THE WORLD’S LEADERS

A NEW SERIES OF BIOGRAPHIES

Edited by W. P. Trent

Each, with portraits. Large 12mo. $1.75 net.

H. W. Boynton’s The World’s Leading Poets.—Homer, Virgil, Dante, Shakespeare, Milton, Goethe.

G. B. Rose’s The World’s Leading Painters.—Leonardo da Vinci, Raphael, Titian, Rubens, Velasquez, Rembrandt.

W. L. Bevan’s The World’s Leading Conquerors.—Alexander, Cæsar, Charles the Great, The Ottoman Conquerors of Europe, Cortes and Pizarro, Napoleon.

Other Volumes in Preparation.

HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY

34 West 33d Street NEW YORK

CHARLEMAGNE

The World’s Leaders
Edited by W. P. Trent

THE WORLD’S
LEADING CONQUERORS

ALEXANDER THE GREAT, CÆSAR, CHARLES
THE GREAT, THE OTTOMAN SULTANS,
THE SPANISH CONQUISTADORS, NAPOLEON

BY
W. L. BEVAN

Doctor of Political Science, Munich; Sometime Fellow of Columbia
University; Professor of History, University of the South

WITH PORTRAITS

NEW YORK
HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY
1913

Copyright, 1913,
BY
HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY

Published March, 1913

THE QUINN & BODEN CO. PRESS
RAHWAY, N. J.

PREFACE

The purpose of this volume is to present, in harmony with the popular character of the series of which it is a part, brief sketches of some of the most familiarly named men and well-known incidents in the history of Western Civilization. The plan upon which the work is constructed assumes that the broad highway of historical narrative must be followed, however attractive may be the deviations from it that offer themselves at almost every page. The story told here has been told often before and very frequently the telling of it has come from master hands of literature. It is no easy task to reproduce, in a condensed form, material so often handled under much more generous limitations of space than are possible in this work. An attempt has been made, however, to escape from the bald tabular method of recording historical happenings that is almost certain to make a continuous reading of text-book history an impossibility. This must be the apology for many omissions; not only had the temptation to generalize to be resisted in favor of what might be called a process of arbitrary selection but many things are passed over in order to give appropriate emphasis in treating the matters which do actually appear in a narrative. If the volume had aimed at comprehensiveness, many more conquests would necessarily have been described and the list of characters and leaders in large numbers of military campaigns could of course be almost indefinitely enlarged. One can say in any case that though such additions will naturally suggest themselves, there is less doubt as to the claim of the leaders and events selected to appear with the prominence here assigned to them. If there has been a guiding principle in the selection, it may be found in the deliberate choice made of widely different periods of history. What may be called the group conquest is best illustrated in the case of the Ottoman Sultans and the Spanish Conquistadors, whereas the personal factor of the conqueror comes intensively forward in the chapters describing Alexander, Cæsar, and Napoleon. Although the military aspect of the history of conquest has not been neglected, the other less visible elements that ushered in great changes in history have not been omitted. In the preparation of the volume some attempt has been made to incorporate methods, points of view, and material that might not be accessible to those not concerned with the range of literature to which the ordinary student of history must appeal. It is only fair, therefore, to express my obligations to the following works. In the chapters dealing with ancient history, Beloch’s “Griechische Geschichte,” Delbrück’s “Kriegs Geschichte,” Kaerst’s “Geschichte des Hellenismus” and Heitland’s “History of the Roman Republic” have been largely used. In the chapter on Charles the Great, apart from Hodgkin’s well-known volumes “Italy and Her Invaders,” I have drawn upon Hartmann’s “Geschichte Italiens,” Ranke’s “Welt Geschichte,” Hauck’s “Kirchen Geschichte” and Lavisse’s “Histoire de France.” For the Ottoman conquest Professor Jorga’s two recently published volumes, “Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches,” have been found especially useful because the author is thoroughly acquainted with the authorities both Slavonic and Turkish not previously accessible to Occidental scholars. In the chapter on the Spanish Conquest use has been made of Payne’s “History of the New World,” MacNutt’s “Life of Las Casas,” and in the narrative portion Garcia’s “Character de la Conquista Española” has been found especially valuable. In the life of Napoleon, which offers the most serious difficulties in applying any accepted method of condensation, the well-known volumes of Fournier and portions of the “Histoire Générale” of Lavisse and Rambaud have been followed. Much help has been received from Professor W. P. Trent, the editor of the series; in the arduous task of revision, I wish to express my special obligations for time and work ungrudgingly given by my colleague, the Rev. S. L. Tyson of the University of the South, and I cannot pass over aid of the same kind received from Mr. Karl Schmidt of the New York Churchman.

W. L. B.

Sewanee, Tenn., January, 1913.

CONTENTS

PORTRAITS

THE WORLD’S LEADING CONQUERORS

ALEXANDER THE GREAT

I
INTRODUCTORY

Even in the critical time of the Persian invasion, the Greek peoples did not act together. The experiences of political individualism were too strong to be overcome, and the rooted tradition of local autonomy successfully resisted all attempts at larger plans of unity. It is not surprising that at a time when Greek thinkers regarded the development of the city-state as the highest field for human endeavor, Greek statesmen should have seen in the expansion of their native communities only a loose federation of subject cities to be exploited financially or for the purpose of adding increased military and naval strength, and not to be subjected to any formal centralized control.

Alexander

As time went on the old solidarity of the Greek city-state was sapped in the fight of social classes and political parties. Not only were Athens, Sparta, and Thebes frequently at war with one another but in each one of these states there were at work factions dominated by revolutionary aims. Nothing was regarded as fixed except that the community must be self-sufficing, it mattered little in what way. It seemed as if the troubled relations of Greek political life might go on indefinitely after the Persian invasion had been repelled.

No Greek statesman for a hundred and fifty years, say roughly from 500 B.C. to 350 B.C., the most brilliant period of Greek history, regarded the kingdom of Macedon as anything but a negligible quantity. Macedon itself was a land that lay on the boundaries of the Hellenic world. Its people were held to be half Hellenic and half barbarian. Even to-day scholars are not at one on the question whether the Macedonian dialect can be reckoned as properly belonging to Greek speech. But it was this alien power that ended in bringing Greece to a kind of unity, a unity based on the force of arms. The most remarkable feature of this achievement lies in the fact that it was accomplished by one man, Philip of Macedon, who began his victorious career in 359 B.C. by repressing internal disturbances at home and by dealing effectively with his warlike neighbors, the Illyrians and the Thracians. The divisions in Greece gave him the opportunity of intervention there. He posed as the friend of the oligarchic party in various Greek communities, and made it his aim to oppose by diplomacy and by war the most important center of Greek democracy, Athens. The final struggle between the free states and the Macedonian monarchy took place at the battle of Chæronea, August, 338 B.C. Philip won a decisive victory, because he had spent years in training a professional army that proved irresistible when it faced the best citizen soldiers of Athens, Thebes, and other smaller towns which, persuaded by the eloquence of Demosthenes, stood side by side in the defense of liberty. Philip survived his victory only a short time, dying in 336 B.C. as the master of Greece and leaving to his son Alexander the heritage of his unique achievements.

II
THE CONQUEST OF GREECE

Alexander’s succession to the throne of Macedon seemed secured by his father Philip’s sincere personal affection for him. His confidence in Alexander’s ability, even in his son’s early youth, was manifested in the assignment to him of the most responsible positions under his father’s directions. Philip saw to it that his son should be carefully educated by placing him under the charge of Aristotle. Good reports must have come of his precocity, because Philip, while he was occupied in the siege of Byzantium, handed over to Alexander, then only sixteen years old, the administration of Macedon. Two years later, at the battle of Chæronea, already mentioned as marking the downfall of Greek freedom, the youth was placed at the head of the division of the army which took the offensive at a critical part of the engagement, and it was through this important command that the questionable honor of striking the decisive blow in the defeat of the allied forces of free Greece was ungrudgingly conceded to him.

Philip, unattractive as his character was in so many ways, stained as he was by savage passions and duplicity, at least performed conscientiously and effectively a father’s part in preparing his son for the high position he was to take in the future. But the domestic situation of the Macedonian royal family was very far from being modeled on that described in the Odyssey as befitting the heroes and the leaders of men. Philip was lawless, and his numerous amours brought him both difficulty and notoriety, for in his irregular relations he did not scruple to disregard the customary conventions of Greek social life. On his return from his campaign for the subjugation of Greece, he became enamored of Cleopatra, a girl belonging to a distinguished Macedonian family, whose uncle, Attalus, had a high place in the government. Cleopatra’s position made it impossible for the King to offer her the place of a royal mistress; accordingly he made her a legitimate wife. Olympias and her son Alexander left Macedon, the queen returning to her home in Epirus, and the crown prince withdrawing to the traditional enemies of the Macedonians, the Illyrians.

Philip, alarmed at the possibility of political combinations dangerous to his throne, came to an agreement with Alexander by which the latter was to return to his father’s court at Pella, and Olympias’ brother, the prince of Epirus, was induced to give up his hostility against his brother-in-law by a promise that he should have in marriage Philip’s daughter, another Cleopatra. This alliance took place with great ceremony in the summer of 336, in the ancient royal town of Ægæ. Immediately after Philip prepared to set out to war with Persia. During the marriage festivities, however, he was assassinated by one of the members of his bodyguard, Pausanias, who in the confusion that followed almost succeeded in making his escape. Personal motives were assigned as grounds for this murder. Pausanias, it appears, had been deeply insulted by Attalus, the uncle of Philip’s young wife Cleopatra, and failing to get redress from the King, had so revenged on him his injured honor. It has been asked why, if this were the case, he did not strike at Attalus rather than Philip. The probability is that Philip’s murder was inspired by a woman’s indignation.

It was suspected immediately after the event that it was a case of “cherchez la femme,” and all indications pointed to the outraged Olympias as the author of the murder. Alexander himself was thought to have been concerned in his father’s death, for his own rights of succession were endangered by the influence of Cleopatra over Philip, an influence no longer merely sentimental, since she had recently given birth to a son. For this infant she would naturally strive to secure the Macedonian crown, and Alexander would be left to play the uncertain rôle of Pretender.

Whatever happened at Ægæ, the fruits of the crime fell into Alexander’s hands. He had been officially proclaimed his father’s heir. Of Philip’s sons he was the only one who had been tested on the battlefield, and he was also the one who had already shown capacity for leading the state in such crises as were bound to result from his father’s murder. Philip’s old companions in arms did not hesitate for a moment as to the proper choice of a ruler. Alexander was immediately recognized as king, and in the selection special weight was attached to the fact that his cause was urged by Antipater, one of Philip’s closest friends and supporters.

In this way the young prince’s road to the succession was made easy; there were no disturbances, and care was also taken that there should be no competitors for the crown in the future, for the young son of Cleopatra was killed. But these grim measures to establish domestic peace did not stop here. There was another line of Macedonian princes, descended from the dethroned family of Lynkestes; there were two members of this house who might, by making awkward claims at unsuitable times, give much trouble. These two, Heromenes and Arrhabæos, were both executed, on the ground that they had acted as accomplices with Pausanias in the conspiracy against Philip. They had a brother Alexander, whose life was spared only because he was a son-in-law of Antipater and had hailed Alexander as the new king immediately after the murder.

By these deeds of violence, Alexander became the acknowledged master of Macedon, but the prospects outside his own country were anything but favorable. In Asia, Attalus was at the head of the Greek cities. As the uncle of Cleopatra he would naturally be a most bitter enemy of Alexander. The uncertain future in Macedon was not lost on those Greeks whose liberties Philip had so recently destroyed, and whose acquiescence in the rule of Macedon was due only to their fear of the conqueror. Now they were ready to throw off the yoke, needing no excuse, but only an opportunity of rising, which the advent to the throne of an untried youth made most hopeful. A revolt broke out in Ambrakia and the Macedonian governor was driven out. Thebes was preparing for a similar outbreak, and there were plain signs of restlessness in Ætolia and in the Peloponnesus.

Athens was the city to which all the opponents of Macedonian rule looked for sympathy and support. The peace party there, who had gained adherents among the Athenians because of the moderation shown by Philip after his decisive victory at Chæronea, now lost ground because patriotic hopes sprung anew to life at the unexpected death of the man who had shattered the traditional system of Greek city autonomy.

Every Greek regarded Macedon as an alien and semibarbarous power, and one can sympathize with their view. Demosthenes was the leader of the patriotic party in Athens, and all attempts to undermine his popularity only put the partisans of Macedonia in a worse light in the eyes of the Athenians. Whenever he was judicially attacked he came out of the trial in triumph. Besides, the personal ascendancy of Demosthenes protected the minor politicians who joined him as opponents of the friends of the Macedonian monarch. Hyperides, who was responsible for a decree calling every Athenian freeman, slave, and ally under arms for the defense of the city against Philip after the defeat of the Greeks, was brought to trial for his action and, despite the eloquence of the pro-Macedonian orator, Aristogeiton, was acquitted.

The current of popular emotion was even more plainly revealed when the time came to deliver the oration, at the Attic feast of the dead, to commemorate the citizens fallen at the battle of Chæronea. The honor fell to Demosthenes, the one man whose implacable hatred to the Macedonian dynasty and all its works was known to everyone. Attempts were made in Athens to reform the terms of military service by arranging that all citizens should be called out to defend their country, and at the same time money was spent in putting the fortifications of the city in a state to resist an army composed of skilled troops and provided with the siege artillery of the time.

But care had been taken not to invite attack while Athens was yet unprepared. At the marriage feast of Ægæ appeared an Athenian deputation bringing a golden wreath to Philip and a copy of a decree, passed formally by the city, by which it undertook to surrender anyone in its jurisdiction who should dare to plot against the king. When the news of the assassination reached Athens, Demosthenes appeared in the council in festal garb, and solemnly thanked the gods for the deliverance done at Ægæ. He considered that Athens had nothing to fear from the silly youth who now was ruling over Macedon.

But Alexander showed that the great orator had not taken his enemy’s measure. By the rapidity of his actions, he checked all attempts to revolt. Suddenly appearing at the head of his army in Thessaly, he received from the Thessalian allied cities the position of commander-in-chief, as his father had done before him, and moving rapidly south, he reached Thermopylæ, where he summoned the Amphiktyons, and meeting no opposition, was declared by them guardian of the temple at Delphi. Marching farther south to Thebes, he prevented, by his presence with an overwhelming force, any anti-Macedonian movement; and when the Athenians sent a delegation to greet him, he was tactful enough not to ask for further guaranties of good behavior on the part of the city they represented.

The Hellenic league, which included all the Greek states south of Thermopylæ and all the islands which had once owned the supremacy of Athens, met again at Corinth and renewed with Alexander the same agreement that had previously been made with his father, a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance, and the chief command by land and sea was assigned to the new king, as his father’s successor. After this triumphal and peaceful progress, Alexander returned home, where his barbarian neighbors were giving trouble by revolts against his authority.

In order to bring himself in contact with the Greek opposition to Alexander, Attalus, one of the two commanders of the Macedonian army in Asia, had entered into relations with Demosthenes, only a short time after Alexander’s succession. As Cleopatra’s uncle he took a leading part in engineering a conspiracy intended to supplant Alexander by Amyntas, the young son of Perdikkas, the elder brother of Philip, who by the traditional usage of the Macedonian monarchy was entitled to succeed Philip. The success of Alexander in Greece convinced Attalus of the futility of his schemes, and he therefore tried to make advances to the young ruler. But Alexander was not to be placated, and, as a deviser of conspiracies in his own interest, he showed that he had nothing to learn from the practised hands of the Macedonian nobles.

It would have been extremely unwise for Alexander to have shown himself openly an enemy of Attalus, who enjoyed much popularity in the army. Accordingly he made a show of friendship by graciously accepting the advances of Attalus, and at the same time he despatched an associate, Hekatæus, on whom he could rely, with directions to assassinate him. The treacherous deed was made the easier, because Parmenio, joint-commander with Attalus in Asia Minor, facilitated the plans of the assassination, despite the fact that Attalus was married to his daughter. The tribal interests of a half-barbarous people had full sway among the Macedonians, so Parmenio, who had throughout his life been conscientiously loyal to the Macedonian monarchy, did not scruple to sacrifice his daughter’s husband, when it appeared that his son-in-law was plotting to supplant the regularly accepted monarch of his people.

Alexander’s difficulties were being quickly dissolved by crime and bloodshed. The Macedonians had none of the political experiences common to the free Greek communities, and assassination was regarded both as an ordinary expedient for removing opponents, and as the logical method of rounding off a policy that was complicated. With Attalus removed, Alexander could proceed, without further hesitation, to strengthen his position at home. Amyntas, the young pretender, was executed, and with him all of the relatives of Attalus and Cleopatra. In this Borgia-like program of eliminating possible claimants to the throne, only the stepbrother of Alexander, a half-witted lad, Amidæus, was spared. Later Alexander’s mother, Olympias, forced her rival, the queen-widow Cleopatra, to commit suicide.

With this orgy of crime, the reign of Alexander was ushered in, and one reads with astonishment to-day the thin and specious apologies which would excuse the young ruler, the real instigator of these atrocities. As a matter of fact he early acquired the habit of assassination; unfortunately he never unlearned it. Whatever may be argued in behalf of his people, who were uncivilized, nothing can extenuate this early exercise in crime of the pupil of Aristotle. When we survey his record of one year we perceive that hatred of his deeds must have been the test of patriotism and good citizenship among the Greek communities, who might well see in him the typical tyrant of their political theories.

Alexander’s violent preparations for a peaceful reign were successful. During his lifetime the tranquillity of Macedonia was not disturbed. Greece had been brought by the display of military supremacy to a position of servitude; all that needed to be done before he took up his father’s program for the invasion of Asia, was to bring the western tribes on his northern frontier to reason, and to force home upon them the realization of the power of Macedon.

In the spring of 335, Alexander left Amphipolis, and by a rapid march of ten days reached Mount Hæmus in the thick of a population which had never recognized the supremacy of Macedon. They tried to defend themselves in their mountain passes, but Alexander soon forced his way through, and on the top of the highest mountain, celebrated his victory by setting up a thank offering to Dionysus. He then gave his attention to various mountain tribes with whom his father had had trouble, who had never before been subjugated, but who now met a decisive defeat at his hands. An island on the Danube, where the tribesmen had placed for security their wives and children and property, proved, however, impregnable. The young king showed himself from the first a master of strategy, for although he could not capture the island, he executed rapid movements along the river, beating the Getæ who were defending the passages, and when the Triballi had come to terms, he marched up the Danube, and then, crossing the eastern passes of the Hæmus range, returned to Pæonia.

Alexander’s absence in the north in this untiring campaign against barbarian tribes, whose homes and habits were hardly known to the civilized states of Greece, was taken advantage of by his enemies. While he was fighting on the Danube, the King of Illyria, Kleitos, whose people had given trouble to Philip and whose father had fallen in battle with the Macedonians, rose in revolt. Several tribes farther north on the Adriatic coast joined with the Illyrians in this anti-Macedonian movement. Without a moment’s hesitation, Alexander turned to deal with his new enemies, and in order to do effective work, penetrated far into the mountainous region of Illyria. The Macedonian army soon found itself in a hazardous position, surrounded on all sides by hostile tribes. By skilful strategy, Alexander withdrew his troops from the danger that threatened them, while they were besieging Pelion in the face of superior numbers, and when he found that the Illyrians were following him, he quickly turned on them, administered a decisive blow, and forced Kleitos to seek a refuge in the territory of the Taulantines, one of the tribes which had been co-operating with the Illyrians in their resistance to his army.

In the meantime, the presence of a Macedonian force in Asia Minor had awakened the Persians to the danger confronting them of an invasion from Greece. Its full meaning was hardly appreciated, and the new situation was interpreted as only another example of the type of attack so frequently made by the Greek communities ever since the time when the Persian invasion of Greece had been successfully blocked. It had always been found possible to avoid a serious attack from Greece on the Persian Empire by playing off one Greek state against another. This well-tried expedient was now used again. Letters were sent from the King of Persia to the states of Greece urging them to rise against Macedon, and offering large sums of money to subsidize the revolt. Sparta alone responded to the invitation; Athens and the other states, which had just renewed a formal alliance with Macedon, seemed to realize the hopelessness of an anti-Macedonian movement, and refused to accept the offer of Persian money. All that the representatives of the great king could accomplish in this direction was to leave in the hands of Demosthenes the sum of three hundred talents, with the understanding that he could use his own discretion in employing it to the best advantage in the interests of Persia.

The action of the great Athenian orator in accepting the Persian gold has been severely criticised and warmly defended. It must be remembered that to him Alexander appeared only as the destroyer of Greek liberty and not as the protagonist of Greek culture, a position which can be understood only as the result of his conquests in the East. There was no reason why an Athenian patriot should have been willing to destroy the Persian Empire at the cost of the enslavement of his own city.

The perils and difficulties of the Illyrian campaign were magnified by the rumors which reached the Greek cities. It was even reported that Alexander had been slain and his army destroyed. This report was soon followed by an uprising in Thebes against the Macedonians. The leaders of the Macedonian faction were murdered and the Macedonian garrison in the citadel closely besieged. The democratic constitution was then restored and Theban officials were elected according to the old constitutional forms. At this juncture, Demosthenes used some of the Persian treasure to purchase arms, which he sent to Thebes to aid its citizens in their contest for the restoration of their independence.

While the Thebans were most active, the rest of Greece was not slow in showing its antipathy to Macedonian control. Athens prepared itself to do battle for Greek autonomy; the isthmus of Corinth was occupied by an army raised from among the Arcadian cities, with Mantineia at their head. And the people of Elis and Ætolia showed that they would be ready to aid the Thebans.

But before any common plan of resistance could be prepared, Alexander and his army had passed the frontiers of Bœotia after a remarkably rapid forced march, undertaken as soon as the news of the defection of the Thebans had reached him in Illyria. It took him but fourteen days in all to cover the distance from the scene of operations in Illyria to the gates of Thebes. He was willing to come to terms with the Thebans, offering them easy conditions provided they would admit his troops into the city; but the mass of the inhabitants preferred to cast in their lot with those who were in favor of resistance.

The exiled citizens of Thebes knew they would receive short shrift at the hands of the son of the man who had driven them from their native city. The chances of successful resistance were overestimated, but Thebes had formerly led a forlorn hope in its contest with the Spartans; and, as the unexpected had happened before, the Thebans, who were preparing to withstand the Macedonians can hardly be blamed for recalling the glorious memories of the battle of Leuktra. But they were now dealing with a new, vigorous army, not with a Spartan force spoiled by routine. As no help could be looked for from the outside, the situation was altogether different. The result proved that the Thebans of Alexander’s day had inherited indeed the valor, but not the intelligence, of the generation of Epaminondas and Pelopidas.

The Macedonian garrison still held out in the Kadmeia, the citadel which lay in the southern part of the city, near the gate of Elektra, through which passed the road to Athens. Its walls were an integral part of the fortifications of the city. The object of the Thebans was therefore to cut off all communication from the Kadmeia by building about it inclosing lines. This operation Alexander aimed to prevent, and with Perdikkas at the head of a contingent of Macedonian mountaineers, he succeeded in breaking through the Theban line of defense, and finally forced his adversaries back to the walls of the city. They were closely pursued in this retreat, and, as they entered the gate in disorder, the Macedonians were able to force their way into the city at the same time. Another division of the Macedonians found little difficulty in entering the Kadmeia, and from this point of vantage they quickly descended into the city. The Thebans made an attempt to rally in the market place, but the rout was soon general. After the city was overrun by the Macedonians and their allies, it was noted that the people of the smaller Bœotian towns signalized themselves by their acts of cruelty done on the now defenseless Thebans, from whose tyranny they had suffered in the past. Six thousand men, it is said, perished in the taking of Thebes, while the Macedonian loss did not exceed 500. (September, 335 B.C.)

Alexander called together his allies to settle the fate of the conquered. The decision was a horrible example of rancorous hatred, for he allowed the smaller cities of Bœotia, smarting, as we have seen, under the sense of long grievances, to work their will on their once powerful neighbor. The town was to be razed to the ground, only the house of Pindar being spared. The sole part of the fortifications of the town to be retained was the Kadmeia, which remained as a military post with its Macedonian garrison. The Theban territory was to be divided among the allies, and all the captive Thebans, men, women, and children, with but a few exceptions, were to be sold as slaves. Those Thebans who escaped from the city were to be outlawed, and no Greek city would be permitted to receive them. The only positive items in this ruthless decree were the provisions for restoring Orchemenos and Platæa, places which Thebes had once treated with the severity now meted out to her.

Such a catastrophe, as the result of a defeat or a siege, had never before been witnessed in Greece, and the impression produced was one of unmitigated terror. It was not simply the misfortunes of the existing Theban community, or the material loss from the annihilation of property. Thebes had the closest associations with the heroic age of Greece, its name was interwoven with the stories of gods and heroes. Kadmus had founded it; within its limits Dionysus and Herakles had been born. The city which had shattered the power of Sparta was left desolate, and the plow passed over the ground where it had once stood. It seemed according to a contemporary as if Zeus had torn the moon from the heavens.

The impression made throughout Greece by this barbarous deed was universal; no one dared to think of resistance to Alexander. There was a general desire among the various cities to place themselves in a favorable position with the conqueror. The Arcadians condemned to death those who had advised that aid should be given to the Thebans; in other places the partisans of Macedonia were received back from exile, and haste was made to acquaint Alexander of the general desire to meet his wishes.

The Athenians were celebrating their most solemn religious festival, the Eleusinian Mysteries, when the taking of Thebes was announced. There was widespread consternation, because it was assumed that the next move of Alexander would be made against Athens in order to punish its citizens for their anti-Macedonian sentiments. The celebration of the festival was abandoned; the inhabitants of the open country took refuge within the city walls, in anticipation of the ravaging of their lands, and the fortifications surrounding the city were fully prepared for defense. In spite of the plain dangers involved in showing sympathy for the defeated Thebans, fugitives from that city were received with an open-handed hospitality, and their needs cared for without stint. But at the same time an opening for maintaining amicable relations with the victor was preserved, by sending a formal embassy to Alexander to congratulate him on his return from Illyria and for his quick victory over the rebels in Thebes.

The true situation of affairs in Athens was an open secret. Alexander knew the part played by the Athenians in preparing for the Theban revolt; he knew, too, that they had been on the point of actively and openly co-operating with the Thebans, and that the plan had been frustrated only by the rapidity with which he had moved on the city. Yet the young ruler showed himself unexpectedly placable in his treatment of Athens. There is no reason to attribute his attitude to mere generosity of sentiment in favor of the city because of its glorious past. There were more practical reasons; the siege of Athens could hardly be successful except through command of the sea, and any attempt of this kind would most likely have been frustrated or at least rendered doubtful by the intervention of the Persian fleet.

Instead of advancing into Attica, Alexander stopped to parley, and agreed to abstain from hostilities on condition that the Athenians should promptly expel the Theban fugitives, and also should surrender to him the men who had been lately responsible for the anti-Macedonian direction of the government. It is to the credit of the Athenians that the first condition was without a negative rejected; and as to the second there were many of the anti-democratic faction who would have been glad to get rid of their opponents by agreeing to this indirect demand of the Macedonian king that the government of the city should be handed over to his partisans. Phokion, one of the distinguished and revered members of the oligarchic group, was willing to accept the condition unreservedly; but Demosthenes and Demades, another popular leader, successfully urged the assembly of the people to vote against it, and even Phokion agreed to head an embassy to acquaint Alexander with the decision of the Athenian citizens. The king showed himself ready to compromise, for the success of his schemes against Asia depended largely on the good will of Athens and its fleet. It was finally arranged that the Athenian anti-Macedonian military leader Charidemos should be banished, a proposal to which it was all the easier for the Athenians to accede, because he was not a native Athenian. This officer and several others withdrew to Asia and took service under Darius.

III
THE CONQUEST OF PERSIA

Now that the pacification of Greece was effected by the restoration of Athens as a member of the Macedonian confederacy, Alexander, without visiting that city, marched to the isthmus of Corinth to arrange for the various Greek contingents for his expedition to Asia, and after receiving from the oracle at Delphi a reply encouraging him to carry out his grandiose scheme of conquest, he retired to Macedonia to spend the winter before setting out on his march against the Persian Empire.

Of the details of his proposed invasion nothing is known beyond the fact that his original scheme must have been considerably modified as he penetrated farther into Asia. His geographical knowledge of the interior of the empire could hardly have been sufficient for an orderly mapping out beforehand of the course he actually took. That was entirely governed by the extraordinary series of events which marked the various stages of his expedition. His design was to dethrone the Persian king and secure possession of the country. To do this effectively the first step was to conquer Asia Minor, to get under his control the remoter provinces of Syria and Egypt, and then to advance on Babylon and Susa. That there was immediate necessity for setting his army on the march was plain to him, because of the dangerous position of the Macedonian forces already in Asia Minor. The Persian general, Memnon, had checkmated Parmenio, who was recalled, and the prospects of Macedonian success were blighted by the defeat of another Macedonian general Kallás in the Troad. Before Alexander left his own kingdom, the authority of the Persian government had been generally restored throughout the whole of Asia Minor.

In the spring of 334, Alexander marched to the Hellespont with an army numbering altogether 30,000 infantry and 4500 cavalry. Of these, 12,000 infantry and 1500 cavalry were from Macedon; contingents from the allies made up the rest. There were besides 160 warships, of which Athens furnished twenty. Alexander’s chief military adviser was Parmenio, whom Philip, his father, had declared to be the only Macedonian general he had discovered in many years. Of the subordinate officers the most noteworthy were Philotas, who was in command of the Macedonian cavalry, and Nikanor, who led the álite of the Macedonian infantry (the so-called Hypaspistæ, or the Bodyguards). During the absence of the king, the administration of Macedon and of the subject states was left in the hands of Antipater.

The incompetence of the Persians in aggressive resistance was manifest from the first. They were far superior to the Greeks at sea, and if they had made intelligent use of their fleet they could have prevented Alexander’s army from crossing the Hellespont. Indeed, orders had been issued the year before to the coast cities that their ships should be kept in readiness in anticipation of an invasion. But so slipshod was the administration in the loosely governed provinces of Persia that their great fleet was unable to put to sea when Alexander reached the narrow arm of water which divides Europe from Asia. He had no difficulty in passing; indeed Parmenio was left to superintend this operation, while the young king visited the cities of the Troad rich in legendary lore, and made a pilgrimage to the tomb of his reputed ancestor, Achilles.

The Greeks soon began their march down the coast. The satraps of the neighboring provinces had in the meantime gathered together all the troops available in the Propontis and had joined the army of Memnon. From the statements made in contemporary sources, it is not possible to gather the numerical strength of the army which now opposed Alexander’s advance; it is certain, however, that in infantry the Persians were weaker than the Greeks, while it is probable that they were also outnumbered in cavalry.

They were certainly aware of their weakness, because Memnon advised against a stand-up battle, suggesting instead that they should retire into the interior, wasting the country as they went, and so hinder the rapidity of the enemy’s march until their own fleet appeared; then the war could be carried into Greece and Alexander forced to retreat. But this prudent strategy was not acceptable to the Persian satraps, who preferred active measures that seemed to offer a chance of preventing Alexander from getting a firm foothold in Persian territory.

They prepared to offer battle by taking up a position on the river Granicus, a stream flowing down from the northern slope of Mt. Ida to the Propontis. It seems as if the Persians, conscious of their weakness, selected a battlefield where their enemies, with a river in front of them, would find it a matter of some difficulty to attack. They may have supposed that Alexander would hesitate to advance under such unfavorable conditions. The Macedonian army was so disposed that the heavy-armed infantry held the center while the wings were formed by the cavalry and the bowmen. Alexander himself was with the picked Macedonian cavalry on the right wing; next him were arranged the hypaspists, extending towards the middle. This wing, comprising cavalry, bowmen, and heavy-armed troops, appears to have crossed the river first and to have put to flight the Persian cavalry. That the Persians used horsemen here and not bowmen seems strange. Cavalry were of little use in preventing an advance up the steep slope from the stream.

First the Persian horse were put to flight by the right Macedonian wing, commanded by Alexander, who took an active part in the hand-to-hand conflict; then the phalanx of Greek mercenaries on the Persian side, who had stood by hitherto without taking any part in the engagement, were attacked in front by the Macedonian phalanx and on the flanks by the cavalry and bowmen and, being thus prevented from making any real resistance, were hewn down or taken prisoners. The Macedonian loss was so small, eighty-five horsemen and thirty foot soldiers, that it would seem that probably the Greek mercenaries, instead of resisting their own kinsmen, allowed themselves to be taken prisoners. The brunt of the battle was borne by the Persian horsemen, who fought valorously, and in the obstinate scrimmage with them Alexander was in considerable personal danger. Two of the satraps lost their lives on the field. The Greek prisoners were sent in chains to Macedon, and of the booty taken, 300 suits of armor were sent to the Parthenon at Athens as a thank-offering, a visible reminder to the Greeks of the victor’s progress. (May-June, 334 B.C.)

The fruits of the victory were immediate: several of the principal cities surrendered, among them Sardis, with its impregnable citadel, and Ephesus. In both places Alexander was greeted as a deliverer from Persian tyranny; democratic government was restored, and a beginning was made for organizing a massacre of the oligarchic faction. This Alexander prevented, making it clear by his intervention that he did not wish to alienate the sympathies of the propertied classes in Asia. Of the other Greek cities in Ionia and Æolis, only one gave serious trouble, Miletus, which looked to the Persian fleet for aid. It was occupied besides by a strong garrison of Greek mercenaries. Alexander’s fleet, however, appeared at Miletus before the Persian fleet, which was on its way from Cyprus and Phœnicia, reached the scene of action. When this fleet came up, it tried in vain to entice the Macedonian ships into an action, and remained idly by while Alexander besieged Miletus and finally took it by storm.

The sole stronghold still left to Persia in the region was Halicarnassus to the south. Hither the Persian fleet repaired, and here, as the place was strongly fortified and well manned with troops, Memnon planned to establish a base for further operations by sea against Greece itself. But Alexander declined to take the risk of meeting the Persian fleet in a naval engagement. Winter was at hand, and most of the Macedonian ships had been sent home; there was only a small squadron left, and the king marched south with his army to besiege Halicarnassus by land.

The problem before him was anything but easy, for Halicarnassus, besides being strongly fortified, had through the presence of the Persian fleet free communication with the outside. It could be supplied with food, although the opportunity of obtaining mercenary troops from Greece was made difficult through the fear of Macedon. The city walls were surrounded with wide ditches and these Alexander filled up, in order to give access to his siege engines. Several breaches were made, but the first attempt to storm the place failed, and the defenders of the city erected new fortifications in place of those that had been cut down. They also made a sortie, trying to destroy the siege engines, but were repulsed with loss. Memnon saw that the town could no longer be held, and by night embarked his troops, carrying them to Cos; but before he left he set fire to the abandoned town. Alexander immediately entered, showed himself merciful to its citizens, and proceeded on his march, leaving a division of 3050 men to watch the citadel of Halicarnassus, which evidently he did not think of sufficient importance to besiege now that the Persians had only a small number of troops in the neighborhood, in Salmakis and on the island Arconnesus.

The whole of the province of Caria now ceased to resist, with the exception of a few places on the coast. A part of the Greek army, under the orders of Parmenio, were sent into winter quarters in Lydia, while Alexander advanced through Lycia and Pamphylia, without meeting any real resistance, and marched by the way of the mountainous country of Pisidia, among a population never conquered by the Persians, and in the spring of 333 joined Parmenio at Gordion, the ancient capital of Phrygia. From here the route of the army was through Cappadocia by the narrow pass called the Cilician Gate, by which the road from the interior plateau crosses the Taurus on its way to Tarsus. The garrison which occupied the pass fled on the approach of the Greek army, Tarsus itself was abandoned, and the whole province of Cilicia was occupied without resistance.

In the meantime, however, Memnon had not been inactive, and he was putting to good use his superiority in naval strength. Several islands had either been occupied or were making preparations to join the Persian general, and even in continental Greece the anti-Macedonian influence was being felt. There was no question that Memnon’s arrival on the shores of European Greece would be the signal for a general abandonment of the Macedonian cause. Athens even sent an embassy to Darius, although the city did not dare to join the Persians openly. In the midst of these successes, Memnon was taken ill and died. Those who succeeded him in the command showed none of his capacity. The fleet was kept in inactivity, and though on land some small successes could be put to the credit of the Persian arms in Asia Minor, the soldiers operating there were soon directed to join the main army of Darius in Syria, now being collected to meet the advancing Greeks. When the news of Alexander’s victory at the Granicus reached the interior of the Persian Empire, Darius began to draw together a large army, and leaving Babylon in January, reached northern Syria in autumn. Alexander was still in Cilicia, detained in Tarsus by a severe illness, and on his recovery busied himself with the conquest of some of the coast cities. But when he heard of the advance of Darius, he marched trough the narrow pass near the coast which connects Cilicia and Syria, and commenced the siege of Myriandros, the first Phœnician city on the road. He evidently reckoned on Darius meeting him in the level places of northern Persia, where the latter’s cavalry could be used to its best advantage, but Darius showed a keener strategical instinct than is usually associated with Persian generalship. While Alexander was taking the coast road south, Darius’ army made a northerly movement, passing over a difficult mountain region, and so appeared in the rear of the Macedonian army on the level plain near Issus. The Persians had a strong position; on their right was the sea, and on their left a chain of mountains. On the front they were protected by the deeply worn bed of the river Pinarus. They had also constructed a line of earthworks.

The preliminary operations of the Persians were conducted with great intelligence. By them Alexander was cut off from his base and his position was desperate, unless he could restore his line of communications by a successful engagement. This was no easy matter, for the mountain defile, the Assyrian Gate, had to be passed through, a place where the mountains and the sea are so close that there is room only for a road. Darius had an excellent position but failed to make any use of it. Without attempting to interfere he allowed Alexander to march through the narrow strip of land between the mountains and the sea and to change from a column formation into regular battle array.

It took the Greek commander the whole night to make the journey from Myriandros, a place south of the defile, to the level country on the banks of the Pinarus. As Alexander’s army debouched on the plain, the cavalry and the light-armed troops sent against them by Darius failed to arrest their progress. The Persians were outmanœuvered from the start, for on the plain, which had very narrow limits—a little more than two miles wide—Darius could make no use of his superior numbers, nor was there opportunity for bringing to bear to any purpose the Persian advantage in cavalry. It was possible for Alexander to extend his own line of battle just as far as the enemy could, and the nature of the ground protected him against any enveloping manœuver. Thus the disposable forces, on either side, were equalized, and on account of the superior training and skill of the Macedonians, there was little doubt from the first as to the issue of the fight.

On the Greek side the left wing was commanded by Alexander in person, and it was made up of the Macedonian cavalry, the hypaspists, and a part of the ordinary infantry. The vigor of their onslaught was irresistible, and the Asiatics opposed to them gave way after a short struggle and fled. The whole Persian center was disorganized, even Darius avoiding capture with difficulty. His chariots, his royal robes, and his arms fell into the hands of the victorious Greeks. In another part of the field Parmenio, who was in command of the left wing of the Greek army, had no easy time in withstanding the charges of the Asiatic cavalry, and also when the Macedonian phalanx undertook to storm the heights which were occupied by Greek mercenary troops on the other side, they were repulsed with considerable loss. Fortunately, Alexander, after defeating the division opposed to him, was able to use his infantry to attack the mercenaries on their rear, and they were forced to withdraw from the field. They retired in good order, but the Persian cavalry proved inefficient, and were repulsed with great loss. In their flight they demoralized the reserves which had been placed by the Persians immediately behind the line of battle. The Persian army ceased to exist as a military entity and the fugitives were saved from further pursuit only by the early nightfall of the autumn season. Darius was able to bring together on the other side of the Syrian mountains 4000 men, most of whom were Greek mercenaries, and with a small force he recrossed the Euphrates. The main body of the Greeks, attached to the army of Darius, made their way to Tripolis in Phœnicia and from there sailed to Cyprus. (October, 333 B.C.)

After the battle the Persian camp was occupied by the Greeks, and among the captives were the mother of Darius and his wife, Stateira, and her children. These members of the royal household were treated considerately. Their presence with the Greek army was a most valuable asset, and a few days after his defeat Darius began to open negotiations for the purpose of having the captives restored to him. Alexander showed no unfriendly spirit, and received an embassy with formal proposals of peace from Darius. The conditions were, that all of the country west of the Euphrates should be ceded and the large sum of 10,000 talents given for the return of the royal captives. In addition to this, as a pledge of good faith, it was proposed that Alexander should receive one of the king’s daughters in marriage. The offer was a proof that Darius realized how deep was his humiliation and how small the chance of successful resistance to the conqueror.

Liberal as the terms were, it must have been plain to Alexander that to make peace now was to leave his work half finished, especially as the first half was the more difficult. In it he had defeated the best soldiers under the command of Darius, and there was nothing more to fear from the Persian fleet, its most important units being withdrawn to protect Syria, nor was a rising in Greece likely to be attempted. The news of the battle of Issus had made the anti-Macedonian faction in the Greek cities see the purposelessness of counting on the co-operation of Persia. At the Isthmian games the representatives of the Hellenic confederation voted Alexander a golden crown as a defender of the liberties of Greece.

Alexander answered the proposition of the Persian king in a stern mood, fully conscious of his strength. His letter to Darius, which has been preserved, is a document that speaks in no uncertain tone. “Your ancestors invaded Macedonia and the rest of Greece, and without provocation inflicted wrongs upon us. I was appointed leader of the Greeks and crossed over into Asia for the purpose of avenging those wrongs; for ye were the first aggressors. In the next place ye assisted the people of Perinthus, who were offenders against my father, and Ochus sent a force into Thrace, which was part of our empire. Further, the conspirators who slew my father were suborned by you, as ye yourselves boasted in your letters. Thou with the help of Bagoas didst murder Arses (son of Ochus) and seize the throne unjustly and contrary to the law of the Persians, and then thou didst write improper letters regarding me to the Greeks, to incite them to war against me, and didst send to the Lacedæmonians and other of the Greeks, for the same purpose, sums of money (whereof none of the other cities partook but only the Lacedæmonians); and these emissaries corrupted my friends and tried to dissolve the peace which I had brought about in Greece. Wherefore I marched forth against thee who wert the aggressor in general. I have overcome in battle first thy generals and satraps, and now thyself and thine host, and possess thy land through the grace of the gods. Those who fought on thy side and were not slain but took refuge with me, are under my protection and are glad to be with me and will fight with me henceforward. I am lord of all Asia, and therefore do thou come to me. If thou art afraid of being evilly entreated, send some of thy friends to receive sufficient guaranties. Thou hast only to come to me to ask and receive thy mother and children, and whatsoever else thou mayest desire. And for the future whenever thou sendest, send to me as to the Great King of Asia, and do not write as to an equal, but tell me whatever thy need be, as to one who is lord of all that is thine. Otherwise I shall deal with thee as an offender. But if thou disputest the kingdom, then wait and fight for it again and do not flee; for I will march against thee, wherever thou mayest be.”

Darius now set about collecting another army and made no more peace proposals. He gathered the fragments of the force that had been beaten at Issus, and to this were added contingents drawn from all the furthermost parts of his empire still in his hands. The army so formed was almost exclusively Asiatic, for of Greek mercenaries there were only the soldiers, a few thousand all told, who had followed him in his flight. No others could now be secured. Darius’ new plan was to await the approach of Alexander on the plains of Assyria, where the Persian cavalry could be used with most effect.

On Alexander’s part there was no haste in turning to the interior. Instead of following Darius, he remained on the sea coast, while Parmenio was sent to Damascus with half the Greek army, to seize the treasure left there by Darius before the battle of Issus. Alexander with the rest of the army turned south to the conquest of the great island city of Phœnicia, which unlike its smaller neighbors had refused to surrender and had declared its neutrality to Alexander. Tyre was the center of Persian sea power, and so long as it remained independent its fleet could be used against the Greek king, either on the sea itself or as an instrument for creating disturbances in continental Greece.

The siege of Tyre involved special difficulties; not only were its walls high and strong, but it was situated on an island separated from the mainland by a shallow body of water. As Alexander had no fleet adequate to conduct aggressive operations from the open sea against the city, he planned to bring up his siege engines against the walls from the land side, by building a causeway over the shallow body of water. The defenders of the town tried repeatedly and with great bravery to prevent such an approach from being made. Tyre’s own commercial competitors, Cyprus and the less important Phœnician cities, including Sidon, placed their navies at Alexander’s disposition, and with their ships he began to operate from the sea. The situation of the town was desperate, but its people made a defense as desperate and as resourceful as their daughter city Carthage in later days against the Romans.

When the causeway was finally constructed, the walls on this side, being 150 feet high and enormously thick, were not damaged by the siege engines. Accordingly Alexander changed his plans quickly; the engines were mounted in vessels and a breach was effected in one of the battlements extending along the harbor. While the Macedonians were now able to penetrate the city, they met with heavy resistance from the besieged townsmen, and the occupation of Tyre was only effected by the protection of Alexander’s naval allies, who forced an entrance into the two harbors, and so drew off a portion of the defenders from the side where the Greeks were making their attack. The stubborn defense cost the Tyrians 8000 men, and of the prisoners 3000 were sold as slaves. On the Macedonian side the loss was small, only amounting to 400 men, but no mention is made of the losses of the allied fleets. The siege of Tyre lasted seven months, the city falling in July, 332. The long delay was worth while, for the successful issue showed how invincible was the generalship of the Greek leader. By the possession of the city he held the key to the control of the eastern Mediterranean.

On the way south he met with no resistance except from the strong citadel at Gaza, which withstood him for two months and was finally taken by storm. The march to Egypt could now be safely undertaken, as the whole sea coast from the Hellespont south was in the hands of the Greeks. Egypt itself had no love for its Persian masters. It had not long before been autonomous for fifty years, and it had been brought back under the régime of the Great King under circumstances of repression that made its inhabitants greet Alexander as a liberator. The Persian governor, seeing the folly of resistance, gave up the strong places, and Alexander passed the winter in the country. During his stay he founded the only good harbor on the coast, the city which still bears his name. This undertaking was not the boastful action of a conqueror, solicitous of the praise of posterity; it was a keen-sighted scheme to divert from the Phœnician towns of Syria the control of the Mediterranean trade. Within half a century Alexandria had become a great commercial emporium, the center of Greek science and learning, and for three hundred years it continued to be the richest and largest city in the world.

As the members of the old Egyptian monarchy had proclaimed themselves sons of Ammon, Alexander, in order to regularize his position in the newly conquered province, made a visit to the temple of Zeus Ammon, traveling across the desert with a small company of troops. He was greeted by the priests of the temple as the divinely accredited ruler of Egypt, but the exact words of the response of the oracle were not communicated. They were kept as a mystery, but the divine honors claimed afterwards by Alexander were always connected with this mysterious attestation of his claim that his father was no earthly parent, but Zeus himself.

Darius, meanwhile, was in no position to interrupt this series of successes in Syria and in Egypt. He had no army there prepared to take the field, but he did try to interfere with the Greek lines of communication in regions more remote from the present scene of operations. Antigonus, left in Phrygia as its governor, was attacked by a force composed of some of the soldiers who had fought on the Persian side at Issus, as well as of contingents from Cappadocia and Paphlagonia. But the attempt was unsuccessful. Antigonus showed remarkable military ability, for with his small force he defeated the Persians and added to the region under him the country of Lycaonia, which had never submitted to Persian rule. In the spring of 331 Alexander left Egypt for his march to the interior of the Persian Empire, and by the middle of the summer he crossed the Euphrates near Thapsacus, and from there, taking a northerly direction through Mesopotamia, he passed the Tigris on the 20th of September.

The advance of the Greek army was continuous, little resistance being offered to its progress. It seemed to be the aim of Darius to do nothing to prevent Alexander from penetrating into the interior. If the Greeks were defeated there, they would be cut off from retreat, and in case the Persians again failed, there would be a chance for the vanquished to withdraw in security to the mountainous country to the north. Alexander has been criticised for delaying so long in his occupation of Syria and Egypt; indeed Parmenio had urged him to accept the terms offered by Darius after the battle of Issus, a suggestion which called forth from Alexander the reply “that he would do it if he were Parmenio.” But the small number of soldiers under his command showed the strategy he followed to be as cautious as his conduct of the expedition was daring. If he had gone straight on after the battle of Issus, he would have been obliged to detach enough men from his main army to act as a corps of observation in Syria and Egypt, and this would have left him hardly more than 20,000 men.

In the meantime he had received accessions of numbers, so that when he came to confront Darius for the second time he had under his command about 47,000 men. The engagement took place at Gaugamela (October, 331 B.C.), not far from the ruins of Nineveh. Darius had made some attempt to give an improved armament to his foot soldiers, supplying them with longer spears and swords so that they might fight the Macedonian phalanx on more equal terms. Besides this, he had provided chariots armed with scythes and a small number of elephants, which could be effectively used only in a level country. But his chief hope lay in his cavalry, of which he probably had 12,000, while Alexander had but 7000.

The Greeks had had four days’ rest in a fortified camp before they were drawn up in battle array, and besides this the ground between them and the Persians had been carefully reconnoitered, in order to discern if the enemy had constructed concealed pits to confuse the cavalry charge. There was no way of protecting the flanks of the army, so Alexander placed a reserve force behind with orders to move towards the right or the left, according as the expected turning movement from the Persians might develop. The Greeks moved forward on the 30th of September, with Alexander leading the Macedonian heavy cavalry and the bulk of the phalanx. He directed his attack against the enemy’s left wing, but as he did so he was charged on the flank by the Scythian and Bactrian horse. He sent against them the reserves previously mentioned, and himself engaged the Persian infantry, who had lost heart when they were attacked by the Macedonian cavalry. The manœuvers with the scythe-bearing chariots did no damage, for the Greeks made way for them to pass through their ranks, and re-formed again as soon as they had rattled past. The onslaught of the phalanx proved irresistible; the Asiatic foot could not withstand its superior armament and discipline. The Persian center was broken and again Darius had the ignominious experience of a headlong flight. The Persian cavalry, left to battle alone, was soon demoralized and could not hold its ground.

Parmenio’s experience with the left wing of the Greeks was different, for he had difficulty in keeping his position against the Persian horse. He could not follow Alexander’s advance, and hence there came to be a great gap between the two positions of the army. In this open space the Persians precipitated themselves; the Greek lines in battle array were forced farther apart and their camp occupied. It was a most dangerous position, but the barbarians, instead of using their advantage, busied themselves in plundering the Greek camp. Alexander turned from pursuing the Persian center to help the hard-pressed left wing, and on his way met the enemy’s cavalry, now on their way back with the booty of the Macedonian camp. He tried to cut them off from their main body, but they fought with desperation and succeeded in breaking through. In the hand-to-hand fights one of Alexander’s closest friends, Hephæstion, was wounded.

The danger to the left wing was now over, for the Persian commander Mazæus, on hearing of his king’s flight, had ceased the attack on Parmenio, who now occupied the Persian camp, while Alexander resumed the pursuit of the main body, anxious to get Darius into his hands. He marched with great rapidity, reaching on the day after the battle Arbela, at which place the supplies and treasures of the flying Persians were discovered. But the Great King had made good his escape to Media, where, owing to the mountainous character of the country, it was useless to pursue him farther. The results of the battle were impressive materially and emotionally. The Persians had no heart to continue the war. Their army was destroyed, 10,000 prisoners were in the hands of their enemy, and the road to their capitals, Babylon and Susa, lay open. All this had been won by Alexander at a small cost, only 100 Macedonians having fallen, and the whole loss of the Greek army did not exceed 500 men.

Alexander marched to Babylon, which was surrendered without resistance by its inhabitants, who welcomed him as a liberator. Religious differences had made the citizens regard the Persians as oppressors, and Alexander won over the Babylonians by acting as the protector of their national religion. He rebuilt the Babylonian temples and also showed a placable temper by keeping the Persian Mazæus as satrap of the province of Babylonia. Without delaying at Babylon longer than was necessary to conciliate the inhabitants, Alexander passed to Susa. Its citadel offered no resistance, and with its surrender the town and its treasury, amounting to 50,000 talents ($60,000,000), became the property of the conqueror. (December, 331 B.C.)

The next stage of the conquest of the interior of Asia was the occupation of the country called Persis, the homeland of the Persians. To reach it a difficult country held by Uxian hillmen had to be passed. These were proud of their independence, for they had never paid tribute to the Persians, and they now occupied their mountain defile, prepared to dispute the passage of the Greeks. They were easily circumvented by Alexander’s strategy, and brought to reason. Farther on, the access to Persepolis was strongly defended by the Persians, but Alexander forced his way through devious mountain roads and took the capital without trouble. The national treasure, equivalent to 120,000 talents, fell into his hands.

Up to this point the march of Alexander had been through territories which the Persians had themselves acquired by conquest, and which had been long exploited by their satraps. The populations were, therefore, not inimical to the new conquerors. Indeed, as we have seen in many cases, the latter were greeted as deliverers from the heavy yoke of the Persians. On its side, the Macedonian army had been kept under strict discipline, and the lives and property of the people through whom it had passed were carefully respected. But Persepolis was really in the enemy’s country, the cradle of Persian rule, and there was no chance of reconciling its inhabitants by kind treatment. They were now to feel the brunt of real warfare. The city was given up to plunder, and the royal citadel of the Achæmenian kings was burnt down in a drunken revel. This ruthless act has been condemned, and it does appear to have been the result of a moment of excess, not planned as part of a policy of repression, for Alexander ordered the flames quenched, though he himself had cast the first firebrand that had set the costly cedar work of the palace in flames.

These various military operations lasted far into the autumn. When winter came the sorely tried and traveled Greeks took four months’ rest, and from this point begins another stage in the expedition, for Persis was regarded as sufficiently pacified to allow the bulk of the army to march into Media. Here Darius was preparing to make a last stand, but his efforts to collect a new army had the somewhat pitiful result of bringing to his standard a force of not more than 3000 horsemen and 6000 foot soldiers. As the Greeks approached, he fled before them, recognizing the hopelessness of resistance. He seemed minded to take refuge in the extreme limits of what had been his empire, the province of Bactria. Without striking a blow, Alexander occupied Ecbatana, the last of the great Persian capitals.

All that now remained was to round off the conquest by capturing the person of the defeated monarch, and to force the satraps of the eastern provinces to accept the new régime. This program offered no serious military problems, but it was bound to consume time and required patience. Many of the non-Macedonian Greeks were now sent home, after receiving generous rewards for their service, and Parmenio was left at Ecbatana, while Alexander with the best of his troops set off to pursue Darius. Hurrying on by Ragæ, a place a little to the south of the modern capital of Persia, Alexander found there that the royal fugitive had already passed through the Caspian Gates into the regions of Parthia. Bactria was still much farther to the east. The followers of Darius, with the exception of a few faithful Greek mercenaries, determined to hand over their unlucky monarch as a prisoner to the satrap of Bactria, Bessus, a kinsman of his, and to trust to his initiative to organize a national resistance more effectively than Darius.

When Alexander, after a stay of several days at Ragæ, heard that his old antagonist was a prisoner he hurried on, taking rest neither by night nor by day, and finally came up with the barbarians, who now preserved no semblance of discipline in their retreat. When Bessus and the other conspirators saw Alexander approaching, they ordered Darius, who was probably carried in a litter, to mount a horse and accompany them. When he refused, they stabbed him and rode off. He was found dying at a spring near the road, by a Macedonian soldier. By the time Alexander reached the place the end had come. All that he could do for his fallen foe was to throw his own cloak over the body and order it to be sent with befitting honor to the queen mother. The last member of the Persian monarchy, which had become a world power under Cyrus, was buried in the royal tombs at Persepolis.

IV
THE INVASION OF INDIA

The death of Darius did not delay the activity of Alexander; he was all the more stirred to pursue Bessus when it was announced that the satrap of Bactria was claiming to be the successor of Darius and had assumed the insignia of royalty. But the regions close at hand had to be pacified, so Parmenio was sent to occupy the country near the southwest coast of the Caspian Sea. Alexander himself had to retrace his steps to deal with a rebellious satrap who had previously sent in his submission.

On the march southward, the province of Drangiana was taken without resistance, but the conqueror’s stay at the capital, Prophthasia, was marked by a mysterious tragedy. It was reported to Alexander that Philotas, the son of Parmenio, was plotting against him. An assembly of the Macedonian army was summoned, and the charges laid formally before them. Philotas admitted that he had known of a plot to assassinate Alexander, but had kept it secret. This reserve was treated as treason, and Philotas was put to death by the soldiers. This semi-judicial act was followed by the murder at Alexander’s command of his faithful lieutenant, Parmenio, for which there was no excuse, as he had never been charged with complicity in the guilty knowledge of his son. But Alexander probably judged that the execution of Philotas would inaugurate a blood feud familiar to Macedonian life, and he resolved to take no chances.

The road to Bactria selected by Alexander led him through modern Afghanistan and across the Hindu Kush mountains. But first he turned to the south in order to secure Seistan and the northwestern portion of Baluchistan, known at that time as Gedrosia. The winter of 330-29 he spent in the south of Seistan among a friendly people, the Ariaspæ, to whom, on account of their hospitable reception, he granted autonomy. Among the Gedrosians, their neighbors, he set up a satrapy, with a capital at Pasa.

In the spring, the Greek army pushed on to Arachosia, almost directly south of Bactria, where the king founded another Alexandria, probably on the site of the modern Candahar. At the foot of the high range of the Hindu Kush, a complex mass of mountains which divides southern from central, eastern from western Asia, called Paropanisus, the army passed the winter, and yet another city, named after their leader, was founded somewhere to the north of Cabul, Alexandria of the Caucasus. In the early spring the difficult mountain ranges which protected Bactria were crossed, the troops suffering much from the cold and from the lack of food. They were obliged to subsist on raw meat and on herbs instead of bread. After resting the army, Alexander led them on through an arid plain to Bactria, the chief city of the satrapy. (329-28 B.C.)

Bessus, the pretender, had tried to hinder the progress of the Greeks by laying waste the country in front of them, but as soon as they drew near, his horsemen deserted him and he fled across the Oxus. Alexander lost no time in following him up. The pursuit carried him through Sogdiana, where he crossed the Oxus on the rafts, made of inflated skins, such as are still in use to-day. The river was passed at a point where it was not a mile wide, at Kilif, and from thence the road was taken to Maracanda, a town whose old name is now thinly disguised as Samarcand. Bessus was deserted by his supporters, who thought that they would be glad to secure peace by his surrender. They abandoned him, and he was found by a division of the Greek army in a walled village, and was finally sent in chains to Bactria, after Alexander had charged him with the murder of Darius, his kinsman and benefactor.

The ardor for annexing the Far Eastern division of the Persian Empire to his rule spurred Alexander on, now that the rebellion of Bessus had so unexpectedly failed. He purposed to make, not the Oxus, but the Tanais his frontier on the northeast. The resistance seemed easily overcome; the seven strongholds of the Sogdians were occupied, and on the banks of the Jaxartes, or Tanais, at a point which is the gate of communication between southwestern Asia and China, the pass over the Tian-shan mountains, Alexander set the boundary of his conquests in this direction, by founding a new city called Alexandria the Ultimate, in later days Khodjend. While he was planning his new town, the country rose in revolt, for the chieftains of Sogdiana had no mind to lose their freedom. The small Macedonian garrisons left in the strongholds a short time before were overpowered, and the city of Maracanda was being besieged. The news of the revolt had spread far and wide, and the various Scythian tribes were hurrying to join in driving out the invaders. Alexander quickly recovered the strongholds, burning five of them, but at Cyropolis there was stout resistance, and he received a wound. The inhabitants of all were removed and forcibly transplanted as citizens of the new Alexandria. (328 B.C.)

It was not possible to go to the rescue of Maracanda because of the threatening attitude of the Scythian tribes, who were preparing to descend upon Alexandria, which was only separated from them by the river Tanais. The danger of being rushed by these barbarous hordes was imminent. The new city, therefore, was made capable of resistance; in the short period of twenty days it was surrounded with walls of unburnt clay. But Alexander determined also to strike terror by aggressive action. He brought up to the banks of the river engines which threw stones and darts among the enemy and forced them to retreat from the stream. Then the Greek army crossed, and the Scythians were soon routed. The king, with his cavalry, pursued them some distance in their own territory. The heat was intense and Alexander was made dangerously ill by drinking the water along the line of march.

On his recovery he had to deal with a difficult revolt in Sogdiana, again led by Spitamenes, who had figured in the previous uprising and who this time had succeeded in cutting off a detachment of Macedonian troops sent in pursuit of him. It is recounted that the fear of a disaster made such a serious impression on the conqueror that he covered the distance to Samarcand, over 150 miles, in three days. Spitamenes did not wait to try conclusions with the Greeks, but abandoned the siege, drawing off hurriedly in a westward direction, closely pursued by Alexander.

The Persian leader and his Scythian supporters were driven into the wastes across the river Sogda, and Alexander, after ravaging the province of Sogdiana, crossed into western Bactria and passed the winter at Zariaspa, one of the chief cities of that region.

While residing here, the trial of the pretender Bessus was begun. He was condemned to mutilation and to die on the cross at Ecbatana. This type of punishment was alien to Greek feeling and tradition, but it is not necessary to say that Alexander’s apologists have argued the necessity of conforming to the habits of Oriental races when they are to be ruled successfully by outsiders. Alexander himself, as he had never assimilated the best traditions of Greece, seemed ready enough to adopt Oriental customs either to heighten his own dignity in Persia or to impress the Persians that he was the legitimate successor of Darius.

The colloquial axiom, “the longest way round is the shortest way home,” can be applied to the science of government and politics, and it is more than probable that the Hellenization of Asia would have had less of the pinchbeck quality if Alexander had been trained in Sparta rather than in Macedon. In any case, we know that his abandonment of the homely traits characteristic of the relations between a Greek commander and his soldiers made him unpopular, and that, especially, the favor shown by him to the Persians who sided with him was distasteful to the Macedonians. His execution of Parmenio savored of oriental despotism, and during this winter there were open signs of discontent in the camp. (328-27 B.C.)

The winter quarters were changed to Maracanda on account of the restlessness among the natives, and in the relaxation from the strict discipline the soldiers and their leaders spent much of their time in carousing. On one occasion when Alexander and his companions were excited with wine, the king was made indignant at some slighting reference to his military exploits made by his foster-brother Clitus, who appealed to some verses of Euripides which signify that the army does the work and the general reaps the glory. Alexander in his drunken passion hurled a spear at the offender, and Clitus fell dead. The fatal issue of this drunken quarrel was followed by three days’ passionate remorse, and Alexander lay in his tent sleepless and refused food. The fact that he had murdered his intimate friend could not be glossed over even if the army were willing to exculpate their leader, by giving Clitus a post-mortem trial, or by their ascribing the act to the Dioscuri, whose festival was being celebrated at the time.

The excitable temperament of Alexander, unfortunately, cannot always be ascribed to intemperance in drink. He began to be intoxicated with the idea that he was a semi-divine being, and he undertook to act the rôle of an avenging deity, in executing a ruthless sentence of destruction on a small Greek colony in Sogdiana, where dwelt the descendants of the people of Branchidæ, who generations before had betrayed to the Persians the treasures of a temple of Apollo not far from Miletus. The act had never been forgotten, and now Alexander caused all the inhabitants of the place to be massacred, and every vestige of it to be destroyed. An action like this was alien to the spirit of free Greece, and it marks the king’s progress in Oriental despotism. It is all the more a witness to his personal degradation that the Milesian men in his own army, to whom Alexander wished to leave the decision, could not themselves agree on the fate of the Branchidæ, and hence the initiative in the massacre was due to the savage sentiments of their leader.

The pacification of Sogdiana took some time, owing to the rugged nature of the regions in the southern part of the province, but the campaign is chiefly noteworthy because it resulted in the marriage of Alexander with Roxane, the daughter of a native chieftain who had gallantly defended against the Macedonians a mountain fastness called the Sogdian Rock. It had never been noted in the career of the youthful conqueror that he was susceptible to the influence of women. Hence this sudden attachment was as unexpected as it was unpopular in the army. They disliked to have their king ally himself with an alien, and their lack of sympathy was accentuated because Alexander chose to marry his bride after the fashion of her country.

The influence of the Oriental environment was seen also in the introduction of Persian court ceremonial. The king desired to make the custom of obeisance to royalty used by the Persians applicable also to the Greeks. Callisthenes, a nephew of Aristotle, who was attached to the army as official historiographer of the campaign, earned Alexander’s resentment because he sturdily refused to adopt the Persian ceremonial in the king’s presence. He was soon afterwards charged with being involved in a plot to murder Alexander, which originated because of the resentment held against the king by the royal pages, when one of their number, Hermolaus, was flogged and reduced from his position for a breach of etiquette in a boar hunt at which Alexander was present. Callisthenes, apparently because he was an intimate friend of Hermolaus and therefore assumed to be an accomplice in the plot, was hanged.

Three years had now passed since the death of Darius; Alexander had done in the interior of Asia a work which no western conqueror has accomplished since on so large a scale. Even to-day the effective occupation by Russia of the lands once included in the Persian Empire falls short of Alexander’s achievement, because Afghanistan, included in his conquests, is still an autonomous state. It will have been already noticed that much attention had to be given while the Macedonian army was in these Far Eastern provinces, to their protection against the nomad tribes on their frontiers. These operations in Bactria and Sogdiana were a necessary part of the conquests of Persia, since these remote provinces acted as a barrier against the savage tribes of the central Asiatic steppes, who might at any time by joint action overrun the civilization of the regions south of them. The special care shown by Alexander in the construction of settlements in this region is an evidence of his desire to make them centers of civilizing influence by which the restless herdsmen might be trained to orderly methods of life. The experiment failed, but it was a brilliant vision—a vision which might have become a reality if the conqueror had lived the normal span of years.

The beating down of all opposition in the enormously extensive empire which the defeat of Darius had laid at his feet had now been accomplished. If Alexander had been a statesman and nothing else, he would have stayed his hand, because the consolidation of the territory he had overrun was a work demanding the time and the talents of the greatest genius. But Alexander had not the temper of a Roman proconsul, capable and zealous to solve large political problems. He was young enough to be influenced by the spirit of adventure, and unlike Cæsar and Napoleon, had sometimes no deeply laid scheme in his military exploits.

There was no political or military necessity summoning Alexander to the conquest of India, but there was the irresistible charm of novelty exerted by the unknown, the ambition to penetrate into regions untrodden before by any Greek, and with this feeling of the conqueror the modern world is able to sympathize. He was lured also by the legendary stories of the visits to India of the god Dionysus and the hero Herakles. The mystical, superstitious traits in Alexander’s character could easily be stimulated, as we have already seen, to emulation with the divinities of his people, and he was also glad to afford proof that he could effect a conquest attempted without success by Cyrus and Semiramis.

The actual military difficulties of the undertaking were not great, for though the Indians were brave and warlike, and though they had a well-populated land to draw from, they were not a national unity. As the Indian states were constantly at war with one another, there would be an opportunity of securing allies in the peninsula. There was no difficulty in securing recruits for the expedition, although it is true a large detachment of the army had well-understood motives for desiring to be left in Bactria; but some of the best Asiatic warriors from these regions were enrolled, 30,000 in number, and the levies with which Alexander now prepared to descend on India were certainly twice as great as those with which he had left Macedon seven years before. His army was now a great cosmopolitan community, an organism resembling the mercenary armies of the Middle Ages, in the times of the Condottieri. It was self-supporting and self-sufficient in more senses than one, for it included artisans, engineers, physicians, diviners, literary men, athletes, secretaries, clerks, musicians, as well as a host of women and slaves.

Most of the states in northern India at this time were inhabited by what is often called an Aryan stock, the descendants of a succession of waves of emigration through the northwestern hills from central Asia. They had given up their nomadic life and reached the agricultural stage. The Brahman caste system, with its asceticism, and with its power of directive guidance in the state, according to the dictates of a religious sect, already dominated the life of India, and the country as a whole was made up of small principalities and village communities with no common bond of union.

Alexander effected his entrance into this new world by marching from Nicæa (probably to be identified with Cabul) along the Cabul river and then proceeded through the now well-known Khyber Pass. For the purpose of securing his communications much time had to be spent in warfare with the brave inhabitants of the Himalaya Mountains. Many fortresses were taken, the most remarkable of these exploits being the capture of the rock of Aormas, which probably lies on the right bank of the Indus, some sixty miles above the junction of that river with the Cabul. The two tribes whose resistance gave the most trouble were the Aspasians and the Assacenes, dwelling in localities which can now be identified as being parts of Chitral in the Pangkan and Swat valleys.

This hard preliminary campaign lasted all the winter; in the spring the Indus was crossed and a three days’ march was made eastward to Taxila, a rich country, whose prince, along with lesser princes, gave a friendly welcome to the conqueror. But this friendly attitude was not taken by Porus, the ruler of the region farther south, who sent a formal defiance to Alexander, and prepared to resist the invaders by collecting an army of from thirty to forty thousand men. With this he encamped on the river Hydaspes and prepared to contest its passage. Alexander transported the boats, which he had constructed for crossing the Indus, to the Hydaspes, and took up a position on the right bank of the stream, near Jalalpur, in view of the army of Porus, who had collected a large number of elephants, a formidable obstacle to the effective use of the Greek cavalry. (326 B.C.)

In the face of an enemy so placed the transit of the river was impossible, for the edge of the stream was slimy, making an insecure footing for the soldiers, and the horses, terrified by the presence of the elephants, could not be kept in control and would certainly be lost. Besides, Porus kept a sharp eye on all the fords near his camping ground. Alexander kept the enemy busy by making various feints as if he were about to attempt to pass the stream. It was the rainy season, and the Indian soldiers and elephants were kept in battle array at the threatened points, exposed for hours to the force of the wind and rain. Porus began to think that the Greeks were afraid to force the passage, and these manœuvers were continued until he was off his guard.

Some sixteen miles below the Greek encampment, where the river made a bend, there was a wooded island which hid the right shore from observation. Taking advantage of this, and also of the fact that on his side of the river there was a thick forest, Alexander managed to bring his boats, which were made of skins, to a place opposite the island, and at the same time he marched some of his troops down the stream, leading them by a detour some distance from the bank, in order to prevent the enemy from detecting his operations. The rest of the Greeks were left at the original camping ground or were posted along the river at different points, with directions to cross and aid him at the proper moment.

The actual crossing of the division under his command was done under his own eyes. Regiments of heavy-armed men were left on the right bank in anticipation of a possible rear attack by Abisares, prince of Cashmir, who, it was known, had promised to assist Porus in resisting the invading army. The passage was facilitated by the stormy weather which prevailed during the night. The Indian outposts heard nothing, and Alexander led the way safely past the island to the opposite shore, where, though some difficulty was caused by mistaking an islet for the mainland, the cavalry were disembarked and put in battle array. The whole number of troops under Alexander’s command were 6000 hypaspists, 4000 light-armed foot, 5000 cavalry, including 1000 Scythian archers. In the meantime the Indian outposts had ridden away to announce to Porus what had happened and to prepare him for the news of the Greek advance. Alexander went swiftly forward, taking with him all the cavalry, and he soon met and defeated a detachment of 1000 Indian horsemen and 160 chariots under the command of the son of Porus.

The Indian king himself was advancing with the bulk of his army, and he drew up his line of battle as soon as he found a piece of sandy ground suitable for displaying the cavalry and elephants. In front he placed 200 elephants at intervals of 100 feet, and behind them his infantry to the number of 20,000. In the wings his cavalry were drawn up, about 4000 in all. Alexander placed the pick of his army, the hypaspists, immediately in front of the elephants. The use of these animals in battle was still a strange sight to the Greeks, and the Indian fighting line seemed to them like a city wall with towers. Porus did not think that his foes would venture to advance through the spaces left between the elephants. He argued that the horses would be terror-stricken and the foot would be met by the Indian foot soldiers if they tried to attack the elephants from the side, and that they would hesitate to move directly against them for fear of being trodden down by their onslaught.

Exactly how the Indian infantry were armed is left uncertain. They probably had not the solidity of the Greek phalanx and were depended upon only to cover the work of the elephants. Alexander kept his infantry in reserve until he was able to confuse the line of the enemy by a cavalry attack. His cavalry he directed to spread out and attack not only in front but on the flanks as well. This manœuver was executed with practised precision, and neither the Indian chariots nor their horse could withstand the furious onslaught of the Greek squadrons, and soon retired behind the elephants with the Macedonians in close pursuit. As the elephants wheeled round, passing through the infantry in order to meet the Macedonians, the quick advance was blocked; the horses could not be induced to charge. They were obliged to retire; then Porus, on his side, vigorously attacked both the Macedonian cavalry and the phalanx.

The fight was now a general one. The Greek authorities paint this stage of the battle in superlative diction, describing how the elephants pressed through the thickly packed masses in front of them, rending and trampling the soldiers and horses as they went, while the engines on their backs scattered destruction far and wide. But the Macedonians finally won by striking down the elephants’ drivers and destroying the turrets they were in, and so wounded the beasts themselves that they ceased to attack. With the elephants rendered useless, the chance of victory for the Indians was gone. Their infantry was not sufficiently disciplined to make any use of the confusion caused in the Greek ranks by the work of the elephants. Besides, the Macedonian cavalry had in the first stage of the engagement got so far into the Indian lines, that they remained not only on the field of battle, but actually were, as the engagement advanced, behind both the enemy’s infantry and the elephants as well. When the Indian cavalry tried to take a hand in the fight and leave the part of the field where the elephants were in action, the Greek horse, having a superiority in numbers, forced them back.

The Greek infantry phalanx had been ordered by Alexander to keep its ground, but when the cavalry fight made it impossible for the Indians to move forward, the Greek foot soldiers drew away from their first position, where they were liable to a frontal attack by the elephants, and driving the elephants back, exposed the enemy to an attack by the Macedonian horse. Unprotected as the Indians were on both sides, they could not escape defeat, and at this point of the battle they suffered severely; most of the elephants and King Porus himself were taken prisoners.

The Greek historian, Arrian, says that the Macedonian loss was only 310 dead, mostly horsemen; but as other authorities add 700 foot soldiers, it seems likely that the battle was a stubborn one, for there were only 11,000 men engaged in Alexander’s army. The fact, too, that the use of elephants became customary in the wars fought by Alexander’s successors, some of whom were present at the battle of Hydaspes, proves that the fight with Porus must have made an impression on his opponents, and this places it in a different category from the easier victories over the Persians. Alexander treated his defeated antagonist with magnanimity and erected his kingdom into a vassal state; but as safeguards of his loyalty, directed that two garrison cities, Bucephala and Nicæa, should be established in his domains, one on either side of the Hydaspes near the site of the battle. A lieutenant, Crateros, was left to carry out these building plans, while Alexander turned to the conquest of the neighboring tribes. The only notable difficulty was the taking of the town of Sangala, the chief citadel of the free and warlike Cathæans, which had been strongly fortified and which had to be taken by storm.

The general result was that the Punjab was annexed to Alexander’s empire and placed in the hands of vassal princes. From this region the Greek army advanced to the river Hyphasis, reaching it at a point higher up than its junction with the Sutlej. This was the extreme limit of Alexander’s march. He would have gladly gone farther, for the whole of India might well have become a subject state; but the army had suffered from the discomforts of the rainy season, and they were weary of campaigning. The horses were worn out, the armor and accoutrements in bad condition. The temper of the troops, devoted though they were to their commander, left no doubt that they would mutiny if Alexander refused to turn back. He told the officers he would go on himself, and that they could return to Macedonia and let the Macedonians know that they had abandoned their king in a hostile land.

But appeals and threats alike failed to convince the army that their view of the situation was unreasonable. The sacrifices were found to be unfavorable, and persuaded by this intimation of the disfavor of the gods, the king consented to return. On the bank of the Hyphasis twelve altars were erected of large size, as lofty as the walls of a city, to mark the limits of Macedonian conquests, and as a thank-offering to the gods for their protection through the hazards of long-continued warfare in strange lands. The army then retired to the Hydaspes.

Alexander was an explorer as well as a conqueror, and his disappointment at this enforced withdrawal from the prosecution of his march must have been that of a man who was within reach of the goal and just failed to attain it. According to the geographical notions of his day, he was near the certain limit of the world; he knew nothing of the great Indian peninsula, and of course nothing of the vast extent of Siberia or the Chinese Empire. He supposed that the Ganges flowed into an eastern sea which was continuous with the Caspian and which washed the shores of Scythia and the base of the high mountains he had lately passed through. On the river Hydaspes, a fleet had already been under construction; as soon as it was ready he embarked on it a part of his best troops, while the mass of the army, in two divisions, moved down the stream. The route followed was along the Hydaspes to its confluence with the Akesines, then down this stream to the Indus and the Indus itself to the Delta.

From the military point of view, this concluding stage of the Indian expedition offers little of special interest. The inhabitants of the country either submitted to or fled from the Greek army, and various strongholds were taken by storm. In an assault on one of them, held by the Malians, who dwelt in the southern Punjab, the king, who had pressed forward in the midst of the enemy, found himself separated from the main body of his followers and was dangerously wounded. In the region the army traversed several colonies were founded; another Alexandria rose at the point where the Akesines flows into the Indus, and at Pattala a harbor and navy yard were built. The conquered portion of India was organized in three satrapies, one of which was under Porus, who had a free position as a vassal prince, for in his territory there were no Macedonian garrisons.

But the real subjugation of the country had not been effected by the spectacular march through it; as soon as the Greeks turned their backs, an uprising took place. Before the whole army reached Pattala, a part had been detached with directions to march west to Arachosia, and to wait in Caramania till it was joined there by the main division. The fleet was placed under the command of Nearchus, a Cretan, who was to take it along the coast of the Indian Ocean and finally into the Persian Gulf. Alexander, at the head of the rest of the army, took the road through Gedrosia.

The difficulties of the return were considerable. The men under Alexander suffered terribly in passing a desert country before they reached, after sixty days’ slow progress, the capital of Gedrosia, Pura. In the farther stretch to Caramania there was also exhausting work, but these trials marked the end of the expedition, for Crateros, who had led the rest of the troops by Arachosia, soon arrived, and news came of the landing of the fleet after a skilfully managed cruise of seventy-five days through unknown waters on the coasts of Caramania. A year had now passed (325 B.C.) since the beginning of the return home from India. During the course of the winter the army returned to Susa, thus concluding this remarkable adventure of Far Eastern conquest.

V
ALEXANDER’S EMPIRE

It had now been five years, from the summer of 330, since Alexander had left Ecbatana in pursuit of Darius. His presence was urgently needed, for the government of the empire was in chaotic state so far as the central administration was concerned. Fortunately the attempts at an uprising had generally been feeble, and were easily and loyally suppressed by the satraps where they did occur. Only one gave trouble, a revolt in Bactria, initiated first of all by Greek mercenaries and taken up by the native inhabitants as far as the border of Scythia. This lasted some time, and peace was not restored until after Alexander’s death.

But the maladministration of the conquered provinces was more serious than these uprisings. During Alexander’s absence in the Far East there had been boundless liberty in the financial plundering of the people. Peculation was the rule everywhere, and it was common to the Persian official class, to whom the government of the satrapies had been intrusted. Trained as these officers had been in maladministration and corruption, they had no notion of following different standards, simply because there was a different ruler. While Alexander was in Bactria he had been forced to deprive several satraps of their governments. It was time for the strong arm of the king to be felt, and there was no doubt about his intentions and aims. Many Persian satraps were executed and their places taken by Macedonian officers. But while Alexander had been away the infection had spread to European office-holders, both military and civil. We hear, for example, of the death penalty being inflicted on Greek commanders of the troops in Media, who had plundered graves and temples and had signalized their rule over the subject population by systemic oppression.

Among the guiltiest of this class was the minister of finance, Harpalus, who treated the state’s money as his private property, had brought over from Athens a company of gay comrades, and was living the easy, reckless life of an Oriental satrap. His previous record had been anything but clean; before the battle of Issus he had been obliged to return to Greece and had only come back to Asia because he had received the royal pardon. He knew that there was no chance of finding the king amenable to excuses or explanations; so with 5000 talents taken from the treasury, he raised a body of 6000 mercenaries and departed for the sea coast, hoping to stir up a revolt. The scheme was a pitiable failure; no satrap held out a hand to him; and finally Harpalus sailed to Athens, where he had influence and could count on a welcome, because of the strong anti-Macedonian feeling in the city.

Alexander showed his appreciation of the lesson of Harpalus’ official career by ordering the governors of the provinces to dismiss all soldiers they had collected on their own authority. Now that the period of military expansion was closed, the king devoted himself to the organization of the empire, following the lines he had worked out originally, which tended to the amalgamation of the Greek and Persian elements. This ideal survived the experience of maladministration, and Alexander held fast to it, despite the opposition of the officers of his army. He seems to have believed firmly in the possibility of educating politically the Asiatic peoples so that they could be ruled without display of despotic power, and he was just as firm in trusting to the loyalty of the Persian ruling class to carry out this program of interracial conciliation. In doing so he failed to take account of the Persian’s deep-rooted dislike of the Greeks, which with Oriental wiliness his new subjects could conceal, but which was ever present as an inducement to them to take advantage of the first opportunity that offered to throw off the yoke imposed upon them by the conquest.

Alexander planned to make his scheme a success by marrying the daughters of the Persian official class to the Macedonian officers. He led the way by claiming, as the successor of the Great King, the right to have more than one legitimate wife, and after his return from India he added to his royal household a daughter of Darius, Stateira, and a daughter of Ochus, Parysatis. Alexander’s close friend, Hephæstion, received another daughter of Darius, and altogether eighty of the high officers in command of the Macedonian army were married to Persian women of high degree. The wedding festivities were made a national affair, and took place at Susa on the same day with great ceremonial, all the brides receiving from Alexander marriage portions. The Macedonian private soldiers, who followed the example of their chief on this occasion, were richly rewarded.

It is said that the officers were as dissatisfied with the matrimonial schemes of the king as they had been with his plans for further conquest in India; in any case, it is known that on the king’s death there was a general movement among them to get rid of their Persian helpmates. The discontent among the rank and file of Alexander’s followers with his program of social equality between Greek and Persian could not be appeased, even when he paid their debts at the time of the “Union of the Two Races” festival, an act of bounty which cost him about $5,000,000. The hostility to Persian influence was accentuated by the introduction of foreign troops into the army. This was naturally a step required by the necessity of raising a force greater than Greece could possibly supply. That thinly populated country must have been already drained to the point of exhaustion by the demands already made upon it to fill up the losses during the years of constant campaigning. And as a matter of fact, we know that a year and a half after the passage of the Hellespont with 35,000 men, Alexander led to battle at Arbela about 60,000, and in the years during which the expedition was moving in the Far East, the various additional troops must have equaled altogether 50,000 men. The substitution of Persian contingents for Greek soldiers was a matter of plain necessity. They received lower pay, they cost less to feed, without considering the saving made in the high cost of transportation of bodies of men from continental Greece to the interior of Asia.

Orders had therefore been given to draw 30,000 young men from the conquered provinces and to prepare them for military services according to Macedonian methods. A further and more radical stage in the amalgamation policy was reached when Persians were enrolled in the Macedonian phalanx and Asiatic horsemen in the élite regiment of the Hetæroi; even in the life guards distinguished Persians were received, and the command of that force was assigned to a warrior from Bactria, Hystaspes.

These leveling measures were more than the Macedonian veterans could endure, and they became openly mutinous when Alexander proposed to dismiss those who had been longest in the service. The whole army stood together and told the king that they would serve no longer, and that he would see how he could do without them, now that he had his Persians to serve under him. Alexander then set to work to organize purely Persian regiments on the Macedonian model, a Persian life guard, a Persian squadron of Hetæroi, and a Persian phalanx. This satisfied the Macedonians, and they were farther placated by being given precedence over the various Persian units of the army. Under these conditions, the veterans were willing to be dismissed, and they received one talent as a bonus and full pay until they were actually on Macedonian soil. Moreover, the king agreed to provide for the education of their children. Ten thousand men on these terms returned to Greece.

A more effective means for bringing together the two races on an equal footing was the establishment of military colonies throughout the empire. At an early stage of the expedition this had been adopted as the readiest way of keeping peace in the conquered territory. Tyre and Gaza, after the native population had been sold into slavery, received a new population of Greek origin. We have already noted the extension of this scheme in the Far Eastern provinces and in India. Altogether seventy cities are said to have been founded by Alexander. These colonies, though primarily intended for military purposes, became centers of industrial communication and of civilization. The case of the Egyptian Alexandria is so well known that it does not require to be stressed. Less familiar are the proofs of Alexander’s sagacity as a founder of flourishing towns in other parts of his empire. Alexandria, on the Persian Gulf, continued through the whole period of antiquity to be the greatest emporium of the whole region of Mesopotamia. Alexandria in Arcia (Herat) and Alexandria in Arachosia (Candahar) are still to-day important towns in Persia.

Despite his absorption in military interests, Alexander found time for looking after the economic development of his empire. The Indian Ocean was opened to commerce by the remarkable voyage of Nearchus which concluded the Indian expedition. Attempts were made to circumnavigate the Arabian peninsula, and, though they failed, yet a considerable portion of the coast was explored. The Caspian Sea was also the scene of exploring adventures, because it was supposed to be a part of the vast ocean by which the earth was surrounded. The Tigris was freed from obstruction and made navigable; the ancient irrigation canals in Babylonia were restored; and a beginning was made in constructing a harbor near Babylon.

Equally farsighted was Alexander’s foundation of a unified monetary system for the empire. Under Persian rule the custom had been for the satraps to coin silver money, while the coinage of gold was reserved to the Great King. The result was that each province followed its own customs and financial chaos prevailed. Alexander reserved the minting privilege to the general government; even where provincial coining was permitted, the coins were of the same general type and bore the name of the king. The only exception to this rule is found in the case of the autonomous Greek cities on the western coast of Asia. This new monetary system was based on that of the Athenians; the bimetallic basis, as it had existed in the Persian Empire, was abandoned and the silver standard, as used at Athens and Corinth, took its place. The reformed monetary system of Alexander continued down to Roman times.

The large hoards of precious metals, which fell into Alexander’s hands during the course of his conquests, not only gave occupation to his mints, but also freed him from financial anxiety. He had begun the expedition in a state of insolvency, for he had a debt of 1300 talents with only seventy in his war chest to cover it. The maintenance of the army required a monthly expenditure of 200 talents, and to this 100 talents had to be added for the fleet. The provinces in western Asia, the first fruits of his victories, could not supply a sum so large, and it was lack of money which caused Alexander to give up his fleet in the autumn of 334. After the battle of Issus and the conquest of the rich province of Egypt, there was soon a surplus where there had been a deficit, and Alexander was able to send considerable sums of money to Antipater to help him out in his campaign in Greece.

Rich as were the Persian treasures, they were heavily and constantly drawn upon by the ever-developing military needs of the conqueror. The whole force under arms, including the very numerous garrisons, must have equaled 100,000 men. This meant at least an expense of 7000 talents; to this large sum must be added the drains caused by Alexander’s generosity, by official peculation such as that of Harpalus, and by the gifts to old soldiers, who were richly rewarded. The royal household, which was organized on the Persian model, was most expensive; the royal table alone costing 600 talents. Of course, the receipts were large, probably from fifteen to twenty thousand talents annually, but Alexandria’s budget was far from balancing; and at the time of his death, there were contained in all the treasuries of the empire only 50,000 talents, about $70,000,000, a small sum when the size of the empire is taken into account.

In administering his domains, Alexander showed great conservatism; he made few changes, he allowed each of the countries which acknowledged the Great King as its overlord to retain its particular institutions. One important modification he did introduce into the loosely organized and haphazard Persian system of rule, the division of power. The Persian satrap was generally the sole governor, having in his hands the civil, military, and financial administration. Alexander limited him to matters of internal administration, appointing a financial officer and a military commander armed with considerable powers. After the return from India, there was a further innovation made by the appointment of a Chiliarch, as the supreme director and head of the provinces, with a place immediately after the monarch himself. This official was a part of the governmental machinery of the Persian Empire, holding in it the place of a Grand Vizier. It was given to Alexander’s friend, Hephæstion, but after his death it was left vacant. The most trusted servant, the actual head of the administration, was the Chief Secretary Eumenes from Cardia, a man of first-rate military and civil capacity; he was unfailingly loyal to his master, and after Alexander’s death, suffered many vicissitudes because of his devotion to the Macedonian royal house.

Alexander was not satisfied with the rôle of conqueror; he wished to give his rule in the East that trait of legitimacy which the popular Oriental mind required as a stimulus to its loyalty. It was impossible for him to be King of Persia by the grace of God, for it was the might of his own hand, not the right of succession, that constituted him the heir of Darius. This Gordian knot of politics he solved in his own direct fashion by directing that divine honors should be paid to him by the subject populations. The custom of apotheosis originated in Egypt, but it was not alien to Greek thought, according to which no deep distinction existed between man and divinity. The mythical heroes of the Greek people, whom all allowed to have once been men, were everywhere honored with altars and sacrifice. Asclepius and Herakles sat on Olympus with the greater divinities of a purely spiritual origin. It had become not unusual in the age preceding Alexander to accord divine honors to the living. Such had been the case with Clearchus of Heracleia who had been greeted as the son of Zeus, and with Dionysius the Younger who had caused himself to be honored at Syracuse as the son of Apollo. Alexander’s achievements, far greater in comparison, gave him a right to this distinction during his lifetime; his divine origin had, besides, been attested by the Erythrian Sibyl and by the oracle at Branchidæ; with this theological and official stamp all that remained to be done was to give the accepted belief a concrete form. The cult of the conqueror became a part of the state religion in the Greek communities throughout the empire. Whether Alexander took the initiative in this form of adulation we do not know; he certainly did not discourage it, and on his return from India he did not reject the adulatory form of congratulation expressed by many Greek states, who instead of sending formal deputations, presented the so-called “theories” usual when the festivals of the gods were celebrated. Athens at first resisted this form of transcendent courtesy, but finally, in order to avoid offending Alexander, it was resolved in the year 324 to enrol the conqueror among the gods of the city under the designation of Dionysus. So this debasing custom took root in Greece; the monarch became, by a noxious fiction, differentiated from the rest of mortals, and the infection spread from Greece to Rome, and later on became crystallized in Christian civilization, through the example of the Byzantine court, and under the form of monarchy by divine right has not yet disappeared.

After the dismissal of the veterans from the army at Opis, Alexander withdrew from the plains of the Tigris, and according to the custom of the Persian monarchs spent the summer in the highlands of Media. He passed the time in relaxation; nautical and athletic festivals were held, in which celebrities from Greece took part. When the cooler weather began, there were expeditions to repress the bandit hill-tribes who dwelt between Ecbatana and Susa, people whom the Persians had never succeeded in bringing under control. Afterwards, the king returned to Babylon, where he received deputations from the Greek states and even from Italy. It was thought that an expedition to the west was being planned. But the king preferred to give his immediate attention to Arabia and, by conquering it, to open at last a direct road of communication between the interior of Persia and Egypt.

By June both the fleet and army were ready to start. A great banquet was given in honor of Nearchus, the admiral who was to undertake the adventurous voyage from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea. The king withdrew from the feast and spent the rest of the night in a carouse with a friend, Medius. He rose late in the morning and another night was spent in excessive drinking. The following day he was attacked with fever; he could not walk and had to be carried on a couch to the altar, to make the customary sacrifices. He spent the day discussing the plans of the expedition with Nearchus. In the evening he had himself conveyed across the river to a garden villa, hoping for relief from its quiet isolation. But for six days the fever continued, the king being able only to attend the sacrificial ceremonial. His condition grew worse, and he was taken back to the palace; he slept a little, but the fever did not abate, and when his officers visited him, they saw that he had lost the power of speech. There was confusion among the soldiers, for it was rumored that their leader was dead; they clamored to be let into the palace, and passing by the bodyguard they circled past the bed of the dying monarch; but he was not able to speak and only signified by movements of his hands and eyes that he recognized them. Some of those about him spent the night in the temple of Serapis, awaiting an indication of the god that he might be transported to the temple as he lay and be healed by divine help. But they were warned, it is said, by a voice that he was not to be moved, and on the evening of June 13th he died, before he had completed his thirty-third year.

During the years of Alexander’s conquests, the history of the Greek states sinks into insignificance. After the battle of Issus all hope of defeating Macedon by a combination with Persia was abandoned. The confederacy sent congratulations, and only Sparta stood aloof. Its king, Agis, even ventured to declare war, but, after a few small successes, he was defeated in the battle of Megalopolis, losing his life in the field. Sparta then sent hostages to Alexander and was generously treated. Later on he interfered again in the affairs of Greece by directing the confederation to take back the Greek exiles, 20,000 in number, and so mark his overlordship by an era of good feeling. Only two states objected, Athens and Ætolia.

The only exciting incident in continental Greece was connected with the flight of the faithless finance minister, Harpalus, who came to the coast of Attica with 5000 talents, a body of mercenaries, and a considerable fleet, hoping to stir up a revolt. But the Athenian politicians were too cautious to be drawn into an intrigue which would certainly have proved dangerous. They seized Harpalus and took his treasure, proposing only to surrender this money to officers expressly sent by Alexander. Half the money taken disappeared and there was no official record made of the sum received. Demosthenes was involved in the scandal, and he emerged from it with a besmirched reputation. Harpalus escaped and was soon afterwards murdered. Demosthenes was condemned, imprisoned, and escaped. But Greek feeling was not sensitive about a case where it was plain that a man had appropriated stolen money for the good of the state, and Demosthenes was praised as a patriot.

Alexander’s conquests, both in method and in achievement, were but the elaboration of the groundwork laid down by Philip his father. The army that conquered Persia and invaded India was trained in the campaigns of continental Greece, and without this preliminary training in Europe, its spectacular successes in Asia would not have been possible. Up to the time of Philip of Macedon, warfare in Greece had achieved only negative results. It was not systematized, no extensive imperial rule had come to the victors through any of the decisive battlefields, for these military successes were never followed up by a consistent scheme of conquest. Philip changed all this, and he brought his developed army and his new political policy into close connection. Demosthenes himself remarked this contrast, for he said that King Philip fought his wars not only with a phalanx of heavy-armed men, but with light infantry, archers, and cavalry.

The old campaigning schedule, which consisted in ravaging the enemy’s territory for a few months, a set battle in the open country, and a withdrawal to winter quarters, was no longer observed. If the Macedonian king did not find his enemy in the field, he besieged his towns, using siege engines to bring him to terms. Summer and winter were alike used for operations when the old array of citizen amateur soldiers had given place to the professional fighters. Alexander’s victories were won not only on the battlefield, but through the quick following up of his victories; the enemies’ power of resistance was annihilated by the rapidity with which a defeated army was pursued and never allowed a chance to gather itself together again after it was beaten. These cavalry marches in the rear of a retreating enemy, or the suddenly delivered attacks on a foe preparing to resist, attacks made irrespective of mountains and deserts, were as military achievements no less remarkable than the set battles and the sieges of strongly walled cities and citadels. Supremely characteristic of Alexander’s strategy was the pursuit after the battle of Gaugamela, when numbers of horses fell on the road from exhaustion.

As a general, Alexander did great deeds and did them in an heroic style. He was a warrior distinguished by personal bravery, filled with the ardor of combat, eager to be in the thickest of the fight, and yet the physical passion of the fighter in no way dulled the acute intelligence of the general, or made him indifferent to the mastery of details in preparing for battle or in following a victory up after it had been won. He showed strategical knowledge in approaching the enemy and knew how to overcome the natural difficulties in his way. So we see him unhesitatingly marching through narrow defiles and organizing different classes of troops according to the changing conditions which confronted him. He showed high capacity in selecting his base, in looking after his communications, in providing for and provisioning his men. When all was ready, and not before, these cautious provisions gave place to the impetuous onslaught in battle and the untiring pursuit of the defeated enemy. But the duties of generalship, complicated as they were, were not allowed to interfere with the “joy of fighting.” Alexander in every fight led his cavalry in person; whenever a breach was made in a fortification he was in the first rank; whenever a town was taken he was the first to scale the wall.

He seemed instinctively to have taken in the significance of the enlarged scale on which warfare under him was conducted. He had to solve untried problems, due to the vast extent of territory he traversed, so different in every way from the restricted limits of continental Greece. The students of strategy have especially admired his originality in the systematic following up of a victory, an element in successful warfare not dreamed of by the citizen generals of Greece. In the Peloponnesian war it never occurred to the Spartans when they had defeated the Athenians to besiege Athens. But after Issus, a most decisive victory, Alexander showed the utmost resourcefulness in the long seven months’ siege of Tyre, and finally took it by storm. The same mobility of generalship is noted in India, where he did not hesitate in the face of a division of elephants, an unknown arm in warfare, to cross a river and deliver a frontal attack.

The army, which never failed to respond to the ever-developing visions and schemes of its commander, until he had carried it to the eastern limits of the known world in his career of conquest, was at the very beginning of Alexander’s career trained for any military project he might propose. It was composed of seasoned officers and men, who had proved their mettle and gained their laurels under Philip while he was bringing his army to the highest pitch of excellence. In the list of great Greek military leaders, Philip is placed by the side of Epaminondas, the Theban, the man who revolutionized the Greek art of warfare by a fine stroke of genius. It had been noted that in the Greek battles, where the phalanx had become the controlling factor, its right wing was frequently victorious in both opposing armies. This phenomenon was simply due to the fact that the Greek heavy-armed soldier carried a shield on his left arm and naturally tended to move in an oblique direction towards the right hand. The chief innovations introduced by Epaminondas were the strengthening of the left wing by increasing its depth—it was made fifty men deep—and the holding back of the right wing as the whole phalanx advanced in battle array. With the increased depth of the phalanx, the front was necessarily shortened, and in order to prevent flanking operations, Epaminondas made great use of cavalry, in protecting the flanks of his men from an encircling movement on the part of the enemy, whose phalanx, since it was not so deep (being the old shape), would stretch out on both sides beyond the lines of the Theban line. As a general, Philip accepted these new tactical principles originated by Epaminondas, and applying them to Macedonian conditions, made of the Macedonian army a wonderfully effective military machine.

Macedonia was peopled by peasants and herdsmen, and up to Philip’s time they were an untrained mass, insufficiently armed, not able to contend with the armies of the rest of Greece. There was a landed aristocracy in Macedon, forming a special warrior class, who fought as cavalry. Using these elements and adding to them Greek mercenaries, King Philip had created a military force far superior to any that Greece had ever seen before.

The Greek cavalry moved in loose formation, the horsemen wore armor, and as arms they had a shield, sword, and spear, the spear being used rather for throwing than for striking, as is the case with the modern lance, with the whole momentum of the moving mass, man and horse. The troops of the Macedonian cavalry, formed of the nobles of the land, were called the followers of the king, “Hetairoi.” They bore a shield and a spear for casting or thrusting, and a sword, and were always given a crucial position in an engagement. As contrasted with Greek cavalry generally, the Macedonians showed superior training and discipline; they moved together and behaved in a fight, not as individual warriors, but as tactical units, and were controlled in their movements by a single will. Such development of cavalry was unfamiliar to the Greek republics, which confined themselves to the technical training of the phalanx.

The Macedonian foot were the special creation of Philip, and were named by him “the followers on foot.” They fought in the ordinary phalanx formation, but closer together than was usual, and used long spears, so that several lines were enabled at once to engage in actual hand-to-hand fighting. The spear was so constructed as to weight, thickness, and length that it could reach the opposing line and yet be firmly grasped. The ordinary spear was somewhat over six feet in length, but the Macedonian phalanx depended for its success not so much on man-to-man fighting as on the irresistible impact of the whole. When it was acting on the defensive, it was virtually impenetrable. Its disadvantage was in its lack of individual initiative; the soldiers were machines rather than fighting men. It was heavy in its movements and could be thrown into disorder more easily than the older Greek phalanx with its looser formation. The élite corps, the hypaspists, were more lightly armed than the men in the phalanx, and so moved more freely. In Alexander’s battles they were the connecting link between the cavalry and heavy mass of the phalanx, which advanced slowly forward. As managed by Alexander, these various arms seem to have worked admirably together, all sharing in the activity of a general offensive movement. It should be added that Alexander was also indebted to his father for much of the advance made in the art of besieging. He constantly used siege engines, and we have noticed how much he depended on their successful employment at Tyre and Halicarnassus.

Posterity has justly selected the epithet “great” as most fitting to be coupled with Alexander’s name, and he has this honor for more than one reason. It is perhaps less contested than in the case of any other of the world’s leading personalities, Charles the Great alone excepted, for Charles, like Alexander, introduced a new age of the world’s history. Great as were the successes of Alexander, they constitute less of a claim on the personal admiration of posterity than his knightly qualities as a warrior, and the charm and impetuosity of youth. His great victories were won between the years of twenty-one and twenty-five. In the space of thirteen years there are crowded together events and achievements that would exalt the longest life of the greatest man.

His sudden and premature death did him a kind of poetic justice, because his temperament cannot be coupled consistently with the characteristics of old age or even with the middle period of man’s life. His body and his brain had been under a tremendous pressure, which even a strong constitution could not resist. It was this restive youthfulness that spurred him on to adventures which were purposeless when looked at from the point of view of the mature statesman, such as the expedition to India, an uncalculated move not to be understood except as due to the stimulus of an explorer’s curiosity and the desire to accomplish a feat unheard of before.

The impulsiveness and emotionalism of Alexander in combination with his military genius produced results unprecedented in history. His career is that of a Homeric hero on a larger stage. It is not surprising that his conquests almost defy criticism and make a personal estimate seem artificial. He did so much that it apparently makes little difference what he was, for his actions speak for themselves, and they tell their tale like a fairy story, without any need of analysis. It is obviously unfair to look for constructive statesmanship in a career so short, when almost every month was occupied with military campaigns either planned or in execution. When his life was ended, Alexander was still a young man with a fresh and vigorous intelligence, open to new impressions. It is hazardous to infer (as Grote does) that he would have spent his life in acts of military aggression or that he would have sunk to the position of an Oriental despot, little differing from the Persian kings to whose title he succeeded. It is safer to put aside these pessimistic historic prognostics of what might have been, and to recognize that Alexander, provided he kept his mental powers undulled by drink, would have remained a Greek and not become a Hun or a Vandal.

His enthusiasm for absolutism was, when one considers his age and how deeply he was involved in military plans and schemes, less of a reflection on himself than a curse to his followers and successors, who kept faithful to the personal tradition of their leader and made the Hellenization of Asia untrue to so much that was best in Greek political life and thought. It was, as Ranke says, a break in their whole national history, for the Greeks to have extended over them the kind of authority which was in no way different from that against which they had contended in warfare for a century. But it must be remembered that Alexander had only just begun to rule over Asiatics; he had receded before his death from pressing his theory of amalgamation to its logical conclusion, and quick as he was to feel instinctively the meaning of new conditions, it may be fairly supposed that he would have come to recognize the value of Aristotle’s profoundly wise advice to him, that he should behave to the Greeks as a leader or president and to the barbarians or non-Greeks as a master.

We may put to one side all the ingenious speculations as to what might have happened if Alexander had reached the ordinary limit of human life, a line of thought which Livy seems to have originated, when he tried to foretell for his age what would have happened if Alexander had taken up the rôle followed later by his relative, Pyrrhus. It is only necessary to say that, so far as Greek affairs were concerned, Alexander was the son of his father. His public career began when, as Philip’s son, he put the finishing touches to Philip’s program for dominating the free states of Greece. So long as Alexander lived, the lines of Macedonian supremacy, the outcome of the battle of Chæronea, remained clear and fixed. The destruction of Thebes was but the epilogue of Philip’s own career. The sentimental vein in the nature of Alexander made him patient with the somewhat childish and ineffective hostility shown him by both Athens and Sparta, venerable names as protagonists in the secular struggle with the Persians, whose mantle had now fallen on his broader shoulders.

In Asia his conquests, rather than his half-thought-out plans for racial amalgamation, were decisive of future political development. There was an expansion of Hellenic culture throughout the East, marked by the common use of the Greek language and by a general absorption of the special traits of Greek social usages and sympathies. The civilization, so wrought out and transplanted, lost the creativeness and the spontaneity of the small communities of continental Greece. The Hellenic spirit lost its potency, if we may so phrase it, and in the sphere of government especially exhibited disheartening symptoms of selfishness and greed. Economically, the opening up of Asia meant enlarged facilities for the commercial exploitation of a vast and rich territory. It ushered in a period of great industrial fortunes, it increased opportunities for communication both by land and sea, it established higher standards of comfort and taste among populations who had lived a crude, colorless, and isolated existence. On the basis of Alexander’s conquests a grandiose cosmopolitanism was built up in Asia which cast down tribal and racial boundaries and made it possible for masses of plain people to gain a livelihood under tolerable conditions.

CÆSAR

I
CÆSAR’S BEGINNINGS

The progress of an imperial power is obscure even when the foundations of its greatness are associated with some great military leader or lawgiver, but when one has to give a reason why some one political community becomes the point of centripetal attraction, and gathers about it, either by fear or devotion, the support of large masses of mankind, the efforts of historical analysis are frustrated at almost every point.

Cæsar

(Naples, Museum.)

The rise of the small town community on the Tiber, about whose name there centered for nearly two thousand years the dread and the reverence of the progressive nations of the world, is veiled in legend. Why did not Palestrina, or Cori, or one of the numerous Etruscan cities to the north, become the germ of a world-wide rule? Of course the answer of the economist is that just because Rome is situated on the Tiber, its position gave it possibilities of advancement denied to the ordinary hill towns of Italy. This explanation may be taken as sufficient only when one allows that the burghers of Rome set out to accomplish what they did, not only because they were traders, but because the imaginative and grandiose factors in commercial enterprise must have worked in a singularly sensitive and highly organized social medium.

If the rise of the republic of Rome is difficult to account for, even more difficult is it to explain why such a community endowed with great generals, great statesmen, and great patriots, found it impossible so to modify their republican institutions that the manifest advantages of a sane and well-balanced democracy might be retained unimpaired, and might be extended at the same time to conquered races and nations. The rigidity of Roman republican institutions led to grave and demoralizing social disorders. The victories of Roman arms abroad were accompanied by political degradation at home. It must have been felt as a shock when a local government, admirably devised to promote civic virtues and secure just administration, was found, just as soon as Rome got the better of her numerous enemies, to be such a convenient protection for misrule.

As early as the last twenty-five years of the second century before Christ, the machinery of Roman government seems to have been recognized as inadequate to perform its functions. Constitutional methods and precedents were inadequate to solve the agrarian question, nor was there in the state, as an organism, sufficient force either to check an oligarchy of wealth or to impose restrictions on the personal ambitions of successful military leaders such as Marius and Sulla. Some of the fundamental principles of the Roman republican system were now treated as legal fiction. There had been years of civil war, for not only had Rome been attacked by groups of Italian towns associated with her for several hundred years, but Roman citizens had been divided among themselves in a way that would have been unthinkable in the period of the Punic wars.

One would like to know the personal political convictions of the opposing leaders, Marius and Sulla. The probability is that neither of them looked much farther ahead than does a representative of “boss” rule in America, who would be very much surprised if asked whether he would like to see the principles of the political ring incorporated frankly and definitely in the Constitution of the United States. It is certain that after the death of Sulla, though personal rule had come to an end, there was no effort made to prevent its re-emergence. The question was rather—from what quarter it would emerge. The common opinion was that the popular general, Pompeius, distinguished by his victories in the East, would come to take the place left vacant by Sulla’s death. He had none of the antipathetic personal qualities of the late dictator, therefore he was regarded as a man of principle, and accordingly, fitted to supply the personal element in Roman administration which most people seem to have felt was needed.

But all these calculations were soon upset. Pompeius, rapidly elevated to greatness along a smooth road of easy gradients, trusted to his friends in Rome to overcome all the political obstacles in his way there. While he was still acclaimed the great military champion of the Roman Republic, he soon found himself face to face with a rival—a man who set himself forward purposefully to revive the popular platform of the Marian party.

Caius Julius Cæsar, born July 12, 100 B.C., had no natural affiliations with the popular side of politics represented by Marius. So far as descent was concerned, he was an aristocrat of the aristocrats, belonging to an ancient patrician gens which traced back its legendary origin to a divine being—the goddess Venus. Of the early years of Cæsar only a little is known; and that little is handed down in the form of anecdotes the value of which lies in the incidental light they throw on his travels in the eastern part of the Roman world. It would be more interesting to know something of Cæsar’s education than of his capture by pirates off the coast of Asia Minor—an accident used by his ancient biographers to prove what everybody knows—that he was a brave man even in the most hazardous circumstances. His early years could not have been spent carelessly, for he acquired a remarkably sound education. His literary tastes must have been the result of long discipline. His manysidedness and intellectual facility were fully recognized by his contemporaries. Even Cicero, who claimed to have spent his youth as a model “grind,” tacitly allows that Cæsar’s intellectual equipment was fully the equal of his own. The years of study were a necessity as well as a diversion. It was not safe even for a brilliant young man, while the truculent Sulla was dictator, to show practical interest in home politics, especially if his sympathies were with the Marian party.

And Cæsar was from the first a partisan of Marius. He was pledged to this political faction by family ties as well as by personal conviction. Marius’s wife was Cæsar’s aunt, and Cæsar himself had made the alliance with the Marians closer by taking as his wife the daughter of Cinna, one of the most active of Marius’s supporters. During the Reign of Terror caused by the proscriptions of Sulla, Cæsar, because of his relations with the democratic party, had with difficulty escaped the dictator’s vengeance, and while Sulla continued to control the Republic Cæsar found it prudent to withdraw into obscurity, from which he only emerged when the revival of the democratic tradition could be safely undertaken. Then he took the first opportunity that offered itself to make a declaration of loyalty to Marius, the old leader of the democracy. It was at the death of his aunt, Marius’s widow, that he delivered a funeral address in which he praised Marius’s principles and achievements. (68 B.C.) This challenge made to the dominant party by the young politician was a bold stroke. His speech was the sensation of the hour, and the glowing words which expressed his purpose of working for the restoration of the Marian democracy won for him the warm approval of the popular party. Not long after this Cæsar was chosen to his first elective office, that of Ædile, in 65 B.C., a somewhat irregular proceeding, for he was two years short of the legal age. He used his term of service in order to increase his favor with the democracy, and he showed a keen political scent in discovering ways and means by which he could keep himself constantly in the foreground as the champion of popular rights, earning a reputation for lavish expenditure of money by giving public games, fairs, and gladiatorial shows. It was not difficult at this time to win the favor of the Roman democracy. Pompeius, who controlled the army and through his position as commander-in-chief exerted a preponderating influence on the government, was on the point of completing the destruction of the upstart empire of Mithridates and bringing the Asiatic provinces with firm hand again under the sway of Rome. There stood in Cæsar’s way as a competitor for political honors only the second-rate personality of Crassus, the richest man in Rome, who, somehow, despite his belief in the venality of the populace and his readiness to act upon his belief, seemed never to have struck the popular imagination powerfully enough to acquire the momentum of the genuine demagogue.

Cæsar had great advantages through his family connections; his position as the legitimate heir of Marius made him already a central figure in the political life of the city, and even Crassus found it advisable to work for him and with him, by advancing him large sums of money to cover the lavish expenditure of the three years’ ædileship. Cæsar was already looking beyond Rome and its purely local interests. That he had no confidence in the kind of government under which he served is shown by pretty clear intimations that he was aware of the existence of a plot, intended to reduce the power of the senatorial oligarchy to zero. It is certain, too, that Cæsar worked hard to secure a military command in Egypt, which was not yet a Roman province and, therefore, could furnish him an admirable vantage ground by its wealth and by its strategical position for blocking the plans of Pompeius, who was working through control of the senatorial oligarchy for a revival in his own hands of personal rule after the Sullan model. This design of Cæsar was a bold one and conceived with a large vision. Its aim was to provide a stronghold for the democracy should the central government, as seemed likely to happen, be manipulated by an irregular dictatorship. The plan may have been suggested by the career of Sertorius in Spain, where this successful opponent of the Sullan régime had so long offered a refuge to all those who were enemies of the oligarchy that ruled the capital. It was characteristic of Cæsar’s confident temperament that he was willing, without previous military training, to undertake a hazardous adventure that meant certainly a conflict with the seasoned generals of the oligarchy.

A further indication, if any were needed, of the purpose of the new leader of the democratic party to treat Pompeius as the danger point on the horizon, was a proposed scheme of an agrarian legislation by which a board was to be created with extensive military and judicial power for the purpose of selling all the properties and territories acquired by the state since the year 88, along with all of the war booty and confiscated revenues now in the hands of Pompeius. To this measure was added a clause intended to transform the bill into a popular manifesto for the colonization of Italy with small landholders, and therefore constructed on the lines of those earlier agrarian laws which mark the commencement of the struggle of the Roman democracy with the capitalistic oligarchy two generations before Cæsar’s time. This agrarian legislation was defeated by Cicero, who in this case, as often elsewhere, championed the interests of the moneyed classes. He who was now Consul and was posing as the Grand Conciliator, praised Pompeius as the strict constitutional champion, and characterized Cæsar’s agrarian legislation as revolutionary. In the face of the Consul’s opposition Cæsar hesitated to press the matter and withdrew his bill. (64 B.C.) As this is the first legislative act brought forward under Cæsar’s influence, it is interesting to note that his later political methods and policies are anticipated in it. His Agrarian Law, when analyzed, contains two elements. There is the purely personal feature, more or less cleverly concealed in various clauses of the measure so constructed as to forward the political interests of its author, and, secondly, one can detect in Cæsar’s plan for agrarian reform a keen-sighted appreciation of existing social and economic needs. This last showed itself in the provision that the surplus population of Rome should be employed as cultivators of the soil. Cicero’s methods of defeating the bill by appealing to party prejudice were as essentially demagogic as were Cæsar’s plans for winning popular support for his measure. The only difference between them was that Cicero was working in the interest of a capitalistic oligarchy, while Cæsar directly aimed at the establishment of personal rule under the protection of an irresponsible commission with unlimited powers. The campaign against the dominant party was not, however, allowed to drop because of the withdrawal of the Agrarian Bill. Cæsar, through one of his lieutenants, brought impeachment proceedings against the murderer of a democratic leader who had distinguished himself in the last days of Marius. It was part of his pin-pricking policy, meant to intimidate the senatorial faction, and the aim was clear, for the Senate had by a decree relieved the murderer of responsibility years before. Nothing came of the impeachment, but it went on record as showing Cæsar’s loyalty to the democracy. His next proposal was especially gratifying to the admirers of Marius, because it involved the removal from the children of the victims of the Sullan proscription the disqualification by which they were prevented from holding public office.

Soon after this, in the spring of 63, when there was a vacancy in the office of Pontifex Maximus, the supreme head of the religion of the city of Rome, Cæsar became a candidate. There were no religious qualifications necessary; the office had no more relation to personal belief than that of a prince bishop of the later history of the German States, when territorial princes added the episcopal to their other titles. Cæsar was one of the most advanced free-thinkers in Rome. But he felt no incongruity, and apparently no one else did, in his desire to figure as the director of the traditional religious usages of the capital. The position meant so much to Cæsar that, heavily indebted as he was, he refused to withdraw his name, when a large sum was offered by an opposing candidate on condition that he would retire from the contest. The office of Pontifex Maximus carried with it a number of powers with great political possibilities, because in addition to controlling the property attached to the college of priests over which he presided, the Pontifex had important jurisdiction in religious questions, the determination of religious scruples, and the charge of the Calendar. All of these matters were intimately connected with the Roman legislative procedure and also with the judicial system as worked by the Roman magistrates. Moreover, it was a life position, and one’s only surprise is that Cæsar’s administration of the office was not attacked by his enemies. As a matter of fact, his career as an official religious leader is marked by beneficent reforms in the Calendar and by a solid contribution to the science of chronology.

There was some difficulty in the election, for it had been placed by Sulla in the hands of the members of the college. But this measure was repealed, and when the people became the electors, Cæsar had easily the majority of the votes over his two conservative opponents. The year 63 had not been, as we have seen, a happy or tranquil one for the men in power; there had been a constant series of attacks made upon them, and they had been forced to stand steadily on the defensive.

Before the time for the consular elections the extreme wing of the popular party appeared to have got out of hand. They selected for their candidate Catiline, a leading spirit among the criminal and corrupt order of Roman society, who had contested the election before and had been defeated. Cæsar had already energetically supported Catiline, but in the latter’s second attempt to be elected Consul, it seems clear that Cæsar’s support was at best half-hearted. Cæsar had come to know the reckless nature of Catiline’s program, with its appeal for a general canceling of debts and its general attack on all capitalistic interests. The scheme, however, did win the approval of the discontented classes, and the occasion for carrying it through was favorable, because Pompeius, the only man with a military force adequate to act forcibly on behalf of the senatorial oligarchy, was absent still in the East. It was understood that Catiline, if he obtained office, would use it to inaugurate a social revolution; if he were defeated, it was planned that violent methods should be used to force a change of government on the oligarchy. An army was to be collected in Italy, the city was to be set on fire, and in the confusion the reins of government would be taken by Catiline and his followers.

The plot was shrewdly defeated by Cicero, who was given by the Senate unlimited powers, after a state of siege had been proclaimed. Catiline escaped from the city, taking refuge with his army, which had been collected near Florence; but several of the other conspirators were taken prisoners in Rome, and the question of their fate was brought up before the Senate. Cæsar had by report been implicated in the conspiracy, but Cicero refused to follow up these suspicions. Accordingly, in the senatorial debate, Cæsar appeared rather in the light of a cross bench statesman than as a firm supporter of the revolutionary leader.

It must be remembered that the Senate had no right to condemn a man to death or to banishment. A general in the field could inflict the death sentence without appeal, but no magistrate within the precincts of the city could do so; there was an appeal from his decision to the people legally assembled. Cicero wished to get from the Senate an authoritative opinion, as to whether under their previous decree of martial law he could exercise in the city the summary rights allowed to a general in the field. Cæsar spoke after the consular members of the Senate, all of whom had declared for the administration of the extreme penalty. He opposed it in a careful and statesmanlike speech, using his opportunity for putting himself on record as the upholder of the democratic view of the constitution.

As no verbal report of any other of Cæsar’s speeches has come down to us, it is interesting to give an extract from Sallust’s version, which may be taken as an accurate outline, for, owing to Cicero’s personal interest in the matter, the whole proceedings of the Senate during this crucial debate were taken down in shorthand. After deprecating the use of rhetoric as likely to prejudice the judgment, and remarking that eloquent pictures of the horrors of war and rebellion were alien to the matter in hand, Cæsar’s words were: “And indeed, for the crimes we have to deal with, no penalty is in itself too cruel; death at least cannot be so, for it puts an end to the misery of this life and brings no torment in another. But the penalty will be looked on as cruel, simply because it is unconstitutional. It has been over and over again forbidden by express legislation to scourge or kill a citizen without trial. You do not propose to scourge these men, presumably because the law forbids it. Why, then, do you propose to put them to death? Both penalties are equally illegal. I must remind you also of the precedent your action will create. Once place such a power as you claim in the hands of a government and you cannot put a limit on its use; it may be and will be used against good and bad alike, as it was by the Thirty at Athens and in our own recollection by Sulla. I do not fear this now or with Cicero as Consul; but I will not answer for the power of the sword in the hands of future Consuls. Let us abide by the law and not seek in a panic to overrule it. My advice is, not indeed that we let these men go, and thus increase the resources of Catiline, but that we commit them for life to close custody in the largest Italian towns, securing them by holding over each town the heaviest possible penalty in case they should escape. And I further propose that we pass a decree embodying our opinion that no proposal touching them shall be made henceforth either in Senate or assembly; and that disregard of the decree shall be treated by the Senate as high treason against the state.”

The hint of a reaction was not an oratorical commonplace; it was suggested by the recent history of Rome itself, and proved most effective, for even Cicero’s own brother, Quintus, who followed Cæsar, expressed his agreement with him. Cicero himself, in his reply, took a rather wavering position, paying special attention to the practical proposals of Cæsar, which so many modern historians have decided to be weak and specious. But these have forgotten that, even if Cæsar’s plans for keeping the prisoners as perpetual ticket-of-leave men in various Italian communities offered no effective guarantee that they would not escape, there was no especial reason for fearing their presence again in Rome after Catiline and his army had been destroyed. None of the conspirators was a man of first-rate ability, and besides, the experience of unsuccessful conspiracy has almost as strong an educational effect as imprisonment. Many Paris communards settled down as peaceful citizens.

Cicero made an unfortunate experiment at this juncture. The Senate listened readily to the summary appeals for justice to traitors made by Cato, but Cicero’s execution of the Catilinarians was stored up against him in the popular mind, and much of the good he might have done in his political career was frustrated by his weakness in identifying himself with the blind passion of the reactionary party. For the moment, however, Cicero carried the people with him; they lost their heads, alarmed by the wild tales of conflagration and massacre. Cæsar’s life was in danger, because he had pleaded for a policy of moderation, and it must be allowed that the words of his speech did not represent a pose. The principles he stood for in 63 he adhered to after the civil wars were over, when a word from him might have initiated a proscription after the Sullan model.

II
ALLIANCE WITH POMPEIUS AND CRASSUS

The year following the suppression of the Catiline conspiracy was one of uncertainty. Pompeius was returning home after his six years’ stay in the East. The question was whether he would play the rôle of a new Sulla. It seems generally to have been expected that he would. There was no army in Italy strong enough to resist his will; certainly the force which had overcome Catiline near Fiesole was quite unequal to such a work. The question was, who were to be his friends and what policy would he pursue. One of the general’s emissaries appeared in Rome, and made it clear that Pompeius could not be used as a mere tool of the senatorial party. Cicero made tactless overtures to secure his favor, and met with a cold reception.

Cæsar showed more diplomacy, paying the general the compliment of requesting him to finish the Capitoline temple, one of the chief shrines of the civic religion of Rome. This duty came within Cæsar’s province as Pontifex Maximus, and besides as Prætor for this year he held a position which made his influence useful to the returning general. Both the scheme for the restoration of the temple and a measure for recalling Pompeius to the city, which was supported by Cæsar, were opposed by the Senate, and the discussion led to such violence that the Senate suspended Cæsar from his functions as magistrate, and only restored him when he had personally intervened to quiet the passions of the mob.

Though Cæsar’s year of office was over (61 B.C.), and the time had come for him to administer Spain as Proprætor, that being the province assigned him, he delayed his departure. There were many grounds for this course. Pompeius had been keeping his own counsel as to his future plans, and required watching. Cæsar had difficulties with his creditors; he had long been heavily in debt, and his year of office, with its sensational political activities, must have severely drained his resources.

But the chief cause which delayed his journey west was the violation, in the House of the Pontifex Maximus, of the sacred mysteries of the Bona Dea by a young Quæstor-elect, Clodius, who was suspected of being the lover of Cæsar’s wife, Pompeia. A scandal involving the head of the state religion was a serious matter, and Cæsar lived up to the rôle assigned him by sententiously remarking that Cæsar’s wife ought not even to be suspected and by seizing this opportunity of divorcing her. The step satisfied public opinion at the time, but the dignity of the act is somewhat lessened in the eyes of later critics from the fact that the Pontifex Maximus himself was, even according to the flexible standards of Rome, notorious for his moral laxity.

When Clodius’ trial was held, Cæsar diplomatically denied that he had any certain knowledge of the case. Politics were so much involved in this trial that proscriptions might have been initiated. Clodius was a figure in the popular party, and, in the end, by the common method of bribing the judges, an acquittal was secured. Pompeius, in the midst of this exciting time, had arrived in Rome, thus giving Cæsar an opportunity of taking the measure of the over-praised Eastern conqueror. Before Cæsar left for Spain, mutual advances had taken place, and he felt sure that Pompeius would not ally himself with the senatorial party. Cæsar also continued to be on good terms with the millionaire Crassus, and before leaving Italy he borrowed from him eighteen hundred talents to satisfy the demands of creditors.

Of the period of Cæsar’s rule in Spain little is known; but his service there was valuable to him because, while contending with the hardy hill tribes, who were constantly in arms against the Romans, he received a training in war that afterwards stood him in good stead. He showed himself, too, an able and conscientious administrator, regardful of the condition of the provincials, who had suffered from the loss of property and from heavy taxation during the unintermitted war that took place while the government at Rome was destroying the home-rule system set up by Sertorius. The beneficent character of Cæsar’s administration showed itself in his friendly relation with the free city of Gades, where he was called in to reform the local laws and to settle factional disputes. The prosperity of the town in after years may reasonably be supposed to have dated from this period. Even Cicero speaks in glowing language of Cæsar’s supervision. The generous character of his treatment of the town is seen in its admission twelve years afterwards to the full Roman franchise. One of the most distinguished of the citizens of Gades, Balbus, became Cæsar’s confidential agent and secretary, serving in this capacity for many years without a break. After his master’s death, Balbus rose to be Prætor and Consul; he was the first enfranchised foreigner who held these highest offices in Rome.

All the affairs relating to his provincial government were set in order in the spring of 59 B.C., when Cæsar set out for Rome to be there in time for the consular elections, which were usually held in summer. He had two objects in view: one to secure the dignity of a triumph, the official stamp of a successful military commander; the other to present himself as a candidate for the consulship. It was impossible for him while holding a military command to appear within the walls and formally solicit the votes of his fellow-citizens. He therefore asked for permission to become a candidate without fulfilling the formal conditions, and this request the Senate refused to grant. Cæsar solved the difficulty by sacrificing the triumph; he resigned his command and entered the city as a private individual.

But now the opposition to him took another form. A determined aristocrat, M. Calpurnius Bibulus, who, apart from his political tenets, had a long-standing personal grudge against Cæsar, was put up by the senatorial party as his colleague for the consulship, and was elected by the lavish use of money. Cæsar’s next move in this game of political strategy was a master stroke of astuteness; he formed a close combination with Pompeius, whom the senatorial party had just irritated by vetoing all his pet schemes, among them an opportunity of a second consulship and a plan to reward his soldiers by a distribution of public lands. As a third member of the alliance Crassus was introduced, a valuable asset because of the great financial backing he could give. He saw a chance for promoting his political advancement with two such colleagues to help him. It was a frank system of give and take; there were no strong personal ties between any of the three members of the junta, but they had at least a common opponent, the senatorial party.

An effort was made, though it was unsuccessful, to detach Cicero from his friendly relations with the aristocratic majority in the Senate; as he declined the invitation, the new political machine became a triumvirate, the union of three influential persons to overcome opposition and to prevent the wheels of public business from being blocked by the endless methods of obstruction ever ready to be employed in the complicated system of Roman government, where the checks were more numerous than the balances. It simply meant that these three men, and not the reactionary senators, should decide on the distribution of provinces, on the candidates for offices, and on the command of armies. From the record of all three, it was clear that the technique of the constitutional system would not be treated with great reverence, for all were practical politicians and had definite personal ambitions to gratify.

As Consul, Cæsar began his year of magistracy with a policy of studied moderation. He tried to get on with Bibulus by showing him marked consideration in the way of official precedence, and his first reform of senatorial practice concerned a subject which might well have been taken as a non-controversial matter, the publication of the Senate’s proceedings. Cæsar proposed that a summary of each debate should be exposed to view in the Forum. It was an intimation to the senators that they must hold themselves responsible to public opinion.

The next proposal was to make some arrangement by which the veterans of Pompeius’ army should be supplied with public lands. These lands had to be acquired by the state from private owners, so the proceeds of the extensive conquests of Pompeius’ conquests in the East were to be applied to this purpose. The Senate refused to listen to any agrarian measure; the very name frightened them. Cato obstructed, trying to talk the scheme out in the Senate. Cæsar, who had as little respect for parliamentary procedure as Cromwell, put a stop to this copious oratory by placing the speaker under arrest. He was soon released, however, in deference to the pressure of his colleagues.

In the face of the hopeless opposition of the Senate to the Consul’s legislation, the only course left to pursue was for Cæsar to present his legislation directly to the popular assembly, without the authorization of the Senate. This method was extraordinary, but not absolutely illegal, and it had been employed by reformers since the time of Tiberius Gracchus. There were, of course, grave objections to it, for measures could be rushed through without proper discussion, and it is well known that hasty legislation is often dangerous, even for those who promote it. A specially drastic feature of the agrarian bill was the clause which compelled senators and all officers, to be elected in future, to swear to be faithful to its provisions.

In this way Cæsar hoped to secure his measure from being abrogated when the year of his magistracy was over. This clause was not, however, a new expedient, but it was now being used in a new way to prevent the claim that prerogatives of the Senate had been violated by passing legislation without consulting its wishes. Pompeius promised to support the bill by arms if violence were resorted to on the other side. A Tribune exercised his right to veto on the measure, when it was introduced in the popular assembly, but this old constitutional check was contemptuously disregarded. Also, when Bibulus, the conservative colleague of Cæsar, interfered by formally delaying action in the measure, he was forcibly removed from the Forum by some of Pompeius’ veterans. Bibulus was equally powerless when he invoked religious scruples of a technical kind, for Cæsar was Pontifex Maximus as well as Consul. Bibulus’ interpretations of signs and omens were ruled out as irregular. Even when the bill was passed by the people, he kept up opposition in the Senate and tried to induce the senators to declare the agrarian law null and void. They, however, were not prepared to join him in such a hazardous undertaking, so in disgust he withdrew for the rest of his term into private life. His retirement led the people to remark jokingly that the two Consuls for the year were Julius and Cæsar, not Cæsar and Bibulus.

The passage of the agrarian democratic measure, as it stood, was undertaken to fulfil engagements made with Pompeius, whose troops were especially concerned in this distribution of lands. Equally personal were the measures passed by the people to regularize the situation of the territories in the East, where Pompeius, after his conquests, had acted on his own initiative in making treaties, imposing taxation, and settling the terms of local administration. The personal relations between the two triumvirs were now drawn closer by the marriage of Cæsar’s daughter Julia to Pompeius; she was at this time twenty-two years old, and as long as she lived she prevented any open rupture between her husband and her father.

In another legislative enactment Cæsar attested his loyal interpretation of the triumvirate compact rather than his desire to forward the public interests of the state. Crassus desired that the farmers of the taxes in the province of Asia should be relieved from the contract which they had made with the government. It was a shady piece of business; even Cicero, who was not apt to be critical where capitalistic interests were involved, called the scheme of Crassus shameful. It was defeated in the Senate by the determined efforts of Cato. The measure was afterwards jammed through the popular assembly in a form which relieved the taxgatherers of one-third of their financial burden.

This was really a shrewd move to separate from the senatorial party the whole mercantile class, who normally acted solidly with them. They now looked upon the triumvirate combination as favorable to their interests, and so deprived the Senate of a solid support at a time when that body needed every element of the population in its unequal struggle with the triumvirs.

Much more worthy than this act of special legislation was a measure for dealing with extortion on the part of provincial administrators. The Roman governors and their subordinates treated the provinces as legitimate spoil, by which they could balance the large amounts spent at home in political corruption. This system offered the most unwholesome example of ring rule. Every man in public life had a good chance of ruling a province at some time in his career, and there was no inducement to touch a well-tried system which had proved profitable to all concerned.

Cæsar’s law was a blanket measure, evidently drawn with great intelligence and showing the familiarity of an ex-provincial official with the concrete needs of the situation. It extended the jurisdiction of existing courts for cases of provincial extortion, in regard to the definition of the crime, the persons liable, and the penalties to be imposed. All the methods of extortion were brought within the scope of this act. The governor and his official staff were held liable, and the punishment, hitherto chiefly imposed by damages, was increased to deprivation of the right to bequeath property, and in some cases expulsion from the Senate and exile were inflicted on offending officials.

Good as this legislation was, it contained a political element which prevented it from meeting the whole situation of provincial misrule. The triumvirate, we have seen, made a distinct bid for the favor of the mercantile classes when the previous bill was passed relieving the taxgatherers of Asia from the full extent of their contract. This new law only concerned the administration of senatorial officials; it did not put an end to extortion, nor did it stop the avenues of public corruption, because the financiers, the men who gathered about the official ruling class, were left to ply their nefarious trade unmolested.

But Cæsar’s consulship broke the power of the senatorial aristocracy, which had been on the decline ever since the death of Sulla. By his alliance with Pompeius and Crassus a continuity of policy was secured, under which the old republican principle that cessation of office meant also cessation of power came to an end. The main business at the close of his year of service as Consul was to arrange that the system he had started should continue to work smoothly. The two candidates for the consulship were pledged supporters of the triumvirate. An even more important tool was the active and unscrupulous Clodius, who had made himself notorious because of the Bona Dea scandal. He was made a Tribune, and as such became the local agent in Rome of the triumvirs’ interests. He signalized his entrance into office by abolishing the small payment still exacted on the state distribution of grain to the people, and he organized the masses into guilds, each under a district leader, so that the populace could be controlled and could be worked together either as a political machine or as a mob, whether to vote or to do deeds of violence according to the password of their leader.

The Senate, in arranging the assignment of provinces in B.C. 59, had tried to diminish Cæsar’s influence by giving him for his work as Proconsul the duty of attending to the internal condition of Italy. This meant that he would have no military force at his command, and that he would be expected to devote himself to the supervision of roads and public works. The senatorial arrangement for rendering their chief opponent innocuous was simply an invitation to him to treat it as non-existing. It was proposed to set the Senate’s action aside and to give Cisalpine Gaul and the adjoining province of Illyria to Cæsar for a period of five years.

When the new measure was before the popular assembly, the Senate, under pressure from Pompeius, voted that in addition to Cisalpine Gaul in the Celtic region on the Italian side of the Alps, the Gallic province, with an ample army and suitable staff, should be assigned to Cæsar. It was known that there was restlessness among the Gauls and the Germans, who were on the borders of the prosperous Roman province in southern Gaul along the lower Rhone. This was, of course, an opportunity for real proconsular duty, but probably no one who voted for the assignment realized the possibilities of the command which now fell into Cæsar’s hand.

But before setting out for his province (58 B.C.), Cæsar remained near at hand to supervise Clodius’ arrangements for muzzling the Senate; it was not safe for the new Proconsul to absent himself from Rome until affairs there had been brought so under control that there would be no chance of a senatorial reactionary movement. Clodius first abolished the use of indefinitely prolonged obstruction, a practice involved in the religious privilege of “watching the heavens” for evil omens, and a method of delay normally used to prevent the assemblies of the people from being held. The next step was to hinder the Censors from making a combination to remove from the Senate partisans of Cæsar. This purpose was secured by another law of Clodius that made it impossible for the Censor to strike from the roll of the Senate anyone, except on a formal accusation, and no member could be removed even then unless both Censors acted together.

Cæsar attempted also to conciliate Cicero by offering him a staff appointment; on this being refused, as it was desirable to deprive the senatorial party of the oratorical talents which gave Cicero a hold on the people, Clodius was allowed to bring charges against him in connection with the execution of the Catilinarian conspirators. The terms of the new law were perfectly general; it simply outlawed any person who had or should hereafter put to death a Roman citizen uncondemned, that is, without due trial and sentence. Cicero took the hint and fled from Rome. At the same time the uncompromising senatorial obstructionist Cato was “kicked upstairs” by being given an appointment as commissioner to supervise the annexation of the island of Cyprus. Ample time was allowed him, and it was arranged that when he had finished with Cyprus, he should go to Byzantium and settle some unimportant disputes in that free city. With Cato kept busy at a long distance from Rome, and with Cicero out of the way, there was little to fear with Clodius acting in the rôle of “boss” of Rome.

III
THE CONQUEST OF GAUL

Very soon after the flight of the great orator, Cæsar, who had been watching with his army the proceedings within the city, started for his province of Gaul. The country which was to be the scene of his labors as governor, and in which through successive campaigns his reputation in generalship was to be made, was larger than modern France, for it extended to the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees. Only a part of it was familiar to the Romans, and for this reason one of the most striking proofs of Cæsar’s skill as a commander is the ability and certainty with which he penetrated into regions unvisited before and therefore unfamiliar to him except by the hearsay stories of the casual traveler. The province had originally been occupied by the Romans in the struggle with Hannibal, because it secured their land communication with Spain. In its southern part it was well developed and civilized, but the limit of Roman rule northward was marked by the valley of the Rhone, and the famous city of Lyons had not yet been founded, which was later on the headquarters of Roman power in Gaul.

Much trouble was being experienced from Germanic invaders farther north, who were crossing the Rhine and were in great numbers occupying the fertile lands to the east of them. The Gauls themselves had no cohesive power of resistance; they were constantly quarreling among themselves, and it seemed only a question of time when the Germans, uniting with the Gauls, who were certain to become subject to their rule, would overwhelm the peaceful and civilized inhabitants of the Roman province. The situation required immediate attention, for the Ædui who lived between the Loire and the Saône were calling on the Romans as allies for help and protection against their neighbors, other Gaulish tribes, who with the aid of the German king, Ariovistus, were threatening to take their land. Besides, it was reported that the Helvetic and the German peoples were contemplating a migration on a large scale, induced to leave south Germany by the prospect of finding better lands farther west.

The country as a whole was in a state of unrest; the unconquered mass of the free tribes, extending from the fringe of Roman occupation in the south to the North Sea, might easily become dangerous to the countries under Roman occupation on the other side of the Pyrenees and the Alps. Up to the time of Cæsar’s advent, the government at Rome had shown singular apathy; a few resolutions had been passed, directing that the allied tribes should be aided, but no additions were made to the army in the province. The emotional temperament of the Gauls made them subject to quick changes in their point of view; unless something were done quickly, even the allies of Rome would have to be counted on the other side. It was easy for them to drop their present allegiance, for they were as a mass a servile population, guided by an aristocracy of nobles or knights, and by a widely extended and mysterious guild, the Druids, who each year held a solemn assembly in a sacred place in the center of the land.

The general difficulties of coping with the situation were great when Cæsar took command, but the special details of the position as it confronted him increased the obstacles in the way of prompt action. There was but one legion beyond the Alps; the other three were far away in Aquileia at the top of the Adriatic. It was fortunate for him that he could draw on the reserves of Cisalpine Gaul, the richest part of Italy, the province which extended over the plains of Lombardy to Tuscany. This province was filled with a hardy race of yeomen cultivators, a mixed population, having its origin in the conquered Celtic tribes and in genuine Roman colonists.

Nowhere else could there be found a better recruiting ground for the legions, and nowhere also, on account of the general intelligence of the inhabitants, would the personal qualities of a general find a more immediate response. The tactfulness of Cæsar had already been put to the test in the arena of political life; he had learned how to make friends and to hold them. Apart from the technical gifts of military art, the personal charm of Cæsar’s character was a great factor in securing for him an army made up of devoted troops and officers. They trusted him, and they were held to him as a leader, because he seems from the first to have been able to establish close relations of a spontaneous and genuine type with those who were under him. His army was not a mere fighting machine, but an organism reflecting the individual driving power and coolness of the man who led it.

The series of campaigns in Gaul begins with Cæsar’s successful blocking of the migration of the Helvetii. All that is known of the details of the strategy employed by the Romans is derived from Cæsar’s own report, which has been frequently criticised as intentionally obscure and misleading. It must be remembered that the famous commentaries on the Gallic wars were hurriedly dictated, and were meant to tell the public what the commander-in-chief wished them to know and nothing more. For example, many modern authorities are agreed that the numbers of the migrating Helvetii are very much overestimated by Cæsar and that the real purpose of their migration was artfully concealed. Napoleon, who was a past master in falsifying military records, declared that the campaign against the Helvetii as narrated by Cæsar was incomprehensible.

The real situation in Gaul prior to the migration seems to have been as follows. As we have said, Ariovistus, the German king, was in control of the central part of the country. This overlordship was burdensome to the Gauls, who paid him a yearly tribute. A prince of the Ædui, Divitiacus, had turned to the Romans for help, but his request was rejected, for Ariovistus, during Cæsar’s own consulship, had been acknowledged as king and formally declared an ally and friend of the Roman people. There was another party among the Ædui, led by Dumnorix, the brother of Divitiacus, who favored throwing off the German yoke, and urged a general uprising of the Gauls, unassisted by the Romans.

Not far away from Æduan territory were the Helvetii, who were independent of the rule of Ariovistus, and with them the autonomous party among the Ædui entered into friendly relations in order to secure them as allies against the Germans. The Helvetii were to be persuaded by their leaders to migrate to western Gaul, and it was arranged that, when the whole tribe was slowly passing through the land of the Ædui, there should be a rising against Ariovistus. The Ædui could count on the assistance of the Helvetii, because as future occupants of Gallic territory the immigrants would have no desire to be dependents of the German king.

This situation and this program were known to Cæsar before he left Rome, for he was in communication with the pro-Roman party among the Ædui. It was of course his object to frustrate this plan of driving out the Germans without the help of Rome, because it was to his interest that Roman overlordship should take the place of German control. The request of the Helvetii to be allowed to pass peacefully through Roman territory came just in time. It gave Cæsar the opportunity of defending the frontier and strengthening his army.

As soon as the Helvetii were refused a passage through the Roman province, they started directly for the land of the Ædui, crossing over the Roman territory, and so they abandoned the fiction of a migration to the west. In the meantime, by the liberal use of money, the pro-Roman party among the Ædui had got the upper hand. Accordingly when the Helvetii, whose rear division had been attacked by Cæsar as they were crossing the Saône, reached the land of their would-be allies, they were treated as enemies by the Ædui, who were now calling on Cæsar for help to resist the invaders. The Helvetii, willing to return, desired to come to terms with the Roman general, but they refused to accept the Roman conditions as to hostages. They started to retrace their steps by following a more northerly course on their return in order to take advantage of the mountainous country, as a protection against an attack on the part of the Romans.

Cæsar followed warily; his own troops were indeed strengthened by Æduan cavalry, but these, on the first engagement, had fled before the enemy. It was obvious their loyalty could not be depended upon, and significant, too, that Dumnorix was in command. When an attempt to surround the Helvetii with two Roman legions failed, Cæsar withdrew to Bibracte, the Æduan capital, to replenish his army and probably to prevent the defection of his allies. The Helvetii might now have returned to their old home unmolested, but they were embittered against the Romans, who had shown constant hostility to their movements, whether they advanced or retreated, and they were quite willing to treat with the patriotic party among the Ædui, who asked them now for help against the Romans. They turned back therefore, with the purpose of attacking the Romans as they were marching towards Bibracte.

The actual number of the Helvetii engaged in this operation cannot have been very great, for their wagon train was in a very short time collected, formed, and turned into an improvised citadel. Their movements before, during, and after battle show that the number 368,000 given by Cæsar is enormously exaggerated. Altogether, including allied forces, Cæsar’s army may be reckoned at 40,000 men. There were six legions (36,000 men) and allied cavalry to the number of 4000.

When the Helvetii approached, the brunt of the fighting was assigned to four legions of veterans; the rest, the fresh recruits and the allies, were placed behind the line of battle and directed to protect the camp. As the Helvetii attacked the four legions, who were advantageously stationed on the slope of a hill, they were thrown back; but, as the legions advanced, these in turn were vigorously attacked on their flanks. The battle was hotly contested, the Romans taking the offensive both in the front and on the sides. Slowly the enemy withdrew, and it was dark before the Roman army took the massed wagons by assault. After the victory, Cæsar remained on the field of battle for three days. The Helvetii fled towards the east and a few days later surrendered, most of them being sent back to their old homes. The Helvetian overthrow was a useful stroke; it made a decided impression on the Gauls, who were now able to take the measure of the new commander of the Romans.

The next move was to break the power of Ariovistus. Cæsar represents the suggestion as coming from various Gallic deputations, who besought him to help them cast off the German yoke. But it is obvious that the presence of Ariovistus in Gaul was incompatible with the purpose of Cæsar to subjugate the entire country. All negotiations with the German chieftain proved futile; he insisted on keeping the Gallic tribes as his tributaries, and simply asked to be let alone.

Cæsar took his army to the east and came into contact with the Germans in the neighborhood of Belfort or in southern Alsace; it is impossible to determine the locality with precision. Ariovistus collected his wagons into a fortified camp on an elevation a short distance from the position of the Romans, using his advantage to break up by cavalry sorties the Roman line of communication. His plan appears to have been to force the Romans to withdraw and to attack them on their march. The German leader took full advantage of the mobility of his troops, and his cavalry proved too strong for the Gallic horse on the side of the Romans. All attempts to draw Ariovistus from his camp failed, until Cæsar divided his army, placing two legions in a fortified position, where they could more efficiently protect the line of communications. This smaller camp Ariovistus tried to take by storm, and failed.

When the main Roman army advanced, and began to threaten the wagon citadel of the Germans, Ariovistus determined to give battle. The battle itself was won through the superior discipline of the Romans; once during its progress the left wing was in danger, but it was saved by the prompt action of the younger Crassus, who was in command of the cavalry. Cæsar with the right wing carried all before him. As to the numbers engaged, it was Napoleon’s opinion that the Germans were not stronger than Cæsar; the probability is that they were weaker. Ariovistus’ whole army, though with it he controlled a large part of Gaul, need not have been more than 20,000 men. They were, of course, a better trained fighting force than anything the Gallic tribes could create, and it was not difficult, using the divisions among the Gauls, to establish an effective overlordship with a small, well-disciplined army.

Apparently the bulk of the German army was destroyed; Ariovistus, however, succeeded in making his escape beyond the Rhine. The defeat of the Germans had important consequences; before the opening of the campaign against Ariovistus, news had come from the north that the Suevi, an important German tribe, were about to move across the Rhine. The knowledge of the fate of Ariovistus forced them back again into the depths of Germany.

During the winter Cæsar crossed the Alps to attend to the administration of the Cisalpine province, leaving his troops quartered in Gaul under the command of his trusted lieutenant, Labienus. He raised two new legions, and when he returned northward it was already plain that the pacification of the country was far from complete. The Gauls feared the expansion of Roman power, and there were rumors of an uprising to be led by the tribes of the Belgæ. Cæsar marched directly to the danger spot, and taking advantage of tribal jealousies, induced the Remi, whose territory lay between the Maas, the Oise, and the Maine, to accept the alliance and protectorate of Rome. (57 B.C.)

This was a wise move, for it was clear from reports on the spot that the whole Belgic confederacy, representing the most warlike of the Gallic tribes, were up in arms. The fate of Ariovistus, the year before, had shown that the only way to resist the extension of Roman rule in Gaul was by tribal combination. The Belgæ thoroughly realized their danger, and when Cæsar passed their frontiers, they opposed him with a large allied army composed of contingents of all the neighboring peoples.

The great difficulty was to keep such large masses of men together and to provide them with food. In the time of Marius, the Germanic invaders, the Cimbri and the Teutones, in order to secure provisions as they went, had divided into several smaller groups, each one of which was beaten in detail by the Roman general. Cæsar’s strategy was to be governed by the same principles; he meant to wear the Belgæ out and to refuse to give battle until they had lost their unity, until each dissevered fraction might be drawn into action without support from the rest. Cæsar having recruited two new legions, in all there were eight. Besides, there served under him a variegated band of allies, Numidians, Cretans, men of the Balearic Islands, and Gallic cavalry.

Altogether the Roman fighting host may be reckoned at fifty to sixty thousand men, with camp followers, perhaps nearly one hundred thousand in all. To keep such a body in the field for a considerable time meant a carefully organized system of transportation and economic equipment. A strongly fortified camp was constructed on the north bank of the River Aisne, where the soldiers were kept in good discipline. The remains of extensive fortifications, in the form of ditches eighteen feet wide and nine or ten feet deep, and a wall with palisades twelve feet high, were found on the site of Cæsar’s camp by the archæologists who worked under the direction of Napoleon III.

The camp was in the country of the Remi, who had, as we have mentioned, become allies of the Romans; it was their town Bibrax which the Belgæ first attacked, hoping to induce Cæsar to leave his fortified position to repel them. He remained, however, where he was, sending sufficient help in the way of defensive artillery to enable the townsmen to defend themselves and to force the Belgæ to give up the siege. They then turned to attack the Roman camp. Cæsar drew up his army, but neither side had any desire to come to close quarters, as in front of the camp there was a considerable stretch of swampy ground. The Belgæ then tried to cut off the Roman line of communications, but this involved crossing the Aisne, and its banks were closely watched by Cæsar’s men. A few horsemen and war engines were sufficient to deter them from making the attempt.

If the Belgæ had crossed with their whole army, they could have carried out their purpose; the Roman communications would have been broken, but the Romans could have gone ahead, and the Belgæ, outside of their own land, had no way of maintaining their supplies. The only thing to do was to surround the Roman camp from all sides and starve it out. Even with their superior numbers, which Cæsar gives as 306,000, this was a difficult operation, for the enveloping lines, owing to the country being traversed by two rivers, would have been large. In any case the Belgæ recognized that they could not keep the field long, and when they heard that Cæsar’s allies, the Ædui, were invading their country, they decided to withdraw, the confederated tribes engaging to help one another if Cæsar’s army invaded their territory. The retreat of the Belgæ was so unexpected that at first the Romans took it for a feint meant to provoke them to leave their camp.

As soon as the news was well authenticated, the cavalry pursued the retreating barbarians, keeping up a series of irritating attacks. The Belgic strongholds surrendered soon after; only three tribes, the Nervii, the Viromandui, and the Atrebates, tried to strike a blow for Gallic freedom. They fell upon the Romans, while they were arranging to encamp in a woody country on the Sambre, and caused almost a panic. The allied troops fled in confusion, but the legionaries held their ground, getting themselves in line, and as they were far superior in numbers to the Nervii, they soon got the upper hand of them, although there was some sharp fighting and for a time two of the legions were hard pressed. It was part of the Roman general’s strategy not to face a superior force. This point is apparent in the previous campaigns, but, as a military writer, Cæsar had no scruples in manipulating his figures for popular consumption. When the Nervii made peace unconditionally, they represented themselves, according to Cæsar, as having only 500 men left out of an original 60,000 capable of bearing arms; a few years later they appear again in the Commentaries as having a considerable army. They also sent a contingent of 5000 to Alesia at the close of the Gallic war. Probably a just estimate of the fighting force of the Nervii would give them 30,000 men, because the whole population of the district could hardly have been more than 150,000 souls. They occupied a territory of four hundred square kilometers, and with the slight density of population in Gaul, they could not have numbered more than the figures given above. Even in the Italian peninsula, which was more thickly settled, there was altogether a population of not more than three and a half millions and a density of only twenty-five per square kilometer. The Roman legions who opposed the Nervii in this last fight numbered at least 40,000 men.

Dwelling east of the Nervii were the Aduatuci, said to be descendants of the survivors of the former Cimbri and Teutones, whom Marius had destroyed. They had promised to help the Nervii, but had come too late for the battle. Now they withdrew to their chief fortress, but when they saw themselves being enveloped in the complicated and scientific siege works of the Romans, their hearts failed and they surrendered before the final assault was made. What they had not been able to do openly they hoped to accomplish by treachery, for they reserved a part of their arms, at the time they made their submission, and when the Romans were off their guard at night, made a sudden attack upon them. They were defeated with heavy loss, and the next day, in order to make an example of them, Cæsar sold the whole tribe, men, women, and children, into slavery, 53,000 souls in all.

After the Belgic campaign was over, Cæsar laid plans for the further expansion of Roman control in Gaul by sending one of his lieutenants to Armorica, modern Normandy and Brittany, to secure the submission of the inhabitants. Moreover, seven legions were placed in winter quarters along the Loire, ready to use the stream to transport themselves to the territory of the Veneti, the chief tribe in the west of Gaul. (56 B.C.)

The announcement of Cæsar’s great success made a profound impression in Rome; new and unknown domains were being annexed, and the people were granted an unprecedented space of fifteen days for a public thanksgiving. During the winter the general himself took up the detailed work of governor of the Cisalpine province, and also made a tour of Illyria, which had been previously unvisited by him. It was filled with a hardy and brave population and might well be used for drawing auxiliary troops for his army.

In Gaul the situation of affairs showed that the people of Armorica could not be depended upon, though they professed loyalty to the Romans. Young Crassus, who commanded a garrison encamped at the mouth of the Loire, when he found his soldiers suffering from lack of supplies, sent some of his officers to collect provisions from the neighboring districts supposedly friendly. The Veneti seized these men, and refused to give them up except in exchange for their own hostages in the hands of the Romans, and they proceeded to bind themselves together for common action, showing their desire to repudiate the sovereignty of Rome. Cæsar’s reply to the challenge was to order the preparation of a fleet of ships to be put into service the following summer against the Veneti, whose chief seats were along the sea coast.

It was not possible for Cæsar to direct these operations in person, for affairs in Rome demanded his presence on the southern side of the Alps. Clodius had mismanaged the affairs of the democratic party in Rome, had proved headstrong, had alienated Pompeius, and had been unable to prevent the return of Cicero from exile. The cause of the senatorial oligarchy was progressing, and a danger point was reached when Crassus drew away from Pompeius, of whose popularity he was jealous, and when Pompeius himself felt that his talents and his position as conqueror of the East were not being sufficiently recognized. Cato, too, was returning from Cyprus, and could be relied upon to give the triumvirs trouble in his rôle of professional obstructionist.

As there was talk already in Rome of the recalling of Cæsar, a consultation between the triumvirs was imperatively needed. Lucca in Tuscany was selected for the place of meeting, which took place in April, 56. A great crowd of officials, magistrates, and senators were present to receive orders from the triumvirs or to hear particulars of the conference. Cæsar by his diplomacy managed to remove the causes of estrangement between Crassus and Pompeius, and the details of a common policy were arranged. By the conference at Lucca, through the adroit manipulation of Cæsar, the old combination that had begun to work haltingly, owing to the estrangement between Crassus and Pompeius, and also to their common lack of political acumen, was re-established and its details settled.

The main thing was to muzzle the Senate; with this done, it would be safe for Pompeius and Crassus to carry out their plans for securing an important province each, together with a military command for a long term of years. The arrangement was that the other two triumvirs (Cæsar of course returning to finish the subjugation of Gaul) should be Consuls in 55; and after their year of magistracy was finished, Pompeius was to have the two provinces in Spain, and Crassus was to go to the East, where there would be a chance of achieving military distinction in a war with the Parthians. In the local affairs of Rome care was taken that Clodius should be kept from continuing his line of irresponsible action, and Cicero was drawn into the sphere of Cæsar’s influence by his brother being given a subordinate military command in Gaul.

Cæsar, when the conference was over, soon returned to the front, to deal with the Veneti in such an effective way that by their example the Gallic tribes might be taught the risks of braving the power of Rome. Divisions of the army were sent to various points of Gaul, where it seemed likely there might be sympathetic uprisings of the populations in favor of the national movement, led by the tribes about the Loire. The Veneti had against them Cæsar himself, and the problem of their subjugation offered some novel difficulties. Their fortified places were usually on headlands; sometimes inaccessible from the mainland except by ship. The country was cut up by many estuaries, and the Veneti, who were practised sailors, showed great mobility in their movements. They withdrew from one post to another, easily cutting themselves off from attack as the Romans, who were not familiar with the country, advanced to meet them with the hope of forcing a decisive engagement. Their power could be destroyed only in a naval battle, and it required both patience and ingenuity on Cæsar’s part before his men could be trained to meet the enemy in their own waters, or even before a fleet could be built suitable to overcome the special difficulties of navigation on the shores of the Bay of Biscay, so unlike the conditions in the Mediterranean. The fleet of the Veneti was finally destroyed; their ships were rendered helpless when the men on the Roman fleet cut their rigging with long poles having at the end sharp hooked knives, and boarding parties disposed of the warriors on the decks. Many of the brave tribe were put to death when they submitted, and the rest were sold as slaves.

In the meantime the operations of the subordinate commanders had been successful, and conspicuous results had been reached in Aquitaine, where the younger Crassus had brought all the tribes to accept Roman sovereignty. Indeed the only failure to be registered this year was Cæsar’s own expedition in the far northern part of Gaul between the Somme and the Rhine, the dwelling place of the Morini and the Menapii. These tribes took refuge in their forests and could not be dislodged, and even some incidental defeats failed to break their obstinacy.

The new year, as it opened, with news of a German invasion on a large scale, brought fresh anxieties to the commander. It was told him that warlike tribes living in and about the Thuringian forest were on the move towards the west, and that others had even crossed the Rhine, dispersing the Gallic tribes in their progress. In Gaul there was a disposition in some quarters to welcome them as deliverers; already some of the Gallic tribes were in communication with them on a friendly basis. (55 B.C.)

Cæsar marched to meet the Germans, and in a conference with their leaders told them they must leave Gallic territory, at the same time offering to make an arrangement by which they could receive land on the right bank of the Rhine. They seemed disposed to accept these terms, but soon hostilities were precipitated because, while the terms were being discussed, the Germans attacked some of the Gallic cavalry attached to Cæsar’s army. The Romans moved suddenly, and according to Cæsar’s own account, butchered in cold blood men, women, and children to the number of 430,000, a hearsay number of course, but there is no reason for doubting that there was a massacre. No Roman was killed and few were wounded. Even in Rome, notoriously insensible to deeds of blood, this wholesale butchery caused disgust. Cato proposed that Cæsar should be given up to the barbarians as an act of justice. But the Senate contented itself with decreeing honors for the victory, although it was proposed, but not carried, that the operations in Gaul should be investigated by a commission.

To finish up the moral effect made on the Germans by the massacre of their kinsmen, Cæsar built a trestle across the Rhine, transported his army into German territory, and for a short time his soldiers were employed in laying waste the country contiguous to the river. He had no intention of penetrating to the interior of the country, and soon returned to Gaul, after destroying the bridge he had built.

This year’s campaign had been marked by daring adventures; it was to have a spectacular close in the expedition to Britain, an island known in a general way to traders from Gaul, but never yet visited by a Roman official or by a Roman army. Cæsar affected to believe that resistance to Roman rule in Gaul was being supported from Britain. In any case a protectorate of the island seemed to offer great material advantages, for exaggerated reports were in circulation as to its wealth and fertility. The expedition was only a partial success. A few tribes made their submission, but the troops had to be hastily withdrawn, because Cæsar desired to be back on the mainland before the equinoctials set in, as the fleet had already severely suffered in a storm.

In the winter preparations were made on a large scale for a second crossing, a large body of transports being prepared and collected at Portus Itius (perhaps Wissant, near Cape Grinez). The troops in the meantime were carefully trained in handling newly constructed vessels specially planned for the waters of the narrow seas. During the winter the periodic signs of disaffection among the Gauls were again plainly visible, this time the Treviri were intriguing with the Germans. An advance in force from Cæsar was needed to put a check to the rising hopes of the anti-Roman party, whose chief, Indutiomar, was forced to give hostages for his good behavior. Much discontent was caused by the necessity of sending contingents to the army; besides, the legions were a burden on the food supplies of the land. The feeling against foreign control grew so strong that Cæsar determined to take some of the Gallic chiefs with him to Britain, to keep them under personal observation. Dumnorix, the Æduan, tried to secure common action among all and to induce the other chiefs not to embark. Only Dumnorix, however, withdrew when the fleet was about to sail. A party was sent back to pursue him. When he resisted, he was slain.

The second expedition to Britain was on an unprecedented scale. There were five legions, two cavalry troops, and an armada of 800 vessels to carry them. The British tribes withdrew from the coast, and there was some fighting, as the Romans made their way inland to attack various British strongholds. Some of the tribes submitted, but the Roman victories were more apparent than real; the camp around the fleet was attacked, and as the army returned, it was continually harassed by an active enemy, who dogged each stage of the march, but refused to come out and fight in the open. The chief result of the invasion was the collection of reliable information about the people and their customs. The island was not occupied or formally conquered for nearly a century. The captives that were taken were brought over to the continent and sold as slaves. (54 B.C.)

When the expedition returned, the troops were distributed through Gaul in winter quarters as camps of observation, not more than a hundred miles from one another; Cæsar’s own headquarters being at Amiens. The scene of the first disturbance was in the northeast; a Roman garrison on the march from one camp to another was cut off, and only a few stragglers were left to tell the tale. Cicero’s brother Quintus, the commander of another garrison, was attacked, and no message could be got through the hostile tribes of the Nervii to tell Cæsar of his desperate straits. Finally news was carried by means of a Gallic slave whose master, a Nervian refugee, promised him his liberty if he were successful.

Cæsar, with one legion and with a division of horsemen, arrived just in time to save the beleaguered garrison. The Gauls were severely handled when the Romans pushed through their lines to reach Cicero’s camp. The news of the relief caused dejection among the other Gallic tribes, who were about to attack isolated Roman garrisons. Labienus alone had trouble with the Treviri, but managed to ward off the blow, inflicting upon them in turn a crushing defeat, and slaying their leader, Indutiomar. The rest of the winter and summer campaign was spent in various expeditions directed against the Gallic tribes whose loyalty was suspected. It was designed to make a special example of the Eburones, who had cut off the Roman legion the preceding year. They were doomed to destruction, and the neighboring tribes were invited to come and enjoy the plunder. Some of those who came preferred to attack the Romans first, and Cicero’s camp again fared badly by a sudden raid, made by the Sigambri, a German tribe, who had crossed the Rhine, invited by the prospect of plundering the Gauls. This mistake confused the whole original scheme, and it resulted in the escape of the leader of the Eburones, Ambiorix, an implacable foe of Rome.

When the winter of 53-52 came on, Cæsar’s sojourn in the Cisalpine province was passed during a season of much anxiety. Rome had been disturbed by factional fights between Clodius and his opponent, Milo, in which the popular demagogue met his death. There had been a drawing together of the senatorial party, and Pompeius, who was now looked upon as the chief bulwark against anarchy, had been intrusted by the Senate with extraordinary powers, enabling him to call for a general levy of men of military age throughout Italy. Julia, the wife of Pompeius, was dead, and with her vanished the one strong personal link between the two triumvirs, for Crassus had perished in the East fighting against the Parthians. The news of the troubles in Italy spread rapidly in Gaul, causing the restless tribes there to believe that Cæsar would be kept on the southern side of the Alps, and that, with the commander-in-chief away, there would be no trouble in bringing about a successful revolt, provided there were common action throughout the whole country. The essential condition was to unite all the Gauls against Roman control, and this had already in a large measure been accomplished by the king of the great tribe of the Arverni, Vercingetorix, now at the head of a confederation extending over the whole of the central part of the country. It was difficult to overcome the particularistic tendencies of the Gauls, but this new chieftain at least understood the difficulties and made a brave effort to counteract them. He showed also a sense of the strategical needs of the situation by advising the Gauls to make use of their superiority in cavalry and to cut off the Roman communications; another feature of his scheme was to lay waste the country and force the Roman garrisons to withdraw as they were gradually starved out.

A necessary part of the program was the fighting of a decisive battle on a large scale. Vercingetorix had the men at his command, for he had won over the Ædui, who from the first had aided the Romans in their conquests. Cæsar’s plan was to take the various tribal strongholds one by one; he succeeded in the case of Avaricum, the capital of the Bituriges. He then sent Labienus against Lutetia with four legions, while he advanced with six to lay siege to the chief city of the Arverni, Gergovia. Cæsar’s army was not strong enough for the task; the plan of attack failed, and the Roman legions were saved only by a quick junction with Labienus.

The whole army was soon withdrawn from central Gaul in order to protect the Roman province from attack and also to secure for Cæsar a position where he could establish a fortified camp, from which it would be difficult to be dislodged, and where he could depend upon a regular source of supplies. He selected a place on the Saône, where he could threaten the Æduan territory and be so protected that it would be dangerous for Vercingetorix to follow him. On the march the Romans were vigorously attacked by the Gallic cavalry, but, as they had with them a detachment of German horse, they were beaten off, and the Romans quickly turned the tables, pursuing the Gallic army and finally enclosing it in a hill town, Alesia (Alise Ste. Reine).

Preparations were now made for a long siege. It was a complicated affair, because Cæsar had to provide against attacks both from the beleaguered army and from the Gauls, who were hastening to aid their natural champion. The lines of contravallation were sixteen kilometers long, those of circumvallation twenty; the space between the Roman army and the town was filled with artificial obstacles, meant to prevent the successful use of infantry. The force under Cæsar numbered about 70,000 men and included eleven legions. Cæsar reports that there were 80,000 men imprisoned in Alesia, while to the Gallic relief army is assigned 250,000 infantry and 8000 cavalry. Probably there were not more than 20,000 men altogether in Alesia, for provisions were scarce. This is the number that Napoleon I would give to the inclosed army, and he further remarks that the relief army in its manœuvering and in its camping operations behaved as if it were equal, not superior in strength, to its adversaries.

Cæsar had five or six weeks of leisure before the relieving army appeared. The first part of the decisive engagement was marked by a cavalry battle, in which Cæsar’s German horse proved superior to the Gauls. Then a night attack on the inclosing lines was tried and failed. A daylight struggle afterwards took place along the weakest part of the Roman fortifications, Vercingetorix and the relief force making coincident attacks. The Gauls from the outside were driven off by a skilfully delivered movement on their flank, executed by Labienus, which forced them to withdraw, and at the same time Vercingetorix moved back into the city, and soon recognizing his hopeless position, surrendered. The fall of Alesia marks the completion of the Gallic wars. The spirit of the Gauls was broken; there were afterwards various punitive expeditions, but with the collapse of the great rebellion the country became pacified and accepted its position as a Roman dependency.

IV
THE BREAK WITH POMPEIUS AND THE SENATE

Cæsar’s government of Gaul was now drawing to its close. He had added to the Roman dominions a territory larger than the two original provinces assigned to him. The question now was, what next? The precedents on this point were clear enough; they were written large in the lives of other recent conquerors, Marius and Sulla. But the senatorial party had no intention of allowing Cæsar to return to Rome with a free hand; it was to be a struggle between the self-interests of a narrow oligarchy and a clear-headed effort to attain personal control of the machinery of the government. On neither side was regard for legality given much weight. Both Cæsar and the senatorial party used without scruple illegal means; both at the same time claimed hypocritically to represent the side of law and order.

As a matter of fact, the old governmental methods of the Republic were adapted only to the conditions of a city community with a homogeneous population. There had been a breakdown years before Cæsar’s time, and the question now was who should benefit from this chaotic situation. The senators meant to get Cæsar out of Gaul, reduce him to the ranks of a private individual, and then ruin him by some legal prosecution in connection with his eight years of provincial rule. The chief asset of the Senate was Pompeius’ jealousy of Cæsar as a rival of his military glory; he was soured because he could not get the position and the influence for which his early record had marked him out. Pompeius was proconsul of Spain, according to the arrangement made at the last meeting of the triumvirs. It was only carried out nominally; he had no intention of losing his control of Rome, a control which depended on his presence at the center of affairs. Contrary to all precedent, he governed his province by means of deputies. He was also in special charge of the corn supply, a position valuable as a means of propitiating the people with votes. He arranged to have a five-year extension of his proconsular power in Spain, and his influence on the Senate is shown by their willingness to allot him 100 talents a year for the maintenance of his troops. He used his patronage exclusively to advance his own personal interests, oblivious of the compact with Cæsar, showing altogether that, while he meant to stand outside the law, the chicanery of legislation could well be used to block the path of his rival.

Cæsar, who had not forgotten to retain the favor of the Roman populace by entertainments and benefactions, and who had all the skill of a party boss in retaining the allegiance of friends and followers, had three very strong allies back of him, leaving aside his natural superiority in capacity and in shrewdness to Pompeius. His conquest of Gaul, followed as it was by a very judicious treatment of the conquered tribes, gave him the support of a warlike population ready to act on his behalf. Moreover, the reduction of the country had unlocked a store of wealth, which was naturally in his hands; the slaves alone, collected from the captives, represented as capital a very large sum of money. Then there were the seasoned legions on whose loyalty he could depend.

The rival claims of the two leaders reached an acute stage when Pompeius, now Consul, passed legislation by which an interval of five years was required between service as a provincial governor and as a magistrate in Rome. Cæsar’s term of office expired in B.C. 49; he had received leave to stand for the consulship and had requested to be left in possession of his provinces till the end of 49. Now in Pompeius’ legislation there was required, unless special permission were given, personal candidature, and also the Senate was given authority to relieve provincial governors at any time during the last year of their service. Cæsar might find himself relieved of his proconsulship before he had been elected Consul. It would be a dangerous position for him to confront a rival armed with extraordinary powers, while he was only an individual citizen. There were further grounds of irritation because the senatorial party refused to recognize certain administrative acts of Cæsar, by which he had extended the franchise to various provincial towns. In arranging the question of provincial succession there was much delay. Pompeius hesitated to accept the Senate’s drastic measure, by which Cæsar would be relieved long before he could be elected Consul. He made a show of conciliation by shortening the interval and also by promising to resign his own command before the expiration of his term if the Senate so desired. Cæsar’s agent in Rome, the Tribune Curio, displayed much ingenuity in obstructing all measures aimed at his chief, and it was plain from the way the political game was being played that Cæsar’s minimum, service as Proconsul till the end of 49, and entrance into the consulship on January 1, 48, would be the watchword of his partisans. In all other respects he showed himself ready for conciliation and compromise. When two legions were asked for the Parthian war, they were promptly sent, and no protest was made at their being kept at Capua, when they were no longer wanted in the East. Curio, too, was ordered to cease blocking the vote of money to pay Pompeius’ troops.

But the senatorial party were not ready to make terms; it seemed to them that with the co-operation of Pompeius they could place Cæsar in an impasse. They miscalculated his personal popularity and his military strength, and now were all the more confident, because they were successfully intriguing with Labienus to detach him from his chief.

The weakness of the senatorial clique was its obvious insincerity in claiming to be the representative of the party of law and order. It was absurd to object to Cæsar stepping directly from the proconsulship to the consulship as an irregularity, when Pompeius had held both offices together; indeed he had been twice Consul within four years, entirely in contravention of the required legal interval of ten years between the holding by one individual of the highest magistracy.

Marcellus, one of the Consuls in B.C. 51, a determined opponent of Cæsar, brought matters to a climax by denouncing Cæsar in the Senate as a brigand and asking that he should be called a public enemy unless he gave up his province by a fixed date. These motions were made as a result of the debate whether a successor to Cæsar should be appointed; they were carried by an imposing majority. An equal majority rejected the motion that Pompeius should be required to resign.

Curio, who had as Tribune interposed his veto on the first motion, then offered a resolution by which both commanders should be required to resign. This was carried by 322 to 320, but no effect was given to it; probably it was vetoed by a Pompeian Tribune. Through private channels, efforts were being made to prevent a break between the two rivals; on account of Pompeius’ well-known indecision of temper, the senatorial clique resolved by a bold stroke to prevent further negotiations. Marcellus, on the 9th of December, using as a pretext the rumor that Cæsar was on his way to Rome with his army, tried in vain to get the Senate to declare Cæsar a public enemy and to authorize Pompeius to take command of the troops in Italy and protect the state. Indignant at the timidity of the senators, he took matters in his own hands, virtually declaring war on his own responsibility, for he handed over the two Italian legions to Pompeius, with the command to march against Cæsar. Pompeius, though this action of the Consul was unconstitutional, accepted the commission; at the end of the month he was still confident that Cæsar would drop his claim to the consulship and that so peace would be restored.

Cæsar acted cautiously; he sent for additional troops from Gaul and also despatched a message to the Senate offering to resign all his provinces and his army, provided Pompeius would do the same. In case of refusal, he said he would be compelled to take measures for asserting his own rights and the freedom of the Roman people. Curio was sent with this ultimatum to Rome; it was only with difficulty that the letter was read. A motion was passed that at a fixed date Cæsar should give up his army and that his non-compliance would be treated as an act of war. There was, of course, the usual obstruction from Marcus Antonius, a Cæsarian Tribune; the final decree by which martial law was introduced and the magistrates called upon to see “that the commonwealth took no harm,” was not passed till the seventh of January. (49 B.C.) Lentulus, the Consul, in the meantime had advised the obstructing tribunes to leave the city if they valued their personal safety. It was this verbal threat which put in Cæsar’s hands the very useful plea that he was acting as the defender of the freedom of the Roman people.

The military strength of the two parties was, from the senatorial point of view, altogether on their side; they had, they reasoned, the whole empire to draw upon for recruits, while Cæsar had only his own province. The difficulty of the senatorial position was, that their forces were not together when the war broke out. Of Cæsar’s original thirteen legions, two were now under Pompeius’ command; besides this, the latter had in Spain seven legions of well-seasoned troops; in Italy he had the two legions already mentioned, which originally belonged to the army of Gaul; and another in a state of creation.

Cæsar’s chance lay in prompt action, in administering a decisive defeat before Pompeius could get his scattered men together. While the negotiations were in progress, he had only one legion in northern Italy; but two had been sent for, and when they were at hand Cæsar had, with his allies, about 20,000 men, a force considerably superior to that of Pompeius, who was especially careful not to lead Cæsar’s old legions against their former commander. With one legion of newly recruited men he could do nothing; the consequence was that in Italy there was practically no resistance to Cæsar’s advance. When some of the newly created cohorts joined him, the senators with their commander fled to Greece.

The moral effect of the abandonment of Italy and the capital was a great asset for the Cæsarian party. The critics have condemned Pompeius because he failed to relieve the senatorial troops inclosed by Cæsar in the town of Corfinium in the Abruzzi. It was a discouraging blow at the very commencement of the struggle for the senatorial party to see their soldiers and one of their chief partisans, Domitius Ahenobarbus, left to their fate. But Pompeius was in no position to give help; if he had attempted to give aid, he would have been defeated and captured.

Instead of pursuing Pompeius across the Adriatic to Greece, Cæsar turned away to the conquest of Spain. Even if transports were lacking, he might have doubled round the Adriatic coast through Illyria, his own province. He might soon have got the control of the entire East before a sufficient force was collected to oppose him. But if he had done so, in the meantime Italy would have been exposed to an invasion from Pompeius’ Spanish veterans, for the senatorial commander would undoubtedly have betaken himself there and acted on the offensive. By the time Cæsar could reach Antioch, in Syria, Pompeius could have occupied Rome. Cæsar therefore consistently followed the principle of striking at the enemy’s force where it was concentrated and prepared for effective work.

Several of the legions newly formed from Italian recruits were sent to Sardinia, Sicily, and Africa as crucial points, from which a descent might be made on Italy; others were left in Italy itself. Of the veteran legions from Gaul, three were despatched to Marseilles, which had taken the senatorial side, and six were taken to Spain. There were seven Pompeian legions in the peninsula under three different commanders, Afranius and Petreius in the north, Varro in the south. Varro, the celebrated antiquarian and scholar, was not an enthusiastic partisan of Pompeius; there seems to be no reason, except his desire to be neutral, why he should have weakened the Pompeian forces in the north by keeping his legions in the south. In any case, the five legions near the Pyrenees, as if conscious of their weakness, remained on the defensive, although for a time they were opposed only by two legions of Cæsar’s.

Cæsar’s force was undoubtedly numerically superior, for there was a considerable contingent of allies, German and Gallic, both horse and foot. The plan of strategy adopted by the Pompeians was to keep Cæsar in check until Pompeius’ preparations in the East were completed, that is, to wait until he could come to Spain to direct the operations there in person, or could make a diversion by attacking Italy with the troops raised in the East. No attempt was made by Pompeius’ lieutenants to stop Cæsar’s passage through the mountain passes of the Pyrenees. This, in any case, would have been a questionable operation and apt to cause a division of strength in the opposing army.

The first point of conflict between the two armies was at Ilerda, 150 kilometers south of the Pyrenees and about forty north of the Ebro. There was a stream in front of the town, crossed by a stone bridge, and near this stream, on a height south of the town, the Pompeians placed their camp. They were well supplied with provisions; and they commanded the access to the bridge. As the stream had a strong current and was liable to the sudden changes of a mountain torrent it would be unsafe for Cæsar to make a temporary bridge to keep in contact two separated portions of an enveloping army. Cæsar could not afford to leave this strongly encamped force in his rear, for the way would be open to them to invade both Gaul and Italy. In case of defeat the Pompeians might make a further stand, with an advantageous position on the banks of the Ebro.

For some time the Cæsarian army under Fabius remained inactive before Ilerda. Two bridges had been built across the stream, but one of these the current had carried away, and at one time two of the legions were in considerable danger while they were foraging on the southern bank. When Cæsar took over the command both bridges had gone, and the Pompeians, by using the stone bridge, could prevent any further bridge building. Food supplies from the north were cut off, and the Cæsarians were hard-pressed for provisions, having exhausted all the food in the neighborhood of their camp. Cæsar managed finally to relieve this trying situation by building a bridge outside the range of the operations of the Pompeians, who never dared to get too far away from their camp. His next move was to try to cut them off from the city, their base of supplies, but this failed. They were secure where they were, but they grew alarmed when some of the native population joined Cæsar’s forces; there was also a prospect of a period of low water in the river, when Cæsar could use a ford and so completely envelop them.

Under such conditions they resolved to abandon their camp and retire to the Ebro to make there another stand. The retreat was accomplished without much difficulty, except from cavalry attacks, which delayed their progress toward the river, which they would have reached five miles south of Ilerda. They had covered most of this distance when Cæsar’s legions suddenly appeared ready for attack. In spite of the difficulty of crossing the stream at Ilerda, Cæsar’s men with great valor had braved the dangers of the swift current and had marched with such rapidity that they caught up with the Pompeians before sunset. Afranius and Petreius soon found themselves outmanœuvered by their opponents, the way to the river being closed to them. The only alternative now was to fight or surrender. After some hesitation, perhaps due to divided counsels in their own camp, they abandoned the attempt to reach the Ebro and returned to their original camping ground at Ilerda. (August, 44 B.C.)

Cæsar, in the meantime, held his hand, though his soldiers earnestly wished for a pitched battle under such favorable circumstances. It was a civil war, and Cæsar had no taste for the kind of butchery practised on the barbarians in Gaul on so many occasions. The Pompeian commanders soon capitulated; the best force of his opponents had now by Cæsar’s superior strategy been put out of action, as effectively as if it had been beaten on the battlefield. Such a victory is practically unique in military annals. The Roman army at Trasimene and at Cannæ, the Prussians at Jena, and the French in 1870-71 were annihilated as military units, but only after hard-fought battles.

Cæsar in this brilliant campaign of forty days deprived his antagonists of an entire and efficient army without striking a blow. He was all the time ready to fight, and the absence of a battle was due to the fact that the commanders on the other side were completely out-generaled. The operations followed one another with the system of moves on a chess board. The losing party saw the uselessness of a fight and the victor had no desire to shed blood needlessly.

Easy terms were imposed upon the vanquished; the only conditions made being that Afranius and Petreius should dismiss their troops on the way back to Italy. Varro, in southern Spain, who had none of the temperament for command, and who was waiting to see which was the winning side, soon found himself deserted by the provincials; even Gades, where he had contemplated making a resolute stand, declared for Cæsar. The most serious feature of the campaign in the West was due to the obstinate resistance of the people of Marseilles; they held out for several months and surrendered only when they were exhausted by pestilence and famine. With this siege ended, Cæsar was free to return to Italy.