THE STORY
OF
THE ZULU CAMPAIGN.

BY
MAJOR ASHE (Late King's Dragoon Guards),
AUTHOR OF "THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE," ETC.
AND
CAPTAIN THE HON. E. V. WYATT-EDGELL
(17th Lancers, Killed at Ulundi).

DEDICATED BY SPECIAL PERMISSION TO HER IMPERIAL MAJESTY

THE EMPRESS EUGÉNIE.

WITH MAP.

London:
SAMPSON LOW, MARSTON, SEARLE, & RIVINGTON,
CROWN BUILDINGS, 188, FLEET STREET.
1880.
[All rights reserved.]

LONDON:
Gilbert and Rivington, Printers,
St. John's Square.

[Click to enlarge]

TO HER IMPERIAL MAJESTY

THE EMPRESS EUGÉNIE

THIS RECORD OF THE ZULU WAR IS, BY GRACIOUS PERMISSION,
HUMBLY DEDICATED, AS A POOR TRIBUTE AND OFFERING.

In Memoriam.

Worthy of the Race of Guzman, and of the soldier of Lodi and Arcola, while recalling memories of him who gave to the gods of the Tiber the gift most precious to Rome—Human Valour—Prince Louis Napoleon's name will live in the hearts of all his English comrades, as a type of pure chivalry, of knightly generosity, and as a rainbow of Hope over two great western powers, for centuries at war, but now allied in friendship.

PREFACE.

Some apology or explanation may be deemed requisite, for delaying the publication of this "Story of the Zulu War" for more than a year after its conclusion. The little book itself was written very shortly after the capture of the king, Cetywayo, and the tardiness of its appearance has been, to a certain extent, intentional on my part.

Although it may seem ungracious and, perhaps, ungrateful to cavil at the war criticisms and descriptions which, by every post and telegram, adorn the pages of contemporaneous journalism, I would submit that the practice of writing ex cathedrâ on war topics the day after an engagement, is too early to allow us to examine motives as well as facts, so that we may form conclusions to which we can only justly arrive, when "Time, the corrector, where our judgments err," has softened prejudice and exposed partisan feeling. The worst and most valueless criticisms on Waterloo were given to the world immediately after the fight of Mont St. Jean. The most unreliable, and indeed erroneous, opinions in regard to the splendid errors of Inkerman and Balaklava, appeared before the Crimean war was ended, and many a hero, elevated by the verdict of contemporaneous eulogy to a temporary pedestal in the Temple of Fame, has since been dethroned by the calmer and more honest judgment of a later generation. When the Emperor Napoleon called us a "nation of shopkeepers," he, perhaps, intentionally, paid us a compliment; for peace, commerce, and prosperity, have, as a rule, I venture to hold, been more regarded in our islands than projects of violence, warfare, or conquest; and this with us has ever been an honourable characteristic of the Spirit of our present Age.

But as Sir Bartle Frere, one of England's greatest, wisest, and most humane administrators, was well aware, the great and time-honoured law of self-defence sometimes compels a State, like an individual, to resort to arms, and the Appeal of Battle, when all peaceful modes of arrangement have been vainly tried, becomes occasionally unavoidable. Then, and perhaps only then, we may be allowed, even by the Peace Society and the Acolytes who trim the lamps for Mr. John Bright, to take an interest in and feel proud of the disciplined courage, the love of honour, and the sense of duty of which we read in the campaigns, where those who are near and dear to us have fought and fallen under the British flag. Then the commanders we may have known as subalterns, but whose names are now in all circles as veritable "Household Words;" whose careers we have watched with proud, yet kindly sympathy, and whose triumphs we have seemed as countrymen to share; whose powers of intellect and prescience array, regulate, and wield at will the grim and stern materials at command; whose daring, and yet coolness in the midst of death, acts like a talisman upon the rank and file—whose providence, when one path fails, is ever ready for fresh resources and designs—are not these the men of whom we may say with Tacitus,—

"Ratio et consilium propriæ Ducis artes"?

and of this class, I venture to think, were Lord Chelmsford and his lieutenants. And when we are ourselves in the "sere and yellow leaf," or have joined, mayhap, that "larger majority" which Gladstonian tactics and energy cannot hope to rival, our children and children's children, when they read of such names as Bartle Frere, Chelmsford, Wood, Pearson, Buller, and Piet Uys, may look back to English History and see that our "island mastiffs" have not become degenerate, either in courage or generosity, since the days of Harold, the Black Prince, or that knightly Sydney who fell at Zutphen!

Some experience of the Kaffir tribes and their characteristics, of the physical and geographical difficulties which attend upon a campaign in South Africa,—dating, indeed, as far back as a score of years ago, and the interest which I have since taken in colonies where, as an Adjutant, I passed some very happy years among Boers, Bôk, and Kaffirs, had at the commencement of the late war prompted me to follow its various phases, with a view to write the story of the campaign. In this purpose I was encouraged by the offers of many old comrades who were about to start with their regiments for the seat of war, and who promised me by each available opportunity the assistances of their several journals, notes, and sketches.

"But one I would select from that proud throng,

···

And to those who have known that most accomplished gentleman and gallant soldier, young, brave, cheery, and débonnaire, Edmund Wyatt-Edgell, I need not say how delighted I was at his undertaking to correspond with me, and, as far as time and opportunity permitted, to keep me au courant with the march of events. From the time of his arrival at Natal to the fatal day on which he fell, he fulfilled that promise, and if any merit be due to the narrative I now present to public notice, it will, I believe, come through those descriptions which I received from my dead comrade and friend—Sit tibi terra levis!

Another motive, or perhaps more than one, "pricked the sides of my intent," and invited me to wield the pen upon a soil where erst I had drawn a "regulation" sword. In the "unvexed silence of a student's cell," i.e., London chambers, I could only watch the progress of the campaign, without hoping to share in its toils or its dangers. I might envy, but I could not participate—

"For who can view the ripen'd rose, nor seek
To wear it?"

In default of this, I could, however, follow in spirit the adventures, by flood and field, of more than a score of old comrades and companions in arms, who were winning honour and renown in a land not unfamiliar to me. In the hasty and, with all deference I say it, somewhat ignorant criticism of those amateur mentors who tell us how battles ought or ought not to be won, and who, from the calm solitudes of Fleet Street, would make or mar a military reputation, I venture to believe, was much injustice done to the Commander-in-chief of our forces in South Africa.

"A man must serve his time to every trade
Save censure. Critics all are ready made."

And I was the more convinced of this partisan and hostile feeling from the knowledge that, west of Temple Bar, and especially in the regions where veterans do most congregate, in the clubs and haunts alike of vieilles moustaches and military neophytes, from the "Senior" to the "Naval and Military," criticism was far less pronounced, and experience, as it invariably is, was more moderate in stricture and charitable in argument than elsewhere.

Lastly, the tragic fate of England's young chivalrous and knightly guest, which formed such a terrible episode of the war and draped our colours with mourning, even in the hour of victory, made a deep impression upon my mind, and caused me insensibly to marvel at the unworthy sentiments to which a large portion of the English public and the English press at that time gave utterance. Political feeling seemed then, as it now seems in poor Ireland, to override all sense of manly honour, generosity, hospitality, or common decency. The slaughter, for it was nothing less, of the princely and noble lad, who came to the shores of his country's hereditary foe, as a messenger of hope, alliance and future friendship, who had been taught by his father to love and study our English laws and customs, and who, in his abandonment in that fatal donga, must have felt shame for the comrades to whom his safety was entrusted; the sacrifice, I say, of this pure and devoted spirit, seemed to me to call for some record, less evanescent than a passing note or a newspaper article. If I have spoken strongly of the living in my sorrow for the dead, as a soldier I can but plead in vindication, that, in all my remembrance of the records of our English army I can recall no instance, save the one I have quoted, where an officer wearing our royal uniform and holding a royal commission, galloped away in front of his escort, and allowed a comrade to be done to death in unknightly fashion!

In conclusion I may say that this little work, although written con amore and from details furnished to me by my friend, Captain the Hon. E. V. Wyatt-Edgell, and others, lays no claim to historical value, but assumes to be merely the impressions de voyage of those who were actors in the scenes described.

WALLER ASHE.

Hare Court, Temple,
Nov. 1880.

CONTENTS.

THE STORY OF THE ZULU CAMPAIGN

CHAPTER I.

Origin of Zulus—Their tribes—Senzagacone—Chaka—His wars—Innovations—Administration—Standing army—Death—Position of Zulus amongst kindred tribes—First contact with whites—The Boers—The English—Panda—His reign and death—Accession of Cetywayo—His promises to the English—Breaches of faith—The boundary question—Its origin and nature—The case of Sirayo—Its history—The Middle Drift affair—Other causes of war—The Ultimatum sent—Official declaration of war—State of the British forces—Cetywayo's army and its organization—Their tactics.

The Emashlabatini country was originally occupied by a small tribe called the Abanguni; of its more ancient kings little is known beyond that they seem to have been of peaceful habits, making no wars, but breeding cattle; also that the name of one was Zulu. In their own country the appellation of Abanguni in course of time died out, though still used by their neighbours, and for it was substituted Abakwa-Zulu (sons of Zulu), Zulu and Undabezita. The tribe was composed of several families or clans, each having its own chieftain. In the time of Cetywayo's reign the names of these clans and their respective chiefs were as follows:—The Uhutilezi, a family having two branches; Umnyama, Cetywayo's prime minister, was chief of one, and Umtyubane of the other; the Ubixela and Umgazi, who were divisions of one family, the former owning Umvumhlana as chief, the latter Sigodi—subsequently slain at Isandhlwana—whose predecessor was Panda's prime minister Masipula, and his successor Mapoko; the Umtombelo and Umblalosi, also two branches of one family, whose respective chiefs were Mabanda and Segetwayo; the Uquabe, whose chief was named Rouhlo; the Uzimgu, whose chieftain rejoiced in the appellation of Unfanawenklela; the Fakazi, whose chief was Umkasana; the Umtanzi, with a chieftain Umbono by name; and the Igazi, whose head was Umkanyile; the Amagungebe, their chief was the notorious Sirayo; the Ukanyile, whose chief was Upagatwayo; the Ulanga, their chief Umhlaka; the Umpingose, whose chief was Ganse; and the Umhloben, a scattered family having no head.

The word Zulu, or Undabezita, was invariably employed in addressing any member of these families, whatever his rank or station might happen to be.

The first king of whom any particulars are known was Senzagacone, son of Ufaina. When this king began to reign he had no legitimate offspring: he had, however, a natural son by Unamdi, daughter of Umkeki, chief of the Langmene tribe, named Chaka (the bastard). He afterwards married this Unamdi, by whom he had a daughter Nuncoba, but no sons. She being his favourite wife, the king, according to the custom of the country, "gave her for a son," his natural son Chaka, thus legitimating him. When Chaka was fifteen, his father, thinking he might become troublesome, sent to kill him; but Chaka, being warned, fled to Dingiswayo, chief of the Umtwetwa, where he remained until the king's death, though on the occasion of his legitimation an invitation was given him to return to the paternal kraal.

Meanwhile Chaka had become an Induna of great influence and popularity in the land of his refuge; so when on the death of Senzagacone the Zulu tribe sent to him requesting him to be their king, and he consented, all the tribes through which he passed on his way to the Zulus accompanied him; and the whole of the Zulu clans assembled to meet him, and he was made king with great rejoicings. In the interim between Senzagacone's death and Chaka's accession, Umkaibye (paternal aunt of Chaka) ruled the Zulus and arranged for Chaka's return. It was now that the jealousy long smouldering between the Umdwandwe and the Umtwetwa, the two most powerful tribes in that part of Africa, broke into an open quarrel. Uzwidi, chief of the former, attacked and utterly routed the latter, killing their chief, Dingiswayo, Chaka's friend and protector. The worsted tribe naturally applied to Chaka for help. Thereupon Uzwidi immediately marched to attack the Zulus, and a great battle ensued on the south of the White Umvolosi. The result was that the left wing of either army was victorious; but both lost so heavily that they retired to their respective countries.

On his retreat, Chaka was attacked by the Langmeni, but failing in their assault, this tribe then deserted their own country and joined the Umdwandwe. Having defeated another coast tribe which assailed him, Chaka occupied both these countries, leaving the Emashlabatini district waste and uninhabited.

Uzwidi had now gathered a fresh army, which Chaka, by a night march, surprised and defeated between Kwagmagwasa and the Umhlatuzi river. He then retreated, but was rapidly followed up by Uzwidi, who had soon regathered his forces, and who succeeded in capturing much Zulu cattle and slaying a number of men, women, and children, surprised in their kraals by the swiftness of his advance. He then again retreated. Uzwidi now made a great and final effort to crush his adversary. All the tribes around were pressed into his service, and the result was that he soon had an army—collected from ten tribes—far superior in point of numbers to the Zulu force, which represented only two tribes. Chaka therefore retreated before Uzwidi's advance, and eventually occupied a strong position on the Inkankla range. Here he awaited his opponent's onset. In place of the old missile weapon, Chaka had armed his men with a shorter and stronger assegai, intended for use at close quarters; he therefore gave them strict orders not to throw their assegais but to charge the foe and fight them hand to hand. He also skilfully placed his force amidst broken ground, so that it was impossible for the enemy to attack in a compact and organized body. The battle, as usual, began in the early morn and continued till after midday. The Zulus, carrying out their leader's instructions, waited till the assault was delivered, and then charged so vigorously on the foe that they swept everything before them. Chaka following up this defeat utterly dissipated the Umdwandwe army. Uzwidi fled beyond his own country, which Chaka annexed, and thus became the chief potentate in that part of Africa, levying tribute from all the tribes around him. Chaka now waged several wars. First he attacked and despoiled the Mangwani, a tribe on the Drakenberg; then he fell upon and extirpated the clan of Zulukanafu, a chief residing to the north of that range. Soon after he sent an army against the Pondos, which captured a considerable amount of cattle and then retreated. Again, in the following year, there was a similar expedition, and the Pondos sued for peace, which was granted. By this time Chaka claimed to rule over the entire country, from the sea to the Pondola, to the Drakenberg, and to the land of the Pondos. His next object was to consolidate his power. Accordingly, the petty kings under his rule were no longer recognized as such, but became tributary chieftains; if any one of these was remiss in payment of his tribute, an "impi" was sent "to eat him" up. From time to time Chaka would also call up these chiefs to his royal kraal, where he would receive them with marks of distinction, and ask their advice on state matters. Another important step to weaken the power of the chiefs, and at the same time to augment his own, was the establishment of a standing army. Military service was made compulsory on all males, each being told off to a certain regiment according to his age. Thus a man ceased to serve under the chief of his own clan, but belonged to a king's regiment, which was composed of men of all tribes. Similar divisions were also made amongst the females, who had to marry into regiments at the king's commands, though on a marriage cattle was still handed over to the bride's father or brother. Furthermore, regiments were not allowed wives till they were entitled to wear "head-rings," and this did not occur till men had reached forty years of age. Chaka's next war was against the Swazis, whom he defeated and made to pay tribute.

In the following year an immense expedition was despatched against the Sotshangana, a people dwelling across the Somba Mountains, beyond Delagoa Bay.

So large was this army that Zululand was almost denuded of warriors, an event which was taken advantage of by Dingaan and five more of the king's brothers, to treacherously fall upon Chaka, whom they slew, together with his chief councillor, Umxamana.

The benefits conferred on his people by Chaka can hardly be over-estimated; he had raised them from a small tribe to a nation, and that nation a dominant one. As the Quirites were amongst the component tribes of the earlier Roman kingdom, so were the Zulus or Undabezita amongst the various tribes subject to the central Zulu authority, and curiously enough this resemblance extends still further; the Quirites were subdivided into gentes, or families, each with a distinctive name, and in a precisely similar manner, as has been before stated, the Undabezita were divided into sub-tribes or clans, each with its own gentile or family name. Nor were his people ungrateful to the memory of their first great king, for after the time of Chaka, the bastard, that name was never employed in its original signification, but to the present day a substitute, "Umlandhwana," is always used by a Zulu to express that idea.

That Chaka was not averse to civilization and white men was evinced by his treatment of Fynn and five others who were rescued from a shipwreck in St. Lucia Bay. He even went so far as to accompany Fynn the whole way to Durban, to see him embark on a ship sent round from Cape Town for him, and to send at considerable expenditure in the shape of cattle two envoys to England, which he contemplated visiting himself, if their report should prove favourable. But this latter project failed in consequence of the king's murder, and the messengers got no further than Cape Town.

A year or two after his departure Fynn returned, and with Chaka's sanction established a trading-station at Durban (1824). Once Fynn and some white men, being called upon for aid, assisted Chaka to punish a refractory tribe. When Chaka's army for the second time invaded the Pondos, it was through Fynn's representations that they would come into collision with the white men that the army proceeded no further.

On the army returning from the Sotshangana expedition, Panda, a brother of Chaka, was requested to assume the chief authority, but he declined, so Dingaan became king. Dingaan commenced his reign by killing all his brothers, except Panda, and all the late king's most trusted ministers. This caused great uneasiness amongst the chiefs, one of whom named Umquetu wishing therefore to withdraw from Dingaan's rule, departed with all his clan and cattle to the south. Coming into collision with the Pondos they were extirpated; hereupon Dingaan despatched an army to recover the cattle, which he regarded as his, from the Pondos. About the same time another chief, Umzilikazi, also revolted, and withdrew himself to the spot where Pretoria now stands. An expedition was in a similar manner despatched against him, and after capturing nearly all his cattle, returned therewith to the king.

Meanwhile the Boers had appeared on the scene at Natal, and they now claimed from Dingaan a considerable quantity of the cattle captured from Umzilikazi, alleging it had been originally stolen from them. To this Dingaan replied by bidding them recover some cattle that a petty chief had taken from him. Having done this and imprisoned the captured chief at Maritzburg, the Boers again applied for their own cattle, and a party under the command of one Peter Retief was sent to Dingaan. There now ensued a game of "diamond cut diamond," the Boers trying to outwit the king and capture him in his kraal, and Dingaan acting in much the same way to the Boers. The exact course of events is unknown, but for certain in the result Retief and his party were surprised and slain (Feb. 5th, 1838). Dingaan then invaded Natal, slaughtered many of the Boers, and captured much cattle. His forces penetrated as far as Ladismith, whence, after a heavy repulse in an attack on the Dutch laager, they retired home. Encounters from time to time continued to occur between the Zulus and the Boers with varying success to either side, till at length a peace was patched up. Panda showed himself so active in this war as to excite Dingaan's jealousy, in consequence of which he, with all his people went over and joined the Boers. Soon after this (Jan. 1840) the Boers, in conjunction with Panda, invaded Zululand. The great fight occurred at Magongo, on the Umkusi river. Dingaan was utterly defeated, and retiring with a few attendants beyond the Bomba range, was killed by the Swazis. Panda now became king, and peace was made between the Zulus and Boers, the former ceding to the latter the Natal territory as far as the Tugela.

It was about this time that there occurred a struggle at Natal between the English and Dutch, in which the latter, being worsted, retired to the Utrecht district, where they received permission from Panda to dwell; Utrecht, it is said, being assigned as their outside limit.

Panda waged no more external wars, but lived peaceably in his kraal, breeding cattle. Most conspicuous amongst the sons of Panda were Cetywayo and Umbulazi; these two, having quarrelled, waged a sort of civil war one against the other, and in the result Umbulazi was defeated and killed. Amongst the army of Umbulazi were John Dunn and about thirty other white men armed with rifles. Cetywayo then quarrelled with another brother, and the same state of disorder continued till Panda's death, which occurred in October, 1872.

Cetywayo being thereupon accepted as king by the Zulu nation, applied to the English Government to recognize him. Accordingly, Sir Theophilus—then Mr.—Shepstone was sent as envoy, and publicly crowned Cetywayo at the Umlambongmenya kraal, on which occasion he spoke thus to the assembled Zulus: "Here is your king. You have recognized him as such, and I now do also, in the name of the Queen of England. Your kings have often met violent deaths at the hands of their people, but if you kill this one, we shall surely require his blood of you." He then went on to say, "that as the English had recognized him as king, they would expect him to give all men a fair trial before condemnation. Even a witch should be let off, and merely sent away to another district." To this the Zulus returned that they would kill any man who went with the king's women, any man who ran away with another's wife, any thief of cattle, royal or otherwise; that a witch should not be put to death on a first accusation, but should any persist in witchcraft, he should be killed. And to this Shepstone signified his assent. The chiefs then rose in a body and said, "We will so govern the country under our King Cetywayo, and we look to England to support him as the king of the Zulu nation." Shepstone replied that he hoped the Zulus would live peaceably under the new king, whom England would expect to adhere to the terms to which he had just assented.

But these promises were broken on more than one occasion. Cetywayo having called up his army, and finding them tardy in response, and many absentees on the plea of illness, forthwith sent a regiment to slay all those thus absent, saying, "Sick men are no good; I will save the doctors the trouble of attending them." Again, one of the divisions of females being ordered to marry a certain regiment, objected that they were too few. Another regiment was named, and further objections raised. Then an impi was sent to punish these women, and a great number were killed. Great abuses in the practice of "smelling out" by witch-doctors also prevailed, though in this respect Cetywayo appears slightly better than his predecessors.

It is now time to turn attention to what is called the Boundary Question.

It has been previously stated that in Panda's time the Boers had settled in the Utrecht district. From time to time cattle undoubtedly was passed between the Boers and the Zulu king. The former assert that it was the price for the absolute ownership of the land they occupied, whilst on behalf of Cetywayo it is urged that it was merely a tribute from the Boers, whose outside limit had been fixed at Utrecht. Be this as it may, there kept occurring at frequent intervals outrages, robberies, and reprisals on either side, Sirayo, whose kraal was nearest the border, being the most prominent actor in these scenes.

Umbelini also now appeared, to further complicate matters. Originally a Swazi, he had fled from his native land, and settled in Zululand, together with his uncle Umbeliani and his people. This uncle joined the Boers, taking his cattle with him. Land was assigned to Umbeliani by the Boers close to where Umbelini was dwelling. No sooner, therefore, had the former built himself a kraal than the latter attacked and destroyed it. Thus ensued a contest between the Boers and Umbelini. The Boers drove Umbelini from his stronghold, but failed to capture him. He, retreating, erected a new kraal on the Dumbe range, north of the Zlobani, whence he continued to make raids into Swaziland and the Transvaal, which had now become British soil.

At Cetywayo's coronation this vexed question of the boundary had been referred to Mr. Shepstone, and he, in accordance with a promise then given, subsequently met the Zulu envoys at Conference Hill to hear their claims in this matter. They then claimed the Buffalo river as their original and proper boundary. In reply, Mr. Shepstone said that he considered this was asking too much; but that a fair line would be the Blood river and the old hunting road running close by the Kambula Kop to the Pongola or Zulu side of Luneberg. He would, however, examine the question more closely before coming to a final decision, which, when arrived at, would be communicated to them.

During all this time the Zulu army had been growing more and more restless, and the younger men especially were clamorous for an opportunity of "washing" their spears. For this sole purpose they contemplated a raid on the Swazis, then in alliance with England. But on Cetywayo's applying to the British Government for its sanction to this project, it naturally declined to allow its allies to be thus wantonly attacked.

There also existed amongst the Zulu an intense antipathy to the Boers; and Cetywayo, after his capture, himself admitted that had the Transvaal not been annexed, it was a mere question of time how soon a war broke out between his people and the Dutch settlers; nor can this afford much ground for wonder, when the characteristics of a Boer are had well in mind. The typical Boer is doubtless a pattern of hospitality, simplicity of heart, fondness for his home and family, and of those general domestic attributes which are so dear to an Englishman. But in his relations and contact with the native races and real owners of the soil, the Dutch Boer seems to lose all sense of reason and justice, and to remember only those early and blood-stained annals of pioneering, when the white man and the black neither gave nor asked for quarter in their struggle for supremacy in the land. Indeed his intolerance of a native is so intense that he cannot be induced to look upon him as a human being, but he regards the unfortunate aboriginal as a wild beast to be hunted and shot down. But the Boer has his fairer side, although his type has as yet been unchangeable. As he existed when he ruled in Cape Colony in 1808, so he now exists in the present day in his settlements in the interior. He is uneducated, uncultivated, unprogressive, and obstinate; but he developes qualities under adverse circumstances which must command English respect. He is certainly domestic as far as his own family circle is concerned, but, at the same time, the reverse of gregarious in regard to the world in general. When he first commences to farm and settle he likes to possess not less than 6000 and not more than 20,000 acres of good undulating "veldt." When he has obtained this, he starts in his waggon with his wife, his children, his scanty supply of goods and chattels, his cattle and sheep, and his only literature, the family Bible. He selects a good spring of water, being careful that no neighbour is located within at least ten miles. He builds his house with one large central hall, with the kitchen in rear, and four or five bedrooms opening out of the hall, all on the ground floor, and sometimes with a wide verandah outside. Kraals for his cattle, fences to his garden, and enclosures of 50 or 100 acres, are quickly run up; and so fertile is the soil and so favourable the climate, that in four or five years his garden will be full of oranges, lemons, citrons, peaches, apricots, figs, apples, pears, and vines. His herds and flocks multiply, his wheat and Indian corn thrive, and thus he lives in a rude but grateful abundance. His sons arrive at manhood and marry; his daughters are sought as wives, and if the land is good and plenty they remain and farm near, and for each generation and new family a new house is built a few hundred yards from the original. More acres with each generation are brought under the plough, and the man who is a good farmer, good father, and good husband cannot be brought to see that he must not covet his neighbour's land when that neighbour happens to be a black man! Without sentiment, without tenderness, and without a particle of enthusiasm, and with the most circumscribed intellectual horizon, he has a stubborn practicability which is admirably suited for the work of a pioneer, but which never developes into a power of civilization amongst savage tribes.

As has been shown in the preceding narrative the relations between the Zulu king and the English Government had been growing more and more tense. Two conspicuous outrages in the early part of 1878 at length brought matters to a climax. These two events were the Sirayo affair, and the Middle Drift difficulty. To understand the Sirayo business it is necessary to enter somewhat into detail. Sirayo and his tribe had a quarrel with one of the royal tribes—the Ischeni. This, like many another tribal dispute common enough in Zululand, never grew to an "assegai" matter, but encounters frequently occurred, in which sticks only were used, and the object of the rival factions was to drive off the opponent's cattle. The result of this, and a "law-suit" between the parties, settled by the king, was that Sirayo lost all his cattle. Shortly after this, one of Sirayo's wives, who had already been put aside on account of having a son whose legitimacy was suspected, being again in the family-way, fled with her paramour into Natal. Another wife, in a similar condition, also accompanied her. Nothing was done at the time, but Sirayo's sons subsequently learning that these women were in kraals close to the border, having collected an armed band, crossed the river Buffalo in broad daylight, seized one of the women, recrossed the stream, and then killed her. The Natal Kaffirs armed and threatened a rescue, but made no attack on Sirayo's party, who, on the same night, made another incursion, and the second woman suffered the same fate as the first.

Thereupon the English demanded the surrender of Sirayo's sons. Cetywayo sent to Sirayo advising him to hand over cattle instead of his sons. Sirayo replied that in consequence of the Ischeni dispute he had no cattle; that he was aware that his sons had transgressed; and that he was sorry. Again the English insisted on the surrender of the two young men. To this Cetywayo replied that they were very young, and therefore their conduct should be excused, and mercy shown to them. He added, that beyond all doubt they had done wrong; that the English had good cause for anger, and that he himself was displeased with Sirayo for not sending either his sons or cattle.

The Middle Drift affair occurred thus:—At the very beginning of 1878 the English were constructing a road from Kranz Kop to the middle drift of the Tugela. The men at work on this were interrupted, and driven away from their task by the Zulus living in the district, and Smith, the road engineer, who had landed on the island at this drift, was seized, stripped of all his clothing, and much maltreated by the same people. Reparation was demanded by the Government for this outrage. Furthermore, from June, 1877, it was evident that Cetywayo was instigating Secocoeni to hostilities; and even allowing that part of this chief's claim for compensation was just, it was necessary that the former chief should be made to understand that while arbitration was going on the law could not be broken by either side. With great tact, Sir T. Shepstone kept the peace until the Galeka and Gaika war was over, when Lord Chelmsford and his forces were freed, and it became possible to support words by action. Such were the events which led to the sending of an ultimatum by Sir Bartle Frere.

In the beginning of December, 1878, therefore, Messrs. John Shepstone, Brownlie, Walker, Fynn, and Fyney were selected to be the messengers to Cetywayo, to whom they were to communicate a message, of which the following was the purport:—The boundary-line was to be drawn from the junction of the Buffalo and Blood rivers to the Magedala Mountains, and thence on to the district of Roundhill and the source of the Pongolo. All the farmers on the frontier and disputed territory who could produce any tangible evidence of damage or loss due to Zulu menace or warlike demonstration were to receive a moderate but fixed compensation. A fine of 500 head of cattle and the surrender of the guilty members of the tribe was imposed upon Usirayo's (Sirayo) people, and twenty days only allowed for the payment of the penalty; 100 head of cattle to be paid for the outrage upon Lieut. Smith; Umbelini, who had given so much trouble, to be handed over to and dealt with by the Transvaal Government; the whole of King Cetywayo's large army at once to be disbanded; freedom of marriage to be allowed when the parties thereto were of age; justice to be impartially administered; missionaries to be allowed to return to the Zulu country; British Residents to be appointed; all disputes between Europeans to be referred to the king and the resident; and, finally, no expulsion from Zulu territory to be carried into effect without the distinct approval of the resident.

It was further intimated to the king that unless he showed his compliance with these terms, on or before December 31st, then on January 1st, 1879, the British army would commence the invasion of his land, and would enforce them at the point of the bayonet. The advance, it has been said, originally was to have been made on the 1st; but his Excellency the High Commissioner, allowing for the possibility of letters being delayed by the swollen state of the river, the Tugela being then in flood, extended his term of grace to the 11th. A Gazette extraordinary was published on January 6th, containing a declaration from Sir Bartle Frere, demanding from Cetywayo unqualified submission, stating that the general would after the 11th instant demand redress, and that the Zulu people were to be protected. The following was its form:—

"Notification by his Excellency the High Commissioner

"In July last two armed bodies of Zulus, retainers of the Chief Usirago, led by his sons and brothers, entered Natal and took away by force refugee women, who were claiming protection from the resident magistrate of Umsinga. These women were dragged across the border, and, it is believed, murdered. These acts of outrage were promptly brought to Cetywayo's notice by his Excellency the Lieutenant-Governor of Natal, but no explanation or redress could be obtained from Cetywayo. Twenty-one days were allowed to the Zulu king to surrender the three sons and brother of the Chief Usirago for trial, and as this term expired on 31st December, 1878, the High Commissioner entertains no hope that it is the intention of the Zulu king to afford the redress which her Majesty's Government has a right to demand.

"Therefore I hereby make known, for the information of Cetywayo and all the Zulu people, that I have placed the further prosecution of this and all other demands for redress and reparation in the hands of his Excellency the Lieutenant-General Lord Chelmsford, commanding her Majesty's Forces in South Africa, with the request that he will take such steps as he may find necessary to protect the British territory from further aggression, and to compel the Zulu king to comply with all the demands made on him for satisfaction due to the British Government, or for the greater security of the British territory, or for the better and more peaceable government of the Zulu people. Lieutenant-General Lord Chelmsford will carefully notify to all Zulu chiefs and people who may come within his reach that the commands of the British Government are made on Cetywayo, as much in the interests of the Zulu people as of the English nation, and that till the 11th January the Lieut.-General will be willing to receive and to transmit to me any intimation of the unqualified acceptance by Cetywayo of all the terms offered to him. If such intimation of unqualified and complete acceptance be received by the Lieut.-General before the 11th January no further hostile movement will be made, unless rendered necessary by the action of the Zulu forces, and up to the above date Lord Chelmsford will be ready to consider any steps which the Zulu king may propose for the purpose of giving real and permanent effect to the demands of the British Government. But unless all these terms be fully complied with by the above date, the Lieut.-General will no longer be bound by the terms of the 11th December, but will take such measures as the forces under his command will permit for compelling the submission of the Zulu king; always bearing in mind that the British Government has no quarrel with the Zulu nation, and that the future good government and well-being of the Zulus is as much an object of the steps now taken as the safety and protection of the British territories of Natal and the Transvaal. And I do hereby warn all residents and inhabitants of her Majesty's possessions and colonies in South Africa, of whatever race, to be guided by this, my notification, and I do strongly charge and command all her Majesty's officers, ministers, and subjects, and all others whom it may concern, to govern themselves and to act accordingly, and to take due notice of and to pay due regard to the tenor thereof.

"H. B. E. Frere,
High Commissioner.

"Pietermaritzburg, Natal, Jan. 4, 1879."

During the whole of December Lord Chelmsford had been indefatigable in collecting and organizing the military forces at his command. The result was that at this date (Jan. 11th) the return in the order-book was as follows:—

General State of the Field Forces.

No. 1 Column (Headquarters, Thring's Post, Lower Tugela).

Commandant—Colonel C. K. Pearson, the Buffs.

Naval Brigade—170 bluejackets and marines of H.M.S. "Active" (with one Gatling and two 7-pounder guns), under Captain Campbell, R.N.

Royal Artillery—Two 7-pounder guns and rocket battery, under Lieut. W. N. Lloyd, R.A.

Infantry—2nd battalion 3rd Buffs, under Lieut.-Col. H. Parnell.

Mounted Infantry—100 men under Captain Barrow, 19th Hussars.

Volunteers—Durban Rifles, Natal Hussars, Stanger Rifles, Victoria Rifles, Alexandra Rifles. Average, forty men per corps, all mounted.

Native Contingent—1000 men, under Major Graves, the Buffs.

No. 2 Column (Headquarters, Helpmakaar, near Rorke's Drift).

Commandant—Colonel Glyn, 1st battalion 24th Regiment.

Royal Artillery—N battery 5th brigade Royal Artillery (with 7-pounder guns), under Major A. Harness, R.A.

Infantry—Seven companies 1st battalion 24th Regiment and 2nd battalion 24th Regiment, under Lieut.-Col. Degacher.

Natal Mounted Police—Commanded by Major Dartnell.

Volunteers—Natal Carabineers, Buffalo Border Guard, Newcastle Mounted Rifles. All mounted; average forty men.

Native Contingent—1000 men, under Commandant Lonsdale, late 74th Highlanders.

No. 3 Column (Headquarters, Utrecht).

Commandant—Colonel Evelyn Wood, V.C., C.B., 90th Regiment.

Royal Artillery—11th battery 7th brigade R.A. (with four 7-pounder guns) under Major E. Tremlett, R.A.

Infantry—1st battalion 13th Regiment and 90th Regiment.

Mounted Infantry—100 men, under Major J. C. Russell, 12th Lancers.

Frontier Light Horse—200 strong, under Major Redvers Buller, C.B., 60th Rifles.

Volunteers—The Kaffrarian Vanguard, Commandant Schermbrucker, 100 strong.

Native Contingent—The Swazis, our native allies, some 5000 strong.

An idea of the numbers and nature of Cetywayo's force may be gathered from the report of the Government Intelligence Department made at this time.

"The Zulu army, as at present constituted, is drawn from the entire male population, as every male between the ages of fifteen and sixty-five is called upon to serve, without any exemption. The military force consists of fourteen corps or regiments, divided into wings right and left, and the latter into companies. The companies, however, are not of equal strength, but vary immensely, even from ten to 200, according to the numerical strength of the corps to which they belong. In fact, the companies and regiments would more correctly be termed families or clans, and each corps possesses its own military headquarters, or kraal, with the following hierarchy, namely, one commanding officer, chief, or Iduna-Yesibaya; one second in command, major, or Iduna-Yohlangoti, who has charge of the left wing; two wing officers, and company officers according to the need of the battalion. As a rule, all these officers are in command of men of the same ages as themselves, and the method of recruiting is as follows:—At stated and periodical intervals, generally from two to five years, a general levy takes place, when all the youths who happen at that time to have attained the age of fifteen are formed into a regiment and undergo a year's probation, during which time they are supposed to pass from boyhood to manhood. As the regiment becomes disciplined and seasoned it receives large drafts from other corps, so that as the elders die out young men come in to fill up the ranks. The entire Zulu army consists of thirty-three regiments, married and unmarried. No one in Zululand, male or female, is allowed to marry without the king's permission, and this permission is never granted until the men are about forty years of age. They then have to shave the crown of the head, and to put a ring round it, and carry a white shield, in contradistinction to the unmarried regiments, who do not shave their heads and carry coloured shields. Many of these regiments are too young for active service, others are too old, consequently it is estimated that only about twenty-five regiments would be able to take the field, and these would muster perhaps 40,000. Of these 4500 are between fifty and sixty years of age; 3400 are between forty and fifty; 10,000 between thirty and forty; and 22,000 between twenty and thirty. We have heard a great deal about the drill of these, but their movements, as far as we can learn, are few and very simple, but very quickly performed in their own way. They form circles of regiments in order to outflank the enemy. From this formation they break into columns of regiments or companies, and from these into skirmishing order, with supports and reserves. The sole commissariat of the Zulu army consists of three or four days' grain, carried by the lads who follow each corps, and, if necessary, a herd of cattle driven with each column."

CHAPTER II.

Plan of campaign—Native levies—Special service officers—The advance—Pearson's column—Glyn's column—Wood's column—Utrecht—First brush with the enemy—Difficulties of transport—Action on Inyezani—Pearson at Ekowe—Glyn's advance—Durnford's failure—Isandhlwana—Description of camp—The battle—Details—Reconnaissance and return of Lord Chelmsford—Rorke's Drift—Causes of Isandhlwana—Remarks.

The plan of the campaign now commenced was to advance into Zululand in four columns, each column complete in itself, having its own artillery, cavalry, and independent leader. Each column was also to keep up communications with the columns on flank, thus creating, as it were, the effect of an advance in one extended line.

By this means it was intended to thoroughly sweep the entire Zulu territory, and at the same time to prevent any large body of the enemy from slipping between the columns, and so getting to the rear and delivering a counter-attack on the colonies.

In addition to the regular European forces, large native levies had been raised, amounting in all to 7400. It is a great error to suppose that these were without arms, dress, or discipline. On the contrary, a great many of them came to us well armed with serviceable-looking rifles, evidently of Birmingham or Sheffield make, while some of the older-fashioned fire-arms had the Tower mark.

Nor were they clothed only with the conventional blanket. On the contrary, their uniform was neat, and, at the same time, workmanlike, and consisted of a corduroy tunic, or rather patrol jacket, and breeches, with long boots of untanned leather, and a broad-leafed sombrero as a head-dress.

Several native corps were rapidly formed, in the following manner:—The commandant and his staff officers were British officers, the captains mostly retired British officers, colonists, or settlers; the non-commissioned officers, white settlers of different nationalities, and the privates usually Kaffirs.

Among the English officers who received commands in this native contingent were Captain Nolan (Pioneers), Major Bengough, Captain Russell (Rocket Battery), Captain Ulich de Burgh (5th West York Militia), Captain Cherry (32nd Foot), and Lieutenant Hon. H. Gough. Colonel Durnford had command of the whole column, which was to be entirely native so far as the rank and file were concerned, and to be composed of all the three arms—artillery, cavalry, and infantry.

There was also a considerable contingent of European Volunteers—more especially of mounted men, whose total reached close on 1000. Conspicuous amongst these were the Volunteer Hussars and Alexandra Mounted Rifles, the Durban Mounted Rifles, Captain Raaf's Diamond Field and Free State Horse, and a contingent of mounted Boers under Piet Uys, who gallantly responded to Colonel Wood's spirited and soldierlike appeal. These Boers were a splendid body of men, most of them crack shots with the rifle, and although somewhat fierce and uncompromising towards their ancient enemies, the Zulus, proved of invaluable service through their knowledge of localities.

The following "special service" officers, sent out from England, had also arrived and entered on their respective duties:—Captain Cherry (32nd Light Infantry), was placed in command of the 3rd battalion Natal Contingent; Captain Gardner (14th Hussars), was sub-director of transports at headquarters, as well as Captain Huntley (10th Regiment), who was posted to the River Mooi; Captains Essex (76th), and Hon. H. Campbell (Coldstream Guards), were also directors of transports. Major Hopton had this duty at Pietermaritzburg. Captain Brunker, of the Cameronians (26th), had the command of a squadron of Light Horse. Captain Barton (7th Regiment), was staff officer to Colonel Durnford; Captains Pelly Clark (103rd Regiment), Spratt (29th), and Lieutenant Lawrence (18th), were all employed on transport duty at Durban, where, as most of the ammunition and stores were landed, their office was no sinecure. Captain Macgregor (29th Regiment), was staff officer to Colonel Pearson, and Captain Hart (31st Regiment) was on the staff of Lord Chelmsford.

Meanwhile Cetywayo's term of grace had expired; the 11th of January had come and gone without any sign from the Zulu monarch. On the following day the war had begun, and the Tugela was successfully crossed. By four o'clock on the 12th the Buffs, four companies of the 99th, the Victoria Mounted Rifles, the native Sappers, the 1st Natal Native Contingent, and the Naval Brigade were well over the Lower Tugela, near Fort Buckingham. The pontoon worked remarkably well, making three trips an hour. Four small boats were also employed. A herd of cattle was brought into the camp by the vedettes, who also reported that a large Zulu force was in position about twenty miles off, and also at Ondini. It has been mentioned that four columns would be formed from out of the three (whose details have been given above), and these four were now advancing into Zululand in a line which partly described a crescent, of which the left extremity rested on Luneberg and the Pongolo, the right upon the Lower Drift of the Tugela, close to the sea, while the inner half of the circle was represented by the boundaries of Natal and the Transvaal.

The centre may be considered as being at Fort Pearson, where there was a strongly entrenched camp on the summit of a rising or bluff overlooking the river Tugela. The column moving from Fort Pearson consisted of 1500 regular infantry, that is to say, eight companies of the Buffs, under Colonel Parnell; six companies of the 99th, under Colonel Welman; one company Royal Artillery and two 7-pounder guns, drawn by mules under Lieutenant Lloyd; one Naval Brigade of 276 bluejackets and Marines, under Captain Campbell, from her Majesty's ships "Active" and "Tenedos," with three Gatlings; 200 Mounted Infantry, under Captain Barrow, and 200 Mounted Volunteers (Durban Mounted Rifles), under Captain W. Shepstone; the Alexandra Mounted Rifles, Captain Arbuthnot; Victoria Mounted Rifles, Captain Saner; Stanger Mounted Rifles, Captain Addison; the Natal Hussars, Captain Norton. Colonel Pearson, of the Buffs, was in command of the column, and had to co-operate with him a native contingent of 2000 men, under Major Graves, as well as two companies of the 99th posted at Stanger and Durban. The total strength of Colonel Pearson's column may, therefore, be set down at 2200 Europeans and 2000 natives.

The second or right centre column moved from Kranz Kop, a most formidable position, supported by Fort Buckingham. This was the scene of operations in 1861. The heights are commanding and look over a wide field of country. The position is unassailable except from the Natal side, and this was strongly fortified. Colonel Durnford, R.E., commanded this district and attack, and had with him now the 1st Regiment Native Contingent, which then consisted of three fine battalions, with three rocket tubes, under Lieutenant Russell, and 250 mounted natives, making altogether 3300 natives, officered by 200 European officers.

Following the line of advance to the left, and occupying about fifty or sixty miles of frontier, we come to column three, the left centre attack, commanded by Colonel Glyn. Take any good map and you will remark how the boundary winds serpentine fashion in its length from Fort Buckingham to Rorke's Drift and Helpmakaar. Helpmakaar made an excellent base to Rorke's Drift. Being situated on a lofty plateau, it formed an admirable place for a permanent encampment. It also had depôts at Greytown on the one side and Ladismith on the other. Colonel Glyn had with him seven companies of the 1st battalion 24th and eight companies of the 2nd battalion 24th, six 7-pounder guns with Kaffrarian carriages under Colonel Harness, a squadron of mounted infantry under Captain Browne, the Natal Mounted Police (150 men), the Natal Carabineers under Captain Shepstone, the Buffalo Border Guard (Captain Robson), the Newcastle Mounted Rifles (Captain Bradstreet), also the native contingent (2nd Regiment), 2000 strong, under Commandant Lonsdale, officered by 200 whites. From Rorke's Drift, about five miles over the river is Ungusdana, and thence on the traveller comes to the Intalalala river, which is about fifteen miles inland. The country all about the district is rugged and broken, and calculated to afford positions of great defensive strength. Colonel Glyn was, if possible, to bear a little to his left flank after crossing the boundary with a view to communication being opened with Wood's right flank. To effect this connexion, however, there was a sad need of cavalry.

We now come to the extreme left of the advance, whose headquarters were Utrecht, and which was thus composed:—Colonel Evelyn Wood, V.C., C.B., 90th Light Infantry, commanding No. 4 Column; Staff Orderly Officer, Lieutenant Lysons, 90th Infantry; Principal Staff Officer, Captain Hon. R. G. E. Campbell, Coldstream Guards; general Staff duties, Captain Woodgate, 4th Regiment; transport duties, Captain Vaughan, R.A.; senior commissary officer, Commissary Hughes; commissary of ordnance, Assistant Commissary Philimore; subdistrict paymaster, Paymaster M'Donald; senior medical officer, Surgeon-Major Cuffe. Corps—Royal Artillery, six 7-pounders, Major Tremlett, R.A.; 1st-13th Light Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel Gilbert, 13th; 90th Light Infantry, Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel Cherry, 90th; Frontier Light Horse, Brevet Lieut.-Colonel Buller, C.B., 60th; Wood's Irregulars, 700 men, Commandant Henderson. In addition, a few Boers were coming in, and more were expected.

Utrecht is the most southerly part of the Transvaal, and lies upon the border of both Natal and Zululand. It is separated from the former by the Buffalo river, and, after crossing the Blood river, a few marches bring one to the territories of King Cetywayo. From the lowest, or most southerly portions of Utrecht, just where the Buffalo and Blood rivers form a junction, to the port of Durban, on the coast of Natal, is but 100 miles, and the capital city is about thirty miles from Newcastle, the most northern of Natal towns. The two districts are connected by a tolerably fair road and a drift over the Buffalo river. Utrecht, in a strategical point of view, wedged in as it were between Natal and Zululand, cannot be equalled by any position of a similar nature. The interior of this district extends away to the summit of the Drakenberg range, one of which reaches an altitude of 4000 feet. Most of the Utrecht land lies in what is called the "terrace country," and has the advantage of the most splendid bracing air, added to which are mountain ridge and peak, precipice, wooded gorge, and grass-land, and scenery whose characteristics are of a grander and nobler nature than that of the Cape Colony. The portion of the Drakenberg which runs through Utrecht has its eastern front and glacis looking towards the sea, which is about eighty miles distant, and as each terrace or range slopes down the character of the country changes, presenting many of the features of the upper portions of the Cape Colony, that is to say, broad undulating downs in one part and immense flats covered with bush on the other. All the principal rivers and streams of Utrecht and their tributaries flow eastward to the Indian Ocean. On one boundary there is the Pongola, and on the other the Buffalo, while the Blood river passes through it with a south-eastern flow, and the Pifan does the same, but with an inclination to the north-east. From the wild highlands between these two streams issue the head waters of the Umoolosi, which traverses Zululand and empties itself into St. Lucia Bay.

Wood's column marched from Utrecht on the 7th, so as to be on the borderland in order to operate with the right-hand column on the appointed day. General Lord Chelmsford had given orders that Colonel Wood was to be at a certain point on the 10th, and consequently arrangements were made to carry out these instructions. It was known that Sirayo would probably oppose the crossing of Colonel Glyn at Rorke's Drift, and Colonel Wood had been told, if possible, to get sufficiently near to operate on the enemy's right and rear should such an attempt be made. Leaving a small guard at his camps at Sandspruit, the rest of Wood's force paraded in the lightest possible order at 1.30 p.m. on the 10th, and marched from two that afternoon until six p.m. A halt was then made until 1.30 a.m., when by the light of a glorious moon the advance was pursued. A mounted advanced guard was thrown out, flanking patrols were organized and told off, and the troops moved in the greatest silence, not a word in the ranks being allowed to be spoken. At 3 a.m., a short halt took place, and the chief ordered forward a reconnaissance, consisting of Buller's Light Horse, two 7-pounder guns under Major Tremlett, and twenty-four picked shots from the 13th and 90th Regiments respectively. These men were to be carried in some of the mule waggons, and were accompanied by the 700 irregulars, horse and foot. Colonel Wood accompanied this advanced force, leaving the remaining (main) body in charge of Colonel Gilbert, who was ordered to follow at a fixed time. The advanced body arrived within ten miles of Rorke's Drift at 7.30 a.m., and by eight the camp fires were lit and the men comfortably having their breakfasts on the banks of a small stream; the mounted men having at once off-saddled, the infantry piled arms, and the horses and mules turned out to graze under a strong guard.

About nine o'clock the general, Lord Chelmsford, cantered up to the camp, accompanied by his staff and an escort of 100 mounted infantry and some Natal mounted police. The general seemed delighted at the celerity with which his orders had been carried out, as in eighteen hours Wood's party had covered twenty-seven miles, and the men and horses were as fresh as paint. A long consultation took place with the general, and then the order was issued for the return to the main body; but this was not found necessary, as Colonel Gilbert met them after about ten miles.

In this day, or rather twenty-four hours, the men had marched thirty-one miles, and were not fated, on camp being pitched, to enjoy the fruits of their labour and toil, for soon after they were settled for the evening a heavy thunderstorm came suddenly over the tents, and in a quarter of an hour they were up to their ankles in a perfect river of water. The tents went down in all directions, and in many cases poles were snapped. The next day, however, a patrol of Buller's horse was paraded soon after daybreak, as scouts had brought in information that a large number of cattle were to be seen in the neighbouring kloof. Soon after leaving camp Buller's men were fired upon, but the Zulus did not stand their ground, and by the afternoon they had brought in nearly 1000 cattle. Captain Barton, who had gone out later in the day with another party, marched twenty miles in the direction of Umkanga's kraal, where in the skirmish which resulted 550 cattle were taken, and seven of the Zulus were killed and wounded. On the following morning a strong reconnaissance was made in the direction of the Bushee Valley. The Zulus were in considerable force, and their general tried to induce the English skirmishers to follow him to ground of his own choosing. Colonel Wood, however, kept his men well in hand, and contented himself by sending forward two companies of the 13th Light Infantry, Colonel Gilbert's fine corps, and menacing the Zulu flank with some score or more horsemen, who, galloping to a favouring eminence, made capital practice at the Zulu main body with their rifles at 700 and 800 yards. The Zulus still continued to creep up in rear, getting what cover they could from the bushes, and a sharp fire was kept up on both sides. As the men in skirmishing order pushed the enemy gradually before them, the mounted force harassed them on either flank, sometimes galloping round to the right and left to obtain vantage-ground and cover, and then dismounting in sections, and acting as infantry, while the main body was kept carefully out of sight in the dense mimosa which was found in the rear. The bush, as they advanced, gradually became more dense, and the path scarcely allowed them to move in fours by a steep descent into a wooded valley. Instinctively it was guessed that here would be the main body of the foe, and this turned out to be the case, for away to the left front, on a tall "copjie" or circular hill, about twenty mounted Zulus were to be seen, evidently the commander and his staff giving orders and directing the operations of the columns in the plain. The firing had now become general, but the soldiers were not allowed to waste their ammunition, and nearly every shot told with fatal effect. Colonel Wood had taken the precaution to strengthen his flanks as he advanced, and as the enemy could not tell how strong he was, the main body being still invisible, they were completely puzzled by the daring of the mounted men, who seemed ubiquitous. The guns were found rather a nuisance; one of the carriages broke down, and the limber had to be left behind, while the gun itself was secured. The head of the first line of skirmishers had now made good their way through the kloof with slight loss, and the Zulus attempted in vain to get round to its rear, but found all hopes of such a manœuvre utterly futile—as the flanking parties were on the qui-vive. It was now Wood's turn to push them, and he used the opportunity. Two more companies were advanced at the double to force the centre of the Zulu line, and in a few moments we had cut it in two. In the meanwhile one of the light field-pieces had obtained a favourable position, and had got the enemy's range exactly, but the execution done was not what could have been obtained with a good honest nine or twelve-pounder. The pursuit was carried on for about a mile, and the Zulus were scattered in all directions, but the commander was too wary to allow his men to go too far, and the recall was sounded, and in a short time brought back the excited fellows, puffing and blowing, to rejoin the main body.

For some days this column continued to advance steadily without meeting any serious opposition. Having moved on from the Blood River, Wood's force encamped at Bemba's Kop till the 20th January. The country over which they had passed since they left Utrecht may be described as a succession of large rolling plains, interspersed in all directions by watercourses (dongas), which radiate from the bases of the table-topped mountains rising at intervals throughout this part of the country. These watercourses are as a rule about twelve to fourteen feet deep, and serve to irrigate the country, which seems prosperous and well-populated. What would be called a road in England does not exist in Zululand. The tracks made by the traders with their waggons answer the purpose. These tracks are, however, tolerably good, and experience proved that artillery could be moved almost anywhere, except in wet weather. Waggons could pass each other at almost any part of the main road from Utrecht to Ulundi, except at that portion leading across the Inhlazatye Mountain, which runs along a narrow ledge, and where it ascends the Intendeka table-land. Wherever the troops moved they came across numerous kraals, each kraal containing from eight to fifteen huts, and each hut ten to fifteen men. From Bemba's Kop they moved on the 20th to Wolpoint, as nearly as possible seven miles west of the White Umbolosi, and thence went on to Tunguin's Neck, where a laager was planned and completed. After a reconnaissance made by Colonel Wood on the 22nd, in which his troops had a slight skirmish with a small body of Zulus, suffering no casualties, and inflicting a slight loss upon them, he halted on the 23rd, and sent out strong patrols in the direction of the Ingwazini River. These men rode over an open plain admirably suited for cavalry operations, but found nothing but some deserted kraals and the dead bodies of some Zulus, who, it was subsequently discovered, were wounded at Isandula the previous day. On their return the party were fortunate enough to discover the whereabouts of a strong body, some 4000 to 5000 Zulu warriors, who, it was imagined, were merely the nucleus of a force intended to surprise Wood's column. They were posted in a well-chosen position at a place called Tintas Hill, and when they moved down in his direction the following day, Wood had concealed a portion of his force so well, that he got them between two fires, and in about half an hour had killed about sixty or seventy of them, his own casualties being only two men wounded. It was during this action that information was brought by Captain Alan Gardner, who gallantly rode without any escort from Helpmakaar to Utrecht, notifying the terrible disaster of the 22nd, and the destruction of No. 3 Column. This news caused Colonel Wood to change his plans, and after a halt of a couple of hours, he turned back towards the Umbolosi, where his little force arrived at seven a.m. on the 25th. On Sunday (26th) he moved on to Ugaba Ka Hawana, where good camping-ground and a defensive position were chosen, and where the minor essentials of wood and water were in plenty.

Colonel Pearson, who commanded No. 1 Column on the extreme right, had also been prosecuting his advance with the greatest vigour, and the results were in every way satisfactory, though already the tremendous difficulties of commissariat and transport had made themselves unpleasantly evident. This force assembled near Fort Stanger, and crossed the Lower Tugela on the 12th, having as nearly as possible 1500 regular troops, consisting of eight companies of the old Buffs, under Colonel Parnell; six companies of the 99th, under Colonel Welman; one company Royal Engineers, and two 7-pounder guns. A naval brigade, however, which might be considered as a little army in itself, went with them, and were under Colonel Pearson's command. This force consisted of 270 bluejackets and marines, under Captain Campbell, of her Majesty's ships "Active" and "Tenedos," with three of the new-pattern Gatling. Two hundred mounted infantry and 200 colonial mounted riflemen also formed part of the column, while the whole force was supplemented by Major Griffiths and about 2000 men of the Native Contingent. The crossing of the river was at first impeded by the rains, and another delay occurred at the lower drift, where the river was at least 400 yards wide, but all these difficulties were overcome, and after a week's delay a flying column was sent forward on the 18th in the direction of Ekowe, which is a mission-station not quite forty miles inland, and distant nearly seventy from the king's kraal at Ulundi. It was the intention of Colonel Pearson to establish here an entrenched post as a point d'appui to the invading army. On the following day the colonel was followed by the rear division, escorting the heavy baggage, necessary though inconvenient impedimenta, as it contained stores and ammunition. The column of waggons extended for five miles, and it took the officers in charge all their time and the services of three horses each during the day to supervise its progress from inspan till outspan. Again, two days later, came the commissariat, and here imagination fails to describe the difficulties encountered. The subject of transport is one that must be considered in any future operations in Africa. The waggons must be stronger than those employed; the animals should be proof against sickness caused by climate, the tulip plant, and the tsetse fly, and this can be avoided by choosing one's own season for marching. The employment of mules would be much preferable to that of oxen, although in many books the converse is stated, the Dutch being infatuated in regard to the superior qualities of the latter. Mules, for instance, have this advantage over oxen. They can travel twenty-five miles a day with ease, while twelve or fifteen a day with oxen is considered good work; but, on the other hand, it must be remembered that a mule costs twice as much as an ox, apart from the cost of feeding. The mule must, of course, be fed on forage carried for him or bought on the road, while the ox will feed on the veldt, except during the three winter months, when his services are not often required. Two kinds of mules can be procured about Pretoria—the Montevidean and the home-bred animal. The latter is generally preferred, although no doubt the former is most tractable. There is an immense trouble in selecting oxen for campaigning, as none but those bred in the sour veldt of Natal or Zululand are of any use for such rough food and hard work; and, as a rule, these will live where others would die. The usual load is 7000 lbs., placed on a waggon weighing 3000 lbs., and drawn by sixteen or eighteen oxen. The cost for oxen averages about 9l. each, but during this war they went up to 18l., and even 25l. Each waggon, with dissel-boom and yokes complete, costs at least 180l. The cost of mules will average 20l. each, and mule waggons 100l., with harness at 5l. for each animal.

The road, after crossing the river Tugela, crosses no less than four streams, and before reaching Ekowe passes through a broken bushy country. On the 22nd, the day on which Isandula was attacked, Colonel Pearson had a sharp engagement with the enemy at a place called by the natives Inyezane, about four or five miles beyond his camping-ground of the 21st. Major Barrow had been sent forward along a fertile valley which led to the Inyezane, when Colonel Pearson received a despatch from him, saying that he had selected a tolerably good place for camping, which he had carefully guarded by vedettes. On receiving this information the colonel at once rode on to the spot, and although he did not quite approve of the ground, as being too full of bush for an outspan, he decided to allow the waggons to be outspanned for two hours on account of there being no water near at hand. This was done to rest and feed the oxen, and to allow the men to have their morning meal. About eight o'clock, just as the waggons had begun to park, and while the officers were busy in directing the posting of pickets, scouts, and sentries, the advanced company of the Native Contingent, which had been scouting in front under Captain Hart, discovered the Zulus in force rapidly advancing over the slopes and attempting to gain the bushes on both flanks. They came on in skirmishing and extended order in the finest style, rushing from bush to bush in a steady but stealthy manner until within 100 or 150 yards of the outposts. Captain Hart's men, being in the open, had to bear the brunt of a heavy fire, and not without casualties, as they lost one officer, four non-commissioned officers, and four privates almost at once. These poor fellows, it is feared, were sacrificed, inasmuch as they did not understand the order to retire and seek cover, and concluded that it was their duty to remain in the open. The Naval Brigade was now ordered into action, and most ably they acquitted themselves. Two 7-pounders and two 24-pounder Naval Brigade rockets were smartly brought into action on a knoll at the base of the pass, but commanding the valley from which the flank attack was made. Meanwhile two companies of the Buffs and A and B companies of the Naval Brigade opened a heavy and well-directed fire upon the enemy, and effectually held him in check. This coign of vantage was occupied by Colonel Pearson, whence he directed the movements of his troops during the fight. All this time the waggons continued to park, and while the fire was kept up by Commander Campbell, Lieutenant Lloyd, with his guns, and Lieutenant Martin with the Buffs, two other companies of the same regiment which had been employed in guarding waggons were moved down, ready to clear the bush as soon as it was well shelled and swept with rockets and musketry. Colonel Pearson selected Captain Macgregor to undertake this duty, with the assistance of Captains Harrison and Wyld, who, getting their men into skirmishing order, and bringing their shoulders gradually forward as steadily as if manœuvring at a field-day, sent the Zulu braves flying discomfited before them, and exposed them once more in the open to the hail of shot and shell which swept the plain. Colonel Welman, 99th Regiment, now took advantage of this favourable moment, when the enemy was demoralized, to send forward Captain Wynne and Major Barrow with the infantry. These, with skirmishers and flankers on the left, and supported by two half-companies of the Buffs and 99th, now moved forward at a steady pace.

The Zulus, however, were not beaten, though evidently puzzled, and Campbell, who was in charge of the Naval Brigade, saw that they were making a flank movement on the left. This officer at once obtained permission from Colonel Pearson to take a portion of his men and drive out a body of Zulus who had obtained possession of a kraal about 400 yards from the knoll. Captain Hart, with part of his Native Contingent, gallantly supported this movement. They managed to obtain possession of the high ground to the left of the Ekowe road, and effectually checked the enemy in their movement on the British left.

But the gallant sailor Campbell was not satisfied with this partial success, and sent for further permission to follow up his coup by driving on the foe to a more respectable distance. Colonel Parnell, of the Buffs, who up to this time had been acting as a sort of reserve with Captain Foster's company at the foot knoll, where Colonel Pearson remained throughout the action, had now an opportunity of mingling in the fray. Smartly deploying his men, he advanced at the double, and forming up on the right of the bluejackets, swept the heights beyond the kraal which a few moments before were crowned with savage warriors. This decided the action, as the Zulus, thoroughly distracted, fled in all directions, the guns making capital practice wherever a group collected. The last round from the rocket-tubes seemed to carry destruction and confusion amongst them, and was fired a little before ten a.m.

Colonel Pearson and Colonel Parnell both had their horses shot under them, and several officers remarked that the fire of the Zulus was principally directed at the English leaders. The regiments opposed to Pearson were composed of the Umxapu, Umdhlanefu, and Ingulubi, and as near as could be judged, and from the information subsequently received, numbered about 5000 men. Of these at the very least 300 were slain, while the number of wounded, as a rule carried away into the bush, could not have been less than double that. Pearson's loss was eight killed and sixteen wounded, and of these were six officers and non-commissioned officers of the Native Contingent. The following day two companies of the Buffs, two companies Native Contingent, and a few mounted men were sent off to the help of Colonel Ely, 99th Regiment, who with three companies of his regiment was bringing up a convoy, much wanted, of seventy waggons of stores and ammunition, while on Saturday, the 18th, Major Coates started with fifty extra waggons to bring up more supplies. On the day after the Inyezane engagement Pearson arrived at Ekowe. The position was a strong one, and he immediately set to work to make it still more formidable. Water was close to the fort, and well under its fire.

At this juncture news of the Isandhlwana disaster reached Colonel Pearson. After consultation with his officers, he decided to remain where he was, feeling confident that even without further supplies or reinforcements he could hold his position for at least a couple of months. All his waggons came in safety to the fort except five, which broke down and had to be abandoned. The mounted men and Native Contingent were sent back to save food, and there thus remained 1200 British troops, having 320 rounds per man.

The first failure in the carrying out of Lord Chelmsford's plans occurred to No. 4 Column, and proved the initial step to the crowning disaster of Isandhlwana. The right centre column, which should have operated simultaneously with Colonel Wood's force, was unfortunately composed almost entirely of natives, and these fellows did not succeed in getting over at the point directed in orders. As this column could not be brought over the river, a portion of it was left behind to keep open communications and guard the frontier, while the remainder, under Colonel Durnford, was moved up to Rorke's Drift to reinforce Colonel Glyn's command. The following day (12th) Colonel Glyn had his first brush with the enemy. Lord Chelmsford had joined this column, and after crossing the Tugela ordered out a reconnaissance by the Bashee Valley and along the road leading to Izpizi. Glyn took with him three companies of the 1st battalion 24th and one battalion 3rd Regiment Natal Native Contingent, while the mounted men, crossing the valley, went rapidly along the road leading over the Ngudu mountains, where high cliffs close in the gorge for more than three miles. Cattle and armed Zulus were seen on the heights, and some of the 24th and the natives were ordered to bear round to the right flank and cut them off. The skirmish which followed lasted about twenty minutes, and was a very smart affair. It resulted in the taking of the fastnesses and the precipitate flight of the Zulus, who suffered a loss of ten killed, three wounded, and nine prisoners taken, together with a quantity of cattle, horses, and sheep. Colonel Glyn's loss was two privates Natal Contingent killed, one officer of the same, Lieutenant Purvis, severely wounded; Corporal Mayer, Natal Native Contingent, severe wound in thigh. Four companies of the 2nd battalion 24th, and four companies of the 2nd battalion 3rd Regiment Natal Native Contingent, under Colonel Degacher, were now ordered by the General to advance up the Bashee and attack Usirayo's kraal, a place called Loxie, about two or three miles farther on. This place, situated in a wild and mountainous gorge or krantz, interspersed with caves, guarded by huge boulders, was completely explored by these men. In the meantime Russell and his mounted men had ascended to the summit of the Ngudu mountain, where they were fired upon at a distance of 90 or 100 yards. Sixteen of the Zulus were killed, and a very heavy thunderstorm came on during the fight. No signs could be observed of any Zulu force in reserve, and this was explained by the subsequent news that Usirayo had made a precipitate flight in the direction of the king's kraal. On the following day communications were opened between Wood's column and that of Colonel Glyn. The General's movements from the first appear to have been hampered by baggage and transport arrangements, and a similar reason delayed Colonel Pearson. Lord Chelmsford was present with this column when it moved from Rorke's Drift, and saw the site which was chosen by Colonel Glyn at Insalwana, ten miles on the road to the Indeni forest. He then left Colonel Glyn in charge of the camp, and on the same day moved, with a portion of the force, ten miles further on, to reconnoitre the country in front. Returning to camp that evening, without having had time to fully explore, the General, the following morning, sent out two separate reconnoitring columns, under the command respectively of Major Dartnell, who took with him the Mounted Police and Natal Volunteers, of which he is commandant, and Commandant Lonsdale with two battalions of his Native Contingent. Dartnell went along the same road as that explored by the General the previous day, while Lonsdale moved along the southern slope of the Inhlazatye range, towards a hill called Malaka's Kop. If possible a junction between these two bodies was to be effected; and, as soon as information could be obtained as to the situation of the enemy and the strategical features of the locality, both were to return to the headquarter camp. By some extraordinary oversight, neither of these reconnoitring columns seems to have been supplied with rations, while it was usual on such expeditions for the men to take preserved meat and three days' biscuit in their haversacks, supposing that mule transport cannot be had. On the afternoon of the Tuesday Major Dartnell sent an officer to the headquarter camp, to inform the General that he could not advance beyond the Insangu river, a small stream near Inkankla Mountain, as the Zulus were posted there in force. Dartnell, therefore, sent an orderly to call up Lonsdale with his Native Contingent, and sent to Lord Chelmsford to request a reinforcement of regulars to enable him to attack the enemy. His lordship did not consider it advisable to comply with this demand, as the daylight was almost gone, and the distance was long. A supply of biscuit was, however, sent out to the exploring party, who bivouacked at the foot of the Inhlazatye. During the night, however, Major Dartnell appears to have become aware of his critical position, and at half-past two on the morning of the 22nd (Wednesday), Colonel Glyn received a letter from him, saying that the Zulus had been strongly reinforced, and were now in his front in great strength. Instead of recalling the column, or at once pushing forward troops to its assistance, a delay took place, and a staff officer was despatched to ask Dartnell what he wished done. After some further lapse of time the General ordered Colonel Glyn to march to Major Dartnell's assistance with the 2nd battalion 24th Regiment, consisting of six companies, the mounted infantry, and four of Harness's guns. As this detachment would considerably weaken the camp, the General at the same time sent off two expresses to Colonel Durnford, who had been left at Rorke's Drift, telling him to move up at once to Isandula with his 500 native troops, 250 of whom were mounted. The General then decided to accompany Colonel Glyn's force, and Lieutenant-Colonel Pulleine, 1-24th, was left in charge of the camp, with orders to defend it, pending the arrival of Durnford's natives. The actual fighting strength of Pulleine's force consisted of 2 officers, 78 men, and 2 guns R.A.; 1-24th Regiment, 15 officers, 334 men; 2-24th Regiment, 5 officers, 90 men; mounted Europeans, 5 officers, 204 men; Native Contingent, 19 officers, 391 men; Natal Pioneers, 1 officer, 10 men; while Durnford, when he arrived very soon after, brought with him 18 officers and 450 men, thus making an aggregate of 772 Europeans and 850 natives, or in all 1622 combatants. On his arrival at the camp, Colonel Durnford, being the senior officer, of course immediately assumed the command.

To the right understanding of what follows it is necessary to give a somewhat detailed account of the situation. The leading feature of the plain on the southern slopes of which the English camp was placed is the Isandhlwana, or Lion Hill. To the west it rises abruptly, forming the head of the crouching animal it resembles in shape; after forming the back it descends sharply to the east. At both ends are necks or ridges connecting the hill with the smaller undulations of which the more level part of the country consists. The road from Rorke's Drift passes over the western ridge, while on the north facing the camp was a deep ravine and watercourse. To the immediate right was a small copse; beyond this the ground was much broken, irregular krantzes and hills all covered with huge boulders continuing as far as the Buffalo river. To the left of the camp, at the distance of rather more than a mile, ran a long ridge towards the south, connecting it with the great Isandhlwana hill, having on its summit a plateau which, towards the east, opened on to an open and extensive valley. On the extreme left of the camp, looking towards the ridge, were pitched the tents of the Natal Native Contingent; between these and the next two battalions intervened a space of rather less than 300 yards; occupying the centre were the British regular Infantry, just above whom came the headquarters camp of Lord Chelmsford, and in close proximity the headquarters of the column. On the right were the guns and mounted corps lining the edge of the road. Soon after it came over the neck at the back of the camp the ground rose considerably, until the bottom of the precipitous Isandhlwana was reached: the camp therefore literally had its back to a wall.

At six a.m. on the 22nd, a company of the Natal Natives was ordered to scout towards the left, the enemy having appeared in that direction. Whilst these were away Durnford arrived, about nine o'clock, with a rocket battery under Colonel Russell, R.A., 250 mounted natives, and 250 native foot. News was now brought in that the Zulus in very large numbers were driving the pickets before them. A later messenger—a native without uniform, supposed by some to be a Zulu purposely sent with false intelligence—brought the news that the Zulus had divided into three columns, one of which it was supposed was about to attack Colonel Durnford's baggage, still on the road from Rorke's Drift, the other to harass Lord Chelmsford and Colonel Glyn's party in their rear, whilst the third was to hover round and watch the camp. Finally came the news "Zulus retiring in all directions." Colonel Durnford thereupon asked Colonel Pulleine to lend him a couple of the 24th companies, but he declined, saying his orders were to guard the camp, and he could not, under the circumstances, let them go without a positive command. Durnford then determined to go on with his own force, which he divided into three, one part being sent up the hill to the left (east), one to the left front, and the third to the rear, in the direction of Rorke's Drift, to act as an escort for the baggage not yet arrived. The rocket battery was of the party that proceeded to the front under Colonel Durnford in person, to a distance of four or five miles from the camp, but being unable to keep pace with the mounted force was soon left behind.

The body of troops despatched to the left became engaged with the enemy almost immediately, and firing was soon heard all along the crest of the hill. In about an hour Durnford's mounted men re-appeared over the hills, hotly pursued by swarms of Zulus; at the same time the horsemen to the front were also driven back. These, after retiring steadily in skirmishing order for about two miles, came upon the remains of the rocket battery, which had been cut off and broken up, whilst a hand to hand engagement was going on with those who remained. It appears that Russell, whilst advancing with his battery, perceived a body of the enemy on his left, he fired three rockets with some effect; then the Zulus fired a volley, upon which the Native Contingent of infantry retreated, the mules were frightened, and disorder ensued. Taking advantage of this, the enemy charged down the hill, a mêlée ensued, and Russell was killed. As the mounted men retired towards them, the Zulus retreated to their cover, and they, after making a final stand in a spruit about a mile and a half in front of the camp, were eventually driven in.

As the cavalry on the left was being pushed rapidly back, Captain Mostyn was ordered to advance with two companies of 1-24th on the eastern neck of the Isandhlwana, where at a distance of about a mile and a half the Zulus were advancing in large numbers along the north of the Isandhlwana, to outflank the camp on the right, and with this wing of the foe they at once became engaged.

Meanwhile the Zulu left rapidly, and the centre steadily, though more slowly, pushed forward, despite the artillery fire poured into them. Orders were now given for three companies of the 1-24th to occupy ground near the Native Contingent camp, facing the hill over which the Zulu force was streaming. These three companies were supported to their right front by the Natal Native Contingent.

Immediately to the right of the Native Contingent tents came the guns, at a distance of about four hundred yards from the left, and rather more from the right, which was composed of two companies, 24th Regiment and the Mounted Corps, and which occupied the extreme right of the camp and rested on the road. The infantry, in extended order, were by this time engaged along the whole line, and were firing rapidly and steadily. Though the enemy fell in hundreds they kept advancing in apparently undiminished numbers. As rank after rank of the foremost were swept down others pressed on, till at length the companies of the 1-24th above mentioned had been driven back to within 300 yards of that portion of the camp occupied by the Native Contingent. A number of the native infantry now began a hasty retreat to the camp; their officers endeavoured to restrain them, but without effect. Captain Essex pointed this out to Colonel Durnford, who ordered him to take men to that portion of the field, and endeavour to hold the enemy in check. But before this could be executed the natives rushed back in the utmost disorder, thus laying open the right and rear of the companies of the first battalion of the 24th on the left and rear, and the enemy dashing forward at once poured in through this part of the line. In a moment all was disorder, and but few had time to fix bayonets before the Zulus were amongst them, using their assegais with terrible effect. Then followed a scene of utter confusion; horse and foot, black and white, English and Zulu, friend and foe, in a struggling, fighting crowd, pushed gradually through the camp towards the road, where the Zulu right already barred the way. Every man endeavoured to escape towards the Buffalo river, but this was almost an impossibility even for mounted men. The ground was rugged, broken with water-washes, boulder-strewn: ground over which an active native Zulu could progress even faster than a horse. In front ran the river, swift, deep, and fordless, sharp rocks, and deep water alternating. Not half of those who escaped from the camp succeeded in crossing this obstacle: many were drowned, many assegaied, some few shot, and so the pursuit continued right into Natal. The guns moved from right to left across the camp, and endeavoured to get on the Rorke's Drift road. This being occupied by the enemy, they turned off to the left, and coming to grief in a donga had to be abandoned. Major Smith, though wounded, managed to reach the Buffalo, but was there shot.

Lieuts. Melvill and Coghill, seeing all was lost, made an attempt to escape on horseback with the colours of the 24th. Coghill succeeded in getting safely across the Buffalo, but Melvill was struck by a shot just as he was reaching the far bank of the river. Coghill, with heroic devotion, turned back to assist his less fortunate comrade—alas! only to share his fate. Their bodies were subsequently discovered in close proximity, and around them a group of dead Zulus. The colours which they had so desperately defended were also found in the bed of the river, saved from the degradation of capture and contamination by the hands of savages.

In this sad affair there perished twenty-six Imperial officers and 600 non-commissioned officers and men. The loss of the Colonial forces was not less terrible, twenty-four officers being included in the list.

The following is a detailed list of the victims of that sad day:—1-24th, Col. Pulleine, Major White; Captains Degacher, Wardell, Mostyn, Younghusband; Lieuts. Hodson, Cavaye, Atkinson, Daly, Anstey, Porteous, Melvill, Quarter-Master Pullen, and five entire companies: 2-24th, Lieuts. Pope, Austin, Dyer, Griffiths, Quarter-Master Bloomfield, and ninety men. Royal Engineers, Colonel Durnford, Lieut. McDowell, Captain G. Shepstone (political assistant to Col. Durnford), Lieut. Coghill, A.D.C. (to Sir Bartle Frere), Surgeon-Major Shepherd. The Mounted Police Carabineers and Volunteers lost forty-three out of seventy-one, including Captain Bradstreet, Lieut. F. J. D. Scott, and Quarter-Master Hitchcock. The Mounted Infantry lost thirty out of thirty-four. The N Battery 5th Brigade, Royal Artillery, under Major Stuart Smith, was destroyed (Lieut. Curling escaped), as also the Rocket Battery under Major Russell, R.A. 1st Battalion 3rd Regiment, N.N.C., lost in officers, Captains Robert Krohn and James Lonsdale, Lieuts. Avery, Holcraft, and Jameson; Surgeon F. Bull, Quarter-Master John McCormick. 2nd Battalion 3rd Regiment, N.N.C., lost Captains Erskine, Barry, and Murray; Lieuts. Pritchard, Young, Gibson, Standish Vereker, and Rivers, Quarter-Master A. Chambers. The loss of material is put down at 102 waggons, 1400 oxen, 2 guns, 400 shot and shell, 1200 rifles, 250,000 rounds of rifle ammunition, 60,000l. worth of commissariat supplies, a rocket trough, and a number of tents.

Four special-service officers, viz. Captain Alan Gardner, 14th Hussars and Essex 75th Regiment, and Lieuts. Smith, Dorien, 95th, and Cochrane, 32nd, together with Lieut. Curling, R.A., succeeded in escaping, and rode away to Helpmakaar, where a laager was immediately formed. The same night, as no other messenger could be found, and it was feared Wood's column might be cut off in rear, Captain Gardner started to give him timely warning. Riding all night, he reached Utrecht about four o'clock next day, thence despatching a messenger to Colonel Wood, he himself returned to Helpmakaar.

The following account is of great interest as having been given by a Zulu deserter:—

"The Zulu army, consisting of the Ulundi corps about 3000 strong, the Nokenke 2000, the Nkobamakosi, including the Uve, 5000 strong, the Umcityu 4000 strong, the Nodwengu 2000 strong, the Umbonambi 3000, and the Udkloko 1000—a total of 20,000 men in all—after an address from the king left the Nodwengu military kraal on January 17th, and proceeded on their march towards Rorke's Drift. On the 20th they halted for the night close by the Isipezi hill, and on the 21st, keeping to the eastward, they occupied a valley running north and south under the spurs of the Ngutu hill, which concealed that of Isandhlwana, distant about four miles nearly due west. The order of encampment was—on the right, the Nodwengu, Nokenke and Umcityu; in the centre, the Nkobamakosi and Umbonambi; on the left, the Ulundi and Udkloko corps. On the morning of the 22nd there was no intention of making an attack on account of some superstition as to the state of the moon, and they were sitting down resting when firing was heard by the Zulus on the right. This was at first supposed by them to be an attack on the centre, but a move being made in that direction this proved not to be the case; and it was soon found out that this was the whites engaged with Matyana's people some ten miles off to the left front. Just after the Zulus had resumed their position, and again sat down, a herd of cattle came past their line driven down by some of their scouts from the right. Just when these were opposite the Umcityu regiment a body of mounted men on the hill to the west were seen galloping and evidently trying to cut them off. When several hundred yards off, seeing the Umcityu, they dismounted, fired a volley, and retired. The Umcityu at once jumped up and charged. This example was followed by the Nokenke and Nodwengu on the right, as well as by the Nkobamakosi and Umbonambi in the centre, whilst the Undi and Udkloko formed a circle—as is customary with the Zulus when a force is about to engage—and remained in their position. With these were the two chief officers Mavamingwana and Tyugwayo, who after a short pause led away these centre troops in a north-westerly direction, and keeping to the north of the Isandhlwana performed a turning movement, unseen by the English through the nature of the ground. Thus the original Zulu left became the extreme right, the right the centre, and the centre the left. The two regiments forming the latter—the Nkobamakosi and Umbonambi—made a turning movement along the front of the camp to the English right, but became engaged before they could complete it. The Uve battalion of the Nkobamakosi had to retire till reinforced; and the Umbonambi suffered heavily from the artillery fire. Meanwhile the Zulu centre, consisting of the Umcityu (left centre) and Nokenke and Nodwengu (higher up on the right) under the hill, were making a direct attack on the left of the camp. The Umcityu suffered very severely from both artillery and musketry fire; the Nokenke from musketry fire alone; while the Nodwengu suffered least. When the camp was carried the regiments became all mixed up together; some pursued the fugitives to the Buffalo; the remainder plundered the camp: but the Undi and Udkloko made the best of their way to Rorke's Drift, in order to plunder the post there."

It is now time to turn attention to the remainder of the troops that had left the camp before this sad event occurred.

The force under Colonel Glyn, accompanied by Lord Chelmsford, moved off at early dawn, and had reached Major Dartnell by 6.15 a.m. The General at once took command, and ordered out scouting parties of mounted men to gain intelligence of the positions and strength of the enemy, who soon after showed in some force on the opposing heights parallel to the Inhlazatye Mountains. A general advance of the troops was made, and the enemy retired slowly, but without firing. The guns and 24th Regiment meanwhile moved up the valley, their left being protected by the Mounted Infantry, while the Mounted Police and Volunteers guarded the right flank. The main body of the enemy drew back in regular order and took up a position with great skill on the spurs of the Isipisi Mountain, distant about six miles, but Captain Shepstone, with his Natal Carabineers, managed to cut off about 300 of the stragglers and destroyed fifty of them. At nine a.m. a messenger, whose horse was panting and covered with foam, arrived before Colonel Glyn with a brief despatch from Colonel Pulleine, notifying that musketry firing was heard on the left front of the camp. Lord Chelmsford at once sent a staff officer, Lieutenant Milne, to an eminence from whence the camp and valley of Insalwana could be seen, and it seems that a delay of an hour took place while this officer was vainly scanning the horizon. The actual scene of conflict where Colonel Durnford was engaged with the Zulu army was five miles away, and hidden by some hills intervening between Lord Chelmsford's position and the British camp. The General, therefore, seems to have felt no apprehensions in regard to the safety of the camp, and continued his operations against the supposed main body of the Zulus.

About two o'clock Lord Chelmsford was on the banks of the Amange stream, selecting a fit spot for a camp, he having already in the morning sent Captain Gardner back to Colonel Pulleine with an order to that officer to forward the camping materials of the party out on reconnaissance. While thus engaged a native on horseback galloped down from the opposite ridge saying that an attack was being made on the camp, and that he had seen heavy firing and heard the big guns. Lord Chelmsford immediately hastened to the crest of the hill, whence through a glass the camp could be plainly seen. All, however, seemed quiet: the sun was shining on the white tents; no signs of firing were seen, and the bodies of men moving about in the camp were put down to be English soldiers and friendly natives. Knowing how careful were his dispositions and how positive his orders for the defence of the camp, one and all of Lord Chelmsford's escort came to the conclusion that an attack had been made and repulsed. It was then decided that the headquarters camp should move to the spot selected on the Amange stream, whilst the General himself, who was anxious to know the details of the attack, should proceed back to camp. The Carabineers and the Mounted Infantry accompanied him: the 1st battalion 24th Regiment, the four guns, the Mounted Police and 2nd battalion of 3rd Regiment Native Contingent were left to form the new camp. During the first seven miles of the journey nothing occurred to excite the General's suspicion. Certainly some of the tents had disappeared, but then this was in accordance with the orders given in the morning. When about four miles from the camp he fell in with the Natal Native Contingent, which had been ordered to return many hours previously, but which seeing the camp attacked by forces superior to its own had wisely halted. In about half-an-hour they were met by a solitary horseman coming at a foot pace from the direction of the camp. Commandant Lonsdale, for it was he, rode up to the General and uttered the astounding words "The camp is in possession of the enemy." It appears that Lonsdale, who had been ill, being very tired was quietly returning from Glyn's column to the camp. He had crossed the small water-wash to the south of the camp and was jogging slowly along in a sort of lethargy, from which he was roused by the discharge of a rifle close to him. Looking up, he saw a native, who had evidently just fired, and him he imagined to be one of his own contingent indulging in reckless firing; so he pursued his way. Sitting in and around the tents were groups of red-coats, so he still kept on till within a bare ten yards of the tents. He then saw a great black Zulu come out of one with a blood-besmeared assegai in his hand. Gazing more carefully, he saw that black men, and black men only, were the wearers of the red-coats. The truth flashed on him: turning his pony sharp round he galloped off before the enemy knew what he was about. Not less than 150 shots were fired at him as he did so, but, providentially, he escaped to warn the General, who, without such warning, his staff and troops with him, would have walked unsuspiciously into the trap, and the whole force would probably have perished to a man.

The General at once sent back to hurry up Colonel Glyn and his force, while Colonel Russell was sent on to reconnoitre the camp, which was found to be as Commandant Lonsdale had reported. On Colonel Glyn's arrival the whole force was disposed in fighting order, and moved rapidly across the plain, but could not arrive in the vicinity of the camp until after dark. All was found a wreck—corpses, broken tents, dead horses, oxen, and other débris were strewed around; and the men, most of whom were without ammunition, and had not tasted food for forty-eight hours, were ordered to bivouac amidst the crowd of blood-stained relics which marked the day's slaughter. Our soldiers had covered more than thirty miles on the previous day without food or ammunition, and if resolutely attacked by the entire force of Zulus might have shared the fate of their comrades. The next morning, therefore, before daylight a sad retreat was effected to Rorke's Drift, where the first glad tidings were heard of the glorious defence which had been made by Chard and Bromhead, with their handful of men.

It came about thus. Lieutenant Chard, with one sergeant and six men, had been left in charge of the ponts over the Tugela at this point. Close by was a commissariat depôt in charge of Lieutenant Bromhead and a company of the 24th Regiment. About three o'clock on January 22nd news of the disaster at Isandhlwana reached this officer, together with a note, saying that the enemy were advancing in force against his post, which was to be held at all costs. Chard immediately withdrew his small party, and in concert with Bromhead arranged for the loopholing and barricading the store-building and hospital, and for connecting the defences of the two by building walls of mealie-bags. At 3.30 an officer of Durnford's Horse with about 100 men came in, and was asked to send them out as vedettes; these, when pressed, to fall back and assist in the defence of the buildings. At 4.30 this officer returned with the news that the enemy was close at hand, that his men would not obey orders, but had galloped off to Helpmakaar. About the same time Captain Stephenson and his detachment of natives also withdrew. It was at once perceived that the line of defence was now too extended for the small force left, and an inner entrenchment of biscuit-boxes was made, and this had been completed to a wall two boxes high, when suddenly 600 of the enemy turned the hill to the south. They advanced at a run against the southern wall, and notwithstanding a tremendous fire reached to within fifty yards of it. Being here encountered by a cross-fire from the store they were stopped. Taking advantage, however, of some shelter afforded by the cookhouse and ovens, they kept up heavy musketry volleys thence, whilst the main body moved on to the left round the hospital, whence they made a rush upon the north-west wall and breastwork of mealie-bags. Meanwhile the mass of the advancing foe lined a ledge of rocks and filled the caves overlooking the English position at a distance of 100 yards to the south, whence they too kept up a constant fire. Another party to the left occupied a garden in a hollow in the road, and also the bush beyond, which time had not permitted to be cut down. The enemy could thus advance close to the English works, and were soon in possession of one whole side of the wall, whilst on the other in a line extending from the hospital all along the wall to the bush they made a series of determined onsets. But each attack was met and splendidly repulsed with the bayonet, Corporal Schiess (N.N.C.) especially distinguishing himself. The fire from the ledge of rock and caves at length became so galling, that it was necessary to retire behind the inner line of biscuit-boxes.

All this time the enemy had been trying to force the hospital, and at length they did set fire to the roof. The garrison defended the place room by room, bringing out all the sick who could be moved before they retired. Privates Williams, Hook, R. Jones, and W. Jones, 24th Regiment, were the last to leave, holding the doorway against the Zulus with their bayonets, their ammunition being quite expended. Five sick men, owing to the smoke and want of interior communication, had unfortunately to be left to their fates. Two heaps of mealie-bags were now converted into a sort of redoubt, and a second line of fire was thus obtained all round. Darkness now came on, and after several more furious attacks had been repulsed the defenders had ultimately to retire to the middle, and then to the inner wall of the kraal, east of the position they had at first held. The attacks continued all night, the soldiers firing with the utmost coolness, and never wasting a shot. At four a.m., January 23rd, firing ceased, and by daybreak the enemy were disappearing over the hill to the south-west. The ground was then patrolled, the arms of the dead Zulus collected, and the position strengthened as far as possible. About seven a.m. a large body of the enemy was again seen on the hill to the south-west, and a friendly Kaffir, who had come in shortly before, was sent to Helpmakaar to ask for assistance. However, about eight a.m. the British 3rd column began to appear, whereupon the enemy, who had been again advancing, fell back as the troops advanced, and Rorke's Drift Post had been saved.

The number of English engaged in this action was eight officers and 131 non-commissioned officers and men; of these fifteen were killed and twelve wounded, two subsequently dying of their hurts. The attacking Zulu force consisted of two regiments—the Undi and Udkloko—in all a total of something less than 4000. Of these 370 lay dead around the post on the morning that Lord Chelmsford so opportunely arrived.

Surgeon Reynolds, Acting Commissary Officer Dalton, and Assistant Commissary Dunne were throughout conspicuous for their gallantry and coolness. Lieutenants Chard, R.E., and Bromhead, 24th Regiment, subsequently received the thanks of both Houses of Parliament for their heroic conduct, and were advanced to the rank of majors.

So much has been said and written as to the cause of, and so many people have been held responsible for the Isandhlwana disaster that the subject cannot here be passed over in silence.

The living no less than the dead have a claim to a full share of justice and truth; but remembering that the mouths of one party—"les morts qui ne reviennent pas"—are closed, we should be extremely careful in drawing any conclusion from acts which, could the testimony of the fallen be obtained, it would not only explain and excuse, but amply justify.

The court of inquiry held at Helpmakaar found itself unable to form from the available evidence any positive judgment; but the facts disclosed point irresistibly to a negative conclusion. Had the troops acted on the defensive, the camp would not have been lost.

Still there may have been cogent—nay irresistible reasons which caused Colonel Durnford to push forward his forces. Were Colonel Pulleine alive, he might give equally good reasons for acceding to Durnford's urgent request and sending out the reinforcements.

The British regular infantry advanced successfully, retired slowly and in unbroken order; they were still firing rapidly, coolly, and with great effect. Things though desperate were by no means hopeless. Suddenly the native levies, "though their officers tried to restrain them, rushed back in the utmost disorder," thus exposing the flank and rear of the regulars. "Few of the men had time to fix bayonets before the enemy were amongst them, using their assegais with terrible effect." Here is the answer to "How did it happen?" The natives on one side—the Zulu—were regarded too lightly; on the other, fighting for the English with too great confidence. "Why," it will be asked, "were not the waggons laagered? Whose duty was it to see this done?" Lord Chelmsford had issued a standing order at the very commencement of the campaign, that this was to be the first consideration in all camps. Lord Chelmsford, accompanied Colonel Glyn from Rorke's Drift, saw the site chosen at Isandhlwana, and then immediately started on a reconnaissance which lasted till after nightfall. Doubtless Lord Chelmsford supposed Colonel Glyn had done what was necessary. On the following morning with the first streak of dawn Colonel Glyn was ordered to proceed to Major Dartnell's assistance, and Lord Chelmsford determined to accompany him, after despatching an express to Colonel Durnford ordering him up "to strengthen the camp." Doubtless Colonel Glyn supposed that Colonel Pulleine would see to laagering the waggons. Colonel Pulleine was in command of the camp a bare three hours, and doubtless, knowing how brief his tenure of office was to be, preferred to let things remain as they were till his successor's arrival. Colonel Durnford had not been a single half-hour in camp before the action was commenced.

It is asked why did not the troops form squares? Hastings, we are told, had Harold's men only remained in their position, would have been a Saxon victory—Torres Vedras a disgrace instead of a glory had the British troops been rashly taunted into leaving their trenches: and Waterloo a more glowing theme for Beranger's lyre had Napoleon been able to entice the patient English squares to forsake their adamantine formation. But why was Colonel Durnford to form squares? How was he to imagine that such an immense force was arrayed against him when the Commander-in-chief had with him a superior force to that left in the camp avowedly to operate against the enemy's main body? For such his information and personal observation led him to believe was the force against whom he and Major Dartnell were acting.

Colonel Durnford was no novice in South African war; like Cæsar, he had the gift of the pen no less than the sword; he had both written and fought well. Colonel Pulleine was an experienced officer of no mean reputation, and by whatever device they were deceived, we may be sure that it was no ordinary one, and that few would have stood where they fell.

Again, who could have anticipated the attack? We have it from the lips of a Zulu that the onset was unpremeditated, and the result of accident. With all humbleness, let it be confessed that—

"Our indiscretion sometimes serves us well
When our deep plots do fail; and that should teach us
There's a divinity that shapes our ends
Rough hew them as we will."

Another question, often asked, is, "Why did not Lord Chelmsford, immediately on his return, make a counter-attack on the enemy." First of all he had to wait for Colonel Glyn and the main body to come up to him. Meanwhile darkness had come on. When Glyn arrived he did advance with his troops formed up for action, and with the intention of re-taking the camp, which he had every reason to suppose was occupied by the enemy. The event proved they had abandoned it. Was not this a good reason for striking a blow? Let the facts of the case be well borne in mind. Lord Chelmsford knew that there was a large force in his rear; the force that had sacked the camp was supposed, and reasonably enough, to be on the right flank. In front were the bright watchfires of another force, and the blazing hospital at Rorke's Drift, which, together with Helpmakaar, there was every ground to believe had been captured and looted by the foe; in a word, his force was surrounded. The men had only fifty rounds of ammunition apiece; they had been twenty-four hours without food; they were physically exhausted by eighteen hours' continuous marching, and no less morally by the loss of their camp; their probabilities of escape were distant. How could a general lead troops in such a condition against a foe flushed and elated with spoil and recent victory?

CHAPTER III.

Ekowe described—The fort—Guard for the frontier—Raid on Dabulamanzi's Kraal—Another raid—Life in Ekowe—Wood at Potter's Kraal—Capture of Baglusini—Skirmish and capture of cattle—Destruction of Manyanyoba Kraal—Colonel Rowlands—Capture of Makatees Kop—Junction with Wood—Camp at Kambula—Coming in of Oham—Disaster at Intombi Drift—Death of Moriarty—Rescue of Oham's wives and people—Events that led to the attack on Umbelini—The Zlobani—The attack—Details—Death of Campbell—Narrow escape of Wood—Death of Weatherly—St. Helena and H.M.S. "Shah."

We must now return to Pearson, whom we left entrenching himself at Ekowe.

The position is a most commanding one, being almost on the summit of the Tyoe range, and more than 2000 feet above the sea level; and for beauty of site could scarcely be surpassed. To the north, about a mile and a half, is the Umlalazi river, at that time rather full from the late rains, and beyond this stream are long undulating grassy plains, almost devoid of bush, with the exception here and there of a few wild and dwarf date-palms, and lichens in the hollows. Behind, to the south, is the Umkukusi range, and a hilly but open country, while on the west is a very broken and difficult country, bounded by the Hintza forest. Away to the east, right to the coast at Port Durnford, is about forty miles of undulating and here and there hilly country. About 1200 yards to the south-east there is a rocky eminence at least 600 feet higher than the fort, and from this place a magnificent view of Port Durnford and the mouth of the Umlalazi can be seen. The sea is not more than twenty-two miles off, in a line as the crow flies. The original building was formerly a Norwegian mission station, and when the present war began it was abandoned by the missionaries and plundered by the Zulus. The buildings, when Pearson arrived, consisted of three moderately-sized brick erections, thatched originally with straw, but subsequently covered with a less inflammable material. In addition to these buildings, which were utilized as stores, there was a small church, built of the native-made sun-dried bricks, and covered, as most of these edifices are in that country, with corrugated galvanized iron. The church was turned into an hospital, while the tower made a capital look-out, from whence could be seen the next post, and which afterwards proved of such service in the way of signalling. Pearson now began to suffer the inconveniences of a regular siege; his communications were cut, and it was found that of the twelve messengers belonging to the Natal Native Contingent sent from Ekowe with letters during the first week in February, only one arrived, the others having been intercepted and killed on their way. The fort soon completely changed its character under the incessant labour bestowed upon it by Pearson's men, under the vigilant supervision of their chief. It now became a six-angled enclosure, about sixty yards wide, having a ditch eighteen feet in depth, while its breadth was twelve feet. At the bottom it was studded profusely with assegai heads securely planted, and the parapets, carefully rivetted, were proof not only against any musketry fire, but field artillery. From its southern angles ran out two well-built curtain walls, enclosing a fine kraal for cattle and horses. These curtains were well protected by the fire of the angles from which they sprung, while the kraal itself had its own massive gateway and drawbridge. At the end of the kraal, or cattle enclosure, furthest from the angular fort, was constructed from the remains of a dilapidated magazine, a kind of irregular redoubt, which also had a deep ditch and thick mud walls, defended by a quantity of powerful thorns laid along the parapet. It was most fortunate that this force brought with them a large supply of well-selected entrenching tools, consisting of shovels, picks, spades, billhooks, axes, and crowbars. Day by day, whenever their time could be spared from patrol and outpost duty, the men were employed in making entanglements of rows of felled trees, as well as constructing fascines, filling sandbags, turning out gabions, loopholes, and abattis. All these obstacles possessed the usual requisites. They were under the close fire of the fort, were covered from the enemy's fire, and gave him no cover; while they were all made so substantially that they could not be cut down or removed without immense difficulty. The piquet duties were rather severe, and each piquet had to furnish two or three double sentries in reliefs, patrols, and links. They were posted under the best circumstances obtainable, being sheltered from the enemy, having a good range in front, with every advantage in retreating if attacked in force. Each face or front of the fort was cleared up to 800 yards; shelter trenches were made for the first line of defence; cover was left for the supports and reserves; ranges were marked and measures taken for the artillery and rifle fire, and all precautionary arrangements made in regard to the supply and storage of provisions, forage, water, and ammunition.

The water was good, and not brackish at that time of the year. It was taken from a bright stream well under the fire of the fort, and fed by a capital spring, also under fire of one of the seven-pounders. The church and the storehouses were also carefully loopholed, and sandbags furnished to make the defences more secure. These three strong loopholed buildings, forming part of the enceinte, were rendered more formidable by double planking, backed crossways by iron barrel hoops, while fine, damp, heavy sand from the neighbouring hill was employed in filling bags, made from old provision sacks.

Every man in the fort had his proper place assigned to him, and at exercise it was found that with three minutes' notice each detachment was in its place. The Buffs were told off to the two northern faces, on which side there was a well-made caponnière thrown up in the re-entering angle. At the west angle of this fort one gun and a detachment of the Royal Artillery were posted, while on the east salient were two guns and a somewhat stronger number of men. Here there was a small outlet for water-parties, guarded on the flank by a little loopholed building, and commanded in the rear by a strong building with a thatched roof. The rocket tubes were placed under charge of the Royal Marines, on the south-west front, and could, if necessary, sweep the trek oxen laager, and slaughter oxen laager outside the fort on that side. The principal gateway was on the west face, and was guarded by a company of the Buffs, who loopholed the church tower in their rear to fall back upon, and to act as a commanding flanking fire. The front, facing due south, was served by the 99th, with one gun at the salient angle, a caponnière in the centre, guarded by a Gatling, and with a thirteen feet stockade at the opposing angle. Another strong building, also thatch roof, commanded this front. Not a day passed but some improvement was made in strengthening these works, and this as much for prudence against possible attack, as to keep the men occupied and free from the lassitude attendant upon long confinement. It should also be mentioned that torpedoes had been laid down by the bluejackets for three miles along the bed of the Tugela, so that if the Zulus attempted to cross near any of the posts of observation they might be somewhat astonished.

The ration daily used to be two pounds of beef—fresh killed and tough as leather—a couple of commissariat biscuits—hard as flint—a very small complement of coffee or tea, sugar, and one spoonful of lime juice, which every man had to take whether he liked it or not; preserved potatoes, compressed vegetables, and an occasional ration of beans, made a little variety now and then. During the last days of the siege the meat and biscuit ration was reduced. A day's routine was as follows:—The men rose with the réveille at four a.m. for a parade of all hands and fatigue duties for a couple of hours, weather permitting: the breakfast bugle sounded at eight, and fatigues were again performed from 9.30 till noon; dinner bugle at 1.30, and rest and recreation till 4.30, and finally "retreat" at 6.30, when no one was to be outside the walls. The men amused themselves with quoits, cricket, and athletics, some of the Buffs being good "all round;" while all the officers, especially the colonel, encouraged these pastimes by example as well as precept. After all, the life was not more monotonous than that on board ship. There was no lack of ammunition, as Colonel Ely on march to Ekowe had to abandon only ten waggons, and these were looted. The rest, however, arrived safely. The garrison also from time to time received valuable and most reassuring information regarding the disposition and whereabouts of their friends along the line of the Tugela, and in their rear. At Fort Pearson, which might be said to be the principal base of operations, and which commanded the river and lower drift from the Natal side, there were sufficient men of the Naval Brigade to work the two guns there. They had also the European officers and the non-commissioned officers of the disbanded native corps. Then, to keep up communications, the Mounted Volunteers of Coast District were posted at intervals along the river, between Fort Pearson and Kranz Kop. Another fort on the Zulu bank of the Tugela was called "Fort Tenedos," in compliment to the detachment which formed its garrison. Major Barrow, with a squadron of mounted infantry, and Lieutenant Kingscote, with a smart body of marines and bluejackets, formed the defensive force. At Rorke's Drift there were now five companies of the 2nd battalion of the 24th Regiment. A strongly entrenched position had also been formed on a commanding site called Macdonald's Farm, on a rocky eminence overlooking the Tugela. Ditches ten feet deep were cut, parapets seven feet high thrown up, the farmhouse itself strengthened, and all the garden walls loopholed. The garrison consisted of the Stanger Mounted Rifles, and some native auxiliaries, who proved most trustworthy as scouts and messengers. Captain Lucas, whose admirable powers of organization were quite proverbial amongst the colonists, and whose frontier experiences were of long standing, was strongly posted at a bend of the river between the farm and Thring's Post, and had with him a useful body of natives. Thring's Post came next on the list, and here there were a couple of hundred of well-mounted and well-armed volunteers divided into squadrons, or corps of fifty men. Thring's Post is on the Imyamazana Mountain, and is about twenty-seven miles from Fort Pearson. The volunteers, knowing the country well, were employed in keeping up by constant patrols communications with Fort Pearson and Fort Cherry.

News also reached them that Wood had been reinforced, and was more than holding his own. There was, therefore, little anxiety felt for the security of the frontier, and everything strengthened Colonel Pearson in his determination to remain in his position instead of attempting to cut his way out.

The health of the Ekowe garrison continued very good. The hospital, it has been said, was the old church of the mission-station. At the end of the second week in March there were only twenty-five men on the sick-list, and many of these almost convalescent. They had, however, lost two of their number lately, namely, poor Williams of the Buffs, and another great favourite, young Coker, the mid-shipman, who fought his Gatling so well at Inyanezi. Both these fine fellows were ill but a short time, and succumbed to fever. They were buried with the usual honours just outside the fort.

Lieutenant Rowden, 98th Regiment, who was nominated by Colonel Pearson commander of the mounted scouts, performed his difficult and dangerous task to perfection. He had by the end of February successfully explored the country in the direction of the Isangweni military kraal, which was not far from Ondini, and about three miles from Ekowe. He reported that there were 1500 men there, and more collecting. The 1500 were composed of the married regiment Isangu, whose average age is fifty-four, and whose services in former wars had been most distinguished. The country between the fort and Isangweni was an undulating table-land, running parallel to the forests on either side, and admirably suited for cavalry. Another brother of Cetywayo, named Dabulamanzi, had a fortified kraal not far from that of Isangweni, and Pearson determined to attack both those places as soon as he was in a position to move upon them.

The second week of March had now come to an end, and it was deemed advisable to vary the monotony of life in the fort by one or two offensive expeditions. The most important of these, both as to the numbers engaged and its effects, was the foray on Dabulamanzi's kraal. The forces detailed for this expedition consisted of fifty men of the Buffs, the same number of the 99th, and twenty-five of the Naval Brigade, with their Gatling, and a small body of mounted scouts, under the active Lieutenant Rowden (98th). Starting about five a.m., the party descended the slopes that led to the river, and continued its march along a valley running north-east, and gradually narrowing. The track in some places was crossed by difficult spruits, and was scarcely defined; but their guides were well acquainted with the landmarks, although the pathways were often obliterated by thorns and bush. The track was also frequently commanded by spurs and bluffs projecting overhead, but these were carefully explored by the mounted men, and no enemy could be seen. A considerable watershed was reached about eight miles from Ekowe, and here, in a favourable and secluded position, was made the first off-saddle for half an hour. The country about here was entirely denuded of fodder, but the horsemen had been fortunately directed to bring a few mealies for their mounts. On resuming the march they crossed the bottom of a deep sandy nullah with very precipitous sides, which they were forced to follow, as it was the only practicable track. About a mile and a half further on the advanced patrols sent back to inform the officer of the main body that there was a camping-ground or temporary kraal about three miles and a half north, where there was sufficient water and grass. The orders were therefore given to push on for this point, and in about forty-five minutes it was reached. It was now sundown, and their chief, having decided that it was inexpedient to march during the night, orders were issued for the usual precautions to be taken, and to bivouac till daybreak.

During the night, however, no one slept, as they had several alarms, and it became evident from certain indications known to the experienced in Zulu camping-out, that they were being reconnoitred by the enemy, though in all probability not in sufficient force to deliver an attack. As, however, it was quite possible that messengers would be despatched to the neighbouring kraals, it was deemed advisable to strengthen the position, in case of their being surrounded before the morning. Taking one of the guides, who said he knew the neighbourhood, from having frequently hunted here, one of the officers and a couple of men were sent to make a reconnaissance round the bivouac. This party at once started without making any noise, and entering on the old watercourse worked their way up towards the summit of the kloof. Large, indeed enormous, blocks of stone were lying about in various directions, and the water during the heavy rains had so far worked its way among these rocks that several hollows were scooped out so as to form caves large enough to hold one or two human beings. These places had evidently been recently occupied, remains of mealies and the charred wood of a recent fire indicating the use to which the shelter had been applied. Ascending the kloof still farther, and keeping well under cover of the bush, these scouts walked along what at first seemed an old war-path, and this being examined it was evident that it had been worn by human beings, and not long since. On following this path, it led to a small piece of table-land not much larger than an ordinary mess-tent or marquee, and this platform was formed by a solid piece of rock rising, not unlike the Pieter Bot at Mauritius, to a couple of hundred feet above where the explorers were standing. To the eye of a soldier the place was impregnable, and as the scouts scanned the country round by the fitful gleams of occasional moonlight they saw that twenty well-armed and steady men could hold the rock against an army. The face of the rock had been scooped out, and, either by time or human labour, a sort of cave or shelter afforded additional protection. Upon leaving the rock and descending the ravine to carry the intelligence to the column in bivouac, these patrols were startled to see the outlines of several dark figures moving in the neighbouring bush. Making all possible speed, therefore, the messengers hurried back, and at the news received every man stood to his arms. They had not long to wait, for the enemy soon appeared, drawn out in clear relief against the grey of the early dawn, which was now coming on. Bodies of Zulus on the opposite ridges, which could not have been seen lower down, were now observed, while a few cattle were being rapidly hurried away in the distance. The Zulu scouts were evidently puzzled at the white men's proceedings, the more so as before leaving the kop one of the guides had tied his handkerchief to an overhanging branch, thus giving the enemy the idea that a detachment had been left to occupy the post. This error on the part of their antagonists served the troops materially, as, by hurrying forward at a quick pace, they were enabled to gain the kop, and with some considerable difficulty get their Gatling to the summit. Their horses, of course, could not ascend, but halfway up there was an excellent position, where grass and water were found, and here the animals were tethered in the usual manner—by the head and knee. When daylight enabled them to examine the surrounding country with field-glasses, they could see the neighbouring kraals of the chief Dabulamanzi and his neighbour, Ungakamatue, and it was evident that the alarm had been given. Several extraordinary movements attracted their attention. Armed bodies of natives were seen to be leaving the villages in various directions, as if going upon messages of importance. Aware of the celerity of movement of the Zulus, and the enormous distances their soldiers can cover in a few hours, this activity was not reassuring, as it was concluded that reinforcements were being sent for, for the purpose of intercepting the retreat to the fort of Ekowe. The English commander, however, was not long in choosing his plan of operations. It would never do to sustain a siege on the rock or kop, which, however defensible if provisioned, was sure to be taken by starvation in the long-run. The Dabulamanzi kraal had evidently been weakened by the absence of men harvesting, and it did not seem more than a mile from where the troops were. One of the guides remembered a cattle-track which, by a circuitous route, led back on the eastern side to Ekowe, and as the road they had arrived by was certain to be now ambushed, it was deemed advisable to make a dash at the kraal, and return with what spoil they could obtain in the new direction. Having cut some long canes, some of the soldiers fixed them securely between the ledges of the rocks, and attached to them some coloured clothes, which they hoped would lead to the belief that they still occupied the kop. These precautions having been taken, the troops moved silently down through the dense bushes on the reverse side of the cliff, and succeeded in getting away without being observed by the Zulus, who evidently seemed principally anxious about their cattle. Part of the mounted force went in front to explore the bush, while the rest remained in rear to follow and reconnoitre. On coming again to the valley, they moved still more rapidly until they came to a little rise, which, on surmounting, they found led to a deep kloof, the mouth of which was almost closed by the proximity of the hills, on either side rising to about 600 feet in height. These curious-looking hills appeared to be a series of ledges of rocks, with lines of dykes—probably of volcanic origin—cropping up, and forming the most natural-looking breastworks, behind which a determined party of men might destroy any attacking party. Having waited to collect the tail of the column, they descended the rise, and sending out a few men to scout on the ridge skirting the hill on their right, the commander led the main body under cover of this range towards the mouth of the kloof, which the guides said was the main entrance to the kraal. When about 200 yards from the mouth of the gorge, the enemy commenced firing upon the advanced files from behind a formidable-looking dyke, and seeing that one of the horses had been badly wounded in the quarter, an officer sent up a dozen men to the top of the range to extend as a covering party. These had barely been posted in a good position, when a perfect shower of bullets fell amongst the main body, the only casualty being, however, one man struck by an almost spent bullet. It being thus seen that they were out of range as far as any material injury could be effected, the men were directed to keep moving along the flank, while the Buffs advanced along the valley in a parallel line, closing to their centres as they neared the mouth of the kloof. At the same time, the men of the Naval Brigade (twenty-five) were detached with their Gatling towards the foot of the left-hand hill, to see if there was a path by which the kraal could be taken in reverse. This left-hand hill seemed to be the key of the position, as it looked down upon the kraal itself. The 99th were all this time held in reserve to prevent the troops being taken in reverse should the enemy's reinforcements come up. While the English were effecting these movements the Zulus, whose forces did not seem to be augmenting, kept up what would have been a hot cross-fire had they been armed with Martinis, but which was perfectly innocuous at 700 yards.

A bugle-call now gave notice to the skirmishers to close in, and when this was effected the mounted men dashed through the kloof, followed by the Buffs and the 99th at the double. The Naval Brigade meanwhile was seen working its way in the most energetic manner round the left flank and ready to effect a junction with the others at the foot of the mound on which stood the outer defences of the kraal. A general stampede of men, women, and cattle now took place, the soldiers being specially warned not to fire at the two latter, and only at the former in return. In ten minutes the outer and inner circles of the kraal were fired, care having been taken to see that no living creature was hidden within. As the Zulus generally store their mealies (Indian corn) underground in the cattle enclosures, there was not time to look for any supplies, but they managed to carry off a few large packages which were found in two huts, as well as some millet (Kaffir corn). They also collected all the cattle they could find, not many having been left, and getting them together in the centre of the column, moved away by the path mentioned by their guides. These movements were conducted so quickly, that they were on the homeward march within half an hour of the time they had entered the kraal. About half a mile from the kraal the kloof separated into two narrow gullies, the ledges of rock between them being inaccessible, and as it was known that these paths made a junction some two miles on, it was decided to use them both, to enable the troops to march more quickly. The Buffs accordingly took one trek, and the 99th detachment the other, both uniting again without any casualty later on. The English attack was undoubtedly a complete surprise, inasmuch as the bulk of the people belonging to the kraal were away, and could not be recalled in time to defend their village. Had the British column possessed a larger force of mounted men, they could have intercepted and carried back the cattle which they saw the attendants driving off. As it was, however, it was not safe or prudent to risk the chances of communications with the fort being cut off by delaying to pursue these animals.

The column had made good about ten miles of the return march when they discovered that their retreat had been found out; straight in front of them also were wooded krantzes and dark ravines, where an army of Zulus might have been concealed, but pioneers having been sent out reported that all was safe in that direction. Upon this they used the utmost speed to gain the friendly covert, as they saw that if pursued there was the best chance of eluding the vigilance of their enemies; or if unable to do this, they would have the opportunity of fighting them to the best advantage. As the troops moved quickly on, they entered the forest and lost sight of the Zulus, who seemed in force, and were apparently retracing their steps for some mysterious object. They were not, however, kept long in doubt as to their proceedings, for upon sending on scouts to an eminence where they could see without being seen, it was found that the whole Zulu force, apparently some 2000 strong, was upon the crest of the hill over which they had passed. An advanced party of skirmishers were running very rapidly, their shields held aloft, and their assegais waving over their heads. They had discovered the trick played upon them, and the ruse of the coloured cloths planted upon the kop. When, however, they could not discover the spoor upon the direct trek by which the English party had come, they lost a considerable amount of time in casting about to make out their real direction. At last, however, when crossing a bit of open veldt, the keen-sighted Zulus observed their cattle being carried away, at least five miles from them. The rage of the pursuers, and their contempt for the marching qualities of British soldiers—compared to their own speed and powers of endurance—no doubt made them confident of overtaking them; but the latter had little apprehension of the result, even if this were effected. They knew that as soon as their foes came within range, they could pick them off at 1000 or 1200 yards, and the little column had been specially furnished with several crack marksmen to whom this distance was no difficulty. They continued their march therefore steadily, and did not abandon the cattle, which, strange to say, gave little trouble, and were kept at a good pace by some of the mounted men, whose anticipation of a full beef ration on their return, from the spoil, made them doubly zealous in their duties. In about an hour the Zulus had gained considerably upon them; they were imprudent enough to move in close order. The evening was, however, now drawing on, and in another hour the troops should be under the guns of the fort. A mist, which had been for some time hanging about the streams and the kloof, prevented the exact progress of the pursuers being seen, but the pursued were not long without intimation of their whereabouts. The rear-guard were attracted, when about three miles from the fort, by what seemed to be dark objects moving between some rocks about half a mile on their left rear. So fitful was the view obtained, however, that the men were uncertain whether they were Zulus or some of the larger species of baboon, which often come out of their holes and caves to look at any human creature passing by. A steady watch was, however, maintained, and before many minutes they could plainly see that a large body of the enemy had, by the most tremendous pedestrian feat, succeeded in getting almost on a level with them, in a position to assail them in flank. The column had not long to wait, for as they came to a portion of the trek they could not avoid, on account of the proximity of a deep morass on the right, the pursuers, deeming them within range, treated them to a volley which rattled up to about fifty paces short of their flank. Ten of the mounted men, all excellent shots, were now sent out to cover the attacked flank, and, as far as they could, to harass the enemy. The ground was difficult and broken, but this was no impediment to these gallant fellows, who, gaining a commanding position 500 yards from the Zulus, and where there was admirable cover, dismounted, and kept up such a galling fire that the Zulus retreated, as if waiting for their main body to come up. As the mist rolled away, they could distinctly be seen carrying off their dead and wounded with improvised stretchers of branches of mimosa. A running fire was now kept up, the English shot taking deadly effect, while no casualty occurred to their men. For more than half an hour this went on, until the fort was sighted, and as the Zulu main body had not come up, the flanking party drew quietly off.

The sun was sinking in the horizon as the returning soldiers received their well-earned welcome from their beleaguered comrades, who were beginning to be somewhat anxious as to their safe return.

Pearson's next raid was a most brilliant affair. It was found out from reliable sources that a body of Zulus had charge of a convoy of cattle, intended for the king's kraal at Ulundi. Deeming the Ekowe garrison as of no account for more than defensive purposes, the Zulu general had merely detailed 400 or 450 men to form the escort, which was known to be on its march not more than seven miles to the north-west of Ekowe, not far from the Inyezani river. Now here Pearson had an opportunity of achieving two objects at one stroke. He wished to explore the land and salient features of the country towards Inyezani, in order to see whether a road could be made by which the dense bush of Hintza could be avoided, while, at the same time, he could inflict a lesson upon the Zulus, and possibly obtain some cattle. The foray was not to be on such a grand scale as that made on Dabulamanzi's kraal, but it was intended to be equally important for military purposes. Twenty men of the Naval Brigade, all the small force of acting engineers, forty of the Buffs, twenty of the 99th, and the mounted scouts were placed under orders to parade before daylight on Friday, 21st March. No Gatling was to accompany, as the utmost celerity of movement was required, and if the expedition did not succeed in its first dash an immediate retreat upon the guns was to be made. On leaving the fort at 3.30 a.m., the road by which the band advanced was found to be good, although here and there commanded from the neighbouring mountains. About two miles from Ekowe a bluff runs out from the spur of the range of hills which had often served as a reconnoitring point, and this was immediately occupied by the mounted men, who had orders to keep up signalling both with the fort and the rest of the expedition. Continuing on its march, the column came to the Inyezani river, which for several miles runs between two remarkable mountains, the bases of which are clothed with luxuriant forest growths, while above spring sheer precipices 1000 and 1100 feet high. The formation seemed to be sandstone and limestone, affording excellent material for building purposes. Before reaching these dark solitudes the river passes through a country undulating and fertile, and the horizon is closed by higher hills, covered in the most part by forest. These forest-trees are of fine growth and of the most valuable description. The banks of the river are fringed by a quantity of bamboo-looking reeds, which serve as wattles in the district, and which are about the thickness of a finger, and some ten or twelve feet high. Tracks of hippopotami are occasionally seen, and it is known that such are in the neighbourhood. The river here is about 200 yards broad, while the depth averages twenty-five feet. The expedition now noticed a few deserted kraals on the right bank, while those on the left were found to be in ruins, as if lately destroyed. At eight a.m. a herd of cattle was seen some two miles off, and rapidly skirting the base of a friendly hill the troops managed to cut in between these animals and a body of Zulus, who appeared to be bivouacking in front of some neighbouring caves, where fires were lit and cooking was going on. The mounted men, who were observing these movements, now descended from the bluff where they had been watching, and coming up rapidly at a canter, made a dash at the Zulus, to cover the infantry retreat, which they effected with the capture of some thirty-five fine cattle. A desultory fire was kept up upon them from the hills during their return, and the enemy, who seemed to be gradually augmented, at one narrow gorge managed to get within range, slightly wounding two or three of the rear-guard. By noon on the same day the men with the captured cattle were safely discussing their frugal dinner, consisting of an extra half-ration in honour of the event, within the old fort, which they were already beginning to look upon as a friend from whom they were soon to part.

In spite of the rapidity of the raid, the necessary observations were made by the officers deputed for this duty, and a rough sketch of the ground passed over gave all the information requisite for the construction of the projected road. This work, which was forthwith taken in hand, had a most satisfactory effect upon the spirits of the garrison generally. The working parties were occasionally driven in, but not without inflicting loss upon the enemy, whose attention was much taken up in guarding and patrolling the main road by which Pearson came.

Wood, it has been mentioned, fell back upon receiving the news of Isandhlwana; but this retrograde movement was of short duration, and from that time till all was ready for the relief of Ekowe, his was the only column acting on the offensive.

From the 25th January to the 1st February his marches and countermarches afford little matter of interest. On the 28th he moved on to a new camping-ground, called Potter's Store, and there obtained full particulars of the Maglisini or Baglusini Kraal. This place Colonel Wood had for some time known as one of the principal rallying-points and depôts of supplies for the Zulu armies. Large quantities of "mealies" (Indian corn) and grain of other sorts were known to have been accumulated at this magazine, while cattle in large droves had been seen on their way to the depôt. Under these circumstances it was necessary to proceed with caution, as, had any ostentatious preparations been made for an advance in the direction of the magazine, it is more than probable Wood's object would only have been gained at a severe cost. In this view it was determined that a cavalry raid should be made by the mounted troops under Piet Uys, with his Burghers, and Colonel Buller, with his dashing corps of Frontier Light Horse. From the camp near Potter's Store to the Baglusini stronghold was at least thirty miles. A plain suitable to the passage of cavalry intervened before the Manzana river was reached, and Colonel Buller saw no reason why the distance should not be covered in one day. The kraals of Umbelini and of Inyatini were also in the same neighbourhood, therefore the utmost caution and secrecy were necessary in making preparations for the attack. The weather had been most unfavourable for some days, but fortunately cleared up, and became settled on the 1st of February. On that morning Colonel Buller, having selected on the previous day 106 of his best mounted men and thirty-three of the Dutch Contingent under Piet Uys, their commandant, paraded his men under the supervision of Colonel Wood, and explained to them clearly the feat they were about to attempt, not concealing the danger which they would have to incur in the performance of a most difficult and dangerous duty. The scene was a most dramatic one, as the camp lanterns lit up the faces of the bronzed and stalwart volunteers who formed the devoted band. Each man was exceedingly well horsed, and no precaution had been neglected in the careful overhauling of arms, accoutrements, and saddlery. Biscuit and, for those who cared, a little ration of rum were served out, and with a hearty "God-speed" from their comrades, who half envied their chances of adventure, the little troop of 141 gallant fellows started long before the earliest streak of dawn. The utmost silence was ordered and maintained, while the ground for some miles was so favourable that the horses' hoofs were scarcely heard as they cantered over the light and springy veldt. Distances on horseback are so differently estimated out in South Africa and at home in England, that when the ground is favourable, very long, and to European experience almost impossible, marches are constantly made without distress to horse or rider. In the present instance two short off-saddles only were indulged in; the first not far from the centre of the flat, and the next after the Manzana river had been safely crossed. The country now became more broken and the pace was reduced to a walk, but before the sun was well up the goal was in sight, and the herds of cattle were seen calmly feeding on the slopes. No suspicion would seem to have been excited, and it is more than probable that the very smallness of the attacking force, and its being all composed of the mounted branch, contributed to the success of the affair. The kraal was exceedingly well built, and seen from a distance of 1200 or 1000 yards it was doubtful whether it held a large guard or not. Cautiously yet swiftly advancing, Colonel Buller felt his way, with a few of his best shots thrown out as vedettes. These men soon encountered some scattered Zulus, who did not seem at all prepared for any hostile demonstration, but on retiring towards the hills they were reinforced by several other larger bodies, who had evidently been sent out to reconnoitre. After a few shots had been fired, a sudden and simultaneous advance was made on two sides of the kraal, and almost without resistance on the part of its defenders the kraal was captured. Two hundred and fifty well-built huts were counted by Buller's men, who, losing not a moment, collected no less than four hundred head of cattle, and a large quantity of grain, and then set fire to the magazine. Six Zulus were killed in the capture of the place, and although more than one body of them were seen hovering about in the vicinity, numbering severally 100 to 200 and 300 men, no opposition was offered to the rear-guard or patrols.

Wood then again moved his camp to the White Umvolosi. His position here was a remarkably strong one, and from it he commanded the passage of the White Umvolosi, the Pewana, while his day and night patrols held the disputed territory south of the Pongolo. A raid was next made in the direction of the Insulwa Kraal. The men got upon the road about seven a.m., and steady marching for about three miles brought them opposite the spot where, a few days before, a large force of Zulus had been seen engaged at drill. A scout who had been sent out on the right front came galloping back with the news that the Zulu cattle were in considerable numbers at the lower end of the valley, while he also added that the guard over these animals was not much larger than the English party. Piet Uys at once concerted with a couple of his smart non-commissioned officers, and decided, as they were exceedingly well mounted, to ride for the kloof which formed the exit to the valley. To execute this manœuvre was the work of ten minutes, during which they were hidden from sight of the Zulus by a tall ledge of scarped rocks which almost divided the valley. In the meanwhile the remainder moved steadily on at a walk, so as not to alarm their prey. In rather more than half an hour they had so far gained upon the cattle that they could make a tolerable guess as to their probable number, which was estimated at a couple of hundreds. The main body had now arrived at a place which Piet Uys and his Dutchmen seemed intimately acquainted with, and the Zulu cattle and guard could be seen on a ridge running parallel to the one they themselves were upon. Below was a deep kloof leading to the river. Some of Buller's Horse were now sent round to the opposite side, to drive the enemy down the kloof to the main party, while they continued to march down the ridge to meet these men as they came on. But they had not advanced very far when, as was expected, a much larger force appeared on the neighbouring heights, but the cliff was so precipitous they could not join their comrades. The seven-pounder was now brought into action, and sent a couple of shells right in amongst them, one of the rounds being a capital shot. Advancing still, the English leader saw that the enemy lately on the heights had managed, by making a détour, to get to the cover of a dense mimosa bush on his left. This move was answered by several rounds of canister, which it was afterwards found were not without effect. The foes were thus driven out into the open, and at one moment it seemed as though they were going to fight; the Boers, however, who had been detached to the neck of the valley now served their comrades by an excellent ruse. They had taken with them one of the bugle boys of the 13th, mounted on a wiry Kaffir pony, and the main party now heard coming across the valley the echoes of his bugle sounding the advance. The Zulus could not make out the meaning of this sound, and evidently imagined that the English commander had posted at least the wing of a regiment to intercept them. The consequence was, that the moment the main body cantered forward with a bold front, the cattle were abandoned; and they were left masters of the field, taking 170 head and some few wounded prisoners. Two villages were left in flames behind the retiring troops, who, as the crackling and flashing approached the bush where the hills met the plain, could see individual forms of black warriors shouting and gesticulating from out of the dust and smoke, wild with impotent rage at the loss of their kraal and cattle. The ridges beyond the gullies still afforded considerable shelter, and the English party were continually fired upon as they returned with their spoil; but it was evident that the Zulus had not any long-range weapons, as it could be seen from the splashes of dust how far short their bullets were falling. Ten of Buller's men were now sent on to cover the passage of the guns through the drift, and in about twenty minutes, and under the protection of the rear-guard, it was passed over in safety.

On the 15th, Wood was fortunate enough to destroy the great military kraal of Manyanyoba. Several reconnaissances had been made by Colonel Wood's directions, and from the local knowledge of one of Piet Uys's men, Colonel Buller was enabled to carry out the instructions of his chief with a success fully equal to the most sanguine expectations. The stronghold in question was situated on the Intomba river, and had always been considered by Cetywayo and his Indunas as a place of more than ordinary strength. At ten p.m. on the 14th the men were got under arms, and the column was composed of a strong detachment of Buller's Horse and fifty of the Burgher Volunteers under Piet Uys, whose services had on more than one occasion been most handsomely mentioned by Colonel Wood. The men paraded without lights, bugles, or the slightest sound, and moved off silently into the bush, without even the jingle of a sabre or the clank of a chain. Their march was accompanied by one gun, the wheels of which were, however, carefully wrapped with cloth and bound with raw hide. This was not only a protection against sound, but a preventive to injury to spokes and axles from the sharp boulders and rocks in the bed of the drift. The column left the camp by moonlight, crossing the usual ford, and were fortunate enough to gain the shelter of the bush without being seen or heard in the neighbouring villages. After a couple of hours' marching they reached a wide plain, where there was a broad watercourse, but sufficiently shallow to be easily forded. Here the gun, as the early grey of the morning came on in the sky, was brought into position, and here the final instructions were given to the men. As the daylight grew more marked there could be seen in front a long unbroken range of mountains, varying in height from 900 to 1000 feet. This range ran along the valley leading to the smaller kraals in the distance. Half the cavalry were now sent away by Colonel Buller to the left, with instructions to gain the bush, and wait dismounted until the shells were heard. They were then to dash forward at a swinging canter and cut off the cattle to be seen feeding on the slopes, which manœuvre would, if carried out, drive them into the hands of Piet Uys and his men posted on the right. Just as the sun began to appear above the horizon the gunners managed to hit off the range to a nicety, and the second shell crashed and burst right into the centre of the interior circle where the cattle were placed at night, and which is usually surrounded by the beehive-shaped huts where the Zulus live. It was at once perceived that this shot had caused the wildest commotion, as it was immediately followed by smoke and flame, figures rushing about through the village, the bellowing of oxen, and the shouts of men. As the horsemen advanced at a gallop towards the kraal, the enemy, firing a random and hasty volley, fled up the sides of the mountain, where cavalry could not follow. All the huts and stores along the base of the mountain were now destroyed without much resistance, although as soon as the Zulus got a little vantage-ground on the cliffs, they turned, and replied to the English fire. Four hundred head of cattle and a quantity of sheep and goats were brought off by Buller's men, who behaved with the most admirable coolness and steadiness. The fight had lasted about half an hour, when indications of reinforcements to the Zulus were observed. Seeing that nothing more was to be gained, and that he might lose the cattle, Colonel Buller gave the order to make good the retreat, covered by skirmishers and a rear-guard. This movement was skilfully effected without loss, and the column reached the camp early in the afternoon, having been about eight or nine hours in the saddle.

Meanwhile, to strengthen Wood's hands, the Commander-in-chief had ordered Colonel Rowlands to join that general. Rowlands at this time had with him, at his entrenched camp at New Derby, only a wing of the 80th, a couple of guns, and 200 Swazis. Raaf's Horse and Weatherly's Borderers were, however, expected daily to reinforce him. In the meantime, Rowlands was not allowing the grass to grow under the feet of his men, for, on the same day that Wood destroyed the Manyanyoba Kraal he left his camp at Derby and marched on to the Talako range, where he knew the enemy were in the numerous caves hidden by dense bush. The operations were entirely successful. Five large kraals, some of them of great natural strength, were burnt to the ground, 197 cattle, seventy goats, and forty-five sheep were captured. Magalini, the chief, was killed, with ten of his men, while defending one of the caves. One Zulu prisoner was taken, and forty women and a number of children came in and claimed protection. Six of the Swazi allies, under Fairlie, were wounded, and one horse killed.

On a still more recent occasion Colonel Rowlands had shown even greater activity. On the 20th February intelligence was brought to his camp that a small force of Zulus had been left in charge of supplies at Makatees Kop, a natural fortress close to Elozo, and intended as a depôt for future operations. The place was by no means easy of access, and apparently innumerable difficulties were mentioned to dissuade the colonel from any hostile attempt. On the date just named (20th) the detachment sent forward as a sort of advanced guard by Colonel Rowlands reached one of the mission-stations still left on the border. There was a laager consisting of a simple stone enclosure, bastioned, however, and loopholed, and situated on the bank of a running stream of bright and clearly sparkling water. In the dead of night the sentries were heard to challenge, and the sergeant on guard at once called his men to arms. This alarm, however, proved to be merely the return of some mounted Boers who had been sent on to reconnoitre on the previous day, and the information they brought in was important. The kraal which they had been seeking was about twenty miles off and supposed to be only held by about fifty Zulus, belonging to the regiment of Nkobamakosi, and part of the Undi or Royal corps. A large number of cattle were not supposed to be yet there, but some were coming in daily, and it was considered advisable to break this link in the enemy's communications. In the early morning, preceded by a few horsemen (many were coming in as volunteers to both Rowlands' and Wood's column), and marching with only their haversacks full of rations for two days, the little expedition started for a duty uncertain and believed to be full of risk. Eight European officers, 275 natives, partly Swazi allies, and some volunteer horse, the whole under command of Captain Harvey, staff officer, formed the reconnaissance; but, as it turns out, a smaller force would have sufficed. From the post or laager at the mission-station the road lay up a narrow valley, from which, after an ascent of about 200 feet, it stretched out on to a wide grassy plain ten miles in length. On the left of this could be plainly seen a number of Zulus tending sheep and cattle on the hills. Crossing part of the Iwangovini district, and fording a drift on the Inpongo river, the Iembe mountain could be seen always to the right; while the Eloso, a rocky height, loomed in front. At the bottom of a steep, rocky, and heavily bush-grown gorge, fourteen miles from the laager, a halt and short off-saddle were made, and every precaution taken against surprise. From this point to the stronghold the pathway was most difficult, and the men had to proceed with the greatest caution, in case of an ambush, which was half suspected. Two columns of smoke, one from a steep krantz on the left and another lower down on the right, were noticed, but these were afterwards found to be abandoned camping-grounds of the enemy, who fancied the British force was much stronger than it really was. On nearing the kraal, and on turning an angle of the gully, the column came in sight of the first village, which was as usual fortified in the Zulu fashion. As the foremost files dashed on, a couple of shots rang out and some assegais were thrown, causing a couple of casualties amongst the Swazis, who, however, showed a bold front, and, gallantly led by the European officers, carried the kraal by a rush. The results of this skirmish may not appear of great importance, but, taken in conjunction with Wood's recent successes, they had a most useful effect upon both the minds of the regular soldiers and those of the colonial volunteers.

The junction of Rowlands' column with Wood's was the next eventful incident in the history of the latter force. It was found, of course, impossible for Wood with so small a column and with so few cavalry to keep an efficient and reliable watch over the lengthy border he had to defend, and the result was that a Zulu force managed to effect a raid in the German settlements over the Pongolo. Commandant Schermbrucker had hitherto done remarkably well in keeping his line of defence intact, but his want of mounted men seriously hampered him, and enabled the Zulus to elude his vigilance. A serious raid happened on the 11th February; but Schermbrucker came up with the marauders as they were retiring with their booty, recaptured some of the cattle taken, and killed about a dozen of the enemy. On the 13th a large Zulu force managed to cross the Pongolo, and steal past the fort and laager of Luneberg. This was in the dead of night, and by daybreak they had burnt a number of huts belonging to natives friendly to or in the employment of the Dutch. The savages rushed in thousands upon the kraals and single huts, setting the roofs on fire and massacring old people, women, and children who could not escape. They deliberately tortured to death about a score of old men, killed in the most brutal manner at least fifty women and an equal number of children, while they left several young women fearfully stabbed with assegais. All this took place within five miles of the fort; and as fire-arms were not employed, the attention of the sentries was not aroused. Early in the morning one of the wounded managed to effect his escape, and brought this terrible news to the laager, and measures were immediately taken to follow and punish the band. Patrols were ordered out, and the utmost diligence exerted to overtake the enemy, who, it was known, was overladen with spoil. Before the Tombe river was reached, the leading patrol came up with a portion of the enemy's rear-guard, and a very pretty fight took place. The Zulus numbered about 450, but they were embarrassed by the cattle they had charge of, and this did not allow them to make a good stand. The consequence was that the Boer patrol killed twenty of their foes, put the remainder to flight, and won back a number of the stolen cattle. The rest, however, managed to escape over the Tombe, and the patrol were wisely ordered not to pursue. These raids were principally due to the activity of both Umbelini and Manyanyoba, and were the immediate cause of the expedition to attack and burn the kraals of the chiefs on the Intombe river. It should be mentioned that Umbelini was a Swazi refugee, and not even a legitimate chieftain of that tribe, but was regarded by the real headmen as a mere adventurer and pretender. Manyanyoba's people, again, were not Zulus, but the débris or remnants of various tribes conquered by Chaka and Dingaan. They wandered about in a starving condition, landless, and without flocks or wealth of any kind, until Cetywayo, from compassion, allowed them to settle north of the Pongolo, and on the banks of the Tombe river. This very land was mentioned in the ultimatum sent by Sir Bartle Frere to the king, who had no right whatever to cede any portion of it.

Wood next moved his camp to the Kambula Kop, and there entrenched himself in a position of great natural strength. There now occurred an event of considerable importance. Oham, brother of Cetywayo, had always declared himself opposed to war, had openly stated his opinion in Zulu's councils, and had ever since the outbreak of hostilities been making overtures of friendship to the British. These, however, had been but lightly treated, as suspicions of their honesty were entertained by the powers that were. How groundless were these suspicions the event proved. On the 2nd inst. Oham came into the camp of Captain M'Leod, the political agent on the border of Swaziland, arrived at Derby on the 4th, and came on thence to Wood at Kambula a couple of days back, and declared his complete submission to her Majesty's Government. Immediately before leaving his kraal in Zululand the chief took the precaution to try and save some of his best cattle, and he subsequently sent a thousand head of his finest herds into the Swazi county; but they fell into Dutch hands, and some of the Boers, obtaining possession of them, had the audacity to brand them as their property before M'Leod could arrive to claim them. Oham had with him between 300 and 400 of his people, and was accompanied by his eldest son, an intelligent lad of fifteen, who soon made himself an object of great interest in Wood's camp, and a favourite with the soldiers. Immediately on his arrival he had an interview with, and was received with great respect by Colonel Wood, who was informed by him that he would have surrendered some time back but for two reasons. In the first place, he was under a system of espionage by the orders of the king, with whom he had never been on good terms since he openly, before the Indunas, spoke against the warlike attitude and aggressive tone of his brother; and, secondly, when he did make his first overtures for submission, he was told that he was not believed by the English, and would be cast into prison, and sent to Robbin Island as a convict.

Oham was a black ikehla (head-ringed man), resembling both his father, the late Mpanda, or Panda, and his brother Cetywayo, and although a large man, his body and muscles were firm, not flabby like those of so many other big Zulus. After the usual salutations he thus opened his interview with Wood:—

"Sir, chief, and great warrior, whom I respect, because you fight against men, and do not kill women or children, I came here to your camp from a desire to see you, and to ask you to intercede for me and my people, who have never wished to make war upon you, but to live in peace and goodwill, and hunt the wild deer together. I have left more than two thousand of my people ready and most anxious to come in and submit to you, surrendering their arms and cattle, and giving their sons as hostages, if you will guarantee their safety."

The chief, who had a dignified manner and an honest expression of countenance, was then informed that he and his people should receive every consideration, and as much protection as was consistent with the safe advance of the English troops into Zululand. He then assured Wood that the Zulu army was considerably demoralized, and that, the people having gone back to their kraals, Cetywayo found it no easy task to collect a really effective fighting force. With some difficulty, indeed, the king had managed to get together a strong impi, composed of the Udhlambedhlu, or "Ill-tempered" Regiment, whose kraal was at Udhlambedhlweni, about six miles east of the Usixepe, to exercise a surveillance over Oham and his people. This corps, however, was formed originally from a clan, or tribe, which were Dingaan's chief and favourite regiment, and although in a measure loyal to their then ruler, they were somewhat indignant at the duty imposed upon them, when they would infinitely prefer the chances of raiding and plunder, which the present unsettled state of the border presented. Now, when Wood was at Utrecht the previous autumn, a letter was sent by the Landdrost Rudolph to the Secretary for Native Affairs, in which he mentioned the arrival of Gwegwana, the favourite messenger of Uhamo or Oham, with letters from that chief to the following effect, which Oham now repeated to Colonel Wood:—"I am sent back by Uhamo to hear what answer his father, Somtseu (Sir Theophilus Shepstone), has sent to his message brought by me on the 10th October last. Uhamo is very anxious to know what is going to take place in the land now that Cetywayo has called the whole of Zululand together, and Uhamo has refused liberty to his people to assemble at 'Ondi,' and will openly tell Cetywayo that if he (Cetywayo) makes war upon the English, he (Uhamo) will not join him, because Cetywayo's people, Sirayo and Umbelini, have, by their overt acts, brought the country into its present state of trouble and disgrace. Moreover, the building by Cetywayo's orders of a military kraal on the Pongolo, and the claims made by him of a portion of the Transvaal beyond the Blood River, which had been, as Uhamo repeatedly told Cetywayo, ceded many years ago to the Transvaal people, and other acts, had never received any countenance from Uhamo, who now asks, Why does Cetywayo want to quarrel with the English, who have ever been his friends, and who, indeed, placed him on his present throne?"

In his second interview with Colonel Wood, Oham was still more explicit and demonstrative. He expressed himself with much indignation at his brother's countenancing such a despicable character as Umbelini, who, neither a pure Zulu nor a Swazi, had all the vices and none of the good qualities of either; and he added that the degradation which his brother had brought upon the race of Chaka by such an unworthy alliance has caused him to lose much of his former popularity. Oham also added that, in case of the continuance of the war, rather than be compelled to fight against his old friends the English he would at all hazards bring his people bodily over to that Government, and under these circumstances claim their protection. "Uhamo loves peace as his father Panda did," said the chief in conclusion, and his open and honest-looking eyes seemed to corroborate this expression.

We now come to another sad event, which though less in magnitude, is in many points similar to the Isandhlwana disaster. Major Tucker, the chief officer at Luneberg, gives this account of the affair:—Captain Moriarty, with a company of the 80th, was ordered to march from Luneberg on the 7th March, for the purpose of bringing in twenty waggons from Derby, variously loaded, which had arrived at the Intombi Drift. Earlier in the month Major Tucker sent down to the Drift, which was not more than four miles off, a small escort to await the arrival of these waggons. Believing, however, the position a perilous one, owing to the proximity to Umbelini's kraal, on the 5th he ordered it to return. On the 7th, however, the waggons, which had all but been captured on the way down, did arrive at the Drift, and Moriarty was again sent with seventy men of his company to act as escort and assist in getting the convoy across the stream, which was considerably swollen by the continued rains. The Drift was only four miles from the stronghold of the renegade Swazi freebooter, Umbelini, who had of late given so much trouble, and Moriarty had orders to neglect no precaution, and above all to laager his waggons and keep an incessant and vigilant look-out. It was ascertained from survivors that the waggons were actually parked, but in a somewhat loose and careless fashion, and that no earthworks were thrown up around the camp. For several days the river continued in strong flood, and consequently no crossing could be effected. On the 11th it was reported by the native waggon-drivers that Umbelini's people were gathering in the neighbourhood. The camp was pitched in a most dangerous position, with its face towards some high ground, covered here and there with dense bush, while its rear was resting upon the swollen river, across which Lieutenant Harward and thirty-four men were posted. No particular precautions appear to have been taken, with the exception of a sentry being posted about fifteen paces from the front of the camp, on the Derby side. When first warned by the drivers, Moriarty ordered the men to stand to their arms, but only for a short time. On the morning of the 12th, at four o'clock, a shot was heard from the unfortunate sentry, who had barely time to call "Guard, turn out!" when dense masses of the savages were seen not more than two hundred yards from the camp. Their front extended for several miles, and they could not, by the lowest estimate, have been less than 4000 or 5000 strong. Lieutenant Harward, who had been on the qui-vive, and who had carefully placed his thirty-five men under cover of his solitary waggon, at once called his detachment to arms, and made what dispositions he could to open fire upon the enemy's flank. In less than ten minutes, however, the whole valley was swarming with the savages, who at once proceeded in their usual manner to surround and overlap the camp and waggons. In less time than it takes to tell, the camp was in their hands, and the majority of the soldiers were assegaied, many of them before they could leave their tents. The fight, or rather butchery, which ensued was soon over, and, in spite of a well-directed and well-sustained fire from the Luneberg bank of the river, the enemy followed up the men, and assegaied them as they endeavoured to swim the river. Harward, seeing the enemy crossing the river in large numbers, gave the order to his men to retire slowly. Then, jumping on the back of his horse, he galloped away at full speed to Luneberg, where he reported what had happened. The savages continued to cross the stream, and coming on in dense masses, for a short time a hand-to-hand fight took place, ending however in the little band being broken up.

Eight men, and the sergeant of Harward's detachment, by taking advantage of shelter afforded by an old and dismantled kraal wall at some little distance from the stream, and by their cool and determined shooting, succeeded in saving their lives and getting to Luneberg. Ten men only were saved from Moriarty's party, while he, with a civilian, Surgeon Cobbin, was slain.

The camp was evidently wrongly placed, and was clearly taken by surprise. Major Tucker went out from Luneberg in person, with a small party of horsemen, followed by 150 of the 80th, to see what could be recovered, and the bodies of the dead were brought over the river and buried, while twenty-five of the enemy's dead were discovered, and a couple of wounded taken prisoners. From these men it was ascertained that Umbelini himself was in command, having with him some men belonging to our old antagonist Manyanyoba. Mcame, a powerful induna, had been asked to join in the foray, but refused. When Tucker and his handful of horsemen arrived on the banks of the river, the enemy were seen to be retreating, but they could not be followed until the infantry came up. Curious to remark, the waggons were not taken, and many of them were only half plundered by the savages, who seemed most anxious to decamp with what spoil they had secured.

For his conduct in this affair Lieutenant Harward was subsequently tried by court-martial. The ground of complaint was his having galloped off on his horse—the only one present on the scene—leaving his men engaged in a desperate engagement. The loss of the camp, or anything of a similar nature, was in no way charged against him. His defence was that he had ridden off to obtain assistance from the nearest point—that this was his duty—and that he could not send a soldier in his place, as none of them could ride. In the event the Court acquitted him. But in May of the ensuing year (1880), the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief issued the following special general order relative to a court-martial recently held on an officer in South Africa:—

"At a general court-martial recently held, an officer was arraigned upon the following charges,—First. Having misbehaved before the enemy, in shamefully abandoning a party of the regiment under his command when attacked by the enemy, and in riding off at speed from his men. Second. Conduct to the prejudice of good order and military discipline in having at the time and place mentioned in the first charge, neglected to take proper precautions for the safety of a party of the regiment under his command when attacked. The Court recorded a verdict of 'Not Guilty' on both charges. The main facts of the case were not in dispute. The officer rode away from his men to a station distant four and a half miles, at a moment of extreme danger, when to all appearance the small party under his command were being surrounded and overwhelmed by the enemy. The charge alleged misbehaviour—that is, cowardice in so doing; the defence averred that it was to procure reinforcements, and either by their actual arrival, or by the imminence of their arrival, to ward off destruction. In acquitting the prisoner, they have found that he was not guilty of cowardice. The proceedings of the Court were submitted to the General commanding, who recorded the following minute:—'Disapproved and not confirmed. Lieutenant ... to be released from arrest, and to return to his duty.' The confirming officer has further recorded his reasons for withholding his approval and confirmation in the following terms:—'Had I released this officer without making any remarks upon the verdict in question, it would have been a tacit acknowledgment that I concurred in what appears to me a monstrous theory, viz., that a regimental officer who is the only officer present with a party of soldiers actually and seriously engaged with the enemy can, under any pretext whatever, be justified in deserting them, and by so doing abandoning them to their fate. The more helpless the position in which an officer finds his men, the more it is his bounden duty to stay and share their fortune, whether for good or ill. It is because the British officer has always done so that he occupies the position in which he is held in the estimation of the world, that he possesses the influence he does in the ranks of our army. The soldier has learnt to feel that, come what may, he can, in the direst moment of danger, look with implicit faith to his officer, knowing that he will never desert him under any possible circumstances. It is to this faith of the British soldier in his officers that we owe most of the gallant deeds recorded in our military annals; and it is because the verdict of this court-martial strikes at the root of this faith that I feel it necessary to mark officially my emphatic dissent from the theory upon which the verdict has been founded.' In communicating to the army the result of this court-martial, the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief desires to signify his entire approval of the views expressed by the confirming officer in respect of the principles of duty which have always actuated British officers in the field, and by which his Royal Highness feels assured they will continue to be guided. This general order will, by his Highness's command, be read at the head of every regiment in her Majesty's service.—By Command, H. Ellice, A.-G."

It was about this time that Oham, whose actions had now clearly proved his sincerity, and the value of his friendship to the British, having made an earnest request to Colonel Wood that his wives and family might be rescued from the power of Cetywayo, the colonel sent off about twenty of the chief's men to collect them. To carry out the remainder of the project, some days after, (on the 14th), a strong detachment of Buller's men and the Burghers under Piet Uys, with 200 of Oham's people, left the camp at daybreak, and guided by James Rorke and Calverly, marched to the caves of Nhlangwine, which were situated rather more than twelve miles east of the source of the Unkassi, and not less than forty-five miles from Kambula. The caves were reached at 9.30 p.m., the last of the march of seven miles being very difficult travelling, and taking three hours to surmount. A few Zulus in charge of cattle were shot, and the animals which had belonged to Oham were taken possession of. As has been said, it was scarcely daybreak when the little column started. They rode along for a considerable time in complete silence, the men being allowed to smoke their pipes, but not to speak above a whisper. At first they followed the spoor of some cattle, which indicated the road by which Oham and his people had come to the camp, and then turning more in a northerly direction, followed the course of some small streams which flowed from the hills upon the left. The moon shone brightly, and enabled them to see clearly for some distance before them. Many strange sounds were heard, the growl of some beast of prey or the scream of the night-birds disturbed by the clank of the horses' hoofs, or the occasional rattle of a chain. The rapidity with which the column cantered over the soft and springy veldt, the dead and ominous silence maintained by all hands, and the steady and business-like mode in which they pursued their course, neither turning to the right nor the left, gave the journey a singularly weird character. As soon as the first morning's light began to appear the guides, who rode in front, turned into a ravine covered with dense brushwood and trees, and, having ascended this for about three miles, they found it was possible to ride out of it in three different directions, besides the one by which they had entered, and thus a retreat could be effected if any attack were made. Here it was decided to make the first off-saddle and partake of breakfast. At a signal from their leader, and without any word of command, the horsemen dismounted, slackened girths, and took off saddles, while the bits were removed from the horses' mouths and the animals allowed, Cape fashion, to take the customary roll in the grass. This luxury to a Cape horse seems indispensable, and without it he will rarely enjoy his grass or corn. No sooner, however, had the steeds rolled than each was again saddled, and, with the exception of the still slackened girths, was ready to be mounted in half a moment. Rifles and revolvers were carefully examined, to see whether the night dew had done any mischief, and then, having made a careful sweep round the horizon with his field-glasses, the commander gave the order for the morning meal, which consisted of a little cold tea, some bread, and "beltong" (sun-dried game).

After half an hour's rest they again started as silently as before. The day had broken with all the splendour of an African morning. The day before had been rainy, and the showers had refreshed the ground and filled the various pools with water, and all kinds of wild animals were busy and cheerful in the plains. A number of parrots and monkeys were screaming and chattering with content, and the sportsmen of the party were much exercised at hearing the pleasant double whistle of the quail sounding from various patches of long grass. Figures which it was first thought were Zulus were seen on the summits of the rocks, but Piet Uys declared that they were merely baboons, whose early morning custom was to come from the heights to search for and dig up roots, which seemed to grow here in abundance. Vultures, sweeping aloft, were circling in the air above where there had evidently been a skirmish, for the carcasses of some horses still remained uneaten and poisoning the pure air. Here and there a black-breasted and magnificent eagle sat on some withered branch, and, seeming quite indifferent to the soldier's presence, scanned the ground below him as if to select the daintiest morsel for his morning meal. Mounting to the head of the kloof the party came to a splendid prospect and panorama stretching out below. The plains seemed to roll away to the north-east as far as the eye could see, while the bright, glowing tints of the rugged foreground were mellowed away into the middle distance, until, quite far away, the bold outlines of the mountains assumed, not a purple, as in Europe they would have done, but a rich blue tint, yet standing out in fine clear relief against the distant sky, the dry atmosphere failing to give the subdued effect of distance usually observed in other climates. These mountains were the Tobomba range, which run northward, and almost parallel to the coast-line. Amidst small groves of what seemed in the distance to be acacia, and near the banks of many tiny streams that wound along the plain, were groups of game. Herds of various kinds of bok were there, and here and there some solitary and not gregarious animal was to be seen, now bounding away from some imaginary danger, and now calmly browsing on the sweet veldt. What a place for an encampment!—wood, water, cover, commanding heights, which, properly occupied and entrenched, could be held against an army; and a climate where fever could scarcely penetrate, so pure and bracing was the air. Away up a smaller valley on the right lay the path that had to be followed, and, leaving the bright and smiling landscape in front, the column once more plunged into the gloom of the bush. Two more outspans brought them to sunset, and now precautions had to be redoubled, as they were nearing most dangerous ground. The chances were more than probable that Cetywayo, on hearing of his brother's defection and flight, had sent a party of his warriors to take possession of his wives and cattle, both vendible commodities in the land. If this were the case, it would inevitably result that a vigilant watch would be kept to prevent their escape to Oham. Strange to say, these anticipations were only partly verified, for as the troops neared the caves they could see that they were watched, but only by scattered and weak bodies of Zulus. These fellows had evidently discovered that the white man's intention was hostile, and they probably thought his object was cattle, and not to recover or rescue Oham's wives and children, for they ran rapidly along the heights above, taking no precaution for concealment, and seeming only anxious to drive away their herds. As the horsemen approached the caves at a canter, flankers were extended on either side to prevent surprise. The excitement of Buller's men could hardly be restrained, while the calm and stolid Dutchmen, who glided silently and grimly on, offered a wide contrast to their more hot-blooded comrades. As they came nearer and nearer the place seemed inhabited, and it was evident that the natives sent on a few days previously had apprised the people of Buller's advent and friendly intentions. Then Oham's people came crowding out of their caves, jostling each other in their anxiety to greet the English soldiers, grasping their assegais, and giving vent to a succession of guttural clicks, which it would baffle any known combination of vowels to reproduce. They did not cheer; such was not their custom, but they waved their spears aloft, as if they felt them entering the enemy's body.

Rorke, having now been sent on with a small escort to explore the caves, was not long in reporting that all the women and children had been collected, and a bivouac having been formed, with outlying pickets in every direction, and sentries posted, that night was passed without molestation. At nine a.m. the following morning a compact column was formed, consisting of the rescued allies or prisoners, the few cattle collected in the centre, and the whole party started for the homeward march. It could scarcely have been hoped that the retreat would have been unmolested, yet only at the Inklepgwene, a difficult defile, were they fired upon by a body of Zulus, evidently hastily collected, and numbering some thousand men. The detachment reached the camp, with the rescued families, at one p.m. on the 16th.

Wood had for some time purposed taking the initiative against Umbelini, and from information obtained from Oham's people came to the conclusion that Umbelini's place on the Mhlobana Mountain, which was not more than five and twenty miles from Kambula, was capable of being successfully surprised. He had heard from headquarters that Lord Chelmsford would probably start for Pearson's relief on the 28th, so he determined to take that opportunity of making a diversion towards Mhlobana.

On Wednesday, 26th March, Colonel Buller and Piet Uys were summoned to Colonel Wood's tent, and told that information had come in to the effect that a large quantity of fine cattle had been seen on the Zlobani range of mountains, some ten or twelve miles from Kambula. This Zlobani range could be seen from the camp, and in most places was steep and precipitous, well wooded, and full of large caves, places of concealment, and natural fastnesses.

Several reconnaissances had been previously made by Colonels Wood and Buller, who had both made themselves well acquainted with its natural features and its various difficulties of attack. It was well known that scattered bands of predatory Zulus, guarding large quantities of cattle, had been for some time concealed in these rocky recesses, and that, in compliance with the king's orders, these bands had been consolidated and reinforced by regiments sent by Cetywayo from Ulundi. Colonel Wood had, however, other information, from some of Oham's people, that all the regiments indicated had not yet come in, and that want of ammunition was detaining them in their own kraals. This, as it turned out, could not have been quite correct. After some conversation, Colonel Weatherly and Commandants Raaf and Schermbrucker were also summoned to the colonel's tent, and it was unanimously decided that it would be advisable to take the initiative and strike a blow before the Zulus concentrated to attack the camp, as Wood was on all hands assured they would do. Before any operations on the Zlobani are described, it should be mentioned that Wood had been enabled from the additions to his column to establish a chain of communications between Kambula, Utrecht, and Dundee. He had also organized a strong outpost between his camp and the Transvaal border, and another at Doornkop, or Thorn-hill. To this place Captain Schermbrucker and a party of his men were sent, but had been temporarily recalled to assist us at Kambula.

After the council of war held by the colonel on the 26th, arrangements were at once made for the reconnaissance to the Zlobani. The force selected for this expedition consisted of the Imperial Mounted Infantry, 150; the Frontier Light Horse, 125; Raaf's Contingent, 50; Piet Uys's Boer Contingent, 50; Weatherly's Horse, 80; and Schermbrucker's Horse, 40, making a total of 495; and each man was supplied with three days' rations and 100 rounds of ammunition.

All the horses intended for the expedition were carefully inspected on the 26th, and the colonel rejected several that did not seem in good form. They did not, as a rule, average more than fourteen hands two inches in height, but all were stout, short-backed, well ribbed up animals, and up to far more weight than their appearance would lead a novice to suppose. All these animals were trained to remain perfectly quiet when the men dismounted to fire, and many of them would actually come to their rider at a whistle. Piet Uys's men were especially well mounted, and it was necessary that they should be, as your Dutch Boer is, as a rule, by no means a feather-weight, being usually over thirteen stone. They are also very powerful men, and until forty or forty-five not unwieldy. After that age, they generally get heavier. Most of the old-fashioned Boers still retained the long "roer" or smoothbore, but all the younger generation had taken to the latest pattern rifles. A revolver and stout cutlass also formed part of their equipment, and a single blanket strapped in front of the saddle carried all their kit.

At three a.m. on the 27th, the first little band of gallant horsemen under Colonel Russell were quietly paraded in the moonlight, and after being carefully inspected were addressed in a few well-chosen words by Colonel Wood, who had finally decided to accompany the party. The whole party made up altogether 495 sabres, every one of whom was a good swordsman and a picked marksman. The horses, although somewhat rough in the coat, were in good wind and excellent condition, and every one of these animals was well trained to stand fire. They moved off quietly from the camp, and passing along the track, which descended towards a sandy and deep nullah with most precipitous sides, debouched into an open space, from which the Zlobani range could be seen in the intervals of moonlight, now and then obscured by the passing clouds, which seemed to foretell a stormy day. The track in many places crossed difficult spruits, and in parts was obliterated by thorn-trees and bush. It was frequently commanded by projecting spurs and bluffs, from which an enemy could have seriously annoyed the advance. At five o'clock the column halted, and after a careful reconnaissance, off-saddled for half an hour, while the men partook of a ration of cold tea and beltong. This halt was made near a large dried-up, sandy watercourse, in parts of which the sand was moist, and by digging holes water was found in sufficient quantities for the horses to wash their mouths. The surrounding country was totally denuded of fodder, and as far as the eye could reach the most wild and barren prospect was to be seen. Another advance of about five miles changed the aspect of the scene, and brought them to a slightly wooded ravine, amidst the rocks of which ran a clear stream, over a grassy or pebbly bed, behind which loomed a range of rocky hills, the summit of which seemed crowned by immense boulders, looking in the distance like huge slabs placed by giant hands in their present position. Away to the left was an undulating plain, upon which were detached clumps of bushes and trees. Over this plain small mountain streams flowed in various directions, winding amongst trees, shrubs, and ferns of different variety. Here and there antelopes were grazing, ostriches were stalking, and now and then vultures were seen grimly circling round in seeming anticipation of a morning feast. A couple of miles further on they came to a large cultivated flat terminating to the right in a long, dark, and winding gorge, black with bush and skirted by huge precipices of sandstone and granite. They turned into this, and proceeded silently but quickly along the banks of a small rivulet, until they came to the foot of the mountain, and, after some little time, discovered a steep path, which seemed cut out of the solid cliff, and wide enough only for one horseman to pass. They were more than three-quarters of an hour scaling this path, which was most dangerous to horsemen unaccustomed to such tracks, and suited more to the bush bok seen here and there as the horsemen ascended higher and higher.

On nearing the top of the krantz the view was magnificent. Away to the extreme right was the purple range of the Ingive Mountains, behind which the sun was fast rising. The Ingonyama came next, and joined the Ntabatulu and Ingoma ranges, the latter of which overhangs the left bank of the Black Umfolosi, all along which are the most extensive forests and inaccessible kloofs and krantzes. The head of the column had no sooner gained the summit of the last ledge than the leading files noticed a large number of cattle grazing on the plateau. These were guarded by about 150 or 200 armed Zulus, who, however, did not see the advancing troops. The range upon which the English party now found themselves extended about seven or eight miles, and was accessible only by a few most difficult footpaths leading from the plains below. Huge masses of scrub and boulders, krantzes, terraces, and ledges of rock, caves and immense fissures in the sides of the mountain, formed a retreat for the cattle, which, upon an alarm being sounded, were quickly driven from the grazing-ground above. The northern face of the mountain was a sheer precipice, perfectly bare of all bush or shrub. They were now halted, and ordered to bivouac. At about seven in the evening Colonel Wood rejoined them, having with him his usual small staff and personal escort, consisting of Captain the Hon. Ronald Campbell, his staff officer; Lieut. Lysons, 90th Light Infantry, his orderly officer; Mr. Lloyd, political agent (son of General Lloyd, of the Natal Legislative Assembly); eight mounted men of the 90th Light Infantry, and six stalwart natives under Umtongo, one of Pondo's sons. Umtongo had by some means or other obtained information that the regiments named Naxeane, Umdomandi, Ucaridanburg, Macalsiene, Udmine, Ekotsamaclooser, and Macalvoore, under the Indunas Umgongo, Umsimoyao, and other noted chiefs, had left Ulundi three days before, on the 24th, and Umtongo was consequently most anxious that the column should at once return to the Kambula. This advice, however, could not have been followed without exposing Colonels Buller and Weatherly and Piet Uys, who were in front, to be cut off and surrounded, so that it was decided that a junction must be made with them at whatever risks.

At half-past three a.m. the commanding officer ordered the word to be quietly passed round for the men to stand to their horses and prepare to march. An occasional and straggling ray of moonlight helped them to follow the faint tracks of those who had gone before them, and before going very far they came upon unmistakable evidences of the advance having been opposed. A distant shot was now and then heard, away towards the bluff of the mountain on the north-east side; and soon after these indications of fighting was heard the sound of horses, and Colonel Weatherly, with his son, and about eighty of his troopers, met Colonel Wood, bringing him the news that on the previous night he had been unfortunate enough to miss his road. As the morning was now breaking, and the warm sun commenced to light up the scene, Colonel Wood noticed, here and there on the path, a broken assegai, a damaged shield, rent with a Martini-Henry rifle-bullet, and further on the bodies of some Zulus and the carcass of a dead horse. These signs marked where Buller had passed and had been attacked. Campbell and Lysons therefore ascended the rocks above a huge cave, and, taking every precaution to screen themselves from observation, scanned the surrounding horizon with the field-glasses. Far away, almost upon the summit of an apparently inaccessible and gigantic cliff, the van of Buller's column could be seen slowly advancing, and driving some dark masses of cattle and Zulus before them. These officers came down at once to report, and Colonel Weatherly requested permission to lead his men on to Buller's assistance, while Colonel Wood followed with the remainder of his horsemen. This permission being granted, Weatherly moved on by a terribly difficult path to the right, while the remainder kept to what seemed to be the main track. About half a mile farther on this party saw, a few hundred yards to the left, about 200 Zulus, who appeared to be armed with rifles. They were moving rapidly across the English front, stopping occasionally to take a shot at the leading files, who had, on account of the difficulties of the road, been compelled to dismount and lead their horses. The object of this detachment was now evident, it being their intention to get between the main column and Weatherly's little band. It was noticed that half a dozen gigantic warriors, each armed with rifle, shield, and bundle of assegais, led the main body of these Zulus. These men took it in turns to run in front, and were evidently acting as guides, often enabling the rest to make short cuts, and thus to get over the ground more quickly. They paused, however, now and then, as if to examine the spoor of the horses, on which the previous night's rain had fallen, and from this Colonel Wood concluded that some of his people were in the same direction. By means of some wild vine and creepers Lysons and one of the escort now descended from the opposite side of the plateau on which was the cave, and running rapidly along the top of the next ridge, made their way unseen to the edge of the bush. They thus commanded the plain below, and the serpentine pathway by which Buller had found his way to the summit of the cliff. From this point Buller and his men could be seen scouring the mountains beyond the intervening kloof, and about halfway up the opposite ascent were observed a strong party of Zulus working forward as if to cut off the horsemen above. As Weatherly and Colonel Wood were now separated by a deep and impassable ravine, they could only hope that they should be able to effect a junction with Buller by different routes, and, if possible, in time to give effective help. Crouching down so as not to be seen by the main column were a few of the enemy on a narrow ledge of rock, about a hundred yards above their heads. Where these fellows had come from it was not easy to imagine, but they immediately opened a hot, but ill-directed fire, which the English troopers did not at first return, as they were too much occupied in guiding their horses over the dangerous places, where a single false step would have sent them to the valley below. Meanwhile Umtongo and two of his men had climbed round by a higher portion of the cliff, and, guiding some of the English marksmen, they opened a fire upon the Zulu scouts, which soon cleared them from the path. Another half-hour's toilsome march brought Wood upon Weatherly's track, and they then could see the rear of Buller's column high above them to the right.

It would be difficult to describe the marvellously rugged and weird nature of the rocks around, and the ghastly features of the sheer precipices gaping on either side. Killed and wounded horses now were seen at every turn of the road, showing how stoutly the enemy must have held their ground, and how difficult an operation Buller had performed. Sending fifty men round to work on our right flank and to endeavour to take the Zulus in the rear, Colonel Wood kept his men for a few moments under cover of a friendly ledge of rocks to look to their rifles, girths, and ammunition, and then ascended rapidly to the front, passing the Border Horse, who had by this time got off the track. The scene was at this moment intensely exciting. The firing was almost continuous, and the yells of the savages were re-echoed back by the loud and heart-stirring cheers of their gallant comrades, who had seen Wood's column coming and gave them this encouragement. It was not long before they came under more direct fire, and at this juncture Colonel Wood, who had been keeping his men cool and steady by his own presence of mind and good-humoured encouragement, left Colonel Russell in charge, and jumping upon his horse, as the ground was now practicable for riding, trotted through the skirmishers, and, closely followed by his staff and escort, pushed rapidly to the front. This party, with a dozen of the Border Horse, galloped to within a hundred paces of the summit of the cliff, where they saw that they were in the thick of the fire, raining upon them both from front and flank, and proceeding from a mass of Zulus skirmishing in the most artistic and workmanlike manner from their caves, crevices, and enormous boulders which formed the natural fortifications of the mountain plateau. At this moment Weatherly, with his gallant and noble-hearted boy, aged only fifteen, and who insisted on fighting by his father's side, were cheering on their men, dashing boldly into the caves, and closing in mortal strife with the Zulus. "Take a dozen men over to the cave to the right front, and rattle out the fellows who are firing so well, Colonel Weatherly," said Colonel Wood, as his horse staggered under him from a deep assegai wound in the chest, and a savage from behind a boulder fired at that officer at ten paces' distance. The bullet missed him, and Llewellen Lloyd, seeing the man loading quickly again, at once rode to cut him down, and was shot through the head. Wood, seeing this officer fall, dashed spurs into his wounded horse and galloped up to catch him, closely followed by Ronald Campbell. Two other Zulus from the cave now fired simultaneously at the colonel, whose horse at this moment was again struck, and fell upon him. The colonel was upon his feet in a moment, and assisted Captain Campbell and his orderly to carry Lloyd's body to a ledge more out of the way. The shot which killed poor Llewellen Lloyd tore Colonel Wood's sleeve underneath his arm before reaching its mark. As Colonel Weatherly's men were engaged with several Zulus at close quarters, some little delay occurred in their advance upon the cave, whence the fire was most galling; and Ronald Campbell, calling on Lysons and some of the escort to follow him, dashed at the opening, having first cleared a sort of breastwork at the entrance. Poor Campbell fell, shot through the head; and Lysons and a brave fellow, Corporal Fowler, following closely upon the footsteps of the brave young guardsman, killed the two remaining Zulus within the cave, while another, severely wounded, managed to crawl away through a narrow crevice in the rock. Having ascertained that the enemy were retreating before Buller on the summit, Colonel Weatherly was sent to make a small circuit lower down the cliff, to endeavour to hit off the path by which the former had so successfully ascended, and which the others were unfortunate enough to miss. Buller, in the meanwhile, was not only driving the Zulus' cattle before him, but was able to assist his comrades by his fire from his vantage-ground above. The enemy in front and flank retired, disputing every available spot, while Weatherly was most skilfully working round to their left rear. His disposition of his men was most judicious, and he rendered very material help to Wood's portion of the force, intercepting and driving back a strong party which were coming up to assist the body they were engaging. These, however, eventually took up a formidable position in some caves in a deep kloof, from which they kept up a constant and dropping fire. Amongst Wood's party they had up to this time but few casualties, though the loss of such splendid and noble-hearted soldiers as Campbell and Lloyd was a terrible blow to their chief, whose right hand men they were. Colonel Wood, in spite of the galling fire still maintained by the entrenched Zulus, assisted the party told off to carry the bodies of the dead to a place about half way down the first hill, where, in disregard of the bullets which kept rattling round, these noble young heroes were buried in a soldier's glorious grave, the funeral honours being discharged over them by the rifles of friend and foe.

Colonel Wood now made a flank movement with a portion of the column in a north-westerly direction, to see if a junction could be effected with that portion of the men which had been left in the charge of Colonel Russell. In effecting this change of position Wood had to pass under the steepest cliffs of the Zlobani Mountain. Umtongo, true to his Rob Roy and predatory instincts, had utilised his opportunity by a little cattle-lifting, and, in spite of the rather hot time he had been experiencing, was engaged in driving, with the aid of his people, a herd of sheep and goats abandoned by the foe. As Wood's party were carrying their wounded men, and now and then halted to give them stimulants, their progress was necessarily slow, and this delay led to serious consequences, for the large reinforcements they knew might arrive from Ulundi later in the day had, without their knowledge, actually arrived, and were marching parallel to their right front, and concealed from sight. Umtongo was the first to discover the proximity of this hostile array, and, although without an interpreter, Colonel Wood understood enough of his language, aided by signs, to comprehend the gravity of the situation. The colonel, having obtained a fresh horse, cantered across some very broken ground to a high bluff just under the Zunguin's Neck, and, guided by some of Oham's people, managed, not without considerable difficulty, to reach a point upon a ledge of rock whence he could, without a glass, see the movements and exact formation of the enemy's force. The column was evidently the reinforcements expected from Ulundi, and had a portion of the English column not missed its way on the night of the 27th, it is tolerably certain they would have effected the object of their raid and retreated to the shelter of the camp without much loss. Wood knew of the despatch of this army on the 24th, but did not calculate that it could have compassed the distance it marched in three days. As matters stood, however, the colonel and his staff could see from their coign of vantage that the Zulu army from Ulundi were marching in a line of five contiguous columns, with a line of skirmishers thrown out in front and on flank, forming the usual horns and chest. From subsequent description given by Buller, it appears that the first part of his task was successfully carried out; that the track up the Zlobani was correctly hit off, the Zulu entrenched caves triumphantly carried by storm, and a large quantity of cattle taken and driven off. Had Wood's portion of the attack and that commanded by Weatherly appeared on the scene of action in time to support Buller's splendid onslaught, all would have gone well, but the delay caused by their missing the track enabled the Zlobani followers of Umbelini and Manyanyoba to hold their own ground until the arrival of the Ulundi army. Buller did all that a skilled general could effect to bring off his men with small loss, but from the nature of the ground it was in this instance almost impossible for cavalry to work with any degree of celerity. The mountain having been carried soon after daybreak, a long off-saddle to feed the horses and an unavoidable delay of four hours were made, to enable the main division to come up. Suddenly the immense force of Zulus, seen by Wood from the Zunguin's Neck, was observed by Colonel Buller and Oham's scouts. An immediate but orderly retreat was commenced, but could not be effected without the most desperate fighting and severe loss. The enemy had massed themselves on three sides of the mountain, and only one terribly steep path was left to descend. This was thoroughly blocked by the Zulus, who, under cover, rained bullets and assegais upon these devoted men, and then, when the moment came for close fighting, dashed in dense masses upon their thinned and weakened files. Halfway down this fearful gorge the road was so narrow and so steep that it was nearly closed up by the proximity of the tall cliffs on either side. These hills seemed to be formed of smooth and slippery ledges, over which many wounded men and horses fell, coming down upon the points of the assegais waiting below to receive them! Caves, with natural breastworks, like casemated batteries, were on either side of the path, wet and slippery with blood. Colonel Wood was of opinion that the Ulundi army did not follow up Buller's retreat for two reasons: first, because its wonderful three days' march had in a great measure exhausted the men, who came in such haste as to dispense with provisions and spare ammunition; and secondly, on account of the powerful demonstration the main or second division made on their flank even at the eleventh hour. To the cool valour and devoted courage of Colonel Buller the safety of those who came back to camp was due. He fought at the rear of the retiring column, assisting the wounded, charged desperately at the dense masses of fiery Zulus who were pressing on with the thirst of blood, and not until he saw the last of his band through this terrible kloof did he turn his horse to follow his men, or to think of his own safety.

Seeing that nothing more could be done to help Buller in his retreat, Colonel Wood despatched a messenger to Colonel Russell, who by this time had commenced the ascent of the extreme westerly point of the range, to retrace his steps eastward, and to cover the retreat of the native allies upon the camp. Russell lost no time in carrying out these instructions, but before he could arrive several natives had been overtaken and speared. The Kambula camp was reached by the column about 7.30. Buller, on learning that our gallant young friend Barton had not returned, and was away on foot with the survivors of the Border Horse, some ten miles off, at once obtained permission from Colonel Wood to go in search of the party. The evening had set in stormy, and torrents of rain were now coming down. Buller had been in the saddle for forty-eight hours, was severely contused, and had escaped death by almost a miracle; but setting a noble example, he obtained a party of volunteers, and taking led horses, started on his expedition. Seven men, who would probably have never reached the camp, were brought in by this gallant act, and these were the sole survivors of Barton's Horse. It would seem that in attempting to follow Wood's track in retiring they were overtaken and cut off. They then attempted to retreat by the north and the Hyntecha Kloof, where the majority died fighting gallantly to the last. Splendid, manly, honest, simple, and taciturn Piet Uys, whose father, uncles, and cousins fought and fell in the old wars with Dingaan! On the evening of the 17th, after the conference in Wood's tent, he spoke in the most feeling terms of his children, of whom, like all Cape Dutchmen, he was passionately fond, and Colonel Wood, with that thoughtful kindness for which he is so well known, at once said that, should anything happen to the father, he would interest himself with the Government to provide for the orphans. Piet Uys could have easily escaped, but, like Buller, he would see the last of his men clear before turning rein. He was last seen with his back to the cliff, standing across the body of his favourite "mooi paard" (grey horse), with six large Zulus lying dead in a circle round him, his empty revolver in his left hand and his body pierced by two assegais! Colonel Weatherly's Horse went into action about eighty strong, and of these brave fellows forty-five were dead, including the gallant colonel and his brave, intelligent, and handsome son, a lad of fifteen, who, at an age when many an English youth is celebrated only in the cricket-field or on the river, had seen more of real fighting than many a veteran in the regulars. Nothing could be more sad than Weatherly's death. At the fatal hour when all save honour seemed lost, he placed his beloved boy upon his best horse, and kissing him on the forehead, commended him to another Father's care above, and implored him to overtake the nearest column of the English horse, which seemed at that time to be cutting its way out. The boy clung to his father, and begged to be allowed to stay by his side, and share his life or death. The contrast was characteristic. The man, a bearded, bronzed, and hardy sabreur, with a father's tears upon his cheek, while the blue-eyed and fair-haired lad, with much of the beauty of a girl in his appearance, was calmly and with a smile of fond delight loading his father's favourite carbine. When the two noble hearts were last seen, the father, wounded to death with cruel assegais, was clasping his boy's hand with his left, while the right cut down the brawny savages who came to despoil him of his charge.

Though in all these operations of which mention has been lately made Lord Chelmsford never once appears, it must not therefore be supposed that he had rested from his labours. On the contrary they were more incessant and arduous than ever. When the news of Isandhlwana first reached the colonies, it caused the utmost excitement and wildest apprehensions. Nothing less, it was averred, was about to happen than an immediate and overwhelming invasion of Natal by the Zulus. The black men were on the point of sweeping the whites into the sea. Lord Chelmsford's first duty, after an urgent application to the home authorities for reinforcements, was to render these alarms groundless. To organize of a sudden the defence of so extended a frontier was no easy task. How thoroughly and conscientiously it was performed the result testifies.

Another duty scarcely less urgent was the rescue of Colonel Pearson. And in this project he received aid, as valuable as unexpected, from the Governor of St. Helena. No sooner did that official hear of Lord Chelmsford's urgent need, than he at once assumed the responsibility of sending on the garrison of his island—in all 160 soldiers—to the rescue. Captain Bradshaw, of H.M.S. "Shah," chanced to be lying in the harbour, homeward bound, after a period of foreign service, but he hesitated not one whit more than the Governor. He embarked the garrison, and on February 19th had anchored at Durban. There a naval brigade of 400 men was furnished from his ship; and thus it came about that long before reinforcements from England could arrive, and on the day that Zlobani was fought, Lord Chelmsford was already well on the way to deliver Pearson from his captivity.

CHAPTER IV.

Effects of Zlobani—Description of Kambula Camp—Desperate Zulu attack thereon—Description of the battle—Deaths of Lieutenants Bright and Nicholson—Gallant rescue by Captain Woodgate—Force and commanders of the Zulu attack—Their losses—The English losses—Fortifications at Kambula Kop—Block House—Arrival of despatches—Exciting scene.

Before Lord Chelmsford set out on his march, Colonel Pearson had sent messengers to warn him that not less than 35,000 Zulus were lying in ambush between the Tugela and Ekowe, in order to assail him as he advanced to the relief of that post. Orders were therefore sent to Colonel Wood to make an attack on the Zulu flank, and so to create a diversion in favour of the relieving column.

Accordingly, Wood advanced from his entrenched position at Kambula Kop to the Zlobani mountain, where Umbelini's chief stronghold and kraal was situated. This Wood assailed, and though after a sharp engagement, which has been previously described, his forces received a decided check, yet he may be said to have achieved a success, inasmuch as he undoubtedly drew away a large part of the force that was intended to operate against Lord Chelmsford. Another result of this battle was that it gave the enemy sufficient encouragement to induce them to attack the English troops on the following day in their position at Kambula, thus enabling Wood to obtain a solid and decisive victory.

From various incidents that came under his observation Colonel Wood formed an opinion, subsequently verified by the event, that an attack upon Kambula would not be long in following the check at Zlobani; a vigilant look-out was therefore maintained during the whole of the night of the 28th. The rain came down heavily during the early part of the night, and shortly before dawn Captain Raaf was sent out with twenty-five men to reconnoitre, and, if possible, pick up any wounded or straggling. Zulus, who would give any information as to the movements of the strong impi known to be in the immediate neighbourhood. About ten a.m. Raaf sent in one of Oham's people—a most intelligent and witty fellow—who gave a graphic account how he was captured when left behind with the recovered cattle taken from Umbelini. Having taken off his distinctive head-badge, although he was recognized by a friend, the Zulus were not aware that he was one of Oham's people, or that he had joined the English cause. On this account, therefore, he was allowed to accompany the Zulu impi as far as Umsedosi. While with the enemy he obtained a tolerably correct notion of their strength, and was intelligent enough to remember the names and titles of the various corps sent from Ulundi, and, indeed, of those which were retained by the king. Cetywayo, he said, had divided his entire military available force into three formidable columns of four regiments each. One of these, consisting of the Naxeane, the Umdomandi, the Ucaridanburg, and the Macalsiene, was sent without commissariat, and by forced marches from Ulundi on the 24th March, and part of this column, but not all, was engaged with Umbelini against Wood at Zlobani on the 28th. This column numbered at the least 20,000 men, and was well supplied with arms of precision. Four regiments were retained at Ulundi as a bodyguard and garrison to the king, and the remaining four were told off to attack Lord Chelmsford at or near Ekowe. Very early on the morning of the 29th, Oham's friendly Zulu, feeling anxious about his own safety, persuaded some of the Zulu braves to accompany him some distance from their camp, under the pretence of obtaining them some drink. Taking a favourable opportunity, however, he managed to elude their vigilance and give them the slip, when he made the best of his way to Raaf's party, who at once sent him on to the Kambula camp, with the information given above. This fellow gave an admirable account of the state of feeling in the Zulu armies, and his opinion was that great numbers of the men were now serving entirely against their will, as they found that, instead of getting plenty of booty in the shape of cattle, stores, arms, and ammunition, they were the losers, as during their absence with the army the English attacked their kraals, and carried off their oxen, sheep, and goats. This man, although quite a chief at Oham's kraal, would seem to be a sort of headman, and to be in the habit of conversing familiarly with those in authority; for, he added, that it was rumoured that Dabulamanzi would, if another reverse fell upon the Zulu arms, in all probability follow Oham's example, and proffer submission.

On receiving the intelligence of the Zulu advance, Colonel Wood had few preparations to make, for in the camp at Kambula each corps, each company, each subdivision, each section, and each man had a place allotted, and had been taught to be in that place at one sound of the bugle. The little fort was in an exceptionally strong position, being laid out upon an elevated and narrow ridge of table-land. A complete precipice, perfectly inaccessible to a white man, even though a born cragsman, guarded the right flank. On the left a succession of steep terraces had been utilised, and carefully entrenched with lines en crémaillère, or outworks, each successive line defilading its neighbour. In front there was a narrow slip of land, hemmed in by ledges of rock, and swept by two 7-pounders, while immediately in rear, upon an eminence about 120 feet above the fort was a small lunette, with open gorge, and armed with two guns. The camp at first consisted of one laager, but an outer defence with a hundred waggons, and an inner one with fifty, had been subsequently added. Deep and wide ditches flanked by caponnières protected the outer boundary, and were traced in the form of an irregular hexagon. As soon as Oham's Zulu had made his report, the garrison were called to arms without the slightest fuss, excitement, or confusion, and messengers were at once despatched to order the return of a fatigue party which had been sent out in the early morning wood-cutting. These men reported on their return that they had seen Zulus scouting about five miles to the west, and had they not been recalled they would have stayed to get further intelligence. As soon as the men of the various corps were at their posts, Colonel Wood rode round to give them a few final words of encouragement, saying in conclusion, that he knew they would hold the fort while a man was left to fire a shot. The tents were then struck, and the men lined the shelter-trenches. The horses stood to their bridles, and the ammunition was served out by fatigue parties told off for this duty. Most of the waggon-drivers had been taught to use the Martini, and a few were served out to each face of the laager.

It was now nearly eleven a.m., and shortly after that time the Zulu battalions were seen on the base of the hill. Here they halted for a considerable time, and apparently a council of war was held. Their movements were evidently not so decided as on former occasions, and it was more than an hour before any forward measure was taken. The cattle had been brought into camp, with the exception of about 220 which had strayed away towards the enemy, and it could be seen that the Zulu chief had detached a portion of his men to secure these animals. On this movement being noticed, Colonel Buller was ordered out to reconnoitre, and to see if any opening offered for a charge upon the detached body of the enemy, but no chance presenting itself, the cavalry retired, and took up an excellent position on the north front of the camp. A flanking movement was now made by a body of Zulus, numbering about 7000 men. These regiments broke from line into column, and ran at a tremendous pace along a ledge situated at the commencement of the cultivated land. As the object of this manœuvre was evidently to entice the cavalry to attack upon broken and difficult ground, Buller and Russell very wisely restrained their men from attempting any sortie. The Zulus were in range by this time, but it was thought desirable to reserve all fire until they were massed in closer order. It was nearly half-past one when the action actually commenced, and it was opened by a cloud of skirmishers, who, fed by supports and reserves, began to scale the north front of the English post. Here, behind the outermost line of entrenchments, Buller and Russell dismounted a portion of their men, and each trooper being cautioned to select his object and fire steadily, some excellent rifle-practice was made. No sooner did a head or a shield appear above a rock, a boulder, or a tuft of grass, than the "ping" of the deadly Martini-Henry rang out, and in nine cases out of ten there was an enemy the less to encounter. Some portion of the band of the gallant but lost Piet Uys, had been sent to reinforce Buller's attenuated squadron, and these men particularly distinguished themselves as highly-skilled marksmen. Many of these Boers still retained their old national weapon, the long single-barrelled roer, carrying an enormous bullet, suited for the destruction of big game. There is no doubt that, in the hands of a South African Dutchman, this is a terrible weapon. The conical bullet, perhaps, has a greater power of penetration, but the larger ball of the old-fashioned fire-arm, which in appearance is not unlike a huge duck-gun, inflicts a wound which rarely fails to kill. These splendid Dutchmen shot with all the skill that hatred of the savages and a desire for vengeance for their late leader could teach, and there could be noticed on the countenance of each a sterner expression and a more deadly resolve than usual. From the little fort a gun was now brought to bear upon the advancing line, but without much effect, as an intervening spur gave shelter to the foe. The attack was now renewed on the north side with redoubled vigour; the lines of skirmishers fell back, and were replaced by a more solid line, supported by the usual dense column in its rear. Buller saw that it became necessary to remount his men, and this movement of course weakened the effect of his fire. He retired, however, slowly, halting now and then, and sending a volley into the masses which kept pouring up the slopes. Major Russell, at this juncture, executed a brilliant dash at a body of Zulus who were running in an easterly direction to gain possession of a ledge of rock, and, catching them on a favourable piece of ground, with about a score of his men managed to sabre a great many without the loss of one trooper. This, however, did not suffice to check the steady advance, and orders were sent for Buller and Russell to retire slowly within the laager, their retreat being splendidly covered by Colonel Gilbert and four companies of his fine regiment, the 13th, who were posted on the right rear of the laager. One company of the 13th, under Captain Cox, an officer of former Cape experience, held the cattle laager, which gave a splendid flanking fire along the front, and these men waited until the Zulus were within 300 yards, and then commenced an independent file firing at the same time that Gilbert's men delivered a withering volley. As Cox and his men could not see the right rear, to which point the principal Zulu attack had now changed, a skilful counter-attack was ordered by Colonel Wood, who directed Major Hackett to take a couple of companies of the 90th Light Infantry to advance over the slope, and open a cross-fire upon the enemy. This movement was magnificently carried out by Hackett, whose men moved out into the open as if on parade, and with a steady advance, such as British troops are proud of, marched on to the rear of the cattle laager, taking the Zulus completely by surprise. Nothing could be better than the calm and deliberate firing of these men. Every shot told with deadly effect, and dark bodies and shields soon began to dot the ground. Still, however, the living stream rolled on, and as one warrior went down in the death-struggle, another, with a shout of vengeance, sprang into his place.

It was now a little after two o'clock, and while this attack upon the left rear had been progressing, another strong body of the enemy had succeeded in gaining an eminence from which, although at a long range, they were enabled to keep up an effective fire and inflict considerable loss upon the British troops. Captain Woodgate, of Ashanti fame, who had been sent to support Major Hackett, together with his lieutenant (Strong), here behaved with conspicuous coolness and valour. These three officers advancing well in front of their men and waving their swords above their heads, showed such an example to their men that the Zulus were driven back on that side, the ground intervening being strewed with bodies of Zulus. A difficult and brilliantly led flanking attack was now effected by the Zulu general, who, having retired a body of his best marksmen from his right along his rear, suddenly opened a galling fire upon the left flank of the 90th companies, who, having accomplished their task, were now ordered to retire. In executing this difficult movement Major Hackett was badly hit, and had to be carried out of fire. Lieutenant Bright, also of the 90th Light Infantry, was here mortally wounded, and shortly afterwards died. Bright was a clever, cheery fellow, a capital artist, a good musician, and a most accomplished officer. It was in running forward to pick up Hackett that poor Bright received his death-wound. Meanwhile, from the lunette on the height, Nicholson's two 7-pounders did capital execution. The Zulu main body had now come within range, and grape and canister were poured into their masses until the slopes over which they were advancing became slippery with blood. Standing on the parapet, Nicholson was, field-glass in hand, directing the pointing of his guns, when a chance bullet struck him in the temple, and he fell upon the weapon he was directing. The loss was observed from the laager, and Major Vaughan was at once sent to replace this gallant young fellow. Colonel Wood, not to expose unduly the horses of the artillery, had retained under the shelter of the laager four guns in reserve. These were under charge of Major Tremlett, R.A., who, with his subalterns, Lieuts. Bigge and Hughes, waited until the Zulus were within a thousand yards, and then making a dash to a small open space of rising ground outside the laager, worked his battery with immense effect. The guns did not return to the laager, but were shifted from time to time as the movements of the enemy warranted, and to their splendid service much of the victory was due. The enemy had now varied his attack a second time, and nothing could exceed the bravery and skilful manœuvring of his regiments. While the 13th and 90th vied with each other in noble rivalry, and beat back the hordes of the Zulus upon the two most exposed flanks, the mounted men under Buller and Russell were occasionally led forward at a gallop by Colonel Wood, who, whenever he saw an opening for a charge, swept down and drove the skirmishers on to the main body. These brilliant charges became more frequent as the day advanced, and their effect upon the savages, unaccustomed to cavalry, was beyond all expectation. At three o'clock a hot cross-fire was opened upon a company commanded by Captain Woodgate, who had been holding a point which was in a measure the key of the position, as it commanded the only practicable road to the upper lunette, which, as has been explained, was open at the gorge. The enemy still held the range which they had occupied during the earlier portion of the day, and Woodgate was ordered to retire under cover of the fire from two of Tremlett's guns, which had now taken a favourable position for shelling the height. After one or two shots had been fired, a shell was dropped into the midst of the party holding this position, and this had a most useful effect, for the other gun coming into action at the same range, drove the enemy's skirmishers to ground much farther off. For another hour and a half the troops continued to be hotly engaged with the enemy, who, when dislodged from one flank, swept round in the most perfect order, and swarmed in masses upon another side. A message now arrived from Colonel Gilbert, to the effect that he could spare Captain Cox and a company from his flank, as the enemy's fire was slackening, and they were gradually extending their line to the right rear. Cox had been hit early in the action, but refused to leave his men, and led them on gallantly till the day was won.

At half-past four the Zulu general seemed to concentrate his principal attention upon the northern side held by the 13th, and some desperate rushes were made almost up to the muzzles of the English rifles. Colonel Wood rode up, and complimented Colonel Gilbert upon the splendid firing of his men, and he was at once greeted with a ringing cheer, which was heard by the enemy. All sides of the laager had been in turn attacked, and soon after half-past four a simultaneous advance was made on the north and north-east face. An enfilade fire, however, was made by a couple of Tremlett's guns, and the 7-pounder directed by Bigge did great execution at 800 yards. Some of the bodies afterwards examined on the north-east face were found to be literally blown to pieces. The Zulus at this time were working round from the right-hand hill, and here, unfortunately, a few large boulders gave them cover. The soldiers were here almost on a line with the enemy, who in other places were below and above them. They had therefore to keep a sharp look-out that the enemy did not break through the line and penetrate the laager. They therefore kept pouring in a heavy cross-fire upon them at 200 and 300 yards, while the guns were defilading them on the right. The enemy could not stand this treble fire, and, though disputing the ground step by step, began reluctantly to retire. Colonel Wood at once sent messengers to the lunette, to open upon them as they passed underneath. At this period Lieutenants Smith and Lysons, seeing some Zulus advancing to assegai a wounded soldier of the 13th, who was lying under fire in the open, rushed out, and, led by Captain Woodgate, carried the man under shelter. In performing this gallant action Smith was badly wounded, and Woodgate's helmet was smashed by a bullet. Surgeons O'Reilly, Brown, and their staff, one and all exposed themselves freely in attending to the wounded who could not be moved out of fire. Soon after five o'clock it became evident that the Zulu fire was beginning to fail, and the English commander at once led a company of the 13th to the right rear of the cattle laager, where the cattle had been for some time exposed to the fire from the hill. A little later on Captains Cox and Persse were taken by Colonel Wood to the edge of the krantzes on the right front of the cattle laager, where the discomfited and disheartened Zulus were retiring from the direct fire. Cox extended his men along the slopes, while Persse occupied a higher ridge, and thus a double-banked and deadly fire was opened upon the retiring enemy. Having driven the Zulus over the edge of the hill, the two companies followed them up in a splendid manner; Cox, although suffering greatly from his wound and loss of blood, leading on his men in the most gallant style to the best points for continuing the fire. Word was now sent to Buller and Russell to mount their men and pursue; and the mule battery opened "action deft," and played upon the devoted Zulus, the regiment of Macalooroo, under Umlinoya, suffering most. Buller's gallant fellows nobly avenged their slaughtered comrades of the previous day, and for more than seven miles the broken Zulu army was chased like a flock of sheep.

It was subsequently ascertained that the attacking Zulu force consisted of nine regiments sent from Ulundi—making a force of 23,000—and of Umbelini's mercenaries; together forming a total of not less than 25,000. Tyangwayo was in chief command, whilst Umbelini held the next rank. The latter having retreated in the direction of the Upper Pongolo Drift, was subsequently pursued and killed by a patrol under the command of Captain Prior, of the 80th Regiment. A wounded prisoner of some importance, by name Waishlahla, who was brought into camp on the 2nd, pointed out to Colonel Wood the bodies of Mubalawa and Maheitjesa, sons of Mnyame, killed on the 29th; and this man said that he knew that Mabuna, son of Umbangasita, Makweli, son of Umlandela, Ummensododo, son of Umfoonsa, and Tyangwayo, his brother, were also killed on that day, together with, according to the Zulu estimate, above 3000 of the king's bravest and best men! There is little reason to suppose that these figures are exaggerated; for 1500 bodies lay about the vicinity of the camp on the night of the 29th, though in the morning many were gone.

The sad duty of burying their own dead and the bodies of the enemies occupied the troops nearly the whole of the week following upon the attack upon the Kambula camp. During the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd of April above 800 Zulus were buried, while others were subsequently found in the caves and krantzes near. There were also 326 fire-arms picked up, amongst which were recognized one Snider belonging to the Artillery, and 16 Martini-Henrys belonging to the 24th and 80th Regiments. Lieut. Bright, 90th Light Infantry, Lieut. Nicholson, R.A., Mr. Ferreira, interpreter, seven privates 13th Light Infantry, ten privates 90th Light Infantry, and one colour-sergeant, two Frontier Light Horse, and one of Buller's Horse were interred on the day following the attack, the service being read in the most impressive manner by General Wood. Wounded Zulus were for some days continually brought into the camp; and these men, as soon as they found that their wounds were attended to, and that the soldiers were kind to them, became most communicative. They said that Cetywayo had sent all his available men, with the exception of two of his favourite regiments, retained as a bodyguard. These prisoners also all agreed in setting down the Zulu losses on the 28th and 29th at 3000 men.

When such individual and numerous acts of bravery were exhibited, it seems superfluous to pick out any special cases; but it would be wrong not to particularly mention the name of Captain Woodgate, whose gallantry and sang-froid were the theme of the whole garrison. During the whole of the action, and while carrying orders from the camp to the fort, he was more exposed than any other officer, and on more than one occasion he deliberately risked his life to save wounded men from being assegaied. To Colonel Buller also the same praise must be accorded for his self-devotion at Zlobani and the heroic manner in which he exposed himself in carrying off wounded men from the very midst of the enemy.

The situation being in every way so admirably adapted to military requirements, it was now resolved to make a permanent station at the Kambula Kop; and new works were day by day added to those already completed. Four well-constructed magazines were built in hollow and sheltered spots, yet close to the guns. Each magazine was lined with wooden frames, with splinter-proof timbers to cover the top, while sheeting planks were placed round the sides and passages. These frames were all perpendicular to the length of the passage—that is to say, across its breadth and about two feet apart. Eight feet thickness of earth was placed over the roof of each magazine, while a stout tarpaulin was stretched over the splinter-proofs to guard against the wet. Gabions were sunk to act in the place of cesspools, and receive the drainage, while a small parapet guarded the entrance to the passage, with a small hole through which ammunition was handed out. Twenty men, in relays, were detailed for this work—that is to say, for each magazine—and although they were to a certain extent unskilled labourers, the officers taught them in such an excellent manner that the four magazines were completed in twenty-four hours. The ditches round the fort were so deep that bridges had to be made, part of which was permanent and part movable. Four entrances into the fort were left, seven feet wide, so as to admit the guns and waggons when supplies arrived. These entrances were closed by rifle-proof doors and gates made of strong planks, strengthened by cross-beams, and lined inside with thin sheet iron and raw bullock hides. These hides formed an admirable substitute for sheet iron, as they were quite bullet-proof and not liable to be set on fire. Two more ditch caponnières were also added, to give increased flanking fire. The terreplein of each of these works was sunk, so that the loopholes were within one foot and a half of the level of the ditch. This method had many advantages, and provided for the trick adopted by the Zulus of lying down in the ditches and counterfeiting death, until an opportunity is afforded for rushing at the parapet. A large supply of brushwood was usefully employed to improve the drains under the parapets, which suffered severely from the continued wet weather. During spare hours the men were never idle, and from the brigadier downwards every officer was encouraged to employ his leisure in instructing the men in every species of field-defence. Gabions for revêtements, fascines, hurdles, sandbags, sods, pickets, chevaux-de-frise palisades, and small shell fougasses occupied the surplus hours not devoted to drill, recreation, and rest, and the few engineers belonging to the garrison declared that as pupils the volunteers at this work were beyond compare.

As in the last action it was found that the enemy were enabled to considerably annoy the troops by occupying some neighbouring eminences, the interior works were strengthened with considerable skill. The parapets were raised, extra traverses erected, and the terreplein sunk. The faces of the work were also made more nearly perpendicular to the enemy's possible fire. Shelter-pits for skirmishers were dug in all directions. These trenches being only required upon sudden emergencies were not made large, being only two feet wide by a foot and a half deep, and with a parapet built so as to reach a height of a foot and a half. These gave room and partial shelter to a couple of men, and to each spot the best marksmen were told off. Horse trenches were also constructed, so that these animals could be sheltered from musketry fire. These were twenty-four yards in rear of the line of the infantry trench, and were five feet long, three feet wide at top, and two feet wide at bottom, with ramps, with a slope of one-half at each end. The parapets of these trenches were three feet high, with a thickness of two feet at the top. Half a dozen men could make such a trench in half an hour. These shelter-trenches were not so neatly dressed as the models to be seen at Chatham or Portsmouth, but they were pre-eminently workmanlike. They followed the contour of the rather broken ground, and were so made that cavalry could easily advance over them. At the intervals for this advance each trench overlapped its neighbour.

In contemplation of the removal of the waggons as soon as the advance should be made, roughly-built block-houses, made of contiguous logs placed vertically and quite bullet-proof, were constructed to substitute the shelter afforded by the former. The logs were twelve feet long, and three feet of this were buried in the ground, the buried ends being spiked into transverse beams; roughly-hewn beams formed the roofs, and over these was placed brushwood covered with four feet of earth. Green timber, of which there was an undiminished supply, was used, and, when necessary, this was covered with raw hides to prevent danger from fire. Now, as the enemy had no artillery, and was not likely to understand its employment, even if provided with the guns captured at Isandhlwana, no defence could be more suitable. An ordinary work could, it was found, be often defiladed from a neighbouring height, while a well-made blockhouse, with carefully prepared roof, was, in every case, impregnable to rifle-fire. The plan for the roofs was as follows:—The young trees or branches were placed with the roots and thick ends inwards, while the smaller ends, sharpened and shaved down thin, were allowed to project over the walls of the building till they reached to within three feet of the ground. These boughs, if thin and with smaller branches between them, would not allow the means for climbing on the roof, should the Zulus attempt it, as they would not bear the weight of a crowd of men. In positions where the blockhouse could not be commanded by any neighbouring height, the roof was made flat and surrounded with a parapet of earth, so as to afford a second tier of fire.

Whilst these works were in progression, and some few days after the battles of Zlobani and Kambula, some officers sitting upon a coign of vantage at an elevated part of the fort, suddenly descried three dark figures with shields and assegais coming at a rapid trot towards their southern front, along the hunting-road which leads from the Blood river and the Buffalo. At first they seemed steadily progressing, as if wishing to make a quick journey, but under no apprehension of pursuit. As they moved quickly on they were lost sight of in the bush, and as the surrounding country was made up of wooded krantzes and dark ravines, in which an army might lie concealed, it was not likely that they would be seen again for some time. Away, however, a little to the right of where these men had passed, was quickly seen a larger party, consisting of about a score of savages, evidently in pursuit of the first-named runners. Their shields were flourished aloft, and their assegais waved in triumph as they followed the spoor of the first party, who had evidently taken to the bush as the most effectual way of escaping the keen eyes of their pursuers. Finding no traceable spoor which they could with certainty follow, they became suspicious, and commenced retracing their steps; and while this was being accomplished the three runners were seen to emerge cautiously towards the crest of the left krantz, now holding a good start of the pursuing party. While they came steadily on in the direction of the camp, however, a keen-sighted scout, who had taken the precaution to climb a huge rock which jutted out above the gorge, saw the quarry, and announced his success by discharging his rifle, and waving the assegai in the direction of the fugitives, whom it was now believed were messengers bringing despatches.

The Zulu, it should be borne in mind, is a born athlete; usually until forty or fifty, and rich, he is a spare man, with scarcely an ounce of superfluous flesh about him, and kept in continual training by constant exertion and no excess of food. He can, as a rule, at a moment's notice take a letter or small packet and run his eight or ten miles, or even walk his seventy or eighty, without breaking down. The ground over which the pursued were running was grassy veldt, while that upon which were the pursuers was sprinkled with low thorn-bushes, mixed with rocks and gravel. The pursuing party, however, were evidently the fresher of the two, while the messengers looked like men who were at the tail of a long journey. The foremost party came struggling on until they reached some clumps of thorn-trees, which, affording cover, were taken advantage of to recover breath and observe the enemy's proceedings. The chase was now getting most exciting. Both the chased and the chasers were plainly visible to those in the camp, while the former only could observe their enemies. Noting here and there a footprint, which served to show them that they were on the right track, the Zulus in pursuit dashed down the ravine and some distance beyond where the three had doubled. The whole party went nearly 300 yards before the leaders halted in consequence of finding no spoor, and they then spread out like hounds in a fox cover to find some signs of their quarry.

It was really wonderful, the rapid and dashing manner in which these human bloodhounds strove to hit off the trail, while, having regained their wind, the pursued trio moved on, not in great haste, but quietly and with a considerable amount of care, that they might not be seen by their enemies. For this purpose they now moved with the utmost caution over a ridge, and entered the wooded valley which lay at the foot of the kop, whereon stood the fort, being there completely out of sight of the pursuers, who were still puzzling over the spoor. The messengers—aware that they were encountering a double risk, as they knew that the wood into which they had gone would probably contain Zulu scouts sent to watch the fort, and who might have seen and laid in ambuscade for them—therefore trotted quickly across till they came to a somewhat open plain, with a line of willow-like trees, evidently denoting the banks of a stream. Knowing that the pursuers in rear would be only temporarily puzzled by the loss of spoor, they therefore decided that the least risk would be incurred by making a final rush across the open road. Waiting for a moment to decide for what part of the stream they should make, they took a rapid glance around, and then made a sudden bolt for the plain. Scarcely 200 yards had been crossed when a terrific yell broke out from the pursuers, denoting that the pursued had been discovered by the Zulus in rear, who immediately sent a couple of scouts to the heights, the better to watch which side of the plain the messengers would make for. These scouts at once shouted to the party below, and, joining them, the whole body was quickly in pursuit. The messengers had, however, almost 500 yards' start, and had obtained their "second wind." They knew, therefore, that, if not lamed by a chance shot, they would probably get over the river and under the guns of the fort before they could be overtaken. How or where to cross the river they seemed not to know, as in some places it is deep and wide, and in others shallow, with marshy banks and long weed-like grasses. Here and there, also, the stream bubbles and boils through deep gorges where only a baboon could ascend or descend. Seeing the willow-looking trees, the stout runners fortunately concluded that the water would be deep where they grew, and they wisely chose another part where low bushes prevailed, and where there were indications of a rapid slope in the ground, which would give them shelter in crossing. The pursuers were about 350 yards behind when the runners reached the bank, which they found steep and rocky, the stream itself running rapidly over a stony bed. Although, like most Zulus, these messengers could swim well, they could not swim safely encumbered with a heavy gun, a bunch of assegais, a shield, and a heavy leathern mailbag, nor could they calculate on reaching the opposite bank without being shot at while so encumbered. On examining the bed of the river, they decided that it could be waded, and that if not, drowning was a more preferable death than torture in the king's kraal, which, if found with letters upon them, was sure to be their fate. They instantly decided, therefore, to cross.

Meanwhile those in the camp had not been idle, for half a dozen of Buller's men, known marksmen, were despatched to a point where they could command the drift and catch the pursuing party en flagrant délit if they attempted to follow too closely. A few minutes' interval and a smart canter brought eight rifles in all to a favourable spot, where, unseen by the enemy, they could watch the proceedings of both friend and foe, and materially assist the crossing and escape of the former. Quietly dismounting, and placing two men, both as vedettes and in charge of the horses, the remainder took up position and waited for the dénouement of this somewhat exciting little episode. Not long indeed had they to wait. As the quick-scented harrier changes from scent to view, and gives melodious tongue as the quarry is in sight, so dashed on the pursuing white shields right up to the banks of the stream, and looking for a moment at the troubled waters, seemed to hesitate what course to pursue, imagining perhaps that some ambush was intended. Meanwhile the messengers had effected the crossing in safety, though not without difficulty. Taking up more tightly the straps that bound the mailbags to their naked bodies, and with their rifles in one hand and shields and assegais in the other, they scrambled like cats down the bank, selecting those points where most ripples appeared upon the water, and managed thus to wade to the opposite bank. The depth was in no part greater than to cover them above the waist, although the rush of the stream was so rapid as to render a foothold difficult. As soon as they found themselves all in the water, they linked arms in some peculiar manner and thus opposed a successful barrier to the current, which otherwise, and if taken singly, would have been too much for them. Half a dozen Zulus who had outstripped their comrades were the first to enter the stream in pursuit, which at the point where they took it was not so favourable, and about fifty yards in width.

Though magnificent specimens of their race, burly and brawny, of immense chest depth and breadth of shoulder, the men in the stream could only advance at a slow pace in consequence of the slippery nature of the rocks and stones on which they had to tread, and on account of the rapid nature of the stream. So entirely were they absorbed in the excitement of the chase that they seemed to have no idea of encountering any risks as they ventured into the river.

The main body of the pursuers meantime lined the banks, lustily cheering on their more adventurous comrades. Suddenly there rang out the simultaneous reports of half a dozen rifles, and as the smoke cleared away two or three arms raised above the blood-dyed waters of the torrent, which whirled the bodies of the baffled Zulus down and away from view, testified to the skill of the marksmen. As the surviving savages regained the opposite bank they gave a yell of defiance, which was answered by a volley which rendered several others hors de combat. The horsemen then mounted, and rode down to meet the rescued runners, who turned out to be messengers from headquarters, and the bearers of most welcome despatches from the Commander-in-Chief to General Wood, in which his lordship, in the most cordial, kind, and flattering manner, sent his congratulations and thanks to the latter, and those under his command, for the manner in which his camp had been defended in the last attack. A general parade was at once ordered, and the commander having formed up the entire force—horse, foot, artillery, and native contingent—read out in firm and ringing tones the welcome and honourable terms in which his lordship had expressed himself. By permission of the commandant three ringing cheers for the Queen were then given, followed by three as hearty for the Commander-in-Chief.

CHAPTER V.

Organization of column for relief of Ekowe—The march—Heliographic signals—Camp at Ginghilovo—Disposition of the troops—Zulu advance—The battle—English victory—Death of Colonel Northey—English losses—Zulu force and loss—Relief of Ekowe—Meeting of Pearson and Chelmsford—State of Ekowe garrison—Barrow's cavalry raid on Dabulamanzi's kraal—British sentry firing on British troops.

We must now turn attention to Lord Chelmsford and his plan for the relief of Ekowe. Tenedos was the base from which he purposed starting; the distance between this and Ekowe, even by the short route discovered and improved by Pearson, is a good thirty-three miles. To accomplish this distance in wet weather and with almost insuperable difficulties in the way of transport was no light task. However, by the 27th of March all was ready for a start, and the relieving column set out in the following order. The vanguard was composed of the Naval Brigade, formed of the seamen and marines of her Majesty's ships "Shah" and "Tenedos"—640 men and two Gatlings; the 91st Regiment (ten companies), 900 men; 99th Regiment (five companies), 400 men; 3rd Buffs (two companies), 180 men; Mounted Infantry, 150 men; Mounted Native Contingent, 200 men; Native Infantry Contingent, 1600 men—making a total of 3720 infantry and 350 cavalry. This leading division was commanded by Colonel Law, R.A. The second or rearward division, under the command of Colonel Pemberton, was composed of the bluejackets and sailors of the "Boadicea," 200 men and one Gatling; 37th Regiment, 900 men; 3rd battalion 60th Rifles, 900 men; and two troops of mounted natives—thus giving a total of 2060 infantry and 190 cavalry—the two divisions making a grand aggregate of 6320 men, with 9-pounders and rocket-tubes. The convoy was made as small and compact as was compatible with the necessary carriage of supplies for the Ekowe garrison, and no tents were taken, each man being allowed only a blanket and a waterproof sheet. Still the waggons numbered 113, and there were also fifty Scotch carts on two wheels, and fifty-six pack-mules. Each waggon was strongly spanned, having twenty oxen instead of the usual eighteen. Two hundred rounds of ball cartridge per man were issued, each soldier carrying seventy rounds in his pouches, and the remaining 130 being carried in reserve by the pack-mules. These waggons and pack-animals marched in the closest possible order, and were capitally flanked and guarded by Nettleton's Native Contingent on the right, and that commanded by Barton on the left. In spite of the comparative smallness of the convoy, Lord Chelmsford managed to bring with him not only full supplies for the fort, but twelve days' complete rations for his own column. Most of the baggage was brought across the Tugela on the 28th, and, in spite of the flooded state of the river; no casualty occurred. The rain did not cease till daybreak on the 29th, when the passage was completed. It must be borne in mind that the Tugela at Fort Pearson, where the column crossed, is more than 600 yards wide, and it is then possible to estimate the difficulties encountered at the outset and before the journey could be fairly said to commence. But there were willing hands and zealous hearts to carry out Lord Chelmsford's minute and ever thoughtful instructions. No detail, even of the smallest, was omitted or forgotten by him, and with such men as Commissary-General Strickland, Surgeon-Major Tarrant, and his dozen assistant-surgeons, as well as Commissary Walton and Transport Officers Lawrence and Findlay, things were bound to go well.

The first plan was to force a passage through to Ekowe with all possible despatch consistent with the safety of the column and its convoy, and then, having exchanged the garrison and having provisioned the brave little fortress for a month, to form another and corresponding post on the Inyezani hills, leaving the latter munitioned for a similar period.

But this plan was afterwards considerably modified. On the first day's march no difficulties as to enemy or transport were experienced, the weather had cleared, and the road from the Tugela to Amatikula was far better than expected. Giving up all idea of the road by which Pearson had originally advanced when he first marched inland, Lord Chelmsford, following Colonel Pearson's advice, determined to move by the coast road, which crossed much more open country, was far more adapted for wheeled transport, and, indeed, for the march of all three arms, while it afforded fewer opportunities for the Zulus to attempt surprise. So satisfactory was the road on the first day's march that the only wonder was that it had not been previously destroyed by the Zulus. In fact, the column had made good more than half the distance before any serious difficulties began. It will be seen in the map that at the villages of Inyoni and Amatikula their respective rivers cross the old road. Now, these rivers cross the coast road as well as the main road, flowing from west to east, and several halts at these two places are mentioned; it is not intended to refer to these villages, but simply to the encampments on the banks of the rivers of the same name.

On the arrival of the column at the Inyoni and Amatikula rivers the waggons were carefully packed in laager, and a well-made ditch and parapet formed around the camp. Sentries were posted at the various angles, and outlying piquets thrown well forward. No noise, or even loud talking was allowed, and the bivouac, for it could scarcely be called a camp, was each night as silent as a grave-yard. Two miles beyond the Zulu bank of the Tugela good camping-ground was passed, but the troops pushed on without any difficulty to the Inyoni river, finding the road very good, although a little heavy for the waggons, from the rains. They were so lightly laden, however, that the drivers managed to get the oxen along at a fair pace, the waggons marching four, and sometimes six abreast. Scarcely any water was met with, but numerous Zulu kraals were passed, so streams or wells must have been in the neighbourhood. The country through which the column passed was very open, affording no cover, except between three miles south of Inyoni and the banks of the river, where there is a gully with thick bush, which scouts carefully explored before the main body came up. The water of the Inyoni was found so brackish that the horses would scarcely drink of it. The Umsundusi and Amatikula rivers are very sweet, the latter particularly so.

Leaving the Inyoni, the next river passed is the Umsundusi, which runs into the Amatikula, north-west of which lies the thorn country. The road thence to Ingesani is good, but there is a mud gully to the south of that place almost impassable after heavy rain. The column now marched more to their right, where the country was still open, although there was considerable cover in places, and kraals were seen around. Near the Umkukusi is a hill, which was occupied for a time, but from which nothing could be seen in the shape of an enemy. Keeping in a north-easterly direction they now reached a lower portion of the Inyesani, and then bore westerly for Ginghilovo, where on the afternoon of the 1st they encamped. Here a parley was held with the besieged, from Pearson's lofty signal-tower at Ekowe, and signals were made warning Lord Chelmsford of the impending Zulu attack.

A few words of digression may here be allowed to the system of signals which proved of such use to both Pearson and Chelmsford at this juncture. When Lord Chelmsford came first to Tenedos and Fort Pearson, it became evident to him that Pearson was so completely blockaded that runners could rarely get through. It was at the same time most essential to his plans that the General should know exactly how the colonel's resources were lasting, and the exact time to which his garrison could hold out. In this emergency Haynes, of the Engineers, was sent for, and asked if he could not do something with the heliograph, and bring the rays of the sun into requisition for the transmission of messages. The General was at once seen, and although by no means sanguine, he gave every facility for the attempt. The difficulties were by no means light. In the first place there were no proper mirrors, and a most diminutive chamber looking-glass had to be employed. Then again there were no skilled or mechanically-trained workers for the improvised apparatus, and all appliances were of the most primitive nature. Another and, as was feared, the most fatal difficulty was that there was no way of attracting the notice of the Ekowe garrison, which from the nearest vantage-point, was fully thirty miles as the crow flies. Nothing daunted, however, by these obstacles Haynes persevered, and knowing that the lives of many gallant soldiers were dependent on success or failure, redoubled his exertions, which after long anxiety and delay were crowned with success. The most sanguine hopes lay in the fact that the Naval Brigade were with Pearson, and that some of them would undoubtedly be trained to mirror signalling. After much delay in getting everything ready, Haynes chose a bright sunshiny morning and went to the top of a hill about five miles from the fort and commenced his flashing, but without the smallest success. The church tower at Ekowe could be plainly seen, but there was no response, and it was evident that the attempts at communication were not noticed, or, if noticed, not understood. Nothing discouraged, although a little chaffed by his comrades, the young Engineer continued day by day, whenever there was a gleam of sunshine, to attend the hill and work his mirror. At length, after a whole week had passed before any indication from the garrison at Ekowe had been made, another thought struck Haynes, and this was to flash occasional whiffs of gunpowder to attract notice. To his intense delight, after a few attempts, this plan succeeded, and when a gleam was once flashed from the beleaguered fort in return the rest was all plain sailing. Another week, however, elapsed before a perfectly intelligible answer was received, and then it was found that Haynes's messages had been read from the beginning, but that they could not get the Ekowe answers at first to work. It is hardly necessary to mention how pleased Lord Chelmsford was, and that Haynes was sent for and thanked in the most flattering manner for his ingenuity and perseverance.

As has been said, Pearson informed Lord Chelmsford of the imminent Zulu attack; he also added that his last raid had been successful and that some cattle had been captured; and that the road he had cut under fire through the bush southwards would shorten the advance or his sortie by at least five miles, and that his people were under no apprehensions of famine or assault for some days. He had improved his defences, his parapet having a command of six feet, flanked by a couple of well-made caponnières on the northern and southern faces, with a loopholed building on the north-west and a sunken stockade in the south-west angle. His four guns—two Gatlings and two rocket-tubes, in addition to his Martini-Henrys—he considered sufficient to render his fort impregnable to everything except hunger, and should the latter come on through Lord Chelmsford's inability or delay in coming, he purposed making a final and desperate sortie for life and liberty. This message was committed to writing, and read out to the men, who answered it with cheers of delight and enthusiasm.

At four a.m. on the 31st ult., in the early dawn the troops paraded outside the laager on the Inyoni. For the first day the march had been without impediment or opposition; progress here and there, it is true, was slightly impeded by portions of swampy ground; but so eager were the men to get forward that the waggons were pushed vigorously through the mud by willing hands. The 57th Regiment, which had only lately arrived from Ceylon, were a little out of condition, and the fatigue and wet had told upon them in a greater degree than the regiments arrived from England. After a pleasant march, the Amatikula river was reached, where the camp was formed with the waggons as usual in laager, and shelter-trenches formed at fifteen paces beyond. The night passed without any alarm, and at six the column marched for Ginghilovo.

The drift on the Amatikula was so swollen that a long time was occupied in getting the waggons across it, and the result was that on Monday very few miles were made. Soon after the troops had crossed, outlying bands of Zulus were seen by the scouts hovering on the flanks, but no attack was attempted. The largest body of these Zulus kept moving in a line parallel with the English march. Towards the afternoon of this day Barrow's Horse was directed by Lord Chelmsford to make a reconnaissance in the direction of the kraal of Makuendo, another of Cetywayo's innumerable brothers, and they returned with the news that they had surprised and fired it. On the previous day Barrow had made a reconnaissance away to the north-east, at least seven or eight miles off, without falling in with any Zulus, whose power of concealment is certainly marvellous. At three o'clock on the 1st of April it became dark overhead, and a severe thunderstorm broke over the laager, wetting nearly every one to the skin. The night of the 1st of April will long be remembered by those who were with Lord Chelmsford on that occasion. Not a sound was heard in the camp, but outside the howls of the wandering jackal and the pariah dog were occasionally echoed by the hoarse scream of the foul birds which hover near a probable battle. At intervals were to be heard the patrols going their rounds in the fitful gleams of the moonlight, which were succeeded by black and rolling masses of cloud chasing each other in the sky, still thunder-laden and lurid. The whispered "Who goes there?" and the almost inaudible countersign, told, however, that the utmost vigilance was awake, and that all felt that England's honour was at stake. At two a.m. Lord Chelmsford, with two of his personal staff, went quietly round. This tour of inspection lasted till three o'clock, as here and there trifling details had to be changed and plans to be explained to the various officers who held the most important points of defence and danger. In front of the camp, but sheltered behind trenches and abattis, were that glorious and time-honoured corps, the 60th, who have no colours on which to record their proud deeds, but whose escutcheon is emblazoned with some of England's hardest-won fields. The General warmly eulogized the neat and workmanlike trenches made by his favourite greenjackets, and passed on next to Brackenbury, of the "Shah," who, with his "little bulldogs," as the bluejackets term the Gatlings, held the right angle of the entrenchment.

Next to Brackenbury and his stout fellows came Clarke with his detachment of the 57th, and at the second corner were two 9-pounders excellently placed and guarded by their watchful gunners, eager as greyhounds held back in the leash. Round to the rear, but by no means a post of less honour, came the gallant old 91st, whose former Cape services have long been their pride and distinction. Four companies of this fine corps were here, and although the ranks were made up by drafts from many other corps, the men had wonderfully soon assumed the peculiarly smart bearing of their new corps. At the next angle were two more Gatlings, and prolonging the faces were posted two companies of the 91st, then three companies of the Buffs, and the 99th. As nearly as possible in the left rear face Lieutenant Cane, of the "Shah," had charge of the ship's rocket-battery.

Lord Chelmsford expressed himself extremely satisfied at the manner in which all his arrangements had been worked out, and the low murmur of gratification, which even discipline could not repress, showed how much his men were devoted to their chief.

It was as nearly as possible a quarter past four when the welcome news was passed from man to man that the Zulus were seen in skirmishing order, supported by dense masses, away some miles off on the right front. It was nearly six o'clock, however, when the enemy's plan of attack appeared to be decided, and this delay, it has since been ascertained, arose from the fact that they had heard that the troops were about to inspan and march in the early morning, and the Zulu general anticipated catching them in all the confusion of starting. At six a.m., then, somewhat favoured by the long grass and weeds which want of time had not permitted the soldiers to cut down, the Zulu array was hurled upon the laager. The regiments which came on in front were the Unembomanaba and Unemsilya. These were in extended order, but much closer than skirmishing order; in fact, somewhat akin to the Prussian infantry first attack. These corps were flanked by the usual horns or wings, composed of the Nokene and Nodwen regiments, formed in respective columns right and left. In the rear, as the body or heart of the formation, were the Monamonosi and a favourite corps of the king's called Zwawani. Somapo was in chief command, while his lieutenant was Dabulamanzi.

The British front enticed the Zulu force, as easy of attack, as the green-coated rifles were lying down in their shallow trenches, and their strength could not well be seen by the enemy. Nothing could have fallen out more fortunately, as the fire from those deadly tubes was doubly fatal in consequence of each man being enabled to have a firm rest for his weapon. There could not be a grander sight to a soldier's eye than to watch these magnificent specimens of savage pride coming on in their mighty strength to sweep the sturdy little riflemen from off the earth. Their white and coloured shields, the crests of leopard skin and feathers, and the wild oxtails dangling from their necks, gave them a terribly unearthly appearance. Every ten or fifteen yards their first line would halt, and a shot would be fired, and then, with an unearthly yell, they would again rush on with a sort of measured dance, while a humming and buzzing sound in time to their movement was kept up. When the first line of skirmishers came to within 300 yards, a terrible and deadly sheet of flame flashed from the shelter-pits, and a great number of the Zulu warriors reeled howling to the earth. This only seemed to incite the main body to renewed exertion, for they came up hurling themselves through the skirmishers, and not even allowing them to get out of their path, but dashing them to the ground in their rage to close with the main array. A perfect feu d'enfer was now rained upon the denser masses of the Zulu main body, and this was maintained for at least twenty minutes, the savages coming on, still fed by columns from their rear, which deployed in excellent order as they reinforced the first line, and alternately halted, fired, and advanced, beaten back some scores of times, and returning as desperately as ever to the front. About half-past six this front attack and onward rush was checked by the gallant 60th. Lord Chelmsford on several occasions rode along their line, giving an occasional kind and complimentary word when a particularly good shot was made or an especial coolness was observed. A sudden and wonderfully well-executed change of front was now made, without the smallest confusion or delay, and the masses of Zulus in front faced to their right and ran round in column to the face held by the 57th and 91st. Here their courage was, if possible, more pronounced, and their welcome was as hot. The 91st had not so many good marksmen in their regiment as the colonel could have wished, as many of his best shots were taken to supply Indian reliefs; but even the youngest soldiers seemed to gain skill and inspiration from what they had seen performed by the 60th. The 57th ably fulfilled their share of the duty, and the torrent of lead poured upon the enemy from the murderous tubes of these seemed to literally plough through the hostile ranks. Notwithstanding this deadly hail, the Zulus came on with what was now the mute valour of despair. They had ceased to shout and only seemed anxious to dash upon the British bayonets. Twice, three times, a fourth, they literally swarmed up to the entrenchments, and if one break in the ranks had taken place the English loss must have been terrible. At one moment, about a quarter before seven, it seemed as though they would have forced their way in, and upon several occasions wounded Zulus were noticed taking aim from behind the cover of the bodies of their dead comrades as they lay in pools of blood in the open. Now that they were within easy range from the tops of the waggons, an effective and galling fire was opened upon the Zulus by the native contingents, who were not allowed in the first line. This double tier of fire was of great help, and so far thinned the assailant ranks that the second attack was after a time renounced as hopeless. Once more, however, a shorter, more desperate, but, as it proved, final rush was made by Cetywayo's doomed and devoted troops. This time it was upon the left of the laager that they delivered their last and supreme effort. They came up on this occasion to within ten or fifteen feet of the muzzles of the men's rifles, and, indeed, one or two of their chiefs seized the hot barrels with one hand, while they stabbed at the men with their shortened or broken assegais. It was curious to remark the three separate lines of Zulu corpses which marked the respective ranges at which the death-dealing Martini-Henrys had swept their ranks. At 300 yards a thin boundary of black bodies and white shields might be traced; at 200 and 100 yards from our lines their walls of dead were more thick, and even up to the trenches wounded men had staggered to receive their coup de grâce. In spite of all their efforts, the Zulus, however, never succeeded in bringing matters to a hand-to-hand struggle, though, if they had done so, Lord Chelmsford's admirable formation would have doubtless saved the camp, although no doubt with more than treble loss. The last attack, and perhaps the boldest—for it was evidently the most desperate—was led most heroically by Dabulamanzi in person, who, with voice and gesture, came on a dozen yards in front of the leading files, as Ney led on his Guard at Waterloo. As on that occasion the French horsemen, so now these stalwart warriors could not stand against the calm, steady, and unflurried mitraille of English infantry fire, and at seven o'clock the flower of Cetywayo's warriors were scattered and broken on the plain they had so magnificently fought and drenched with their blood. Lord Chelmsford saw the moment had come; Barrow, who had already mounted his men in anticipation, scarcely waited for the orderly to repeat the permission to dash forth. Away charged the little band of sabres, and the mounted infantry came at the flying groups like a whirlwind, their sabres flashing bright in the morning sun, but soon dyed crimson with the best of the Zulu blood.

During the attack 1200 rounds were fired from the splendidly served Gatlings, and about 40 rounds of case and shrapnel from the 9-pounders, which subsequently shelled the bush as the Zulus fled for cover. Colonel Crealock, military secretary, and Captain Molyneux, of Lord Chelmsford's staff, had their chargers shot under them. Poor young Johnstone, of the 99th, was killed at nearly the commencement of the fight; and Colonel Northey was badly hit early in the action. He at first could not be induced to leave his men, but at last was reluctantly compelled to do so, as he fainted from loss of blood. At the close of the action, however, and when he was aroused from his state of insensibility by the ringing echoes of the British cheers which proclaimed the flight of the enemy, he suddenly raised himself on one hand from under the waggon where he was lying, and joined in the shouts of the men, thus bursting the bandaged wound and causing violent hemorrhage to recommence. This gallant and valued officer subsequently died, on the afternoon of the 6th, having lingered in considerable pain for four days. The entire English loss was wonderfully small, being but 2 officers and 4 privates killed, and 3 officers and 34 privates wounded! The Zulu loss, on the contrary, cannot altogether be set down at less than 1000; for the English troops buried between 700 and 800 Zulu corpses; and about 300 rifles, which they discarded in their flight, were subsequently picked up. Zulu prisoners stated that there were 180 companies present with Somapo and Dabulamanzi on the 2nd, and allowing each company to be composed of 60 warriors, the actual fighting array must have been about 11,000. Information was also shortly afterwards received that another impi of about the same strength was despatched the day after Dabulamanzi marched from the king's kraal at Ulundi, and this latter force, misled by erroneous information, was unable to effect the intended junction with the force defeated. These prisoners also maintain that neither Somapo nor Dabulamanzi was aware of Lord Chelmsford's march for Ekowe till the day before he was assailed. Barrow's admirably planned and executed reconnaissances and raids on the 30th, 31st, and 1st undoubtedly had much to do with hoodwinking the Zulus, and it is tolerably certain that the military promenade made by him on the 31st towards the Ingoya led them to believe that the whole force was likely to operate in that direction.

On the following day, the 57th, 60th, and 91st were formed into a flying column, taking with them nothing but some light Scotch carts and three days' rations, together with the mounted men and some of the Naval Brigade, and started en route by way of the coast road for Ekowe. The portions of the Buffs, 99th, and a detachment of the "Shah's" men were left behind to garrison Ginghilovo, under the command of Major Walker. The heliograph was set to work, and Pearson replied that he should certainly come out to meet Lord Chelmsford and his party. At daybreak, therefore, Barrow went on with his horsemen to reconnoitre, and to see if any remnant or fresh portion of the Zulu army lay between Ekowe and its relievers. The line of country to be traversed was known to be more difficult than that passed, and it was thought that the Zulus might have had sufficient tenacity of purpose to make one more effort to stay the general's purpose. The first part of the journey was anything but pleasant; swamps, morasses, bogs, watercourses, nullahs, spruits, boulders, and all the disagreeable features of South Africa were in abundance; progress, consequently, was very much impeded, and at one time it was thought the troops would have to encamp on the way, and make a two days' march of the journey. Several small but awkward streams had to be crossed, and the General very wisely served out an extra ration of grog after the passage of these places.

After travelling about five miles, a halt for breakfast was called, and here Barrow rode back to report that all was clear in front, and that not a single Zulu could be seen, although the plains and bush had been most diligently scoured. Barrow reported that in the direction he had been, assegais, shields, feathers, ear and head ornaments, skins, furs, blankets, and even guns were lying about in profusion, evidently cast away in the hurried and headlong flight of the Zulus to their kraals, but that no bodies, however, had as yet been seen by the scouts.

The shrill notes of the bugles sounded the halt, and soon after the "Prepare to dismount," and "Off-saddle." Although no precaution was neglected to guard against surprise, a certain amount of latitude was now allowed, which on the previous three days' marches had not been sanctioned. Piquets, as usual, were thrown out on the neighbouring heights, and a chain of vedettes posted, which commanded ten miles of country in every direction. This being effected, the infantry formed up and piled arms, the cavalry off-saddled, and the horses, having first been allowed their usual roll in the dusty veldt, were turned out, under the protection of a guard, to enjoy a short graze, having, of course, been previously knee-haltered. This knee-haltering process is universal throughout all the Cape Colonies, and is effected in the following manner: by simply taking a couple of half-hitches round the horse's fore-leg with a strong rein or reim attached to the neck-strap, which brings the animal's head towards the ground, and effectually prevents his running away. This is the simple precaution adopted by all travellers in South Africa. The men now were told off in sections to draw water and collect wood to make fires for their morning or midday coffee. The officers collected in groups, and compared notes and exchanged anecdote and repartee.

After an hour's rest, which men and horses required after their severe four days' work, the bugles again summoned all to the ranks, and they started anew to complete the journey.

From this halting-place the road had a rather dangerous appearance, and every precaution was taken, lest Dabulamanzi should have received any reinforcements, which would enable him to attack the somewhat weak column at a disadvantage. The road over which they were passing was in itself open and fairly easy of transit, but not far to the left, and running parallel to the waggon-track, there were patches of bush so dense that horsemen could not enter, and they had to be examined with the aid of an infantry contingent, a few of whom had fortunately been brought in case of an emergency of this sort. Not far from the foot of one of the ascents to Ekowe on the left of the column lay the spot where Pearson was attacked on the 22nd January, and which, although called the battle of Inyazani, is some distance from the banks of that river. Some cavalry were taken over by Barrow to explore, but nothing marked the locality of the action except a large mound and a roughly carved cross where the dead were laid. On this cross were roughly cut the names of those who lay at rest below. Leaving at length the bushy country, the column now came to some steep and broken ground, and here were seen the remains of some of the waggons which had to be abandoned from Ely's convoy. Strange to say, some of the contents, tins of provisions and other stores, were still intact; but no arms nor ammunition had been left behind. Seven miles from Ekowe the troops came to a plain from which they were divided by a broad and well-worn watercourse. Here they faced the steep and scarped sides of a mountain, and in the distance could see a long unbroken range over which the sun was beginning to set. At this spot the Zulus had evidently attempted to impede the advance, as part of the road had been cut away. Engineers, however, soon remedied the damage, and they were enabled to push on; although it was fortunate that they had no waggons, as it was not without considerable effort they managed to get the two-wheeled carts across. As soon as this spot had been passed, the whole character of the landscape changed as if by magic; and as the wind freshened and carried away some misty clouds, the remnants of the late rains, a splendid prospect was seen, as the column wound its slow trail along a steep and rugged kloof leading into a fair and fertile valley beyond. Here, however, was a position that might have been held for some considerable time had the enemy chosen this spot to oppose the march. A sheer precipitous rock frowned on the right, and the only possible track lay exactly under its base, where with a few resolute savages above, huge boulders and masses of rock could have been hurled upon the column as it passed. On the left was a spongy swamp perfectly impassable to wheels, and not particularly easy to troops or human feet. Here a short way up the mountain farther on were seen the remains of a ruined kraal, and of some huts apparently not long vacated. These dwellings were formed, as usual, of rudely twined canes wattled and filled in with clay, and they had somewhat the appearance of a cluster of huge beehives.

As the leading files quitted the low ground, signals were made by the advanced patrols that cavalry were in sight, and the General and several of his staff at once galloped past the column to the front. All anxieties were briefly at an end, for, mounted upon an exceedingly handsome charger, and attended by a numerous cavalcade, coming towards the column at a smart canter was the gallant soldier who had held his inhospitable guard at Ekowe for more than seventy days.

Lord Chelmsford at once spurred forward, and warmly grasped Colonel Pearson by the hand, whilst discipline for once gave way, and the respectful silence of the General's escort was broken by a cheer such as only English throats can give, waking up every echo of the Zulu caves and valleys.

Colonel Pearson brought with him, according to his promise, about 500 men, and his staff, consisting of Colonel Walker and Captains M'Gregor and Knight. A long conversation at once took place, and the General informed Colonel Pearson that, anticipating the evacuation of the fort, he had left part of his force to entrench Ginghilovo, and make it a permanent station. The reasons for this were manifold. In the first place the approaches to Ekowe were easy to the Zulus, unencumbered with baggage or other impedimenta, but most difficult and trying to a European force. Ginghilovo or its neighbourhood answered every purpose as a link in the line of communications, while a site could be chosen equally as formidable in a defensive point of view. The column did not reach Ekowe fort till nearly eleven p.m. Here the welcome of comrades, fellow-messmates, and men of the same ships and corps, was a happy and fitting sequel to the rencontre of the reliever and the relieved.

It was a pleasant surprise to the General on arriving at Ekowe to find that matters had been made much worse by report than they were in reality. No gaunt and famine-stricken faces greeted him, but, on the contrary, there was a look of plumpness about most of the privates that savoured more of want of exercise than want of beef. In fact, the medical officer stated that the meat ration had never been diminished, as it was considered just as advisable to kill and consume the trek oxen as to see them die for want of forage. Now a trek ox in the best condition is not particularly tender, or even when fed upon the best of food, but when kept short of fodder, and without proper shelter from the sun and rain, he cuts up anything but well for beef. Tobacco was the article most wanted by both soldiers and sailors, and the most agreeable gift that could be made by the relievers to their lately besieged comrades was this luxury in any form or shape. The health of the garrison at first was good, but gradually the want of vegetables and useful medicines filled the hospitals, and made the cemetery more full. Anxiety, doubtless, had much to do with the sick-roll, and until communications with St. Andrew's Mission had been established a certain amount of uneasiness was felt as to how the war was going. Thirty deaths occurred during the seventy days the garrison were shut up, but several of these, it must be remembered, were cases of wounded men from the fighting at the Inyezani. At Fort Ekowe the hero of the scouting parties was undoubtedly young Rowden, of the 99th, who was detailed by Colonel Pearson to form a mounted infantry corps similar to Barrow's, from volunteers from the Buffs and his own corps. It is no secret that one of the great advantages we possess in our service is that we are never at a loss, when we can get horses, to find riders. Most of our youngsters in the service would rather have a stigma on their morals than on their knowledge of horseflesh and of horsemanship, and herein lies the secret of our bearing up against our first reverses in Zululand. Every officer, serving in South Africa, whether cavalry, infantry, artillery, engineers, medical staff, or commissariat, gets rations or allowances for horse or horses, according to his rank. This is one of the secrets, combined with the sport and shooting, why South African service is so popular. Now both the 99th and the Buffs vied with the 13th and 90th in their equestrian proclivities, and, in default of regular cavalry, a large body of mounted infantry was raised, and in a great measure mounted from the horses belonging to the officers of their respective regiments, lent or sold to Government for the purpose. Rowden's patrols were literally the "eyes and ears" of the garrison, and ably fulfilled all the onerous duties of light cavalry. In short the great value of their services may be gathered from the frequently and openly stated opinions of Colonel Wood and of Colonel Pearson, that all infantry regiments serving at the Cape should have at least one Gatling and one mounted company.

The great event of the camp life in Ekowe was the discovery of certain queer flashes of light on the white walls of the church tower. These, after puzzling many of the officers and soldiers, were at length brought under the notice of an officer of the naval brigade, whose education in the use of the heliograph enabled him at once to explain the apparent mystery. Three days of unpleasant suspense, however, elapsed before the first message could be clearly made out, and then three more before an apparatus could be rendered workable to reply. Fortunately an old mirror was found, and this, with an empty wooden cartridge case, sufficed. Within the week, therefore, conversation was opened, and its effect on the imprisoned garrison was seen by all to be more beneficial than all the tonics the hospital could afford. The next great event was, perhaps, the construction of the road from the fort to the lower coast trek, and the consequent excitement of having to work with the chance of feeling an assegai or Zulu bullet whizzing into the party. But the long days and longer nights were not at all devoid of recreation. Lawn tennis, bowls, ninepins, and quoits were devised. Concerts were organized, and dramatic recitals on a modest scale were improvised.

A cavalry raid had been, it will be remembered, made some time back upon Dabulamanzi's kraal, which was shelled and burned by Pearson. Some cattle and sheep were captured, and a desultory and running fight was kept up between the discomfited chief and the English patrols, which resulted in no casualty to the troops, while several Zulus were killed. This attack did not, however, extend to Dabulamanzi's private habitation, as its approaches were considered too far off and too difficult of access. No sooner, however, had Lord Chelmsford arrived at Ekowe than he determined to complete the blow already commenced. It was decided to effect this raid with Barrow's horsemen. The whole affair was promptly and admirably organized, and at eight o'clock on the morning after Lord Chelmsford's arrival a group of officers might have been seen on foot conversing, while their horses were led up and down by the attendant orderlies. First of all there was the Commander-in-chief, and with him his military secretary, Colonel Crealock, whose recent wound did not even place him for one day upon the sick report. Major Barrow was there in his workmanlike dress, a Norfolk shirt patched with leather, high untanned boots, and a stout sabre at his side. With him were John Dunn, Lieutenants Sugden, Rawlins, and Courtenay, Captains Addison, M'Lean, and Ganz.

The entire force consisted of 50 mounted infantry under Barrow, 55 volunteers under Addison, and 120 volunteers under Ganz and M'Lean. At a quarter to nine the cavalcade had been inspected by their respective commanders, and in sections of fours moved off, amid the smiles and congratulations of the garrison. The road was as usual over that sweet-smelling and springy turf which makes walking an impossibility, and any pace but a canter impossible to man and beast. A little more than half an hour, or about a four-mile spurt over the elastic veldt, brought them in sight of Dabulamanzi's "great place." A rolling grassy plain, leading to some easy and gentle slopes, was presented to view, and evidently to the astonishment of most of the party, who had been accustomed to the rude and rocky fastnesses in which these kraals are usually built. Beyond these smiling and inviting hills the kraal itself could scarcely be seen, but its locality was indicated by half a dozen Zulus running away with some cattle at full speed. Their measures were quickly taken, as their information forbade them to imagine that any trap could be laid, and they knew that the chances were ten to one against the chief having any force near enough to make a stand against them. Lord Chelmsford paid Major Barrow the high compliment of allowing him to take an independent command of the whole party, and remained more as a spectator than as an active official on the scene. Barrow at once detached mounted portions of his men right and left, while he led the way direct at a smart canter at the kraal. The combined movement answered admirably, and the place was surrounded as if by magic, without any resistance or a shot being fired. Rawlins, and a few of Barrow's men, were now ordered to dash into the kraal, and as soon as they had assured themselves that there were no women or children or sick people there, to fire it in various places. They had scarcely galloped off to carry out this order when the silence was broken by the well-known "ping" of a rifle, sounding from the near vicinity of the kraal; and on looking in the direction from which the sound came the General and his staff could see a small group of Zulus taking deliberate aim at them. The distance was about 1200 yards. But the General still moved on, although the bullet had been well aimed, for it whizzed just over the head of one of his aides-de-camp; and John Dunn, putting up his glass, declared that he recognized Dabulamanzi by his head-dress and peculiar method of walking. With the utmost nonchalance John began to load his weapon, and remarked to the General, "See what will happen!" One of the Zulus at this moment was coolly making a rest for his rifle upon a ledge of rock behind which his chief had retired, and Dunn, taking a long and careful aim, fired, and evidently wounded his man, who slipped back into the arms of a comrade. As the party sent to fire the kraal emerged from its outer enclosure, a heavy cloud of smoke betokened that their mission was accomplished. This white column hid the horsemen from the natives, who finding themselves in danger of being surrounded and captured by Sugden and his detached party, made a hasty and somewhat undignified retreat. The General now moved round to the right, and found that the detached party under Nettleton were coming back with a fine young Zulu, whom they had overtaken and captured on the left of the kraal. They had secured him with some buffalo-hide girths, and he readily—too readily for belief—answered John Dunn's questions, informing him that the cattle, women, and children had time to escape from the kraal, as the horsemen were discovered cantering across the open. He added that had they advanced a little faster they would have captured them. But this was not their object, and they were rather glad not to have the encumbrance of prisoners, remembering the trouble Oham's wives and relations gave at Kambula.

The return to Ekowe was accomplished without further incident. On the following day, having destroyed as much of the fortifications at Ekowe as time would permit, they started upon the return journey to the camp at Ginghilovo. They overtook Pearson in laager after having marched about six miles; and while he and his column moved on later in the day to his destination on the Lower Tugela, Lord Chelmsford and his division halted and laagered camp at about two miles north of Inyezani, and about five from Ginghilovo. Here an unfortunate disaster occurred. A young sentry of the 91st fancied he saw Zulus in the bush. He at once, without challenging, as he should have done, fired. The picket to which he belonged at once retired, and as Dunn's scouts were out reconnoitring, they ran in upon the next picket to the camp, composed also of young soldiers of the 60th, who, mistaking them for Zulus charging upon the laager, recklessly opened fire, by which four of their own men were wounded and one killed, while nine of the unfortunate scouts were badly wounded. The officer commanding the picket did all he could to steady his men, and did not even retire with them, so he was quite blameless. On the 24th April they reached the entrenchments at Ginghilovo, which were about two miles from the former laager, and Lord Chelmsford, having given the fullest instructions in regard to strengthening and guarding the camp, started on the following day for Fort Tenedos, en route for Durban, to reorganize an immediate advance.

CHAPTER VI.

End of first period of the Zulu war—Organization of fresh advance—Reinforcements from England—Scene in Durban—Disembarkation of troops—Cavalry camp at Berea—Lord Chelmsford's arrival at Durban—His reception—Review of Lancers and King's Dragoons at Cato Manor—Plan of new campaign—Composition of No. 1 column—Composition of No. 2 column—Cask bridge over Amatikula—Forts Crealock and Chelmsford—Wood's reconnaissance to Blood River—Description of Blood River and its scenery—Appearance of Buller's Light Horse—Removal of Wood's Kambula camp—Grandier's capture and escape—His tale—Description of Dabulamanzi and Cetywayo—Death of Dabulamanzi.

The relief of Ekowe, and the Zulu defeats at Ginghilovo and Kambula, mark in a most unmistakable manner the conclusion of the first period of the Zulu war. All fear of an invasion of Natal was now completely dissipated, and the only task that remained to be accomplished was to organize a force to carry an offensive war into the heart of Cetywayo's kingdom. Kambula and Ginghilovo had neutralized the disastrous results of Isandhlwana—the winning blow was still to be struck. It will be remembered that after the fatal field of Isandhlwana no time had been lost in applying to England for large reinforcements, and the home authorities were in no way slack in acceding to this urgent appeal. Lord Chelmsford on his part was no less active in preparing and getting these forces to the front, and though to the ordinary observer there might seem to be a period of inaction and sloth, since there was indeed a necessary lull in active operations, yet in reality no cessation of labour really occurred in any of the military departments. Within one month seventeen transports brought from England and landed on the shores of South Africa more than 9000 troops and 2000 horses, and all the munitions and stores, not only for the maintenance of such a force, but also for other regiments at the front. As each ship arrived at the outer anchorage, she was discharged without difficulty, and in no case were the troops kept on board an unnecessary hour, while in no instance was any damage, accident, or loss sustained during the process of disembarkation. To the enterprise, energy, and forethought of the contractors was due this satisfactory result; and the timely engagement of all the available steam-tugs by these authorities enabled them to carry out their undertaking in a manner beyond the most sanguine anticipations. In addition to the employment of the tugs "Union," "Somtsen," "Adonis," and others, the hulls of two fine schooners were prepared and specially adapted for the accommodation of horses, and these being lashed alongside the transports, with the aid of steam-cranes and excellent wharves, the rest was not a matter of difficulty. The weather, most fortunately, was generally favourable, while the equinoctial gales were so slight that the dreaded bar was never quite impassable. There were at this time no less than sixteen magnificent steam-transports, some of them the largest afloat, lying at the outer anchorage. Twenty-three vessels were in the inner harbour, and there were, irrespective of local tenders and tugs, at least thirty vessels in the roads. Such a sight had never been seen in the colony, and Durban will never again exhibit such a martial aspect. While from time to time returns were issued of the reinforcements as they arrived, no complete field state was made out till April 16th. It will be well here to give a brief résumé. In the "Egypt" and "Spain" were embarked at Southampton the King's Dragoon Guards, whose muster-roll gave 31 officers, 622 men, 91 officers' chargers, and 480 troop-horses. In the "France" and "England" were the 17th Lancers, numbering 31 officers, 622 men, 91 officer's chargers, and 480 troop-horses. These embarked at Blackwall and Southampton. The "Manora" and "Olympus," from Southampton, brought M and N Batteries, 6th Brigade Royal Artillery, with 10 officers, 536 men, and 161 troop-horses. The "Palmyra," from Chatham, came with the 30th company Royal Engineers, composed of 6 officers, 196 men, 2 officers' chargers, and 44 troop-horses. The "City of Paris," from Queenstown, brought the 21st Royal North British Fusiliers, with 30 officers, 906 men, and 7 officers' chargers. The "Russia," from Portsmouth, embarked the 58th Foot, consisting of 30 officers, 906 men, and 7 officers' chargers; while the same vessel brought the 3rd battalion 60th Rifles, with 30 officers, 906 men, and 7 officers' chargers. From Ceylon came the 57th Foot, which, with drafts from England, made up 30 officers, 906 men, and 7 chargers. The "China," from Southampton, brought these drafts, calling at Ceylon for the 57th. The same fine and roomy ship brought also from Southampton the 94th Foot, with 30 officers, 906 men, and 7 chargers. The "City of Venice," from Queenstown, brought the 3rd and 4th companies of the Army Service Corps (transport branch); while the "Queen Margaret," from Woolwich, brought No. 5 company of the same, the whole making up 19 officers, 550 men, and 480 horses. The "Palmyra," as well as the Engineers from Chatham, brought 4 officers and 140 men of the Army Hospital Corps from Portsmouth. The numerical strength of these reinforcements was therefore, according to return, exactly as follows:—Cavalry, two regiments, making 1250 sabres; artillery, two batteries, 12 guns, and 540 men; engineers, one company, 190 men; infantry, six regiments, 5320 bayonets; Army Service Corps and drafts, 1200; total, 8500 men and 1871 horses. The two batteries of artillery were not armed alike, the one being equipped with the usual 9-pounder field-gun, and the other having the six new 7-pounders similar to those employed in Abyssinia, but mounted, owing to the advice of General Sir John Bissett, K.C.B., upon the tall and special Kaffrarian carriages recently introduced into the service. These carriages are totally different from the small 7-pounder carriages with which the Abyssinian guns were fitted, as they are raised upon wheels five feet in height, the carriage, although lighter, being exactly the same as to size as that used for the 9-pounder of eight cwt. These little guns, however, weigh only 200 lb., and have rather a queer dwarfed appearance mounted on their long axles, between their tall wheels; but the plan was found in many cases successful in this and late Kaffir campaigns, owing to the obstacles presented to the dwarfed carriage by the long grass so abundant in all parts of the colony. Mules had also arrived for these guns from Malta and Gibraltar. Most of the regiments brought out their own equipment complete and ready for the field—tents, waterproof sheets, cooking utensils, barrack and camp stores—which enabled them to be ready at once for the forward movement. This arrangement was not fully carried out by the Royal Artillery and Army Service Corps, as they had a long train of carriages to take to the front; but the company of the Army Service Corps which came in the "Queen Margaret" from Woolwich brought 100 splendid waggons, light yet of great strength, and others came from Queenstown in the "City of Venice." As the transports engaged for the infantry regiments had a considerable quantity of spare room for cargo, all the available space was utilized for stores, munitions, and supplies. Preserved meats, preserved vegetables, and other victualling stores were landed in quantities of an almost alarming nature, while about twenty tons of 7-pounder shells had arrived by the "Donald Currie," "Duart Castle," and other hired transports.

Undoubtedly the most interesting event to both civil as well as military circles in Durban was the arrival of the two cavalry regiments destined for the front. The absence of cavalry was indeed one of the great defects in our army, and had there been previously a couple of regiments of real light cavalry the progress of the campaign would doubtless have taken a far more favourable turn, while some of our misfortunes or disasters would never have happened. The value of cavalry was so abundantly manifested by the services of Piet Uys, Colonels Russell and Buller, Major Barrow, and Captain Rowden, that it would be idle to dwell upon the subject. In the expedition, again, to Ekowe, how completely was the value of this force shown by Major Barrow's horsemen! This officer had not more than 200 sabres with him, while at least half of these were natives; but the completeness of the success achieved by General Chelmsford was attributed in a great measure by his lordship to the services of this contingent, who were literally the eyes and ears of the main column. They were, during the march, effectually scouting the country around, ahead, and in rear, and so constantly did they perform this work that the Zulu spies, who swarmed around, could not by any possibility get close enough to learn the real strength of the column. Again, until Zlobani, all or nearly all Wood's most brilliant successes were gained by his mounted men, and he himself never ceased deploring the absence of a stronger body of horsemen. The "Spain" and "Egypt," which brought out the King's Dragoon Guards to their first South African service, two as fine-looking vessels as ever floated in African seas, both arrived and anchored in the outer roadstead on Sunday morning, the 13th. The "Spain" made a most successful voyage, having left Southampton on the 27th of February, touched at St. Vincent on 16th March, and arrived at Capetown on 5th April. She had on board 312 troops and 286 horses. There was scarcely any sickness at all on board during the voyage, and all the horses, both officers' chargers and troopers, were landed in a very fair condition. The horses submitted to the slinging, almost without an exception, with the greatest docility, and the whole of them were landed in a wonderfully short space of time, considering the distance and the state of the weather. The whole of the left wing of the regiment was on shore by half-past five, and was at once marched to the 17th Lancers' encampment at the foot of the Berea. The "Egypt" was a trifle less in tonnage than the "Spain," but the difference would not be noticed by an unprofessional eye. She had on board 20 officers, 300 troops, and 300 horses. Her horses were also in excellent condition, and were all landed on the 14th. By the 16th the men had quite settled down in their new quarters at the cavalry camp at the Berea, and everything was in the most admirable order. The ground was admirably chosen for the 1250 horsemen who were there under canvas, and the considerations of water, wood, health, and position were all carefully thought of and provided. Each regiment was formed in column of troops, occupying 172 yards of front and 130 yards of depth. From the centre to centre of tents was ten yards, and each horse picketed was allowed four feet by twenty feet. In front of the camp was a fine open space of level parade, which was employed as a parade-ground for duty, and an agreeable lounge and sort of out-door club after stable-hours. The hours for réveille and tattoo, the time for the promulgation of orders, the arrangements for rations and forage, the position of the brigade office, commanding officer's tent, headquarters, commissariat depôt, hospital and guards, the postal arrangements for letters and telegrams, the arrangements for water for men and horses, the police arrangements, the detail for guards and pickets, the detail of other duties, and the statement of returns required, were all noted in daily orders, and printed for circulation amongst men and officers. By this means a system of discipline was established as strict and regular as if in presence of an enemy, and every officer and non-commissioned officer was made acquainted with the usual system of encampment in his branch of the service, and the principles which govern such arrangements, in regard particularly to quickness of change and means of transport, compactness, and safety from an enemy's attack by day or surprise by night. On April 12th General Lord Chelmsford and staff arrived back at Durban by special train from the Lower Tugela, viâ Jaccharine, at 6.45. With him were Colonel Crealock, military secretary, Commodore Richards, and Lieutenant Milne. A very large crowd was at the station to greet the General.

Not the least notable figure among the brilliant group who waited to receive the Commander-in-chief was that of the Prince Imperial of France, whose bright, intelligent face, as he conversed with Sir John Bissett, was lit up with the anticipation of a possible campaign.

Besides General Sir John Bissett and the Prince Imperial, there were present at the railway station Major-General Newdigate, Major-General Marshall, Major-General Clifford, V.C., Colonel Bellairs, D.A.G., Colonel Riley, Major Huskisson, Captain Somerset, Hon. W. Drummond, Captain Granville, and many others.

The 19th of April was a day that will long be remembered in Durban; for then was seen a sight such as had never before been beheld in that town, and probably will never be repeated. On that day Lord Chelmsford inspected the two lately arrived regiments of cavalry, the 17th Lancers and the King's Dragoon Guards. As each regiment passed before the General, it was noticed that its rear squadron had attached to it half a company, and its usual complement of store and supply waggons. These consisted of four waggons, carrying three days' supplies of food, and one day's oats for the horses, four waggons for squadron equipments, such as tents, blankets, and cooking utensils, together with one headquarter waggon and one quarter-master's stores waggon, making ten vehicles in all. Each of these waggons was drawn by four horses, while the armourers' forge waggon was drawn by six horses, and the ambulance waggon by six fine mules. Both regiments were in full dress, but in the lightest possible marching order, but even in this, the men's average weight was not less than 18 stone. The regiments were both encamped at Cato Manor, which is admirably suited to cavalry purposes, having good grass and plenty of wood and water. The column extended a long distance, and wound its way along West Street, Abnel Street, Smith Street, past the Royal Hotel and the new club, and viâ Field Street back to the Manor, where the inspection and march past were held in the presence of the General-in-chief. The top of West Street was reached at half-past seven, and here the largest crowd was assembled. At the corner of Gardner Street the column was joined by Lord Chelmsford, who was loudly cheered, while handkerchiefs were waved from every carriage and window. Outside the town gardens a number of private carriages were drawn up, and each of these was fully occupied by ladies in full toilette, who seemed delighted at the novelty of the spectacle. Such a sight as six hundred British cavalry seemed to raise the enthusiasm of the townspeople to a great pitch, and on all sides expressions of delight and gratification at the fine and imposing appearance of the two corps were freely vented. The entrance to the picturesque grounds of the manor is situated within easy walking distance of the town, but in Natal few people ever think of pedestrian exercise, so that the cavalcade was supplemented by almost an equal number of mounted spectators of both sexes. The cavalry brigade was, as soon as it entered the manor, wheeled into line, and after receiving Lord Chelmsford with a general salute, was minutely inspected by his lordship, who expressed himself in the most flattering terms to both Colonels Lowe and Alexander, remarking particularly the excellent condition of the 17th's horses. The Dragoons and Lancers quitted Durban for Helpmakaar on April 24th, and every precaution was taken by easy marching at first to avoid sore backs and girth galls. Lord Chelmsford also left Durban, and proceeded to Maritzburg: thence he travelled on to Dundee and Utrecht, and then on to Wood's camp at Kambula, where he arrived on May 3rd.

The main features of the plans for the fresh campaign were, roughly speaking, as follows.

Two principal forces, operating from separate bases, the one at Utrecht, and the other at Durban, were to be held in communication by Wood, with a flying column, and by Marshall's cavalry. The common objective of these four columns was to be Ulundi, the king's chief kraal. To keep up communications with these two flanks, to make occasional raids and dashes forward into the enemy's country, and at any favourable moment to convert a feigned into a real rush upon Ulundi, Wood was to retain his separate and independent command. His force, however, was to be largely reinforced, and more troops, if possible cavalry, sent to him. The first column, as it was called, under Major-General Hope Crealock, C.B., was to advance rapidly by the coast road, having as its respective bases of operations Durban, Fort Pearson, and Ginghilovo. The other column, under the personal command of Lord Chelmsford, with Utrecht as its principal base on the extreme north, was to move also upon Ulundi. Meanwhile Wood, who had been strongly reinforced, while nominally forming part of Lord Chelmsford's headquarter division, practically retained his independent command, and formed a sort of flying column connecting the two flanks with each other. No. 1 division, then preparing for advance from the Lower Tugela, consisted of three fine brigades. The First Brigade, commanded by Colonel Pearson of Ekowe fame, consisted of the 3rd Buffs, the 88th Connaught Rangers, and the 99th Foot, each of these corps averaging 800 bayonets. The Second Brigade, under the command of Colonel Pemberton, had in it the 57th, the 3rd battalion 60th Rifles, and the 91st Highlanders; while the Third Brigade, under Colonel Law, had a battery of Royal Artillery, the Naval Brigade from the "Shah" and "Boadicea," at least 800 strong, with four guns and two Gatlings, Barrow's Horse, and a Native Contingent. Before the final advance was made, it was determined that posts of communication should be established at the Amatikula and the Inyezani rivers, over which pontoon bridges were to be constructed. Meanwhile for temporary purposes there was constructed over the Amatikula stream a cask bridge, by laying two slings, with eye splices at one end, parallel to each other, at a distance in proportion to the length of the casks. On these ropes were placed as many casks as required, bungs uppermost, and side by side. Across the upper surface of the barrels balks were laid parallel to each other, and the ends of the slings at each end of the row of casks were brought up and fastened to the ends of the balks. A small rope with an eye at each end was fastened to each sling between each pair of casks. These "braces," as they are technically called, were then carried once round the nearest balk, and afterwards passed over to the other side, carried round the opposite braces, returned to its own side, and finally made fast to the standing part of the brace close below the balk by the assistance of two half-hitches. Each pier of casks made in this fashion can be completed in a marvellously short time by skilled engineers, and in a reasonable period by infantry who have been exercised at such work under the supervision of their scientific comrades. Transoms or beams connect each pier with its neighbour, while chesses and outriggers can be laid down as in a regular pontoon bridge. When crossing these cask bridges great care, of course, has to be taken by officers in charge of waggons and supplies to see that no undue weight is carried beyond what must be theoretically allowed by the practical methods of calculating the relative buoyancy of the casks. In addition to the redoubts thrown up to protect the laagers at Amatikula and Inyezani, têtes-de-pont, or bridge-heads, were also constructed to form a safeguard for pontoons. The position on the Amatikula was admirable. It was not too steep, having a hill which formed as it were, a sort of natural glacis, with a slope of not more than 10 deg., which is about the most favourable for infantry. The post could not be overlooked at any point by the enemy, while the ground in front, being duly cleared, gave no cover. The flanks rested upon natural obstacles easily strengthened. The post on the Inyezani was situated upon an eminence which fell away to the rear, so that its second line and reserves could be placed almost entirely under cover. A lake on one side and a ravine on the other, both perpendicular to the position, gave additional security to the fort, and these were strengthened by every means at disposal. In the armament of these works the guns were placed en barbette, as being more suitable to distant fire, and as our antagonists had no artillery with which they could reply, no anxiety was entertained as to their being dismounted. Guns, of course, which are fired over a parapet instead of through an embrasure have a far greater lateral range, and as the Zulu mode of attack invariably includes rapid changes of front and frequent flank movements, this mode of armament was calculated to prove the most effective, as fire could be brought to bear in all directions. A further advantage is not to be lost sight of, and this is, that guns fired over a parapet, or en barbette, are higher, and could therefore plunge into such hollows as the Zulus invariably made for when exposed to the rifle fire. Gabions and screens of sandbags, to save the men from undue exposure, were placed on each side of the guns. While No. 1 column was thus employed in fort-building, Lord Chelmsford was moving from Utrecht to Kambula and Durnberg, where the following corps were being concentrated, to form his column:—General Newdigate's division, a formidable body, consisting of the 2nd battalion 21st Fusiliers, the 2nd battalion 24th, the 58th and 94th Regiments, with M and N batteries 6th Brigade Royal Artillery: Brigadier-General Evelyn Wood, V.C., who had now with him the 13th and 90th Light Infantry Regiments, Tremlett's battery of Royal Artillery, and Buller's Light Horse, strongly augmented. Major-General Marshall's cavalry brigade was also attached to Lord Chelmsford's command, and was composed of the King's Dragoon Guards, the 17th Lancers, and Russell's Horse, lately augmented. Finally Major-General the Hon. Hugh Clifford, V.C., C.B., whose former South African services go back to 1846, remained in command of the base, depôt, and reserves at Durban, with Major T. Butler, C.B., of Red River and Ashanti fame, as chief of his staff.

It has been stated that one of the points at which Crealock was to concentrate his forces was Ginghilovo; but by the advice of high medical authorities, Lord Chelmsford ordered the camp at Ginghilovo to be broken up and shifted to a more favourable site near the Inyezani. The Ginghilovo camp, as far as strategical position was concerned, was all that the most fastidious engineer could desire, but upon sanitary grounds it was decidedly defective. It was favourably sheltered in a sort of hollow having defensive heights, which were to have been entrenched on either side, but want of good water and other reasons made it desirable to abandon the idea of converting it into a permanent post. Two strong laagers were now, therefore, constructed, the first about seven miles beyond Tenedos, and the other on the Inyezani river, a few miles from where Pearson's first battle took place. The former of these was called Fort Crealock, the latter Fort Chelmsford. As far as position, and indeed construction, Fort Chelmsford had many advantages not possessed by Fort Crealock. The nature of the soil upon which the latter had been built had much to do with this; but there was but little choice in the matter, as it was absolutely necessary that a strong post should be built in this particular neighbourhood. The soil from which most of the works had been thrown up was unfortunately of a light, sandy nature, and of that particular unbinding description so disliked by engineers. The high winds and rain which prevailed also quickly found out the weak points in the armour of the fort, and working parties were constantly employed in restoring what had been blown down or washed away. Fort Chelmsford, on the contrary, had the advantage of a fine firm soil, neither too heavy nor too light, while some quarries which had been found within easy distance were of great assistance in supplying the revêtements, galleries, and platforms.

The fort itself was situated in a most picturesque part of the country. The pass leading into the valley through which the river runs was most romantic, winding through a delightful parklike country, crossed by rapid streams of clear, ice-cold water, and, as it narrowed became quite precipitous, the road dwindling to a mere footpath, so narrow that mounted men could not ride more than two abreast. The kloof was flanked on the precipice side by loose masses of rock, intermingled with trees and bush, and tangled with monkey-ropes and creepers of all kinds. The lower side sloped suddenly with a fall of about sixty feet to the bottom of the valley, where a rapid mountain stream, gurgling as it rushes over its rocky bed, fell soothingly upon the ear with a most dreamy yet refreshing sound. The other road to the fort passed through a still more beautiful valley, leading to the Inyezani kloof by a path cut in the precipitous face of the hill, whose sides were clothed with "spekboem" (elephant bush) and all kinds of flowering shrubs. The road looked down a declivity of some 200 feet, and was worn in places into a perfect staircase of boulders by successive torrents of tropical rain, and would be quite impracticable for any other species of vehicle than a Cape waggon. The edge facing the precipice had no kind of parapet, and the dangerous nature of the pass was brought into still greater prominence by the débris of an ox waggon still lying broken up in minute particles at the bottom of the valley, where it had evidently gone down bodily with its span of oxen. The pass was, however, in spite of its danger, very beautiful. Convolvuli ran over the bushes in rich clusters, the star-shaped jessamine, with its pink undersides, and the magnificent specimens of mesembryanthemums, or fig-marigolds, of which there are hundreds of different species, having little transparent pellicles, containing pure liquid, scattered over the leaves, giving them the appearance of being sprinkled over with ice, and scarlet geraniums, attaining a height of ten or twelve feet amidst the thick bush, glowed on every side.

Meanwhile General Wood had been no less busy in and around his camp at Kambula. On April 17th he made a reconnaissance, at Lord Chelmsford's suggestion, to the Blood river, where a site had been chosen for a permanently entrenched camp, to serve as a large depôt for the main body of the army. The ride was about fifteen miles, and the General and his party passed through some beautiful valleys, and through a path cut in the precipitous face of a pass whose sides were clothed with "spekboem" (elephant bush) and various other flowering shrubs. After four miles' cantering, they came to a part of the road which looked down a declivity of some 200 feet. The scene was, however, most picturesque. Convolvuli, the star-shaped jessamine, and the magnificent Strelitzia Reginae flourished around, while scarlet geraniums attained to a height unthought of in England. Two excellent sites for outposts were selected, by which communication could be kept up with the large depôt and Kambula. These had commanding positions, and subsequently stone buildings were solidly constructed, square in form, but loopholed and flanked by ditch caponnières, while each fort contained accommodation for mounted men and a detachment of infantry. The Blood river, like most South African streams, is subject to great fluctuations. At that period, owing to recent rains, it was in flood, and in many places twenty and thirty feet deep, running with a powerful current that rendered it most dangerous to cross. The banks in most places are dangerously high, and the sides are steeply scarped by the force of the stream. Fording-places only occur at long intervals, so that when crossing in a flood, it is not at all easy to hit them off, while if once carried down by the force of the current the traveller has very little chance of escaping an accident. The best way of crossing a flooded river, and that which was adopted by regulation in Wood's column, is the Kaffir plan of taking off some way up the stream, and so making a good allowance for driftage. Old settlers and Boers often undress themselves completely before mounting their horses, and carry their clothes and arms in a bundle on top of their heads, in case of a capsize. The stirrups should, of course, be crossed over the pommel of the saddle, and the horse allowed to have his head, the rider guiding him by the snaffle, while in difficult cases it is better for him to relieve his animal of weight altogether by floating alongside and guiding his head in the proper direction. The Blood river flows through some fine scenery, bordered, however, at times by impenetrable bush and tangled vegetation of all descriptions, again winding under lofty mountains of basaltic rock, beautifully variegated with foliage, the thickets affording shelter to swarms of animal and insect life, giving rise on a still evening to a perfect babel of sound, amidst which the plaintive coo of the ringdove, the incessant chirp of the cicala, the twittering of many-plumaged birds, and the hoarse challenge of the bull-frogs are pre-eminent. Conspicuous among the birds are to be noticed especially the little crested kingfisher, showing a perfect gem of colour, several varieties of sugarbird—a species somewhat allied to the hummingbirds, or "hoverers," which are constantly to be seen flying restlessly over the aloe blossom—the orange-throated lark, the blue jay, and the Zulu finch, whose black and white plumage and red throat are set off by his long, streaming tail, the feathers of which are so prolonged that when flying they nearly overbalance him. The sandy plain on which the first fort was built was covered with stunted karoo bush, and was full of Duyker gries-buck and bush-buck, while two kinds of hares frequented the plain, the larger kind grey-furred like the English rabbit, and a small red mountain species, much better eating than the former, but which is scarcely considered fit for the European table, on account of its scavenging propensities.

Colonel Buller's Frontier Light Horse was also largely reinforced, its last augmentation being Captain Marshall's new troop of eighty well-armed and well-mounted men. A corps of Natal Mounted Kaffirs, principally recruited from the Edendal Mission-station, had also been added to this command, and they were found most trustworthy and intelligent. They were armed with the short Martini-Henry carbine, and drilled with equal steadiness to the European troopers.

Buller's Light Horse were destined to play so important a part in the final advance on Ulundi, that a short description of their appearance and equipment will not here be out of place. The first requisite was a well-built, sober, and intelligent horseman, who in addition to being able to shoot with the Martini-Henry, knew also how to groom, saddle, and nurse his horse. This was required to be an animal neither leggy, long-tailed, nor showy, but a clever, cobby sort of quadruped, who could climb like a cat, and obey its master like a well-broken spaniel, endued with a sound constitution, stout and wiry, and with a good turn of speed. The saddlery was, as far as possible, of a uniform pattern, and selected with considerable judgment and care. The great points were that the tree should be wide enough in the fork not to pinch the shoulders, but yet not so wide as to let the saddle right down on the withers, with the seat long enough to sit in comfortably and to spread the weight to some extent over the horse's back. As many of the Cape horses are buck-jumpers, slightly-padded flaps were in vogue, although not insisted upon. They are a great protection to the knees in riding through bush. The saddle, of course, was provided with wallets in front, which contained a couple of pairs of socks, one flannel shirt, a tooth-brush, towel, and piece of yellow soap. Saddle-bags were worn only when going on distant expeditions, but a tin mug, knife, fork, and spoon, revolver, and flint and steel formed the invariable equipment of these troopers, and with a cloak or blanket à discrétion made up the weight carried by the horse. Although the mounted infantry were volunteers drawn from various line regiments, there was sufficient leaven of the cavalry element to insure efficiency in the mounted duties. When the corps was first raised any kind of dress was worn, but fashion subsequently exerted its sway, and a rather picturesque "get-up" became almost universally adopted. Broad-leaved felt hats, with coloured puggarees, brown cord breeches, "baggy" to the last degree, and so patched with untanned leather that the original material had almost disappeared; a sort of patrol jacket, all over pockets, dyed mimosa colour, and also patched with leather of any colour on the shoulders and wherever the gun was accustomed to rest, brown laced gaiters, coming high up the leg, and even thighs, and a rough coloured flannel shirt, entirely open at the neck; such was the most usual costume. The rifles were of various patterns—long Martinis, Martini-Henry carbines, some of Sharpe's old-pattern Sniders, and Snider carbines. No bucket, however, was ever used, as it was considered better that a man unencumbered with a long sabre should have his weapon slung to his body, and not to his horse.