CONTENTS
PAGE [Foreword] 3 [Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address] 4 [The Battle of Gettysburg] 5-10 Location of the Armies. General Lee’s Plan. Lee’s First Movement. Hooker’s Plan. The Appointment of Meade. Advance of Lee. Meade’s Movement. Stuart’s Movement. Situation of Confederate Forces on June 30th. Situation of Union Forces on June 30th. The Approach. [The First Day] 11-17 Arrival of Reynolds. Death of Reynolds. A Morning Lull. Arrival of Rodes and Early. The Opposing Lines. Arrival of Howard. Howard’s Position. The Confederate General Early’s Position. The Union Retreat. Arrival of Lee. Formation of Union Line. General Lee’s Report. [First Day Highlights] 17-22 Death of Major-General Reynolds. The 26th Emergency Regiment. The First Soldier Killed at Gettysburg. A Mysterious Letter. The Flag of the 16th Maine. The Barlow-Gordon Incident. General Ewell Is Hit by a Bullet. The School Teachers’ Regiment. An Incident of the First Day. [The Second Day] 23-31 The Union Line of Battle. Confederate Line of Battle. Sickles’ Change of Line. General Lee’s Plan. Little Round Top. The Peach Orchard and the Wheatfield. Ewell’s Attack on Meade’s Right. Situation at End of the Second Day. [Incidents of the Second Day] 32-36 The Roger House. Spangler’s Spring. Colonel Avery’s Lost Grave. The Leister House. The Louisiana Tigers. General Meade’s “Baldy.” General Lee’s “Traveller.” [The Third Day] 37-51 Second Battle at Culp’s Hill. Meade’s Line of the Third Day. Lee’s Line of the Third Day. The Bliss Buildings. The Artillery Duel. Pickett’s Charge. The Advance. Engagements on the Union Left. The Cavalry Fight on the Right Flank. The Location. General Stuart’s Plan. General Gregg’s Report. Lee’s Retreat. No Pursuit by Meade. The Gettysburg Carriage. [Happenings on the Third Day] 51-58 A Medal for Disobedience. The Wentz House. Fought with a Hatchet. After the Battle. An Honest Man. Extracts from the Diary of Colonel Fremantle. [Gettysburg and Its Military Park] 59-70 [The Soldiers’ National Cemetery] 70-71 [Lincoln at Gettysburg] 72-75 [Bibliography] 76 [Organization of the Army of the Potomac] 77-79 [Organization of the Army of Northern Virginia] 79-80
Copyright, 1935, by J. Horace McFarland Company
THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG
The Country
The Contestants
The Results
BY
W. C. STORRICK, Litt.D.
Retired Superintendent of Guides. For Twenty Years Connected with the Gettysburg National Park Commission
First edition, 1931
Second edition, 1935
Third edition, 1938
Fourth edition, 1944
Fifth edition, 1945
Sixth edition, 1946
Seventh edition, 1946
Eighth edition, 1947
Ninth edition, 1949
Tenth edition, 1949
Eleventh edition, 1951
Twelfth edition, 1951
Thirteenth edition, 1953
Fourteenth edition, 1954
Fifteenth edition, 1955
Sixteenth edition, 1956
Seventeenth edition, 1957
Eighteenth edition, 1959
Nineteenth edition, 1959
Twentieth edition, 1961
Twenty-first edition, 1962
Twenty-second edition, 1965
Twenty-third edition, 1966
Twenty-fourth edition, 1969
HARRISBURG, PA.
THE McFARLAND COMPANY
1969
Map of the
GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN
Map showing country through which the armies approached Gettysburg
FOREWORD
No one is better fitted to describe the Battle of Gettysburg and the National Park established on its site than Mr. William C. Storrick. Born a short distance from the field, he was seven years old at the time of the battle. He remembers the flight from home as the army drew near; he remembers also the return to a house which had been occupied by troops. Still more distinctly he recalls going to Gettysburg on November 19, standing with his hand clasped in his father’s, watching a doorway from which the President of the United States was shortly to appear. He shook hands with Lincoln, was awed by his great height, and listened eagerly to his plain and simple address.
For more than twenty years Mr. Storrick was connected with the Battlefield Commission, first in charge of the farms, then of the guide service as well. The history of the campaign which forms a part of this volume was prepared at the request of the War Department.
There is no corner of the field which Mr. Storrick does not know; there is no detail of its history which he has not studied; there is no disputed question of which he cannot give both sides. His clear and uncontroversial account of the battle is but an outline of his store of information upon which he plans to draw more largely in a volume of greater scope.
ELSIE SINGMASTER LEWARS.
THE GETTYSBURG ADDRESS
·XIX NOVEMBER·MDCCCLXIII·
★
FOURSCORE & SEVEN YEARS AGO OUR FATHERS BROUGHT FORTH ON THIS CONTINENT A NEW NATION·CONCEIVED IN LIBERTY·AND DEDICATED TO THE PROPOSITION THAT ALL MEN ARE CREATED EQUAL·
NOW WE ARE ENGAGED IN A GREAT CIVIL WAR·TESTING WHETHER THAT NATION·OR ANY NATION SO CONCEIVED AND SO DEDICATED·CAN LONG ENDURE·WE ARE MET ON A GREAT BATTLE-FIELD OF THAT WAR·WE HAVE COME TO DEDICATE A PORTION OF THAT FIELD AS A FINAL RESTING PLACE FOR THOSE WHO HERE GAVE THEIR LIVES THAT THAT NATION MIGHT LIVE·IT IS ALTOGETHER FITTING & PROPER THAT WE SHOULD DO THIS·
BUT·IN LARGER SENSE·WE CANNOT DEDICATE—WE CANNOT CONSECRATE—WE CANNOT HALLOW—THIS GROUND· THE BRAVE MEN·LIVING AND DEAD·WHO STRUGGLED HERE HAVE CONSECRATED IT FAR ABOVE OUR POOR POWER TO ADD OR DETRACT·THE WORLD WILL LITTLE NOTE NOR LONG REMEMBER WHAT WE SAY HERE·BUT IT CAN NEVER FORGET WHAT THEY DID HERE·IT IS FOR US·THE LIVING·RATHER· TO BE DEDICATED HERE TO THE UNFINISHED WORK WHICH THEY WHO FOUGHT HERE HAVE THUS FAR SO NOBLY ADVANCED· IT IS RATHER FOR US TO BE HERE DEDICATED TO THE GREAT TASK REMAINING BEFORE US—THAT FROM THESE HONORED DEAD WE TAKE INCREASED DEVOTION TO THAT CAUSE FOR WHICH THEY GAVE THE LAST FULL MEASURE OF DEVOTION·THAT WE HERE HIGHLY RESOLVE THAT THESE DEAD SHALL NOT HAVE DIED IN VAIN·THAT THIS NATION· UNDER GOD·SHALL HAVE A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM·AND THAT GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE·BY THE PEOPLE·FOR THE PEOPLE·SHALL NOT PERISH FROM THE EARTH·
·ABRAHAM LINCOLN·
THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG
It is difficult to present a great battle with sufficient detail to please both the student of tactics and the average reader. If the visitor is not satisfied with the brief outline here presented, he is recommended to read further in the books listed, and especially to employ a guide, without whose trained and supervised services the best manual is inadequate. The reader in search of romance is recommended to the successive Incidents of the Battle as herein presented.
According to official records, the Gettysburg campaign of 1863 began on June 3rd and ended on August 1st. No effort will be made to describe the movements, counter-movements, and fifty minor engagements that occurred before the armies crossed the Mason and Dixon’s line and finally concentrated at Gettysburg, where they engaged in battle on July 1st, 2nd, and 3rd. It is necessary, however, that the visitor should understand the approach to the field.
Location of the Armies.
On June 3rd the Union Army, called the Army of the Potomac, lay at Falmouth, Va., on the north side of the Rappahannock River, Major-General Joseph Hooker in command.
The Confederate Army, called the Army of Northern Virginia, occupied the south bank, with headquarters at Fredericksburg, General Robert E. Lee in command.
Both armies were resting after the major engagement at Chancellorsville, in which the Confederates were victorious.
The Army of the Potomac was made up of seven infantry and one cavalry corps. It numbered at the time of the battle approximately 84,000.
The Army of Northern Virginia was made up of three infantry corps and one division of cavalry. It numbered at the time of the battle about 75,000.
Following the text is a roster of officers, which should be consulted, both for an understanding of the battle and because of the obligation to honor brave men.
General Lee’s Plan.
During the month of May, General Lee visited Richmond to discuss with the Confederate government various plans involving political and military considerations. Up to this time, the South had won the major victories, but her resources, both in men and sinews of war, were diminishing, and a prolonged conflict would be disastrous. It was decided that the army should invade the North via the Shenandoah and Cumberland valleys, with Harrisburg as an objective. This route not only afforded a continuous highway but put the army in a position to threaten Baltimore, Philadelphia, and Washington from the north. The Blue Ridge Mountains to the east would screen the advance, and the rich agricultural section would furnish supplies of food and forage.
The time was propitious. General Lee’s army was in the prime of condition. The North was discouraged by losses, distrustful of Lincoln, weary of war. The South believed that one great victory would assure her the friendliness of the leading powers of Europe. Her independence once acknowledged, she could import the materials of war and the necessities of life which she lacked. It was thought certain that at the prospect of invasion the North would withdraw troops from the siege of Vicksburg then being conducted by General Grant. With high hopes the march was begun.
Lee’s First Movement.
On June 3rd Lee put his army in motion northward, with Ewell’s Corps, preceded by Jenkins’ and Imboden’s Cavalry, in the advance, followed by Longstreet and lastly by Hill. Longstreet moved on the east side of the Blue Ridge in order to lead Hooker to believe that Washington would be threatened. On reaching Snicker’s Gap, he crossed the Ridge into the Shenandoah Valley and followed Hill, who was now in advance. The great army was strung out from Fredericksburg, Va., on the south to Martinsburg, W. Va., on the north, with the cavalry division under Stuart guarding the gaps along the Blue Ridge.
Since 1863 the population of Gettysburg has increased from 2,000 to 5,500
After driving out Union forces stationed at Winchester under Milroy, Lee’s Army crossed the Potomac at Williamsport and Shepherdstown on June 23rd, 24th, and 25th, and advanced northward, unopposed, through the Cumberland Valley, toward Harrisburg.
Hooker’s Plan.
On June 10th, Hooker proposed to President Lincoln that he cross the Rappahannock and attack Hill, who still remained, and then move south, threatening Richmond. He thought this might divert Lee from his invasion of the North. In reply Lincoln said:
“I think Lee’s Army and not Richmond is your sure objective point.”
The Appointment of Meade.
Thereupon Hooker started in pursuit of Lee on June 13th, moving east of the Blue Ridge on a line parallel with Lee on the west, with the cavalry guarding his left. He thus protected Baltimore and Washington. He crossed the Potomac at Edward’s Ferry on the 25th and 26th and reached Frederick on the 27th, where he halted. Believing himself handicapped by orders from General Halleck, Chief in Command at Washington, who refused the use of the Union forces at Harper’s Ferry, he asked to be relieved of the command of the Army of the Potomac. The request was granted, and, on June 28th, Major-General George G. Meade, in command of the 5th Corps, was appointed his successor, Sykes taking command of General Meade’s Corps.
Advance of Lee.
Lee’s Army had been steadily moving northward in the Cumberland Valley. Ewell, in the advance, detached Early’s Division on reaching Chambersburg, directing him to move through Gettysburg on June 26th and thence to York and Wrightsville, there to cross the Susquehanna to Columbia and move up to Harrisburg to meet the divisions of Rodes and Johnson. Rodes reached Carlisle on June 28th, accompanied by Ewell; Johnson was at Greenvillage, between Chambersburg and Carlisle. Hill moved from Chambersburg to Cashtown, and Longstreet was in the rear at Chambersburg. Lee’s headquarters were in Messersmith’s Woods near Chambersburg.
General Reynolds’ position shortly before his death.—Near General Buford’s statue, pointing toward the spectator, is the first gun fired by the Union forces
In his advance into Gettysburg, Early was opposed by the 26th Emergency Regiment of Pennsylvania Volunteers, Company A, consisting of students of Pennsylvania (now Gettysburg) College, citizens of the town, and some volunteers from Harrisburg. After skirmishing on the Chambersburg Pike about 3 miles from the town, this regiment was obliged to retreat, finally reaching Harrisburg. About 175 were captured, but were afterward paroled. On the same day, George Sandoe, a Union scout, was shot by one of Early’s pickets on the Baltimore Pike. He was the first Union soldier killed in the vicinity of Gettysburg prior to the battle.
On account of the absence of his cavalry under Stuart, who had been left with five brigades to guard the rear and hold the gaps of the Blue Ridge, Lee did not know until June 28th that the Union Army had crossed the Potomac and was threatening his line of communication with the South. Learning this, he ordered a concentration of his forces at Cashtown.
Meade’s Movement.
On assuming command, General Meade moved his army northward from the vicinity of Frederick and established a tentative line along Pipe Creek, between Manchester on his right and Emmitsburg on his left, with headquarters near Taneytown.
Stuart’s Movement.
After the Union Army crossed the Potomac, Stuart left the line of the Blue Ridge with three brigades of cavalry and made a raid around the Union Army, crossing the Potomac at Seneca Creek and moving thence to Hanover, where he engaged Kilpatrick’s Division of Union cavalry on June 30th. Passing through Jefferson, Dover, and Dillsburg to Carlisle, he reached Carlisle on the afternoon of July 1st, getting into communication with Lee, after an interval of a week.
Situation of Confederate Forces on June 30th.
On June 30th, Pender’s Division, Hill’s Corps, moved from Fayetteville to Cashtown; Anderson’s Division to Fayetteville; Rodes’ Division, Ewell’s Corps, from Carlisle via Petersburg to Heidlersburg. Early’s Division advanced from York through Weiglestown and East Berlin, and encamped 3 miles from Heidlersburg. Johnson’s Division marched from Greenvillage to Scotland. Hood’s and McLaws’ Divisions, Longstreet’s Corps, moved from Chambersburg to Fayetteville; Pickett’s Division remained at Chambersburg. Lee’s headquarters were at Greenwood.
Situation of Union Forces on June 30th.
On June 30th the 11th Corps was at Emmitsburg, the 1st at Marsh Creek, the 3rd at Bridgeport, the 5th at Union Mills, the 6th at Manchester, the 12th at Littlestown, the 2nd at Taneytown. Two brigades of Buford’s Cavalry Division were at Gettysburg; Gregg’s Cavalry Division was at Manchester; Kilpatrick’s at Hanover. Meade’s headquarters were at Taneytown.
The Approach.
Neither commander yet foresaw Gettysburg as a field of battle. Each had expected to take a strong position and force his adversary to attack. But in the hot summer weather fate was moving the mighty hosts closer and closer. The sky was cloudless, and the summer moon was at its brightest. The wheat was ripe, and the armies marched between partly reaped fields.
The Pennsylvania Monument, with bronze figures of distinguished officers and a roster of all Pennsylvanians in battle.
On the 30th, Hill, in the front at Cashtown, sent Pettigrew’s Brigade to Gettysburg for supplies, shoes especially being badly needed. In the meantime, Meade ordered Buford, with two brigades of cavalry at Emmitsburg, to make a reconnaissance to Gettysburg. Buford reported:
“I entered this place today at 11 A.M. Found everybody in a terrible state of excitement on account of the enemy’s advance.”
On reaching Seminary Ridge, Pettigrew saw the approach of Buford. Not wishing to bring on an engagement, he withdrew to the vicinity of Cashtown.
Buford moved through the town and bivouacked for the night west of the Seminary, along McPherson Ridge. He assigned to Gamble’s Brigade the task of watching the Fairfield and Cashtown roads and to Devin the Mummasburg, Middletown (now Biglerville), and Harrisburg roads. Early on the morning of the 1st, he picketed all the roads leading north and northeast.
THE FIRST DAY
Informed by Pettigrew that Union forces had reached Gettysburg, and anxious to know their strength, Hill sent Heth’s and Pender’s Divisions with Pegram’s battalion of artillery forward on a reconnaissance in force. This movement, made at 5.30 A.M. on July 1, precipitated the battle.
The advance was soon interrupted by Buford’s skirmishers. On reaching Herr Ridge, which crosses the Cashtown Road at right angles, Hill deployed his line of battle—Heth on both sides of the road with Pender in reserve. Pegram posted his artillery on Herr Ridge, and at 8 o’clock fired his first shot. Buford’s artillery, under Calef, posted on the opposite ridge, fired in reply. The battle was on, and the gravity of the situation was clear to Buford, who at 10.10 A.M. sent this message to Meade:
“The enemy’s force are advancing on me at this point and driving my pickets and skirmishers very rapidly. There is a large force at Heidlersburg that is driving my pickets at that point from that direction. I am sure that the whole of A. P. Hill’s force is advancing.”
Arrival of Reynolds.
Union reinforcements were at hand. General Reynolds, in advance of the 1st Corps, arrived from Marsh Creek, via the Emmitsburg Road. After a short conference with Buford at the Seminary buildings, he sent an orderly urging Wadsworth, whose division was advancing across the fields, to hasten. On its arrival, Reynolds posted Cutler to the right, across the railroad cut which lies parallel to the Chambersburg Pike, and Meredith on the left. (Reynolds Avenue now marks this line.)
Death of Reynolds.
After posting Hall’s battery in place of Calef’s, Reynolds rode to the McPherson Woods, and while directing the advance of Meredith at 10.15 A.M. was instantly killed by a Confederate sharpshooter. Doubleday consequently assumed command of the 1st Corps, and Rowley succeeded Doubleday in command of the Division. Compelled to fall back into the grove, Buford moved his cavalry to the left near the Fairfield Road, and Meredith advanced into the woods, drove Hill’s right across Willoughby Run, and captured General Archer and part of his men.
On the Union right, Cutler was attacked in flank by Davis’s Brigade, of the left of Hill’s line, and was compelled to withdraw. Davis advanced into the railroad cut where part of his force was captured. He then withdrew to his original line.
A Morning Lull.
At 11 A.M. there was a lull. Doubleday withdrew his forces from across Willoughby Run and established a new line through the McPherson Woods from north to south. Robinson’s Division reached the field and was held in reserve at the Seminary buildings. Rowley’s Division (formerly Doubleday’s) arrived a little later; Stone’s Brigade of this Division was deployed in the front line on what is now Stone Avenue, and Biddle’s Brigade was placed on the left of Meredith, along what is now South Reynolds Avenue. In the afternoon, Robinson’s Division was moved to the right, prolonging the Union line to the Mummasburg Road in order to meet the advance of Rodes’ Division, coming forward via the Carlisle Road. Devin’s cavalry was moved from Buford’s right to the vicinity of the York Pike and the Hanover Road.
Gettysburg Seminary Doorway.—The Lutheran Theological Seminary was used as an observation point and hospital. The portico was erected in 1913 to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the battle.
In this preliminary action of the forenoon the advantage was in favor of the Union forces. The Confederate General Heth reported:
“The enemy had now been felt, and found in heavy force in and around Gettysburg. The division was now formed in line of battle on the right of the road; Archer’s brigade on the right, Pettigrew’s in the center, and Brockenbrough’s on the left. Davis’s brigade was kept on the left of the road that it might collect its stragglers, and from its shattered condition it was not deemed advisable to bring it again into action that day.”
The Union General Buford reported:
“On July 1, between 8 and 9 A.M. reports came in from the 1st Brigade (Colonel Gamble’s) that the enemy was coming down from toward Cashtown in force. Colonel Gamble made an admirable line of battle, and moved off proudly to meet him. The two lines soon became hotly engaged, we having the advantage of position, he of numbers. The 1st Brigade held its own for more than two hours, and had to be literally dragged back a few hundred yards to a more secure and sheltered position.”
Arrival of Rodes and Early.
On learning at Middletown (now Biglerville) that Hill was engaged with the Union forces at Gettysburg, Rodes marched thither directly via the Carlisle Road. Early approached via the Harrisburg or Heidlersburg Road. The advance of both was quickened by the sound of cannonading. Arriving a little past noon, Rodes deployed his Division of five brigades on both sides of Oak Ridge, his right on the left of Heth’s Division and his left with Early’s right, extending across the plain north of the town. Carter’s artillery was posted on Oak Hill.
The Opposing Lines.
Robinson’s Division of the 1st Union Corps was moved from its position in reserve at the Seminary buildings to the right of Cutler, to oppose Rodes’s Confederate line.
Hill prolonged his right by bringing up Pender’s Division that had been held in reserve. The artillery of McIntosh’s battalion was brought into action in support. These guns, with Carter’s and Pegram’s, together numbering 60, and 11 brigades of infantry now opposed the 1st Union Corps of 36 guns and 6 brigades.
Arrival of Howard.
General Howard, in command of the 11th Union Corps, reached Gettysburg from Emmitsburg between 10 and 11 A.M., in advance of his Corps, and took command of the Union forces. Schurz succeeded Howard in command of the Corps, and Doubleday resumed command of his Division.
On reaching Gettysburg, Howard went to the top of the Fahnestock building at the corner of Baltimore and Middle streets to observe the lines of battle. He reported:
“I had studied the position a few moments, when a report reached me that General Reynolds was wounded. At first I hoped his wound might be slight and that he would continue to command, but in a short time I was undeceived. His aid-de-camp, Major William Riddle, brought the sad tidings of his death. This was about 11.30 A.M. Prior to this the General had sent me orders to move up at a double quick, for he was severely engaged. On hearing of the death of Reynolds, I assumed command of the left wing, instructing General Schurz to take command of the 11th Corps. After an examination of the general features of the country, I came to the conclusion that the only tenable position for my limited force was the ridge to the southeast of Gettysburg (now well known as Cemetery Ridge). I at once established my headquarters near the cemetery, and on the highest point north of the Baltimore Pike.”
Howard’s Position.
On the arrival of the 11th Corps, Howard ordered Schurz to move the 3rd and 1st Divisions to positions north of the town, while the 2nd Division was held on Cemetery Hill in reserve. On account of the prior arrival of the Confederates under Rodes, who covered the plain north of the town, Schurz was unable to connect with the right of the Union line on Oak Hill, and a gap remained between the two lines. The position of the 11th Corps coincides with what is now Howard Avenue.
The Confederate General Early’s Position.
Shortly after the 11th Corps moved to the front, Early’s Division of Ewell’s Corps arrived from Heidlersburg and went into line to the right of Howard, connecting with Rodes’s left across the plain. Early posted his artillery, Jones’s battalion, in position to enfilade the right of Howard, while Carter’s batteries on Oak Hill enfiladed the left. The Confederate forces largely exceeded the Union forces, the former being about 28,000 and the latter about 18,000. The whole Confederate line advanced and attacked the Union forces in front and on both flanks. On Oak Hill part of Rodes’ forces, O’Neal’s and Iverson’s brigades, were repulsed, a large part of the latter being captured.
The Union Retreat.
After a strenuous resistance the whole Union line was compelled to withdraw to Cemetery Hill. The 11th Corps retreated through the center of town where many were captured. The 1st Corps fell back through the western part of the town. By 4.30 P.M. all the territory held by the Union forces was occupied by the Confederates.
Arrival of Lee.
General Lee reached the field from Cashtown about 3 P.M., witnessed the retreat of the Union forces, and established his headquarters in tents in an apple orchard back of the Seminary. He ordered Ewell to follow up the repulse if he thought it practicable. In this connection Ewell reported:
“The enemy had fallen back to a commanding position known as Cemetery Hill, south of Gettysburg, and quickly showed a formidable front there. On entering the town, I received a message from the Commanding General to attack this hill, if I could do so to advantage. I could not bring artillery to bear on it, and all the troops with me were jaded by twelve hours’ marching and fighting, and I was notified that General Johnson’s division (the only one of my corps that had not been engaged) was close to town. Cemetery Hill was not assailable from the town.... Before Johnson could be placed in position the night was far advanced.”
John Burns, Gettysburg constable and Mexican War veteran, shouldered his musket and went out to meet the Confederates.
General Hill reported:
“Under the impression that the enemy was entirely routed, my own two divisions exhausted by some six hours’ hard fighting, prudence led me to be content with what had been gained.”
The failure of Ewell to follow up the repulse and capture Cemetery Hill and Culp’s Hill, defended by a weak line of the Union forces, enabled the Union commanders to establish during the night a line of defence that was secure against attack. By many military critics, this is generally considered Lee’s lost opportunity.
Formation of Union Line.
The retreating Union soldiers were met at East Cemetery Hill by Generals Hancock and Howard, who directed them to positions, the 1st Corps on Cemetery Ridge and Culp’s Hill, and the 11th on East Cemetery Hill. The 12th Corps arrived on the Baltimore Pike, and soon after Sickles’ 3rd Corps came up from Emmitsburg.
Hancock had been instructed by Meade to take command and report if he thought the ground a suitable place to continue the battle. A battle-line was at once established on Cemetery Ridge. Geary’s Division of the 12th Corps was ordered to the extreme left to occupy Little Round Top. Hancock sent word to General Meade that the position was strong, but that it might be easily turned. He then turned over the command to Slocum, his senior, and returned to Taneytown to report in person. Meade had already ordered a rapid concentration of all his forces at Gettysburg.
Barlow’s Knoll.—The extreme right of the Union line on the first day
General Lee’s Report.
For the day, the Confederate commander reported:
“The leading division of Hill met the enemy in advance of Gettysburg on the morning of July 1. Driving back these troops to within a short distance of the town, he there encountered a larger force, with which two of his divisions became engaged. Ewell coming up with two of his divisions by the Heidlersburg road, joined in the engagement. The enemy was driven through Gettysburg with heavy loss, including about 5,000 prisoners and several pieces of artillery. He retired to a high range of hills south and east of the town. The attack was not pressed that afternoon, the enemy’s force being unknown, and it being considered advisable to await the arrival of the rest of our troops. Orders were sent back to hasten their march, and, in the meantime, every effort was made to ascertain the numbers and position of the enemy, and find the most favorable point of attack. It had not been intended to fight a general battle at such a distance from our base, unless attacked by the enemy, but, finding ourselves unexpectedly confronted by the Federal Army, it became a matter of difficulty to withdraw through the mountains with our large trains.... Encouraged by the successful issue of the engagement of the first day, and in view of the valuable results that would ensue from the defeat of the army of General Meade, it was thought advisable to renew the attack.”
FIRST DAY HIGHLIGHTS
Death of Major-General Reynolds
Major-General John Fulton Reynolds, killed at Gettysburg while commanding the 1st Corps, was born in Lancaster, Pa., on the 21st day of September, 1820. His father, John Reynolds, also a native of Lancaster County, was the son of William Reynolds, who came to America in 1760 from Ireland. His mother’s maiden name was Lydia Moore, daughter of Samuel Moore, who held a commission in the Revolutionary Army. He had an elder brother, William, who served as Admiral in our Navy with great distinction, and also two other brothers who served in the war, one as paymaster, and the other, the youngest of the four, as Quartermaster-General of Pennsylvania.
William and John went first to an excellent school at Lititz, in Lancaster County, going thence to Long Green, Md., and from there they returned to the Lancaster Academy. Through the influence of James Buchanan, they received appointments, one as midshipman in the Navy, and the other as cadet at West Point. John was graduated from West Point on June 22nd, 1841, at the age of twenty-one. He served with distinction during the Mexican War, and at the outbreak of the Civil War entered the Union Army. At the battle of Gaines’ Mill, on June 28th, 1862, he was captured, and after a confinement of six weeks in Libby Prison, he was exchanged for General Barksdale.
General Reynolds was six feet tall, with dark hair and eyes. He was erect in carriage and a superb horseman, so much at ease in the saddle as to be able to pick a dime from the ground while riding at full speed. He was killed in the grove now known as Reynolds’ Grove on the morning of July 1st, between 10 and 11 o’clock, while directing the attack of Meredith’s brigade against Archer’s Confederate brigade. His body was first taken to the Seminary, and later to Lancaster, where it was interred in the family graveyard.
The 26th Emergency Regiment
The 26th Emergency Regiment met the advance of Gordon’s brigade of Early’s Division of Ewell’s Corps in their advance into Gettysburg. Company A consisted of students of the Lutheran Theological Seminary, Pennsylvania (now Gettysburg) College, and citizens of the town. H. M. M. Richards, of Company A gives the following sketch of the services of the regiment:
“Upon the first indication of an invasion of Pennsylvania, the 26th Regiment, P. V. M., was organized and mustered into the United States service at Harrisburg, under the command of Colonel W. W. Jennings of that city. Company A of this regiment, to which I belonged, was composed of students from the Lutheran Theological Seminary and the Pennsylvania College at Gettysburg, and of citizens of the town; one other company came from Hanover, but a few miles distant.
“On June 23rd we left Harrisburg for Gettysburg, to be used, I believe, as riflemen among the hills at or near Cashtown. A railroad accident prevented this plan from being carried out, and kept us from reaching Gettysburg until the 26th, by which time General Early had reached Cashtown. In accordance with orders received from Major Granville O. Haller, acting aide-de-camp to General Couch, commanding the Department of the Susquehanna, we were marched out on the Chambersburg Pike at 10 A.M., June 26th, for a distance of about three and a half miles, accompanied by Major Robert Bell, who commanded a troop of horse, also raised, I understand, in Gettysburg. Having halted, our colonel, accompanied by Major Bell, rode to the brow of an elevation and there saw General Early’s troops a few miles distant.
“We, a few hundred men at most, were in the toils; what should be done? We would gladly have marched to join the Army of the Potomac, under Meade, but where was it? Our colonel, left to his own resources, wisely decided to make an effort to return to Harrisburg, and immediately struck off from the pike, the Confederates capturing many of our rear-guard after a sharp skirmish, and sending their cavalry in pursuit of us. These later overtook us in the afternoon at Witmer’s house, about four and a half miles from Gettysburg on the Carlisle Road, where, after an engagement, they were repulsed with some loss. After many vicissitudes, we finally reached Harrisburg, having marched 54 out of 60 consecutive hours, with a loss of some 200 men.
“It should be added that Gettysburg, small town as it was, had already furnished its quota to the army. Moreover, on the first day of the battle, hundreds of the unfortunate men of Reynolds’s gallant corps were secreted, sheltered, fed, and aided in every way by the men and women of the town.”
The First Soldier Killed at Gettysburg
George W. Sandoe, the first Union soldier killed at Gettysburg, was a member of Company B Independent 21st Pennsylvania Cavalry. Upon arriving at Gettysburg, June 26th, 1863, General Gordon sent out a picket line on the Baltimore Pike. As these pickets reached the Nathaniel Lightner property, George W. Sandoe and William Lightner, also a member of Company B, approached the pike, coming across the McAllister field from the direction of Rock Creek. Owing to a growth of bushes and trees along the fence, they did not discover the Confederate pickets until they were ordered to halt. Lightner at once jumped his horse across the fence and escaped by riding rapidly down the pike. Sandoe’s horse fell in making the leap, and in attempting to escape by riding back in the direction from which he came, Sandoe was shot. He lies buried at Mount Joy Church, in Mount Joy, Adams County.
A Mysterious Letter
Having passed through Gettysburg on June 28th, General John B. Gordon, of Lee’s army, went on to York and Wrightsville before returning on July 1st. In his “Reminiscences of the Gettysburg Campaign” he tells the following story:
“We entered the city of York on Sunday morning. Halting on the main street, where the sidewalks were densely packed, I rode a few rods in advance of my troops, in order to speak to the people from my horse. As I checked him and turned my full dust-begrimed face upon a bevy of ladies very near me, a cry of alarm came from their midst; but after a few words of assurance from me, quiet and apparent confidence were restored. I assured these ladies that the troops behind me, though ill-clad and travel-stained, were good men and brave; that beneath their rough exteriors were hearts as loyal to women as ever beat in the breasts of honorable men; that their own experience and the experience of their mothers, wives, and sisters at home had taught them how painful must be the sight of a hostile army in their town; that under the orders of the Confederate commander-in-chief both private property and non-combatants were safe; that the spirit of vengeance and of rapine had no place in the bosoms of these dust-covered but knightly men; and I closed by pledging to York the head of any soldier under my command who destroyed private property, disturbed the repose of a single home, or insulted a woman.
“As we moved along the street after this episode, a little girl, probably twelve years of age, ran up to my horse and handed me a large bouquet of flowers in the center of which was a note in delicate handwriting, purporting to give the numbers and describe the position of the Union forces of Wrightsville, toward which I was advancing. I carefully read and reread this strange note. It bore no signature and contained no assurance of sympathy for the Southern cause, but it was so terse and explicit in its terms as to compel my confidence. The second day we were in front of Wrightsville, and from the high ridge on which this note suggested that I halt and examine the position of the Union troops, I eagerly scanned the prospect with my field-glasses, in order to verify the truth of the mysterious communication or detect its misrepresentations.
“There, in full view of us, was the town, just as described, nestling on the banks of the Susquehanna. There was the blue line of soldiers guarding the approach, drawn up, as indicated, along an intervening ridge and across the pike. There was the long bridge spanning the Susquehanna and connecting the town with Columbia on the other bank. Most important of all, there was the deep gorge or ravine running off to the right and extending around the left bank of the Federal line and to the river below the bridge. Not an inaccurate detail in that note could be discovered. I did not hesitate, therefore, to adopt its suggestion of moving down the gorge in order to throw my command on the flank, or possibly in the rear of the Union troops, and force them to a rapid retreat or surrender. The result of this movement vindicated the strategic wisdom of my unknown and—judging by the handwriting—woman correspondent, whose note was none the less martial because embedded in roses, and whose evident genius for war, had occasion offered, might have made her a captain equal to Catherine.”
The Flag of the 16th Maine
A marker showing the position of the 16th Maine Infantry Regiment on the afternoon of the first day’s battle stands at the intersection of Doubleday Avenue and the Mummasburg Road, and contains the following inscription:
Position Held July 1, 1863, at 4 o’Clock P.M.
by the 16th Maine Infantry
1st Brig., 2nd Div., 1st Corps
WHILE THE REST OF THE DIVISION WAS RETIRING, THE REGIMENT HAVING MOVED FROM THE POSITION AT THE LEFT WHERE ITS MONUMENT STANDS, UNDER ORDERS TO HOLD THIS POSITION AT ANY COST.
It Lost on This Field
Killed 11, Wounded 62, Captured 159
Out of 275 Engaged.
When almost surrounded, the regiment withdrew to the left of the railroad cut to help cover the withdrawal of Stewart’s battery, which was also almost surrounded. The regiment had two flags, the Stars and Stripes and the flag of Maine.
Finally, assaulted by the flank and rear, they determined not to surrender their colors, but tore them from their staffs and into small bits, each man taking a star or a bit of silk which he placed in his pocket. Some of these fragments were carried through the southern prisons and finally home to Maine, where they are still treasured as precious relics by the relatives and friends of the brave men of the regiment.
The Barlow-Gordon Incident
Barlow’s Knoll, a short distance northeast of Gettysburg, is named in honor of Brigadier-General Francis C. Barlow, in command of the 1st Division of the 11th Corps. In his “Reminiscences of the Civil War,” General Gordon describes his meeting with Barlow:
“Returning from the banks of the Susquehanna, and meeting at Gettysburg, July 1, 1863, the advance of Lee’s forces, my command was thrown quickly and squarely on the right flank of the Union Army. A more timely arrival never occurred. The battle had been raging for four or five hours. The Confederate General Archer, with a large part of his brigade, had been captured. Heth and Scales, Confederate generals, had been wounded. The ranking Union officer on the field, General Reynolds, had been killed, and General Hancock was assigned to command. The battle, upon the issue of which hung, perhaps, the fate of the Confederacy, was in full blast. The Union forces, at first driven back, now reënforced, were again advancing and pressing back Lee’s left and threatening to envelop it. The Confederates were stubbornly contesting every foot of ground, but the Southern left was slowly yielding. A few moments more and the day’s battle might have been ended by a complete turning of Lee’s flank. I was ordered to move at once to the aid of the heavily pressed Confederates. With a ringing yell, my command rushed upon the line posted to protect the Union right. Here occurred a hand-to-hand struggle. That protecting Union line, once broken, left my command not only on the right flank, but obliquely in rear of it.
“Any troops that were ever marshalled would, under like conditions, have been as surely and swiftly shattered. Under the concentrated fire from front and flank, the marvel is that they escaped. In the midst of the wild disorder in his ranks, and through a storm of bullets, a Union officer was seeking to rally his men for a final stand. He, too, went down pierced by a minie ball. Riding forward with my rapidly advancing lines, I discovered that brave officer lying upon his back, with the July sun pouring its rays into his pale face. He was surrounded by the Union dead, and his own life seemed to be rapidly ebbing out. Quickly I dismounted and lifted his head. I gave him water from my canteen, and asked his name and the character of his wounds. He was Major-General Francis C. Barlow, of New York, and of Howard’s Corps. The ball had entered his body in front and passed out near the spinal cord, paralyzing him in legs and arms. Neither of us had the remotest thought that he could survive many hours. I summoned several soldiers who were looking after the wounded, and directed them to place him upon a litter and carry him to the shade in the rear. Before parting, he asked me to take from his pocket a package of letters and destroy them. They were from his wife. He had one request to make of me. That request was that, if I lived to the end of the war and ever met Mrs. Barlow, I would tell her of our meeting on the field of Gettysburg and his thoughts of her in his last moments. He wished to assure me that he died doing his duty at the front, that he was willing to give his life for his country, and that his deepest regret was that he must die without looking upon her face again. I learned that Mrs. Barlow was with the Union Army, and near the battlefield. When it is remembered how closely Mrs. Gordon followed me, it will not be difficult to realize that my sympathies were especially stirred by the announcement that his wife was so near to him. Passing through the day’s battle unhurt, I despatched, at its close, under a flag of truce, the promised message to Mrs. Barlow. I assured her that she should have safe escort to her husband’s side.
“In the desperate encounters of the two succeeding days, and the retreat of Lee’s army, I thought no more of Barlow, except to number him with the noble dead of the two armies who have so gloriously met their fate. The ball, however, had struck no vital point, and Barlow slowly recovered, though his fate was unknown to me. The following summer, in battles near Richmond, my kinsman with the same initials, General J. B. Gordon of North Carolina, was killed. Barlow, who had recovered, saw the announcement of his death, and entertained no doubt that he was the Gordon whom he had met on the field of Gettysburg. To me, therefore, Barlow was dead; to Barlow I was dead. Nearly fifteen years passed before either of us was undeceived. During my second term in the United States Senate, the Hon. Clarkson Potter of New York was the member of the House of Representatives. He invited me to dinner in Washington to meet a General Barlow who had served in the Union Army. Potter knew nothing of the Gettysburg incident. I had heard that there was another Barlow in the Union Army, and supposed of course, that it was this Barlow with whom I was to dine. Barlow had a similar reflection as to the Gordon he was to meet. Seated at Clarkson Potter’s table, I asked Barlow: ‘General, are you related to the Barlow who was killed at Gettysburg?’ He replied: ‘Why, I am the man, sir. Are you related to the Gordon who killed me?’ ‘I am the man, sir,’ I responded. No words of mine can convey any conception of the emotions awakened by these startling announcements. Nothing short of an actual resurrection of the dead could have amazed either of us more. Thenceforward, until his untimely death in 1896, the friendship between us which was born amidst the thunders of Gettysburg was cherished by both.”
General Ewell Is Hit by a Bullet
General Gordon gives an account of an amusing incident of the first day:
“Late in the afternoon of this first day’s battle, when the firing had greatly decreased along most of the lines, General Ewell and I were riding through the streets of Gettysburg. In a previous battle he had lost one of his legs, but prided himself on the efficiency of the wooden one which he used in its place. As we rode together, a body of Union soldiers, posted behind some dwellings and fences on the outskirts of the town, suddenly opened a brisk fire. A number of Confederates were killed or wounded, and I heard the ominous thud of a minie ball as it struck General Ewell at my side. I quickly asked: ‘Are you hurt, sir?’ ‘No, no,’ he replied; ‘I’m not hurt. But suppose that ball had struck you: we would have had the trouble of carrying you off the field, sir. You see how much better fixed I am for a fight than you are. It don’t hurt a bit to be shot in a wooden leg.’
“Ewell was a most interesting and eccentric character. It is said that in his early manhood he had been disappointed in a love affair, and had never fully recovered from its effects. The fair maiden to whom he had given his affections had married another man; but Ewell, like the truest of knights, carried her image in his heart through long years. When he was promoted to the rank of brigadier or major-general, he evidenced the constancy of his affections by placing upon his staff the son of the woman whom he had loved in his youth. The meddlesome Fates, who seem to revel in the romances of lovers, had decreed that Ewell should be shot in battle and become the object of solicitude and tender nursing by this lady, Mrs. Brown, who had been for many years a widow. Her gentle ministrations soothed his weary weeks of suffering, a marriage ensued, and with it came the realization of Ewell’s long-deferred hope. He was a most devoted husband. He never seemed to realize, however, that marriage had changed her name, for he proudly presented her to his friends as ‘My wife, Mrs. Brown, sir.’”
The School Teachers’ Regiment
The 151st Pennsylvania Infantry, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel George F. McFarland, included Company D, made up mainly of the instructors and students of the Lost Creek Academy, of McAlisterville, Juniata County, of which Colonel McFarland was principal. For this reason it was called the “Schoolteachers’ Regiment.” The material throughout was excellent, many of the men being experienced marksmen. The regiment went into battle with 21 officers and 446 men, and sustained a loss in killed, wounded, and missing of 337, or over 75 per cent.
The casualties of the 26th North Carolina Regiment, against which they were engaged, were 588 out of 800, just about the same percentage.
Colonel McFarland lost his right leg and had the left permanently disabled, but survived until 1891. On the twenty-fifth anniversary of the battle, he delivered the dedicatory address at the unveiling of the regimental monument, exactly twenty-five years to the hour after his engagement in battle.
An Incident of the First Day
An incident, similar to that described by Browning in his poem “An Incident of the French Camp,” occurred at the railroad cut early on the first day.
An officer of the 6th Wisconsin Regiment, active in the capture of the Mississippians belonging to the 2nd and 42nd Regiments, who had taken shelter in the railroad cut after turning the right of Cutler’s line, approached Colonel Rufus R. Dawes after the engagement was over. Colonel Dawes supposed, from the erect appearance of the man, that he had come for further orders, but his compressed lips told a different story. With great effort the officer said: “Tell them at home I died like a man and a soldier.” He then opened his coat, showed a ghastly wound on his breast, and dropped dead.
Dormitory of Gettysburg College.—The dormitory of Gettysburg (then Pennsylvania) College sheltered many Union and Confederate wounded
THE SECOND DAY
The scene of the engagements of the second and third days shifted to the south and southeast of Gettysburg. General Meade arrived on the field from his headquarters at Taneytown, Md., at 1 A.M., July 2nd, and established his headquarters at the Leister House, on the Taneytown Road, in rear of the line of the 2nd Corps. As soon as it was light he inspected the position already occupied and made arrangements for posting the several corps as they should reach the ground.
The Union Line of Battle.
Starting on the right with Slocum’s 12th Corps, Williams’ Division extended from Rock Creek by way of Spangler’s Spring to Culp’s Hill, with Geary’s Division on the hill. The line between Culp’s Hill and Cemetery Hill was held by Wadsworth’s Division of the 1st Corps. Barlow’s Division of the 11th Corps under Ames was located at the foot of East Cemetery Hill. Carman, Colgrove, Slocum, Geary, and Wainwright avenues follow these lines of battle.
On Cemetery Hill, across the Baltimore Pike, the line was held by Schurz and on his left Steinwehr, both of the 11th Corps. Robinson’s Division of the 1st Corps extended across the Taneytown Road to Ziegler’s Grove. Beyond lay Hancock’s 2nd Corps, with the Divisions of Hays, Gibbon, and Caldwell from right to left. To the left of Hancock, Sickles’ 3rd Corps, consisting of the Divisions of Humphreys and Birney, prolonged the line to the vicinity of Little Round Top. Beginning at the Taneytown Road, Hancock and Sedgwick avenues follow these lines of battle.
Arriving later in the day, the 5th Corps, under General Sykes, was posted on the Baltimore Pike, at the Rock Creek crossing. Later it occupied the ground about Round Top to the left of the 3rd Corps. The 6th Corps, under General Sedgwick, reaching the field still later after a march of over 30 miles, was posted in reserve back of Round Top, from which position portions were moved as circumstances demanded. The lines held by the 5th and 6th Corps coincide with Sykes, Ayres, Wright, and Howe Avenues.
Stevens’ Knoll.—Arriving on Stevens’ Knoll at the end of the first day, General Slocum brought supporting troops. The lunettes protecting the cannon remain intact.
Gamble’s and Devin’s brigades of Buford’s Cavalry, which had had an active part in the battle of the first day, were on the left between Cemetery and Seminary Ridges until 10 A.M. when they were ordered, by some mistake, to move to Westminster, Md., before the arrival of Gregg’s Division on its way from Hanover, and Merritt’s brigade of Buford’s Division from Mechanicsburg (now Thurmont), Md.
General Meade’s line, shaped like a fishhook, was about 3 miles long. The right faced east, the center over Cemetery Hill, north, and the left from Cemetery Hill to Round Top nearly west. The whole line was supported by artillery brigades belonging to the different corps.
Confederate Line of Battle.
General Lee’s line was nearly the same shape as General Meade’s but, being the outer line, was about 6 miles long. On the right, facing the two Round Tops, were Hood’s and McLaws’ Divisions of Longstreet’s Corps. On the left of McLaws, extending along the line of Seminary Ridge, were the Divisions of Anderson and Pender of Hill’s Corps, with Heth’s Division in the rear in reserve. On the left of Pender, extending through the town along the line of West Middle Street, was Rodes’ Division of Ewell’s Corps, then Early’s and Johnson’s Divisions, the latter reaching to Benner’s Hill, east of Rock Creek. Pickett’s Division of Longstreet’s Corps was at Chambersburg, guarding trains, and Law’s Brigade of Hood’s Division of Longstreet’s Corps at New Guilford, guarding the rear. The latter arrived at noon on the 2nd in time to participate in the day’s engagement. Pickett’s Division arrived later and was not engaged until the afternoon of the 3rd. The artillery was posted according to the different corps to which it was attached.
General Lee’s line coincides with the present West Confederate Avenue along Seminary and Warfield or Snyder Ridges, west of the town, then runs through the town to coincide with East Confederate Avenue. The distance between the Union and Confederate lines is three-fourths of a mile to a mile.
Military critics agree that General Meade held the stronger position. Both flanks presented precipitous and rocky fronts, difficult to attack, and it was possible to send reinforcements by short distances from point to point.
Sickles’ Change of Line.
As already stated, General Sickles’ 3rd Corps was on the left of General Hancock’s 2nd Corps on Cemetery Ridge, and Birney’s Division was near the base of Little Round Top, replacing Geary’s Division after its withdrawal to be posted on Culp’s Hill. Humphreys’ Division was on low ground to the right between Cemetery Ridge and the Emmitsburg Road.
Anxious to know what was in his front, Sickles sent the Berdan Sharpshooters and the 3rd Maine Infantry forward on a reconnaissance. On reaching the Pitzer Woods, beyond the Emmitsburg Road, they found the Confederates there in force, and after a sharp engagement with Wilcox’s Brigade, withdrew and reported.
Believing that Lee planned a flank movement on his line, and that the Emmitsburg Road afforded better positions for the artillery, Sickles moved his Corps forward and posted Humphreys’ Division on the right along the Emmitsburg Road and his left extending to the Peach Orchard. Birney’s Division prolonged the line from the Peach Orchard across the Wheatfield to Devil’s Den. This new line formed a salient at the Peach Orchard and therefore presented two fronts, one to the west, the other to the south.
About 3 P.M. Sickles was called to General Meade’s headquarters to a conference of corps commanders. Upon the sound of artillery, the conference adjourned, and Meade, Sickles, and Warren, Meade’s Chief Engineer, rode to inspect Sickles’ change of line. The artillery was already engaged, and believing it too late to make any changes since the enemy was present, Meade decided to attempt to hold the new position by sending in supports. After reviewing the new line, General Warren left the other members of the party and rode up Little Round Top. He found the height unoccupied except by the personnel of a signal station.
General Meade’s Statue.—General Meade viewed Pickett’s Charge from the center of the Union line. This statue, like those of Reynolds and Sedgwick, is the work of Henry K. Bush-Brown.
General Lee’s Plan.
Lee as well as Meade occupied the forenoon in the arrangement of his line of battle. After a conference with Ewell, he decided to attack Meade’s left. In his report, Lee says:
“It was determined to make the principal attack upon the enemy’s left, and endeavor to gain a position from which it was thought that our artillery could be brought to bear with effect. Longstreet was directed to place the division of McLaws and Hood on the right of Hill, partially enveloping the enemy’s left, which he was to drive in.
“General Hill was ordered to threaten the enemy’s center to prevent reinforcements being drawn to either wing, and coöperate with his right division in Longstreet’s attack.
“General Ewell was instructed to make a simultaneous demonstration upon the enemy’s right, to be converted into a real attack should opportunity offer.”
When General Lee arranged this plan of attack he believed Meade’s left terminated at the Peach Orchard; he did not know that Sickles’ advance line extended to the left from the salient at the Peach Orchard to Devil’s Den. In plain view of the Union signal station on Little Round Top, some of his forces were compelled to make a wide detour via the Black Horse Tavern on the Fairfield Road in order to avoid observation.
Little Round Top.
Meanwhile, General Warren on Little Round Top saw the importance of the hill as a tactical position on Meade’s left. The signal officers were preparing to leave; he ordered them to remain and to keep waving their flags so as to lead the Confederates to believe that the hill was occupied. He dispatched a messenger to Devil’s Den, where a Union battery was posted, with an order that a shot be fired to produce confusion in the woods in front, through which Hood’s forces were supposed to be advancing. Seeing the reflection of the sunlight from Confederate muskets, he realized that if this important position were to be held, it would be necessary to get troops there without delay.
Quickly he sent a member of his staff to Sickles for troops. Sickles said none could be spared. Warren sent another staff officer to Meade, who immediately ordered Sykes to move his Corps to Little Round Top. Barnes’ Division of this Corps had already been called for by Sickles to defend his line, and three brigades, Vincent’s, Tilton’s, and Sweitzer’s, were moving toward the Wheatfield. Learning of the need of troops on Little Round Top, Vincent moved back, skirted the east side of Little Round Top, and went into position between Little and Big Round Top, arriving just before the Confederates from Hood’s right advanced over Big Round Top.
Having watched these movements, Warren rode down to the crossing of what is now Sykes Avenue and the Wheatfield Road. There he met Colonel O’Rorke, in command of the 140th New York, and ordered his regiment, together with Hazlett’s battery, to the crest of the hill. With the addition of Weed’s Brigade, the combined forces held the Round Tops. There was a desperate engagement in which both contestants displayed courage of a very high order. The Union soldiers were victorious, and Meade’s left was secured against further attack.
The Peach Orchard and the Wheatfield.
After the struggle for the possession of Little Round Top, the other Confederate brigades of Hood and McLaws advanced rapidly. A lack of coordination in their movement allowed Meade to bring up supports. Three brigades of Anderson’s Division of Hill’s Corps advanced against Humphreys’ line, in the following order: Wilcox, Perry, Wright. Wounded, General Pender was unable to direct Posey and Mahone in support of Wright, and Wright was obliged to withdraw. Humphreys was compelled to change front in order to meet the assault on his flanks. This maneuver served to stay the Confederate attack for a brief time. The Valley of Death between the Round Tops and the opposite height was now a seething mass of opposing forces, enshrouded in clouds of smoke.
Meade had already depleted his right to support his left by withdrawing all of Slocum’s 12th Corps except Greene’s Brigade. He now sent all of the 5th Corps to the left and ordered Caldwell’s Division from the left of Hancock’s 2nd Corps south of the Angle to the Wheatfield. Willard’s Brigade on Hays’ line of the 2nd Corps was ordered to advance and oppose the Confederate, Barksdale, who, after crossing the Emmitsburg Road north of the Peach Orchard and the field beyond, reached Watson’s Union battery posted on the Trostle farm. General Sickles was severely and Barksdale mortally wounded.
Wheatfield.—Scene of carnage on the second day
Wofford’s Brigade of McLaws’ Division broke through the salient at the Peach Orchard and reached the valley between Devil’s Den and Little Round Top, where they were met by a charge of the Pennsylvania Reserves of Crawford’s Division, led by McCandless, some of whose men fought in sight of their own homes. Wofford was obliged to withdraw to and beyond the Wheatfield; the Reserves advanced across the valley from their position on the north of Little Round Top and reached the stone wall on the east side of the Wheatfield. Here they remained until after Pickett’s charge on the 3rd, when they advanced against the Confederates who had succeeded in regaining control of that part of the field.
About the time when Sickles was wounded, Meade directed Hancock to assume command of Sickles’ Corps in addition to his own. Meade in person led Lockwood’s brigade, brought from the extreme right, against the Confederate advance. Newton, now in command of the 1st Corps, sent in Doubleday’s Division. With these troops Hancock checked the advance of the Confederate brigades of Barksdale, Wilcox, Perry, and Wright, while Sykes checked the advance of Hood and McLaws. Brigades of the 6th Corps reached the field toward the close of the engagement. Withdrawing from the Wheatfield Road, Bigelow’s battery made a determined stand at the Trostle buildings and succeeded in checking the Confederate advance until the gap on Sickles’ first line was protected by a line of guns. Most of the Confederate brigades got no farther than Plum Run, except Wright’s, which actually reached the line of guns on Hancock’s front before it was obliged to withdraw.
During the repulse of the Confederate advance, the 1st Minnesota regiment of Harrow’s Brigade of Gibbon’s Division of Hancock’s Corps was ordered by Hancock to oppose Wilcox’s and Perry’s Brigades, rapidly advancing against Hancock’s left. The Minnesota regiment moved up at once and succeeded in repelling the attack, but only after losing 82 per cent of its men.
Though seriously threatened, Meade’s line held, and after the repulse of Wright, the attack ended. During the night the line was prolonged to the top of Big Round Top. The Confederates remained west of Plum Run, except at Big Round Top, where they intrenched along the western slope.
Ewell’s Attack on Meade’s Right.
Ordered by Lee to begin his attack on Meade’s right at the same time as Longstreet’s attack on Meade’s left, Ewell’s artillery on Benner’s Hill opened fire on Culp’s Hill and Cemetery Hill where the Union forces were posted and well protected with earthworks. On account of the destructive fire from the Union batteries on East Cemetery Hill, Ewell lost most of his guns, and no infantry advance was made until Longstreet’s assault had ended. At sundown General Johnson’s infantry advanced against Culp’s Hill, General Early against East Cemetery Hill. Rodes, who was directed to move against West Cemetery Hill, was unable to obey instructions. General Walker, who had been sent east to Brinkerhoff Ridge in the forenoon, to guard Ewell’s flank, and who was expected to assist in this attack, was prevented by meeting part of the Union cavalry of Gregg’s Division that had arrived via Hanover on the forenoon of the 2nd. After an engagement with Gregg, Walker moved up to assist Johnson, but too late to be of service, as the attack on Culp’s Hill had ended.
The attack was conducted with the greatest dash and daring, in part up rough slopes of woodland over heaped boulders. On East Cemetery Hill the fight among the Union guns was hand to hand, and clubbed muskets, stones, and rammers were used to drive back the assailants. After sunset a bright moon illuminated the field. The Union troops stood firm, and at 10 o’clock the Confederates desisted, having captured only a few Union entrenchments.
Monument of the Irish Brigade.—At the foot of the Celtic Cross is the Irish wolfhound, symbolic of devotion.
Situation at End of the Second Day.
Lee’s assaults on Meade’s left had failed to accomplish anything decisive. While Sickles’ advance-line was driven back and most of the field, including the Peach Orchard, the Wheatfield, Devil’s Den, and the base of Big Round Top, was occupied by the Confederates, Meade’s line was practically intact from the crest of Big Round Top on the left to near Spangler’s Spring on the right. On the slopes of Round Top, on Cemetery Hill and Culp’s Hill, the advantage of the defensive positions multiplied the forces of the defenders in comparison with the attackers at least three to one. Prodigious deeds of valor were performed by both armies, and courage of the highest order was displayed in attack and in the defense. Casualties were very heavy on both sides. Meade estimated that his losses were 65 per cent of the total for the three days. At the end of the day he made the following report:
“July 2, 1863, 8 P.M. The enemy attacked me about 4 P.M. this day, and, after one of the severest contests of the war, was repulsed at all points. We have suffered considerably in killed and wounded. Among the former are Brigadier Generals Paul and Zook, and among the wounded are Generals Sickles, Barlow, Graham, and Warren slightly. We have taken a large number of prisoners. I shall remain in my present position tomorrow, but am not prepared to say, until better advised of the condition of the army, whether my operations will be of an offensive or defensive character.”
Later in the night, at a council of war held by Meade with his corps commanders—Gibbon, Williams, Sykes, Newton, Howard, Hancock, Sedgwick and Slocum—sentiment favored remaining and fighting a defensive battle. As Lee attacked both wings of Meade’s line on the 2nd it was expected that if another attack were made it would be on the center. This expectation was correct—Wright’s attack on the 2nd, when he succeeded in reaching Meade’s line south of the Angle, led Lee to believe that this was the most vulnerable point.
General Lee had more definite plans:
“The result of this day’s operations induced the belief that, with proper concert of action, and with the increased support that the positions gained on the right would enable the artillery to render the assaulting column, we should ultimately succeed, and it was accordingly determined to continue the attack.”
The general plan was unchanged. Longstreet, re-enforced by Pickett’s three brigades, which arrived near the battlefield during the afternoon of the 2nd, was ordered to attack the next morning, and General Ewell was directed to assail the enemy’s right at the same time. The latter, during the night, re-enforced General Johnson with three brigades from Rodes’ and Early’s Divisions.
INCIDENTS OF THE SECOND DAY
The Roger House
The Roger House is located on the west side of the Emmitsburg Road, about a mile south of Gettysburg, midway between Meade’s line of battle on Cemetery Ridge and Lee’s line on Seminary Ridge. On the afternoon of July 2nd, after Sickles advanced his corps from its first position to the Emmitsburg Road, it was surrounded by the right of the new line. The 1st Massachusetts Regiment, whose monument stands adjacent to the house, held this part of the line, and was hotly engaged when the brigades of Wilcox and Wright advanced during the assault of Longstreet on the Union left on the afternoon of the 2nd. During Pickett’s Charge, on the afternoon of the 3rd, the house was again surrounded by fighting men.
While the battle raged on all sides, a granddaughter of the owner, Miss Josephine Miller, remained, and, notwithstanding the great danger, baked bread and biscuits for the hungry soldiers. In 1896, Miss Miller, then Mrs. Slyder, paid a visit to her old home, and related the following story of her experience to Mr. Wilfred Pearse, of Boston, Mass., a visitor to Gettysburg at the same time. After his return he published the following article.
“The veterans of the 1st Massachusetts Infantry Regiment will be glad to learn that the only woman member of the 3rd Army Corps ‘Veterans’ Association,’ Mrs. Slyder, née Miss Josephine Miller, granddaughter of farmer Roger, owner of the farm near which the 1st Massachusetts monument stands, is visiting her old home on the battleground where she stood from sunrise to sunset for two days of the battle making hot biscuits for the Boys in Blue. She refused to take money for the bread, and refused to stop her work even when Confederate shells were bursting around the house. She told me the other day that when her stock of flour was almost exhausted six members of the 1st Massachusetts kindly volunteered to go out and steal three sacks of flour from General Sickles’ commissary stores. In an hour’s time they returned with flour, raisins, currants, and a whole sheep, with which a rattling good meal was made.
“The old range still stands in the kitchen, and in it, at the last reunion of the 3rd Corps, Mrs. Slyder cooked a dinner for General Sickles.”
Spangler’s Spring
This spring, which takes its name from Abraham Spangler, its owner at the time of the battle, is located at the southeast corner of Culp’s Hill. Inasmuch as it was used by soldiers of both armies during the battle, and since then by thousands of tourists, it is an interesting feature of the field. Only during the drought of 1930 has it failed to give forth a copious flow of cool, pure water. At the time of the battle it was surrounded by a wall of flat stones with a flagstone cover over the top. These were removed and a canopy top erected.
The 12th Corps of the Army of the Potomac occupied this part of Meade’s line on the night of the first day and until the afternoon of the 2nd, when the troops were ordered to the left to help repel Longstreet’s assault. Until this time the spring was used only by the Union troops. During their absence, the Confederates under Johnson moved up and took possession of part of the vacated line. In the early morning of the third day, the Union forces, who had returned from the left during the night of the 2nd, attacked Johnson, drove him out and succeeded in regaining possession of the line that had been vacated by them on the afternoon of the 2nd, including the spring.
The story that a truce was entered into between the opposing forces on the night of the 2nd and that they met in large numbers at the spring to get water is a mistake. The captured and wounded of the Union forces were allowed access to it along with the Confederates who were there at the time, but there was no truce. When armies were encamped, pickets from the opposing lines would sometimes get together, usually to trade coffee and tobacco, but this was never done when a battle was in progress.
Spangler’s Spring.—Spangler’s Spring was used first by the Union, then by the Confederate troops, and since by thousands of tourists
The following extract from the address of Captain Joseph Matchett at the dedication of the monument erected by the 46th Pennsylvania Infantry Regiment, shows that there was no truce:
“Some time in the night (2nd), we were ordered to return to our works on Culp’s Hill. It seems Captain Selfridge of Company H had taken some of his men’s canteens and gone ahead to Spangler’s Spring to fill them, when he discovered ‘Johnnies’ also filling their canteens. He backed out with the best grace he could command, and reported it to the colonel. Colonel McDougall, the brigade commander, did not believe it and got very angry, but the colonel of the regiment insisted on deploying his men, and sent a skirmish line, who found the enemy as stated and saved many lives.”
Colonel Avery’s Lost Grave
Among those who faced death in the desperate charge on the Union right on East Cemetery Hill, July 2nd, Colonel I. E. Avery, of North Carolina, in command of Hoke’s brigade, bore a gallant part. At the head of the column he led his men up the slope of Cemetery Hill and, a conspicuous mark, fell mortally wounded.
Unable to speak, he drew a card from his pocket and wrote the following: “Tell father that I died with my face toward the enemy.” In the retreat from Gettysburg, his body was taken along to be delivered to his family, but when the army reached Williamsport the Potomac was too high to cross. There, in the cemetery overlooking the river, the remains were interred in an oak coffin under a pine tree. He was buried in his uniform by the men who saw him fall.
Thirty years after, Judge A. C. Avery, of the Supreme Court of North Carolina, a resident of Morgantown, and Captain J. A. McPherson of Fayette, N. C., both veterans of the Confederacy, came to Williamsport with the object of locating Colonel Avery’s grave. Their search was fruitless.
The Leister House
On his arrival, General Meade established his headquarters at the Leister House, one of the oldest houses in the community, located at the intersection of Meade Avenue and the Taneytown Road. At the time of the battle it was the property of a widow, Mrs. Leister. It now belongs to the Government, and a bronze plate marks it as Meade’s Headquarters. It is built of logs, chinked and weatherboarded with rough pine boards, pierced by bullet-holes and scarred by shells.
Inside there are two rooms, a small kitchen at the west, and a larger room at the east. In the latter, Meade held a council of war after the battle of the 2nd had ended, summoning his Corps commanders between 9 and 10 o’clock to consult them as to what action, if any, should be taken on the 3rd. Generals Sedgwick, Slocum, Hancock, Howard, Sykes, Newton, Birney, Williams, and Gibbon were present. The following questions were asked:
(1) Under existing circumstances is it advisable for this army to remain in its present position, or to retire to another nearer its base of supplies?
(2) It being determined to remain in present position, shall the army attack or wait the attack of the enemy?
(3) If we wait attack, how long?
Replies:
Gibbon: (1) Correct position of the army, but would not retreat. (2) In no condition to attack, in his opinion. (3) Until he moves.
Williams: (1) Stay. (2) Wait attack. (3) One day.
Birney and Sykes: Same as General Williams.
Newton: (1) Correct position of the army, but would not retreat. (2) By all means not attack. (3) If we wait it will give them a chance to cut our line.
Howard: (1) Remain. (2) Wait attack until 4 P.M. tomorrow. (3) If don’t attack, attack them.
Hancock: (1) Rectify position without moving so as to give up field. (2) Not attack unless our communications are cut. (3) Can’t wait long; can’t be idle.
Sedgwick: (1) Remain. (2) Wait attack. (3) At least one day.
Slocum: (1) Stay and fight it out.
The unanimous opinion of the council was to stay and await attack. Just as the council broke up, General Meade said to Gibbon, “If Lee attacks tomorrow, it will be on your front. He has made attacks on both our flanks and failed, and if he concludes to try it again it will be on our center.” The attack of Lee on the 3rd was made where Meade expected.
During the forenoon of the third day, conditions at headquarters were generally quiet. In the afternoon, when the Confederate artillery on Seminary Ridge opened fire as a prelude to Pickett’s Charge, it was directed mainly against the left center of the Union line on Cemetery Ridge. As the location of Meade’s headquarters was in the immediate rear, just under the crest of the ridge, much damage was done by the hail of shot and shell that crossed the ridge. A shell exploded in the yard among the staff officers’ horses tied to the fence, and a number of them were killed, while still other horses were killed in the rear of the building. Several members of the headquarters’ guard were slightly wounded.
George G. Meade, a grandson of General Meade, in his interesting narrative “With Meade at Gettysburg,” tells the following story:
“During this rain of Confederate shell, and while Meade, deep in thought, was walking up and down this little back yard between the house and the Taneytown Road, he chanced to notice that some of his staff, during the enforced inactivity while waiting the pleasure of their general, were gradually and probably unconsciously edging around the side of the house.
“‘Gentlemen,’ he said, stopping and smiling pleasantly, ‘Are you trying to find a safer place? You remind me of the man who was driving the ox-cart which took ammunition for the heavy guns on the field of Palo Alto. Finding himself within range, he tilted up his cart and got behind it. Just then General Taylor came along, and seeing the attempt at shelter, shouted, “You damned fool; don’t you know you are no safer there than anywhere else?” The driver replied, “I don’t suppose I am, General, but it kind o’ feels so.”’”
As the firing still continued it was decided to move the headquarters several hundred yards south on the Taneytown Road, to a barn on the Cassatt property. There a Confederate shell exploded and wounded General Butterfield, the chief of staff, who was obliged to leave the field and was unable to return that day. After remaining a short time, General Meade and staff removed to General Slocum’s headquarters at Powers’ Hill, along the Baltimore Pike, moving there by way of Granite Lane.
The Louisiana Tigers
Major Chatham R. Wheat’s battalion of Louisiana Infantry was organized in New Orleans in May, 1861. Their first engagement was in the first battle of Bull Run, where Major Wheat was shot through both lungs. After his recovery, he re-entered the service and took an active part in command of the battalion in the defense of Richmond in 1863 against the advance of the Union forces under McClellan. During this campaign the battalion became known as “The Louisiana Tigers” on account of their desperate fighting qualities. At the battle of Gaines Mill, Major Wheat and several other leading officers of the battalion were killed, and the loss of the organization was very heavy. It was then broken up and the survivors distributed among the other Louisiana regiments, of Hays’ brigade of Early’s Division, and Nicholls’ brigade of Johnson’s Division of Ewell’s Corps. A number of them were in the battle of Gettysburg with these brigades, but not as the separate organization originally known as “The Louisiana Tigers.” This designation was given to all the Louisiana troops after the original battalion was discontinued. The story sometimes told, that 1,700 Louisiana Tigers attacked East Cemetery Hill on July 2nd, that all but 300 were killed or captured, and that the organization was unknown afterward, is not correct.
General Meade’s “Baldy”
In the first great battle of the Civil War, at Bull Run, there was a bright bay horse with white face and feet. He, as well as his rider, was seriously wounded and the horse was turned back to the quartermaster to recover. In September General Meade bought him and named him “Baldy.” Meade became deeply attached to the horse but his staff officers soon began to complain of his peculiar racking gait which was hard to follow. Faster than a walk and slow for a trot, it compelled the staff alternately to trot and walk.
“Baldy” was wounded twice at the first battle of Bull Run; he was at the battle of Drainsville; he took part in two of the seven days’ fighting around Richmond in the summer of 1862; he carried his master at Groveton, August 29th; at the second battle of Bull Run; at South Mountain and at Antietam. In the last battle he was left on the field for dead, but in the next Federal advance he was discovered quietly grazing on the battleground with a deep wound in his neck. He was tenderly cared for and soon was fit for duty. He bore the general at the battles of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville. For two days he was present at Gettysburg, where he received his most grievous wound from a bullet entering his body between the ribs and lodging there. Meade would not part with him and kept him with the army until the following spring.
In the preparations of the Army of the Potomac for the last campaign, “Baldy” was sent to pasture at Downingtown, Pa. After the surrender of Lee at Appomattox, Meade hurried to Philadelphia where he again met his faithful charger, fully recovered. For many years the horse and the general were inseparable companions, and when Meade died in 1872, “Baldy” followed the hearse. Ten years later he died, and his head and two fore-hoofs were mounted and are now cherished relics of the George G. Meade Post, Grand Army of the Republic, in Philadelphia.
General Lee’s “Traveller”
The most famous of the steeds in the stables of General Lee, was “Traveller,” an iron-gray horse. He was raised in Greenbriar County, Virginia, near Blue Sulphur Springs, and as a colt won first prize at a fair in Lewisburg. When hostilities commenced, Traveller, then called “Jeff Davis,” was owned by Major Thomas L. Broun, who had paid $175 in gold for him. In the spring of 1862, Lee bought him for $200 and changed his name to “Traveller.”
“Traveller” was the especial companion of the general. His fine proportions attracted immediate attention. He was gray in color, with black points, a long mane, and flowing tail. He stood sixteen hands high, and was five years old in the spring of 1862. His figure was muscular, with deep chest and short back, strong haunches, flat legs, small head, quick eyes, broad forehead, and small feet. His rapid, springy step and bold carriage made him conspicuous. On a long and tedious march he easily carried Lee’s weight at five or six miles an hour without faltering and at the end of the day’s march seemed to be as fresh as at the beginning. The other horses broke down under the strain and each in turn proved unequal to the rigors of war, but “Traveller” sturdily withstood the hardships of the campaigns in Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania. When, in April, 1865, the last battle of the Army of Northern Virginia had been fought and Lee rode to the McLean House at Appomattox Court House, he was astride “Traveller” who carried him back to his waiting army, and then to Richmond. When Lee became a private citizen and retired to Washington and Lee University as its president, the veteran war-horse was still with him, and as the years passed and both master and servant neared life’s ending, they became more closely attached. As the funeral cortege accompanied Lee to his last resting-place, “Traveller” marched behind the hearse. After “Traveller’s” death, his skeleton was mounted and is on exhibition in the museum in the chapel on the campus of Washington and Lee University.
A Union Battery, in action on the afternoon of the second day
THE THIRD DAY
The first engagement on the third day was a continuation and conclusion of the attack and defense of Meade’s right. His forces, returning from the left, where they had been sent on the afternoon of the 2nd, found part of their earthworks in possession of the enemy. At daybreak preparations were made to recapture the lost entrenchments. By 10.30 the effort was successful, and Meade’s line was once more intact from end to end.
Second Battle at Culp’s Hill.
This action on the morning of the 3rd was one of the most hotly contested of the battle. The Confederate losses in killed were almost the same as those of Pickett’s Division in the attack on Meade’s left center in the afternoon. Meade’s losses were comparatively light, as his line was well protected by the line of earthworks. So intense was the artillery and musketry fire that hundreds of trees were shattered. After the repulse, Johnson’s forces were withdrawn, and this ended their participation in the battle.
Meade’s Line of the Third Day.
After the engagement on the morning of the 2nd, the 12th Corps reoccupied its original line, beginning on the right at Spangler’s Hill and extending to and over Culp’s Hill. Wadsworth’s Division of the 1st Corps retained its position of the 2nd, between Culp’s Hill and Barlow’s Division under Ames of the 11th Corps, at the foot of East Cemetery Hill. Barlow’s Division was strengthened by a brigade of the 2nd Corps. Doubleday’s Division of the 1st Corps, which had taken the position of Caldwell’s Division on the left of the 2nd Corps, remained. Caldwell was posted so as to support the artillery reserve to the left of Doubleday.
The other divisions of the 1st and 2nd Corps remained in the positions they occupied on the morning of the 2nd. The 5th Corps extended the line from the left of the artillery reserve to Big Round Top. Some of the brigades of the 6th Corps were put in position as local reserves and others to protect the flanks of the line. The 3rd Corps was posted in rear of the center as a general reserve. A detachment of cavalry was in reserve in rear of the 2nd Corps at the Angle. Few changes were made in the artillery positions. Beginning at Cemetery Hill and extending to Little Round Top, about ninety guns, under General Hunt, were in position to operate.
Meade’s Headquarters.—The Leister House, General Meade’s headquarters until the artillery fire on the third day compelled him to move
Lee’s Line of the Third Day.
Beginning on the right, Longstreet’s Corps held the ground west of Plum Run, including the base of Big Round Top, Devil’s Den, and the Peach Orchard. Pickett’s Division, after its arrival on the field on the morning of the 3rd, took the place of Anderson in reserve. Heth’s and Pender’s Divisions extended the line to the left on Seminary Ridge, connecting with part of Rodes’ Division in the western part of the town. Early’s and Johnson’s Divisions, after the engagement on the morning of the 3rd, held their positions of the 2nd. Changes in the positions of the batteries of artillery were made on the morning of the 3rd. A total of 138 guns were in position to operate. Those on the right were in charge of Colonel E. P. Alexander; those on the left under Colonel R. L. Walker.
The Bliss Buildings.
After the end of the engagement at Culp’s Hill at 10.30 A.M. there was a short battle for the capture of the Bliss house and barn, midway between the lines in front of Ziegler’s Grove. These buildings were occupied by Confederate sharpshooters, who were causing considerable loss in Hays’ line of the 2nd Corps at the grove. Two regiments were sent forward, the 12th New Jersey and the 14th Connecticut, and the buildings were captured and burned.
The Artillery Duel.
Until 1 o’clock there was comparative quiet. It was ended on the stroke of the hour by two guns of Miller’s battery belonging to the Washington artillery of New Orleans, posted near the Peach Orchard, and fired in rapid succession as a signal to the Confederate artillery.
The Confederate Colonel Alexander says:
“At exactly 1 o’clock by my watch the two signal guns were heard in quick succession. In another minute every gun was at work. The enemy was not slow in coming back at us, and the grand roar of nearly the whole of both armies burst in on the silence.
“The enemy’s position seemed to have broken out with guns everywhere, and from Round Top to Cemetery Hill was blazing like a volcano.”
The artillery duel was but a preface, intended to clear the ground for the infantry action to follow. The order had already been given by Longstreet to Alexander:
“Colonel: The intention is to advance the infantry if the artillery has the desired effect of driving the enemy off, or having other effect such as to warrant us in making the attack. When the moment arrives advise General Pickett, and of course advance such artillery as you can use in making the attack.”
General Wright, who was present when this order was received, expressed doubt as to whether the attack could be successfully made. He said:
“It is not so hard to go there as it looks; I was nearly there with my brigade yesterday. The trouble is to stay there. The whole Yankee army is there in a bunch.”
For one and a half hours the air was filled with screaming, whistling shot and shell. An occasional Whitworth missile, from Oak Hill on the north, made, on account of its peculiar form, a noise that could be heard above the din of all others. The headquarters of General Meade at the Leister House formed a concentric point continually swept with a storm of shot and shell. Headquarters were therefore moved to Slocum’s headquarters at Powers’ Hill, along the Baltimore Pike.
Locations, Buildings and Avenues as referred to in “The Battle of Gettysburg”
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Batteries on the Union line, especially at the Angle, were badly damaged, and General Hunt had others brought forward with additional supplies of ammunition. On the whole the losses inflicted upon the Union infantry were comparatively light. The stone wall and the undulations of the ground afforded protection, as most of the men were lying down.
After the artillery had operated for about an hour and a half, Meade and Hunt deemed it prudent to stop the fire, in order to cool the guns, save ammunition, and allow the atmosphere between the lines to clear of the dense cloud of smoke before the expected attack was made. This pause in the fire led the Confederates to believe that the Union line was demoralized, and that the opportune time had arrived for the onset of the infantry. Accordingly, they moved forward and Pickett’s Charge was on.
At the signal station on Little Round Top, General Warren and others saw gray infantry moving out across the plain in front of the Spangler Woods. Warren at once wig-wagged to General Hunt:
“They are moving out to attack.”
This message was passed from man to man along the entire Union line.
Devil’s Den.—Hid among the rocks of Devil’s Den, Confederate sharpshooters picked off officers and men occupying Little Round Top
Pickett’s Charge.
Pickett’s Division of Longstreet’s Corps was moved from the rear to the ravine in front of the Spangler Woods and placed in line as follows: Kemper on the right; Garnett on the left in the front line; Armistead in the rear, overlapping Kemper’s left and Garnett’s right, in the second line. On the left of Garnett was ranged Archer’s Brigade of Hill’s Corps under Frye, then Pettigrew’s Brigade under Marshall. Next to Marshall came Davis’ Brigade of Hill’s Corps, and on the extreme left Brockenbrough’s Brigade, also of Hill’s Corps. In the rear of the right of Pickett were the brigades of Wilcox and Perry of Hill’s Corps and in the rear of Pettigrew were the brigades of Scales and Lane of Hill’s Corps, in command of Trimble.
The column of assault consisted of 42 regiments—19 Virginia, 15 North Carolina, 2 Alabama, 3 Tennessee, and 3 Mississippi—a total of about 15,000 men.
In addition to the artillery fire, they encountered 27 regiments—9 of New York, 5 of Pennsylvania, 3 of Massachusetts, 3 of Vermont, 1 of Michigan, 1 of Maine, 1 of Minnesota, 1 of New Jersey, 1 of Connecticut, 1 of Ohio, and 1 of Delaware—a total of 9,000 to 10,000 men.
In advance of the assaulting column a strong skirmish line was deployed. A skirmish line was also deployed in front of Meade’s line, which fell back as the assaulting column drew near.
The Advance.
General Longstreet ordered General Alexander, Chief of Artillery, to watch the havoc wrought in the Union line and signify the moment for advance.
General Alexander says:
“Before the cannonade opened I made up my mind to give the order to advance within fifteen or twenty minutes after it began. But when I looked at the full development of the enemy’s batteries and knew that his infantry was generally protected from fire by stone walls and swells of the ground, I could not bring myself to give the word.
“I let the 15 minutes pass, and 20, and 25, hoping vainly for something to turn up. Then I wrote to Pickett: ‘If you are coming at all, come at once, or I cannot give you proper support; but the enemy’s fire has not slackened at all; at least eighteen guns are still firing from the cemetery itself.’
“Five minutes after sending that message, the enemy’s fire suddenly began to slacken, and the guns in the cemetery limbered up and vacated the position.
“Then I wrote to Pickett: ‘Come quick; eighteen guns are gone; unless you advance quick, my ammunition won’t let me support you properly.’
“Pickett then rode forward, and on meeting Longstreet said: ‘General, shall I advance?’ Longstreet nodded his assent and the column moved forward.”
The column passed through the line of guns, fifteen or eighteen of which had been ordered to follow. Meanwhile the eighteen Union guns that were withdrawn were replaced by others. The Union line was once more intact, and it opened a terrific fire against the rapidly moving columns of assault. As the Confederates continued to advance, their courage unaffected in face of the tremendous fire of both artillery and infantry, their enemies were filled with admiration.
At the Emmitsburg Road, where post-and-rail fences had to be crossed, the line was broken, but only for a moment. The musketry fire from the Union line was so heavy that the attacking column was unable to maintain a regular alignment, and when the Angle was reached the identity of the different brigades was lost.
Armistead’s Brigade forged to the front at the Angle, and, reaching the wall, Armistead raised his hat on his sword and said:
“Give them the cold steel, boys!”