HISTORY
OF
MERCHANT SHIPPING
AND
ANCIENT COMMERCE.

BY
W. S. LINDSAY.

IN FOUR VOLUMES.

VOL. III.

With numerous Illustrations.

LONDON:
SAMPSON LOW, MARSTON, LOW, AND SEARLE.
CROWN BUILDINGS, 188 FLEET STREET.
1876.

[All Rights reserved.]

LONDON:
PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS,
STAMFORD STREET AND CHARING CROSS.

PREFACE.

On publishing the first two volumes of this work, it was not my intention that the following volumes should be preceded by any preface. I have, however, been induced to reconsider this resolution, in order to acknowledge the ready assistance I have received from men of great experience, not only of this but of foreign countries. My first volume treats more especially of the antiquities of the mercantile marine, and closes with the sixteenth century. In the second, I trace the progress of maritime commerce down to about the close of the great French War (1815), when a new era dawned and a new state of things was inaugurated. Details, relating in an especial manner to this period, form the subject of my last two volumes—in one I treat of the Navigation Laws of Cromwell and of the causes which led to their abolition, together with the effects of their abolition; while the other is devoted, entirely, to the rise and progress of steam-ships and to the different branches of commerce in which they are engaged.

In order to render this portion of my labours valuable for the purpose of reference, I have sought the aid of those best able to afford me trustworthy information, and to supply me with documents and tables of unquestionable authenticity.

To none am I more deeply indebted in this respect than to Mr. Farrer and others, of the Board of Trade, whose kindly promptitude I again acknowledge. For that part relating to France I have profited by the valuable aid of Mr. Michael Chevalier, who has not grudged the pains of carefully and critically revising the proofs of that portion of the work, and making many interesting additions to it.

Nor must I omit to record the readiness exhibited by Mr. R. B. Forbes, of Boston, United States, by Commodore Prebble, Commandant of the Philadelphia Dockyard, and by the Presidents of the New York and other American Chambers of Commerce, and to the United States authorities generally, in supplying me with official data with reference to the development of the maritime commerce of the United States.

To my own countrymen, whether Shipowners, Merchants, Shipbuilders, or Underwriters, my thanks are heartily due, and to the Directors and Managers of those large Shipping Companies which arose in the middle of the present century, both at home and abroad. And, in an especial manner I have to thank Mr. John Burns, of Glasgow (Cunard Company), Mr. Alfred Holt, of Liverpool, and Mr. B. Waymouth, the Secretary to ‘Lloyd’s Register.’

To enumerate all those who have so courteously and generously striven to forward the views of an historian whose only object has been to chronicle facts and events, would be to give an undue extension to these prefatory remarks. I have, therefore, contented myself with acknowledging the sources of my information in foot-notes throughout my work; and I trust they will accept my thanks in the sense in which they are tendered.

In conclusion, I must refer to the kind attention paid to my request by Earl Russell, in revising that portion of my work which refers to the repeal of the Navigation Laws when he was First Minister of the Crown; and to other eminent Statesmen (two of whom have gone through the whole of the sheets of both volumes, making many valuable suggestions) for the approval expressed by them of the manner in which I have compressed the debates on these Laws which have now passed into the domain of history.

W. S. LINDSAY.

Shepperton Manor,
18th January, 1876.

CONTENTS.

ILLUSTRATIONS.

CHART
OF THE
BRITISH ISLES
SHEWING THE
WRECKS AND CASUALTIES
DURING THE YEAR 1873-4,
distinguishing those attended with
Loss of Life

Large Map

MERCHANT SHIPPING.

CHAPTER I.

Progress of the United States of America—Their resources—Discriminating duties levied by France, 1820, against American ships—Rapid rise of New Orleans, and of New York—Boston ships extend their trade to India and China—Stephen Girard, the rich and eccentric American shipowner, note—Mercantile marine laws of the United States—Duties of master and mate—Provision for Seamen—Special Acts relating to them—Power given to American consuls to deal with seamen on their ships—Superiority of native American seamen, owing to their education—Excellent schools and early training for them—Spirit and character of the “Shipping Articles” as affecting the seamen—the owners—and the master or consignee—Conditions of wages, and remedies for their non-payment; and other securities for seamen—Power of Appeal by them to the Admiralty Courts—Laws with reference to pilots—Character of American seamen, and especially of the New Englanders.

Progress of the United States of America.

Perhaps no nation, in either ancient or modern times, ever made such prodigious strides in wealth, population, and power, and, necessarily, in commerce and navigation, as have the United States of America during the first half of the present century. Nor is this a matter for surprise. Practically, the American people had during that period started in life with the singular advantage, that they commenced their career with the accumulated wisdom of a long ancestry, with whom, unlike the nations of ancient times, they have continued to have the means of easy communication. Therefore, they had the capability of assuming, almost at once, an important position in the world, and of exercising no mean influence over its affairs, having few of those difficulties to encounter, which European nations, in their slow emergence from a state of political and intellectual darkness, have taken centuries to surmount.

Their resources.

Finding themselves in a safe geographical position, with the most magnificent harbours on every part of their coast, already prepared by the hand of nature for their use, with the greatest navigable rivers in the world, with lakes which are inland seas, and with boundless virgin soil at their disposal: wanting nothing, in short, but wise laws and abundant labour, they speedily discovered their strength, and, in their earlier debates, in Congress gravely discussed the question whether they should not style themselves the most enlightened people in the world.[1] Nor, indeed, was this boast altogether vain and baseless, for the Americans were in a position to adopt, as they might choose, the whole sum of human knowledge, with the power, at the same time, of applying this knowledge to the satisfaction of their varying wants.

Their capacity for government, in its application to commerce and navigation, equalled, if it did not surpass, that of the race whence they descended; and their system of education, the only true basis of a nation’s greatness, far surpassed that of Great Britain; hence, in all diplomatic negotiations, relating either to their political independence or to their material interests, they have generally exhibited such marked tact, ability, and acuteness, as has enabled them frequently to obtain ample redress from foreign nations, and often, too, without that formal demand which, if not complied with, leads to war: from their example a few of our diplomatists, who reside abroad, would do well to take a lesson.

With these elements of knowledge, wealth, and national power, combined with a martial spirit, readily kindled into action whenever the necessity arose, the Americans, under an extremely liberal government, have rapidly and deservedly assumed a proud position among nations. Not the least interesting and instructive cause of their rise was the promptitude with which they developed, by the then best known means, their great natural resources, and none more so than their maritime commerce, for, within eighty years from their Declaration of Independence, they rivalled, and, indeed, surpassed in the amount of their merchant shipping, all other nations.[2]

Discriminating duties levied by France, 1820, against American ships.

Nor was that high position reached without innumerable difficulties in the shape of laws adverse to her interests. Great Britain excluded her ships from all her colonies; and, though France had ceded to her by treaty in 1803, for the sum of fifteen million dollars, the State of Louisiana, that country for many years afterwards continued to levy heavy differential duties on all goods imported into France in American bottoms, while American shipowners had to contend at their port of export against the predominant interests of a country whose settlers for a long time greatly outnumbered the native Americans resident in New Orleans. Indeed, so late as 1820, a long memorial[3] was presented to Congress from twenty-four captains of American vessels then lying at New Orleans, stating that they “cannot earn a competent livelihood, owing to the fatal discriminating duties established in France in favour of its own vessels in the exclusive importation there of the staples of the United States.” The memorialists[4] further alleged that on some articles the duty was “ten times” in favour of French vessels, and that the “aggregate importation in French vessels at the port of New Orleans exceeded very much in quantity the amount imported by American vessels;” being in the proportion of “nearly four to one.” In confirmation of these statements the memorialists furnished a return from the Customs which demonstrated that the carrying trade between New Orleans and France was being then rapidly transferred from American to French vessels; and they stated that the only reason why the French did not absorb the whole trade, was that they had not a sufficient number of vessels to undertake it. The petitioners further insisted that nothing but “a positive tonnage duty,” graduated according to the amount of the differential duties levied in France on the chief American staples, would avail to keep their trade in their own hands.

Rapid rise of New Orleans

Nevertheless, in spite of these hostile tariffs, and the war of retaliating duties which was for some time waged, New Orleans, from being the natural emporium of the vast tracts of country traversed by the Mississippi, Missouri, and their tributary streams, and enjoying, as it does, a greater command of internal navigation than any other city in either the Old or New World, has made since 1820 the most astounding strides in its maritime commerce.[5]

and of New York.

But in the face of equal difficulties as regards hostile tariffs, New York, through the great natural resources at her command, and other causes, surpassed New Orleans in the rapidity of its early commercial and maritime progress. Although its advancement during the first decade of the present century was scarcely equal to that of the preceding ten years, during which it enjoyed unexceptionable prosperity (no other city in the United States having profited so much, during the earlier periods, by the war in Europe), its merchants and shipowners suffered severely between 1806 and 1815 from the disastrous effects of captures, condemnations, and embargoes. Nor was it until 1825 that New York began to assume the importance which she has continued to maintain among the other commercial cities of the Union. In that year an internal element of prosperity was brought into operation by the construction of the Erie Canal, which opened for trade the agricultural products of the fertile valley of the Tennessee, and the whole coasts of the northern lakes. The introduction of steam-navigation, to which I shall fully refer hereafter, affording greatly increased facilities for the conveyance of merchandise to and from New York by means of the numerous navigable rivers which intersected that and the neighbouring States, naturally gave an enormous impulse to its navigation, while the coal from the great Pennsylvania coal basin contributed essentially to its prosperity.[6]

Boston ships extend their trade to India and China.

Nor was the prosperity confined to New York. It extended for many years to all the ports of the Union. Boston, which, twenty years before the Declaration of Independence, was only a village containing about twenty houses, and, so late as 1822, was still governed by a body of “select men,” according to the custom of New England [the people, till then, declining to adopt a municipal government], vied with New York in the Foreign Trade which had arisen, and early in the present century despatched their vessels on the most distant voyages. Indeed, so early as 1789, the merchants of Boston and Salem sent various ships direct to the East Indies and China, and, many years before the “Free Traders” of Great Britain could enter upon this trade, then monopolised by the ships of the East India Company, so far as regards Great Britain, the merchants[7] of Massachusetts supplied, not merely their own people with the bulk of the teas, spices, silks, sugar and coffee from the East as well as with nankeens and other cotton clothes, but reshipped them from Boston to Hamburg and the Northern ports of Europe in their own vessels, thus deriving large profits from a trade with our possessions, from which the great bulk of our ships were long excluded by the stringent restrictions of a pernicious monopoly.[8]

Mercantile marine laws of the United States.

We have thus seen with what rapidity the Americans, in their early career, covered almost every ocean with their ships. As in other matters, so in the rules and regulations drawn up for the internal management of their marine, they were able, at the commencement of their independence, to adopt from other nations such laws, even to their most minute details, as appeared to them the best fitted for their position. Thus, one of their earliest Acts, that of 1790, provides: that, “if a seaman is engaged without the execution of the shipping paper, the master or mariner shall pay to the seaman the highest wages that have been given within the three months next before the time of such shipping;” and the principle of this law has been long maintained, for the Act of 1840 declares that “any seaman so shipped may, at any time, leave the service, and demand the highest rate of wages given to any seaman shipped for the voyage.” In the Bank and Cod-fisheries, the contract of seamen with the masters and owners is required to be in writing, expressing the general terms of the voyage; and in the Whale-fishery, though the shipping paper is not absolutely required by the law, there is still a regular engagement, generally in writing, stipulating, among other things, the terms of the voyage, and the shares or “lays” of each officer and seaman on board the ship.

Duties of master and mate.

The several modes in which seamen’s contracts are executed, are the hiring by the month or by the voyage so long as it shall continue, or for a share of the profits, or of the freight earned in certain voyages. The American law invests the master with the sole government of his ship and the absolute right of direction, subject to the legal consequences of any abuse of his powers. He may enforce his authority by the infliction of punishment upon the crew, but, should he exceed these limits, he is liable, by a Statute of the United States, to an action for damages in the Civil Courts, and to a criminal prosecution. The measure of punishment proportioned to the offence is to be ascertained by the special circumstances of the case; but all punishments must be inflicted with proper instruments. Hence, while the master has power to punish a seaman and to imprison him on board, to prevent a violation of the order and peace of the ship, he must be prepared to show that such measures were necessary.

The duties of mate, as laid down by the United States, resemble those of other countries. In the absence or death of the master he takes his place, exercising a general superintendence over the affairs of the ship. But his ordinary duties are confined to calling the attention of the master to everything requiring his notice, to the receipt and stowage of cargo, and to whatever is necessary for the proper equipment and sailing of the vessel while at sea. The mate is also required to keep the log-book, wherein he is bound to enter every matter of importance, such as the courses steered, the winds, and state of the weather, with many other minute details connected with the navigation of the ship. If he is guilty of such negligence as to involve the loss of his cargo, he alone is responsible; and if he interferes with the responsibility, of others he renders himself responsible. Thus, if he undertakes, while in harbour, the removal of any merchandise, resulting in loss, the amount may be deducted from his wages, it being the rule, that the wharfinger is responsible for the safe delivery of all goods on board the vessel.

Provision for seamen.

The American law has, also, provided for the proper sustenance of seamen, by requiring that a certain amount of the provisions shipped be set apart for this purpose, and, further, that they shall be provided for during bonâ fide sicknesses occurring during the service of the ship, and not from the seamen’s own fault, when absent occasionally or without express permission. All vessels bound for any ports beyond the limits of the United States are to be provided with a medicine chest. Provision, moreover, is made for sick and disabled seamen on shore, the law enjoining on the master or owner of every vessel the payment towards the maintenance of hospitals on shore, into the hands of the Collector of Customs of 20 cents per month for every seaman in their employ. This sum is deducted from the wages of the seamen, and is required from all seamen alike, whether in the coasting or oversea trades.

Barratry committed by the master or mariner is treated as in England. Running away with or destroying the ship, mutiny, piracy, piratical confederacy, endeavouring to create a revolt, desertion, embezzlement, negligence, drunkenness, and disobedience, are all regarded as grave offences, and punished in a greater or less degree.

Special Acts relating to them.

By the Act of the 20th February, 1803, it was provided that the master of any merchant vessel, clearing for a foreign port, should enter into a bond in the sum of 400l. for the production of his crew at the first port at which he should arrive on his return to the United States, unless any one or more of the crew had been discharged in a foreign country, with the consent of the American consul or commercial agent of the United States, except in the case of death, of absconding, or of forcible impressment into some other service. This Act, likewise, provided that, when a vessel was sold abroad, and the crew discharged by mutual consent, the master should pay to the consul for any seaman thus discharged three months’ wages over and above those he had earned up to the time of his discharge; two-thirds thereof to be paid to the seaman himself, on his engagement to return to the United States, and the remaining third to be retained towards a fund for the payment of the passages for seamen, citizens of the United States, who may be desirous of returning home; and for the maintenance of destitute American seamen resident at the port of discharge.

Power given to American consuls

Although many persons were of opinion that the Act of 1803, requiring, under the circumstances named, a payment of three months’ extra wages, and empowering consuls to send seamen home, disabled or otherwise, “in the most reasonable manner,” frequently led to improper expenditure, and that a more strict accountability, than then existed, ought to be enforced, these clauses remained unaltered until 1840, when their features were changed; consuls and commercial agents of the United States being by the Act of the 20th July of that year invested with the power to discharge, when they thought it “expedient,” any seaman, on the joint application of the master of the ship and the seaman himself, without requiring payment of any sum beyond the wages due at the time of discharge.

The Act, however, of 1840 created so many objections of another kind, that it became necessary, shortly afterwards, to make various alterations. It was felt that the discretion given to the consuls was likely to operate unfortunately for all parties concerned. Acting, as the consuls then very frequently did, in the double capacity of agent for the United States and consignee of the vessel, they were too often induced to gratify the wishes of the owner and master to the injury of the seaman. Consequently, either the American consular establishments had to be re-organised upon a more independent system, or the “expediency” clauses had to be abolished. But other and still more weighty reasons suggested the desirability of adopting the former course. While, at a later period, the discretionary power was abolished, except in cases of sickness and insubordination, arrangements were made to disconnect Government agencies entirely from commercial operations. Now, all consuls, who must be exclusively American citizens, are remunerated by fixed salaries, instead of fees as formerly, and are removed from the possibility of all interested connexion with shipowners and shipmasters; by being, in nearly every instance, as is now the case with the consuls of Great Britain, prohibited from carrying on business on their own account—at least such business as can in any way interfere with their duties as consul.

to deal with seamen on their ships.

But it has been necessary also to make several other material alterations in the maritime laws. By the Act of 1790, it was provided that if any seaman deserted, or even absented himself for forty-eight hours without leave from his ship, he forfeited to the master or owner of the vessel all the wages due to him, and all his goods and chattels on board, or in any store where they were deposited at the time of such desertion or absence, besides other penalties. This forfeiture might be necessary or proper to check desertion; but it was easy to see, that it was in the highest degree unwise, that it should be given for the use of the master or owner of the ship. It tended, indeed, to produce the very effect and mischief it was intended to prevent. Masters of American vessels, when nearing a port where a new crew could be shipped at reduced wages, and when in arrears to their seamen (a fact which often occurs in long whaling voyages), were apt to adopt a course of tyrannical conduct, with the desire of compelling desertion; and, on their arrival, to permit their sailors a temporary absence from the ship, and then to leave them, under the plea of desertion, as a charge on the hands of the consul.

One flagrant instance was mentioned by the consul at Lima, of a supercargo of a vessel, who stated that he had saved in one voyage alone more than 1000 dollars by the desertion of his hands, as if this were a fair source of profit to either owner or master.

The simple entry in the log-book of the fact of absence or desertion was, then, deemed conclusive against the seaman. Hence a very large sum was necessarily expended by the American Government in providing for destitute seamen. But this was partly attributable to the general increase of the United States commerce, and not altogether to the defective working of the law. While the aggregate amount of the registered tonnage of the United States in 1830 was about 576,000 tons, it had reached in 1840, 899,000, showing an increase of 323,000 in ten years,[9] but the increase of seamen applying for relief at distant consulates had at that time, it would seem, gone far beyond the general increase in the amount of shipping.

The whole question of the relations between the men and their employers, as they existed in the United States, is too wide a subject to be embraced in the present work. There are, however, some general, as well as special, points, both as regards the mariners and the law regulating their conduct, which deserve attention. During the first half of this century the masters of American vessels were, as a rule, greatly superior to those who held similar positions in English ships, arising in some measure from the limited education of the latter, which was not sufficient to qualify them for the higher grades of the merchant service. American shipowners required of their masters not merely a knowledge of navigation and seamanship, but of commercial pursuits, the nature of exchanges, the art of correspondence, and a sufficient knowledge of business to qualify them to represent the interests of their employers to advantage with merchants abroad. On all such matters the commanders of English ships, with the exception of the East India Company’s, were at this period greatly inferior to the commanders of the United States vessels.

“Education,” remarks Mr. Joseph T. Sherwood,[10] “is much prized by the citizens; many vessels, therefore, are commanded by gentlemen with a college education, and by those educated in high schools, who, on leaving those institutions, enter a merchant’s counting-room for a limited time before they go to sea for practical seamanship, &c., or are entrusted by their parents, guardians, or friends, with the command of vessels.”

Superiority of native American seamen, owing to their education.

In confirmation of this opinion, Mr. Consul Peter, of Philadelphia, states[11]: “A lad intended for the higher grades of the merchant service in this country, after having been at school for some years and acquired (in addition to the ordinary branches of school learning) a competent knowledge of Mathematics, Navigation, Ships’ husbandry, and perhaps French, is generally apprenticed to some respectable merchant, in whose counting-house he remains two or three years, or at least until he becomes familiar with exchanges and such other commercial matters as may best qualify him to represent his principal in foreign countries. He is then sent to sea, generally in the capacity of second mate, from which he gradually rises to that of captain.”

Besides this, however, it must be remembered that American shipowners offered greater inducements than the English then did to young men of talent and education to enter the merchant service, as the amount of wages, alone, was two- and three-fold greater in the former than in the latter. Again, the American shipmasters were, also, almost invariably admitted, nay frequently solicited by the managing owners, to take some shares in the ships placed under their command; and, in cases, where the master had no capital, the owner often conveyed to him a share of one-sixth, and sometimes even one quarter, to be paid for out of his wages and the profits of the ships. Thus young men of good position and talent were led to enter the American merchant service, and had much greater inducements than they would then have had in Great Britain to take a zealous interest in the economy, discipline, and success of the ship they commanded; and this, not merely from the fact that they were well recommended, but from the confidential and courteous treatment they received from their employers. Captains of the larger class of packets or merchant-ships, therefore, could not only afford to live as gentlemen, but, if men of good character and fair manners (which they generally were), they were received into the best mercantile circles on shore. They were also allowed, besides their fixed salary, a percentage (usually 2½ per cent.) on all freights, and by various other privileges (particularly in relation to passengers) they were thus enabled to save money and to become, in time, merchants and shipowners on their own account, a custom which prevailed, to a large extent, in the New England States.

Excellent schools and early training for them.

Nor were the interests of the common seamen overlooked. Boys of all classes, when fit, had the privilege of entering the higher free schools, in which they could be educated for almost every profession. An ignorant American native seaman was, therefore, scarcely to be found; they all, with few exceptions, knew how to read, write, and cypher. Although, in all nations, a mariner is considered a citizen of the world, whose home is on the sea, and, as such, can enforce compensation for his labour in the Courts of any country, his contract being recognised by general jurisprudence, the cases of disputes between native-born Americans and their captains have ever been less frequent both in this country and abroad than between British masters and seamen, owing, in a great measure, to the superior education and the more rigorous discipline on board American vessels. In the United States, the master of the ship was, and is still, usually employed to hire the seamen; and although, in hiring, he is the agent of the owners (and they have co-ordinate power), still if they do not dissent, the engagement entered into by the master with the seamen is binding on the owners also. The contract is, however, not made with the person of the master, but with the shipowners; therefore, if there is no master, the seamen contract to sail under any master who may be appointed. Thus, on the one side of the contract is the seaman, and, on the other, the master or owner—the master acting as the owner’s agent, under ordinary circumstances, although the owner, from his holding the property in the ship, is more directly affected by the contract.

Spirit and character of the “Shipping Articles,”

The master and owner, on their side, agree by the contract, technically termed “Shipping Articles,” which, if drawn up in the prescribed form and signed by all the seamen, expresses the conditions of the voyage, with a promise to pay to the mariners their stipulated wages. It is, also, implied in it that the voyage shall be legal, and the vessel provided with the various requisites for navigation; and, further, that it shall be within defined limits and without deviation, except such as may be absolutely necessary for the safety of the crew, vessel, or cargo. It is also a part of the contract that the seamen shall be treated with humanity, and be provided with subsistence according to the laws of their country; unless there is in it an express provision to the contrary, or a condition to conform with the usages of a particular trade.

as affecting the seamen;

The seaman, on his side, by the act of signing the “Shipping Articles,” contracts to do all in his power for the welfare of the ship; engages that he has competent knowledge for the performance of the duties of the station for which he contracts; to be on board at the precise time which, by American law, constitutes a part of the articles; and to remain in the service of the ship till the voyage has been completed. If he does not so report himself on board the vessel, he may be apprehended and committed to the custody of the law till the ship is ready to sail. He contracts also to obey all the lawful commands of the master; to preserve order and discipline aboard, and to submit, as a child to its parent, for the purpose of securing such order and discipline during the voyage.[12]

the owners;

As in England, the owners have the right of removing a master, who is part owner of a vessel; but, if he is removed without good cause, and while at the same time specially engaged, they are liable to him for damages. Where, however, he has only a general engagement with a vessel, his relation to the owners is scarcely more than a mere agency, revocable at any time. On the other hand, the master cannot leave the ship in which he has contracted to sail without being himself answerable to the owners.

The authority of a master over his ship is in all essential particulars the same as that prescribed by British law. With regard to letting the ship, the same principles prevail on both sides of the Atlantic.[13]

In general the owners are responsible for injuries committed by the master in that capacity, as in cases of collision, discharges of mariners, damages to cargo from want of ordinary care, and embezzlement. The master is answerable for all contracts made by him in connexion with the navigation of a ship, as also for all damages arising from his want of skill or care, and for repairs and supplies, except when furnished on the exclusive credit of the owner.

and the masters or consignees.

If the master of a ship is at the same time commander and consignee, he stands in the twofold relation of agent of the owner and consignor, and is invested with appropriate duties in both capacities. Inasmuch as the master and owner are in the eyes of the American law common carriers, it is the master’s duty to see that his vessel is seaworthy and provided with a proper crew, to take a pilot, where required by custom or law, to stow the goods properly, to set sail in fair weather, to transport the cargo with care, and to provide against all but inevitable mishaps. In other respects, American and English laws are almost identical; the admirable decisions of Judge Story, Chancellor Kent, and Chief Justice Marshall having, however, made some refined distinctions.

Conditions of wages,

and remedies for their non-payment; and the other securities for seamen.

As it was considered the duty of sailors to remain by their vessel till the cargo was discharged, they had no claim to their wages till then, but, if these were not paid within ten days after such discharge, they had a right to an admiralty process against the vessel. Only one-third of the wages earned can be demanded by the mariner at any port of delivery during the voyage. There may be on this subject a special stipulation; but, if the ship be lost or captured, wages earned up to the last port of delivery may be recovered by the mariner, on his return home, to the place to which the vessel has carried freight; freight being by the laws of all nations “the Mother of Wages:” inasmuch, however, as they depend upon the vessel’s safety and the earning of the freight, they cannot be insured. In all cases of capture, the seamen lose their wages, unless the ship is restored. In cases of rescue, recapture, and ransom, the wages of mariners are subject to a general average, but in no other case are they liable to contribute. In cases of shipwreck the rule prevails, as elsewhere, that, if parts of the ship be saved by the exertions of the seamen, they hold a lien on those parts for some kind of compensation, but this is viewed somewhat in the light of salvage. When a seaman dies on board ship, wages are usually allowed up to the time of his decease, if the cause of death occurred during the term of his engagement, and otherwise than by his own fault. In the whale-fishery, the representatives of a deceased mariner are entitled to that share of the profits which the term of his service bore to the whole voyage, according to his contract. If a voyage is broken up by the fault of the master or owner, full compensation must be given to the seaman; so also, in cases of wrongful discharge, the seaman usually recovers full indemnification in American Courts of law. Indeed they have more effectual remedies for the recovery of their wages than the seamen of most other countries, from the fact that Americans have followed the ancient laws already quoted: moreover, they have their remedy against the master, and can recover their wages from him personally, or from the owner or owners of the vessel, or from the person who appointed the master and gave him his authority.

For personal injuries inflicted by the master upon the seamen, such as assaults, batteries, or imprisonments, the seaman in the United States has his remedy by an action at common law, or by a libel in the Admiralty Courts, in what is technically denominated “a cause of damage.” So, also, in a wrongful discharge, an action would be not only on the special tort committed, but also for the wages on the original contract of hiring, the wrongful discharge being void.

Power of appeal by them to the Admiralty Courts.

In order to institute suits in the Courts of Admiralty in the United States it is necessary that the voyage should be on tidal waters, and that the service on which suit is brought should be connected with commerce and navigation. The jurisdiction of those Courts in America extends to personal suits, and includes claims founded in contract and in wrong, and also those cases where claims, founded in a hypothecary interest of the nature of a lien, are urged and adjudicated upon. Their jurisdiction extends, moreover, to those cases in which shares of fish, taken on the Bank and other Cod-fisheries, and of oil in the Whale-fishery, are claimed; and, as in English Courts, the seaman may unite his claims, though founded on distinct contracts, in one suit, but this only when demanding wages. The Courts of Common Law in the United States also take cognizance of mariners’ contracts, but they are not competent to give a remedy so as to enforce the mariner’s lien on the vessel; hence, they confine their jurisdiction to personal suits against the master or owner, in accordance with the contract made with the seaman; but, in cases of tort committed on the high seas, and where the form of action is trespass, or a special action, the common law has concurrent jurisdiction.

The laws of the United States[14] expressly provide that the crews of merchant vessels shall have the fullest liberty to lay their complaints before their consuls abroad, and shall in no respect be restrained therein by any master or officer, unless some sufficient and valid objection exist against their landing, in which case it is the duty of the master to apprize the consul forthwith, stating the reason why the seaman is not permitted to land; whereupon, the consul must proceed on board, and act as the law directs. In all cases where deserters are apprehended the consul is required to investigate the facts, and, if satisfied that the desertion was caused by unusual or cruel treatment, the mariner shall be, in such case, not merely discharged, but shall receive, in addition to his wages, three months’ pay, and the whole act is required to be entered upon the crew-list and shipping articles, with full particulars of the nature of this treatment. Any consul or commercial agent of the United States neglecting or omitting to perform his duties, or guilty of malversation or abuse of power, is liable to an action from the parties aggrieved; and, for corrupt conduct in office, he is liable to indictment, and on conviction may be fined from one to ten thousand dollars, and be imprisoned not less than one, or more than five, years.

Laws with reference to pilots.

Although Congress possesses the power to make the laws necessary for the regulation of Pilots, and the whole business of pilotage is within its authority, there is no general law for these purposes, and the superintendence of pilots is left to the legislation of the individual States. By the Act of 7 August, 1789, it was enacted that all pilots in the bays, inlets, rivers, harbours, and ports of the United States should continue to be regulated by the existing laws of the States respectively, until further legislative proceeding by Congress. The licensing of pilots and fixing rates of pilotage were therefore thus arranged at first; but, as some difficulties arose, it was enacted by the Act 2 March, 1837, that it was lawful for the master or commander of any vessel coming into, or going out of, any port situate upon waters forming the boundaries of any two States to employ any duly licensed or authorised pilot of either State.[15]

Character of American seamen, especially, of the New Englanders.

The native-born American seamen are bold, adventurous, and brave. In their merchant vessels the proportion of native seamen is estimated at about one-third, while it was a common remark that “the rest are rascally Spaniards, surly John Bulls, Zealanders, Malays, anything of any country.” The American native-born seaman is frequently promoted to be an officer, and, sometimes, to the command of large ships, but there are perpetual complaints that the people of the United States do not “take to the sea” with alacrity. Indeed, it is only in the New England States that the sailor’s life may be said to belong to the soil itself, and even the natives of that comparatively barren soil and rigorous climate become sailors, perhaps less from love of adventure and from their natural hardiness, than from necessity. When boys they had, perhaps, widowed mothers to support, younger brothers and sisters to care for, and, there being no other congenial occupation, they “go to sea.” When complaining of his “dog’s life,” the American sailor sits by the hour whittling a stick, and building little boats for his child, recounting at the same time the perils and hardships of the sea. Like British seamen, he has always his pet ship, in which most of his experience has been acquired, and the name of that ship is oftenest on his lips. It is associated with the story of his loves, with the memory of his friendships, and he dates all eras from his several voyages in the vessel of the “one loved name.” As New England was the great storehouse of American seamen, there the best specimens of their seafaring population were to be found. We have seen, even in our time, the puritanical, weather-beaten, Boston skipper—once so famous—sharp as a north-easter, dressed in knee-breeches and buckles, with a three-cornered cocked-hat, not forgetting the pigtail, the very personification of our Commodore Trunnion and Piper of a century ago. But, though they may have degenerated since then, the seamen engaged in the deep-sea fisheries are still a remarkably hardy, robust race, and, hence, have succeeded in that branch of maritime enterprise far more than our own adventurers of late years.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] See Alexander Baring’s pamphlet, 1808.

[2] In 1860, the United States owned a larger amount of tonnage, including lake and river steamers, than the United Kingdom, and nearly as much as Great Britain and all her colonies and possessions combined.

[3] State papers, America, ‘Commerce and Navigation,’ vol. ii. p. 413.

[4] The names appended to the petition are nearly all Anglo-Saxon, such as Rogers, Jones, Howard, &c.

[5] In 1818, the whole of the exports from New Orleans was only in value a little more than three million sterling; in 1850 it had reached thirty millions; the shipments of raw cotton alone in that year being 1,600,000 bales. During the year ending June 30, 1874, the exports of that article to foreign countries were 2,883,785 bales from the port of New Orleans alone.

[6] In the year ending 30th September, 1822, the tonnage of American vessels entered inwards at New York was 217,538 tons, cleared 185,666, against 22,478, and 17,784 tons foreign vessels, respectively. But for the year ending June 30, 1874, the proportion of entrances at the Port of New York was: American vessels, 1,124,055 tons; foreign vessels, 3,925,563. The clearances were in somewhat the same proportion. The chief causes of these extraordinary changes will appear in the course of this work. In 1850, 2,632,788 tons of American shipping, and 1,728,214 tons of foreign shipping cleared from the ports of the United States. In 1860, the relative proportions were, native vessels, 6,165,924 tons: foreign, 2,624,005; but in 1871, while the clearances of American vessels had fallen to 3,982,852 tons, the clearances of foreign vessels from the ports of the United States had risen to 9,207,396 tons! I take these startling figures, which I wish my readers to bear in mind, from the United States’ official reports, for history is of little value unless it teaches useful lessons.

[7] Among the leading merchants of Boston and Salem then engaged in this lucrative trade may be mentioned the names of Russell, Derby, Cabot, Thorndike, Barrell, Brown, Perkins, Bryant, Sturgis, Higginson, Shaw, Lloyd, Lee, Preble, Peabody, Mason, Jones, and Gray. From 1786 to 1798, Thomas Russell was one of the most enterprising and successful merchants of Boston. His charities were extensive; he was a warm friend to the clergy, and a liberal supporter of all religious institutions. Curiously enough, a member of the families (by the father and mother’s side), of Perkins and of Bryant and Sturgis (Russell Sturgis), now fills the place which Joshua Bates so long occupied as a leading partner in the house of Baring Brothers and Co., of London; Joshua Bates himself having first come to London as agent for Gray, the last name on the list I have given. Towards the close, however, of last century, Brown and Ives of Providence, Peabody of Salem, and T. H. Smith of New York, with Perkins and Co., and Bryant and Sturgis of Boston, carried on nearly all the trade with China.

[8]

Stephen Girard, the rich and eccentric American shipowner.

Though altogether unlike Mr. Russell and the other shipowners and merchants of Boston I have just named, I cannot omit to mention, in connexion with the early history of the Merchant Shipping of the United States, the name of Stephen Girard, one of the most prosperous and eccentric of men, who was long known as the “rich shipowner and banker of Philadelphia.” Born near Bordeaux, in 1750, of obscure parents, he, at the age of ten or twelve years, embarked as a cabin boy, with only a very limited knowledge of the elements of reading and writing, on a vessel bound for the West Indies. Thence he sailed in the service of an American shipmaster, to whom he had engaged himself, as an apprentice, for New York. He soon rose to be mate and master, and, after making a little money, he opened a small store in Philadelphia, and also carried on a shipping business with New Orleans and St. Domingo. At the latter place a tragical circumstance occurred strongly illustrative of the troubles of the time, but which contributed materially to swell Girard’s fortune. It chanced that at the moment of the insurrection of St. Domingo, Girard had two vessels lying near the wharf in one of the ports of that island. On the sudden outbreak, the planters, instinctively rushed to the harbour and deposited their most valuable treasures in the ships then there for the purpose of safety; but returned themselves in order to collect more property. As the greater part of them were massacred, few remained to claim the property, and as a large portion of it had been deposited in Girard’s vessels, for which no claims were made, he thus became its owner. In 1791 he commenced building a class of beautiful ships, long the pride of Philadelphia, for the trade with Calcutta and China—their names, however,—the Montesquieu, Helvetius, Voltaire, and Rousseau—too conspicuously reveal the religious dogmas of their owner. By judicious and successful operations in banking, combined with shipowning, Girard made so large a fortune that, in 1813, he was considered the wealthiest trader in the United States. It is told of him that when, in that year, one of his vessels with a cargo consisting of teas, nankeens, and silks from China, was seized on entering the Delaware, he ransomed her from the captors on the spot by a payment of $93,000, paid in doubloons, and by this transaction added half a million of dollars to his fortune! But Girard, with all his wealth, ended his career without a friend or relative to soothe his declining years and close his eyes in death. His legacies were large and numerous, while the largest of them were characteristic of the man. Among these may be named his bequest of 208,000 acres of land and thirty slaves to the city of New Orleans, and other large tracts of land in Louisiana to the Corporation of Philadelphia. To the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania he gave $30,000 for internal improvements; but the most extraordinary of his bequests was $2,000,000, which he left for the erection of an orphan college at Philadelphia—a magnificent building—and the endowment of suitable instructors, requiring and enjoining, however, by his will, “that no ecclesiastic, missionary, or minister of any sect whatsoever shall ever hold or exercise any station or duty whatever in the said college; nor shall any such person ever be admitted for any purpose, or as a visitor, within the premises appropriated to the purposes of the said college.” Such was Stephen Girard, master and mariner.

[9] Vide Mr. Calhoun’s report, ‘Executive Documents,’ 2nd Session, 28th Congress, Document No. 95. 1844-45.

[10] Letter addressed by Mr. Sherwood, British Consul for Maine and New Hampshire, U.S., to Foreign Office, July 23, 1847, see Par. Paper, ‘Commercial Marine of Great Britain, 1848,’ p. 382.

[11] Papers relating to the Commercial Marine of Great Britain, 1848, p. 388.

[12] Act of 20th July, 1840, section 3, U.S. Acts, Boston Ed., vol. v. p. 394.

[13] For some very nice points of distinction, the reader may consult ‘Arnold’s Marine Insurance,’ Ed. 1857, where the decisions of Judge Story and Chancellor Kent are laid down with profound learning and judgment.

[14] Act 20th July, 1840, 16th and 17th sections.

[15] In a note to this Act (Statutes at Large U.S., Boston, 1850) will be found an admirable exposition of some decisions of the American Courts respecting the scope of a pilot’s duties. They are excellent, but too long to insert here.

CHAPTER II.

Necessity of proper education for merchant seamen—Practice in Denmark—In Norway and Sweden—Russia and Prussia—France—Remarkable care of seamen in Venice, Scuola di San Nicolo—Character of this institution, and general working—Variously modified since first creation—State since 1814—Qualifications of Venetian shipmasters—Present regulations of Austria—Great Britain—Need of a public institution for merchant seamen—The “Belvidere” or Royal Alfred Aged Seaman’s Institution, note—Mr. Williams, observations by, on the advantage of a general Seaman’s Fund, note—Institution in Norway—Foreign Office circular of July 1, 1843—Its value, though unfair and one-sided—Replies to circular—Mr. Consul Booker—Mr. Consul Baker—Mr. Consul Yeames—The Consul at Dantzig—The Consuls of Genoa, Ancona, and Naples—Mr. Consul Sherrard—Mr. Consul MacTavish—Mr. Consul Hesketh—Reports from the Consuls in South America—General conclusions of Mr. Murray, Nov. 22, 1847, and suggestions for remedies—Board of Trade Commission, May 17, 1847—Its results—Shipowners condemned for the character of their ships and officers—Views of Government—Necessity of a competent Marine Department.

Necessity of proper education for merchant seamen.

Although it can scarcely be said that the character of British seamen degenerated from the time America declared her independence till towards the close of the first half of the present century, there is no doubt that those of other nations were making rapid strides in advance of them. Indeed, many causes had combined to raise, alike, the position of the shipowners and seamen of foreign nations, not the least of these being the protection afforded to our shipowners by the Navigation Laws, as under that protective system they felt it less necessary to exert themselves to contend with the foreigner as keenly as, under other circumstances, they would surely have done. Most foreign nations had also directed their attention, long before we did, to the necessity of thorough education for their seafaring population—a policy they have since maintained. With that object in view, schools were established at all their principal seaports, where not merely the rudiments of navigation were taught the youths, but considerable attention was also devoted to their moral and intellectual improvement.

Practice in Denmark.

In Denmark, for instance, the system of education for the higher grades of the merchant service was particularly strict and effective. No Danish subject was allowed to act as master of a merchant vessel unless he had previously made two voyages in the capacity of mate, while the mates themselves had, and still have, to submit to a general examination, embracing (1st) a knowledge of dead-reckoning, the nature and use of logarithms, and the first rudiments of geometry; (2nd) the nature and use of the compass and log; and (3rd) the form and motions of the earth, and the geographical lines projected on its surface, so as to be able to determine the position of different places. It was also expected that he should understand the nature of Mercator’s charts, and the mode of laying down the ship’s course on them, together with such calculations as may be necessary for this purpose. Expertness in keeping a journal, in the use of the quadrant, and in making the necessary allowances for currents, lee-way, and the variations of the compass, were all required, together with some idea of the daily motion of the celestial bodies, of the sun’s proper motion, and the meaning of the words “horizon,” “refraction,” “semi-diameter,” “radius,” and “parallax.” He was also required to know how to use the instruments for calculating the elevation of the sun and stars, and the distance between objects on shore! Nor, indeed, was his examination limited to the more ordinary details of a navigator’s duty. He was expected to be expert in ascertaining what star enters the meridian at a given time at the highest and the lowest elevations, as well as in finding the latitude, both by means of the meridian height of the sun or of a star, and in determining the time for high and low water. He was further expected to understand the mode of calculating the time of sunrise and sunset, and of ascertaining the variations of the compass by means of one or more bearings in the horizon, and by the azimuth.

In Norway and Sweden.

In Norway and Sweden, mates of ships had to undergo a similar examination before being allowed to act in that capacity, and a still more rigid examination both as regards seamanship, navigation, and the general knowledge of business relating to shipping affairs, before they could command a vessel, together with a knowledge of the Customs and Navigation Laws, and of the usual averages and exchange. They had likewise to know something of the elements of shipbuilding, and of the mode of measuring a ship’s capacity.

Russia and Prussia.

In Russia and Prussia the mates and masters of merchant vessels, besides the qualifications above referred to, were required not merely to read and write their own language with accuracy, but to have some knowledge also of English and French.

So early as 1806 a school was founded in Nicolaieff to train masters and pilots for the commercial marine, which, in 1832, was enlarged and removed to Cherson, while another and similar establishment was at the same time founded in St. Petersburg. All coasting vessels are now bound to have masters who have left these schools with certificates of competency. But the most important measure for the encouragement of seamen in Russia, whether employed in river or sea navigation, was enacted in 1826; families devoted to navigation being then for the first time incorporated in certain towns along the sea coasts and great rivers under the designation of “Corporations of Free Mariners.” These corporations were exempted from the capitation and land taxes, and from the conscription and quartering of troops, on condition that they sent their young men to serve for five years as apprentices in the Imperial fleet.

France.

The system, however, of combining the services of seamen for the navy and the mercantile marine alike has been more thoroughly organised in France than in any other country. There the State and Commercial Navy are under the same code of regulations, the members of each being equally entitled to a pension after a certain length of service: in fact, all seamen in France are held to be in Government employ; their names are registered in the office of the Marine Commissioners of the port to which they belong, and, from the age of eighteen to fifty, they are liable to be ordered at any time on board a Government ship, to serve as long as necessary. Hence it is that almost every seaman or fisherman of France has served in the navy for at least three years. At the age of fifty, and on the completion of a service at sea of three hundred months in either the navy or the merchant marine, a seaman receives a pension according to a certain scale, whereby, however, he cannot get more than six hundred francs, or less than ninety-six francs per annum. But these pensions are not really paid by the State, as a deduction of three per cent. is made from the monthly pay of every seaman in either service, so as to provide a fund for their payment.

France also provides for her seafaring classes more liberal and effective means of education than are, perhaps, to be found in any other country. A professor, paid by Government, resides in each of its principal ports, who affords to all, seeking to be commanders in the merchant service, instruction, free of charge, on the different subjects connected with their profession.[16]

Remarkable care of seamen in Venice; Scuola di San Nicolo.

Seaman’s funds, somewhat similar to those in France, have been established by all other European nations, though the objects in view have differed. That in England, well known as the Merchant Seaman’s Fund, was instituted during the early part of the present century, for the benefit solely of merchant seamen, who were not under any obligation to serve in ships of war, though, during the great war, they were too frequently pressed into the service. All these associations appear to have had their origin with the Italian Republics, and that of Venice is of considerable historical importance, forming as it did the basis on which nearly all the others have been engrafted. This institution, called the Scuola di San Nicolo, was originally founded at that city in the year 1476, in commemoration of the successful defence of Scutari by the Venetians against the Turks. Greenwich Hospital, in some respects, resembles it, but the Venetian institution had attached to it a Merchant Seaman’s Fund, distinctly intended for the relief of the old and infirm sailors of that service. The building itself was destroyed in 1806, but the institution still survives.

Character of this institution;

In 1786, the laws relating to this excellent institution having been carefully revised, required that all seamen, whether Venetians or foreigners, as a condition of their employment in the Venetian merchant service, should inscribe their names at the Scuola di San Nicolo. Foreigners domiciled, who had been employed in the sea service of Venice for the space of five years, were also entitled to the benefits of the institution to the same extent as natives.

On the first inscription, each man had to pay three Venetian livres and two soldi (about 2s. 1d.) as entrance money, and, subsequently, an annual contribution of one livre and eleven soldi (1s. 1½d.). In addition to the above, every sailor or other person of the crew of a vessel was bound to pay twenty soldi (10d.) for each voyage out and home.

All who had been inscribed two years, and had punctually paid their contributions, were entitled to the benefits of the institution, that is, to medical attendance and lodging in the Hospital of Invalids, when advanced in years or infirm. Children, it would seem, were only eligible in cases where the fathers had sailed for ten years beyond the limits of the Gulf of Venice, or along the Dalmatian coast.

and general working.

Variously modified since first creation.

The “Scuola di San Nicolo,” as above described, was preserved with all its laws and rules during the first occupation of the Austrians, from 1797 to 1806, after which it was suppressed by the then Government of Italy. An invalid fund was then established, which may be called an institution for the relief of invalid sailors. One-sixtieth was deducted from all payments made on account of the navy, and assigned to it; it thus becoming, in reality, a military institution, under the protection of the Royal Navy. Subsequently additional funds were assigned to it, in the shape of a percentage on all prizes, the proportion given depending on whether the prize or its captor were a ship of war, a privateer, or a merchant vessel.

By a decree of 1811, the endowment of the institution was further augmented, and the means of giving relief were consequently increased. Three per cent., instead of one-sixtieth, was granted out of the pay of the Royal Navy; and merchant seamen were likewise obliged to contribute their respective shares of pay or prize money. Finally, in addition to the percentage on prizes, the following casual sources of emolument were set aside for this institution:—The proceeds of wrecked vessels, if not claimed within a certain time; the pay due to sailors or others, who had deserted from vessels in the service of the State; half of the pay due to deserters from the merchant service; and the amount due on account of pay, prize-money, &c., to sailors or others dying at sea, if not claimed within a certain time. The immediate direction of the establishment was vested in the Comptroller of the Marine, under the supervision of the Royal Navy Board.

State since 1814.

After the return of the Austrian government in 1814, the civil and military establishment and their administration were separated. Invalid sailors of the navy were placed on the same footing as soldiers, and the institution was then kept up and applied solely to the benefit of the commercial marine, under the title of “The Charitable Institution for Invalids of the Venetian Commercial Navy.” The administration of this establishment was vested in the office of Captain of the Port, under the control of the Government.

Merchant seamen sailing in vessels entered on the registers of the Venetian provinces contribute to its support at the rate of three per cent. on their pay, whether captains, officers, or men; this sum to be paid at the office of the Captain of the Port by the captain or owner of the vessel, according to the muster-roll of the crew. Instead of the casual sources of revenue granted by the decree of 1811, above quoted, this institution is now endowed, in lieu of the moiety of the unclaimed pay of deserters from the merchant service, with an equivalent sum together with the amount of all fines levied on seafaring persons for infringement of the naval laws and regulations. The capital thus accruing is invested in the public funds, and the interest applied to the relief of the deserving, according to the following scale:—Captain, one Austrian livre (about 8d. sterling) daily; an officer, eighty centimes daily; and a sailor, about seventy centimes daily; their widows receiving respectively one-half the above sums. In making selections from the candidates for relief, regard is had to the most aged and infirm. There is no building now appropriated for the reception of the aged and infirm, but the sick are admitted, on application, to the Civil Hospital in Venice. Orphan children are not entitled under the rules to relief: indeed these regulations, like others of a similar character, seem but provisional; but, as they embrace the general features of the Austrian and French systems, they merit attention.

Qualifications of Venetian shipmasters.

The law of the Venetian Republic of 1786, relative to the merchant service, shows the pains taken in former times by the Republic to secure efficient and well-educated men for the command of their merchant vessels. It may be inferred that no conditions were imposed on persons desirous of commanding merchant vessels previously to this law, as, by one of its provisions, it was not to affect persons then in employment as captains or masters—a principle adopted by Great Britain in her recent Mercantile Marine Acts. Those desirous of becoming captains or masters were required to prove that they were Venetian subjects; or if foreigners, that they had been naturalised and had resided in the State without intermission, or had been employed in the Venetian sea service for fifteen years. In addition to this it was requisite for the candidates to give proof of being at least twenty-four years of age; of having served at sea for eight years, either in a private ship or in one belonging to the State, before they could command a ship. Every one, too, besides being able to read and write, was required to satisfy competent examiners that he was versed in the theory and practice of navigation. A Venetian subject, having an interest or share in a vessel and being duly qualified, was, however, entitled to command in preference to any other master.

Present regulations of Austria.

The Austrians, following the example of their provinces, now require candidates for the command of merchant vessels to show that they are twenty-one years of age, and are domiciled in the Austrian dominions: that they have served not less than five years in national vessels other than coasting vessels, and that their general conduct has been good. They are required to undergo a severe examination before a commission, consisting of the officer of government charged with the affairs of navigation and trade, the Professor of mathematics in the Naval College, the Captain of the port, one member of the Chamber of Commerce, and two experienced merchant captains. Candidates are required to answer theoretical and practical nautical questions; to solve such problems as are set before them, and show that they are acquainted with naval laws and discipline, before they can take the command of merchant ships.

Great Britain.

Strange to say, Great Britain, the greatest of all maritime nations, has only, at a comparatively recent period, established a system, to which I shall hereafter refer, whereby all masters and mates in her service are now required to undergo an examination: unlike France, however, she still leaves whatever may be the expense of gaining the previous and fundamental knowledge to be borne by themselves.

Need of a public institution for merchant seamen.

It would weary my readers were I to give further details of the different modes established in other nations for securing the due qualifications of masters and seamen, or for providing institutions for their benefit in sickness and old age. With the exception of Greenwich Hospital, created for the benefit of seamen serving in the Royal Navy, England possesses no State institution appropriated exclusively for the education of our merchant seamen, or for their benefit in sickness or old age. The Merchant Seaman’s Fund was abolished[17] in 1851; and I know of no institution in this country where the aged seaman can find refuge, except one which was recently established, and is maintained by voluntary subscriptions.[18] There are, of course, numerous charitable institutions—far more than in any other country—where seamen, as well as all other classes of the community, are to some extent provided for. But it is to be regretted that, when the Merchant Seaman’s Fund was abolished, some great institution, under the authority of the State, to be supported mainly by the seamen, as well as by voluntary contributions and otherwise, was not then attempted for their special use, so as to afford them some certainty that they would receive either outdoor or indoor relief (the former is preferable) when no longer able to provide for themselves.[19]

Institution in Norway.

One of the best of these institutions was formed in Norway, in conformity with the royal rescript of the 23rd December, 1834. It is maintained, by voluntary contributions from seamen and others, by penalties arising from offences of seamen, and, in some measure, by Government aid. The claimants on this society are those seamen who, while employed, contribute regularly to its funds. Its affairs are managed by directors consisting chiefly of shipmasters. Seamen who, on foreign voyages, leave their vessels without permission of the master, lose any rights they may have acquired; while such of them as are entitled to claim, or their relicts, must prove to the satisfaction of the directors that they stand in need of aid. Shipwrecked seamen also receive aid from this society.

Institutions like these, combined with the course of examination required from all men holding responsible positions on board ship, tend materially to improve the condition of foreign seamen, and to give them advantages too long withheld from the British. These advantages, combined with the unwise protection afforded by the Navigation Laws to the shipowners and seamen of Great Britain, gave foreign nations, for a time, a decided superiority over them. Indeed, it was found that during the first half of the present century neither the ships nor their crews kept pace with those of other maritime nations, till at length it became necessary to adopt measures, not merely for the improvement of the condition of our ships, but likewise for raising our seafaring population, by means of a sound education, to such a position as would enable them to compete successfully under all circumstances with the ships and seamen of other states.

Foreign Office circular of July 1, 1843.

Its value, though unfair and one-sided.

With that important object in view, the English Foreign Office issued a circular on the 1st July, 1843, to all our consuls abroad, requesting information respecting the conduct and character of British shipmasters and seamen frequenting foreign ports; the replies to which produced a large mass of valuable information, presented to Parliament in 1848.[20] But this information would have been still more valuable had it been obtained in a less one-sided and invidious manner. “I am particularly desirous,” remarks the writer of the circular, Mr. James Murray, “of gaining information in regard to instances which have come under your observation of the incompetency of British shipmasters to manage their vessels and their crews, whether arising from deficiency of knowledge of practical navigation and seamanship, or of moral character, particularly want of sobriety.... My object is to show the necessity for more authoritative steps on the part of Her Majesty’s Government to remedy what appears to be an evil, detrimental to, and seriously affecting the character of, our commercial marine, and therefore advantageous to foreign rivals, whose merchant vessels are said to be exceedingly well manned and navigated.”

Replies to circular.

Mr. Consul Booker.

With this assumption, that British ships and seamen did exhibit the inferiority suggested by the writer of the circular, it was but natural that the answers to it should, as a rule, be in conformity with the prejudged and premature opinions expressed in it. Voluminous documents poured in from the different consulates, and, certainly, some of them contained charges of the gravest character against the owners and crews of our merchant fleet. The first is a letter (11th July, 1843) from Vice-Consul Booker, at Cronstadt, who seems to have ransacked his archives, containing, as these did, the results of an experience of fifty-nine years—to discover materials whereon he could ground a charge against the British sailors; but, while admitting that drunkenness was their principal failing, and that it was “a rare circumstance that a master is unfit to clear his ship either inwards or outwards,” he added: “It does not happen above two or three times in the year, in which case I get hold of the mate, and no stoppage ensues; and, in the intermediate time, when the ship is loading, the master, if the worse for liquor, avoids the office.” Of the seamen he remarked: “The crews behave like too many common Englishmen; take their glass freely when they can get it, and sell or pawn their clothes when they have no money; get into scrapes on a Sunday night, and are brought before me on a Monday, lectured, and discharged.”

Mr. Consul Baker.

Consul Baker, of Riga, was more pointed in his charges. He remarked: “I am sorry to state that, in my opinion, the British commercial marine is at present in a worse condition than that of any other nation. Foreign shipmasters are generally a more respectable and sober class of men than the British. I have always been convinced that, while British shipowners gain by the more economical manner in which their vessels are navigated, they are great losers from the serious delays occasioned, while on the voyage, and discharging and taking in cargoes, growing out of the incapacity of their shipmasters, and their intemperate habits. I have had occasion to remark, while consul in the United States, that American vessels, in particular, will make three voyages to two of a British vessel, in this way having an immense advantage over their competitor; and also from the superior education, and consequent business habits, obtaining better freights and employment for their vessels on foreign exchanges.” He further remarked, that, in several instances, he had been compelled, on the representations of the consignees, to take from shipmasters the command of their vessels in a foreign port, and to appoint others for the return voyage; their constant state of intoxication rendering them wholly “unfit to carry on their duties.”

Mr. Consul Yeames.

Consul-General Yeames, writing from Odessa on the 1st December, 1843, stated, that though in his experience he had known many unexceptionable and respectable persons in command of British vessels, they, as a rule, fell very far below the character of commanders of foreign vessels, more especially those of Austria. He attributed this inferiority in a great measure to the want of education and an absence of discipline. “Some of these shipmasters,” he added, “are shamefully illiterate, and are not qualified to do justice to the interest of owners in common transactions that occur in this port. There is, too, an impression here (and certainly among all the foreign merchants) that British shipmasters are indifferent to the condition of their cargoes, and careless of their preservation, which is prejudicial at least to our interests in the carrying trade.”

The Consul of Dantzig.

Somewhat similar accounts were received from Gottenburg, and numerous other ports. “Taken as a whole,” remarked the consul at Dantzig, “there is not—and I say it with regret—a more troublesome and thoughtless set of men, to use the mildest term, to be met with than British merchant-seamen. Only very lately, a master left his vessel, which was loaded with a valuable cargo and ready for sea, and was, after several days’ search, found in a house of ill-fame; his mate was very little better than himself; and his people, following this example, a set of drunkards.” He added, that occurrences nearly as bad as these were by no means rare, and that a Prussian vessel was sure to obtain a preference when freights were remunerative.

The Consuls of Genoa, Ancona, and Naples.

From the Mediterranean ports the accounts received were hardly more favourable to the character of British seamen. The consul at Genoa stated that it was quite common for captains of vessels at that port to take up their abode at a tavern; leaving the entire charge of the vessel in the hands of an ignorant mate, whose whole learning was not a whit superior to that of a man before the mast, and whose quarrels with the men or those among themselves were forced upon the consul for adjustment. At Ancona, the greater part of the masters who frequented the port were considered by the consul there to be unequal to the responsible trust imposed in them, not so much from the want of nautical skill as of sobriety. Out of the shipwrecks which had occurred during his residence at that port, he considered one to have arisen from incompetency, one from the inebriety of the master, and one from causes beyond control. At Naples, the consul spoke of the masters of British vessels being, on the average, ignorant and uneducated—“little superior in mental or literary acquirements to the seamen they are placed over;” and though, on the whole, good seamen, “few of them understand navigation beyond the mere power of keeping the ship’s reckoning. Nothing,” he added, “could be more truly disgraceful or discreditable than the manner of keeping the log-books of the vessels that resort to this port.”

Mr. Consul Sherrard.

Mr. Consul MacTavish.

From Trieste, Constantinople, and Alexandria, reports nearly the same were sent in. Nor were those from our consuls resident in the United States of a more favourable character. “It was but last week,” remarked Mr. Sherrard, writing from Portland, 27th July, 1843, “that I had occasion to take upon myself the risk of sending back to New Brunswick a vessel, whose master, after disposing of her cargo and receiving the proceeds, squandered the whole in liquor, leaving his crew without their wages and the vessel without sea stores.” He mentioned, also, the instance of another, a British barque, from England for St. John’s, Newfoundland, which was boarded by a revenue cutter, the whole crew, including master and mate, being in a helpless state of intoxication, and the vessel drifting about embayed in a dangerous place near Mount Desert. From Baltimore the consul, Mr. MacTavish, wrote that, with few exceptions, “almost all the masters of English merchantmen which have arrived here from British ports in my time appear to me incompetent, arising chiefly from inebriety; but, with regard to colonial vessels, I am happy to say that my experience has been the reverse of the foregoing; the temperance principle is becoming very general on board of them, and a manifest improvement is in progress from that cause;” he added, in reply to questions about the conduct of masters of Hanseatic ships frequenting Baltimore, that, in his thirteen years’ experience, he had heard of but one master of a vessel being a drunkard, and he was at once removed. “They are,” he said, “invariably competent navigators and good scholars, many of them belonging to respectable families in Bremen; and most abstemious, the principal beverage used in the cabin being light-bodied claret and vin de grave.” Of the British shipmasters frequenting Baltimore he wrote in very disparaging terms, asserting them to be, in point of intelligence, address, and conduct, greatly inferior to the shipmasters of either Bremen or America.

Mr. Consul Hesketh.

Mr. Hesketh, writing from Rio de Janeiro, states that, during an active service of more than thirty years as consul at that port, he had experienced unwearied trouble and much anxiety, in consequence of the intemperate habits of the masters and crews of British merchant vessels, and that cases were not uncommon in which it had been found absolutely necessary to take from on board all intoxicating liquors. With regard to their competency in other respects, he said: “I have come to the conclusion that British shipmasters are frequently entrusted with commands on voyages requiring more knowledge of the scientific department of navigation than they possess;” he added, however, that the masters of large or first-class merchant vessels were generally fully competent for their duties.

Reports from the Consuls in South America.

Similar reports came from the consuls of Bahia, Pernambuco, and Paraguay; the consul at the last-named port remarking, “shippers now give such a decided preference to the merchant vessels of Sweden, Denmark, Sardinia, Hamburg, and Austria, that they are rapidly engrossing the carrying trade of Brazil; and this alarming fact is attributed by the most intelligent British merchants and shipmasters, with whom I have conversed on the subject, to the greater care taken by foreign masters, and enforced by them on their crews, in the reception and stowage of their cargoes, which they consequently deliver in much better order than do British vessels, the masters of which are in general said to be exceedingly careless and inattentive in this respect,” an opinion confirmed by Mr. Ellis in his despatch to the Foreign Office from Rio, 10th December, 1842.

Although, for the reasons I have named, these voluminous reports are not so impartial as they otherwise might have been, had Mr. Murray, in his circular-note, merely expressed his desire to ascertain the facts without expressing any opinion of his own, there is too much reason for believing that the character of British ships and the conduct of British crews were then greatly inferior to those of other nations; hence Mr. Murray’s subsequent memorandum of the 22nd November, 1847, contains unquestionably many valuable suggestions for their improvement, while his conclusions could hardly be questioned when he stated:—

General conclusions of Mr. Murray, Nov. 22, 1847,

“1st. That the character of British shipping has declined, and that the character of foreign shipping has improved.

“2nd. That there was not sufficient control over British shipmasters and seamen, either at home or abroad, while foreign vessels were subject to considerable control.

“3rd. That there was no system of regular education for the merchant service of Great Britain, but that, in foreign countries, this matter was much attended to.

“4th. That the sort of education which a British subject receives, when training for the higher grades of the merchant sea service, does not suffice to qualify him to represent with advantage to the merchant by whom he may be employed that merchant’s interest; and that he may often neglect those interests and the merchant not be aware of the fact.”

“What was wanted,” Mr. Murray continued, “was not merely a study of navigation and seamanship, but a thorough knowledge of ship’s husbandry, and a thorough knowledge of stowage of cargo, of exchanges, and other commercial information which would qualify a master to act, if necessary, as the representative of his employer in the character of merchant; the commander of a ship being in law considered the representative of the owners of the property on board. It was further urged that a merchant had no means of accurately ascertaining the character and capability of shipmasters or of seamen, and really depended for the safety of his property upon his insurances.”

and suggestions for remedies

For these reasons, with a view to maintain the supremacy of Great Britain in commercial navigation and enterprise, Mr. Murray proposed to establish “a Board or Department of Commercial Marine,” at the same time pointing out that the want of such a department was greatly felt in the preparation of any new law, and still more so in the subsequent process of acting upon it. Nine departments, he explained, were concerned in the Merchant Sea Service Laws; and there was no central board to point out to each department how each could best act for the success of the whole; each department being left to look merely to those interests committed to its charge, and to its own convenience. The Board of Trade was indicated as the department to which the community would naturally look with regard to everything relating to commerce, whether at sea or on shore.

Board of Trade Commission, May 17, 1847.

Its results.

Previously to the issue of Mr. Murray’s ‘Memorandum,’ that Board had, on the 17th May, 1847,[21] announced the intention of Government to issue a commission without delay to examine into certain matters relating to the commercial marine. This inquiry confirmed in all material respects the information previously received by Mr. Murray. Indeed, three only out of seventy-five reports from consuls stated that the condition of British shipping had improved rather than declined; and, in these cases, it was shown that, from the nature of the trade in which the vessels were engaged—the fruit trade of Greece, and from the perishable character of their cargoes—the greatest care had to be taken in selecting the best ships.

There can be no doubt that, as early as 1843, when Mr. Murray issued his circular letter to the consuls, and more especially in 1847, when Lord Palmerston ordered further inquiry to be made by means of this commission, Government saw the time was approaching when great changes would be demanded, not merely with regard to the Navigation Act, but likewise in the laws affecting our ships and seamen; and that it would, ere long, be essential for our own interests to follow the example set us by foreigners in the education of our seamen, as well as in the application of public tests to prove the competency of the masters and officers of British merchant vessels.

Shipowners condemned for the character of their ships and officers.

Strong objections were, however, raised by the shipowners against any Government interference, on the ground that it would be partial, and consequently so far unjust, these objections being naturally strengthened by the manner in which Mr. Murray had set about the enquiry of 1843. It was, nevertheless, but too evident that, however much British shipowners might deprecate the assistance or interference of Government, a large proportion of their ships were commanded and navigated in a manner reflecting discredit on our national intelligence, and injurious to the interests of Great Britain; that the persons placed in command of them were too frequently unfit for their duties; and that, while many of them were so habitually addicted to drunkenness as to be altogether incompetent for their position, not a few of them were almost without education.[22]

Nor in too many instances were the ships much better than their masters; and hence foreign vessels were frequently chartered in preference to British, not because, as ships, they were superior in quality, but on account of the greater care foreign shipmasters bestowed on the stowage and transport of their cargoes, and from the fact that being generally educated, sober, intelligent, and capable of commanding respect and maintaining discipline, the seamen themselves were consequently more orderly.

Views of Government.

For these and numerous other reasons, Government naturally asked whether it was justifiable that the lives of thousands of persons should be constantly jeopardised, because shipowners had the power of placing incompetent persons in charge of their vessels; and whether it was proper for the State to allow its seafaring population to be left in ignorance and disorder, and exposed to the evil example of illiterate and intemperate masters. Many thoughtful men out of doors also began to enquire if it was right that these men, by sheltering themselves under the Navigation Laws, should be thus allowed to encourage the growth and employment of foreign in preference to British shipping, to the injury of the national interests.

Necessity of a competent Marine Department.

Even had it not become apparent that the time had arrived for great changes in the commercial policy of England, the condition of our seamen and the state altogether of our merchant service required the exclusive attention of some such public department as Mr. Murray had recommended. But such matters, however important, being subsidiary to the question of the Navigation Laws and their effect upon maritime commerce, were left in abeyance till these had been fully considered.

FOOTNOTES:

[16] See papers relating to the Commercial Marine of Great Britain, 1846, p. 235.

[17] The “Winding-up Act, 1851,” enacted that compulsory contributions should cease from that date; that those who had paid up till then, should have the option of continuing these payments, but those seamen who had not contributed before 1851 should not be admitted. Thus the fund was practically “abolished,” and is now only in operation for the purpose, as the Act names, of “winding-up.” This well-intended Institution had become hopelessly insolvent through the grossest mismanagement. Its administration was vested in different irresponsible bodies at the different ports, and while the Legislature compelled contributions, it took no security for the just appropriation of these funds, and no security for solvency! The Winding-up Act of 1851 transferred its affairs to the Board of Trade for the purpose of paying all existing pensions, and to allow the then existing contributors to continue their annual payment should they wish to do so. It has cost the country upwards of 1,000,000l., and will probably cost 500,000l. more before all claims have been satisfied. The pensions granted by the Board of Trade until now (1875) have been 7528l. to masters and seamen, and 14,972l. to widows and children.

[18]

The “Belvidere,” or “Royal Alfred Aged Seaman’s Institution.”

The “Belvidere,” known as the “Royal Alfred Aged Seaman’s Institution,” was established, soon after the abolition of the “Merchant Seaman’s Fund,” mainly through the exertions of the late Mr. William Phillipps, Mr. George Marshall, and other philanthropic shipowners. The laudable object of this excellent institution is to provide for the “relief of aged and worn out merchant seamen of the United Kingdom.” It was started by a grant of 5000l. from the Shipwrecked Mariners’ Society, and is now maintained entirely by legacies, donations, and annual subscriptions from charitable persons. These amounted, in 1874, to somewhere about 7600l., though, out of this sum, the annual subscriptions were only 1600l. Its inmates were then 105 decayed seamen, whose ages ranged from 63 to 85. There were, besides, in that year 110 persons receiving from its funds 12l. per annum in out-door pensions. The inmates are provided with comfortable cabins, clothed, a good mess, and have every comfort, with pleasant grounds for exercise, overlooking the River Thames. All their physical and spiritual wants are well supplied; and, so far as its limited funds permit, it has proved of great service, being well and economically managed. When its claims on the public—I might say on the country—become better known, its means of doing good will thus, I hope, be largely extended. Indeed, the Board of Trade having now in hand upwards of 200,000l., arising from the unclaimed wages and effects of deceased merchant seamen, from the surplus fees of the mercantile marine, and other similar sources, the question suggests itself if a portion of these surplus funds could not be appropriated to the benevolent purposes of the Royal Alfred Aged Seaman’s Institution?

[19] In 1859, when a member of the Royal Commission on manning the Royal Navy, I proposed to my colleagues the establishment of a merchant seamen’s fund, under Government supervision, as a means of raising a large portion of the reserves of seamen we were then considering. Though my views on this and other points were not adopted, they were published by order of the House of Commons, and accompanied the report; and as the question is still one of much public importance and still requires solution, I furnish extracts from these “remarks”:—

Mr. Williams, observations by, on the advantage of general Seaman’s Fund.

“‘Experience has shown,’ says Mr. H. R. Williams, of the Board of Trade, in his sensible paper on the subject, ‘that any attempt to establish a merchant seamen’s fund upon the principle of voluntary payments would not be supported by a large body of seamen. The working of the Seamen’s Fund Winding-up Act has proved that seamen generally, whatever advantages may be offered to them, will not voluntarily contribute to a fund. However great may be the objections, therefore, to compulsory payments, there is no probability that a fund can be established with any chance of success upon any other principle.’

“I admit that there is something repugnant to the feelings of the sailor, and, in fact, to all Englishmen, in the word ‘compulsory,’ when applied to the management of his own affairs; but, in general practice, that which would be termed compulsion, if sanctioned and regulated by the Legislature, is already a voluntary act cheerfully undertaken by large masses of the people. There is scarcely a handicraft trade in the kingdom the members of which have not formed themselves into a society, the object of which is, by means of periodical subscriptions, to secure a pension or payment in sickness or old age. Both individually and nationally, every such institution is in the highest degree commendable. If, therefore, these benefit societies deserve encouragement and support, when formed for artisans and others whose occupations are on shore, they merit encouragement and support still more when their object is to relieve those whose occupation is at sea. Seamen have no means of forming such associations, as they are scattered over the whole world, having no organization, no central power, and no machinery to put such a system into operation. Whatever incentives they may have to combine together for such a purpose, they have not the means of carrying into effect their wishes. This appears to be generally conceded; and we have arrived at the conclusion that it is the duty of Government to step forward to aid those who, from their peculiar calling, are incapable of acting themselves.

“Commander Brown, the Registrar, Mr. Baker and Mr. Williams, of the Board of Trade, together with Captain Pierce, of the Liverpool Sailors’ Home, all concur in the opinion that the time has arrived when a new seamen’s fund should be established on sound principles under Government supervision, and upon such a basis as shall offer to the seaman a strong and powerful inducement to preserve that test which secures to him substantial maintenance in old age, or when prematurely worn out. The whole of the machinery necessary to effect this object is now established at the shipping offices, and in the existing departments of the Board of Trade, and already in operation upon 12,000 masters and seamen who have contributed to the fund under the Winding-up Act of 1851.

“... I am of opinion that such an institution would be highly popular, even with the shipping interest. I say this, with the knowledge that a seaman may calculate his wages at only 2l. 9s. instead of 2l. 10s. per month; and with the possibility, that the difference of 1s. per month may fall upon the shipowner, to which class I belong. But if the incidence of this extra shilling should, in point of fact, fall absolutely upon the shipowners, they would be gainers thereby, as it is of the highest importance to them that the seaman should have some substantial tie to bind him to this country. At present no such tie exists. The British-born seamen become citizens of the world, and find themselves quite as much at home in the United States as in their native country. The higher rate of wages paid in the American ships presents a temptation to them to enter that service in preference to that of England. Now if some special inducement were offered to them to remain at home, it would operate to diminish the number of British seamen in the service of foreign states. The sailor would thus have also ‘his stake in the public hedge.’ At present, the exceptional use of savings banks furnishes almost the only link, for the beneficial use of money-order offices, however great their advantages, is rather a ready facility given than a permanent benefit enjoyed.

“With those views, I should propose to make a seamen’s fund the basis of raising the remaining 18,000 men for a reserve. I think that the fund should be a general one, to which both seamen in the Royal Navy and in the mercantile marine should be called upon to subscribe. I think it would be desirable to break through the line of demarcation which has so long existed between the two services, and this would be one step towards effecting that object. I would give seamen of all classes a common interest in this one great fund, which might be designated as National.

“I am aware that objections will be raised to any compulsory fund. I would much prefer to have it a voluntary one; but knowing the character of the seamen as I do, I am thoroughly convinced that any fund established even under the auspices and with the guarantee of the Government, on the voluntary principle, would be a failure.

“... So far as the nation was concerned, the salutary effects of such a fund would operate in three different ways: it would prevent the seamen from being objects of charity or claimants upon the poor rates during their old age; it would be a permanent tie to bind them to their native country, founded upon a common bond of self-interest; while it would form the groundwork of a system whereby the reserve of 18,000, still wanting, might be raised.”

[20] Papers relating to Commercial Marine of Great Britain.

[21] See Sir John Shaw Lefevre’s letter, page 144, part ii., Parl. Papers relating to Mercantile Marine.

[22] In my own time, I remember a shipowner saying to me that he never would have a “scholar” in command of any of his vessels, because education taught him how to make up false accounts and the art of cheating; while another whom I knew, only retained one “educated” master in his service, because he was flattered by being invariably addressed by him as “Mr. Joseph Perkins, Esquire.”

CHAPTER III.

High estimate abroad of English Navigation Laws—Change necessary, owing to the Independence of America—Other nations at first Protectionist—Mr. Pitt’s proposals with reference to trade with America—Mr. Pitt resigns, and a temporary Act ensues—Shipowners and loyalists in America successfully resist his scheme—Congress the first to retaliate—Restrictions injurious, alike, to England and her Colonies—Commercial treaties with America between 1794 and 1817—Acts of 1822 and 1823, and further irritation in America—Order in Council, July 1826—Conciliatory steps of the Americans in 1830—Foreigners look with suspicion on any change in the Navigation Laws—Reciprocity treaties of 1824-6—Value of treaties in early times, but inadequate for the regulation of commercial intercourse, and liable to unfair diplomacy—Reciprocity treaties only, partially, of value, and do not check the anomalies of Protection—Committee of 1844-5 promoted by the Shipowners, who seek protection against Colonial shipping—Reciprocity must lead to free navigation—New class of Statesmen, well supported by the People—Exertions of Lord John Russell, who leads the way against Protection—Richard Cobden and the Anti-Corn-Law League—John Bright—Effect of the Irish famine, 1845-6—Sir Robert Peel carries the Repeal of the Corn Laws, and resigns.

In proceeding to consider the great alterations in the ancient commercial system of England which have ultimately led to the entire abrogation of the Navigation Laws, it is advisable to trace their remarkable history under several distinct heads, premising, however, that, previously to 1844, their complete repeal had probably not suggested itself to any of the statesmen who, at various periods, had held the chief power in England.

High estimate abroad of English Navigation Laws.

For nearly two centuries an opinion had prevailed in England, as well as in all foreign countries carrying on maritime commerce, that the English Navigation Laws, created originally to check, if not to annihilate, the maritime power of Holland, had been the means of raising Great Britain to her unquestioned superiority on the ocean. But this opinion is best answered by the fact that, long after the creation of these laws, the Dutch still remained more powerful at sea than any other nation;[23] while, on the other hand, the shipping of England, under a different policy, has become much more prosperous than it ever was at any period during which the laws of Cromwell were enforced.

Change necessary,

Other nations, however, could not fail to see that English shipowners upheld these laws with much tenacity; hence when, on the cessation of the wars of Napoleon, they had more time to devote their attention to individual pursuits, they asked themselves two questions: (1st) if protective laws had been beneficial to English ships, why should they not follow the example of that country and enact for themselves similar laws? and (2nd) if England persisted in excluding their ships from her ports, why should they not treat her vessels in the same manner? In other words, they were already prepared to act on the principle of retaliation, and adopt the course pursued by the United States of America in 1817, when Congress passed a law, the counterpart, if not the copy, of that in the English Statute-book, which was adopted with the declared intention of retaliating on Great Britain.

owing to the Independence of America.

In the case of the American States, so long as they were dependencies of the British Crown, their ships could trade with all British dependencies on the same footing as our own; but, when they became independent, their ships, like those of any other foreign Power, were excluded from every port where our laws prohibited the entry of such vessels. Previously they could freely trade with the British possessions in America and with the West Indies, with which they had hitherto carried on a profitable intercourse, supplying them with lumber for their houses, staves for their casks, corn, fish, and other provisions, together with horses and cattle for their plantations, besides affording our people there a sure market for their surplus produce of coffee, sugar, and rum.

Other nations at first Protectionist.

Mr. Pitt’s proposals with reference to trade with America.

Mr. Pitt resigns, and a temporary Act ensues.

Up to this period the practice of foreign nations had not very materially complicated our navigation system. If Great Britain, on her part, persisted in refusing to receive, for instance, the produce of the Spanish and Portuguese colonies in any but British ships, Spain and Portugal, on their side, declined to send their goods to England in any ships but their own. So that our law in such cases, rigorous as it was, did nothing but determine how a trade, in which we had never had a share, must be carried on, should we be permitted to enter it. But the case of the United States was attended with much greater difficulty. Here was an extensive and flourishing maritime commerce, averaging nearly 3,500,000l. yearly, which had hitherto been open to English and American vessels, indifferently, but which was now, by the operation of our Navigation Laws, confined entirely to the former.[24] It was then that the strength and elasticity of our exclusive system were first severely tested. Mr. Pitt foresaw this serious difficulty so early as 1783 when Chancellor of the Exchequer, and the necessity of immediately introducing a temporary measure to regulate the commercial intercourse with the now independent States of North America. The Bill then actually introduced by Mr. Pitt proposed to allow American vessels to import into our colonies any articles whatever of the growth, produce, or manufacture of the United States, and to export any articles from our colonies to the United States. But, unfortunately, while this wise measure was under the consideration of the House of Commons, the ministry to which Mr. Pitt belonged resigned, and their successors, to save themselves the trouble of passing a Bill of this prudent and necessary character, passed a temporary Act, afterwards renewed from time to time, vesting in the Crown alone the power of regulating the trade with America.

The shipowners and loyalists in America successfully resist Mr. Pitt’s scheme.

As might have been anticipated, considerable discussion immediately arose with regard to the manner in which this power of the Crown should be exercised. The West Indians, on the one hand, represented the ruinous position in which they would be placed if they were forbidden to trade with the United States: while, on the other, the loyalists of the remaining North American Colonies pleaded that they were quite able to supply the people of the West Indies with all they required, and prayed that the monopoly the war had given them should not be abrogated. These views were maintained by the shipowners of Great Britain, on the plea that, if American vessels were allowed to export West Indian produce, they would convey it to foreign countries as well as to the United States, thus securing a materially improved position as carriers by sea; and, after this case had been fully argued before the Board of Trade, the shipowners and the loyalists unfortunately won the day.

Congress the first to retaliate.

Exasperated by such conduct, three of the American States made a requisition to Congress to prohibit all commercial intercourse with the British colonies;[25] and, before Congress met in 1789, no less than nine of these States had demanded retaliatory measures on British commerce and navigation. The result was that two Acts of Congress were immediately passed: one imposing a tonnage duty of six cents on all American built and American owned vessels, of thirty cents on vessels built in the United States but owned by foreigners, and of forty cents on foreign vessels; while the other imposed a tariff of duties in the ordinary form, and provided for the remission of 10 per cent. of such duties in case the goods were imported in American ships. The Americans thus paid us off in our own coin, and continued this retaliatory system till 1817, when they passed the Navigation Act to which I have just referred, in all respects analogous to our own. Nor, indeed, can there be any question but that they were fully justified in these retaliatory measures. If one nation insists on excluding the vessels of other nations from their trade, they must naturally expect that the legislators of the countries, whose vessels are thus excluded, will take similar steps, even to the injury of their own people; in fact, this is just what England did when she prohibited her people from obtaining from other countries, at the lowest cost, the produce or manufactures essential for their existence.

These restrictions injurious, alike, to England and her Colonies.

But besides this, these restrictive measures on the part of Great Britain, had in more than one instance, proved, in many other respects, most injurious to her own people, while inflicting the greatest hardships and most lamentable sufferings on her own West Indian colonies. Thus, between 1780 and 1787 no less than 15,000 slaves perished from starvation, having been unable to obtain the requisite supplies of food from the North American colonies at a period, when the home-grown portion of their sustenance had been destroyed by several hurricanes. Yet, notwithstanding this terrible calamity, the British Parliament persevered in the system it adopted, and ultimately passed an Act (28 Geo. III., cap. 6) whereby no goods could be imported into the West Indies from the United States, even in British ships, except about thirty enumerated articles, the produce of these States. Indeed, the Act went so far as to prohibit the importation of even these articles from any of the foreign West Indian Islands, except in cases of public emergency, when the governors of individual colonies were allowed to relax this prohibition. Similar laws were also passed to prohibit the importation of goods into our North American colonies from the United States, except for similar reasons.

Commercial treaties with America between 1794 and 1817.

The injurious consequences of such policy, especially in the provocation it gave to the Americans, led to the conclusion, in 1794, of the treaty to which I have already incidentally referred[26] (though, strange to say, even this was disapproved of by many persons in England), whereby American vessels, not exceeding seventy tons burden, were allowed admission into the British West Indies with such articles of United States produce as were not generally prohibited, and, at the same time, permitted to export therefrom to the United States any produce of the West Indies legally exportable thereto in British vessels. Curiously enough, the following proviso was appended to this clause:—“That this liberty only extends to a direct intercourse between the British West Indies and the ports of the United States, and the United States engage to prohibit the carriage of molasses, sugar, coffee, cocoa, or cotton in American vessels, either from his Majesty’s dominions or from the United States to any other part of the world.” The treaty also provided for placing the trade between Great Britain and the United States on a permanent footing, it having till then been regulated by Orders in Council. This treaty, which gave even greater dissatisfaction in the United States than in England, was not ratified by Congress till 1796; nor was the Act for giving effect to it in Great Britain passed till the following year.

This Act, however, made no provision for the admission of American vessels generally into our colonies. It simply provided that American ships were at liberty to import into Great Britain such produce of their own States as was admissible in British vessels; it moreover imposed a tonnage duty on the ships, and a discriminating duty on the goods imported by them, in order to countervail any duties levied on goods imported into the United States by British ships. The provisions of the treaty as to opening the trade of the West Indies appear to have fallen to the ground. An additional article to the treaty of 1794 stipulated that the article containing those provisions shall be suspended; while a later treaty (1806) contained a recital that the two high contracting parties had been unable to arrange the terms on which the commerce between the United States and the West Indies was to be carried on. In fact, they came to no definite arrangements till the United States passed their retaliatory Acts in 1817 and 1820, and, even then, it took more than ten years to settle the differences between them on almost any one question. Indeed, the only alterations of any importance made between 1806 and the passing of the American Navigation Act, in 1817, were the opening of the trade between the United States and our North American colonies, in 1807, and the conclusion of a treaty in 1815 abolishing the differential duties levied by the two countries on the ships of each other in respect of direct voyages between them.[27]

In 1808, and more fully in 1810, similar privileges were granted to the Portuguese dominions in South America; and, in 1822, these were extended to all countries in America, being, or having been, under the dominion of Spain. When the Customs Laws were first consolidated in 1825, the exceptions became the rule, and importations from Asia and Africa were placed on a similar footing to those from America. Thus our original rule as to importations from Asia and Africa, as well as from America, was broken down.

Acts of 1822 and 1823, and further irritation in America.

Though the Act of 1822 allowed a considerable number of articles to be imported into the free ports of the West Indies from any foreign country in America in ships of such country, it contained a clause reserving to the King the power of prohibiting such intercourse with any foreign country not treating British shipping with equal favour. The President of the United States, having been previously empowered by Congress to open the ports of that country to British vessels on the same terms as were required from United States vessels when coming from any British port in the West Indies, passed on the 21st March, 1823, an Act to regulate “the commercial intercourse between the United States and certain British ports.” By this Act the ports of the United States became open to British vessels coming from the free ports of the British North American and West Indian possessions, while power was given to the President to remove the differential duties levied on goods so imported, on receiving information that similar privileges had been conceded in such British colonial ports to the vessels of the United States. The Act, however, required all goods so imported to be the produce of the colony whence they came and to have been imported thence direct. It further enacted that such British ships might take back produce of the United States, provided they gave bonds to land it directly at the port for which they cleared out. As the provisions of this Act were, however, to depend on the continuance of those enacted by the British Legislature in 1822 (3rd Geo. IV., cap. 44), and, as the vessels of the United States were not placed on precisely the same footing in the ports of the West Indies as British ships, this power of the President was never exercised, and a British Order in Council in opposition to it was subsequently issued on the 21st July, 1823. Here again arose another war of tariffs, for this Order levied countervailing duties on vessels of the United States and their cargoes in the ports of the British North American and West Indian possessions from the ports in the United States to the extent of 4s. 3d. per ton, as well as a discriminating duty of 10 per cent. on imported articles.

Order in Council, July, 1826.

In 1825, when the consolidation of the Customs Laws was under consideration, as well as the extension of treaties with other countries, negotiations were again renewed with the United States, but they were not successful, and another Order in Council was issued on the 27th July, 1826, reciting that the conditions laid down by the Possessions Act, 6 Geo. IV., cap. 114, had not been fulfilled, that is to say, that the United States had not reciprocated the privileges Great Britain had granted to American ships, and that, therefore, the privileges possessed by American vessels of importing the produce of their country into British possessions abroad, and of exporting the produce of those possessions to any foreign country whatever, would cease on certain dates fixed in the following year. As might have been anticipated, the President issued, on the 17th March, 1827, a proclamation prohibiting the trade and intercourse with the British possessions authorised by the Act of Congress of 1st March, 1823.

Conciliatory steps of the Americans, 1830.

Happily, however, these retaliatory measures did not remain long in force; and, after various negotiations, it was enacted by the American Congress on the 29th May, 1830, that, whenever the President should have evidence that Great Britain would open the ports of her colonial possessions in the West Indies, South America, and the Bermudas, for a limited or indefinite time to United States ships, at the same rate of impost and tonnage and with the same cargoes as British vessels, and that they would be allowed to export from such British possessions to any country whatever any article which could be exported in British vessels, leaving any other intercourse with Great Britain in other respects as it then was, he might grant similar privileges to British vessels coming from the said possessions to the United States. This conciliatory measure was followed on October 5th, 1830, by a proclamation from the President, extending the provisions of the Act to the British colonies therein specified, and which had been opened to American vessels. Finally, a British Order in Council of the 5th November of that year, repealing the various Orders passed between 1823 and 1827, was issued, authorising vessels of the United States to import into British possessions abroad any produce of the United States from those States, and to export goods from the British possessions abroad to any foreign countries whatever.

Foreigners look with suspicion on any change in the Navigation Laws.

Subsequently to the failure of Mr. Pitt’s measure respecting the trade of the United States, no great effort was made for many years to modify grievances with other nations, which every one felt were caused by the Navigation Laws. Protection had become so thoroughly engrafted on the whole policy of the nation, that the question of the repeal of these laws could only be approached by degrees, the country being so impressed with their necessity, that any attempt during the first quarter of this century to sweep them away would have proved a signal failure. Indeed, at the close of the French war, when modifications were offered, conditionally, to other countries, it is not surprising that such foreign nations as believed the prosperity of England to be due to her protective system were not satisfied of the honesty of her intentions: most of them, in fact, looked with suspicion on proposals which, in the dawn of sound commercial knowledge, were not unnaturally thought by them inimical to the interests of England. Foreign nations were slow to recognise that the comparative freedom of her constitution, her vast mineral resources, the skill and energy of her people, the security of property, and the equality of taxation, could secure for England either her commercial or her manufacturing superiority; and, still less, could they comprehend how much such causes as these had to do with her maritime supremacy. They were equally unable to discover to how great an extent the prosperity of these interests and of shipping were mutually dependent on each other, ships being really the adjuncts only of commerce, as without it there would be no reason for their existence.

Reciprocity Treaties of 1824-6.

But after much discussion reciprocity treaties were concluded by Mr. Canning and Mr. Huskisson with several Continental Powers, the object of these statesmen being to hold out the right hand of fellowship to other nations, and to surrender in exchange for some concession on their part the more stringent conditions of our Navigation Laws. The earliest of these treaties was with Prussia, on the 2nd April, 1824: on the 16th June, we made another with Denmark; on the 29th September, 1825, with the Hanseatic Republics of Lubeck, Bremen, and Hamburg; on the 16th January, 1826, with France, and on the 26th December, of the same year, with Mexico. Various other treaties followed; opening, on certain terms of reciprocity, the ports of Great Britain to the ships of the nations with whom they were made; but reserving to her own ships, as a rule and with jealous care, her colonial ports.

Value of treaties in early times,

During the Middle Ages, when foreigners were too frequently subjected to unjust treatment, treaties were, no doubt, necessary for their protection. For instance, at one time, all foreigners residing in England were held liable for the debts and even for the crimes of each other. Shipwrecks, though attended with less of the barbarity of earlier times, were regarded in most countries as fortunate opportunities for plunder; while tolls and local charges of the most arbitrary description were levied on aliens by states, princes, corporations, and the lords of manors. There were also many other matters scarcely less oppressive and unjust which could only be redressed by negotiations.

but inadequate for the regulation of commercial intercourse, and liable to unfair diplomacy.

Under such circumstances it was necessary for commercial States to secure, by treaties, that protection and security for the person and property of their subjects abroad against the injustice they were liable to, and which they could not obtain from the laws of the countries where they might happen to be. Treaties were also required for the regulation of neutral commerce during war, and for defining clearly what goods could not be carried by neutrals for the belligerents. For all such purposes treaties were, of course, essential; but, when they came to be used, with the further object of teaching different nations how to conduct their own business, a practice arose which, however useful at the time in assisting a change of system, could not long endure. Regulations as to the duties chargeable on certain articles, or for the privileges of certain ships, according as they were built by, or belonged to, particular countries, inducing constant misrepresentation and tending to create grave differences between nations, were soon found to be neither the best nor the wisest means for producing economic or friendly commerce. Moreover, the whole system of treaties so constructed was attended with a mode of bargaining, in which the clever diplomatist might frequently gain unfair advantages for the people he represented. Such a course of action was so obviously undignified in the conduct of national affairs, that all merchants of high standing in different countries at length protested against it. Statesmen, also, began to discover that, as a rule, it was better for commerce to flow on with no interference from treaties or other legislation—that, as a matter of fact, it prospers best unaided; and, further, that such a state of things, while unsatisfactory so far as the intercourse between nations is concerned, was also discreditable, alike to the nations entertaining such propositions, and to the ministers or officers by whom they were proposed.

As the whole of the treaties, with their numerous protocols and appendices, their labyrinths of “clever clauses” and mysterious paragraphs, have been published,[28] and can be examined by those of my readers who are interested in such diplomatic intricacies, it is only necessary to give here the general purport of them, as I shall have occasion to notice, hereafter, in reviewing the progress of merchant shipping, those more directly affecting that interest; but, that my readers may understand more clearly the nature of these treaties, I furnish the text of that with France.[29] It gives the general conditions embodied in such documents, and the extent of the concessions England was prepared to make with those countries which were willing to reciprocate with her.

Reciprocity treaties only, partially, of value,

The results of these “Reciprocity Treaties,” however, as shown in the note,[30] were, for the time, satisfactory to both countries, in so far as they materially tended to increase intercourse, while they, certainly, proved advantageous, in the long run, to the shipowners of England. But they were full of inconsistencies, and, as the trade between nations increased, it became simply impossible to carry them out satisfactorily.

Nor was it, indeed, likely that people of different nations, who had been thus far “educated” to the advantages derivable from free intercourse, would continue to endure the absurd clauses of treaties prohibiting them from using corn, cotton, sugar, and numerous other necessaries of life, piled in heaps as these often were in their stores and warehouses, merely because they had been imported in other ships than those of Great Britain, or of the countries where they had been produced.

and do not check the anomalies of Protection.

The fact was, that while these treaties did create a sort of uniformity before unknown, and so far increased the facilities of intercourse, they did not obviate the most glaring hardships and inconveniences of the previous system of protection. An American vessel, for instance, might bring American cotton to England direct; but if this cotton had been landed at any foreign port, neither the ships of that country nor of any other could have conveyed it thence to our shores; while the corn of Russia, if landed in Prussia, or in the ports of any other nation, was prohibited in England, however great might be the demand for it at the time.

Nevertheless, when it was first proposed in 1821 to allow British ships to import non-prohibited articles from any part of the world, the proposal was, for the time, effectually resisted by our shipowners, on the plea that the cheaply built and navigated vessels of other countries would carry the produce of America and Asia into continental ports, and leave to British ships only the small profit to be derived from its conveyance across the English Channel!

Committee of 1844-5 promoted by the Shipowners, who seek protection against Colonial shipping.

But though it was abundantly clear that great changes were necessary beyond the treaties which had been effected (an enlightened class of merchants and manufacturers having now arisen who required that they should be entirely unfettered in the conduct of their own affairs, and that they should be at liberty to import and export whence, whither, and how they pleased) it was no easy thing to induce Government even to consider the advisability of taking a further step in advance and repealing laws so long in force. No important changes were, therefore, contemplated until 1844, when a Committee of the House of Commons was appointed to inquire into the working of those treaties and the condition of the commercial marine of the country: indeed, the appointment of even this Committee appears to have originated from complaints preferred by our shipowners, as one of the duties imposed upon it was the consideration of the best mode of encouraging and extending the employment of British shipping. Curiously enough, the chief complaint of the shipowners, in this instance, was against the privileges granted to colonial-built ships, the owners of which were, of course, on the same footing as those of vessels built in the United Kingdom. It was alleged that the latter, as costing a great deal more, were unable to compete successfully with the less costly ships of North America, and, therefore, legislative protection was sought, on the ground that the competition of these ships had materially lowered the rates of freight.

The Committee of 1844 was appointed at the instance of Mr. Lyall, a shipowner, and one of the Members for London; and, although it sat during the whole Session, it reported that, from unforeseen circumstances, it had been prevented from going fully into the matter, and requested re-appointment in the following Session, which was acceded to. But, as about this time, after a long period of depression, prosperity returned to the shipping interest, employment for ships having become better, while, in many important trades, the rates of freight had advanced, the inquiry by the Committee, under such auspicious circumstances, was allowed to drop. It was, however, plain enough from the temper of Parliament, that no recurrence would be permitted to anti-colonial protective measures.

Reciprocity must lead to free navigation.

The General Shipowners’ Society[31] attributed this prosperity to the guano trade, which had recently arisen on the coast of Africa; but other and far more influential causes had been at work. The treaties of reciprocity had, with all their imperfections, no doubt, tended materially to increase our intercourse with foreign nations, while the admission of their ships to our own ports, strange as it may appear, had greatly increased the employment for our own. Though our shipowners resolutely denied that these measures had anything whatever to do with the increased prosperity, more enlightened men had arrived at entirely different conclusions, and were convinced that the policy of reciprocity, however unsatisfactory in many respects, was not merely a step in the right direction, but was the best, and perhaps then the only, mode of breaking down, bit by bit, the huge fabric of protection, the growth of more than two centuries: indeed, it was clear that the “Great Maritime Charter of England,” as the Act of Cromwell had been somewhat ostentatiously denominated, could only be destroyed by degrees. This vast tree, if it may be so described, had taken too deep root in the soil of England to be overthrown at one blow; and the Reciprocity Treaties undoubtedly served as wedges for its destruction.

In the meantime, Sir Robert Peel had made great changes in the Tariff. Commencing with the coarser sorts of manufactures, he had relinquished all duties on the importation of wool, linen, and cotton, and had reduced the duties on the finer qualities of the same goods from twenty to ten per cent., and on manufactured silks from thirty to fifteen per cent., making equally important reductions in the duties imposed on various other articles.

New Class of Statesmen, well supported by the People outside.

But a new class of men had now arisen to extend the principles of Free-trade, and to force home the wedges of unfettered commerce with heavier blows than Canning, Huskisson, or even Peel, had ever done. The people, led in this instance by men from among themselves, of the industrial classes; and, guided by the voice of Wisdom, were now trumpet-tongued proclaiming their rights and demanding justice, on conditions which, however large, were yet so unanswerable, that, before long, the proudest of our aristocracy and the most exalted of our statesmen paid their homage to the “unadorned eloquence” resounding throughout the land.

Exertions of Lord John Russell,

Though Lord John Russell, an honest adherent from his youth to the enlightened policy of Charles James Fox, followed in their footsteps, and struggled onwards amid innumerable difficulties, it was impossible for him to force his way, almost alone against the class to which he belonged, and through the rank grass and tangled brushwood which surrounded this huge old tree. Indeed, almost every member of the ancient aristocracy except himself was opposed to the course he had resolved to pursue; and although the Parliamentary Reform Bill of 1832 carried on his motion, and, in a great measure, by his early and unwearied exertions, had returned to the House of Commons many men ready to render him every assistance, the power of that House was still insufficient to effect, to anything like the extent he had in view, the laudable and, indeed, noble object of his ambition, a thoroughly unfettered commerce. On the people, however, he could fully rely: they were now inquiring more earnestly than they had ever done how it was that the food necessary for their existence was so heavily taxed, and why they were not allowed to buy that food where they pleased, and to import it on the most economical terms. If their knowledge of geography, as they were sometimes sneeringly told, extended no further than what they had learned from the Sacred writings, that grand old historical record taught them, that Egypt produced grain at less cost and in far greater abundance, than England; so great, indeed, that its granaries had once supplied the wants of Rome and of the Ancient World. When, therefore, they learned that that grain could not be had, because a comparatively small number of men—landowners and shipowners—who, from their wealth, exercising great influence in Parliament, were of opinion that the importation of food from other and cheaper countries meant ruin to them, the people, in mass, unequivocally desired to know, in a more detailed and more satisfactory manner than they had hitherto been told, “the reasons Why.” The question they had now asked, through their leaders, was one which demanded an answer. First promulgated in the workshops of Lancashire, it spread in all directions. It was whispered in Belgravia; loudly proclaimed by the toiling millions; talked about by the cottagers in every valley and by the shepherds on every hillside; till, at length, it was adopted, in the most earnest manner, by the middle classes, the bone and sinew of Great Britain.

who leads the way against Protection.

With such overwhelming aid, Lord Russell and his exploring party were enabled to penetrate the dense forest of protection, and reach the roots of the huge and rank old tree, which not merely overshadowed the rich soil of their native land, but spread its branches over their seaports, so as to prevent the importation from other lands of articles necessary for their existence. They saw that, under its shadow, no herbs grew except such as, from their position, were favoured by a ray of the hazy sunlight of protection; healthy shrubs, luxuriant in their nature, withered and decayed wherever its branches extended.

Richard Cobden and the Anti-Corn-Law League

The chief of the new class of politicians, who had arisen was no common man: he was one whose clear judgment, while it embraced existing wants, penetrated far into the future. Richard Cobden, the son of a Sussex yeoman, and, practically, one of themselves, who had been trained to commerce,[32] saw perhaps more clearly than any one else the pernicious effects of all protective laws. Supported by an overwhelming array of facts, he arranged them in a manner so clear, and made them known in so pleasing and homely a style of eloquence, as to command attention and carry conviction to every man who was open to reason. In a word, he was the first to thoroughly convince the people of Great Britain that they had a right to be allowed to purchase the necessaries of life wherever they could obtain them, and to dispose of their manufactures wherever they could sell them, on the most advantageous terms.

John Bright.

In directing the attention of the masses to this all-important question he sought the aid of men who had sprung from the people and had been trained to commerce; and he found many able and truly earnest colleagues, but none more so than John Bright, a man of greater, though perhaps not more convincing eloquence than his own, who like himself had no object in view, as the whole experience of his life has proved, than the good of his country. While Cobden and Bright proclaimed, with overwhelming force, the policy of Charles James Fox, which Huskisson and Canning had first practically put in operation, and which Lord John Russell was now zealously pursuing in Parliament,[33] an Association, under their leadership, was being formed out of doors destined to give the fullest freedom to commerce. The first object of the Anti-Corn-Law League was to lower the price of bread, which with every deficient harvest approached a famine price, and thus enable the working classes of every grade to compete with greater prospects of success and to the best advantage, in the production of those articles most in demand in their own and other countries, and, at the same time, to secure them more steady employment and a higher rate of wages. With this object, its members set themselves heartily to work, proclaiming their views at public meetings in almost every city and town in Great Britain, and, in the course of their labours, making many converts to their policy among the higher classes, among whom Charles Villiers ought to take high rank, for he was unwearied in his exertions on behalf of the people. Nor did they lack some associates among even the shipowners of England, who, seeing that the free importation of corn from other countries would afford greatly increased employment for their ships, readily joined the league. It is certain, however, that many of this class did not at the time perceive that, though the immediate object of the association was to cut down the chief branch of the huge old tree of protection, other branches, such as those interfering with free navigation, must likewise be pulled down as the supplement to free importation of corn: probably they did not reflect that, should the Free-traders abolish the protection then afforded to the proprietors of land, a protective system for the maritime interest alone could no longer be maintained.

Effect of the Irish famine, 1845-6.

But an event happened which, although in itself a grievous national misfortune, brought about, at an earlier period than might otherwise have been the case, the abolition of the Corn Laws, as well as the suspension, for a time, of the Navigation Laws. This calamity was the failure of the potato crop in Ireland in 1845 by “a pestilence so minute that it eluded the power of the finest microscope, so mysterious that it defied the researches of the most searching philosophy, but strong enough to overturn governments, general enough to alter established commerce, powerful enough to cause the migration of nations.”[34]

The whole crop of potatoes in Ireland having been destroyed, the price of grain rose at one bound from 45s. 9d. to 60s. the quarter, and Cabinet Councils assembled in November to consider the propriety of throwing open the ports of the United Kingdom. As the Cabinet was divided on the subject, Sir Robert Peel, impressed with the dangers of the approaching crisis, resigned office, and Lord John Russell, whose celebrated letter on that occasion must long be remembered, was called upon to form a new Administration; but personal jealousy among the Whigs[35]—a jealousy which lasted many years—prevented the formation of a ministry by the opposition party. Nor was Lord Stanley, who had been a member of Sir Robert Peel’s Cabinet, more successful in a similar attempt: hence, with the exception of his Lordship, the members of that Cabinet resumed their former places.

On the 4th December, 1845, it was intimated through the ‘Times’ newspaper, which had for some months previously avoided the question of total repeal, that Sir Robert Peel would propose the entire abolition of the Corn Laws. The Queen’s speech, as well as the speech of Sir Robert Peel on the Address, more distinctly announced the policy of the reconstructed Administration, and, having called attention to the measures of commercial reform already adopted, which had tended so materially to the greatness of this country and the welfare and happiness of its inhabitants,[36] he called on the agriculturists to submit to some sacrifice on their part, proposing a sliding-scale of duties on corn until February 1849, with the condition, however, that wheat and other cereal produce should, after that date, be imported from foreign countries at a duty of 1s. a quarter.

Sir Robert Peel carries the Repeal of the Corn Laws, and resigns.

It is not the province of this work to describe the struggles of parties during this momentous period, and it is therefore sufficient to state that the measures of Sir Robert Peel, supported as they were out of doors by the vigorous action of the Anti-Corn-Law League, and in Parliament by the Liberal party, were carried by large majorities through the Commons and were, ultimately, passed by the Lords. But, meantime the Irish Arms Bill had furnished the Opposition with a temporary accession of members to defeat that measure, and consequently with the means of overthrowing Sir Robert’s Administration, so that the night of his triumph on the great question of the repeal of the Corn Laws was a witness also of his downfall; and, in the records of the debates of that ever-memorable evening, may be read the words now so familiar to our ears:—“It may be,” he remarked, in his concluding speech, “that I shall be sometimes remembered with good-will in those places which are the abodes of men whose lot it is to labour and earn their daily bread by the sweat of their brow; in such places, perhaps, my name may be remembered with expressions of good-will, when those who inhabit them recruit their exhausted strength with abundant and untaxed food, the sweeter because no longer leavened with the spirit of injustice.”

FOOTNOTES:

[23] In a little book, ‘Political Arithmetic,’ by Sir William Petty, written about 1675, and published in 1691, the author of it remarks, “The extent of the shipping of Europe being about two millions of tons, I suppose the English have five hundred thousand—the Dutch nine hundred thousand, the French an hundred thousand, the Hamburgers and the subjects of Dantzic two hundred and fifty, and Spain, Portugal, Italy, &c., two hundred and fifty thousand!” the value of which the author reckoned “at 8l. per tun” (ton).

[24] See a review of the ‘History of the Navigation Laws of England from the Earliest Times,’ by a Barrister, a most able exposition, from the pen (I understand) of Sir Stafford H. Northcote, Bart., now (1875) Chancellor of the Exchequer, published by Ridgway, London, 1849.

[25] McPherson’s ‘Annals of Commerce,’ vol. iv. p. 26.

[26] See ante, vol. ii. p. 354.

[27] See Mr. Huskisson’s Speech on Colonial Policy, March 21, 1825.

[28] Hertslet’s Treaties.

[29] [Appendix, No. I.], p. 563.

[30] In 1814 there were entered inwards 1,290,248 tons of British shipping, and 599,287 tons of foreign shipping.

In 1824 there were entered inwards 1,797,320 tons of British shipping, and 759,441 tons of foreign shipping.

In 1846 there were entered inwards 4,294,733 tons of British shipping, and 1,806,282 tons of foreign shipping.

The clearances at the respective dates were about the same in amount and proportion.

[31] See these Reports of 16th July, 1845.

[32] I first became intimate with Cobden in 1852, and our friendship continued unbroken until his untimely death in 1865. He was the most agreeable companion, and the most convincing reasoner I ever met. Though his name has long been a household word, yet as his life has not been written (I hope it may soon be given to the world), many of my readers may not be aware of his career as a man of business. He was often my companion for days together where I now pen these notes, and, though I possess many pleasing reminiscences in connexion with his most useful life and numerous letters from him, for he had the pen of a ready writer, I prefer leaving these to be dealt with by his biographer, when his executors consider that the time has arrived to publish his life. But I think I ought not to withhold from my readers the account he gave me of his commercial career, more especially as an erroneous impression prevails in public that, though great as a statesman, he was unsuccessful as a man of business. This letter referred to the question of Limited Liability which we had frequently discussed. It is written in his happiest style; and if I could to advantage (but I cannot), I would not alter a single word. “It is singular,” he remarks in another letter of his now before me, approving of some comments I had made, “how much better we all write when we are expressing ourselves with unrestrained freedom to a friend, than when we are polishing off our sentences for the great public. I find it always in my own case, and the reason is simply that we are more natural, and therefore kindle a warmer sympathy in the breast of the reader. It is this which makes the private memoirs and correspondence of great men much more interesting than their public performances.” For these reasons, I venture to give to the public the letter he writes about himself and his business career unaltered, except where I have omitted the names of two noble Lords still living.

“Midhurst, 24th March, 1856.

“My dear Lindsay,

“I can see no flaw in your indictment, and do not think there is a shade of difference in our views upon partnership matters. But I would rather talk than write to you on the subject. It has always appeared to me that the fundamental fallacy which overrules all the objections to limited liability is the fear that capitalists will not be able to take care of their money without a little help from Parliament. I think they may be safely trusted. You and I agree also in the practical view of the question—that legislators and theorists overrate the extent to which the actual possession of capital affords a guarantee to the creditor. It is the character, experience, and connexions of the man wanting credit, his knowledge of his business, and opportunities of making it available in the struggle of life, that weigh with the shrewd capitalists far more than the actual command of a few thousands more or less of money in hand. I began business in partnership with two other young men, and we only mustered a thousand pounds amongst us, and more than half of it was borrowed. We all got on the ‘Peveril of the Peak’ coach, and went from London to Manchester in the, at that day, marvellously short space of twenty hours. We were literally so ignorant of Manchester houses that we called for a directory at the hotel, and turned to the list of ‘calico printers,’ theirs being the business with which we were acquainted, and they being the people from whom we felt confident we could obtain credit. And why? Because we knew we should be able to satisfy them that we had advantages from our large connexions, our knowledge of the best branch of the business in London, and our superior taste in design, which would insure success. We introduced ourselves to Fort Brothers and Co., a rich house, and told our tale, honestly concealing nothing. In less than two years from 1830 we owed them forty thousand pounds for goods which they had sent to us in Watling Street, upon no other security than our characters and knowledge of our business. I frequently talked with them in later times upon the great confidence they showed in men who avowed that they were not possessed of 200l. each. Their answer was that they would always prefer to trust young men with connexions and with a knowledge of their trade, if they knew them to possess character and ability, to those who started with capital without these advantages, and that they had acted on this principle successfully in all parts of the world. We did not disappoint them or ourselves. In 1834-1835 our stock takings showed a net balance of 20,000l. a year profit. Then I began to write pamphlets and to talk politics, and from that moment I ceased to make money, and in 1846, when the League finished its labours, my children must have been beggars, had not my neighbours, who knew my circumstances, originated the subscription which restored me independence. I took the money without shame, because I had earned it. If money had been my sole object in life I should have been a more successful man by sticking to my calicoes, for my partners have grown richer than I by doing so, and young men taken into the concern since I left have made fortunes. I may add that the original formation of the partnership, and the whole scheme of the business, sprung exclusively from myself. But what has this to do with your bill? I never detect myself falling into a twaddle about things personal and past without suspecting that I am growing old and garrulous. I doubt the policy of your presenting a bill to the House. Your strength lies in your principle—perfect freedom—which you can argue with more force when not compelled to enter upon details. If you have any suggestions as to the clauses of the Bill, would it not be better to do as you did with the Shipping Bill by giving the Board of Trade the benefit of your hints? It may be necessary to concede something for the sake of carrying any measure, but I doubt whether any concession, beyond a registration, which may be shown to be a convenience to all parties, will not be unsoundness. If it be necessary to tamper with sound principles for the sake of pleasing the Lords, let the proposal come from their party. I suspect we shall be weaker in both Houses in dealing with the question of private partnership upon free-trade principles than with that of Joint Stock Associations. Upon the latter question, people of the —— and —— school of political economy, whose principles are, if pushed home, a little socialistic, took a great interest, because they have an amiable faith in the power of association amongst the working classes. But I doubt whether they will throw much zeal into the question of private partnership. By the way, don’t put the question in the House in the form of a problem A. B. C. D. &c. It does in a written argument, and even then demands a severe attention; but I find that that mode of stating the case in the House does not succeed.

“I shall be happy to renew the discussion when we meet, and remain very sincerely yours,

“Rd. Cobden.”

[33] Though not within the province of this work, it should be remembered that Fox stoutly opposed Pitt’s great Free-trade Treaty with France, in 1756, and that Lord John Russell did not come out as a thorough and earnest Free-trader until 1840-41.

[34] Alison’s ‘History of Europe,’ vol. vii. p. 168.

[35] This difference reached its climax in 1845, when Lord Grey wished to exclude Lord Palmerston from the Foreign Office, and Lord Russell insisted on his being nominated for that department.

[36] The exports of Great Britain rose from 47,000,000l. in 1842 to 60,000,000l. in 1845, and the imports from 65,000,000l. to 85,000,000l., and, in the same period, the entries of British mercantile shipping rose from 4,627,440 tons to 6,031,557 tons. (See Porter’s ‘Progress of the Nation.’)

CHAPTER IV.

Lord John Russell’s first steps as Prime Minister: the Equalization of the Sugar Duties—He suspends the Navigation Laws, January 1847—Mr. Ricardo’s motion, February 1847—Reply of Mr. Liddell—Mr. Ricardo’s motion carried—Committee appointed, February 1847—Meeting of the shipowners, August 12, 1847—Their arguments—What constitutes “British ships”—State of Navigation Laws in 1847—Rules in force in the Plantation Trade—Their rigorous character—Their history from 1660 to 1847—First infringement of the principle of confining the American trade to British vessels—Absurdity and impotency of these laws—State of the law before the Declaration of American Independence—Trade with Europe—Modifications of the law—East India Trade and shipping—Trade with India in foreign and in United States ships even from English ports—Coasting trade—Summary of the Navigation Laws.

Lord John Russell’s first steps as Prime Minister: the Equalization of the Sugar Duties.

Suspends the Navigation Laws, January 1847.

The first measure introduced by Lord John Russell, when he succeeded Sir Robert Peel as Prime Minister,—the equalization of the Sugar Duties—was one almost as important to the interests of merchant shipping as the repeal of the Corn Laws. A change so great, affecting, indirectly, the general as well as the fiscal policy of the empire, was even more remarkable than the abolition of the Corn Laws. It was strenuously opposed by the Protectionist party, but Sir Robert Peel, having given his support to Government, the Bill was carried by a large majority. This measure in itself afforded much additional employment to shipping; and in the course of the debate upon it, Lord John Russell made the memorable declaration that he “did not propose in any respect to alter the existing Navigation Laws.”[37] He was, however, obliged immediately afterwards to suspend the operation of these Laws till the 1st September following, so as to facilitate the importation of grain and flour. Indeed, some such measure was absolutely necessary, as the crops of Germany and France had in many instances failed, and the French Government had also been compelled to suspend for a time their Navigation Laws, in order to obtain supplies of food from other countries.

As the necessity of increasing, at all events for a limited period, the facilities for importing grain from foreign countries and the admission of sugar more freely into breweries and distilleries, so as to augment the supply of food, had been pointed out in the Royal Speech, no opposition was offered to this temporary suspension of the Navigation Laws; but it was stoutly maintained by the Protectionists that the suspension must be limited to the period fixed in the Bill. The Free-traders, however, on the other hand, could not see the necessity of any limitation, and, though the Ministry did not feel strong enough to undertake the task of a total abolition of the Navigation Laws, one of its principal supporters gave notice that, on an early day, he would formally call the attention of Parliament to this important subject.

Mr. Ricardo’s motion, February 1847.

Accordingly, on the 9th February, 1847, Mr. John Lewis Ricardo brought forward his motion,[38] “That a Select Committee be appointed to inquire into the operation and policy of the Navigation Laws.” Intense interest was excited among shipowners; the fact of Mr. Ricardo proposing the motion was deemed highly ominous, as he was known to hold very advanced opinions on Free-trade, and to be prepared to go further in that direction than perhaps any other member of the House. He was, indeed, at that time, one of the most formidable exponents of the Free-trade doctrines. His speech,[39] delivered in a tone of much confidence, propounded, as indisputable facts, what were then rather startling assertions. After briefly recapitulating the history of the Navigation Act, which had been held to be perfect till 1821-22, he pointed out that Mr. Wallace in those years, and Mr. Huskisson in 1824-25, had broken into the exclusive principle on which the Navigation Act rested. He then referred, at great length, to the labours of the Committee on British Shipping in 1844, and boldly asserted that that inquiry was instituted by the shipowners to prove the efficacy of the existing laws, and was allowed to drop because they had no case for further encouragement. He specially singled out the opinions of the late Mr. Joseph Somes, one of the largest shipowners of that time, who went so far as to demand a tax on Colonial shipping; and he successfully combatted this by contending that the colonists already suffered severely by the Navigation Laws. Millions upon millions, he said, were spent upon internal communications;[40] Parliament was looking with great jealousy lest a half-penny or a penny too much should be charged for inland transit; yet, when goods arrived by sea, there was a law which increased the cost of carriage over the greater part of their journey. He then referred to the opinions expressed by Mr. G. F. Young, one of the leading opponents of any change in the laws of shipping, who had also advocated a tax on Colonial vessels, stating, in his evidence in 1844-45, that he “considered the whole system of Navigation Laws as relating more to the encouragement of maritime commerce than to any other object, and that, therefore, many sacrifices of pecuniary interests ought to be made for it,” adding, “I have no doubt that private interests ought to be sacrificed for the general interests of the country. If the Legislature should decide that it was no longer necessary to keep up the Navigation Laws as a means of national security, no doubt the consumers of foreign articles could purchase at a cheaper rate, since this would be the natural consequence of admitting imports in the ships of foreign nations.”