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CURRENT HISTORY

A MONTHLY MAGAZINE

THE EUROPEAN WAR

VOLUME II.

From the Beginning to March, 1915

With Index

Number 2, May, 1915

NEW YORK
THE NEW YORK TIMES COMPANY
1915

Contents - Number II, May, 1915.

COMMANDER THIERICHENS—Commander of the German commerce-raider Prinz Eitel Friedrich, which sank the American sailing ship William P. Frye.

THE GRAND DUCHESS OF LUXEMBURG—
Whose little State was first occupied by the German forces.—
(Photo from George Grantham Bain.)

The New York Times Current History

A Monthly Magazine

The European War

April, 1915

General Sir John French's Own Story

The Costly Victory of Neuve Chapelle

LONDON, April 14.—Field Marshal Sir John French, commander of the British expeditionary forces on the Continent, reports the British losses in the three days' fighting at Neuve Chapelle last month, as follows: Killed, 190 officers, 2,337 men; wounded, 359 officers, 8,174 other ranks; missing, 23 officers, 1,728 men; total casualties, 12,811. The report continues:

The enemy left several thousand dead on the field, and we have positive information that upward of 12,000 wounded were removed by trains. Thirty officers and 1,657 of other ranks were captured.

The British commander's dispatch concerning the battle is long, and says, among other things:

Considerable delay occurred after the capture of Neuve Chapelle, and the infantry was greatly disorganized. I am of the opinion that this delay would not have occurred had the clearly expressed order of the general officer commanding the First Army been more carefully observed.

Field Marshal Sir John French's report, which covers the battles of Neuve Chapelle and St. Eloi under date of April 5, was published in the official Gazette today. The Commander in Chief writes:

The event of chief interest and importance which has taken place is the victory achieved over the enemy in the battle of Neuve Chapelle, which was fought on March 10, 11, and 12.

The main attack was delivered by the troops of the First Army under command of General Sir Douglas Haig, supported by a large force of heavy artillery, a division of cavalry, and some infantry of the General Reserve. Secondary and holding attacks and demonstrations were made along the front of the Second Army, under direction of its commander, Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien.

While the success attained was due to the magnificent bearing and indomitable courage displayed by the troops of the Fourth and Indian Corps, I consider that the able and skillful dispositions which were made by the general officer commanding the First Army contributed largely to the defeat of the enemy and to the capture of his position. The energy and vigor with which General Sir Douglas Haig handled his command show him to be a leader of great ability and power.

Another action of considerable importance was brought about by a surprise attack made by the Germans on March 14 against the Twenty-seventh Division holding the trenches east of St. Eloi. A large force of artillery was concentrated in this area under the cover of a mist and a heavy volume of fire was suddenly brought to bear on the trenches.

At 5 o'clock in the afternoon this artillery attack was accompanied by two mine explosions, and in the confusion caused by these and by the suddenness of the attack the position of St. Eloi was captured and held for some hours by the enemy.

Well-directed and vigorous counter-attacks, in which the troops of the Fifth Army Corps showed great bravery and determination, restored the situation by the evening of the 15th.

The dispatch describes further operations, saying:

On Feb. 6 a brilliant action by the troops of the First Corps materially improved our position in the area south of La Bassée Canal. During the previous night parties of the Irish Guards and the Third Battalion of the Coldstream Guards had succeeded in gaining ground from which a converging fire could be directed on the flanks and rear of certain brick stacks occupied by the Germans, which had been for some time a source of considerable annoyance. At 2 P.M. the affair commenced with a severe bombardment of the brick stacks and the enemy's trenches.

A brisk attack by the Third Battalion of the Coldstream Guards and Irish Guards from our trenches west of the brick stacks followed and was supported by the fire from the flanking position which had been seized the previous night by the same regiments.

The attack succeeded, the brick stacks were occupied without difficulty, and a line was established north and south through a point about forty yards east of the brick stacks.

The casualties suffered by the Fifth Corps throughout the period under review, and particularly during the month of February, have been heavier than those on other parts of the line. I regret this, but do not think, taking all circumstances into consideration, that they were unduly numerous. The position then occupied by the Fifth Corps had always been a very vulnerable part of our line. The ground was marshy, and trenches were most difficult to construct and maintain. The Twenty-seventh and Twenty-eighth Divisions of the Fifth Corps had no previous experience in European warfare, and a number of the units composing the corps had only recently returned from service in tropical climates. In consequence, the hardships of a rigorous Winter campaign fell with greater weight upon these divisions than upon any other in the command.

Chiefly owing to these causes the Fifth Corps, up to the beginning of March, was constantly engaged in counter-attacks to retake trenches and ground which had been lost. In their difficult and arduous task, however, the troops displayed the utmost gallantry and devotion, and it is most creditable to the skill and energy of their leaders that I am able to report how well they have surmounted all their difficulties and that the ground first taken over by them is still intact and held with little greater loss than is incurred by the troops in all other parts of the line.

Describing an attack on the German trenches near St. Eloi on Feb. 28 by Princess Patricia's Regiment, of the Canadian contingent, under command of Lieut. C.E. Crabbe, the Commander in Chief says:

The services performed by this distinguished corps have continued to be very valuable since I had occasion to refer to them in my last dispatch. They have been most ably organized and trained and were commanded by Lieut. Colonel F.D. Farquhar, D.S.O., who I deeply regret to say was killed while superintending some trench work on March 20. His loss will be deeply felt.

Emphasizing the co-operation of the British and French forces and the new rôle in warfare assumed by the cavalry, the Commander in Chief writes:

During the month of February I arranged with General Foch to render the Ninth French Corps, holding the trenches to my left, some much-needed rest by sending the three divisions of the British Cavalry Corps to hold a portion of the French trenches, each division for a period of ten days alternately.

Map showing the field of the Battle of Neuve Chapelle and its position in the Allied line.

It was very gratifying to me to note once again in this campaign the eager readiness which the cavalry displayed to undertake a rôle which does not properly belong to them in order to support and assist their French comrades. In carrying out this work the leader, officers, and men displayed the same skill and energy which I have had reason to comment upon in former dispatches.

Referring to Neuve Chapelle and the considerations leading up to this, the Field Marshal says:

About the end of February many vital considerations induced me to believe that a vigorous offensive movement by the troops under my command should be planned and carried out at the earliest possible moment. Among the more important reasons which convinced me of this necessity were the general aspect of the allied situation throughout Europe, and particularly the marked success of the Russian Army in repelling the violent onslaughts of Marshal von Hindenburg; the apparent weakening of the enemy on my front, and the necessity for assisting our Russian allies to the utmost by holding as many hostile troops as possible in the western theatre; the efforts to this end which were being made by the French forces at Arras and in Champagne, and—perhaps the most weighty consideration of all—the need of fostering the offensive spirit in the troops under my command after the trying and possibly enervating experiences which they had gone through of a severe Winter in the trenches.

In a former dispatch I commented upon the difficulties and drawbacks which the Winter weather in this climate imposes upon a vigorous offensive. Early in March these difficulties became greatly lessened by the drying up of the country and by spells of brighter weather.

I do not propose in this dispatch to enter at length into the considerations which actuated me in deciding upon the plan, time, and place of my attack. As mentioned above, the main attack was carried out by units of the First Army, supported by troops of the Second Army and the general reserve. The object of the main attack was to be the capture of the village of Neuve Chapelle and the enemy's position at that point, and the establishment of our line as far forward as possible to the east of that place.

The object, nature, and scope of the attack and the instructions for the conduct of the operations were communicated by me to Sir Douglas Haig in a secret memorandum, dated Feb. 19.

After describing the main topographical features of the battlefield and showing how the Germans had established a strong post with numerous machine guns among the big houses, behind walls and in orchards which flanked the approaches to the village, Sir John proceeds:

The battle opened at 7:30 o'clock the morning of the 10th of March by a powerful bombardment of the enemy's position in Neuve Chapelle. The artillery bombardment had been well prepared and was most effective, except on the extreme northern portion of the front of attack.

At 8:05 o'clock the Twenty-third and Twenty-fifth Brigades of the Eighth Division assaulted the German trenches on the northwest of the village. At the same hour the Garhwal Brigade of the Meerut (British India) Division, which occupied a position to the south of Neuve Chapelle, assaulted the German trenches in its front. The Garhwal Brigade and the Twenty-fifth Brigade carried the enemy's lines of intrenchment, where the wire entanglements had been almost entirely swept away by our shrapnel fire.

The Twenty-third Brigade, however, on the northeast, was held up by wire entanglements which were not sufficiently cut. At 8:05 o'clock the artillery was turned on Neuve Chapelle, and at 8:35 o'clock the advance of the infantry was continued. The Twenty-fifth and the Garhwal Brigades pushed on eastward and northeastward, respectively, and succeeded in getting a foothold in the village. The Twenty-third Brigade was still held up in front of the enemy's wire entanglements, and could not progress. Heavy losses were suffered, especially in the Middlesex Regiment and the Scottish Rifles.

The progress, however, of the Twenty-fifth Brigade into Neuve Chapelle immediately to the south of the Twenty-third Brigade had the effect of turning the southern flank of the enemy's defenses in front of the Twenty-third Brigade. This fact, combined with powerful artillery support, enabled the Twenty-third Brigade to get forward between 10 and 11 A.M., and by 11 o'clock the whole of the village of Neuve Chapelle and the roads leading northward and southwestward from the eastern end of that village were in our hands.

During this time our artillery completely cut off the village and surrounding country from any German reinforcements which could be thrown into the fight to restore the situation, by means of a curtain of shrapnel fire. Prisoners subsequently reported that all attempts at reinforcing the front line were checked. Steps were at once taken to consolidate the positions won.

Considerable delay occurred after the capture of the Neuve Chapelle position. The infantry was greatly disorganized by the violent nature of the attack and by its passage through the enemy's trenches and the buildings of the village. It was necessary to get the units to some extent together before pushing on. The telephonic communication being cut by the enemy's fire rendered communication between the front and the rear most difficult. The fact of the left of the Twenty-third Brigade having been held up had kept back the Eighth Division and had involved a portion of the Twenty-fifth Brigade in fighting to the north, out of its proper direction of advance. All this required adjustment. An orchard held by the enemy north of Neuve Chapelle also threatened the flank of an advance toward the Aubers Bridge.

I am of the opinion that this delay would not have occurred had the clearly expressed order of the general officer commanding the First Army been carefully observed.

The difficulties above enumerated might have been overcome earlier in the day if the general officer commanding the Fourth Corps had been able to bring his reserve brigades more speedily into action. As it was, a further advance did not commence before 3:30 o'clock. The Twenty-first Brigade was able to form up in the open on the left without a shot being fired at it, thus showing that, at the time, the enemy's resistance had been paralyzed.

The brigade pushed forward in the direction of Moulin-du-Pietre. At first it made good progress, but was subsequently held up by machine gun fire from houses and from a defended work in the line of the German intrenchments opposite the right of the Twenty-second Brigade.

Further to the south the Twenty-fourth Brigade, which had been directed on Pietre, was similarly held up by machine guns in houses and trenches. At the road junction, 600 yards to the northwest of Pietre, the Twenty-fifth Brigade, on the right of the Twenty-fourth, was also held up by machine guns from a bridge held by the Germans over the River Les Layes, which is situated to the northwest of the Bois du Biez.

While two brigades of the Meerut Division were establishing themselves on a new line the Dehra Dun Brigade, supported by the Jullunder Brigade of the Lahore Division, moved to the attack of the Bois du Biez, but were held up on the line of the River Les Layes by a German post at the bridge, which enfiladed them and brought them to a standstill.

The defended bridge over the Les Layes and its neighborhood immediately assumed considerable importance. While the artillery fire was brought to bear, as far as circumstances would permit, on this point, General Sir Douglas Haig directed the First Corps to dispatch one or more battalions of the First Brigade in support of the troops attacking the bridge. Three battalions were thus sent to Richebourg St. Vaast.

Darkness coming on and the enemy having brought up reinforcements, no further progress could be made, and the Indian Corps and the Fourth Corps proceeded to consolidate the position they had gained.

While the operations, which I have thus briefly reported, were going on, the First Corps, in accordance with orders, delivered an attack in the morning from Givenchy simultaneously with that against Neuve Chapelle, but as the enemy's wire was insufficiently cut very little progress could be made, and the troops at this point did little more than hold fast to the Germans in front of them.

On the following day, March 11, the attack was renewed by the Fourth and Indian Corps, but it was soon seen that further advance would be impossible until the artillery had dealt effectively with the various houses and defended localities which had held the troops up along the entire front.

Efforts were made to direct the artillery fire accordingly, but, owing to the weather conditions, which did not permit of aerial observations, and the fact that nearly all the telephone communications between the artillery observers and their batteries had been cut, it was impossible to do so with sufficient accuracy. When our troops, who were pressing forward, occupied a house there, it was not possible to stop our artillery fire, and the infantry had to be withdrawn.

As most of the objects for which the operations had been undertaken had been attained, and as there were reasons why I considered it inadvisable to continue the attack at that time, I directed General Sir Douglas Haig on the night of the 12th to hold and consolidate the ground which had been gained by the Fourth and Indian Corps, and suspend further offensive operations for the present.

The losses during these three days' fighting were, I regret to say, very severe, numbering 190 officers and 2,337 of other ranks killed, 359 officers and 8,174 of other ranks wounded, and 23 officers and 1,720 of other ranks missing. But the results attained were, in my opinion, wide and far-reaching.

Referring to the severity of the casualties in action, the Commander in Chief writes:

I can well understand how deeply these casualties are felt by the nation at large, but each daily report shows clearly that they are endured on at least an equal scale by all the combatants engaged throughout Europe, friends and foe alike.

In war as it is today, between civilized nations armed to the teeth with the present deadly rifle and machine gun, heavy casualties are absolutely unavoidable. For the slightest undue exposure the heaviest toll is exacted. The power of defense conferred by modern weapons is the main cause for the long duration of the battles of the present day, and it is this fact which mainly accounts for such loss and waste of life. Both one and the other can, however, be shortened and lessened if attacks can be supported by a most efficient and powerful force of artillery available; but an almost unlimited supply of ammunition is necessary, and a most liberal discretionary power as to its use must be given to artillery commanders. I am confident that this is the only means by which great results can be obtained with a minimum of loss.

Roberts Of Kandahar.

SIDNEY LOW, in The London Times.

Through the long years of peril and of strife,

He faced Death oft, and Death forbore to slay,

Reserving for its sacrificial Day,

The garnered treasure of his full-crowned life;

So saved him till the furrowed soil was rife,

With the rich tillage of our noblest dead;

Then reaped the offering of his honored head,

In that red field of harvest, where he died,

With the embattled legions at his side.

The Surrender of Przemysl

How Galicia's Strong Fortress Yielded to the Russian Siege

The Austrian fortress of Przemysl fell on March 22, 1915, after an investment and siege which lasted, with one short interruption, for nearly four months. This important event was celebrated by a Te Deum of thanksgiving in the presence of the Czar and the General Staff. The importance to the Russians of the capitulation of Przemysl is suggested by the fact that about 120,000 prisoners were reported taken when the Austrians yielded. Until this was effected the Russians could not venture upon a serious invasion of Hungary, and the investing troops who were then freed were more numerous than the defenders.

[By the Correspondent of The London Times.]

PETROGRAD, March 22.

The Minister of War has informed me that he has just received a telegram from the Grand Duke Nicholas announcing the fall of Przemysl.

The fall of Przemysl marks the most important event of the Russian campaign this year. It finally and irrevocably consolidates the position of the Russians in Galicia. The Austro-German armies are deprived of the incentive hitherto held out to them of relieving the isolated remnant of their former dominion. The besieging army will be freed for other purposes. From information previously published the garrison aggregated about 25,000 men, hence the investing forces, which must always be at least four times as great as the garrison, represent not less than 100,000 men. From all the information lately received from both Russian and neutral sources, the position of the Austro-German armies in the Carpathians has become distinctly critical. The reinforcements for the gallant troops of General Brusiloff, General Radko Dmitrieff, and other commanders are bound to exercise an enormous influence on the future course of the campaign in the Carpathians.

All honor and credit are given by the Russians to the garrison of Przemysl and General Kusmanek. Russian officers ever had the highest opinion of the personality of the commandant. I heard from those who fought under General Radko Dmitrieff in the early stages of the Galician campaign that when our troops, after sweeping away the resistance at Lwow and Jaroslau, loudly knocked at the doors of the fortress of Przemysl, they met with a stern rebuff. In reply to the summons of the Russians to surrender the keys the commandant wrote a curt and dignified note remarking that he considered it beyond his own dignity or the dignity of the Russian General to discuss the surrender of the fortress before it had exhausted all its powers of resistance. During the second invasion of Poland by the Austro-German armies the enemy's lines swept up to and just beyond Przemysl, interrupting the investment of the fortress. The wave of the Austrian invasion began to subside at the end of the first week in November. Only then could we begin the siege of the mighty fortress, which proved successful after the lapse of four months.

The first Russian attempt to storm Przemysl without previous bombardment, which followed immediately upon the commandant's refusal to surrender, resulted in very great loss of life to no purpose. Thereafter it was decided to abstain from further attempts to take the fortress until our siege guns could be placed and a preliminary bombardment could sufficiently facilitate the task of the besiegers. Meanwhile, although the fortress and town were duly invested, our lines were somewhat remote from the outlying forts, and the peasants of adjacent villages were, it is said, able to pass freely to and from the town of Przemysl—a fact which would enable the inhabitants to obtain supplies. From all accounts neither the garrison nor the inhabitants were reduced to very great straits for food. The announcement made at the time of the first investment of the fortress that provisions and supplies would easily last till May was, however, obviously exaggerated.

I understand that heavy siege guns were ready to be conveyed to Przemysl at the end of January, but that the Russian military authorities decided to postpone their departure in view of the determined attempts made by the Austro-German forces to pierce the Russian lines in the Carpathians in order to relieve the fortress, which, if successful, might have endangered the safety of the siege material. Owing to this fact the bombardment of Przemysl began only about a fortnight ago, when the Austro-German offensive had so far weakened as to satisfy the Russian authorities that there was no further danger from this quarter.

The concluding stages of the siege have been related in the dispatches from the Field Headquarters during the past week. The capture of the dominating heights in the eastern sector followed close upon the first bombardment. The final desperate sortie led by General Kusmanek at the head of the Twenty-third Division of the Honved precipitated the end. The remnants of the garrison were unable to man the works extending to a thirty-mile periphery.

The loss of the western approaches left General Kusmanek no alternative but to surrender. He had exhausted his ammunition and used up his effectives. His messages for help were either intercepted or unanswered. The assailants broke down the last resistance. The most important strategical point in the whole of Galicia is now in Russian hands.

TE DEUM AT HEADQUARTERS.

PETROGRAD, March 22.

The following official communiqué was issued from the Main Headquarters this morning:

The fortress of Przemysl has surrendered to our troops.

At the Headquarters of the Commander in Chief a Te Deum of thanksgiving was celebrated in the presence of the Czar, the Grand Duke Nicholas, Commander in Chief, and all the staff.

The following communiqué from the Great Headquarters is issued here today:

Northern Front.—From the Niemen to the Vistula and on the left bank of the latter river there has been no important change. Our troops advancing from Tauroggen captured, after a struggle, Laugszargen, (near the frontier of East Prussia,) where they took prisoners and seized an ammunition depot and engineers' stores.

The Carpathians.—There has been furious fighting on the roads to Bartfeld (in Hungary) in the valleys of the Ondawa and Laborcz.

Near the Lupkow Pass and on the left bank of the Upper San our troops have advanced successfully, forcing the way with rifle fire and with the bayonet. In the course of the day we took 2,500 prisoners, including fifty officers and four machine guns.

In the direction of Munkacz the Germans, in close formation, attacked our positions at Rossokhatch, Oravtchik, and Kosziowa, but were everywhere driven back by our fire and by our counter-attacks with severe losses. In Galicia there has been a snowstorm.

Przemysl.—On the night of the 21st there was a fierce artillery fire round Przemysl. Portions of the garrison who once more tried to effect a sortie toward the northeast toward Oikowic were driven back within the circle of forts with heavy losses.

Note.—This portion of the communiqué was evidently drafted before the fall of Przemysl took place, and the communiqué proceeds:

In recognition of the joyous event of the fall of Przemysl the Czar has conferred upon the Grand Duke Nicholas the Second Class of the Order of St. George and the Third Class of the same order on General Ivanoff, the commander of the besieging army.

Map of the Siege of Przemysl. The small triangles indicate outlying fortified hills with their height in feet.

COLLECTING THE ARMS.

By Hamilton Fyfe, Correspondent of The London Daily Mail.

PETROGRAD, March 23.

Advance detachments of Russian troops entered Przemysl last night. The business of collecting the arms is proceeding. I believe the officers will be allowed to keep their swords.

Great surprise has been caused here by a statement that the number of troops captured exceeds three army corps. Possibly on account of the snowstorm no further telegram has been received from the Grand Duke Nicholas, and no details of the fall of the garrison have yet been officially announced. I have, however, received the definite assurance of a very high authority that the force which has surrendered includes nine Generals, over 2,000 officers, and 130,000 men. In spite of the authority of my informant, I am still inclined to await confirmation of these figures.

The leading military organ, the Russki Invalid, says that the garrison was known to number 60,000 men and that it had been swelled to some extent by the additional forces drafted in before the investment began. The Retch estimates the total at 80,000, and a semi-official announcement also places the strength of the garrison at that figure, excluding artillery and also the men belonging to the auxiliary and technical services.

There is an equal difference of opinion regarding the number of guns taken. The estimates vary from 1,000 to 2,000. What is known for certain is that the fortress contained 600 big guns of the newest type and a number of small, older pieces.

The characteristic spirit in which Russia is waging war is shown by the service of thanksgiving to God which was held immediately the news of the fall of the fortress reached the Grand Duke's headquarters. The Czar was there to join with the staff in offering humble gratitude to the Almighty for the great victory accorded to the Russian arms.

The first crowds which gathered here yesterday to rejoice over the great news moved with one consent to the Kazan Cathedral, where they sang the national hymn and crossed themselves reverently before the holy, wonder-working picture of Kazan, the Mother of God. In spite of the heaviest snowstorm of the Winter, which made the streets impassable and stopped the tramway cars, the Nevski Prospekt rang all the afternoon and evening with the sound of voices raised in patriotic song.

Przemysl is admitted to be the first spectacular success of the war on the side of the Allies. It is not surprising that the nation is proud and delighted, yet so generous is the Russian mind that there mingle with its triumph admiration and sympathy for the garrison which was compelled to surrender after a long, brave resistance. Popular imagination has been thrilled by the story of the last desperate sortie, which will take a high place in the history of modern war.

When toward the end of the week the hope of relief, which had so long buoyed up the defenders, was with heavy, resolved hearts abandoned, General Kousmanek resolved to try to save at all events some portion of his best troops by sending them to fight a way out. From the ranks, thinned terribly by casualties and also by typhus and other diseases caused through hunger and the unhealthy state of the town, he selected 20,000 men and served out to them five days' reduced rations, which were all he had left. He also supplied them with new boots in order to give them as good a chance as possible to join their comrades in the Carpathians, whose summits could be seen from Przemysl in the shining, warm Spring sunshine.

It was a hopeless enterprise, pitifully futile. It is true that the Austrian armies sent to relieve the city were only a few days' march distant, but even if the 20,000 had cut a way through the investing force they would have found another Russian army between them and their fellow-countrymen. General Kousmanek, before they started, addressed them. In a rousing speech he said:

Soldiers, for nearly half a year, in spite of cold and hunger, you have defended the fortress intrusted to you. The eyes of the world are fixed on you. Millions at home are waiting with painful eagerness to hear the news of your success. The honor of the army and our fatherland requires us to make a superhuman effort. Around us lies the iron ring of the enemy. Burst a way through it and join your comrades who have been fighting so bravely for you and are now so near.

I have given you the last of our supplies of food. I charge you to go forward and sweep the foe aside. After our many gallant and glorious fights we must not fall into the hands of the Russians like sheep; we must and will break through.

In case this appeal to the men's fighting spirit were ineffective threats were also used to the troops, who were warned by their officers that any who returned to the fortress would be treated as cowards and traitors. After the General's speech the men were told to rest for a few hours. At 4 in the morning they paraded and at 5 the battle began. For nine hours the Austrians hurled themselves against the iron ring, until early in the afternoon, when, broken and battered, the remains of the twenty thousand began to straggle back to the town. Exhausted and disheartened, the garrison was incapable of further effort.

In order to prevent useless slaughter General Kousmanek sent officers with a flag of truce to inquire about the terms of surrender. These were arranged very quickly.

In spite of the local value of the victory, and the vastness of the captures of material as well as of men, it must not be thought, as many are inclined to think here, that the Novoe Vremya exaggerates dangerously when it compares the effect likely to be produced with that of the fall of Metz and Port Arthur.

It certainly brings the end of the Austrians' participation in the war more clearly in sight. But the Austrians will fight for some time yet. What it actually does is to free a large Russian force for the operations against Cracow or to assist in the invasion of Hungary.

What is the strength of this force it would be imprudent to divulge, but I can say that it certainly amounts to not less than an "army," (anything from 80,000 to 200,000 men.) Those who are anxious to arrive at a closer figure can calculate by the fact that the Russians had a forty-mile front around Przemysl which was strong enough to repulse attacks at all points. Another very useful consequence is that all the Galician railway system is now in Russian hands. It makes the transport of troops much easier.

One further reflection was suggested to me last night by a very distinguished and influential Russian soldier, holding office under the Government. "The method which prevailed at Przemysl was as follows: Instead of rushing against the place and losing heavily, we waited and husbanded our forces until the garrison was unable to hold out any longer. That is the method adopted by the Allies. It must in the course of time force Germany to surrender also.

"Up to now we have held our own against her furious sorties. Soon we shall begin to draw more closely our investing lines. Only one end was possible to Przemysl. The fate of Germany is equally sure."

Now all eyes are fixed on the Dardanelles. The phrase on every lip is: "When the fall of Constantinople follows, then Prussia must begin to see that the case is hopeless." But we must not deceive ourselves, for even when her allies are defeated Prussia will still be hard to beat. Przemysl must not cause us to slacken our effort in any direction or in the slightest degree.

WHAT THE RUSSIANS FOUND

Special Cable to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

LONDON, April 3.—The London Times under date Przemysl, March 30, publishes a dispatch from Stanley Washburn, its special correspondent with the Russian armies, who, by courtesy of the Russian high command, is the first foreigner to visit the great Galician fortress since its fall. He says:

Przemysl is a story of an impregnable fortress two or three times over-garrisoned with patient, haggard soldiers starving in trenches, and sleek, faultlessly dressed officers living off the fat of the land in fashionable hotels and restaurants.

The siege started with a total population within the lines of investment of approximately 200,000. Experts estimate that the fortress could have been held with 50,000 or 60,000 men against any forces the Russians could bring against it. It is probable that such supplies as there were were uneconomically expended, with the result that when the push came the situation was at once acute, and the suffering of all classes save the officers became general. First the cavalry and transport horses were consumed. Then everything available. Cats were sold at 8 shillings, and fair-sized dogs at a sovereign.

While the garrison became thin and half starved, the mode of life of the officers in the town remained unchanged. The Café Sieber was constantly well filled with dilettante officers who gossipped and played cards and billiards and led the life to which they were accustomed in Vienna. Apparently very few shared any of the hardships of their men or made any effort to relieve their condition. At the Hotel Royal until the last, the officers had their three meals a day, with fresh meat, cigars, cigarettes, wines, and every luxury, while, as a witness has informed me, their own orderlies and servants begged for a slice of bread.

There can be no question that ultimate surrender was due to the fact that the garrison was on the verge of starvation, while the officers' diet was merely threatened with curtailment. Witnesses state that private soldiers were seen actually to fall in the streets from lack of nourishment. The officers are reported to have retained their private thoroughbred riding horses until the day before the surrender, when 2,000 of them were killed to prevent them from falling into the hands of the Russians. A Russian officer of high rank informed me that when he entered the town hundreds of these bodies of beautiful thoroughbred horses were to be seen with half-crazed Austrian and Hungarian soldiers tearing into the bodies with their faces and hands smeared with red blood as they devoured the raw flesh.

Map showing the scene of action between Przemysl and Cracow and the Carpathian Passes.

The Russians were utterly amazed at the casual reception which they received. The Austrian officers showed not the slightest sign of being disconcerted or humiliated at the collapse of their fortress.

The first Russian effort was at once to relieve the condition of the garrison and civilians. Owing to the destruction of the bridge this was delayed, but soon with remarkable efficiency distribution depots were opened everywhere and the most pressing needs were somewhat relieved.

The entire conduct of the siege on the part of the garrison seems wholly without explanation. The Austrians had throughout plenty of ammunition, and they certainly grossly outnumbered the Russians; yet they made but one recent effort to break out, which occurred three days before the surrender.

Civilians inform me that they gladly welcome the Russians and that the first troops who entered were greeted with cheers, while the garrison was frankly pleased that the siege was over and their troubles at an end.

As an example of overofficering it may be stated that General Kusmanek had seventy-five officers on his staff, while General Artamonov, the acting Russian Governor, had but four on his immediate staff.

The removal of the prisoners is proceeding with great efficiency. They are going out at the rate of about 10,000 a day. The docility of the captives is indicated by the fact that the Russian guards attached to the prisoners' columns number about one for every hundred prisoners. They are all strung out for miles between the fortress and Lemberg. The prisoners are so eager to get out and to see the last of the war that they follow the instructions of their captors like children.

All the civilians as well as prisoners I have talked with are unanimous in their praise of the Russian officers and soldiers, who have shown nothing but kindness and delicacy of feeling since their entrance into the fortress. This consideration strikes me as being utterly wasted on the captured officers, who treat the situation superciliously and are quite complacent in their relations with the Russians.

The Jesters.

By MARION COUTHOUY SMITH.

Ev'n he, the master of the songs of life,

May speak at times with less than certain sound—

"He jests at scars who never felt a wound."

So runs his word! Yet on the verge of strife,

They jest not who have never known the knife;

They tremble who in the waiting ranks are found,

While those scarred deep on many a battle-ground

Sing to the throbbing of the drum and fife.

They laugh who know the open, fearless breast,

The thrust, the steel-point, and the spreading stain;

Whose flesh is hardened to the searing test,

Whose souls are tempered to a high disdain.

Theirs is the lifted brow, the gallant jest,

The long last breath, that holds a victor-strain.

Lord Kitchener Advertises for Recruits

This map shows the comparative distances from London of Ostend and of some English towns. London is in the exact center of the map.

If the German Army were in Manchester.

If the German Army were in Manchester, every fit man in the country would enlist without a moment's delay.

Do you realise that the German Army is now at Ostend, only 125 miles away—or 40 miles nearer to London than is Manchester?

How much nearer must the Germans come before you do something to stop them?

The German Army must be beaten in Belgium. The time to do it is now.

Will you help? Yes? Then enlist TODAY.

God Save the King.

[Facsimile of an advertisement that appeared in The London Times, March 17, 1915.]

Battle of the Dardanelles

The Disaster That Befell the Allies' Fleet

AS THE TURKS SAW IT.

BERLIN, March 22, (via London, 11:33 A.M.)—The correspondent at Constantinople of the Wolff Bureau telegraphed today a description of the fighting at the Dardanelles on Thursday, March 18, in which the French battleship Bouvet and two British battleships were sent to the bottom. An abridgment of the correspondent's story follows:

The efforts of the Allies to force the Strait of the Dardanelles reached their climax in an artillery duel on Thursday, March 18, which lasted seven hours. The entire atmosphere around the Turkish forts was darkened by clouds of smoke from exploding shells and quantities of earth thrown into the air by the projectiles of the French and British warships. The earth trembled for miles around.

The Allies entered the strait at 11:30 in the morning, and shelled the town of Chank Kale. Four French and five British warships took part in the beginning. This engagement reached its climax at 1:30, when the fire of the Allies was concentrated upon Fort Hamidieh and the adjacent fortified positions.

The attack of modern marine artillery upon strong land forts presented an interesting as well as a terrifying spectacle. At times the forts were completely enveloped in smoke. At 2 o'clock the Allies changed their tactics and concentrated their fire upon individual batteries, but it was evident that they found difficulty in getting the range. Many of the shells fell short, casting up pillars of water, or went over the forts to explode in the town.

At 3:15, when the bombardment was at its hottest, the French battleship Bouvet was seen to be sinking at the stern. A moment later her bows swung clear of the water, and she was seen going down. Cheers from the Turkish garrisons and forts greeted this sight. Torpedo boats and other craft of the Allies hurried to the rescue, but they were successful in saving only a few men. Besides having been struck by a mine, the Bouvet was severely damaged above the water line by shell fire. One projectile struck her forward deck. A mast also was shot away and hung overboard. It could be seen that the Bouvet when she sank was endeavoring to gain the mouth of the strait. This, however, was difficult, owing, apparently, to the fact that her machinery had been damaged.

Shortly after the sinking of the Bouvet a British ship was struck on the deck squarely amidship and compelled to withdraw from the fight. Then another British vessel was badly damaged, and at 3:45 was seen to retire under a terrific fire from the Turkish battery. This vessel ran in toward the shore. For a full hour the Allies tried to protect her with their guns, but it was apparent that she was destined for destruction. Eight effective hits showed the hopelessness of the situation for this vessel. She then withdrew toward the mouth of the Dardanelles, which she reached in a few minutes under a hail of shells. The forts continued firing until the Allies were out of range.

This was the first day when the warships attacking the Dardanelles kept within range of the Turkish guns for any considerable length of time. The result for them was terrible, owing to the excellent marksmanship from the Turkish batteries. The Allies fired on this day 2,000 shells without silencing one shore battery. The result has inspired the Turks with confidence, and they are looking forward to further engagements with calm assurance.

ELIMINATION OF MINES.

The London Times naval correspondent writes, in its issue of March 20:

The further attack upon the inner forts at the Dardanelles, which was resumed by the allied squadrons on Thursday, has resulted, unfortunately, but not altogether unexpectedly, in some loss of ships and gallant lives.

The clear and candid dispatch in which the operations are described attributes the loss of the ships to floating mines, which were probably released to drift down with the current in such large numbers that the usual method of evading these machines was unavailable. This danger, it is said, will require special treatment. Presumably the area having been swept clear of anchored mines, it was not considered necessary to take other precautions than such as were concerned with the movement of the battleships themselves.

The satisfactory feature of the operations is that the ships maintained their superiority over the forts, and succeeded in silencing them after a few hours' bombardment. The sinking of the battleships occurred later in the afternoon, and it would seem at a time when a portion of the naval force was making a further advance to cover the mine-sweeping operations. There is nothing in the dispatch which indicates anything but the eventual success of the work, nor that the defenses have proved more formidable than was anticipated. The danger from floating mines may have been somewhat underestimated, but it is one that can be met and is most unlikely to form a decisive factor.

Manifestly the Turks, with their German advisers, have done their utmost to repair, by means of howitzers and field guns, the destruction of the fixed defenses; but it is not likely that any temporary expedients will prove more than troublesome to the passage of the fleet. The determination of the Allies to make a satisfactory ending of the operations is shown by the immediate dispatch of reinforcing ships, and by the fact that ample naval and military forces are available on the spot.

Every one will regret that illness has obliged Vice Admiral Carden to relinquish the chief command, but this is now in the very capable hands of Vice Admiral Robeck.

BRITISH OFFICIAL REPORT.

[From The London Times, March 20, 1915.]

After ten days of mine-sweeping inside the Dardanelles the British and French fleets made a general attack on the fortresses at the Narrows on Thursday. After about three hours' bombardment all the forts ceased firing.

Three battleships were lost in these operations by striking mines—the French Bouvet, and the Irresistible and the Ocean. The British crews were practically all saved, but nearly the whole of the men on the Bouvet perished.

The Secretary of the Admiralty issued the following statement last night:

Mine-sweeping having been in progress during the last ten days inside the strait, a general attack was delivered by the British and French fleets yesterday morning upon the fortresses at the Narrows of the Dardanelles.

At 10:45 A.M. Queen Elizabeth, Inflexible, Agamemnon, and Lord Nelson bombarded Forts J, L, T, U, and V; while Triumph and Prince George fired at Batteries F, E, and H. A heavy fire was opened on the ships from howitzers and field guns.

At 12:22 the French squadron, consisting of the Suffren, Gaulois, Charlemagne, and Bouvet, advanced up the Dardanelles to engage the forts at closer range. Forts J, U, F, and E replied strongly. Their fire was silenced by the ten battleships inside the strait, all the ships being hit several times during this part of the action.

By 1:25 P.M. all forts had ceased firing.

Vengeance, Irresistible, Albion, Ocean, Swiftsure, and Majestic then advanced to relieve the six old battleships inside the strait.

As the French squadron, which had engaged the forts in the most brilliant fashion was passing out, Bouvet was blown up by a drifting mine and sank in thirty-six fathoms north Erenkeui Village in less than three minutes.

At 2:36 P.M., the relief battleships renewed the attack on the forts, which again opened fire. The attack on the forts was maintained while the operations of the mine-sweepers continued. At 4:09 Irresistible quitted the line, listing heavily; and at 5:50 she sank, having probably struck a drifting mine. At 6:05, Ocean, also having struck a mine, both vessels sank in deep water, practically the whole of the crews having been removed safely under a hot fire.

QUEEN MARY—
Wife of George V., King of Great Britain and Ireland.—
(Photo from Underwood & Underwood.)

THE RIGHT HON. DAVID LLOYD GEORGE—
The radical Chancellor of the British Exchequer, upon whom
has devolved the task of financing the great war.—
(Photo by A. & R. Annan & Sons.)

The Gaulois was damaged by gun fire.

Inflexible had her forward control position hit by a heavy shell, and requires repair.

The bombardment of the forts and the mine-sweeping operations terminated when darkness fell. The damage to the forts effected by the prolonged direct fire of the very powerful forces employed cannot yet be estimated, and a further report will follow.

The losses of ships were caused by mines drifting with the current which were encountered in areas hitherto swept clear, and this danger will require special treatment.

The British casualties in personnel are not heavy, considering the scale of the operations; but practically the whole of the crew of the Bouvet were lost with the ship, an internal explosion having apparently supervened on the explosion of the mine.

The Queen and Implacable, which were dispatched from England to replace ships' casualties in anticipation of this operation, are due to arrive immediately, thus bringing the British fleet up to its original strength.

The operations are continuing, ample naval and military forces being available on the spot.

On the 16th inst., Vice Admiral Carden, who has been incapacitated by illness, was succeeded in the chief command by Rear Admiral John Michael de Robeck, with acting rank of Vice Admiral.

THE SCENE IN THE STRAIT.

The London Times publishes this story of an eyewitness:

TENEDOS, (Aegina,) March 18.

This is not so much an account of the five hours' heavy engagement between the Turkish forts and the allied ships which has been fought actually within the Dardanelles today as an impression of the bombardment as seen at a distance of fifteen miles or so from the top of a high, steep hill called Mount St. Elias, at the northern end of Tenedos.

Over the ridge of Kum Kale you plainly see, like a great blue lake, the first reach of the Dardanelles up to the narrow neck between Chanak and Kilid Bahr. It was up and down in this stretch of water that the largest vessels of the allied fleet steamed today for over four hours, hurling, with sheets of orange flame from their heavy guns, a constant succession of shells on the forts that guard the Narrows at Chanak, while the Turkish batteries, with a frequency that lessened as the day went on, flashed back at them in reply, with the difference that, while the effects of the Allies' shells were continually manifest in the columns of smoke and dust that were signs of the damage they had wrought, a great number of the enemy's shots fell in the sea hundreds of yards from the bombarding ships, sending torrents of water towering harmlessly into the air.

Not that the successes of the day have been won without cost. I saw several ships, French and British, struck by shells that raised volumes of white smoke, and one of the French squadron is toiling slowly home at this moment down by the head and with a list to port, while, so far as one could make out with a glass, several boatloads of men were being taken off her.

The ships left their stations between the Turkish and Asiatic coasts and Tenedos early this morning and by 11 they were steaming in line up the Dardanelles.

It was 11:45 when the first notable hit was made by an English ship. I could see eight vessels, apparently all battleships, lying in line from the entrance up the strait. The ship furthest up appeared to be the Queen Elizabeth, and I think it was she that fired the shot which exploded the powder magazine at Chanak. A great balloon of white smoke sprang up in the midst of the magazine which leaped out from a fierce, red flame, and reached a great height. When the flame had disappeared the dense smoke continued to grow till it must have been a column hundreds of feet high.

In the five minutes that followed this shot three more shells from the Queen Elizabeth fell practically on the same spot, and two minutes later yet another by the side of the smoking ruins.

There were now eight battleships, all pre-dreadnoughts, left at Tenedos, and at noon six of them started off in line a-head toward the strait. The English ships already within were passing further up and went out of sight.

The bombarding ships were steaming constantly up and down, turning at each end of the stretch, which is about a couple of miles long.

A long thin veil of black smoke was drifting slowly westward from the fighting. At about 1:30 Erenkeui Village, standing high on the Asiatic side, received a couple of shells. At 1:45 a division of eight destroyers in line steamed into the entrance of the strait, and a little later the last two battleships from Tenedos joined, the Dublin patrolling outside. An hour later the most striking effect was produced by a shell falling on a fort at Kilid Bahr, which evidently exploded another magazine. A huge mass of heavy jet-black smoke gradually rose till it towered high above the cliffs on the European and Asiatic sides. It ballooned slowly out like a gigantic genie rising from a fisherman's bottle.

By now the action was slackening, and at 3:45 five ships were slowly steaming homeward from the entrance. At 4:30 there were still eight vessels in the strait, but the forts had practically ceased to fire. The action was over for the day.

The result had been the apparent silencing of several Turkish batteries, and those terrific explosions at the forts at Chanak and Kilid Bahr, the ultimate effect of which remains to be seen when the attack is renewed tonight. For Chanak is burning.

Official Story of Two Sea Fights

[From The London Times, March 3, 1915.]

Admiralty, March 3, 1915.

The following dispatch has been received from Vice Admiral Sir David Beatty, K.C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O., commanding the First Battle Cruiser Squadron, reporting the action in the North Sea on Sunday, the 24th of January, 1915:

H.M.S. Princess Royal,

Feb. 2, 1915.

Sir: I have the honor to report that at daybreak on Jan. 24, 1915, the following vessels were patrolling in company:

The battle cruisers Lion, Capt. Alfred E.M. Chatfield, C.V.O., flying my flag; Princess Royal, Capt. Osmond de B. Brock, Aide de Camp; Tiger, Capt. Henry B. Pelly, M.V.O.; New Zealand, Capt. Lionel Halsey, C.M.G., Aide de Camp, flying the flag of Rear Admiral Sir Archibald Moore, K.C.B., C.V.O., and Indomitable, Capt. Francis W. Kennedy.

The light cruisers Southampton, flying the broad pennant of Commodore William E. Goodenough, M.V.O.; Nottingham, Capt. Charles B. Miller; Birmingham, Capt. Arthur A.M. Duff, and Lowestoft, Capt. Theobald W.B. Kennedy, were disposed on my port beam.

Commodore (T) Reginald Y. Tyrwhitt, C.B., in Arethusa, Aurora, Capt. Wilmot S. Nicholson; Undaunted, Capt. Francis G. St. John, M.V.O.; Arethusa and the destroyer flotillas were ahead.

At 7:25 A.M. the flash of guns was observed south-southeast. Shortly afterward a report reached me from Aurora that she was engaged with enemy's ships. I immediately altered course to south-southeast, increased to 22 knots, and ordered the light cruisers and flotillas to chase south-southeast to get in touch and report movements of enemy.

This order was acted upon with great promptitude, indeed my wishes had already been forestalled by the respective senior officers, and reports almost immediately followed from Southampton, Arethusa, and Aurora as to the position and composition of the enemy, which consisted of three battle cruisers and Blücher, six light cruisers, and a number of destroyers, steering northwest. The enemy had altered course to southeast. From now onward the light cruisers maintained touch with the enemy, and kept me fully informed as to their movements.

The battle cruisers worked up to full speed, steering to the southward. The wind at the time was northeast, light, with extreme visibility. At 7:30 A.M. the enemy were sighted on the port bow steaming fast, steering approximately southeast, distant 14 miles.

Owing to the prompt reports received we had attained our position on the quarter of the enemy, and so altered course to southeast parallel to them, and settled down to a long stern chase, gradually increasing our speed until we reached 28.5 knots. Great credit is due to the engineer staffs of New Zealand and Indomitable—these ships greatly exceeded their normal speed.

At 8:52 A.M., as we had closed to within 20,000 yards of the rear ship, the battle cruisers manoeuvred to keep on a line of bearing so that guns would bear, and Lion fired a single shot, which fell short. The enemy at this time were in single line ahead, with light cruisers ahead and a large number of destroyers on their starboard beam.

Single shots were fired at intervals to test the range, and at 9:09 A.M. Lion made her first hit on the Blücher, No. 4 in the line. The Tiger opened fire at 9:20 A.M. on the rear ship, the Lion shifted to No. 3 in the line, at 18,000 yards, this ship being hit by several salvos. The enemy returned our fire at 9:14 A.M. Princess Royal, on coming into range, opened fire on Blücher, the range of the leading ship being 17,500 yards, at 9:35 A.M. New Zealand was within range of Blücher, which had dropped somewhat astern, and opened fire on her. Princess Royal shifted to the third ship in the line, inflicting considerable damage on her.

Our flotilla cruisers and destroyers had gradually dropped from a position broad on our beam to our port quarter, so as not to foul our range with their smoke; but the enemy's destroyers threatening attack, the Meteor and M Division passed ahead of us, Capt. the Hon. H. Meade, D.S.O., handling this division with conspicuous ability.

About 9:45 A.M. the situation was as follows: Blücher, the fourth in their line, already showed signs of having suffered severely from gun fire; their leading ship and No. 3 were also on fire, Lion was engaging No. 1, Princess Royal No. 3, New Zealand No. 4, while the Tiger, which was second in our line, fired first at their No. 1, and when interfered with by smoke, at their No. 4.

The enemy's destroyers emitted vast columns of smoke to screen their battle cruisers, and under cover of this the latter now appeared to have altered course to the northward to increase their distance, and certainly the rear ships hauled out on the port quarter of their leader, thereby increasing their distance from our line. The battle cruisers, therefore, were ordered to form a line of bearing north-northwest, and proceed at their utmost speed.

Their destroyers then showed evident signs of an attempt to attack. Lion and Tiger opened fire on them, and caused them to retire and resume their original course.

The light cruisers maintained an excellent position on the port quarter of the enemy's line, enabling them to observe and keep touch, or attack any vessel that might fall out of the line.

At 10:48 A.M. the Blücher, which had dropped considerably astern of enemy's line, hauled out to port, steering north with a heavy list, on fire, and apparently in a defeated condition. I consequently ordered Indomitable to attack enemy breaking northward.

At 10:54 A.M. submarines were reported on the starboard bow, and I personally observed the wash of a periscope two points on our starboard bow. I immediately turned to port.

At 11:03 A.M. an injury to the Lion being reported as incapable of immediate repair, I directed Lion to shape course northwest. At 11:20 A.M. I called the Attack alongside, shifting my flag to her at about 11:35 A.M. I proceeded at utmost speed to rejoin the squadron, and met them at noon retiring north-northwest.

I boarded and hoisted my flag on Princess Royal at about 12:20 P.M., when Capt. Brock acquainted me of what had occurred since the Lion fell out of the line, namely, that Blücher had been sunk and that the enemy battle cruisers had continued their course to the eastward in a considerably damaged condition. He also informed me that a Zeppelin and a seaplane had endeavored to drop bombs on the vessels which went to the rescue of the survivors of Blücher.

The good seamanship of Lieut. Commander Cyril Callaghan, H.M.S. Attack, in placing his vessel alongside the Lion and subsequently the Princess Royal, enabled the transfer of flag to be made in the shortest possible time.

At 2 P.M. I closed Lion and received a report that the starboard engine was giving trouble owing to priming, and at 3:38 P.M. I ordered Indomitable to take her in tow, which was accomplished by 5 P.M.

The greatest credit is due to the Captains of Indomitable and Lion for the seaman-like manner in which the Lion was taken in tow under difficult circumstances.

The excellent steaming of the ships engaged in the operation was a conspicuous feature.

I attach an appendix giving the names of various officers and men who specially distinguished themselves.

Where all did well it is difficult to single out officers and men for special mention, and as Lion and Tiger were the only ships hit by the enemy, the majority of these I mention belong to those ships.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

(Signed) DAVID BEATTY,

Vice Admiral.

OFFICERS.

Commander Charles A. Fountaine, H.M.S. Lion.

Lieut. Commander Evan C. Bunbury, H.M.S. Lion.

Lieut. Frederick T. Peters, H.M.S. Meteor.

Lieut. Charles M.R. Schwerdt, H.M.S. Lion.

Engineer Commander Donald P. Green, H.M.S. Lion.

Engineer Commander James L. Sands, H.M.S. Southampton.

Engineer Commander Thomas H. Turner, H.M.S. New Zealand.

Engineer Lieut. Commander George Preece, H.M.S. Lion.

Engineer Lieut. Albert Knothe, H.M.S. Indomitable.

Surgeon Probationer James A. Stirling, R.N.V.R., H.M.S. Meteor.

Mr. Joseph H. Burton, Gunner (T), H.M.S. Lion.

Chief Carpenter Frederick E. Dailey, H.M.S. Lion.

PETTY OFFICERS AND MEN.

Py. Or. J.W. Kemmett, O.N. 186,788, Lion.

A.B.H. Davis, O.N. 184,526, Tiger.

A.B.H.F. Griffin, O.N.J. 14,160, Princess Royal.

A.B.P.S. Livingstone, O.N. 234,328, Lion.

A.B.H. Robison, O.N. 209,112, Tiger.

A.B.G.H. le Seilleur, O.N. 156,802, Lion.

Boy, 1st CL., F.G.H. Bamford, O.N.J. 26,598, Tiger.

Boy, 1st CL., J.F. Rogers, O.N.J. 28,329, Tiger.

Ch. Ee. R. Artr., 1st CL., E.R. Hughes, O.N. 268,999, Indomitable.

Ch. Ee. R. Artr., 2d CL, W.B. Dand, O.N. 270,648, New Zealand.

Ch. Ee. A. Artr. W. Gillespie, O.N. 270,080, Meteor.

Mechn. A.J. Cannon, O.N. 175,440, Lion.

Mechn. E.C. Ephgrave, O.N. 288,231, Lion.

Ch. Stkr. P. Callaghan, O.N. 278,953, Lion.

Ch. Stkr. A.W. Ferris, O.N. 175,824, Lion.

Ch. Stkr. J.E. James, O.N. 174,232, New Zealand.

Ch. Stkr. W.E. James, O.N. 294,406, Indomitable.

Ch. Stkr. J. Keating, R.F.R., O.N. 165,732, Meteor.

Stkr. Py. Or. M. Flood, R.F.R., O.N. 153,418, Meteor.

Stkr. Py. Or. T.W. Hardy, O.N. 292,542, Indomitable.

Stkr. Py. Or. A.J. Sims, O.N. 276,502, New Zealand.

Stkr. Py. Or. S. Westaway, R.F.R., O.N. 300,938, Meteor.

Actg. Ldg. Skr. J. Blackburn, O.N.K. 4,844, Tiger.

Stkr., 1st Cl., A.H. Bennet, O.N.K. 10,700, Tiger.

Stkr., 2d Cl., H. Turner, O.N.K. 22,720, Tiger.

Ldg. Carpenter's Crew, E.O. Bradley, O.N. 346,621, Lion.

Ldg. Carpenter's Crew, E. Currie, O.N. 344,851, Lion.

Sick Berth Attendant C.S. Hutchinson, O.N.M. 3,882, Tiger.

Ch. Writer S.G. White, O.N. 340,597, Tiger.

Third Writer H.C. Green, O.N.M. 8,266, Tiger.

Officers' Steward, 3d Cl., F.W. Kearley, O.N.L. 2,716, Tiger.

HONORS AWARDED.

Lord Chamberlain's Office,

St. James's Palace,

March 3, 1915.

The King has been graciously pleased to give orders for the following appointment to the Most Honorable Order of the Bath, in recognition of the services of the undermentioned officer mentioned in the foregoing dispatch:

To be an Additional Member of the Military Division of the Third Class or Companion.

Capt. Osmond de Beauvoir Brock, A.D.C., Royal Navy.

Admiralty, S.W.,

March 3, 1915.

The King has been graciously pleased to give orders for the following appointment to the Distinguished Service Order, and for the award of the Distinguished Service Cross, to the undermentioned officers in recognition of their services mentioned in the foregoing dispatch:

To be Companion of the Distinguished Service Order.

Lieut. Frederic Thornton Peters, Royal Navy.

To receive the Distinguished Service Cross.

Surg. Probationer James Alexander Stirling, R.N.V.R.

Gunner (T) Joseph H. Burton.

Chief Carpenter Frederick E. Dailey.

The following promotion has been made:

Commander Charles Andrew Fountaine to be a Captain in his Majesty's fleet, to date March 3, 1915.

The following awards have also been made:

To receive the Distinguished Service Medal.

P.O. J.W. Kemmett, O.N. 186,788.

A.B. H. Davis, O.N. 184,526.

A.B. H.F. Griffin, O.N.J. 14,160.

A.B. P.S. Livingstone, O.N. 234,328.

A.B. H. Robison, O.N. 209,112.

A.B. G.H. le Seilleur, O.N. 156,802.

Boy, 1st Cl., F.G.H. Bamford, O.N.J. 26,598.

Boy, 1st Cl., J.F. Rogers, O.N.J. 28,329.

Ch. E.R. Art., 1st Cl., E.R. Hughes, O.N. 268,999.

Ch. E.R. Art., 2d Cl., W.B. Dand, O.N. 270,648.

Ch. E.R. Art., W. Gillespie, O.N. 270,080.

Mechn. A.J. Cannon, O.N. 175,440.

Mechn. E.C. Ephgrave, O.N. 288,231.

Ch. Stkr. P. Callaghan, O.N. 278,953.

Ch. Stkr. A.W. Ferris, O.N. 175,824.

Ch. Stkr. J.E. James, O.N. 174,232.

Ch. Stkr. W.E. James, O.N. 294,406.

Ch. Stkr. J. Keating, R.F.R., O.N. 165,732.

Stkr. P.O. M. Flood, R.F.R., O.N. 153,418.

Stkr. P.O. T.W. Hardy, O.N. 292,542.

Stkr. P.O. A.J. Sims, O.N. 276,502.

Stkr. P.O. S. Westaway, R.F.R., O.N. 300,938.

Actg. Ldg. Stkr. J. Blackburn, O.N.K. 4,844.

Stkr., 1st Cl., A.H. Bennet, O.N.K. 10,700.

Stkr., 2d Cl., H. Turner, O.N.K. 22,720.

Ldg. Carpenter's Crew, E.O. Bradley, O.N. 346,621.

Ldg. Carpenter's Crew, E. Currie, O.N. 344,851.

Sick Berth Attendant C.S. Hutchinson, O.N.M. 3,882.

Ch. Writer S.G. White, O.N. 340,597.

Third Writer H.C. Green, O.N.M. 8,266.

Officers' Steward, 3d Cl., F.W. Kearley, O.N.L. 2,716.

BATTLE OF THE FALKLANDS

Admiralty, March 3, 1915.

The following dispatch has been received from Vice Admiral Sir F.C. Doveton-Sturdee, K.C.B., C.V.O., C.M.G., reporting the action off the Falkland Islands on Tuesday, the 8th of December, 1914:

INVINCIBLE, at Sea,

Dec. 19, 1914.

Sir: I have the honor to forward a report on the action which took place on Dec. 8, 1914, against a German squadron off the Falkland Islands.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

F.C.D. STURDEE,

Vice Admiral, Commander in Chief.

The Secretary, Admiralty.

(A)—PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS.

The squadron, consisting of H.M. ships Invincible, flying my flag, Flag Capt. Percy T.M. Beamish; Inflexible, Capt. Richard F. Phillimore; Carnarvon, flying the flag of Rear Admiral Archibald P. Soddart, Flag Capt. Harry L.d'E. Skipwith; Cornwall, Capt. Walter M. Ellerton; Kent, Capt. John D. Allen; Glasgow, Capt. John Loce; Bristol, Capt. Basil H. Fanshawe, and Macedonia, Capt. Bertram S. Evans, arrived at Port Stanley, Falkland Islands, at 10:30 A.M. on Monday, Dec. 7, 1914. Coaling was commenced at once, in order that the ships should be ready to resume the search for the enemy's squadron the next evening, Dec. 8.

At 8 A.M. on Tuesday, Dec. 8, a signal was received from the signal station on shore:

"A four-funnel and two-funnel man-of-war in sight from Sapper Hill, steering northward."

THE BATTLE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS FROM THE OFFICIAL REPORT OF ADMIRAL STURDEE.

The numbers given on the plan show the corresponding positions of vessels at various times. All ships bearing the same number were simultaneously in the positions charted.]

At this time the positions of the various ships of the squadron were as follows:

Macedonia: At anchor as lookout ship.

Kent (guard ship): At anchor in Port William.

Invincible and Inflexible: In Port William.

Carnarvon: In Port William.

Cornwall: In Port William.

Glasgow: In Port Stanley.

Bristol: In Port Stanley.

The Kent was at once ordered to weigh, and a general signal was made to raise steam for full speed.

At 8:20 A.M. the signal station reported another column of smoke in sight to the southward, and at 8:45 A.M. the Kent passed down the harbor and took up a station at the entrance.

The Canopus, Capt. Heathcoat S. Grant, reported at 8:47 A.M. that the first two ships were eight miles off, and that the smoke reported at 8:20 A.M. appeared to be the smoke of two ships about twenty miles off.

At 8:50 A.M. the signal station reported a further column of smoke in sight to the southward.

The Macedonia was ordered to weigh anchor on the inner side of the other ships, and await orders.

At 9:20 A.M. the two leading ships of the enemy, (Gneisenau and Nürnberg,) with guns trained on the wireless station, came within range of the Canopus, which opened fire at them across the low land at a range of 11,000 yards. The enemy at once hoisted their colors and turned away. At this time the masts and smoke of the enemy were visible from the upper bridge of the Invincible at a range of approximately 17,000 yards across the low land to the south of Port William.

A few minutes later the two cruisers altered course to port, as though to close the Kent at the entrance to the harbor, but about this time it seems that the Invincible and Inflexible were seen over the land, as the enemy at once altered course and increased speed to join their consorts.

The Glasgow weighed and proceeded at 9:40 A.M. with orders to join the Kent and observe the enemy's movements.

At 9:45 A.M. the squadron—less the Bristol—weighed, and proceeded out of harbor in the following order: Carnarvon, Inflexible, Invincible, and Cornwall. On passing Cape Pembroke Light the five ships of the enemy appeared clearly in sight to the southeast, hull down. The visibility was at its maximum, the sea was calm, with a bright sun, a clear sky, and a light breeze from the northwest.

At 10:20 A.M. the signal for a general chase was made. The battle cruisers quickly passed ahead of the Carnarvon and overtook the Kent. The Glasgow was ordered to keep two miles from the Invincible, and the Inflexible was stationed on the starboard quarter of the flagship. Speed was eased to twenty knots at 11:15 A.M., to enable the other cruisers to get into station.

At this time the enemy's funnels and bridges showed just above the horizon.

Information was received from the Bristol at 11:27 A.M. that three enemy ships had appeared off Port Pleasant, probably colliers or transports. The Bristol was therefore directed to take the Macedonia under orders and destroy transports.

The enemy were still maintaining their distance, and I decided, at 12:20 P.M., to attack with the two battle cruisers and the Glasgow.

At 12:47 P.M. the signal to "Open fire and engage the enemy" was made.

The Inflexible opened fire at 12:55 P.M. from her fore turret at the right-hand ship of the enemy, a light cruiser; a few minutes later the Invincible opened fire at the same ship.

The deliberate fire from a range of 16,500 to 15,000 yards at the right-hand light cruiser, which was dropping astern, became too threatening, and when a shell fell close alongside her at 1:20 P.M. she (the Leipzig) turned away, with the Nürnberg and Dresden, to the southwest.

These light cruisers were at once followed by the Kent, Glasgow, and Cornwall, in accordance with my instructions.

The action finally developed into three separate encounters, besides the subsidiary one dealing with the threatened landing.

(B.)—ACTION WITH THE ARMORED CRUISERS.

The fire of the battle cruisers was directed on the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. The effect of this was quickly seen when, at 1:25 P.M., with the Scharnhorst leading, they turned about seven points to port in succession into line ahead and opened fire at 1:30 P.M. Shortly afterward speed was eased to twenty-four knots and the battle cruisers were ordered to turn together, bringing them into line ahead, with the Invincible leading.

The range was about 13,500 yards at the final turn, and increased until at 2 P.M. it had reached 16,450 yards.

The enemy then (2:10 P.M.) turned away about ten points to starboard, and a second chase ensued until at 2:45 P.M. the battle cruisers again opened fire; this caused the enemy, at 2:53 P.M., to turn into line ahead to port and open fire at 2:55 P.M.

The Scharnhorst caught fire forward, but not seriously, and her fire slackened perceptibly; the Gneisenau was badly hit by the Inflexible.

At 3:30 P.M. the Scharnhorst led around about ten points to starboard; just previously her fire had slackened perceptibly, and one shell had shot away her third funnel; some guns were not firing, and it would appear that the turn was dictated by a desire to bring her starboard guns into action. The effect of the fire on the Scharnhorst became more and more apparent in consequence of smoke from fires, and also escaping steam. At times a shell would cause a large hole to appear in her side, through which could be seen a dull red glow of flame. At 4:04 P.M. the Scharnhorst, whose flag remained flying to the last, suddenly listed heavily to port, and within a minute it became clear that she was a doomed ship, for the list increased very rapidly until she lay on her beam ends, and at 4:17 P.M. she disappeared.

The Gneisenau passed on the far side of her late flagship, and continued a determined but ineffectual effort to fight the two battle cruisers.

At 5:08 P.M. the forward funnel was knocked over and remained resting against the second funnel. She was evidently in serious straits, and her fire slackened very much.

At 5:15 P.M. one of the Gneisenau's shells struck the Invincible; this was her last effective effort.

At 5:30 P.M. she turned toward the flagship with a heavy list to starboard, and appeared stopped, with steam pouring from her escape pipes and smoke from shell and fires rising everywhere. About this time I ordered the signal "Cease fire!" but before it was hoisted the Gneisenau opened fire again, and continued to fire from time to time with a single gun.

At 5:40 P.M. the three ships closed in on the Gneisenau, and at this time the flag flying at her fore truck was apparently hauled down, but the flag at the peak continued flying.

At 5:50 P.M. "Cease fire!" was made.

At 6 P.M. the Gneisenau heeled over very suddenly, showing the men gathered on her decks and then walking on her side as she lay for a minute on her beam ends before sinking.

The prisoners of war from the Gneisenau report that by the time the ammunition was expended some 600 men had been killed and wounded. The surviving officers and men were all ordered on deck and told to provide themselves with hammocks and any articles that could support them in the water.

When the ship capsized and sank there were probably some 200 unwounded survivors in the water, but, owing to the shock of the cold water, many were drowned within sight of the boats and ship.

Every effort was made to save life as quickly as possible, both by boats and from the ships; lifebuoys were thrown and ropes lowered, but only a portion could be rescued. The Invincible alone rescued 108 men, fourteen of whom were found to be dead after being brought on board. These men were buried at sea the following day with full military honors.

(C)—ACTION WITH THE LIGHT CRUISERS.

At about 1 P.M., when the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau turned to port to engage the Invincible and Inflexible, the enemy's light cruisers turned to starboard to escape; the Dresden was leading and the Nürnberg and Leipzig followed on each quarter.

In accordance with my instructions, the Glasgow, Kent, and Cornwall at once went in chase of these ships; the Carnarvon, whose speed was insufficient to overtake them, closed the battle cruisers.

The Glasgow drew well ahead of the Cornwall and Kent, and at 3 P.M. shots were exchanged with the Leipzig at 12,000 yards. The Glasgow's object was to endeavor to outrange the Leipzig with her 6-inch guns and thus cause her to alter course and give the Cornwall and Kent a chance of coming into action.

At 4:17 P.M. the Cornwall opened fire, also on the Leipzig.

At 7:17 P.M. the Leipzig was on fire fore and aft, and the Cornwall and Glasgow ceased fire.

The Leipzig turned over on her port side and disappeared at 9 P.M. Seven officers and eleven men were saved.

At 3:36 P.M. the Cornwall ordered the Kent to engage the Nürnberg, the nearest cruiser to her.

Owing to the excellent and strenuous efforts of the engine room department, the Kent was able to get within range of the Nürnberg at 5 P.M. At 6:35 P.M. the Nürnberg was on fire forward and ceased firing. The Kent also ceased firing and closed to 3,300 yards; as the colors were still observed to be flying on the Nürnberg, the Kent opened fire again. Fire was finally stopped five minutes later on the colors being hauled down, and every preparation was made to save life. The Nürnberg sank at 7:27 P.M., and, as she sank, a group of men were waving a German ensign attached to a staff. Twelve men were rescued, but only seven survived.

The Kent had four killed and twelve wounded, mostly caused by one shell.

During the time the three cruisers were engaged with the Nürnberg and Leipzig, the Dresden, which was beyond her consorts, effected her escape owing to her superior speed. The Glasgow was the only cruiser with sufficient speed to have had any chance of success. However, she was fully employed in engaging the Leipzig for over an hour before either the Cornwall or Kent could come up and get within range. During this time the Dresden was able to increase her distance and get out of sight.

The weather changed after 4 P.M., and the visibility was much reduced; further, the sky was overcast and cloudy, thus assisting the Dresden to get away unobserved.

(D)—ACTION WITH THE ENEMY'S TRANSPORTS.

A report was received at 11:27 A.M. from H.M.S. Bristol that three ships of the enemy, probably transports or colliers, had appeared off Port Pleasant. The Bristol was ordered to take the Macedonia under his orders and destroy the transports.

H.M.S. Macedonia reports that only two ships, steamships Baden and Santa Isabel, were present; both ships were sunk after the removal of the crews.

I have pleasure in reporting that the officers and men under my orders carried out their duties with admirable efficiency and coolness, and great credit is due to the engineer officers of all the ships, several of which exceeded their normal full speed.

The names of the following are specially mentioned:

OFFICERS.

Commander Richard Herbert Denny Townsend, H.M.S. Invincible.

Commander Arthur Edward Frederick Bedford, H.M.S. Kent.

Lieut. Commander Wilfred Arthur Thompson, H.M.S. Glasgow.

Lieut. Commander Hubert Edward Danreuther, First and Gunnery Lieutenant, H.M.S. Invincible.

Engineer Commander George Edward Andrew, H.M.S. Kent.

Engineer Commander Edward John Weeks, H.M.S. Invincible.

Paymaster Cyril Sheldon Johnson, H.M.S. Invincible.

Carpenter Thomas Andrew Walls, H.M.S. Invincible.

Carpenter William Henry Venning, H.M.S. Kent.

Carpenter George Henry Egford, H.M.S. Cornwall.

PETTY OFFICERS AND MEN.

Ch. P.O. D. Leighton, O.N. 124,288, Kent.

P.O., 2d Cl., M.J. Walton, (R.F.R., A. 1,756,) O.N. 118,358, Kent.

Ldg. Smn. F.S. Martin, O.N. 233,301, Invincible, Gnr's. Mate, Gunlayer, 1st Cl.

Sigmn. F. Glover, O.N. 225,731, Cornwall.

Ch. E.R. Art., 2d Cl., J.G. Hill, O.N. 269,646, Cornwall.

Actg. Ch. E.R. Art., 2d Cl., R. Snowdon, O.N. 270,654, Inflexible.

E.R. Art., 1st Cl., G.H.F. McCarten, O.N. 270,023, Invincible.

Stkr. P.O. G.S. Brewer, O.N. 150,950, Kent.

Stkr. P.O. W.A. Townsend, O.N. 301,650, Cornwall.

Stkr., 1st Cl., J. Smith, O.N. SS 111,915, Cornwall.

Shpwrt., 1st Cl., A.N.E. England, O.N. 341,971, Glasgow.

Shpwrt., 2d Cl., A.C.H. Dymott, O.N.M. 8,047, Kent.

Portsmouth R.F.R.B. 3,307 Sergt. Charles Mayes, H.M.S. Kent.

F.C.D. STURDEE.

BETWEEN MIDNIGHT AND MORNING.

By SIR OWEN SEAMAN.

[From King Albert's Book.]

You that have faith to look with fearless eyes

Beyond the tragedy of a world at strife,

And trust that out of night and death shall rise

The dawn of ampler life;

Rejoice, whatever anguish rend your heart,

That God has given you, for a priceless dower,

To live in these great times and have your part

In Freedom's crowning hour.

That you may tell your sons who see the light

High in the heavens, their heritage to take—

"I saw the powers of darkness put to flight!

I saw the morning break!"

The Greatest of Campaigns

The French Official Account Concluded

The second and succeeding installments—the first installment appeared in CURRENT HISTORY for April—of the official French historical review of the operations in the western theatre of war from the beginning until the end of January, 1915—the first six months—are described in the subjoined correspondence of The Associated Press.

LONDON, March 18, (Correspondence of The Associated Press.)—The Associated Press has received the second installment of the historical review emanating from French official sources of the operations in the Western theatre of war, from its beginning up to the end of January. It should be understood that the narrative is made purely from the French standpoint. The additional installment of the document dealing with the victory of the Marne, Sept. 6th to 15th, is as follows:

If one examines on the map the respective positions of the German and French armies on Sept. 6 as previously described, it will be seen that by his inflection toward Meaux and Coulommiers General von Kluck was exposing his right to the offensive action of our left. This is the starting point of the victory of the Marne.

On the evening of Sept. 5 our left army had reached the front Penchard-Saint-Souflet-Ver. On the 6th and 7th it continued its attacks vigorously with the Ourcq as objective. On the evening of the 7th it was some kilometers from the Ourcq, on the front Chambry-Marcilly-Lisieux-Acy-en-Multien. On the 8th, the Germans, who had in great haste reinforced their right by bringing their Second and Fourth Army Corps back to the north, obtained some successes by attacks of extreme violence. They occupied Betz, Thury-en-Valois, and Nanteuil-le-Haudouin. But in spite of this pressure our troops held their ground well. In a brilliant action they took three standards, and, being reinforced, prepared a new attack for the 10th. At the moment that this attack was about to begin the enemy was already in retreat toward the north. The attack became a pursuit, and on the 12th we established ourselves on the Aisne.

LEFT OF KLUCK'S ARMY THREATENED.

Why did the German forces which were confronting us and on the evening before attacking so furiously retreat on the morning of the 10th? Because in bringing back on the 6th several army corps from the south to the north to face our left the enemy had exposed his left to the attacks of the British Army, which had immediately faced around toward the north, and to those of our armies which were prolonging the English lines to the right. This is what the French command had sought to bring about. This is what happened on Sept. 8 and allowed the development and rehabilitation which it was to effect.

On the 6th the British Army had set out from the line Rozcy-Lagny and had that evening reached the southward bank of the Grand Morin. On the 7th and 8th it continued its march, and on the 9th had debouched to the north of the Marne below Chateau-Thiery, taking in flank the German forces which on that day were opposing, on the Ourcq, our left army. Then it was that these forces began to retreat, while the British Army, going in pursuit and capturing seven guns and many prisoners, reached the Aisne between Soissons and Longueval.

The rôle of the French Army, which was operating to the right of the British Army, was threefold. It had to support the British attacking on its left. It had on its right to support our centre, which from Sept. 7 had been subjected to a German attack of great violence. Finally, its mission was to throw back the three active army corps and the reserve corps which faced it.

On the 7th it made a leap forward, and on the following days reached and crossed the Marne, seizing, after desperate fighting, guns, howitzers, mitrailleuses, and 1,300,000 cartridges. On the 12th it established itself on the north edge of the Montagne-de-Reime in contact with our centre, which for its part had just forced the enemy to retreat in haste.

THE ACTION OF FERE-CHAMPENOISE.

Our centre consisted of a new army created on Aug. 29 and of one of those which at the beginning of the campaign had been engaged in Belgian Luxemburg. The first had retreated on Aug. 29 to Sept. 5 from the Aisne to the north of the Marne and occupied the general front Sézanne-Mailly.

The second, more to the east, had drawn back to the south of the line Humbauville-Chateau-Beauchamp-Bignicourt-Blesmes-Maurupt-le-Montoy.

The enemy, in view of his right being arrested and the defeat of his enveloping movement, made a desperate effort from the 7th to the 10th to pierce our centre to the west and to the east of Fére-Champenoise. On the 8th he succeeded in forcing back the right of our new army, which retired as far as Gouragançon. On the 9th, at 6 o'clock in the morning, there was a further retreat to the south of that village, while on the left the other army corps also had to go back to the line Allemant-Connantre.

Despite this retreat the General commanding the army ordered a general offensive for the same day. With the Morocco Division, whose behavior was heroic, he met a furious assault of the Germans on his left toward the marshes of Saint Gond. Then with the division which had just victoriously overcome the attacks of the enemy to the north of Sézanne, and with the whole of his left army corps, he made a flanking attack in the evening of the 9th upon the German forces, and notably the guard, which had thrown back his right army corps. The enemy, taken by surprise by this bold manoeuvre, did not resist, and beat a hasty retreat.

On the 11th we crossed the Marne between Tours-sur-Marne and Sarry, driving the Germans in front of us in disorder. On the 12th we were in contact with the enemy to the north of the Camp de Chalons. Our other army of the centre, acting on the right of the one just referred to, had been intrusted with the mission during the 7th, 8th, and 9th of disengaging its neighbor, and it was only on the 10th that, being reinforced by an army corps from the east, it was able to make its action effectively felt. On the 11th the Germans retired. But, perceiving their danger, they fought desperately, with enormous expenditure of projectiles, behind strong intrenchments. On the 12th the result had none the less been attained, and our two centre armies were solidly established on the ground gained.

THE OPERATIONS OF THE RIGHT.

To the right of these two armies were three others. They had orders to cover themselves to the north and to debouch toward the west on the flank of the enemy, which was operating to the west of the Argonne. But a wide interval in which the Germans were in force separated them from our centre. The attack took place, nevertheless, with very brilliant success for our artillery, which destroyed eleven batteries of the Sixteenth German Army Corps.

On the 10th inst. the Eighth and Fifteenth German Army Corps counter-attacked, but were repulsed. On the 11th our progress continued with new successes, and on the 12th we were able to face round toward the north in expectation of the near and inevitable retreat of the enemy, which, in fact, took place from the 13th.

The withdrawal of the mass of the German force involved also that of the left. From the 12th onward the forces of the enemy operating between Nancy and the Vosges retreated in a hurry before our two armies of the East, which immediately occupied the positions that the enemy had evacuated. The offensive of our right had thus prepared and consolidated in the most useful way the result secured by our left and our centre.

Map showing the successive stages of the Battle of the Marne.

Such was this seven days' battle, in which more than two millions of men were engaged. Each army gained ground step by step, opening the road to its neighbor, supported at once by it, taking in flank the adversary which the day before it had attacked in front, the efforts of one articulating closely with those of the other, a perfect unity of intention and method animating the supreme command.

To give this victory all its meaning it is necessary to add that it was gained by troops which for two weeks had been retreating, and which, when the order for the offensive was given, were found to be as ardent as on the first day. It has also to be said that these troops had to meet the whole German army, and that from the time they marched forward they never again fell back. Under their pressure the German retreat at certain times had the appearance of a rout.

In spite of the fatigue of our men, in spite of the power of the German heavy artillery, we took colors, guns, mitrailleuses, shells, more than a million cartridges, and thousands of prisoners. A German corps lost almost the whole of its artillery, which, from information brought by our airmen, was destroyed by our guns.

"THE RUSH TO THE SEA."

LONDON, March 18.—The third installment of the historical review of the war, emanating from French official sources and purely from the French viewpoint, has been received by The Associated Press. The French narrative contains a long chapter on the siege war from the Oise to the Vosges, which lasted from Sept. 13 to Nov. 30. Most of the incidents in this prolonged and severe warfare have been recorded in the daily bulletins. The operations were of secondary importance, and were conducted on both sides with the same idea of wearing down the troops and the artillery of the opposing forces with the view of influencing the decisive result in the great theatre of war in the north. The next chapter deals with "the rush to the sea," Sept. 13 to Oct. 23, and is as follows:

GENERAL CHARACTER OF THE ACTION.

As early as Sept. 11 the Commander in Chief had directed our left army to have as important forces as possible on the right bank of the Oise. On Sept. 17 he made that instruction more precise by ordering "a mass to be constituted on the left wing of our disposition, capable of coping with the outflanking movement of the enemy." Everything led us to expect that flanking movement, for the Germans are lacking in invention. Indeed, their effort at that time tended to a renewal of their manoeuvre of August. In the parallel race the opponents were bound in the end to be stopped only by the sea; that is what happened about Oct. 20.

The Germans had an advantage over us, which is obvious from a glance at the map—the concentric form of their front, which shortened the length of their transports. In spite of this initial inferiority we arrived in time. From the middle of September to the last week in October fighting went on continually to the north of the Oise, but all the time we were fighting we were slipping northward. On the German side this movement brought into line more than eighteen new army corps, (twelve active army corps, six reserve corps, four cavalry corps.) On our side it ended in the constitution of three fresh armies on our left and in the transport into the same district of the British Army and the Belgian Army from Antwerp.

For the conception and realization of this fresh and extended disposition the French command, in the first place, had to reduce to a minimum the needs for effectives of our armies to the east of the Oise, and afterwards to utilize to the utmost our means of transport. It succeeded in this, and when, at the end of October, the battle of Flanders opened, when the Germans, having completed the concentration of their forces, attempted with fierce energy to turn or to pierce our left, they flung themselves upon a resistance which inflicted upon them a complete defeat.

DEPLOYMENT OF A FIRST ARMY.

The movement began on our side only with the resources of the army which had held the left of our front during the battle of the Marne, reinforced on Sept. 15 by one army corps.

This reinforcement, not being sufficient to hold the enemy's offensive, (district of Vaudelincourt-Mouchy-Uaugy,) a fresh army was transported more to the left, with the task "of acting against the German right wing in order to disengage its neighbor, ... while preserving a flanking direction in its march in relation to the fresh units that the enemy might be able to put into line."

To cover the detrainments of this fresh army in the district Clermont-Beauvais-Boix a cavalry corps and four territorial divisions were ordered to establish themselves on both banks of the Somme. In the wooded hills, however, which extend between the Oise and Lassigny the enemy displayed increasing activity. Nevertheless, the order still further to broaden the movement toward the left was maintained, while the territorial divisions were to move toward Bethune and Aubigny. The march to the sea went on.

From the 21st to the 26th all our forces were engaged in the district Lassigny-Roye-Peronne, with alternations of reverse and success. It was the first act of the great struggle which was to spread as it went on. On the 26th the whole of the Sixth German Army was deployed against us. We retained all our positions, but we could do no more; consequently there was still the risk that the enemy, by means of a fresh afflux of forces, might succeed in turning us.

Once more reinforcements, two army corps, were directed no longer on Beauvais, but toward Amiens. The front was then again to extend. A fresh army was constituted more to the north.

DEPLOYMENT OF THE SECOND ARMY.

From Sept. 30 onward we could not but observe that the enemy, already strongly posted on the plateau of Thiepval, was continually slipping his forces from south to north, and everywhere confronting us with remarkable energy.

Accordingly, on Oct. 1 two cavalry corps were directed to make a leap forward and, operating on both banks of the Scarpe, to put themselves in touch with the garrison of Dunkirk, which, on its side, had pushed forward as far as Douai. But on Oct. 2 and 3 the bulk of our fresh army was very strongly attacked in the district of Arras and Lens. Confronting it were two corps of cavalry, the guards, four active army corps, and two reserve corps. A fresh French army corps was immediately transported and detrained in the Lille district.

But once more the attacks became more pressing, and on Oct. 4 it was a question whether, in view of the enemy's activity both west of the Oise and south of the Somme, and also further to the north, a retreat would not have to be made. General Joffre resolutely put this hypothesis aside and ordered the offensive to be resumed with the reinforcements that had arrived. It was, however, clear that, despite the efforts of all, our front, extended to the sea as it was by a mere ribbon of troops, did not possess the solidity to enable it to resist with complete safety a German attack, the violence of which could well be foreseen.

In the Arras district the position was fairly good. But between the Oise and Arras we were holding our own only with difficulty. Finally, to the north, on the Lille-Estaires-Merville-Hazebrouck-Cassel front, our cavalry and our territorials had their work cut out against eight divisions of German cavalry, with very strong infantry supports. It was at this moment that the transport of the British Army to the northern theatre of operations began.

VICE ADMIRAL H.R.H. THE DUKE OF THE ABRUZZI—
Cousin of the King of Italy, Commander of the dreadnought squadron
of the Italian Navy.—(Photo (c) by Pach Bros., N.Y.)

H.M. FERDINAND I.—Tsar of the Bulgars.—
(Photo from P.S. Rogers.)

THE TRANSPORT OF THE BRITISH ARMY.

Field Marshal French had, as early as the end of September, expressed the wish to see his army resume its initial place on the left of the allied armies. He explained this wish on the ground of the greater facility of which his communications would have the advantage in this new position, and also of the impending arrival of two divisions of infantry from home and of two infantry divisions and a cavalry division from India, which would be able to deploy more easily on that terrain. In spite of the difficulties which such a removal involved, owing to the intensive use of the railways by our own units, General Joffre decided at the beginning of October to meet the Field Marshal's wishes and to have the British Army removed from the Aisne.

It was clearly specified that on the northern terrain the British Army should co-operate to the same end as ourselves, the stopping of the German right. In other terms, the British Army was to prolong the front of the general disposition without a break, attacking as soon as possible, and at the same time seeking touch with the Belgian Army.

But the detraining took longer than had been expected, and it was not possible to attack the Germans during the time when they had only cavalry in the Lille district and further to the north.

THE ARRIVAL OF THE BELGIAN ARMY.

There remained the Belgian Army. On leaving Antwerp on Oct. 9 the Belgian Army, which was covered by 8,000 British bluejackets and 6,000 French bluejackets, at first intended to retire as far as to the north of Calais, but afterwards determined to make a stand in Belgian territory. Unfortunately, the condition of the Belgian troops, exhausted by a struggle of more than three months, did not allow any immediate hopes to be based upon them. This situation weighed on our plans and delayed their execution.

On the 16th we made progress to the east of Ypres. On the 18th our cavalry even reached Roulers and Cortemark. But it was now evident that, in view of the continual reinforcing of the German right, our left was not capable of maintaining the advantages obtained during the previous few days. To attain our end and make our front inviolable a fresh effort was necessary. That effort was immediately made by the dispatch to the north of the Lys of considerable French forces, which formed the French Army of Belgium.

THE FRENCH ARMY OF BELGIUM.

The French Army of Belgium consisted, to begin with, of two territorial divisions, four divisions of cavalry, and a naval brigade. Directly after its constitution it was strengthened by elements from other points on the front whose arrival extended from Oct. 27 to Nov. 11. These reinforcements were equivalent altogether in value to five army corps, a division of cavalry, a territorial division, and sixteen regiments of cavalry, plus sixty pieces of heavy artillery.

Thus was completed the strategic manoeuvre defined by the instructions of the General in Chief on Sept. 11 and developed during the five following weeks with the ampleness we have just seen. The movements of troops carried out during this period were methodically combined with the pursuit of operations, both defensive and offensive, from the Oise to the North Sea.

On Oct. 22 our left, bounded six weeks earlier by the Noyon district, rested on Nieuport, thanks to the successive deployment of five fresh armies—three French armies, the British Army, and the Belgian Army.

Thus the co-ordination decided upon by the General in Chief attained its end. The barrier was established. It remained to maintain it against the enemy's offensive. That was the object and the result of the battle of Flanders, Oct. 22 to Nov. 15.

OPERATIONS IN FLANDERS.

The fourth installment of the French review takes up the operations in Flanders, as follows:

The German attack in Flanders was conducted strategically and tactically with remarkable energy. The complete and indisputable defeat in which it resulted is therefore significant.

The forces of which the enemy disposed for this operation between the sea and the Lys comprised:

(1) The entire Fourth Army commanded by the Duke of Württemberg, consisting of one naval division, one division of Ersatz Reserve, (men who had received no training before the war,) which was liberated by the fall of Antwerp; the Twenty-second, Twenty-third, Twenty-sixth and Twenty-seventh Reserve Corps, and the Forty-eighth Division belonging to the Twenty-fourth Reserve Corps.

(2) A portion of another army under General von Fabeck, consisting of the Fifteenth Corps, two Bavarian corps and three (unspecified) divisions.

(3) Part of the Sixth Army under the command of the Crown Prince of Bavaria. This army, more than a third of which took part in the battle of Flanders, comprised the Nineteenth Army Corps, portions of the Thirteenth Corps and the Eighteenth Reserve Corps, the Seventh and Fourteenth Corps, the First Bavarian Reserve Corps, the Guards, and the Fourth Army Corps.

(4) Four highly mobile cavalry corps prepared and supported the action of the troops enumerated above. Everything possible had been done to fortify the "morale" of the troops. At the beginning of October the Crown Prince of Bavaria in a proclamation had exhorted his soldiers "to make the decisive effort against the French left wing," and "to settle thus the fate of the great battle which has lasted for weeks."

Map showing the swaying battle line from Belfort to the North Sea and the intrenched line on April 15, 1915.

On Oct. 28, Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria declared in an army order that his troops "had just been fighting under very difficult conditions," and he added: "It is our business now not to let the struggle with our most detested enemy drag on longer.... The decisive blow is still to be struck." On Oct. 30, General von Deimling, commanding the Fifteenth Army Corps (belonging to General von Fabeck's command,) issued an order declaring that "the thrust against Ypres will be of decisive importance." It should be noted also that the Emperor proceeded in person to Thielt and Courtrai to exalt by his presence the ardor of his troops. Finally, at the close of October, the entire German press incessantly proclaimed the importance of the "Battle of Calais." It is superfluous to add that events in Poland explain in a large measure the passionate resolve of the German General Staff to obtain a decision in the Western theatre of operations at all costs. This decision would be obtained if our left were pierced or driven in. To reach Calais, that is, to break our left; to carry Ypres, that is, to cut it in half; through both points to menace the communications and supplies of the British expeditionary corps, perhaps even to threaten Britain in her island—such was the German plan in the Battle of Flanders. It was a plan that could not be executed.

CHECK OF GERMAN ATTACK.

The enemy, who had at his disposal a considerable quantity of heavy artillery, directed his efforts at first upon the coast and the country to the north of Dixmude. His objective was manifestly the capture of Dunkirk, then of Calais and Boulogne, and this objective he pursued until Nov. 1.

On Oct. 23 the Belgians along the railway line from Nieuport to Dixmude were strengthened by a French division. Dixmude was occupied by our marines (fusiliers marins). During the subsequent day our forces along the railway developed a significant resistance against an enemy superior in number and backed by heavy artillery. On the 29th the inundations effected between the canal and the railway line spread along our front. On the 30th we recaptured Ramscapelle, the only point on the railway which Belgians had lost. On the 1st and 2d of November the enemy bombarded Furnes, but began to show signs of weariness. On the 2d he evacuated the ground between the Yser and the railway, abandoning cannon, dead and wounded. On the 3d our troops were able to re-enter the Dixmude district. The success achieved by the enemy at Dixmude at this juncture was without fruit. They succeeded in taking the town. They could not debouch from it. The coastal attack had thus proved a total failure. Since then it has never been renewed. The Battle of Calais, so noisily announced by the German press, amounted to a decided reverse for the Germans.

GERMAN DEFEAT AT YPRES.

The enemy had now begun an attack more important than its predecessor, in view of the numbers engaged in it. This attack was intended as a renewal to the south of the effort which had just been shattered in the north. Instead of turning our flank on the coast, it was now sought to drive in the right of our northern army under the shock of powerful masses. This was the Battle of Ypres.

In order to understand this long, desperate, and furious battle, we must hark back a few days in point of time. At the moment when our cavalry reached Roulers and Cortemark (Oct. 28) our territorial divisions from Dunkirk, under General Biden, had occupied and organized a defensive position at Ypres. It was a point d'appui, enabling us to prepare and maintain our connections with the Belgian Army. From Oct. 23 two British and French army corps were in occupation of this position, which was to be the base of their forward march in the direction of Roulers-Menin. The delays already explained and the strength of the forces brought up by the enemy soon brought to a standstill our progress along the line Poelcapelle, Paschendaele, Zandvorde, and Gheluvelt. But in spite of the stoppage here, Ypres was solidly covered, and the connections of all the allied forces were established. Against the line thus formed the German attack was hurled from Oct. 25 to Nov. 13, to the north, the east, and the south of Ypres. From Oct. 26 on the attacks were renewed daily with extraordinary violence, obliging us to employ our reinforcements at the most threatened points as soon as they came up. Thus, on Oct. 31, we were obliged to send supports to the British cavalry, then to the two British corps between which the cavalry formed the connecting link, and finally to intercalate between these two corps a force equivalent to two army corps. Between Oct. 30 and Nov. 6 Ypres was several times in danger. The British lost Zandvorde, Gheluvelt, Messines, and Wytschaete. The front of the Allies, thus contracted, was all the more difficult to defend; but defended it was without a recoil.

REINFORCEMENTS ARRIVE.

The arrival of three French divisions in our line enabled us to resume from the 4th to the 8th a vigorous offensive. On the 10th and 11th this offensive, brought up against fresh and sharper German attacks, was checked. Before it could be renewed the arrival of fresh reinforcements had to be awaited, which were dispatched to the north on Nov. 12. By the 14th our troops had again begun to progress, barring the road to Ypres against the German attacks, and inflicting on the enemy, who advanced in massed formation, losses which were especially terrible in consequence of the fact that the French and British artillery had crowded nearly 300 guns on to these few kilometers of front.

Thus the main mass of the Germans sustained the same defeat as the detachments operating further to the north along the coast. The support which, according to the idea of the German General Staff, the attack on Ypres was to render to the coastal attack, was as futile as that attack itself had been.

During the second half of November the enemy, exhausted and having lost in the Battle of Ypres alone more than 150,000 men, did not attempt to renew his effort, but confined himself to an intermittent cannonade. We, on the contrary, achieved appreciable progress to the north and south of Ypres, and insured definitely by a powerful defensive organization of the position the inviolability of our front.

[The compiler of the report here adds a footnote saying that the bodies of more than 40,000 Germans were found on the battlefield during these three weeks of battle. The report next proceeds to summarize the character and results of the operations since the Battle of Flanders—that is, during the period Nov. 30-Feb. 1.]

Since the former date the French supreme command had not thought it advisable to embark upon important offensive operations. It has confined itself to local attacks, the main object of which was to hold in front of us as large a number of German corps as possible, and thus to hinder the withdrawal of the troops which to our knowledge the German General Staff was anxious to dispatch to Russia.

FEW SENT TO THE EAST.

As a matter of fact, the numbers transported to the eastern front have been very moderate. Of the fifty-two army corps which faced us on the western front, Germany has only been able to take four and one-half corps for the eastern front. On the other hand, climatic conditions—the rain, mud, and mist—were such as to diminish the effectiveness of offensive operations and to add to the costliness of any undertaken, which was another reason for postponing them. Still another reason lies in the fact that from now on the allied forces can count upon a steadily expanding growth, equally in point of numbers and units as of material, while the German forces have attained the maximum of their power, and can only diminish now both in numbers and in value. These conditions explain the character of the siege warfare which the operations have assumed during the period under review.

Map illustrating the Battle of Flanders, the Battle of Ypres, and the terrain of the frustrated German efforts to reach Dunkirk and Calais.

Meanwhile, it is by no means the case that the siege warfare has had the same results for the Germans as for us. From Nov. 15 to Feb. 1, our opponents, in spite of very numerous attacks, did not succeed in taking anything from us, except a few hundred metres of ground to the north of Soissons. We, on the contrary, have obtained numerous and appreciable results.

[The French writer here proceeds to strike a balance of gains and losses between the allied and the German forces in France during the Winter campaign. The result he sums up as follows:]

1. A general progress of our troops; very marked at certain points.

2. A general falling back of the enemy, except to the northeast of Soissons.

To complete the balance it must be added that:

1. The German offensive in Poland was checked a month ago.

2. The Russian offensive continues in Galicia and the Carpathians.

3. A large part of the Turkish Caucasian army has been annihilated.

4. Germany has exhausted her resources of officers, (there are now on an average twelve officers to a regiment,) and henceforth will only be able to develop her resources in men to the detriment of the existing units.

5. The allied armies, on the contrary, possess the power of reinforcing themselves in a very considerable degree.

It may, therefore, be declared that in order to obtain complete success it is sufficient for France and her allies to know how to wait and to prepare victory with indefatigable patience.

The German offensive is broken.

The German defensive will be broken in its turn.

[It is evident from the report that the numbered German army corps are Prussian corps unless otherwise specified.]

THE FRENCH ARMY AS IT IS.

LONDON, March 18, (Correspondence of The Associated Press.)—All of Part II., of the historical review of the war, emanating from French official sources, and purely from the French viewpoint, has been received by The Associated Press. Part II, deals with the conditions in the French Army, furnishing a most interesting chapter on this subject under the title, "The French Army as it Is."

The compiler of the report, beginning this part of his review on Feb. 1, says that the condition of the French Army is excellent and appreciably superior to what it was at the beginning of the war from the three points of view of numbers, quality, and equipment. Continuing, he says:

In the higher command important changes have been made. It has, in fact, been rejuvenated by the promotion of young commanders of proved quality to high rank. All the old Generals, who at the beginning of August were at the head of large commands, have been gradually eliminated, some as the result of the physical strain of war and others by appointment to territorial commands. This rejuvenation of the higher ranks of the army has been carried out in a far-reaching manner, and it may be said that it has embraced all the grades of the military hierarchy from commanders of brigades to commanders of armies. The result has been to lower the average age of general officers by ten years. Today more than three-fourths of the officers commanding armies and army corps are less than 60 years of age. Some are considerably younger. A number of the army corps commanders are from 46 to 54 years of age, and the brigade commanders are usually under 50. There are, in fact, at the front extremely few general officers over 60, and these are men who are in full possession of their physical and intellectual powers.

MANY COLONELS PROMOTED.

This rejuvenation of the high command was facilitated by a number of circumstances, notable among which were the strengthening of the higher regimental ranks carried out during the three years preceding the war, as a result of which at the outset of the campaign each infantry regiment had two Lieutenant Colonels, and each cavalry and artillery regiment a Colonel and Lieutenant Colonel, and also the system of promotion for the duration of the war. Many officers who began the war as Colonels now command brigades. Some are even at the head of divisions or army corps. Ability proved on the field of battle is now immediately recognized and utilized, and in this way it has been possible to provide in the most favorable manner for the vacancies created by the changes in command which were considered necessary in the first weeks of the war.

The higher grades of the French Army are inspired by a remarkable unity in the matter of military theory, and by a solidarity of spirit which has found striking expression in the course of the numerous moves of army corps from one part of the theatre of operations to another, which have been carried out since the beginning of the war.

The cavalry after six months of war still possesses an excess of officers. There are on an average thirty-six officers to a regiment instead of the thirty-one considered to be the necessary minimum. The artillery, which has suffered relatively little, has also an excess of officers, and is further able to count upon a large number of Captains and other officers, who before the war were employed in the arsenals or in technical research. Finally the reserve artillery officers have nearly all proved to be excellent battery commanders.

The losses in the junior commissioned ranks have naturally been highest in the infantry. There is, however, nothing like a want of officers in this arm. Many Captains and Lieutenants who have been wounded by machine-gun fire (such wounds are usually slight and quickly healed,) have been able to return speedily to the front. The reserve officers have in general done remarkably well, and in many cases have shown quite exceptional aptitude for the rank of company commanders. The non-commissioned officers promoted to sub-Lieutenancies make excellent section leaders, and even show themselves very clever and energetic company commanders in the field.

It must be remembered also that thanks to the intellectual and physical development of the generation now serving with the colors; and thanks, above all, to the warlike qualities of the race, and the democratic spirit of our army, we have been able to draw upon the lower grades and even upon the rank and file for officers. Many men who began the war on Aug. 2 as privates, now wear the officers' epaulettes. The elasticity of our regulations regarding promotion in war time, the absence of the spirit of caste, and the friendly welcome extended by all officers to those of their military inferiors who have shown under fire their fitness to command, have enabled us to meet all requirements.

The state of our infantry on Jan. 15 was very satisfactory and much superior to that of the German infantry. On an average each of our regiments has forty-eight officers, including eighteen regular officers, fifteen reserve officers, and fifteen non-commissioned officers. In each regiment six of the twelve companies are commanded by Captains who are regular officers, three by Captains of the reserve and three by Lieutenants. Each company has at least three officers. The state of the army as regards the commissioned ranks from the highest to the lowest is declared to be exceptionally brilliant. The army is led by young, well-trained, and daring chiefs, and the lower commissioned ranks have acquired the art of war by experience.

2,500,000 FRENCH AT FRONT.

Including all ranks, France now has more than 2,500,000 men at the front, and every unit is, or was on Jan. 15, at war strength. The infantry companies are at least 200 strong. In many regiments the companies have a strength of 250 or more.

In other arms, which have suffered less than the infantry, the units are all up to, or above, regulation strength.

This fact constitutes one of the most important advantages of the French Army over the Germans. While Germany has created a great number of new units, army corps or divisions, which absorbed at a blow all of her available resources in officers and men, the French supreme command has avoided the formation of new units, except in limited number, and has only admitted exceptions to this rule when it was able to count with certainty on being able to provide amply for both the present and future requirements of the new units, as regards all ranks, without encroaching upon the reserves needed for the existing units.

At the same time, thanks to the depots in the interior of the country, the effectives at the front have been maintained at full strength. The sources of supply for this purpose were the remainder of the eleven classes of the reserves, the younger classes of the territorial army, and the new class of 1914. A large number of the men wounded in the earlier engagements of the war have been able to return to the front. They have been incorporated in the new drafts, providing these with a useful stiffening of war-tried men.

With regard to the supplies of men upon which the army can draw to repair the wastage at the front, we learn that there are practically half as many men in the depots as at the front, in other words about 1,250,000. Further supplies of men are provided by the class of 1915 and the revision of the various categories of men of military age previously exempted on grounds of health or for other reasons from the duty of bearing arms. As a result of this measure nearly half a million men have been claimed for the army, almost all of whom, after rigorous physical tests, have been declared fit for military service.

DRILLED BY CONVALESCENTS.

In the depots in which the new soldiers are being trained the services of many officers and non-commissioned officers discharged as convalescents after being wounded are utilized in order to give a practical turn to the instruction. There are still many voluntary enlistments, and with all these resources of men the army can count upon reinforcements soon to be available which will considerably augment its offensive power.

The quality of the troops has improved perceptibly since the beginning of the war. The men have become hardened and used to war, and their health—largely owing to the excellence of the commissariat—is extremely satisfactory. In spite of the severity of the Winter hardly any cases of disease of the respiratory organs have occurred, and the sanitary returns of the army show an appreciable improvement on those of the preceding Winter.

With regard to the reserves, experience has verified the dictum of the Serbian and Bulgarian Generals in the war of 1913, namely, that "two months in the field are necessary in order to get at the full value of reserves." Our infantry is now accustomed to the rapid and thorough "organization" of the defensive. In August it neither liked nor had the habit of using the spade. Today those who see our trenches are astounded. They are veritable improvised fortresses, proof against the 77-millimeter gun and often against artillery of higher calibre. During the last five months not a single encounter can be cited in which our infantry did not have the advantage over the German infantry. All the enemy's attacks have been repulsed, except to the north of Soissons, where their success was due to the flooded state of the Aisne and the carrying away of our bridges. Our attacks, on the other hand, have yielded important results, and have been carried out with plenty of spirit, although without the imprudence which cost us such heavy losses in August.

The cavalry has made remarkable progress. Throughout October this branch was called on to eke out the inadequate numbers of the infantry, and showed itself perfectly adapted to the necessities of fighting on foot. Several regiments of cavalry have been used as infantry, and, armed with rifles, have rendered the most valuable services.

The artillery has displayed a superiority in the use of its admirable material, which is recognized by the Germans themselves.

LONDON, March 27, (Correspondence of The Associated Press.)—Further installments of the French official review of the condition of the French Army after six months of war have been obtained by The Associated Press. The sixth installment deals with material, artillery, transport, and supplies, and the seventh takes up the situation of the German Army and makes an analysis of the German forces in the field and available for service.

The first chapter of the seventh installment, headed "The German Effort," opens with a statement as to the German forces at the beginning of the campaign. The writer says:

The military effort of Germany at the outset of the campaign exceeded all anticipations. Her design was to crush the French Army in a few weeks under a tremendous mass of troops. Nothing was neglected to bring that mass together.

The number of German army corps in time of peace is twenty-five. When war began the German General Staff put in the field on the two theatres of operations: 1, as fighting troops, (active, reserve, Ersatz or Landwehr,) sixty-one army corps; 2, as troops to guard communications and territory, formations of the Landsturm.

In October six and a half new army corps made their appearance, plus a division of sailors—in all seven corps. From the end of November to the end of December there was only an insignificant increase, consisting of the division of sailors. In January, 1915, the number of fighting formations put into line by the German Army was therefore sixty-nine army corps, divided as follows:

Active corps, twenty-five and a half; reserve corps, twenty-one and a half; Ersatz brigades, six and a half; reserve corps of new formation, seven and a half, and corps of Landwehr, eight and a half.

GERMANY'S GREAT INITIAL EFFORT.

The immense effort thus made by Germany explains itself very well, if, having regard to the position of Germany at the opening of the war, one considers that of the Allies. Germany desired to take advantage of the circumstances which enabled her to make a simultaneous mobilization of all her forces—a mobilization which the three allied armies could not carry out so rapidly. Germany wished with the mass of troops to crush first of all the adversary who appeared to her the most dangerous. This effort, broken for the first time on the Marne, attained its maximum at the moment of the battle of Flanders, in which more than fifty army corps out of sixty-nine were pitted against the French, British, and Belgian Armies.

Here also the method followed by Germany is easily comprehensible. At the end of October the Russian danger was beginning to become pressing, and it was necessary to win a decisive victory in the western theatre of the war. It was imperative to give international opinion the impression that Germany remained in that quarter mistress of operations. Finally, it behooved her by this victory to gain the freedom to transport a large number of army corps to Poland. We have seen that the battle of Flanders, instead of being a success for Germany, was a marked defeat. This defeat was fraught with results, and it dominates the present position of the German Army. The plans above described of the German mobilization, which had their justification in view of a prompt victory, were calculated to become extremely perilous from the moment that that victory failed to be gained.

INITIATIVE LOST BY GERMANY.

From that moment, in fact, Germany lost the initiative and the direction of the war. And, furthermore, she was condemned to suffer the counter-effects of the enormous and precipitate effort which she had made in vain. From the point of view of her effectiveness and her regimental cadres, (basic organization,) she had undergone a wastage which her adversaries, on the other hand, had been able to save themselves. She had, in the words of the proverb, put all her eggs in one basket, and in spite of her large population she could no longer, owing to the immediate and sterile abuse which she had made of her resources, pretend to regain the superiority of numbers.

She was reduced to facing as best she could on both war fronts the unceasingly increasing forces of the Allies. She had attained the maximum of tension and had secured a minimum of results. She had thus landed herself in a difficulty which will henceforward go on increasing and which is made clear when the wastage which her army has suffered is closely studied.

WASTAGE OF GERMAN EFFECTIVES.

Chapter II. of this section of the review bears the headline "Wastage of German Effectives."

The wastage of effectives is easy to establish, it says. We have for the purpose two sources—the official lists of losses published by the German General Staff and the notebooks, letters, and archives of soldiers and officers killed and taken prisoners. These different documents show that by the middle of January the German losses on the two fronts were 1,800,000 men.

These figures are certainly less than the reality, because, for one thing, the sick are not comprised, and, for another, the losses in the last battle in Poland are not included. Let us accept them, however; let us accept also that out of these 1,800,000 men 500,000—this is the normal proportion—have been able to rejoin after being cured. Thus the final loss for five months of the campaign has been 1,300,000 men, or 260,000 men per month. These figures agree exactly with what can be ascertained when the variations of effectives in certain regiments are examined.

It is certain that the majority of the German regiments have had to be completely renewed. What, then, is the situation created by these enormous losses?

This question is answered by a statement headed "German troops available for 1915."

The total of German formations known at the beginning of January, says the review, represented in round numbers 4,000,000 men. According to the official reports on German recruiting, the entire resources of Germany in men amount to 9,000,000. But from these 9,000,000 have to be deducted men employed on railways, in the police, and in certain administrations and industries—altogether 500,000 men. The total resources available for the war were therefore 8,500,000. Out of these about one-half, say 4,000,000, are now at the front. The definitive losses represent at least 1,300,000 men. The available resources amounted, then, at the beginning of January, to 3,200,000 men.

GERMANY'S RESERVES UNTRAINED.

Of what are these resources composed? Chiefly of men who were untrained in time of peace, the trained reservists having almost all left the depots for the front. It has, moreover, to be noted that out of these 3,200,000 men there are, according to the statistics, 800,000 who are more than 39 years of age, and therefore of only mediocre military value. Thus there remain 2,400,000. Finally, the category of the untrained in peace comprises, according to the estimates of German military authorities themselves, one-quarter of inefficients.

The really valuable resources capable of campaigning are therefore just 2,000,000. These men, comprising the 1915, 1916, and 1917 classes, called out in anticipation, constitute—and this point cannot be too strongly insisted upon—the total of available resources for the operations during the twelve months of 1915. As to what the military value of these troops will be, considering the haste with which they have been trained, the formidable losses sustained in the battle of Flanders by the newly formed corps show very clearly. Their military value will be limited.

GERMAN LOSSES 260,000 A MONTH.

When it is remembered that, according to the German documents themselves, the definite loss each month is 260,000 men, it is manifest that the available resources for the year 1915 will not suffice to fill the gaps of a war of ten months.

It is then superabundantly established that in the matter of effectives Germany has reached the maximum of possible effort. If with the men at present available she creates, as it is certain that she is preparing to do at this moment, fresh formations, she will be preventing herself, if the war lasts another ten months, as is admissible, from being able to complete afresh her old formations. If she creates no new formations, she will have in 1915 exactly what is necessary and no more to complete the existing units afresh.

Bearing in mind the ways of the German General Staff, one may suppose that, disregarding the eventual impossibility of recompleting, it is still addressing itself to creating new formations. The weakness to which Germany will expose herself in the matter of effectives has just been set forth, and it is easy to show that this weakness will be still further aggravated by the wastage in the regimental orders.

PRAISES FRENCH "SEVENTY-FIVES."

In the sixth installment, beginning with the field gun, the famous "seventy-fives," the compiler of the report, after rehearsing the splendid qualities of this weapon—its power, its rapidity of action, and its precision—points out that it possesses a degree of strength and endurance which makes it an implement of war of the first order.

It may be stated without hesitation [says the review] that our "seventy-five" guns are in as perfect condition today as they were on the first day of the war, although the use made of them has exceeded all calculations. The consumption of projectiles was, in fact, so enormous as to cause for a moment an ammunition crisis, which, however, was completely overcome several weeks ago.

The methodical and complete exploitation of all the resources of the country, organized since the beginning of the war, has enabled us to accumulate a considerable stock of fresh munitions, and an increasing rate of production is henceforth assured. We are thus sure of being able to provide without particular effort for all the needs of the campaign, present and future, however long the war may last, and it is this certainty which has enabled us to supply projectiles to several of the allied armies, among others, to the Serbian and Belgian armies. From the statements of German prisoners we have learned that the effectiveness of our new projectiles is superior to that of the old ones.

FRENCH HEAVY GUNS SUPERIOR.

Our heavy artillery was in process of reorganization when the war broke out, with the result that we were indisputably in a position of inferiority in respect of this arm during the first battles. But today the rôles have been changed and our adversaries themselves acknowledge the superiority of our heavy artillery.

The change has been brought about in various ways, partly by the intense activity of the cannon foundries in new production, partly by the employment at the front of the enormous reserves of artillery preserved in the fortresses. The very large number of heavy guns at the front represents only a part of the total number available for use. There is an abundant stock of projectiles for the heavy artillery, which, as in the case of the field gun ammunition, is daily growing in importance. The same is true of the reserves of powder and other explosives and of all materials needed for the manufacture of shells.

With regard to small arms, hand grenades, bombs, and all the devices for lifetaking which the trench warfare at short distance has brought into use, the position of the French troops is in every way favorable.

There follows a passage on the development of the machine gun in this kind of warfare.

Owing to the extended use of this weapon, the number supplied to the various units has been appreciably increased, says the review. Not only is each unit in possession of its full regulation complement of machine guns, but the number of these guns attached to each unit has been increased since Feb. 1 by one-third.

The report next passes to the transport service, which, it says, has worked with remarkable precision since the beginning of the war. This section of the review closes by referring to food supplies for the army, which are described as abundant.

LONDON, March 27, (Correspondence of The Associated Press.)—The eighth installment of the French official review of the war, previous chapters of which have been published, takes up the German losses of officers, the wastage of guns and projectiles, and "the moral wastage of the German Army."

The chapter on losses of officers begins with the statement that the condition of the cadres, or basic organizations, in the German Army is bad. The proportion of officers, and notably of officers by profession, has been enormously reduced, it says; and a report made in December showed that in a total of 124 companies, active or reserve, there were only 49 officers of the active army. The active regiments have at the present time, according to the review, an average of 12 professional officers; the reserve regiments, 9 to 10; the reserve regiments of new formation, 6 to 7; and it is to be remembered that these officers have to be drawn upon afresh for the creation of new units.

"If Germany creates new army corps, and if the war lasts ten months," it continues, "she will reduce almost to nothing the number of professional officers in each regiment, a number which already is very insufficient."

FRENCH CONDITIONS IN CONTRAST.

The French report points out that on the other hand, all the French regiments have been constantly kept at a minimum figure of eighteen professional officers per regiment. At the same time it admits that the commanders of German corps, commanders of active battalions, and the officers attached to the commanders of army corps are officers by profession.

The French report then addresses itself to the wastage of material. Discussing the wastage of guns, it says:

It is easy to ascertain the German losses in artillery. On Dec. 28 the Sixty-sixth Regiment of Artillery entrained at Courtrai for Germany twenty-two guns, of which eighteen were used up. This figure is extremely high for a single regiment.

The same facts have been ascertained as regards heavy artillery. On Dec. 21 and 22 seventy-seven guns of heavy artillery, which were no longer serviceable, were sent to Cologne. These movements, which are not isolated facts, show how ill the German artillery has resisted the ordeal of the campaign.

Other proofs, moreover, are decisive. For some weeks we have noted the very peculiar aspect of the marking on the bands of a great number of shells of the 77 gun. When these markings are compared with those of shells fired three months ago it is plain beyond all question that the tubes are worn and that many of them require to be replaced. This loss in guns is aggravated by the necessity which has arisen of drawing upon the original army corps for the guns assigned to the recently formed corps or those in course of formation. Several regiments of field artillery have, in fact, had to give up two batteries.

WEARING OUT OF MATERIAL.

These two phenomena—wearing out of material and drafts upon batteries—will inevitably result either in the reduction of batteries from six to four guns, a reduction of the number of batteries in the army corps, or the partial substitution for 77 guns of 9-centimeter cannon of the old pattern, the presence of which has been many times perceived at the front.

Furthermore, the German artillery lacks and has lacked for a very long time munitions. It has been obliged to reduce its consumption of shells in a notable degree. No doubt is possible in this respect. The statements of prisoners since the battle of the Marne, and still more since the battle of the Yser, make it clear that the number of shots allowed to the batteries for each action is strictly limited. We have found on officers killed or taken prisoner the actual orders prescribing positively a strict economy of munitions.

For the last three months, too, we notice that the quality of the projectiles is mediocre. Many of them do not burst. On Jan. 7, in the course of a bombardment of Laventie, scarcely any of the German shells burst. The proportion of non-bursts was estimated at two-fifths by the British on Dec. 14, two-thirds by ourselves in the same month. On Jan. 3 at Bourg-et-Comin, and at other places since then, shrapnel fell the explosion of which scarcely broke the envelope and the bullets were projected without any force. About the same time our Fourteenth Army Corps was fired at with shrapnel loaded with fragments of glass, and on several points of our front shell casings of very bad quality have been found, denoting hasty manufacture and the use of materials taken at hazard.

From numerous indications it appears that the Germans are beginning to run short of their 1898 pattern rifle. A certain number of the last reinforcements (January) are armed with carbines or rifles of a poor sort without bayonets. Others have not even rifles. Prisoners taken at Woevre had old-pattern weapons.

The upshot of these observations is that Germany, despite her large stores at the beginning, and the great resources of her industrial production, presents manifest signs of wear, and that the official optimism which she displays does not correspond with the reality of the facts.

MORAL WASTAGE.

Under the caption "Moral Wastage of the German Army," the review continues:

The material losses of the German Army have corresponded with a moral wastage which it is interesting and possible to follow, both from the interrogation of prisoners and the pocketbooks and letters seized upon them or on the killed.

At the beginning of the war the entire German Army, as was natural, was animated by an unshakable faith in the military superiority of the empire. It lived on the recollections of 1870, and on those of the long years of peace, during which all the powers which had to do with Germany displayed toward her a spirit of conciliation and patience which might pass for weakness.

The first prisoners we took in August showed themselves wholly indifferent to the reverses of the German Army. They were sincerely and profoundly convinced that, if the German Army retired, it was in virtue of a preconceived plan, and that our successes would lead to nothing. The events at the end of August were calculated to strengthen this contention in the minds of the German soldiers.

The strategic retreat of the French Army, the facility with which the German armies were able to advance from Aug. 25 to Sept. 5, gave our adversaries a feeling of absolute and final superiority, which manifested itself at that time by all the statements gleaned and all the documents seized.

At the moment of the battle of the Marne the first impression was one of failure of comprehension and of stupor. A great number of German soldiers, notably those who fell into our hands during the first days of that battle, believed fully, as at the end of August, that the retreat they were ordered to make was only a means of luring us into a trap. German military opinion was suddenly converted when the soldiers saw that this retreat continued, and that it was being carried out in disorder, under conditions which left no doubt as to its cause and its extent.

This time it was really a defeat, and a defeat aggravated by the absence of regular supplies and by the physical and moral depression which was the result. The severity of the losses sustained, the overpowering effects of the French artillery, began from this moment to be noted in the German pocketbooks with veritable terror. Hope revived, however, at the end of some weeks, and there is to be found in the letters of soldiers and officers the announcement of "a great movement" which is being prepared, and which is to lead the German armies anew as far as Paris.

LOSSES IN "BATTLE OF CALAIS."

This is the great "battle of Calais," which, contrary to the anticipations of the enemy, was in reality fought to the east of the Yser. The losses of the Germans, which during those ten days exceeded 150,000 men, and may perhaps have reached 200,000, produced a terrifying impression on the troops. From that moment prisoners no longer declared themselves sure of success. For a certain time they had been consoled by the announcement of the capture of Warsaw. This pretended success having proved to be fictitious, incredulity became general.

During the last two months the most intelligent of the prisoners have all admitted that no one could any longer say on which side victory would rest. If we think of the absolute confidence with which the German people had been sustained, this avowal is of great importance.

Letters seized on a dead officer speak of the imminence of a military and economic hemming-in of Germany. They discuss the possibility of Germany finding herself after the war with "empty hands and pockets turned inside out." There is no longer any question of imposing the conqueror's law upon adversaries at his mercy, but of fighting with the energy of despair to secure an honorable peace. An officer of the General Staff who was made prisoner on Jan. 18 said: "Perhaps this struggle of despair has already begun."

There follows a chapter bearing the title, "The System of Lies," in which the review describes the methods by which it is alleged the German Government "made a sustained effort to create in the army an artificial state of mind based entirely upon lies and a scientific system of fables."

Sonnet On The Belgian Expatriation.

By THOMAS HARDY.

[From King Albert's Book.]

I dreamt that people from the Land of Chimes

Arrived one Autumn morning with their bells,

To hoist them on the towers and citadels

Of my own country, that the musical rhymes

Rung by them into space at measured times

Amid the market's daily stir and stress,

And the night's empty starlit silentness,

Might solace souls of this and kindred climes.

Then I awoke; and, lo, before me stood

The visioned ones, but pale and full of fear;

From Bruges they came, and Antwerp, and Ostend,

No carillons in their train. Vicissitude

Had left these tinkling to the invaders' ear,

And ravaged street, and smoldering gable-end.

War Correspondence

A Month of German Submarine War

By Vice Admiral Kirchhoff of the German Navy

Under the heading, "A Month of U-Boat War," Vice Admiral Kirchhoff of the German Navy discusses the German submarine warfare against merchant shipping in its first month. The article, appearing in the Hamburger Framdenblatt of March 19, 1915, is reproduced:

On March 18 a month had passed since the beginning of our sharp procedure against our worst foe. We can in every way be satisfied with the results achieved in the meantime! In spite of all "steps" taken before and thereafter, the English have everywhere had important losses to show at sea—some 200 ships lost since the beginning of the war, according to the latest statements of the Allies—so that even they themselves no longer dare to talk about the "German bluff."

On the new and greater "war zone" established by us, our submarines have known how to work bravely, and have been able, for instance, to operate successfully on a single morning on the east coast, in the Channel, and in the Irish Sea. We have heard of many losses of our opponents, and on the other hand of the subjugation of only two of our brave U-boats. Ceaselessly they are active on the coasts of Albion; shipping is paralyzed at some points; steamship companies—including also many neutral ones—have suspended their sailings; in short, our threat of a more acute condition of war "with all means at hand" has been fully fulfilled.

The "peaceful shipping," too, has taken notice of it and adjusted itself according to our instructions. The official objections of neutrals have died away without effect; throughout the world we have already been given right; the shipping circles of the neutral States are in great part holding entirely back. The empty threats that floated over to us from across the Channel, that the captured crews of German submarines will be treated differently than other prisoners—yes, as plain pirates and sea robbers—those are nothing but an insignificant ebullition of British "moral insanity." They are a part of the hypocritical cant without which, somehow, Great Britain cannot get along. If Great Britain should act in accordance with it, however, then we shall know what we, for our part, have to do!

German and probably English mines, too, have helped our submarines in clearing up among the English mercantile and war fleet. Many merchant ships warned long in advance have been compelled to believe in the warning, and with them frequently a great part of their crews—"without any warning whatever," as our opponents like to say.

All measures of defense, yes, even more significant, all measures of deception and boastful "ruses de guerre," and even all attempts to hush up the news of German accomplishments and whenever possible to suppress it completely—all these efforts have been futile. Our results surpass the expectations that had been cherished. Who knows how many accomplishments other than those which have been published may also have been achieved? Foreign newspapers report a large number of steamships overdue. From overseas likewise we receive favorable reports about the sinking of enemy ships. But the best is the news that our submarines have succeeded in sinking two English auxiliary cruisers and perhaps also one or two larger English transport ships with several thousand men on board.

The last announcement has filled us all with greatest satisfaction. This, our latest method of warfare, is "truly humane"; it leads more speedily to the goal than anything else, so that the number of victims will in the end be smaller after all. It brings peace to all of us sooner than the empty paper protests and crying to Heaven about violence and international law, law of the sea, and laws of humanity could do. In the innocent exalted island kingdom many a fellow is already striking; why should not even the recruit strike, who is also beginning to get a glimmer of the truth that there are no props in the ocean waves?

The more opponents come before the bows of our ships and are sunk, the better! Down with them to the bottom of the sea; that alone will help! Let us hope that we shall soon receive more such cheerful news.

Three Weeks of the War in Champagne

By a British Observer

The following article, issued by the British Press Bureau, London, March 18, 1915, is from a British observer with the French forces in the field who has the permission of General Joffre to send communications home from time to time, giving descriptions of the work, &c., of the French Army which will be of interest to the British reader.

I propose to give some account of the operations which have been in progress for the last three weeks in Champagne. Every day since Feb. 15 the official communiqués find something to say about a district which lies midway between Rheims and Verdun. The three places which are always mentioned, which form the points of reference, are Perthes-lez-Hurlus, Le Mesnil-lez-Hurlus, and Beauséjour Farm. The distance between the first and the last is three and one-half miles; the front on which the fighting has taken place is about five miles; and the French have been attacking at one point or another in this front every day for the last three weeks. It is, therefore, an operation of a different kind to those which we have seen during the Winter months. Those were local efforts, lasting a day or two, designed to keep the enemy busy and prevent him from withdrawing troops elsewhere; this is a sustained effort, made with the object of keeping a constant pressure on his first line of defense, of affecting his use of the railway from Bazancourt to Challerange, a few miles to the north, and of wearing down his reserves of men and ammunition. It may be said that Feb. 15 marks the opening of the 1915 campaign, and that this first phase will find an important place when the history of the war comes to be written.

We must first know something of the nature of the country, which is entirely different to that in which the British Army is fighting. It is one vast plain, undulating, the hills at most 200 feet higher than the valleys, gentle slopes everywhere. The soil is rather chalky, poor, barely worth cultivating; after heavy rain the whole plain becomes a sea of shallow mud; and it dries equally quickly. The only features are the pine woods, which have been planted by hundreds. From the point of view of profit, this would not appear to have been a success; either the soil is too poor, or else it is unsuitable to the maritime pine; for the trees are rarely more than 25 feet high. As each rise is topped, a new stretch of plain, a new set of small woods appear, just like that which has been left behind.

ELEUTHERIOS K. VENIZELOS—The great Greek statesman who
recently resigned as Prime Minister.—(Photo from Medom Photo Service.)

LORD HARDINGE OF PENSHURST—Who, as Viceroy,
rules England's Indian Empire during the critical period of the war.

The villages are few and small, most of them are in ruins after the fighting in September; and the troops live almost entirely in colonies of little huts of wood or straw, about four feet high, dotted about in the woods, in the valleys, wherever a little water and shelter is obtainable. Lack of villages means lack of roads; this has been one of the great difficulties to be faced; but, at the same time, the movement of wagons across country is possible to a far greater extent than in Flanders, although it is often necessary to use eight or ten horses to get a gun or wagon to the point desired.

From the military point of view the country is eminently suitable for troops, with its possibilities of concealment, of producing sudden surprises with cavalry, and of manoeuvre generally. It is, in fact, the training ground of the great military centre of Châlons; and French troops have doubtless been exercised over this ground in every branch of military operation, except that in which they are engaged at the present moment.

What commander, training his men over this ground, could have imagined that the area from Perthes-lez-Hurlus to Beauséjour Farm would become two fortress lines, developed and improved for four months; or that he would have to carry out an attack modeled on the same system as that employed in the last great siege undertaken by French troops, that of Sebastopol in 1855? Yet this is what is being done. Every day an attack is made on a trench, on the edge of one of the little woods or to gain ground in one of them; every day the ground gained has to be transformed so as to give protection to its new occupants and means of access to their supports; every night, and on many days, the enemy's counter-attacks have to be repulsed.

Each attack has to be prepared by a violent and accurate artillery fire; it may be said that a trench has to be morally captured by gun fire before it can be actually seized by the infantry. Once in the new trench, the men have to work with their intrenching tools, without exposing themselves, and wait for a counter-attack, doing what damage they can to the enemy with hand grenades and machine guns. Thus the amount of rifle fire is very small; it is a war of explosives and bayonets.

Looking at the battle at a distance of about 2,000 yards from the enemy's line, the stillness of what one sees is in marked contrast to the turmoil of shells passing overhead. The only movement is the cloud of smoke and earth that marks the burst of a shell. Here and there long white lines are visible, when a trench has brought the chalky subsoil up to the top, but the number of trenches seen is very small compared to the number that exist, for one cannot see into the valleys, and the top of the ground is an unhealthy place to choose for seating a trench. The woods are pointed out, with the names given them by the soldiers, but it needs fieldglasses to see the few stumps that remain in those where the artillery has done its work. And then a telephone message arrives, saying that the enemy are threatening a counter-attack at a certain point, and three minutes later there is a redoubled whistling of shells. At first one cannot see the result of this fire—the guns are searching the low ground where the enemy's reserves are preparing for the movement, but a little later the ground in front of the threatened trench becomes alive with shell bursts, for the searching has given place to the building up of a wall of fire through which it is impossible for the foe to pass without enormous loss.

The attached map may enable us to look more closely at what has been achieved. The lowest dotted line, numbered 15, is the line of the French trenches on Feb. 15. They were then close up to the front of the German line with its network of barbed wire, its machine-gun emplacements, often of concrete, and its underground chambers for sheltering men from the shells. Each successive dotted line shows the line held by the French on the evening of the date written in the dotted line. Thus the total gain of ground, that between the most southerly and the most northerly dotted lines, varies between 200 yards, where the lines are close together northeast of Perthes, and 1,400 yards, half way between Le Mesnil and Beauséjour Farm. But the whole of this space has been a series of trenches and fortified woods, each of which has had to be attacked separately.

Map of the French Operations in the Champagne

Some of the severest fighting on the western battle front took place in this little section of about four miles of trenches, lying between Rheimes and Verdun. For a whole month from Feb. 15, the attacks were kept up by the French forces almost continuously, and the sketch gives the graphic result of changes for three weeks of that time. Ostensibly the purpose of the French was to pierce the German line and cut the railway a few miles to the rear. Incidentally, the French aimed to keep their opponents busy, and thus prevent any reinforcements being sent to von Hindenburg in the east.

The total gain of ground—that between the most southerly and most northerly dotted lines—varies from 200 yards northeast of Perthes to 1,400 yards, half way between Le Mesnil and Beauséjour Farm. But the whole of this space has been a series of trenches and fortified woods, each of which had to be attacked separately.

The letters (A to G) in the sketch indicate the points of the severest fighting. A (the "little fort") was taken and lost three times before the French finally held it. B saw some of the stiffest encounters, the Germans attacking the hill nearly every day after the French captured it, and even the Prussian Guard being put in. The woods at C, D, and E were centres of terrific combats, in which trenching and mining were continuous tasks. The redoubt at F was captured only after large losses on both sides. At the extreme west is still another wood, (G.) which the French attacked three times before they were successful in getting a foothold there.]

Some of the points where the fighting has been heaviest are shown in letters on the map. A is the "little fort," a redoubt on an open spur, holding perhaps 500 men. This was first attacked in January; it was partly taken, but the French in the end retained only the southern corner, where they remained for something like a fortnight. On Feb. 16 it was again taken in part, and lost the same day. On the 17th the same thing happened. On the 23d they once more got into the work; in the evening they repulsed five separate counter-attacks; then a sixth succeeded in turning them out. On the 27th they took all except a bit of trench in the northern face, and two days later they made that good, as well as a trench about fifty yards to the north of the work.

B is a small hill, marked 196. The capture of this, with its two lines of trenches, was one of the most brilliant pieces of work done. Since this date, the 26th, the enemy have continued to counter-attack nearly every day. It was here that the Prussian Guard was put in; but they have failed to get it back, and their losses have been very high. The prisoners stated that one regiment had its Colonel and all the superior officers killed or wounded. C is a wood, called the "Yellow Burnt Wood." It is still in the hands of the Germans, a regular nest of machine guns, which command the ground not only to the front but also down valleys to the east and west. The French are just in the southwest corner.

At D there are two woods; the southern we will call No. 3, the northern No. 4. On the 16th our allies got a trench just south of No. 3; they got into the wood on the 18th, and fought backward and forward in the wood that day and all the 19th and 20th; by the evening of the 20th they had almost reached the northern edge. On the 21st a stronger counter-attack than usual was repulsed, and in pursuing the retiring enemy they secured the northern edge. On the 22d there was more fighting in No. 3, but in the end the French managed to make their way into No. 4 as far as a trench which runs along a crest midway through the wood. The next six days saw continuous fighting in No. 4, sometimes near the northern end, sometimes at the crest in the middle, and occasionally back near the southern end. The French now hold the northern edge, and have pushed troops into the "Square" wood just north of the line of the 25th.

At E again there are two small woods; these were both captured on the 26th, but the trenches in the northern one had been mined, and the French had no sooner seized them than they were blown up. At F there was another small redoubt; part of this was taken on the 19th from the east, but the work was not finally captured till the 27th, when 240 corpses were found in it. On the extreme west, at G, is a wood which has twice been unsuccessfully attacked. On the first occasion troops got into the wood, but a severe snowstorm prevented the artillery from continuing to assist them, and they were driven out. The second was an attempt to surprise the enemy at 2 A.M. on the 25th; this also failed. A third attack was made on March 7 and was successful; the French line now runs through the wood.

The above will serve to show the tenacity which is required for an operation of this kind. Up to the present the French have made steady and continuous progress, and their success may be best judged from the fact that they have not been forced back on any day behind the line they held in the morning, despite innumerable counter-attacks. And this is not merely a question of ground, but one of increasing moral superiority, for it is in the unsuccessful counter-attacks that losses are heavy, and these and the sense of failure affect the morale of an army sooner or later.

Will the French push through the line? Will a hole be made, or is the enemy like a badger, who digs himself in rather faster than you can dig him out? I cannot tell; it would indeed be an astonishing measure of success for a first attempt, and the enemy may require a great deal more hammering at many points before he has definitely had enough at any one point. But these operations have brought the day closer, and turn our thoughts to the time when we shall be able to move forward, and one finds the cavalrymen wondering whether perhaps they, too, will get their chance.

The Germans Concrete Trenches

By F.H. Gailor, American Rhodes Scholar of New College, Oxford

[From The London Daily Mail, March 24, 1915.]

At the kind invitation of General Longchamps, German Military Governor of the Province of Namur, I spent two days with him going along the country in and behind the firing line in Northern France from near Rheims to the small village of Monthois, near Vouziers, on the Aisne.

About five miles out of Monthois we came to the artillery positions of the Germans. We could see the flashes of the guns long before we reached the hills where they were placed, but when we came up and dismounted the position was most cleverly concealed by a higher hill in front and the heavy woods which served as a screen for the artillery. I noticed many holes where the French shells had burst, and the valley to the north looked as if some one had been experimenting with a well digger. One 21-centimeter shell had cut a swath about 100 yards long out of the woods on the hill where we dismounted. The trees were twisted from their stumps as if a small cyclone had passed, and one could realize the damage the shells could do merely by the displaced air.

We went on forward into the valley on foot and stopped about two hundred yards in front and to the left of where the German guns were firing. There, although of course we could not see the French position, we could hear and see their shells as they exploded. They were firing short, one of the officers told me, because they thought the Germans were on the forward hill. He could see one of the French aeroplanes directing their fire, but I could not make it out. We stayed there listening to the shells and watching the few movements of German batteries that were taking place. A party of officers hidden by the trees were taking observations and telephoning the results of the German fire and, no doubt, of the French fire in the German trenches. There was no excitement; but for the noise the whole scene reminded me of some kind of construction work, such as building a railroad.

After about an hour, when nothing had happened, one began to realize that even such excitement may become monotonous and be taken as a matter of course. One of the officers told me that the Germans had been there since the beginning of October and that even the trenches were in the same position as when they first came.

Certainly the trenches seem permanent enough for spending many Winters. A number of them have now been built of concrete, especially in that swampy part near the Aisne where they strike water about three feet underground. The difficulty is in draining out the water when it rains.

Some of the trenches have two stories, and at the back of many of them are subterranean rest houses built of concrete and connected with the trenches by passages. The rooms are about seven feet high and ten feet square, and above the ground all evidence of the work is concealed by green boughs and shrubbery so that they may escape the attention of the enemy's aeroplanes.

With the noise and the fatigue, the men say it is impossible to sleep naturally, but they become so used to the firing and so weary that they become oblivious of everything even when shells are falling within a dozen yards of them. They stay in the trenches five days and then get five days' rest. In talking to the men one feels the influence on them of a curious sort of fatalism—they have been lucky so far and will come through all right. One sees and feels everywhere the spirit of a great game. The strain of football a thousand times magnified. The joy of winning and boyish pleasure in getting ahead of the other fellows side by side with the stronger passions of hatred and anger and the sight of agony and death.

We talked to some of the little groups of men along the road who were going back to their five days in the trenches. Of course all large units are split up so as not to attract attention. They were all the same, all sure of winning, and all bearded, muddy, and determined. I could not help thinking of American football players at the end of the first half. These men seemed all the same. I have no recollection of a single individual. The "system" and its work has made a type not only of clothes but of face. Their answers to the usual questions were all the same, and one felt in talking to them that their opinions were machine-made. Three points stood out—Germany is right and will win; England is wrong and will knuckle under; we hate England because we are alike in religion, custom, and opinion, and it is the war of kindred races. Everywhere one met the arguments and stories of unfairness and cruelty in fighting that have appeared in the English papers, but with the names reversed. English soldiers had surrendered and then fired; had shot from beneath a Red Cross flag or had killed prisoners. The stories were simple and as hackneyed as most of those current in England.

The concrete rest houses were interesting. Most of them have furniture made from trees "to amuse us and pass the time." Both officers and men use the same type of house, though discipline forbids that the same house be used by both officers and men. The light in these houses is bad and the ventilation not all that it should be, but they are extremely careful about sanitation, and everywhere one smells disinfectants and sees evidence of scrupulous guarding against disease. Oil and candles are scarce and the "pocket electric" that all the men and officers carry does not last long enough for much reading. There are always telephone connections, but in most cases visits are impossible save by way of the underground passages and the trenches.

One officer described the life as entirely normal; another said, in speaking of a Louis XV. couch which had been borrowed from a near-by château and was the pride of a regiment, "Oh! we are cave-dwellers, but we have some of the luxuries of at least the nineteenth century."

The Major Commandant at Rethel showed me a letter from a friend demanding "some easy chairs and a piano for his trench house," and the Major said, "I hear they have music up on the Yser, but the French are too close to us here!"

All that I saw of the German Red Cross leads me to believe that it is adequate and efficient. At Rethel we saw a Red Cross train of thirty-two cars perfectly equipped. The cars are made specially with open corridors, so that stretchers or rubber-wheeled trucks may be rolled from one car to another. The berths are in two tiers, much like an American sleeping car, and each car when full holds twenty-eight men. There is an operating car fully equipped for the most delicate and dangerous cases; in fact, when we saw the train at Rethel it had stopped on its way to Germany for an operation on a man's brain.

The Spirits of Mankind

By Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States

The conviction that great spiritual forces will assert themselves at the end of the European war to enlighten the judgment and steady the spirits of mankind was expressed by President Wilson in an address of welcome delivered at the Maryland annual conference of the Methodist Protestant Church at Washington on April 8, 1915. The text of his address appears below.

These are days of great perplexity, when a great cloud of trouble hangs and broods over the greater part of the world. It seems as if great, blind, material forces had been released which had for long been held in leash and restraint. And yet underneath that you can see the strong impulses of great ideals.

It would be impossible for men to go through what men are going through on the battlefields of Europe and struggle through the present dark night of their terrible struggle if it were not that they saw, or thought that they saw, the broadening of light where the morning should come up and believed that they were standing each on his side of the contest for some eternal principle for right.

Then all about them, all about us, there sits the silent, waiting tribunal which is going to utter the ultimate judgment upon this struggle, the great tribunal of the opinion of the world; and I fancy I see, I hope that I see, I pray that it may be that I do truly see, great spiritual forces lying waiting for the outcome of this thing to assert themselves, and are asserting themselves even now to enlighten our judgment and steady our spirits.

No man is wise enough to pronounce judgment, but we can all hold our spirits in readiness to accept the truth when it dawns on us and is revealed to us in the outcome of this titanic struggle.

It is of infinite benefit that in assemblages like this and in every sort of assemblage we should constantly go back to the sources of our moral inspiration and question ourselves as to what principle it is that we are acting on. Whither are we bound? What do we wish to see triumph? And if we wish to see certain things triumph, why do we wish to see them triumph? What is there in them that is for the lasting benefit of mankind?

For we are not in this world to amuse ourselves with its affairs. We are here to push the whole sluggish mass forward in some particular direction, and unless you know the direction in which you want to go your force is of no avail. Do you love righteousness? is what each one of us ought to ask himself. And if you love righteousness are you ready to translate righteousness into action and be ashamed and afraid before no man?

It seems to me, therefore, that it is worth suggesting to you that you are not sitting here merely to transact the business and express the ideals of a great church as represented in the State of Maryland, but you are here also as part of the assize of humanity, to remind yourselves of the things that are permanent and eternal, which if we do not translate into action we have failed in the fundamental things of our lives.

You will see that it is only in such general terms that one can speak in the midst of a confused world, because, as I have already said, no man has the key to this confusion. No man can see the outcome, but every man can keep his own spirit prepared to contribute to the net result when the outcome displays itself.

"What the Germans Say About Their Own Methods of Warfare"

By Joseph Bedier, Professor in the College de France

[From an article in the Revue de Paris for January, 1915.]

I purpose to show that the German armies cannot altogether escape the reproach of violating on occasion the law of nations. I shall establish this by French methods, through the use of documents of sound value.

My texts are genuine, well vouched for, and I have taken pains to subject them to a critical examination, as scrupulous and minute as heretofore in times of peace I expended in weighing the authority of some ancient chronicle, or in scrutinizing the authenticity of some charter. Perhaps this care was born of professional habit, or due to a natural craving for exactness, but in either case it is a voucher for the work, which is meant for all comers—for the passer-by, for the indifferent, and even for my country's foes. My wish is that the veriest looker-on, idly turning these pages, may be confronted only with documents whose authenticity will be self-evident, if he is willing to see, and whose ignominious tale will reach his heart, if ye have a heart.

I have, moreover, sought for documents not only incontestably genuine but of unquestioned authority. Accusation is easy, while proof is difficult. No belligerent has ever been troubled to find mountains of testimony, true or false, against his enemy; but were this evidence gathered by the most exalted magistrates, under the most solemn judicial sanction, it must unfortunately long remain useless; until the accused has full opportunity to controvert it, every one is free to treat it as false or, at the best, as controvertible. For this reason I shall avoid resting the case upon Belgian or French statements, though I know them to be true. My purpose has been to bring forward such testimony that no man living, be he even a German, should be privileged to cast a doubt upon it. German crimes will be established by German documents.

These will be taken mainly from the "War Diaries," which Article 75 of the German Army Regulations for Field Service enjoins upon soldiers to keep during their marches, and which were seized by the French upon the persons of their prisoners, as military papers, as authorized by Article 4 of The Hague Convention of 1907. The number of these is daily increasing, and I trust that some day, for the edification of all, the complete collection may be lodged in the Germanic section of manuscripts in the National Library. Meantime, the Marquis de Dampierre, paleographer and archivist, graduate of the Ecole des Chartes, is preparing, and will shortly publish, a volume in which the greater part of these notebooks will be minutely described, transcribed, and clarified. Personally, I have only examined about forty of them, but they will answer my purpose, by presenting relevant extracts, furnishing the name, rank, and regiment of the author, with indications of time and place. Classification is difficult, mainly because ten lines of a single text not infrequently furnish evidence of a variety of offenses. I must take them almost at random, grouping them under such analogies or association of ideas or images as they may offer.

I.

The first notebook at hand is that of a soldier of the Prussian Guard, the Gefreiter Paul Spielmann, (of Company I, First Brigade of the Infantry Guard.) He tells the story of an unexpected night alarm on the 1st of September in a village near Blamont. The bugle sounds, and the Guard, startled from sleep, begins the massacre, (Figs. 1 and 2:)

Figure 1.

The inhabitants fled through the village. It was horrible. The walls of houses are bespattered with blood and the faces of the dead are hideous to look upon. They were buried at once, some sixty of them. Among them many old women, old men, and one woman pregnant—the whole a dreadful sight. Three children huddled together—all dead. Altar and arches of the church shattered. Telephone communication with the enemy was found there. This morning, Sept. 2, all the survivors were driven out; I saw four little boys carrying on two poles a cradle with a child some five or six months old. The whole makes a fearful sight. Blow upon blow! Thunderbolt on thunderbolt! Everything given over to plunder. I saw a mother with her two little ones—one of them had a great wound in the head and an eye put out.

Deserved repression, remarks this soldier: "They had telephone communication with the enemy." And yet, we may recall that by Article 30 of The Hague Convention of 1907, signed on behalf of H.M. the Emperor of Germany, "no collective penalty, pecuniary or other, shall be proclaimed against a population, by reason of individual acts for which the population is not responsible in solido." What tribunal during that dreadful night took the pains to establish this joint participation?

Figure 2.

II.

The unsigned notebook of a soldier of the Thirty-second Reserve Infantry (Fourth Reserve Corps) has this entry:

Creil, Sept. 3.—The iron bridge was blown up. For this we set the streets on fire, and shot the civilians.

Yet it must be obvious that only the regular troops of the French Engineer Corps could have blown up the iron bridge at Creil; the civilians had no hand in it. As an excuse for these massacres, when any excuse is offered, the notebooks usually note that "civilians" or "francs-tireurs" had fired on the troops. But the "scrap of paper" which Germany subscribed—the Convention of 1907—provides in its first article "the laws, the rights, and the duties are not applicable solely to the army, but also to militia and bodies of volunteers" under certain conditions, of which the main one is that they shall "openly bear arms;" while Article 2 stipulates that "the population of an unoccupied territory, which on the approach of the enemy spontaneously takes up arms to resist the invading forces, without having had time to organize as provided in Article I, shall be considered as a belligerent, if they bear arms openly and observe the laws and customs of war."

Figure 3.

In the light of this text, the bearing of the barbarous recitals which follow may be properly estimated:

(a) Notebook of Private Hassemer, (Eighth Corps, Sept. 3, 1914, at Sommepy, Marne.)—Dreadful butchery. Village burned to the ground; the French thrown into the burning houses, civilians and all burned together.

(b) Notebook of Lieut. Kietzmann, (Second Company, First Battalion, Forty-ninth Infantry,) under date of Aug. 18, 1914, (Fig. 3.)—A short distance above Diest is the village of Schaffen. About fifty civilians were concealed in the church tower, and from there fired on our troops with a mitrailleuse. All the civilians were shot.

[It may here be noted, for the sake of precision, that the First Report of the Belgian Commission of Inquiry, Antwerp, Aug. 28, Page 3, identifies some of the "civilians" killed at Schaffen on the 18th of August; among them, "the wife of François Luyckz, 45 years of age, with her daughter aged 12, who were discovered in a sewer and shot"; and "the daughter of Jean Ooyen, 9 years of age, who was shot"; and "André Willem, sacristain, who was bound to a tree and burned alive.">[

(c) Notebook of a Saxon officer, unnamed, (178th Regiment, Twelfth Army Corps, First Saxon Corps,) Aug. 26.—The exquisite village of Gué-d'Hossus (Ardennes) was given to the flames, although to my mind it was guiltless. I am told that a cyclist fell from his machine, and in his fall his gun was discharged; at once the firing was begun in his direction, and thereupon all the male inhabitants were simply thrown into the flames. It is to be hoped that like atrocities will not be repeated.

This Saxon officer had, nevertheless, already witnessed like "atrocities." The preceding day, Aug. 25, at Villers-en-Fagne, (Belgian Ardennes,) "where we found grenadiers of the guard, killed and wounded," he had seen "the curé and other inhabitants shot"; and three days previous, Aug. 23, at the village of Bouvignes, north of Dinant, he had witnessed what he thus describes:

Through a breach made in the rear we get access into the residence of a well-to-do inhabitant and occupy the house. Passing through a number of apartments, we reach a door where we find the corpse of the owner. Further on in the interior our men have wrecked everything like vandals. Everything has been searched. Outside, throughout the country, the spectacle of the inhabitants who have been shot defies any description. They have been shot at such short range that they are almost decapitated. Every house has been ransacked to the furthest corners, and the inhabitants dragged from their hiding places. The men shot; the women and children locked into a convent, from which shots were fired. And, for this reason, the convent is about to be set fire to; it may, however be ransomed if it surrenders the guilty ones and pays a ransom of 15,000 francs.

We shall see as we proceed how these notebooks complement one another.

(d) Notebook of the Private Philipp, (from Kamenz, Saxony, First Company, First Battalion, 178th Regiment.) On the day indicated above—Aug. 23—a private of the same regiment was the witness of a scene similar to that just described; perhaps, the same scene, but the point of view is different.—At 10 o'clock in the evening the First Battalion of the 178th came down into the burning village to the north of Dinant—a saddening spectacle—to make one shiver. At the entrance to the village lay the bodies of some fifty citizens, shot for having fired upon our troops from ambush. In the course of the night many others were shot down in like manner, so that we counted more than two hundred. Women and children, holding their lamps, were compelled to assist at this horrible spectacle. We then sat down midst the corpses to eat our rice, as we had eaten nothing since morning. (Fig. 4.)

Figure 4.

Here is a military picture fully outlined, and worthy to compete in the Academy of Fine Arts of Dresden. But one passage of the text is somewhat obscure and might embarrass the artist—"Women and children, holding their lamps, were compelled to assist at this horrible spectacle." What spectacle?—the shooting, or the counting of the corpses? To get some certainty on this historic point, the artist should question that noble soldier—the Colonel of the 178th.

His work of that night, however, was in accord with the spirit of his companions in arms, and of his chiefs. We may assure ourselves of this by consulting the Sixth Report of the Belgian Commission of Inquiry upon, the violation of the rules of the law of nations (Havre, Nov. 10, 1914) and the ignoble proclamations placarded by the Germans throughout Belgium. I will content myself with three short extracts.

Extract from a proclamation of General von Bülow, placarded at Liège, Aug. 22, 1914:

The inhabitants of the city of Andenne, after having protested their peaceful intentions, were guilty of a treacherous surprise upon our troops. It was with my consent that the General in Chief set fire to the whole locality, and that about one hundred persons were shot.

(The Belgian report controverts the accusation against the inhabitants of Andenne of having taken hostile measures against the German troops, and adds: "As a matter of fact, more than two hundred persons were shot"—almost everything was ravaged. For a distance of at least three leagues the houses were destroyed by fire.)

Extract from a proclamation of Major Dieckmann, placarded at Grivegnée, Sept. 8, 1914:

Any one not responding instantly to the command "raise your arms" is subject to the penalty of death.

Extract from proclamation of Marshal Baron von der Goltz, placarded at Brussels, Oct. 5, 1914:

Hereafter the localities nearest the place where similar acts (destruction of railways or telegraphic lines) were done—whether or not they were accomplices in the act—will be punished without mercy. To this end hostages have been taken from all the localities adjacent to railways menaced by similar attacks, and upon the first attempt to destroy the railways, telegraphic or telephone lines, they will at once be shot.

III.

I copy from the first page of an unsigned notebook, (Fig. 5:)

Langeviller, Aug. 22.—Village destroyed by the Eleventh Battalion of Pioneers. Three women hanged to trees; the first dead I have seen.

Who can these three women be?—criminals undoubtedly—guilty of having fired upon German troops, unless, indeed, they may have been "in communication by telephone" with the enemy; and the Eleventh Pioneers unquestionably meted out to them just punishment. But, at all events, they expiated their guilt, and the Eleventh Pioneers has passed on. The crime these women committed is unknown to the troops which are to follow. Among these new troops will there be found no chief, no Christian, to order the ropes cut and allow these dangling bodies to rest on the earth?

Figure 5.

No, the regiment passes under the gibbets and their flags brush against the hanging corpses; they pass on, Colonel and officers—gentlemen all—Kulturträger. And they do this knowingly; these corpses must hang there as an example, not for the other women of the village, for these doubtless already understand, but as an example to the regiment and to the other regiments that will follow, and who must be attuned to war, who must be taught their stern duty to kill women when occasion offers. The teaching will be effective, unquestionably. Shall we look for proof of it? The young soldier, who tells us above that these corpses were the first dead he had ever seen, adds a week later, on the tenth and last page of his notebook, the following, (Fig. 6:)

In this way we destroyed eight dwellings and their inhabitants. In one of the houses we bayoneted two men, with their wives and a young girl 18 years old. The young: one almost unmanned me, her look was so innocent! But we could not master the excited troop, for at such times they are no longer men—they are beasts.

Figure 6.

Let me add a few texts which will attest that these assassinations of women and children are customary tasks set to German soldiers:

(a) The writer in a notebook, unsigned, reports that at Orchies (Nord) "a woman was shot for not having obeyed the command to halt!" whereupon he adds, "the whole locality was set on fire." (Fig. 7.)

Figure 7.

(b) The officer of the 178th Saxon Regiment, mentioned above, reports that in the vicinity of Lisognes (Belgian Ardennes) "the Chasseur of Marburg, having placed three women in line, killed them all with one shot."

(c) A few lines more, taken from the notebook of the Reservist Schlauter (Third Battery, Fourth Regiment, Field Artillery of the Guard,) (Fig. 8:)

Aug. 25, (in Belgium.)—We shot 300 of the inhabitants of the town. Those that survived the salvo were requisitioned as grave diggers. You should have seen the women at that time! But it was impossible to do otherwise. In our march upon Wilot things went better; the inhabitants who wished to leave were allowed to do so. But whoever fired was shot. Upon our leaving Owele the rifles rang out, and with that, flames, women, and all the rest.

Figure 8.

IV.

Frequently when a German troop want to carry a position, they place before them civilians—men, women, and children—and find shelter behind these ramparts of living flesh. As such a stratagem is essentially playing upon the nobility of heart of the adversary, and saying to him "you won't fire upon these unfortunates, I know it, and I hold you at my mercy, unarmed, because you are not as craven as I am," as it implies a homage to the enemy and the self-degradation of the one employing it, it is almost inconceivable that soldiers should resort to it; it represents a new invention in the long story of human vileness, which even the dreadful Penitentiels of the Middle Ages had not discovered. In reading the stories from French, Belgian, and English sources, attributing such practices to the Germans, it has made me doubt, if not the truthfulness, at least the detailed exactness of the stories. It seemed to me that the tales must be of crimes by men who would be disavowed, individual lapses, which do not dishonor the nation, because the nation on ascertaining them would repudiate them. But how can we doubt that the German Nation has, on the contrary, accepted these acts as exploits worthy of herself, that in them she recognizes her own aptitudes, and finds pleasure in the contemplation; how, I ask, can we doubt this in reading the following narrative signed by a Bavarian officer, Lieut. A. Eberlein, spread out in the columns of one of the best known periodicals of Germany, the Münchner Neueste Nachrichten, in its issue of Wednesday, Oct. 7, 1914, Page 22, Lieut. Eberlein relates there the occupation of Saint-Dié at the end of August. He entered the town at the head of a column, and while waiting for reinforcements was compelled to barricade himself in a house, (Fig. 9:)

Figure 9.

We arrested three civilians, and a bright idea struck me. We furnished them with chairs and made them seat themselves in the middle of the street. There were supplications on one part, and some blows with the stocks of our guns on the other. One, little by little, gets terribly hardened. Finally, there they were sitting in the street. How many anguished prayers they may have muttered, I cannot say, but during the whole time their hands were joined in nervous contraction. I am sorry for them, but the stratagem was of immediate effect. The enfilading directed from the houses diminished at once; we were able then to take possession of the house opposite, and thus became masters of the principal street. From that moment every one that showed his face in the street was shot. And the artillery meanwhile kept up vigorous work, so that at about 7 o'clock in the evening, when the brigade advanced to rescue us, I could report "Saint-Dié has been emptied of all enemies."

As I learned later, the —— Regiment of Reserves, which came into Saint-Dié further north, had experiences entirely similar to our own. The four civilians whom they had placed on chairs in the middle of the street were killed by French bullets. I saw them myself stretched out in the street near the hospital.

V.

Article 28 of The Hague Convention of 1907, subscribed to by Germany, uses this language: "The sacking of any town or locality, even when taken by assault, is prohibited." And Article 47 runs: "[in occupied territory] pillage is forbidden."

We shall see how the German armies interpret these articles.

Private Handschuhmacher (Eleventh Battalion of Chasseurs Reserves) writes in his notebook:

Aug. 8, 1914, Gouvy, (Belgium.)—There, the Belgians having fired on some German soldiers, we started at once pillaging the merchandise warehouse. Several cases—eggs, shirts, and everything that could be eaten was carried off. The safe was forced and the gold distributed among the men. As to the securities, they were torn up.

This happened as early as the fourth day of the war, and it helps us to understand a technical article on the operations of the military treasury (Der Zahlmeister im Felde) in the Berliner Tageblatt of the 26th of November, 1914, in which an economic phenomenon of rather unusual import is recited as a simple incident: "Experience has demonstrated that very much more money is forwarded by postal orders from the theatre of operations to the interior of the country than vice versa."

As, in accordance with the continual practice of the German armies, pillaging is only a prelude to incendiarism, the sub-officer Hermann Levith (160th Regiment of Infantry, Eighth Corps) writes:

The enemy occupied the village of Bievre and the edge of the wood behind it. The Third Company advanced in first line. We carried the village, and then pillaged and burned almost all the houses.

And Private Schiller (133d Infantry, Nineteenth Corps) writes:

Our first fight was at Haybes (Belgium) on the 24th of August. The Second Battalion entered the village, ransacked the houses, pillaged them, and burned those from which shots had been fired.

And Private Sebastian Reishaupt (Third Bavarian Infantry, First Bavarian Corps) writes:

The first village we burned was Parux, (Meurthe-et-Moselle.) After this the dance began, throughout the villages, one after the other; over the fields and pastures we went on our bicycles up to the ditches at the edge of the road, and there sat down to eat our cherries.

They emulate each other in their thefts; they steal anything that comes to hand and keep records of the thefts—"Schnaps, Wein, Marmelade, Zigarren," writes this private soldier; and the elegant officer of the 178th Saxon Regiment, who was at first indignant at the "vandalismus" of his men, further on admits that he himself, on the 1st of September, at Rethel, stole "from a house near the Hôtel Moderne a superb waterproof and a photographic apparatus for Felix." All steal, without distinction or grade, or of arms, or of cause, and even in the ambulances the doctors steal. Take this example from the notebook of the soldier Johannes Thode (Fourth Reserve Regiment of Ersatz):

At Brussels, Oct. 5, 1914.—An automobile arrived at the hospital laden with war booty—one piano, two sewing machines, many albums, and all sorts of other things.

"Two sewing machines" as "war booty." From whom were these stolen? Beyond a doubt from two humble Belgian women. And for whom were they stolen?

VI.

I must admit that, out of the forty notebooks, or thereabout, that I have handled, there are six or seven that do not relate any exactions, either from hypocritical reticence or because there are some regiments which do not make war in this vile fashion. And there are as many as three notebooks whose writers, in relating these ignoble things, express astonishment, indignation, and sorrow. I will not give the names of these, because they deserve our regard, and I wish to spare them the risk of being some day blamed or punished by their own.

Figure 10.

The first, the Private X., who belongs to the Sixty-fifth Infantry, Regiment of Landwehr, says of certain of his companions in arms, (Fig. 10:)

They do not behave as soldiers, but rather as highwaymen, bandits, and brigands, and are a dishonor to our regiment and to our army.

Another, Lieut. Y., of the Seventy-seventh Infantry of Reserves, says:

No discipline, ... the Pioneers are well nigh worthless; as to the artillery, it is a band of robbers.

The third, Private Z., of the Twelfth Infantry of Reserves, First Corps, writes, (Fig. 11:)

Figure 11.

Unfortunately, I am forced to make note of a fact which should not have occurred, but there are to be found, even in our own army, creatures who are no longer men, but hogs, to whom nothing is sacred. One of these broke into a sacristy; it was locked, and where the Blessed Sacrament was kept. A Protestant, out of respect, had refused to sleep there. This man used it as a deposit for his excrements. How is it possible there should be such creatures? Last night one of the men of the Landwehr, more than thirty-five years of age, married, tried to rape the daughter of the inhabitant where he had taken up his quarters—a mere girl—and when the father intervened he pressed his bayonet against his breast.

Beyond these three, who are still worthy of the name of soldiers, the other thirty are all alike, and the same soul (if we can talk of souls among such as these) animates them low and frantic. I say they are all about alike, but there are shades of difference. There are some who, like subtle jurists, make distinctions, blaming here and approving there—"Dort war ein Exempel am Platze." Others laugh and say "Krieg ist Krieg," or sometimes they add in French, to emphasize their derision, "Ja, Ja, c'est la guerre," and some among them, when their ugly business is done, turn to their book of canticles and sing psalms, such as the Saxon Lieut. Reislang, who relates how one day he left his drinking bout to assist at the "Gottesdienst", but having eaten too much and drunken too much, had to quit the holy place in haste; and the Private Moritz Grosse of the 177th Infantry, who, after depicting the sacking of Saint-Vieth, (Aug. 22,) the sacking of Dinant, (Aug. 23,) writes this phrase:

Throwing of incendiary grenades into the houses, and in the evening a military chorus—"Now let all give thanks to God." (Fig. 12.)

They're all of a like tenor. Now, if we consider that I could exchange the preceding texts with others quite similar, quite as cynical, and taken at random, for instance—from the notebook of the Reservist Lautenschlager of the First Battalion, Sixty-sixth Regiment of Infantry, or the notebook of the Private Eduard Holl of the Eighth Corps, or the notebook of the sub-officer Reinhold Koehn of the Second Battalion of Pomeranian Pioneers, or that of the sub-officer Otto Brandt of the Second Section of Reserve Ambulances, or of the Reservist Martin Müller of the 100th Saxon Reserve, or of Lieut. Karl Zimmer of the Fifty-fifth Infantry, or that of the Private Erich Pressler of the 100th Grenadiers, First Saxon Corps, &c., and if we will note that, among the exactions reported above, there are very few that are the work of isolated brutes, (such as, unfortunately, may be found even in the most noble armies,) but that, on the contrary, the crimes represented here are collective actions in obedience to service orders, and such as rest upon and dishonor not only the individual but the entire troop, the officers, and the nation; and if we will further note that these thirty notebooks taken at random—Bavarian, Saxon, Pomeranian, Brandeburger, or from the provinces of Baden and the Rhine—must of necessity represent hundreds and thousands of others quite similar, as we may judge from the frightful monotony of their recitals; if we consider all this, we must, I think, be forced to admit that these atrocities are nothing less than the practical application of a methodically organized system.

Figure 12.

VII.

H.M. the Emperor of Germany, by ratifying The Hague Convention of 1907, covenanted (Article 24) that "it is forbidden (c) to kill or wound an enemy who, having laid down his arms, or being without means of defense, has surrendered unconditionally. (d) To declare that no quarter shall be given."

Have the German armies respected these covenants? Throughout Belgian and French reports depositions such as the following abound. This is taken from a French Captain of the 288th Infantry:

On the 22d, in the evening, I learned that in the woods, about one hundred and fifty meters north of the square formed by the intersection of the great Calonne trench with the road from Vaux-les-Palameis to Saint-Rémy, there were corpses of French soldiers shot by the Germans. I went to the spot and found the bodies of about thirty soldiers within a small space, most of them prone, but several still kneeling, and all having a precisely similar wound—a bullet through the ear. One only, seriously wounded in his lower parts, could still speak, and told me that the Germans before leaving had ordered them to lie down and that then had them shot through the head; that he, already wounded had secured indulgence by stating that he was the father of three small children. The skulls of these unfortunates were scattered; the guns, broken at the stock, were scattered here and there; and the blood had besprinkled the bushes to such an extent that in coming out of the woods my cape was spattered with it; it was a veritable shambles.

I quote this testimony, not to base any accusations upon it, but simply to give precision to our indictment. I will not lay stress upon it as evidence, for I wish to keep to the rule which I have laid down—to have records of nothing but German sources of information.

I will quote here the text of an order of the day addressed by General Stenger, in command of the Fifty-eighth German Brigade, on the 26th of August, to the troops under his orders:

From this day forward no further prisoners will be taken. All prisoners will be massacred. The wounded, whether in arms or not in arms, shall be massacred. Even the prisoners already gathered in convoys will be massacred. No living enemy must remain behind us.

Signed—First Lieutenant in Command of the Company, Stoy; Colonel Commanding the Regiment, Neubauer; General in Command of the Brigade, Stenger.

About thirty soldiers of Stenger's Brigade (112th and 142d Regiments of Baden Infantry) were questioned. I have read their depositions, taken under oath and signed with their own names; all confirming the fact that this order of the day was given to them on the 26th of August. In one place by the Major Mosebach, in another by Lieut. Curtius, &c. Most of these witnesses said that they were ignorant whether the order was carried out, but three among them testified that it was carried out under their own eyes in the Forest of Thiaville, where ten or twelve wounded French, already made prisoners by a battalion, were done away with; two others of the witnesses saw the order carried out along the road of Thiaville, where several wounded, found in the ditches by the company as it marched past, were killed.

Figure 13.

Of course, I cannot here produce the original autograph of General Stenger, nor am I here called upon to furnish the names of the German prisoners who gave this testimony. But I shall have no trouble to establish entirely similar crimes on the faith of German autographs.

For instance, we find in the notebook of Private Albert Delfosse (111th Infantry of Reserves, Fourteenth Reserve Corps,) (Fig. 13:)

In the woods (near Saint-Rémy, 4th or 5th of September)—Found a very fine cow and a calf killed; and again the corpses of Frenchmen horribly mutilated.

Must we understand that these bodies were mutilated by loyal weapons, torn perhaps by shells? This may be, but it would be a charitable interpretation, which is belied by this newspaper heading, (Figs. 14 and 15:)

JAUERSCHES TAGEBLATT Amtlicher Anzeiger Für Stadt und Kreis Jauer Jauer, Sonntag, Den 18, Oktober, 1914. Nr. 245. 106, Jahrgang.

This is a heading of a newspaper picked up in a German trench. Jauer is a city of Silesia, about fifty kilometers west of Breslau, where two battalions of the 154th Regiment of Saxon Infantry are garrisoned. One Sunday morning, Oct. 18, doubtless at the hour when the inhabitants—women and children—were wending their way to church, there was distributed throughout the quiet little town, and through the hamlets and villages of the district, the issue of this local paper with the following inscription: "A day of honor for our regiment, Sept. 24, 1914," as the title of an article of some two hundred lines, sent from the front by a member of the regiment—the sub-officer Klemt of the First Company, 154th Infantry Regiment.

GENERAL VON KUSMANEK—
Whose stubborn defense of Przemysl made it one of the most notable
sieges of history.—(Photo from Underwood & Underwood.)

CAPT.-LIEUT. OTTO WEDDIGEN—
Whose submarine exploits have done more damage to England's navy
than all Germany's gunners.—(Photo from The Photo News.)

Figure 14.

Figure 15.

The sub-officer Klemt relates how, on the 24th of September, his regiment having left Hannonville in the morning, accompanied by Austrian batteries, suddenly came up against a double fire of infantry and artillery. Their losses were terrible, and yet the enemy was still invisible. Finally, says this officer, it was found that the bullets came from above, from trees which the French soldiers had climbed. From this point let me quote verbatim, (Fig. 16:)

Figure 16.

They're brought down from the trees like squirrels, to get a hot reception with bayoneted stock; they'll need no more doctors' care. We are not fighting loyal enemies, but treacherous brigands. [Note—It is scarcely necessary to point out that it is no more "treacherous," but quite as lawful, to fire from the branches of a tree as from a window, or from a trench, and that, on the contrary, it is rather more venturesome and more courageous, as the sequel of this story will show.] We crossed the clearing at a bound. The foe is hidden here and there among the bushes, and now we are upon them. No quarter will be given. We fire standing, at will; very few fire kneeling; nobody dreams of shelter. We finally reach a slight depression in the ground, and there the red trousers are lying in masses, here and there—dead or wounded. We club or stab the wounded, for we know that these rascals, as soon as we are gone by, will fire from behind. We find one Frenchman lying at full length upon his face, but he is counterfeiting death. A kick from a robust fusilier gives him notice that we are there. Turning over he asks for quarter, but he gets the reply—"Oh! is that the way, blackguard, that your tools work?" and he is pinned to the ground. On one side of me I hear curious cracklings. They're the blows which a soldier of the 154th is vigorously showering upon the bald pate of a Frenchman with the stock of his gun; he very wisely chose for this work a French gun, for fear of breaking his own. Some men of particularly sensitive soul grant the French wounded the grace to finish them with a bullet, but others scatter here and there, wherever they can, their clubbings and stabbings. Our adversaries have fought bravely. They were élite troops that we had before us. They had allowed us to come within thirty, and even within ten, meters—too close. Their arms and knapsacks thrown down in heaps showed that they wanted to fly, but upon the appearance of our "gray phantoms" terror paralyzed them, and, on the narrow path in which they crowded, the German bullets brought them the order to halt! There they are at the very entrance of their leafy hiding places, lying down moaning and asking for quarter, but whether their wounds are light or grievous, the brave fusiliers saved their country the expensive care which would have to be given to such a number of enemies.

Now the recital continues very ornate, very literary, and the writer relates how his Imperial Highness Prince Oscar of Prussia, being advised of the exploits (perhaps, indeed, other exploits than these) of the 154th and of the Regiment of Grenadiers, which forms the Brigade with the 154th, declared them both worthy of the name of "King's Brigade," and the recital closes with this phrase: "When night came on, with a prayer of thankfulness on our lips we fell asleep to await the coming day." Then adding, by way of postscript, a little phrase "Heimkehr vom Kampf." He carries the notebook—prose and verse together—to his Lieutenant, who countersigns it: "Certified as correct, De Niem, Lieutenant Commanding the Company," and then he sends his paper to his town of Jauer, where he is quite confident that he will find some newspaper publisher to accept it, printers to set it up, and a whole population to enjoy it. Now, let me ask any reader—whatever be his country—if he can imagine it possible for such a tale to be spread abroad in any paper in his language, in his native town, for the edification of his wife and his children. In what other country than in Germany is such a thing conceivable? Not in France, at all events. Now, if my readers want another document to show how customary it is in the German Army to mutilate the wounded, well, I will borrow one from the notebook of Private Paul Glöde of the Ninth Battalion of Pioneers, Ninth Corps, (Figs. 17 and 18:)

Aug. 12, 1914, in Belgium.—One can get an idea of the fury of our soldiers in seeing the destroyed villages. Not one house left untouched. Everything eatable is requisitioned by the unofficered soldiers. Several heaps of men and women put to execution. Young pigs are running about looking for their mothers. Dogs chained, without food or drink. And the houses about them on fire. But the just anger of our soldiers is accompanied also by pure vandalism. In the villages, already emptied of their inhabitants, the houses are set on fire. I feel sorry for this population. If they have made use of disloyal weapons, after all, they are only defending their own country. The atrocities which these non-combatants are still committing are revenged after a savage fashion. Mutilations of the wounded are the order of the day.

This was written as early as the 12th of August—the tenth day after the invasion of innocent Belgium—and these wounded creatures that were tortured had done nothing more than defend their land against Germany—their native land—which Germany had sworn, not only to respect but, if need be, to defend. And yet, in many countries pharisees reading these lines will go forward tranquilly to their churches, or their temples, or their banking houses, or their foreign offices, saying: "In what do these things concern us?" "Ja, ja, this is war." Yes, it is war, but war such as was never made by the soldiers of Marceau, such as never will be made by the soldiers of Joffre, such as never has been made and never will be made by France—"Mother of Arts, of Arms, and of Laws." Yes, it is war, but war such as Attila would not have carried on if he had subscribed to certain stipulations; for, in subscribing them, he would have awakened to the notion, which alone distinguishes the civilized man from the barbarian, distinguishes a nation from a horde—respect for the word once given. Yes, it is war, but war the theory of which could only be made up by such pedant megalomaniacs as the Julius von Hartmanns, the Bernhardis, and the Treitschkes; the theory which accords to the elect people the right to uproot from the laws and customs of war what centuries of humanity, of Christianity, and chivalry have at great pains injected into it; the theory of systematic and organized ferocity; today exposed to public reprobation, not only as an odious thing, but no less silly and absurd. For have we not reached the ridiculous when the incendiaries of Louvain, and Malines, and Rheims, the assassins of women and children, and of the wounded, already find it necessary to repudiate their actions, at least in words, and to impose upon the servility of their ninety-three Kulturträger such denials as this: "It is not true that we are making war in contempt of the law of nations, nor that our soldiers are committing acts of cruelty, or of insubordination, or indiscipline.... We will carry this conflict through to the end as a civilized people, and we answer for this upon our good name and upon our honor!" Why this humble and pitiful repudiation? Perhaps because their theory of war rested upon the postulate of their invincibility, and that, in the first shiver of their defeat upon the Marne, it collapsed, and now their repudiation quickly follows—in dread of the lex talionis.

Figure 17.

Figure 18. [Continuation of Figure 17.

I will stop here. I leave the conclusion to the allied armies, already in sight of victory.

NOTE.—General Stenger's order of the day, mentioned on page [Transcriber's Note: blank in original], was communicated orally by various officers in various units of the brigade. Consequently, the form in which we have received it may possibly be incomplete or altered. In face of any doubt, the French Government has ordered an inquiry to be made into the prisoners' camps. Not one of the prisoners to whom our magistrates presented the order of the day in the above-mentioned form found a word to alter. They one and all declared that this was the order of the day which had been orally given in the ranks, repeated from man to man; many added the names of the officers who had communicated the order to them; some related in what a vile way it had been carried out under their eyes. All the evidence of these German soldiers was collected in a legal manner, under the sanction of an oath, and it is after reading their depositions that I wrote the order of the day.

The text of all this evidence was transmitted to all the French Embassies and Legations in foreign countries on the 24th of October, 1914. Every neutral wishing to clear his conscience is at liberty to obtain it from the representatives of the French Republic, who will certainly respond willingly.

The Recruit.

By HORTENSE FLEXNER.

He had a woodland look—half-startled, gay—

As if his eyes, light-thirsty, had not learned

To wake accustomed on earth's joyous day,

A child, whose merriment and wonder burned

In harmless flame, even his uniform

Was but a lie to hide his wind-wild grace,

Whose limbs were rounded youth, too supple, warm,

To hold the measure of the street-made pace.

Music and marching—colors in the sky—

The crowded station, then the train—farewell!

For all he had the glance, exultant, shy,

That seemed to marvel, "More to see—to tell!"

Yet with his breathing moved, hid by his coat,

A numbered, metal disk, strapped round his throat!

American Reply to Britain's Blockade Order

By William J. Bryan, American Secretary of State

With the publication on April 6, 1915, of its note in reply to the British Government's Order in Council, proclaiming a virtual blockade against commerce to and from Germany—printed in the April, 1915, number of THE NEW YORK TIMES CURRENT HISTORY—the American Government rested its case. The text of the note to Great Britain follows:

WASHINGTON, March 30, 1915.

The Secretary of State to the American Ambassador at London:

You are instructed to deliver the following to his Majesty's Government in reply to your Nos. 1,795 and 1,798 of March 15: The Government of the United States has given careful consideration to the subjects treated in the British notes of March 13 and March 15, and to the British Order in Council of the latter date.

These communications contain matters of grave importance to neutral nations. They appear to menace their rights of trade and intercourse, not only with belligerents but also with one another. They call for frank comment in order that misunderstandings may be avoided. The Government of the United States deems it its duty, therefore, speaking in the sincerest spirit of friendship, to make its own view and position with regard to them unmistakably clear.

The Order in Council of the 15th of March would constitute, were its provisions to be actually carried into effect as they stand, a practical assertion of unlimited belligerent rights over neutral commerce within the whole European area and an almost unqualified denial of the sovereign rights of the nations now at peace.

This Government takes it for granted that there can be no question what those rights are. A nation's sovereignty over its own ships and citizens under its own flag on the high seas in time of peace is, of course, unlimited, and that sovereignty suffers no diminution in time of war, except in so far as the practice and consent of civilized nations has limited it by the recognition of certain now clearly determined rights which it is conceded may be exercised by nations which are at war.

A belligerent nation has been conceded the right of visit and search, and the right of capture and condemnation, if upon examination a neutral vessel is found to be engaged in unneutral service or to be carrying contraband of war intended for the enemy's Government or armed forces.

It has been conceded the right to establish and maintain a blockade of an enemy's ports and coasts and to capture and condemn any vessel taken in trying to break the blockade. It is even conceded the right to detain and take to its own ports for judicial examination all vessels which it suspects for substantial reasons to be engaged in unneutral or contraband service and to condemn them if the suspicion is sustained. But such rights, long clearly defined both in doctrine and practice, have hitherto been held to be the only permissible exceptions to the principle of universal equality of sovereignty on the high seas as between belligerents and nations not engaged in war.

It is confidently assumed that his Majesty's Government will not deny that it is a rule sanctioned by general practice that, even though a blockade should exist and the doctrine of contraband as to unblockaded territory be rigidly enforced, innocent shipments may be freely transported to and from the United States through neutral countries to belligerent territory, without being subject to the penalties of contraband traffic or breach of blockade, much less to detention, requisition, or confiscation.

Moreover, the rules of the Declaration of Paris of 1856—among them that free ships make free goods—will hardly at this day be disputed by the signatories of that solemn agreement.

His Majesty's Government, like the Government of the United States, have often and explicitly held that these rights represent the best usage of warfare in the dealings of belligerents with neutrals at sea. In this connection I desire to direct attention to the opinion of the Chief Justice of the United States in the case of the Peterhof, which arose out of the civil war, and to the fact that that opinion was unanimously sustained in the award of the Arbitration Commission of 1871, to which the case was presented at the request of Great Britain. From that time to the Declaration of London of 1909, adopted with modifications by the Order in Council of the 23d of October last, these rights have not been seriously questioned by the British Government. And no claim on the part of Great Britain of any justification for interfering with the clear rights of the United States and its citizens as neutrals could be admitted. To admit it would be to assume an attitude of unneutrality toward the present enemies of Great Britain, which would be obviously inconsistent with the solemn obligations of this Government in the present circumstances. And for Great Britain to make such a claim would be for her to abandon and set at nought the principles for which she has consistently and earnestly contended in other times and circumstances.

The note of his Majesty's principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, which accompanies the Order in Council, and which bears the same date, notifies the Government of the United States of the establishment of a blockade which is, if defined by the terms of the Order in Council, to include all the coasts and ports of Germany and every port of possible access to enemy territory. But the novel and quite unprecedented feature of that blockade, if we are to assume it to be properly so defined, is that it embraces many neutral ports and coasts, bars access to them, and subjects all neutral ships seeking to approach them to the same suspicion that would attach to them were they bound for the ports of the enemies of Great Britain, and to unusual risks and penalties.

It is manifest that such limitations, risks, and liabilities placed upon the ships of a neutral power on the seas, beyond the right of visit and search and the right to prevent the shipment of contraband already referred to, are a distinct invasion of the sovereign rights of the nation whose ships, trade, or commerce is interfered with.

The Government of the United States is, of course, not oblivious to the great changes which have occurred in the conditions and means of naval warfare since the rules hitherto governing legal blockade were formulated. It might be ready to admit that the old form of "close" blockade, with its cordon of ships in the immediate offing of the blockaded ports, is no longer practicable in the face of an enemy possessing the means and opportunity to make an effective defense by the use of submarines, mines, and air craft; but it can hardly be maintained that, whatever form of effective blockade may be made use of, it is impossible to conform at least to the spirit and principles of the established rules of war.

If the necessities of the case should seem to render it imperative that the cordon of blockading vessels be extended across the approaches to any neighboring neutral port or country, it would seem clear that it would still be easily practicable to comply with the well-recognized and reasonable prohibition of international law against the blockading of neutral ports, by according free admission and exit to all lawful traffic with neutral ports through the blockading cordon.

This traffic would, of course, include all outward-bound traffic from the neutral country and all inward-bound traffic to the neutral country, except contraband in transit to the enemy. Such procedure need not conflict in any respect with the rights of the belligerent maintaining the blockade, since the right would remain with the blockading vessels to visit and search all ships either entering or leaving the neutral territory which they were in fact, but not of right, investing.

The Government of the United States notes that in the Order in Council his Majesty's Government give as their reason for entering upon a course of action, which they are aware is without precedent in modern warfare, the necessity they conceive themselves to have been placed under to retaliate upon their enemies for measures of a similar nature, which the latter have announced it their intention to adopt, and which they have to some extent adopted, but the Government of the United States, recalling the principles upon which his Majesty's Government have hitherto been scrupulous to act, interprets this as merely a reason for certain extraordinary activities on the part of his Majesty's naval forces and not as an excuse for or prelude to any unlawful action.

If the course pursued by the present enemies of Great Britain should prove to be in fact tainted by illegality and disregard of the principles of war sanctioned by enlightened nations, it cannot be supposed, and this Government does not for a moment suppose, that his Majesty's Government would wish the same taint to attach to their own actions or would cite such illegal acts as in any sense or degree a justification for similar practices on their part in so far as they affect neutral rights.

It is thus that the Government of the United States interprets the language of the note of his Majesty's principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, which accompanies the copy of the Order in Council, which was handed to the Ambassador of the United States by the Government in London and by him transmitted to Washington.

This Government notes with gratification that "wide discretion is afforded to the prize court in dealing with the trade of neutrals in such a manner as may in the circumstances be deemed just, and that full provision is made to facilitate claims by persons interested in any goods placed in the custody of the Marshal of the prize court under the order." That "the effect of the Order in Council is to confer certain powers upon the executive officers of his Majesty's Government," and that "the extent to which these powers will be actually exercised and the degree of severity with which the measure of blockade authorized will be put into operation are matters which will depend on the administrative orders issued by the Government and the decisions of the authorities especially charged with the duty of dealing with individual ships and cargoes, according to the merits of each case."

This Government further notes with equal satisfaction the declaration of the British Government that "the instructions to be issued by his Majesty's Government to the fleet and to the customs officials and executive committees concerned will impress upon them the duty of acting with the utmost dispatch consistent with the object in view, and of showing in every case such consideration for neutrals as may be compatible with that object, which is succinctly stated, to establish a blockade to prevent vessels from carrying goods for or coming from Germany."

In view of these assurances formally given to this Government, it is confidently expected that the extensive powers conferred by the Order in Council on the executive officers of the Crown will be restricted by orders issued by the Government, directing the exercise of their discretionary powers in such a manner as to modify in practical application those provisions of the Order in Council, which, if strictly enforced, would violate neutral rights and interrupt legitimate trade. Relying on the faithful performance of these voluntary assurances by his Majesty's Government, the United States takes it for granted that the approach of American merchantmen to neutral ports situated upon the long line of coast affected by the Order in Council will not be interfered with when it is known that they do not carry goods which are contraband of war or goods destined to or proceeding from ports within the belligerent territory affected.

The Government of the United States assumes with the greater confidence that his Majesty's Government will thus adjust their practice to the recognized rules of international law because it is manifest that the British Government have adopted an extraordinary method of "stopping cargoes destined for or coming from the enemy's territory," which, owing to the existence of unusual conditions in modern warfare at sea, it will be difficult to restrict to the limits which have been heretofore required by the law of nations. Though the area of operations is confined to "European waters, including the Mediterranean," so great an area of the high seas is covered and the cordon of ships is so distant from the territory affected that neutral vessels must necessarily pass through the blockading force in order to reach important neutral ports which Great Britain as a belligerent has not the legal right to blockade and which, therefore, it is presumed she has no intention of claiming to blockade.

The Scandinavian and Danish ports, for example, are open to American trade. They are also free, so far as the actual enforcement of the Order in Council is concerned, to carry on trade with German Baltic ports, although it is an essential element of blockade that it bear with equal severity upon all neutrals.

This Government, therefore, infers that the commanders of his Majesty's ships of war, engaged in maintaining the so-called blockade, will be instructed to avoid an enforcement of the proposed measures of non-intercourse in such a way as to impose restrictions upon neutral trade more burdensome than those which have been regarded as inevitable, when the ports of a belligerent are actually blockaded by the ships of its enemy.

The possibilities of serious interruption of American trade under the Order in Council are so many, and the methods proposed are so unusual, and seem liable to constitute so great an impediment and embarrassment to neutral commerce, that the Government of the United States, if the Order in Council is strictly enforced, apprehends many interferences with its legitimate trade which will impose upon his Majesty's Government heavy responsibilities for acts of the British authorities clearly subversive of the rights of neutral nations on the high seas. It is, therefore, expected that the Majesty's Government, having considered these possibilities, will take the steps necessary to avoid them, and, in the event that they should unhappily occur, will be prepared to make full reparation for every act which, under the rules of international law, constitutes a violation of neutral rights.

As stated in its communication of Oct. 22, 1914, "this Government will insist that the rights and duties of the United States and its citizens in the present war be defined by the existing rules of international law and the treaties of the United States irrespective of the provisions of the Declaration of London, and that this Government reserves to itself the right to enter a protest or demand in each case, in which those rights and duties so defined are violated or their free exercise interfered with by the authorities of the British Government."

In conclusion you will reiterate to his Majesty's Government that this statement of the view of the Government of the United States is made in the most friendly spirit, and in accordance with the uniform candor which has characterized the relations of the two Governments in the past, and which has been in large measure the foundation of the peace and amity existing between the two nationals without interruption for a century.

BRYAN.

Germany's Conditions of Peace

The First Authoritative German Presentation of the Idea

By Dr. Bernhard Dernburg, Late German Colonial Secretary of State

That Germany would be willing to make peace on the basis of a free neutral sea, guaranteed by the powers, was indicated in a letter written by Dr. Bernhard Dernburg, ex-Colonial Secretary of Germany, and read at a pro-German mass meeting held in Portland, Me., on April 17, 1915. After an explanatory note Dr. Dernburg divided into numbered clauses his letter, as follows:

(1) Whatever peace is concluded should be of a permanent nature; no perfunctory patching up should be permitted. The horror of all the civilized nations of the Old World slaughtering one another, every one convinced of the perfect righteousness of their own cause—a recurrence, if it could not be avoided absolutely, should be made most remote, so as to take the weight from our minds that all this young blood of the best manhood of Europe might be spilled in vain.

(2) For this purpose it must be borne in mind that the world has changed considerably since the last big conflagration, and that all the countries striving for humanity and civilization are now one big family, with interests, spiritual as well as commercial, interlocking to a degree that no disturbance of any part of the civilized globe can exist without seriously affecting the rest. A disturbance in one quarter must make quite innocent bystanders involuntary victims, to the serious detriment of spiritual peace and commercial pursuits.

The great highway on which thoughts and things travel are the high seas. I can with full authority disclaim any ambition by my country as to world dominion. She is much too modest, on the one hand, and too experienced, on the other hand, not to know that such a state will never be tolerated by the rest. Events have shown that world dominion can only be practiced by dominion of the high seas. The aim of Germany is to have the seas, as well as the narrows, kept permanently open for the free use of all nations in times of war as well as in times of peace. The sea is nobody's property and must be free to everybody. The seas are the lungs from which humanity draws a fresh breath of enterprise, and they must not be stopped up.

I, personally, would go so far as to neutralize all the seas and narrows permanently by a common and effective agreement guaranteed by all the powers, so that any infringement on that score would meet with the most severe punishment that can be meted out to any transgressor.

(3) A free sea is useless except combined with the freedom of cable and mail communications with all countries, whether belligerent or not. I should like to see all the cables jointly owned by the interested nations and a world mail system over sea established by common consent. But, more than this, an open sea demands an open policy. This means that, while every nation must have the right, for commercial and fiscal purposes, to impose whatever duties it thinks fit, these duties must be equal for all exports and imports for whatever destination and from whatever source. It would be tantamount to world empire, in fact, if a country owning a large part of the globe could make discriminating duties between the motherland and dominions or colonies as against other nations.

This has been of late the British practice. German colonies have always been open to every comer, including the motherland, on equal terms. Such equality of treatment should be the established practice for all the future. The only alternative to an open sea and free intercourse policy would be a Chinese wall around each country. If there is no free intercourse every country must become self-sufficient. Germany has proved that it can be done. But this policy would mean very high customs barriers, discrimination, unbounded egotism, and a world bristling in arms. While the free sea policy stands for the true aims of international relations, namely, in exchange of goods, which must benefit either party, to be mutually satisfactory, it will engender friendly feeling among all the peoples, advance civilization, and thereby have a sure tendency toward disarmament.

(4) Germany has been taxed with disregarding treaty obligations, tearing up a scrap of paper—a solemn engagement of international character regarding Belgium. I have the less reason to enter into this matter since—if it was a breach of international law at all—it has been followed up by all other belligerents by destroying other parts of that code so essential to the welfare of the community of nations. Two German men-of-war have been destroyed in neutral waters. The protests that the Government of this country had to make against Great Britain's treatment of international sea law and the rights of the neutrals are too numerous to be recounted. Chinese neutrality has been violated in the grossest way.

In disregard of all conventions, China is now being subjected to demands incompatible with the rights of self-respecting nations. Egypt and Cyprus have been annexed by Great Britain, disregarding all treaties. Germany's diplomatic representatives have been driven from China, Morocco, and Egypt—all countries sovereign at the time. The Declaration of London, which had been set up by the Government of the United States as the governing document, had to be dropped as such. There is practically no part of international law that could stand the test. Justice toward neutrals compels that international law should be re-established in a codified form, with sufficient guarantees so as to save, as far as possible, all the neutrals from possible implication in a war in which they do not take part.

(5) Germany does not strive for territorial aggrandizement in Europe; she does not believe in conquering and subjugating unwilling nations—this on account of a spirit of justice and her knowledge of history. No such attempts have ever been permanently successful.

Belgium commands the main outlet of Western German trade, is the natural foreland of the empire, and has been conquered with untold sacrifice of blood and treasure. It offers to German trade the only outlet to an open sea and it has been politically established, maintained, and defended by England in order to keep these natural advantages from Germany.

The love for small peoples that England heralds now will never stand investigation, as shown by the destruction of the small Boer republics. So Belgium cannot be given up. However, these considerations could be disregarded if all the other German demands, especially a guaranteed free sea, were fully complied with and the natural commercial relationship of Belgium to Germany was considered in a just and workable form. In this case Germany will not fail when the times come to help in rebuilding the country; in fact, she is doing so now.

(6) Germany is a country smaller in size than California, but populated thirty-five times as thickly as that State. She loves and fosters family life, and sees her future in the raising of large families of healthy children under the home roof and under the national flag. German parents have no desire to expatriate every year a considerable number of their children. This implies that her industrial development, which would alone give occupation to the yearly increase of pretty nearly a million people, should go on unhampered.

The activity of her people should have an outlet in the development of such foreign parts as need or wish for development. Great Britain has shown very little foresight in constantly opposing such efforts, playing Morocco into the hands of France, a nation that remained stationary for forty-four years, with little more than half of the population of Germany, and with a system equally undermining religion and morality in keeping families small for the sake of worldly comforts.

England, furthermore, constantly obstructed the German endeavor to reclaim for the benefit of all of the world the granary in Mesopotamia. A permanent peace will mean that this German activity must get a wide scope without infringement upon the rights of others. Germany should be encouraged to continue her activities in Africa and Asia Minor, which can only result in permanent benefit to all the world. Americans have a saying "that it will never do good to sit on a safety valve."

There is nothing in the program of my country which would not be beneficial to the rest of the world, especially the United States. That this is so the events of the last months have conclusively shown, and a better appreciation of what Germany really stands for has recently taken place. So, if I plead the cause of my country, I am not pleading as a German alone, but as a citizen of a country who wishes to be a useful and true member of the universality of nations, contributing by humanitarian aims and by the enhancement of personal freedom to the happiness of even the lowliest members of the great world community.

I am proud to say that I cannot only give this assurance, but produce facts, and I beg to refer to the modern system of social reforms which Germany inaugurated and carries through at an expense which is every year larger by half than the expense of the military system.

The brunt of this war has not been borne by the men who fight, but by the women who suffer, and it will be one of the proudest and most coveted achievements that Germany will gain in rewarding in a dignified and permanently beneficial way the enormous sacrifices of womanhood, to alleviate to the extent of the possible the hardships and sorrows that this war has brought upon them.

The Allies' Conditions of Peace

By Sir Edward Grey

Sir Edward Grey, presiding at a lecture on the war by Mr. Buchan, delivered March 22, 1915, reviewed the origin and causes of the conflict. Germany, he said, refused every suggestion made to her for settling the dispute by means of a conference. On her must rest for all time the appalling responsibility for having plunged Europe into this war. One essential condition of peace must be the restoration to Belgium of her independence and reparation to her for the cruel wrong done to her. England claims for herself and her allies claim for themselves, and together will secure for Europe, the right of independent sovereignty for the different nations, the right to pursue a national existence in the light of general liberty.