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CURRENT HISTORY
A MONTHLY MAGAZINE
THE EUROPEAN WAR
JULY, 1915

CONTENTS

[THE LUSITANIA CASE]
[MR. BRYAN'S RESIGNATION]
[PRESIDENT WILSON'S REPLY TO BERLIN]
[THE LUSITANIA'S "GUNS"]
[Dr. Meyer-Gerhard's Mission]
[Germany's Press Opinion]
[Press Opinion of the Allies]
[American Comment on Mr. Bryan's Resignation]
[Mr. Bryan's Defense]
[Bryan, Idealist and Average Man]
[In the Name of Peace.]
[A World League to Enforce Peace]
[The League to Enforce Peace]
[German-American Dissent]
[Chant of Loyalty.]
[American Munition Supplies]
[A League for Preparedness]
[Przemysl and Lemberg]
[BELGIUM.]
[Battle of the Labyrinth]
[The Modern Plataea]
[A British Call For Recruits]
[The British Army in France]
[The Dardanelles Campaign]
[THE EUROPEAN WAR AS SEEN BY CARTOONISTS]
[Italy vs. Austria-Hungary]
[The Armed Strength of Italy]
[The Alpine Frontier]
["Italy's Violation of Faith"]
[Why Italy Went to War]
[Britain's Cabinet and Munitions]
[Lloyd George's Appeal to Labor]
[Balkan Neutrality—As Seen By the Balkans]
[Portsmouth Bells]
[The Wanderers of the Emden]
[Civilization at the Breaking Point]
["Human Beings and Germans"]
[Garibaldi's Promise.]
[The Uncivilizable Nation]
[Retreat in the Rain.]
[War a Game for Love and Honor]
[THE BELGIAN WAR MOTHERS]
[How England Prevented an Understanding With Germany]
[Germany Free!]
[Chronology of the War]
[To the Captain of the U——.]

THE LUSITANIA CASE
President Wilson’s Reply to Germany

Account of the Resignation of William J. Bryan as
American Secretary of State

True to the intimation in his note to President Wilson, Mr. Bryan has made public in full his reasons for resigning while American relations with Germany were strained. His statements are given herewith, together with comments in Europe and America on the causes and consequences of Mr. Bryan's act. The German reply to President Wilson's note of May 13 on the Lusitania case and the American rejoinder of June 9; the sending to Berlin of Dr. Anton Meyer-Gerhard, as arranged by Ambassador von Bernstorff in the White House on June 4, in order to explain more fully to the German Government the American policy and public feeling in this country; the Stahl perjury case, relating to the German charge that the Lusitania was armed; the question whether the American steamer Nebraskan was torpedoed on May 26 in the German submarine "war zone"; the controversy over exportations to the Allies of American munitions of war: the agitation for a stronger army and navy in the United States, and the meeting in Independence Hall, Philadelphia, on June 17, when 109 of the foremost men in the United States took steps toward forming a League of Peace among all the nations of the earth—these, as recorded below, form a new chapter in American history.

THE GERMAN MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE
AMERICAN AMBASSADOR AT BERLIN.

[TELEGRAM.]

No. 2,326.]

BERLIN, May 28, 1915.

The undersigned has the honor to make the following reply to the note of his Excellency Mr. James W. Gerard, Ambassador of the United States of America, dated the fifteenth instant, on the subject of the impairment of many American interests by the German submarine war.

The Imperial Government has subjected the statements of the Government of the United States to a careful examination and has the lively wish on its part also to contribute in a convincing and friendly manner to clear up any misunderstandings which may have entered into the relations of the two Governments through the events mentioned by the American Government.

With regard firstly to the cases of the American steamers Cushing and Gulflight, the American Embassy has already been informed that it is far from the German Government to have any intention of ordering attacks by submarines or flyers on neutral vessels in the zone which have not been guilty of any hostile act; on the contrary the most explicit instructions have been repeatedly given the German armed forces to avoid attacking such vessels. If neutral vessels have come to grief through the German submarine war during the past few months by mistake, it is a question of isolated and exceptional cases which are traceable to the misuse of flags by the British Government in connection with carelessness or suspicious actions on the part of the captains of the vessels. In all cases where a neutral vessel through no fault of its own has come to grief through the German submarines or flyers according to the facts as ascertained by the German Government, this Government has expressed its regret at the unfortunate occurrence and promised indemnification where the facts justified it. The German Government will treat the cases of the American steamers Cushing and Gulflight according to the same principles. An investigation of these cases is in progress. Its results will be communicated to the Embassy shortly.[1] The investigation might, if thought desirable, be supplemented by an International Commission of Inquiry, pursuant to Title Three of The Hague Convention of October 18, 1907, for the pacific settlement of international disputes.

In the case of the sinking of the English steamer Falaba, the commander of the German submarine had the intention of allowing passengers and crew ample opportunity to save themselves.

It was not until the captain disregarded the order to lay to and took to flight, sending up rocket signals for help, that the German commander ordered the crew and passengers by signals and megaphone to leave the ship within ten minutes. As a matter of fact he allowed them twenty-three minutes and did not fire the torpedo until suspicious steamers were hurrying to the aid of the Falaba.

With regard to the loss of life when the British passenger steamer Lusitania was sunk, the German Government has already expressed its deep regret to the neutral Governments concerned that nationals of those countries lost their lives on that occasion. The Imperial Government must state for the rest the impression that certain important facts most directly connected with the sinking of the Lusitania may have escaped the attention of the Government of the United States. It therefore considers it necessary in the interest of the clear and full understanding aimed at by either Government primarily to convince itself that the reports of the facts which are before the two Governments are complete and in agreement.

The Government of the United States proceeds on the assumption that the Lusitania is to be considered as an ordinary unarmed merchant vessel. The Imperial Government begs in this connection to point out that the Lusitania was one of the largest and fastest English commerce steamers, constructed with Government funds as auxiliary cruisers, and is expressly included in the navy list published by British Admiralty. It is moreover known to the Imperial Government from reliable information furnished by its officials and neutral passengers that for some time practically all the more valuable English merchant vessels have been provided with guns, ammunition and other weapons, and reinforced with a crew specially practiced in manning guns. According to reports at hand here, the Lusitania when she left New York undoubtedly had guns on board which were mounted under decks and masked.

The Imperial Government furthermore has the honor to direct the particular attention of the American Government to the fact that the British Admiralty by a secret instruction of February of this year advised the British merchant marine not only to seek protection behind neutral flags and markings, but even when so disguised to attack German submarines by ramming them. High rewards have been offered by the British Government as a special incentive for the destruction of the submarines by merchant vessels, and such rewards have already been paid out. In view of these facts, which are satisfactorily known to it, the Imperial Government is unable to consider English merchant vessels any longer as "undefended territory" in the zone of maritime war designated by the Admiralty Staff of the Imperial German Navy, the German commanders are consequently no longer in a position to observe the rules of capture otherwise usual and with which they invariably complied before this. Lastly, the Imperial Government must specially point out that on her last trip the Lusitania, as on earlier occasions, had Canadian troops and munitions on board, including no less than 5,400 cases of ammunition destined for the destruction of brave German soldiers who are fulfilling with self-sacrifice and devotion their duty in the service of the Fatherland. The German Government believes that it acts in just self-defense when it seeks to protect the lives of its soldiers by destroying ammunition destined for the enemy with the means of war at its command. The English steamship company must have been aware of the dangers to which passengers on board the Lusitania were exposed under the circumstances. In taking them on board in spite of this the company quite deliberately tried to use the lives of American citizens as protection for the ammunition carried, and violated the clear provisions of American laws which expressly prohibit, and provide punishment for, the carrying of passengers on ships which have explosives on board. The company thereby wantonly caused the death of so many passengers. According to the express report of the submarine commander concerned, which is further confirmed by all other reports, there can be no doubt that the rapid sinking of the Lusitania was primarily due to the explosion of the cargo of ammunition caused by the torpedo. Otherwise, in all human probability, the passengers of the Lusitania would have been saved.

The Imperial Government holds the facts recited above to be of sufficient importance to recommend them to a careful examination by the American Government. The Imperial Government begs to reserve a final statement of its position with regard to the demands made in connection with the sinking of the Lusitania until a reply is received from the American Government, and believes that it should recall here that it took note with satisfaction of the proposals of good offices submitted by the American Government in Berlin and London with a view to paving the way for a modus vivendi for the conduct of maritime war between Germany and Great Britain. The Imperial Government furnished at that time ample evidence of its good will by its willingness to consider these proposals. The realization of these proposals failed, as is known, on account of their rejection by the Government of Great Britain.

The undersigned requests his Excellency the Ambassador to bring the above to the knowledge of the American Government and avails himself of the opportunity to renew, &c.

VON JAGOW.

MR. BRYAN’S RESIGNATION

WASHINGTON, June 8, 1915.

My Dear Mr. President:

It is with sincere regret that I have reached the conclusion that I should return to you the commission of Secretary of State, with which you honored me at the beginning of your Administration.

Obedient to your sense of duty and actuated by the highest motives, you have prepared for transmission to the German Government a note in which I cannot join without violating what I deem to be an obligation to my country, and the issue involved is of such moment that to remain a member of the Cabinet would be as unfair to you as it would be to the cause which is nearest my heart; namely, the prevention of war.

I, therefore, respectfully tender my resignation, to take effect when the note is sent, unless you prefer an earlier hour.

Alike desirous of reaching a peaceful solution of the problems, arising out of the use of submarines against merchantmen, we find ourselves differing irreconcilably as to the methods which should be employed.

It falls to your lot to speak officially for the nation; I consider it to be none the less my duty to endeavor as a private citizen to promote the end which you have in view by means which you do not feel at liberty to use.[2]

In severing the intimate and pleasant relations which have existed between us during the past two years, permit me to acknowledge the profound satisfaction which it has given me to be associated with you in the important work which has come before the State Department, and to thank you for the courtesies extended.

With the heartiest good wishes for your personal welfare and for the success of your Administration, I am, my dear Mr. President, very truly yours,

W.J. BRYAN.

THE HON. WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN
Formerly Secretary of State of the United States
(Photo from Bain News Agency)

THE PRESIDENT TO SECRETARY BRYAN.

Washington, June 8, 1915.

My Dear Mr. Bryan:

I accept your resignation only because you insist upon its acceptance; and I accept it with much more than deep regret, with a feeling of personal sorrow.

Our two years of close association have been very delightful to me. Our judgments have accorded in practically every matter of official duty and of public policy until now; your support of the work and purposes of the Administration has been generous and loyal beyond praise; your devotion to the duties of your great office and your eagerness to take advantage of every great opportunity for service it offered have been an example to the rest of us; you have earned our affectionate admiration and friendship. Even now we are not separated in the object we seek, but only in the method by which we seek it.

It is for these reasons my feeling about your retirement from the Secretaryship of State goes so much deeper than regret. I sincerely deplore it.

Our objects are the same and we ought to pursue them together. I yield to your desire only because I must and wish to bid you Godspeed in the parting. We shall continue to work for the same causes even when we do not work in the same way.

With affectionate regard,

Sincerely yours,

WOODROW WILSON.

To Hon. William Jennings Bryan,
Secretary of State.

ROBERT LANSING, SECRETARY OF STATE AD INTERIM.

The White House, Washington, June 9, 1915.

The Hon. William Jennings Bryan having resigned the office of Secretary of State, I, Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States of America, do hereby, in conformity with the provisions of Sections 177 and 179 of the Revised Statutes, and of the act of Congress approved February 9, 1891, authorize and direct the Hon. Robert Lansing, Counselor for the Department of State, to perform the duties of the office of Secretary of State for a period not to exceed thirty days, until a Secretary shall have been appointed and have qualified.

WOODROW WILSON.

THE HON. ROBERT J. LANSING
Who Was Called by the President to Take Charge of the State Department
after Mr. Bryan's Resignation
(Photo from Paul Thompson)

PRESIDENT WILSON’S
REPLY TO BERLIN

No. 1803.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, June 9, 1915.

American Ambassador, Berlin:

You are instructed to deliver textually the following note to the Minister of Foreign Affairs:

In compliance with your Excellency's request I did not fail to transmit to my Government immediately upon their receipt your note of May 28 in reply to my note of May 15, and your supplementary note of June 1, setting forth the conclusions so far as reached by the Imperial German Government concerning the attacks on the American steamers Cushing and Gulflight. I am now instructed by my Government to communicate the following in reply:

The Government of the United States notes with gratification the full recognition by the Imperial German Government, in discussing the cases of the Cushing and the Gulflight, of the principle of the freedom of all parts of the open sea to neutral ships and the frank willingness of the Imperial German Government to acknowledge and meet its liability where the fact of attack upon neutral ships "which have not been guilty of any hostile act" by German aircraft or vessels of war is satisfactorily established; and the Government of the United States will in due course lay before the Imperial German Government, as it requests, full information concerning the attack on the steamer Cushing.

With regard to the sinking of the steamer Falaba, by which an American citizen lost his life, the Government of the United States is surprised to find the Imperial German Government contending that an effort on the part of a merchantman to escape capture and secure assistance alters the obligation of the officer seeking to make the capture in respect of the safety of the lives of those on board the merchantman, although the vessel had ceased her attempt to escape when torpedoed. These are not new circumstances. They have been in the minds of statesmen and of international jurists throughout the development of naval warfare, and the Government of the United States does not understand that they have ever been held to alter the principles of humanity upon which it has insisted. Nothing but actual forcible resistance or continued efforts to escape by flight when ordered to stop for the purpose of visit on the part of the merchantman has ever been held to forfeit the lives of her passengers or crew. The Government of the United States, however, does not understand that the Imperial German Government is seeking in this case to relieve itself of liability, but only intends to set forth the circumstances which led the commander of the submarine to allow himself to be hurried into the course which he took.

Your Excellency's note, in discussing the loss of American lives resulting from the sinking of the steamship Lusitania, adverts at some length to certain information which the Imperial German Government has received with regard to the character and outfit of that vessel, and your Excellency expresses the fear that this information may not have been brought to the attention of the Government of the United States. It is stated in the note that the Lusitania was undoubtedly equipped with masked guns, supplied with trained gunners and special ammunition, transporting troops from Canada, carrying a cargo not permitted under the laws of the United States to a vessel also carrying passengers, and serving, in virtual effect, as an auxiliary to the naval forces of Great Britain. Fortunately these are matters concerning which the Government of the United States is in a position to give the Imperial German Government official information. Of the facts alleged in your Excellency's note, if true, the Government of the United States would have been bound to take official cognizance in performing its recognized duty as a neutral power and in enforcing its national laws. It was its duty to see to it that the Lusitania was not armed for offensive action, that she was not serving as a transport, that she did not carry a cargo prohibited by the statutes of the United States, and that, if in fact she was a naval vessel of Great Britain, she should not receive clearance as a merchantman; and it performed that duty and enforced its statutes with scrupulous vigilance through its regularly constituted officials. It is able, therefore, to assure the Imperial German Government that it has been misinformed. If the Imperial German Government should deem itself to be in possession of convincing evidence that the officials of the Government of the United States did not perform these duties with thoroughness the Government of the United States sincerely hopes that it will submit that evidence for consideration.

Whatever may be the contentions of the Imperial German Government regarding the carriage of contraband of war on board the Lusitania or regarding the explosion of that material by the torpedo, it need only be said that in the view of this Government these contentions are irrelevant to the question of the legality of the methods used by the German naval authorities in sinking the vessel.

But the sinking of passenger ships involves principles of humanity which throw into the background any special circumstances of detail that may be thought to affect the cases, principles which lift it, as the Imperial German Government will no doubt be quick to recognize and acknowledge, out of the class of ordinary subjects of diplomatic discussion or of international controversy. Whatever be the other facts regarding the Lusitania, the principal fact is that a great steamer, primarily and chiefly a conveyance for passengers, and carrying more than a thousand souls who had no part or lot in the conduct of the war, was torpedoed and sunk without so much as a challenge or a warning, and that men, women, and children were sent to their death in circumstances unparalleled in modern warfare. The fact that more than one hundred American citizens were among those who perished made it the duty of the Government of the United States to speak of these things and once more, with solemn emphasis, to call the attention of the Imperial German Government to the grave responsibility which the Government of the United States conceives that it has incurred in this tragic occurrence, and to the indisputable principle upon which that responsibility rests. The Government of the United States is contending for something much greater than mere rights of property or privileges of commerce. It is contending for nothing less high and sacred than the rights of humanity, which every Government honors itself in respecting and which no Government is justified in resigning on behalf of those under its care and authority. Only her actual resistance to capture or refusal to stop when ordered to do so for the purpose of visit could have afforded the commander of the submarine any justification for so much as putting the lives of those on board the ship in jeopardy. This principle the Government of the United States understands the explicit instructions issued on August 3, 1914,[3] by the Imperial German Admiralty to its commanders at sea to have recognized and embodied, as do the naval codes of all other nations, and upon it every traveler and seaman had a right to depend. It is upon this principle of humanity as well as upon the law founded upon this principle that the United States must stand.

The Government of the United States is happy to observe that your Excellency's note closes with the intimation that the Imperial German Government is willing, now as before, to accept the good offices of the United States in an attempt to come to an understanding with the Government of Great Britain by which the character and conditions of the war upon the sea may be changed. The Government of the United States would consider it a privilege thus to serve its friends and the world. It stands ready at any time to convey to either Government any intimation or suggestion the other may be willing to have it convey and cordially invites the Imperial German Government to make use of its services in this way at its convenience. The whole world is concerned in anything that may bring about even a partial accommodation of interests or in any way mitigate the terrors of the present distressing conflict.

In the meantime, whatever arrangement may happily be made between the parties to the war, and whatever may in the opinion of the Imperial German Government have been the provocation or the circumstantial justification for the past acts of its commanders at sea, the Government of the United States confidently looks to see the justice and humanity of the Government of Germany vindicated in all cases where Americans have been wronged or their rights as neutrals invaded.

The Government of the United States therefore very earnestly and very solemnly renews the representations of its note transmitted to the Imperial German Government on the 15th of May, and relies in these representations upon the principles of humanity, the universally recognized understandings of international law, and the ancient friendship of the German Nation.

The Government of the United States cannot admit that the proclamation of a war zone from which neutral ships have been warned to keep away may be made to operate as in any degree an abbreviation of the rights either of American shipmasters or of American citizens bound on lawful errands as passengers on merchant ships of belligerent nationality. It does not understand the Imperial German Government to question those rights. It understands it, also, to accept as established beyond question the principle that the lives of non combatants cannot lawfully or rightfully be put in jeopardy by the capture or destruction of an unresisting merchantman, and to recognize the obligation to take sufficient precaution to ascertain whether a suspected merchantman is in fact of belligerent nationality or is in fact carrying contraband of war under a neutral flag. The Government of the United States therefore deems it reasonable to expect that the Imperial German Government will adopt the measures necessary to put these principles into practice in respect of the safeguarding of American lives and American ships, and asks for assurances that this will be done.

ROBERT LANSING,
Secretary of State ad Interim.

THE LUSITANIA’S “GUNS”

In a Washington dispatch of June 2, 1915, to The New York Times, the following report appeared:

In his conversation with President Wilson today the German Ambassador said that he had obtained evidence through means of affidavits that the Lusitania was an armed vessel, as asserted by the German Government. The affidavits to which Count von Bernstorff referred have been placed in possession of the State Department, which has turned them over to the Department of Justice for an investigation as to the statements sworn to and the character of the individuals making them.

HIS EXCELLENCY COUNT JOHANN VON BERNSTORFF
German Ambassador to the United States

One of the affidavits is made by Gustav Stahl of 20 Leroy Street, New York City. He says:

On the day prior to the sailing of the Lusitania, I was asked by my friend, A. Lietch, who was employed as first cabin steward, to help him to bring his trunk aboard. In the course of the evening we went on board, without being hindered by the quartermaster on guard. After having remained some time in the "gloria," (steward's quarters,) we went to the stern main deck. About fifteen to eighteen feet from the entrance to the "gloria," on port and starboard, respectively, I saw two guns of twelve to fifteen centimeters. They were covered with leather, but the barrel was distinctly to be seen. To satisfy my curiosity I unfastened the buckles to ascertain the calibre of the guns. I could also ascertain that the guns were mounted on deck on wooden blocks. The guns were placed about three feet from the respective ship sides and the wall could be removed at that particular place.

On the foredeck there were also two guns of the same calibre and covered in the same manner. They were placed at about fifteen to twenty feet from the entrance of the crew's quarters, and four feet from the ship side, where the wall could also be removed.

Josephine Weir, who describes herself as a New York boarding house keeper, provided another affidavit. She swore that Lietch, who is named in Stahl's statement, told her he was to sail on the Lusitania as a steward, and when she spoke of the danger from German submarines, he said:

"Oh, I am not afraid. We have four big brightly polished copper guns."

A man named Grieve has an affidavit that he heard Lietch make this statement to Mrs. Weir.

In an affidavit furnished by one Bruckner it is stated that he saw a cannon on the Lusitania. He was standing on the dock in New York at the time, he avers.

The affidavits were supplied to the State Department by the German Embassy in order to support the allegation, contained in the German response to President Wilson's note of May 13, that the Lusitania was an armed vessel.

By The Associated Press.

WASHINGTON, June 2.—The four affidavits as presented to the State Department by the German Embassy alleging that guns were carried by the Lusitania are believed to constitute the evidence to which the German Government referred in its last note. Should it develop that the Foreign Office had been misinformed, German diplomatists said, an acknowledgment of the mistake would not be withheld.

These affidavits were not made public by either the embassy or the State Department, but the character of the individuals who made them and their testimony is being made the subject of a quiet investigation. Those officials who had seen the statements, however, were confident that they could not be accepted as disproving the testimony given by Inspectors whose duty it was to search for guns.

THE ARREST OF STAHL.

The following report appeared in The New York Times June 11, 1915:

Gustav Stahl, the former German soldier who made an affidavit that he saw four guns mounted on the Lusitania on the night before it sailed from this port on its last voyage and who disappeared immediately after the affidavit was made public, was produced by Secret Service men before the Federal Grand Jury yesterday afternoon at a proceeding to determine whether Paul Koenig, alias Stemler, who is the head of the detective bureau of the Hamburg-American Line, and others unnamed, had entered into a conspiracy to defraud the United States Government. The fraud is not stated specifically, and the charge is a technical one that may cover a variety of acts.

Stahl, who speaks little English, affirmed through an interpreter to the Grand Jury that he had seen the guns on the Lusitania. He was questioned for two hours and a half and told his story with great detail.

As he was leaving the Grand Jury room he was arrested by United States Marshal Thomas B. McCarthy on a complaint made on information and belief by Assistant District Attorney Raymond H. Sarfaty that Stahl had committed perjury in his testimony before the Federal Grand Jury. Stahl was held in bail of $10,000 by United States Commissioner Houghton and locked up in the Tombs.

Stahl was the only witness heard by the Grand Jury in the proceedings against Koenig. It was learned that Stahl had been in conference with Koenig before he made the affidavit, and that his affidavit had passed through Koenig's hands before it went to Ambassador Bernstorff, who submitted it to Secretary of State Bryan.

The proceedings against Koenig were initiated to establish the charge that Koenig used improper influence to induce Stahl to make the affidavit.

While Stahl was waiting in the Marshal's chamber in the Federal Building, after his arrest, for the arrival of Edward Sandford, a lawyer, of 27 William Street, who had been assigned to act as his counsel, he was asked, through an interpreter:

"Would you be willing to spend twenty years in jail for your Fatherland?"

"Make it a hundred!" he replied, in German, and then broke into a hearty laugh.

Stahl is about 27 years old and slightly under middle size. He has a round, somewhat rosy countenance, dark hair getting very thin in front, and parted in the middle, dark-brown eyes and a small, closely-cropped dark mustache. He was calm and smiling, ready with his answers, and very insistent and emphatic in repeating that he had seen the guns on the Lusitania.

He was neatly dressed in a dark mixed suit, with a new straw hat, a green tie on which was a stickpin with a dog's head in porcelain, brightly polished tan shoes, and lavender socks with scarlet-embroidered flowers.

Following is the complaint on which he was held:

Raymond H. Sarfaty, being duly sworn, deposes and says that he is an Assistant United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York.

That on the 10th day of June, 1915, there was then and there pending before the Grand Jury of the United States in and for the Southern District of New York, a certain proceeding against one Paul Koenig, alias Stemler, and others, upon a charge of having conspired to defraud the United States, in violation of Section 37, U.S.C.C.; that on the said 10th day of June, 1915, the foreman of said Grand Jury, Frederick M. Delano, an officer duly empowered and qualified to administer oaths in the proceedings before said Grand Jury, duly administered an oath to the said Gustav Stahl, that he would testify to the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, with respect to the aforesaid matter then being presented before the said Grand Jury; that the said Gustav Stahl, at the time and place aforesaid, and within the district aforesaid, and within the jurisdiction of this court, after said oath was administered, knowingly and fraudulently committed perjury, and that he testified in part, in substance, and effect as follows:

That on the 30th day of April, 1915, the said Gustav Stahl went aboard the steamship Lusitania at the City of New York, in the Southern District of New York, with one Neal J. Leach; that while on said steamship he saw four guns on one of the decks of said steamship, two forward and two aft; that the said guns were mounted on wooden blocks; that the said guns were covered with leather.

That affiant is informed and believes, and therefore avers, that, whereas, in truth and in fact, the said Gustav Stahl did not, on the 30th day of April, 1915, go aboard the steamship Lusitania at the City of New York, in the Southern District of New York, with one Neal J. Leach, nor did he, the said Gustav Stahl, go aboard the steamship Lusitania on said last mentioned date; and the said Gustav Stahl did not see four guns on the deck of the said steamship, two forward and two aft, nor did he, the said Gustav Stahl, see four guns on the deck of said steamship mounted on wooden blocks; nor did he, the said Gustav Stahl, see four guns on the deck of said steamship covered with leather.

That the said matters testified to before the said Grand Jury by the said Gustav Stahl, as aforesaid, were material matters in the investigation aforesaid; against the peace of the United States and their dignity, and contrary to the form of the statute of the United States in such case made and provided.

That to disclose the source of affiant's information at this time might defeat the ends of justice.

Wherefore, affiant prays that said Gustav Stahl may be arrested and imprisoned, or bailed, as the case may be.

This complaint was read to Stahl when he was taken before Commissioner Houghton, being interpreted for him, sentence by sentence. When the name of Neal J. Leach was read as the alleged steward who had taken him aboard the Lusitania, Stahl exclaimed: "Not Neal." In his affidavit he had described the steward as "A. Leach." A steward named Neal J. Leach went down when the Lusitania was torpedoed.

When that part of the complaint was read which said that Stahl had not seen guns on the Lusitania, he exclaimed in German:

"Yes, I did see them."

After the complaint had been read, Commissioner Houghton asked about bail. Assistant District Attorney Roger B. Wood, who conducted the proceedings before the Grand Jury, said:

"Ten thousand dollars, not a cent less."

Commissioner Houghton fixed bail at that figure. He then asked Stahl if he had anything to say, and the prisoner replied:

"Before I say anything I would like to see several gentlemen."

Commissioner Houghton then asked if he had a lawyer. Stahl replied that he had not, and that he had no means to employ one.

"Shall I assign one for you?" asked the Commissioner.

"No," replied Stahl; "I should like to have Mr. Sandford, who acted for me yesterday and the day before."

He referred to Edward Sandford of 27 William Street, who was counsel for Carl Buenz, a Director of the Hamburg-American Line, and for other officials of that line, who were indicted by the Federal Grand Jury on March 1 on the charge of conspiring against the United States by making out false clearance papers and false manifests for the collection of customs in connection with the steamships Fram, Somerstadt, Lorenzo, and Berwind, which were loaded with coal and provisions intended for the German cruiser Karlsruhe and the auxiliary cruiser Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse.

Commissioner Houghton assigned Mr. Sandford as counsel for Stahl. The Commissioner then asked Stahl if he had any friends in the room, to which Stahl with a smile, replied in the negative.

"I would like to have the date of June 24 set for the hearing," said Assistant District Attorney Wood. "The Grand Jury which is now holding this investigation will probably continue its hearings until then."

Commissioner Houghton fixed the date accordingly.

After the hearing adjourned Stahl was asked where he had been since his disappearance. He replied in German:

"I told the Grand Jury all I have to say."

He was asked where he would live if he got bail.

"I don't want anybody to know," he said. "I have had so many visitors in the past few days that I don't want any more, if I can help it."

He was asked if he was a German reservist, and he replied that that was his business. Other questions got the same response. He denied that he knew Paul Koenig, the Hamburg-American detective, but he admitted he knew Stemler, which is a name sometimes used by the detective. When he was informed that he was to spend the night in the Tombs he said:

"Will Stemler be with me?"

He seemed disappointed when he was told that he would have to go there alone. Stahl was asked if Josephine Weir, who had signed a corroborative affidavit, knew of his whereabouts during his hiding. He refused to answer this question, but of Josephine Weir he said in English:

"Oh, that's a nice girl."

Stahl sat smoking a cigar and laughing in the best of temper until a flashlight powder was exploded unexpectedly. He put both hands to his face and hid in a corner made by a wall and a filing cabinet, but when he realized that his picture had been taken he ran to a man whom he thought to be a Federal employe, and protested in German. A little later Mr. Sandford arrived with another interpreter and went into consultation with his client.

Stahl went to Albany on June 4, the day after his affidavit was made public. While a search was being conducted in this city and surrounding cities by Federal agents and newspapers, Stahl was in hiding in Albany, his expenses there being paid for him by a confidential adviser sent with him.

Instead of relaxing after a few days, the search for Stahl grew more rigorous. When it was seen that there was little chance of keeping Stahl in permanent seclusion and that the extraordinary character of the disappearance of the German Ambassador's chief witness against the Lusitania was arousing intense nationwide interest, Paul Koenig, the Secret Service man of the Hamburg-American Line, decided that it would be better if he were found at once.

On Monday of this week Koenig and Mr. Sandford called on Inspector Lamb of the Customs Service and told him that Stahl was at Albany and would be available if the Federal officials wanted him. Superintendent William M. Offley, of the special agents of the Department of Justice, had at that time some strong clues as to Stahl's whereabouts.

On Tuesday Stahl and his personal conductor arrived in this city from Albany and were met by Superintendent Offley and Special Agents Adams and Pigniullo. Stahl was taken to the office of Superintendent Offley in the presence of Mr. Sandford, who was asked to take part in the proceedings in the interests of fair play, although he was not then Stahl's lawyer.

At this examination and at a second one held on Wednesday, Stahl repeated his charge that he had seen guns on the Lusitania. He showed great familiarity with the details of the construction of the Lusitania.

At the end of the examination it was urged by representatives of the Hamburg-American Line that Stahl should stay under the watch of the Federal agents in order that, if he told a different story later, there could be no charge that outsiders had tampered with him. Stahl remained with the Government detectives on Tuesday, Wednesday and yesterday, although he was not under arrest. When he appeared yesterday before the Grand Jury it was under a subpoena.

Assistant District Attorney Wood said yesterday that the charge of perjury had been lodged against Stahl on the strength of the statement by the Collector of the Port, Dudley Field Malone, that there were no guns aboard the Lusitania.

"We can bring fifty witnesses," he said, "to prove that the Lusitania had no guns on board and that Stahl is guilty of perjury."

Mr. Wood was asked if there was any evidence that Stahl had ever been in the employ of the German Consul-General at this port or of Captain Boy-Ed, Naval Attaché of the German Embassy, who is said to be the head of the German Secret Service here. Mr. Wood refused to discuss either question. When he was asked if the investigation promised to involve any man of importance, he said:

"I don't know. We are holding the Grand Jury investigation to find out all that we can about the case."

After consulting with Stahl, Mr. Sandford said that he would not represent the prisoner but would seek to get a good lawyer for him at once. When asked if he represented Koenig, he refused to say. He was asked if he knew anything about the charge against Koenig. He said:

"No. The charge of attempting to defraud the Government is a charge on which the Government can get anybody at any time for anything."

CAPT. TURNER’S DENIAL.

A London cable dispatch of June 15 to The New York Times said:

At the opening of the Court of Inquiry today into the torpedoing of the steamship Lusitania on May 7, two outstanding points were vividly impressed. One was that the Cunarder was unarmed. The other was that the ship was proceeding at reduced speed, eighteen knots an hour, only nineteen of her twenty-five boilers being used, the result of her effort to save in coal and labor.

Sir Edward Carson, the Attorney General, in outlining the evidence in the hands of the Crown, adverted impressively to President Wilson's note to Germany on the sinking of the Lusitania in which the President informed the German Government that it was wrong in assuming that the Lusitania was equipped with masked guns and manned by trained gunners. "We have ample evidence to disprove the German lie that the Lusitania was armed," said the Attorney General. "Aside from the word of witnesses we have that of President Wilson in his recent note to Germany, based upon investigation made by officials under him. The sinking of the Lusitania was murder."

Sir Edward lifted a newspaper clipping of the President's note from the table and slowly read the passage disposing of the German allegation that the Lusitania was an armed auxiliary.

Captain W.T. Turner, who seemed slightly grayer than before the Lusitania was torpedoed, in that way alone showing the strain under which he has been since his ship was sunk under him, gave evidence that there was not one gun on the Lusitania's deck, and declared that the German assertion that the steamer was armed was a "sheer lie."

CAPTAIN WILLIAM T. TURNER, R.N.R.
Commander of the R.M.S. Lusitania
(Photo from Underwood & Underwood)

STAHL INDICTED FOR PERJURY.

In The New York Times of June 19 appeared the following report of the Grand Jury's indictment of Stahl on a charge of perjury and the announcement that the Federal investigation will be continued:

Gustav Stahl, the alleged German reservist, who made an affidavit that he had seen guns on board the Lusitania on the day before she sailed on her last voyage, was indicted on a charge of perjury by the Federal Grand Jury yesterday. The perjury charge is based on his testimony before the Grand Jury, during which examination he repeated that he had seen the guns on the Lusitania as set forth in his affidavit filed by the German Embassy in Washington and now in the hands of the State Department.

The name of Paul Koenig, who, it is said, was known to Stahl as Stemler, and who is the chief of the secret service of the Hamburg-American Line, is mentioned by name in the indictment. The indictment sets forth that on June 10 there was pending before the Grand Jury an investigation concerning Koenig and others and that Stahl was among the witnesses called in the course of that investigation. It then goes on to say that Stahl testified in substance and to the effect that on April 30 he went aboard the Lusitania, then with one Leach, and that while on the vessel he saw four guns on one of the decks of the steamship, two forward and two aft, and all mounted on wooden blocks and covered with leather. The indictment further charges that at the time of so swearing Stahl did not believe it to be true that he had been on board the Lusitania and had seen the four guns.

The indictment, in conclusion, charges that there were no guns upon the decks of the Lusitania on April 30. "Therefore," the Grand Jury charges, "that Stahl, after taking an oath before a competent officer to truly depose and testify, did willfully, knowingly and feloniously and contrary to his said oath, depose and state material matters which were not true and which he did not then believe to be true, and thereby did commit willful and corrupt perjury against the peace of the United States and their dignity and contrary to the form of the statute of the United States in such cases made and provided."

Stahl will be arraigned before Judge Russell in the criminal branch of the United States District Court on Monday. He is now in the Tombs in default of $10,000 bail. Should he be convicted of perjury he may be sentenced to prison for five years or fined $10,000, or both.

The indictment of Stahl does not mean that the Government's investigation of the Lusitania affidavits, and the way in which they were procured, is at an end. On the other hand it is proceeding vigorously. Three witnesses, all Government officials, were before the Grand Jury yesterday in connection with the case. Heinz Hardenberg, who was found in Cincinnati a week ago today and brought here to be examined by the Grand Jury, has not yet appeared before that body, although the Government agents insist they can produce him when his testimony is desired.

THE NEBRASKAN CASE.

An Associated Press dispatch dated at London on May 26, 1915, reported:

The American steamer Nebraskan, Captain Greene, from Liverpool May 24 for Delaware Breakwater, was torpedoed yesterday evening by a submarine at a point forty miles west-southwest of Fastnet, off the south coast of Ireland. [Captain Greene's report, given below, says the Nebraskan was "struck by either mine or torpedo.">[

The sea was calm at the time. The crew at once took to the boats and stood by the steamer. It was soon ascertained that the Nebraskan was not seriously damaged, but she had been struck forward, and her foreholds were full of water.

The crew returned on board and got the vessel under way. No lives were lost among the crew. The Nebraskan did not carry any passengers.

This information was received at the British Admiralty in London, and it was at once communicated to the American Embassy.

Immediately she was struck the Nebraskan began calling for help by wireless. Brow Head received the wireless communication at 9 P.M. yesterday from Crookhaven.

A message to Lloyd's from Kinsale, Ireland, says that the Nebraskan passed that point at 11 o'clock this morning. She was down at the bows, but was proceeding under her own steam, and flying the signal: "I am not under control."

The vessel passed Queenstown in the afternoon on the way to Liverpool. She was proceeding at eight knots.

A message to The Star from Liverpool says that the name and nationality of the Nebraskan were painted in large letters on her sides. She was in water ballast.

A message to Lloyd's says that an armed trawler went to the assistance of the Nebraskan and stood by her all night.

The report that the Nebraskan had been torpedoed caused surprise to American officials here. Apparently the affair occurred before 9 o'clock last night.

Last evening was clear, and the period between 8 and 9 o'clock is the twilight hour in the British islands at this season.

The German submarine campaign is continuing actively. Dispatches from Norway state that the people of that country have been aroused by the sinking last week of the Norwegian steamer Minerva and the attempt to torpedo the Iris, which went to her assistance.

The steamer Cromer, loaded with passengers, had a narrow escape from being torpedoed while bound for Rotterdam yesterday. A submarine fired a torpedo without warning. It missed the ship by only fifteen yards. According to the Captain's story, told to Rotterdam correspondents, the periscope was seen 500 yards distant, and then the wash of the torpedo, which was moving so rapidly that nothing could be done to avoid it. The attack occurred at a point four miles north of North Hinder Lightship.

The first news of the Nebraskan having been disabled off the southwest coast of Ireland was received on May 26, at the office of the American-Hawaiian Line in a message from the Captain, which read:

Struck by either mine or torpedo, forty-eight miles west of Fastnet. Am steaming under convoy to Liverpool. Water in lower hold. No one injured.

GREENE.

[[Enlarge]]

Map indicating sites of attacks on American ships or American lives in the German submarine war zone. The damage to the Nebraskan was sustained on May 25, last.

Three dispatches concerning the Nebraskan incident were received at the State Department at Washington on May 26—one from Walter H. Page, the American Ambassador in London, and two from Robert P. Skinner, the United States Consul General in London. The dispatch from the Ambassador said:

Urgent. Report at midnight last night to British Admiralty from Lands End states that American steamer Nebraskan torpedoed forty-five miles south by west of Southcliffe, crew taking to boats. British trawler standing by now reports Nebraskan still afloat and making for Liverpool with four holds full of water. No lives reported lost.

The first dispatch from Consul General Skinner was as follows:

Admiralty reports American steamer Nebraskan, Liverpool for Delaware Breakwater, torpedoed forty miles south by west of Fastnet. Crew in boats. Standing by. Weather fine.

The following cablegram came from the Consul General:

Nebraskan proceeding to Liverpool under own steam about 8½ knots, crew having returned on board. Apparently no lives lost. Extent of damage unknown.

In an Associated Press dispatch from Crookhaven, Ireland, on May 26, this report appeared:

It was learned today that a submarine was seen last night off the southern coast of Ireland. She was sighted soon after 9 P.M., near Barley Cove, which is about ten miles from Fastnet. The mishap to the steamer Nebraskan is reported to have occurred shortly before 9 o'clock, about forty miles from Fastnet.

A steamer was seen outside Crookhaven, which lies just north of Barley Cove, at about 9 o'clock last night. As she approached in the direction of Fastnet Lighthouse two loud reports of a gun were heard. A boat in Crookhaven Harbor went in the direction of the steamer which put about and was lost to sight.

Several residents of Crookhaven turned out and went along the shore, keeping a sharp lookout. They sighted a submarine off Cove, near the mouth of a little creek. One of the men on shore fired two shots with a rifle at the man in the conning tower of the submarine. The submarine dived immediately, but soon rose again further out. Three more shots were fired at her and she again disappeared.

The detailed report on the Nebraskan incident by Lieutenant Towers of the American Embassy in London, as submitted by Ambassador Gerard to the State Department, is thus described in a Washington dispatch to The New York Times of June 16, 1915:

Evidence indicating that the American steamer Nebraskan was torpedoed by a German submarine on May 25, was obtained by the State Department today when it received a long mail report from Ambassador Page at London containing the results of the investigation conducted by the American Consul General at Liverpool upon the arrival of the Nebraskan at that port.

Ambassador Page's mail report contained the detailed report made by Lieutenant John H. Towers, Naval Attaché of the American Embassy at London, who made a technical and expert examination of the Nebraskan in drydock at Liverpool. Lieutenant Towers's report contained a number of photographs of the shattered fore section of the hull of the Nebraskan, but the most interesting feature of the report consisted of exhibits in the form of what Secretary Lansing described as "fragments of metal."

While officials would not make known the character of these fragments or the details of the report until they had opportunity to carefully examine the data, it was learned tonight that the report indicated that the Nebraskan was torpedoed, and that the fragments sent with the report consisted of portions of the shell of a torpedo, which were found in the hull of the Nebraskan.

The report also contained the depositions of three of the officers of the Nebraskan, taken by the Consul at Liverpool, including the statement of the Captain and the Chief Engineer. The latter stated that at 8:24 o'clock on the night of May 25, after the flag of the Nebraskan had been hauled down, he observed a white streak in the water perpendicular to the ship on the starboard side and a severe shock was almost instantly felt, followed by a violent explosion abreast of No. 1 hold.

The report of Lieutenant Towers showed that the hatch covers of No. 1 hold were blown off, also the cargo booms above it, and that the bottom plating and pieces of the side of the ship were blown up through two decks of the ship.

THE “FRAGMENTS OF METAL”

The following appeared as a special dispatch from Washington to The New York Times, dated June 17:

Despite the extreme secrecy of officials, indications were abundant in Washington tonight that the case of the American steamer Nebraskan, believed to have been torpedoed by a German submarine, was assuming great importance in the eyes of the United States Government. One evidence of this is found in the unusual pains that are being taken to determine by indisputable evidence whether the Nebraskan, which was damaged by an external explosion off Fastnet Rock, on May 25, was the victim of a torpedo or a mine.

Despite the reports forwarded by Ambassador Page, the Administration is unwilling to base its conclusions in the Nebraskan case on the verbal evidence it already possesses. It has determined upon an independent expert, technical, and scientific examination of the "fragments of metal" that have been sent by Ambassador Page, in conjunction with the photographs that have been received. This investigation is being conducted by experts of the Navy Department, and will probably take about ten days. Robert Lansing, the Secretary of State ad interim, refused tonight to discuss the "fragments of metal" received from Ambassador Page in connection with the Nebraskan case further than to say that the reports received yesterday, with the photographs and accompanying exhibits, had been referred to the Navy Department. Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy, said tonight that the report had been referred to experts of the Navy Department for a confidential report to be submitted to the State Department.

Neither at the State Department nor from any official or officer of the Navy Department was it possible to obtain any further clue as to the character of the reports.

It was learned that the reports accompanying the set of photographs and "fragments of metal" were not the original reports on the Nebraskan case, made by Lieutenants Towers and McBride, which were received by the State Department last week, but were in the nature of a second set of supplementary reports, based on actual examination of the battered bow of the Nebraskan and the technical examination of the interior of her forward compartment. This examination was made by Lieutenants Towers and McBride, while the Nebraskan was in a drydock at Liverpool. Photographs of the interior and exterior of the steamer's hull were taken by the naval experts.

The "fragments" in question will be analyzed metallurgically for the purpose of ascertaining precisely what metal they contain. Generally speaking, torpedoes are made of a higher grade of metal, within and without, than that used in the construction of mines. The exterior metal of torpedoes consists of nickel steel and copper, and the interior mechanism includes the same kinds of metal and brass. The exterior shell of a mine is generally made of less expensive material, such as galvanized iron, but the interior mechanism and clock-work are of finer metal.

In the examination being conducted by the Navy Department the metallurgical nature of the fragments will be ascertained after their size, shape, contour and character have been very carefully studied by a large number of naval experts who will endeavor to ascertain not only the character of the naval engine of destruction these fragments once fitted, but also the particular portion of torpedo or mine the fragments constituted. These studies and tests are to be conducted partly in the Navy Department, partly at the Washington Navy Yard, partly at the naval proving grounds at Indian Head, Md., and partly at the experimental station at the Naval Academy at Annapolis.

All the naval experts in Washington qualified to have a hand in the tests will be utilized. There are some naval experts outside of Washington, within a few days' reach of the city, who will be summoned here to participate in the examination. It is understood the examination will continue about ten days before any report can be formulated for submission to the State Department.

While this unusual care is being exercised in the tests of the fragments, it is understood that there is nothing in the conclusions thus far drawn in the reports to indicate that the fragments were once part of a mine, and that the reports as they stand indicate that the Nebraskan was hit by a torpedo. This is the conclusion the Administration is expected to draw from the evidence unless the technical examination of the fragments nullifies this evidence.

Dr. Meyer-Gerhard’s Mission

In a cable dispatch from Berlin, via London, dated June 2, 1915, the following complaint of lack of official news from Washington and of means for obtaining it was made known by the German Government:

The German Foreign Office is unable to communicate with Count von Bernstorff, the Ambassador at Washington, except by wireless in plain language, and even this mode of communication is uncertain during periods when the static conditions of the atmosphere are unfavorable.

Reports which reach the newspapers are regarded with suspicion, not only because they come exclusively through British channels, but on account of their contradictory character.

One set of reports intimates that the German counter-proposals have been found to harmonize with Mr. Bryan's plan of providing for a period of investigation in cases of international conflict, while other advices reproduce various American editorials, declaring that the German note is utterly unacceptable, and demanding that steps of varying degrees of aggressiveness be taken.

While waiting, the time is being utilized by some of the more aggressive German newspapers and writers of the type of Reventlow to launch abusive articles against the United States and President Wilson's policy, but the press and public generally seem desirous of avoiding anything which might increase the tension between the two Governments while the German note is under consideration. In this they are acting in complete accord with the Foreign Office, which apparently is sincerely anxious to preserve friendly relations with the United States and deprecates any publication which would tend to inflame the feelings either in Germany or America.

There seems to be no doubt that the Foreign Office would rejoice at a solution consistent with German interests, and it is considered here that one of the unfortunate features of the situation is the inability of the Foreign Office to cope with the chronic firebrands of the press.

This complaint was followed by the news, published by The Chicago Herald on June 4, that a special arrangement had been effected by Ambassador Bernstorff in his conference with President Wilson on June 2, as follows:

With the approval of the President of the United States, Count von Bernstorff, the German Ambassador in Washington, has sent a special agent to Berlin to discuss the American view of the Lusitania tragedy with the German Government.

The agent is Dr. Anton Meyer-Gerhard. He sailed today for Denmark. It is not believed that his voyage will be interfered with. Mr. Gerhard's connection with the great question between the United States and Germany has been guarded with the utmost secrecy. It leaked out only when inquiries were made regarding his departure in such a hurry. Mr. Gerhard himself could not be seen.

The suggestion that Mr. Gerhard go to Berlin was made by Count von Bernstorff to the President at the White House conference on Wednesday. The Ambassador described to the President the difficulties he experienced in transmitting information to his Government. He cannot use the cables, which are in the possession of the Allies. So far as wireless is concerned, conditions make it almost impossible to send anything but the briefest dispatches. As a result, Germany is not well informed in regard to the reasons controlling the policy of the Administration or the state of public sentiment. If his Government were adequately informed the Ambassador is confident that it would look at the demands of the United States in a different fashion.

The President apparently appreciated the view presented by the Ambassador. In any event, he authorized him to send an agent to Berlin, and it is presumed that thereupon he was apprised of the identity of the man selected. Count von Bernstorff vouched for Mr. Gerhard as thoroughly informed on the entire diplomatic situation as well as upon the condition of public sentiment. In addition, he is carrying full explanatory reports from the Ambassador himself.

[Dr. Meyer-Gerhard arrived in Berlin via Copenhagen on June 16 and reported at the German Colonial Office. While en route The Providence Journal and The New York Tribune published stories, varying in detail, to the effect that the United States Government had been hoaxed into obtaining safe conduct into Germany for a Dr. Alfred Meyer, reported to be a German buyer of munitions of war in this country, either under the name of Dr. Anton Meyer-Gerhard, falsely given, or under Meyer-Gerhard's protection. On receiving assurances to the contrary from Count von Bernstorff, Secretary Lansing announced on June 18 that the charge was false.]

Germany’s Press Opinion

Editorial comment of the German newspapers on President Wilson's note of June 9 was reported by The Times staff correspondent in Berlin on June 12 as being "surprisingly restrained and optimistic." Captain L. Persius, the naval critic of the Berliner Tageblatt, which is close to Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, writing under the caption, "On the Way to an Understanding," said:

An agreement is possible and the Washington Government shows an honest desire to arrive at an agreement. This is characteristic of the American note. There is no evidence of rattling the sabre, as those who viewed American statesmen and American conditions rightly anticipated. The hopes of our enemies who have already rejoiced at the thought that the Stars and Stripes soon would be floating beside the union jack and the tricolor are proved false, and one can anticipate that the answer of our Government will put aside that last stumbling block to doing away with all differences. The note indicates that America by no means takes the position that the German Admiralty must issue an order to end the submarine warfare before any negotiations can be entered upon. Giving up submarine warfare is only hinted at by implication. Germany's humanity is appealed to entirely in general terms and merely the expectation is expressed that the lives of American citizens and their property will be spared in the future.

A willingness is expressed to help make England give up the plan to starve out Germany. The giving up of the attempt to starve Germany out on the part of England is the most important point for us. The main interest will centre in future upon it. Will England declare herself ready to return to the basis of the London Declaration? Will she no longer place any difficulties in the way of neutral commerce, and in particular will she remove the declaration of the North Sea as a war zone? We will wait and see if the English statesmen have learned that Germany can't be starved. We can await Great Britain's decision with quietness.

The evening edition of the Vossische Zeitung said:

President Wilson's note creates no new situation between Germany and America, but its honorable and carefully weighed tone will help to clear up the existing situation. There can be no difference of opinion about Mr. Wilson's final aim—that the lives of peaceful neutrals must be kept out of danger. What we can do and what America must do to achieve this will require negotiations between us and America, which must be conducted with every effort toward being just and by maintaining our standpoint in the friendliest spirit.

The Lokalanzeiger commented:

The colored reports spread by our enemies are not borne out by the text, which contains no trace of an ultimatum. The tone is friendly and free from all brusqueness. The contents are only a rewriting of the earlier standpoint, and it will be a matter for further negotiations to state again the arguments advanced by Germany and to justify them. It would be premature to comment on individual points, particularly those of a technical nature. One can rejoice, however, that the Wilson note is so couched as not to preclude a possibility for further negotiations promising success.

He gives the German Government an opportunity to send further proofs in the Lusitania case and declares his willingness to negotiate between Germany and England relative to mutual concessions having a bearing on submarine warfare. This offer, to be sure, would have been decidedly more valuable if he had expressed a willingness to take the initiative. But be that as it may, in the further negotiations America will see that on the German side exists an honorable desire to deal with friendly suggestions in a friendly spirit. In any event, the situation resulting from the American note is such that it is apparent that in the statement trumpeted abroad that America had also entered the ranks of our enemies the wish was father to the thought.

The widely read Mittag Zeitung said of the note:

The alarming messages which the Reuter Bureau appended to the Bryan resignation must be all taken back today. There is neither an ultimatum nor any threatening language toward Germany in the note. To be sure, the difference between America's and Germany's conception of the submarine warfare remain. The Americans for the present simply will not see that the best protection against endangering the lives of American citizens is for Americans not to go aboard English ships.

Over the question of whether the Lusitania carried ammunition or not, which for us is not in question, the present inquiry will throw some light. In any case, the English hope and prophecy that the new note would mean a rupture in the German-American negotiations have not been fulfilled. For everything else we can wait with calmness.

The morning edition of the Vossische Zeitung, commenting on the summary, merely said:

The contents and tone of this note make it inexplainable that the break between Wilson and Bryan was on its account. After Bryan's declarations we had expected a note which might conjure up danger of a German-American war. Mr. Bryan, who heads all the American peace associations and likes to hear himself popularly referred to as the Prince of Peace, apparently wants to appear as the savior from this danger for reasons of internal politics, so as to win peace friends among the German-Americans, Irish, and Jews with a view to the Democratic Presidential nomination. Mr. Wilson, on the other hand, hopes as negotiator between England and Germany to play the rôle of arbiter mundi and through a great success in foreign politics assure his position at home. The new Secretary, Mr. Lansing, has been long considered a coming man. He has by no means been considered an out-and-out friend of England.

The Morgen Post, in a particularly sane two-column editorial, expresses Germany's genuine satisfaction over America's hearty offer of good offices, and says:

There is no tinge of threat or high-handed tone toward Germany in the note. On the contrary, its tone is quiet though earnest throughout, and in several places it strikes a note of whole-hearted friendship and seeks to leave a way open for further friendly negotiations. No doubt the German Government will accept America's proffered good offices with pleasure. It will be interesting to see what attitude the English will now take. If they will revise the contraband list set up by themselves and desist from making difficulties for neutral commerce with Germany, and, above all, let foodstuffs and textile raw materials through unhindered to Germany, then so far as we are concerned the submarine warfare can cease.

Let the English continue to violate international law whereby they forced us to resort to the use of the submarine as a weapon against their commerce, and we will never allow ourselves to be persuaded to give up this weapon, the only one we have to protect us against violation at the hands of England and with which we can punish England for her unlawful conduct. Should America's good offices prove to be in vain it will be not ours but England's fault, and the Americans will then readily understand that the reproach of an inhuman mode of warfare must be laid at the doors of England and not Germany.

It will soon be seen whether President Wilson employs the same measure of energy against the English as against us. We sincerely hope so because of the friendly, hearty tone of his note. "The American Government cannot admit that the proclamation of a war zone may be made to abbreviate the rights of American citizens?" Really not? We recall that at the beginning of the war England declared the whole North Sea as a war zone and the Americans did not get excited at that time. We had a right to protest bitterly at America's attitude then, but we will forget about it at the present moment. America has proffered her good offices, and we will not doubt that her intentions are honorable and meant in good faith.

Paul Michaelis, in the Tageblatt, said:

It is certain that the note does not simplify the serious situation, and it is equally certain that it does not completely bar the way to a peaceful and friendly understanding. The American Government holds fast to the principle that submarine warfare on merchantmen is inconsistent with the principles of justice and humanity, but the German Government has never left the slightest doubt that it only decided on the submarine warfare because the English method of scorning all previous rules of naval warfare forced Germany to a counter-war on commerce with the submarine.

But there seems to be no reason why the German and American Governments should not get together in a joint discussion looking toward some other form of naval warfare. This presupposes that England, which took the first step in the commerce war, also takes the first step to end it. At the same time the question must be investigated of how ammunition shipments to our enemies can be reconciled with the eternal principles of humanity featured by the American note.

While there may be some practical difficulties, there can be no doubt of Germany's willingness to help to bring about a modification of the naval war along more humane lines. The answer to the American note must, of course, take most carefully into account all the diplomatic, political, and military exigencies, and it will be several weeks before it is ready to be handed to the American Ambassador, especially as we must wait to hear Dr. Meyer-Gerhard.

But it must be said now that the German people, now, as formerly, lay great value on a continuation of unclouded relations with the United States, whose war for freedom it once greeted with rejoicing, and within whose borders millions of Germans have found a new home.

Count Reventlow, Germany's "enfant terrible" who has been a consistent thorn in the flesh of the German Foreign Office because of his anti-American utterances, struck a surprisingly restrained and moderate tone in the Tageszeitung:

The question is not how it may be possible to do away with all differences of opinion under all circumstances, but whether it is at all possible to do away with them without rendering the submarine war impotent. This standpoint contains nothing unfriendly, nothing brusque against the United States. The practical question remains whether we can preserve our German standpoint and still come to an understanding with America. If Mr. Wilson holds to his non-recognition of the war zone, with all its corollaries, then we cannot see how we can possibly come to a real understanding.

On the other hand, the question arises whether President Wilson would continue to cling to that standpoint if certain modifications and mutual guarantees could be brought about which under certain circumstances would render American passenger traffic safe.

A newspaper war between advocates of a friendly settlement and the "no compromise" representatives soon began to rage. Naval writers in particular urged that Germany could not afford to yield an iota regarding the principles and practice of submarine warfare, but the very violence of their attacks upon the advocates of an understanding indicates that the latter are not without influence.

The Cologne Gazette points out editorially that the German press in general has shown satisfaction that President Wilson's communication offers opportunity for an understanding, and expresses the belief that diplomacy on both sides of the Atlantic will work with zeal and good-will to this end. It adds:

It is quite certain the German Government, at least, will do this, and will be generally supported therein by the people. It would be pure imbecility to seek to drag in without necessity a ninth or tenth enemy for ourselves, even though its participation in the war should be limited to supplying the Quadruple Alliance with money and munitions. We say without necessity; for recognition of the fact that Germany is acting in self-defense in using the torpedoes of its submarines against hostile merchantmen so long as England maintains its business blockade against us should, we believe, be a condition which the United States should recognize as preliminary to negotiations.

In a leading article entitled "Bad Advice" the Cologne Gazette takes the Lokalanzeiger to task for attempting to palliate the British "starving-out policy" and exportations from America of war supplies. Conceding that the cutting off of supplies is an accepted method of warfare, it states that international law provides expressly that this weapon may be used only in the form of an effective blockade. It holds that no effective blockade of the German coasts has been declared, however, and that Germany therefore is deprived of the possibility of taking action against blockading ships.

Regarding the exportation of munitions from the United States, the Gazette adopts the argument of Philip Zorn, German member of The Hague Tribunals, that, although the convention adopted at The Hague justifies sales by private firms, a neutral State is bound to prohibit sales of this nature when the commerce in arms assumes such magnitude that continuation of war is directly dependent thereon. He says:

"That the German representatives [at The Hague] voted in favor of permission to deliver arms is incontestable," the article continues, "but there is a great difference between stamping every sale of arms by a private firm in a neutral State as a violation of international law—this was what the German representatives objected to—and arguing that to supply enormous quantities to one group of belligerents alone, and to devote practically the entire available industry of a country thereto, is consonant with the spirit of true neutrality."

Captain von Kuehlwetter, the naval expert of the Tag, points out that the American note passes over in silence the German representations regarding the British Admiralty's instructions to merchantmen to seek cover under neutral flags and to attack submarines under this cover. He declares this is the kernel of the whole argument and the justification for the German policy. He adds:

If a submarine attacks such a ship there is an outcry about barbarians who violate international law and endanger innocent neutral passengers, but if a ship attacks a submarine then it is a brave act of a daring shipper, to whom is given a commission, a gold watch, and a diploma.

Press Opinion of the Allies

BRITISH COMMENT.

A.G. Gardiner, editor of The London Daily News, writing in that paper on June 12, says the rupture between President Wilson and Mr. Bryan is one of the great landmarks of the war. He goes on:

Whatever other significance the event may have, it is conclusive evidence of the failure of German diplomacy in America. The Kaiser has made many miscalculations about nations and about men, but no greater miscalculation than that which he has made in regard to President Wilson and the United States.

He is not alone in that. There has been a good deal of ignorance on the same subject in this country. In the early stages of the war there was a mischievous clamor against the United States in a section of the press, which has never quite got rid of the idea that America is only a rather rebellious member of our own household, to be patronized when it does what we want and lectured like a disobedient child when it does not.

President Wilson has assumed in these ill-informed quarters to be a timid academic person, so different from that magnificent tub thumper, Roosevelt, who would have been at war with Mexico in a trice, and would, it was believed, have plunged into the European struggle with or without an excuse.

If there was misunderstanding here on this subject, we cannot be surprised that the Kaiser blundered so badly. He, too, believed in the schoolmaster view of Woodrow Wilson. A man who had refused such a golden opportunity of annexing Mexico must be a timid, invertebrate person, who had only to be bullied in order to do what he was told. Moreover, was there not a great German population to serve as a whip for the Presidential blank and see that he did not send the polite, the gracious, the supple Prince von Bülow to Washington?

That courtly gentleman was dispatched to Italy to charm the Italian Nation into quiescence. For the Americans he needed another style of diplomacy, and he sent thither the stout and rather stupid Dernburg to let President Wilson and the Americans know that Germany was a very rough customer and would stand no nonsense from anybody.

It was a fatal blunder, the blunder of a people who had been so blinded by materialism that they do not seem to have so much as the consciousness that there is such a thing as moral strength on earth. No one who had followed with intelligent understanding the career of President Wilson could have doubted that he had to deal with a man of iron, a man with a moral passion as fervid as that of his colleague Bryan, but with that passion informed by wide knowledge and controlled by a masterful will, a quiet, still man, who does not live with his ear to the ground and his eye on the weathercock, who refuses to buy popularity by infinite hand-shaking and robustous speech, but comes out to action from a sanctuary of his own thoughts, where principle and not expediency is his counselor.

It is because no man in a conspicuous position of the democratic world today is so entirely governed by principle and by moral sanctions that President Wilson is not merely the first citizen of the United States, but the first citizen of the world.

The Daily Chronicle says:

President Wilson's note gives Germany every opportunity of saving her face if she desires to do so. Not only is it phrased in the most friendly terms, but it invites a submission of further evidence regarding the Lusitania's alleged guns and even the resumption of negotiations with Great Britain through American intermediacy. Here are the vistas of a negotiation which might keep the diplomatists of Berlin and Washington happily employed till the war is over; only the President insists once more that the submarine outrages must stop while the negotiations are in progress. It is this last point, firmly submitted at the end of the note, which gives significance to the whole. Obviously, without it the note would be nothing but an abdication on the part of the United States, and it is because it is not that Mr. Bryan disapproves it.

We do not question the sincerity of Mr. Bryan's attachment to the cause of arbitration; but it is strange that he does not see what a disservice he does to arbitration by accepting and preaching a travesty of it. When there is litigation between individuals over an alleged wrong, the first condition is that the wrong shall stop for the interim—a result effected through an interim injunction between nations. There is no judge to grant such an injunction. It has to be obtained by mutual consent unless it is obtained by arbitration. It simply means a license to the wrongdoer to continue his wrongdoing for as long as he can make the arbitration last, which, where the time is important, will be all that he wants. To accept such a doctrine, as Mr. Bryan apparently does, is simply to put a premium on the wrongdoing and a very heavy discount on arbitration.

The Morning Post comments as follows:

Mr. Bryan resigned, according to his own explanation, because he thought President Wilson's note to Germany would endanger the cause of peace. It might, therefore, have been supposed that the American note was to be a departure from the previous American policy; but now that President Wilson's note is published we are puzzled to find the reason for Mr. Bryan's action. The note contains nothing new; it merely affirms in a friendly manner the position taken up by the United States—a position founded upon the generally accepted principles of international law. It testates the claim which America has always made, that a belligerent has no right to sink a presumably innocent merchantman and endanger the lives of its crew and passengers, but must first determine the character of its cargo and establish its contraband nature and must secure the safety of the people on board. This is obviously a stand in the cause of humanity. We might call it the irreducible minimum of the rights of neutrals; for it is clear that, if a Government allows its subjects to be slain in cold blood and its ships to be destroyed, it abandons the primary function of a Government.

The Daily Mail says:

The first impression made upon most readers of the new American note to Germany will be, we suspect, that it is extremely polite and quite harmless. They will ask in wonder what Mr. Bryan could have found in it sufficiently menacing to call for his resignation. To many people it will seem that Mr. Bryan altogether misjudged the effect of the American reply. They will find it difficult to believe that any diplomatic dispatch could in the circumstances be more courteous or more restrained. It observes all the forms of international politeness, with, if anything, almost exaggerated punctiliousness.

Yet it is possible that Mr. Bryan is as nearly right as he ever is. The vital passages in the note are those in which the United States Government "very earnestly and very solemnly renews the representations of its note" of May 15, and again asks for assurances that American lives and American ships shall not be endangered on the high seas. In other words, the United States still presses for an official disavowal of the acts of German submarine commanders, still demands reparation for the American lives lost in the Lusitania, and still calls for a promise that no similar outrage will be perpetrated in future.

The Daily Telegraph says:

The note presented to Germany on behalf of the United States Government is a firm and courteous document—the courtesy at least as obvious as the firmness—stating the position of the President very much on the lines expected, and leaving us to wonder even more than we did before why Bryan thought it necessary to resign his Secretaryship. The spirit of the second note is exactly that of the first.

Following is The London Times comment:

The gist of President Wilson's note lies in the last half dozen words and proceeds. It remains to be seen what answer will be made to this categorical demand. The general opinion in the United States appears to be that it will not be a refusal. Germany, it is thought, will begin by making concessions enough to prevent the abrupt conclusion of conversations, and will finally extend them sufficiently to preserve friendly relations with the Republic.

It would be rash to express a decided view, but we shall not be surprised should this forecast prove to be correct. The feeling in Germany is very bitter against the Government and people of the United States; but it seems unlikely that the Government in Berlin will allow the ill-temper of the public to influence its conduct. The semi-official Lokalanzeiger is already deprecating an unfriendly attitude toward the United States. There is nothing in the note to suggest that a policy such as the American newspapers seem to expect from Germany would be doomed to failure. The American people, we are told, are determined to attain their ends, but they welcome every prospect of attaining them by peaceful means.

The note, it is observed, not only does not shut out further conversations, but gives a distinct opening for them by its treatment of von Jagow's renewed intimation that Germany would gladly accept American good offices in negotiations with this country as to the character and conditions of maritime war. The Wilhelmstrasse can discover in this and some other passages material for procrastination if it so desires.

PRAISE FROM CANADA.

The Daily Standard of Kingston, Ont., commenting on June 11, says:

President Wilson's second message to Germany will rank with his first one as a document that at once convinces and convicts—convinces of the sincerity of the President that he is "contending for nothing less high and sacred than the rights of humanity," and convicts the nation to whom it is addressed of being responsible for the fact that the men, women, and children on the Lusitania were sent to their death under circumstances "unparalleled in modern warfare."

The note is not only dignified and statesmanlike, but it breathes a spirit of tolerance and Christianity that is as noteworthy as it is admirable. There is in it not even a suggestion of a threat, no word of bluster, no breath of jingoism. It is sound, sensible, firm, resolute, self-contained, magnanimous even. It does not incite to war, but, instead, appeals to the highest principles of justice and right.

But though the words are conciliatory and the spirit admirable, there is not the least abatement of the insistence upon the principles which the President formulated in his earlier message and laid down for the guidance of Germany and for the protection of the American people. The way is now open to Germany either for peace or for war. The decision is left with her.

FRENCH COMMENT.

The Temps of June 12 says:

Germany must choose between having the services of America in proposing to the Allies a moderation of their blockade, conducted with the strictest humanity, and the cessation of torpedoing neutral ships, the continuation of which exposes Germany to a diplomatic rupture with the United States, if not to war. Assuredly this prospect caused Bryan's resignation.

La Liberté says of the note:

It is in every way worthy of a great country conscious of its dignity, its rights, and its duties. It has not the tone of an ultimatum, since it is couched in courteous terms, but it is energetic, and it requires Germany finally to cease recourse to false expedients.

The Journal des Débats, in discussing the note, says:

The United States, representing in this case the civilized world, places the sacred rights of humanity above considerations of the military order, to which Germany subordinates everything. They are resolved, so far as concerns American subjects, to have those rights respected.

The essence of the note is, first, measures required by humanity must be taken, and afterward, if desired, will come discussions of a new regulation of naval warfare. If Germany insists on putting herself outside the pale of humanity she will suffer the consequences.

ITALIAN COMMENT.

The Corriere della Sera of June 12 compares the attitude of Secretary Bryan to that of former Premier Giolitti, leader of the party which sought to prevent war with Austria. It says Mr. Bryan's action probably will have the same effect in America that Signor Giolitti's intervention had in Italy, and that it will strengthen public opinion in favor of President Wilson.

It will give him greater power in this important moment, defeating men who are ready to lower the prestige and honor of the country.

The Tribuna says:

The United States, the greatest neutral nation, has with this document assumed a special rôle, that is, the defense not of a particular group or interest, but the interest of civil humanity; to guard those principles of common right which above any particular right constitute the sacred patrimony of humanity. She raises her voice, whose firmness is not diminished by the courtesy of the language.

We do not know if Germany will be able to understand the significance, but if she does not she will commit a grave error—the gravest perhaps in the immense series made by her in this war. Mr. Wilson seems to persevere in the hope that Germany will listen to the American admonition. Germany must not forget that the longer the hope the more violent will be the reaction.

The Idea Nazionale says:

The note is not only not a declaration of war or the prelude to a declaration of war, but a species midway of humanitarian sentimentalism and lawyerlike arguments which can have, at least for the present, but one consequence, that of encouraging Germany in intransigentism—that is, the maintenance of her point of view regarding naval warfare.

American Comment on Mr.
Bryan’s Resignation

The New York Times of June 14, 1915, presented the following condensed quotations condemning unsparingly Mr. Bryan's retirement from the Secretaryship of State, gathered from newspapers throughout the United States, and classified according to their professions of political faith:

DEMOCRATIC NEWSPAPERS.

From The New York World.

Unspeakable treachery, not only to the President, but to the nation.

From The Buffalo Enquirer.

If Mr. Bryan goes on, he will share the detestation of the most despised character in American history.

From The Buffalo Courier.

The new note to Germany puts Emperor William and former Secretary Bryan in the same hole.

From The Utica Observer.

He turns tail in the face of a crisis and seeks refuge by counseling dishonor.

From The Louisville Courier-Journal, (Henry Watterson.)

Treason to the country, treachery to his party and its official head.

From The Portland (Me.) Eastern Argus.

Bryan's announced campaign has something of the character of submarine warfare.

From The Helena (Mon.) Independent.

As much mistaken in this instance as in years gone by.

From The Lexington (Ky.) Herald.

His propaganda is designed and intended "to defeat the measures of the Government of the United States" in violation of Section 5, [of the law of treason.]

From The Mobile Register.

If Germany is misled into actions still further violative of our rights, the resultant hostility will be very largely attributable to Mr. Bryan.

From The Columbia (S.C.) State.

The President's clear head may now be trusted the more that his methods of thinking are relieved of opposition in the Cabinet.

From The Montgomery Advertiser.

He will go back to his first love, agitation.

From The Richmond Times-Dispatch.

Wilson, not Bryan, strikes the note to which the hearts of the American people respond.

From The Savannah News.

The people are following the President and not Mr. Bryan.

From The Austin (Texas) Statesman.

Mr. Bryan's diplomacy has not been of the type that has inspired the confidence of the American people.

From The Charleston News and Courier.

The bald and ugly fact will remain—he deserted his chief and his Government in the midst of an international crisis.

From The Memphis Commercial-Appeal.

Mr. Bryan's views, turned into a national policy, would mean national suicide.

From The Brooklyn Eagle.

An obstacle has seen fit to remove itself; it has substituted harmony for discordance.

From The Boston Post.

Mr. Bryan has shabbily infringed that good American doctrine that politics should end at the water's edge.

From The Baltimore Sun.

The Germans torpedo one "Nebraskan." Oh, for a "Busy Bertha" that could effectually dispose of the other one!

From The Charlotte Observer.

The country simply was afraid of him.

From The Cleveland Plain Dealer.

He is a preacher of disloyalty.

From The Chattanooga Times.

The reason given for his resignation ... approximates disloyalty, if nothing else; a monstrous statement.

From The New Orleans Times-Picayune.

His voluntary resignation will give satisfaction.

REPUBLICAN NEWSPAPERS.

From The New York Tribune.

A man with such a cheaply commercial conception of the post held by so long a line of American statesmen was by nature disqualified for it.

From The New York Globe.

Instead of promoting a peaceful settlement, Mr. Bryan practically throws his influence in the other balance.

From The Syracuse Post-Standard.

Billy Sunday in the wrong niche.

From The Rochester Post-Express.

Amazement and contempt for him grow.

From The Pittsburgh Gazette Times.

He has not filled the place with dignity, ability, or satisfaction, nor yet with fidelity; a cheap imitation.

From The Pittsburgh Chronicle Telegraph.

The peace-piffle and grape-juice statesman.

From The Philadelphia Inquirer.

A peace-at-any-price man.

From The Wilkes-Barre Record.

An amazing, an astounding blunder.

From The Cincinnati Commercial Tribune.

The seriousness of the situation is all that prevents Mr. Bryan's foreign policy from being laughable.

From The Baltimore American.

The country wants no more vapid theorizing; it wants no more Bryanism.

From The Hartford Courant.

Those newspapers that said Mr. Bryan was in bad taste made a slight mistake. He is a bad taste.

From The Augusta (Me.) Kennebec Journal.

Impossible for a man of Mr. Bryan's ability and love of the limelight to remain longer wholly obscure in this national crisis.

From The Portsmouth (N.H.) Chronicle.

Childish policies and small politics, even if the Nobel Peace Prize is at stake, must not be considered by an American statesman.

From The Portland (Me.) Press.

There was nothing to do but get out and shut up.

From The Paterson Press.

He has dealt his country a stunning blow.

From The Lincoln (Neb.) State Journal.

It is characteristic of Mr. Bryan to shut his eyes to arguments and facts when he reaches the ecstacy of sentimental conviction.

From The Omaha Bee.

His action may have a weakening effect on our position.

From The Nebraska City (Neb.) Press.

Knowing his disposition to watch out for the main chance ... that Mr. Bryan will be a candidate for the Senate from Nebraska is almost a foregone conclusion.

From The Topeka Capital.

Represents only the personal idiosyncrasies of William J. Bryan.

From The Milwaukee Sentinel.

Calculated to create prejudice and misgiving against the American note and to mislead foreign opinion.

From The St. Louis Globe-Democrat.

Mr. Bryan could have found no better way of causing the President embarrassment at this crisis.

From The Minneapolis Tribune.

President Wilson has had his own way in State Department affairs, to the minimization of Secretary Bryan, almost at times to the point of humiliation.

From The Seattle Post-Intelligencer.

A pacifist temporarily bereft of reason and lost to sense of patriotic duty; a misplaced figurehead.

From The Portland Oregonian.

The archpriest of the peace-at-any-price party ... a poor staff to lean upon.

From The Albany Knickerbocker-Press.

Mr. Bryan must Chautauquahoot, as the rooster must crow.

From The Scranton Republican.

Prompt acceptance of his resignation was the proper thing.

From The Los Angeles Times.

The inefficiency and ineptness of the Secretary of State have been a reproach to the country.

From The Wilmington (Del.) News.

Far better if Mr. Bryan had retired long ago.

From The St. Paul Pioneer Press.

His retirement was merely a matter of time.

PROGRESSIVE NEWSPAPERS.

From The New York Press.

A sorry misfit in our Government—mortifyingly, dangerously so.

From The Boston Journal.

He appoints himself, though now a private citizen, the director of the nation.

From The Washington Times.

The only person who has been talking war and giving out the impression that he thought this note meant war.

INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPERS.

From The New York Evening Post.

How far he will carry his treachery by actual machinations against Mr. Wilson remains to be seen.

From The New York Sun.

Sulked and ran away when honor and patriotism should have kept him at his post.

From The New York Herald.

His convictions are all wrong; his retirement should be heartily welcomed by the country.

From The Philadelphia Public Ledger.

How much longer, as Cicero asked Catiline, does he intend to abuse our patience?

From The Pittsburgh Dispatch.

Bryan's obsession by the peace-at-any-price propaganda bordered on the fanatical.

From The Baltimore News.

A surrender to opportunism such as calls for a nation's contempt.

From The Chicago Herald.

As a private citizen he will be less a menace to the peace of the nation than he has been as Secretary of State.

From The Denver Post.

His services can be most satisfactorily dispensed with.

From The Kansas City Star.

Has not impressed the country as a practical man in dealing with large affairs.

From The Toledo Times.

He should support the President.

From The Terre Haute Star.

Now free to pursue the prohibition propaganda.

From The Newark (N.J.) Star.

The statement [Bryan's] is simply an effort to corral for himself a large voting element in the population.

From The Newark Evening News.

His narrow vision has overcome him.

From The Boston Traveler.

If war does come Mr. Bryan will be the one American held most responsible for the trouble.

From The Boston Globe.

Mr. Wilson has been relieved of one of his many problems.

From The Boston Herald.

Is certainly not inspired by a sense of loyalty to the party or the country.

From The Lowell Courier-Citizen.

Lagged superfluous on a stage in which he played no part beyond that of an amanuensis, and hardly even that.

From The Manchester (N.H.) Union.

Should mark the end of Bryanism in American politics.

From The Providence Journal.

He has bowed himself into oblivion.

GERMAN-AMERICAN PRESS.

Under the caption, "He Kept His Vow," the evening edition of the New-Yorker Staats-Zeitung, which for months had been referring to Secretary Bryan as "Secretary Bryan Stumping," as opposed to "Secretary Lansing Acting," said on June 9:

As unreservedly as we believe that he [Mr. Bryan] is sacrificing high office to a principle—something that seems to be incomprehensible not alone to American politicians; readily as we pay him tribute that a man in public life has again had the courage to act, despite the machinations of editorial offices, pulpits, and the counting rooms of money agents; clearly as we see again his latest act, the old Bryan, who can sacrifice nothing to utilitarianism, everything to an idea, no matter how fantastic it may be, nevertheless it must not be left unmentioned that his exit out of the Wilson Cabinet was under all circumstances only a question of time. Bryan may want to be a candidate in 1916, a rival of Wilson; there may be a political motive at the bottom of the dramatically staged resignation; the fact remains that two hard heads, Wilson and Bryan, could not permanently agree. One had to yield; one had to go. Just as Bismarck had to go when Wilhelm II. felt himself safe in the saddle, so Bryan had to yield as soon as Woodrow Wilson himself took the reins, all the reins, into his hand.

Whether the departure of Bryan will exercise great influence on the course of events, so far as relations with Germany are concerned, is an open question. At all events, the peace party in Congress and in the country as a whole has found a leader who is a fighter, who today still has a large following in Congress and out of it. And in Congress, through the masses, the question must finally be decided. Meanwhile, is it to be assumed without further ado that President Wilson himself stands diametrically opposed to the peace views of Bryan? We do not believe that. We are even today still of the opinion that Wilson desires war with Germany as little as does Bryan, the friend of peace, who has just let his deeds follow his words.

From the St. Paul Daily Volks Zeitung.

Bryan's stand for fair play forces his resignation. Bryan's resignation at this critical moment is the greatest service the Commoner has ever rendered his country, because it has aroused the people to see the danger of the foreign policy now pursued by the President.

From the Minneapolis Freie Presse Herold.

It is evident that Mr. Bryan, believing that Wilson and Roosevelt will be the next Presidential nominees, now sees the opportunity to secure the German vote for himself, but Mr. Bryan's hypocrisy will fool no one, particularly the Germans.

From Alex E. Oberlander, Editor the Syracuse Union.

Mr. Bryan will be a greater power for peace out of the Cabinet than in it. As a member of the Cabinet diplomacy muzzled him, but now as a private citizen he can and will be outspoken, and his voice for peace will carry far more weight than the manufacturers of war munitions, Wall Street, would-be Generals, Colonels, and Captains, and the jingo press.

From Paul F. Mueller, Editor Abendpost of Chicago.

The people will choose Mr. Bryan's side if the President persists on a way which may lead to war and must lead to dishonor.

From Horace L. Brand, Publisher Illinois Staats-Zeitung.

Mr. Bryan will have the support of all sane Americans on any reasonable proposition which will keep this country out of war. Mr. Bryan, with all his faults, evidently has his principles.

From the Waechter und Anzeiger of Cleveland, Ohio.

He would not be a man had he signed the death warrant for what he regarded as the crowning deed and success of his life's work. And, because this was asked of him, many a person will say the Scotch in the President's veins did not deny itself in the manner which compelled Mr. Bryan's resignation, although keeping up the appearance that it came of Bryan's own free will because of a disagreement over principles.

From the Colorado Herald of Denver.

Bryan's resignation comes as the biggest surprise of the year to all those of pro-German proclivities who were heretofore laboring under the impression that Bryan represented the spirit in the Cabinet that savored of anything but a square deal for Germany.

From the Illinois Staats-Zeitung of Chicago.

Mr. William Jennings Bryan, by his resignation and by his reasons of his resignation, caused us fear that President Wilson's second note to Germany would be full of thunder and lightning, and would lead at best to a severance of the diplomatic relations between the two countries, the friendship of which grew almost to be a tradition.

Our surprise is just as great as it is pleasant. The note of the President is in its tone sound and friendly, and excludes the possibility of hostilities. Germany, though she had many reasons to complain about a hostile disposition on the part of the people, the press, and the Government of the United States, will readily admit that our Government is in duty bound to protect American lives and American property, even though she should have been justified in torpedoing the Lusitania. President Wilson seems to be willing to admit such justification and invites Germany to submit her evidence. This means an invitation to further negotiations, to which President Wilson was apparently opposed in his first note.

From Charles Neumeyer, Editor the Louisville Anzeiger.

It is inexplicable why Bryan could reconcile the signing of the first note, which was of a much more assertive tone, with his sentiments and principles, and then refuse his assent to this one, characterized by dignified friendliness. Mr. Bryan must either have become extremely touchy and particular over night, or somebody must have been fooling somebody else. At any rate, the American note is a guarantee of continued peace as to the issues now pending.

Mr. Bryan’s Defense

In a statement headed "The Real Issue" and addressed "To the American People," issued on June 10, 1915; in a second statement, appealing "To the German-Americans," on June 11; in a third, issued June 12, on the "First and Second German Notes," and in a series of utterances put forth on three successive days, beginning June 16, Mr. Bryan justified his resignation and offered what he styled a practical working solution of the problem of bringing peace to Europe. These statements were preceded by a formal utterance about his resignation, published on June 10. Their texts are presented below.

THE REASON FOR RESIGNING.

Washington, June 9, 1915.

My reason for resigning is clearly stated in my letter of resignation, namely, that I may employ, as a private citizen, the means which the President does not feel at liberty to employ. I honor him for doing what he believes to be right, and I am sure that he desires, as I do, to find a peaceful solution of the problem which has been created by the action of the submarines.

Two of the points on which we differ, each conscientious in his conviction, are:

First, as to the suggestion of investigation by an international commission, and,

Second, as to warning Americans against traveling on belligerent vessels or with cargoes of ammunition.

I believe that this nation should frankly state to Germany that we are willing to apply in this case the principle which we are bound by treaty to apply to disputes between the United States and thirty countries with which we have made treaties, providing for investigation of all disputes of every character and nature.

These treaties, negotiated under this Administration, make war practically impossible between this country and these thirty Governments, representing nearly three-fourths of all the people of the world.

Among the nations with which we have these treaties are Great Britain, France, and Russia. No matter what disputes may arise between us and these treaty nations, we agree that there shall be no declaration and no commencement of hostilities until the matters in dispute have been investigated by an international commission, and a year's time is allowed for investigation and report. This plan was offered to all the nations without any exceptions whatever, and Germany was one of the nations that accepted the principle, being the twelfth, I think, to accept.

No treaty was actually entered into with Germany, but I cannot see that that should stand in the way when both nations indorsed the principle. I do not know whether Germany would accept the offer, but our country should, in my judgment, make the offer. Such an offer, if accepted, would at once relieve the tension and silence all the jingoes who are demanding war.

Germany has always been a friendly nation, and a great many of our people are of German ancestry. Why should we not deal with Germany according to this plan to which the nation has pledged its support?

The second point of difference is as to the course which should be pursued in regard to Americans traveling on belligerent ships or with cargoes of ammunition.

Why should an American citizen be permitted to involve his country in war by traveling upon a belligerent ship, when he knows that the ship will pass through a danger zone? The question is not whether an American citizen has a right, under international law, to travel on a belligerent ship; the question is whether he ought not, out of consideration for his country, if not for his own safety, avoid danger when avoidance is possible.

It is a very one-sided citizenship that compels a Government to go to war over a citizen's rights and yet relieve the citizen of all obligations to consider his nation's welfare. I do not know just how far the President can legally go in actually preventing Americans from traveling on belligerent ships, but I believe the Government should go as far as it can, and that in case of doubt it should give the benefit of the doubt to the Government.

But even if the Government could not legally prevent citizens from traveling on belligerent ships, it could, and in my judgment should, earnestly advise American citizens not to risk themselves or the peace of their country, and I have no doubt that these warnings would be heeded.

President Taft advised Americans to leave Mexico when insurrection broke out there, and President Wilson has repeated the advice. This advice, in my judgment, was eminently wise, and I think the same course should be followed in regard to warning Americans to keep off vessels subject to attack.

I think, too, that American passenger ships should be prohibited from carrying ammunition. The lives of passengers ought not to be endangered by cargoes of ammunition, whether that danger comes from possible explosions within or from possible attacks from without. Passengers and ammunition should not travel together. The attempt to prevent American citizens from incurring these risks is entirely consistent with the effort which our Government is making to prevent attacks from submarines.

The use of one remedy does not exclude the use of the other. The most familiar illustration is to be found in the action taken by municipal authorities during a riot. It is the duty of the Mayor to suppress the mob and to prevent violence, but he does not hesitate to warn citizens to keep off the streets during the riots. He does not question their right to use the streets, but for their own protection and in the interest of order he warns them not to incur the risks involved in going upon the streets when men are shooting at each other.

The President does not feel justified in taking the action above stated. That is, he does not feel justified, first, in suggesting the submission of the controversy to investigation, or, second, in warning the people not to incur the extra hazards in traveling on belligerent ships or on ships carrying ammunition. And he may be right in the position he has taken, but, as a private citizen, I am free to urge both of these propositions and to call public attention to these remedies, in the hope of securing such an expression of public sentiment as will support the President in employing these remedies if in the future he finds it consistent with his sense of duty to favor them.

W.J. BRYAN.

“THE REAL ISSUE.”

Washington, June 10, 1915.

To the American people:

You now have before you the text of the note to Germany—the note which it would have been my official duty to sign had I remained Secretary of State. I ask you to sit in judgment upon my decision to resign rather than to share responsibility for it.

I am sure you will credit me with honorable motives, but that is not enough. Good intentions could not atone for a mistake at such a time, on such a subject, and under such circumstances. If your verdict is against me, I ask no mercy; I desire none if I have acted unwisely.

A man in public life must act according to his conscience, but, however conscientiously he acts, he must be prepared to accept without complaint any condemnation which his own errors may bring upon him; he must be willing to bear any deserved punishment, from ostracism to execution. But hear me before you pass sentence.

The President and I agree in purpose; we desire a peaceful solution of the dispute which has arisen between the United States and Germany. We not only desire it, but, with equal fervor, we pray for it; but we differ irreconcilably as to the means of securing it.

If it were merely a personal difference, it would be a matter of little moment, for all the presumptions are on his side—the presumptions that go with power and authority. He is your President, I am a private citizen without office or title—but one of the one hundred million of inhabitants.

But the real issue is not between persons, it is between systems, and I rely for vindication wholly upon the strength of the position taken.

Among the influences which Governments employ in dealing with each other there are two which are pre-eminent and antagonistic—force and persuasion. Force speaks with firmness and acts through the ultimatum; persuasion employs argument, courts investigation, and depends upon negotiation. Force represents the old system—the system that must pass away; persuasion represents the new system—the system that has been growing, all too slowly, it is true, but growing for 1,900 years. In the old system war is the chief cornerstone—war, which at its best is little better than war at its worst; the new system contemplates a universal brotherhood established through the uplifting power of example.

If I correctly interpret the note to Germany, it conforms to the standards of the old system rather than to the rules of the new, and I cheerfully admit that it is abundantly supported by precedents—precedents written in characters of blood upon almost every page of human history. Austria furnishes the most recent precedent; it was Austria's firmness that dictated the ultimatum against Serbia, which set the world at war.

Every ruler now participating in this unparalleled conflict has proclaimed his desire for peace and denied responsibility for the war, and it is only charitable that we should credit all of them with good faith. They desired peace, but they sought it according to the rules of the old system. They believed that firmness would give the best assurance of the maintenance of peace, and, faithfully following precedent, they went so near the fire that they were, one after another, sucked into the contest.

Never before have the frightful follies of this fatal system been so clearly revealed as now. The most civilized and enlightened—aye, the most Christian—of the nations of Europe are grappling with each other as if in a death struggle. They are sacrificing the best and bravest of their sons on the battlefield; they are converting their gardens into cemeteries and their homes into houses of mourning; they are taxing the wealth of today and laying a burden of debt on the toil of the future; they have filled the air with thunderbolts more deadly than those of Jove, and they have multiplied the perils of the deep.

Adding fresh fuel to the flame of hate, they have daily devised new horrors, until one side is endeavoring to drown noncombatant men, women, and children at sea, while the other side seeks to starve noncombatant men, women, and children on land. And they are so absorbed in alternate retaliations and in competitive cruelties that they seem, for the time being, blind to the rights of neutrals and deaf to the appeals of humanity. A tree is known by its fruit. The war in Europe is the ripened fruit of the old system.

This is what firmness, supported by force, has done in the Old World; shall we invite it to cross the Atlantic? Already the jingoes of our own country have caught the rabies from the dogs of war; shall the opponents of organized slaughter be silent while the disease spreads?

As an humble follower of the Prince of Peace, as a devoted believer in the prophecy that "they that take the sword shall perish with the sword," I beg to be counted among those who earnestly urge the adoption of a course in this matter which will leave no doubt of our Government's willingness to continue negotiations with Germany until an amicable understanding is reached, or at least until, the stress of war over, we can appeal from Philip drunk with carnage to Philip sobered by the memories of a historic friendship and by a recollection of the innumerable ties of kinship that bind the Fatherland to the United States.

Some nation must lead the world out of the black night of war into the light of that day when "swords shall be beaten into plowshares." Why not make that honor ours? Some day—why not now?—the nations will learn that enduring peace cannot be built upon fear—that good-will does not grow upon the stalks of violence. Some day the nations will place their trust in love, the weapon for which there is no shield; in love, that suffereth long and is kind; in love, that is not easily provoked, that beareth all things, believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things; in love, which, though despised as weakness by the worshippers of Mars, abideth when all else fails.

W.J. BRYAN.

THE GERMAN-AMERICANS.

Washington, June 11, 1915.

To the German-Americans:

Permit me to address a word to you, as one American citizen speaking to fellow-citizens in whose patriotism he has entire confidence. It is natural that in a contest between your Fatherland and other European nations your sympathies should be with the country of your birth. It is no cause for censure that this is true. It would be a reflection upon you if it were not true. Do not the sons of Great Britain sympathize with their mother country? Do not the sons of France sympathize with theirs? Is not the same true of Russia and of Italy? Why should it not be true of those who are born in Germany or Austria? The trouble is that the extremists on both sides have mistaken a natural attachment felt for birthplace for disloyalty to this country.

The President has been unjustly criticised by the partisans of both sides—the very best evidence of his neutrality. If he had so conducted the Government as to wholly please either side it would excite not only astonishment, but misgivings, for partisans cannot give an unbiased judgment; they will of necessity look at the question from their own point of view, giving praise or blame, according as the act, regardless of its real character, helps or hurts the side with which they have aligned themselves.

The fact that the Administration has received more criticism from German-Americans than from those in sympathy with the Allies is due to the fact that, while both sides are at liberty under international law to purchase ammunition in the United States, the Allies, because of their control of the seas, have the advantage of being able to export it.

It is unfortunate that partisan supporters of Germany should have overlooked the legal requirements of the situation and have thus misunderstood the position of the Administration. The Administration's position has not only been perfectly neutral, but it could not have been otherwise without a palpable and intentional violation of the rules governing neutrality.

This Government is not at liberty to materially change the rules of international law during the war, because every change suggested is discussed, not upon its merits as an abstract proposition, but according to the effect it will have upon the contest. Those who wanted to lay an embargo upon the shipments of arms defended their position on the ground that it would hasten peace, but it is strange that they could have overlooked the fact that the only way in which such action on our part could hasten peace would have been by helping one side to overcome the other.

While the attacks made upon the President by the extremists of both sides were very unjust, it was equally unjust to suspect the patriotism of those who took sides. I feel well enough acquainted with the European-born Americans to believe that in a war between this country and any European power the naturalized citizens from that country would be as quick to enlist as native-born citizens.

As I am now speaking to German-Americans, I am glad to repeat in public what I have often said in private, and would have said in public before but for the fact that it would not have been proper for one in my official position to do so—namely, that in case of war between the United States and Germany—if so improbable a supposition can be considered—German-Americans would be as prompt to enlist and as faithful to the flag as any other portion of our people. What I have said in regard to German-Americans is an introduction to an appeal which I feel it my duty to make to them.

First, if any of them have ever in a moment of passion or excitement suspected the President of lack of friendship toward the German Government and the German people, let that thought be forgotten, never again to be recalled. I have, since my resignation, received numerous telegrams from German-Americans and German-American societies commending my action. I think the senders of these telegrams understand my position; but that no one may mistake it let me restate it. The President is not only desirous of peace, but he hopes for it, and he has adopted the methods which he thinks most likely to contribute toward peace.

My difference from him is as to method, not as to purpose, and my utterances since resigning have been intended to crystallize public sentiment in support of his efforts to maintain peace, or, to use a similar phrase, "Peace with Honor." But remember that when I use the phrase "Peace with Honor" I do not use it in the same sense that those do who regard every opponent of war as favoring "peace at any price." Peace at any price is an epithet, not a true statement of any one's position or of the policy of any group. The words are employed by jingoes as an expression of contempt, and are applied indiscriminately to all who have faith in the nation's ability to find a peaceful way out of every difficulty, so long as both nations want peace.

The alarmists of the country have had control of the metropolitan press, and they have loudly proclaimed that the prolongation of negotiations or the suggestion of international investigation would be a sign of weakness—and everything is weakness that does not contain a hint of war. The jingo sees in the rainbow of promise only one color—red.

Second—Knowing that the President desires peace, it is our duty to help him secure it. And how? By exerting your influence to convince the German Government of this fact and to persuade that Government to take no steps that would lead in the direction of war. My fear has been that the German Government might, despairing of a friendly settlement, break off diplomatic relations, and thus create a condition out of which war might come without the intention of either country.

I do not ask you to minimize the earnestness of the President's statement—that would be unfair, both to him and to Germany. The sinking of the Lusitania cannot be defended upon the facts as we understand them. The killing of innocent women and children cannot be justified, whether the killing is by drowning or starving.

No nation can successfully plead the inhumanity of her enemies as an excuse for inhumanity on her own part. While it is true that cruelty is apt to beget cruelty, it cannot be said that "like cures like." Even in war, we are not absolved from the obligation to remedy evils by the influence of a good example. "Let your light so shine" is a precept that knows no times nor seasons as it knows neither latitude nor longitude.

Third—Do not attempt to connect the negotiations which are going on between the United States and Germany with those between the United States and Great Britain. The cases are different, but, even if they were the same, it would be necessary to treat with each nation separately. My personal preference has been to repeat our insistence that the Allies shall not interfere with our commerce with neutral countries, but the difference on this point was a matter of judgment and not a matter of principle. In the note to Great Britain, dated March 30, this Government said:

In view of these assurances formally given to this Government, it is confidently expected that the extensive powers conferred by the Order in Council on the executive officers of the Crown will be restricted by "orders issued by the Government" directing the exercise of their discretionary powers in such a manner as to modify in practical application those provisions of the Order in Council which, if strictly enforced, would violate neutral rights and interrupt legitimate trade. Relying on the faithful performance of these voluntary assurances by his Majesty's Government the United States takes it for granted that the approach of American merchantmen to neutral ports situated upon the long line of coast affected by the Order in Council will not be interfered with, when it is known that they do not carry goods which are contraband of war or goods destined to or proceeding from ports within the belligerent territory affected.

There is no doubt that our Government will insist upon this position—that is an important thing, the exact date of the note is not material. My reason for desiring to have the matter presented to Great Britain at once was not that Germany had any right to ask it, but because I was anxious to make it as easy as possible for Germany to accept the demands of the United States and cease to employ submarines against merchantmen.

There is no reason why any German-Americans should doubt the President's intentions in this matter. I am sure that every one upon reflection recognizes that our duty to prevent loss of life is more urgent than our duty to prevent interference with trade—loss of trade can be compensated for with money, but no settlement that the United States and Germany may reach can call back to life those who went down with the Lusitania—and war would be the most expensive of all settlements because it would enormously add to the number of the dead.

Fourth—I hope that Germany will acquiesce in the demands that have been made, and I hope that she will acquiesce in them without conditions. She can trust the United States to deal justly with her in the consideration of any changes that she may propose in the international rules that govern the taking of prizes. The more generously she acts in this matter the greater will be the glory which she will derive from it. She has raised a question which is now receiving serious consideration, namely, whether the introduction of the submarine necessitates any change in the rules governing the capture of prizes. The position seemingly taken by Germany, namely, that she is entitled to drown noncombatants because they ride with contraband, is an untenable position. The most that she could insist upon is that, in view of the introduction of this new weapon of warfare, new rules should be adopted, separating passengers from objectionable cargo.

If the use of the submarine justifies such a change in the law of blockade as will permit the cordon to be withdrawn far enough from the shore to avoid the danger of submarine attack, may it not be found possible to secure an international agreement by which passengers will be excluded from ships carrying contraband, or, at least, from those carrying ammunition?

It would require but a slight change in the shipping laws to make this separation, and belligerent nations might be restrained from unnecessarily increasing the contraband list if they were compelled to carry contraband on transports as they now carry troops.

Personally, I would like to see the use of submarines abandoned entirely, just as I would like to see an abandonment of the use of aeroplanes and Zeppelins for the carrying of explosives, but I am not sanguine enough to believe that any effective instrument of warfare will be abandoned as long as war continues.

The very arguments which the advocates of peace advance against the submarine, the aeroplane, and the Zeppelin are advanced for them by those who conduct war. The more fatal a weapon is the more it is in demand, and it is not an unusual thing to see a new instrument of destruction denounced as inhuman by those against whom it is employed, only to be employed later by those who only a little while before denounced it.

The above suggestions are respectfully submitted to those of German birth or descent, and they are submitted in the same spirit to naturalized citizens from other countries. To the naturalized citizen this is the land of adoption, but in one sense it may be nearer to him than it is to us who are native born, for those who come here are citizens by voluntary choice, while we are here by accident of birth. They may be said to have paid a higher compliment to the United States than we who first saw the light under the Stars and Stripes. But, more than that, it is the land of their children and their children's children, no matter for what reason they crossed the ocean. They not only share with us the shaping of our nation's destiny, but their descendants have a part with ours in all the blessings which the present generation can, by wise and patriotic action, bequeath to the generations that are to follow.

W.J. BRYAN.

SEES CHANGE IN TONE OF PRESS.

On the same day with this outgiving Mr. Bryan issued a statement expressing his gratification over what he termed a change in the tone of the press regarding the note. The statement follows:

I am glad to note the change in the tone of the press in regard to the note to Germany. From the time the papers began to publish forecasts down to yesterday the jingo editors have been predicting that the matter would be dealt with with "great firmness"; that Germany would be told that there must be no more delay in the acceptance of this country's demands, &c.

Instead of waiting until the note was issued they put their own construction upon it in advance, and colored it to suit their own purposes. It is a relief to find the papers now emphasizing the friendly tone of the note, and pointing out that it does not necessarily mean war.

Something has been gained if the warrior journalists at last realize that the country does not want war, but that, on the contrary, it will support the President in his efforts to find a peaceful solution of the difficult problem raised by the use of the submarine against merchantmen.

In giving out his statement Mr. Bryan supplemented it with the following anecdote:

A Congressman replying to a jingo speech recently said:

"While I am personally against war, I am in favor of the country having what it wants. If the country wants war, let it have war, but let it first find out if the country does want war. If it becomes necessary to ascertain the sentiment of the country, I suggest that a ballot be taken; let those who want war vote for war and those opposed to war vote against it, and let the vote be taken with the understanding that those who vote for war will enlist for war and that those who vote against war will not be called upon until after those who want war have exhausted their efforts."

"I still believe," added Mr. Bryan, "in the right of the people to rule, and think the Congressman's suggestion might insure deliberate action on the part of the voters."

Mr. Bryan was reminded of the suggestion of some of his friends that in case of war he would be one of the first to enlist. He replied:

I do not want to talk about war, but on one occasion I enlisted to defend my country on the first day war was declared.

GERMAN-AMERICAN OPINION.

Commenting on Mr. Bryan's appeal, the evening edition of the New Yorker Herold on June 12 said:

The arguments which Mr. Bryan dishes up will not be agreed to by most citizens of German descent, but the open discussion of the various points can only be useful.

So far as influencing the German Government is concerned, we are convinced that in Berlin they will not forget for an instant how terrible a warlike conflict between the two countries would be, particularly for the Germans in America. In view of the many bonds of blood that link the German population of our country with the old Fatherland, a war with the United States would be regarded practically as fratricidal, as a calamity which, if in any way possible, must be avoided. Mr. Bryan may rest assured of this.

The influence of the German-Americans is required less in Germany than here, at this point and place, in the United States. Here the jingo press is raging and seeking to fire minds to war, not in Germany.

From the Detroiter Abendpost.

Mr. Bryan's proclamation will disappoint only those who hailed him when he published his reasons for leaving the Cabinet; but we find in his last document the confirmation of what we have always thought of the man and the politician Bryan, namely, that he considers all means right if they suit his political intentions.

From Charles Neumeyer, Editor Louisville Anzeiger.

Mr. Bryan's appeal directed chiefly to American citizens of German birth exhibits an astonishing lack of tact as well as lack of judgment. The former Secretary of State seems to be going on the presumption, like many other native Americans not actuated by a feeling of prejudice or race hatred, that German-Americans have left their hearts behind them in the old country and are, therefore, unable to feel as true American citizens should feel toward their country and everything involving its destiny.

Mr. Bryan's appeal, especially the one directed to German-Americans, will not, can not, and should not meet with the slightest response.

From the Colorado Herold of Denver.

Bryan's appeal to the Germans, while it may be classed as patriotic, was unnecessary, and Dr. Dernburg, Germany's special envoy, practically voiced the same sentiments in his farewell address in New York Friday night. Bryan's well-known prohibition tendencies, however, preclude the idea that he was bidding for German-American votes.

From the Waechter und Anzeiger of Cleveland, Ohio.

Mr. Bryan might well have abstained from issuing his statement to the German-Americans. To make any impression he should have explained why he now thinks it the duty of neutrality to furnish contraband to England, when in 1914 he stated in his Commoner that the President had blazed a new way when he, without conference with other nations, committed this nation to the policy that furnishing the "contraband of money" was inconsistent with the spirit of neutrality. What are the influences that have now changed his views? Mr. Bryan is neither frank nor consistent, hence not impressive.

A “SOFTENED” NOTE.

[The First and Second German Notes.]

Washington, June 12, 1915.

My attention has been called to a number of newspaper editorials and articles which, in varying language, asks the question, "Why did Mr. Bryan sign the first note to Germany, and then refuse to sign the second?" The argument presented in the question is based on the supposition that the two notes were substantially the same and that the second note simply reiterates the demands contained in the first. They then declare it inconsistent to sign one and refuse to sign the other. The difference between the two cases would seem obvious enough to make an answer unnecessary, but, lest silence on the subject be taken as an admission of inconsistency, the following explanation is given:

The notes must be considered in connection with the conditions under which they were sent. The first note presented the case of this Government upon such evidence as we then had. It was like the plaintiff's statement in a case, his claim being based on the facts as he presents them. I did not agree entirely with the language of the first note, but the difference was not so material as to justify a refusal to sign it. Then, too, I was at that time hoping that certain things would be done which would make it easier for Germany to acquiesce in our demands.

The three things which I had in mind which, in my judgment, would have helped the situation were: First, an announcement of a willingness upon our part to employ the principle of investigation, embodied in our thirty peace treaties; second, action which would prevent American citizens from traveling on belligerent ships or on American ships carrying contraband, especially if that contraband consisted of ammunition; and, third, further insistence upon our protest against interference of our trade with neutrals. I thought that these three things were within the range of possibilities, and that two, or at least one was probable.

Some weeks have elapsed since the first note was sent, and we have not only failed to do any of these things hoped for, but Germany has in the meantime answered and in her answer has not only presented a number of alleged facts which, in her judgment, justified the deviation which she has made from the ordinary rules applicable to prize cases, but she has suggested arbitration. A rejection of the arguments which she presented and of the allegations made, together with a reiteration of the original demands, creates a very different situation from that which existed when the first demand was made.

As I have before stated, my fear has been that, owing to the feeling existing in Germany, the Government might, upon receipt of such a note under such circumstances, break off diplomatic relations and thus create a situation out of which war might come without the intention of either side. I am sure that the President does not want war and I am confident that our people do not want war; I have no reason to believe that either the German Government or the German people desire war.

But war, a calamity at any time, is especially to be avoided now because our nation is relied upon by both neutrals and belligerents as the one nation which can exert most influence toward bringing this war to an end. If we were, by accident, to be drawn into the conflict, we would not only surrender the opportunity to act as a mediator, but we might become responsible for drawing other nations into this contest. When we see how one nation after another has been dragged into this war we cannot have confidence in the ability of any one to calculate with certainty upon the results that might follow if we became embroiled in the war.

No one would be happier than I if the President's plan results in a peaceful settlement, but no one was in position to say what effect our note would have upon Germany, or what results would follow if she, in anger, broke off diplomatic relations, and I was not only unwilling to assume the responsibility for the risks incurred—risks which no one could with any degree of accuracy measure—but I felt that, having done all I could in the Cabinet, it was my duty to undertake, outside the Cabinet, the work upon which I have entered.

I have no doubt that the country will unanimously support the President during the war, if so great a misfortune should overtake us, but I believe that the chances of war will be lessened in proportion as the country expresses itself in favor of peace—not "peace at any price"—but peace in preference to a war waged for the redress of such grievances as we have against Germany—at least against war until we have given to Germany the opportunity which we are pledged to give to Great Britain, France, and Russia—to have every difference of every character submitted to an international commission of investigation.

I would contend as earnestly for the application of the treaty principle to the Allies as I contend for it in the case of Germany. If the principle is sound, it ought to be applied to every country with which we have a difference, and if it ought to be applied at all I think it is better to suggest it in the beginning than to accept it later after a seeming reluctance to apply it.

I understand that Secretary Lansing has already given out a statement, correcting an inaccuracy which appeared in this morning's paper. I appreciate his kindness.

It is true that I saw the final draft of the note just before my resignation took effect, but it contained an important change. I had no knowledge of this change at the time my resignation was tendered and accepted. This change, while very much softening the note, was not, however, sufficient, in my judgment, to justify me in asking permission to withdraw my resignation.

As Germany had suggested arbitration, I felt that we could not do less than reply to this offer by expressing a willingness to apply the principle of the peace treaties to the case. These treaties, while providing for investigation of all questions, leave the nations free to act independently after the international commission has concluded the investigation.

W.J. BRYAN.

STATEMENTS ON THE WAR IN EUROPE.

Mr. Bryan on June 16 gave out the first of three statements about the present war, and in it he predicts that a conference will be held at the close of the conflict to revise the rules of international law. The present rules, in Mr. Bryan's opinion, "seem to have been made for the nations at war rather than for the nations at peace."

The statement contains a hint to President Wilson in the concluding paragraph which says that "in all history no other peacemaker has ever been in position to claim so rich a blessing as that which will be pronounced on our President when the time for mediation comes—as come it must." Its text follows:

Washington, June 16, 1915.

I shall tomorrow discuss the origin of the war and the reasons which led the nations of Europe to march, as if blindfolded, into the bloody conflict which now rests like a pall over the fairest parts of the Old World; today let us consider the war as it is and the injury it is doing to the neutral nations.

The war is without a precedent in the populations represented, in the number of combatants in the field, in daily expenditures, in the effectiveness of the implements employed, in the lists of dead and wounded, in the widespread suffering caused and in the intensity of the hatreds aroused.

No class or condition is exempt from the burdens which this war imposes. The rich bear excessive taxation and the poor are sorely oppressed; the resources of today are devoured and the products of tomorrow are mortgaged. No age is immune. The first draft was upon the strong and vigorous, but the Governments are already calling for those above and below the ordinary enlistment zone.

The war's afflictions are visited upon women as well as upon men—upon wives who await in vain a husband's return, and upon mothers who must surrender up the sons whose support is the natural reliance of declining years. Even children are its victims—children innocent of wrong and incapable of doing harm. By war's dread decree babes come into the world fatherless at their birth, while the bodies of their sires are burned like worthless stubble in the fields over which the Grim Reaper has passed.

The most extreme illustrations collected from history to prove the loathsomeness of war are overshadowed by new indictments written daily; the most distressing pictures drawn by the imagination are surpassed by the realities of this indescribable contest. Surely we behold "the pestilence that walketh in darkness and the destruction that wasteth at noonday."

Neutral nations cannot look on with indifference—the ties that bind them together are too strong, the relationship too intimate. This is especially true of the United States. We have a composite population, every nation of Europe having contributed liberally to our citizenship. These our countrymen, themselves born abroad or immediately descended from foreign-born ancestors, cannot but take a likely interest in the conduct as well as in the results of the war, and a still larger circle shares the concern of those directly connected. Not a soldier falls on either side but the sorrow expressed in his home finds an echo at some fireside in the United States.

But, aside from sentimental considerations, neutral nations suffer serious disturbances because of the war. Duelists, when dueling was in fashion, were careful to select a place where they could settle their personal differences without harm to unoffending bystanders, but warring nations cannot, no matter how earnestly they try, avoid injury to neutrals. As the nauseous odors of a slaughterhouse, carried on the breeze, pollute the air in every direction, so the evil influences emanating from these wide-extended battlefields taint the atmosphere of the whole political world. War is an international nuisance. Nearly every neutral nation finds new domestic problems thrust upon it and old problems made more difficult.

No American citizen can note without deep concern the manner in which war questions have intruded themselves into our politics—overshadowing economic issues and stimulating agitation in favor of enlarged appropriations for military and naval purposes. Business is deranged and expensive readjustments made necessary, while commerce with foreign nations is seriously interrupted. Fluctuations in price abroad are reflected in the markets of the United States. A fall of one cent in the price of cotton means tens of millions of dollars to our producers and merchants. Added to this, freight rates and insurance premiums have been increased to cover the greater risks incident to war.

Scarcity of ships is one of the greatest commercial embarrassments caused by the war. We have depended largely upon foreign ships to carry our commerce, and we could not but suffer when the merchantmen of one side were driven from the sea and a part of the merchant fleet of the other side was withdrawn for Government use.

The neutral nations are put to a great expense to preserve neutrality and are constantly in danger of being embroiled in the war without intention or fault on their part.

The rules of international law seem to have been made for the nations at war rather than for the nations at peace. It is almost impossible to alter these rules during the war, because any material change, affecting as it would the interests of belligerents, would be a seeming violation of neutrality. As soon as peace returns there will be a demand for an international conference on the subject. The presumption should then be given to peace, for peace, not war, is the normal condition. If nations are determined to fight they should, as far as possible, bear their burden themselves and not be permitted to transfer it to the nations which avoid war by resorting to reason instead of force.

Under the stress and strain of the titanic struggle in which they are engaged, each side has felt itself justified in encroaching upon the rights of neutrals. The ocean highways, the common property of all, have been to some extent appropriated for war purposes, and delicate diplomatic questions are forced upon the neutral nations. Just at this time, when these questions are most acute, the belligerent Governments are least able to deal with them with the calmness and poise which their great importance demands.

No wonder every neutral nation is increasingly anxious for the war to end; but of all the neutral nations ours has the most reason for the return of peace—most reason to set its face resolutely against participation in this war. This nation, the head of the neutral group and the sincere friend of all the belligerents, is in duty bound to set an example in patience and self-restraint.

In all history no such opportunity has ever come to any other nation as that which is destined to come to the United States. In all history no other peacemaker has ever been in a position to claim so rich a blessing as that which will be pronounced upon our President when the time for mediation comes—as come it must.

W.J. BRYAN.

“PREPAREDNESS” AND WAR.

That military preparedness provokes war is the conclusion drawn by Mr. Bryan in the second utterance in his series of three concerning the European conflict and war in general. It reads:

Washington, June 17, 1915.

The conflict now raging in Europe has been described as "The Causeless War," but since no one would be bold enough to lay the blame for such an unholy situation upon an overruling Providence, it must find its origin in acts for which man, and man alone, is responsible.

It is not a race war; on the contrary, the races are quite inexplicably mixed. Latin joins with Saxon; the Frank is the ally of the Slav; while in the opposing ranks Teuton and Turk fight side by side.

Neither is it a religious war. On the Bosporus the Cross and the Crescent make common cause; Protestant Kaiser and Catholic Emperor have linked their fortunes together and hurl their veteran legions against an army in which are indiscriminately mingled communicants of the Greek Church, of the Church of Rome, and of the Church of England.

Nor yet is it a rivalry between families. The leading actors in this unprecedented tragedy are related by blood, but kinship seems to be a negligible factor—it explains neither friendships nor enmities.

No. Race, religion, and family, each with many wars to answer for, can plead not guilty in the present inquiry. So far as can be judged, there appears upon the surface no cause that by any known standard can be regarded as adequate for such a cataclysm as we are now witnessing.

The notes that passed from chancellery to chancellery were couched in most friendly language. These notes could not have been intended to deceive. Sovereigns visited each other and were received with every evidence of cordiality and good-will. This hospitality could not have been insincere.

Each ruler declared that he did not wish war; would they all say this if an adequate cause for war had actually existed? They have all denied responsibility for the war—would they have done so if they had regarded the war as either necessary or desirable?

But there is even better proof, aye, indisputable proof, that no sufficient cause existed, viz., the conclusion to be drawn from inaction.

Would not these rulers have busied themselves trying to save their subjects by the eradication of the cause had they known of the existence of such a cause? Would they have spent their time in social festivities and in exchanging compliments had they known that they were on the brink of war? It is inconceivable! It would be a gross libel on them, one and all, to charge such a wanton disregard of their sacred duty.

What, then, was the cause? If I have correctly analyzed the situation, the war is the natural result of a false philosophy. Theories of life are invisible, but they control for good or for evil. They enter our very being, and may be as deadly to the moral man as germs of disease, taken into the body, are deadly to the physical man. The fundamental precept of this false philosophy is that "might makes right." It is not proclaimed now as loudly as it once was, but it is often acted upon in particular cases by those who would be unwilling to indorse it as a general principle.

The individual makes this maxim his excuse for violating three commandments that stand in his way; this maxim also leads nations to violate these same three commandments for the same purpose, but on a larger scale.

Strange that men should fail to apply to nations the moral principles which are now so generally applied to the individual units of a nation!

The tendency is to condemn the violation of these commandments, not in proportion to the injury done, but rather in inverse proportion. No one will dispute the validity of the injunction against covetousness as long as the object coveted is of little value or not greatly desired, but the last and all-inclusive specifications, viz., "or anything that is thy neighbor's," is sometimes interpreted by nations to except a neighbor's vineyard or a neighbor's territory. Covetousness turns to might as the principle to be invoked, and the greater the unlawful desire the firmer the faith in the false principle.

Conquest is the word used to describe the means employed for securing the thing desired, if the force is employed by a nation, and conquest violates the commandments Thou Shalt Not Steal and Thou Shalt Not Kill.

By what sophistry can rulers convince themselves that, while petit larceny is criminal, grand larceny is patriotic; that, while it is reprehensible for one man to kill another for his money, it is glorious for one nation to put to the sword the inhabitants of another nation in order to extend boundaries?

It is a mockery of moral distinctions to hang one man for taking the life of another, either for money or in revenge, and then make a hero of another man who wades "through slaughter to a throne, and shut the doors of mercy on mankind."

As in the case of the individual, the violation of the commandments Thou Shall Not Covet, Thou Shalt Not Steal, and Thou Shalt Not Kill, are usually traceable to the violation of the first great commandment—Thou Shalt Have No Other Gods Before Me—that is, to the putting of self before service of the Creator.

The violation of these commandments by nations is not always, but usually, due to selfishness—the putting of supposed material advantages before obedience to the Divine Law.

War is occasionally altruistic in purpose and the soldier always exhibits unselfishness of high order, but, as a rule, conflicts are waged for selfish ends.

The individual finds that Jehovah's justice cannot be evaded; for wrongdoing works its own punishment on the wrongdoer in the form of perverted character when he escapes the penalties of human law. The nation is as powerless to repeal or to ignore with impunity the laws of God—"Though hand join in hand they shall not be unpunished."

If I have made it clear that the doctrine that might makes right is the most common cause of war, we may pass to the consideration of a maxim quite sure to be applied in war, namely, that "like cures like"—the theory upon which retaliation rests.

The two are so closely allied that it is almost inevitable that those who indorse the former will resort to the latter—one representing the spirit of will, the other its most familiar manifestation. Rivalry for rivalry in wrongdoing—a neck-and-neck race to the bottomless pit. And yet there are many believers in the gospel of force, who have brought themselves to think that cruelty can be cured by greater cruelty—that the only way to win an antagonist away from inhuman acts is to surpass him in inhumanities. Absurdity of absurdities!

But might must find a pretext for arming itself; and what is the pretext? There was a time when men openly advocated war as a thing to be desired; commended it to each generation as a sort of tonic to tone up the moral system and prevent degeneracy, but we have passed that day.

Now all join in the chorus for peace. And how, according to the jingoes, shall peace be insured? "By preparedness," say these sons of Mars. Prepare, all prepare; equip yourselves with the most modern implements of destruction; arm, drill, get ready, and then stand with fingers on a barrel of a musket and preserve peace—you preserve it until some one, by accident or design, gives the signal—then all fall upon each other with cries for blood. Preparedness is the kindling; opportunity is the match.

We dare not trust the peace of the world to those who spend their time in getting ready for wars that should never come. Half the energy employed in preparing for war would effectually prevent war if used in propagating the principles which make for peace.

Instead of preventing war, preparedness provokes war, because it is impossible to coerce the people into bearing the burdens incident to continuous and increasing preparation without cultivating hatred as if it were a national virtue. There must be some one to fear; some other preparing nation that must be represented as plotting for war.

Hate sets up sham standards of honor and converts every wound into a festering sore; hate misunderstands; hate misinterprets; hate maligns its supposed adversary, while every contractor, battleship builder, and manufacturer of munitions of war applauds.

How can preparedness prevent war, if all prepared? Each step taken by one nation toward more complete preparedness excites the other nations to additional purchases and new levies, until all have exhausted their productive industries and menaced their moral progress.

The doctrine that preparedness will prevent war will not stand the test of logic, and the conflagration in Europe shows that it fails when tested by experience.

If any nation is without excuse for entering into a mad rivalry with the belligerent nations in preparation for war it is the United States. We are protected on either side by thousands of miles of ocean, and this protection is worth more to us than any number of battleships. We have an additional protection in the fact—known to every one—that we have the men with whom to form an army of defense if we are ever attacked, and it is known also that we have the money, too—more money than we would have if the surplus earnings of the people had been invested in armament. We not only do not need additional preparation, but we are fortunate in not having it, as now it seems impossible for a nation to have what is called preparedness on slight notification.

The leading participants in the present war are the nations that were best prepared, and I fear it would have been difficult for us to keep out of this war if we had been as well prepared as they.

Happily for our nation, we have in the White House at this time a President who believes in setting the Old World an example instead of following the bad example which it has set in this matter. What an unspeakable misfortune it would have been if in such an hour as this the nation had been under the leadership of a President inflamed by the false philosophy which has plunged Europe into the abyss of war.

W.J. BRYAN.

HOW TO END THE WAR.

The concluding argument of ex-Secretary Bryan for permanent peace among the great powers was published on June 18, 1915. The statement follows:

Washington, June 18, 1915.

Having considered the war as it is and the injury which it does neutrals, and then the origin of the war and the causes which led up to it, we are now ready to make inquiry as to the way out—that is, the means by which hostilities can be brought to an end and permanent peace restored. To state in a sentence the propositions which I shall proceed to elaborate: Mediation is the means, provided by international agreement, through which the belligerent nations can be brought into conference; time for the investigation of all disputes is the means by which future wars can be averted, and the cultivation of international friendship is the means by which the desire for war can be rooted out.

What are the nations fighting about? No one seems to know, or if any one does know, he has not taken the public into his confidence. We have been told, in a general way, that the Allies are fighting against "militarism" and in defense of "popular government," and that Germany is fighting in defense of "German culture" and for the nation's right to "a place in the sun." But these generalities are so differently interpreted as not to convey a definite idea. When the President offered mediation at the very beginning of the struggle the answers which he received from the various rulers were so much alike that one telegram might have served for all. The substance of each answer was, "I did not want war and I am not to blame for the war that now exists." But that was ten months ago; the question now is not whether those in authority in the belligerent nations did or did not want war then; we may accept their answers as given in good faith, but the important question is still unanswered. "I did not want war" may have been deemed sufficient at the time the answers were given, but the real question is, "Do you want war now? If not, why not say so?"

The months have dragged their bloody length along—each more terrible than the month before—and yet the crimson line of battle sways to and fro, each movement marked by dreadful loss of life. While warriors die and widows weep, the sovereign rulers of the warring powers withhold the word that would stop the war. No Chief of State has yet said, "I do not want war." No one in authority has yet publicly declared his willingness to state the terms upon which his nation is ready to negotiate peace. Are not these dying men and these sorrowing women entitled to know definitely for what their nation is fighting? Is it territory? Then how much territory, and where is it located? Is it the avenging of a wrong done? Then how much more blood must be spilled to make atonement for the blood already shed? Some day accumulated suffering will reach its limit; some day the pent-up anguish which this war is causing will find a voice. Then, if not before, the rulers in the war zone will pause to listen to the stern question, "Why do we die?"—the question which shakes thrones and marks the furthermost limits of arbitrary power.

And is not the outside world entitled to know the price of peace? Must the neutrals bear the penalties which war necessarily visits upon them, and yet remain in ignorance as to the issues at stake? Their trade is interrupted, their citizens are drowned, they are the victims of stray bullets—have they no right to know what it is that, being done, will draw down the curtain of this dark tragedy? Has any nation a purpose for continuing this war which it does not dare to state to the world, or even to its own people?

Surely neither side thinks it can annihilate the other. Great nations cannot be exterminated—population cannot be wiped out by the sword. The combatants, even though the war may have made them heartless, will shrink from the task of carrying this slaughter beyond the point necessary to win a victory. And it must be remembered that war plans often miscarry. Predictions made at the beginning of the war have not been fulfilled. The British did not destroy the German fleet in a month, and Germany did not take Paris in two months, and the Russian Army did not eat Christmas dinner in Berlin. But even if extermination were possible, it would be a crime against civilization which no nation or group of nations could afford to commit. If it is vandalism to destroy the finest specimens of man's workmanship, is it not sacrilege to engage in the wholesale destruction of human beings—the supreme example of God's handiwork? We may find cases of seeming total depravity among individuals, but not in a nation or in a race. The future has use for the peoples now at war; they have a necessary part in that destiny which mankind must work out together regardless of these ebullitions of anger. The Lord might have made all flowers of one kind, of one color and alike in fragrance—but He did not. And because He did not, the world is more beautiful. Variety, not uniformity, is the law among men as well as among the flowers. The nations which are actively participating in this war are what they are because of struggles that have lasted for centuries. They differ in language, in institutions, in race characteristics, and in national history, but together they constitute a great living bouquet that is of surpassing beauty.

We may put aside, therefore, as wholly impracticable, if not inconceivable, the thought that this war can continue until one side has annihilated the other. What, then, can be the purpose? The complete domination of Europe by one nation or group of nations? The absurdity of such a plan is only second to the absurdity of the thought that either side can annihilate the other. The world is not looking for a master; the day of the despot is gone. The future will be gloomy indeed if the smaller nations must pass under the yoke of any power or combination of powers. The question is not who shall dictate on land, or who shall dominate upon the sea. These questions are not practical ones. The real question is, not how a few can lay burdens upon the rest, but how all can work together as comrades and brothers.

Even if it were possible for one side to force the other side to its knees in supplication, even if it were possible for one side to write the terms of the treaty in blood and compel the other side to sign it, face downward and prostrate on the ground, it could not afford to do so; and unless the belligerents have read history to no purpose, they will not desire to do so. Time and again some nation, boastful of its strength, has thought itself invincible, but the ruins of these mistaken and misguided nations line the pathway along which the masses have marched to higher ground. Despotism has in it the seeds of death; the spirit that leads a nation to aspire to a supremacy based on force is the spirit that destroys its hope of immortality. Only those who are unacquainted with the larger influences can place their sole reliance on the weapons used in physical warfare. They see only the things that are transient and ephemeral; they do not comprehend the higher truth that "the things that are seen are temporal; the things that are unseen are eternal."

Christian nations need to read again Christ's prayer upon the Cross, "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do." All the participants in this war have sinned enough to make them anxious to exhibit that forgiving spirit which is the measure of the forgiveness which can be claimed.

When can peace be restored? Any time—now, if the participants are really weary of this war and ready for it to end. If any nation is not ready, let its ruler state in clear, distinct, and definite terms the conditions upon which it is willing to agree to peace; then if an agreement is not reached the blame for the continuance of the war will be upon those who make unreasonable demands.

What can be done by the advocates of peace? First, they can crystallize the sentiment in favor of peace into a coercive force, for public opinion at last controls the world. There is a work which the neutrals can do; they can offer mediation, jointly or severally. It is not an act of hostility, but an act of friendship. The Hague Convention, to which all the Governments are parties, expressly declares that the offer of mediation shall not be considered an unfriendly act. The duty of offering mediation may seem to rest primarily upon the United States, the largest of the neutral nations, and the one most intimately bound by ties of blood to all the belligerents. The United States did make an offer immediately after the war began. But why not again and again and again, until our offer or some other offer is accepted? Why not stand at the door and knock, as we would at the door of a friend if we felt that the friend was in need and that we could render a service?

But our action or failure to act need not deter any other neutral country from acting. This is not a time to stand on ceremony; if any other country, for any reason, no matter what that reason may be, is in a better position than we to tender its good offices, it should not delay for a moment. It is for the belligerents to decide which offer, if any, they will accept. I am sure they will not complain if, following the promptings of our hearts, we beseech them to let us help them back to the paths of peace.

Will they object on the ground that they will not consent to any peace until they have assurances that it will be a permanent peace? That suggestion has been made—I think both sides have expressed a desire that the peace, when secured, shall be permanent—but who can give a pledge as to the future? If fear that the peace may not be permanent is given as the reason for refusal it is not a sufficient reason. While no one can stand surety for what may come, it is not difficult to adopt measures which will give far greater assurance of permanent peace than the world has ever known before.

Second—The treaty in which they join should provide for investigation by a permanent international commission of every dispute that may arise, no matter what its character or nature. The United States has already made thirty treaties embodying this principle, and these thirty treaties link our country to nearly three-quarters of all the inhabitants of the world. We have such a treaty in force between the United States and four of the countries now at war—Great Britain, France, Russia, and Italy. The principle of this treaty has been accepted by three other belligerents—Germany, Austria, and Belgium—although treaties with these nations have not yet been negotiated. These seven warring nations have indorsed the principle embodied in these treaties, namely, that there shall be no declaration of war or commencement of hostilities until the subject in dispute has been investigated by an international commission. Why cannot they apply the principle as between themselves? What cause of war is of such magnitude that nations can afford to commence shooting at each other before the cause is investigated? A treaty such as those which now protect the peace of the United States would give a year's time for investigation and report, and who doubts that a year's time would be sufficient to reach an amicable settlement of almost every difficulty?

Does any one suppose that the present war would have been begun if a year's time had been taken to investigate the dispute between Austria and Serbia? It will be remembered that Serbia had only twenty-four hours in which to reply, and it will also be remembered that during this brief time the rulers of the Old World endeavored to find a means of preventing war. If they had only had some machinery which they could have employed to avert war, how gladly would they have availed themselves of it! The machinery provided by treaty can be resorted to with honor—yes, with honor—no matter how high a sense of honor the nation has. The trouble has been that, while the nations were abundantly provided with machinery for conducting war, they possessed no machinery for the promotion of peace. A year's time allows passion to subside and reason to resume its sway. It allows man to act when he is calm instead of having to act when he is angry. When a man is angry he swaggers around and talks about what he can do, and he often overestimates his strength; when he is calm he considers what he ought to do. When he is angry he hears the rumbling of earthquakes and the sweep of the hurricane; when he is calm he listens to the still small voice of conscience.

Third—While the period of investigation provided for in our treaties will go far toward preventing war, still even a year's deliberation does not give complete protection. In order to secure the investigation of all questions without exception it was necessary to reserve to the contracting parties liberty of action at the conclusion of the investigation. War is thus reduced from a probability to a mere possibility, and this is an immeasurable advance; but the assurance of permanent peace cannot be given until the desire for war is eradicated from the human heart. Compulsory periods of investigation supply the machinery by which nations can maintain peace with honor if they so desire; but the final work of the advocates of peace is educational—it is the cultivation of the spirit of brotherhood condensed into the commandment "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." Is it impossible to imagine a civilization in which greatness will be measured by service and in which the rivalry will be a rivalry in doing good? No one doubts that the lot of each member of society would be infinitely better under such conditions; why not strive to bring about such conditions? Is it visionary to hope and labor for this end? "Where there is no vision the people perish." It is a "death grapple in the darkness 'twixt old systems and the Word." The old system has broken down; it can let loose the furies, but it cannot bind them; it is impotent to save. The question is not whether the Word will triumph—that is certain—but when? And after what sufferings?

Thomas Carlyle, his voice rising clear and strong above the babble of Mammon, asked, in the closing chapters of his French Revolution:

"Hast thou considered how Thought is stronger than Artillery Parks, and (were it fifty years after death and martyrdom, or were it two thousand years) writes and unwrites Acts of Parliament, removes mountains, models the World like soft clay? Also how the beginning of all Thought worth the name is Love."

The truth which he uttered is still truth, and no matter who uttered it, the thought is the thought of Him who spake as never man spake; who was described in prophecy as the Prince of Peace; whose coming was greeted with the song of "Peace on earth; good-will to men," and whose teachings, when applied, will usher in the enduring peace of a universal brotherhood.

W.J. BRYAN.

Bryan, Idealist and Average Man

By Charles Willis Thompson

The subjoined estimate of William J. Bryan's character and public career, which appeared in The New York Times of June 9, 1915, is by the hand of one of its staff writers who has specialized in American national politics.

THE plain man of the prairie became Secretary of State when William J. Bryan did; the prairie then entered diplomacy, international controversy. The secret of all that has puzzled the land in his behavior lies in that fact. His hold on the West lies in the fact that he is in himself the average man of that country, with that man's ideals, aspirations, defects, and drawbacks. There seems nothing strange or funny in a Secretary of State who goes to New York and signs temperance pledges, or holds Billy Sunday's platform in Philadelphia, when you get a few miles away from the cities; and if it seems a little queer to New York to find the Secretary of State undertaking to demolish the Darwinian theory, there are plenty of regions where the Darwinian theory is regarded as a device of the devil to upset the Mosaic cosmogony. Chesterton says that Dickens never wrote down to the mob, because he was himself the mob; and Bryan never talked down to the men of the prairie for the same reason.

He is not a man of culture, nor of reading. He has been around the world, but when he came back the books and articles he wrote were such as might have been published as guide books or in encyclopedias; he could have written them without leaving home. Travel had no broadening or polishing effect upon his mind.

The vast influence he still has is due to the fact that the common man, with all his mistakes and gaucheries, speaks in him, and that when the common man hears his own thoughts spoken in Bryan's voice he knows that the accent is sincere. Bryan may have taken up this or that particular issue because it sounded like a vote-maker, but none of them represented the least divergence from his course as a whole, which has always been honestly bent in a certain plain direction. He never hesitated to be in a minority and never dodged a fight. He is an innocent theorist, who frequently goes wrong because of the simplicity of his mental processes; but he acts upon his theories, right or wrong, with an intrepidity and a whole-hearted courage in which the ordinary man sees the qualities he himself would like to have, and dreams he has. His mind is not broad, but it is strong; he is always sure he is right, and always ready to fight for his beliefs, and he keeps his hold upon his followers because he is not below them, and not much above them, and because they know he is honest and sincere.

In 1906, the Democratic Party, picking itself out of the wreckage of Parker's defeat, was yearning to reunite. "Big business," assaulted and bruised and banged about by President Roosevelt, was ready to come into line. Roosevelt or his candidate could be defeated in 1908 only by Democratic harmony. Bryan was abroad, traveling, and somehow his distant figure looked less appalling than the near-by figure in the White House. The East did not ask him to recant his radicalism, but only not to talk about it. He arrived in New York, and business went to hear him make a harmony speech. If he made it, business would support him for President. He made the speech; he declared for Government ownership of railroads. Business, roaring with pain, fell back into the Republican arms, and Bryan was defeated for President. No, Bryan is not an opportunist—not in things that really matter.

William Bayard Hale once accurately described him as "essentially a preacher, a high-class exhorter, a glorified circuit rider." There are vast spaces of our country still populated by men and women of the old-fashioned kind; Chesterton describes them as "full of stale culture and ancestral simplicity." They are the descendants of the Puritans—intellectually, at any rate—they look askance on cards, dancing, and the stage; they are the kind of folks who peopled the Mississippi Valley in Lincoln's day and Massachusetts in John Hancock's. Bryan does not talk down to that type for votes; he is that type. Colonel George Harvey, with sarcastic intent, alleged that Bryan became a white-ribboner after hearing a little girl recite "The Lips That Touch Liquor Shall Never Touch Mine." There are regions which would accept that parable as Gospel truth, and much to Bryan's credit.

Salem, Ill., is a little town which fairly shrieks at you its pre-eminence as a picture of that type. As you pass through its orderly little streets, with its little frame houses, all of the same kind and all neat and unassuming, with its dirt roads and its typical Town Hall, set correctly back behind a correct little patch of grass in a neat square, you feel instinctively that the Darwinian theory must be avoided in your Salem conversation. You know at once that the same families have lived there for generations. So they have; one of them was Bryan's, and he was born there on March 19, 1860.

Of course, he was the valedictorian of his class—Illinois College, 1881. Of course, he became a lawyer; and, of course, in the Middle West, that involved politics. He lived now in Lincoln, Neb., in a Republican district, but he was a Democrat. There was a landslide in 1890. The whole country went Democratic, and many a forlorn hope leader in some hide-bound Republican district was swept into Congress, Bryan among them. He made a great speech on the tariff, which won him instantly a national reputation; but Lincoln had recovered its Republican poise, and he did not go back to Congress. He added to his reputation in his own State, however, as editor of its chief Democratic organ, The Omaha World-Herald, and went to Chicago as the head of its delegation to the National Convention of 1896.

At a moment when David B. Hill's masterly presentation of the gold-standard case and Tillman's failure in his effort at rejoinder had thrown a wet blanket over the silverites, Bryan came forward with his "Cross of Gold" speech. The cheering delegations carried him around the hall on their shoulders. None of the candidates before the convention was dominating or really of Presidential size; the convention was deadlocked for many ballots, and at last it turned to Bryan and nominated him.

His defeat by McKinley really marked the beginning of his career as a national leader. Despite the accident which had made him the Democracy's nominal leader, he demonstrated that he was the ablest of the radicals into whose hands it had fallen, and his nominal chieftainship became a real one. It was evident from the beginning that he would be renominated in 1900. When the Spanish war broke out he offered his services and became Colonel of the Third Nebraska Regiment. The Republican Administration was taking no chances on his getting any military glory, and it marooned him in Florida till after the war. He returned good for evil by going to Washington, uniform and all, and dragooning reluctant Democratic Senators into voting for the treaty with Spain whereby we acquired the Philippines. This was one of his incidental opportunisms; he believed it would give the Democrats a winning issue, that of imperialism. The cast of Bryan's mind is such that he always gets his winning issues on wrong end foremost; it gave the Republicans a winning issue, that of imperialism.

Bryan went down to defeat again in 1900, on this new issue, and as usual epitaphs were written over his political grave. It is a favorite parlor game; but Bryan never stays dead, because there is something enduring in him. What is it? That same spokesmanship for the average man of many regions, the man of the little parlor with the melodeon or parlor organ, the plush-bound photograph album and the "History of the San Francisco Earthquake" bought by subscription from a book agent, and the grandfather's clock in the corner of the hall.

But in 1904 the Democratic leaders, tired of defeat, turned desperately to the opposite wing of the party. The radical leaders, really opportunists, forswore or hid their convictions for the sake of victory, tried to teach their unskillful tongues the language of conservatism, and joined in with the conservatives in the nomination of Parker. But Bryan did not yield; he forswore nothing, hid nothing, and he fought a lonely fight, the bravest of his life.

His fight was of one man against a multitude. Alone, he had to be everywhere; he was in the Committee on Resolutions, in the Committee on Credentials, on the floor of the convention, speaking, fighting, working, twenty hours a day. He had no one to help him; all his fellows were on the other side, strangling their convictions and fighting against him. He was insulted on the platform, even by fellow-radicals; he was elbowed aside and snarled at by men who had been more radical than himself; attempts were made to deny him a hearing. Nothing could daunt him or perturb him; he fought on until Parker was nominated, went to his hotel at dawn as the convention adjourned, and fell into his bed in utter collapse. A doctor was summoned, who said that Bryan must instantly give up all work and undergo treatment.

That evening the news came that Parker had refused to run unless the word "gold" was written into the platform; the convention was thrown into panic; the sick man rose from his bed and entered the wild and turbulent hall, white-faced, breathing with difficulty, sweat pouring down his face, and there took up the work again, single-handed still. He fought on all night, was defeated again, and went under the doctor's hands. Those speeches in that convention were really the greatest of his life, though they may not read as well as others; each of them was a battle.

Parker's defeat by Roosevelt again erased that ever-recurring epitaph over Bryan's political grave. It was evident at once that nothing could prevent him from being again the candidate in 1908. Again he was defeated, and again the epitaph was jubilantly rewritten. He was extinguished, he would never again be an influence in the party; it was, to use the phrase of 1896, 1900, and 1904, "the end of Bryan."

Again the epitaph had to be erased. He was so far from being extinguished that he became the dominating force of the convention of 1912. There is no doubt in the mind of the writer, who was there, that Bryan had given up all hope of running for President, because, as he expressed it in a thrilling midnight speech at that convention, he recognized at last that he had too many enemies ever to expect to win. But he did determine to be a king-maker if he could not be a king, and king-maker he was.

Not even the convention of 1904 showed Bryan in better light as a fighter than that of 1912. He was determined that the reactionaries should not control the convention. At the beginning he was defeated, but defeat never affected Bryan in the least in all his life, and this time, as usual, he only went on fighting. When the convention rejected him for Temporary Chairman and elected Parker, the embodiment of all he opposed, he merely took a fresh hold and fought harder.

When he swung Nebraska from Champ Clark to Wilson he had won, and thereafter Wilson's nomination was only a question of time. He was the centre of violent scenes, as when maddened men swept down upon him and shook their standards in his face and seemed on the verge of assaulting him. When he tried to get a hearing and the opposition shouted him down, he simply climbed up on the platform beside the Chairman and forced them to hear. Once, while the whole convention seemed to be yelling at him, and he stood in the midst of a whirlwind of angry noise, ex-Governor McCorkle of West Virginia, jumping up and facing him, shrieked in a voice heard above the cyclone: "Are you a Democrat?"

"My Democracy has been certified to by six and a half million voters. But," pointing his palm-leaf fan at McCorkle, with magnificent contempt, "I will ask the secretary to record one vote in the negative if the gentleman will give me his name."

He won; Wilson was nominated. He brought his great following into line for an Eastern man, and Wilson was elected. The new President, following a precedent set by Taylor, Garfield, and Harrison, made him Secretary of State.

Then Bryan showed a new side of his character to the country. He effaced himself in Wilson's interest; he became a loyal subordinate, accepting a minor place cheerfully and laboring with might and main to make the Administration a success. It is chiefly due to his efforts that it was one for its first two years. The new President was unknown to most of his party, and the legislation he recommended would have met with internal opposition but for Bryan. The Secretary whipped his followers into line even for legislation so repugnant to them as the Currency bill, and the Presidential program went through. In two years Mr. Wilson had become a definite personality to the country, and had a following of his own; but his initial success was due to Bryan, and but for Bryan Mr. Wilson might have had to face a party as divided as did Cleveland, and might have seen his Administration wrecked as Cleveland's was.

Mr. Bryan hoped to make an enduring name for himself as Secretary of State. In the years that had elapsed since he was Colonel of the Third Nebraska he had become an ardent pacifist, and he dreamed of going into history with a title greater than that of any other statesman who ever lived—for such, surely, would have been the meed of the man who abolished war. That mind of his, honest as the day, but far from great; strong but not broad, sees everything as simple, not as complex. Is there a wrong? Why, then, abolish it; it is as simple as A B C. War is wrong; therefore let us stop it. How? Why, get everybody to agree not to fight without taking a year to look into the thing. And he busied himself drafting and negotiating treaties with all the world to get it to agree to this simple but certain remedy. The "glorified circuit rider" was at the head of the Department of State of the United States. If anybody had suggested to him that there were nations which no treaty could bind, he would have answered, in the style of the prayer-meeting exhorter, "Ah! I have a higher faith in human nature." So he worked busily, building himself his niche in the temple of fame, and meanwhile the greatest war in history broke out.

With such a mind as has been described, it is evident that this event could not shake Mr. Bryan's confidence in himself or his remedies. To him it was obvious that the war came because the nations involved had not signed his treaty; if they had, Germany would have abided by it; would not have dreamed of treating it as a scrap of paper; would have waited the prescribed year, and Austria would have given Serbia the same time to reply to her ultimatum. The mischief was done, but he set about heroically to repair it; he sought to have the United States intervene as a peacemaker; he sought to prevent the United States from protecting its citizens on the high seas, since that seemed likely to lead to war; and at last, finding his efforts of no avail, he resigned.

No one who had seen him in his unequal fights for his principles on less momentous occasions could doubt that he would fight for them to the end on this greatest one. There is no parallel to his action in American history. So far as its political aspects are concerned, the nearest thing to it is Blaine's resignation from Harrison's Cabinet in 1892; but that only faintly resembles it. Blaine did not resign because of any difference in principles, but because he wanted to fight the Administration; and the superficial resemblance lies only in the similarity of the relations of the two Presidents to their Secretaries of State.

Bryan leaves the Cabinet saddened, but not disillusioned. When he had been Secretary of State two months he said that he would not have taken office "if I thought there was to be a war during my tenure." "I believe," he added, "there will be no war while I am Secretary of State, and I believe there will be no war so long as I live." It has not come out that way; it might have so easily come out that way if only Germany had signed that treaty of his! But he is not disillusioned; nothing can disillusion him; his ideal is still only a day or two ahead of him, and he resigns to fight for it, since fight for it in the Cabinet he cannot any longer.

In the Name of Peace.

By LAVINIA V. WHITNEY.

(After Kipling.)

A World League to Enforce Peace

By William Howard Taft, ex-President of the United States.

President Wilson on June 15 denied the statement, cabled from Europe, that the United States was the only great neutral Government that had not encouraged the movement among neutral nations looking to a conference of neutrals to end the European conflict. To this Government, said the President, answering a direct inquiry, had been given no more opportunity than everybody knew in furthering a neutral movement for peace. He stated that this Government had supported everything of the sort as far as it could legitimately. It had done everything that was for peace and accommodation, he added. But the great drawback has been that none of the warring Governments has directly, that is officially, indicated that it would respond sympathetically to any suggestion that it become a party to a movement to end the war. The idea of a league of neutral nations, having for its object a concerted effort to bring about peace, is reported to be in the back of the President's mind, and members of the Cabinet have given some thought to the suggestion, which might contemplate the firm maintenance of neutral rights if peace could not be obtained, but the situation has not developed to a point where the American Government is ready to make a definite move.

Meanwhile, as the outgrowth of a series of meetings held in the Century Club, New York, terminating in a call for a conference signed by a National Provisional Committee of 109 members headed by ex-President Taft, an organization known as the League to Enforce Peace, American Branch, was formed on June 17, 1915, in Independence Hall, Philadelphia. The purpose of the conference was explained by Mr. Taft in his address as President, which appears in full below.

MY fellow-seekers after peace, we thank you for your cordial greeting. In calling this meeting my associates and I have not been unaware that we might be likened to the tailors of Tooley Street, who mistook themselves for the people of England. We wish first to say that we do not represent anybody but ourselves. We are not national legislators, nor do we control the foreign policy of this Government. A number of us were invited to dinner at the Century Club (New York) by four generous hosts, who were deeply interested in devising a plan for an international agreement by which, when this present war shall cease, a recurrence of such a war will be made less probable.

We are not here to suggest a means of bringing this war to an end; much as that is to be desired and much as we would be willing to do to obtain peace, that is not within the project of the present meeting.

We hope and pray for peace, and our hope of its coming in the near future is sufficient to make us think that the present is a good time to discuss and formulate a series of proposals to which the assent of a number of the great powers could be secured. We think a League of Peace could be formed that would enable nations to avoid war by furnishing a practical means of settling international quarrels, or suspending them until the blinding heat of passion had cooled.

When the World Conference is held our country will have its official representatives to speak for us. "We, Tailors of Tooley Street," will not be there, but if, in our sartorial leisure, we shall have discussed and framed a practical plan for a league of peace, our official representatives will be aided and may in their discretion accept it and present it to the conference as their own.

There are Tooley Streets in every nation today and the minds of earnest men are being stirred with the same thought and the same purpose. We have heard from them through various channels. The denizens of those Tooley Streets will have their influence upon their respective official representatives. No man can measure the effect upon the peoples of the belligerent countries and upon the peoples of the neutral countries—the horrors and exhaustion that this unprecedented war is going to have. It is certain they all will look with much more favorable eye to leagues for the preservation of peace than ever before.

In no war has the direct interest that neutrals have in preventing a war between neighbors been so closely made known.

This interest of neutrals has been so forced upon them that it would require only a slight development and growth in the law of international relations to develop that interest into a right to be consulted before such a war among neighbors can be begun. This step we hope to have taken by the formation of a Peace League of the Great Powers, whose primary and fundamental principle shall be that no war can take place between any two members of the league until they have resorted to the machinery that the league proposes to furnish to settle the controversy likely to lead to war.

If any member refuses to use this machinery and attacks another member of the league in breach of his league obligation, all members of the league agree to defend the members attacked by force.

We do not think the ultimate resort to force can be safely omitted from an effective League of Peace. We sincerely hope that it may never become necessary, and that the deterrent effect of its inevitable use in case of a breach of the league obligation will help materially to give sanction to the laws of the league and to render a resort to force avoidable.

We are not peace-at-any-price men, because we do not think we have reached the time when a plan based on the complete abolition of war is impracticable. So long as nations partake of the frailties of men who compose them, war is a possibility, and that possibility should not be ignored in any League of Peace that is to be useful. We do not think it necessary to call peace-at-any-price men cowards or apply other epithets to them. We have known in history the most noble characters who adhered to such a view and yet whose physical and moral courage is a heritage of mankind.

To those who differ with us in our view of the necessity for this feature of possible force in our plan, we say we respect your attitude. We admit your claim to sincere patriotism to be as just as ours. We do not ascribe your desire to avoid war to be a fear of death to yourselves or your sons; but rather to your sense of the horrors, injustice, and ineffectiveness of settling any international issue by such a brutal arbitrament. Nevertheless, we differ with you in judgment that, in the world of nations as they are, war can be completely avoided.

We believe it is still necessary to use a threat of overwhelming force of a great league with a willingness to make the threat good in order to frighten nations into a use of rational and peaceful means to settle their issues with their associates of the league. Nor are we militarists or jingoes. We are trying to follow a middle path.

Now what is the machinery, a resort to which we wish to force an intending belligerent of the league—it consists of two tribunals, to one of which every issue must be submitted. Issues between nations are of two classes:

First—Issues that can be decided on principles of international law and equity, called justiciable.

Second—Issues that cannot be decided on such principles of law and equity, but which might be quite as irritating and provocative of war, called non-justiciable.

The questions of the Alaskan boundary, of the Bering Sea seal fishing, and of the Alabama Claims were justiciable issues that could be settled by a court, exactly as the Supreme Court would settle claims between States. The questions whether the Japanese should be naturalized, whether all American citizens should be admitted to Russia as merchants without regard to religious faith, are capable of causing great irritation against the nation denying the privilege, and yet such nations, in the absence of a treaty on the subject, are completely within their international right, and the real essence of the trouble cannot be aided by a resort to a court. The trouble is non-justiciable.

We propose that for justiciable questions we shall have an impartial court to which all questions arising between members of the league shall be submitted. If the court finds the question justiciable, it shall decide it. If it does not, it shall refer it to a Commission of Conciliation to investigate, confer, hear argument, and recommend a compromise.

We do not propose to enforce compliance either with the court's judgment or the Conciliation Commission's recommendations. We feel that we ought not to attempt too much—we believe that the forced submission and the truce taken to investigate the judicial decision or the conciliatory compromise recommended will form a material inducement to peace. It will cool the heat of passion, and will give the men of peace in each nation time to still the jingoes.

The League of Peace will furnish a great opportunity for more definite formulation of the principles of international law. The arbitral court will amplify it and enrich it in their application of its general principles to particular cases. They will create a body of Judge-made law of the highest value. Then the existence of the league will lead to ever-recurring congresses of the league, which, acting in a quasi-legislative capacity, may widen the scope of international law in a way that a court may not feel able or competent to do.

This is our plan. It is not so complicated—at least, in statement. In its practical application difficulties now unforeseen may arise, but we believe it offers a working hypothesis upon which a successful arrangement can be made.

We are greeted first by the objection that no treaties can prevent war. We are not called upon to deny this in order to justify or vindicate our proposals as useful. We realize that nations sometimes are utterly immoral in breaking treaties and shamelessly bold in avowing their right to do so on the ground of necessity; but this is not always the case. We cannot give up treaties because sometimes they are broken any more than we can give up commercial contracts because men sometimes dishonor themselves in breaking them. We decline to assume that all nations always are dishonorable, or that a solemn treaty obligation will not have some deterrent effect upon a nation that has plighted its faith to prevent its breach. When we add to this the sanction of an agreement by a number of powerful nations to enforce the obligation of the recalcitrant and faithless member, we think we have a treaty that is much more than a "scrap of paper"—and we base our faith in this on a common-sense view of human nature.

It is objected that we propose only to include the more powerful nations. We'll gladly include them all. But we don't propose to have the constitution of our court complicated by a demand for equal representation of the many smaller nations. We believe that when we have a league of larger powers the smaller powers will be glad to come in and enjoy the protection that the league will afford against the unjust aggression of the strong against the weak.

It is suggested that we invite a conference of neutral nations to bring about measures for present peace and to formulate demands as to the protection of neutral rights. This may be a good plan, but, as Kipling says, that is another story.

The League to Enforce Peace

Personnel and Text of the Resolutions Adopted

RESOLUTIONS.

[Adopted in Independence Hall, Philadelphia, June 17, 1915.]

Throughout 5,000 years of recorded history, peace, here and there established, has been kept, and its area has been widened, in one way only. Individuals have combined their efforts to suppress violence in the local community. Communities have co-operated to maintain the authoritative state and to preserve peace within its borders. States have formed leagues or confederations or have otherwise co-operated to establish peace among themselves. Always peace has been made and kept, when made and kept at all, by the superior power of superior numbers acting in unity for the common good.

Mindful of this teaching of experience, we believe and solemnly urge that the time has come to devise and to create a working union of sovereign nations to establish peace among themselves and to guarantee it by all known and available sanctions at their command, to the end that civilization may be conserved, and the progress of mankind in comfort, enlightenment, and happiness may continue.

We, therefore, believe it to be desirable for the United States to join a league of nations binding the signatories to the following:

1. All justiciable questions arising between the signatory powers, not settled by negotiations, shall, subject to the limitations of treaties, be submitted to a judicial tribunal for hearing and judgment, both upon the merits and upon any issue as to its jurisdiction of the question.

2. All other questions arising between the signatories and not settled by negotiation shall be submitted to a Council of Conciliation for hearing, consideration, and recommendation.

3. The signatory powers shall jointly use forthwith both their economic and military forces against any one of their number that goes to war, or commits acts of hostility, against another of the signatories before any question arising shall be submitted as provided in the foregoing.

4. Conferences between the signatory powers shall be held from time to time to formulate and codify rules of international law, which, unless some signatory shall signify its dissent within a stated period, shall thereafter govern the decision of the judicial tribunal mentioned in Article 1.

There were half a dozen brief speeches in favor of the report. John Wanamaker did not think the report went far enough. He had hoped the conference would send out a message to the warring nations that would make them pause and think. He could not help but favor the report, he added, but felt that it, standing alone without any further action, would be laughed at by those on the other side of the Atlantic.

It is expected the Executive Committee will meet in the near future to adopt plans to carry out the objects of the league. One of the things that probably will be done, according to members of the Executive Committee, will be to start a propaganda in this country with a view to having the United States Senate adopt measures in line with the object of the league. Mr. Taft said today that, judging by its action in rejecting treaties in the past, the chief stumbling block to the aspirations of the league would be the Senate. Steps will also be taken to get European countries interested in the league.

ORGANIZATION.

President.

William Howard Taft.

Vice Presidents.

• Lyman Abbott,
• Edwin A. Alderman,
• A. Graham Bell,
• R. Blankenburg,
• Charles R. Brown,
• Francis E. Clark,
• John H. Finley,
• W.D. Foulke,
• James Cardinal Gibbons,
• W. Gladden,
• George Gray,
• Myron T. Herrick,
• John G. Hibben,
• George C. Holt,
• D.P. Kingsley,
• S.W. McCall,
• J.B. McCreary,
• Victor H. Metcalf,
• John Mitchell,
• John B. Moore,
• Alton B. Parker,
• George H. Prouty,
• Jacob H. Schiff,
• John C. Schaffer,
• Robert Sharp,
• Edgar F. Smith,
• C.R. Van Hise,
• B.I. Wheeler,
• Harry A. Wheeler,
• Andrew D. White,
• W.A. White,
• George G. Wilson,
• Luther B. Wilson,
• Oliver Wilson,
• Stephen S. Wise,
• T.S. Woolsey,
• James L. Slayden,
• David H. Greer,
• Bernard N. Baker,
• Victor L. Berger,
• Edward Bok,
• Arthur J. Brown,
• Edward O. Browne,
• R. Fulton Cutting,
• John F. Fort,
• A.W. Harris,
• L.L. Hobbs,
• George H. Lorimer,
• Edgar O. Lovett,
• S.B. McCormick,
• Martin B. Madden,
• Charles Nagel,
• George A. Plimpton,
• Isaac Sharpless,
• William F. Slocum,
• Dan Smiley,
• F.H. Strawbridge,
• Joseph Swain,
• Edwin Warfield,
• H. St. G. Tucker.

Executive Committee.

• W.H. Mann,
• John B. Clark,
• J.M. Dickinson,
• Austen G. Fox,
• Henry C. Morris,
• Leo S. Rowe,
• Oscar S. Straus,
• Thomas R. White,
• Hamilton Holt,
• Theodore Marburg,
• W.B. Howland,
• John H. Hammond,
• W.H. Short,
• A.L. Lowell,
• John A. Stewart,
• William H. Taft.

German-American Dissent

By Hugo Muensterberg.

The subjoined letter from Hugo Muensterberg, Professor of Psychology at Harvard University, is addressed to Augustus J. Cadwalader, Secretary of the National Provisional Committee for the League to Enforce Peace.

Clifton, Mass., June 9, 1915.

Dear Sir: I beg to express my thanks for the courtesy of the invitation to attend the conference of the League of Peace in Independence Hall under the Presidency of the Hon. W.H. Taft. I feel myself, of course, in deepest sympathy with the spirit of justice and peacefulness which has suggested the foundation of such a league. Nevertheless, I beg to be excused from attendance, as I am convinced that this time of international excitement and prejudice is unfit for the crystallization of new forms for the common life of the nations.

I venture, however, to add that I feel in any case grave doubts of the value of any plans which aim to secure future peace by the traditional type of agreements and treaties. We live in the midst of a war in which one belligerent nation after another has felt obliged to disregard treaties and to interpret agreements in a one sided way. Only yesterday Italy, without any reason of vital necessity, annulled an agreement and a treaty which had appeared the firmest in European politics, and which yet failed in the first hour of clashing interests. A psychologist has no right to expect that the national temper of the future will be different.

Moreover, the Supreme Court of the United States has sanctioned the idea, which is shared practically by all nations, that treaties are no longer binding when a situation has changed so that the fulfillment of the agreement would be against the vital interests of the nation. We have learned during the last ten months how easily such disburdening changes can be discovered as soon as the national passions are awakened.

The new plan depends upon only one new feature by which the mutual agreement is to be fortified against the demands of national excitement. The plan of the League of Peace promises the joint use of military forces in case that one nation is unwilling to yield. But the world witnesses today the clear proof that even the greatest combination of fighting forces may be unable to subdue by mere number a nation which is ready to make any sacrifice for its convictions. One hundred and fifty millions are attacked by eight hundred and fifty millions, by joint forces from five continents, which moreover are backed by the economic forces of the richest country in the world; and yet after ten months of fighting one million prisoners, but no other hostile soldiers, stand on German soil. After this practical example the plan merely to join the military forces will less than ever appear a convincing argument in an hour in which a nation feels its existence or its honor threatened. For a long time we heard the claim that the Socialists and the bankers would now make great wars impossible; both prophecies have failed. The threat that the warring nation will have to face the world in arms will be no less futile. But the failure in this case will be disastrous, as the terms of such an agreement would draw many nations into the whirlpool which would have no reason of their own for entering the war.

The interests of strong growing nations will lead in the future as in the past to conflicts in which both sides are morally in the right and in which one must yield. We have no right to hope that after this war the nations will be more willing to give up their chances in such conflicts without having appealed to force. On the contrary, the world has now become accustomed to war and will therefore more easily return to the trenches. The break between England and Russia and finally the threatening cloud of world conflict between Occident and Orient can already be seen on the horizon; the battles of today may be only the preamble. In such tremendous hours the new-fashioned agreements would be cobwebs which surely could not bind the arms of any energetic nation.

But, worst of all, they would not only be ineffective—they would awake a treacherous confidence. The nations would deceive themselves with a feeling of safety, while all true protection would be lacking. The first step forward toward our common goal must be to learn the two lessons of the war of today and to face them unflinchingly; mere agreements do not and can not bind any nation on the globe in an hour of vital need, and the mere joining of forces widens and protracts a war, but does not hinder it. We must learn that success for peace endeavors can be secured only from efforts to avert war which are fundamentally different from the old patterns of pledges and threats. These old means were negative; we need positive ones.

If a psychologist can contribute anything to the progress of mankind, he must, first of all, offer the advice not to rely on plans by which the attention is focused on the disasters which are to be avoided. Education by forbidding the wrong action instead of awaking the impulses toward the right one is as unpromising for peoples as it is for individuals. We must truly build up from within. But a time in which the war news of every hour appeals to sympathies and antipathies is hardly the time to begin this sacred work, which alone could bring us the blessed age of our vision, the United States of the World.

HUGO MUENSTERBERG.

Chant of Loyalty.

By ELIAS LIEBERMAN.

American Munition Supplies

The Alleged German Plot to Buy
Control of Their Sources

The following dispatch from Washington, dated June 8, 1915, appeared in The Chicago Herald:

President Wilson and his Cabinet considered today the known fact that German interests, reported backed by the German Government, are negotiating for the purchase of the great gun and munition of war plants in this country.

Secretary McAdoo of the Treasury laid the matter before the Cabinet. He had information from Secret Service agents of the Government who have been following these German activities for some weeks. It is reported today, confirming The Herald dispatch of last night, that the plants for which negotiations are on include that of Charles M. Schwab at Bethlehem, Penn.; the Remington small arms works at Hartford, Conn., and the Cramp works at Philadelphia, which, it is said, Schwab is about to acquire; the Metallic Cartridge Company, the Remington Company, and other munition and small arms works.

Included in the Schwab plant holdings are the Fore River Shipbuilding Company, Massachusetts, and the Union Iron Works, San Francisco, where it is reported parts of submarines are being made for English contract, shipment being made through Canada.

This new move of the Germans involves the outlay of hundreds of millions, a gigantic financial operation in the face of war needs and conditions. It is one of the most sensational developments of the present conflict in connection with the United States. Its consummation inevitably would lead this country into serious disagreement, if not conflict, with Great Britain and the Allies.

The latter will demand the fulfillment of their contracts with these concerns. The German move is to prevent this delivery of munitions of war. With the consummation of the purchases, the German owners could refuse to fill these contracts. They will not fear suits for broken contracts.

The whole matter is fraught with such possibilities of danger to this country that Attorney General Gregory and the experts of the Department of Justice have taken up the question with a view to interposing legal obstacles. It may become necessary, it was suggested today, to prevent such a sale on the grounds of public welfare because of strained relations with Germany.

Secretary McAdoo will not disclose who are the agents for the German interests seeking to purchase the munitions plants, or who are the financial backers. The Secret Service men are believed to know these details, having been on the investigation for three weeks. Rich Germans in the United States are believed to be interested.

Charles M. Schwab, head of the Bethlehem Company, came here two weeks ago in response to an urgent summons. He saw Secretary McAdoo, Secretary Daniels, and other officials. At that time it was given out that he was conferring as to details of supplies to be furnished this Government under contracts for new warship construction about to be awarded. It is now understood that Secretary McAdoo sought information as to the negotiations under way at that time for the purchase of the munitions plants in this country by the German interests.

The report of Secretary McAdoo today stirred the Cabinet as deeply almost as the resignation of Secretary of State Bryan. Complete reports were asked and the Secret Service arm of the Government will be required to furnish immediately more complete and detailed information.

Of the efforts to obtain control of the munitions companies, The Providence Journal of June 9, 1915, reported:

Acting under the personal instructions of the German Ambassador, several German bankers of New York have been working together for the last week on preliminary negotiations for the purchase of every large plant they can lay their hands on which is now engaged in turning out munitions of war for the Allies.

Count von Bernstorff, Dr. Dernburg, and two well-known German bankers held a conference at the German Embassy in Washington on Tuesday, June 1. At that conference the Ambassador outlined in detail instructions he had received the day before from Berlin to proceed with this propaganda, and he declared to the three men there present that his Government considered the success of the plan as of vital importance, superseding every other phase of the war situation.

The bankers at once returned to New York, and at a meeting next day with Captain Boy-Ed and several other men at the German Club outlined their plan of campaign.

For months past the German Ambassador has been in possession of a list of factories all over the country engaged in turning out munitions of war for the Allies. Last Saturday a concerted movement was begun toward securing a majority control of many of these plants.

When one of the bankers at the conference in Washington asked the Ambassador if he had any conception of the magnitude of the financial problems involved in the scheme he replied that his Government was fully prepared to pay everything necessary, and repeated that the fate of the empire might rest on the success or failure of the plan. He then added these words:

"There is no limit, gentlemen, to the amount of money available."

The activities of the representatives of Count von Bernstorff in this matter have already brought them up to the point of negotiation, or attempted negotiation, with the Fore River Shipbuilding Company, the Remington Arms Company, the Bethlehem Steel Company, and the Union Metallic Cartridge Company.

Government officials, when notified of this new propaganda yesterday, were a unit in declaring it was impossible to believe that such a scheme could be carried through successfully. In the first place, they pointed out that activity of this kind would be a direct violation of the Sherman act, and, secondly, a case of conspiracy would lie against individuals attempting such a movement for wholesale violation of contracts, which would become necessary in order to carry the plan to its successful conclusion.

The moment the German agents in New York began to disclose their purpose, several cunning individuals who have had some slight connection with the contracts for supplying the Allies with various materials have deliberately put themselves in the path of these agents under the pretext that they already had contracts, or were about to be given contracts, and have already mulcted the German Government of many thousands of dollars.

In two specific cases men have talked of having contracts for picric acid—the manufacture of which necessitates the most skilled training, with most expensive and complicated machinery, and which is only being attempted in four places in this country, and were promptly paid off, on their pledge that they would violate these alleged agreements. One of these deals was made in the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel last Saturday.

Another case, which is fully authenticated, is that of a Western dealer in horses, who delivered 1,500 horses to the port of New Orleans for the British Government last January. As soon as he ascertained what the German agents were doing, he produced his receipt for delivery of his first and only order, and declared he was now searching for 5,000 horses, in addition, for the British Government. On his pledge to abandon this search, he was given $2,500 by German agents.

The keen anxiety of the German Government, acting through the embassy in Washington, to deprive the Allies of any shipments of war materials that they can possibly stop is based on the result of calculations made in Berlin and forwarded to this country two weeks ago, which profess to show that the Allies cannot possibly arm their increasing forces or secure ammunition for their great numbers of large guns from their own resources, and that they must have the help of this country in order to accomplish their purpose. The German representatives also thoroughly believe that without this assistance the Allies cannot continue and complete an aggressive campaign, driving the Kaiser's armies out of Belgium and France.

In The New York Times of June 9, 1915, appeared the following statement of counter-negotiations to checkmate the German operators in America:

Negotiations for the purchase of arms and ammunition manufactories in this country have been under way for some little time, it is asserted, but so quietly have they been conducted that no hint of them became public until yesterday. Yet, coincident with their disclosure, came yesterday, also, announcement of a contract for the manufacture for the Allies of shrapnel and high explosive shells on the greatest scale yet undertaken by an American corporation, which revealed as could nothing else how carefully these supposedly secret dealings had been discovered, watched, and checkmated by the Allies.

This contract, all but the smallest details of which are said to be settled, is to be taken by the General Electric Company, directors of which admitted that the total involved would be at least $100,000,000 and might run far in excess of this figure. In fact, the order was spoken of as limited more by the capacity of the General Electric's plants than by any restricting order of the Allies.

The significance of this contract does not lie wholly, or even chiefly, in its size, for the American Locomotive Company recently closed a $65,000,000 contract with the Allies for shells. What is considered of especial note is that less than a week ago an official of the General Electric stated emphatically that his company had not taken any orders and was not negotiating for any despite the fact that for some time a proposal to specialize in war orders had been under consideration. Less than a week ago the company had reached a negative decision and less than a week ago there was no reason to suppose that it would rescind this decision.

J.P. Morgan & Co., fiscal agents for Great Britain and France in the matter of war supplies, then entered the field. Charles Steele, a partner in the banking house, is a Director of the General Electric Company and negotiations went forward rapidly. These were conducted with a secrecy which exceeded that even of the German interests with the other arms and ammunition companies, but there are several factors which, it is known, were of prime importance in effecting the General Electric's change of policy.

In the past much valuable time has been lost in the distribution of orders among a score or so of concerns which have had facilities for making shells, ordnance, and so forth. Competitive bidding for parts of contracts has held back the finished product and successful bidders have frequently been handicapped by inability to obtain necessary machinery.

Now plans for accelerating manufacture in all war lines have been launched by David Lloyd George, the new British Minister of Munitions, and in the shadow of his influence J.P. Morgan & Co. have practically brought to a conclusion plans to centre future war orders in a few great companies, with the General Electric Company as the dominant unit.

The extent to which the banking house used its tremendous influence is problematical, but it is history that Mr. Lloyd George has been bringing all pressure to bear to increase England's supplies, and with them the supplies of the remaining allies, since British purchasing agents are, to a large extent, looking after the interests of France and Russia, and it may be inferred that the Morgan firm has been as active as possible in carrying out the wishes of the European nations.

Persons in touch with the progress being made in war orders state that the British authorities have become greatly concerned over their supplies of ammunition at hand and in process of manufacture. While orders aggregating many hundreds of millions of dollars have been placed in this country and Canada, deliveries have been disappointing. Canadian plants got to work early in the war, but the delay in ordering supplies in the United States and other neutral countries has seriously affected the efficiency of the allied armies in France and Poland, it is said.

The experience of the American Locomotive Company is typical of the situation. After negotiations which covered several weeks, the company procured a contract which is said to amount to approximately $65,000,000 for shells. During the discussion of terms, and even before, the Locomotive officials were busy buying the necessary lathes and other machinery, but installation of equipment and the training of men could not be done in a few days. The contract was definitely closed six weeks ago, but the company has only begun to turn out the shells at its Richmond plant, and it was said in authoritative quarters that several weeks more would pass before anything like a substantial output would be possible.

The centring of manufacture in a single, or a few, great plants carries the additional and chief advantage to Great Britain and the Allies, that no efforts of Germany can now cut off their ammunition supply. The stoppage of this supply has been one of Germany's chief concerns since the war began, and by embargo propaganda here and by the attempt to create sentiment she has tried to cut down the supplies reaching the Allies from this country.

Well-founded gossip in Wall Street has had it that early rises in the stocks of munition-making concerns were occasioned not so much by the acquisition of war orders as by efforts of German agents quietly to buy up control of these companies in the open market. These devices failing, it is said, orders for ammunition and other supplies have been placed by Germany with no hope of receiving the goods, but merely to clog the channels against the Allies. With the General Electric and other co-operating companies pledged to the Allies this danger will cease to exist.

The concerns selected to join with the General Electric for what will thus amount practically to a combination of resources for rapid manufacture will be those whose equipment, with a few alterations, can be adapted to the new work.

The General Electric Company, according to a Director, is in a position to begin turning out shells at a high daily rate, and, under present plans, the company will not sublet any of the $100,000,000 order. There are facilities available in the plants at Schenectady, Lynn, Harrison, Pittsfield, and Fort Wayne to carry on the work rapidly and without interfering with the ordinary electrical manufacture now being conducted.

Wall Street offered one of the first evidences that things of moment were occurring in the war supply situation. Bethlehem Steel shot forward 10 points, to 165, a new high record, although Mr. Schwab's company was not mentioned in connection with fresh contracts.

It is believed that when the proposed concentration of munition making occurs the Bethlehem Steel Corporation and other companies which already have booked sufficient contracts to keep them busy for some time will not be included.

Stock of the Studebaker Corporation was in large demand as the result of reports that about $7,000,000 of additional war orders had been taken for artillery wheels, motor trucks, and harness. Tennessee Copper shares were strong after it became known definitely that the concern had arranged with the du Pont Powder Company for an increased monthly supply of sulphuric acid. Toward the close of business stocks generally reacted, being influenced by the desire of many traders to keep out of the market until the tenor of President Wilson's note to Germany was known.

But despite the many physical manifestations of unusual activity, officers and Directors of the companies mentioned as those on which Germany had set her eyes were uniformly non-committal when they did not positively deny that there was truth in the story.

William J. Bruff, who is President of the Union Metallic Cartridge Company and a Director of the Remington Arms and Ammunition Company, said:

"I don't think there is any truth in it. Yes, I am certain that no offer of any kind has been made by Germany to buy the two companies. I would know if such offers had been made and I haven't heard of them, except such reports as I have read in the newspapers."

Henry Bronner, a Director of the Bethlehem Steel Company, said:

"I have not heard that Germany or any one else has offered to buy the Bethlehem Steel Company. If such an offer were made, Charles M. Schwab would be the man who would know it."

The New York Times of June 10, 1915, included this report of Charles M. Schwab's purposes with respect to the control of the Bethlehem Steel Company:

There is not the least danger of German interests getting control of the Bethlehem Steel Company and breaking the concern's contracts with the British for arms and ammunition, it was made known yesterday from an authoritative source. This same authority had no information that, as alleged by The Chicago Herald and The Providence Journal, and quoted in The New York Times yesterday, the same interests were seeking to obtain control of other companies.

What blocks the attempts of the German agents, in the case of the Bethlehem Steel Company, for one thing, is that the majority of the stock of the concern is not in the market. Contrary to rumors that have lately been floating about hotel corridors and into and out of the brokers' offices adjacent to them, Charles M. Schwab still owns the majority of stock. This much Mr. Schwab emphatically confirmed to a Times reporter yesterday at the St. Regis. That he had no intention of selling he asserted just as emphatically.

At the same time the information is authoritative that agents representing the German Government or German interests have approached Mr. Schwab, not once, but several times, since the beginning of the war, asking that negotiations be opened. It has been intimated that interests, private or Governmental, were willing to pay any price that Mr. Schwab would name for his controlling interest.

Figures running into scores of millions have been named in offers, it being the understanding that the prospective owners simply wished to buy the big plant—the only one in the world that now compares with that of the Krupps, with the possible exception of that of the Schneiders at Creusot—and shut it up, in order to stop the vast sales of munitions of war to the Allies, and the filling of contracts so big that their delivery has hardly begun. Mr. Schwab, it is understood, could get today $100,000,000 or more for his stock in the Bethlehem Company.

It was established yesterday that more or less directly the visit of Mr. Schwab to England last Fall, on the Olympic, was due to the activity of German agents in this country in their efforts to buy the Bethlehem Steel Company.

Word of the attempts of the German agents to obtain control of the Bethlehem Company soon found its way to England, and the result was that Mr. Schwab was invited to London for a special conference with the War Office. He renewed his acquaintance with Lord Kitchener, and his previously formed intention not to sell out was fortified with a guarantee of orders large enough to keep the big plant at Bethlehem going steadily for eighteen months or more.

When rumors were prevalent about New York that the visit of Sir Trevor Dawson, head of a great English steel concern, had as its object an attempt to obtain control of the Bethlehem Company so as to insure that it would continue turning out supplies for the Allies, the German agents here were making a strong bid for the control of the concern, and their efforts have since continued.

A Times reporter put to Mr. Schwab yesterday the direct question as to whether he was in actual control of the Bethlehem Steel Company.

"Absolutely," he said. "The only way anybody else could obtain control would be to get my interest. I would never sell my interest without making for the men who stood by me with their support when I was struggling to put the Bethlehem Company where it is today the same terms that would be offered for my share. As a matter of fact, my interest in the Bethlehem Company is not for sale. Indeed, I could not sell. I have contracts that I cannot break."

It was said yesterday that the Germans had been trying to conduct their negotiations for the Bethlehem Company in much the same fashion as they recently had employed in their diplomatic negotiations, and that if they had been successful in getting the Bethlehem Company they would have found themselves with contracts on their hands which they would have had to carry out. The mere closing of the plant and the refusal to continue the further manufacture and delivery of munitions of war already contracted for would not save them from a situation which would be the equivalent of jumping from the frying pan into the fire.

Not only the courts would be promptly invoked to see that legal contracts were carried out, but, if necessary, the Federal Government could step in and insist that the manufacture and delivery of supplies contracted for be continued, in order to prevent a breach of neutrality. Then would be presented the spectacle of German interests turning out vast quantities of guns, shells, and shrapnel to be sent to Europe to be used in fighting their own troops.

According to the authority already mentioned, the Bethlehem Steel Company is the only plant in the United States that can turn out shrapnel shell complete. Most of the contracts that have been given here have been taken for various parts of the ammunition by different firms. One thing necessary for the turning out of shrapnel and shells is a twelve-mile proving ground, and the only privately owned range of the kind in this country is that of the Bethlehem Company.

Mr. Schwab has insisted to his friends who have questioned him about the rise in Bethlehem stock that the only valid reason, aside from whatever might be the intrinsic value of the property, is the tremendous war orders that have been obtained. On this account, as well as on account of his knowledge that the majority of the stock was safe in his possession, he was able to enjoy his trip to the Pacific Coast regardless of rumors at one time prevalent that a big market operator, who was supposed to retain an ancient grudge against him, was trying to wrest from him the control of the company he had built up.

A League for Preparedness

By Theodore Roosevelt, ex-President of the United States,
and
George L. von Meyer, ex-Secretary of the Navy.

It was ascertained in Washington on June 1, 1915, that the Atlantic battleship fleet would remain in Atlantic Ocean waters indefinitely. The plan to send the fleet through the canal in July for participation in the Panama-Pacific Exposition at San Francisco had been abandoned, and Admiral Fletcher's ships would not cross the Isthmus this year. The decision to hold the fleet in Atlantic waters is predicated on two principle factors. These are: First, there undoubtedly will be another great slide in Culebra Cut in the Panama Canal some time this Summer, and it would be considered highly undesirable to have the fleet on the Pacific Coast with such a slide interposed between Admiral Fletcher's vessels and the Atlantic waters. Second, the general situation of American foreign affairs growing out of relations with Germany is such that it is considered unwise to send the fleet to the west coast and leave the Atlantic Coast unguarded. This is the extent, at present, of national preparation against war.

The Peace and Preparation Conference, called in the name of the National Security League to discuss the military needs of the nation, began on the evening of June 14, 1915, with the opening to the public of the Army and Navy Exhibit in the Hotel Astor, where there were to be seen numerous placards which gave in figures and words information as to the situation of the United States so far as military preparedness is concerned.

General Luke E. Wright of Memphis, who was Secretary of War the latter part of the second Roosevelt Administration, was among the visitors to the conference, and said he was in thorough sympathy with the aims of the National Security League. In his opinion the American first line of defense, to be immediately available for service, should be at least 300,000 men.

An audience composed of nearly as many women as men heard in Carnegie Hall, on the evening of June 15, the arguments of Alton B. Parker, Dr. Lyman Abbott, Henry L. Stimson, ex-Secretary of War; Charles J. Bonaparte, ex-Attorney General, and Jacob M. Dickinson, ex-Secretary of War, advocating immediate increases in the army and navy as the best safeguard against war. Ex-Judge Parker, who was Chairman of the meeting, struck the keynote of the conference in these words:

"We want to arouse the people of the United States from the Atlantic to the Pacific, to the end that they shall let Congress know that they have made up their minds to spend a little of that $187,000,000,000 of which we boast in order that our wives and our children and our grandchildren shall not be visited with the calamity which has befallen Belgium."

Two features of the conference were the reading of a letter to Hudson Maxim from ex-President Theodore Roosevelt and a speech on naval unpreparedness by George von L. Meyer, ex-Secretary of the Navy. The speech is reproduced below in part, and the letter from Mr. Roosevelt in full, together with the resolution of the conference.

MR. ROOSEVELT’S LETTER.

My Dear Mr. Maxim:

I thank you heartily for your book on "Defenseless America." It is a capital book and I believe it is safe to say that no wise and patriotic American can fail to recognize the service that you have rendered in writing it. I hope it will have the widest possible circulation throughout our country.

I was glad to see the first-class letters that have been written you by such good Americans as Oscar Straus, Garrett P. Serviss, Rear Admiral W.W. Kimball, C.P. Gray, Holman Day, and the others. On the other hand, I was saddened by the extraordinary letter sent you by the three young men who purported to speak for the senior class of the college of which they are members. The course of conduct which these men and those like them advocate for the nation would, of course, not only mean a peculiar craven avoidance of national duty by our people at this time, but would also inevitably tend permanently to encourage the spirit of individual cowardice no less than of national cowardice.

The professional pacifists, the professional peace-at-any-price men, who during the last five years have been so active, who have pushed the mischievous all-arbitration treaties at Washington, who have condoned our criminal inactivity as regards Mexico and, above all, as regards the questions raised by the great world war now raging, and who have applauded our abject failure to live up to the obligations imposed upon us as a signatory power of The Hague Convention, are, at best, an unlovely body of men, and taken as a whole are probably the most undesirable citizens that this country contains.

But it is less shocking to see such sentiments developed among old men than among young men. The college students who organize or join these peace-at-any-price leagues are engaged, according to their feeble abilities, in cultivating a standard of manhood which, if logically applied, would make them desire to "arbitrate" with any tough individual who slapped the sister or sweetheart of one of them in the face.

Well-meaning people, as we all know, sometimes advocate a course of action which is infamous; and, as was proved by the great Copperhead Party fifty years ago, there are always some brave men to be found condoning or advocating deeds of national cowardice. But the fact remains that the advocates of pacifism who have been most prominent in our country during the past five years have been preaching poltroonery.

Such preaching, if persevered in long enough, softens the fibre of any nation, and, above all, of those preaching it; and if it is reduced to practice it is ruinous to national character. These men have been doing their best to make us the China of the Occident, and the college students, such as those of whom you speak, have already reached a level considerably below that to which the higher type of Chinaman has now struggled on his upward path.

On the whole, for the nation as for the individual, the most contemptible of all sins is the sin of cowardice; and while there are other sins as base there are none baser. The prime duty for this nation is to prepare itself so that it can protect itself—and this is the duty that you are preaching in your admirable volume. It is only when this duty has been accomplished that we shall be able to perform the further duty of helping the cause of the world righteousness by backing the cause of the international peace of justice (the only kind of peace worth having) not merely by words but by deeds.

A peace conference such as that which some of our countrymen propose at the moment to hold is purely noxious, until as a preliminary we put ourselves in such shape that what we say will excite the respect and not the derision of foreign nations; and, furthermore, until we have by practical action shown that we are heartily ashamed of ourselves for our craven abandonment of duty in not daring to say a word when The Hague Conventions were ruthlessly violated before our eyes.

Righteousness must be put before peace, and peace must be recognized as of value only when it is the hand-maiden of justice. The doctrine of national or individual neutrality between right and wrong is an ignoble doctrine, unworthy the support of any brave or honorable man. It is wicked to be neutral between right and wrong, and this statement can be successfully refuted only by men who are prepared to hold up Pontius Pilate, the arch-typical neutral of all time, as worthy of our admiration.

An ignoble peace may be the worst crime against humanity, and righteous war may represent the greatest service a nation can at a given moment render to itself and to mankind.

Our people also need to come to their senses about the manufacture and sale of arms and ammunition. Of course, the same moral law applies here between nations as between individuals within a nation. There is not the slightest difference between selling ammunition in time of war and in time of peace, because when sold in time of peace it is only sold with a view to possibility or likelihood of war. It should never be sold to people who will make bad use of it, and it should be freely sold at all times to those who will use it for a proper purpose.

It is absolutely essential that we should have stores where citizens of a nation can buy arms and ammunition. It is a service to good citizenship to sell a revolver to an honest householder for use against burglars or to a policeman for use against "gunmen." It is an outrage against humanity knowingly to sell such a revolver to a burglar or a "gunman." The morality of the sale depends upon the purpose and the probable use. This is true among individuals. It is no less true among nations.

I am speaking of the moral right. Our legal right to sell ammunition to the Allies is, of course, perfect, just as Germany, the greatest trader in ammunition to other nations in the past, had an entire legal right to sell guns and ammunition to Turkey, for instance. But, in addition to our legal right to sell ammunition to those engaged in trying to restore Belgium to her own people, it is also our moral duty to do so, precisely as it is a moral duty to sell arms to policemen for use against "gunmen."

Wishing you all possible success, I am, faithfully yours,

THEODORE ROOSEVELT.

Hudson Maxim, Esq., Lansing, N.J.

MR. MEYER’S SPEECH.

The National Security League brought its two-day Peace and Preparation Conference to a close on June 15, 1915, with a luncheon in the Hotel Astor at which more than 1,000 men and women listened to George von L. Meyer, ex-Secretary of the Navy, as he announced that the navy of the United States was utterly unfit for war with any first-class nation. Mr. Meyer was interrupted many times by applause, and the loudest outburst came when he placed the blame for what he termed the present demoralized state of the navy squarely up to Secretary Josephus Daniels. He said, in part:

In calling attention to these defects I have not done so from a desire to criticise the present head of the navy, although I do believe that he is responsible for the demoralized condition of the personnel and the decreased efficiency of the navy.

In advancing his argument for a greater navy Mr. Meyer contended that such a step would be the best safeguard against war. He asserted that we would have had no war with Spain in 1908 if we had had four more ships like the Oregon. With such a powerful fighting force, he argued, no nation at that time would have dared to meet us. Spain would have yielded without a fight, and this country would have saved $500,000,000. He continued:

The only attack we need consider is an attack from some great naval power, and for that reason we need an adequate navy because it tends toward peace, because it discourages attack and serves the best interests of the country, while an inadequate navy is a vast expense to the country and does not serve as a protection.

Of the thirty-five battleships that we have today only twenty-one are in commission and ready for emergency. Of those twenty-one, three have broken shafts, and the fourth is a turbine battleship which was put out of commission because it needs to be thoroughly overhauled. In addition to that, there are seventy fighting vessels which are not ready to be called upon for an emergency because they are out of commission and would require a long overhauling. We lack battle cruisers, scout cruisers, aeroplanes, and armed airships.

Our submarine fleet is in a critical condition. The complement of torpedo vessels has been reduced from 15 to 25 per cent. to get men to commission new boats. This reduction in personnel is a serious handicap, reduces the efficiency of the destroyers, affects contentment, and prevents the boats being kept in good condition. The Atlantic fleet needs 5,000 men, according to the evidence of the Commander in Chief of that fleet. The reserve fleet at Philadelphia was largely depleted in order to get a new crew for the Alabama when she was ordered to Hampton Roads to enforce neutrality; and the naval force of Hampton Roads was a pitifully weak one: One small submarine, one little torpedo destroyer diverted from Annapolis, and one reserve battleship, of which the fleet in Philadelphia had been robbed in order to put her in commission.

The review in New York this year was a poor imitation of previous reviews, in that the reserve fleet was absent. It was a mere parade, not a mobilization. It did not indicate the true condition of the fleet, because the people did not know the whole truth. For lack of men, ships are laid up in navy yards, where they rapidly deteriorate, like a vacant house.

All small ships and all cruisers now laid up for lack of men are needed in Mexico and elsewhere, and should be ready for an emergency call. The complement of enlisted men at shore stations and training stations has been kept down, with a decided loss of efficiency and greatly to the discontent and discomfort of the men. A navy with an insufficient and disgruntled personnel cannot be efficient, and its morale must necessarily be disastrously affected.

It would take 18,000 men in order to put the vessels that are fit for war service into commission, Mr. Meyer asserted. Congress was to blame for not having established a national council of defense, a general staff, and a national reserve of 50,000 efficient men. He added:

It is the lack of any definite naval policy and the failure of Congress to recognize the necessity for such a policy that has placed us in a position of inferiority, which may lead us to war or cause us great embarrassment as well as discredit to the country.

Mr. Meyer urged an investigation by Congress of our national defense, to the end that a comprehensive plan should be adopted for the future. He declared further:

This investigation has been denied to the people by the leaders of the party in power, and it is deplorable that there should be an attempt to deceive the people in a matter of such vital importance.

OFFICIAL RESOLUTION.

Here is the resolution of the league, which was later ratified by the official delegates and forwarded to the White House at Washington:

Whereas, The events of the past year have demonstrated the fact that war, no matter how greatly it may be deplored, may suddenly and unexpectedly occur, notwithstanding the existence of treaties of peace and amity, and have also shown that nations who were unprepared have paid and are paying the price of their lack of foresight;

And, Whereas, The reports of our military and naval experts have made clear that the defensive forces of the country are inadequate for the proper protection of our coasts and to enable our Government to maintain its accepted policies and to fulfill its obligations to other States, and to exert in the adjustment of international questions the influence in which the Republic is entitled;

Therefore, be it Resolved

That we appeal to the President, if consistent with the public interest, to call the early attention of Congress to the pressing need of prompt and efficient action so that the resources of our great country can be utilized for the proper defense of the Republic;

And, Resolved, That the National Security League, under whose auspices this Peace and Preparation Conference has been held, be urged to continue the work which it has already undertaken, of bringing the American people to a full realization of our deplorable state of unpreparedness and of the necessity of action by Congress.

Przemysl and Lemberg

German Reports of Mackensen’s
Victorious Thrust in Galicia

Przemysl fell to the German arms on June 3, 1915, ten weeks after the Russians had captured the fortress and its Austrian garrison following a six months' investment. The campaign which meant as its first result the recapture of this great fortress of nineteen modern forts and sixteen field fortifications, with innumerable trenches, was continued by the renewal of the "thrust" of General von Mackensen toward Lemberg, the capital of Galicia. Semi-official figures published in Berlin estimated the Russian losses from May 1 to June 18, when the victorious German armies were approaching the gates of Lemberg, at 400,000 dead and wounded and 300,000 prisoners, besides 100,000 lost before Field Marshal von Hindenburg's forces in Poland and Courland. On June 22 Berlin reported five Austro-German armies shelling the last lines of the Russian defenses before Lemberg, which fell on June 23.

The admitted weakness of Russia in this campaign was the exhaustion of her ammunition supplies. The intent of the German thrust was to drive the Russians far back and establish easily defended positions from which the Germans might detach forces for operations against Italy and the Allies in the west. Political consequences, also, were expected from German success in Galicia in deterring Bulgaria and Rumania from entering the war.

On June 21 advices reaching Tokio from Vladivostok indicated that heavy shipments of munitions of war intended for use by Russia's armies had arrived at that seaport, in such quantities that facilities were lacking to forward them by rail through Siberia.

THE WEST GALICIAN “DRIVE.”

(Wolff Telegraphic Bureau, Berlin, May 6, 1915.)

From the Great Headquarters we have received the following in regard to the "drive" in West Galicia:

To the complete surprise of the enemy, large movements of troops into West Galicia had been completed by the end of April. These troops, subject to the orders of General von Mackensen, had been assigned the task in conjunction with the neighboring armies of our Austrian ally of breaking through the Russian front between the crest of the Carpathians and the middle Dunajee. It was a new problem and no easy undertaking. The heavens granted our troops wonderful sunshine and dry roads. Thus fliers and artillery could come into full activity and the difficulties of the terrain, which here has the character of the approaches of the German Alps, or the Hörsal hills in Thuringia, could be overcome. At several points ammunition had to be transported amid the greatest hardships on pack animals and the marching columns and batteries had to be moved forward over corduroy roads, (artificial roads made of logs.) All the accumulation of information and preparations necessary for breaking through the enemy's line had been quietly and secretly accomplished. On the first of May in the afternoon the artillery began its fire on the Russian positions. These in some five months had been perfected according to all the rules of the art of fortification. In stories they lay one over the other along the steep heights, whose slopes had been furnished with obstacles. At some points of special importance to the Russians they consisted of as many as seven rows of trenches, one behind the other. The works were very skillfully placed, and were adopted to flanking one another. The infantry of the allied [Teutonic] troops in the nights preceding the attack had pushed forward closer to the enemy and had assumed positions in readiness for the forward rush. In the night from May 1 to 2 the artillery fired in slow rhythm at the enemy's positions. Pauses in the fire served the pioneers for cutting the wire entanglements. On the 2d of May at 6 A.M. an overwhelming artillery fire, including field guns and running up to the heaviest calibres, was begun on the front many miles in extent selected for the effort to break through. This was maintained unbroken for four hours.

FIELD MARSHALL VON MACKENSEN
Who Commanded the Victorious Teutonic Forces Against the Russians
in the Southeast

At 10 o'clock in the morning these hundreds of fire-spouting tubes suddenly ceased and the same moment the swarming lines and attacking columns of the assailants threw themselves upon the hostile positions. The enemy had been so shaken by the heavy artillery fire that his resistance at many points was very slight. In headlong flight he left his defenses, when the infantry of the [Teutonic] allies appeared before his trenches, throwing away rifles and cooking utensils and leaving immense quantities of infantry ammunition and dead. At one point the Russians themselves cut the wire entanglements to surrender themselves to the Germans. Frequently the enemy made no further resistance in his second and third positions. On the other hand, at certain other points of the front he defended himself stubbornly, making an embittered fight and holding the neighborhood. With the Austrian troops, the Bavarian regiments attacked Mount Zameczyka, lying 250 meters above their positions, a veritable fortress. A Bavarian infantry regiment here won incomparable laurels. To the left of the Bavarians Silesian regiments stormed the heights of Sekowa and Sakol. Young regiments tore from the enemy the desperately defended cemetery height of Gorlise and the persistently held railway embankment at Kennenitza. Among the Austrian troops Galician battalions had stormed the steep heights of the Pustki Hill, Hungarian troops having taken in fierce fighting the Wiatrowka heights. Prussian guard regiments threw the enemy out of his elevated positions east of Biala and at Staszkowka stormed seven successive Russian lines which were stubbornly held. Either kindled by the Russians or hit by a shell, a naphtha well behind Gorlise burst into flames. Higher than the houses the flames struck up into the sky and pillars of smoke rose to hundreds of yards.

On the evening of the 2d of May, when the warm Spring sun had begun to yield to the coolness of night the first main position in its whole depth and extent, a distance of some sixteen kilometers had been broken through and a gain of ground of some four kilometers had been attained. At least 20,000 prisoners, dozens of cannon and fifty machine guns remained in the hands of the allied troops that in the battle had competed with one another for the palm of victory. In addition, an amount of booty to be readily estimated, in the shape of war materials of all sorts, including great masses of rifles and ammunition, had been secured.

WORK OF GERMAN ARTILLERY.

(German Press Headquarters in Galicia, May 4, 1915.)

Reports of prisoners are unanimous in describing the effect of the artillery fire of the Teutonic allies as more terrible than the imagination can picture. The men, who were with difficulty recovering from the sufferings and exertions they had undergone, agreed that they could not imagine conditions worse in hell than they had been for four hours in the trenches. Corps, divisions, brigades, and regiments melted away as though in the heat of a furnace. In no direction was escape possible, for there was no spot of ground on which the four hundred guns of the Teutonic allies had not exerted themselves. All the Generals and Staff Officers of one Russian division were killed or wounded. Moreover, insanity raged in the ranks of the Russians, and from all sides hysterical cries could be heard rising above the roar of our guns, too strong for human nerves. Over the remnants of the Russians who crowded in terror into the remotest corners of their trenches there broke the mighty rush of our masses of infantry, before which also the Russian reserves, hurrying forward, crumbled away.

The Routes to Lemberg

[[Enlarge]]

At least four Austro-German armies were operating toward Lemberg, the capital of Eastern Galicia, which Grand Duke Nicholas, Commander in Chief of the Russian Army, evacuated on June 23 to escape being surrounded. After the recapture of Przemysl (1) one army advanced along the railroad to Lemberg and captured Grodek, (2,) where the Russians were expected to make a possibly successful stand at the line of the lakes. Another, advancing along the railroad from Jaroslau, (3,) took Krakowice, Jaworow, Skio, Janow, and Zolkiew (4). A third, advancing from Sieniawa, (5,) apparently was joined by forces which took Tarnogrod (6) and on June 21 captured Rawa Ruska, (7,) thus cutting the Russian communications and line of retreat to the north. Finally an army, operating from Stryi, (8,) drove the Russians across the Dniester.

GERMAN TEAM WORK.

(Wolff Telegraphic Bureau, Vienna, May 7, 1915.)

From a well-informed source at the Royal and Imperial Chief Command, the War Press Bureau has received the following communication:

While by those concerned in conducting the operations of the armies individual achievements and isolated developments of distinction are regarded as excluded from particular mention, in the public press not infrequently certain successes are assigned to certain personalities. This, too, has been the case frequently with reference to the recent happenings in Galicia. The suggestions and plans made in the war are always the result of the co-operation of a number of persons. The Commander in Chief then assumes the responsibility for them. So far as the present operations in Galicia are concerned, these had in March already been similarly planned, and at that time such forces as were available were put into position for a penetrating thrust in the direction, by way of Gorlice, through the chain of valleys toward Zmygrod. These forces, however, proved to be numerically too weak, in spite of initial successes at Senkorva and Gorlice, to break through the enemy's stubbornly defended front. Only the proposal made by General von Falkenhayn and sanctioned by the German chief command, to bring up further strong German forces for a forward drive, supplied the foundation for the brilliant success of May 1 by the armies of Mackensen, Archdukes Joseph and Frederick and Boroevic.

ADVANCE IN MIDDLE GALICIA.

(Wolff Telegraphic Bureau, Berlin, May 26, 1915.)

We learn from the Great Headquarters the following concerning the progress of the operations of the Teutonic allies in Middle Galicia:

In barely fourteen days the army of Mackensen has carried its offensive forward from Gorlice to Jaroslaw. With daily fighting, for the most part against fortified positions, it has crossed the line of three rivers and gained in territory more than 100 kilometers in an airline. On the evening of the fourteenth day, with the taking of the city and bridge-head, Jaroslau, they won access to the lower San. It was now necessary to cross this stream on a broad front. The enemy, though, still held before Radymo and in the angle of San-Wislok with two strongly fortified bridge-heads the west bank of this river. For the rest he confined himself to the frontal defense of the east bank.

While troops of the guard in close touch with Austrian regiments gained, fighting, the crossing of the river at Jaroslau, and continued to throw the enemy, who was daily receiving reinforcements, continually further toward the east and northeast, Hanoverian regiments forced the passage of the river several kilometers further down stream. Brunswickers, by the storming of the heights of Wiazowinca, opened the way and thereby won the obstinately defended San crossing. Further to the north the San angle was cleared of the enemy that had still held on there. One Colonel, fifteen officers, 7,800 prisoners, four cannon, twenty-eight machine guns, thirteen ammunition wagons, and a field kitchen fell into our hands. The rest found themselves obliged to make a hasty retreat to the east bank.

These battles and successes took place on the 17th of May in the presence of the German Emperor, who, on the same day, conferred upon the Chief of Staff of the army here engaged, Colonel von Seeckt, the order pour le mérite, the commander of the army, General von Mackensen, having already received special honors. The Emperor had hurried forward to his troops by automobile. On the way he was greeted with loud hurrahs by the wounded riding back in wagons. On the heights of Jaroslau the Emperor met Prince Eitel Friedrich, and then, from several points of observation, for hours followed with keen attention the progress of the battle for the crossing.

In the days from the 18th to the 20th of May the Teutonic allies pressed on further toward the east, northeast, and north, threw the enemy out of Sieniawa and took up positions on the east bank of the river upon a front of twenty or thirty kilometers. The enemy withdrew behind the Lerbaczowa stream. All his attempts to win back the lost ground were unsuccessful, although in the days from the 13th to the 20th of May he brought on no less than six fresh divisions to stem our advance at and beyond Jaroslau.

Altogether, the Russian command had since the beginning of the operation thrown seven army corps from other areas of the war against the front of the army of von Mackensen and against the centre and right wing of the army of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand. These were the Third Caucasian, the Fifteenth, and a combined army corps, six individual infantry regiments, the Thirty-fourth, Forty-fifth, Fifty-eighth, Sixty-second, Sixty-third, Seventy-seventh, and Eighty-first Infantry, and the Thirteenth Siberian division, not counting a cavalry division, which entered the field already in the earliest days. With the combined army corps there appeared a Caucasian infantry division, the Third, made up of Armenians and Grusinians, which till January had fought in Persia, was transferred in April to Kars, and later to Odessa, where it formed part of the so-called Army of the Bosporus. Before our front now also appeared Cossacks on foot, a special militia formation, which hitherto had fought in the Caucasus. Finally, there came on the outermost left wing of the Russians the Trans-Amoor border guards, a troop designed purely for protection of the railway in North Manchuria, whose use in this part of the area of war was probably not foreseen even in Russia.

Yet the Russians still held along the lower San the bridge-head of Radymo on the west bank. The problem of the next ensuing battles was to drive him also from this point.

APPROACHING PRZEMYSL.

(By The Associated Press.)

VIENNA, June 1, (via Amsterdam and London.)—The following official communication was issued today:

East of the San our troops were attacked Monday night along the entire front by strong Russian forces. This was especially true on the lower Lubaczowka, where superior forces attempted to advance. All the attacks were repulsed with severe losses to the enemy, who at some points retreated in disorder.

On the lower San, below Sieniawa, Russian attacks also failed.

On the north front of Przemysl Bavarian troops stormed three defenses of the circle of forts, capturing 1,400 prisoners and 28 heavy guns.

South of the Dniester the allied troops penetrated the enemy's defensive position, defeated the Russians and conquered Stry, the enemy retreating toward the Dniester. We captured 53 officers and over 9,000 prisoners, 8 cannon, and 15 machine guns.

On the Pruth and in Poland the situation is unchanged.

BERLIN, June 1, (via London.)—The German General Staff gave out the following report today on the operations in the eastern theatre of war:

In the eastern theatre of war, near Amboten, fifty kilometers, (about thirty miles,) east of Libau, (Courland,) German cavalry defeated the Russian Fourth Regiment of Dragoons. Near Shavli, hostile attacks were unsuccessful.

Our booty in the month of May, north of the Niemen River, amounts to 24,700 prisoners, seventeen cannon, and forty-seven machine guns; south of the Niemen and the Pilica, 6,943 prisoners, eleven machine guns, and one aeroplane.

In the southeastern theatre of war: In front of Przemysl Bavarian troops yesterday stormed Forts 10-A, 11-A, and 12, west of Dunkowiczki, capturing the remainder of a garrison of 1,400 men, with eighteen heavy and five light cannon. The Russians attempted to escape their fate by an attack in masses against our positions east of Jaroslau, but failed, an enormous number of dead covering the battlefield before our front.

The conquerors of Zwinin (a ridge in the Carpathians)—the Prussian Guard under command of the Bavarian General, Count Bothmer—stormed a strongly fortified place on the Stry, and broke through Russian positions near and northwest of Stry. Up to the present time we have captured in this region fifty-three officers, 9,183 men, eight cannon, and fifteen machine guns.

According to an unofficial report from Piotrkow, Russian Poland, the Russians have evacuated Radom, in Poland, to the south of Warsaw.

[[Enlarge]]

Map of Przemysl and its defenses.

MORE DEFENSES TAKEN.

VIENNA, June 2, (via Amsterdam and London.)—The official statement issued by the Austrian War Office tonight reads as follows:

The Russians have renewed their strong attacks against the allied troops on the eastern bank of the San. Desperate attacks everywhere have been repulsed with heavy Russian losses.

On the northern front of Przemysl two additional fortifications have been taken by storm, and we have maintained the conquered ground.

South of the Dniester our attacks are making successful progress. Hostile positions between Stry and Drohobycz were stormed yesterday.

Strong Russian forces, which yesterday attacked our position near Solowina, in South Galicia, suffered severe losses. They retreated and, at some points, took to flight.

Besides the booty mentioned in the German communication as having been captured during the month of May from the Russians we took 189 ammunition wagons and a quantity of other war material, such as 8,500 rounds of artillery ammunition, 5,500,000 cartridges, and 32,000 rifles.

BERLIN, June 2, (via London.)—The following report on the operations in the eastern theatre of war was issued today by the German General Staff:

Successful engagements occurred against minor Russian divisions at Neuhausen, fifty kilometers (about thirty miles) northeast of Libau, and at Shidiki, sixty-nine kilometers (about forty miles) southeast of Libau. The same thing happened further south in the district of Shavli, and on the Dubysa, southeast of Kielmy and between Ugiamy and Ejargola. At Shavli we took 500 prisoners.

Further Russian intrenchments situated around Dunkowiozki (near Przemysl) were taken by storm yesterday. After the victory at Stry the allied troops advanced yesterday in the direction of Medenice.

In the month of May 863 officers and 268,869 men were taken prisoners in the southeastern theatre of war, while 251 cannon and 576 machine guns were captured. Of these numbers, the capturing of 400 officers, including two Generals, 153,254 men, 160 cannon, including twenty-eight heavy ones, and 403 machine guns, is to the credit of the troops under General Mackensen.

Including prisoners taken in the eastern theatre of war, as well as those announced yesterday, the total number of Russians who have fallen into the hands of the Germanic allied troops during the month of May amounts to about 1,000 officers and more than 300,000 men.

PRZEMYSL RECAPTURED.

VIENNA, June 3, (via Amsterdam and London.)—The following official communication on the Przemysl victory was issued in Vienna today:

In the Russian war theatre the German troops last night stormed the last positions on the north front of Przemysl and entered the town at 3:30 o'clock this morning from the north.

Our Tenth Corps entered the town from the west and south and reached the centre of the town soon after 6 o'clock.

The importance of this success cannot yet be estimated.

The attack of the allied troops in the sector north of Stry is making successful progress.

Following is the Berlin official announcement of the fall of Przemysl, dated June 3:

The fortified town of Przemysl was taken by us early this morning, after the fortifications on the northern front, which still held out, had been stormed during the night. The amount of booty taken has not yet been ascertained.

PETROGRAD ADMITS DEFEAT.

PETROGRAD, June 3.—Petrograd admits the loss of the fortress in the following official bulletin:

As Przemysl, in view of the state of its artillery and its works, which were destroyed by the Austrians before their capitulation, was recognized as incapable of defending itself, its maintenance in our hands only served our purpose until such time as our possession of positions surrounding the town on the northwest facilitated our operations on the San.

The enemy having captured Jaroslau and Radymno and begun to spread along the right bank of the river, the maintenance of these positions forced our troops to fight on an unequal and very difficult front, increasing it by thirty-five versts, (about twenty-four miles,) and subjecting the troops occupying these positions to the concentrated fire of the enemy's numerous guns.

Przemysl was bombarded with heavy guns up to 16-inch calibre, and the enemy delivered his principal attack against the north front in the region of Forts 10 and 11, which the Austrians had almost completely demolished before the surrender of the fortress.

When we repulsed these attacks the enemy succeeded in taking several of our guns, which had bombarded the enemy's columns until the latter were close to the muzzles, and the last shell was spent. According to supplementary information we took two hundred prisoners and eight quick-firers.

In Galicia on Monday between the Vistula and Przemysl stubborn fighting developed, our troops gaining somewhat important successes on the left bank of the lower San, taking several villages, some with the bayonet. On the right bank of the same river we were successful near the village of Kalukouve, taking a base south of the village, capturing 1,200 prisoners, including twenty-two officers and eight quick-firers.

RUSSIAN RETREAT FROM PRZEMYSL.

VIENNA, (via London,) June 4.—The Austrian War Office this evening issued the following official communication announcing the retreat of the Russians from Przemysl, their stand at Medyka, ten miles to the east, and their defeat at other points:

During the day Przemysl was cleared of the enemy, who is retreating in an easterly direction, offering resistance on the height southwest of Medyka. The allied troops there are attacking.

Meanwhile the army of the Austrian General Eduard von Boehm-Ermolli has succeeded in breaking through the Russian defensive positions from the south, and advanced in the direction of Mosciska, on the railroad to Lemberg, ten miles beyond Medyka, within a short distance of which our troops now hold positions. In these engagements we have captured numerous prisoners.

The army under General Alexander Linsingen also has achieved fresh successes, and the Russians are in full retreat before him.

On the Pruth line, in consequence of the events on the San and the upper Dniester, further fighting has developed. Wherever the enemy attempts an attack he is repulsed with severe losses. We have captured 900 men.

Otherwise the situation on the lower San and in Poland is unchanged.

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN FIELD HEADQUARTERS, (via London,) June 5.—According to information given out by the Austro-Hungarian military authorities to representatives of the press, heavy fighting is now in progress along virtually the entire Galician front, and the general situation is very favorable to the Austro-Germans. A decisive conclusion to the entire Russian campaign in Galicia is in sight.

Przemysl's recapture by Austrian and Bavarian troops, according to details received from the front, resulted from the taking of five forts in the northern sector and the simultaneous threatening of the forts on the south and west fronts.

With the forts on the north side in the possession of the besiegers, with a Bavarian corps pressing impetuously through the breach against the city, and with the Austrian Tenth Army Corps within storming distance of the southern and western forts, which artillery fire already had reduced sufficiently for attack, the Russians decided to evacuate the town and all the forts except those on the eastern and southeastern sectors. This movement was executed Wednesday night.

The Bavarians resumed their attack at dawn on Thursday, and entered Przemysl upon the heels of the retiring Russians.

The Austrian Tenth Army Corps simultaneously started toward the west and south fronts, but found the forts there had been evacuated. An attack now is in progress against the forts still held by the Russians, those positions being defended apparently with the object of covering the latter's retirement.

"The Russian rear guards," the statement to the press says, "are fighting delaying actions south of the Dniester River against the Austro-German forces advancing from Stry to cover the passage of the river. The Russians north of Przemysl are launching a series of the most desperate attacks against General von Mackensen's army. Here they are making use of new reserves, and at the same time they are exerting heavy pressure against the troops commanded by Archduke Joseph Ferdinand in the triangle between the River San and the River Vistula.

"The Russian offensive in Southeastern Galicia, designed to relieve this situation, has been a complete failure."

BERLIN, (via London,) June 4.—The following official communication on the Eastern fighting was issued here today:

Our troops, after much fighting, reached the line east of Przemysl and to the northeast thereof, to Bolesteasyzce, Ormis, Poodziao, and Tarzawa. The booty taken at Przemysl has not yet been ascertained. According to statements made by prisoners of the most varied descriptions, the Russians during the night of June 2-3, during which Przemysl was taken by storm, had prepared a general attack over the whole front against the army under General von Mackensen. This offensive broke down completely at the outset. Twenty-two kilometers (about 13½ miles) east of Przemysl German troops under General von Marwitz are fighting on the heights on both sides of Myslatyeze. The army of General von Linsingen is about to cross the lower crossing of the Stry, northeast of the town of the same name.

Our cavalry has driven Russian divisions out of the villages of Lenen and Schrunden, sixty kilometers, (thirty-seven miles,) and seventy kilometers, (forty-three miles,) east of Libau Courland. In the district of Rawcliany, west of Kurschany and near Sredniki, on the Dubysa, attacks by the enemy failed.

GERMAN THRUST TOWARD LEMBERG.

[By The Associated Press.]

VIENNA, June 3, (via London, Friday, June 4.)—The German and Austrian forces which broke the Russian lines at Stry are moving northward rapidly. The Russians are apparently unable to make a stand in the plains, and the chances of doing so north of the river are regarded as problematical.

Now that Przemysl has fallen, rendering it possible for General Mackensen to continue his movement eastward, he would naturally meet a check at the Russian fortified positions partly composed of a chain of lakes extending north and south, about eighteen miles west of Lemberg. It is thought, however, that these positions will prove untenable, because General Linsingen, having crossed the Dniester to the west of Mikolajow, will likely cut the communications with Lemberg. The Austro-German plan of operations against Lemberg apparently is the same as against Przemysl. The assailants are expected to throw columns on both sides of the city and then press together some distance beyond it. In the meantime this movement seems to threaten the Russians fighting around Nadworna with a loss of contact with the main body.

In view of the double success at Przemysl and Stry, it is expected in Vienna that the Galician campaign will move at an accelerated pace the next few days.

AN ENCIRCLING MOVEMENT.

LONDON, June 5.—Heavy fighting is still in progress in Galicia, where the Austro-Germans are attempting an encircling movement against Lemberg such as proved successful at Przemysl. The following statement was given out today at the War Office in Vienna:

East of Przemysl, near Medkya, the Russians have been unable to resist a further advance of the Teutonic allies toward Mosziska.

In the district of the Lower San the enemy's attacks were repulsed. From the west Austro-German troops approached the district near Kalusz and Zurawna.

On the Pruth fighting is proceeding. The enemy obstinately attacked here at several points but was driven back to the river.

The following is the official report from Berlin:

In connection with the Russian attacks repulsed yesterday at Rawdejany and Sawdyniki, our troops have made further advances and have driven off their opponents who held the bridge-head at Sawdyniki. They made 1,970 prisoners. Further north cavalry engagements took place yesterday in the region of Fokeljanij with good results for us.

To the east of Jaroslau the situation remains unchanged. South of Przemysl our troops, under General Marwitz, together with Austro-Hungarian troops, are advancing in the direction of Mosziska. The army under General von Linsingen has driven the enemy back in the direction of Kalusz and Zurawno on the Dniester.

SIXTH WEEK OF THE “THRUST.”

BERLIN, June 7, (via London.)—Everything indicates that the Teutonic allies are beginning the sixth week of their Galician campaign with a promising outlook. The Russians have lost their line on the River San, and they appear also about to lose their positions on the River Dniester. These same advices indicate further that the Russians to the east and northeast of Czernowitz already have begun to retreat. The following bulletin was issued by the War Office today:

During the battles at Przemysl 33,805 prisoners were taken. East of Przemysl the troops of the Teutonic allies continued their victorious battle. They drove back the enemy toward Wysznia, to the northeast of Mosciska.

Part of the army under General von Linsingen has crossed the Dniester at Zurawna, and has taken the hill to the north of the eastern bank by storm. Further south the pursuit reached the Nowica-Kalusz-Tomaszow line. The number of prisoners taken has been increased to more than 13,000.