MAP OF ARGENTINA AND ADJOINING STATES

THE SOUTH AMERICAN SERIES

EDITED BY MARTIN HUME, M.A.

ARGENTINA

BY
W. A. HIRST

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY
MARTIN HUME, M.A.

WITH A MAP AND SIXTY-FOUR ILLUSTRATIONS

T. FISHER UNWIN
LONDON LEIPSIC
ADELPHI TERRACE INSELSTRASSE 20

(All rights reserved.)

PREFACE

In establishing the commercial and industrial greatness of Argentina my countrymen have co-operated with her people for a longer time and more efficiently than any other foreign nation. The land and the people are therefore a subject of lively interest to Englishmen, and it is hoped that this sketch, however inadequate, will help towards a closer knowledge of Argentina. I have received much valuable assistance from many sources, but I do not indicate them, because I do not wish to shift the blame for any inaccuracies that may be found in these pages. For all such mistakes I am solely responsible.

April 22, 1910.

CONTENTS

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

INTRODUCTION

The most stupendous achievement ever attained by a nation in so short a time was the discovery, conquest, and settlement of Mexico and South America by Spain within the compass of a century. To fix indelibly and for ever upon the peoples of a vast continent the language, religion, customs, polity, and laws of a nation on the other side of the globe called for qualities which could only be temporarily evoked by an irresistible common sentiment. The sentiment which gave to Spain for a time the potency to carry through simultaneously the tasks of imposing religious orthodoxy upon Christendom and founding her great colonial empire was pride: pride of religion, race, and person, deliberately fostered by rulers for political ends. This origin of the delusive strength that carried the Conquistadores through an untracked continent regardless of perils and sufferings, and made South America Spanish, rendered inevitable that the rewards, national and individual, should disappoint the recipients. For pride and its concomitant covetousness are never satisfied; and the frenzied thirst for rapid riches and distinction that spurred the Spanish explorers and conquerors onward rarely ended in the idle luxurious dignity that was their goal, and it ultimately brought to the mother country nought but penury and degradation.

It was ignorance of economic truth that led Spaniards in the sixteenth century to regard the possession of the precious metals as wealth, regardless of circumstances: and the error coloured the whole domination of Spain in the New World. That the nation and the individual should hope to become permanently powerful and rich by obtaining vast stores of the metallic medium whilst discouraging productive industry appears to modern ideas ridiculous, but to the discoverers of America it was regarded as quite the natural course of events. The effect is seen in the rapid subjection and development of the regions believed to be rich in the precious metals, and the comparative neglect of the vast territories where patience and the labour of man were needed to win nature's abundant bounty from the fertile soil.

The west side of the South American Continent, though furthest from Europe, therefore took precedence of the eastern coast in the efforts and regards of the conquerors. When the piled-up riches of the Incas and the inexhaustible mines of the Peruvian Andes beckoned to the greedy adventurers from the mother country, the endless alluvial pampas and dense primeval forests of the east might call in vain. From Panama down the Pacific Coast, therefore, the main tide of conquest and empire flowed, drawn by the magnet gold; and on the northern continent a similar course was taken. The Aztec empire with its accumulated treasures absorbed an ever-increasing stream of Spaniards, whilst the more northern territories now included in the United States were left later to English settlers, whose hopes were not centred upon wringing yellow metal from the earth, but upon founding a free new agricultural England across the sea.

Thus it happened that to navigators in search of the short cut to Asia rather than to the typical Conquistador was left the first exploration of what we now know is the coming emporium of the South American Continent and its permanent centre of productive prosperity. Domingo de Solis, chief pilot of Spain, was sent by Charles V. to South America not as a settler, or primarily as a gold-seeker, but as an explorer; and when in 1508 he entered the noble Bay of Rio Janeiro it seemed at last that the object of his quest was gained, and that here was the coveted waterway to the East. But he soon found out his mistake, and when, sailing further south, he crossed the wide estuary of the River Plate, his hopes again rose that this tremendous volume of water, a hundred and fifty miles wide at the mouth, was not a river merely, but the ocean channel to the Pacific. Returning home with his hopes still high Solis, was authorised by his sovereign to explore his important discovery, and in 1516 he sailed into the delta of the great network of streams that have brought down upon their bosoms from the far Andes in the course of ages a large portion of the continent as we now know it.

To the Spaniard's eyes the land was not inviting. Far stretching plains of waving grasses, great expanses of marsh and swamp, league after league. No palaces and temples of hewn stone, like those of Peru and Mexico, met the eye here; no promise of gold in the fat alluvial soil; no cities where the arts were practised and treasure accumulated. Such Indians as there were differed vastly from the mild serfs of the Incas. Nomad savages were these; robust, stout, and hardy, elusive of pursuit and impossible of subjection in their wandering disunity. For three hundred miles through the endless pampa-country Solis sailed onward up the stream, his hopes that this way led to the Indies gradually fading as he progressed, until he and his men fell into a trap laid for them by the pampa Indians and were slaughtered.

Four years afterwards Magellan on his epoch-making voyage sailed up the great river; but he too fell a victim to the perils of the way in the Asiatic seas, and never returned to Spain to tell of his discoveries in the heart of South America. Then Sebastian Cabot, the Englishman in the service of Spain, was sent to explore, and if possible to take possession of the land for Charles V.; for the Portuguese claimed indefinite territory in this direction under the convention of Tordesillas, and it behoved Spain to assert ownership before it was too late. High up the river Paraguay Cabot found a country with different features and peopled by another race. Silver ornaments, too, he found in plenty amongst these Guaranies, to whom distant echoes of Inca influence had reached across the wastes and mountains to the west. But here, many hundreds of miles from the ocean and far from any base of supplies, it was impracticable for Cabot with the resources at his disposal to effect a settlement, and he also returned to Spain with his story of silver as an incentive for further expeditions.

This was in 1527, and in the following year the first attempt to establish a permanent footing on the Plate was made by the building of a fort at Rosario, but this was soon abandoned for a site on the sea coast of what is now a part of Brazil to the north of the river. In the meantime the Portuguese were busy advancing their posts to the north of the delta in order to assert their claims; and in face of this, rather than because remunerative metallic treasure from the new territory was to be expected, Charles V. authorised an extensive colonising experiment to be made and the great waterway and its banks claimed for Spain. The stirring history of Mendoza's attempts to found a settlement on the Paraná, the establishment of Buenos Aires and its abandonment again and again, the fateful colonisation of Asuncion, far up the river in the heart of the continent, the heroic adventures of Irala, Ayolas, and Cabeza de Vaca, and the reconquest of the river territories down to the sea from the isolated Spanish post of Asuncion eight hundred miles up stream, is adequately told in Mr. Hirst's pages, and need not be related here.

The permanent fixing of the flag of Spain on the territory east of the Andes was not less heroic an achievement than the more showy conquests of Peru and Mexico; for in the former case the incentive of easily won gold was absent, and the object was more purely national than was the case elsewhere. But, though it was necessary for Spain to assert her ownership over these endless pampas and the unexplored wastes beyond, the new territory was always subordinated to the gold-producing viceroyalty of Peru across the Andes. A glance at the map will show the almost incredible obstacles wilfully interposed by the home authorities upon the River Plate colonies in forcing the latter not only to be subject in government to the Viceroy of Peru, but to carry on most of their commercial communications with the mother country across the wide continent from the Pacific coast by way of Panama and Peru. The law was, of course, extensively evaded, and the luxuriant fertility of the pampa both for agriculture and grazing made the River Plate colonies prosperous in spite of Government restrictions.

The English slave-traders and adventurers made no scruple of braving the King of Spain's edicts; and the estuary of the Plate, within a few weeks' sail of Europe, saw many a cargo welcomed upon a mere pretence of force by the colonists whose lives were rendered doubly hard by the obstacles placed in their way by their own Government. In 1586 the Earl of Cumberland's ships on a privateering expedition to capture every Spanish and Portuguese vessel they encountered sailed into the River Plate and learnt some interesting particulars of the settlements from one of the unfortunate shipmasters they had plundered. These give a good idea of the difficulties under which traffic was then carried on. "He told me that the town of Buenos Aires is from the Green island about seventy leagues' standing on the south side of the river, and from thence to Santa Fé is one hundred leagues, standing on the same side also. At which town their ships do discharge all their goods into small barks, which row and tow up the river to another town called Asuncion, which is from Santa Fé a hundred and fifty leagues, where the boats discharge on shore, and so pass all their goods by carts and horses to Tucuman, which is in Peru." The commerce here referred to was probably the contraband trade done in spite of the Spanish regulations, for it was found that even to the far distant towns in the interior, like Tucuman and Mendoza, it was easier and cheaper thus to convey goods from Europe by the eastern coast than from the Pacific across the almost impassable Andes.

The Earl of Cumberland's factor gives also an account of the Spanish settlements then (1586) existing on the River Plate.[1] "There are in the river five towns, some of seventy households, some of more. The first town was about fifty leagues up the river and called Buenos Aires, the rest some forty or fifty leagues from one another, so that the uppermost town, called Tucuman, is two hundred and thirty leagues from the entrance to the river.[2] In these towns is great store of corn, cattle, wine and sundry fruits, but no money of gold or silver. They make a certain kind of slight cloth, which they give in truck for sugar, rice, marmalade, and sucket, which were the commodities this ship (i.e., the prize) had."

Thus with everything against it except its irrepressible natural advantages of soil and climate and its lack of mineral wealth, the colony grew in prosperity in spite of man's shortsightedness. There was no temptation here, even if it had been possible, for the Spaniards to exterminate the aborigines by forced work in unhealthy mines. The innumerable herds of cattle and horses that in a very few years peopled the pampa from the few animals brought from Europe and abandoned by the first settlers provided sustenance, even wealth, with comparatively easy labour to the mixed race of Indians and Spaniards, which took kindly to the half-wild pastoral life in harmony with the nomadic traditions of the natives; and thus with much less hardship and cruelty than in other South American regions the Argentines gradually grew into a homogeneous people, whose pastoral and agricultural pursuits brought them to a higher level of general well-being than populations elsewhere in South America.

INDIAN CHILD.

But great as is the actual and potential wealth of the Argentine from its favoured soil, it is not that alone that has made its capital the greatest in South America, and has brought to the development of the Republic citizens and resources from all the progressive nations of the world. It is also as the main highway to the remote recesses of the vast continent that the Argentine region has appealed to the imaginations of men. The noble waterways, navigable far into the interior, provide cheap and easy transport for the products of distant provinces possessing infinite possibilities as yet hardly known. The unbroken plains, extending from the Atlantic sea-board to the foot of the Andes eight hundred miles away, offer unrivalled facilities for the construction of railways to convey to the ports food supplies for the Old World from this, the greatest undeveloped grain and pasture region in temperate climes. It is this character of a thoroughfare offering easy access to the coming continent that ensures for Buenos Aires its future position as a world emporium, and to the States of the Argentine Republic readily accessible markets for their abundant and varied natural products. And to add to this advantage the opening of the Transandine tunnel, now at last an accomplished fact, makes the Argentine the natural highway for passengers and fine goods to the cities of Chile and the Pacific Coast, saving the tedious and costly voyage round Cape Horn or through the Straits of Magellan.

The greatest admirers of the old Spanish colonial system will hardly deny that the prodigious development effected since the declaration of Argentine independence, of the resources of the country, thanks largely to the influx of foreign immigrants and capital, would have been impossible under the Spanish domination. That a new people, unaccustomed to, and perhaps as yet unprepared for, self-government and political emancipation should have had to work out its own problems during a period of turbulence was inevitable. It is no reproach to the Argentine people that this natural process, necessary to fit them for a stable political existence, has in the past caused violence and lawlessness. The constant introduction of men of other races into the Argentine is giving to the population new features and qualities which will render the racial stock of the future one of the most interesting ethnological problems in the world; and this abundant admixture of foreign blood, readily assimilated as it is by the native stock, certainly makes for increasing stability.

The same may be said of the large amount of foreign capital invested in Argentine enterprises. Argentine statesmen, taught by experience as they have been, and keenly awake to the need for foreign aid in developing their country, are not in the least likely in future to frighten away capital by dishonest finance or revolutionary methods. Responsibility has already brought sobriety into Argentine politics, and although the official procedure and Governmental ethics of the Spanish races vary from those usually prevalent in Anglo-Saxon countries, they are in most cases better suited to the character of the people than those that commend themselves to us. When we for our own purposes go to a foreign country, it is unreasonable to expect, as many Englishmen do, that we can carry with us and impose upon our hosts our own traditions and standards.

No country known to me impresses upon a visitor from Europe so forcibly as the Argentine the unlimited possibilities of its soil. Travelling hour after hour by a railway straight as a line over gently undulating or perfectly flat plains, stretching on all sides as far as the eye can reach, the observer is struck by the regular ripple of the rich grass, like the waves of the sea, as the breeze blows over it. Here and there little clumps of eucalyptus slightly break the monotony of the landscape, and a gleam of a bright green alfalfa field occasionally relieves the eye. Far away at rare intervals gleaming white walls and turrets surrounded by eucalyptus groves mark the position of an estancia, and innumerable herds of cattle, sheep, and almost wild troops of horses everywhere testify to the richness of the pasture.

A SHEEP RUN.

From Buenos Aires to Mendoza, almost at the foot of the Andes, some six hundred miles away, the scene hardly changes. Far to the south the pampa is poorer and more sparse, but still splendid pasture for certain sorts of cattle, whilst in Entre Rios, the great tract between the rivers Paraná and Uruguay, the country is wilder and more broken, especially towards the north. Scattered amongst the vast flocks of sheep upon the open veldt are many ostriches, now a profitable investment, whilst great numbers of running partridges seek cover in the pampa grass from the dreaded hawks that hover above them. The native grass is flesh-forming but not fattening, and, to an English grazier, looks poor food enough for the millions of head of cattle that thrive upon it. It does not, as does the best English pasture, entirely cover the surface, but grows in distinct tufts. The native grass, however, is now rapidly being supplanted in the rich plains of Central Argentina by new forms of pasture, mostly English, infinitely richer, perennial in its luxuriance, and forming upon this favoured soil the best cattle-grazing in the world.

AN OSTRICH.

Of late years, as Mr. Hirst shows in his book, enormous tracts of land, especially to the south of Buenos Aires and high up the Paraná, are being broken up for wheat-growing, and Bahia Blanca, the ambitious port south of Buenos Aires, bids fair soon to become a great centre of grain export. Vast quantities of maize are also raised in the country on the banks of the Paraná, and are mainly exported from Rosario. Whichever way one turns fresh evidences of fertility are forced upon the attention. Cattle standing knee-deep in pasture, sheep growing fat at fifty to the acre, leagues of ripening corn, equal to any on earth, growing upon virgin soil; flowers to which we are accustomed in England as tender shrubs developing here into robust blossoming trees; and fruit orchards flourishing, solid miles of them, prolific beyond belief, within a short distance of Buenos Aires, where only a few years ago nothing but wild scrub and tangled forest existed.

The extension of railways in every direction has now to a great extent destroyed or modified the old free life upon the pampas of Argentina. The estancias, except in remote districts, are often large establishments where all the comforts and some of the luxuries of life are to be found, instead of the walled semi-fortresses of olden times. The white-domed well, with its shady ombú-tree, still stands near the principal entrance to the courtyard, and the high palenque, the hitching-post for horses, still flanks the gateway, but the picturesque gaucho who goes loping over the plain, his lasso at his saddle-bow, his naked feet thrust into his big leather horseskin brogues, and his poncho fluttering in the breeze, is no longer the monarch of the pampa as he once was, for civilisation has touched even him. The silver ornaments that once covered his accoutrements are less abundant than they used to be; he is fortunately less free with his knife, for he was never much of a hand with a gun, loving the bolas better; and the rural railway station in which he likes to dawdle about in the intervals of his life in the saddle is the symbol of his discipline and decline.

The great waterways that characterise Argentina, although they are now less used for passenger traffic into the hinterland than formerly, must still in the future be a great, if not the principal, highway for the produce of the distant interior. Rosario, some two hundred miles above Buenos Aires on the Paraná, is a progressive and improving port, serving the rich maize and grain-growing expanses of the province of Santa Fé; and far up the stream, almost to the Paraguayan border at Corrientes, river ports are rapidly growing into importance as centres of export as the surrounding country is developed.

But wonderful as is the apparently boundless promise of this country of favoured plains, Argentina is not only pampa. The Gran Chaco, a great country still for the most part a wilderness, is a region of dim tropical forest, where the parrots, birds of paradise, and brilliant butterflies vie with those of the Amazon; a hot, moist region, where the monkey and the land crab flourish exceedingly, and where savage Indians still hunt down with primitive weapons the jaguar and the puma. From this sultry country of forest and flood to the almost treeless, arid steppes of Patagonia is a change rather to another world than to another province of the same Republic, and hardly less difference exists between the rolling plains of the pampa country and the magnificent regions of towering peaks, stern uplands, and vast lakes that form the Andine portions of Argentina.

The change is noticed as the road approaches Mendoza, where the pampa gradually gives way to a country strongly resembling parts of Southern Spain; a land of poplars, willows, and acacias shading endless lines of irrigation channels; for rain falls but seldom on this eastern side of the Sierra, and on all hands, climbing the lower laps of the hills and lining the valleys, are miles of vineyards, which provide a stout red wine for the rest of the Republic. Further west still the land becomes more broken and barren as the hills rise higher and higher, until the ruddy sides, white glaciers, and snow-crested mountains of the Sierra appear, the giant Aconcagua monarch of them all. Further south than this the wonderful series of lakes that are almost inland seas high up in the Andes exist, as yet only partially explored to decide the frontier dispute between the Argentine and Chile, the remote valleys and austere uplands where the giant sloth is still believed by many to linger, a sole survival of the world before the great flood that destroyed life upon the nascent continent unrecorded ages ago.

ACONCAGUA.

This marvellous country of Argentina is destined to be one of the great nations of the world. Nature is just, and in giving it a prodigious extent of flat fertile soil has more than compensated it for withholding the gift of abundant gold that has made the history of other portions of South America. With a climate that varies, as does that of Chile, from the tropical to the antarctic, with pasture and arable land unsurpassed in the world, and with facilities for transport by land and water enabling the fruits of the soil to be conveyed easily from remote districts to eager markets for them, no bounds can be set to the wealth that awaits enterprise in the country. As a highway, too, the possibilities of Argentina are immense. The connection of Buenos Aires by rail with Santiago and Valparaiso opens up a new and shorter route to New Zealand and Australia; whilst the rapidly progressing extension of the railway into Bolivia—another link, it is intended, of the line to run eventually from New York to Buenos Aires—will provide a new and welcome outlet for the treasures of her mines to Bolivia, a vast country without a port of its own.

The possession of a temperate climate has made the Argentine and Chile the two South American nations of most promise for the future, owing to the fact that both countries have attracted and assimilated a great admixture of the robust peoples of Europe. The immigrants have been to a large extent drawn from the countries where life is hard and the fare frugal; from North Italy, from Galicia and Russia; whilst in stern Patagonia the Scotsman and the Welshman find an environment after their own hearts. In the second generation the immigrants of all nations usually become sturdy Argentines, and this easy assimilation of new ethnological elements is one of the most striking signs of the energy of the nation as a whole, and the most promising fact as regards the future political stability of the country. That a composite race will result from this admixture, possessing much of the patient laboriousness of the Ligurian and the practical hardheadedness of the Teuton, to temper the keen vehemence of the Ibero-American, may be confidently hoped: and if such be the case the advantages that nature has showered upon the Argentine will be complete, and a splendid future for the country secure.

MARTIN HUME.

ARGENTINA

CHAPTER I
THE COUNTRY—ITS FOUR DIVISIONS—THE RIVERS—THE CLIMATE

The attempt to present a bird's-eye view of Argentina may well be called presumptuous, for the country is larger than Russia in Europe and offers every variety of climate—"hot, cold, moist, and dry." Nor would the utmost industry of the traveller suffice to glean anything like complete information, for large tracts, owing to the inhospitality of nature or man, are unexplored, and both north and south he would be checked by impenetrable forests, or rugged barriers of rock, or by savage Indians who are saved from extinction by the inaccessibility of their habitations. Further, even as regards the settled parts of those districts which, however desolate, are practicable to the traveller, there is more to be learnt (and the conditions are ever changing) than could well be absorbed in a lifetime, for Argentina is not, like several South American countries, a mere gigantic mass of potential riches, but is rapidly assuming a leading position among the commercial states of the world. From Buenos Aires to Mendoza, from Bahia Blanca to Tucuman, are to be seen all the signs of wealth and prosperity, all the unmistakable portents of coming potency usually apparent in a new country that has emerged from the stage of childhood and weakness and feels the vigour of lusty youth in its veins, impelling it to take its place in the system of world politics.

If a single volume is all too short to represent Argentina in its manifold aspects, still less adequate is a single chapter to sketch its physical characteristics. In fact, its interest is at present more physical than moral, rather in its vast capacities for producing wealth and distributing it by means of magnificent waterways and ever-extending railroads, than in anything which Argentinians have done to ennoble life by arts or other services.

Before, however, proceeding to the study of a country the learner must endeavour to set before himself its principal geographical features, and as those of Argentina are well defined and comparatively simple they lend themselves to broad and clear classification. Geographically Argentina falls into four divisions. Firstly, Patagonia, which stretches from the Rio Colorado to Cape Horn. Secondly, the Andine region, which runs from the southern frontier of Bolivia right along the Chilian border. Thirdly, the Gran Chaco, which embraces the whole of the north of Argentina except the Andine strip. Fourthly, the Pampa, which comprises the central and best known region.

Patagonia received its name, patagon, or large paw, from the enormous footprints which the Spanish explorers remarked in the sand. Till recently it was almost a terra incognita, roamed by Indians and herds of guanacos, but of late years the beginnings of settlement have been made, and sheep-farming has become a considerable industry. The southern portion is cold and inclement all the year round, but in the north the summers are hot. The country is well watered by six considerable rivers—the Negro, Chubut, Santa Cruz, Deseado, Coyly, and Gallegos—but scarcity of rain has caused it to be neglected by agriculturists. The whole of the plateau, indeed, has been called the Great Shingle Desert; it is of Tertiary formation, and the endless waste of sand and gravel was chiefly contributed by glacial action. This inhospitable desert is arranged in terraces which slope gently eastward, first from heights of 2,000 feet to 500, and then from this lower elevation to the sea-level.

In old days wonderful tales were told about the Patagonian giants—their enormous size, strength, and ferocity, but here it need only be said that the accounts were at least exaggerated. "In height, although very much above the average—some, indeed, reaching the height of 6 feet 4 inches, and all being broad and muscular—they have been greatly exaggerated, for, being very long in the body, they seem to tower above the European while sitting on horseback. They are short in the legs, and when standing on the ground do not on an average come over about 5 feet 11 inches."[3]

The Andine region, which in some of the South American States is the overwhelming characteristic, does not set a distinctive mark upon Argentina—essentially a plain country—but the western frontier of the Republic is guarded by a colossal range of mountains. These begin with Cerro de las Granadas in the extreme north, and extend beyond the Upper Colorado basin, where the Sierra Auco Mahinda of 16,000 feet is one of the most southerly of the important peaks. After this, although there is still a chain of moderate height, the mountains are not distinctively Andine. The highest of all the Argentine mountains is probably the Nevado de Famatina.

ANDINE PASS.

In general this region is excessively dry and the mountains are almost bare of vegetation. The annual rainfall at Mendoza is but 6 inches and at San Juan it is only 3.

The Gran Chaco may be taken as a rough denomination for the whole of the Republic lying north of the Pampa, excluding the Andine fringe. This is a land of luxuriant vegetation with a warm and moist climate and, as might be expected, the products vary greatly from those of the temperate plains. Rice and the sugar-cane, castor-oil, sesame, and the poppy are all cultivated, but this part of the country is as yet scantily populated and quite undeveloped; there are therefore few surplus products to export. It is a region of great beauty, and travellers praise the silent tropical nights, whose darkness is relieved by myriads of fireflies, the primeval forests, and the magnificent rivers. But it is mostly virgin land and in many parts is peopled by savage inhabitants who make travel dangerous.

A LONELY SCENE, SIERRA DE LA VENTANA.

The real Argentina is the Pampa; it is that vast and fertile champaign which makes the great Republic what she is, and to which she owes all her wealth and prosperity. Erroneous as is the popular idea that Argentina is merely a land of grassy steppes and rich cornfields, this is due to the fact that all except specialists have confined their travels to the Pampa. It extends from Cordoba to the Rios Negro or Colorado. In it are contained the great and growing towns, and from it these towns draw their prosperity. It is a country to delight the heart of the agriculturist. In many countries of South America the traveller passes through interminable jungles sparingly scattered with patches of cultivation where a few bony cattle scour for a livelihood. In the Pampa there is rich tilth and fine pasture; magnificent red and white beasts graze and fatten, standing knee-deep in the fresh grass, and sheep innumerable are raised. The dead level of the land is not quite unbroken, for south of the Plate estuary there are two small mountain ranges, the Tandil and Ventana. They never exceed 2,800 feet. In the east the rainfall is generally satisfactory, but it becomes scanty in the western districts. The winter is cold, the summer decidedly hot, but the climate is not intemperate, and might be called pleasant but for the fierce hot and cold winds which disturb enjoyment and are in some cases prejudicial to health. This brief summary must, for the present, suffice for the four regions; as we survey the country more in detail, we shall have opportunities of describing their characteristics more fully. It remains, however, to take a brief survey of several features which can better be described while we look at the country as a whole. The geology of Argentina greatly interested Darwin. He says:[4] "The geology of Patagonia is interesting. Differently from Europe, where the Tertiary formations appear to have accumulated in bays, here along hundreds of miles of coast we have one great deposit, including many Tertiary shells, all apparently extinct. The most common shell is a massive, gigantic oyster, sometimes even a foot in diameter. These beds are covered by others of a peculiar soft, white stone, including much gypsum, and resembling chalk, but really of a pumiceous nature. It is highly remarkable, from being composed, to at least one-tenth part of its bulk, of infusoria: Professor Ehrenberg has already ascertained in it thirty oceanic forms. This bed extends for 500 miles along the coast, and probably for a considerably greater distance. At Port St. Julian its thickness is more than 800 feet! These white beds are everywhere capped by a mass of gravel, forming probably one of the largest beds of shingle in the world: it certainly extends from near the Rio Colorado to between 600 and 700 nautical miles southward; at Santa Cruz (a river a little south of St. Julian) it reaches to the foot of the Cordillera; half-way up the river its thickness is more than 200 feet; it probably everywhere extends to this great chain, whence the well-rounded pebbles of porphyry have been derived: we may consider its average breadth as 200 miles, and its average thickness as about 50 feet. If this great bed of pebbles, without including the mud necessarily derived from their attrition, was piled into a mound, it would form a great mountain chain! When we consider that all these pebbles, countless as the grains of sand in the desert, have been derived from the slow-falling masses of rock on the old coast-lines and banks of rivers, and that these fragments have been dashed into smaller pieces, and that each of them has since been slowly rolled, rounded, and far transported, the mind is stupefied in thinking over the long, absolutely necessary lapse of years. Yet all this gravel has been transported, and probably rounded, subsequently to the deposition of the white beds, and long subsequently to the underlying beds with their Tertiary shells." His observations upon the Cordillera are equally noteworthy. He says:[5] "No one fact in the geology of South America interested me more than these terraces of rudely stratified shingle. They precisely resemble in composition the matter which the torrents in each valley would deposit if they were checked in their course by any cause, such as entering a lake or arm of the sea; but the torrents, instead of depositing matter, are now steadily at work wearing away both the solid rock and these alluvial deposits, along the whole line of every main valley and side valley. It is impossible here to give the reasons, but I am convinced that the shingle terraces were accumulated during the gradual elevation of the Cordillera by the torrents delivering, at successive levels, their detritus on the beach-heads of long, narrow arms of the sea, first high up the valleys, then lower and lower down as the land slowly rose. If this be so, and I cannot doubt it, the grand and broken chain of the Cordillera, instead of having been suddenly thrown up, as was till lately the universal, and still is the common opinion of geologists, has been slowly upheaved in mass, in the same gradual manner as the coasts of the Atlantic and Pacific have risen within the recent period. A multitude of facts in the structure of the Cordillera, on this view, receive a simple explanation." His conclusion is: "Daily it is forced home on the mind of the geologist that nothing, not even the wind that blows, is so unstable as the level of the crust of this earth."

LA VENTANA.

The geological character of Argentina is tolerably uniform. The surface is a coating of sandy soil, not usually more than 2 feet thick, which is alluvial and, from a geological point of view, quite modern. In the western districts it is usually bare of vegetation, but in the east it is covered with green herbage more or less thick. Underneath this superficial covering, however, lies the true geological formation, and this consists of argillaceous earth or mud of a reddish colour and interspersed with marly rock called by the inhabitants Tosca rock. It extends to latitude 38° or thereabouts, and is the famous Pampean formation, which Darwin calls Pampean mud. The thickness of this stratum varies considerably; it may average about 40 feet, and geologically it belongs to the Quaternary epoch, otherwise called Diluvian or Post-Pliocene. Its most remarkable feature is the enormous number of mammiferous remains which are to be found embedded in this Pampean mud, and naturalists believe that it would be impossible to dig a deep trench in any direction without disinterring some of these extinct giants. Frequently perfect skeletons are discovered. These ossiferous remains are richest in the province of Buenos Aires and become somewhat less frequent in the north and west. Some observers have marvelled that such huge creatures in such vast numbers were ever able to find nourishment, but that question is not a serious difficulty, for the largest animals are by no means the most voracious, and doubtless, like elephants of to-day, their struggle for existence was not so much against hunger as against the depredations of other animals or natural catastrophes. A much greater puzzle is their disappearance. It has been suggested that they were killed off by the Glacial cold, but it is not obvious, as has been pointed out, why this visitation carried off the mastodons and spared the parrots and hummingbirds. Another theory, put forward by a savant named M. Bravard, opines that a vast simoon overwhelmed them, but such a belief, inadequate and full of difficulties, is refuted by the fact that most of the skeletons are mutilated. Had they been overwhelmed by sand storms, they would have been preserved in almost perfect condition. The notion of drought is also inadequate. Darwin remarks that it is absurd to suppose that the most terrible calamity of this sort could destroy every species from Patagonia to Behring Straits. It is impossible to suppose that prehistoric man hunted down and slew these great creatures. The simplest hypothesis and the one which surmounts the greatest number of difficulties is that a mighty deluge overwhelmed man and beast in common ruin. A great geologist"[6] says: "I argue that this destruction was caused by an invasion of the continent by water—a view which is completely en rapport with the facts presented by the great Pampean deposit, which was clearly laid down by water. How otherwise can we account for this complete destruction and the homogeneousness of the Pampas deposits containing bones? I find an evident proof of this in the immense number of bones and of entire animals whose numbers are greatest at the outlets of the valleys, as Mr. Darwin shows. He found the greatest number of the remains at Bahia Blanca, at Bajada, also on the coast, and on the affluents of the Rio Negro, also at the outlet of the valley. This proves that the animals were floated, and hence were chiefly carried to the coast."

But D'Orbigny seems to have erred in attempting to push his theory too far, for he insists that the great deluge not only destroyed the mammoths but at the same time created the Pampean plain. Nothing, however, can be more certain than that the lapse of countless ages was necessary to accumulate "the dust of continents to be." It is incredible that a great fragment of a continent was created per saltum. Darwin believes (and, it appears, rightly), "that the Pampean formation was slowly accumulated at the mouth of the former estuary of the Plata and in the sea adjoining it."[7] As we shall see, when we come to deal with Patagonia, the country was once a lake or sea, and the water system of South America was very different from what it now is, nor is there any difficulty in believing that the stupendous volume of the Parana waters (then even mightier than now) was able to wash down an accumulation of mud capable of making the sea into dry land.

So much, then, for the Quaternary Pampean mud interlaced with the bones of giant animals.

The Patagonian plain, however, is, in appearance at any rate, a different and much older formation, namely the Tertiary, an extensive gravel bed which possibly extends under the whole Quaternary deposit of the Pampa. But exposures occur of both varieties of this formation, i.e., the Patagonian and the Guaraman, in the banks of the Parana and elsewhere. It is supposed to have been contributed chiefly by Glacial action.

THE RIVER URUGUAY.

The river system of Argentina, which is perhaps the most remarkable physical feature of the country, next demands our attention. All the Argentine rivers find their way into the Atlantic, but all are insignificant compared with the marvellous confluence of mighty streams in the Plate estuary. The Parana rises in far-away Brazilian mountains, and is already a noble stream when it reaches the north-eastern confines of Paraguay. Flowing southward it then, for more than 100 miles, serves as the boundary between Paraguay and Brazil, and from the point where it is joined by the Iguazu River it becomes an Argentine stream, and, inclining more and more to the west, it is now the boundary between Argentine and Paraguay. At Corrientes it unites with the Paraguay River and flows almost due south, running into the Plate estuary at the same point as the Uruguay. Few rivers can match the Parana in majesty; at Rosario it is 20 miles wide, and would give the impression of the broad sea were it not for the cluster of poplar-clad islands which intercept the view. In thus tracing the course of the Parana we have mentioned only a few of the innumerable streams of the system in which it takes the most conspicuous part; the waters drain the south of Brazil, the whole of Uruguay and Paraguay, the fertile districts of Argentina, and even portions of Bolivia. The Parana—the Nile of the West—debouches through fourteen channels; it has a drainage area of 1,198,000 square miles, and the discharge of each twenty-four hours is sufficient to create a lake a mile square and 1,650 feet deep.[8] Subordinate to the Parana are several Argentine systems which deserve mention. The provinces of Corrientes and Entre Rios, called the Argentine Mesopotamia, are drained by the Corrientes, the Saranai, and the Gualeguay, which last falls eventually not into the Parana but the Pavon, a curious channel which runs parallel with the lower course of the great river for a considerable distance.

RIVER LANDING STAGE.

The northernmost part of the country is drained by the Pilcomayo and the Vermejo, which both fall into the Paraguay. The Vermejo has a course of 1,300 miles. The Salado meanders through the Gran Chaco, and is the only perennial river in that region. Owing to the western dryness and the curious contour of the Gran Chaco and the Pampa, many of the rivers are unable to make headway and find a channel to carry them to the sea. Thus the Rio Dulce which, with innumerable small tributaries, drains a large area round about Tucuman, ends in a morass named Porongos, which is connected in flood-time with the great lake of Mar Chiquita—Little Sea. In like manner the Mendoza river loses itself in arid country.

Having dealt with the giant, we now turn to the pygmies; for pygmies are the Patagonian and South Argentine streams in comparison with the Parana of the upper region. The Colorado basin presents a very curious phenomenon, in that it has lost the whole of its upper tributaries. One of these is the aforesaid errant Mendoza, which, with the Salado (the second river of that name) fail to reach the parent stream and end in the Laguna Amarga, a group of salt lakes situated at no great distance from the Rio Colorado. It is certain that, like Central Asia, Patagonia has experienced an immense increase of aridity—probably in comparatively recent times. The Colorado proper is perennial, and when swollen by melting snows from the Andes it is as broad as the Thames at London Bridge.

AMONG THE CACTUS.

South of the Colorado we have the Rio Negro. It runs a solitary course through the desert unaided by any tributaries. It is formed by two other streams, the Neuquen and the Rio Limaz, which has its source in the picturesque lake of Nahuelhuapi. Patagonia, it may be added, has numerous lakes, some of great beauty. Other solitary streams, wholly dependent upon the Andes, may be enumerated—the Chubut, the Desire, the Chico, the Santa Cruz, and the Gallegos. On these rivers Burmeister[9] confesses that his information is very imperfect. They are now somewhat better known, but they are still difficult to explore. His remarks upon the Rio de Santa Cruz, concerning which he had gathered more facts than the others, may be given. He says: "Near the ocean it has a breadth of from 5 to 10 English miles, and is bordered by terraces in flights which rise on either side to a height of 500 feet. The surface of these terraces is occupied by broad plains covered with dry pebbles, and among them grow stunted plants and thorny bushes. It is a savage and gloomy land. Further inland, near the source, basaltic rocks appear which approach close to the river, and its bed is strewn with their fragments, which are about the size of a man's head. Huge blocks of granite and palæologic schists are met with only in the neighbourhood of the Cordillera." Darwin made an adventurous voyage of 140 miles up this river in 1834, and describes it with his accustomed acuteness and accuracy.[10]

When we come to deal with Patagonia we shall have another opportunity of reverting to its scanty and little-known river system.

The climate of Argentina varies greatly, as might be expected in a country with a length of nearly 2,300 miles from north to south. In the provinces of Buenos Aires, Santa Fé, San Luis, Mendoza, parts of Cordoba, and parts of one or two adjoining provinces, the climate is temperate with mild winters and moderately hot summers, while in the north the climate is hot and moist. Towards the south the cold becomes more and more severe, and the winters last from May to the beginning of October. Snow frequently falls. In Buenos Aires the spring begins in September and lasts to mid-December, followed by summer, which extends into March. Autumn lasts till the end of May, and winter occupies the rest of the year. The following table will show that in the city of Buenos Aires itself the extremes are not rigorous:—

The annual rainfall is about 34 inches. But the above table gives only the average temperature. The thermometer in Buenos Aires often rises as high as 100, and in the early mornings of June and July sometimes touches freezing-point. In Mendoza, Cordoba, and Tucuman, and many other places, the mercury frequently falls below 32, while in Patagonia the cold of winter is intense.

The following figures will give a rough idea of the general climate of the Republic:—

On the whole, the climate of Buenos Aires is good, and does not interfere with the comfort or pursuits of a healthy and vigorous man. Its worst feature is the sonda, or north wind, which blows tempestuously chiefly in the winter, and causes rapid fluctuations in the temperature. The winds from the north are always considered unhealthy. In the summer the heat is greatly aggravated by the pamperos—the strong winds from the south-west. But the general climate of the country is dry and invigorating.

It will be noticed that the rainfall is scanty. Unfortunately, nearly all the valuable parts of Argentina have barely sufficient rain, and Mendoza is almost rainless. Irrigation, therefore, is largely used, and when it is extended over the south many millions of additional acres will be brought under the plough. Droughts are by far the most formidable foe of the agriculturist. The Gran Seco of 1827-1832, during which period scarcely any rain fell in the Pampa, destroyed all the vegetation down to the thistles, and caused enormous loss.[11] It is feared that the dry area is extending; but it is fortunate that the magnificent rivers of Argentina would suffice to irrigate every part of the country, and even arid Patagonia has perennial streams. In general, it may be said that the climate of Argentina is far from disagreeable, and highly favourable to health and work.

CHAPTER II
EARLIEST HISTORY AND ETHNOLOGY

Scanty beyond all belief is our information about the people of the River Plate before the coming of the Spaniards. Mexico and Peru had goodly hoards of gold and silver, and were therefore objects of eager curiosity to the invaders whose chroniclers deigned to inquire into the traditions and mythology of their subjects; but the Silvery River—the Rio Plata—washed no treasure regions, and the settlements in that part of the continent were despised and neglected. Accordingly anthropologists have been obliged to work backwards; they can only infer the character of the prehistoric races by examining their descendants and such scanty traces as have survived from ancient days. And they are able to glean very little.

The European belief[12] in a western land beyond the Pillars of Hercules was deep-rooted in classical antiquity. Beginning with a vague legend of a wonderful world in the west, it hardened into a semi-scientific hypothesis. The pseudo-Aristotle[13] seems to have been the first to treat this subject in a practical manner. He says: "Popular speech divides our inhabited world into islands and continents, but it ignores the fact that the whole is but a single island surrounded by the sea named the Atlantic. It is probable that there are other lands far away, some of which are larger, some smaller, than the world we know." He conjectured that on the other side of the Atlantic there was a great Terra Australis corresponding to Africa. Strabo opined that it would be possible to make a westward voyage to India were it not for the immense extent of the Atlantic, and if circumstances had been favourable there would probably have been an early discovery of America. It is believed that the Carthaginians visited Madeira and the Canaries. But the two maritime nations, Greece and Carthage, fell before Rome, and the triumphs of Rome were on land. Roman poets and panegyrists often indulged in vague and magnificent predictions of nations both in the remotest East and the remotest West who should come under the sway of Rome, and Seneca's[14] language is particularly precise, but they found the ocean an insuperable barrier. With the downfall of the Empire and the influx of barbarians progress was checked, but it is certain that about a thousand years after the birth of Christ some hardy Norsemen reached Greenland, and it is even conjectured that they penetrated into North America. Then, in the later Middle Ages, as the trading spirit grew stronger and the demand for slaves increased, the Portuguese began to make voyages down the African coast. But discovery became no longer a mere profitable adventure, it was imperatively demanded as the salvation of Christendom from ruin, when the Turks obtained possession of Constantinople and the caravan routes. Unless the rich Indian trade could be continued, two-thirds of the wealth of Europe would be destroyed, and thus the work of discovery was stimulated. The Portuguese found an easy route to India by way of the Cape of Good Hope; but the unsuccessful attempts to reach India by a western voyage brought even more fruit, and at last the great island in the Atlantic was discovered.

Anthropologists have found much difficulty in determining the origin of the various peoples who were found in the New World. The supposition now is that the human race migrated into the continent from Europe by way of Greenland and Labrador, and from Asia by way of the Behring Straits, and proof is afforded by the discovery in the Pampas of Argentina and many other places both of the long-headed Afro-European and the round-headed Asiatic skull. The Europeans were probably the first arrivals, and they appear early to have found their way into Argentina, whither they were afterwards followed by the Asiatics. It should be noticed that the whole primitive civilisation of South America was concentrated into a comparatively narrow strip of mountainous country between Chile and Colombia, but this imperfect civilisation probably came into existence in quite recent times.

The Spaniards themselves, doubtless relying on native, traditions, believed that the establishment of the Inca dominion was an event of no great antiquity.[15] But it appears certain that this itself was preceded by a civilisation of "white and bearded men" round about Lake Titicaca, and Prescott declines to hazard a conjecture as to the antiquity of South American civilisation. The long-headed race (its origin is uncertain) kept to the east, the round-headed (usually held to be Mongolian) kept to the west, and they met in Patagonia. However, some savants consider that all the American races are veritable aborigines and have no Asiatic or European origin, and although this theory seems hardly borne out by the little evidence we possess, there is no reason to question the belief of Ehrenreich and many others that the South American Indians have been so long isolated that they form a distinct type.

Evidence as to the date of their migration or the length of time they may have been settled in Argentina we have none, but there is a theory of considerable plausibility to the effect that there was a break in the continuity of the human race in South America. It has already been shown that the bones of huge extinct animals appear very frequently in Argentina; indeed, as Darwin remarks, "the whole area of the Pampas is one wide sepulchre for these extinct animals." Now, mingled with them have often been found human bones and the tools and weapons of man in his pleistocene stage. Near Buenos Aires,[16] for example, a discovery was made of bones of the mastodon, machairodus, and other extinct animals, and together with them were mingled human bones and tools in stone and bone. These facts help to strengthen the hypothesis that at a remote period of antiquity there occurred some gigantic natural cataclysm which swept away alike man and the vast animals with which he lived in these regions. Little as we know about the origin of South American man we can, of course, classify the races which are known to exist in South America or which existed when the Spaniards appeared.[17] The aborigines may be divided into three great races—the Ando-Peruvian, the Pampean, and the Brasilio-Guaranian. The Ando-Peruvian has three branches, known as the Peruvian proper, the Antisian, and the Araucanian. The Pampean likewise has three branches—the Pampean proper, the Chiquitean, the Moxean; while the Brasilio-Guaranian has no ramifications. The Peruvians, who do not concern us here, include, of course, the whole of the Inca race. The Antisians are so called because they lived in the mountains east of Cuzco, which the Incas called Antis (hence Andes), and they now inhabit the hot and moist forest-lands of Bolivia and Peru. They are, and always have been, savages, with clear olive complexions and slight, somewhat effeminate figures. The Tacana is their most important tribe. The Araucanians (who include the Fuegians) are more important for our purpose, and are a very hardy race, who fought for hundreds of years on equal terms with the Spaniards and were finally subdued rather by the subtle blight of civilisation than by arms. A Frenchman[18] who visited the River Plate in the middle of the eighteenth century describes them in the following terms: "The Indians who inhabit this part of America, north and south of the river de la Plata, are of that race called by the Spaniards Indios bravos. They are middle-sized, very ugly, and afflicted with the itch. They are of a deep tawny colour, which they blacken still more by continually rubbing themselves with grease. They have no other dress than a great cloak of roe-deer skins hanging down to their heels, in which they wrap themselves up. These skins are very well dressed; they turn the hairy side inwards and paint the outside with various colours. The distinguishing mark of their cacique is a band or strap of leather, which is tied round his forehead; it is formed into a diadem or crown and adorned with plates of copper. Their arms are bows and arrows; and they likewise make use of nooses and of balls.... Sometimes they come in bodies of two or three hundred men, to carry off the cattle from the lands of the Spaniards or to attack the caravans of the travellers. They plunder and murder or carry them into slavery. This evil cannot be remedied; for how is it possible to conquer a nomadic nation in an immense uncultivated country, where it would be difficult even to find them? Besides, these Indians are brave and inured to hardships, and those times exist no longer when one Spaniard could put a thousand Indians to flight." D'Orbigny says that in character and religion the Araucanians have strong affinities to the Patagonians and Puelches, but physically they are very different, and they undoubtedly belong to the Peruvian or mountain race.

The Pampean race spread over the whole of modern Argentina and beyond. They include the Patagonians and Puelches of the south and many tribes, such as the Charruas, in the river regions of the north. These all belong to the branch of the Pampean proper.

The Chiquitean branch is of less importance, comprising the foreign Indians of Paraguay—the unfortunate people who were so cruelly harried by the Paulistas in the seventeenth century. The Moxeans are an interesting branch, but they do not properly belong to our subject, for they inhabit the unexplored forest tracts on the confines of Peru, Bolivia, and Brazil.

The Brasilio-Guaranian race is very extensive, spreading from the north of Argentina over the whole of Brazil. They are a rude race, civilised by the Jesuits, but probably the paternal form of government was the highest to which they were adapted, and when their protectors departed they retrograded. Their physical characteristics are described as follows:[19] "The traits of the Guaranies can be distinguished at the first glance from those of the Pampean tribes; their head is round and not compressed sideways, nor does their forehead recede; it is, on the contrary, high, and its flatness in some of the tribes is due to artificial causes. Their face is almost circular, the nose short and rather large with nostrils far less open than those of the plain races. Their mouth is of moderate size, but slightly projecting; their lips are somewhat thin, their eyes small and expressive, ... their chin is round, very short, and it never advances as far as the line of the mouth; their cheekbones are not prominent in their youth, but in later life they project somewhat; their eyebrows are well arched and very narrow. Their hair is long, straight, coarse, and black, and their beard, among the tribes of Paraguay and the Missions, is reduced merely to a few short bristles, straight and scanty, growing on the chin and upper lip." The Guaranies were more important in the earlier days when both their subjection and protection were grave problems. Those who still live in their original state are to be found in the primitive forests of the north, where it is difficult to disturb them.

The religion of these rude tribes was tolerably uniform and, as might have been expected, was on a much lower grade than that of the Incas, who worshipped the invisible God Pachacamac, the creator of all things. In general they believed in Quecubu, an evil spirit, but (what is curious) they did not think it necessary to propitiate him in any way, nor, again, did they worship or supplicate the Creator of the world in which they had a shadowy belief. They believed that man was perfectly free in his actions and that neither good deeds nor evil deeds would affect the action either of the Creator or the evil spirit. This Epicurean apathy was tempered by a belief in a future life—the translation to a paradise of delight beyond the seas. Such ritual and religious observances as they had appear to have centred in their medicine-men, who interpreted dreams and omens and the like. If we consider their extreme barbarism, we may judge that their religion was singularly free from the taint of cruel rites and gross superstitions, but it seems to have been weak and cold. The majority of the tribes, even the most savage, have now nominally embraced Christianity.

It is thus possible to form some idea of the condition of the aborigines at the time of the appearance of the Spaniards, but to obtain any knowledge of the events in South America during the centuries immediately preceding that event is a flat impossibility, and it is probably safe to say that the veil will never be uplifted, for the relics we have are of prehistoric not of modern man. Nor, in all probability, do we lose much by our ignorance, for judging by the actual state of the inhabitants of the extra-Andine regions of South America, when the Spaniards found them, we may repeat the disparaging verdict of Thucydides upon ancient Greece—that looking back as far as we can we are inclined to believe that the ancients were not distinguished, either in war or in anything else.

The history of Argentina may be held to begin with the advent of the Spaniards.

CHAPTER III
THE EUROPEAN CONQUEST

Compared with Mexico and Peru the southern portions of the New World at first excited little interest, because they produced neither gold nor silver. Yet even here the discoverer was very early at work, and achievements less showy but on an almost equally grand scale have to be recorded. In 1515 Juan Diaz de Solis was sent out on a voyage of discovery by the King of Castile, who wished to counteract Portuguese influence on the east coast of South America, and Solis was the first European to sail up the River Plate, which he named after himself. But he trusted to the natives, who proved treacherous. They invited him to land, and when he had accepted their invitation they attacked and killed him and every man in the boat-crew, and afterwards roasted and devoured them in the sight of their companions. It was long before the Spaniards touched on that coast again, and the name of Solis had no permanence in the land which he discovered.

Some ten years later a more fortunate expedition was made by the Englishman Cabot. In the service of the King of Spain he left Seville with four ships, intending to make a search for the islands of Tarsis, Ophir, and Eastern Cathay by the newly discovered Straits of Magellan. The little fleet touched at Pernambuco and remained there for three months. The Spaniards still appear to have had a design to check the Portuguese in Brazil, but Cabot evidently found them too strong in that quarter, so, says Purchas,[20] "he thought good to busy himself in something that might be profitable; and entered the year 29 discovering the River of Plate, where he was almost three years; and not being seconded, with relation of that which he had found, returned to Castile, having gone many leagues up the River. He found plate or silver among the Indians of those countries, for in the wars which these Indians had with those of the kingdoms of Peru they took it, and from it is called the River of Plate, of which the country hath taken the name."

Here Purchas makes two mistakes. The discovery was not made in 1529, but several years earlier, and the river derived its name not from any metallic booty but from its silvery colour. Cabot went some distance up the Paraguay River, where he met with many adventures and lost many of his followers, and he made a serious endeavour to lay the foundations of Spanish power in Argentina, but the natives were unfriendly and he found the enterprise too formidable for his limited means. It is not surprising that he failed to secure the goodwill of the Indians. Cabot was a skilful and daring navigator and less ruthless than most of the Spanish adventurers, but he was rough in his methods and tainted by the prevailing inhumanity of the time. At San Vincente, for example, he bought fifty or sixty slaves of both sexes for the benefit of his partners in Seville. He had, in fact, disobeyed his instructions, which were to make for the Pacific, and when he returned to Seville in 1530 he was at once prosecuted and punished on various charges, though his disgrace was but temporary. His expedition has merely a geographical importance.

Charles V. had too many anxious concerns in Europe to take an active part in organising expeditions to the New World, and he found it convenient to commit the task to wealthy nobles. Pedro de Mendoza had enriched himself at the sack of Rome and had dreams of still greater wealth. Accordingly he obtained a grant of the whole country from the River Plate to the Straits of Magellan, with a salary of 2,000 ducats a year as Governor, a similar sum as an official allowance, and valuable privileges as to ransom and booty. In return, he engaged to take out an adequate force and to open up a land route from the Atlantic to the Pacific. In August, 1534, he set sail from Cadiz with eleven ships and 800 men. This was the largest expedition which had ever sailed from Europe to the New World. Mendoza seems to have been an enterprising leader, but his lack of experience brought many unnecessary hardships upon his followers. The fleet entered the River Plate in January, 1535, and Mendoza landed on the right bank and founded the city of Buenos Aires, "so named in regard of the freshness of the air, and the healthfulness of his men, during their abode there."[21] The Adelantado, or Governor, was eager to push up the great rivers and discover a land fabulously rich in gold, such as was then enriching many of his more fortunate countrymen. But still the difficulties were insuperable; the Indians were implacably hostile and cut off all foraging parties; the Spaniards had come with inadequate provisions and were frequently in danger of starvation. Many died of their privations, and the site of Buenos Aires was abandoned within a year of its foundation. Mendoza's lieutenants made many adventurous expeditions up the vast waterways and the ill-fated Azolas founded Asuncion in 1536.[22] But their deeds belong more to the history of Spanish conquest than to Argentina proper. The estuary of the Plate was subject to sudden storms, and Mendoza, having lost eight ships and being thoroughly wearied by his misfortunes, decided to return home. On the voyage he fell ill and died, and of his large force not more than one hundred and fifty survived their privations and dangers. A highly interesting and important matter should here be mentioned. The Spaniards brought only thirty mares and seven stallions for breeding purposes, but a Portuguese mariner states thirty years later the country near the coast was full of horses.

TROOP OF MARES.

As successor to Mendoza the Spanish Government appointed Cabeza de Vaca, an experienced adventurer, who sailed from Spain in 1540 with four hundred men. He landed at Santa Catherina in Brazil, and thence made a most adventurous march to Asuncion. He set out on October 18, 1541, and did not arrive till March 11, 1542, after suffering extraordinary hardships. At Asuncion he found that the Spanish settlers had chosen Domingo Irala as their chief. The two rivals, however, had enough work for both, and Cabeza de Vaca sailed down to the River Plate where the Spaniards had practically abandoned their settlements, and the few survivors were in great danger of destruction by the Indians. He refounded Buenos Aires towards the end of 1542; but the time was not yet ripe for the planting of colonies, and not many months later the city was abandoned for the second time. Nor was Cabeza de Vaca fortunate in his undertakings in Paraguay. His attempts to reform abuses made him unpopular with the settlers, who preferred Irala, and in 1544 Cabeza de Vaca was seized and sent a prisoner to Spain where, after the law's long delays, he was acquitted, but never compensated.

Irala, who was an able and daring leader, contrived to maintain his authority till his death, which occurred in 1557, and credit is due to him for keeping the Spanish flag flying in the isolated post of Asuncion, which was rapidly growing in importance, and in 1547 was made the seat of a Bishop by Pope Paul III. All this time, however, it should be remembered that we are dealing rather with the history of what is now Paraguay than Argentina, for the southern settlements on the River Plate were once more in the hands of the Indians. It was at this time that another important town was established in territory which now belongs to Argentina. Peru had been conquered by Pizarro, parts of Chile by Almagro, and in 1559 Hurtado de Mendoza passed over the Andes from the west and founded the pleasant city which bears his name. This work of building cities on the eastern side of the Andes was carried on by other Spaniards from Peru, and they founded Tucuman in 1565 and Cordoba in 1573.

In the meantime the Guaranies of Paraguay steadily resisted every advance of the Spaniards, but in 1560 they were defeated in a great battle at Acari, and the Spaniards began to push southwards with the determination of again colonising the Parana country—a step, indeed, which was almost essential to their safety, since it would secure their communication with the Atlantic. The necessary exploit was achieved by a man who deserves an honoured place among Spanish-American worthies—Juan de Garay.[23] He advanced slowly towards the south from Asuncion, and in 1573 founded Santa Fé at the junction of the Parana and the Paraguay. In 1580 he took the still more important step of re-establishing Buenos Aires for the third time. With a true statesman's instinct he recognised that a mere military post would not be sufficient for the security of the rapidly growing colonies, and he took with him, besides Creoles and Spaniards, two hundred Indian settlers, and he laid out a town on a considerable scale, while farms and ranches were established in the neighbourhood. There was sharp fighting with the Indians, and Garay was unfortunately killed in a skirmish, but his work remained behind him. "The city," says Southey,[24] "immediately began to prosper, and the ship which sailed for Castile with tidings of its refoundation, took home a cargo of sugar, and the first hides with which Europe was supplied from the wild cattle which now began to over-spread the open country, and soon produced a total change in the manners of all the adjoining tribes."

In 1588 Corrientes had been founded, and the people began to acquire pastoral wealth, although the advantages which they drew from the rapidly increasing herds of horses and cattle were seriously discounted by the exactions and restrictions of officials. It was a piece of great good fortune for both settlers and Indians that neither gold nor silver was to be found in the River Plate country, and thus European marauders, whether Spanish or English, were without one great temptation to harry them. The next generation was one of steady progress, and by the year 1620 the city of Buenos Aires contained three thousand inhabitants. The indefatigable Jesuits established themselves in the country in 1590, and though their history properly belongs to Paraguay, they did much good in Argentina by protecting the Indians and spreading civilisation.

In 1620 a step of extreme importance was taken. The office of Adelantado, or Governor, was abolished, and the River Plate country was formed into two separate provinces. Thus we get a rough beginning of Argentina, which now consisted of Buenos Aires, Santa Fé, Entre Rios, Corrientes, and the tract now called Uruguay. This last, however, was still uninhabited. Buenos Aires became the seat of a bishop. But the whole of the settlements remained under the Viceroyalty of Peru.

More important than any measure of partition was the personality of Hernan Darias de Saavedra, the ruler at that time. Of pure Spanish blood, he was born in South America in 1561, early distinguished himself in wars with the Indians, and took as his model the able Garay. In 1602 he was appointed to act as Governor of Buenos Aires, and during his term of authority, which did not really end when a new Spanish Governor was placed over his head, he distinguished himself at once by his severity to refractory Indians and his energetic measures to protect those who followed peaceful pursuits. In 1615 he became substantive Governor, and it was by his advice that the division of 1620 was made.

His whole heart was in the peaceful development of the country; he encouraged the Jesuits to teach industries to the natives and to settle virgin tracts, and at the same time he set his face against all forms of slavery. Few Spanish Americans have exercised more beneficent rule, and he was the founder of Argentine prosperity—a tradition which the country never wholly lost in the worst days, and which in recent times it has renewed in a wonderful manner. Not long after the partition this noble-minded statesman died, full, as the historian says, of glory and virtues. Funes[25] remarks: "From tender years he performed military service, earning fame for valour. His valour was rendered the more illustrious by that consummate prudence which in war gives glory to warriors. He distinguished himself by his ability both in the arts of peace and war. He was a staunch protector of the Indians and, in fine, being one of the heroes to whom the New World has given birth, he deserved to have his portrait placed in the Chamber of Commerce in Cadiz. We regret that time has destroyed the records which might have enabled us to draw a more accurate likeness."

With his death it may be said that the history of Argentina as a Spanish colony has fairly begun. It is true that the Governorship of Buenos Aires was both smaller and larger than the present Argentine Republic—larger as comprising Uruguay, and considerably smaller in the absence of Patagonia and much other territory. In fact, there were three Governorships—Buenos Aires, Paraguay, and Tucuman—and these were looked upon as a single colony, although each one was an administrative entity, dependent upon the Crown and independent of its neighbours. Our narrative will necessarily ignore the interesting history of Paraguay and embrace the other two provinces. The above narrative has few of the exciting episodes which marked the history of the conquest of Mexico or Peru, but the history, though less dazzling, is less sullied by crimes, and the two figures of Garay and Hernan Darias afford examples of disinterested toil for the common welfare which in that age was rare indeed except among a small proportion of the clergy. And as the earlier years of Argentina were less turbulent, so have the latter years been more blessed with prosperity than has been the case with other South American States.

The colonisation of South America proceeded upon lines very different from those pursued in the northern continent. The latter was the objective of men who belonged, for the most part, to the Anglo-Saxon race, and who came not for adventure or any kind of gain, but to escape from uncongenial institutions and live their own life. As far as possible they avoided contact with the natives, and neither desired, nor, in fact, maintained, intimate relations with the mother country. But in spite of the circumstances of their exile, they carried with them most of the institutions of their own land, and continued to develop on the lines of their brothers on the other side of the Atlantic. The Spaniards did not, indeed, treat the natives in South America with humanity; on the contrary, in the mining regions their cruelty was notorious, and they were frequently at war with the old inhabitants. But in Argentina and many other places they showed no disinclination to intermarry; they made, as we have seen, systematic settlements of Indians, which assumed that the conquered race was an integral part of their own body politic, and in some respects their policy was statesmanlike and even humane according to the standards of the time. The result was a fusion of races, and the various nations which sprang up were as much Indian as Spanish. How the Argentine nation was evolved it will be the business of the succeeding historical chapters to show, as it will be that of the remainder of this volume to display the country and the people as they actually are after four centuries of growth.

CHAPTER IV
THE SPANISH DOMINION

The subsequent history of Argentina during the Spanish dominion does not present much incident, and indeed it is not an uncommon practice for historians of Latin-American countries to make a single leap from the Conquest to the Revolution. But to the real student of history there is much that is of interest in the record of the attempt of Spain to govern a mighty empire and the rapid decay of her power. In the next chapter the Spanish colonial system will be examined; in the present it will be observed in operation. Much will be said about the illiberal restrictions which here receive only incidental notice, but however short-sighted they may have been, at least they could not prevent Argentina from thriving. A considerable trade sprang up between Cordoba and the Andine territories now known as Chile and Bolivia; nor was it only in material well-being that progress was made. At Cordoba, also, a university was founded in 1613, and the town became a seat of learning and a centre of Jesuit influence. For some years peace reigned, but in the second quarter of the seventeenth century it received two serious disturbances. The first was a dangerous Indian war with the powerful nation of the Calchaquies.

This people had lived from time immemorial in the valleys of Rioja and Catamarca, and had been under the suzerainty of the Incas. As the Spaniards around the River Plate became more powerful they made aggressions upon the Calchaquies, and by the end of the sixteenth century had partly subdued them. Many of these Indians were sold into slavery, and many more were forced to settle about Santa Fé and Rosario, but the spirit of the remainder was still unsubdued, and they awaited an opportunity of recovering their independence. It was about the middle of the century that they made their expiring effort. A leader named Bohorquez came forward and claimed to be the descendant and heir of the Inca kings. He is said to have been a mere impostor of humble Andalusian origin, but it is seldom easy to find out the exact truth about pretenders. Funes doubts whether he was in his right mind. "But the light of reason appeared when he took his first steps in deceit, an art to which he was naturally inclined."[26] He and his wife were greeted with the honours due to the Inca kings, the revolt spread, and he caused the Spaniards endless trouble. The Calchaquies, whom he claimed to represent, were a hardy race, and down to modern times have shown good fighting qualities, and they were inflamed by resentment against the intruding Spaniards, who had undoubtedly oppressed them. Bohorquez first came forward in 1656, and though he appears to have possessed nothing better than the showy qualities of a bold charlatan, he brought about a dangerous war. Don Alonso Mercado, who had been appointed Governor of Tucuman the year before, was obstinate and overbearing, and, strangely enough, began by patronising and encouraging the impostor. The Jesuits, who were always anxious to redress Indian grievances, also supported him, and the revolt assumed such serious proportions that the Governor soon had to abandon his former attitude and took up arms against him. The Indians, who, with simple credulity, accepted all the claims of Bohorquez, made a long and heroic resistance, but the Spanish power was too great. The pretender was defeated, and the Spaniards, aware that there could be no safety for the northern provinces as long as Bohorquez was alive, spared no effort to track him down, and were eventually successful. Bohorquez was taken to Lima and put to death, and the Calchaquies were placed under a military Deputy-Governor, who was subordinate to Tucuman. Their martial spirit, however, did not die out, and in the nineteenth century they proved themselves one of the most spirited of the warlike races of South America.

The other trouble of the seventeenth century was more serious and involved more bloodshed. We have seen that there was considerable jealousy between the Spanish and Portuguese in South America. In 1580 Portugal had been united to Spain, but this change did not make the relations any more harmonious, for there was a standing cause of quarrel between the two nations. The Portuguese had founded in the temperate Brazilian uplands the city of São Paulo, and the inhabitants known as Paulistas, were a turbulent people and had an intense hatred of the Jesuits. The Jesuits, supported by the Spanish Government, protected the Indians and devoted themselves to their general welfare, but the chief business of the Paulistas was to capture Indians and sell them into slavery. They looked with covetous eyes upon the Reductions, as the Jesuit settlements were called, for here was the raw material of their industry in the shape of hundreds of thousands of submissive Indians. Accordingly, in 1629 they picked a quarrel with the Jesuits and attacked the Reduction of San Antonio, where they committed great ravages, killing and capturing multitudes of the helpless Indians. The Jesuits, who were not loved by the Governor of Paraguay, were compelled to evacuate Guayra and the scope of their benevolent labours was largely curtailed. This cruel and devastating war continued for many years and caused widespread ruin and loss of life until, in 1638, the Jesuits appealed to the Court of Spain, requesting that their wrongs might be redressed and that they might arm their helpless converts against the oppressor. The appeal was successful. "The King," says Southey,[27] "confirmed all the former laws in favour of the Indians: he declared the conduct of the Paulistas, who had carried away more than thirty thousand slaves from Guayra, and had begun the same work of devastation in the Tapé and on the Uruguay, to be contrary to all laws, human and divine, and cognisable by the Holy Office. The enslaved Indians were ordered to be set at liberty, and directions given to punish those who should commit these crimes in future, as guilty of high treason. A more important edict, because more easily carried into effect, provided that all Indians converted by the Jesuits in the province of Guayra, Tapé, Parana, and Uruguay, should be considered as immediate vassals of the Crown, and not on any pretext consigned to any person for personal service. Their tribute was fixed, but not to commence till the year 1649, by which time, it was presumed, they might be capable of discharging it. And the King not only granted permission to the Jesuits to arm their converts, but sent out positive orders to the Governors of Paraguay and the Plata to exert themselves for the protection of the Reductions." But in 1640 Portugal regained her independence and the marauding Paulistas left a lasting mark on the map of South America. Undoubtedly but for their incursions the whole valley of the Parana would have been Spanish instead of Portuguese, but, as it was, the Spaniards had to retire behind the river Iguazu.

Emboldened by this success, the Portuguese ever kept in view the design of extending their dominions still further southward. In 1680 the Governor of Rio de Janeiro sent an expedition by sea and built a fort, which he named Nova Colonia, opposite the city of Buenos Aires. Thus the disputed territory of Uruguay was for the first time occupied by Europeans. The establishment of this hostile post caused great annoyance to the Governor of Buenos Aires, and he succeeded in capturing it upon several occasions, but the Home Government, in view of European politics, had no wish to offend Portugal, nor did it consider that the possession of almost uninhabited tracts was worth the risk of complications. It thus happened that Nova Colonia was always restored to the Portuguese eventually. It became a most prosperous port, for it was the seat of the contraband trade, and by its means the Argentines were able to export hides to Brazil. Doubtless it was beneficial to them, however much it may have interfered with the illicit gains of Spanish Governors. It remained in the possession of the Portuguese until 1777.

The contraband trade was indeed the chief feature of the domestic history of Argentina in the sixteenth century, and its tendency was to raise important international questions. The fight against the Spanish monopoly became every year keener as the various countries of Europe became more settled and secure and began to devote their energies to trade. In 1616 the monopoly received a heavy blow by the discovery of a way into the Pacific without passing through the guarded Straits of Magellan. This was made by the Dutchman, Schouten,[28] who named Cape Horn after Hoorn, his birthplace. Immediately numerous Dutch and English ships took advantage of the new route and a great trade sprang up. As we have seen, the Governors of Buenos Aires played a prominent part in this trade, and no earthly power was able to prevent the economic law from taking effect. The case of Villacorta, a Governor who was discovered to have sent away three million dollars' worth of prohibited goods to Flanders, illustrates the helplessness of the artificial law. He was dismissed at the moment, but not long after he reappears as Governor of Tucuman. But, however illegally, trade went on and Argentina flourished. A traveller[29] who visited Buenos Aires in 1769 says that its chief trade was with Chile and Peru, and that it sent to them "cotton, mules, some skins, and about 400,000 Spanish pounds' weight of the Paraguay herb, or South Sea tea, every year." In fact Argentina, like the other Spanish colonies, advanced steadily in wealth and population during the eighteenth century, until progress was abruptly checked by the Revolution. But her history from the founding of Nova Colonia to the appearance of the English before Buenos Aires is remarkably barren in incident.

It was, of course, the fate of colonies to be pawns in the wars between powerful European States. Spain was a principal in the great war of the Spanish Succession, which was ended in 1713 by the Peace of Utrecht. Two of the articles were of importance to the Spanish possessions. By the Asiento de Negros England obtained the right to send yearly to the Spanish colonies twelve hundred negro slaves, and Buenos Aires was named as one of the establishments for that traffic, while by the Navio de Permiso she was permitted to send out yearly to the South Seas a ship with 650 tons of merchandise. These concessions, of course, greatly stimulated the contraband trade, for the colonists were as eager to buy as the English merchants were to sell, nor had the Spanish officials the will or the power to prevent many interlopers following in the wake of the privileged ships. Parish[30] remarks that it was "a trade which supplied the most pressing wants of the colony, and the profits of which were shared by the native capitalists. If they (the officials) did occasionally make a show of exercising their right to visit the ships, it was an empty threat, little heeded by men who were looked upon with almost as much dread as the buccaneers who had so long been the terror of all that part of the world."

Under the Bourbons and under the skilful administration of Alberoni, the fortune of Spain revived, and the colonies benefited in a corresponding degree.

In 1726 the Spaniards seized and fortified Montevideo which had been founded by the Portuguese a few years previously; this was an important step, for it declared that, in spite of Nova Colonia, the territory now known as Uruguay should be Spanish. The new town rapidly became wealthy and second only to Buenos Aires.

There can be little doubt that historians have considerably exaggerated the weakness and decay of Spain during the eighteenth century. Her comparative strength is proved by the fact that she maintained her trade regulations which were only contravened surreptitiously. The attempt of England to overthrow them by force shows how great was the resistive power of this unenterprising but still formidable empire. The War of Jenkins's Ear may be considered as a rehearsal of the struggle for the New World which occupied a great part of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and which is still unfinished.

Therefore, although the war is in itself trivial and ineffective, its purport is not so; it was the battle of the new spirit against the old, of the trader against the official, of the active against the passive. If here and elsewhere the latter had conquered, we might have had, in place of our modern hives of industry, vast thinly populated regions dotted with little, self-sufficient villages, which possibly were destined to be overrun by a more restless and energetic yellow race.[31]

Undoubtedly the English had not a shadow of right on their side; they were encouraging the breaking of treaties and flagrant political dishonesty. But under the brutal economic codes of the time there was no law but the law of the stronger; England might take if she had the power and Spain might keep if she could. The turbulent English mobs, clamouring for war, were shrewder than Walpole, shrewder than Burke, for they knew that to an island and trading people outlets for their commerce were matters of sheer necessity.

The Spaniards strongly disliked the Asiento Treaty, and, as is well known, English merchants, under cover of the privilege, carried on extensive smuggling operations against which the Spanish guarda costas retaliated vigorously. It was in 1731 that they perpetrated upon Captain Jenkins the outrage which was to make so great a stir some years later. It may be added that Jenkins did really lose his ear on the high seas, and that the insinuations that the whole affair was a fabrication are themselves quite without foundation.[32] However, not for nearly seven years was there any attempt to make political capital out of it, although the smuggling question remained a constant source of irritation between the two countries. It was at the beginning of 1738 that circumstances were favourable for an outbreak, for a powerful opposition was longing to bring about the fall of Walpole, and his position was weakened by the death of Queen Caroline. No weapon could be more effectual than the accusation of being insensible to the claims of national honour and of tamely suffering insults from Spain. On March 30th Carteret, in the House of Commons, carried an address against the right of search, and Walpole, who was anxious on all grounds to settle the matter, expedited the negotiations which had been for some time proceeding with Spain on the subject of compensation. In January, 1739, the terms of the agreement were published to the following effect. The Spaniards were willing that damages against themselves should be assessed to the amount of £200,000, but, on the other hand, the English Government acknowledged a counterclaim of £60,000, on account of the destruction of the Spanish fleet by Byng in 1718. With this and other possible deductions and abatements, the compensation seemed rather meagre, and the whole question of right of search being left to a Commission's decision, there was nothing in the findings that could be agreeable to Englishmen. A storm at once rose. The Prince of Wales voted against the Government. Young Pitt thundered against Walpole. The Prime Minister had to give way. His colleagues were in favour of war, and, as often happened in such struggles, Admiral Vernon was despatched, long before a declaration of war, "to destroy the Spanish settlements and to distress their shipping." The national feeling continued to rise, and great were the manifestations of popular joy on the occasion of the formal declaration of war on October 23rd. "They now ring the bells," said Walpole, "they will soon ring their hands."

Meanwhile Vernon, though his force was small, lost no time, and having appeared off Porto Bello with six ships on November 20th, he captured it the next day, and the news of this success (which did not reach London till March, 1740), was received with extravagant demonstrations of rejoicing. In the spring Vernon was menacing Cartagena, and on March 24, 1740, captured Chagre. The home authorities appear to have been extremely dilatory, for it took them a whole year to send effectual reinforcements, and then their value was seriously discounted by the fact that General Wentworth had succeeded to the command of the land forces. This officer was thoroughly incompetent, and no exhortations of Vernon could rouse him to energy, and owing to his mismanagement the assault upon Cartagena of April 9th was a complete failure. The armament departed about a week later, having lost at least eight thousand men, and in July an attempt upon Santiago in Cuba failed likewise, owing to Wentworth's incompetence. Little more of note occurred on that side, and it is here proper to mention that Vernon was in nowise to blame for the unfortunate results, and that, with an efficient colleague, there seems no reason to doubt that he would have made a great name for himself in the annals of the British Navy. Nor should Smollett, because he happens to be a famous novelist, be accepted as a judge of the strategy of the expedition. He had, in fact, infinitely less materials for forming a judgment than a private at Waterloo had for criticising Wellington's dispositions.

The haphazard general management is well illustrated by the only brilliant achievement of the war—the Anson circumnavigation. Anson, with six ships manned by Chelsea pensioners and raw recruits, was ordered to the Pacific, and set sail on September 18, 1740. Although his little squadron dwindled to three, he rounded the Horn, and subsequently burnt Paita in Peru, and played havoc with Spanish commerce. He crossed the Pacific, captured a great treasure-ship, and returned by the Cape of Good Hope to England, which he reached June 15, 1744. He brought home treasure amounting to £500,000, and this was paraded through the streets of London in thirty-two wagons.

It would be difficult to say when the War of Jenkins's Ear ended, or what were its results. Carlyle[33] says: "What became subsequently of the Spanish War, we in vain inquire of History-Books. The War did not die for many years to come, but neither did it publicly live; it disappears at this point: a River Niger, seen once flowing broad enough, but issuing—Does it issue nowhere, then? Where does it issue?... Forgotten by official people; left to the dumb English Nation." Doubtless it was not forgotten by the people; they soon showed once more their eagerness to break down the monopoly, and this curious war is noteworthy both as striking the real keynote of a long series of vast struggles, and also as showing the great vis inertiæ of Spain. Southey[34] remarks that the history of the War of Jenkins's Ear proves the strength of Spain in South America, and points out that an event in the war contributed indirectly to the prosperity of the River Plate settlement. When it was known that Anson was fitting out his celebrated squadron, the Spanish Government for its part also despatched six ships and three thousand five hundred men to protect the settlement. They delayed a long time there and, it is said, eventually not more than one hundred of the crews returned home, the greater part remaining to settle in the country.

Not less important than these hostilities against English and Portuguese (who from their near neighbourhood were almost equally dangerous in the contraband trade) was the loss to South America of that body which had been the conscience of Spanish America, which had protected the Indians, instructed the ignorant, and turned the wilderness into fertile fields. For a long time the civil power in Roman Catholic countries had been jealous of the influence wielded by the Jesuits. As their object was to suppress everything opposed to the Roman Catholic system as they understood it, so every element that felt itself menaced naturally rose in self-defence, and the Jesuits found themselves friendless in Europe. Their downfall was principally due to the able and astute Pombal, the Prime Minister of Portugal, who considered that his country was depressed by a too powerful hierarchy, and his machinations were greatly assisted by circumstances in the River Plate settlements.

Colonia had long been a trouble to the Spaniards, diminishing their trade and insulting them by its propinquity, and in 1750 they made overtures for an exchange. The offending port was to be surrendered and the Portuguese were to receive in exchange a large portion of the Jesuit Missions, i.e., the territory called La Guayra and about 20,000 square miles to the east of the Uruguay River. This included seven Jesuit Reductions, and the Society and the Indians strenuously resisted the transference. Although the story of the Jesuits belongs rather to Paraguay than Argentina, it is for many reasons necessary to refer to that wonderful and benevolent despotism which they exercised in the Parana settlements, and also to relate the circumstances of their expulsion from South America—a matter of great importance to all the colonies.

The Jesuits did not commence effective work in Paraguay earlier than the beginning of the seventeenth century. In the days of the conquest attempts had been made by them to convert the natives and to further general missionary work, but the circumstances had not been favourable. It was in 1610 that two members of the Order, Cataldino and Mazeta, founded the settlement of Loreto on the Upper Parana. An unfriendly critic[35] remarks: "They began by gathering together about one hundred and fifty wandering families, whom they persuaded to settle, and they united them into a little township. This was the slight foundation upon which they have built a superstructure which has amazed the world, and added so much power at the same time, that it has brought so much envy and jealousy upon their society. For when they had made this beginning, they laboured with such indefatigable pains, and with such masterly policy that, by degrees, they mollified the minds of the most savage nations,[36] fixed the most rambling, and subdued the most averse to government. They prevailed upon thousands of various dispersed tribes of people to embrace their religion, and to submit to their government; and when they had submitted, the Jesuits left nothing undone that could conduce to their remaining in this subjection, or that could tend to increase their number to the degree requisite for a well-ordered and potent society, and their labours were attended with amazing success."

The Jesuit establishments are one of the many meritorious acts of Saavedra who, seeing with concern the depression of the Indians and recognising their value to the Spanish Crown, appealed to the King, whereupon Phillip III., in 1609, issued royal letters patent to the Order of Jesuits for the conversion of the Indians. It is true that the Jesuits drew considerable wealth from their obedient subjects. They exported hides in large quantities and had a monopoly of the production of maté. Their method of government also would have been unsuitable to a race of harder fibre,[37] for they jealously excluded their Reductions from the external world, allowing no European to enter, and the Indians were kept constantly at work at the agricultural pursuits which the Jesuits themselves had greatly improved. But in those days it was rare indeed for any settlers to pay any regard to the welfare of the uncivilised races whom they encountered, and it must be remembered that the Jesuits were practically the only Christian missionaries in the period between the Reformation and the middle of the eighteenth century. All honour, then, is due to them for their devotion and philanthropy.

When the peaceful Indians heard of the great disaster that had overtaken them in their abandonment to their old enemies the Portuguese, there was consternation, but they were remorselessly driven from their homes. However, the Jesuits protested strongly, and in the end the Spanish Government was induced to annul the treaty. Nevertheless, the Indians never recovered their losses and the West of Rio Grande became permanently Portuguese, in spite of the abrogation of the treaty. The result would, no doubt, have been different had their powerful protectors remained in the country.

The officials at Buenos Aires cared much about Colonia and little for the Reductions or the fate of the Indians, and the Jesuits were accused of having brought about the recision of the treaty. Any pretext was now welcome, for their destruction was contemplated. As we have seen, the able Pombal had resolved to expel them from Portugal, and in 1759 he trumped up against them a charge of attempting to assassinate the King, and issued a decree for their deportation from Portugal. France eventually followed this example, and in 1767 even the Spanish King was induced to do the same, while in 1773 Pope Clement XIV. decreed the entire suppression of the Order.

In Argentina the Jesuits were seized and deported. It was expected that the Indians, who were armed, would make a serious resistance, but they were as sheep having no shepherd, and rather than remain in their old abodes to be harried by new masters they migrated to Entre Rios and Uruguay. But the work of the Jesuits has not perished, for they and the conventual orders were the first to give an example of humanity in the treatment of inferior races.

This great change was quickly followed by another. In 1776 the Vice-royalty of Buenos Aires was created, that is, the four countries now known as Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay, were detached from the Vice-royalty of Peru, under Don Pedro Cevallos, sometime Governor of Buenos Aires. This step was a recognition of the importance of Buenos Aires, to which all observers testify. All the efforts of the Spaniards to force the trade of Europe over the Isthmus of Panama and the Andes had failed, and Buenos Aires was now to fulfil its destiny as the metropolis of Spanish America. The new Governor brought a large force, for there had been serious trouble with Portugal. As the latter was too weak to resist, and as the news of peace between the two countries followed almost immediately, there was no difficulty in coming to terms, and Colonia was finally made over to Spain. The result of this important treaty was that Spain was left in undisputed possession of Uruguay and Portugal of Brazil in its present form, for she recovered Rio Grande and Santa Catharina. Free trade was established between Buenos Aires and Spain, and Argentina made wonderful industrial advances. The rest of the century was uneventfully prosperous, but great events were in the wind, and they were destined to have a powerful influence on Spanish America. The easygoing paternal rule was to come to an end, and a long period of bloodshed and turbulence was to succeed. As was the case in every other part of the world, the motive power was supplied by the French Revolution.

CHAPTER V
THE SPANISH COLONIAL SYSTEM

Colonies were one of the many new things which were introduced to Europe at the end of the fifteenth century. Of them mediæval Europe had known nothing since the dissolution of the Roman Empire; the means of communication were too bad, the Asiatic races were too powerful, and the Western world itself was too thinly populated to allow of distant excursions. The planting of settlements was familiar to both Greece and Rome. The Greek system was the simpler of the two, for the city state merely propagated itself by colonies as a plant propagates itself by seeds, and two cities existed instead of one, each independent of the other. But a Roman colony was incorporated as a subordinate and inferior part of the mother state. Greek history and literature were almost unknown in the Middle Ages, and even after the Renaissance they remained much less familiar than Latin. On the other hand, many European States, and especially Spain, inherited their law and their municipal systems from Rome, Latin was the international language, and the Church, by far the most powerful mediæval institution, was Roman. It is, therefore, not surprising that Spain followed the Roman colonial system, but all the circumstances were so different that beyond the mere incorporation and inferiority of the new dominions there was little other resemblance.

The main difference and the main characteristic of the Spanish colonial system was this—the colonies were the private property of the King of Spain. This, then, is the keystone of the edifice—that the dominions were vested in the Crown, not in the nation. The derivation of this theory is doubtless from the fact that in the early exploring days the Spanish and Portuguese kings were, really or apparently, private adventurers, and, in fact, the adventurers always assumed that they were stewards of royal estates rather than officers of a kingdom. Thus the colonies were the property of the King of Spain for the time being. Ferdinand had, in 1511, established a tribunal to manage his new property. This was the Council of the Indies, which made laws for the colonies and distributed all the appointments and acted as a Court of Appeal from the Audiencia in America. The King made all grants of land, and allowed the colonists only local liberties; the Spanish nation had no concern whatever in the matter. A modern parallel is the Congo Free State as it was a year or two ago. It is probable that the New World had little to complain of except in the matter of trade and commerce, but here the system was illiberal and short-sighted. The fifth share of the King in the produce of all the gold and silver mines was a small matter in comparison with the multitude of harassing restrictions,[38] which Spain never had the wisdom to cancel till it was too late. No colony was allowed to trade with any country except Spain; all the exports, whatever their destination, had first to go to the mother country, and the navigation laws were conceived in a similar spirit. The most glaring instance of stupidity was the prohibition of import trade laid upon Buenos Aires. No Atlantic colonial port might receive goods from Spain except Nombre de Dios. When Argentina purchased goods from Spain they were despatched across the Atlantic to Nombre de Dios, carried by mule across the Isthmus, transhipped to Callao, and then taken over innumerable mountains into the River Plate country. Merely to state such a system is to condemn it, but there was no possibility of altering it, because the whole shipping trade of Spain was in the hands of a syndicate of Cadiz merchants, and they were all-powerful.

As is well known, no foreign State was allowed to trade with Spanish America, nor was any foreigner even allowed to enter it without special permission. Various manufactures were forbidden, and even the cultivation of the vine and olive was placed under restrictions, as it was feared that their produce might compete with the produce of Spain. In fact, the ideal of the home-staying Spaniard was that the colonies should be mere mining-camps. Gold and silver were regarded as the whole of wealth, and it was considered the height of commercial wisdom to drain the whole produce of the mines of America into Spanish ports without allowing a fraction to be diverted elsewhere.

Thus legitimate trade was made extremely difficult, for the Spaniards even discouraged colonial exports from the fear that precious metals might be concealed among them. Accordingly, in 1599, the Governor of Buenos Aires was commanded to forbid exportation and importation alike under penalty of death. But the stringency of the various laws and regulations defeated their own objects, a gigantic contraband trade grew up, and all the officials, from the Governor downward, were implicated in it. Bribes accompanied almost every business transaction.[39] The manufactures of Europe were surreptitiously landed at Buenos Aires, and of course ruined the sale of the goods that had come over oceans, Isthmus, and mountains. This contraband trade was chiefly carried on by the English and the Dutch, and, as Professor Seeley has frequently pointed out, the power to trade with the New World formed for some two hundred years the chief bone of contention in the foreign politics of European countries. The practice of smuggling has had two marked and very pernicious effects upon Spanish-American character; it has fostered contempt of law and the preference of Government service to profitable industry. As the Argentines despised the laws of contraband, so they came to despise all laws, and during their independent history the shackles of the law have been cobwebs light as air to restrain individuals or communities from disturbing the public peace. In a word, out of the contraband trade sprang one of the worst features of South America—lawlessness and turbulence. It is obvious that it also fostered an almost equally injurious spirit—the craving of office. It was easier and more profitable to take bribes from the smugglers than to engage actively in smuggling, and so the tradition has descended to prefer the certain emoluments (direct and indirect) of office to the uncertain gains of trade. In Spanish America it is better to be the nephew of a President than of a successful trader. Of course, it would be absurd to attribute these two evils solely to the contraband trade, but the first has been undoubtedly encouraged, and the second, to a considerable extent, caused by the practice which was forced upon the Spanish colonies by an absurd fiscal system. The economic condition, therefore, of these countries appears to us very sombre. It must, however, be remembered that such treatment of "plantations" was the accepted policy of the age, and probably the reason why Spain was more unfortunate with her foreign possessions than other nations is rather to be found in the indolent character of her sons and her foreign embarrassments than in any particular set of restrictions.

Till the middle of the eighteenth century the principles of the Spanish colonial system were considered the last words of commercial policy by all nations and practically all individuals.[40] That great statesman, Lord Chatham, was fully convinced of the wisdom of these principles. He remarked: "Let the sovereign authority of this country over the colonies be asserted in as strong terms as can be devised, and be made to extend to every point of legislation whatsoever. That we may bind their trade, confine their manufactures, and exercise every power whatsoever, except that of taking money out of their pocket without their consent."[41] Indeed, the general commercial and colonial policy of Spain was at least as liberal as that of England, and was, during the half century preceding the Revolution, infinitely more liberal, and if we make allowance for the enlargement of the human mind in a hundred and fifty years, it must be admitted that the present commercial policy of the South American Republics compares unfavourably with the Spanish system. There was at least material prosperity. Adam Smith,[42] while censuring the Spanish system of government and considering it inferior to that obtaining in English colonies, recognised that great progress was being made. He says: "The Spanish colonies are under a government in many respects less favourable to agriculture, improvement, and population, than that of the English colonies. They seem, however, to be advancing in all these much more rapidly than any country in Europe. In a fertile soil and happy climate the great abundance and cheapness of land, a circumstance common to all new colonies, is, it seems, so great an advantage as to compensate many defects in civil government." It is impossible to put down the failure of Spain to anything but defect of character—the grand defect of mañana, of putting off every exertion till to-morrow, or rather for ever. But it cannot be denied that a hundred years ago the ill-starred country had to face a series of misfortunes which might well have disheartened a more energetic people. The revolutionary spirit which had spread all over the globe was at first wonderfully impotent in the Spanish settlements owing to the rigid disciplinary system which had been in force for upwards of two hundred years. Yet that of itself would have been enough to have taxed all the energies of an ancient and absolute monarchy. Further, Spain contrived to change sides in such a way during the war as to get all the hardships of defeat and none of the fruits of victory. When she was in alliance with France her fleet was destroyed by the English, and when she was in alliance with England her territory was overrun by the French. At this crisis also she was afflicted by the feeblest king of a feeble line and probably the worst queen and minister that ever lived. Under these circumstances it can hardly be a matter for wonder that she lost her colonies.

And yet if her general policy towards them be considered, it must be acknowledged that she deserved her fate less than any colonial power then existing. The Spanish merchants did indeed greatly hamper the development of South America, but they acted in obedience to a theory which was considered axiomatic and which was rigorously put into practice by every other nation. The King and the high officials always exerted their influence in favour of humane treatment of the Indians. Irala was conspicuous for his humanity, and the protective regulations which he put forward on their behalf and at the beginning of the seventeenth century, when reports reached Spain that the Indians in Tucuman were being ill-treated, it was ordered that Don Francisco de Alfaro, Auditor of the Supreme Court of Peru, should go to Paraguay and investigate the whole matter. The result was the Ordinances of Alfaro in 1612, which abolished both the forcible subjection of Indians and slavery, and substituted a small capitation tax. As we have seen, the Court of Madrid warmly seconded the early efforts of the Jesuits. The treatment, then, of subject races was as benevolent as circumstances and theories would permit, nor were the colonists in practice subject to any considerable severity. The commercial regulations were easily evaded, and the Argentina steadily advanced in prosperity.

The latter days of Spanish rule were extremely creditable to the sagacity and liberality of the Crown and its advisers. In 1764 a line of vessels was established to run between Corunna and various South American ports, with permission to carry Spanish merchandise and bring back in return the products of the colonies, and in 1774 the colonies were allowed intercommunication and trade. In 1778 a new commercial code was drawn up for the benefit of the Spanish Indies, and this was surprisingly liberal for those days. Nine ports in Spain and twenty-four in the colonies were declared "ports of entry," and goods, for the most part, were allowed to pass in and out freely. The general duty was nominally 3 per cent. on Spanish goods and 7 per cent. on foreign goods; but as the latter had to be shipped from Spain, the duty upon them was really 40 or 50 per cent. If we compare this scale with that now in force, we shall see how greatly South America has retrograded since the removal of the control of Spain. It is interesting to remember that these beneficent regulations were framed while Smith was publishing the "Wealth of Nations," and that therefore backward Spain anticipated both Pitt and Huskisson.

After this Argentina advanced by leaps and bounds. The average export of hides had been 150,000; they soon rose to 800,000, and in one particular year the figure was 1,400,000. At least seventy ships sailed to Spain every year, and the population of Buenos Aires rose from 37,000 in 1778, to 72,000 in 1800. Buenos Aires became openly what she had long been struggling to be—the entrepôt for wine and brandy from Cuzo, hides from Tucuman, tobacco, yerba maté, and wood from Paraguay, and gold, silver, copper, rice, sugar, and cocoa from the distant interior. Had the fate of Spain been happier, and the character of her sons stronger, South America would have had a very different destiny, for everything pointed to a period of peaceful development, and the people had a government which was exactly suited to them. The Revolution substituted for the mild rule of Spain a preposterous democracy which was only effective or tolerable when metamorphosed into a dictatorship, and for more than two centuries of comparative peace an indefinitely long period of disorder and bloodshed.

Before closing this brief sketch of a period which has been both neglected and misunderstood (for it is usually passed over with a few reflections upon the perversity and tyranny of Spanish rule) it is desirable to indicate briefly the machinery of government, which underwent substantial alteration only in the last generation of the Spanish dominion. The King had a special body of advisers to help him in the administration of his oversea territory, and this was called the Council of the Indies. There were only two Viceroys—who, of course, were subject to the home authorities—they were the Viceroy of Mexico and the Viceroy of Peru. The latter ruled over the whole of South America. When a new colony was founded it was put under the charge of an Adelantado, or Governor, who was nominally subject to the Viceroy, but in practice he was independent and answerable only to the King. When he vacated office his acts were subject to a review, and he was liable to punishment if found guilty of misconduct, but in the nature of things there was little effective check upon him by the Home Government, and he was really a military ruler with almost despotic powers. However, the Spaniards, following the Roman tradition, always strongly favoured municipal government, and provisions were made which modified the arbitrary character of the system, although, as was inevitable, there were loud complaints that the claims of the Creoles—those born in the country—were neglected, and that the good posts were given to Spaniards from over the seas. Even to the last this grievance remained.[43]

The system of local government, which modified this exclusiveness and gave the children of the soil a considerable share in the management of their own affairs, is a most important feature in the history of Argentina.

To begin with, the Governor made grants of land to each white settler. The recipients of the grants became Encomenderos, who received also in fief several Indian villages and took tribute from the inhabitants in return for protection and Christian teaching. The Encomenderos swore "to defend, enrich, and ennoble the kingdom and care for the Indians," and they appear to have discharged their trust with tolerable fidelity.

But the Spaniards are city-dwelling people, and the history of Argentina chiefly centres in the towns where the governing body was the Cabildo, or town council. The Cabildo consisted of from six to twelve members, and although they had bought their offices of the King and held them for life, they imparted no insignificant popular element into the system of government, and when the Revolution came the Cabildos had sufficient vitality to act as the rallying-point for the revolutionists in every district. In Buenos Aires the Cabildo had great power, and the Governor could not easily override it, while in every city in the provinces the little town councils represented Creole and local interests. This system lent itself to particularism and was unfavourable to representative government, which accordingly has not been a success in Argentina, partly owing to this cause and partly to the natural incapacity of the people. It has been always very difficult to obtain a national assembly even for the decision of the most momentous questions and legislation, elections and administrations are controlled by functionaries rather than by electors and deputies. Under Spanish rule the Cabildo system worked extremely well. In the thinly populated districts the great proprietors ruled in patriarchal fashion.

Inefficiency and indolence were the chief grievances which the inhabitants of the Plate district could have reasonably urged against their rulers. The commercial regulations, as we have seen, were so bad that they were perpetually evaded, and the Governor and other officials took bribes and connived at the evasions. Thus grew up the evil tradition that official and political careers are above all others desirable, and that the productive classes are fair game for every kind of official exaction. But, in spite of all defects, the settlements steadily prospered, there were few serious Indian wars, comparatively little fighting even with the Portuguese or other foreign nations, and civil tumults were few and far between. If we make allowance for the natural progress that all nations must make in the face of all adverse circumstances, we cannot deny that even Argentina has lost ground in the nineteenth century, as compared with her position in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

Another institution which exerted great influence upon the history of Spanish America was the Consulado, or Chamber of Commerce. In 1543 the first of these bodies was founded at Seville, and its principal object was to regulate trade with the Indies. The Consulado of Cadiz became eventually by far the most influential and gained an unenviable notoriety for its commerce-destroying enactments; but it was following the accepted commercial principles of the age, and there can be no doubt that the Consulados at Mexico and Lima were beneficial. Their business was to adjudge commercial suits and carry on the entire trade in their respective Viceroyalties, and in general they undertook the commercial development of the settlements. Their policy was cautious and conservative.

Such, then, were the institutions which tempered the rigours of personal or despotic rule, modifying either the unlimited power of the Crown or the absolute military sway of the Governor. But in theory the royal authority was as complete as that of the Roman Emperor. Just as in later days Queen Victoria took the title of Empress of India as the successor of the Mogul Emperor, so the King of Spain was Emperor of the Indies in succession to Montezuma in Mexico and the Incas in Peru. The King's will was the source of law; legislation was carried out by means of Cédulas Reales, or Royal Decrees, which were issued by the Council of the Indies in his name, and, as was natural, the attempt was made at regulation on far too complete a scale, and matters which ought to have been settled by local authorities were the subject of decrees, and thus these enactments increased with alarming rapidity. The principles of these Cédulas soon fell into confusion; it is said that their codification, ordered in 1635, was not carried into effect until 1680, by which time it had become obsolete. It does not appear, however, that the rulers troubled themselves much about the confusion of the law; they would probably have been much more uneasy had all the decrees become effective, for it was obviously impossible to carry on all legislation at such a distance, and travellers and annalists agreed that the Governors and their subordinates usually neglected the law and governed according to equity. The result was not unsatisfactory.

Current ideas about history are very often wrong; they are often the repetition at third or fourth hand of an extremely indifferent authority. An American traveller may have come with the preconceived belief that all republics are free and all monarchies grinding tyrannies, and having accordingly stated that the condition of South America under Spanish rule was miserable, his statement has been echoed by all his successors. Or, again, another writer notices that the commercial regulations were absurd and vexatious, and he declares that the colonies were paralysed by the blight of Spanish rule. A third has no difficulty in discovering instances of atrocities committed against the Indians who worked in the Peruvian mines, and he enlarges upon the greed and inhumanity of the Spaniards. Thus the whole history, which possesses few striking incidents to tempt investigators, is distorted by prejudice and the three hundred years of Spanish rule are summarily dismissed as a barren period, fruitful in nothing but misery.

In fact, from first to last the Spanish colonies enjoyed a more liberal trade policy than did those of England. The reason that the abuses of the Spanish colonies were so much more prominent was that the Spanish trade was incomparably more valuable than the North American. Again, apart from the mines, the Spanish treatment of the Indians was considerably in advance of the standards of the time in humanity, nor would it be easy to find any body of men in the three centuries who pursued a wiser and juster policy towards inferior and conquered races. And, further, such cruelty as was perpetrated was the work of private exploiters or, at worst, of disobedient officials. The King of Spain and the ecclesiastics of Spain made every effort to redress the instances of ill-treatment which came to their ears. It was Charles III. who encouraged the Jesuits to proceed upon their mission of mercy, and if he had had the power he would have restrained the cruelty of the Portuguese Paulistas. The condition of the River Plate settlements under Spanish rule compares favourably with that of most civilised nations during the same period.

A recent writer,[44] summing up the general subject, makes some remarks which deserve quotation: "In discussing the often-repeated accusation of Spanish oppression, it is necessary to define what sort of oppression is meant: whether oppression of the Indians by the whites, or oppression of the whites by the Spanish Government. If the former is meant, then the Creoles were as guilty as the Europeans, and both were more guilty than the Spanish Government and its immediate representatives. If the latter, the restraint of the whites was in fact the measure of protection enjoyed by the natives; free immigration and large autonomy granted to European settlers would have meant extermination or enslavement. But the theory of a universal control which should foster both 'commonwealths' and protect the weaker was largely ineffective; and in this failure lay the troubles of the Indians....

"The usual exclusion of Creoles from the highest posts was a grievance; but both its extent and its significance were much exaggerated during the struggle for independence, since a very large number of subordinate posts, some of them commanding large influence and dignity, were usually held by Creoles. In fact, almost all the revolutionary leaders were connected with the royal service through posts held either by themselves or by their fathers....

"Here was an empire which, by the testimony of its own administrators, was honeycombed with continuous decay in all directions; yet this empire survived repeated external shocks, continually extended its influence, and after three centuries evoked the admiration of foreign observers. This vitality is not explained by the theoretic system of administration, nor yet by the practical neglect of that system. Perhaps the explanation may partly be found in personal character.... Examples constantly recur of admirable and loyal service, which has something Oriental in its simplicity and self-abandonment; in emergencies the presence of one capable leader counterbalances all vices. Again, the undefinable Spanish quality of hidalguía, which animated the better part of the community, especially in New Spain, showed itself in a noble charity and hospitality, a liberal and careless use of wealth, indifference to material results, and an old-fashioned, uncalculating loyalty, sometimes almost fantastic."

The Spaniards had not the constructive genius of the Romans, and both in the mechanical contrivances of civilisation and in the moral force which founds laws and institutions they were far inferior. But they played very much the same part in South America which the Romans did in Europe. France, Spain, Portugal, and Italy are not more distinctively Roman than Argentina, Chile, Peru, and Colombia are Spanish. As Spain was in language and institutions the most completely Romanised of all European countries, so she has left her mark upon the West more distinctively than any other colonising Power. For good or evil, Buenos Aires, Lima, and the rest are Spanish cities, and there seems no reason to believe that they will ever be anything else, and the Spanish influence seems likely to be as permanent as the Roman in Southern Europe. Nor will any candid student of the history of the continent be unwilling to acknowledge that it was no small achievement for a nation to build up and administer such an empire, and he will regret that ignorance and prejudice have prevented the world from giving the praise due to a vast political and religious experiment which, in spite of extraordinary difficulties, was successful as far as its own character was concerned, and which, when it broke down by reason of the weakness of the mother country, left behind it all its institutions, political, religious, and social. Governors became Dictators or Presidents, but everything remains substantially Spanish.

CHAPTER VI
THE ENGLISH FAILURE IN ARGENTINA

In the early years of the nineteenth century England was engaged in a life and death struggle with Napoleon, and Spain and Holland, two of the chief colonial Powers, were in alliance with the Corsican. At Trafalgar, in 1805, the naval power of France and Spain had been shattered, but Napoleon was master of practically the whole of Europe, and he was devising weapons against his enemies which he hoped would be more potent than fleets or armies. England's trade and industries were advancing rapidly, but the long-continued war tended to spoil her markets, and Napoleon was attempting to prevent his subject allies from engaging in any trade whatever with the enemy. Consequently there was throughout the war frequent distress, especially in the North of England, and the manufacturing interest was urgent upon the Government to find new markets. Possibly in some cases the effective fighting strength of England was dissipated in distant expeditions, but in these years some of the most valuable additions were made to our Empire, and if the expedition which is to be related had been in competent hands, the history of South America would have been changed and England would have had vast dominions in every continent of the world.

One such was acquired in South Africa in January, 1806, when Cape Town was rapidly and easily taken from the Dutch. Sir Home Popham commanded the naval forces while Sir David Baird was Commander-in-Chief. Popham was an able and restless man, and hearing a few months later from an American sea-captain that the people of Buenos Aires and Montevideo were oppressed by the Spanish Government and would welcome the English as liberators, he resolved to make an attempt in that quarter and persuaded Baird to lend him a brigade.[45] The flotilla consisted of five ships of war and five transports, and the little army numbered 1,635 men under the command of that fine soldier, General Beresford. Popham was disobeying his orders and leaving Cape Town defenceless, but he knew that the acquisition of a new trade opening would atone for any technical disobedience in the eyes of the Home Government. The expedition left Table Bay on the 13th of April, 1806, and reached the River Plate on June 10th. Very wisely Popham proceeded to Buenos Aires instead of Montevideo, and on June 25th anchored off Quilmes, which is 15 miles south of the capital, and disembarked the same evening. The Spanish Viceroy made a very feeble resistance, and the next day the English force was encamped in the suburb of Barracas. On the 27th of June Beresford hoisted the English flag on the fort and a city of 72,000 inhabitants had been captured by a weak brigade. The Viceroy fled to Cordoba, and undoubtedly the feebleness displayed by the Spanish officials on that occasion helped to prepare the ground for the subsequent Revolution. The Argentines, indeed, had lost the qualities of self-help and initiative under the paternal rule of Spain, but they were ashamed of the surrender to so small a force, and under their nonchalant attitude there was an eager desire to expel the foreigners if an opportunity should arise. All that was needed was a leader, and a leader was found in Jacques Liniers. He was a Frenchman who had been thirty years in the service of Spain, and at the time of the invasion he was Governor of Misiones. Seeing that the people were ripe for an attempt upon the English he made his way to Montevideo and asked for help from the General in command. This was readily given, and with a small force he marched to Colonia and thence passed over by boats to Conchas, 21 miles north of Buenos Aires. Meanwhile Puirredon, a Creole patriot, had been skirmishing in the neighbourhood, and had succeeded in capturing a gun from the English. This success, which was won by Gauchos, greatly emboldened Liniers and gave him confidence in the abilities of his followers for partisan warfare. His force amounted to 1,124 men with two large guns and four small pieces. On August 10th he suddenly entered the northern suburb of Buenos Aires. The next day he summoned Beresford to surrender, and on his refusal the attack began. On the 12th the enemy forced their way to the Cathedral which overlooks the square where the English had their headquarters, and soon, by annoying street-fighting, compelled them to abandon all the neighbouring streets. From the square itself Beresford was forced by artillery fire to retreat, and the situation was soon seen to be untenable. After 165 had been killed or wounded, the English force, which had attempted an enterprise for which its numbers were altogether inadequate, surrendered to General Liniers. He honourably desired to keep the terms, which were that the soldiers should be embarked for England and not serve again until exchanged, but the Spanish authorities maintained that they had surrendered at discretion and marched them up-country as prisoners of war. Beresford, it may be added, contrived to escape six months later. The people of Buenos Aires had learned the lesson that if they desired security they must depend upon themselves rather than upon Spain. The first step they took was to depose their faint-hearted Viceroy and set up Liniers in his place.

Popham had sent home a glowing account of the commercial possibilities of the new conquest, and English traders made immense preparations to take advantage of the opportunity which was indeed sufficiently great. Sir David Baird had sent reinforcements of 1,400 men from the Cape, which arrived after the surrender, but of course Popham was too weak to retake the capital. He landed at Maldonado on the left bank and awaited reinforcements which were soon forthcoming, for the Cabinet had been greatly elated by the easy initial victory. On October 11th Admiral Sterling sailed from England in charge of a military force of 4,350 and a month later an expedition of equal strength under General Crauford followed for Chile. When the news of the disaster to Beresford reached England a swift ship was despatched after Crauford, ordering him to sail to the River Plate. Finally there followed General Whitelocke with additional troops and orders to take command of the whole expedition. The total armament amounted to twelve thousand men, eighteen ships of war, and eighty transports—a force amply sufficient to command success if it were well handled, but unfortunately it was placed in incompetent hands. The Ministry of All the Talents failed to justify its title in the planning of expeditions and the allocation of commanders.

John Whitelocke,[46] the new commander, had served with moderate success in the West Indies, but he owed his advancement (chiefly in pacific appointments) to his brother-in-law, Matthew Lewis, the Deputy Secretary at War, and father of the well-known "Monk" Lewis. But his appointment to this important command remains a mystery. It appears from Windham's Diary that he wished to give the command to Sir John Stuart, while Leveson-Gower was in favour of Whitelocke, and the annotator to the Diary declares that the Duke of York decided in favour of Whitelocke. This does not seem very probable, and though Lord Holland, who was a member of the not very competent Cabinet, suggests more plausibly that Whitelocke as Inspector-General of Recruiting was opposed to an important scheme of Windham, who therefore wished to get rid of him, still this view seems untenable in face of Windham's positive statement. The appointment can only be considered as one of the many blunders which sometimes counteract England's usual good luck; and on this occasion the effect was complete.

However, until he arrived matters proceeded in brilliant fashion. The first officer of high rank to appear was Sir Samuel Auchmuty, a loyal American who had served the King, for whose sake his family had suffered ruin, in America, India, and Egypt. Although he had expected merely to assist in the task of completing the conquest of Argentina, he was not dismayed when he found that the work had to be begun over again. He promptly began the bombardment of Montevideo and within a few days, February 3, 1807, the breach was found to be practicable. The town, strongly fortified as it was, taken by storm with a loss to the English of six hundred men, and the General acting humanely and prudently, conciliated the inhabitants and established civil rule. Many adventurous English merchantmen, whose owners anticipated a boom, arrived and unloaded, and necessaries and luxuries were sold at prices hitherto unknown in Argentina.

Whitelocke arrived on May 10th and Crauford on June 15th. It was on June 28th that the expedition left Montevideo. It consisted of four brigades, of which three were commanded by Generals Crauford, Auchmuty, and Lumley, the fourth by Colonel Mahon. The transports left amidst the cheers of the fleet, and success might well have been anticipated, for an enterprise was being attempted which a year earlier had been easily accomplished by less than one-sixth of Whitelocke's army, which was ten thousand strong. But these proportions hardly represented the difference between the brother-in-law of Matthew Lewis and the future victor of Albuera, and, moreover, the spirit of the colonists had risen, and they rejected both the feeble restrictions of Spain and the new prosperity offered by England. The first mistake was made in landing at Ensenada, 48 miles south of Buenos Aires, and the troops had to make long marches through deep swamps. But Whitelocke arrived at Quilmes (where he ought to have landed) on July 1st without having seen an enemy, and all promised to go well.

On that day Liniers attempted to oppose the invaders in force, but Crauford, with a vigorous charge, beat down all resistance and pursued the enemy to the suburbs. There is little doubt that Crauford was correct in his belief that if he had been supported by the main body, Buenos Aires would have fallen on that very day. But Leveson-Gower, the second in command, who was as incompetent as Whitelocke and who was the moving spirit in the whole disaster, recalled the troops and gave the discouraged Spaniards a welcome delay. On July 2nd Whitelocke called upon them to surrender, and they refused. He himself was well aware of the difficulties of an assault. As soon as Crauford arrived at Montevideo the Commander-in-Chief had taken him round the works, pointed out the peculiar facilities which the flat-roofed South American houses afforded for street-fighting, and declared that he would never expose his troops to the risk of a general assault. In this resolve Crauford heartily concurred.

The General had two easy and certain means of attaining his object. He might blockade the town and so starve it into surrender, or he might bombard it. But unfortunately he was too unstable to persevere in his previous resolution, and he allowed Leveson-Gower to persuade him to adopt a preposterous scheme of assault. It was decided that on July 5th the troops should be divided into eight columns, and orders were actually issued that they should advance with their muskets unloaded, lest they should be tempted to waste time in returning the enemy's fire. The columns were to march through the town until each had arrived at the square nearest the river. Then they were to halt and, apparently, do nothing, for no further orders were issued.

The attack began at half-past six in the morning. When the English had entered the town a withering fire was poured upon them from innumerable houses. But they pushed gallantly on. Auchmuty, who was on the left, made his way to the Retiro and the Plaza de Toros, where he captured thirty-two guns and six hundred prisoners. The troops on the right seized the Residencia. But these successes were of no avail through lack of a competent guiding mind; the column leaders did not even know the whereabouts of the Commander-in-Chief, much less what he wished them to do, and further, the ill-judged scheme had borne its natural fruit in several serious disasters.

Crauford had seized the Convent of San Domingo, but he was surrounded by a very large force of the enemy who kept up a deadly fire of musketry and artillery, and by half-past four in the afternoon he was compelled to surrender. The same fate befell columns under Colonel Cadogan and Colonel Duff. In this day's fighting the English lost 70 officers and 1,130 men, killed and wounded, while prisoners amounted to 120 and 1,500.

Whitelocke and Auchmuty were now besieged in the Retiro. Their army had suffered severely, but they had still a large and efficient force, they had command of the sea, and the knowledge that the English Government would support them with all its available strength. Even if ordinary skill were out of the question, ordinary resolution would quickly have retrieved the initial reverses. But it was not to be.

Flushed by his success, General Liniers the next day sent a flag of truce to Whitelocke proposing to surrender all his prisoners if the English would evacuate Buenos Aires. He probably hardly expected anything but rejection of such terms, but the civilian Alzaga seemed to have had a better appreciation of the character of Whitelocke and insisted that Montevideo should be added to Buenos Aires. Nothing could be lost by making extravagant demands. The panic-stricken Whitelocke agreed to everything. At first he seems to have hesitated a little, but Liniers had added the menace that he could not be responsible for the safety of the prisoners if the attack were renewed. In any case such a threat should have been treated with contempt, but it was, as it happened, perfectly empty, for the life and property of every inhabitant of Montevideo were in Whitelocke's power.

Finally, he accepted the terms of surrender without raising the slightest objection to the inclusion of Montevideo, and taking great credit to himself for his humanity in yielding to Linier's threat, he wrote complacently: "Influenced by this consideration, which I knew to be founded in fact, and reflecting of how little advantage would be the possession of a country the inhabitants of which were so absolutely hostile, I resolved to forego the advantages which the bravery of the troops had obtained, and acceded to a treaty, which I trust will meet the approbation of his Majesty."

He had signified his willingness to withdraw from Buenos Aires in forty-eight hours and from Montevideo in two months. As the Judge-Advocate remarked at the subsequent trial: "He is his own accuser: he has furnished the strongest testimony against himself." The English army sailed from Buenos Aires on July 12th, from Montevideo on September 9, 1807.

Seldom has there been such a fine army and such splendid officers under such a pusillanimous commander. A young officer[47] on the staff remarks that on many of the street corners in Montevideo was written: "General Whitelocke is either a coward or a traitor! Perhaps both!" He also tells us: "All the English merchants are in an uproar. They say the losses will be immense; that upwards of three millions worth of property is on its way to this country, and that, if it is given up, half the merchants in England will be ruined. God knows what will be the result of this unfortunate affair. It appears to me one of the most severe blows that England has ever received." Whittingham adds, with some penetration, that "the period of a revolution" was "not far distant."

It is some small consolation that the court-martials administered even-handed justice. The most important tribunal adjudged "that the said Lieutenant-General Whitelocke be cashiered, and declared totally unfit and unworthy to serve his Majesty in any military capacity whatever." On the other hand Popham, who had disobeyed his orders in initiating the whole scheme, was severely reprimanded, but received a sword of honour from the City of London and a few months later was given an important command.

Sir David Baird, who had sanctioned Popham's adventure, was censured and recalled from the Cape, but he also was given the chief command of the very same expedition as Popham—that against Copenhagen. It is certain that public opinion would not have sanctioned any severe measures against officers who had been zealous in the South American attempt.

The most noticeable point throughout the whole affair is the eagerness of the English commercial world, which was dreading the loss of the Continental markets and was rightly convinced that the discovery of new outlets was a matter of life and death.

The remarks of the Judge-Advocate condense the whole case: "By this most unfortunate event all the hopes have been defeated which had been justly and generally entertained, of discovering new markets for our manufactures, of giving a wider scope to the spirit and enterprise of our merchants, of opening new sources of treasure, and new fields for exertion in supplying either the rude wants of countries emerging from barbarism, or the artificial and increasing demands of luxury and refinement, in those remote quarters of the globe. Important as these objects must be at all times to this country, the state of Europe, and the attempts that have been daily making to exclude us from our accustomed intercourse with the Continent, have added to the importance of these objects, and to the disappointment of these hopes." It is, perhaps, doubtful whether England could have held any considerable territory in Argentina, for a revolutionary spirit was rapidly being wafted into South America from Europe, and though the population was small the country was vast, and if the population had continued hostile the difficulty of either conciliating or conquering them would have been immense. But, doubtless, the retention of Montevideo and the territory now called Uruguay would have been feasible, and would have been highly beneficial both to England and South America. To have had one country in South America governed upon liberal and conservative principles, with an enlightened system of commerce and complete security for life and property, would have been an incalculable benefit, and would undoubtedly been a salutary check upon the wars and revolutions which have devastated South America since the overthrow of the Spanish dominion.

CHAPTER VII
THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE

When the English retired from Buenos Aires and Montevideo there seemed no reason to expect any change in the relations between Argentina and the mother country. The Spanish rule was not rigorous, and, from a financial point of view, its policy was now highly favourable to the colonists. They also warmly sympathised with their European kinsmen in the apparently hopeless struggle against the oppression of Napoleon. When Charles IV. abdicated in 1808, all the Spanish-American dependencies hailed Ferdinand VII. as their King with enthusiasm. Nothing seemed less likely than any kind of disloyalty. And yet a very few years saw the beginning of a struggle which ended in an old and haughty nation being stripped of every one of the dominions she possessed on the American continent, and sinking into a state of lethargy and decay from which, after the lapse of a century, there seems little prospect of a "Roman recovery." The causes of this strange phenomenon certainly do not seem adequate. It is, of course, obvious that the weakness of the Home Government and their own successful repulse of the English showed the Argentines that if they had the will to be independent there was no doubt about the power. Again, their sense of importance could not but be increased by the eagerness with which foreigners sought for a share in their trade, and Cisneros, the Viceroy, had strengthened this impression by admitting neutrals unreservedly to the South American trade—a step which he took with great reluctance. But neither of these circumstances could have had any effect if goodwill and loyalty had remained unimpaired. These had probably been undermined by the jealousy between Creole and Spaniard, by the pride of caste shown by the latter towards the former, and by the preference always given to Spaniards in the matter of official appointments. As the people of Argentina increased in consciousness of worth and power, they would be the less willing to brook this assumption of superiority, and doubtless hot-headed young men had frequently discussed the possibility of the step for which the cant term is now "cutting the painter." There is a further circumstance which may have had influence on the course of events. Able and ambitious men could not but see that in the turmoil of revolution, followed by independence, there was a prospect of unbounded riches, and power, which, however speculative, is always more attractive to such minds than to be seated in the mean. Indeed a certain Francisco Miranda from Caracas, ex-volunteer in Washington's army, had, at the close of the war, discussed Spanish emancipation with Washington himself. He then visited Europe, fought in the French revolutionary army, and actually attained to the rank of general. His efforts subsequently to induce Pitt or President Adams to initiate a war of liberation in South America were, however, unsuccessful, but his constant intrigues with Spanish Americans show that the project was undoubtedly in the air.

Yet when we have gone over the meagre list of possible causes, we cannot but attribute the chief place to one which strengthened all the circumstances favourable to change and neutralised or reversed those which were unfavourable. This was the doctrine of the Rights of Man or, to be plain, the revolutionary spirit itself. Its influence was felt by all classes, and it caused ferment and bloodshed in such widely different places as Ireland and the West Indies. It had already invaded England, and afterwards attacked her ancient rival and overthrew the French monarchy and trampled down the French Church. Thus, this purely moral cause must be taken as the efficient factor of the Spanish-American Revolution; the others could have effected nothing had not the seemingly barren dogma of equality provided an atmosphere and a soil ready to foster any revolutionary seed that might find its way to South America.

Ferdinand VII. was proclaimed King in 1808. The heroic Liniers was then Viceroy at Buenos Aires, but doubtless his French nationality gave rise to suspicions, and as soon as the news came that Joseph, the puppet of Napoleon, had been imposed upon Spain, the Frenchman was deposed, and on July 19, 1809, Cisneros became Viceroy in the name of Ferdinand. As stated above, he threw open the ports with startling results, for the customs revenue was immediately quadrupled. And yet this wise measure revealed to the people their strength and self-sufficiency, and may have predisposed them to revolution.[48]

On the 13th of May, 1810, news came from Spain that the mother country was now under the heel of France and had no longer any power to help or control them. Cisneros was in a very difficult situation. On May 25th he consented to the formation of a Council under the title of the Provisional Government of the Provinces of Rio de la Plata, and this date has been generally regarded by historians as the beginning of the Revolution. Prominent among those who desired change were Moreno, Belgrano, Saavedra, and Castelli. Moreno, who was secretary to the new Council, was a man of large views, irresistible enthusiasm, and full of daring. Belgrano was equally fervent in the cause and was devoted to Moreno, content to serve him without reward for the liberation of Spanish America, and he was one of the few men in the Province who, by business aptitude and coolness of character, was qualified to direct the movement. The Council acted with considerable adroitness. Professing to be acting for Ferdinand and thus conciliating all classes, they worked steadily in the direction of depressing and discrediting all Spanish officials, and at last, on June 1st, Moreno ordered Cisneros and other high functionaries to be seized and deported. A merchant brig conveyed them to the Canaries and they vanish from history.

Moreno anticipated trouble from Cordoba; but even there his opponents were losing ground. Liniers had retired thither, but despairing of success he, with several loyal Spaniards, collected a force of about four hundred men and marched in the direction of Peru. They were pursued, overwhelmed, and captured. The liberator of La Plata and five of his colleagues were thereupon shot. This outrage, equally remarkable as an instance of atrocity and ingratitude, was a fitting prelude to Spanish-American history. Before the end of the year the whole of the north was in the hands of the revolutionists, and about the same time they experienced an equally valuable success. The loyalists still held Montevideo and their fleet blockaded Buenos Aires. Moreno took advantage of the English anxiety for open markets, and appealed to the English Minister at Madrid. He received the reply that the British Government could not recognise the blockade, as it desired to maintain a position of perfect neutrality, and thus a potent Spanish weapon was rendered innoxious.

However, it was very early evident that unity and federation would not characterise the Revolution; that each Province would aim at its own particular independence; that Buenos Aires would not be the New York of a single new nation. An expedition sent to Paraguay, with the object of extirpating the Spanish partisans, failed altogether to attach that country to Argentina. Paraguay, like its neighbours, preferred independence.

At the same time jealousies broke out between the leaders. Moreno was worsted in a personal dispute with Saavedra, and at the beginning of the year 1811 was glad to accept an important mission to England. He died on the voyage thither. But the revolutionists were reminded that internal dissensions were out of place by the arrival at Montevideo of the able and energetic Elio, who had been appointed Viceroy by the Home Government. Although he was speedily forced to content himself with holding the town only, he was a source of great trouble to the Council and formed a valuable rallying-point for the loyalists. The Peruvian partisans also harassed them in the north, but Belgrano, by the victory of Tucuman on September 25th, laid the foundations of Argentine independence. The triumphant general wrote to Buenos Aires: "Our country may celebrate with just pride the complete victory obtained on the 25th of September, the anniversary of Our Lady of Mercy, whose protection we had invoked. We have captured seven guns, three flags, one standard, fifty officers, four chaplains, two curés, and six hundred men, besides four hundred wounded prisoners, the stores belonging to the infantry and the artillery, the largest part of the baggage. Such is the day's result. Officers and soldiers have behaved gloriously and bravely. We are pursuing the routed enemy." This victory freed the north from all fear of invasion in the future.

There is no need to give details of the skirmishes with the royal forces or the skirmishes between intriguing leaders which occupied the next eighteen months. It is sufficient to say that during this time the influence of the soldier San Martin was growing rapidly, and towards the close of the year 1813 he replaced Belgrano as commander of the northern army. Hitherto power had been in the hands of two or three men, among whom Alvear was now the most prominent; but in January, 1814, a Congress assembled at Buenos Aires, and on the 31st of that month it chose Posadas, a relation of Alvear, to be Dictator of the so-called United Provinces. In June Alvear captured Montevideo, and the hopes of Spain in the Plate district were for ever quenched; but Uruguay refused to be subordinate to Buenos Aires, and Posadas was in no position to coerce her. Uruguay, therefore, finally severed the connection with Argentina, and passes out of our history.

Meanwhile San Martin, who had become Governor of Mendoza, was carrying on that campaign for the liberation of South America which was to make his name immortal; but in Buenos Aires affairs were going by no means well—in fact, anarchy reigned. The appointment of Puirredon as Dictator brought about some improvement, and on July 9, 1816, the separation from Spain was formally announced.

The next year San Martin, with an efficient army of four thousand men, moved to help the Chilians, and gained a glorious victory over the Spaniards at Chacabuco, not far from Santiago. A year later he won a no less decisive triumph at Maipu (April 5, 1818), which secured the independence of Chile, and by his victories he also strengthened the position of Puirredon and the Government at Buenos Aires.

It was now time for constructive work. A Congress assembled once more at Buenos Aires, and, on May 25, 1819, promulgated a federal Constitution on the pattern of the United States of North America. At the same time Puirredon was glad to resign his difficult position, and, in his stead, General Rondeau became Dictator, or President. He was incapable, and the system of government by Juntas or Dictators, which had distracted the country for ten years, came to an end, and seemed likely to be succeeded by even worse conditions, for all the "United Provinces" flew back to particularism and anarchy. But in 1821 the able and honest Rivadavia intervened, and reduced affairs to some semblance of order. In that year also San Martin entered Lima in triumph, and it was clearly necessary to organise the new and sovereign States of South America. In 1822 Lord Londonderry declared for the part of the English Government that "so large a portion of the world could not long continue without some recognised and established relations, and that the State, which neither by its councils nor by its arms could effectually assert its own rights over its dependencies so as to enforce obedience, and thus make itself responsible for maintaining their relations with other Powers, must sooner or later be prepared to see those relations established by the overruling necessity of the case in some other form." The United States had recognised the independence of Argentina, and in 1823 the complicated state of world politics made decisive action necessary. Spain was once more in the grip of France, and it was the object of England to counteract her influence. Accordingly it was intimated to France that England considered the separation of the colonies from Spain as complete, and in the December of that year the United States put forward the celebrated Munroe Doctrine to serve as a warning to France or any other European Power that might cherish transatlantic designs.

It was on January 23, 1825, that the inevitable result was brought about. With the countenance of Sir Woodbine Parish, the English Minister, whose name is preserved by a meritorious work upon the country where he played so conspicuous a part, the federal States assembled and decreed the fundamental law of the Constitution. Here we may date the true commencement of the Republic of Argentina. The Revolution was at an end. True to the general character of her history Argentina displayed, in this important struggle, fewer striking events than any of the other young nations. The battles in her territory were few, and even the city feuds and inevitable executions were comparatively mild and infrequent. And yet that Argentina had the leading share in the Revolution no one can doubt, for, first of all, she gave to Spanish America that disinterested patriot San Martin, who was the George Washington of South America; and, in the next place, the victory of Belgrano at Tucuman went far towards paralysing loyalist activity in Peru, and finally Buenos Aires was even then regarded as the capital of the continent, on which were fixed the eyes of all South American revolutionists, and towards which all the plans of European statecraft and private intrigue were directed. Argentina was the leader and organiser of victory.

And what good came of it all? It may be regarded as a regrettable necessity due to the weakness of Spain. Spain was too feeble and the other Powers were too alien in every way to control this great Empire. It was necessary to act; but who will say that the consequences of the action were wholly beneficial? Argentina exchanged a benevolent, if unenterprising, Government for a long period of anarchy, alternating with despotism, but she was less unfortunate than most of the sister Republics. The men who fought and laboured for the cause of South American independence had no illusion on the subject. General Bolivar, the Liberator, when his task was over, said: "This country will inevitably fall into the hands of the unbridled rabble, and little by little become a prey to petty tyrants of all colours and races. If it were possible for any part of the world to return to a state of primitive chaos, that would be the fate of South America."

South America was in every respect most unfortunate. The weakness and misfortunes of Spain followed closely upon the growth of the revolutionary spirit which disturbed the whole world, and though the Continent was for a long time comparatively little affected by it, vigorous intrigues in Europe kept it alive, and when the time was ripe the revolutionists set to work. Equally unfortunate was it that the Revolution took place at a time when unchecked democracy was considered a practicable form of government. Experience has shown that it is beset with difficulties in all States; but where a portion of the people have political instincts and capacity, public affairs may go on, even if to some extent hampered by professions of a belief in ochlocracy, without serious disaster. Few people in the world could have been found less suited to direct democratic institutions than the Spanish Creole was at the time of the War of Independence. Little town communities, paternally governed groups of villages, all with complete local self-government and united only by common loyalty to a King or Viceroy—such was the form of government under which the Indo-Spaniards might have lived and prospered; but the constitutions which they attempted to formulate were altogether incongruous under the circumstances. Political theorising has cost South America very dear.

Canning's oft-quoted sentence about the "New World which was called into existence to redress the balance of the Old" is, in the sense in which it is often quoted, a piece of cheap rhetoric. But, in fact, he was arguing that it was not worth while to go to war with France on account of the marching of French troops into Spain; the present Spain, he said, was not the country of which our ancestors were jealous; the Spain over the waters is independent, and the fact has entirely changed the balance of power.

To suppose, as those who quote the phrase often suppose, that South America was initiating a happy age in contrast to the wrongs and oppressions of the Old World, is too extravagant a belief to require refutation. In the nineteenth century the countries of Europe made steady progress, and even their internal troubles were generally fruitful in improved conditions. In South America most of the countries retrograded, and the whole continent was drenched with blood uselessly shed. Comparative tranquillity now prevails, but this is due to the general progress of the peoples—a progress which it would be rash to say was furthered by their political institutions. The heroics which have been uttered over the Spanish-America War of Independence are discounted by the facts of South American history. For a long time bloodshed and tyranny were its results; the people were as yet unfitted for full emancipation, and so little advantage has been taken of the experiences of three-quarters of a century that the promise of the future is by no means serene, and its chief hope is that material prosperity may counterbalance defective political conditions. These are still unsound, and until rulers and subjects advance in civic capacity the good of Argentina will be the effects rather of the industry and enterprise of private individuals than of assemblies and statesmen.

CHAPTER VIII
ANARCHY AND DESPOTISM—THE WAR WITH PARAGUAY

The rule of Rivadavia was of great value to the country. He reformed the laws and administration, introduced wide and somewhat drastic ecclesiastical changes, established the University of Buenos Aires, and, in general, pursued an enlightened and progressive policy.[49] But the country was divided into two hostile parties, and neither being prepared to tolerate the triumph of the opposing system, the position of Rivadavia was rendered very difficult. He belonged to the Unitarian party, and its members have succeeded in maintaining their system, which aimed at a Republic with merely municipal local government. Buenos Aires was to be the administrative centre and to control every province, and thus to hold the position which Paris occupied in France. But the propertied classes in the interior belonged chiefly to the Federalist party. They viewed with suspicion the oligarchy of office at the capital, and advocated a federation on the model of the United States. At first Rivadavia held his ground against his active opponents, led by Manuel Dorrego, who were eagerly looking for an occasion against him; and this was speedily found in a foreign war.

Uruguay has been united to Brazil, but in 1825 it revolted against the Emperor, and, as might have been expected, Argentina took the part of her neighbour, and Brazil declared war. Assisted by Admiral Brown, an Irishman, the Argentines inflicted great loss upon Brazilian shipping, and Alvear took command of a large army, which invaded Rio Grande do Sul and completely defeated the Brazilians at Ituzaingo on February 20, 1827. This blow was decisive, and a treaty was made by which Rivadavia, distracted by domestic troubles and anxious to secure peace at any price, agreed that Uruguay should still remain a part of Brazil. His enemies had already spared no efforts to rouse prejudice and inflame public resentment against him. Appeals had been made to provincial jealousies, the issue of paper-money was alleged to be draining the country of the precious metals, and even his statesmanlike efforts to encourage immigration and the hospitality he offered to foreigners were matters of accusation against him. The treaty raised a storm of indignation, and had to be annulled. Rivadavia was so completely discredited by this transaction that on July 7, 1827, he was forced to resign, and thus the country lost probably the best constructive statesman she has produced—a loss which she could ill afford.

Dorrego succeeded him, but in reality the Republic was showing a strong tendency to split up, and Lopez in Santa Fé, Ibarra in Santiago, Bustos in Cordoba, and Quiroga in Cuyo, possessed almost as much power as Dorrego at Buenos Aires. However, with the help of several of these men, he succeeded in ending the war by a compromise which left Uruguay an independent state. Argentina was thus free to devote herself to domestic warfare.

Lavalle was now the head of the Unitarians, and he succeeded in expelling Dorrego from Buenos Aires. The latter fled to his estates and raised a body of adherents, but was captured and shot by Lavalle. The death of Dorrego cleared the way for a man who was destined to have a much longer political life than is usual in South America, and also to fill a much larger space in the eyes of the world. That man was Juan Manuel Rosas.

Darwin records that he and the well-wishers of Argentina were looking with satisfaction and hope at the vigorous measures and rapid advances of this remarkable man, and he also adds in a note written years afterwards that these hopes had been miserably disappointed. Rosas was a rich man, and from his earliest days had been engaged in cattle-raising on the southern Pampas. In this hardy open-air life he had greatly distinguished himself by his boldness and skill in riding, and was the idol of hundreds of half-savage Gauchos. He was not endowed with signal abilities, but he was a hard, practical man, full of audacity and little troubled by scruples. He was now the chief of the Federalists, but at first there seemed little prospect that he would be able to make head against Lavalle. The latter led an army to attack his enemies in Santa Fé, while General Paz marched upon Cordoba, and at the same time they sent some veteran troops to operate against Rosas in the south. But these were overthrown by the hardy horsemen of Rosas, and he came to the rescue of the Federalists. General Paz had captured Cordoba, and defeated Quiroga with heavy slaughter, but Rosas' weight turned the scale. He marched to Buenos Aires, and in June, 1829, Lavalle, who had become involved in a dispute with the French Minister, was glad to resign and leave the country. His successor, Viamont, was a puppet of Rosas.

On December 8, 1829, Rosas was elected Captain-General in the interests of the Federalists, but he had no intention of allowing Federalist principles to stand in the way of his supreme rule. Lopez was despatched against Paz, who had the misfortune to be accidentally taken prisoner. Showing unusual magnanimity, Lopez spared his life. The troops of the Unitarians never recovered from the loss of their brave leader, and being attacked by the ferocious Quiroga and driven to Tucuman, they were in a hopeless position. Quiroga butchered five hundred prisoners in cold blood, and few of the remnants of Paz's army escaped to Bolivia.

Rosas then employed himself in consolidating his power at Buenos Aires, and with this object he repealed several of the Liberal laws of Rivadavia. In this task he was assisted by a clever and crafty man named Anchorena, with whose collaboration he passed a rigorous law of "suspects" directed against the Unitarians. Severe as he was against that party, and detested as he was by the late holders of office in the capital, who resented the dominion of a rustic, he was really, by his masterful measures, advancing the principle against which he posed as the nominal antagonist.[50] At the end of 1832 his term of office came to an end, and he was re-elected. But as his extraordinary powers were not renewed he haughtily refused office, and left Buenos Aires to reduce the Indians of the Pampa, who had taken advantage of the civil discords of Argentina. Again a man of straw was put at the helm. His name was Balcarce.

In the Indian war Rosas was successful, penetrating as far as the Rio Negro and destroying, according to his own computation, twenty thousand of the enemy. It is not necessary to describe the manœuvres and hesitations which preceded his return to nominal as well as real power. In 1835 he accepted the title of Governor and Captain-General, and henceforth ruled as a military Dictator. Never was there a more ruthless tyrant. The two most prominent soldiers and possible rivals left in Buenos Aires were Quiroga and Lopez. Quiroga had seen the elevation of Rosas with ill-concealed disgust, and the new Dictator resolved to make away with him. Rosas, therefore, commissioned him to go to pacify Salta and Tucuman, and on his way thither caused him and his suite to be assassinated. Shortly afterwards Lopez died, and it is only necessary to say that his physician was handsomely rewarded by Rosas. He established a reign of terror, and formed a club of ruffians called the Massorca, whose business it was to murder his enemies. One Maza attempted a Parliamentary resistance to him, and the crafty Dictator, after the plan had failed, first lulled him into security by vague promises of safety and then sent four men to stab him to death. His death was followed by an extensive proscription; in fact, the history at this period is distinctly Tacitean.

The power of Rosas was the greater because he had the help of a skilful general named Urquiza, against whom none of the Dictator's many enemies could make head. For a long time his power was unassailable, for the poignards of the Massorca were ready to repress any opposition, and even the Church was powerless against him. He expelled the Jesuits, paying a tribute at the same time to "their Christian and moral virtues," but declaring that they were opposed to the principles of government. Undoubtedly they were to the principles of his Government.

One of the main features of his policy was jealousy of foreign influence. He decided that all children born in Argentina were ipso facto citizens and liable to military service, and this decision remains in force at the present day. It led, however, to endless trouble with France. It is probable that if he had been able Rosas would have closed the country to all foreign nations, as his brother-tyrant, Francia, did in Paraguay.

But the old Greek saying that the worst disease of tyranny is the impossibility of reposing trust in its friends was to be justified, and Urquiza, his right-hand man, who had crushed the invaders from Uruguay at the battle of India Muerta and who had overawed all opposition, was at last to prove faithless. He had long been established as Governor of Entre Rios, where he had acted with remorseless cruelty in stamping out disaffection. His first attempts to subvert the authority of Rosas were unsuccessful, but in 1851 he made an alliance with Brazil and one of the Uruguayan factions, and in the December of that year he assembled a force of twenty-four thousand men, crossed the Parana, and marched into Santa Fé. On February 3, 1852, Rosas was overwhelmed at the battle of Casseros near the capital and he fled to Europe. Twenty-five years later he died in Hampshire.

Rosas disappeared unregretted. Although it is possible that at the time he came to the front a military dictatorship was the only possible form of government, yet he was one of the worst of the long list of South American tyrants, and it is probably impossible to find any redeeming feature about him except the fact that he encouraged agriculture—a service which was largely neutralised by his hatred of foreigners and foreign commerce. Undoubtedly he stopped the progress of a promising country, not only for the twenty years of his remorseless tyranny but for the long years which were required to recover from the effects of his sanguinary and soulless domination.[51]

Anxious as all were for peace and constitutional government, there was some civil warfare and much dissension before the position of Urquiza could be secured. Finally, on May 1, 1853, the Constituent Congress drew up a Federal constitution, and this is practically still in force.[52] Hardly less important was the treaty of the 10th of July following, made with England, France, and the United States, which declared that the Parana and other rivers should be for ever open to navigation.

Urquiza was elected the first President under the new constitution for a period of six years, and the country began to recuperate. The port of Rosario sprang into being, and the other river cities rapidly doubled in population. But towards the end of Urquiza's term civil troubles were renewed. The Province of Buenos Aires had been left outside the Confederation and was in a position of antagonism to the other Provinces. The party of the capital was called the Porteños—the men of the Port—and they took the place of the old Unitarian party. In 1859 Buenos Aires actually declared war upon the Federal Government, but Urquiza defeated its forces. Before a settlement could be made his term of office expired and he was succeeded by Dr. Durqui. Fortunately, the Governor of Buenos Aires, Bartolemo Mitre, was a true patriot, and though he was obliged to make war upon the President his efforts were directed to settling the Federal question, and they were, for the time, successful. Urquiza evacuated the capital and retired southwards. Mitre followed him with a large army, and in October, 1861, defeated him at Pavon and himself became President.

It would have been well if the energies of Mitre had been left unhampered to settle the thorny question of the respective claims of the Porteños and the provincials, but it was the misfortune of Argentina to be suddenly involved in the most serious foreign war of its history. This was the great Paraguayan war.

The occasion of the hostilities was Uruguay. That country had long been distracted by the savage political strife of the Colorados and Blancos, and in 1864 the Blancos, having got the upper hand, elected Dr. Aguirre to the Presidency, who, by his rigorous measures against all suspected of disaffection, excited the resentment of both Argentina and Brazil. Both of these countries had important stock-raising interests on the Uruguay frontiers, and in the civil turmoil their subjects were frequently subjected to extortion and plunder. Having incurred the hostility of its too-powerful neighbours, Uruguay looked about for an ally, and found one in General Lopez, the Dictator of Paraguay.

Lopez in his youth had visited Europe, admired the great armies of the Continent, and returned convinced that he might play the part of Napoleon in South America. He had still hardly reached middle age and was able, cruel, and obstinate. He devoted all his efforts to raising and equipping an army by which he hoped to make himself the arbiter of South American politics. Accordingly he welcomed the appeal of Uruguay, and declared that he would regard an invasion of Uruguay by Brazil as an unfriendly act. When Brazil attacked Uruguay he did not, indeed, hasten to fulfil his promise; he cared nothing for the Colorados or Blancos, and the difficulties of invading Brazil were at first insuperable, but he was awaiting a favourable opportunity for his own aggrandisement. As far as Uruguay was concerned the Brazilians soon settled the matter; they beat down all resistance, set up Flores as President in February, 1865, and having established good relations with Montevideo, withdrew their army. But Lopez was a more difficult problem.

Lopez had already declared war; he had attacked Brazilian ships and made preparations to invade Rio Grande do Sul. His main object was to crush the Brazilian troops in the Plate district before they could be reinforced. His plans were bold, but there appeared no reason why they should not be successful. He had forty-five thousand infantry, ten thousand cavalry, and adequate artillery. Another fact in his favour was the friendship of Urquiza, now Governor of Corrientes, who was the enemy of Mitre. Both Brazil and Paraguay requested permission from Mitre to march their army through Misiones, but the President wished to remain neutral and refused both requests. Lopez, however, was dismayed by no obstacle, and directed General Robles with twenty-five thousand men to invade Corrientes. They soon overran the province. Argentina was in an awkward position, for her regular army amounted to six thousand men only, but she had the support of Brazil and Uruguay. On June 2, 1865, the defeat of the Paraguayan fleet by Brazil at Riachuelo baulked Lopez's schemes of an offensive war, and the allies prepared to invade Corrientes. Lopez was further hampered by the defection of Urquiza, who finally refused to assist him.

The plan for the invasion of Rio Grande had not been abandoned, but the Paraguayan force was opposed by that of Brazil and Uruguay on August 17th, and suffered defeat. A month later the defeated army under Ertigarribia surrendered. Before the end of the year Lopez was compelled to evacuate the Argentine territory.

But his position was less unfavourable than might be supposed upon a comparison of the resources of the contending countries, for he had an excellent army and the country between the Parana and the Paraguay was admirably adapted to defensive operations. It was densely wooded and liable to floods which often made it impassable. As long as he could hold Humaita, where he had erected batteries to stop the Brazilian fleet, it would be impossible for the allies to make an effective advance. They had an army of forty thousand men concentrated near the town of Corrientes, and by April, 1866, they had forced the passage of the Parana and were in Paraguay. On May 24th they were attacked by twenty-five thousand Paraguayans and a desperate battle ensued, which ended in the victory of the allies. The Paraguayans lost five thousand killed and wounded, and their opponents, who lost about two thousand, were so severely crippled that they could not advance upon Humaita—a movement which might have ended the war.

The army was devoted to Lopez and the Paraguayan made a fine soldier, while the allies, encamped in unhealthy swamps, lost heavily from disease. Mitre at last began an onward movement, but on September 22nd he was repulsed with great slaughter at Curupaiti, and the war came to a standstill. There was a long pause, for the difficulties of the allies were enormous and cholera broke out in their camp. It was not till November, 1867, that the Brazilian army succeeded in crossing the Paraguay north of Humaita, and this clever movement of the Brazilian Marshal Caxias decided the fate of the war. The allied armies began to close round Humaita and Brazilian warships forced their way beyond Curupaiti. Lopez fought with remarkable determination and skill, but his embarrassments rapidly increased, and on February 18, 1868, the Brazilian fleet ran the batteries at Humaita, and this entirely disorganised the transport system of Lopez, who relied chiefly upon his waterways. All through the year fighting continued, but on December 27, 1868, Lopez received a crushing defeat at Angostura, south of Asuncion, and he was compelled to fly into the interior. A few days later the Brazilians occupied Asuncion. But the irrepressible Lopez proclaimed a new capital at Peribebuy and made desperate efforts to carry on the war. After much fighting the allies succeeded in capturing the town in August, 1869, and pursuing Lopez, defeated him at Campo Grande, the last pitched battle of the war. He fled into the forest with his mistress, Madame Lynch, his children, and numerous faithful followers. Even in this extremity he still kept the field, until at last, on March 1, 1870, while he was encamped far to the north on the river Aquidaban, his men were thrown into a panic by the approach of the enemy. In the confusion Lopez and his staff attempted to escape, but the General's horse stuck in a swamp; he refused to surrender, and was killed by a spear-thrust. Thus died this extraordinary man, who had wantonly led his country into a war in which five-sixths of her population perished.

During this long war the domestic history of Argentina was uneventful. Brazil was far more prominent in the war than Argentina, for General Mitre was several times distracted by rebellions in the north-west which called him from Paraguay. The rebels were easily driven across the Andes. But the constitutional question had never been settled, and hostility to the Porteños became stronger. The influence of Mitre had waned, and in 1868 Sarmiento was quietly elected in his place.

The close of the Paraguayan war is also the close of the anarchical period of Argentina's history. Hereafter, though she was often to be unwisely governed, the worst of the wars and revolutions were at an end, and the people were to devote themselves to developing the natural wealth of the country. Since the Revolution, her history had been almost as bloodstained and turbulent as the worst of her neighbours, but henceforward peace and prosperity, though not uninterrupted, are to distinguish her from the other South American Republics.

CHAPTER IX
MODERN ARGENTINA—SETTLEMENT AND PROGRESS

The era of modern Argentina is inaugurated by the Presidency of Sarmiento in 1868. Hitherto her business had been to work out her destiny with much waste of human life and wealth, now her task was to create both. Population[53] began to increase and industries flourished. Railways were extended and the administration was improved. It was a season of prosperity in almost every part of the world, and in this Argentina fully shared. Brazil had suffered much during the war, and Argentina profited by supplying its needs and also made up for her own losses by developing the vast pastoral and agricultural resources. The only political event of importance during Sarmiento's term of office was an insurrection in Entre Rios, where the veteran Urquiza was still Governor. One Lopez Jordan was leader of the revolt, and he succeeded in capturing and murdering Urquiza. The old man deserved a more peaceful end, for, though cruel, he had aimed at the public welfare, and he was one of those who did good service in establishing the Republic on a firm basis. After much bloodshed the rebellion was suppressed by young Julio Roca, a rising soldier.

Sarmiento's term of office came to an end in 1874. Mitre, favoured by the Porteños, and Dr. Avellaneda were rivals for the succession, and the latter became President, greatly to the annoyance of the Porteños. He introduced a more economical policy, and the country continued to prosper, but by far the most important event of the time was the reduction of Patagonia—an event the magnitude of which cannot even yet be estimated. It was less than a hundred years ago since the first small attempts at settlement had been made there, and Patagonia was still practically an enormous waste, a no-man's land, unmapped and roamed over by savage Indians. General Roca, now Minister of War, began to peg out claims for posterity. After Rosas had fallen from power the Indians had recovered most of the territory which he had taken from them, but now that Argentina was at peace the Government was more than able to hold its own, and in 1878 Roca employed the whole power of the country to subjugate Patagonia. He succeeded in making the Rio Negro the southern boundary. The Province of Buenos Aires claimed the whole of this new territory, but the other members of the Federation were naturally unwilling to see her thus augmented, and she had to be content with an addition of 63,000 square miles. The rest of the new land was divided into Gobernaciones, or Territories, as they would be called in the United States.

But he was to attain more notoriety in a less useful struggle. The perennial source of discord—the Provinces against Buenos Aires or the Federalists against the Unitarians—which ought to have been settled on the downfall of Rosas, was once more to convulse the Republic. Avellaneda, who was favourable to the Provinces, was determined to choose his successor, and the opposition candidate was Dr. Tejedor, who had the support of Mitre. Roca was the nominee of the outgoing President. The situation rapidly became strained, and in June and July, 1880, the partisans of either side took up arms and there was considerable bloodshed in Buenos Aires. The advantage rested with Roca's party; the Porteños were compelled to ask for terms of peace, and at last the difficult constitutional question was settled. Without delay Buenos Aires was declared the Federal capital, and although the Porteños were nominally defeated, their principles triumphed in reality. The result was the establishment of a strong central Government, and this was of the happiest effect in consolidating the Confederacy and in binding together its hitherto disjointed members.

This was a time of great material prosperity. Other opportunities will be taken of dwelling on this subject; here it is sufficient to say that industry and commerce expanded very rapidly. There was a huge boom; men seemed to be growing rich rapidly; it was a period of inflation and the President's attempt to establish the currency on a gold basis was unpopular and unsuccessful. But under his rule, and with the assistance of the able Pellegrini, the credit of Argentina improved and a loan of £8,000,000 was negotiated. On the whole, Roca's administration did him credit, although undoubtedly he might have taken more advantage of the exceptionally favourable circumstances, and introduced sounder and more honest principles of administration.

His successor, Dr. Juarez Celman, was a person of altogether inferior stamp. The fever for speculation grew rapidly, large additions were made to the national indebtedness, and the premium on gold doubled. The Government, as is usually the case with South American Governments, was below rather than above the public standard of conduct. Government, Provinces, and municipalities, led the way in wasteful expenditure, the inflation reached its height. The time of the inevitable crash drew near.

In 1889 public opinion, wiser than the Government, grew apprehensive, and the Civic Union was formed with the object of overthrowing the President and reforming the finances and administration. Roca and Mitre, sincerely anxious for the good of their country, were the leading spirits in the opposition, and in July, 1890, the Revolution began. Some fighting took place, but the spirit of faction was less ferocious than it had been a generation ago, and most men seemed to consider that the desperate financial condition needed radical measures. The resistance of the Government was half-hearted, and on July 30th Celman resigned.

Pellegrini, the Vice-President, succeeded him, and it was time for the national affairs to be placed in more capable hands. The treasury was empty, and there was a great burden of debt. The whole financial and monetary system was in confusion, and in September Pellegrini was obliged to issue notes for $50,000,000. This step provided money for the immediate necessities of administration, but it helped to precipitate the crash which came in March, 1891. This vast monetary convulsion will be long remembered in England, and it has served as a salutary warning both to European investors and to speculators in the country itself, who now recognise that credit and the reputation for honesty is one of the chief factors in a country's prosperity. The Banco Nacional, in spite of all efforts on the part of the Government to save it, was submerged, and the same fate met every other bank except the London and River Plate. As a matter of course, political trouble followed industrial trouble, and in February while Roca was driving in a carriage he was fired at and slightly wounded. It was, however, to him and Mitre that the people looked to extricate them from their troubles, and the Porteños nominated Mitre as candidate for the Presidency amidst great enthusiasm, but the Cordoba section was indignant, and Mitre was induced to withdraw on condition that the new candidate should be non-party and that the election should be impartial. At the beginning of 1892 Saenz Peña, the candidate favoured by Mitre and Roca, was elected, and Alem, the leader of the new Radical party, known as the Civic Union, was banished. Pellegrini's term of office had disappointed his supporters and few regretted his retirement.

The task of Peña was hardly less difficult than that of Pellegrini. The improvement in the finances and administration came very slowly, but the chief troubles were political, for Argentina had not yet adapted herself to the smooth working of federal institutions. Alem, who had returned from exile, was still preaching disaffection and taking advantage of the turbulent disposition of the various Provinces. In 1893 Costa, the Governor of the Province of Buenos Aires, who had a strong military force, planned the overthrow of the central Government, and his example was followed by Santa Fé and several other Provinces. In August Costa was forcibly deposed, but the movement in Santa Fé was fostered by Alem, and the Radicals were eager to overthrow Peña and his friends. Matters grew extremely serious, for there was disaffection in the navy, but on September 25th General Roca took command of the army, and on October 1st he rescued Rosario from the hands of the revolutionists. Alem and other leaders were imprisoned and the power of the Radicals vanished, but public affairs remained in a threatening condition.

Evidence was found of widespread corruption, and that there was no public feeling against it is shown by the following incident. Costa had left the affairs of Buenos Aires in confusion, and the central Government appointed Dr. Lopez to administer them. He found evidence of malpractices against one Colonel Sarmiento and charged him, but failed to secure a conviction. Thereupon Sarmiento provoked Lopez to a duel, in which the latter was mortally wounded, but Sarmiento received a merely nominal punishment. The Government was thoroughly distrusted; it seemed powerless to reform abuses, and there was little likelihood that if the ruling Ministers were removed their successors would do any better. Such progress as the country made was due to the efforts of private citizens and the improvement in the trade conditions of the world.

The detachment of Peña from political parties had been expected to prove advantageous, but in practice this was not the case, for the President, having no party, had no supporters in the Congress, and matters approached a deadlock. At the beginning of 1895 the President found it impossible to induce the Congress to vote the Budget, and there was also a split in the Cabinet about the fate of two naval officers condemned for participation in the Santa Fé outbreak. Peña wished to confirm the death sentence; there was strong opposition, and Peña was probably glad of the excuse to resign and disappear from political life. This took place on January 21, 1895. The sentence upon the two officers was commuted to one of imprisonment.

He was succeeded by the Vice-President Uriburu, who had also been chosen on account of his neutrality; but he was more successful, and he had the powerful support of Roca and Pellegrini. During his first year of office it seemed probable that a foreign war would be added to all the other troubles of the Republic, for the boundary dispute with Chile was assuming a threatening attitude and continued to disturb public tranquillity for seven years. This subject can be treated more conveniently in the history of the next administration, when it was settled. In this year a boundary dispute with Brazil about the Misiones was settled by the arbitration of President Cleveland in favour of the latter country.[54]

Little progress in settling the nation's difficulties was made under Uriburu, but internal and external peace was maintained. In 1898 General Roca succeeded him as President, and it was generally felt that a man had appeared who was competent to steer the ship of State into smoother waters. He had been of great service during the troubles which had attended the resignation of Celman, and had kept the disorderly elements in check. He had, all through the troubles of ten years, been on the side of law and order, and he was practically the leader of a national party.

In May, 1898, the President in his message to Congress denounced judicial corruption, and the publicity which he gave to these abuses resulted in several improvements; but there is still much matter for adverse criticism in the administration of justice in Argentina. The improvements in Government methods led to gradual general improvement, which, however, was also the result of natural causes, and Argentina became undoubtedly the most prosperous country in South America. The fear of political disintegration has become a thing of the past, owing to the preponderance of the capital in wealth and influence, but neither Roca himself nor any other successor has been able to banish a serious evil from which Argentina suffers, and which, though not causing civil war on a large scale, brings about disquieting strikes and riots. This is due to defective methods of government. The President may be said to have been the "saviour of his country" in the sense that a weaker or dishonest man would probably have plunged the country into both domestic and foreign war, and neutralised all the progress of a generation. But he could not bequeath political capacity to his colleagues, nor could he eradicate many bad traditions of long standing.

His last work was the settlement of the boundary dispute with Chile. It is not necessary to go into the history of the subject previous to the Treaty of 1881. In the old Spanish days there had been uncertainty about the boundary, and during the existence of the two Republics the quarrel had never slept. "During the whole of its progress the Argentine Republic contended that her western boundary from north to south was the Cordillera de los Andes, and that, in consequence, she had dominion over all the territory eastward of the crest of the Cordillera, the greater part of the Straits of Magellan, and the whole of Tierra del Fuego. Chile on her part accepted the natural boundary of the Cordillera, to a great extent, but maintained that this boundary did not rule in the southern part of the continent; that in Patagonia the territory on both sides of the Andes were Chilian, from the Pacific to the Atlantic; that the Straits of Magellan were Chilian; and that Tierra del Fuego was also Chilian."[55]

The two Republics made a Treaty in 1881. They agreed that down to 52° S., i.e., to the Straits of Magellan, the boundary was to be the Cordilleras de los Andes. The line was to pass over the highest points of the watershed. The southern boundary was also determined. The Treaty represents a concession on the part of Chile, who gave up her extravagant claims to the east of Patagonia. But she still claimed that the line should follow the highest points in the watershed, while the Argentine Government insisted that the line should run from highest peak to highest peak.

This Treaty was ratified, but not carried out. In 1883 the Argentine Government informed its Ambassador at Santiago that the time had come to trace the boundary line. But procrastination is a South American characteristic, and the affair drifted on until, in 1888, a Convention was made. In accordance with the Treaty of 1881, this Convention appointed experts to trace the line. The matter, in fact, was one of great difficulty, for unfortunately it turned out that the watersheds and the highest summits did not coincide, and the experts disagreed hopelessly.

The question of the rivers had raised fresh obstacles, and the experts had brought matters to such a tangle that it was necessary in 1893 to draw up a Protocol to explain them further. The main principle which it fixed was that in case the high peaks of the Cordillera should be crossed by any river, that river should be cut by the boundary line. The experts continued their work, which was extremely arduous, for the boundary line ran through unexplored forests and mountains. But in 1895 feelings ran to a dangerous height in both countries, and the people of Argentina declared that the Chilians were assuming an aggressive attitude and were likely to attack them. They were made the more uneasy by the discovery that the army and stores had, like everything else, suffered from long years of misrule, and Congress voted fifty million gold dollars for military preparations. In July, 1898, a further controversy arose. The Puna de Atacama is a great salt waste of rugged tableland, volcanic, grassless, and inhospitable. Working from the north, the experts had found no great difficulty until they reached this savage territory. Here there was a deadlock, and the Chilians claimed the whole district. Possibly the belief that the disputed territory contained considerable borax deposits accentuated the quarrel, but the main source of it was national pride, for the majority of the Andine territory was of small value. The experts south of the Atacama waste proceeded more smoothly till they reached Patagonia. "Here,[56] indeed, the fundamental condition of identity between the "highest crest" and the "water parting" (or "divide," as it is called in North America), existed in full force, and no ground for dispute presented itself, the "main range" of the Andes being exceptionally well adapted by position and structure for an international boundary. It was the divergence of these two essential conditions in Patagonia which imperilled the peace of South America. The Patagonian rivers were found to flow from east to west right athwart, or transverse to, the general trend of the Andine mountain system from north to south. They were found to break across the great mountain masses, and to intersperse wide valleys, across which the boundary must either be carried from one mass of peaks to the next or else be made to skirt the indefinite edge of cordillera and pampas, where the two insensibly combine and where the rivers rise. A very little examination proved the incompatibility of "higher crests" with "water parting" as a fixed principle of demarcation in these parts."[57]

With this fruitful field of dispute before them it is not surprising that angry feelings were engendered, especially among the Chilians, who have narrow territory, and were unwilling to give up a square mile without a struggle. In August Chile despatched an ultimatum demanding arbitration, and Roca induced his Cabinet to assent to the demand.

BOUNDARY LINE IN THE ANDES.

The smaller question—the Atacama territory—was referred to the United States. Mr. Buchanan was appointed arbiter, and he was assisted by one Chilian and one Argentine Commissioner. Mr. Buchanan drew a boundary line which he considered to be just, and by an ingenious device contrived that both the agreement and the disagreement of the Commissioners should preserve its integrity.[58] The dispute was thus happily settled, and not long afterwards Roca met the Chilian President at Punta Arenas, and an agreement to restrict armaments was made.

But the Patagonian boundary was a matter of much greater difficulty. It was referred to Great Britain, and in December, 1899, the Commission in London issued a most exhaustive report. It was necessary to proceed very slowly in such a perplexing matter, and public feeling was greatly excited, both countries appearing to be eager for war. Such a catastrophe seemed to be probable, for Señor Alcorta, the Argentine War Minister, was extremely bellicose, but on January 31, 1902, Sir Thomas Holdich was sent with a small Commission to endeavour to determine the boundary line, and it was intimated to both Governments that if hostile preparations continued King Edward VII. would be compelled to withdraw from his position as arbiter. The tension was somewhat relieved by the sudden death of Señor Alcorta, and Roca acted a statesmanlike part in working for peace, and it was largely through his exertions that in June, 1902, a Treaty was signed to restrict armaments. When Sir Thomas Holdich's Commission gave its decision a few months later, the award was loyally accepted.

This settlement of a great question is one of the most signal triumphs for the principle of arbitration, for on this occasion neither party was willing to make concessions and the disposition of both was rather to war than to peace. The benefit of the settlement was incalculable, for it preserved the two most flourishing States in South America from a war which would have gone far towards ruining both.[59] This example has been of the utmost value to South America, and arbitration is undoubtedly beginning to replace the appeal to arms.

With this triumph of peace this modern history of Argentina may fitly be closed. President Roca, who had deserved so well of his country, was succeeded in 1904 by Dr. Manuel Quintana, who still holds that post, and his term of office has been one of great material prosperity for the Republic.

CHAPTER X
THE CONSTITUTION—THE ARMY AND NAVY—GENERAL POLITICAL CONDITIONS

Argentina is nominally a Federal Republic and her Constitution closely resembles that of the United States. But, in fact, the federal element is much fainter in the southern Republic, for, as has been shown, the struggles between the two great parties eventually led to the attainment by the central Government at Buenos Aires of that preponderance which was inevitable in view of the vast superiority of the capital to the Provinces in population, civilisation, and geographical position. But the Spanish distaste for centralised administration shows itself in the reluctance to admit the facts, and of this the town of La Plata is an almost comic instance. When, in 1882, it was decided to make this place, which is distant about thirty-five miles from Buenos Aires, the capital of the Province, the authorities spared no effort in planning and building a magnificent city which should be an effectual counterpoise to the federal capital and a standing protest against Unitarian theory. But to build a town is one thing and to people it another; the vast political and commercial interests of Buenos Aires completely overshadowed the upstart city, and it remains a mere lifeless husk, unvitalised by the comparatively insignificant Provincial business. In the United States interference by the Federal Government in State rights is extremely rare and would be liable to cause real civil war; in the Argentina it is common and only brings about a "revolution"—a political phenomenon which has been very mild in type in Argentina during the last decade or two, and indeed public opinion generally seems to applaud the President when he brings an unruly Governor to book.

PASEO AL BOSQUE, LA PLATA (PROVINCIAL CAPITAL).

The President is the outstanding feature of the Constitution. Important as the head of the State is in the North American Republic, in Argentina the President might almost say "L'État c'est moi," for the well-being of Argentina has practically been conditioned by the character of the Presidents. The wickedness of a Rosas or the folly of a Celman formerly made her a byword among nations, while the sagacity and patriotism of a Rivadavia or a Roca have turned imminent disaster into prosperity. The President and Vice-President are elected by Presidential electors who are chosen in each Province by the direct vote of the people, and who, as in the United States, are chosen for that purpose alone. The office of President is held for six years, and the holder of it is Commander-in-Chief and has all the State patronage, including the ecclesiastical. In him, of course, the executive power is embodied. He is assisted by eight Secretaries of State—the Interior, Foreign Affairs, Finance, War, Justice, Agriculture, Marine, and Public Works—but they are appointed by him and may be dismissed at pleasure, so it will be easily understood that his power is enormous.

The Legislature is of the familiar type. The upper house is the Senate with thirty members, two for each of the fourteen Provinces and two for the city of Buenos Aires, and their term of office is for nine years, but one third of them is renewed every three years. The provincial senators are elected by the Legislatures of the Provinces, the two for Buenos Aires by a special body of electors. The House of Deputies, which is the lower branch of the National Congress, consists of 120 members, elected by the people, and there is supposed to be one deputy for every 33,000 inhabitants. Each member of Congress receives the somewhat extravagant allowance of 12,000 dollars, or about £1,060. The Vice-President is Chairman of the Senate—and here it will be noticed how very closely the Argentines follow the northern practice—and it has also sometimes happened that the apparent sinecure of the Vice-Presidency has been the step to the great office. The President now in power, Dr. José Figueroa Alcorta,[60] was Vice-President till March, 1906, when he succeeded on the death of President Quintana. Like our House of Commons, the House of Deputies is the money chamber, and it has the right of impeaching guilty officials before the Senate.

The various Provinces have their own Constitution and in theory have complete local self-government, even to the right of framing their own fiscal policy, but, as hinted above, they have not in practice very great power. There are also a number of Gobernaciones, thinly populated and governed in more or less absolute fashion. For convenience of reference, the list of Provinces and Gobernaciones, with their areas and estimated population, may be given.

The Supreme Federal Court with its five judges administers justice and is also the Court of Appeal. Trial by jury appears in the Constitution but it is never practised. The administration of justice has long been acknowledged to be in an unsatisfactory state and attempts to improve it have not borne much fruit. Cases are known in which Englishmen have been kept twelve months in prison awaiting trial, and if this is the case with foreigners it may be supposed that natives have much cause for complaint. In his last Message to Congress (May, 1909) the President, while paying a tribute to "the patriotic diligence of our magistrates," remarked that the ordinary Courts of Justice of the capital still leave something to be desired as regards rapidity of action, and he attributes the delay to the fact that the population has outgrown the system, which, he said, "is too cramped to cope with the demands on it, and I think there is urgent and imperious need for reform if we desire to avert a permanent cause for complaint and discredit." Undoubtedly the foreign man of business, whose capital and enterprise is essential to the development of Argentina, will be more deterred by defects in the administration of justice than any other circumstance, for if there is the probability of pecuniary loss in civil cases and discomfort and persecution for his subordinates in the criminal Courts, the advantages of the country as a field for capital must be seriously discounted. It is, however, in far-away, scantily populated districts where the hard cases occur, but it is generally acknowledged that there is considerable room for improvement in the administration of justice.

The position in the world of a great State depends upon the courage and endurance of its people, and these qualities are typified by the efficiency which they demand in the army and navy. Argentina is advancing on the road to greatness, and therefore her military position is a matter of increasing importance. It may be hoped that conditions are now no longer favourable to the unprofitable wars which in the past have been perpetually waged between South American States, for foreign capital has a steadying influence and the sense of kinship between Latin Americans is becoming stronger. However, it must be remembered that the fraternal spirit of the Greeks did not preserve them from internecine wars, and Argentina, flanked by each of the other two powerful South American Republics, cannot afford to neglect her armaments. It may be that the wars nullos habitura triumphos are at an end; it is almost certain that they will be less frequent; but there is now the question of foreign interference, and every Republic, however small and weak, jealously guards its own independence and wishes to be safe from the possibility of dictation from either the United States or Japan. None of the Republics as yet are World States, but South America is a World Power, though not a political entity, and as time goes on it is safe to predict that Pan-Americanism will become a powerful force. Accordingly, Argentina, Chile, and Brazil, at least, are busily strengthening their defences.

Military service is compulsory upon all citizens, and, it may be added, every person born in Argentina, whatever his parentage, is liable. At the age of twenty the young recruit has to serve for two years[61] and in some cases he prolongs his term for three years more. Thus the Republic is certain of having a tolerably large amount of disciplined material upon which to draw for an army. The peace strength of the army consists of sixteen thousand or seventeen thousand officers[62] and men, and is made up as follows: There are eighteen batteries of artillery and two mountain batteries, two battalions of chasseurs of the Andes, nine regiments of cavalry, two regiments of gendarmes, five batteries of field artillery, three mountain batteries, and five companies of engineers. For ten years after the first enlistment the Argentine soldier belongs to the active army, and is liable to frequent drill and must attend the annual rifle meeting of his district. Then, for ten years, he passes into the National Guard, and subsequently serves for another five years in the Territorial Guard. In these two forces the drilling is, of course, much less frequent. In war ten divisions of twelve thousand men would be available, but there might be a difficulty in obtaining them in full strength and satisfactory condition. Sir Thomas Holdich speaks of sixty thousand infantry, twenty-five thousand cavalry, and twenty thousand artillery. There is, however, little doubt that Argentina possesses a good army, sufficient for the defence of even her very vulnerable frontier. Upon the Argentine army, at least as regards the cavalry[63] and artillery, favourable judgments have been passed. The cavalry is, to a large extent, ready-made. In England two years of incessant training is required to make an efficient cavalry trooper, but the Gaucho is a horseman from his childhood; he and all his ancestors have passed all their life with horses, and horsemanship is part of his nature. Consequently, although Argentine soldiers, as a rule, have very little service to their credit, they learn their trade in an astonishingly short time. The troops are also well mounted—not on the common Criollo horse, which is grass-fed, and, except under Pampa conditions, not over-hardy. The artillery are armed with 75-millimetre Krupp guns; the infantry have Mauser rifles; the arms and stores are in a high state of efficiency. The infantry some years ago was condemned as untidy and undisciplined, and its officers as ignorant of their duties, but Sir Thomas Holdich considers that there is no ground for sweeping condemnation. It is, however, undoubtedly much inferior to the cavalry, and pains are being taken to improve it. Possibly the training of officers is too short, and there is reason to believe that military service is not popular among Argentines of the highest class. An excellent institution has been started in a technical school for warrant officers (we should call them non-commissioned), which has five hundred pupils, and has already provided 278 corporals to various regiments. At the same time the pay and condition of the sergeants have been improved. As the backbone of the army is the non-commissioned man, these steps will doubtless be most effective. Sir T. Holdich[64] remarks: "The fighting army of South America, generally will, however, never be infantry in the future, unless it be mounted infantry. In Argentina especially, where a horse can readily be found for every man, and where every man knows how to ride, and where there is a large population (diminishing, unfortunately, day by day) which habitually exists on the very scantiest of a meat supply which needs no special transport, caring nothing for those extras which make so large a demand on English commissariat, efficient mounted infantry is almost ready-made. The mobilisation of such a force would be as effective as that of the Boers, and its discipline far superior."

The Argentines are proud of their army, and with reason, for its history is more illustrious than that of any other Latin American people. They twice conquered the English under some of our best (and one of our worst) generals. The exploits of San Martin in Chile are among the most glorious in the history of the continent. The Argentine army also had a large share in the reduction of Paraguay, then the strongest military power in South America, and there seems to be every probability that it will maintain its reputation. It may, however, be reasonably doubted whether it is equal in military efficiency to the army of Chile, and it rests with wealthy and influential Argentines to make the choice of Hercules, and, preferring the national good to luxury and pleasure, encourage by their active example the military traditions of the race.