CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION
IN ALABAMA

CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION

IN

ALABAMA

BY
WALTER L. FLEMING, Ph.D.
PROFESSOR OF HISTORY IN WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY

New York
THE COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS
THE MACMILLAN COMPANY, Agents
LONDON: MACMILLAN & CO., Ltd.
1905

All rights reserved

Copyright, 1905,
By THE MACMILLAN COMPANY.
Set up and electrotyped. Published October, 1905.

Norwood Press
J. S. Cushing & Co.—Berwick & Smith Co.
Norwood, Mass., U.S.A.

TO
MY WIFE
MARY BOYD FLEMING

PREFACE

This work was begun some five years ago as a study of Reconstruction in Alabama. As the field opened it seemed to me that an account of ante-bellum conditions, social, economic, and political, and of the effect of the Civil War upon ante-bellum institutions would be indispensable to any just and comprehensive treatment of the later period. Consequently I have endeavored to describe briefly the society and the institutions that went down during Civil War and Reconstruction. Internal conditions in Alabama during the war period are discussed at length; they are important, because they influenced seriously the course of Reconstruction. Throughout the work I have sought to emphasize the social and economic problems in the general situation, and accordingly in addition to a sketch of the politics I have dwelt at some length upon the educational, religious, and industrial aspects of the period. One point in particular has been stressed throughout the whole work, viz. the fact of the segregation of the races within the state—the blacks mainly in the central counties, and the whites in the northern and the southern counties. This division of the state into “white” counties and “black” counties has almost from the beginning exercised the strongest influence upon the history of its people. The problems of white and black in the Black Belt are not always the problems of the whites and blacks of the white counties. It is hoped that the maps inserted in the text will assist in making clear this point. Perhaps it may be thought that undue space is devoted to the history of the negro during War and Reconstruction, but after all the negro, whether passive or active, was the central figure of the period.

Believing that the political problems of War and Reconstruction are of less permanent importance than the forces which have shaped and are shaping the social and industrial life of the people, I have confined the discussion of politics to certain chapters chronologically arranged, while for the remainder of the book the topical method of presentation has been adopted. In describing the political events of Reconstruction I have in most cases endeavored to show the relation between national affairs and local conditions within the state. To such an extent has this been done that in some parts it may perhaps be called a general history with especial reference to local conditions in Alabama. Never before and never since Reconstruction have there been closer practical relations between the United States and the state, between Washington and Montgomery.

As to the authorities examined in the preparation of the work it may be stated that practically all material now available—whether in print or in manuscript—has been used. In working with newspapers an effort was made to check up in two or more newspapers each fact used. Most of the references to newspapers—practically all of those to the less reputable papers—are to signed articles. I have had to reject much material as unreliable, and it is not possible that I have been able to sift out all the errors. Whatever remain will prove to be, as I hope and believe, of only minor consequence.

Thanks for assistance given are due to friends too numerous to mention all of them by name. For special favors I am indebted to Professor L. D. Miller, Jacksonville, Alabama; Mr. W. O. Scroggs of Harvard University; Professor G. W. Duncan, Auburn, Alabama; Major W. W. Screws of the Montgomery Advertiser; Colonel John W. DuBose, Montgomery, Alabama; Mrs. J. L. Dean, Opelika, Alabama; Major S. A. Cunningham of the Confederate Veteran, Nashville, Tennessee; and Major James R. Crowe, of Sheffield, Alabama. I am indebted to Mr. L. S. Boyd, Washington, D.C., for numerous favors, among them, for calling my attention to the scrap-book collection of Edward McPherson, then shelved in the Library of Congress along with Fiction. On many points where documents were lacking, I was materially assisted by the written reminiscences of people familiar with conditions of the time, among them my mother and father, the late Professor O. D. Smith of Auburn, Alabama, and the late Ryland Randolph, Esq., of Birmingham. Many old negroes have related their experiences to me. Hon. Junius M. Riggs of the Alabama Supreme Court Library, by the loan of documents, assisted me materially in working up the financial history of the Reconstruction; Dr. David Y. Thomas of the University of Florida read and criticised the entire manuscript; Dr. Thomas M. Owen, Director of the Alabama Department of Archives and History, has given me valuable assistance from the beginning to the close of the work by reading the manuscript, by making available to me not only the public archives, but also his large private collection, and by securing illustrations. But above all I have been aided by Professor William A. Dunning of Columbia University, at whose instance the work was begun, who gave me many helpful suggestions, read the manuscript, and saved me from numerous pitfalls, and by my wife, who read and criticised both manuscript and proof, and made the maps and the index and prepared some of the illustrations.

WALTER L. FLEMING.

New York City,
August, 1905.

CONTENTS

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

LIST OF MAPS

PART I
INTRODUCTION

CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION
IN ALABAMA

CHAPTER I

THE PERIOD OF SECTIONAL CONTROVERSY

When Alabama seceded in 1861, it had been in existence as a political organization less than half a century, but in many respects its institutions and customs were as old as European America. The white population was almost purely Anglo-American. The early settlements had been made on the coast near Mobile, and from thence had extended up the Alabama, Tombigbee, and Warrior rivers. In the northern part the Tennessee valley was early settled, and later, in the eastern part, the Coosa valley. After the river valleys, the prairie lands in central Alabama were peopled, and finally the poorer lands of the southeast and the hills south of the Tennessee valley. The bulk of the population before 1861 was of Georgian birth or descent, the settlers having come from middle Georgia, which had been peopled from the hills of Virginia. Georgians came into the Tennessee valley early in the nineteenth century. The Creek reservation prevented immigration into eastern Alabama before the thirties, but the Georgians went around and settled southeast Alabama along the line of the old “Federal road.” When the Creek Indians consented to migrate, it was found that the Georgians were already in possession of the country,—more than 20,000 strong, and a government was at once erected over the Indian counties. People from Georgia also came down the Coosa valley to central Alabama. The Virginians went to the western Black Belt, to the Tennessee valley, and to central Alabama. North Carolina sent thousands of her citizens down through the Tennessee valley and thence across country to the Tombigbee valley and western Alabama; others came through Georgia and followed the routes of Georgia migration. South Carolinians swarmed into the southern, central, and western counties, and a goodly number settled in the Tennessee valley. Tennessee furnished a large proportion of the settlers to the Tennessee valley, to the hill counties south of the Tennessee, and to the valleys in central and western Alabama. Among the immigrants from Virginia, North and South Carolina, and Tennessee was a large Scotch-Irish element, and with the Tennesseeans came a sprinkling of Kentuckians. In western Alabama were a few thousand Mississippians, and into southeast Alabama a few hundred settlers came from Florida. From the northern states came several thousand, principally New England business men. The foreign element was insignificant—the Irish being most numerous, with a few hundred each of Germans, English, French, and Scotch. In Mobile and Marengo counties there was a slight admixture of French blood in the population.[1]

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In regard to the character of the settlers it has been said that the Virginians were the least practical and the Georgians the most so, while the North Carolinians were a happy medium. The Georgians were noted for their stubborn persistence, and they usually succeeded in whatever they undertook. The Virginians liked a leisurely planter’s life with abundant social pleasures. The Tennesseeans and Kentuckians were hardly distinguishable from the Virginians and Carolinians, to whom they were closely related. The northern professional and business men exercised an influence more than commensurate with their numbers, being, in a way, picked men. Neither the Georgians nor the Virginians were assertive office-seekers, but the Carolinians liked to hold office, and the politics of the state were moulded by the South Carolinians and Georgians. All were naturally inclined to favor a weak federal administration and a strong state government with much liberty of the individual. The theories of Patrick Henry, Jefferson, and Calhoun, not those of Washington and John Marshall, formed the political creed of the Alabamians.

NATIVITY OF PUBLIC MEN

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Each figure represents some person who became prominent before 1865, and indicates his native state. The location of the figure on the map indicates his place of residence. Note the segregation along the rivers and the Black Belt.

The wealthy people were found in the Tennessee valley, in the Black Belt extending across the centre of the state, and in Mobile, the one large town. They were (except a few of the Mobilians) all slaveholders. The poorer white people went to the less fertile districts of north and southeast Alabama, where land was cheap, preferring to work their own poor farms rather than to work for some one else on better land. But nearly every slave county had its colony of poorer whites, who were invariably settled on the least fertile soils. Among these settlers there was a certain dislike of slavery, because they believed that, were it not for the negro, the whites might themselves live on the fertile lands. Yet they were not in favor of emancipation in any form, unless the negro could be gotten entirely out of the way—a free negro being to them an abomination. If the negro must stay, then they preferred slavery to continue.

Over the greater part of Alabama there were no class distinctions before 1860; the state was too young. In the wilderness classes had fused and the successful men were often those never heard of in the older states. A candidate of “the plain people” was always elected, because all were frontier people. This does not mean that in Huntsville, Montgomery, Greensboro, and Mobile there were not the beginnings of an aristocracy based on education, wealth, and family descent. But these were very small spots on the map of Alabama, and there were no heartburnings over social inequalities.[2]

Such was the composition of the white population of Alabama before 1860. No matter what might be their political affiliations, in practice nearly all were Democrats of the Jeffersonian school, believing in the largest possible liberty for the individual and in local management of all local affairs, and to the frontier Democrat nearly all questions that concerned him were local. The political leaders excepted, the majority of the population knew little and cared less about the Federal government except when it endeavored to restrain or check them in their course of conquest and expansion in the wilderness. The relations of the people of Alabama with the Federal government were such as to confirm and strengthen them in their local attachments and sectional politics. The controversies that arose in regard to the removal of the Indians, and over the public lands, nullification, slavery, and western expansion, prevented the growth of attachment to the Federal government, and tended to develop a southern rather than a “continental” nationality. The state came into the Union when the sections were engaged in angry debate over the Missouri Compromise measures, and its attitude in Federal politics was determined from the beginning. The next most serious controversy with the Federal government and with the North was in regard to the removal of the Indians from the southern states. The southwestern frontiersmen, like all other Anglo-Americans, had no place in their economy for the Indian, and they were determined that he should not stand in their way.

Indians and Nullification

For half a century, throughout the Gulf states, the struggle with the Indian tribes for the possession of the fertile lands continued, and in this struggle the Federal government was always against the settlers. Before the removal of the Indians, in 1836, the settlers of Alabama were in almost continual dispute with the Washington administration on this subject.[3] The trouble began in Georgia, and thousands of Georgians brought to Alabama a spirit of jealousy and hostility to the United States government, and a growing dislike of New England and the North on account of their stand in regard to the Indians. For when troubles, legal and otherwise, arose with the Indians, their advisers were found to be missionaries and land agents from New England. The United States wanted the Indians to remain as states within states; the Georgia and Alabama settlers felt that the Indians must go. The attitude of the Federal government drove the settlers into extreme assertions of state rights. In Georgia it came almost to war between the state and United States troops during the administration of John Quincy Adams, a New Englander, who was disliked by the settlers for his support of the Indian cause; and the whole South was made jealous by the decisions of the Supreme Court in the Indian cases. Had Adams been elected to a second term, there would probably have been armed resistance to the policy of the United States. Jackson, a southern and western man, had the feeling of a frontiersman toward the Indians; and his attitude gained him the support of the frontier southern states in the trouble with South Carolina over nullification.

GAINESWOOD.
A Marengo County Plantation Home. Abandoned since the War.

Immediately after the nullification troubles, the general government attempted to remove the white settlers from the Indian lands in east Alabama. The lands had been ceded by the Indians in 1832, and the legislature of Alabama at once extended the state administration over the territory. Settlers rushed in; some were already there. But by the treaty the Indians were entitled to remain on their land until they chose to move; and now the United States marshals, supported by the army, were ordered to remove the 30,000 whites who had settled in the nine Indian counties. Governor Gayle, who had been elected as an opponent of nullification, informed the Secretary of War that the proposed action of the central government meant nothing less than the destruction of the state administration, and declared that he would, at all costs, sustain the jurisdiction of the state government. The troops killed a citizen who resisted removal, and the Federal authorities refused to allow the slayers to be tried by state courts. There was great excitement in the state, and public meetings were everywhere held to organize resistance. The legislature authorized the governor to persist in maintaining the state administration in the nine Indian counties. A collision with the United States troops was expected, and offers of volunteers were made to the governor,—even from New York. Finally the United States government yielded, the whites remained on the Indian lands, the state authority was upheld in the Indian counties, the soldiers were tried before state courts, and the Indians were removed to the West. The governor proclaimed a victory for the state, and the 30,000 angry Alabamians rejoiced over what they considered the defeat of the unjust Federal government.[4]

Thus in Alabama nullification of Federal law was successfully carried out. And it was done by a state administration and a people that a year before had refused to approve the course of South Carolina. But South Carolina was regarded in Alabama, as in the rest of the South, somewhat as an erratic member that ought to be disciplined once in a while. A strong and able minority in Alabama accepted the basis of the nullification doctrine, i.e. the sovereignty of the states, and after this time this political element was usually known as the State Rights party. They had no separate organization, but voted with Whigs or Democrats, as best served their purpose. Secession was little talked of, for affairs might yet go well, they thought, within the Union. A majority of the Democrats, for several years after 1832, were probably opposed in theory to nullification and secession when South Carolina was an actor, but in practice they acted as they had done in the Indian disputes which concerned them more closely.

The Slavery Controversy and Political Divisions

It was at the height of the irritation of the Indian controversy that the agitation by the abolitionists of the North began. The question which more than any other alienated the southern people from the Union was that concerning negro slavery. From 1819 to 1860 the majority of the white people of Alabama were not friendly to slavery as an institution. This was not from any special liking for the negro or belief that slavery was bad for him, but because it was believed that the presence of the negro, slave or free, was not good for the white race. To most of the people slavery was merely a device for making the best of a bad state of affairs. The constitution of 1819 was liberal in its slavery provisions, and the legislature soon enacted (1827) a law prohibiting the importation, for sale, hire, or barter, of slaves from other states. For a decade there was strong influence at each session of the state legislature in favor of gradual emancipation; agents of the Quakers worked in the state, buying and paying a higher price for cotton that was not produced by slave labor; and in north Alabama, during the twenties and early thirties, there was a number of emancipation societies.[5] An emancipation newspaper, The Huntsville Democrat, was published in Huntsville, and edited by James G. Birney, afterwards a noted abolitionist. The northern section of the state, embracing the strong Democratic white counties, was distinctly unfriendly to slavery, or rather to the negro, and controlled the politics of the state.[6] The effect of the abolition movement in the North was the destruction of the emancipation organizations in the South, and both friends and foes of the institution united on the defensive. The non-slaveholders were not deluded followers of the slave owners. After the slavery question became an issue in politics, the non-slaveholders in Alabama were rather more aggressive, and were even more firmly determined to maintain negro slavery than were the slaveholders. To the rich hereditary slaveholders, who were relatively few in number, it was more or less a question of property, and that was enough to fight about at any time. But to the average white man who owned no negroes and who worked for his living at manual labor, the question was a vital social one. The negro slave was bad enough; but he thought that the negro freed by outside interference and turned loose on society was much more to be feared.[7] The large majorities for extreme measures came from the white counties; the secession vote in 1860 was largely a white county vote. But when secession came, the Whiggish Black Belt which had been opposed to secession was astonished not to receive, in the war that followed, the hearty support of the Democratic white counties.

Before the nullification troubles in 1832 there was no distinct political division among the people of Alabama; all were Democrats. Those of the white counties were of the Jacksonian type, those of the black counties were rather of the Jeffersonian faith; but all were strict constructionists, especially on questions concerning the tariff, the Indians, the central government, and slavery. The question of nullification caused a division in the ranks of the Democratic party—one wing supporting Jackson, the other accepting Calhoun as leader. For several years later, however, the Democratic candidates had no opposition in the elections, though within the party there were contests between the Jacksonians and the growing State Rights (Calhoun) wing. But with the settling of the country, the growth of the power of the Black Belt, and the differentiation of interests within the state, there appeared a second party, the Whigs. Its strength lay among the large planters and slaveholders of the central Black Belt, though it often took its leaders from the black counties of the Tennessee valley. This party was able to elect a governor but once, and then only because of a division in the Democratic ranks. After 1835 it secured one-third of the representation in Congress and the same proportion in the legislature. It was the “broadcloth” party, of the wealthier and more cultivated people. It did not appeal to the “plain people” with much success; but it was always a respectable party, and there was no jealousy of it then, and now “there are no bitter memories against it.”[8]

Numerically, the Whigs were about as strong as the anti-nullification wing of the Democratic party, so that the balance of power was held by the constantly increasing State Rights (Calhoun) element. When Van Buren became leader of the national Democracy, the State Rights people in Alabama united with the regular Democrats and voted with them for about ten years. The State Rights men were devoted followers of Calhoun, but in political theories they soon went beyond him. For a while they were believers in nullification as a constitutional right, but soon began to talk of secession as a sovereign right. They were in favor of no compromise where the rights of the South were concerned. They were logical, extreme, doctrinaire; they demanded absolute right, and viewed every action of the central government with suspicion. A single idea firmly held through many years gave to them a power not justified by their numerical strength.

The Whigs did not stand still on political questions; as the Democrats and the State Rights men abandoned one position for another more advanced, the Whigs moved up to the one abandoned. Thus they were always only about one election behind. It was the constant agitation of the slavery question that drove the Whigs along in the wake of the more advanced party. Both parties were in favor of expansion in the Southwest. They were indignant at the New England position on the Texas question, and talked much of disunion if such a policy of obstruction was persisted in. Again, after the Mexican War all parties were furious at the opposition shown to the annexation of the territory from Mexico. It was now the spirit of expansion, the lust for territory, that rose in opposition to the obstructive policy of northern leaders; and a new element was added when an attempt was made to shut out southerners from the territory won mainly by the South by forbidding the entrance of slavery.

The number of those in favor of resisting at every point the growing desire of the North to restrict slavery was increasing steadily. The leader of the State Rights men was William L. Yancey. He opposed all compromises, for, as he said, compromise meant that the system was evil and was an acknowledgment of wrong, and no right, however abstract, must be denied to the South. He was a firm believer in slavery as the only method of solving the race question, and saw clearly the dangers that would result from the abolition programme if the North and South remained united. So to prevent worse calamities he was in favor of disunion. He was the greatest orator ever heard in the South. He was in no sense a demagogue; he had none of the arts of the popular politician. Sent to Congress in the heat of the fight between the sections, he resigned because he thought the battle was to be fought elsewhere. For twenty years he stood before the people of Alabama, telling them that slavery could not be preserved within the Union; that before any effective settlement of controversies could be made, Alabama and the other southern states must withdraw and make terms from the outside, or stay out of the Union and have done with agitation and interference. Secession was self-preservation, he told a people who believed that the destruction of slavery meant the destruction of society. For twenty years he and his followers, heralds of the storm, were ostracized by all political parties, which accepted his theories, but denied the necessity for putting them into practice. When at last the people came to follow him, he told them that they had probably waited too late, and that they were seceding on a weaker cause than any of those he had presented for twenty years.

Yancey was a leader of State Rights men but never a leader in the Democratic party. Once, in 1848, when all were angry on account of the opposition on the Mexican question, Yancey was called to the front in the Democratic state convention. He offered resolutions, which were adopted,[9] to the effect (1) that the people of a territory could not prevent the holding of slaves before the formation of a state constitution, and that Congress had no power whatever to restrict slavery in the territories; (2) that those who held the opposite opinion were not Democrats, and that the Democratic party of Alabama would not support for President any candidate who held such views. The delegates to the National Democratic Convention at Baltimore were instructed to withdraw if the Alabama resolutions were rejected. By a vote of two hundred and sixteen to thirty-six they were rejected; yet none of the delegates except Yancey withdrew. Refusing to support Cass for the presidency because he believed in “squatter sovereignty,” Yancey was again ostracized by the Democratic leaders.[10] Now the State Rights men became more aggressive, for they said this was the time to settle the slavery question, before it was too late. The North, it was thought, would not be averse to separation from the South. The Whigs began to advance non-intervention theories, and but for the death of President Taylor, who adhered to the free-soil Whigs, political parties in Alabama would probably have broken up in 1850 and fused into one on the slavery question.

Growth of Secession Sentiment

The compromise measures of 1850 pleased few people in Alabama, and there was talk of resistance and of assisting Texas by force, if necessary, against the appropriation of her territory by the central government. The moderates condemned the Compromise and said they would not yield again. The more advanced demanded a repeal of the Compromise or immediate secession. Yancey said there was no hope of a settlement and that it was time to set the house in order. In 1850-1851 there was a widespread movement toward a rejection of the Compromise and a secession of the lower South, but the political leaders were disposed to give the Compromise a trial. To the Nashville convention, held in June, 1850, to discuss measures to secure redress of grievances, the Alabama legislature at an unofficial meeting chose the following delegates: Benjamin Fitzpatrick, William Cooper, John A. Campbell, Thomas J. Judge, John A. Winston, Leroy P. Walker, William M. Murphy, Nicholas Davis, R. C. Shorter, Thomas A. Walker, Reuben Chapman, James Abercrombie, and William M. Byrd—all Whigs or Conservative Democrats. The resolutions passed by the convention were cautious and prudent, and were generally supported by the Whigs and opposed by the Democrats. In Montgomery, upon the return of the Alabama delegation, a public meeting, held to ratify the action of the Nashville convention, condemned it instead, and approved the programme of Yancey who again declared that it was “time to set the house in order.” The contest in Alabama was simply between the Compromise, with maintenance of the Union, and rejection of the Compromise to be followed by secession. It was not a campaign between Whig and Democrat, but between Union and Secession. The old party lines were not drawn. Associations were formed all over the state to oppose the Compromise and to advocate secession. The Unionists drew together, but less heartily. The compact State Rights element lost influence on account of a division that now showed in its ranks. One section, led by William L. Yancey, was for separate and unconditional secession; another, led by J. J. Seibels, favored coöperation of the southern states within the Union and united deliberation before secession.[11] The State Rights Convention met in Montgomery, February 10, 1851, and recommended a southern congress to decide the questions at issue and declared that if any other state would secede, Alabama should go also.[12] The action of the convention pleased few and was repudiated by the “separate secessionist” element. The candidates of the State Rights—now called the “Southern Rights”—party were supported by a majority of the Democrats. They demanded the repeal of the Compromise, and resistance to future encroachments; they demanded southern ministers and southern churches, southern books and papers, and southern pleasure resorts.

The “Union” leaders were Judge Benajah S. Bibb, James Abercrombie, Thomas J. Judge, Henry W. Hilliard, Thomas H. Watts, Senator William R. King,—nearly all Virginians or North Carolinians by birth or descent. At the State “Union” Convention held in Montgomery, January 19, 1851, among the more prominent delegates were: Thomas B. Cooper, R. M. Patton, W. M. Byrd, B. S. Bibb, J. M. Tarleton, W. B. Moss, James H. Clanton, L. E. Parsons, Robert J. Jamison, Henry W. Hilliard, R. W. Walker, Thomas H. Watts, Nicholas Davis, Jr., and C. M. Wilcox,—all were Whigs, and were Virginians, North Carolinians, and men of northern birth. This meeting denied the “constitutional” right of secession. The Union candidates for Congress were C. C. Langdon, James Abercrombie, Judge Mudd, William R. Smith, W. R. W. Cobb, George S. Houston, and Alexander White,—each of whom denied the “constitutional” right of secession, but said nothing about it as a “sovereign” right.

The “Unionists”—the old Whigs and the Jacksonian Democrats—were successful in the elections, but by accepting, though disapproving, the Compromise measures, and by repudiating the doctrine of secession as a “constitutional” right,[13] they had advanced beyond the position held by Yancey in 1848.

After the success of the “Union” party in 1851-1852, the Southern Rights Associations resolved to suspend for a time the debate on secession. Thereupon the “Union” Democrats resumed their old party allegiance and the “Union” party was left to consist of old Whigs alone. The Whigs wished to continue the “Union” organization, for they no longer found it possible to act with the northern Whigs, and in 1852 several of their prominent leaders in Alabama refused to support the Whig presidential ticket. On the other hand, the extreme “Southern Rights” men broke away from the Democrats in 1852 and declared for immediate secession. They supported Troup and Quitman, who polled, however, only 2174 votes in the state; but the Whigs and the Democrats each lost about 15,000, who refused to vote.

And now came the break-up of old parties. The slavery question was always before the people and was becoming more and more irritating. Compromises had failed to quiet the controversy. The position of the “Union” Whigs in the black counties became intolerable. They had to combat secession at home, and they had to guard against trouble among their slaves caused by the abolitionist propaganda. By 1855 almost all the Alabama Whigs had become “Americans,” at the same time searching for a new issue and repudiating the principles upon which the “American” party was founded. Again they were left alone by the antislavery stand taken by the northern wing of this party. Yet in spite of every possible discouragement they held together and controlled the black counties. When the Kansas question arose all the parties in Alabama were united in reference to it. The doctrine of squatter sovereignty was not accepted, but there was an opportunity, both parties thought, to win Kansas peaceably and stay the threatened separation, but the northern methods of settling Kansas by organized antislavery emigration from New England paralyzed the efforts of the moderate “Union” southerners. Similar methods were attempted by the South, and several colonies of emigrants were sent from Alabama;[14] but by 1857 it was known that Kansas was lost.

The great debate between William L. Yancey and Roger A. Pryor in the Southern Commercial Convention held in Montgomery in May, 1858, showed that the people of Alabama were then in advance of their political leaders and were coming to the position long held by Yancey and the secessionists. Pryor’s position in favor of compromise and delay had the support of nearly all the party leaders of Alabama; Yancey, always in disfavor with party leaders, captured the convention with his policy of secession in case of failure of redress of grievances. Secession was no longer a doctrine to be condemned unless on the ground of expediency. Whig leaders were now becoming Southern Rights Democrats. Many Democrats thought it was time to force an issue and come to a settlement; this Yancey proposed to do by demanding a repeal of all the laws against the slave trade because they expressed a disapproval of slavery. If slavery were not wrong, then the slave trade should not be denounced as piracy. Yancey had not the slightest desire to reopen the slave trade, and knew that the North would not consent to a repeal of the laws against it, yet he said the demand should be made. He believed the demand to be legitimate, though sure to be rejected. The national Democratic party would thus be divided and the issue forced.[15]

For any purpose of opposing the Yancey programme the Alabama “Union” men were rendered helpless by the turn politics were taking in the North. The formation out of the wreck of the old Whig party of the distinctly sectional and radical Republican party, the attitude of the leaders of that party, the talk about the “irrepressible conflict” and the “Union cannot endure half slave and half free,” the indorsement of the “Impending Crisis” with its incendiary teachings, the effect of “Uncle Tom’s Cabin” on thousands who before had cared nothing about slavery, and finally the raid of John Brown into Virginia,[16]—these were influences more powerful toward uniting the people to resistance than all the speeches of State Rights leaders on abstract constitutional questions. After 1856 the people were in advance of their leaders.

On January 11, 1860, the Democratic state convention unanimously adopted resolutions favoring the Dred Scott decision as a settlement of the slavery question. The delegation to the national nominating convention at Charleston was instructed to withdraw in case these resolutions were not accepted in substance as a part of the platform. At Charleston the majority report of the committee on the platform sustained the Alabama position. When the report was laid before the convention, a proposition was made to set it aside for the minority report, which vaguely said nothing. Yancey in a great speech delivered the ultimatum of the South, the adoption of the majority report. The vote was taken and the South defeated. L. Pope Walker[17] announced the withdrawal of the Alabama delegation and the delegations from the other southern states followed.[18] Both sections of the convention then adjourned to meet in Baltimore. Influences for and against compromise were working, and it is probable that a majority of the seceders would have harmonized had not the Douglas organization declared the seats of the seceders vacant and admitted delegates irregularly elected by Douglas conventions in the South. After the damage was done, Yancey was pressed to take the vice-presidency on the Douglas ticket.[19] Douglas was known to be in bad health and Yancey was told that he might expect to be President within a few months, if he accepted. But it was too late for further compromise, and Yancey toured the North, speaking for Breckenridge. A State Rights convention in Alabama indorsed the candidates of the seceded convention; a convention of Douglas Democrats in Montgomery declared for Douglas; the “Constitutional Union” party (the old Whigs and “Americans” or “Know-nothings”), for Bell and Everett and old-fashioned conservative respectability. During the campaign Douglas visited the state and was well received, but aroused no enthusiasm, while Yancey was tumultuously welcomed.

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A JOHN BROWN EXTRA.

As far back as February 24, 1860, the legislature had passed almost unanimously a resolution concurring with South Carolina in regard to the right and necessity of secession, and declaring that Alabama would not submit to the domination of a “foul sectional party.” In case of the election of a “Black” Republican President a convention was to be called, and $200,000 was appropriated for its use.[20] A committee was appointed to reorganize the militia system of the state, and so important was the work deemed that the committee was excused from all other duties. The Senate declared that it was expedient to establish an arsenal, a firearms factory, and a powder mill. A bill was passed to encourage the manufacture of firearms in Alabama.[21] At this session seventy-four military companies were incorporated and provision made for military schools.[22]

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In Lawrence, Coosa, and Mobile Counties the vote was nearly evenly divided.

Elections returns were anxiously awaited.[23] It was certain that the election of Lincoln and Hamlin would result in secession.[24] When the news came the old “Union” leaders declared for secession and by noon of the next day the “Union” party had gone to pieces. The leaders who had opposed secession to the last—Watts, Clanton, Goldthwaite, Judge, and Hilliard—now took their stand by the side of Yancey and declared that Alabama must withdraw from the Union. Governor Moore, a very moderate man, in a public speech said that no course was left but for the state to secede, and with the other southern states form a confederacy. Public meetings were held in every town and village to declare that Alabama would not submit to the rule of the “Black Republican.” A typical meeting held in Mobile, November 15, 1860, arraigned the Republican party because: (1) it had declared for the abolition of slavery in all territories and Federal districts and for the abolition of the interstate slave trade; (2) it had denied the extradition of murderers, marauders, and other felons; (3) it had concealed and shielded the murderers of masters who had sought to recover fugitive slaves; (4) it advocated negro equality and made it the basis of legislation hostile to the South; (5) it opposed protection of slave property on the high seas and had justified piracy in the case of the Creole; (6) it had invaded Virginia and shed the blood of her citizens on her own soil; and (7) had announced a policy of total abolition.[25] In December, 1860, the Federal grand jury at Montgomery declared the Federal government “worthless, impotent, and a nuisance,” as it had failed to protect the interests of the people of Alabama. The presentment was signed by C. C. Gunter, foreman, and nineteen others.[26]

Had the governor been willing to call a convention at once, secession would have been almost unanimous; but delay caused the more cautious and timid to reflect and gave the so-called “coöperationists” time to put forth a platform. The leaders of the party of delay representing north Alabama, the stronghold of radical democracy, were William R. Smith, M. J. Bulger, Nicholas Davis, Jere Clemens, and Robert J. Jemison, all strong men, but none of them possessing the ability of the secessionist leaders or of the former “Union” leaders who had joined the secession party. But secession was certain,—it was only a question as to how and when. By law the governor was to call a convention in case the “Black Republican” candidates were elected, and December 24, 1860, was fixed as the time for election of delegates, and January 4, 1861, the time for assembly.

Separation of the Churches

Before the political division in 1861 the religious division had already occurred in the larger and in several of the smaller denominations. At the close of 1861 every religious body represented in the South, except the Roman Catholic church,[27] had been divided into northern and southern branches. The political rather than the moral aspects of slavery had finally led to strife in the churches. The southern churches protested against the action of the northern religious bodies in going into politics on the slavery question and thus causing endless strife between the sections as represented in the churches. The response of the northern societies to such protests resulted in the gradual alienation of the southern members and finally in separation. The first division in Alabama came in 1821, when the Associate Reformed Presbyterian church excluded slaveholders from communion and thereby lost its southern members.[28] Next came the separation of the two strongest Protestant denominations, the Baptists and the Methodists. The southern Baptists were, as slaveholders, excluded from appointment as missionaries, agents, or officers of the Board of Foreign Missions, although they contributed their full share to missions. The Alabama Baptist Convention in 1844 led the way to separation with a protest against this discrimination. The Board stated in reply that under no circumstances would a slaveholder be appointed by them to any position. The Board of the Home Mission Society made a similar declaration. The formal withdrawal of the southern state conventions followed in 1844, and in 1845 the Southern Baptist Convention was formed.[29]

In the Methodist Episcopal church the conflict over slavery had long been smouldering, and in 1844 it broke out in regard to the ownership of slaves by the wife of Bishop Andrew of Alabama. The hostile sections agreed to separate into a northern and a southern church, and a Plan of Separation was adopted. This was disregarded by the northern body and the question of the division of property went to the courts. The United States Supreme Court finally decided in favor of the southern church. From these troubles angry feelings on both sides resulted. The southern church took the name of the Methodist Episcopal Church South; the northern church retained the old name.[30]

In 1858, the northern conferences of the Methodist Protestant Church, having failed to change the constitution of the church in regard to slavery, withdrew, and uniting with a number of Wesleyan Methodists, formed the Methodist Church.[31]

The Southern Aid Society was formed in New York in 1854 for mission work in the South because it was generally believed that the American Home Mission Society was allied with the abolitionists, and because the latter society refused to aid any minister or missionary who was a slaveholder. In Alabama the Southern Aid Society worked principally among the Presbyterians of north Alabama.[32]

The Presbyterians (N.S.) separated in 1858 “on account of politics,” and the southern branch formed the United Synod South.[33] The East Alabama Presbytery (O.S.) in 1861 supported the Presbytery of Memphis in a protest against the action of the General Assembly of the church in entering politics. The Presbytery of South Alabama (O.S.) met at Selma in July, 1861, severed its connection with the General Assembly, and recommended a meeting of a Confederate States Assembly. This Assembly was held at Augusta and formed the Presbyterian Church in the Confederate States of America. A long address was published, setting forth the causes of the separation, the future policy of the church, and its attitude towards slavery. It declared that the northern section of the church with its radical policy was playing into the hands of both slaveholders and abolitionists and thus weakening its influence with both. “We,” the address stated, “in our ecclesiastical capacity are neither the friends nor foes of slavery.” As long as they were connected with the radical northern church the southern Presbyterians felt that they would be excluded from useful work among the slaves by the suspicions of the southern people concerning their real intentions.[34]

The Christian church was divided in 1854. During the war the southern synods of the Evangelical Lutherans withdrew and formed the General Synod South. There were few members of these churches in Alabama.[35]

The Cumberland Presbyterians, though separated by the war, seem not to have formally established an independent organization in the Confederate States. A convention was called to meet at Selma in 1864, but nothing resulted.[36]

In May, 1861, the Protestant Episcopal Convention of Alabama declared null and void that part of the constitution of the diocese relating to its connection with the church in the United States. Instead of the President of the United States, the Governor of Alabama, and later, the President of the Confederate States, was prayed for in the formal prayer. Bishop Cobbs, a strong opponent of secession, died one hour before the secession of the state was announced. Rev. R. H. Wilmer, a Confederate sympathizer, was elected to succeed him.[37] In July the bishops of the southern states met in Montgomery to draft a new constitution and canons. A resolution was passed stating that the secession of the southern states from the Union and the formation of a new government rendered it expedient that the dioceses within those states should form an independent organization. The new constitution was adopted in November, 1861, by a general convention, and the Protestant Episcopal Church in the Confederate States was formed.[38] And thus the religious ties were broken.

Business had also become sectionalized by 1861. The southern states felt keenly their dependence upon the states of the North for manufactures, water transportation, etc. For two decades before the war the southern newspapers agitated the question and advocated measures that would tend to secure economic independence of the North. As an instance of the feeling, many of the educators of the state were in favor of using only those text-books written by southern men and printed in the South. Professor A. P. Barnard[39] of the University of Alabama was strenuously in favor of such action. He declared that nothing ought to be bought from the North. From 1845 to 1861, fifteen “Commercial Conventions” were held in the South, largely attended by the most prominent business men and politicians. The object of these conventions was to discuss means of attaining economic independence.

When Alabama withdrew from the Union in 1861, no bonds were broken. Practically the only bond of Union for most of the people had been in the churches; to the Washington government and to the North they had never become attached. The feelings of the great majority of the people of the state are expressed in the last speech of Senator C. C. Clay of north Alabama in the United States Senate. It had been forty-two years, he said, since Alabama had entered the Union amidst scenes of excitement and violence caused by the hostility of the North against the institution of slavery in the South (referring to the conflict over Missouri). In the churches, southern Christians were denied communion because of what the North styled the “leprosy of slavery.” In violation of Constitution and laws southern people were refused permission to pass through the North with their property. The South was refused a share in the lands acquired mainly by her diplomacy, blood, and treasure. The South was robbed of her property and restoration was refused. Criminals who fled North were protected, and southern men who sought to recover their slaves were murdered. Southern homes were burned and southern families murdered. This had been endured for years, and there was no hope of better. The Republican platform was a declaration of war against the South. It was hostile to domestic peace, reproached the South as unchristian and heathenish, and imputed sin and crime to that section. It was a strong incitement to insurrection, arson, and murder among the negroes. The southern whites were denied equality with northern whites or even with free negroes, and were branded as an inferior race. The man nominated for President disregarded the judgment of courts, the obligations of the Constitution, and of his oath by declaring his approval of any measure to prohibit slavery in the territories of the United States. The people of the North branded the people of the South as outlaws, insulted them, consigned them to the execration of posterity and to ultimate destruction. “Is it to be expected that we will or can exercise that Godlike virtue that beareth all things, believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things; which tells us to love our enemies, and bless them that curse us? Are we expected to be denied the sensibilities, the sentiments, the passions, the reason, the instincts of men?” Have we no pride, no honor, no sense of shame, no reverence for ancestors and care for posterity, no love of home, of family, of friends? Are we to confess baseness, discredit the fame of our sires, dishonor ourselves and degrade posterity, abandon our homes and flee the country—all—all—for the sake of the Union? Shall we live under a government administered by those who deny us justice and brand us as inferiors? whose avowed principles and policy must destroy domestic tranquillity, imperil the lives of our wives and children, and ultimately destroy the state? The freemen of Alabama have proclaimed to the world that they will not.[40]

CHAPTER II

SECESSION FROM THE UNION

On November 12, 1860, a committee of prominent citizens, appointed by a convention of the people of several counties, asked the governor whether he intended to call the state convention immediately after the choice of presidential electors or to wait until the electors should have chosen the President. They also asked to be informed of the time he intended to order an election of delegates to the convention.[41] Governor Moore replied that a candidate for the presidency was not elected until the electors cast their votes, and until that time he would not call a convention. The electors would vote on December 5, and as he had no doubt that Lincoln would be elected, he would then order an election for December 24, and the convention would assemble in Montgomery on January 7, 1861. The date, he said, was placed far ahead in order that the people might have time to consider the subject. He summed up the situation as follows: Lincoln was the head of a sectional party pledged to the destruction of slavery; the non-slaveholding states had repeatedly resisted the execution of the Fugitive Slave Law, even nullifying the statutes of the United States by their laws intended to prevent the execution of the Fugitive Slave Law; Virginia had been invaded by abolitionists and her citizens murdered; emissaries had burned towns in Texas; and in some instances poison had been given to slaves with which to destroy the whites. With Lincoln as President the abolitionists would soon control the Supreme Court and then slavery would be abolished in the Federal district and in the territories. There would soon be a majority of free states large enough to alter the Constitution and to destroy slavery in the states. The state of society, with four million negroes turned loose, would be too horrible to contemplate, and the only safety for Alabama lay in secession, which was within her right as a sovereign state. The Federal government was established for the protection and not the destruction of rights; it had only the powers delegated by the states and hence had not the power of coercion. Alabama was devoted to the Union, but could not consent to become a degraded member of it. The state in seceding ought to consult the other southern states; but first she must decide for herself, and coöperate afterwards. The convention, the governor said, would not be a place for the timid or the rash. Men of wisdom and experience were needed, men who could determine what the honor of the state and the security of the people demanded, and who had the moral courage to carry out the dictates of their honest judgment.

The proclamation, ordering an election on Christmas Eve and the assembly of the convention at Montgomery, on January 7, 1861, was issued on December 6, the day after the choice of Lincoln by the electors. On January 7, every one of the one hundred delegates was present. It was a splendid body of men, the best the people could send.

There were the “secessionists,” who wanted immediate and separate secession of the state without regard to the action of the other southern states; the “coöperationists,” who were divided among themselves, some wanting the coöperation of the southern states within the Union in order to force their rights from the central government, and others wanting the southern states to come to an agreement within the Union and then secede and form a confederacy, while a third class wanted a clear understanding among the cotton states before secession. It was said that there were a few “submissionists,” but the votes and speeches fail to show any.

At first both parties claimed a majority, but before the convention opened it was known that the larger number were secessionists. A test vote on the election of a presiding officer showed the relative strength of the parties. William M. Brooks of Perry was elected over Robert Jemison of Tuscaloosa by a vote of 54 to 46, north Alabama voting for Jemison, central and south Alabama for Brooks. And thus the parties voted throughout the convention.

It is probable that the majority of the delegates were formerly Whigs, and a majority of them was still hostile to Yancey, who was the only prominent agitator elected. His colleague, from Montgomery County, was Thomas H. Watts, formerly a Whig. Other prominent secessionists were J. T. Dowdell, John T. Morgan, Thomas H. Herndon, E. S. Dargan, William M. Brooks, and Franklin K. Beck. The opposition leaders were William R. Smith, Robert Jemison, M. J. Bulger, Nicholas Davis, Jeremiah Clemens, Thomas J. McClellan, and David P. Lewis. Yancey, Morgan, and Watts excepted, the opposition had the more able speakers and debaters and the more political experience. The advantage of representation was with the white counties, which sent 70 of the 100 delegates.

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When the convention settled down to work, the grievances of the South had no important place in the discussions. The little that was said on the subject came from the coöperationists and that only incidentally. There was a genuine fear of social revolution brought about by the Republican programme, but the secessionists had been stating their grievances for twenty years and were now silent.[42] All seemed to agree that the present state of affairs was unbearable, and that secession was the only remedy. The only question was, How to secede? To decide that question the leaders of each party were placed on the Committee on Secession. A majority of the convention was in favor of immediate, separate secession. They held the logical state sovereignty view that the state, while a member of the Union, should not combine with another against the government or the party controlling it. Such a course would be contrary to the Constitution and would be equivalent to breaking up the Union while planning to save it. As a sovereign state, Alabama could withdraw from the Union, and hence immediate, separate secession was the proper method. Then would follow consultation and coöperation with the other seceded southern states in forming a southern confederacy. From the first it was known that the secessionists were strong enough to pass at once a simple ordinance of withdrawal. They said but little because their position was already well understood. The people were now more united than they would be after long debates and outside influence. Yet, for policy’s sake, and in deference to the feelings of the minority, the latter were allowed to debate for four days before the question at issue was brought to a vote. In that time they had about argued themselves over to the other side. With the exception of Yancey, the secessionists were silent until the ordinance was passed. The first resolution declared that the people of Alabama would not submit to the administration of Lincoln and Hamlin. Both parties voted unanimously for this resolution.[43]

The coöperationists were determined to resist Republican rule, but did not consider delay dangerous. Some doubtless thought that in some way Lincoln could be held in check and the Union still be preserved, and a number of them were doubtless willing to wait and make another trial. It was known that an ordinance of secession would be passed as soon as the secessionists cared to bring the question to a vote, but for four days the Committee on Secession considered the matter while the coöperationists made speeches.[44] On January 10 the committees made two reports. The majority report, presented by Yancey, simply provided for the immediate withdrawal of the state from the Union. The minority report, presented by Clemens, was in substance as follows: We are unable to see in separate state secession the most effectual mode of guarding our honor and securing our rights. This great object can best be attained by concurrent and concentrated action of all the states interested, and such an effort should be made before deciding finally upon our own policy. All the southern states should be requested to meet in convention at Nashville, February 22, 1861, to consider wrongs and appropriate remedies. As a basis of settlement such a convention should consider: (1) the faithful execution of the Fugitive Slave Law and the repeal of all state laws nullifying it; (2) more stringent and explicit provisions for the surrender of criminals escaping into another state; (3) guarantees that slavery should not be abolished in the Federal district or in any other place under the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress; (4) non-interference with the interstate slave trade; (5) protection of slavery in the territories which, when admitted as states, should decide for themselves the question of slavery; (6) right of transit through free states with slave property; (7) the foregoing to be irrepealable amendments to the Constitution. This basis of settlement was not to be regarded as absolute, but simply as the opinion of the Alabama convention, to which its delegates to the proposed convention were expected to conform as nearly as possible. Secession should not be attempted except after the most thorough investigation and discussion.[45]

The secessionists were of one mind in regard to secession and did not debate the subject; the coöperationists—all from north Alabama—were careful to explain their views at length in their speeches of opposition. Bulger (c.)[46] of Tallapoosa thought that separate secession was unwise and impolitic, but that an effort should be made to secure the coöperation of the other southern states before seceding. To this end he proposed a convention of the southern states to consider the grievances of the South and to determine the mode of relief for the present and security for the future, and, should its demands not be complied with, to determine upon a remedy.

Clark (c.) of Lawrence denied the right of separate secession, which would not be a remedy for existing evils. The slavery question would not be settled but would still be a vital and ever present issue. Separate secession would revolutionize the government but not the northern feeling, would not hush the pulpits, nor calm the northern mind, nor purify Black Republicanism. The states would be in a worse condition politically than the colonies were before the Constitution was adopted. The border states would sell their slaves south and become free states; separate secession would be the decree of universal emancipation. A large majority of the people were opposed to separate secession, and besides, the state alone would be weak and at the mercy of foreign powers. The proper policy for Alabama was to remain in a southern union, at least, with the border states for allies. Would secession repeal “personal liberty” laws, return a single fugitive slave, prevent abolition in the Federal district and territories, or the suppression of interstate slave trade? By secession Alabama would relinquish her interest in the Union and leave it in the control of Black Republicans. It would be almost impossible to unite the southern states after separate secession—as difficult as it was to form the original Union. The only hope for peaceable secession was in a united South, and now was the time for it, for southern sentiment, though opposed to separate secession, was ripe for southern union. The “United South” would possess all the requirements of a great nation—territory, resources, wealth, population, and community of interests. Separate secession would result in the deplorable disasters of civil war. He hoped that even yet some policy of reconciliation might succeed, but if the contrary happened, there should be no scruples about state sovereignty; the United South would assert the God-given right of every community to freedom and happiness. Jones (c.) of Lauderdale declared that it was a great mistake to call his constituents submissionists, since time after time they had declared that they would not submit to Black Republican rule. They differed as to the time and manner of secession, believing that hasty secession was not a proper remedy, that it was unwise, impolitic, and discourteous to the border states.

Smith of Tuscaloosa, the leader of the coöperationists,[47] read the platform upon which he was elected to the convention; which, in substance, was to use all honorable exertions to secure rights in the Union, and failing, to maintain them out of the Union. Allegiance, he went on to say, was due first to the state, and support was due her in any course she might adopt. If an ordinance of secession should be passed, it would be the supreme law of the land. Kimball (c.) of Tallapoosa said that his constituents were opposed to secession, but were more opposed to Black Republicanism. Before taking action he desired a solid or united South. He agreed with General Scott that with a certain unanimity of the southern states it would be impolitic and improper to attempt coercion. To secure the coöperation of the southern states and to justify themselves to the world a southern convention should be called. However, rights should be maintained even if Alabama had to withdraw from the Union.

Watkins (c.) of Franklin stated that he would vote against the ordinance of secession in obedience to the will of the people he represented. He believed that separate secession was wrong. Edwards (c.) of Blount said that secession was unwise on the part of Alabama, while Beard (c.) of Marshall thought the best, safest, and wisest course would be to consult and coöperate with the other slave states. He favored resistance to Black Republican rule, and his constituents, though desiring coöperation, would abide by the action of the state.

Bulger (c.) of Tallapoosa stated that he had voted against every proposition leading to immediate and separate secession. Yet he would give to the state, when the ordinance was passed, his whole allegiance; and, if any attempt were made to coerce the state, would join the army.[48] Winston (c.) of De Kalb stated that his constituents were opposed to immediate secession, yet they would, no doubt, acquiesce. He had written to his son, a cadet at West Point, to resign and come home. A convention of the slave states should be called to make an attempt to settle difficulties. Davis (c.) of Madison, who had stoutly opposed separate secession, now declared that since the meeting of the convention serious changes had occurred. Several states had already seceded and others would follow. Consequently Alabama would not be alone. Clemens (cs.) of Madison said he would vote for secession, but would not do so if the result depended upon his vote. He strongly preferred the plan proposed by the minority of the committee on secession.

During the debates there was not a single strong appeal for the Union. There was simply no Union feeling, but an intense dislike for the North as represented by the Republican party. The coöperationists contemplated ultimate secession. They wished to make an attempt at compromise, but they felt sure that it would fail. Their plan of effecting a united South within the Union was clearly unconstitutional and could only be regarded as a proposition to break up the old Union and reconstruct a new one.[49]

Political Theories of the Members

The secessionists held clear, logical views on the question before them. They clearly distinguished the “state” or “people” from “government.” No secessionist ever claimed that the right of secession was one derived from or preserved by the Constitution; it was a sovereign right. Granted the sovereignty of the state, the right to secede in any way at any time was, of course, not to be questioned. Consequently, they said but little on that point.

The coöperationists were vague-minded. Most of them were stanch believers in state sovereignty and opposed secession merely on the ground of expediency. A few held a confused theory that while the state was sovereign it had no right to secede unless with the whole South. This view was most strongly advocated by Clark of Lawrence. Separate secession was not a right, he said, though he admitted the sovereignty of the state. To secede alone would be rebellion; not so, if in company with other southern states. Earnest (c.) of Jefferson said that the state was sovereign, and that after secession any acts of the state or of its citizens to protect their rights would not be treason. But unless the state acted in its sovereign capacity, it could not withdraw from the Union, and her citizens would be subject to the penalties of treason.[50] Sheffield (c.) of Marshall believed in the right of “secession or revolution.” Clemens of Madison, elected as a coöperationist, said that in voting for secession he did it with the full knowledge that in secession they were all about to commit treason, and, if not successful, would suffer the pains and penalties pronounced against the highest political crime. Acting “upon the convictions of a lifetime” he “calmly and deliberately walked into revolution.”[51]

The coöperationists were generally disposed to deny the sovereignty of the convention. Most of them were former Whigs, who had never worked out a theory of government. Davis (c.) of Madison repeatedly denied that the convention had sovereign powers; sovereignty, he said, was held by the people. Clark (c.) of Lawrence complained that the convention was encroaching upon the rights of the people whom it should protect, and asserted it did not possess unlimited power, but that its power was conferred by act of the legislature, which created only a general agency for a special purpose; that the convention had no power to do more than pass the ordinance of secession and acts necessary thereto. Smith (c.) said that the convention was the creature of the legislature, not of the people, and that the southern Congress was the creature of the convention. Buford (s.) of Barbour[52] doubted whether the convention possessed legislative powers. According to his views, political or sovereign power was vested in the people; the convention was not above the constitution which created the legislature. Watts (s.) of Montgomery believed that the power of the convention to interfere with the constitution was confined to such changes as were necessary to the perfect accomplishment of secession. Yelverton (s.) of Coffee summed up the theory of the majority: the convention had full power and control over the legislative, executive, and judiciary; the people were present in convention in the persons of their representatives and in them was the sovereignty, the power, and the will of the state. This was the theory upon which the convention acted.

Passage of the Ordinance of Secession

On January 11, 1861, Yancey spoke at length, closing the debate on the question of secession. Referring to the spirit of fraternity that prevailed, he stated that irritation and suspicion had, in great degree, subsided. The majority had yielded to the minority all the time wanted for deliberation, and every one had been given an opportunity to record his sentiments. The question had not been pressed to a vote before all were ready. Though preferring a simple ordinance of secession, the majority had, for the sake of harmony and fraternal feeling, yielded to amendment by the minority. All, he said, were for resistance to Republican rule, and differed only as to the manner of resistance. Some believed in secession, others in revolution. The ordinance might mean disunion, secession, or revolution, as the members preferred. The mode was organized coöperation, not of states, but of the people of Alabama, in resistance to wrong. Yet the ordinance provided for coöperation with other states upon the basis of the Federal Constitution. Every effort, he said, had been made to find common ground upon which the advocates of resistance might meet, and all parties had been satisfied. This was not a movement of the politicians, but a great popular movement, based upon the widespread, deep-seated conviction that the government had fallen into the hands of a sectional majority who were determined to use it for the destruction of the rights of the South. All were driven by an irresistible tide; the minority had been unable to repress the movement, the majority had not been able to add one particle to its momentum; in northern, not in southern, hands was held the rod that smote the rock from which flowed this flood.

Some, he said, concluded that by dissolving the Union the rich inheritance bequeathed by the fathers was hazarded. But liberties were one thing, the power of government delegated to secure them was another. Liberties were inalienable, and the state governments were formed to secure them; the Federal government was the common agent, and its powers should be withdrawn when it abused them to destroy the rights of the people. This movement was not hostile to liberty nor to the Federal Constitution, but was merely a dismissal of an unfaithful agent. The state now resumed the duties formerly delegated to that agent. The ordinance of secession was a declaration of this fact and also a proposition to form a new government similar to the old. All were urged to sign the ordinance, not to express approval, but to give notice to their enemies that the people were not divided. “I now ask that the vote may be taken,” he said.

CIVIL WAR LEADERS.

Alexander Hamilton Stephens.		William Lowndes Yancey.
General L. P. Walker, First Confederate Secretary of War. President of Convention of 1875.
William R. Smith, Leader of Coöperationists in 1861.		Jere Clemens.

The ordinance was called up. It was styled “An Ordinance to dissolve the Union between Alabama and other States united under the Compact styled ‘The Constitution of the United States of America.’” The preamble stated that the election of Lincoln and Hamlin by a sectional party avowedly hostile to the domestic institutions, peace, and security of Alabama, preceded by many dangerous infractions of the Constitution by the states and people of the North, was a political wrong of so insulting and menacing a character as to justify the people of Alabama in the adoption of prompt and decided measures for their future peace and security. The ordinance simply stated that Alabama withdrew from the Union and that her people resumed the powers delegated by the Constitution to the Federal government. A coöperationist amendment expressed the desire of the people to form with the other southern states a permanent government, and invited a convention of the states to meet in Montgomery on February 4, 1861, for consultation in regard to the common safety. The ordinance was passed by a vote of 69 to 31, every delegate voting. Fifteen coöperationists voted for secession and 22 signed the ordinance.

In the convention opinions varied as to whether peace or war would follow secession. The great majority of the members, and of the people also, believed that peaceful relations would continue. All truly wished for peace. A number of the coöperationists expressed themselves as fearing war, but this was when opposing secession, and they probably said more than they really believed. Yet in nearly all the speeches made in the convention there seemed to be distinguishable a feeling of fear and dread lest war should follow. However, had war been a certainty, secession would not have been delayed or checked.

There was warm discussion on the question of submitting the ordinance to the people for ratification or rejection. The coöperationists, both before and after the passage of the ordinance, favored its reference to the people in the hope that the measure would be delayed or defeated. No one expected that it would be referred to the people, but this was a good question for obstructive purposes. The minority report on secession declared that, in a matter of such vital importance, involving the lives and liberties of a whole people, the ordinance should be submitted to them for their discussion, and that secession should be attempted only after ratification by a direct vote of the people on that single issue.

Posey (c.) of Lauderdale said that his constituents expected the question of secession to be referred to the people, and that they would submit more willingly to a decision made by popular vote; that the ordinance was objectionable to them unless they were allowed to vote on it. He further stated that when the convention had refused to submit the ordinance to the popular vote, the first impulse of some of the coöperationists had been to “bolt the convention.” However, not being responsible, they preferred to remain and aid in providing for the emergencies of the future. Kimbal (c.) of Tallapoosa said that the people were the interested parties, that sovereignty was in the people, and that they ought to decide the question. Edwards (c.) of Blount said that his constituents expected the ordinance to be referred to them and had instructed him to use his best exertions to secure reference to the people. Bulger (c.) of Tallapoosa voted against all propositions looking toward secession without reference to the people. Davis (c.) of Madison denied the sovereignty of the convention. He said that the vote of the people might be one way and that of the convention another. He believed that the majority in convention represented a minority of the people.

In closing the debate on this subject, Yancey (s.) of Montgomery said that, as a measure of policy, to submit the ordinance to a vote of the people was wrong. The convention was clothed with all the powers of the people; it was the people acting in their sovereign capacity; the government was not a pure democracy, but a government of the people, though not by the people. Historically the convention was the supreme power in American political theory, and submission to the people was a new doctrine. If the ordinance should be submitted to the people, the friends of secession would triumph, but irritation and prejudice would be aroused. Yancey’s views prevailed.

Establishing the Confederacy

A number of the coöperationists professed to believe that secession would result in disintegration and anarchy in the South. The secessionists were accused of desiring to tear down, not to build up. These assertions were, in fact, unfounded, since, during the entire debate, those favoring immediate secession stated plainly that they expected to reunite with the other southern states after secession. Williamson (s.) of Lowndes said that to declare to the world that they were not ready to unite with the other slave states in a permanent government would be to act in bad faith and subject themselves to contempt and scorn; united action was necessary; financial and commercial affairs were in a deplorable condition; confidence was lost, and in the business world all was gloom and despair—this could be remedied only by a permanent government. Whatley (s.) of Calhoun was unwilling for it to be said by posterity that they tore down the old government and failed to reconstruct a new; the cotton states should establish a government modelled on the Federal Union.

In accordance with these views the ordinance of secession proposed a convention of southern states, and a few days later a resolution was passed approving the suggestion of South Carolina to form a provisional government upon the plan of the old Union and to prepare for a permanent government. Each state was to send as many delegates to the convention on February 4 as it had had senators and representatives in Congress. The Alabama convention (January 16) elected one deputy from each congressional district and two from the state at large, most of them being coöperationists or moderate secessionists.

Yancey, on January 16, read a unanimous report from the Committee on Secession in favor of forming a provisional confederate government at once. The report also stated that the people of Alabama had never been dissatisfied with the Constitution of the United States; that their dissatisfaction had been with the conduct of the northern people in violating the Constitution and in dangerous misinterpretation of it, causing the belief that, while acting through the forms of government, they intended to destroy the rights of the South. The Federal Constitution, the report declared, represented a complete scheme of government, capable of being put into speedy operation, and was so familiar to the people that when properly interpreted they would feel safe under it. A speedy confederation of the seceded states was desirable, and there was no better basis than the United States Constitution. The report recommended the formation, first, of a provisional, and later, of a permanent, government. The secessionists warmly advocated the speedy formation of a new confederacy. The coöperationists renewed their policy of obstruction. Jemison (c.) of Tuscaloosa proposed to strike out the part of the resolution relating to the formation of a permanent government. Another coöperationist wanted delay in order that the border states might have time to take part in forming the proposed government. Others wanted the people to elect a new convention to act on the question. Yancey replied that delay was dangerous, if coercion was intended by the North; that the issue had been before the people and that they had invested their delegates with full power; that the convention then in session had ample authority to settle all questions concerning a provisional or a permanent government; that another election would only cause irritation; that delay, waiting for the secession of the border states, would be suicidal. The proposition for a new convention was lost by a vote of 53 to 36.

The convention decided to continue the work until the end. After choosing delegates (January 16) to the southern convention, which was to meet in Montgomery on February 4, the state convention adjourned until the Confederate provisional government was planned and the permanent constitution written. Then the state convention met again on March 4 to ratify them. The coöperationists now proposed that the new plan of government be submitted to the people. It was right and expedient, they said, to let the people decide. Morgan[53] (s.) of Dallas said that the proposition for ratification by direct vote of the people was absurd. The people would never ratify, for too many unrelated questions would be brought in. Dargan (s.) of Mobile said that the people had conferred upon the convention full powers to act, and that a new election would harass the candidates with new issues such as the slave trade, reconstruction, etc., introduced by the opponents of secession. Stone (s.) of Pickens thought that a new election would cause angry and bitter discussions, wrangling, distrust, and division among the people; that the proposed constitution was very like the United States Constitution, to which the people were so devoted that they had given up the Union rather than the Constitution; that Lincoln’s inaugural address was a declaration of war, and a permanent government was necessary to raise money for armies and fleets. Still the coöperationists obstructed, saying that not to refer to the people was unfair and illiberal; that the convention was usurping the powers of the people, who desired to be heard in the matter; that government by a few was like a house built on the sand; that there was no danger in waiting, for the people would be sure to ratify and then would be better satisfied, etc. Finally most of the coöperationists agreed that it would be better not to refer the question to the people and the permanent Confederate constitution was ratified on March 12 by the vote of 87 to 5.[54]

For the first time Yancey stood at the head of the people of the state. They were ready to give him any office. But the coöperationists and a few secessionist politicians in the convention were jealous of his rising strength and desired to stay his progress. So Earnest (c.) of Jefferson introduced a self-denying resolution making ineligible to election to Congress the members of the state legislature and of the convention. It was a direct attack by the dissatisfied politicians upon the prominent men in the convention, and especially upon Yancey. The measure was supported by Jemison (c.) who said that it was a practice never to elect a member of a legislative body to an office created by the legislature. Clemens (cs.) thought such a measure unnecessary, as the majority necessary to pass it could defeat any undesirable candidate. Stone (s.) said that such a resolution would cost the state the services of some of her best men when most needed; that the best men were in the convention; and that the southern Confederacy should be intrusted to the friends, not to the enemies, of secession. Morgan (s.) of Dallas thought that, as a matter of policy, the congressmen would be chosen from outside of the convention. Bragg (s.) of Mobile wanted the best men regardless of place; this was no ordinary work and the best men were needed; the people had already made a choice of the members once and would approve them again. Yancey said that in principle he was opposed to such a measure. He declared that he would not be a candidate. But he believed that the people had a right to a choice from their entire number, and that the convention had no right to violate the equality of citizenship by disfranchising the 223 members of the convention and the legislature. Yelverton (s.) of Coffee at first favored the resolution, but upon discovering that it was aimed at a few leaders and especially at Yancey, he opposed it. He did not wish the leaders of secession to be proscribed.

The resolution was lost by a vote of 46 to 50, but the delegates sent to the Provisional Congress were, with one exception, taken from outside the convention. A few politicians among the secessionists united with the coöperationists and, passing by the most experienced and able leaders, chose an inexperienced Whiggish delegation.[55]

The African Slave Trade

The Committee on Foreign Relations reported that the power of regulating the slave trade would properly be conferred upon the Confederate government, but, meanwhile, believing that the slave trade should be prohibited until the Confederacy was formed, the committee reported an ordinance forbidding it. Morgan (s.) of Dallas opposed the ordinance because it was silent as to the cause of the prohibition. He was opposed to the slave trade on the ground of public policy. If at liberty to carry out Christian convictions, he would have Africans brought over to be made Christian slaves, the highest condition attainable by the negro. In holding slaves, the South was charged with sin and crime, but the southern people were unable to perceive the wrong and unwilling to cease to do what the North considered evil. The present movement rested, in great measure, upon their assertion of the right to hold the African in slavery. The laws of Congress denouncing the slave trade as piracy had been a shelter to those who assailed the South, and had affected the standing of the South among nations. If the slave trade were wrong, then it was much worse to bring Christian and enlightened negroes from Virginia to Alabama than a heathen savage from Africa to Alabama. Slavery was the only force which had ever been able to elevate the negro. He believed that on grounds of public policy the traffic should be condemned, but it was a question better left to the Confederate government, because the various states would not make uniform laws. There were slaves enough for twenty years and, when needed, more could be had. Reopening of the African slave trade should be forbidden by the Confederate government expressly for reasons of public policy.

Smith (c.) of Tuscaloosa said that the question of morality did not arise; the slave trade was not wrong. The heathen African was greatly benefited by the change to Christian Alabama. But no more negroes were needed; they were already increasing too fast and there was no territory for extension. Crowded together, the white and black might degenerate like the Spaniards and natives in Mexico. He supported the ordinance as a measure to disarm foes who charged that one of the reasons for secession was a desire to reopen the African slave trade, which should be denied to the world. The slave trade would lead to war, and “If Cotton is King, his throne is peace,” war would destroy him. Jones (c.) of Lauderdale did not want another negro on the soil of Alabama. The people of the border states were afraid that the cotton states would reopen the slave trade, but for the sake of uniformity the question should be left to the Confederate government. Posey (c.) of Lauderdale also thought the border states should be reassured, and said that on the grounds of expediency alone he would vote against the slave trade. There were already too many negroes; already more land was needed, and that for whites. The slave trade should be prohibited as a great evil to the South. Potter (c.) of Cherokee was astonished that the slave trade and slavery were treated as if identical in point of morality. It was a duty to support and perpetuate slavery; the slave trade was immoral in its tendency and effects; the question, however, should be settled on the grounds of policy alone.

Yelverton (s.) of Coffee[56] said that the slave trade should not now be reopened nor forever closed, but that the regulation of it should be left to the legislature. It was said that the world was against the South on the slavery question; then the South should either own all the slaves, or set them all free in deference to unholy prejudice. As the southern people were not ready to surrender the negroes, they should be at liberty to buy them in any market, subject simply to the laws of trade. Slavery was the cause of secession and should not be left in doubt. A slave in Alabama cost eight times as much as one imported from Africa. If the border states entered the Confederacy, they could furnish slaves; if they remained in the Union and thus became foreign country, the South should not be forced to buy from them alone. Slavery was a social, moral, and political blessing. The Bible sanctioned it, and had nothing to say in favor of it in one country and against it in another. To restrict the slave market to the United States would be a blow at states rights and free trade, and with slavery stricken, King Cotton would become a petty tyrant. Slavery had built up the Yankees, socially, politically, and commercially. The English were a calculating people and would not hesitate, on account of slavery, to recognize southern independence, and other nations would do likewise. Expansion of territory would come and would cause an increased demand for slaves. The arguments against the slave trade, he said, were that fanaticism might be angered, that there were too many negroes already, and that those who had slaves to sell might suffer from reduced prices. But the larger part of the people would prefer to purchase in a cheaper market, and non-slaveholders, as they grew wealthier, could become slave owners. The argument against the slave trade, he added, was usually the one of dollars and cents. The great moral effect was lost sight of, and it seemed from some arguments that Christianity did not require the Bible to be taught to the poor slave unless profit followed. The time was not far distant when the reopening of the slave trade would be considered essential to the industrial prosperity of the cotton states.

Stone (s.) of Pickens said that he would not hesitate, from moral reasons, to purchase a slave anywhere. Slavery was sanctioned by the divine law; it was a blessing to the negro. But on grounds of policy he would insist upon the prohibition of the slave trade. Too many slaves would make too much cotton; prices would then fall and weaken the institution. Keep the prices high, and the institution would be strengthened; reduce the value of the slaves, and the interest of the owners in the institution would be reduced, and the border states would listen to plans for general emancipation. There was no territory in which slavery could expand.

Yancey (s.) explained his course in the Southern Commercial Conventions in preceding years when he had advocated the repeal of the laws against the slave trade. He thought that the laws of Congress defining the slave trade as piracy placed a stigma on the institution, condemned it from the point of view of the government, and thus violated the spirit of the Constitution by discriminating against the South. He did not then advocate the reopening of the slave trade, nor would he do so at this time. For two reasons he insisted that the Confederate Congress should prohibit the slave trade: (1) already there were as many slaves as were needed; (2) to induce the border states to enter the Confederacy.

Dowdell (s.) of Chambers proposed an amendment to the ordinance of prohibition, declaring that slavery was a moral, social, and political blessing, and that any attempt to hinder its expansion should be opposed. He opposed reopening the slave trade, though he considered that there was no moral distinction between slavery and the slave trade. The border states, he said, need not be encouraged by declarations of policy; they would join the Confederacy anyway. Slavery might be regulated by Congress, but should not be prohibited by organic law. He expressed a wish that he might never see the day when white immigration would drive out slave labor and take its place, nor did he want social or political inequality among white people whom he believed should be kept free, independent, and equal, recognizing no subordinate except those made as such by God. The legislature, he thought, should be left to deal with the evil of white immigration from the North, so that the southern people might be kept a slaveholding people. But, he asked, can that be done with slaves at $1000 a head? And must the hands of the people be tied because a fantastical outside world says that slavery and the slave trade are morally wrong?

Watts (s.) of Montgomery proposed that the Confederacy be given power to prohibit the importation of slaves from any place. Smith (c.) of Tuscaloosa said that the proposal of Watts was a threat against the border states, which would lose their slave market unless they joined the Confederacy; that the border states must be kept friendly, a bulwark against the North.

A resolution was finally passed to the effect that the people of Alabama were opposed, for reasons of public policy, to reopening the slave trade, and the state’s delegates in Congress were instructed to insist on the prohibition.

The debates show clearly the feeling of the delegates that, on the slavery question, the rest of the world was against them, and hence, as a measure of expediency, they were in favor of prohibiting the trade. Some wished to have all the whites finally become slaveholders; others believed that the negroes were the economic and social enemies of the whites, and they wanted no more of them. But all agreed that slavery was a good thing for the negro.

Yancey (s.) introduced a resolution favoring the free navigation of the Mississippi. The North, he said, was uncertain as to the policy of the South and must be assured that the South wished no restrictions upon trade. “Free trade” was its motto. Dowdell (s.) proposed that the navigation should be free only to those states and territories lying on the river and its tributaries, while Smith (c.) thought that all navigation should remain as unrestricted and open to all as before secession. Yancey thought that absolutely unrestricted navigation would tend to undermine secession, for it would tend to reconstruct the late political union into a commercial union. Such a policy would discriminate against European friends in favor of New England enemies. As passed, the resolution expressed the sense of the convention that the navigation of the Mississippi should be free to all the people of those states and territories which were situated on that river or its tributaries.

Commissioners to Other States

As soon as the governor issued writs of election for a convention, fearing that the legislatures of other states then in session might adjourn before calling conventions, he sent a commissioner to each southern state to consult and advise with the governor and legislature in regard to the question of secession and later confederation. These commissioners made frequent reports to the governor and convention and did much to secure the prompt organization of a permanent government.[57]

After the ordinance of secession was passed a resolution was adopted to the effect that Alabama, being no longer a member of the Union, was not entitled to representation at Washington and that her representatives there should be instructed to withdraw. A second resolution, authorizing the governor to send two commissioners to Washington to treat with that government, caused some debate.

Clemens (cs.) said that there was no need of sending commissioners to Washington, because they would not be received. Let Washington send commissioners to Alabama; South Carolina was differently situated; Alabama held her own forts, South Carolina did not. Smith (c.) proposed that only one commissioner be sent. One would do more efficient work and the expense would be less. Watts (s.) said that Alabama as a former member of the Union should inform the old government of her withdrawal and of her policy for the future; that there were many grave and delicate matters to be settled between the two governments; and that commissioners should be sent to propose terms of adjustment and to demand a recognition of the new order.

Webb (s.) of Greene said that Alabama stood in the same attitude toward the United States as toward France. And the fact that the commissioners of South Carolina had been treated with contempt should not influence Alabama. If one was to be in the wrong, let it be the Washington government. To send commissioners would not detract from the dignity of the state, but would show a desire for amicable relations. Whatley (s.) took the same ground, and added that, having seized the forts to prevent their being used against Alabama, the state, as retiring partner, would hold them as assets until a final settlement, especially as its share had not been received. Some members urged that only one commissioner be sent in order to save expenses. All were getting to be very economical. And practically all agreed that it was the duty of the state to show her desire for amicable relations by making advances.

Yancey thought the matter should be left to the Provisional Congress; the United States had made agreements with South Carolina about the military status of the forts and had violated the agreement; the other states also had claims of public property, and negotiations should be carried on by the common agent. Separate action by the state would only complicate matters.

Finally, it was decided to send one commissioner, and the governor appointed Thomas J. Judge, who proceeded to Washington, with authority to negotiate regarding the forts, arsenals, and custom-houses in the state, the state’s share of the United States debt, and the future relations between the United States and Alabama, and through C. C. Clay, late United States senator from Alabama, applied for an interview with the President. Buchanan refused to receive him in his official capacity, but wrote that he would be glad to see him as a private gentleman. Judge declined to be received except in his official capacity, and said that future negotiations must begin at Washington.

Foreseeing war, Watts (s.) proposed that the general assembly be given power to confiscate the property of alien enemies, and also to suspend the collection of debts due to alien enemies. Shortridge (s.) thought that the measure was not sufficiently emphatic, since war had practically been declared. He said the courts should be closed against the collection of debts due persons in the northern states which had passed personal liberty laws. He stated that Alabama owed New York several million dollars, and that to pay this debt would drain from the country the currency, which should be held to relieve the strain.

Jones (c.) was opposed to every description of robbery. The course proposed, he said, would be a flagrant outrage upon just creditors, as the greater wrong would be done the friends of the South, for nineteen-twentieths of the debt was due to political friends—merchants who had always defended the rights of the South. Those debts should be paid and honor sustained. The legislature, he added, would pass a stay-law, which he regretted, and that would suffice. Smith (c.) said that confiscation was an act of war, and would provoke retaliation. Every action should look toward the preservation of peace.

Clarke (s.) of Marengo saw nothing wrong in the measure. There was no wish or intention of evading payment of the debt; payment would only be suspended or delayed. It was a peace measure. Lewis (cs.) said that only the war-making power would have authority to pass such a measure, and that this power would be lodged in the Confederate Congress. Meanwhile, he proposed to give the power temporarily to the legislature.

Early in the session the secessionists introduced a resolution pledging the state to resist any attempt by the United States to coerce any of the seceded states. Alabama could not stand aside, they said, and see the seceded states coerced by the United States government, which had no authority to use force. All southern states recognized secession as the essence and test of state sovereignty, and would support each other.

Earnest (c.) of Jefferson was of the opinion that this resolution was intended to cover acts of hostility already committed by individuals, such as Governor Moore and other officials, before the state seceded, and to vote for the resolution subjected the voter to the penalties of treason. When a state acted in its sovereign capacity and withdrew from the Union, then those individuals were relieved. But to vote for such a measure before secession was treason.

Morgan (s.) of Dallas said that, whether Alabama were in or out of the Union, she could see no state coerced; the question was not debatable. To attack South Carolina was to attack Alabama. “We are one united people and can never be dissevered.” The North was pledging men and money to coerce the southern states, and its action must be answered. Jemison (c.) thought the war alarms were false and that there was no necessity for immediate action, while Smith (c.), his colleague, heartily indorsed the measure. Jones (c.) declared that before the state seceded he would not break the laws of the United States; that he had sworn to support the Constitution, and only the state could absolve him from that oath; that such a measure was not lawful while the state was in the Union.

After secession the resolution was again called up, and all speakers agreed that aid should be extended to seceded states in case of coercion. Some wanted to promise aid to any one of the United States which might take a stand against the other states in behalf of the South. Events moved so rapidly that the measure did not come to a vote before the organization of the Provisional Congress.

Legislation by the Convention

Not only was the old political structure to be torn down, but a new one had to be erected. In organizing the new order the convention performed many duties pertaining usually to the legislature. This was done in order to save time and to prevent confusion in the administration.

Citizenship was defined to include free whites only, except such as were citizens of the United States before January 11, 1861. A person born in a northern state or in a foreign country before January 11, 1861, must take the oath of allegiance to the state of Alabama, and the oath of abjuration, renouncing allegiance to all other sovereignties. The state constitution was amended by omitting all references to the United States; the state officers were absolved from their oath to support the United States Constitution; jurisdiction of the United States over waste and unappropriated lands and navigable waters was rescinded; and navigation was opened to all citizens of Alabama and other states that “may unite with Alabama in a Southern Slaveholding Confederacy.” A registration of lands was ordered to be made; the United States land system was adopted, a homestead law was provided for, and a new land office was established at Greenville, in Butler County. The governor was authorized to revoke contracts made under United States laws with commissioners appointed to locate swamps and overflowed lands. The general assembly was authorized to cede to the Confederacy exclusive jurisdiction over a district ten miles square for a seat of government for the Confederate States of America.

Provision was made for the military defence of Alabama, and the United States army regulations were adopted almost in their entirety. The militia was reorganized; all commissions were vacated, and new elections ordered. The governor was placed in charge of all measures for defence. He was authorized to purchase supplies for the use of the state army, to borrow money for the same, and to issue bonds to cover expenses. Later, the convention decreed that all arms and munitions of war taken from the United States should be turned over to the Confederacy; only the small arms belonging to the state were retained. The governor was authorized to transfer to the Confederate States, upon terms to be agreed upon between the governor and the president, all troops raised for state defence. Thus all volunteer companies could be transferred to the Confederate service if the men were willing, otherwise they were discharged. A number of ordinances were passed organizing the state military system, and coöperating with the Confederate government. Jurisdiction over forts, arsenals, and navy yards was conferred upon the Confederate States. This ordinance could only be revoked by a convention of the people.

The port of Mobile was resumed by the state. The collector of the port and his assistants were continued in office as state officials who were to act in the name of the state of Alabama. With a view to future settlement the collector was ordered to retain all funds in his hands belonging to the United States, and the state of Alabama guaranteed his safety, as to oath, bond, etc. As far as possible, the United States customs and port regulations were adopted. Vessels built anywhere, provided that one-third was owned by citizens of the southern states and commanded by southern captains, were entitled to registry as vessels of Alabama. The collector was authorized to take possession in the name of the state of all government custom-houses, lighthouses, etc., and to reappoint the officers in charge if they would accept office from the state. The weights and measures of the United States were adopted as the standard; discriminating duties imposed by the United States, and regulations on foreign vessels and merchandise were abolished; Selma and Mobile were continued as ports of entry, and all ordinances relating to Mobile were extended to Selma.

Thaddeus Sanford, the collector of Mobile, reported to the convention that the United States Treasury Department had drawn on him for $26,000 on January 7, 1861, and asked for instructions in regard to paying it. The Committee on Imports reported that the draft was dated before secession and before the ordinance directing the collector to retain all United States funds, that it was drawn to pay parties for services rendered while Alabama was a member of the Union. So it was ordered to be paid.

After the Confederacy was formed, the convention ordered that the custom-houses, marine hospital, lighthouses, buoys, and the revenue cutter, Lewis Cass, be turned over to the Confederate authorities; and the collector was directed to transfer all money collected by him to the Confederate authorities, who were to account for all moneys and settle with the United States authorities. The collector was then released from his bond to the state.

Postal contracts and regulations in force prior to January 11, 1861, were permitted to remain for the present. The general assembly was empowered to make postal arrangements until the Confederate government should be established. Meanwhile, the old arrangements with the United States were unchanged.[58] Other ordinances adopted the laws of the United States relating to the value of foreign coins, and directed the division of the state into nine congressional districts.

The judicial powers were resumed by the state and were henceforth to be exercised by the state courts. The circuit and chancery courts and the city court of Mobile were given original jurisdiction in cases formerly arising within the jurisdiction of the Federal courts. Jurisdiction over admiralty cases was vested in the circuit courts and the city court of Mobile. The chancery courts had jurisdiction in all cases of equity. The state supreme court was given original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases concerning ambassadors and public ministers. All admiralty cases, except where the United States was plaintiff, pending in the Federal courts in Alabama were transferred with all records to the state circuit courts; cases in equity in like manner to the state chancery courts; the United States laws relating to admiralty and maritime cases, and to the postal service were adopted temporarily; the forms of proceedings in state courts were to be the same as in former Federal courts; the clerks of the circuit courts were given the custody of all records transferred from Federal courts and were empowered to issue process running into any part of the state and to be executed by any sheriff; United States marshals in whose hands processes were running were ordered to execute them and to make returns to the state courts under penalty of being prosecuted as if defaulting sheriffs; the right was asserted to prosecute marshals who were guilty of misconduct before secession. The United States laws of May 26, 1796, and March 27, 1804, prescribing the method of authentication of public acts, records, or judicial proceedings for use in other courts, were adopted for Alabama. In cases appealed to the United States Supreme Court from the Alabama supreme court, the latter was to act as if no appeal had been taken and execute judgment; cases appealed from inferior Federal courts to the United States Supreme Court, were to be considered as appealed to the state supreme court which was to proceed as if the cases had been appealed to it from its own lower courts. The United States were not to be allowed to be a party to any suit in the state courts against a citizen of Alabama unless ordered by the convention or by the general assembly. Federal jurisdiction in general was to be resumed by state courts until the Confederate government should act in the matter.

No law of Alabama in force January 11, 1861, consistent with the Constitution and not inconsistent with the ordinances of the convention, was to be affected by secession; no official of the state was to be affected by secession; no offence against the state, and no penalty, no obligation, and no duty to or of state, no process or proceeding in court, no right, title, privilege, or obligation under the state or United States Constitution and laws, was to be affected by the ordinance of secession unless inconsistent with it. No change made by the convention in the constitution of Alabama should have the effect to divest of any right, title, or legal trust existing at the time of making the change. All changes were to have a prospective, not a retrospective, effect unless expressly declared in the change itself.

The general assembly was to have no power to repeal, alter, or amend any ordinance of the convention incorporated in the revised constitution. Other ordinances were to be considered as ordinary legislation and might be amended or repealed by the legislature.[59]

North Alabama in the Convention

All the counties of north Alabama sent coöperation delegates to the convention, and these spoke continually of a peculiar state of feeling on the part of their constituents which required conciliation by the convention. The people of that section, in regard to their grievances, thought as the people of central and south Alabama, but they were not so ready to act in resistance. Moreover, it would seem that they desired all the important measures framed by the convention to be referred to them for approval or disapproval. The coöperationists made much of this state of feeling for purposes of obstruction. There was, and had always been, a slight lack of sympathy between the people of the two sections; but on the present question they were very nearly agreed, though still opposing from habit. Had the coöperationists been in the majority, secession would have been hardly delayed. Of course, among the mountains and sand-hills of north Alabama was a small element of the population not concerned in any way with the questions before the people, and who would oppose any measure supported by southern Alabama. Sheets of Winston was probably the only representative of this class in the convention. The members of the convention referred to the fact of the local nature of the dissatisfaction. Yancey, angered at the obstructive tactics of the coöperationists, who had no definite policy and nothing to gain by obstruction, made a speech in which he said it was useless to disguise the fact that in some parts of the state there was dissatisfaction in regard to the action of the convention, and warned the members from north Alabama, whom he probably considered responsible for the dissatisfaction, that as soon as passed the ordinance of secession became the supreme law of the land, and it was the duty of all citizens to yield obedience. Those who refused, he said, were traitors and public enemies, and the sovereign state would deal with them as such. Opposition after secession was unlawful and to even speak of it was wrong, and he predicted that the name “tory” would be revived and applied to such people. Jemison of Tuscaloosa, a leading coöperationist, made an angry reply, and said that Yancey would inaugurate a second Reign of Terror and hang people by families, by towns, counties, and districts.

Davis (c.) of Madison declared that the people of north Alabama would stand by the expressed will of the people of the state, and intimated that the action of the convention did not represent the will of the people. If, he added, resistance to revolution gave the name of “tories,” it was possible that the people of north Alabama might yet bear the designation; that any invasion of their rights or any attempt to force them to obedience would result in armed resistance; that the invader would be met at the foot of the mountains, and in armed conflict the question of the sovereignty of the people would be settled. Clark (c.) of Lawrence said that north Alabama was more closely connected with Tennessee, and that many of the citizens were talking of secession from Alabama and annexation to Tennessee. He begged for some concession to north Alabama, but did not seem to know exactly what he wanted. He intimated that there would be civil war in north Alabama. Jones (c.) of Lauderdale said that his people were not “submissionists” and would share every toil and danger in support of the state to which was their supreme allegiance. Edwards (c.) of Blount was not prepared to say whether his people would acquiesce or not. He promised to do nothing to excite them to rebellion! Davis of Madison, who a few days before was ready to rebel, now said that he, and perhaps all north Alabama, would cheerfully stand by the state in the coming conflict.

JEFFERSON DAVIS.

A majority of the coöperationists voted against the ordinance of secession, at the same time stating that they intended to support it when it became law. The ordinance was lithographed, and the delegates were given an opportunity to sign their names to the official copy. Thirty-three of the delegates from north Alabama, two of whom had voted for the ordinance, refused to sign, because, as they said, it might appear as if they approved all that had been done by the secessionists. Their opposition to the policy of the majority was based on the following principles: (1) the fundamental principle that representative bodies should submit their acts for approval to the people; (2) the interests of all demanded that all the southern states be consulted in regard to a plan for united action. The members who refused to sign repeatedly acknowledged the binding force of the ordinance and promised a cheerful obedience, but, at the same time, published far and wide an address to the people, justifying their opposition and refusal to sign, causing the impression that they considered the action of the convention illegal. There was no reason whatever why these men should pursue the policy of obstruction to the very last, yet it was done. Nine of the thirty-three finally signed the ordinance, but twenty-four never signed it, though they promised to support it.

The majority of the members and of the people contemplated secession as a finality; reconstruction was not to be considered. A few of the coöperationists, however, were in favor of secession as a means of bringing the North to terms. Messrs. Pugh and Clay (members of Congress) in a letter to the convention suggested that the border states considered the secession of the cotton states as an indispensable basis for a reconstruction of the Union. Smith of Tuscaloosa, the leading coöperationist, stated his belief that the revolution would teach the North her dependence upon the South, how much she owed that section, bring her to a sense of her duty, and cause her to yield to the sensible demands of the South. He looked forward with fondest hopes to the near future when there would be a reconstruction of the Union with redress of grievances, indemnity for the past, complete and unequivocal guarantees for the future.

Incidents of the Session

The proceedings were dignified, solemn, and at times even sad. During the whole session, good feeling prevailed to a remarkable degree among the individual members, and toward the last the utmost harmony existed between the parties.[60] For this the credit is due the secessionists. At times the coöperationists were suspicious, and pursued a policy of obstruction when nothing was to be gained; but they were given every privilege and shown every courtesy. During the early part of the session an enthusiastic crowd filled the halls and galleries and manifested approval of the course of the secessionist leaders by frequent applause. In order to secure perfect freedom of debate to the minority, it was ordered that no applause be permitted; and this order failing to keep the spectators silent, the galleries were cleared, and thereafter secret sessions were the rule.

Affecting and exciting scenes followed the passage of the ordinance of secession. One by one the strong members of the minority arose and, for the sake of unity at home, surrendered the opinions of a lifetime and forgot the prejudices of years. This was done with no feeling of humiliation. To the last, they were treated with distinguished consideration by their opponents. There was really no difference in the principles of the two parties; the only differences were on local, personal, sectional, and social questions. On the common ground of resistance to a common enemy they were united.

On January 11, 1861, after seven days’ debate, it became known that the vote on secession would be taken, and an eager multitude crowded Capitol Hill to hear the announcement of the result. The senate chamber, opposite the convention hall, was crowded with the waiting people, who were addressed by distinguished orators on the topics of the day. As many women as men were present, and, if possible, were more eager for secession. Their minds had long ago been made up. “With them,” says the grave historian of the convention, “the love songs of yesterday had swelled into the political hosannas of to-day.”

The momentous vote was taken, the doors were flung open, the result announced, and in a moment the tumultuous crowd filled the galleries, lobbies, and aisles of the convention hall. The ladies of Montgomery had made a large state flag, and when the doors were opened this flag was unfurled in the hall so that its folds extended almost across the chamber. Members jumped on desks, chairs, and tables to shake out the floating folds and display the design. There was a perfect frenzy of enthusiasm. Yancey, the secessionist leader and splendid orator, in behalf of the ladies presented the flag to the convention. Smith, the leader of the coöperationists, replied in a speech of acceptance, paying an affecting tribute to the flag that they were leaving—“the Star-Spangled Banner, sacred to memory, baptized in the nation’s best blood, consecrated in song and history, and the herald of liberty’s grandest victories on land and on sea.” In memory of the illustrious men who brought fame to the flag, he said, “Let him who has tears prepare to shed them now as we lower this glorious ensign of our once vaunted victories.” Alpheus Baker of Barbour in glowing words expressed to the ladies the thanks of the convention.

Amidst wild enthusiasm in hall and street the convention adjourned. One hundred and one cannon shots announced the result. The flag of the Republic of Alabama floated from windows, steeples, and towers. Party lines were forgotten, and until late in the night every man who would speak was surrounded by eager listeners. The people were united in common sentiment in the face of common danger.

One hour before the signal cannon shot announced that the fateful step had been taken and that Alabama was no longer one of the United States, there died, within sight of the capitol, Bishop Cobb of the Episcopal Church, the one man of character and influence who in all Alabama had opposed secession in any way, at any time, or for any reason.[61]

PART II
WAR TIMES IN ALABAMA

CHAPTER III

MILITARY AND POLITICAL EVENTS

Sec. I. Military Operations

On January 4, 1861, the Alabama troops, ordered by Governor Andrew B. Moore, seized the forts which commanded the entrance to the harbor at Mobile, and also the United States arsenal at Mount Vernon, thirty miles distant. A few days later the governor, in a communication addressed to President Buchanan, explained the reason for this step. He was convinced, he said, that the convention would withdraw the state from the Union, and he deemed it his duty to take every precaution to render the secession peaceable. Information had been received which led him to believe that the United States government would attempt to maintain its authority in Alabama by force, even to bloodshed. The President must surely see, the governor wrote, that coercion could not be effectual until capacity for resistance had been exhausted, and it would have been unwise to have permitted the United States government to make preparations which would be resisted to the uttermost by the people. The purpose in taking possession of the forts and arsenal was to avoid, not to provoke, hostilities. Amicable relations with the United States were ardently desired by Alabama; and every patriotic man in the state was praying for peaceful secession. He had ordered an inventory to be taken of public property in the forts and arsenal, which were held subject to the control of the convention.[62] A month later, Governor Moore, in a communication addressed to the Virginia commissioners for mediation, stated that Alabama, in seceding, had no hostile intentions against the United States; that the sole object was to protect her rights, interests, and honor, without disturbing peaceful relations. This would continue to be the policy of the state unless the Federal government authorized hostile acts. Yet any attempt at coercion would be resisted. In conclusion, he stated that he had no power to appoint delegates to the proposed convention, but promised to refer the matter to the legislature. However, he did not believe that there was the least hope that concessions would be made affording such guarantees as the seceding states could accept.[63]

The War in North Alabama

For a year Alabama soil was free from invasion, though the coast was blockaded in the summer of 1861. In February, 1862, Fort Henry, on the Tennessee River, fell, and on the same day Commodore Phelps with four gunboats sailed up the river to Florence. Several steamboats with supplies for Johnston’s army were destroyed to prevent capture by the Federals. Phelps destroyed a partly finished gunboat, burned the Confederate supplies in Florence, and then returned to Fort Henry.[64] The fall of Fort Donelson (February 16) and the retreat of Johnston to Corinth left the Tennessee valley open to the Federals. A few days after the battle of Shiloh, General O. M. Mitchell entered Huntsville (April 11, 1862) and captured nearly all the rolling stock belonging to the railroads running into Huntsville. Decatur, Athens, Tuscumbia, and the other towns of the Tennessee valley were occupied within a few days. To oppose this invasion the Confederates had small bodies of troops widely scattered across north Alabama. The fighting was almost entirely in the nature of skirmishes and was continual. Philip D. Roddy, later known as the “Defender of North Alabama,” first appears during this summer as commander of a small body of irregular troops, which served as the nucleus of a regiment and later a brigade. Hostilities in north Alabama at an early date assumed the worst aspects of guerilla warfare. The Federals were never opposed by large commands of Confederates, and were disposed to regard the detachments who fought them as guerillas and to treat them accordingly. In spite of the strenuous efforts of General Buell to have his subordinates wage war in civilized manner,[65] they were guilty of infamous conduct. General Mitchell was charged by the people with brutal conduct toward non-combatants and with being interested in the stealing of cotton and shipping it North. He was finally removed by Buell.[66]

One of Mitchell’s subordinates—John Basil Turchin, the Russian colonel of the Nineteenth Illinois regiment—was too brutal even for Mitchell, and the latter tried to keep him within bounds. His worst offence was at Athens, in Limestone County, in May, 1862. Athens was a wealthy place, intensely southern in feeling, and on that account was most heartily disliked by the Federals. Here, for two hours, Turchin retired to his tent and gave over the town to the soldiers to be sacked after the old European custom. Revolting outrages were committed. Robberies were common where Turchin commanded. His Russian ideas of the rules of war were probably responsible for his conduct. Buell characterized it as “a case of undisputed atrocity.” For this Athens affair Turchin was court-martialled and sentenced to be dismissed from the service. The facts were notorious and well known at Washington, but the day before Buell ordered his discharge, Turchin was made a brigadier-general.[67]

General Mitchell himself reported (May, 1862) that “the most terrible outrages—robberies, rapes, arson, and plundering—are being committed by lawless brigands and vagabonds connected with the army.” He asked for authority to hang them and wrote, “I hear the most deplorable accounts of excesses committed by soldiers.”[68] About fifty of the citizens of Athens, at the suggestion of Mitchell, filed claims for damages. Thereupon Mitchell informed them that they were laboring under a very serious misapprehension if they expected pay from the United States government unless they had proper vouchers.[69] Buell condemned his action in this matter also. Mitchell asked the War Department for permission to send prominent Confederate sympathizers at Huntsville to northern prisons. He said that General Clemens and Judge Lane advised such a measure. He reported that he held under arrest a few active rebels “who refused to condemn the guerilla warfare.” The War Department seems to have been annoyed by the request, but after Mitchell had repeated it, permission was given to send them to the fort in Boston Harbor.[70]

Mitchell was charged at Washington with having failed in his duty of repressing plundering and pillaging. He replied that he had no great sympathy with the citizens of Athens who hated the Union soldiers so intensely.[71]

As the war continued the character of the warfare grew steadily worse. Ex-Governor Chapman’s family were turned out of their home to make room for a negro regiment. A four-year-old child of the family wandered back to the house and was cursed and abused by the soldiers. The house was finally burned and the property laid waste. Governor Chapman was imprisoned and at last expelled from the country. Mrs. Robert Patton they threatened to strip in search of money and actually began to do so in the presence of her husband, but she saved herself by giving up the money.[72] Such experiences were common.

The provost marshal at Huntsville—Colonel Harmer—selected a number of men to answer certain political questions, who, if their answers were not satisfactory, were to be expelled from the country. Among these were, George W. Hustoun, Luke Pryor, and —— Malone of Athens, Dr. Fearn of Huntsville, and two ministers—Ross and Banister. General Stanley condemned the policy, but General Granger wanted the preachers expelled anyway, although Stanley said they had never taken part in politics.[73] The harsh treatment of non-combatants and Confederate soldiers by Federal soldiers and by the tories resulted in the retaliation of the former when opportunity occurred. Toward the end of the war prisoners were seldom taken by either side. When a man was caught, he was often strung up to a limb of the nearest tree, his captors waiting a few minutes for their halters, and then passing on. The Confederate irregular cavalry became a terror even to the loyal southern people. Stealing, robbery, and murder were common in the debatable land of north Alabama.[74]

Naturally the “tory” element of the population suffered much from the same class of Confederate troops. The Union element, it was said, suffered more from the operation of the impressment law. The Confederate and state governments strictly repressed the tendency of Confederate troops to pillage the “Union” communities in north Alabama.[75]

General Mitchell and his subordinates were accustomed to hold the people of a community responsible for damages in their vicinity to bridges, trestles, and trains caused by the Confederate forces. In August, 1862, General J. D. Morgan, in command at Tuscumbia, reported that he “sent out fifty wagons this afternoon to the plantations near where the track was torn up yesterday, for cotton. I want it to pay damages.”[76] When Turchin had to abandon Athens, on the advance of Bragg into Tennessee, he set fire to and burned much of the town, but his conduct was denounced by his fellow-officers.[77] Near Gunterville (1862) a Federal force was fired upon by scouts, and the Federals, in retaliation, shelled the town. This was done a second time during the war, and finally the town was burned. In Jackson County four citizens were arrested (1862) because the pickets at Woodville, several miles away, had been fired upon.[78]

In a skirmish in north Alabama, General R. L. McCook was shot by Captain Gurley of Russell’s Fourth Alabama Cavalry. The Federals spread the report among the soldiers that he had been murdered, and as the Federal commander reported, “Many of the soldiers spread themselves over the country and burned all the property of the rebels in the vicinity, and shot a rebel lieutenant who was on furlough.” Even the house of the family who had ministered to General McCook in his last moments was burned to the ground. The old men and boys for miles around were arrested. The officer who was shot was at home on furlough and sick. General Dodge’s command committed many depredations in retaliation for the death of McCook. A year later Captain Gurley was captured and sentenced to be hanged. The Confederate authorities threatened retaliation, and he was then treated as a prisoner of war. After the close of the war he was again arrested and kept in jail and in irons for many months at Nashville and Huntsville. At last he was liberated.[79]

Later in the war (1864), General M. L. Smith ordered the arrest of “five of the best rebels” in the vicinity of a Confederate attack on one of his companies, and again five were arrested near the place where a Union man had been attacked.[80] These are examples of what often happened. It became a rule to hold a community responsible for all attacks made by the Confederate soldiers.

The people suffered fearfully. Many of them had to leave the country in order to live. John E. Moore wrote to the Confederate Secretary of War from Florence, in December, 1862, that the people of north Alabama “have been ground into the dust by the tyrants and thieves.”[81] The citizens of Florence (January, 1863) petitioned the Secretary of War for protection. They said that they had been greatly oppressed by the Federal army in 1862. Property had been destroyed most wantonly and vindictively, the privacy of the homes invaded, citizens carried off and ill treated, and slaves carried off and refused the liberty of returning when they desired to do so. The harshness of the Federals had made many people submissive for fear of worse things. No men, except the aged and infirm, were left in the country; the population was composed chiefly of women and children.[82] It was in response to this appeal that Roddy’s command was raised to a brigade. But the retreat of Bragg left north Alabama to the Federals until the close of the war, except for a short period during Hood’s invasion of Tennessee.

The Streight Raid

April 19, 1863, Colonel A. D. Streight of the Federal army, with 2000 picked troops, disembarked at Eastport and started on a daring raid through the mountain region of north Alabama. The object of the raid was to cut the railroads from Chattanooga to Atlanta and to Knoxville, which supplied Bragg and to destroy the Confederate stores at Rome. To cover Streight’s movements General Dodge was making demonstrations in the Tennessee valley and Forrest was sent to meet him. Hearing by accident of Streight’s movements, Forrest left a small force under Roddy to hold Dodge in check and set out after the raider. The chase began on April 29. Streight had sixteen miles the start with a force reduced to 1500 men, mounted on mules. As his mounts were worn out, he seized fresh horses on the route. The chase led through the counties of Morgan, Blount, St. Clair, De Kalb, and Cherokee—counties in which there was a strong tory element, and the Federals were guided by two companies of Union cavalry raised in north Alabama. Streight had asked for permission to dress some of his men “after the promiscuous southern style,” but, fortunately for them, was not allowed to do so.[83]

On May 1 occurred the famous crossing of Black Creek, where Miss Emma Sansom guided the Confederates across in the face of a heavy fire. Forrest now had less than 600 men, the others having been left behind exhausted or with broken-down horses. The best men and horses were kept in front, and Streight was not allowed a moment’s rest. At last, tired out, the Federals halted on the morning of May 3. Soon the men were asleep on their arms, and when Forrest appeared, some of them could not be awakened. Men were asleep in line of battle, under fire. Forrest placed his small force so as to magnify his numbers, and Streight was persuaded by his officers to surrender—1466 men to less than 600. The running fight had lasted four days, over a distance of 150 miles, through rough and broken country filled with unfriendly natives. Forrest could not get fresh mounts, the Federals could; the Federals had been preparing for the raid a month; Forrest had a few hours to prepare for the pursuit, and his whole force with Roddy’s did not equal half of the entire Federal force of 9500.[84]

During the summer and fall there were many small fights between the cavalry scouts of Roddy and Wheeler and the Federal foraging parties. In October General S. D. Lee from Mississippi entered the northwestern part of the state, and for two or three weeks fought the Federals and tore up the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. The First Alabama Union Cavalry started on a raid for Selma, but was routed by the Second Alabama Cavalry. The Tennessee valley was the highway along which passed and repassed the Federal armies during the remainder of the war.

During the months of January, February, March, and April, 1864, scouting, skirmishing, and fighting in north Alabama by Forrest, Roddy, Wheeler, Johnson, Patterson, and Mead were almost continuous; and Federal raids were frequent. The Federals called all Confederate soldiers in north Alabama “guerillas,” and treated prisoners as such. The Tennessee valley had been stripped of troops to send to Johnston’s army. In May, 1864, the Federal General Blair marched through northeast Alabama to Rome, Georgia, with 10,500 men. Federal gunboats patrolled the river, landing companies for short raids and shelling the towns. In August there were many raids and skirmishes in the Tennessee valley. On September 23, Forrest with 4000 men, on a raid to Pulaski, persuaded the Federal commander at Athens that he had 10,000 men, and the latter surrendered, though in a strong fort with a thousand men.

Rousseau’s Raid

July 10, 1864, General Rousseau started from Decatur, Morgan County, with 2300 men on a raid toward southeast Alabama to destroy the Montgomery and West Point Railway below Opelika, and thus cut off the supplies coming from the Black Belt for Johnston’s army. General Clanton, who opposed him with a small force, was defeated at the crossing of the Coosa on July 14; the iron works in Calhoun County were burned, and the Confederate stores at Talladega were destroyed. The railroad was reached near Loachapoka in what is now Lee County, and miles of the track there and above Opelika were destroyed, and the depots at Opelika, Auburn, Loachapoka, and Notasulga, all with quantities of supplies, were burned. This was the first time that central Alabama had suffered from invasion.[85]

In October General Hood marched via Cedartown, Georgia, into Alabama to Gadsden, thence to Somerville and Decatur, crossing the river near Tuscumbia on his way to the fatal fields of Franklin and Nashville. “Most of the fields they passed were covered with briers and weeds, the fences burned or broken down. The chimneys in every direction stood like quiet sentinels and marked the site of once prosperous and happy homes, long since reduced to heaps of ashes. No cattle, hogs, horses, mules, or domestic fowls were in sight. Only the birds seemed unconscious of the ruin and desolation which reigned supreme. No wonder that Hood pointed to the devastation wrought by the invader to nerve his heroes for one more desperate struggle against immense odds for southern independence.”[86] A few weeks later the wreck of Hood’s army was straggling back into north Alabama, which now swarmed with Federals. Bushwhackers, guerillas, tories, deserters, “mossbacks,” harried the defenceless people of north Alabama until the end of the war and even after. A few scattered bands of Confederates made a weak resistance.

The War in South Alabama

To return to south Alabama. During the years 1861 and 1862 the defences of Mobile were made almost impregnable. They were commanded in turn by Generals Withers, Bragg, Forney, Buckner, and Maury. The port was blockaded in 1861, but no attacks were made on the defences until August, 1864, when 15,000 men were landed to besiege Fort Gaines. Eighteen war vessels under Farragut passed the forts into the bay and there fought the fiercest naval battle of the war. Admiral Buchanan commanded the Confederate fleet of four vessels—the Morgan, the Selma, the Gaines, and the Tennessee.[87] The Tecumseh was sunk by a torpedo in the bay, and Farragut had left 17 vessels, 199 guns, and 700 men against the Confederates’ 22 guns and 450 men. The three smaller Confederate vessels, after desperate fighting, were riddled with shot; one was captured, one beached, and one withdrew to the shelter of the forts. The Tennessee was left, 1 against 17, 6 guns against 200. After four hours’ cannonade from nearly 200 guns, her smoke-stack and steering gear shot away, her commander (Admiral Buchanan) wounded, one hour after her last gun had been disabled, the Tennessee surrendered. The Federals lost 52 killed, and 17 wounded, besides 120 lost on the Tecumseh. The Tennessee lost only 2 killed and 9 wounded, the Selma 8 killed and 17 wounded, the Gaines about the same.[88] The fleet now turned its attention to the forts. Fort Gaines surrendered at once; Fort Morgan held out. A siege train of 41 guns was placed in position and on August 22 these and the 200 guns of the fleet opened fire. The fort was unable to return the fire of the fleet, and the sharpshooters of the enemy soon prevented the use of guns against the shore batteries of the Federals. The firing was furious; every shell seemed to take effect; fire broke out, and the garrison threw 90,000 pounds of powder into cisterns to prevent explosion; the defending force was decimated; the interior of the fort was a mass of smouldering ruins; there was not a place five feet square not struck by shells; many of the guns were dismounted. For twenty-four hours the bombardment continued, the garrison not being able to return the fire of the besiegers, yet the enemy reported that the garrison was not “moved by any weak fears.” On the morning of August 23, 1864, the fort was surrendered.[89] Though the outer defences had fallen, the city could not be taken. The inner defences were strengthened, and were manned with “reserves,”—boys and old men, fourteen to sixteen, and forty-five to sixty years of age.

In March, 1865, General Steele advanced from Pensacola to Pollard with 15,000 men, while General Canby with 32,000 moved up the east side of Mobile Bay and invested Spanish Fort. He sent 12,000 men to Steele, who began the siege of Blakely on April 2. Spanish Fort was defended by 3400 men, later reduced to 2321, against Canby’s 20,000. The Confederate lines were two miles long. After a twelve days’ siege a part of the Confederate works was captured, and during the next night (April 8), the greater part of the garrison escaped in boats or by wading through the marshes. Blakely was defended by 3500 men against Steele’s 25,000. After a siege of eight days the Federal works were pushed near the Confederate lines, and a charge along the whole three miles of line captured the works with the garrison (April 9). Three days later batteries Huger and Tracy, defending the river entrance, were evacuated, and on April 12 the city surrendered.[90] The state was then overrun from all sides.[91]

Wilson’s Raid and the End of the War

During the winter of 1864-1865, General J. H. Wilson gathered a picked force of 13,500 cavalry, at Gravelly Springs in northwestern Alabama, in preparation for a raid through central Alabama, the purpose of which was to destroy the Confederate stores, the factories, mines, and iron works in that section, and also to create a diversion in favor of Canby at Mobile.[92] On March 22 he left for the South. There was not a Confederate soldier within 120 miles; the country was stripped of its defenders. The Federal army under Wilson foraged for provisions in north Alabama when they themselves reported people to be starving.[93] To confuse the Confederates, Wilson moved his corps in three divisions along different routes. On March 29, near Elyton, the divisions united, and General Croxton was again detached and sent to burn the University and public buildings at Tuscaloosa. Driving Roddy before him, Wilson, on March 31, burned five iron works near Elyton. Forrest collected a motley force to oppose Wilson. The latter sent a brigade which decoyed one of Forrest’s brigades away into the country toward Mississippi,[94] so that this force was not present to assist in the defence when, on April 2, Wilson arrived before Selma with 9000 men. This place, with works three miles long, was defended by Forrest with 3000 men, half of whom were reserves who had never been under fire. They made a gallant fight, but the Federals rushed over the thinly defended works. Forrest and two or three hundred men escaped; the remainder surrendered. When the Federals entered the city, night had fallen, and the soldiers plundered without restraint until morning. Forrest had ordered that all the government whiskey in the city be destroyed, but after the barrels were rolled into the street the Confederates had no time to knock in the heads before the city was captured. The Federals were soon drunk. All the houses in the city were entered and plundered. A newspaper correspondent who was with Wilson’s army said that Selma was the worst-sacked town of the war. One woman saved her house from the plunderers by pulling out all the drawers, tearing up the beds, throwing clothes all over the floor along with dishes and overturned tables, chairs, and other things. When the soldiers came to the house, they concluded that others had been there before them and departed. The outrages, robberies, and murders committed by Wilson’s men, notwithstanding his stringent order against plundering,[95] are almost incredible. The half cannot be told. The destruction was fearful. The city was wholly given up to the soldiers, the houses sacked, the women robbed of their watches, earrings, rings, and other jewellery.[96] The negroes were pressed into the work of destruction, and when they refused to burn and destroy, they were threatened with death by the soldiers. Every one was robbed who had anything worth taking about his person. Even negro men on the streets and negro women in the houses were searched and their little money and trinkets taken.[97]

The next day the public buildings and storehouses with three-fourths of the business part of the town and 150 residences were burned. Three rolling mills, a large naval foundry, and the navy yard,—where the Tennessee had been built,—the best arsenal in the Confederacy, powder works, magazines, army stores, 35,000 bales of cotton, a large number of cars, and the railroad bridges were destroyed. Before leaving, Wilson sent men about the town to kill all the horses and mules in Selma, and had 800 of his own worn-out horses shot. The carcasses were left lying in the roads, streets, and dooryards where they were shot. In a few days the stench was fearful, and the citizens had to send to all the country around for teams to drag away the dead animals, which were strewn along the roads for miles.[98]

Nearly every man of Wilson’s command had a canteen filled with jewellery gathered on the long raid through the richest section of the state. The valuables of the rich Cane Brake and Black Belt country had been deposited in Selma for safe-keeping, and from Selma the soldiers took everything valuable and profitable. Pianos were made into feeding troughs for horses. The officers were supplied with silver plate stolen while on the raid. In Russell County a general officer stopped at a house for dinner, and had the table set with a splendid service of silver plate taken from Selma. His escort broke open the smoke-house and, taking hams, cut a small piece from each of them and threw the remainder away. Everything that could be was destroyed. Soft soap and syrup were poured together in the cellars. They took everything they could carry and destroyed the rest.

On April 10 Wilson’s command started for Montgomery. A negro regiment of 800 men[99] was organized at Selma and accompanied the army, subsisting on the country. Before reaching Georgia there were several such regiments. On April 12 Montgomery was surrendered by the mayor. The Confederates had burned 97,000[100] bales of cotton to prevent its falling into the hands of the enemy. The captors burned five steamboats, two rolling mills, a small-arms factory, two magazines of stores, all the rolling stock of the railways, and the nitre works, the fire spreading also to the business part of the town.[101] Here, as at Selma, horses, mules, and valuables were taken by the raiders.

The force was then divided into two columns, one destined for West Point and the other for Columbus. The last fights on Alabama soil occurred near West Point on April 16, and at Girard, opposite Columbus, on the same day. At the latter place immense quantities of stores, that had been carried across the river from Alabama, were destroyed.[102]

Croxton’s force reached Tuscaloosa April 3, and burned the University buildings, the nitre works, a foundry, a shoe factory, and the Sipsey cotton mills. After burning these he moved eastward across the state, destroying iron works, nitre factories, depots, and cotton factories. Before he reached Georgia, Croxton had destroyed nearly all the iron works and cotton factories that had been missed by Rousseau and Wilson.[103]

Destruction by the Armies

For three years north Alabama was traversed by the contending armies. Each burned and destroyed from military necessity and from malice. General Wilson said that after two years of warfare the valley of the Tennessee was absolutely destitute.[104] From the spring of 1862 to the close of the war the Federals marched to and fro in the valley. There were few Confederate troops for its defence, and the Federals held each community responsible for all attacks made within its vicinity. It became the custom to destroy property as a punishment of the people. Much of the destruction was unnecessary from a military point of view.[105] Athens and smaller towns were sacked and burned, Guntersville was shelled and burned; but the worst destruction was in the country, by raiding parties of Federals and “tories,” or “bushwhackers” dressed as Union soldiers. Huntsville, Florence, Decatur, Athens, Guntersville, and Courtland, all suffered depredation, robbery, murder, arson, and rapine.[106] The tories destroyed the railways, telegraph lines, and bridges, and as long as the Confederates were in north Alabama they had to guard all of these.[107]

Along the Tennessee River the gunboats landed parties to ravage the country in retaliation for Confederate attacks. In the counties of Lauderdale, Franklin, Morgan, Lawrence, Limestone, Madison, and Jackson nearly all property was destroyed.[108]

In 1863, a member of Congress from north Alabama tried to get arms from Bragg for the old men to defend the county against Federal raiders, but failed, and wrote to Davis that all civilized usages were being disregarded, women and children turned out and the houses burned, grain and provisions destroyed, women insulted and outraged, their money, jewellery, and clothing being stolen.

In December, 1863, General Sherman ordered that all the forage and provisions in the country around Bridgeport and Bellefont “be collected and stored, and no compensation be allowed rebel owners.” In April, 1864, General Clanton wrote to Governor Watts that the “Yankees spared neither age, sex, nor condition.” Tories and deserters from the hills made frequent raids on the defenceless population.

General Dodge reported, May, 1863, that his army had destroyed or carried off in one raid near Town Creek, “fifteen million bushels of corn, five hundred thousand pounds of bacon, quantities of wheat, rye, oats, and fodder, one thousand horses and mules, and an equal number of cattle, sheep, and hogs, besides thousands that the army consumed in three weeks; we also brought out fifteen hundred negroes, destroyed five tanyards and six flouring mills, and we left the country in such a devastated condition that no crop can be raised during the year;” and nothing was left that would in the least aid the Confederates. On the night of his retreat Dodge lit up the Tennessee valley from Town Creek to Tuscumbia with the flames of burning dwellings, granaries, stables, and fences. In June Colonel Cornyn reports that in a raid from Corinth to Florence he had destroyed cotton factories, tanyards, all the corn-cribs in sight, searched every house in Florence, burned several residences, and carried off 200 mules and horses.[109] A few days later General Stanley raided from Tennessee to Huntsville and carried off cattle and supplies, but did not lay waste the country. General Buell did all that he could to restrain his subordinates, but often to no avail. After Sherman took charge affairs grew steadily worse. In a remarkable letter giving his views in the matter he says: “The government of the United States has in north Alabama any and all rights which they choose to enforce in war, to take their lives, their houses, their lands, their everything, because they cannot deny that war exists there, and war is simply power unrestrained by constitution or compact. If they want eternal warfare, well and good. We will accept the issue and dispossess them and put our friends in possession. To those who submit to the rightful law and authority all gentleness and forbearance, but to the petulant and persistent secessionists, why, death is mercy and the quicker he or she is disposed of the better. Satan and the rebellious saint of heaven were allowed a continuance of existence in hell merely to swell their just punishment.” He referred to the fact that in Europe, whence the principles of war were derived, wars were between the armies, the people remaining practically neutral, so that their property remained unmolested. However, this present war was, he said, between peoples, and the invading army was entitled to all it could get from the people. He cited as a like instance the dispossessing of the people of north Ireland during the reign of William and Mary.[110] After this no restraint on the plundering and persecution of Confederate non-combatants was even attempted, and hundreds of families from north Alabama “refugeed” to south Alabama.

General Sherman wrote to one of his generals, “You may send notice to Florence that if Forrest invades Tennessee from that direction, the town will be burned; and if it occurs, you will remove the inhabitants north of the Ohio River and burn the town and Tuscumbia also.”[111] All through this section fences were gone, fields grew up in bushes, and weeds, residences were destroyed, farm stock had disappeared. People who lived in the Black Belt report that Wilson’s raiders ate up all the cooked provisions wherever they went, taking all the meat, meal, and flour to their next camping-place, where they would often throw away wagon loads of provisions. Frequently the meal and flour that could not be taken was strewn along the road. The mills were burned, and some families for three months after the close of the war lived on corn cracked in a mortar. All the horses and mules were taken; and only a few oxen were left to work the crops.

Governor Parsons said that Wilson’s men were a week in destroying the property around Selma. Three weeks after, as Parsons himself was a witness, it was with difficulty that one could travel from Planterville to Selma on account of the dead horses and mules. The night marches of the enemy in the Black Belt were lighted by the flames of burning houses. Until this raid only the counties of north Alabama had suffered.[112]

Wilson had destroyed during this raid 2 gunboats; 99,000 small arms and much artillery; 10 iron works; 7 foundries; 8 machine shops; 5 rolling mills; the University buildings; many county court-houses and public buildings; 3 arsenals; a naval foundry and navy yard; 5 steamboats; a powder magazine and mills; 35 locomotives and 565 cars; 3 large railroad bridges and many smaller ones; 275,000 bales of cotton; much private property along the line of march, many magazines of stores; and had subsisted his army on the country.[113] Trowbridge, who passed through Alabama in the fall of 1865, said that Wilson’s route could be traced by burnt gin-houses dotting the way.[114] Three other armies marched through the state in 1865, burning and destroying.

The Federals took horses and mules, cattle and hogs, corn and meat, gold and silver plate, jewellery, and other valuables. Aged citizens were tortured by “bummers” to force them to tell of hidden treasure. Some were swung up by the neck until nearly dead. Straggling bands of Federals committed depredations over the country. Houses were searched, mattresses were cut to pieces, trunks, bureaus, wardrobes, and chests were broken open and their contents turned out. Much furniture was broken and ruined. Families of women and children were left without a meal, and many homes were burned. Cattle and stock were wantonly killed. What could not be carried away was burned and destroyed.[115]

Though two-thirds of the state was untouched by the enemy two months before the close of hostilities, yet when the surrender came. Alabama was as thoroughly destroyed as Georgia or South Carolina in Sherman’s track.

Sec. 2. Military Organization

Alabama Soldiers: Numbers and Character

The exact number of Confederate soldiers enlisted in Alabama cannot be ascertained. The original records were lost or destroyed, and duplicates were never completed. There were on the rolls infantry regiments numbered from 1 to 65, but the 52d and 64th were never organized. Of the 14 cavalry regiments, numbered from 1 to 12, two organizations were numbered 9. There was one battalion of artillery, afterwards transferred to the regular service, and 18 batteries.

In Alabama, as in the other southern states, local pride has placed the number of troops furnished at a very high figure. Colonel W. H. Fowler, superintendent of army records, who worked mainly in the Army of Northern Virginia, estimated the total number of men from Alabama at about 120,000. Governor Parsons, in his inaugural proclamation, evidently following Fowler’s statistics, placed the number at 122,000,[116] while Colonel M. V. Moore placed the number at 60,000 to 65,000.[117] General Samuel Cooper, adjutant and inspector-general of the Confederate States Army, estimated that not more than 600,000 men in the Confederacy actually bore arms.[118] This estimate would make the share of Alabama even less than Colonel Moore estimated. The highest estimates have placed the number at 128,000 and 135,000, but the correct figures are evidently somewhere between these extremes.[119]

The Superintendent of the Confederate Bureau of Conscription estimated that according to the census of 1860 there were in Alabama, from 1861 to 1864, 106,000 men between the ages of eighteen and forty-five, and of these, more than 8000 had been regularly exempted during the year 1864, all former exemptions having been revoked by act of Congress, February 17, 1864.[120] Livermore’s estimate,[121] based on the census of 1860, was: There were in Alabama (1861) between the ages of eighteen and forty-five, 99,967 men, and in the entire Confederacy there were 265,000 between the ages of thirteen and sixteen. Of the latter, a rough estimate would place Alabama’s proportion about one-tenth of the whole, that is, about 26,500. Those men over forty-five who later became liable to military duty he estimates at 20,000, that is, about 2000 in Alabama. Thus there were in Alabama, in 1861, not allowing for deaths, 127,467 persons who would become subject to military service unless exempted. Livermore places the number of boys from ten to twelve years of age and of men from forty-seven to fifty, in the Confederacy in 1861, at 300,000, or about 30,000 in Alabama. These would become liable to service in the state militia before 1865.[122] In 1861 the governor stated that by October 7 there had been 27,000 enlistments in the various organizations. Several of these commands were enrolled for short terms of three months, six months, or one year. Before November, 1862, there had been 60,000 enlistments. Included in this number were several thousand reënlistments and transfers. At the end of 1863, when enlistment and reorganization had practically ceased, there had been 90,857 enlistments of all kinds from Alabama.[123] For two years troops were organized in Alabama much faster than they could be supplied with arms. For months some of the new regiments waited for equipment. Four thousand men at Huntsville were in service several months before arms could be procured, and several infantry regiments were drilled as artillery for a year before muskets were to be had.[124]

Before the close of 1863, Alabama had placed in the Confederate service about all the men that could be sent. The organization of new regiments by original enlistment practically ceased with the fall of 1862. In 1863, only three regiments were thus organized, and two of these were composed of conscripts and men attracted by the special privileges offered.[125] The other regiments, formed after the summer of 1862, were made by consolidating smaller commands that were already in service. The few small regiments of reserves called out in 1864 and 1865 and given regular designations saw little or no service. Those few who were made liable to service by the conscript law and who entered the army at all, as a rule went as volunteers and avoided the conscript camps. The strength of the Alabama regiments came from central and south Alabama, for the full military strength of north Alabama could not be utilized on account of invasion by the enemy. At first there were many small commands—companies and battalions—which were raised in a short time and sent at once to the front before a regimental organization could be effected. Later these were united to form regiments. Nearly all the higher numbered infantry regiments and more than half of the cavalry regiments were formed in this way. The first regiments raised and the strongest in numbers were sent to Virginia. To these went also the largest number of the recruits secured by the recruiting officers sent out by the regiments. On an average, about 350 recruits or transfers were secured by each Alabama regiment in Virginia, though some had almost none. There were numbers of persons who obtained authority to raise new commands for service near their homes, and in order to fill the ranks of their regiments and companies they would offer special inducements of furloughs and home stations. The cavalry and artillery branches of the service were popular and secured many men needed in the infantry regiments.[126] Each commander of a separate company or battalion desired to raise his force to a regiment, and it was to the interest of the state to have as many organizations as possible in the field as its quota. A better show was thus made on paper. Such conditions prevented the recruitment of old regiments, especially those in the armies that surrendered under Johnston and Taylor. Consequently the regiments in the Western Army were, as a rule, much smaller than the ones in the Army of Northern Virginia, to which recruits were sent instead of new regiments.

In each infantry and cavalry regiment there were ten companies.[127] The original strength of each company was from 64 to 100. Later the number was fixed at 104 to the company for infantry, 72 for cavalry, and 70 in the artillery. After the formation of new commands had practically ceased, the number for each company of infantry was raised to 125 men, 150 in the artillery, and 80 in the cavalry.[128] The original strength of each infantry regiment was, therefore, from 640 to 1000, not including officers; of cavalry, 600 to 720. A battery of artillery seems to have had any number from 70 to 150, though usually the smaller number. The size of the regiments varied greatly. Colonel Fowler reported that to February 1, 1865, 27,022 men had joined the 20 Alabama regiments in Virginia, an average of 1351 men to the regiment. Brewer gives the total enrolment of 15 regiments in the Army of Northern Virginia as 21,694, an average of 1446 to the regiment.[129] Four of these regiments had an enrolment of less than 1200;[130] so it is evident that the other 5, not given by Brewer, must have averaged about 1265 to the regiment.[131] These numbers include transfers, details, and reënlistments, the exact number of which it is impossible to ascertain. Brewer lists the transfers and discharges from 15 regiments at 4398, an average of 293 each, of which about one-third seem to have been transfers.[132] There were also many reënlistments from disbanded organizations.[133] Both Brewer and Fowler count each enlistment as a different man and arrive at about the same results.[134]

The enrolment of 8 Alabama regiments in Johnston’s army, as given by Brewer, amounted to 8300, an average to the regiment of 1037.[135] It was the practice, in 1864 and 1865, to unite two or more weaker regiments into one. No Alabama regiments in Virginia were so united, and of the 8 in the Western Army, whose enrolment is given by Brewer, only 1 was afterward united with another.[136] It would then seem that the enrolment of the strongest regiments is known.[137] The total number of enlistments in the Alabama commands in Virginia was, according to Fowler, about 30,000, and these were in 20 infantry regiments, and a few smaller commands. In the armies surrendered by Johnston and Taylor there were 38 Alabama infantry regiments, and 13 of these had been consolidated on account of their small numbers. Eight of them which remained separate and which must have been stronger than the ones united had enrolled an average of 1037 (according to Brewer). Thirty-eight regiments of this strength (which is probably too large an estimate) would give a total enrolment of 39,406. This number, added to Fowler’s estimate of 27,022 in the Army of Northern Virginia, will give 66,428 enlistments of all kinds, for the infantry arm of the service. Add to this 3000 for the 3 regiments of reserves called out in 1864,[138] and the total is 69,428 enlistments in the infantry.

There were 14 cavalry regiments, 7 of which, and possibly more, were formed by the consolidation of smaller commands already in service. The cavalry regiments did not enter the service as early as the infantry, only 1 regiment being organized in 1861. The original strength of each regiment, as has been said, was from 600 to 720. All these regiments served in the commands surrendered by Johnston and Taylor, where recruits were scarce, so 1000 to the regiment is a very large estimate of total enrolment. However, this would give 14,000 in the cavalry regiments.

Of artillery, there were 19 batteries and 1 battalion of 6 batteries, making 25 batteries in all, with an enrolment ranging from 70 to 150 in each. A total enrolment of 3750, or 150 to each battery, would be a large estimate.

Fowler reported about 3000 enlistments in the various smaller commands from Alabama in the Army of Northern Virginia.[139] An additional 2000 would more than account for all similar scattering commands in the other armies.[140]

The total enrolment may then be estimated:—

This total includes many transfers and reënlistments, which can be only roughly estimated. In the Army of Northern Virginia 464 resigned, 245 were retired, 3639 were discharged, 1815 were transferred to other commands, and 1666 deserted or were unaccounted for. Those who resigned—as a rule to accept higher positions—reëntered the service. Almost all of those who retired or were discharged had to enter the reserves, and many of them again became liable to service. Numbers of soldiers were accustomed to leave one command and go to another without any formality of transfer. Deserters who were driven back to the army nearly always chose to enter other regiments than their own. There were numbers of transfers from the cavalry to the infantry, for each cavalryman had to furnish his own horse, and, should it be killed or die and the soldier be unable to secure another, he was sent to an infantry regiment. There were also smaller infantry organizations, which were mounted and merged into the cavalry regiments. Half of the enlistments in the artillery came from the infantry. One regiment[141] at one time lost 100 men in this way, and it has been estimated that one-fifth of the Alabama soldiers served in more than one command.[142] Counting each name on the rolls as one man, as Brewer and Fowler do,[143] it is difficult to see how more than 90,000 enlistments can be counted, and from this total must be deducted several thousand for transfers and reënlistments. Miller’s estimate of a deduction of one-fifth for names counted twice would make the total number of different men about 75,000, which is probably about the correct number. Not only were the same names counted twice, and even oftener in different commands, but sometimes in the same companies and regiments they were counted more than once. It was to the interest of local and state authorities to have each enlistment counted as a different man, and this was invariably done.[144] Five of the early regiments were reorganized and reënlisted, and thus 5000 at least were added to the total enrolment without securing a single recruit. The three-year regiments reënlisted in 1864,[145] and here again were extra thousands of enlistments to be added to the former total. There were also 19 infantry regiments[146] which were formed by the reorganization of former commands that had already been counted, and upon reënlistment for the war they were again counted. In this same way 7 regiments at least of cavalry were formed.[147] this way it is possible to count up a total enlistment from Alabama of about 120,000.[148] There is no method which will even approximate correctness by which the total number of enlistments may be reduced to enlistments for a certain term, as three years or four years. The history of every enlistment must first be known.

There were three lieutenant-generals who entered the service in command of Alabama troops—John B. Gordon, Joseph Wheeler,[149] James Longstreet[149]; seven major-generals—H. D. Clayton, Jones M. Withers,[149] E. M. Law, C. M. Wilcox, John H. Forney,[149] W. W. Allen, R. E. Rodes[147]; and thirty-six brigadier generals—Tennent Lomax,[150] P. D. Bowles,[149] S. A. M. Wood, E. A. O’Neal, William H. Forney, J. C. C. Sanders,[[149], [150]] I. W. Garrott,[150] Archibald Gracie,[[149], [150]] B. D. Fry, James Cantey, J. T. Holtzclaw, E. D. Tracy,[150] E. W. Pettus, Z. C. Deas, G. D. Johnston, C. M. Shelly, Y. M. Moody, Wm. F. Perry, John T. Morgan, M. H. Hannon, Alpheus Baker, J. H. Clanton, James Hagan, P. D. Roddy, John Gregg,[150] L. P. Walker, D. Leadbetter,[[149], [150]] J. H. Kelley,[[149], [150]] J. Gorgas, C. A. Battle, John W. Frazer, Alex. W. Campbell, Thomas M. Jones, M. J. Bulger, John C. Reid, James Deshler.[150] Other Alabamians exercised commands in the troops of other states, and several were staff officers of general rank. The naval commanders were Semmes, Randolph, and Glassell, and a few subordinate officers.[151]

During the early months of 1865 a movement was started to enroll negroes as Confederate soldiers, and a number of officers, among whom was John T. Morgan, received permission to raise negro troops. The conference of governors at Augusta in 1864 recommended the arming of slaves, but Governor Watts asked the Alabama legislature to disapprove such a movement.[152] An enthusiastic meeting of citizens, held in Mobile, February 19, 1865, declared that the war must be prosecuted “to victory or death,” and that 100,000 negroes should be placed in the field.[153] It was too late, however, for success. Wilson, on his raid, picked up the Confederate negro troops at Selma, and took them with him.[154] In 1862, the “Creoles” of Mobile applied for permission to enlist in a body. They were mulattoes, but were free by the treaties with France in 1803 and with Spain in 1819, were property holders, often owning slaves, and were an orderly, respectable class, true to the South and anxious to fight for the Confederacy. The Secretary of War was not friendly to the proposal, but in November, 1862, the legislature of Alabama authorized their enlistment for the defence of Mobile. A year later, at the urgent request of General Maury, they were received into the Confederate service as heavy artillery.[155]

The Alabama troops in the Confederate service made a notably good record. The flower of the Alabama army served with Lee in Virginia, but nearly as good were the Alabama troops in the western armies. Brewer says they moved “high and haughty in the face of death.” The regiments of reserves raised late in the war and stationed within the state were not very good. Yet there were instances of regiments, with bad reputation when stationed near home, making splendid records when sent to the front. The spirit of the troops at the front was high to the last. In 1864 an Alabama regiment reënlisted for the war, with the oath that they would “live on bread and go barefoot before they would leave the flag under which they had fought for three years.”[156] On the morning of April 9, 1865, the Sixtieth Alabama (Hilliard’s Legion), then about 165 strong, captured a Federal battery.[157] Fowler, in his report in 1865, asserts that Alabama sent more troops into the service than any other state; also that she sent more troops in proportion to her population than any other state. “I am certain too,” he says, “that when General Lee surrendered his army, the representation from Alabama on the field that day was inferior to no other southern state in numbers, and surely not in gallantry.”[158]

Union Troops from Alabama

To the Union army Alabama furnished about 3000 regular enlistments. Of these 2000 were white men. It is not likely that there were many more, since in 1900 there were in Alabama only 3649 persons, northerners, negroes, and all, drawing pensions, and some of these on account of the Indian and Mexican wars.[159] The white Union troops served in the First Alabama Union Cavalry, in the First Alabama and Tennessee Cavalry (the First Vedette), Kennamer’s Scouts (Cavalry), and in northern regiments—principally those from Indiana. The report of the Secretary of War for 1864-1865 says that no white regiments were regularly enlisted in Alabama for the Union army. But this is evidently not correct, since the report for 1866 says that there were 2576 enlistments in Alabama for various periods of service.[160]

Of negro regiments in the Union army, there were the First Alabama Volunteers, afterward known as the Fifth United States Colored Infantry, the Second Alabama Volunteers (negroes), and the First Alabama Colored Artillery, afterward known as the Sixth United States Heavy Artillery, which served at Fort Pillow. Late in 1864 General Lorenzo Thomas reported that he had recently organized three regiments of colored infantry in Alabama, and Wilson organized several other negro regiments in the state in 1865. Many negroes from north Alabama went into various negro organizations, and were credited to the northern states, the official records showing only 4969 negro enlistments credited directly to Alabama. A conservative estimate would be from 2000 to 2500 whites and 10,000 negroes enlisted in Alabama, not counting those who were enrolled in the spring of 1865.[161] The white Union soldiers from Alabama were mostly poor men from the mountain counties of north Alabama. The Union troops from Alabama received no bounty.[162]

The Militia System

The militia system of Alabama in 1861 existed only in the statute books, and in the persons of a few brigadiers and a major-general, whose entire duty had consisted in wearing uniforms at the inauguration of a governor and ever thereafter bearing military titles. A series of Arabic numbers, something more than a hundred, was assigned to the militia regiments that were unorganized, but which, under favorable circumstances, might be enrolled and called out. The county was the unit. To each county was assigned one regiment or more according to the white population. Several counties formed a militia district under a brigadier-general, and over all was a major-general. Bodies of trained volunteers were not connected with the militia system at all, but these went at once, on the outbreak of war, into the state army, which was soon merged into the Confederate army.

In theory the militia consisted of all the male citizens of Alabama of military age. The enlistments for war service soon reduced the material from which militia regiments could be formed, and the system broke down before it was tried. A few regiments may have been enrolled in 1861 and 1862, but if so, they at once entered the Confederate service. The Forty-eighth Alabama Militia regiment was ordered out to defend Mobile in 1861, and $6000 was appropriated to provide pikes and knives with which to arm them, as it was impossible to get firearms. On March 1, 1862, Governor Shorter appealed to the people to give their shotguns, rifles, bowie-knives, pikes, powder, and lead to state agents, probate judges, sheriffs, and other state officials for the use of the state militia.[163] A few days later he ordered out, for the defence of Mobile and the coast, the militia from the river counties and the southwestern counties—eighteen counties in all. But the militia failed to appear. It seems that the governor expected a hearty response from the people. He asked for too much, and got nothing. On March 12, 1862, he again ordered out the militia, this time specifying the regiments by number.[164] But again the militia failed to respond. The fact was, there was no longer any militia; the officers and men had gone, or were preparing to go, into the Confederate service. Many of the militia regiments could not have mustered a dozen men, and it is doubtful if there was a muster-roll of a militia regiment in all Alabama.[165] In May, 1862, the governor, recognizing that the militia system was worthless as a means of raising troops for home defence, issued a proclamation asking the people to form volunteer organizations. The response, as he said, “was not prompt.” The legislature of that year, not seeing the necessity, refused to reorganize the militia so as to give the governor any effective control. The people seem not to have been worried by any fear of invasion, and many thought that organization into militia companies was merely preliminary to entering the Confederate service. Some did not wish to go until they had to do so, others preferred to go at once to the Confederate army. It appears that all persons, for various reasons, disliked militia service.

December 22, 1862, the governor issued a proclamation, in which, after mentioning the tardy response to his May proclamation and the failure of the legislature to reorganize the system, he again asked the people to volunteer in companies for home defence.[166] He begged the people to drive those who were shirking service to their duty by the force of public scorn. He requested that business houses be closed early in order to give time for drill. The response to this was the same as to his previous proclamation. There was no longer any material for a militia organization. Early in 1863, and in some sections even before, the need began to be felt for a militia force to execute the laws. Under the direction of the governor, small commands were organized here and there of those who were not likely to become subject to service in the Confederate army. These were state and Confederate officials, young boys, and sometimes old men. These organizations were later a source of constant conflict between the state authorities and the Confederate enrolling officers, who wanted to take such commands bodily into the Confederate service, and who usually did so with the full consent of most of the men and to the great indignation of the governor.[167] In August, 1863, the legislature finally passed a law to reorganize the militia system, or rather to establish a new system. By the law an official in each county, appointed by the governor, was to enroll as first-class militia all males under seventeen and over forty-five years of age, including all state and Confederate civil officials, and those physically disqualified for service in the Confederate army. The second class was to consist of those not in the first class, that is, of men between seventeen and forty-five years of age. But men of the second class were subject to enrolment by Confederate conscript officers, and consisted of the few thousand who were specially exempted by the Confederate authorities. Those of the first class who wished to do so might enroll in the second class. The governor was given the usual power over the militia, but it was ordered that the first-class militia was not to go beyond the limits of the county to which it belonged.[168] Presumably the second class might be ordered beyond the county limits, but there were so few in their class that they were not organized. The first-class militia in each county was under a commandant of reserves, militia now being called reserves. He had the power to call it out to repel invasion and execute the laws. Jealousy of Confederate authority had caused the legislature to take legal means of making the militia worthless to the Confederacy, and useful only for local defence and for executing the state laws in particular localities.[169] Still, the system seems to have been practically useless, and the governor continued to organize small irregular commands to execute the laws and to furnish military escorts to civil officials. As has been stated, such commands were highly approved of by the Confederate enrolling officers, who eagerly persuaded them to join the Confederate army, and thus called forth strong remonstrances from Governor Watts. The War Department reasoned that a state could keep troops of war which were not subject to absorption in the Confederate service, but that the militia were subject to the superior claims of the Confederacy.[170] February 6, 1864, Governor Watts, in an address to the people, declared that a raid into the state was threatened and called upon young and old to volunteer for the defence of the state.[171] The reserve system was now worthless. Few of the regiments had more than fifty men, many had none, and the governor was powerless to use them beyond the limits of their respective counties. The state was at the mercy of any invading force, and Rousseau’s Raid, through the heart of the state, showed the woful condition of affairs. On October 7, 1864, the legislature passed an act which prohibited Confederate army officers from commanding the reserves. It was again ordered that the first-class reserves should not serve beyond the limits of the county to which they belonged. At the same time, permission was granted to the harassed citizens of Dale and Henry counties to organize themselves to protect their homes, provided they did so under the direction of the commandant of the first-class militia. Perhaps the legislature was afraid that, if left to themselves, they might cross the county line, or choose a Confederate officer to lead them. In December, 1864, when north Alabama was almost entirely overrun by tories, deserters, and Federals, the citizens of Marion County were authorized to organize into squads and protect themselves.[172] Still the legislature refused to make an effective reorganization of the militia. When the spring campaign in 1865 began, Governor Watts appealed to the people to do what the legislature had failed to do. The first-class militia could not, he said, be ordered beyond the limits of their counties, and in three congressional districts in north Alabama it had not been and, by law, could not be, organized. He estimated that 30,000 men were enrolled in the first-class militia, of whom 4000 were boys, and to the latter he made the appeal to defend the state. Evidently the remaining 26,000 men were, in his estimation, not worth much as soldiers. However, he called upon all first-class militia to volunteer as second class.[173] A few hundred responded to this appeal, and all of them who saw active service were with Forrest in front of Wilson.

The various organizations mentioned in the War Records, the Junior Reserves, Senior Reserves, Mobile Regiment, Home Guards, Local Defence Corps,[174] and others, were, except the reserves, volunteer organizations for local defence, and all that saw active service before 1865, except the Home Guards, were absorbed into the Confederate organization.[175] The stupid conduct of the legislature during the last two years of the war in failing to provide for the defence of the state cannot be too strongly condemned. The final result would have been the same, but a strong force of militia would have enabled Governor Watts to execute the laws in all parts of the state, and to protect the families of loyal citizens from outrage by tories and deserters.

Sec. 3. Conscription and Exemption

Confederate Enrolment Laws

In the spring of 1862, the Confederate Congress passed the Enrolment Act, by which all white men between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five were made liable to military service at the call of the President, and those already in service were retained. The President was authorized to employ state officials to enroll the men made subject to duty, provided the governor of the state gave his consent; otherwise he was to employ Confederate officials. The conscripts thus secured were to be assigned to the state commands already in the field until these organizations were recruited to their full strength. Substitutes were allowed under such regulations as the Secretary of War might prescribe.[176] Five days later, a law was passed exempting certain classes of persons from the operations of the Enrolment Act. These were: Confederate and state officials, mail-carriers, ferrymen on post-office routes, pilots, telegraph operators, miners, printers, ministers, college professors, teachers with twenty pupils or more, teachers of the deaf, dumb, and blind, hospital attendants, one druggist to each drug store, and superintendents and operatives in cotton and wool factories.[177] In the fall of 1862, the Enrolment law was extended to include all white men from thirty-five to forty-five years of age and all who lacked a few months of being eighteen years of age. They were to be enrolled for three years, the oldest, if not needed, being left until the last.[178]

At this time was begun the practice, which virtually amounted to exemption, of making special details from the army to perform certain kinds of skilled labor. The first details thus made were to manufacture shoes for the army.[179] The list of those who might claim exemption, in addition to those named in the act of April 21, 1862, was extended to include the following: state militia officers, state and Confederate clerks in the civil service, railway employees who were not common laborers, steamboat employees, one editor and the necessary printers for each newspaper, those morally opposed to war, provided they furnished a substitute or paid $500 into the treasury, physicians, professors, and teachers who had been engaged in the profession for two years or more, government artisans, mechanics, and other employees, contractors and their employees furnishing arms and supplies to the state or to the Confederacy, factory owners, shoemakers, tanners, blacksmiths, wagon makers, millers, and engineers. The artisans and manufacturers were granted exemption from military service provided the products of their labor were sold at not more than seventy-five per cent profit above the cost of production. On every plantation where there were twenty or more negroes one white man was entitled to exemption as overseer.[180]

In the spring of 1863 mail contractors and drivers of post-coaches were exempted;[181] and it was ordered that those exempted under the so-called “twenty-negro” law should pay $500 into the Confederate treasury; also, that such state officials as were exempted by the governor might be also exempted by the Confederate authorities. The law permitting the hiring of substitutes by men liable to service was repealed on December 28, 1863, and a few days later even those who had furnished substitutes were made subject to military duty.[182]

A law of February 17, 1864,[183] provided that all soldiers between the ages of eighteen and forty-five should be retained in service during the war. Those between the ages of seventeen and eighteen, and forty-five and fifty were called into service as a reserve force for the defence of the state. All exemptions were repealed except the following: (1) the members of Congress and of the state legislature, and such Confederate and state officers as the President or the governors might certify to be necessary for the proper administration of government; (2) ministers regularly employed, superintendents, attendants, and physicians of asylums for the deaf, dumb, and blind, insane, and other public hospitals, one editor for each newspaper, public printers, one druggist for each drug store which had been two years in existence, all physicians who had practised seven years, teachers in colleges of at least two years’ standing and in schools which had twenty pupils to each teacher; (3) one overseer or agriculturist to each farm upon which were fifteen or more negroes, in case there was no other exempt on the plantation. The object was to leave one white man, and no more, on each plantation, and the owner or overseer was preferred. In return for such exemption, the exempt was bound by bond to deliver to the Confederate authorities, for each slave on the plantation between the ages of sixteen and fifty, one hundred pounds of bacon or its equivalent in produce, which was paid for by the government at prices fixed by the impressment commissioners. In addition, the exempt was to sell his surplus produce at prices fixed by the commissioners. The Secretary of War was authorized to make special details, under the above conditions, of overseers, farmers, or planters, if the public good demanded it; also (4) to exempt the higher officials of railroads and not more than one employee for each mile of road; and (5) mail carriers and drivers. The President was authorized to make details of old men for special service.[184] By an act passed the same day free negroes from eighteen to fifty years of age were made liable to service with the army as teamsters. These acts of February 17, 1864, were the last Confederate legislation of importance in regard to conscription and exemption. During the year 1864 the Confederate authorities devoted their energies to construing away all exemptions possible, and to absorbing the state reserve forces into the Confederate army.

Policy of the State in Regard to Conscription

To return to 1861. The state legislature, when providing for the state army, authorized the governor to exempt from militia duty all railway, express, steamboat, and telegraph employees, but even the fire companies had to serve as militia.[185] The operation of the enrolment law stripped the land of men of militia age, and on November 17, 1862, the legislature ordered to duty on the public roads men from sixteen to eighteen years of age, and forty-five to fifty-five, and later all from sixteen to fifty as well as all male slaves and free negroes from fourteen to sixty years of age.[186] Militia officers between the ages of eighteen and forty-five were declared subject to the enrolment acts of Congress,[187] as were also justices of the peace, notaries public, and constables.[188]

Yet, instead of making an effective organization of the militia, the legislature in 1863 proceeded to frame a law of exemptions patterned after that of the Confederacy. It released from militia duty all persons over forty-five years of age, county treasurers, physicians of seven years’ practice or who were in the public service, ministers, teachers of three years’ standing, one blacksmith in each beat, the city police and fire companies, penitentiary guards, general administrators who had been in service five years, Confederate agents, millers, railroad employees, steamboat officials, overseers, managers of foundries, salt makers who made as much as ten bushels a day and who sold it for not more than $15 per bushel. Besides, the governor could make special exemptions.[189] In 1864 millers who charged not more than one-eighth for toll were exempted.[190] It will be seen that in some respects the state laws go farther in exemption than the Confederate laws, and thus were in conflict with them. But it must be remembered that the Confederacy had already stripped the country of nearly all the able-bodied men who did not evade duty. To this time, however, there was no conflict between the state and Confederate authorities in regard to conscription. An act was also passed providing for the reorganization of the penitentiary guards, and only those not subject to conscription were retained.[191] A joint resolution of August 29, 1863, called upon Congress to decrease the list of exemptions, as many clerks and laborers were doing work that could be done by negroes. At the end of the year 1863 the legislature asked that the conscript law be strictly enforced by Congress.[192]

On the part of the state rights people, there was much opposition to the enrolment or conscription laws on the ground that they were unconstitutional. Several cases were brought before the state supreme court, and all were decided in favor of the constitutionality of the laws; furthermore, it was decided that the courts and judicial officers of the state had no jurisdiction on habeas corpus to discharge from the custody of a Confederate enrolling officer persons who had been conscripted under the law of Congress.[193] A test case was carried to the state supreme court, which decided that a person who had conscientious scruples against bearing arms might pay for a substitute in the state militia and claim exemption from state service, but if conscripted he was not exempted from the Confederate service unless he belonged to the religious denominations specially exempted by the act of Congress.[194] The court also declared constitutional the Confederate law which provided that when a substitute became subject to military duty his principal was thereby rendered liable to service.[195] In 1864 the supreme court held that the state had a right to subject to militia service persons exempted by the Confederate authorities as bonded agriculturists under the acts of February 17, 1864, and that only those overseers were granted exemption from militia service under the act of Congress in 1863 who at the time were not subject to militia duty, and not those exempted from Confederate service by the later laws,[196] and that the clause in the act of Congress passed February 17, 1864, repealing and revoking all exemptions, was constitutional.[197] In other cases the court held that a person regularly enrolled and sworn into the Confederate service could not raise any question, on habeas corpus, of his assignment to any particular command or duty,[198] but that the state courts could discharge on habeas corpus from Confederate enrolling officers persons held as conscripts, who were exempted under Confederate laws;[199] that the Confederacy might reassert its rights to the military service of a citizen who was enrolled as a conscript and, after producing a discharge for physical disability, had enlisted in the state militia service;[200] and finally, that the right of the Confederacy to the military service of a citizen was paramount to the right of the state.[201]

The First Confederate Capitol. The State Capitol, Montgomery.		Montgomery Residence of President Davis.
Confederate Monument, Montgomery.		The Inauguration of Jefferson Davis. (From an old negative.)

During the year 1864 Governor Watts had much trouble with the Confederate enrolling officers who insisted upon conscripting his volunteer and militia organizations, whether they were subject to duty under the laws or not. The authorities at Richmond held that while a state might keep “troops of war” over which the Confederacy could have no control, yet the state militia was subject to all the laws of Congress. “Troops of war,” as the Secretary of War explained, would be troops in active and permanent service,[202] and hence virtually Confederate troops. A state with troops of that description would be very willing to give them up to the Confederacy to save expense. Thus we find the legislature of Alabama asking the President to receive and pay certain irregular organizations which had been used to support the Conscript Bureau.[203] The legislature, now somewhat disaffected, showed its interest in the operations of the enrolling officers by an act providing that conscript officials who forced exempts into the Confederate service should be liable to indictment and punishment by a fine of $1000 to $6000 and imprisonment of from six months to two years.[204] It went a step further and nullified the laws of Congress by declaring that state officials, civil and military, were not subject to conscription by the Confederate authorities.[205]

Effect of the Enrolment Laws

Few good soldiers were obtained by conscription,[206] and the system, as it was organized in Alabama,[207] did more harm than good to the Confederacy. The passage of the first law, however, had one good effect. During the winter of 1861-1862, there had been a reaction from the enthusiastic war feeling of the previous summer. Those who thought it would be only a matter of weeks to overrun the North now saw their mistake.[208] Many of the people still had no doubt that the North would be glad to make peace and end the war if the government at Richmond were willing. Numbers, therefore, saw no need of more fighting, and hence did not volunteer. Thousands left the army and went home. A measure like the enrolment act was necessary to make the people realize the actual situation. Upon the passage of the law all the loyal population liable to service made preparations to go to the front before being conscripted, which was deemed a disgrace, and the close of the year 1862 saw practically all of them in the army. Those who entered after 1862 were boys and old men.[209] Many not subject to service volunteered, so that when the age limit was extended but few more were secured.

Great dissatisfaction was expressed among the people at the enrolment law. Some thought that it was an attack upon the rights of the states, and the irritating manner in which it was enforced aroused, in some localities, intense popular indignation. Conscription being considered disgraceful, many who would have been glad for various good reasons to remain at home a few months longer went at once into service to escape conscription. Yet some loyal and honest citizens found it disastrous to leave their homes and business without definite arrangements for the safety and support of their families. Such men suffered much annoyance from the enrolling officers, in spite of the fact that the law was intended for their protection. The conscript officials, often men of bad character, persecuted those who were easy to find, while neglecting the disloyal and refractory who might make trouble for them. In some sections such weak conduct came near resulting in local insurrections; this was especially the case in Randolph County in 1862.[210] The effect of the law was rather to stop volunteering in the state organizations and reporting to camps of instructions, since all who did either were classed as conscripts. Not wishing to bear the odium of being conscripted, many thousands in 1862 and 1863 went directly into the regular service.[211]

While the conscript law secured few, if any, good soldiers who would not have joined the army without it, it certainly served as a reminder to the people that all were needed, and as a stimulus to volunteering. Three classes of people suffered from its operations: (1) those rightfully exempted, who were constantly annoyed by the enrolling officers; (2) those soon to become liable to service, who were not allowed to volunteer in organizations of their own choice; and (3) “deadheads” and malcontents who did not intend to fight at all if they could keep from it. It was this last class that made nearly all the complaints about conscription, and it was they whom the enrolling officers left alone because they were so troublesome.

The defects in the working of conscription are well set forth in a letter from a correspondent of President Davis in December, 1862. In this letter it was asserted that the conscript law had proven a failure in Mississippi and Alabama, since it had stopped the volunteering. Governor Shorter was reported to have said that the enforcement of it had been “a humbug and a farce.” The writer declared that the enrolling officers chosen were frequently of bad character; that inefficient men were making attempts to secure “bomb-proof” offices in order to avoid service in the army; and that the exemption of slave owners by the “twenty-negro law” had a bad influence upon the poorer classes. He also declared that the system of substitutes was bad, for many men were on the hunt for substitutes, and others liable to duty were working to secure exemptions in order to serve as substitutes, while large numbers of men connected with the army managed in this way to keep away from the fighting. He was sure, he said, that there were too many hangers-on about the officers of high rank, and that it was believed that social position, wealth, and influence served to get young men good staff positions.[212] Another evil complained of was that “paroled” men scattered to their homes and never heard of their exchange. To a conscript officer whose duty it was to look after them they said that they were “paroled,” and he passed them by. The officers were said to be entirely too lenient with the worthless people and too rigorous with the better classes.[213]

Exemption from Service

After the passage of the enrolment laws, every man with excessive regard for the integrity of his person and for his comfort began to secure exemption from service. In north Alabama men of little courage and patriotism lost confidence after the invasions of the Federals, and resorted to every expedient to escape conscription. Strange and terrible diseases were developed, and in all sections of the state health began to break down.[214] It was the day of certificates,—for old age, rheumatism, fits, blindness, and various physical disabilities.[215] Various other pretexts were given for staying away from the army, while some men hid out in the woods. The governor asked the people to drive such persons to their duty.[216] There was never so much skilled labor in the South as now. Harness making, shoe making, charcoal burning, carpentering—all these and numerous other occupations supposed to be in support of the cause secured exemption. Running a tanyard was a favorite way of escaping service. A pit was dug in the corner of the back yard, a few hides secured, carefully preserved, and never finished,—for more hides might not be available; then the tanner would be no longer exempt. There were purchasing agents, sub-purchasing agents, and sub-sub-agents, cattle drivers, tithe gatherers, agents of the Nitre Bureau, agents to examine political prisoners,[217] and many other Confederate and state agents of various kinds.[218] The class left at home for the enrolling officers to contend with, especially after 1862, was a source of weakness, not of strength, to the Confederate cause. The best men had gone to the army, and these people formed the public. Their opinion was public opinion, and with few exceptions the home stayers were a sorry lot. From them came the complaint about the favoritism toward the rich. The talk of a “rich man’s war and a poor man’s fight” originated with them, as well as the criticism of the “twenty-negro law.” In the minds of the soldiers at the front there was no doubt that the slaveholder and the rich man were doing their full share.[219]

Very few of the slaveholders and wealthy men tried to escape service; but when one did, he attracted more attention and called forth sterner denunciation than ten poor men in similar cases would have done. In fact, few able-bodied men tried to secure exemption under the “twenty-negro law.” It would have been better for the Confederacy if more planters had stayed at home to direct the production of supplies, and the fact was recognized in 1864,[220] when a “fifteen-negro law” was passed by the Congress, and other exemptions of planters and overseers were encouraged.[221]

There is no doubt that those who desired to remain quietly at home—to be neutral, so to speak—found it hard to evade the conscript officers. One of these declared that the enrolling officers “burned the woods and sifted the ashes for conscripts.” Another who had been caught in the sifting process deserted to the enemy at Huntsville. He was asked, “Do they conscript close over the river?” “Hell, stranger, I should think they do; they take every man who has not been dead more than two days.”[222] But the “hill-billy” and “sand-mountain” conscripts were of no service when captured; there were not enough soldiers in the state to keep them in their regiments. The Third Alabama Regiment of Reserves ran away almost in a body. There were fifteen or twenty old men in each county as a supporting force to the Conscript Bureau, and they had old guns, some of which would not shoot, and ammunition that did not fit.[223] Thus the best men went into the army, many of them never to return, and a class of people the country could well have spared survived to assist a second time in the ruin of their country in the darker days of Reconstruction. Often the “fire-eating, die-in-the-last-ditch” radical of 1861 who remained at home “to take care of the ladies” became an exempt, a “bomb-proof” or a conscript officer, and later a “scalawag.”

Some escaped war service by joining the various small independent and irregular commands formed for frontier service by those officers who found field duty too irksome. Though these irregular bodies were, as we have seen, gradually absorbed by the regular organizations, yet during their day of strength they were most unpleasant defenders. The men sometimes joined in order to have more opportunity for license and plunder, and such were hated alike by friend and foe.

Another kind of irregular organization caused some trouble in another way. Before the extension of the age limits to seventeen and fifty, the governor raised small commands of young boys to assist in the execution of the state laws, no other forces being available. Later, when the Confederate Congress extended its laws to include these, the conscript officers tried to enroll them, but the governor objected. The officers complained that, in order to escape the odium of conscription, the young boys who were subject by law to duty in the reserves evaded that law by going at once into the army, or by joining some command for special duty. They were of the opinion that these boys should be sent to camps of instruction. The governor had ten companies of young men under eighteen years of age raised near Talladega, and really mustered into the Confederate service as irregular troops, before the law of February 17, 1864, was passed. After the passage of the law, the enrolling officers wished to disband these companies and send the men to the reserves. Watts was angered and sharply criticised the whole policy of conscription. He said that much harm was done by the method of the conscript officers; that it was nonsense to take men from the fields and put them in camps of instruction when there were no arms for them, and no active service was intended; they had better stay at home, drill once a week with volunteer organizations, and work the rest of the time; to assemble the farmers in camps for useless drill while the crops were being destroyed was “most egregious folly.” The governor also attacked the policy of the Bureau in refusing to allow the enrolment in the same companies of boys under eighteen and men over forty-five.[224] In regard to the attempts to disband his small force of militia in active service, the governor used strong language. To Seddon, the Secretary of War, he wrote in May, 1864: “It must not be forgotten that the states have some rights left, and that the right to troops in the time of war is guaranteed by the Constitution. These rights, on the part of Alabama, I am determined shall be respected. Unless you order the Commandant of Conscripts to stop interfering with [certain volunteer companies] there will be a conflict between the Confederate general [Withers] and the state authorities.”[225] Watts carried the day and the Confederate authorities yielded.

The enrolment law provided that state officials should be exempt from enrolment upon presenting a certificate from the governor stating that they were necessary to the proper administration of the government. In November, 1864, Governor Watts complained to General Withers, who commanded the Confederate reserve forces in Alabama, that the conscript officers had been enrolling by force state officials who held certificates from the governor and also from the commandant of conscripts, and, he added: “This state of things cannot long last without a conflict between the Confederate and state authorities. I shall be compelled to protect my state officers with all the forces of the state at my command.” The enrolling officers referred him to a decision of the Secretary of War in the case of a state official in Lowndes County,—that by the act of February 17, 1864, all men between the ages of seventeen and fifty were taken at once into the Confederate service, and that state officials elected later could not claim exemption. Governor Watts then wrote to Seddon, “Unless you interfere, there will be a conflict between the Confederate and the state authorities.” He denied the right of Confederate officers to conscript state officials elected after February 17, 1864: “I deny such right, and will resist it with all the forces of the state.”[226] The Secretary of War replied by commending the Confederate officers for the way in which they had done their duty, insisting that it was not a political nor a constitutional question, but one involving private rights, and that it should be left to the courts. This was receding from the confident ruling made in the case of the Lowndes County man. There was no more dispute and it is to be presumed that the governor retained his officials.[227] No wonder that Colonel Preston, the chief of the Bureau of Conscription, wrote to the Secretary of War that, “from one end of the Confederacy to the other every constituted authority, every officer, every man, and woman was engaged in opposing the enrolling officer in the execution of his duties.”[228]

But these officers had only themselves to blame. They pursued a short-sighted, nagging policy, worrying those who were exempt—the state officials and the militia—because they were easy to reach, and neglecting the real conscript material.[229] The work was known to be useless, and the whole system was irritating to the last degree to all who came in contact with it. It was useless because there was little good material for conscription, except in the frontier country where no authority could be exerted. During 1862 and 1863 practically nothing was done by the Bureau in Alabama, and at the end of the latter year, Colonel E. D. Blake, the Superintendent of Special Registration, reported that there were 13,000 men in the state between the ages of seventeen and forty-five, and of these he estimated 4000 were under eighteen years of age, and hence, at that time, beyond the reach of the enrolling officers. More than 8000[230] were exempt under laws and orders. This left, he said, 1000 subject to enrolment. Nowhere, in any of the estimates, are found allowances for those physically and mentally disqualified. The number then exempted in Alabama by medical boards is unknown. In other states this number was sometimes more and sometimes less than the number exempted by law and by order.

A year later, after all exemptions had been revoked, the number disqualified for physical disability by the examining boards amounted to 3933. Besides these there were the lame, the halt, the blind, and the insane, who were so clearly unfit for service that no enrolling officer ever brought them before the medical board. The 4000 between the ages of seventeen and eighteen, and also the 4600 between sixteen and seventeen, came under the enrolment law of February 17, 1864, as also several thousand who were over forty-five. But it is certain that many of these, especially the younger ones, were already in the general service as volunteers. It is also certain that many hundreds of all ages who were liable to service escaped conscription, especially in north Alabama. In a way, their places in the ranks were filled by those who did not become liable to enrolment until 1864, or even not at all, but who volunteered nevertheless.

From April, 1862, to February, 1865, there had been enrolled at the camps in Alabama 14,875 men who had been classed in the reports as conscripts. This included all men who volunteered at the camps, all of military age that the officers could find or catch before they went into the volunteer service, details made as soon as enrolled, irregular commands formed before the men were liable to duty, and a few hundred genuine conscripts who had to be guarded to keep them from running away. It was reported that for two years not a recruit was sent by the Bureau from Alabama to the army of Tennessee or to the Army of Northern Virginia, but that the men were enrolled in the organizations of the state. This means that much of the enrolment of 14,875 was only nominal, and that this number included the regiments sent to the front from Alabama in 1862, after the passage of the Enrolment Act in April. Eighteen regiments were organized in Alabama after that date, in violation of the Enrolment Act, many of the men evading conscription, as the Bureau reported, by going at once into the general service. The number who left in these regiments was estimated at more than 10,000.[231] There was not a single conscript regiment.

It is possible to ascertain the number exempted by law and by order before 1865. A report by Colonel Preston, dated April, 1864, gives the number of exempts in Alabama as 8835 to January, 1864.[232] A month later, all exemptions were revoked.[233] In February, 1865, a complete report places the total number exempted by law and order in Alabama at 10,218, of whom 3933 were exempted by medical boards. The state officials exempted numbered 1333,[234] and Confederate officials, 21; ministers, 726; editors, 33, and their employees, 155; public printers, 3; druggists, 81; physicians, 796; teachers, 352; overseers and agriculturists, 1447; railway officials and employees, 1090; mail carriers and contractors, 60; foreigners, 167; agriculture details, 38; pilots, telegraphers, shoemakers, tanners, and blacksmiths, 86; government contractors, 44; details of artisans and mechanics, 570; details for government service (not specified), 218. There were 1046 men incapable of field service who were assigned to duty in the above details, chiefly in the Conscript Bureau, Quartermaster’s Department, and Commissariat.[235] It is certain that many others were exempted by being detailed from service in the army. The list of those pardoned in 1865 and 1866 by President Johnson shows many occupations not mentioned above.

It is interesting to notice the fate of the conscript officers when captured by the Federals. Bradford Hambrick was tried by a military commission in Nashville, Tennessee, in January, 1864, charged with being a Confederate conscript officer and with forcing “peaceable citizens of the United States” in Madison County, Alabama, to enter the Confederate army. He was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment at hard labor for one year, and to pay a fine of $2000 or serve an additional imprisonment of 1000 days.[236]