of Americans, perhaps owing a little to certain of the traditions that we may have taken from Britain.

One has to stop and uproot impressions that are almost instinctive, to remember that our forefathers reached these shores by virtue of knowledge which they owed to the astronomical researches of Egyptians and Chaldeans, who inspired the astronomers of Greece, who inspired those of the Renaissance in Italy, Spain, and Germany, keeping alive and developing not merely the art of measuring space and time, but also that conception of order in external nature without which the growth of organized knowledge, which we call science, enabling men to carry on their exploitation of the world, would have been impossible; that our very alphabet comes from Rome, who owed it to others; that the mathematical foundation of our modern mechanical science—without which neither Newton nor Watt nor Stevenson nor Ericson nor Faraday nor Edison could have been—is the work of Arabs, strengthened by Greeks, protected and enlarged by Italians; that our conceptions of political organization, which have so largely shaped our political science, come mainly from the Scandinavian colonists of a French province; that British intellect, to which perhaps we owe the major part of our political impulses, has been nurtured mainly by Greek philosophy; that our Anglo-Saxon law is principally Roman, and our religion almost entirely Asiatic in its origins; that for those things which we deem to be the most important in our lives, our spiritual and religious aspirations, we go to a Jewish book interpreted by a Church Roman in origin, reformed mainly by the efforts of Swiss and German theologians.

And this interaction of the respective elements of the various nations, the influence of foreigners, in other words, and of foreign ideas, is going to be far more powerful in the future than it has been in the past. Morally, as well as materially, we are a part of Europe. The influence which one group exercises on another need not operate through political means at all; indeed, the strongest influences are non-political.

American life and civilization may be transformed by European developments, though the Governments of Europe may leave us severely alone. Luther and Calvin had certainly a greater effect in England than Louis XIV. or Napoleon. Gutenberg created in Europe a revolution more powerful than all the military revolutions of the last ten centuries. Greece and Palestine did not transform the world by their political power. Yet these simple and outstanding truths are persistently ignored by our political and historical philosophers and theorists. For the most part our history is written with a more sublime disregard of the simple facts of the world than is shown perhaps in any other department of human thought and inquiry.

You may today read histories of Europe written by men of worldwide and pre-eminent reputation, professing to tell the story of the development of human society, in which whole volumes will be devoted to the effect of a particular campaign or military alliance in influencing the destinies of a people like the French or the German. But in those histories you will find no word as to the effect of such trifles as the invention of the steam engine, the coming of the railroad, the introduction of the telegraph and cheap newspapers and literature on the destiny of those people; volumes as to the influence which Britain may have had upon the history of France or Germany by the campaigns of Marlborough, but absolutely not one word as to the influence which Britain had upon the destinies of those people by the work of Watt and Stephenson.

A great historian philosopher laying it down that the "influence" of England was repelled or offset by this or that military alliance, seriously stated that "England" was losing her influence on the Continent at a time when her influence was transforming the whole lives of Continental people to a greater degree than they had been transformed since the days of the Romans.

I have gone into this at some length to show mainly two things—first, that neither morally nor materially, neither in our trade nor in our finance, nor in our industry, nor in all those intangible things that give value to life can there be such a thing as isolation from the rest of Christendom. If European civilization takes a "wrong turning"—and it has done that more than once in the past—we can by no means escape the effects of that catastrophe. We are deeply concerned, if only because we may have to defend ourselves against it and in so doing necessarily transform in some degree our society and ourselves.

And I wanted to show, secondly, that not only as a simple matter of fact as things stand are we in a very real sense dependent upon Europe, that we want European capital and European trade, and that if we are to do the best for American prosperity we must increase that dependence, but that if we are effectively to protect those things that go deeper even than trade and prosperity, we must co-operate with Europe intellectually and morally. It is not for us a question of choice. For good or evil, we are part of the world affected by what the rest of the world becomes and affected by what it does. And I want to show in my next article that only by frankly facing the fact (which we cannot deny) that we are a part of the civilized world and must play our part in it, shall we achieve real security for our material and moral possessions and do the best that we know for the general betterment of American life.

II.—AMERICA'S FUTURE ATTITUDE

In my last article I attempted to show how deeply must America feel, sooner or later, and for good or evil, the moral and material results of the upheavals in Europe and the new tendencies that will be generated by them. I attempted to show, too, how impossible it is for us to escape our part of all the costs, how we shall pay our share of the indemnities, and how our children and children's children may be affected even more profoundly than we ourselves.

The shells may not hit us, yet there is hardly a farmhouse in our country that will not, however unconsciously, be affected by these far-off events. We may not witness the trains of weary refugees trailing over the roads, but (if we could but see the picture) there will be an endless procession of our own farmers' wives with a hardened and shortened life and their children with less ample opportunities.

And our ideals of the future will in some measure be twisted by the moral and material bankruptcy of Europe. Those who consider at all carefully the facts hinted at in my last article—too complex to be more than hinted at in the space available—will realize that the "isolation" of America is an illusion of the map, and is becoming more so every day; that she is an integral part of Occidental civilization whether she wishes it or not, and that if civilization in Europe takes the wrong turn we Americans would suffer less directly but not less vitally than France or Britain or Germany.

All this, of course, is no argument for departing from our traditional isolation. Our entrance into the welter might not change things or it might change them for the worse or the disadvantages might be such as to outweigh the advantages. The sensible question for America is this: "Can we affect the general course of events in Europe—in the world, that is—to our advantage by entering in; and will the advantage of so doing be of such extent as to offset the risks and costs?"

Before answering that question I want to indicate by very definite proposals or propositions a course of action and a basis for estimating the effect. I will put the proposal with reference to America's future attitude to Europe in the form of a definite proposition thus:

That America shall use her influence to secure the abandonment by the powers of Christendom of rival group alliances and the creation instead of an alliance of all the civilized powers having as its aim some common action—not necessarily military—which will constitute a collective guarantee of each against aggression.

Thus when Germany, asked by the Allies at the prospective peace to remove the menace of her militarism by reducing her armaments, replies, "What of my protection against Russia?" Christendom should, with America's help, be in a position to reply: "We will all protect you against Russia, just as we would all protect Russia against you."

The considerations which support such a policy on America's part are mainly these: First, that if America does not lend the assistance of her detachment from European quarrels to such an arrangement, Europe of herself may not prove capable of it. Second, that if Europe does not come to some such arrangement the resulting unrest, militarism, moral and material degeneration, for the reasons above indicated and for others to be indicated presently, will most unfavorably affect the development of America, and expose her to dangers internal and external much greater than those which she would incur by intervention. Third, that if America's influence is in the manner indicated made the deciding factor in the establishment of a new form of world society, she would virtually take the leadership of Western civilization, and her capital become the centre of the political organization of the new world State. While "world domination" by military means has always proved a dangerous diet for all nations that have eaten of it heretofore, the American form of that ambition would have this great difference from earlier forms—that it would be welcomed instead of being resisted by the dominated. America would have given a new meaning to the term and found a means of satisfying national pride, certainly more beneficial than that which comes of military glory.

I envisage the whole problem, however, first and last in this discussion on the basis of America's interest; and the test which I would apply to the alternatives now presenting themselves is simply this: What on balance is most advantageous, in the broadest and largest sense of the term, in its moral as well as its material sense, to American interest?

Now I know full well that there is much to be said against the step which I think America should initiate. I suppose the weight of the reasons against it would be in some such order as the following: First, that it is a violation of the ancient tradition of American statecraft and of the rule laid down by Washington concerning the avoidance of entangling alliances. Second, that it may have the effect which he feared of dragging this country into war on matters in which it had no concern. Third, that it will militarize the country, and so, Fourth, lead to the neglect of those domestic problems upon which the progress of our nation depends.

I will take the minor points first and will deal with the major consideration presently.

First, I would remind the reader of what I pointed out in the last article, that there is no such thing as being unaffected by the military policies of Europe, and there never has been. At this present moment a campaign for greatly increased armaments is being waged on the strength of what is taking place in the Old World, and our armaments are directly and categorically dictated by what foreign nations do in the matter. So that it is not a question in practice of being independent of the policies of other nations; we are not independent of their policies.

We may refuse to co-operate with them, to have anything to do with them. Even then our military policy will be guided by theirs, and it is at least conceivable that in certain circumstances we should become thoroughly militarized by the need for preparing against what our people would regard as the menace of European military ambitions. This tendency, if it became sufficiently acute, would cause neglect of domestic problems hardly less mischievous than that occasioned by war.

In my last article I touched upon a quite possible turn of the alliance groupings in Europe—the growing influence of Russia, the extension of that influence to the Asiatic populations on her borders, (Japan and Russia are already in alliance,) so that within the quite measurable future we may be confronted by a military community drawing on a population of 500,000,000 souls, autocratically governed and endowed with all the machinery of destruction which modern science has given to the world. A Russo-Chino-Japanese alliance might on behalf of the interest or dignity of one of the members of such a group challenge this country in some form or another, and a Western Europe with whom we had refused to co-operate for a common protection might as a consequence remain an indifferent spectator of the conflict.

Such a situation would certainly not relieve us from the burdens of militarism merely because we declined to enter into any arrangement with the European powers. As a matter of fact, of course, this present war destroyed the nationalist basis of militarism itself. The militarist may continue to talk about international agreement between nations being impossible as a means of insuring a nation's safety, and a nation having no security but the strength of its own arms, but when it actually comes to the point even he is obliged to trust to agreement with other nations and to admit that even in war a nation can no longer depend merely upon the strength of its arms; it has to depend upon co-operation, which means an agreement of some kind with other nations as well.

Just as the nations have by forces stronger than their own volition been brought into industrial and commercial co-operation, so, strangely enough, have they been brought by those same forces into military co-operation. While the warrior and militarist have been talking the old jargon of nationalism and holding international co-operation up to derision as a dream, they have themselves been brought to depend upon foreigners. War itself has become internationalist.

There is something of sardonic humor in the fact that it is the greatest war of history which is illustrating the fact that even the most powerful of the European nations must co-operate with foreigners for its security. For no one of the nine or ten combatants of the present war could have maintained its position or defended itself alone. There is not one nation involved that would not believe itself in danger of destruction but for the help of foreigners; there is not one whose national safety does not depend upon some compact or arrangement with foreign nations. France would have been helpless but for the help of Britain and of Russia. Russia herself could not have imposed her will upon Germany if Germany could have thrown all her forces on the eastern frontier. Austria could certainly not have withstood the Russian flood single handed. Quite obviously the lesser nations, Serbia, Belgium, and the rest, would be helpless victims but for the support of their neighbors.